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CONFIDENTIAL 45128 (J01R) SECSTATE PASS TO
VN TRN CTR, FSI SECTION 1 OF 2
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT THIEU'S VISIT TO THE FOUR CORPS

1-15 JULY 1969 (U)
REFERENCE: HQ MACV MEMORANDUM, MACJ01R, PRESIDENT

THIEU'S VISIT TO THE FOUR CORPS, 1-15 JULY 1969, DATED 24 JUL (C)

1. (U) PURPOSE: THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES PRESIDENT
THIEU'S FIELD REVIEW OF PHASE I OF THE 1969 PACIFICATION AND
DEVELOPMENT CAMPAIGN AND THE GUADANCE HE ISSUED AT EACH
CTZ FOR THE 1969 ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN (APC).

2. (C) SUMMARY: PRESIDENT THIEU VISITED THE FOUR CTZ'S
DURING 1-15 JULY TO REVIEW PHASE I AND EMPHASIZE MOST
IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF PHASE II, THE 1969 APC (1 JULY - 31 OCT).
EACH CORPS COMMANDER FIRST BRIEFED THE PRESIDENT ON RESULTS
ACHIEVED AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED. IN REPLY, THIEU'S BASIC
REMARKS CLOSELY FOLLOWED HIS DIRECTIVE NO. 939/PTT AND PRIME
MINISTER HUONG'S DIRECTIVE (COPIES POUCHED) WHICH ESTABLISHED
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR PHASE II. THIEU EXPLAINED CY 1969
APC ESSENTIALLY AS AN EXTENSION OF PHASE I.

INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-2 J3-12 J4-3 J5-2 SACSA-4 NMCC-1

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1 OF 5

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BUT SLATED TO LAST FOUR MONTHS TO AVOID LAST YEAR'S VERY
PAGE 3 RHMSMVA 1198 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SHORT TIME FRAME OF THREE MONTHS.

NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER WILL BE KEPT OPEN TO COMPLETE THOSE
PORTIONS OF THE 69 APC UNCOMPLETED BY END-OCTOBER, TET
HOLIDAYS THIS YEAR DELAYED PHASE I CAMPAIGN; TET NEXT YEAR
WILL FALL IN MIDDLE OF PHASE SO THERE WILL BE NO EXCUSE FOR SLOW-
DOWN. THE PRESIDENT MADE THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS RE
1969 APC:

A, MUST IMPROVE SECURITY SO THAT 50 PERCENT OF POPULATION IS
RATED AB BY HES, AND 90 PERCENT ABC.

B, QUALITY OF HAMLET ADMINISTRATION MUST BE IMPROVED.

C, PROVINCE CHIEFS MUST PERSONALLY SUPERVISE PHOENIX,
INFORMATION AND LAND REFORM PROGRAMS.

3, (C) I CTZ: PRESIDENT PRAISED RF AND PF PERFORMANCE AND
MENTIONED PHUNG HOANG (SPOTTY), PSDF (MORE NEEDED),
AND VILLAGE/HAMLET ELECTIONS (GOOD SHOW). VILLAGE SELF-
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM MUST BE MADE TO MOVE IF GVN IS TO
DEMONSTRATE ABILITY TO HELP THE PEOPLE.

HE REMINDED PROVINCE CHIEFS TO STUDY AND FOLLOW PRESI-
DENTIAL AND PRIME MINISTERIAL DIRECTIVES ON PHASE II. PEOPLE
MUST REALIZE GVN PRESENCE IN HAMLETS IS PERMANENT; THEY
PAGE 4 RHMSMVA 1198 C O N F I D E N T I A L

MUST BE ORGANIZED AND GIVEN MEANS TO DEFEND THEIR INTERESTS.
THIEU EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF ELECTIONS AND NEED FOR GOOD
CANDIDATES IN ORDER TO DEFEAT UNKNOWNNS PUT FORWARD BY COM-
MUNISTS TO CONFUSE THE PEOPLE.

THE FOLLOWING MAJOR PROBLEMS WERE RAISED AND DISCUSSED:

--SHORTAGE OF VILLAGE AND HAMLET COMMISSIONERS,

--FERTILIZER SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION,

--CEMENT,

--REFUGEES,

--PHUNG HOANG,

--URBAN CENTERS.

4, (C) II CTZ: PRESIDENT SAID PACIFICATION A CONTINUOUS
PROCESS; EFFORT NEEDED TO UPGRADE AREAS, NOT JUST OCCUPY THEM.
PRESIDENT STRESSED PHUNG HOANG, INFORMATION, LAND REFORM,
AND PSDF AS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN COMING POLITICAL STRUGGLE.
DYNAMIC LAND REFORM PROGRAM ESSENTIAL TO COMBAT VC
PROPAGANDA THAT GVN REPRESENTS VESTED LAND INTERESTS AT
PEOPLE'S EXPENSE. PRESIDENT EXPLAINED MOBILIZATION POLICY
NOT JUST TO SWELL RANKS OF ARVN BUT ALSO TO ORGANIZE @PEOPLE'S
GROUPS@, I.E., PSDF, @HOMEFRONT@ MUST BE ORGANIZED AND

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MOBILIZED TO CREATE RESERVES AND CONCENTRATE RESOURCES. PSDF PART OF THIS PROCESS. PEOPLE MUST HAVE ORGANIZATIONAL DISCIPLINE IN ORDER TO EXPRESS STRONG NATIONALIST CONVICTIONS. FOLLOWING PROBLEMS WERE RAISED AND DISCUSSED:

--LEGALIZE STATUS OF GROUND CURRENTLY OCCUPIED BY REFUGEES IN CAM RANH,

--NEED FOR INCREASE IN BINH DINH PF ALLOCATIONS,

--BINH THUAN REQUEST FOR MORE BARBED WIRE TO REINFORCE PF OUTPOSTS.

5. (C) III CTZ: PRESIDENT NOTED III CTZ HAD GOOD HAMLET GOAL RECORDS; PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM WEAK AS IT WAS LEFT TO POLICE; PSDF NOT ADEQUATELY ARMED; INFORMATION PROGRAM POOR; AND LAND REFORM EFFORT A GOOD TRY. THIEU EMPHASIZED THESE PROGRAMS PROVINCE CHIEFS' RESPONSIBILITIES AND CANNOT BE DELEGATED AWAY.

PRESIDENT REPEATED HIS POLICY OF ENSURING CONTROL (AB) OF 50 PERCENT OF POPULATION BY END-OCTOBER, WITH ANOTHER 40 PERCENT IN C HAMLETS. HE SAID THERE WILL BE NO VOTE WITH COMMUNISTS IN 1969, BUT POPULAR SUPPORT NEEDED FOR PROVINCE COUNCIL ELECTIONS. PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF PSDF AND CRITICAL NEED TO IMPROVE INFORMATION PROGRAM. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT ESSENTIAL PROGRAMS WOULD MEAN GVN DEFEAT EVEN THOUGH GVN WOULD NEVER ACCEPT FORMAL COALITION WITH COMMUNISTS. PROGRESS MEANS VIETNAMESE BODY POLITIC WILL BE STRONG ENOUGH TO SAFELY BEAR A FEW COMMUNISTS.

THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS WERE RAISED AND DISCUSSED:

--SHORTAGE OF CAPABLE VILLAGE/HAMLET CADRE AND RECOMMENDATION THEY BE DRAFT DEFERRED,

--NEED FOR TELEVISION PROGRAMS BETWEEN 1700 - 1900 HOURS,

--NEED FOR CLEAR-CUT REGULATIONS GOVERNING INFORMATION CADRE,

--FEASIBILITY OF ARVN OFFICERS ON TDY TO ADMINISTER PSDF IN PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS.

6. (C) IV CTZ: PRESIDENT SAID IV CORPS DID A GOOD JOB IN PHASE I BUT MUST NOW MOVE FROM FIRST AND SECOND TO THIRD AND FOURTH GEARS. PRESENT SITUATION SHOULD BE EXPLOITED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF GVN'S GROWING STRENGTH AND ENEMY'S WEAKNESS. EMPHASIZED THAT QUALITY MEANS PROPER CONTROL, NOT JUST ENTRY INTO A HAMLET. AS A MINIMUM, GVN MUST BE CERTAIN THIS YEAR OF 50 PERCENT OF PEOPLE'S VOTE AND ON TO MORE NEXT YEAR. GVN

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3 OF 5

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VN TRN CTR, FSI. FINAL SECTION OF 2
HAS ONE AND ONE-HALF YEARS TO ENSURE A FAVORABLE VOTE, AS
THERE WILL BE NO ELECTIONS BEFORE 1971. NEVERTHELESS, GVN
MUST CONSOLIDATE THE NATIONAL SPIRIT AND SECURE SUPPORT FOR
THE @JUST CAUSE. @

HE MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON PHASE II

A, TERRITORIAL SECURITY PROGRESS TOO SLOW; TOO FEW
C HAMLETS RAISED TO HIGHER CATEGORY.B, RF AND PF STILL NOT PROPERLY DEPLOYED; INSUFFICIENT
SUPPORT FOR RD CADRE TEAMS.C, HAMLETS ARE NOT@COMPLETED@ AFTER ENTRY AND RD CADRE
HAVE DONE A FEW JOBS. PACIFICATION A CONTINUOUS PROCESS OFF
IMPROVEMENT.D, PHUNG HOANG STILL DOES NOT RECEIVE PROPER EMPHASIS.
PROGRAM IS PROVINCE CHIEFS' DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY AND CANNOT
BE LEFT TO DISTRICT CHIEFS ONLY.E, UTILIZATION OF HOI CHANH MUST IMPROVE IN ORDER TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF THEIR PROVEN CAPABILITIES, NEED TO ACCEPT INHERENT

4 OF 5

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DANGERS IN THEIR UTILIZATION IN ORDER TO GAIN GREATER BENEFITS.
HOI CHANH CAN BE EMPLOYED IN TWO WAYS,

- (1) AS APT'S TO EXPLOIT THEIR PROPARGANDA CAPABILITIES.
- (2) AS MEMBERS OF MOBILE RF PLATOONS,

F. PSDF HAS TWO ELEMENTS: COMBAT ELEMENTS AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS. PSDF, RF AND PF MUST PROVIDE TERRITORIAL PROTECTION, PARTICULARLY AS THE US REDUCES ITS FORCES. ORGANIZATION OF PSDF SUPPORT ELEMENTS IS ALSO IMPORTANT AS A MEANS OF FORMING PEOPLES GROUPS, WHICH MEANS ENHANCING THE CHANCES OF GETTING BALLOTS.

G. VILLAGE AND HAMLET OFFICIALS MUST BE TRAINED AS WELL AS TECHNICAL CADRE. THEY MUST KNOW WHAT TO DO AND HOW TO DO IT. MOST IMPORTANT CADRE ARE VILLAGE CHIEFS AND INFORMATION CADRE.

H. REFUGEE PROBLEM IN IV CORPS IS DIFFERENT FROM I AND II CORPS. NO SHORTAGE OF LAND IN IV CORPS, SO REFUGEE PROBLEM SHOULD BE SOLVED IN RELATIVELY SHORT TIME ON LARGELY SELF-HELP BASIS.

I. INFORMATION PROBLEM IS PROVINCE CHIEFS' DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY. INFORMATION ACTIVITY IS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, WHICH MEANS POLITICS OF THE NATION STATE AND NOT PARTISAN POLITICS. GP#4

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5 OF 5

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