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✗✓71-136208	1	SEC	Strategy of Mil. Assistance South VN
✗ 71-136361	1 Tape	CONF	Pacification
✗ 71-136251	1 Tape	CONF	Pacification
✗ 71-134729	1 Roll Film	CONF #1	Pacification
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
Viet Cong Infrastructure Neutralization System (VCINS)

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
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ABSTRACT

The Viet Cong Infrastructure Neutralization System (VCINS) Command Manual is the master document governing utilization of the system. VCINS was developed to provide Military Assistance Command, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support-PHOENIX Directorate with an automated means of processing and reporting data on the location, identification, and neutralization of the Viet Cong Infrastructure. This data allows for the evaluation of the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program and its success as one aspect of the pacification program.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Viet Cong Infrastructure Neutralization System (VCINS) Command Manual was prepared by the MACV Project Documentation Group, Control Data Corporation (Western Pacific Division), Military Assistance Command Vietnam Project, Systems Analysis and Documentation Section. The Programming Section of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam Project contributed to the content of the manual. The manual was prepared under Army Missile Command (AMICOM) Contract No. DAAH01-70-C-0009.

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VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE NEUTRALIZATION SYSTEM (VCINS)

1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION

This section includes a statement of the purpose of the Command Manual and presents discussions on the application, operation, configuration, performance, and organization of the Viet Cong Infrastructure Neutralization System (VCINS). A description of the data base and a general description of the system's inputs, processing, and outputs are also included.

1.1 Purpose of the Command Manual.

The VCINS Command Manual is designed to meet the requirements of Military Assistance Command, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support-PHOENIX Directorate staff personnel by describing VCINS data processing procedures. The material orients the reader and informs him of system functions, capabilities, and procedures necessary for effective use of the system.

A glossary of acronyms, abbreviations, and terms with special meanings used within the text is included as Appendix A of this manual.

1.2 System Application.

In support of the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program, MACCORDS-Reports and Analysis Directorate (RAD) was tasked with developing an Automatic Data Processing (ADP) system for processing and reporting PHOENIX Monthly Neutralization Report Worksheets. VCINS was designed and implemented in May 1969 to provide a rapid means of data retrieval and correlation through the use of ADP techniques. This Command Manual describes VCINS data processing procedures. Non-ADP information relevant to the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program is included in Appendix B to this manual.

The objectives of VCINS are to process the monthly worksheets, prepared by Province (PIOCC) Coordinators; maintain a VCINS Province Year-To-Date Totals File, updated monthly; and produce the monthly VCINS Activity Listing and VCINS PHOENIX Monthly Consolidated Progress Report. The VCINS listing and report are used by MACCORDS-PHOENIX personnel in the field and in Saigon, and by U.S. and GVN agencies for purposes of in-depth neutralization analysis and evaluation of the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program.

1.3 System Operation.

Figure 1-1 depicts the flow of source documents required by the system through the organizations responsible for the preparation and processing of the data. The flow chart illustrates the relationship between these organizations and briefly notes the activities of each. Source documents input to the system are the PHOENIX Monthly Neutralization Report Worksheets.* These worksheets are completed by each Province PHOENIX Coordinator,

*This worksheet is the second part of the monthly PHOENIX Consolidated Viet Cong Infrastructure Report, prepared in accordance with Annexes A and B (unclassified) of MACV Directive 381-43, 14 March 1969 (CONFIDENTIAL). Annex B to the Directive, which contains the current breakout of identified VCI executive and significant cadre, is included as Appendix B to this manual. No portion of the Directive itself has been used within the text of this manual. It should be noted that MACV Directive 381-43 is in the process of being revised, and that VCINS accordingly, will eventually be supplanted by the Vietnamese Communist Infrastructure Neutralization Information System (VCINS/IS).

working with his GVN PHUNG HOANG counterpart, based on reports submitted by District PHOENIX (DIOCC) Coordinators and various agencies in the field. Province PHOENIX Coordinators forward the data to the Corps PHOENIX Coordinator, who is responsible for transmission of the data to MACCORDS-PHOENIX Directorate in Saigon no later than the 7th of the succeeding month. PHOENIX-Directorate personnel audit the reports to verify the integrity of the information being introduced into the system and correct any invalid information. The source documents are delivered to MACCORDS-RAD, where a review monitor is assigned the task of logging in the documents as they arrive. MACCORDS-RAD prepares the documents for processing; and the documents are submitted to Military Assistance Command-Data Management Agency (DMA). Processing begins as soon as the documents are received. Cards are punched with data directly from the source documents, mechanically verified against the documents, logged, and returned to MACCORDS-RAD. MACCORDS-RAD checks the cards for errors in transcription, corrects any keypunch errors, and then routes the cards (keypunched VCINS activity) back to DMA for further processing and generation of output reports (refer to paragraph 1.6). Inputs to the system and outputs from VCINS are discussed in detail in Section 2 of this manual, paragraphs 2.4 through 2.9.

1.4 System Configuration.

VCINS is processed by DMA on a System 360 Model 50 Computer. Supporting equipment includes standard card punch and card verifier equipment, a card read punch, disk units, tape drives, and a line printer.

1.5 Performance.

VCINS consists of two computer procedures (three programs) which are discussed in general terms in paragraph 1.6 below and in detail in the VCINS Operations Manual and Program Maintenance Manuals.

1.6 System Organization.

The VCINS processing cycle consists of two computer procedures which edit VCINS data and produce VCINS reports. VCINS activity is edited for valid information and a VCINS Exception Report reflecting errors is produced for correction by MACCORDS-PHOENIX Directorate. When all errors are corrected, the VCINS Province Year-To-Date Totals File is updated with data for the current month, and the VCINS Activity Listing showing all activity with valid record codes, and the VCINS PHOENIX Monthly Consolidated Progress Report are produced. This latter report is checked against the year-to-date totals of the previous month's report and the current month's VCINS Activity Listing to be sure they balance.

1.7 Data Base.

The data base consists of the VCINS Province Year-To-Date Totals File, an historical file containing VCINS activity which has passed through the system during the year. Data is added to the file during each month's processing cycle.

1.8 General Description of Inputs, Processing, Outputs.

Source documents are input to VCINS for the purpose of automatic processing and reporting of VCINS information contained therein, thereby eliminating the need for time-consuming manual processing of information. In order to provide up-to-date report information detailing the status of VCINS information, source documents are input to the system on a monthly basis. This data is received in the form of VCINS PHOENIX Monthly Neutralization Report Worksheets. Content of the worksheets consists of the names of neutralized individuals; the VC name of the echelon in which he operated and the USID number of the location or nearest




Figure 1-1

VCINS INFORMATION FLOW CHART

location of the individual's area of operation; levels/types of VCI organization; neutralization methods, types of operations and action forces utilized; disposition of neutralized individuals, and the source of intelligence in determining the individual's identification. In association with source document input, source data (activity) cards are keypunched by DMA from the source documents. Also, the VCINS Province Year-To-Date Totals File is required as input to VCINS for updating by the source data.

Output produced by VCINS as a consequence of the input consists of the VCINS Activity Listing and the VCINS PHOENIX Monthly Consolidated Progress Report, which reflect the data input from the submitted VCINS PHOENIX Monthly Neutralization Report Worksheets. Associated system output is the computer-printed VCINS Exception Report, which reflects invalid activity records, and the updated VCINS Province Year-To-Date Totals Files, which reflects previous and current month data and which is retained by DMA for use in the next processing cycle. The recipients of the system's output are described in paragraph 2.9.

The relationship of system input to output has been described previously in paragraph 1.3 and illustrated in Figure 1-1. Section 2 of this manual includes a detailed description and samples of the input to VCINS (paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5) and outputs of the system (paragraphs 2.7 through 2.9).

2 STAFF FUNCTIONS RELATED TO TECHNICAL OPERATIONS

This section includes information on all details necessary to prepare input to VCINS. Also included are detailed explanations of the characteristics and meaning of all system-produced outputs.

2.1 Staff Input Requirements.

The following paragraphs present requirements to be observed in preparing entries to the system. VCINS inputs include source documents (VCINS PHOENIX Monthly Neutralization Report Worksheets), source data cards and date control cards, and data base files (VCINS Province Year-To-Date Totals File).

All inputs are CONFIDENTIAL and are treated in accordance with classified handling procedures.

2.1.1 Source Documents. The VCINS PHOENIX Monthly Neutralization Report Worksheets (MACCORDS Form 31) are completed by Province PHOENIX Coordinators on a monthly basis. These reports, which are submitted through the Corps PHOENIX Coordinator to MACCORDS-PHOENIX Directorate, are used to record VCIN data for the current month. Detailed instructions for completing the worksheet are contained in paragraph 2.4.1, and the format of the worksheet is shown in Figure 2-1, paragraph 2.5.

2.1.2 Source Data Cards. MACCORDS-RAD submits the VCINS PHOENIX Monthly Neutralization Report Worksheets and a completed Punched Card Machine (PCM) Work Request form to DMA for keypunching. (The PCM Work Request form is explained and illustrated in the VCINS Operations Manual.) VCINS date control cards (punched by MACCORDS-RAD) and activity records (punched by DMA directly from the worksheet data) are prepared as described in paragraph 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. Each run produces the VCINS Exception Report, plus valid cards (see paragraph 2.4.4). Errors must be corrected and cards punched as input to the next run until no VCINS Exception Report is produced. Valid cards from each run are saved until the edit cycle is complete.

2.1.3 Data Base Files. The VCINS Province Year-To-Date Totals File contains an historical record of the VCINS activity processed by the system throughout the year. New totals are added to the file's contents with each monthly processing cycle. The detailed contents of this file are given in paragraph 2.4.5.

2.2 Composition Rules.

When preparing source documents, the following conventions should be observed to minimize keypunch errors:

- (a) All dates should be written in standard military format (e.g., 10 SEP 69; 17 JAN 69).
- (b) The numeric character "0" should be written as "Ø".
- (c) The alphabetic character "O" should be written as "O".
- (d) The numeric character "1" should be written as "1".
- (e) The alphabetic character "I" should be written as "I".
- (f) The numeric character "2" should be written as "2".
- (g) The alphabetic character "Z" should be written as "Z".

2.3 Vocabulary.

The data element parameters listed in paragraph 2.4.2 itemize each field of the VCINS source data (activity) cards.

2.4 Input Formats.

The contents of source documents, source data cards, and the VCINS Province Year-To-Date Totals Files are presented in the paragraphs below. Illustrations of VCINS input formats are contained in paragraph 2.5.

2.4.1 VCINS PHOENIX Monthly Neutralization Report Worksheet. This preprinted worksheet (MACCORDS Form 31) is used by Province PHOENIX Coordinators to record VCIN data. The District name and Province name are entered on the worksheet, and information is recorded under seven major headings:

Individual's Name
VC Name of Echelon
USID Number
VCI Organization
Neutralization
Disposition
Source of Identification

Instructions for completing the worksheet are stated in Appendix 2 to Annex A (unclassified) of MACV Directive 381-43, 14 March 1969 (CONFIDENTIAL), which follows. The instructions are keyed to Figure 2-1, paragraph 2.5.

MACV Eir 381-43

PHOENIX MONTHLY NEUTRALIZATION REPORT

1. Introduction

A. The following instructions are provided to assist in completing the PHOENIX Monthly Neutralization Report Worksheet. The Worksheet is divided into 7 major headings:

(1) Individual's Name

(2) VC Name of Echelon

(3) U.S. ID Number

(4) VCI Organization

Sub-Heading: a. Organization (Major)

b. Echelon

c. Function Level

d. Section Category

e. Multiple Positions Held

(5) Neutralization

Sub-Heading: a. Neutralization Method

b. Type of Operation

c. Level of Direction

d. Type of Action Force 1

e. Type of Action Force 2

f. Type of Action Force 3

(6) Disposition

(7) Source of Identification

B. Each part of the report is explained in the following instructions.

Appendix 2 to Annex A

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2. Instructions on How to Fill Out the Worksheet

Heading (1) Individual's Name

Enter the name of the neutralized individual. The entry must be in family name - middle name - first name sequence with a space between each and must begin in the first position of the field. If appropriate enter Also Known As (AKA) names of neutralized individual on the back of the worksheet by referencing the corresponding entry on front of the worksheet as follows: Line item # - Individual Name - AKA names. Use standard transliteration of Vietnamese diacritical marks into English.

Heading (2) VC Name of Echelon

Enter the VC name of the echelon (below COSVN) from which the individual operated, i.e., for the Section Chief of the Investigation Section of the VC KHU 7 district of Gia Lai province enter "KHU 7". The entry must begin in the first position of the field.

Heading (3) U.S. ID Number

Enter U.S. ID Number of CTZ, Province, District, Village and Hamlet from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) for the location or nearest location of the individuals area of operation.

Heading (4) VCI Operation

Sub-Heading: 1. Organization

A. PRP

B. NLF

C. Organizations affiliated with the NFLSV (other than PRP)

Sub-Heading: 2. Echelon

Page 2 of Appendix 2 to Annex A

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Enter in Col 2 the appropriate letter from the following list corresponding to the echelon the individual operated from.

- A. COSVN
- B. Region
- C. Province/Sub-Region
- D. District
- E. Village
- F. Hamlet
- G. City (District Capitals, Province Capitals, Autonomous Cities)

Sub-Heading: 3. Functional Level

Enter in Col 3 the appropriate letter from the following list corresponding to the functional level the individual held.

- A. Party Secretary
- B. Deputy Party Secretary
- C. Section Chief
- D. Deputy Section Chief
- E. Sub-Section Chief
- F. Deputy Sub-Section Chief
- G. Cadre (Trained individuals capable of taking charge and training others. Holds equivalent rank of assistant squad leader and up.)
- H. Member

Sub-Heading: 4. Section Category

Page 3 of Appendix 2 to Annex A

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Enter in Col 4 the appropriate letter from the following list corresponding to the section the individual was assigned to.

- A. Liberation/Autonomous/
Revolutionary/Committee
- B. Peoples Revolutionary
Party (Executive Committee)
- C. Current Affairs Committee
- D. Investigations Section
- E. Front Section
- F. Civilian Proselyting
Section
- G. Military Proselyting
Section
- H. Propaganda/Indoctrination
Culture (Propaganda/Train-
ing) Section
- I. Finance & Economy Section
- J. Medical (Public Health)
Section
- K. Security Section
- L. Organization Section
- M. Forward Supply Council
(Forward Support & Rein-
forcement Section)
- N. City Affairs Section
- O. Administration (Party
Office) Section
- P. Base Area (Work Site or
Production) Section
- Q. Political Struggle Section

Page 4 of Appendix 2 to Annex A

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- R. National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) Central Committee
- S. NFLSV Secretariat
- T. Liberation Youth Association Executive Committee
- U. Liberation Women's Association Executive Committee
- V. Liberation Peasants (Farmers) Association Executive Committee
- W. Liberation Workers Association Executive Committee
- X. South Vietnam Patriotic Buddhists Association Executive Committee
- Y. Western Highlands People's Autonomy Movement Executive Committee
- Z. Other Association Executive Committees

Sub-Heading: 5. Multiple Positions (Double Hatted)

Enter in Col 5 an (A) if the individual was assigned in more than one of the section categories listed in Col 4.

Heading (5) Neutralization

Sub-Heading: 1. Neutralization Method

Enter in Col 1 the appropriate letter from the following list corresponding to the method by which the individual was neutralized.

- A. Killed by reaction unit

Page 5 of Appendix 2 to Annex A

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- B. Killed by air
- C. Killed by artillery
- D. Captured
- E. Rallied

Sub-Heading: 2. Type of Operation

Enter in Col 2 the appropriate letter from the following list corresponding to the type of operation which contributed to the neutralization of the individual.

- A. Specific target
- B. General target
- C. Cordon and Search
- D. Main Force Sweep
- E. Other (Explain on back of worksheet by referencing the corresponding line item number from front of sheet.)

Sub-Heading: 3. Level of Direction

Enter in Col 3 the appropriate letter from the following list corresponding to the level which directed the type of operation indicated in Col 2.

- A. Corps
- B. Division Tactical Area (DTA)
- C. Sector/Province/PIOCC
- D. Sub-Sector/DIOCC

Sub-Heading: 4. Type of Action Force

Enter in Col 4 the appropriate letter from the

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following list corresponding to the type of action force used for describing the type of operation in Col 2.

- A. FWMAF Other than US
- B. US Forces
- C. ARVN Main Forces
- D. RF
- E. PF
- F. CIDG
- G. PRU
- H. RD Cadre
- I. Census Grievance
- J. APT
- K. Military Security Service
- L. NPFF
- M. NP
- N. SP
- O. Chicu Hoi Center
- P. Other

Sub-Heading: 5 & 6. Type of Action Force (cont'd)

If applicable, enter in Col 5 & 6 the appropriate letter(s) from the above list corresponding to the additional force(s) used for the type of operation in Col 2.

Heading (6) Disposition

Enter the appropriate letter from the following list corresponding to the disposition of the individual.

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- A. PIC Interrogation Center
- B. Province Detention Center
- C. Forwarded to a National Detention Center
- D. Chieu Hoi Center
- E. NP Detention Facilities
- F. Other (Explain on back of worksheet by referencing the corresponding line item number from the front of the sheet.)
- G. Individual Killed

Heading (7) Source of Identification

Enter the appropriate letter from the following list corresponding to the source of intelligence used in identifying the individual.

- A. Static Census Grievance
- B. PHUNG HOANG Political O.B.
- C. Captured Document
- D. Confession
- E. Agent/Informant
- F. Other (Explain on back of worksheet by referencing line item number from the front of the sheet.)

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2.4.2 VCINS Data File. This file, input to the edit program, consists of 80-column cards containing VCINS data. These cards are punched from data contained in the VCINS PHOENIX Monthly Neutralization Report Worksheet (see Figure 2-1, paragraph 2.5). Format of the card is shown in Figure 2-2, paragraph 2.5.

<u>Card Column</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Data Element Parameter</u>
1-22	Individual's Name	Alpha; left-justified
23-34	VC Name of Echelon	Alphanumeric; left-justified
35-43	USID Number	Nine digits. Note: final edit run will produce only a few errors. Cards are punched by hand and included with the rest of the valid cards. Cards changed manually must have positions 1-3 of USID (Columns 35-37) changed as follows: 329 (Gia Dinh) - 529 396 (Saigon) - 596
44-48	VCI Organization	
44	Organization	One-character alpha; A, B, or C
45	Echelon	One-character alpha; A through G
46	Functional Level	One-character alpha; A through H
47	Section Category	One-character alpha; A through Z
48	Multiple Position	One-character alpha; A or blank
49-54	Neutralization	
49	Neutralization Method	One-character alpha; A through E
50	Type of Operation	One-character alpha; A through E
51	Level of Direction	One-character alpha; A through D
52	Type of Action Force	One-character alpha; A through P
53-54	Types of Additional Action Force(s)	One or two-character alpha; A through P or blanks
55	Disposition	One-character alpha; A through G
56	Source of Identification	One-character alpha; A through F
57-80		Blank

2.4.3 Date Control Card. This card, punched by MACCORDS-RAD, is input to the edit program as a separate file along with the VCINS Data File.

<u>Card Column</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Data Element Parameter</u>
1	Code	One-character alpha; constant 'C'
2-3	Year	Two digits
4-5	Month	Two digits; right justified, zero fill
6-80		Blank

2.4.4 VCINS Edited Data File. This file, input to programs that produce reports, consists of edited VCINS activity records (see Figure 2-3, paragraph 2.5). These records consist of the following:

<u>Card Column</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Data Element Parameter</u>
1-76	Same as 2.4.3 above	
77-78	Year	Two digits
79-80	Month	Two digits; right justified; zero fill

The first record in the file is a Date Control Record:

<u>Card Column</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Data Element Parameter</u>
1-2	Last day of month	Two digits; right justified; zero fill
3-5	Month (abbreviation)	Three-character alpha
6-7	Year	Two digits
8-80		Blank

2.4.5 VCINS Province Year-To-Date Totals File. This file contains records of 30 characters with 50 records per block. Records contain the following data elements:

<u>Field Description</u>	<u>Record Position</u>
Corps/Province USID	1-3
Blanks	4-25
Year-To-Date Totals	26-30

The file is input to the programs that produce VCINS reports, updated with current month totals, and used as input to the run for the following month. The layout of the file is shown in the VCINS Program Maintenance Manuals.

2.5 Sample Inputs.

Figures 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3 are samples (unclassified) of VCINS input. As previously indicated, these figures are keyed to the text of paragraphs 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.3, respectively.

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)		PHOENIX MONTHLY NEUTRALIZATION REPORT WORKSHEET										CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)	
DISTRICT _____												PROVINCE _____	
① INDIVIDUALS NAME		② VC NAME OF ECHELON		③ US I.D. NO		④ VCI ORGAN		⑤ NEUTRAL		⑥ DEPOSIT		⑦ DEBON	
1		18	22	35	43	44	48	49	54	55	56	57	58
2													
3													
4													
5													
6													
7													
8													
9													
10													
11													
12													
13													
MACCORDS FORM 31 (TEST) 11 JAN 68													

Figure 2-1

PHOENIX MONTHLY NEUTRALIZATION REPORT WORKSHEET

Figure 2-2

VCINS DATA FILE

DECLASSIFIED

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DECLASSIFIED

Figure 2-3
VCINS EDITED DATA FILE

2.6 Output Requirements.

All outputs are produced on a fixed monthly schedule within DMA during computer processing. VCINS outputs are classified CONFIDENTIAL and are treated in accordance with classified handling procedures.

2.7 Output Formats.

The contents of outputs from the system are discussed in the paragraphs that follow. For samples (unclassified) of reports produced by VCINS, refer to paragraph 2.8.

2.7.1 VCINS Province Year-To-Date Totals File. Data elements contained in the VCINS Province Year-To-Date Totals File, which is updated during each monthly processing cycle, are given in paragraph 2.4.5.

2.7.2 VCINS Exception Report. This report is a listing of activity cards that fail to pass the edit program, providing control totals for the edit. A report is produced following each edit run for correction by MACCORDS-PHOENIX Directorate. The next to the last page of the report gives the number of total cards in error, and the last page shows the number of type records (old input); number of VCINS records (cards)(new input to the edit); and number and type of activity cards output and totals for each. Type AA indicates the first date control card; Type KA indicates valid cards (those that passed the edit). The number of total cards in error plus the number of Type KA cards equals the number of new input cards. This report is classified CONFIDENTIAL because of data contained therein. A sample of the report containing only header information and preprinted data which is not classified is shown in Figure 2-4, paragraph 2.8

2.7.3 VCINS Activity Listing. This report, produced after all edit errors have been corrected, reflects valid VCINS information contained in the VCINS PHOENIX Monthly Neutralization Report Worksheets. This report is classified CONFIDENTIAL because of data contained therein. A sample listing containing only header information and preprinted data which is not classified is shown in Figure 2-5, paragraph 2.8.

2.7.4 VCINS PHOENIX Monthly Consolidated Progress Report. This report, sequenced by the four corps and provinces within the corps, shows -- for Hamlet, Village, City, District, Province, and Other -- the number of Killed (K), Captured (C), and Rallied (R) VCI for the current month; corps totals for each category; monthly totals; and year-to-date totals. Capital Military District (CMD)(Saigon and Gia Dinh) totals are also given. The last page of the report shows totals for the four corps and CMD as well as RVN totals. This report is classified CONFIDENTIAL because of data contained therein. A sample of the report containing only header information and preprinted data which is not classified is shown in Figure 2-6, paragraph 2.8.

2.8 Sample Outputs.

Figures 2-4 through 2-6 illustrate samples (unclassified) of VCINS output described in paragraphs 2.7.2 through 2.7.4, respectively.

2.9 Utilization of System Output.

Computer printout and multilith copies of the VCINS Activity Listing and VCINS PHOENIX Monthly Consolidated Progress Report are produced and distributed to MACCORDS-PHOENIX Directorate, Saigon; PHOENIX Coordinators in the field; other divisions and directorates within MACCORDS and Military Assistance Command Vietnam; and GVN and U.S. governmental agencies. The data is used for purposes of in-depth neutralization analysis and evaluation of the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program and its success as one aspect of the pacification program.

REPORT NUMBER 5B113SAA
VCIN MASTER FILE 01-70

PACIFICATION DATA RANK SUPPORT SYSTEM
VCIN EXCEPTION REPORT

REPORT PAGE 1
RUN DATE 30 JAN 70

1-----	2	2	3	3	4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
		3-----	4	5-----	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6

***FIELDS-IN-ERROR**
NEUTRAL DP (50)
NEUTRAL DIRECT (51)
NEUTRAL DIRECT (51)
***FIELDS-IN-ERROR**
NEUTRAL DP (50)
NEUTRAL DIRECT (51)
NEUTRAL DIRECT (51)
***FIELDS-IN-ERROR**
NEUTRAL METHOD (49)
NEUTRAL METHOD (49)

Figure 2-4

VCINS EXCEPTION REPORT (Page 1 of 3)

REPORT NUMBER S8113SAA
VCIN MASTER FILE 01-70

PACIFICATION DATA BANK SUPPORT SYSTEM
VCIN EXCEPTION REPORT

REPORT PAGE 2
RUN DATE 30 JAN 70

RECORD COUNTS

TOTAL CARDS IN ERROR

END OF REPORT NUMBER S8113SAA

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DECLASSIFIED

Figure 2-4

VCINS EXCEPTION REPORT (Page 2 of 3)

REPORT NUMBER S8113SAB
VCIN MASTER FILE 01-70

PACIFICATION DATA BANK SUPPORT SYSTEM
VCIN ABSTRACT REPORTREPORT PAGE 1
RUN DATE 30 JAN 70

RECORD COUNTS

OLD INPUT

PREV KA RECORDS

NEW INPUT

VCIN RECS (CARDS)

ACTIVITY OUT

TYPE AA

TYPE KA

TOTAL

END OF REPORT NUMBER S8113SAB

Figure 2-4

VCINS EXCEPTION REPORT (Page 3 of 3)

VCI PERSONNEL NEUTRALIZED																		
PHOENIX CONSOLIDATED MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT																		
AS OF 30 SEP 1969																		
CMD CORPS	.	HAMLET	.	VILLAGE	.	CITY	.	DISTRICT	.	PROVINCE	.	OTHER	.	TOTALS	.	REPORT 1969		
PROVINCE	.	K	C	R	.	K	C	R	.	K	C	R	.	K	C	R	.	MONTH YTD
GIA DINH	•
SAIGON	•
CORPS TOTALS	•

EXPLANATORY NOTE - K=KILLED, C=CAPTURED, R=RALLIED

Figure 2-6

VCI PERSONNEL NEUTRALIZED													
PHOENIX CONSOLIDATED MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT													
AS OF 30 SEP 1969													
CORPS	HAMLET	VILLAGE	CITY	DISTRICT	PROVINCE	OTHER	TOTALS	REPORT.1969	MONTH.	YTD	MONTH.	YTD	TOTAL.TOTAL
PROVINCE	K	C	R	K	C	R	K	C	R	K	C	R	K
I CORPS
II CORPS
III CORPS
IV CORPS
CMD
RVN TOTALS

EXPLANATORY NOTE - K=KILLED, C=CAPTURED, R=PARALYZED

Figure 2-6

VCINS PHOENIX MONTHLY CONSOLIDATED PROGRESS REPORT (Page 3 of 3)

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

This Glossary contains definition of terms, abbreviations, and acronyms used in this manual. Items defined in the Glossary are listed in alphabetical order.

<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
CMD	Capital Military District (Saigon, Gia Dinh)
DIOCC	District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center
DMA	Data Management Agency
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HES	Hamlet Evaluation System
MACCORDS-RAD	Military Assistance Command, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support-Reports and Analysis Directorate
PCM	Punched Card Machine
PIOCC	Province Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
USID Number	United States Identification Number. Each component geopolitical level in RVN (hamlet, village, district, province, corps) has a unique U.S.-assigned identification number (USID or, commonly, ID). To afford complete identification of all levels, from corps (the highest reporting unit) to hamlet (the lowest reporting unit), a nine-digit USID number is used, as shown below:

4	3	0	0	1	0	4	0	1
1st digit denotes corps	2nd & 3rd digits denote province	4th & 5th digits denote district	6th & 7th digits denote village	8th & 9th digits denote hamlet				

In the example shown above, the corps ID number is 4; the province ID number is 430; the district ID number is 43001; the village ID number is 4300104; and the hamlet ID number is 43001401.

UTM

Universal Transverse Mercator. A standard grid system used to identify geographic points of areas. In HES, eight-position UTM Coordinates are used, providing location of geographic points accurate to within 100 meters. UTM coordinates are listed as eight positions. The first two are alphabetic and the last six are numeric.

GLOSSARY (Cont.)

VC Viet Cong

VCI Viet Cong Infrastructure. The administrative and political organization through which the Viet Cong control, or seek to control, the people of South Vietnam. The VCI embodies those organizations listed in Appendix B to this manual.

VCIN Viet Cong Infrastructure Neutralization

VCINS Viet Cong Infrastructure Neutralization System

APPENDIX B

CURRENT BREAKOUT OF IDENTIFIED VCI
EXECUTIVE AND SIGNIFICANT CADRE
(Annex B of MACV Directive 381-43, 14 March 1969)

DECLASSIFIED

MACV Directive 381-43

ANNEX B

DECLASSIFIED

CONTENTS

Appendix 1

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

Appendix 2

- A. NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM
- B. OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (DIFFERENT FROM THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY)

Appendix 3

COMMUNIST AUTHORITY ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

X - probable existence

17 December 1968

MESSAGE

From: - The Minister of Interior, Chairman of Central
PHUNG HOANG Committee
To: - Commanders of CTZs, Chairmen of PHUNG HOANG
Committees (all over the country)
- Prefect Mayor, City Mayors, Province Chiefs,
Chairmen of City and Province PHUNG HOANG Com-
mittees (all over the country)
- District Chiefs, Chiefs of DIOCCs (all over the
country)
To: - Members of Central PHUNG HOANG Committee
- The Under Secretary of RD Ministry
- The Colonel, Defense Ministry Representative
- Open Arms Ministry Representative
- The Colonel, Military Security Service Chief
- The Colonel, Chief of J2/JGS
- The Colonel, Chief of J3/JGS
- The Director of Cadre Directorate/RD Ministry
- The Chief of PSB/NPDG
- The Chief of FP/NPDG

Support agencies:

- The Minister of Information
- The Lieutenant General, Chairman of National
Coordinated Intelligence Committee
- The Major General, Chief of Staff/JGS
- The Major General, Chief of General Department/Polwar
- The Director of Political Directorate/Interior
Ministry

Text # 0739/P4/K/KH/M

To easily classify VCI and discover targets for eliminating them, the Central PHUNG HOANG Committee has prepared a "Collation and classification list on the organization of VCI executive cadres and other significant cadres" for use as basic document. All echelons of PHUNG HOANG Committees, Chairmen and Center Chiefs all over the country are requested to use this document in case they need to define VCI composition.

General TRAN THIEN KHIEM
Signed and sealed

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PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

Breakout of Identified VC Infrastructure Executive and Significant Cadre Functions	Echelon at Which Identified					
	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
I Peoples Revolutionary Party						
A. Executive Committee						
1 Secretary	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Assistant Secretary	X	X	X	X	X	X
3 Current Affairs Committee Member	X	X	X	X	X	X
4 Alternate (Party) Committee Member	X					
B. Current Affairs Committee						
1 Current Affairs Committee Member	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Clerk	X	X	X	X	X	X
II Investigation Section						
1 Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Assistant Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	X
3 Member	X	X	X	X	X	X

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
III Front Section						
1 Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Assistant Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	X
3 Member	X	X	X	X	X	X
IV Civilian Proselyting Section						
1 Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Assistant Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	X
A. <u>Correspondence Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
3 Personnel	X	X	X			
B. <u>Religion Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
3 Personnel	X	X	X	X		

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
C. <u>Worker Proselyting Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
3 Personnel	X	X	X	X		
D. <u>Chinese Proselyting Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
3 Personnel	X	X	X			
E. <u>Women Proselyting Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
3 Personnel	X	X	X	X	X	
F. <u>Farmer Proselyting Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
3 Personnel	X	X	X	X	X	

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
G. <u>Youth Proselyting Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
3 Personnel	X	X	X	X	X	
H. <u>Montagnard Proselyting Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
3 Personnel	X	X	X	X		
I. <u>Intellectual Proselyting Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
3 Personnel	X	X	X			
V <u>Troop Proselyting Section</u>						
1 Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Assistant Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
3 Section Member	X	X	X	X	X	
A. <u>Propaganda Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
a. Photograph Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
b. Press Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
c. Information Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
d. Leaflet Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
e. Book and Periodical Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
B. <u>Training Sub-Section</u>						
1 Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
2 Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
a. Educational Institution Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
b. Document Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
c. Prisoner of War Sub-Section						
(1) Sub-Section Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
C. <u>Administrative Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
a. Administrative Office Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
b. Finance Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
c. Liaison Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
d. Transportation Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
e. Mess Personnel Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
f. Base Protection Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
g. Public Health Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
h. Security Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
D. <u>Fifth Columnist Sub-Section</u>						

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
a. Urban Area Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
b. Rural Area Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
c. Enemy Installation Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
E. Research Sub-Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
a. Report and Analysis Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
b. Enemy Installation Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
c. Instruction and Drafting Element						
(1) Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
(3) Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
F. <u>Organization Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
3 Personnel	X	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>			
VI <u>Propaganda, Culture and Indoctrination Section</u>						
1 Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Assistant Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	
3 Member	X	X	X	X		
A. <u>Administrative Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
3 Personnel	X	X	X			
B. <u>Electric Power Element</u>						
1 Element Chief	X					

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
2 Assistant Element Chief		X				
3 Personnel		X				
C. <u>Public Health Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
3 Personnel	X	X	X			
D. <u>Security Squad</u>						
1 Squad Leader	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Squad Leader	X	X	X			
3 Member	X	X	X			
E. <u>Agricultural Production Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
3 Personnel	X	X	X			
F. <u>Signal Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief		X				

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MACV Dir 381-43

Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
2 Assistant Sub- Section Chief	X					
3 Personnel	X					
G. <u>Liberation Broad- casting Station</u>						
1 Station Chief	X					
2 Assistant Station Chief	X					
3 Personnel	X					
H. <u>Propaganda Sub- Section (People/ Culture)</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
2 Assistant Sub- Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
3 Personnel	X	X	X	X		
I. <u>Diplomacy Sub- Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X					
2 Assistant Sub- Section Chief	X					
3 Personnel	X					
J. <u>Psywar and Enter- tainment Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
2 Assistant Sub- Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
3 Personnel	X	X	X	X		
K. Indoctrination Sub-Section (Training)						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
2 Assistant Sub- Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
3 Personnel	X	X	X	X		
L. Party Political School						
1 Director	X	X	X			
2 Deputy Director	X	X	X			
3 Board of Teachers	X	X	X			
M. Press Sub- Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Sub- Section Chief	X	X	X			
3 Personnel	X	X	X			
N. Movie Sub- Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X		X			

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
2 Assistant Sub- Section Chief	X		X			
3 Personnel	X		X			
O. Press Section <u>(Information)</u>						
1 Section Chief	X		X			
2 Assistant Sub- Section Chief	X		X			
3 Personnel	X		X			
P. Type-Setting <u>Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Sub- Section Chief	X	X	X			
3 Personnel	X	X	X			
a. Printing Element						
(1) Element Chief	X					
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X					
(3) Personnel	X					
b. Photography and Zincogra- phy Element						

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
(1) Element Chief	X					
(2) Assistant Element Chief	X					
(3) Personnel	X					
Q. Indoctrination Sub-Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
3 Personnel		X	X	X		
VII Finance-Economy Section						
1 Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Assistant Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	
3 Member	X	X	X	X	X	
A. Administrative Sub-Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
3 Personnel	X	X				

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
B. Finance and Statistics Sub-Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
3 Personnel	X	X	X			
C. Currency Sub-Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X					
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X					
3 Personnel	X					
D. Supply and Food Storage Sub-Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
3 Personnel	X	X	X			
E. Commerce Sub-Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X			

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
3 Personnel	X	X	X			
F. Production Sub-Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
3 Personnel	X	X	X	X		
G. Transportation Sub-Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief			X			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief			X			
3 Personnel			X			
H. Hospital Sub-Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief			X			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief			X			
3 Personnel			X			
VIII Medical Section (Civil Health)						
1 Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Assistant Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
3 Personnel	X	X	X	X		
A. <u>Administrative Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief		X		X		
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief		X		X		
3 Personnel	X					
B. <u>Hospital and Dispensary Sub-Section</u>						
1 Director	X		X			
2 Deputy Director	X		X			
3 Personnel			X			
a. Element B1						
Doctor	X					
b. Element B2						
Doctor	X					
c. Element B3						
Doctor	X					
d. Element B4						
Doctor	X					
e. Element B5						
Pharmacist	X					

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
C. <u>Pharmaceutical Products Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X		X			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X		X			
3 Personnel	X		X			
D. <u>Medical Training Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X					
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X					
3 Personnel	X					
E. <u>Military Medical Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X		X			
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X		X			
3 Personnel	X		X			
F. <u>Civil Health Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X		X			

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X		X			
3 Personnel	X		X			
G. Type Setting <u>Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X					
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X					
3 Personnel	X					
H. Protection <u>Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X					
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X					
3 Personnel	X					
IX Security Section						
1 Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Assistant Section Chicf	X	X	X	X	X	
3 Personnel	X	X	X	X	X	
A. Administrative <u>Sub-Section</u>						

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
3 Personnel	X	X	X	X		
B. <u>Internal Security Sub-Section (Political Protection)</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
3 Personnel	X	X	X			
a. Reconnaissance Element						
(1) Element Chief			X	X		
(2) Assistant Element Chief			X	X		
(3) Personnel			X	X		
b. <u>Juridical Element (The People's Court)</u>						
(1) Element Chief	X	X	X			

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
(2) Assistant Element Chief		X	X	X		
(3) Personnel	X	X	X			
C. <u>Documentation Element (Espionage/Intelligence)</u>						
1 Element Chief	X	X	X	X		
2 Assistant Element Chief	X	X	X	X		
3 Personnel	X	X	X	X		
D. <u>Educational Institution Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X				
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X				
3 Personnel	X	X				
E. <u>Commo-Liaison Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	
3 Commo-Liaison (Agent)	X	X	X	X		

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
F. <u>Interrogation/</u> <u>Detention Sub-</u> <u>Section (POW</u> <u>Camp/Detention</u> <u>Camp)</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X		X			
2 Assistant Interrogation Sub-Section Chief	X		X			
3 Assistant Detention Sub-Section Chief	X		X			
4 Personnel	X		X			
G. <u>Guard Unit</u> <u>(Public Security)</u>						
1 Unit Leader	X		X			
2 Assistant Unit Leader	X		X			
3 Unit Member	X		X			
H. <u>Mobile Unit</u> <u>(Border Surveillance and Security Group)</u>						
1 Unit Leader	X					
2 Assistant Unit Leader	X					
3 Member	X					

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
I. Logistical Sub-Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief		X				
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief		X				
3 Personnel	X					
J. Production Sub-Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X					
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X					
3 Personnel	X					
X Organization Section						
1 Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	
2 Assistant Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	
3 Section Member	X	X	X	X	X	
A. Correspondence Sub-Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X					
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X					
3 Personnel	X					

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
B. Personnel <u>Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X					
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X					
3 Personnel	X					
C. Planning and Policy Sub-Section						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X					
2 Assistant Section Chief	X					
3 Personnel	X					
D. Party Development <u>Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X					
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X					
3 Personnel	X					
E. Cadre Management <u>Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X					

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X					
3 Personnel	X					
XI <u>Frontline Supply Council (Frontline Support and Reinforcement Section)</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	
3 Member	X	X	X	X	X	
A. <u>Vanguard Security Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X					
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X					
3 Cadre	X					
B. <u>Civilian Laborer Sub-Section</u>						
1 Sub-Section Chief	X					
2 Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X					
3 Cadre	X					

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	Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
XII	<u>(City Action)</u> <u>Special Action</u> <u>Section</u>						
1	Section Chief	X					
2	Assistant Section Chief		X				
3	Member		X				
XIII	<u>Administrative</u> <u>Section (Party</u> <u>Office)</u>						
1	Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
2	Assistant Section Chief	X	X	X	X		
3	Member	X	X	X	X		
A.	<u>Identity Card</u> <u>Sub-Section</u>						
1	Sub-Section Chief	X					
2	Assistant Sub-Section Chief	X					
3	Member	X					
B.	<u>Correspondence</u> <u>and Radio-Communi-</u> <u>cation Sub-</u> <u>Section</u>						
1	Sub-Section Chief	X					

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	Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
2	Assistant Sub-Section Chief			X			
3	Personnel		X				
C.	<u>Base Protection Element</u>						
1	Element Chief	X					
2	Assistant Element Chief		X				
3	Personnel (Assistant Element Chief)		X				
XIV	<u>Section in Charge of the Base (Work-site or Production)</u>						
1	Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	
2	Assistant Section Chief	X	X	X	X	X	
3	Member	X	X	X			
XV	<u>Political Struggle Section</u>						
1	Section Chief			X		X	
2	Assistant Section Chief			X			
3	Member			X		X	

The Political Struggle Sections on village level are probably merged with the Motivation Section.

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NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSV)

Breakout of Identified VC Infrastructure Executive and Significant Cadre Functions	Echelon at Which Identified					
	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
I NFLSV Central Committee						
1 Chairman	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Vice-Chairman	X	X	X	X	X	X
3 Members of the Presidium		X	X	X		
II NFLSV Secretariat						
1 Secretary or Secretary General	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Secretary or Assistant Secretary General	X	X				
3 Other Members	X					
III Specialized Sections						
A. <u>Indoctrination-</u> <u>Corrcspondence-</u> <u>Information</u> <u>Section (or Sub-</u> <u>Section)</u>						
1 Section Chiefs or Sub-Section Chiefs	X	X	X			

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
2 Assistant Section Chiefs or Assistant Sub-Section Chiefs	X	X	X			
3 Standing Members (not for Sub-Sections)	X	X	X			
B. Medical Section (or Sub-Section)						
1 Section Chief (or Sub-Section Chief)	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Section Chief (or Assistant Sub-Section Chief)	X	X	X			
3 Standing Member (not for Sub-Section)	X	X	X			
4 Member	X	X	X			
C. Liaison and Foreign Affairs Section (or Sub-Section)						
1 Section Chief (or Sub-Section Chief)	X	X	X			
2 Assistant Section Chief or Assistant Sub-Section Chief)	X	X	X			

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
3 Standing Member (not for Sub-Section)	X	X	X			

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OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT
FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (Different from the
People's Revolutionary Party)

	Breakout of Identified VC Infrastructure Executive and Significant Cadre Functions	Echelon at Which Identified					
		Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
I	Liberation Youth Association Execu- tive Committee						
	Standing Section						
1	Chairman	X	X	X	X	X	X
2	Vice-Chairman	X	X	X	X	X	
3	Secretary	X	X	X	X	X	
II	Liberation Women's Association Execu- tive Committee						
	Standing Section						
1	Chairman	X	X	X	X	X	X
2	Vice-Chairman	X	X	X	X	X	
3	Secretary	X	X	X	X	X	
	Members						
1	Propaganda and Training Member	X	X	X	X		
2	Organization Member	X	X	X	X		

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
3 Social Affairs Member	X	X	X	X		
4 Inspection Member	X	X	X	X		
III <u>Liberation Farmers' Association Executive Committee</u>						
1 Chairman or President	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Vice Chairman or Vice President	X	X	X	X	X	
3 Member	X	X	X	X		
IV <u>Liberation Workers' Association Executive Committee</u>						
1 Chairman or President	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Vice Chairman or Vice President	X	X	X	X	X	
3 Member	X	X	X	X		
V <u>SVN Patriotic Buddhist Association Executive Committee</u>						
1 Chairman or President	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Vice Chairman or Vice President	X	X	X	X	X	

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	Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
3	Member	X	X	X	X		
VI	<u>Western Highlands Autonomous People's Movement Executive Committee</u>						
1	Chairman or President	X	X	X	X	X	X
2	Vice Chairman or Vice President	X	X	X	X	X	
3	Member	X	X	X	X		
VII	<u>Liberation Psywar and Entertainment Association Executive Committee</u>						
1	Chairman or President	X	X	X	X	X	X
2	Vice Chairman or Vice President	X	X	X	X	X	
3	Member	X	X	X	X		
VIII	<u>SVN Patriotic Teachers' Association Executive Committee</u>						
1	Chairman or President	X	X	X	X	X	X
2	Vice Chairman or Vice President	X	X	X	X	X	

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
3 Member	X	X	X	X		
IX <u>Former Resistance Personnel's Association Executive Committee</u>						
1 Chairman or President	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Vice Chairman or Vice President	X	X	X	X	X	
3 Member	X	X	X	X		
X <u>Central Wounded and Dead Soldiers' Association Executive Committee</u>						
1 Chairman or President	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Vice Chairman or Vice President	X	X	X	X	X	
3 Member	X	X	X	X		
XI <u>United Asian and African Peoples' Association Executive Committee</u>						
1 Chairman or President	X	X	X	X	X	X
2 Vice Chairman or Vice President	X	X	X	X	X	
3 Member	X	X	X	X		

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	Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
XII	<u>Liberation Labor</u> <u>Association Execu-</u> <u>tive Committee</u>						
1	Chairman or President	X	X	X	X	X	X
2	Vice Chairman or Vice President	X	X	X	X	X	
3	Member	X	X	X	X		

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COMMUNIST AUTHORITY ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Breakout of Identified VC Infrastructure Executive and Significant Cadre Functions	Echelon at Which Identified					
	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
<u>I Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace- ful Forces of Vietnam Confirmed Cadre</u>						
<u>Executive Committee</u>						
<u>Standing Committee</u>						
1 Chairman		X				
2 Vice Chairman		X				
3 Secretary General		X				
4 Assistant Secretary General		X				
5 Standing Member		X				
<u>II People's Council Confirmed Cadre</u>						
<u>Standing Committee</u>						
1 Chairman					X	
2 Vice Chairman					X	
3 Member					X	

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Functions	Cntl	Rgn	Prov	Dist	Vil	Ham
III People's Liberation Committee						
<u>Standing Committee</u>						
1 Chairman		X	X	X		
2 Vice Chairman		X	X	X		
3 Secretary		X	X	X		
<u>Hamlet Liberation Section</u>						
1 Section Chief					X	
2 Assistant Section Chief					X	

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 FOR: ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG
 CUSHMAN, MGHOCKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION I OF XIV.
 SUBJ: PACIFICATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM DURING 1967 (U)
 1. (U) THIS YEAR-END REPORT IS THE ELEVENTH IN A SERIES OF ASSESSMENTS OF PACIFICATION. IT IS BASED UPON FIELD REPORTING AND ANALYSIS DONE IN SAIGON.

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2. (C) SUMMARY: THE END OF 1967 LENDS ITSELF TO A BROADER LOOK AT THE RESULTS OF OUR PACIFICATION EFFORTS. A QUICK READING OF EVENTS INDICATES THAT MUCH HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, THOUGH LESS THAN WE WOULD HAVE HOPED. POPULATION IN SECURE AREAS INCREASED FROM 62PCT TO 67PCT (APPROXIMATELY 13 MILLION PEOPLE). SECURE HAMLETS INCREASED BY 638 FROM 4702 AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR TO 5340 AT

THE END OF DECEMBER; 27,178 HOI CHANH (INCLUDING 17,671 MILITARY RETURNEES, OR THE EQUIVALENT OF TWO ENEMY DIVISIONS) RALLIED TO THE GVN, COMPARED TO 20,240 IN 1966; AS A RESULT OF THE MANILA COMMITMENT (OCTOBER 1966), THE NUMBER OF ARVN BATTALIONS ASSIGNED TO DIRECT SUPPORT OF RD WENT FROM ZERO TO 55 BATTALIONS BY THE END OF THE YEAR; 93PCT OF ALL ARVN BATTALIONS AND 84PCT OF ALL RF COMPANIES WERE GIVEN SPECIAL RD TRAINING BY MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS; SUCCESS-

FUL VILLAGE AND HAMLET ELECTIONS WERE HELD IN MORE THAN 5000 HAMLETS AND 1000 VILLAGES; POSITIVE ACTION BEGAN AGAINST CORRUPTION, LEADING TO THE RELIEF OF AT LEAST SIX PROVINCE CHIEFS AND 13 POLICE CHIEFS FOR MALFEASANCE OR INEFFICIENCY; THE CENTRAL REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL (CRDC) WAS REINSTITUTED AS THE TOP-LEVEL GVN

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 COORDINATION MECHANISM: AN INTEGRATED US ORGANIZATION FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT REACHING FROM SAIGON TO DISTRICT LEVEL WAS SET UP UNDER COMUSMACV; COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR 1968 (AB1431) CONTAINING FULLY INTEGRATED TREATMENT OF PACIFICATION, WAS APPROVED ON 14 NOVEMBER 1967; COLLECTION AND USE OF LAND TAXES WAS RETURNED TO VILLAGE CONTROL BY DECREE 041/67, 18.9159734; RF/PF WERE GIVEN PROPER RECOGNITION AS A RESULT OF THE FIRST STEP IN RVNF REORGANIZATION WHICH ESTABLISHED GENERAL THANG AS VICE CHIEF OF THE JGS IN CHARGE OF TERRITORIAL SECURITY; AND THE RICE PADDY PRICE TO THE FARMER WAS APPROXIMATELY DOUBLED, MARKING A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN TERMS OF TRADE IN FAVOR OF THE COUNTRY SIDE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GVN HAS YET TO INVEST ITSELF WITH THE IMAGE OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION AND A DYNAMIC ALTERNATIVE TO THE NLF. ALTHOUGH BADLY MAULED IN 1967, THE ENEMY RETAINED A CONSIDERABLE CAPABILITY TO DISRUPT THE PACIFICATION EFFORT. ON A SECURITY RATING BASIS ALONE, ONLY 268 ADDITIONAL HAMLETS WERE UPGRADED TO THE RELATIVELY SECURE CATEGORY BETWEEN 31 JUN AND 31 DEC 67. SINCE MANY MORE HAMLETS WORKED BY RD TEAMS WERE UPGRADED TO SECURE STATUS DURING THE YEAR, IT APPEARS THERE WAS A REGRESSION OF SECURITY IN A

PAGE 5 RUMSMA 0223B C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R M
 CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF PREVIOUSLY SECURE HAMLETS. WHILE ARVN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION INCREASED GREATLY, ARVN BATTALIONS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF RD WERE EMPLOYED LARGEMLY IN STATIC DEFENSIVE ROLES WHICH LIMITED THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. THE INFRASTRUCTURE, THOUGH WEAKENED, RE

MAINTAINS INTACT AND EFFECTIVE IN LARGE AREAS. CORRUPTION, EXACERBATED BY THE INFLATION AND POLITICAL TURMOIL OF RECENT YEARS, REMAINED A PERVERSIVE AND CORROSION PROBLEM.

SHORTLY AFTER CORDS WAS FORMED, IT MADE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF PACIFICATION IN VIETNAM AS OF 31 MAY 1967. EIGHT PRIORITY ACTION PROGRAMS WERE DEVELOPED TO GUIDE FUTURE PLANS AND ACTIVITIES:

- (1) IMPROVE 1968 PACIFICATION PLANNING
- (2) ACCELERATE THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM
- (3) MOUNT AN ATTACK ON THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE

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- (4) EXPAND AND IMPROVE RVNAF SUPPORT TO PACIFICATION
- (5) EXPAND AND SUPPLEMENT RD TEAM EFFORT
- (6) INCREASE CAPABILITY TO HANDLE REFUGEES
- (7) REVAMP POLICE AND PFFDO
- (8) PRESS REHABILITATION AND EXPANSION OF DETENTION FACILITIES

TO EXPEDITE ACTION, PROGRAM MANAGERS AND AN OVERALL PROJECT MANAGER WERE DESIGNATED WITHIN MACV. A SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONAL

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 ARRANGEMENT WAS ESTABLISHED AT EACH CORPS. THE TOTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WAS CODE-NAMED PROJECT TAKEOFF. SUBPROGRAMS WITHIN EACH TAKEOFF PROGRAM SET FORTH DETAILED GOALS AND TASKS. TAKEOFF PRO-

GRAMS HAVE COMPRISED THE PRIMARY GUIDANCE FOR CORDS ACTIVITIES.

SINCE 1 JULY 1967.

IN SUM, MUCH HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, BUT MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE. NONETHELESS THE GREATER RESOURCES, GREATER EXPERIENCE AND IMPROVED ORGANIZATION GENERATED DURING 1967 PROVIDES A SOLID BASE FROM WHICH TO ACHIEVE GREATER RESULTS IN 1968.

3. (C) IMPACT OF THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE PACIFICATION EFFORT":

A. ATTACK ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE: THIS ACTION PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHED ITS PRIMARY ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES, SET AN EXAMPLE FOR AND PROMOTED INVOLVEMENT OF GVN AGENCIES AT ALL LEVELS, AND, BUILDING ON EXISTING INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION PROGRAMS, MOVED GRADUALLY INTO ITS OPERATIONAL PHASE. LESS PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE BROAD AREA OF ARREST, CONTROL, EXPLOITATION, JUDICIAL PROCESSING AND DETENTION OF VC CIVIL DETAINEES.

(1) CORPS AND PROVINCE ICEX COORDINATORS HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED, AND ICEX COMMITTEES FORMED AT BOTH LEVELS. MANY OF

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SS
ACTION

INFO AID 10, EA 06, SAL 01, SS-10, GPM 03, INR 07, MM 01, FILE 01, SR 01

ORM 01, IO 13, IGA 02, P 03, 055 W

R 030250Z FEB 68 ZFF-6 ZFG

FM COMUSMACV

TO CINCPAC

INFO CJCS

DOD

STATE AID

CIA

CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ

CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ

CG III MAF SA I CTZ

SA IV CTZ

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 03518 FM MACJ01R
 FOR: ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG
 CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION II OF XIV.
 THESE COMMITTEES ARE SUPPLEMENTED BY FUNCTIONAL SUB-COMMITTEES OR
 WORKING GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED TO ACCOM-
 PLISH SPECIFIC ICEX TASKS ON BEHALF OF THEIR COMMITTEES. THE
 FULL AUTHORIZED COMPLEMENT OF 126 MACV MILITARY PERSONNEL -
 62 OFFICERS AND 64 ENLISTED MEN, ARMY AND NAVY - HAS BEEN TRAINED

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 AND DISPATCHED TO FULL TIME DUTIES AT CORPS, PROVINCE AND DIS-
 TRICT.

121 WHILE THE US STRUCTURE WAS BEING ORGANIZED, CON-
 SIDERABLE EFFORT WAS PUT INTO PERSUADING THE GVN TO ADOPT THE PRO-
 GRAM. A MAJOR OBSTACLE WAS THE RELUCTANCE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE
 TO ACCEPT THE DOICC (NOW DIOCC) PRINCIPLE.

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THROUGH A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS WITH APPROPRIATE GVN OFFICIALS, THEIR FEARS WERE OVERCOME, AND IN DECEMBER THE PRIME MINISTER ASSIGNED THE NATIONAL POLICE THE MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR ELIMINATION OF THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE. THIS INSTRUCTION ESTABLISHED GVN "PHOENIX" STRUCTURE OF COORDINATING COMMITTEES PARALLELING THE US ICEX STRUCTURE AT NATIONAL, CORPS, PROVINCE AND DISTRICT LEVELS.

(3) AS A RESULT OF ICEX ACTIVITIES THERE HAS BEEN A SHARP REVIVAL OF THE PROVINCIAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING COMMITTEES, TOGETHER WITH THEIR PERMANENT OFFICES. SOME PROVINCES HAVE ORGANIZED PROVINCIAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING CENTERS (PIC-C), WHERE VC INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION IS COLLATED. THESE HAVE BECOME THE PROVINCIAL REPOSITORY FOR THIS INFORMATION. IN OTHER PROVINCES, WHERE THE PROVINCIAL INTERROGATION CENTER (JKPIC) IS

VCI


LNU

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FUNCTIONING EFFECTIVELY, THE PIC HAS BECOME THE REPOSITORY FOR INFRASTRUCTURE FILES.

(4) ALONG WITH THE GROWTH OF THE ICEX STRUCTURE THERE WAS A TANGIBLE INCREASE IN COORDINATED JOINT OR COMBINED OPERATIONS, AND A RISING WILLINGNESS FOR ONE AGENCY TO GENERATE ACTION ON INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM ANOTHER AGENCY. IN QUANG TRI, A JOINT FORCE OF US MARINES, US NAVY, ARVN, NATIONAL POLICE, MSS, AND PRU MOUNTED AN OPERATION THAT COMPLETELY ELIMINATED VC CONTROL OF A HAMLET. IN TUYEN DUC THE PSB, PFF, RF, AND PRU CONDUCTED A CORDON AND ARREST OPERATION OF A HAMLET THAT NETTED 11 OUT OF 17 VCI ON THEIR TARGET LIST. IN QUANG NAM 62 MEMBERS OF THE HOI AN CITY VC INFRASTRUCTURE WERE IMPRISONED AS A RESULT OF A COORDINATED OPERATION BY GVN FORCES AND US ADVISORS. THE SECRETARY-TREASURER OF THE FINANCE-ECONOMY SECTION OF THE CITY VC COMMITTEE WAS CAPTURED, IN ADDITION TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOI AN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.

(5) THE ICEX/SIDE STUDY GROUP DRAFTED AN EXECUTIVE DECREE SIGNED BY THE CHIEF OF STATE ENABLING THE CREATION OF FOUR NEW MILITARY FIELD COURTS. THIS DOUBLES THE NUMBER OF MILITARY FIELD COURTS. THE STAFF FOR THE FIRST OF THESE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED. OFFICE SPACE FOUND IN SAIGON. A PLAN TO CONSTRUCT 8000 DETAINEE/

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 PRISONER SPACES ON A CRASH BASIS BY 30 JUNE 1968 WAS APPROVED. THIS
 PLAN PROVIDES E AICELY, SUBJECT TO SECURITY AND SITE AVAILABILITY
 FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND EXPANSION OF EXISTING FACILITIES AS
 FOLLOWS:

TABLE ONE

PRISON ADDITIONS	CAPACITY
CON SON ISLAND	20000
TAN HIEP, III CORPS	10500
DETENTION FACILITIES	CAPACITY
HAU NGHIA, III CORPS	500
PHUOC TUY, III CORPS	500
BINH DUONG, III CORPS	500
PHONG DINH, IV CORPS	10500
KIEN HOA, IV CORPS	500
DINH TUONG, IV CORPS	500
VINH LONG, IV CORPS	500
TOTALS	80000

(6) DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS COORDINATING
 CENTERS AND PROVINCIAL INTERROGATION CENTERS:

TABLE TWO

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DIOCCS


	ACTIVATED	PROGRAMMED
I CORPS	20	20
II CORPS	19	20
III CORPS	47	53
IV CORPS	17	22
TOTALS	103	115

TABLE THREE

	NUMBER OF PICS	CAPACITY (PERSONS)
I CORPS	6	156
II CORPS	9	200
III CORPS	10	260
IV CORPS	13	298
TOTAL	38	914

B. EXPAND AND IMPROVE TERRITORIAL SECURITY: THE HAMLET
 EVALUATION SYSTEM (HES) WAS IMPLEMENTED IN JANUARY 1967 TO PROVIDE

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A RELIABLE, AUTOMATED FILE OF PACIFICATION STATISTICS, FOR THE 11 MONTHS ENDING 31 DEC 67, HES DATA INDICATES THAT THE PERCENTAGE OF RVN POPULATION LIVING IN RELATIVELY SECURE AREAS INCREASED BY 4.8 PERCENT TO A DECEMBER TOTAL OF 66.9 PERCENT OF THE OVERALL POPULA-

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 TION. THIS PERCENTAGE IS ALSO THE HIGH FOR THE YEAR, WHICH MANIFESTS THE STEADILY IMPROVING TREND OF POPULATION LIVING IN SECURE AREAS. THE PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION LIVING IN CONTESTED AREAS DECLINED BY 2.0 PERCENT TO A YEAR-END TOTAL OF 16.5 PERCENT OF OVERALL RVN POPULATION. THE PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION CONTROLLED BY THE VC DECLINED BY 2.8 PERCENT TO A YEAR-END TOTAL OF 16.6 PERCENT OF OVERALL POPULATION. THE HES INDICATES THE YEAR-END TOTAL POPULATION OF RVN IS 17.2 MILLION PEOPLE. THE REPORTING AGENTS (US DISTRICT ADVISORS) HAVE ADDED 873 FORMERLY UNLISTED HAMLETS TO THE SYSTEM. THESE ADDITIONS ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT 500,000 OF AN OVERALL RVN POPULATION INCREASE OF 807,000 SINCE JANUARY, WITH REFINEMENTS IN REPORTING ACCURACY ACCOUNTING FOR THE BALANCE. EVEN THOUGH HALF OF THESE ADDED HAMLETS WERE VC-CONTROLLED, THE OVERALL TOTAL OF VC HAMLETS DECREASED BY 341 (316,000 POPULATION) DUE LARGEY TO ABDANDONMENT, AND TO UP-GRADING OF FORMER VC HAMLETS IN BINH DINH, PHU YEN AND PLEIKU PROVINCES. BETWEEN JANUARY-DECEMBER 1967, 348 VC HAMLETS WERE ABANDONED, AND 145 HAMLETS FORMERLY RATED AS GVN CONTROLLED WERE RE-EVALUATED AS VC.
 III ALL FOUR CORPS AREAS SHOW AN INCREASE FOR THE YEAR IN PERCENTAGE OF POPULTION LIVING IN THE RELATIVELY SECURE

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ORM 01, ID 13, IGA 02, P 03, /059 W

P 030250Z FEB 68 ZFF6

FM: COMUSMACV

TO: CINCPAC

INFO: CJCS

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CG: I FFORCEV SA II CTZ

CG: II FFORCEV SA III CTZ

CG: III MAF SA I CTZ

SA: IV CTZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R M 0 3 5 1 8 F M : M A C U 0 1 R
 POR: ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG
 CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION III OF XIV.
 AREAS. THE LARGEST INCREASE WAS IN I CORPS WITH AN 8.1 PERCENT
 GAIN, FOLLOWED BY II CORPS WITH A 6.8 PERCENT INCREASE, IV CORPS
 WITH A GAIN OF 4.7 PERCENT, AND A III CORPS GAIN OF 3.2 PERCENT.
 ALL FOUR CORPS SHOWED LARGE INCREASES IN THE B-HAMLET CATEGORIES.
 THE DECREASE IN POPULATION PERCENTAGE RATED AS VC-CONTROLLED WAS

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 0225B C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R M
 LARGEST IN II CORPS (DOWN 6.7 PERCENT), FOLLOWED BY I CORPS (DOWN
 5.6 PERCENT), IV CORPS (DOWN 1.6 PERCENT) AND III CORPS (DOWN 1.2
 PERCENT). SINCE II CORPS INCLUDES SAIGON, IT REMAINS THE MOST
 SECURE, WITH 81.4 PERCENT OF ITS POPULATION LIVING IN SECURE AREAS.
 OTHER SECURE TOTALS ARE II CORPS (74.8 PERCENT), I CORPS (56.6 PER-
 CENT) AND IV CORPS (55.6 PERCENT). AN GIANG PROVINCE, IN IV CORPS,

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IS THE ONLY PROVINCE IN RVN HAVING 100 PERCENT OF ITS POPULATION LIVING IN SECURE AREAS. DURING THE YEAR AN GIANG SHOWED IMPROVEMENT BY UP-GRADING 166,000 CATEGORY C POPULATION TO A AND B CATEGORIES.

(2) THE FOLLOWING TABLES SHOW THE RESULTS OF THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM (HES) AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1967. NOTES: CHANGES IN HAMLET STATUS FROM 31 JANUARY 1967 ARE SHOWN BY & OR- NUMBERS IN EACH CATEGORY.

TABLE FOUR

POPULATION STATUS (SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT)
(THOUSANDS)

SECURE	A	B	C	NONHAM.	SUBTOT.	PERCENT
I CORPS	76.6	628.6	664.2	484.1	1853.5	56.6
TOTAL RVN	848.4	8360.1	830.0	8104.9	8543.4	

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 0225B C O N F I D E N T I A L	NONFORN	NONHAM.	SUBTOT.	PERCENT		
I CORPS	217.9	703.0	903.9	305.5	2130.2	74.8
II CORPS	-48.5	811.2	4166.9	-120.6	8109.0	
III CORPS	29.1	767.9	1293.8	2235.5	4326.3	81.4
IV CORPS	820.2	8277.7	8.7	815.1	8313.7	
TOTAL RVN	371.4	1381.9	1417.3	346.3	3204.8	55.6
I CORPS	4289.8	8205.8	40.8	97.8	8357.2	
II CORPS	695.0	3481.3	4279.1	3059.4	11514.8	66.9
III CORPS	8310.0	8954.9	8156.8	898.3	81323.3	
CONTESTED	D	E	OTHER	NONHAM.	SUBTOT.	PERCENT
I CORPS	412.3	66.0	3.6	143.4	625.3	19.1
II CORPS	-1.3	34.8	83.6	871.6	841.6	
III CORPS	325.5	78.4	37.2	50.3	491.4	17.2
IV CORPS	-34.8	-19.6	837.2	-3.7	-20.9	
TOTAL RVN	564.2	48.2	11.3	83.4	707.1	13.3
I CORPS	-26.5	-25.1	811.3	-38.8	-79.2	
II CORPS	855.7	126.0	16.3	10.7	1008.6	17.5
III CORPS	-45.0	-105.0	816.3	-8.4	-142.1	
IV CORPS	2157.7	318.6	68.3	287.8	2832.4	16.5
TOTAL RVN	-105.1	-184.6	868.3	-820.8	-200.6	
VC	HAMLET	NONHAM.	SUBTOT.	PERCENT	TOTAL	

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I CORPS	761.4	32.5	793.9	24.3	3272.7
	-9.2	-5.3	-14.6		-570.4
II CORPS	217.5	10.7	228.2	13.0	2849.8
	-207.9	-1.7	-209.6		-121.5
III CORPS	245.7	37.6	283.2	5.3	5316.6
	-2.3	-45.5	-47.7		-186.8
IV CORPS	1523.9	31.9	1555.8	27.0	5769.2
	-43.3	-1.0	-44.3		-170.8
TOTAL RVN	2748.5	112.6	2861.1	16.6	17208.3
	-262.7	-53.4	-316.2		-8806.6

TABLE FIVE
HAMLET STATUS (SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT)

SECURE	A	B	C	SUBTOT	PERCENT
I CORPS	27	268	538	833	33.8
	-89	-8111	-816	-8136	
II CORPS	54	500	1022	1576	50.7
	-40	-845	-8209	-8214	
III CORPS	6	1205	653	964	45.0
	-82	-851	-829	-882	
IV CORPS	144	736	1087	1967	39.3

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	8104	878	824	8206	
TOTAL RVN	231	1809	13300	5340	42.0
	-875	-8285	-8278	-8638	

CONTESTED VC

D	E	OTHER	SUBTOT	PCT	SUBTOT	PCT	TOTAL	
I CORPS	433	68	196	697	28.2	938	38.0	2468
	-53	-48	-196	-895		-156		-875
II CORPS	544	140	350	1034	33.3	499	16.1	3109
	-43	-2	-350	-8305		-350		-8169
III CORPS	444	74	199	717	33.5	461	21.5	2142
	-33	-17	-199	-8199		-215		-8398
IV CORPS	809	163	80	1052	21.0	1984	39.7	5003
	-22	-97	-80	-39		-64		-8231
TOTAL RVN	2230	445	825	3500	27.5	3882	30.5	12722
	-85	-164	-825	-576		-341		-8873

TABLE SIX

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POPULATION STATUS (SECURITY ONLY)
(THOUSANDS)

SECURE	A	B	C	NONHAM	SUBTOT	PERCENT
I CORPS	334.4	511.8	591.2	484.1	1921.5	58.7

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 0225B C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN	A	B	C	NONHAM	SUBTOT	PERCENT
I CORPS	4250.1	855.0	844.2	8104.9	8494.1	
	450.8	552.5	852.2	305.5	2161.0	75.8
	13.2	325.0	8373.1	120.6	84.3	
III CORPS	291.8	951.0	1023.5	2285.5	4501.9	84.7
IV CORPS	826.4	8110.3	8148.3	815.1	8300.1	
	565.1	1191.6	1331.9	34.3	3122.9	54.9
	813.2	100.4	829.5	97.8	8144.5	
TOTAL RVN	1642.1	3206.9	3798.8	3059.4	11707.3	68.0
	8576.5	170.2	8635.1	98.3	8943.1	
CONTESTED	D	E	OTHER	NONHAM	SUBTOT	PERCENT
I CORPS	357.7	52.7	3.6	143.4	557.3	17.0
	839.9	22.3	83.6	871.6	890.8	
II CORPS	307.0	66.1	37.2	50.3	460.6	16.2
	839.1	811.2	837.2	83.7	883.8	
III CORPS	395.0	41.8	11.3	83.4	531.5	10.0
	6.0	32.0	811.3	38.8	65.6	
IV CORPS	935.4	128.1	16.3	10.7	1090.5	18.9
	8146.4	103.8	816.3	8.4	870.6	
TOTAL RVN	1995.1	288.7	68.3	287.8	2640.0	15.3
	8239.4	148.9	868.3	820.8	8179.6	

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ACTION

INFO AID 10, EA 06, SAL 01, SS 10, GPM 03, INR 07, MM 01, FILE 01, SR 01,

ORM 01, IO 13, IGA 02, P 03, /059 W

R 030250Z FEB 68 ZFF-6
 FM: COMUSMACV
 TO: CINCPAC
 INFO: CJCS
 DOD
 STATE: AID
 CIA
 EG I: FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 EG II: FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 EG III: MAF SA I CTZ
 SA IV CTZ

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 03518 FM: MACJ01R
 FOR: ADM SHARP, INFO: GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG
 CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION IV OF XIV.

VC	HAMLET	NONHAM	SUBTOT	PERCENT	TOTAL
I CORPS	761.4	32.5	793.9	24.3	3272.7
	-9.2	-5.3	-14.6	.6D	GTUPMR
II CORPS	217.5	10.7	228.2	8.0	2849.8
	-207.9	-1.7	-209.6		-121.5

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III CORPS	245.7	37.6	283.2	5.3	5316.6
	-2.3	-45.5	-47.7		4186.8
IV CORPS	1523.9	31.9	1555.8	27.0	5769.2
	-43.3	-1.0	-44.3		5170.8
TOTAL RVN	2748.5	112.6	2861.1	16.6	17208.3
	-262.7	-8R	AEQYMW		GIPYMY

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TABLE SEVEN

HAMLET STATUS (SECURITY ONLY)

SECURE	A	B	C	SUBTOT	PERCENT
I CORPS	111	270	527	908	36.8
	856	825	82	879	
II CORPS	186	569	959	1704	54.8
	115	107	8307	885	
III CORPS	114	340	565	1019	47.6
	820	814	890	856	
IV CORPS	269	718	1028	2015	40.3
	8126	895	817	848	
TOTAL RVN	680	1897	3069	5646	44.4
	847	891	8412	8268	
CONTESTED			VC		

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	D	E	OTHER	SUBTOT	PCT	SUBTOT	PLT	TOTAL
I CORPS	369	57	196	622	25.2	938	38.0	2468
	815	829	8296	8152		8156		875
II CORPS	441	115	350	906	29.1	499	16.1	3109
	848	836	8350	8434		835		8169
III CORPS	410	53	199	662	30.9	461	21.5	2142
	874	832	8199	8241		8101		8398
IV CORPS	777	147	80	1004	20.1	1984	39.7	5003
	8118	879	880	8119		864		8231
TOTAL RVN	1997	372	825	3194	25.1	3882	30.5	12722
	8225	8104	8825	8946		8341		8873

TABLE EIGHT

SECURE, CONTESTED AND VC CONTROLLED POPULATION TOTAL RVN 31 DEC 67

POPULATION (THOUSANDS)

	SECURE	VC	CONTESTED
SECURITY ONLY	11707.3	2861.1	2640.0
SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT	11514.8	2861.1	2832.4
PERCENT OF TOTAL, 31 DEC 67			
SECURE	68.0	16.6	CONTESTED
SECURITY ONLY			15.3

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SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 66.9 16.6 16.5

PERCENT OF TOTALS 31 JAN 67

SECURE VC CONTESTED

SECURITY ONLY 65.6 19.4 15.0

SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 62.1 19.4 18.5

(3) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (LESS ANTI-AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS) IN 1967 WAS LESS THAN IN 1966, ALTHOUGH THEY INCREASED IN I CORPS. ON THE OTHER HAND, ASSASSINATIONS MORE THAN DOUBLED OVER THE PREVIOUS YEAR, AND ABDUCTIONS INCREASED BY MORE THAN 40PCT. THE INCREASE WAS GREATEST IN I CORPS. THIS KIND OF ACTIVITY CAUSES LITTLE LOSS TO THE ENEMY AND HAS FAR-REACHING PSYCHOLOGICAL REPRECUSSIONS ON THE POPULATION.

THE LAST QUARTER OF 1967 WAS WITNESS TO A PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY, ESPECIALLY IN I CORPS AND IN THE SAIGON/GIA DINH AREA. WE THEREASSESS SECURITY BY CORPS.

(A) THROUGHOUT 1967, SECURITY REMAINED THE PRIMARY PROBLEM IN I CTZ. COMPARED TO A YEAR AGO, THE MILITARY SITUATION IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY, ESPECIALLY WITH THE INCREASE OF FREE WORLD FORCES. THE ENEMY'S EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH SECURE INFILTRATION ROUTES

PAGE 5 RUMSMA 0226B C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R M

THROUGH THE DMZ WERE REPULSED WITH SUBSTANTIAL LOSSES IN BOTH MEN AND MATERIEL. IN THE LATE SPRING OF 1967, THE ENEMY ATTEMPTED TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN THE KHE SANH AREA OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE. REACTIONON THE PART OF FREE WORLD FORCES RESULTED IN THEIR DISPERSEL TO THE NORTH AND WEST, AND THEY HAVE FAILED TO INJECT MAJOR UNITS INTO THE AREA FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR. ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY HAS BEEN LESS ABLE TO CONDUCT LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS, THERE WERE TWICE AS MANY INCIDENTS IN 1967 AS IN 1966. THE ENEMY ACHIEVED ITS GREATEST PROPAGANDA SUCCESSES FROM THE FOLLOWING EVENTS:

PENETRATION OF ALL PROVINCIAL CAPITALS; OVERRUNNING FOUR DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS AND THREE PROVINCIAL JAILS; ROCKET ATTACKS ON THE DANANG AIR BASE ON 27 FEBRUARY AND 15 JULY; AND STRATEGIC CONTROL OF THE A SHAU VALLEY. THE ENEMY HAS APPLIED STEADY PRESSURE ON RD TEAMS AND ISOLATED OUTPOSTS THROUGH THE CORPS. SUCH ATTACKS HAVE BEEN MINIMIZED BY THE CONTINUOUS PRESENCE OF FRIENDLY GROUND FORCES AND THE AVAILABILITY OF SUPPORTING ARMS. IN ALL CASES THE ENEMY HAS BEEN

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UNABLE TO ESTABLISH HIMSELF IN STRENGTH WITHIN THE COASTAL AREAS AND HAS BEEN FORCED TO WITHDRAW INTO THE HIGHLANDS. VC/NVA FORCES HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY HURT BY STEADY INTERDICTION OF THEIR SUPPLY ROUTES. AS A RESULT OF OUR 1967 EFFORT, THE ENEMY STARTS 1968 WITH LESS CON-

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 0226B C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 TROL OF THE SITUATION THAN ONE YEAR AGO. HE HAS INCREASED HIS USE OF TERRORISM TO MAKE HIS PRESENCE FELT. THE RESULT HAS BEEN A GENERALLY INCREASING TREND OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS. THE VC ASSASSINATED 1,127 CIVILIANS DURING 1967 AND ABDUCTED ANOTHER 1,794 PERSONS. THE MONTHLY AVERAGE FOR ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS RESPECTIVELY WAS 27.1 AND 97.3 FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1967, COMPARED TO 110.7 AND 184.5 THE SECOND SIX MONTHS. SIMILARLY, THE RATE OF ROAD MINING ROSE. THIS INCREASING USE OF SMALL SCALE TERRORISM PROBABLY CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE IN 1968 AS THE VC ARE LESS ABLE TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS BY CONVENTIONAL MILITARY MEANS. RD TEAMS AND HAMLET SECURITY CONTINUE TO BE A PROBLEM, BUT OF DIMINISHING MAGNITUDE. THE PRINCIPAL FACTORS WERE THE INCREASING AGGRESSIVENESS OF RD DIRECT SUPPORT ARVN BATTALIONS, ADDITIONAL FHMADF, GREATER EXPERIENCE OF RD TEAMS, AND BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND COORDINATION OF THE RD CAMPAIGN CONCEPT. ON THE OTHER HAND, VIGOROUS ENEMY ATTACKS AGAINST RD AREAS IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN DURING THE EARLY PART OF THE YEAR AND IN QUANG NGAI MORE RECENTLY, RETARDED PROGRESS. THE RF/PP FORCES HAVE MADE EXCELLENT PROGRESS DURING 1967 IN SUPPORT OF RD. INCREASED PARTICIPATION BY RD COMPANIES AND PF PLATOONS HAS HELPED INSTILL GREATER CONFIDENCE IN THE POPULATION. NO ONLY HAVE THE NUMBER OF

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ACTION

INFO AID 10, EA 06, SAL 01, SS 10, GPM 03, INR 07, FILE 01, MM 01, SR 01

ORM 01, IO 13, P 03, IGA 02, 1059, W

P 030250Z FEB 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CINCPAC
 INFO CJCS
 DOD
 STATE AID
 CIA
 CO I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 SA IV CTZ

REF A
 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 03518 FM: MAJ OIR
 FOR: ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG
 CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION V OF XIV.
 OPERATIONS INCREASED, BUT ALSO THEIR EFFICIENCY, AS ATTESTED TO BY
 THE NUMBER OF ENEMY KILLED. RF/PF UNITS PLAYED A VITAL ROLE IN IN-
 SURING THE SUCCESS OF THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS BY PROVIDING CLOSE SE-
 CURITY FOR POLLING PLACES.

TABLE NINE

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 0227B CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN
 I CORPS SECURITY RESUME

	1967	1966
VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AA)	9,017	9,432
TERRORISM INCIDENTS	9248	NO RECORD
VC/NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	38,195	31,150
ASSASSINATIONS, ABDUCTIONS OF CIVILIANS	3,648	1,045

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VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RD:	504	NO RECORD
STATUS OF ROADS - GREEN (PCT)	76.0	42.9 (JUL 67)
(SEE FOOTNOTE 1) AMBER (PCT)	24.0	51.7 (JUL 67)
43\$ (PCT)	0	5.4 (JUL 67)
HES NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (ABC)	908	829
CATEGORY (SECURITY ONLY)		(JAN 67)
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE	58.7	52.8
CATEGORY (SECURITY ONLY)		(JAN 67)
RF STRENGTH	19,873&&	18,166&&
PF STRENGTH	23,620&&	24,119&&
& FIGURES AVAILABLE FROM 1 MAY 1967 ONLY		
&& 30 NOVEMBER 1967		
&& 31 JANUARY 1967		
(B) SECURITY IN III CORPS AT THE END OF DECEMBER PRE-		

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 0227B C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 PRESENTED THE SAME VARIED PICTURE. IT HAS SHOWN ALL YEAR. SEVEN OF THE PROVINCES REPORTED THEIR SECURITY AS DECIDELY UNFAVORABLE, WHILE THE REMAINDER REPORTED A MIXED SITUATION OF ADEQUATE SECURITY BUT AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. EVERY PROVINCE BUT ONE REPORTED AN EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH NUMBER OF INCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH INCIDENTS IN II CORPS REMAINED CONSIDERABLY BELOW THOSE OF THE OTHER THREE CORPS AREAS. ENEMY OBJECTIVE DURING THE YEAR WERE TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE PRESENCE IN THE POPULATED COASTAL PROVINCES, DRAW AS MANY US AND FREE WORLD FORCES AS POSSIBLE TO THE HIGHLANDS, AND WIN A SIGNIFICANT VICTORY THERE IF POSSIBLE. IN THIS REGARD THEY INCREASED THEIR PRESSURE IN THE HIGHLANDS AND BUILT UP THEIR TROOP STRENGTH THERE. BUT SPOILING ATTACKS BY US AND ARVN FORCES KEPT THEM OFF GUARD UNTIL THE BATTLE AT DAK TO IN EARLY NOVEMBER, WHEN US AND ARVN FORCES INFILCTED HEAVY LOSSES ON FOUR NVA REGIMENTS. IN THE COASTAL PROVINCES ENEMY ACTIVITY REMAINED AT A LOW LEVEL FOR THE FIRST THREE QUARTERS OF THE YEAR, CONSISTING PRIMARILY OF HARASSMENT AND TERRORIST TYPE ACTIVITIES. IN THE FOURTH QUARTER A NUMBER OF LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS BEGAN WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF DISRUPTING RD, INTERDICTING LOC AND OBTAINING FOOD SUPPLIES. OVERALL ENEMY STRENGTH IN II CTZ AT THE END OF THE YEAR WAS ESTIMATED AT JUST SHORT OF 60,000 TROOPS.

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PAGE 4 RUMSMA 0227B C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN!
 ABOUT 20,000 OF WHOM WERE NVA REGULARS. THERE WERE DEFINITE INDICATIONS DURING THE YEAR OF A DECREASE IN BOTH THEIR STRENGTH AND THEIR QUALITY. THE ESTIMATED RECRUITMENT OF THE VN DROPPED BY ALMOST ONE-HALF DURING THE YEAR. MOREOVER, ESTIMATED ENEMY LOSSES OF 29,000 MEN KIA EXCEEDED THE ENEMY INFILTRATION (ESTIMATED AT ABOUR 24,000 MEN). THESE FACTORS, COMBINED WITH HEAVY LOSSES OF ARMS AND SUPPLIES, HAVE WEAKENED THE ENEMY IN III CORPS. NEVERTHELESS, THE ENEMY'S 1968 WINTER-SPRING CAMGAIGN OBJECTIVES ARE THE SAME AS IN 1967.

TABLE TEN
 III CORPS SECURITY RESUME

	1967	1966
VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AA)	3,612	4,375
TERRORISM INCIDENTS	1,312	NO RECORD
VC/NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	28,484	38,607
ASSASSINATIONS, ABDUCTION OF CIVILIANS	2,265	1,999
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	335	NO RECORD
STATUS OF RQ-DS - GREEN (PCT)	60.3	48.3 (JUL 67)
AMBER (PCT)	39.0	41.0 (JUL 67)
RED (PCT)	0.7	11.7 (JUL 67)

HES NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SECURE TABCI CATEGORY 1,70
 19619

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 (SECURITY ONLY)

HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE	75.8	72.6
CATEGORY (SECURITY ONLY)		(JAN 67)
F STRENGTH	36,270&&	36,257&&
PF STRENGTH	35,434&&	36,423&&

& FIGURES AVAILABLE FROM 1 MAY 1967 ONLY

& 30 NOVEMBER 1967

&& 31 JANUARY 1967

(C) ALTHOUGH 1967 SAW A DECLINE IN VC ABILITY TO MOUNT LARGE SCALE ATTACKS AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS IN III CORPS, THERE HAS BEEN A CONCURRENT INCREASE IN SMALL UNIT ACTIONS AND TERRORISM. THERE WERE 1598 VC INITIATED INCIDENTS (LESS ANTI-AIRCRAFT) IN THE LAST QUARTER OF 1967, A SLIGHT DECREASE FROM THE QUARTERLY AVERAGE OF 16

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TERRORIST INCIDENTS HOWEVER, ROSE SIGNIFICANTLY DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE YEAR, AND ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS WERE CONSIDERABLY HIGHER THAN IN 1966. THE ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT UPON THE PEOPLE HAS BEEN OUT OF PROPORTION TO ACTUAL ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND HAS SPARKED WIDESPREAD CRITICISM OF GVN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY. THE MOST SPECTACULAR EVENTS WERE IN DINH LONG AND PHUOC LONG PROVINCES, WHICH WHILE VICTORIES FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT DEMONSTRATED

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 0227B C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 STARTED VC/NVA ABILITY TO ATTACK IN MULTI-BATTALION STRENGTH AT POINTS OF THEIR CHOOSING. SECURITY OF RD AND TRUONG SON CADRE TEAMS IS ALSO A CONTINUING PROBLEM. THE SEVERITY OF ATTACKS AGAINST THESE TEAMS INCREASED THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, AND A PRIME OBJECTIVE OF THE 1968 CAMPAIGN PLAN IS TO IMPROVE RD TEAM SECURITY THROUGH COMBINED OPERATIONS. ON THE BRIGHTER SIDE THE END OF 1967 FINDS MANY MORE ROADS IN III CTZ OPEN FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS AND FBI SUPPORT OF THE RESURGENCE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. FOR EXAMPLE, HIGHWAY NBI FROM XUAN LOC TO THE II CORPS BOUNDARY, AND HIGHWAY NB3 FROM BEN CAT TO HON QUAN, BINH LONG PROVINCE, HAVE BOTH BEEN OPENED DURING THE YEAR. OPENING OF THESE ROUTES HAS CREATED A SHIFT ON THE PART OF THE POPULATION FROM PREOCCUPATION WITH THE MECHANISMS OF SURVIVAL TO HOW TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRADE AND TRAVEL.

TABLE ELEVEN
 III CORPS SECURITY RESUME

	1967	1966
VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AAI)	6,546	7,915
TERRORISM INCIDENTS	789&	NO RECORD
VC/NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	30,282	38,823
ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION OF CIVILIANS	1,237	606

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ACTION

INFO AID 10, EA 06, SAL 01, SS 10, GPM 03, INR 07, MM 01, FILE 01, SR 01,

ORM 01, IO 13, IGA 02, P 0357059-W

P 030250Z FEB 68 ZFF-6

FM COMUSMACV

TO CINCPAC

INFO CJCS

DOD

STATE AID

CIA

CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ

CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ

CG III MAF SA I CTZ

SA IV CTZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R M 03578 FM: MACU01R
FOR: ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG
CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER, SECTION VI OF XIV.

VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC

228 NO RECORD

STATUS OF ROADS - GREEN (PCT)

73.3 60.6 (JUL 67)

AMBER (PCT)

26.7 28.4 (JUL 67)

43% (PCT)

0 11.0 (JUL 67)

(JUL 67)

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 0228B C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R M

STATUS OF WATERWAYS - GREEN (PCT) 61.3 31.1

(SEE FOOTNOTE 1) AMBER (PCT) 34.3 60.0

43% (PCT) 4.4 8.9

HES NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (ABC) CATEGORY 1 019 963 (JAN 67)

(SECURITY ONLY)

HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORY 84.7 81.9

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KSECURITY ONLY)

(JAN '67)

RF STRENGTH

38-278&& 38-365&&

RF STRENGTH

26-373&& 27-841&&

& FIGURES AVAILABLE FROM 1 MAY 67 ONLY & 30 NOVEMBER 1967

&& 31 JANUARY 1967

5(D) DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1967, THE SECURITY SITUATION IN IV CORPS WAS UNRAMATIC.

PACIFICATION ELEMENTS OFTEN

MOVED INTO PHASE I HAMLETS IN THE WAKE OF DDPARTING VC GUERRILLAS WHO WIGHDREW WITHOUT A CONTEST, PROMISING TO RETURN WHEN THE "GVN MOVED ON AGAIN AS THEY ALWAYS DO". USUALLY TET IN THE DELTA IS ASSIDUOUSLY OBSERVED BY BOTH SIDES, AND 1967 WAS A CLASIC YEAR IN THIS REGARD. ENEMY ACTIVITY SLOWED WHILE THE RATE OF HOI CHANH ACCESSIONS SOARED UNDER THE PRESSURE OF RD BATTALION OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PHASE I

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PACIFICATION AND THE LONGING OF VC TO REJOIN THEIR FAMILIES. MODERATE-LOW LEVEL HARASSMENT, TERRORISM, AND LOC INTERDICTION WERE MAINTAINED BY THE ENEMY, BUT LITTLE OR NO COUNTER-PACIFICATION EFFORTS

WERE APPARENT. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT, FROM THE START OF THE YEAR, THE VC PERSISTENTLY PUT BLOCKS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF HIGHWAY 4 EVEN DURING THE SLOW TET PERIOD. EARLIER IN THE YEAR, BECAUSE THESE BLOCKS WERE CONSISTENTLY - USUALLY WEEK AFTER WEEK - PLACED IN THE SAME LOCATIONS, THEY WERE TREATED AS ROUTINE LOCAL HARASSMENT. AS THE YEAR WORE ON, HOWEVER, CONCERN OVER THIS ACTIVITY ROSE AS THE EXTENT OF THE PATTERN WAS SURFACED BY INTENSIFIED EFFORTS AT INTERDICTION. IN THE LATTER PART OF OCTOBER (THE INCEPTION OF THE VC "WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN"), THERE WAS A MARKED UPTURN IN VC ATTACKS ON TOWNS, RD HAMLETS, AND OUTPOSTS, PALELED BY A GREATLY INCREASED INTERDICTION OF NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AND KEY PROVINCIAL ROADS. THIS ACTIVITY GREW THROUGHOUT NOVEMBER AND WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY A SERIES OF WELL EXECUTED VC NIGHT ATTACKS. DESPITE THE MOOD OF UNCERTAINTY GENERATED BY THESE VC EFFORTS, THERE WAS AT NO TIME ANY QUESTION OF THE ABILITY OF GVN FORCES TO MAINTAIN THEIR ASCENDANCY OVER THE LONG RUN IN AREAS UNDER GVN CONTROL. THE "WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN" APPARENTLY WAS AIMED AT DEMONSTRATING VC STRENGTH, DESTROYING PACIFICATION MOMENTUM, NULLIFY-

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ASSASSINATIONS, ABDUCTION OF CIVILIANS VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	1823	1545
RD	259	NO RECO
STATUS OF ROADS - GREEN (PCT)	23.1	11.7 (JUL)
671	76.9	88.3 (JUL)
671	0	0 (JUL)
671	43.6 (PCT)	
671	38.7	0.0 (JUL)
671	51.4	84.58 (JU
L671		

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RED (PCT)

L671	9.9	15.5 (JU
HES NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (ABC) CATEGORY (SECURITY ONLY)	2015	1.967
71		(JAN 6
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORY (SECURITY ONLY)	54.1	53.2
71		(JAN 6
RF STRENGTY	1967	1966
88	53.6758	53.0628
RF STRENGTH	60.6908	68.9968
88		

8 FIGURES AVAILABLE FROM 1 MAY 1967 ONLY 88 30 NOVEMBER 1967
88 31 JANUARY 1967

FOOTNOTE 1	JAN	DEC
LOCs (NATION-WIDE)		
ROADS - A GREEN	35PCT	60.9PCT (1707.5 KM)
AMBR	47PCT	38.8PCT (1087.5 KM)
RED	18PCT	3PCT (10.0 KM)
WATHERWAYS - GREEN	MAR	
AMBER	14PCT	47.5PCT (275 KM)
	62PCT	44.7PCT (259 KM)

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 ING GAINS GENERATED BY THE LOCAL ELECTIONS AND CONTROLLED ISOLATION
 OF THE LOWER DELTA. THE CAMPAIGN SERVES BOTH LOCAL PRAGMATIC AND
 SWEEPING POLITICAL ENDS. WITH THE RICE HARVEST UNDERWAY, CONTROLLED
 INTERDICTION OF NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ROADS CAN HOLD RICE IN THE
 DISTRICT AND PERMIT THE MOVEMENT OF MANUFACTURED GOODS (TAXABLE BY
 THE VC) FROM SAIGON INTO PROVINCIAL CAPITALS. HARASSMENT AND TERROR-
 ISM BOLDLY APPLIED REAWAKEN THE POPULATION TO THE RIGORS OF WAR.
 ANTI-US PROPAGANDA BY THE VC IS DESIGNED TO UNDERLINE THE COMMON
 BLIGHT OF ALL VIETNAMESE, AND SNEERING AT THE "PUPPET GOVERNMENT",
 PURPORTS TO SHOW THE VIET CONG AS THE ONLY REAL FORCE REPRESENTATIVE
 OF THE PEOPLE, MORE PARTICULARLY OF THE RURAL PEOPLE. THE DELTA VC
 HAVE OBTAINED MANY NEW WEAPONS AND MUCH AMMUNITION - OF SOVIET AND
 CHINESE ORIGIN. THESE HAVE PROBABLY COME INTO THE DELTA FOR THE
 MOST PART VIA CAMBODIA AND THE SEA. IN DECEMBER, THE MOMENTUM GEN-
 ERATED BY THE VC FALTERED IN THE DELTA. THEIR PROPAGANDA IN IV CTZ
 STILL DEPICTS THEIR ROLE AS THE PEOPLE'S DEFENDER AND SLAPS AT THE
 AMERICANS. LATTERLY IN DECEMBER, SIGNS APPEARED OF A CONCERTED
 DRIVE ON AMERICAN ADVISORS. GVN AND US FORCES NOT IN THE DELTA ARE
 STRONG AND ABLE TO PREVENT ANY LASTING VC GAINS, PROBABLY EVEN IN
 POST-RD HAMLETS. THE MOST TROUBLING ASPECTS OF THE DELTA SITUATION

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 ARE THE SERIOUS CONDITION OF LAND ROUTES OF COMMUNICATIONS, THE NUMBE
 R
 OF GVN LOCAL FORCES TIED UP IN STATIC POSITIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF
 HEIGHTENED VC ACTIVITY, AND THE IMPUNITY WITH WHICH VC CAN CONCEN-
 TRATE, MOVE OVER FAMILIAR ROUTES, AND STRIKE AND THEIR ACCUSTOMED
 TARGETS. RD CADRE AND RF/PF CONTINUED TO ACQUIT THEMSELVES WELL,
 WITH A FEW ISOLATED EXCEPTIONS IN ACTION AGAINST VC GUERRILLAS AND
 SMALL LOCAL FORCE UNITS.

TABLE TWELVE
 IV CORPS SECURITY RESUME

	1967	1966
VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AA)	6,747	7,788
TERRORISM INCIDENTS	1,215	& NO RECO
RD		
VC COMBAT STRENGTH	18,195	20,08

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
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RED 24PCT 708PCT (45 KM)
DEC 66

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ACTIONINFO AID 10, EA 06, SAL 01, SS 10, GPM 03, INR 07, FILE 01, MM 01, SR 01,
ORM 01, IO 13, IGA 02, P 03, /059 W

P 030250Z FEB 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CINCPAC
 INFO CJCS
 DOD
 STATE AID
 CIA
 EG I FFORCE SA II CTZ
 CG II FFORCE SA III CTZ
 CG III MAF SASI CTZ
 SA IV CTZ

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 03518 FM MACJ04R
 FOR: ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LT 49JJ9, LTG WEYAND, LTG
 CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER, SECTION VII OF XIV.
 RAILS - GREEN 28PNT 31PCT (384.9 KM)

W BER 17PCT 6.5PCT JKIPMI KM)
 43\$ 56PCT 62.5PCT (774.6KM)
 C. EXPAND AND SUPPLEMENT RD GROUPS AND ASSOCIATED PROGRAMS:
 (1) RD CADRE

PAGE 1 & 47-J-0229B C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 (1) FROM THE BEGINNING OF JANUARY TO THE END OF
 THE YEAR THE RD CADRE GREW FROM 361 TO 555 RD TEAMS. BY DECEMBER,
 THERE WERE 29,120 RD KADRE IN THE FIELD AND OVER 7,843 IN TRAINING
 AT VUNG TAU, THE GREATEST ADVANCE WAS IN QUALITY. CADRE ACTIVITIES
 IN PHASE II HAMLETS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY A PROFESSIONALISM THAT

INCLUDED IN IDA

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WAS ABSENT DURING MTXT OF PHASE I. THE REASON FOR THE IMPROVED CADRE PERFORMANCE IS TO BE FOUND IN A COMPLEX OF FACTORS AT EACH LEEL OF GVN AUTHORITY. GENERAL THANG'S FORCE, HONESTY AND COMMITMENT PROVED SHARP WEAPONS WHEN APPLIED TO NODES OF POWER IN COMMAND CHANNELS RUNNING RRM SAIGON TO RD HAMLET. HE CURRICULA AT VUNG TAU WERE HONED. FAILURES REGISTERED IN PHASE I GENERATED A GROWING FUND OF EXPERIENCE. THE CORDS ORGAIZATION BROUGHT AN INTEGRATED ADVISORY EFFORT TO BEAR ON RD TEAMS AND FOSTERED A MORE FINELY MESHED PROVINCIAL INTERSERVICE APPROACH TO RD. CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION IMPROVED AS A FUNCTION OF EXPERIENCE, MOUNTING VC PRESSURE, MOBILE TRAINING FOR RVNAF UNITS, AND EXPANSION OF RD TEAM COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES.

(B) CIVIL-MILITARY (C/M) TEAMS WERE LOOKED TO EARLY IN THE PERIOD AS AN EFFECTIVE MEDIUM FOR QUANTITAVE AUGMENTATION OF THE RD TEAM EFFORT. THE STRENGTH OF THESE TEAMS ROSE TO

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 0229B K O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 THIRTY-FIVE AND THEN DECLINED AS 1967 TASKS WERE COMPLETED AND ATTENTION SHIFTED TO 1968. A NUMBER OF C/M TEAMS ARE PROGRAMMED INTO CORPS 1968 PACIFICATION PLANS. THE MOST ATTRACTIVE FEATURE OF THE C/M TEAMS IS THEIR INCORPORATION OF PROVINCIAL TECHNICAL SERVICE CADRE. THUS, PARTICIPATION IN HAMLET CONSTRUCCION COULD LEAVE A VALUABLE RESIDUM OF INTEREST AMONG CIVIL OFFICIALS, IN POST RD DEVELOPMENT. LIKE THE C/M TEAMS, THE QUARTER ZONE EXPERIMENT IN BINH THUAN IS NOT WIDELY EMULATED, ALTHOUGH IT REMAINS A MODEL OF THE KIND OF SELF-ENERGIZING PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT THAT COULD BE A SIGNIFICANT ANTIDOTE TO HAMLET REGRESSION.

(C) RD CADRE LEADERSHIP, NOTORIOUSLY WEAK AT THE OUTSET OF 1967, STRENGTHENED STEADILY AS THE YEAR UNROLLED. THE PRIME FACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS NEW MUSCLE ARE EXPERIENCE, THE ATTRITION OF INCOMPETENTS, IMPROVED GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE FROM PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS, AND THE GROWTH IN AWARENESS OF PACIFICATION AS A COMPLEX OF CIVIL AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP. THE NEW LEADERSHIP TRAINING COURSE AT THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER WHICH PRODUCED 784 GRADUATES IN DECEMBER WILL LEND IMPETUS TO THIS TREND. STRENGTHENING OF CADRE LEADERSHIP IS BASICALLY FIXED IN THE PATTERN OF DEVELOPMENT OF RD TEAM PERFORMANCE. THEREFORE, IT

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PAGE 4 RUMSMA 0229B C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 REMAINS AS IT ALWAYS HAS BEEN, CONTINGENT UPON INCREASED INTERACTION
 BETWEEN ALL PACIFICATION ELEMENTS. THE EFFORT TO STIMULATE INTEREST
 IN THE RD PROGRAM AMONG GVN OFFICIALS HAS FOSTERED A VASTLY WIDENED
 PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE ROLE OF RD CADRE, OF THE NATIONAL TRAINING
 CENTER, AND OF THE FACT THAT PACIFICATION IS A TOTAL INVOLVEMENT
 RATHER THAN THE WORKING OF A SINGLE "MIRACLE ELEMENTS SUPPORTED BY
 PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES.

(D) THE PROJECTED COURSE FOR PROVINCE AND DISTRICT
 CHIEKS AND RD CADRE LEADERS, A KEY FACET OF THIS EFFORT TO INTENSIFY
 INTEREST, FAITED TO MATERIALIZE IN LATE DECEMBER AS HOPED. IT IS
 REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT GENERAL THIEU WILL GIVE HIS APPROVAL TO
 THE UNDERTAKING, PROBABLY EARLY IN 1968. US OVERTURES TO SEEK RE-
 MOVAL OF CORRUPT OR INCAPABLE GVN OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN RD ELICITED
 LITTLE RESPONSE.

BUT THE LAST QUARTER OF 1967 SAW THE FIRST CLEAR EVI-
 DENCE OF SERIOUS GVN RESPONSE TO US GESTURES OF THIS KIND.

(E) WIDESPREAD COMPLECENCY ABOUT HAMLET SELF-
 DEFENSE FORCES WAS TRANSFORMED RAPIDLY INTO ADVISORY CONCERN BY
 PROJECT TAKEOFF'S CLEARLY STATED EMPHASIS. THE FORMATION AND TRAIN-
 ING OF RDPG IN THE YEAR'S LATTER HALF WAS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE.

PAGE 5 RUMSMA 0229B C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 PARALLELED BY THE UPGRADING OF APT - OF THE CHANGE THAT CAN BE
 WROUGHT LOCALLY BY APPROPRIATE VANAGEMENT EMPHASIS. ARMING HE
 GROUPS REMAINED A NETTLESOME PROBLEM THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD ALTHOUGH
 A SURPRISING NUMBER WERE EQUIPPED FROM LOCAL RESOURCES. A JGS DI-
 RECTIVE OF 6 DECEMBER SET FORTH A WORKABLE METHODOLOGY FOR ARMS
 ISSUE AND THE NECESSARY DETAILED GUIDANCE IS CURRENTLY UNDER PREPAR-
 ATION. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE CONCEPT WAS "BOUGHT" BY GENERAL THANG
 AFTER, AND BECAUSE THE GROUPS MATERIALIZED ?

IN THE AP DOI MOI.

II

 TABLE THIRTEEN
 NUMBER OF CADRE TEAMS

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IM	31 DEC 67	31 DEC 66	PCT INCREASE	DEC 66 - DEC 67
I CORPS	129	97	33	
II CORPS	169	91	EU	
III CROPS	83	51	-63	
IV CORPS	181	95	91	

IN ADDITION TO RD KADRE, THERE WERE 108 TSRD MONTAGNARD TEAMS AS OF 31 DECEMBER. THERE ARE ALSO 30 CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMS, 26 OF THEM IN II CORPS.

(2) RD CADRE DESERTIONS WERE A PRINCIPAL PROBLEM FOR

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 0229B C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

THE PROGRAM DURING THE YEAR. THE DESERTIONS FOR 1967 WERE 166.8 PER THOUSAND. TOTAL CADRE LOSSES ARE SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

TABLE FOURTEEN

RD CADRE LOSSES

	1967	1966
KIA	720	593
CAPTURED	122	75
RESIGNED	1127	849
DISCHARGED AND RETIRED	1856	686
DESERTED	4020	8
TOTAL	7845	2203

& ACCURATE DESERTION FIGURES FOR 1966 ARE NOT AVAILABLE.

(3) THE STATIC CENSUS GRIEANCE PROGRAM WAS RELATIVELY TROUBLE-FREE DURING THE YEAR AND

WAS PROBABLY THE MOST SUCCESSFUL OF

THE RD PROGRAMS. AT THE END OF THE YEAR THERE WERE 5,502 CENSUS GRIEANCE CADRES OF A CEILING OF 7917 SET FOR 1 JANUARY 1968. THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANH INDUCED TO RALLY BY RD AND CG ARE:

RD: G TSRD	923
CENSUS GRIEANCE	1681

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ACTION

INFO AID 10, EA 06, SAL 01, SS 10, GPM 03, INR 07, FILE 01, MM 01, SR 01,
 ORM 01, IO 13, IGA 02, P 03, 1059 W

P 030250Z FEB 68 ZFF-6
 FM COMUSMACV
 TO CINCPAC
 INFO CJCS
 DOD
 STATE AID
 CIA
 CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 CG II FFORCEV SA III KTZ
 CG III MAF SA I CTZ
 SA IV CTZ

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 03518 FM: MAJ 01R
 FOR: ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROYSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG
 CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER, SECTION XIII OF XIV.
 PEOPLE RESULTED.

(2) IN 1967, 93 PERCENT OF ARVN BATTALIONS AND 84 PER-
 CENT OF RF COMPANIES RECEIVED RD MOBILE TRAINING. FIFTY-SEVEN PER-
 CENT OF PF PLATOONS RECEIVED "NEW" MIP TRAINING. THE HARDEST TASK
 IN THE RVNAF ACTION PROGRAM PROVED TO BE DISPELLING THE LOGISTICAL

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 0235B CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN
 APATHY OF RVNAF COMMANDERS AND THEIR STAFFS. GVN PLANNING AND EXE-
 CUTION CONSISTENTLY SLIGHT TIE DETAILS OF MATERIAL SUPPORT AND MORE
 PARTICULARLY, OF TROOP AND DEPENDENT CARE. HOWEVER, FIRM PRESSURE
 HAS ELICITED FORWARD MOVEMENT IN SOME AREAS. FREE OPERATIONAL RATES
 ARE NOW BEING ISSUED TO ARVN AND 57 PERCENT OF THE 1967 GOAL OF 21
 UNIT MESSES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. THE VERY EXTENSIVE 1967 ENDEAVO

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TO DEVELOP A WORTHWHILE RVNAF COMMISSARY SYSTEM HAS REGISTERED CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS, QUALIFIED BY RATHER LISTLESS DISTRIBUTION AND WAREHOUSING. SIXTEEN MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF US FOOD ITEMS REQUISITIONED BEGAN ENTERING THE COUNTRY IN SEPTEMBER. ABOUT SIX MILLION DOLLARS WORTH HAD ARRIVED BY THE END OF DECEMBER, WITH SALES REACHING THE ONE MILLION MARK DURING THE SAME PERIOD. US FOOD IMPORTS ARE MEANT TO UPGRADE TROOP AND DEPENDENT DIETS AND PROVIDE A SUBSIDY TO COVER OPERATING COSTS AND LIMITED INVESTMENT IN NEW ASSETS FROM PROFITS GENERATED. IT APPEARS THAT THE ARVN WEAPONS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM MAY GENERATE A SPINOFF OF INTENSIFIED AGGRESSIVENESS, JUDGING BY THE PERFORMANCE OF 1ST DIVISION ELEMENTS ARMED WITH THE M-16 RIFLE. THE DCSLOGAUTOMATED EQUIPMENT STATUS REPORTING SYSTEM REMAINS PROJECTED FOR SPRING 1968.

(3) MUCH ATTENTION HAS BEEN FOCUSED ON THE SECURITY

0-83 3 RUMSMA 0235B C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN MAINTENANCE, AND UTILIZATION OF LOCATIONS THE ATTITUDE OF GVN CIVIL AUTHORITIES AND RVNAF HAS SHIFTED FROM COMPLACENCY TO CONCERN IN VIEW OF PRESENT C EFFORTS AGAINST NATIONAL HIGHWAYS. THERE ARE 19 MOBILE ADVISORY TEAMS (MATs) DEPLOYED IN IV CTZ AND 24 IN III CTZ. IN II KTZ THERE ARE 12 COMBINED MILITARY IMPROVEMENT TEAMS AND 12 COMBINED MILITARY TRAINING TEAMS, BOTH LOCAL MEASURES AIMED AT UPGRADING RF/PF PERFORMANCE. FIELD REPORTS INDICATE THAT SOME PROBLEMS IN PROPER UTILIZATION, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, AND MORALE ATTENDED THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF MAT IN IV CTZ. THE CONCEPT IS PROVING ITSELF, HOWEVER. MOST OF THE PROBLEMS THAT AROSE WHEN THE TEAMS WERE FIELDED GREW OUT OF THE TRANSITION FROM AMERICAN T-SOOP UNIT ASSIGNMENTS TO RELATIVELY UNSTRUCTURED ADVISORY ROLES.

(4) THE AVERAGE MONTHLY NUMBER OF NIGHT OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY THROUGH DECEMBER 1967 WERE: ARVN, ABOUT 17,400 WITH 264 CONTACTS (1.5 PERCENT); RF, ABOUT 20,600 WITH 282 CONTACTS (1.4 PERCENT); PF, ABOUT 36,700 WITH 433 CONTACTS (1.2 PERCENT). THE FIGURES INDICATE AN AVERAGE OF 10 NIGHT OPERATIONS PER PF PLATOON PER MONTH, WITH ONE CONTACT.

(5) THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN EXPANSION OF PACIFICATION-SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE PERIOD JULY THROUGH

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PAGE 4 RUMSMA 02358 C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 DECEMBER. BASICALLY, MACCORDS NOW AN INTEGRATED CIVIL-MILITARY TELEPHONE AND TELETYPE NETWORK EXTENDING FROM SAIGON TO ALL CORPS HEADQUARTERS, WITH EXTENDED SERVICE INTEGRAL TO EACH CORPS HEADQUARTERS. THE NUMBER OF PROVINCES SERVED BY SECURE TELETYPE ROSE FROM 22 IN JULY TO 38 BY 31 DECEMBER. EXPANSION AND IMPROVEMENT OF PACIFICATION-SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS MADE EXCELLENT PROGRESS. PROCUREMENT OF USAID-FUNDED AUGMENTATION EQUIPMENT IS UNDERWAY. USAID EQUIPMENT AND O&M FUNDING WILL BE PHASED OUT OVER THE NEXT 18-24 MONTHS. PROBLEMS IN PROVINCE-LEVEL CORDS COMMUNICATIONS CURRENTLY CENTER AROUND TESTS AND MODIFICATIONS BEING APPLIED TO THE AN/PRC-74 RADIO.

J. IMPROVE PACIFICATION PLANNING

(1) THIS PROGRAM, THROUGH NOT UNMARKED BY SERIOUS SETBACKS, DEVELOPED ALONG THE LINES ENVISIONED IN PROJECT TAKEOFF. THAT IT SHOULD HAVE DONE SO THROUGH A PERIOD HIGHLIGHTED BY NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND EXTENSIVE GVN REORGANIZATION IS REMARKABLE. AB 143- THE COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR 1968-CONTAINED THE FIRST FULLY INTEGRATED TREATMENT OF PACIFICATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A TOTAL CAMPAIGN. FROM THE TIME PLANNING BEGAN IN AUGUST, EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN A TOTALLY COORDINATED CONFIGURATION WERE REPEATEDLY FRUSTRATED.

PAGE 5 RUMSMA 02358 C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
 BY THE CHRONIC INABILITY OF THE MINISTRIES TO MAKE DECISIONS OR TO COORDINATE EVEN MINIMALLY WITH ONE ANOTHER, US PRESSURE RESULTED IN ESTABLISHMENT, IN NOVEMBER, OF A CENTRAL RD COUNCIL AND COUNCILS AT CORPS AND PROVINCE, BUT FEW OF THEM WERE FUNCTIONING SATISFACTORILY BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

(2) IN SEPTEMBER, MORD 1968 PLANNING GUIDELINES WERE PUBLISHED. CLOSE US-GVN COORDINATION PRIOR TO PUBLICATION KEPT THE GUIDELINES IN CONSONANCE WITH AB 143. KORPS DEPCORDS BEGAN WORK ON REGIONAL ANNEXES TO THE AID CAP (COUNTY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM) SECTOR PLANS. DURING OCTOBER, AB 143 WAS PUBLISHED AND A MAJOR MACCORDS EFFORT WENT INTO REVIEW AND REVISION OF THE AID KAP TO INSURE COMPATIBILITY WITH PACIFICATION PLANS. THERE WAS A MARKED LACK OF GVN RESPONSE TO MACCORDS PLANNING OVERTURES AT THIS TIME DUE TO PREOCCUPATION WITH FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT. NOVEMBER SAW AB 143 SIGNED AND THE AID CAP RECONCILED AGAINST PACIFICATION PLANS. THE CULMINATION OF THE 1968 PLANNING EFFORT WAS THE PRODUCTION OF

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PROVINCE PACIFICATION PLANS WHICH ARE BEING REVIEWED AT THE PRESENT TIME. THESE PLANS ARE GENERALLY THE PRODUCT OF UNPRECEDENTED US-GVN COORDINATION AND ARE CHARACTERIZED BY AMBITIOUS BUT REALISTIC GOALS, A SYSTEM OF PACIFICATION PRIORITIES, COUPLED WITH

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 2235B CONFIDENTIAL INFOR
INCLUSION OF TIME-PHASED GOALS, ARE OTHER SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF
1968 PACIFICATION AND CAMPAIGN PLANS. THE CONSENSUS OF FIELD COM-
MANDERS MARKS AB143 AS AN ENCOURAGING SUCCESS.

4. (C) STATUS OF PACIFICATION
RESOURCES

TABLE TWENTY-NINE

	1967	1966
UNITS IN DIRECT SUPPORT:		
ARVN BATTALIONS	55	
RF COMPANIES	208	
QF PLATOONS	568	
GROUPS:		
RD KADRE (END OF 1967 INCLUDES 38 20-MAN TEAMS IN AN GIANG)	555	361
TGUONG SON	108	171
CIVIL/ MILITARY	30	
QUARTER ZONE TEAM	2	
STATIC CENSUS GRIEVANCE CADRE	5,500	5,131
NATIONAL POLICE	73,371	61,250

5. (C) INDICATOR TRENDS:

TABLE THIRTY

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ACTION

INFO AID 10, EA 06, SAL 01, SS 10, GPM 03, INR 07, MM 01, FILE 01, SR 01,
ORM 01, IO 13, IGA 02, P 03, /059 W.

P 030250Z FEB 68 ZFF-6

FM COMUSMACV

TO CINCPAC

INFO JCS

DOD

STATE AID

CIA

CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ

CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ

CG III MAF SA I CTZ

SA IV CTZ

Chu

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 03518 FM: MAOJOIR
FOR: ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG W
EYAND, LTG
CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION VIII OF XIV.

TOTAL 2604

DO ACCELERATE THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM.

11) ALTHOUGH THE 1967 RETURNEE RATE EXCEEDED THAT FOR
1966, IT DID NOT COME UP TO EXPECTATIONS. GVN INACTION CONTRIBUTED
HEAVILY TO THE PROGRAM'S PERFORMANCE WITH NEARLY 11,000 RALLIERS

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 0230B C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
AT THE END OF MARCH, CERTAIN NEW CHALLENGES WERE INJECTED INTO THE
SITUATION THAT SIMPLY COULD NOT BE MET DESPITE HEAVY ADVISORY
EFFORT.

CENTERS WERE NOT ONLY STRAINED BUT TAXED WELL BEYOND CAPACITY. NO
EFFECTIVE MEANS WERE FOUND TO GOAD THE GVN INTO HASTENING NEW CON-

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STRUCTURE, VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION, RESETTLEMENT ID CARDS, AND SOCIAL REINTEGRATION BECAME PROBLEMS OF THE FIRST RANK, OARGELY IGNORED BY GVN AND GROWING BEYOND THE CAPABILITIES OF CHIEU HOI ADVISORS PREOCCUPIED WITH SIMPLE CARE AND FEEDING. NOT ONLY DID THE HEAVY INFLUX OF THE FIRST THREE MONTHS GENERATE SEVERE INTERNAL STRAINS, BUT IT ELICITED STRONG VC COUNTERPRESSURES THAT WERE NEVER RELAXED FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR. DEFLECTION BECAME, AND REMAINED, DIFFICULT. STRINGENT CONTROLS WERE APPLIED TO WEAPONS. HAD MICH AND THE PROVINCE CHIEFS SEEN FIT TO MAKE AGGRESSIVE USE OF PROGRAM RESOURCES, THE IMPETUS OF THE TET CAMPAIGN MIGHT HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED. THE MAJOR 1967 LESSON IS THAT TIME AND SUCCESS SHIFTED THE CENTRAL PROBLEM FROM RECEPTION TO REESTABLISHMENT WHERE GVN CAPABILITY WAS MOST DEFICIENT. (THE REFUGEE PROGRAM EXHIBITS A PARALLEL SHIFT.)

(2) NEW CONSTRUCTION NEVER MOVED APPRECIABLY UNTIL THE SECONDHALF. BY THE END OF NOVEMBER, 16 OF 53 PROGRAMMED PROJECTS

PAGE 3. RUMSMA 0230B IC O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN WERE COMPLETED, AND BY THE END OF DECEMBER, 20. DURING THE YEAR, ABOUT 5,450 HOI CHANH RECEIVED A CICKRSE OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING. THE EFFORT TO AMALGAMATE NEW CONSTRUCTION AND VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION IN A TRAINING PACKAGE AT CERTAIN CENTERS WITH EDUCATION CONSULTANT REPRESENTATIVES IN THE ROLE OF INSTRUCTORS/TECHNICAL SUPERVISORS, HELD PROMISE BUT DOGGED WON IN GVN INDIFFERENCE AND TEMPORIZING. ALTHOUGH THE EDUCATIONAL CONSULTANTS LTD. (EDCON) EMPLOYEES BROUGHT A VALUABLE FUND OF CONSTRUCTION SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE INTO THE PROGRAM, A SHORTAGE OF TOOLS HELD THE TRAINING TO AN EXTREMELY NARROW SPECTRUM AND HINDERED WORK PROGRESS. THE FIRST SHIPMENTS OF AMERICAN TOOLS WERE RECEIVED IN COUNTRY IN NOVEMBER.

(3) THE PROJECT TAKEOFF SUBPROGRAMS TARGETED ON UTILIZATION OF RALLIERS ENJOYED A NOTABLE SUCCESS IN SPITE OF A MULTITUDE OF NAGGING PROBLEMSM ABOUT 1100 HOI CHANH UNDERWENT RDC TRAINING AT VUNG TAU. THESE MEN WITH RARE EXEPTIONS HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES TO BE EAGER, COMPETENT RD CADRE. IN NOVEMBER JGS AND MACV DIRECTIVES RELATIVE TO THE ARMING THE APT WENT TO THE FIELD. THE ISSUANCE OF ARMS UNDER THEIR PROVISIONS BEGAN DURING THE SAME MONTH. ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAM (APT) TRAINING ACHIEVED AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS BY NOVEMBER, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO NATIONAL PROGRAM.

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 THE EMPLOYMENT OF HOI CHANH AS KIT CARSON SCOUTS INCREASED SHARPLY
 DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE YEAR.
 THE USE OF AIK FUNDS TO PAY KIT CARSON
 SCOUTS DURING THE REMAINDER OF FY 68 WAS APPROVED BY MACV IN LATE
 DECEMBER.
 LONG-RUN SUCCESS OF THIS PROMISING UNDERTAKING IS CON-
 TINGENT UPON DEVELOPMENT OF AN ADEQUATE SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION AND
 LOGISTICS, WHICH WILL BE DEALT WITH
 DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1968. THE GVN CHIEU HOI FIELD STAFF FINISHED
 THE YEAR IN BETTER SHAPE THAN AT THE OUTSET, BUT STILL TOO WEAK TO
 EFFECT A GENERAL RESOLUTION OF THE PROGRAM'S PERSISTENT PROBLEMS
 EARLY IN 1968. ADVISORY PRESSURE
 AND MINISTERIAL INTEREST PROMISE

IMPROVEMENT, BUT THE PROCESS
 OF WEEDING OUT THE INEFFECTIVE AND
 GETTING CAPABLE MEN TO REPLACE THEM WILL PROBABLY BE A TIME-CONSUM-
 ING PROCESS.

(4) THE OVERALL INCREASE IN CHIEU HOI FIGURES IS
 ILLUSTRATED IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE: TABLE FIFTEEN

	1967	1966	1965
I CORPS	2512	1734	1224
II CORPS	7168	9068	5200
III CORPS	8054	3713	2200
IV CORPS	9444	5727	3200
TOTAL	27,178	20,242	12,600

PAGE 5 RUMSMA 02300 C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

II CORPS	7168	9068
III CORPS	8054	3713
IV CORPS	9444	5727
TOTAL	27,178	20,242

(5) IN SPITE OF THE DECLINE IN RETURNEE RATES, CHIEU
 HOI RESULTS IN 1967 EXCEEDED THOSE OF 1966. THE FOLLOWING TABLE
 SHOWS HOW:

	1 JAN - 31 DEC	1 JAN - 31 DEC	PERCENT
--	----------------	----------------	---------

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	1966	1967	CHANGE
I CORPS	1,734	2,512	44.9
II CORPS	9,068	7,168	(20.9)
III CORPS	3,713	8,054	117.0
IV CORPS	5,727	9,444	64.9
TOTAL	20,242	27,178	34.2

(6) THE CAPACITY OF CHIEU HOI CENTERS GREW, BUT NOT AS MUCH AS WE WOULD HAVE LIKED.

TABLE SEVENTEEN

	31 DEC 67	CAPACITY, 1 JAN 67	PERCENT INCREASE
I CORPS	765	310	147

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 0230B C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R M

II CORPS	2,020	1,000	102
III CORPS	1,945	785	148
IV CORPS	1,880	1,010	86

TOTAT PROGRAMMED NEW CAPACITY WAS 7,505. ADDED CAPACITY TOTALED 6,610 REPRESENTING 82%NG OF PROGRAM COMPLETION.
 (7) THE NUMBERS OF HOI CHANH IN APTS ARE SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE.

TABLE EIGHTEEN

	1 JAN 67	31 DEC 67	WEAPONS (AS OF 30 NOV)
I CORPS	1,324	378	216
(NATIONAL TOTAL)			
II CORPS		549	316
III CORPS		707	299

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IV CORPS

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36

SAIGON	857	530
TOTAL	1,324	2,664
		1,397

3. IMPROVE THE REFUGEE EFFORT:
(1) THE REFUGEE PROGRAM AT THE END OF JUNE WAS FACED
WITH A COMPLEX OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS. FIELD STAFF STRENGTH STOOD AT
LESS

THAN HALF THE AUTHORIZED LEVEL; NEW RESETTLEMENT CONSTRUCTION

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ACTION

INFO AID 10, EA 06, SAL 01, SS 10, GPM 03, INP 07, MM 01, FILE 01, SR 01,
 ORM 01, 10 03, IGA 02, P 03, 1049: W

P 030250Z FEB 68 ZFF=6 ZFD
 FM CCMUSMACV
 TO CINCPAC
 INFO CJCS
 DOD
 STATE AID
 CIA
 CG I FFORCE SA II CTZ
 CG II FFORCEV SA UMI CTZ
 CG III MAE SA I CTZ
 SA IV CTZ

R. T. *yes*

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 03518 FM MACROIR
 FOR: ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG

CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION IX OF XIV.
 LAGGED SERIOUSLY, AND TEMPORARY RESETTLEMENT CENTERS WERE OVERCROWDED
 WHILE NEW REFUGEES WERE SUPPORTED IN AD-INTERIM CAMPS OR STRAGGLED.

BACK TO THEIR HAMLETS OF ORIGIN. SECURE LAND FOR REFUGEE REESTABLISH-
 MENT WAS NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLE, PARTICULARLY IN I CORPS, AND ADMINIS-
 TRATIVE CONTROL OF TEMPORARILY RESETTLED REFUGEES DID NOT MEET THE

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 0231B CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN
 STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES.
 (2) THE FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE MID-YEAR REFUGEE SITU-
 ATION WERE THE KICK OF PROGRAM PRIORITY, WEAK GVN REFUGEE FIELD

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ADMINISTRATORS, THE ABSENCE OF THE JOB OPPORTUNITIES, AND LACK OF SECUR

LAND FOR REESTABLISHMENT OF REFUGEES. PROJECT TAKEOFF TURNED MANAGEMENT ATTENTION TO THESE AREAS OF WEAKNESS AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH A HIGHER PRIORITY FOR THE REFUGEE PROGRAM. INCREASED US AND GVN EMPHASIS ON THE PROGRAM MANIFESTED ITSELF IN IMPROVED PERFORMANCE BY FIELD STAFF, WITH SEVERAL GVN REFUGEE OFFICIALS REMOVED FOR INEFFECTIVENESS. CORDS INITIATIVES SPURRED AID/W TO EXPEDITE RECRUITMENT FOR REFUGEE ADVISORS, WITH A SPECIFIC EFFORT AIMED AT END-OF-TOUR PACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS.

(3) DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1967, CORDS REFUGEE FIELD ADVISOR STRENGTH WAS DOUBLED. WORK WAS STARTED ON WRITING REFUGEE RELIEF AND RESETTLEMENT INTO AB 143A, THE 1968 COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN.

THE LATTER REQUIRES BOTH GVN AND US/FWMAF TO PROVIDE IN THEIR OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR THE SECURITY AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF REFUGEES.

AN EXISTING COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION PROJECT WAS EXPANDED

TWOFOLD TO TRAIN 36 SCR MOBILE TEAMS OVER A YEAR'S PERIOD. BY THE END OF DECEMBER, 34 OF THE VERY EFFECTIVE GVN MOBILE TEAMS HAD BEEN

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FIELDED. REORGANIZATION OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSARIAT FOR REFUGEES (SCRBI) INTO THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND REFUGEES (MSWR) UNDER DR. QUE IN OCTOBER PROMISED LONG-RUN GAINS THROUGH IMPROVED PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION.

(4) LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE IN INTEGRATING EFFECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS INTO THE REFUGEE PROGRAM. WHILE JUSPAO FUNDING IS CITED AS A LIMITING FACTOR, THE MAJOR DETERRENT TO IMPORTANT GAINS WAS PREOCCUPATION WITH DISQUIETING OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS.

IN FACT, THE REFUGEE PROGRAM AT THE INCEPTION OF TAKEOFF WAS SUCH THAT INTENSE MANAGEMENT INTEREST IN PRIORITY UHLRADING WAS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE COURSE. INDETERMINATE LOGISTICAL GAINS ARE ATTRIBUTED

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TO THE OCTOBER SCR-CENTRAL PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY AUTHORITY (CPSA) AGREEMENT, AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE MSWR REORGANIZATION WILL, OVER THE NEXT QUARTER, IMPROVE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE. NONETHELESS, SECURE LAND AND EFFECTIVE PROVINCIAL PROVED THE CRITICAL INADEQUACIES DURING 1967.

(5) VC ATTACKS ON REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS HAVE SHARPENED THE SECURITY PROBLEM IN RECENT MONTHS. PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN VOCATIONAL REHABILITENION AND COTTAGE INDUSTRIES. US/GVN INTERZONAL RESETTLEMENT PLANNING IS NOW IN PROCESS. VOLUNTARY AGENCY PARTICI-

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PATOLS GROWTH WAS STEADY - THREE AGENCIES AND ABOUT 100 PEOPLE - DURING THE LATTER SIX MONTHS. THE THREE US CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANIES WERE OF CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE TO THE PROGRAM, PARTICULARLY IN I CORPS. OTHER US/FWMAF MILITARY UNITS WERE ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR SIGNIFICANT CIVIC ACTION SUPPORT DURING THE YEAR.

(6) CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS WAS MADE IN REFUGEE REESTABLISHMENT, AND, IN FACT, MORE REFUGEES WERE RESETTLED THAN GENERATED, RESULTING IN A DECLINE IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPUGEEES REQUIRING CARE BY 16,000 DURING THE YEAR. THE INFLOW OF NEW REFUGEES WAS APPROXIMATELY HALVED IN 1967 OVER 1966.

TABLE NINETEEN
REFUGEE INFLOW AND RE-ESTABLISHMENT

	1966	1967
REFUGEE INFLOW	893,738	436,108
REFUGEES RE-ESTABLISHED	868,133	452,120
TEMPORARY REFUGEES 31 DEC & 1 JAN 64 - 31 DEC 66	809,956	793,944

(7) REFUGEEES NOT REESTABLISHED ARE CLASSIFIED AS TEMPORARY REFUGEEES. THESE PEOPLE ARE THE OBJECT OF GVN PROGRAMS OF TEMPORARY CARE AND EVENTUAL RESETTLEMENT.

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SEE TABLE TWENTY

TEMPORARY REFUGEEES, 31 DEC 67

IN CAMP OUT OF CAMP TOTAL

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I CORPS	199,263	203,679	402,942
II CORPS	75,524	115,640	191,164
III CORPS	13,820	68,231	82,051
IV CORPS	8,501	109,286	117,787
TOTAL	297,108	496,836	793,944

1. EXPAND POLICE EFFECT

Refer

(1) EFFORTS TO UPGRADE THE NATIONAL POLICE MET WITH VARYING SUCCESS. NEW CONSTRUCTION AND EXPANSION OF EXISTING POLICE FACILITIES MADE A POOR SHOWING IN Q367, AS THEY HAVE DONE FAIRLY REGULARLY IN THE PAST. DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR 13, PROVINCIAL POLICE CHIEFS WERE REPLACED FOR INEFFICIENCY OR CORRUPT PRACTICES, OR BOTH. THE INTERNAL SECURITY BUREAU HAS BEEN EXPANDED FROM ASMEPAMEX SAIGON-BASED FORCE TO A NATIONWIDE NETWORK OF OVER 500 MEN. CERTAIN MOVES, SUCH AS THE ASSIGNMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY ADVISORS AND THE PROVISION OF CERTAIN COMMODITY SUPPORT TO TRAINING CENTERS, OMISE MEASURABLE RETURNS IN THE COMING YEAR.

(2) RESOURCES DENIAL POLICY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES,

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 STILL IN PROCESS OF APPLICATION, PROMISE A MORE EFFECTIVE PROGRAM WITH A SUBSTANTIAL DIMINUTION OF THE DELETERIOUS ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SIDE EFFECTS OF RESOURCES CONTROL.
 THE OLD BLOC HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A SERVICE WITHIN THE DIRECTORATE OF UNIFORMED POLICE AND, IN ACCORD WITH AB 143, MAJOR ATTENTION HAS SHIFTED FROM THE MOVEMENT OF FOODSTUFFS TO MOVEMENT OF WAR-RELATED MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT. AN END TO THE ABUSES

PERPETRATED ON COMMERCIAL CARRIERS IN THE NAME OF RESOURCES CONTROL WILL LOSEN CONSTRAINTS ON THE MOVEMENT OF LEGITIMATE CARGO AND HELP RAISE NATIONAL POLICE IN THE PUBLIC ESTEEM.

(3) THROUGH AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER NEW DETENTION FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION STALLED FOR LACK OF FUNDS. MONEY FOR CONSTRUCTION AND SALARY INCREASES FOR DETENTION STAFF WAS REFUSED BY THE DGBFA. NONETHELESS, PLANNING FOR EXPANSION OF THE NATIONAL DETENTION PLANT WAS UNDERTAKEN BY THE ICEX/SIDE STUDE GROUP.

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OCTOBER WAS MARKED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FOUR ADDITIONAL FIELD COURTS, BRINGING THE TOTAL TO EIGHT, OR TWO PER CTZ. IN NOVEMBER, US EFFORTS TO GET NEW CONSTRUCTION UNDERWAY BORE THEIR FIRST FRUIT WITH A FLURRY OF ACCEPTED BIDS AND NEW INVITATIONS.

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ACTION

INFO AID 10, EA 06, SAL 01, SS 10, GPM 03, INR 07, FILE 01, MM 01, SR 01,
ORM 01, IO 13, IGA 02, P 03, 1059, W

P 030250Z FEB 68 ZFF6

FM COMUSMACV

TO CINCPAC

INFO CUCS

DOD

STAZE AID

CIA

CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ

CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ

CG III MAF SA I CTZ

SA IV CTZ

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 03518 FM: MACJ01R
FOR: ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG
CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION X OF XIV.
WORK COMPLETED DURING DECEMBER INCREASED THE II CTZ PRISON CAPACITY
BY 2,500 SPACES. IN BINH DINH, ONE DETENTION CENTER WAS COMPLETED
AND ANOTHER IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION.
DURING 1967 THE INTERIGR MINISTRY FAILED TO JAR RECRUITMENT OF
DETENTION EMPLOYEES OUT OF PRESENT STATE OF NEAR-BALANCE WITH

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ATTRITION, ALTHOUGH MOVES TO INCLUDE DRAFT DEFERMENTS AND SALARY IN-
CREASES REPORTEDLY ARE BEING READIED NOW BY GVN. WE WILL PRESS TO
SEE THAT THESE MOVES MATERIALIZE.

(4) IN AUGUST, A NEW NPFF SPO REDIRECTING POLICE FIELD
FORCES INTO AN ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE ROLE WAS PUBLISHED. THE ID CARD
PROGRAM STALLED WHEN THE CARDS WERE FOUND TO BE UNSUITABLE AND RE-

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ENCLOSURE BY DDA

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MWINED MOTIONLESS "FOR WANT OF A NAIL" THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR. IN AUGUST IT WAS ASSUMED THAT THE NATIONAL POLICE YEAR END FORCE LEVEL GOAL OF 74,000 COULD NOT BE ATTAINED WITH RECRUITMENT BARELY OFFSETTING ATTRITION. DURING OCTOBER, NATIONAL POLICE SALARIES AND EMOLUMENTS WERE INCREASED IN RESPONSE TO US INITIATIVES. WHILE THESE CONSERVATIVE RAISES WERE EXPECTED TO HAVE ONLY MINOR IMPACT, THEIR COINCIDENCE WITH THE NATIONAL MOBILIZATION DECREE INCREASED RECRUITMENT SHARPLY (ROUGHLY TENFOLD) IN NOVEMBER. BY THE END OF THE YEAR, NATIONAL POLICE STRENGTH STOOD AT 73,371 MN, AN EXCELLENT SHOWING. DURING OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, NPFF, WITH 69 COMPANIES OPERATIONAL, CONTINUED TO REDEPLOY AGAINST THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE. TARGETING OF POLICE FIELD FORCES ON VC1 WAS STILL INCOMPLETE AT THE END OF THE YEAR, BUT THE REDIRECTION OF EFFORT, WHERE ACCOMPLISHED, PRODUCED ENCOURAGING RESULTS. COMPLETE SUCCESS IN THIS UNDERTAKING

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AWAITING A WELL-DEVELOPED GVN "PHOENIX" STRUCTURE THAT WILL ROUTINELY DRAW ON THE DATA BASE AND INPUT SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNELS TO NPFF UNITS.

G. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC WORKS, VILLAGE DEVELOPMENTS, AGRICULTURE, SELF-HELP AND PSYOPS:

(1) GENERALLY: DURING 1967 THE BULK OF NLD PROGRAMS GENERALLY WERE CARRIED OUT AS ENVISIONED DESPITE SEVERE LIMITATIONS, SUCH AS FREQUENTLY INADEQUATE GVN PARTICIPATION AND SUPERVISION, NUMEROUS DIFFICULTIES IN BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION AND CONSTRUCTION, AND GVN PREOCCUPATION WITH THE ELECTIONS. DESPITE THESE HANDICAPS, THERE WERE SUBSTANTIAL SUCCESSES. IN I CORPS THE MAJOR PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE SELF-HELP AREA. IN III CORPS 523 HECTARES OF IR-8 RICE WERE PLANTED IN THE VO DAT AREA, BINH TUY PROVINCE. THIS WAS THE FIRST LARGE-SCALE EXPERIMENT WITH NEW SEED VARIETIES THAT MAY REVOLUTIONIZE VIETNAMESE AGRICULTURE. THE CROP IN VO DAT WILL BE HARVESTED IN MID-FEBRUARY. TENTATIVE RESULTS OF PLOT PLOTS ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY WERE REPORTED IN LAST MONTH'S AIRGRAM. IN IV CORPS A SHORTAGE OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, SUCH AS GRAVEL AND ROCK, PRODUCED A CONCENTRATED EFFORT TO EXPAND THE OUTPUT OF NUI SAP QUARRY. ACQUISITION OF REAL ESTATE IS VIRTUALLY COMPLETE AND FULL-SCALE PRODUCTION UNDER AN

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 RMK: CONTRACT SHOULD COMMENCE ON 1 JUNE

(2) STATISTICAL INDICATORS AND ASSESSMENTS BY FUNCTION
 ALL AREAS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

TABLE TWENTY

NEW REVOLUTIONARY

DEVELOPMENT BUDGETS

AND EXP

B EXPENDITURES BY CTZ

1967 BUDGET \$VN	31 NOV 67	PCT EXPENDED	31 DEC 66
		31 DEC 67 = "	
341,465,000	71	79	72
489,229,000	64	73	71
540,369,000	67	77	78
817,292,000	61	70	76
TOTAL 2,188,355,000	65	73	75

AS ESTIMATED

TABLE TWENTY-TWO
 FINANCIAL STATUS BY ACTIVITY

ACTIVITY	1967 BUDGET \$VN	PCT EXPENDED	31 DEC 66
		31 DEC 67 = "	
VILLAGE/HAMLET ADMINISTRATION	31,933,000	56	NA
SELF-HELP HAMLET DEVELOPMENT	244,288,000	87	91

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TRANSPORTATION	189,599,000	46	NA
WAREHOUSES	53,714,000	48	45
RURAL EDUCATION	478,046,000	98	97
RURAL HEALTH	173,530,000	82	79
ROADS AND BRIDGES	457,830,000	65	63
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION	82,031,000	42	18
AGRICULTURAL IRRIGATION	51,601,000	91	87
ANIMAL HUSBANDRY	101,795,000	75	82
AGRICULTURE AFFAIRS AND			

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EXTENSTION	105,641,000	79	77
FISHERIES	44,773,000	83	76
HIGHLANDER AGRICULTURE AND			INCLUDED IN
ANIMAL HUSBANDRY	15,124,000	73	AGR AFF & EX
AS ESTIMATED			

FUNDS OBLIGATED X 31 DECEMBER MAY BE "EXPENDED" DURING THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF THE FOLLOWING CALENDAR YEAR. EXPENDITURES CUMULATIVE TO 31 DECEMBER (AS IN THE TABLES ABOVE), THEREFORE ARE NOT THE TOTAL EXPENDITURES FOR THE BUDGT YEAR, WHICH DOES NOT END UNTIL 31 MARCH.

(3) VILLAGE AND HAMLET ADMINISTRATION: THE GOAL

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 ADOPTED BY THE PROVINCES WAS TO GIVZ ORIENTATION TRAINING TO 22,900 NEWLY ELECTED OFFICIALS BY THE END OF 1967. AS OF 31 DECEMBER, 15,500 OFFICIALS HAD ACTUALLY RECEIVED THE TRAINING. IMPROVED TRAINING TECHNIQUES WERE OBSERVABLE IN A MAJORITY OF PROVINCES AS A RESULT OF INSTRUCTOR TRAINING, MATERIALS DEVELOPMENT, AND LEADERSHIP FROM GVN ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANTS TO THE FOUR GOVERNMENT DELEGATES. ALTHOUGH IT IS TOO EARLY TO REPORT CONCLUSIVELY, THE SIGNS OF THE TRAININGS'S IMPACT ON LOCAL OPERATIONS APPERA FAVORABLE.

(4) SELF-HELP HAMLET DEVELOPMENT

TABLE TWENTY-THREE

SLEFI HELP PROJECTS	PROGRAMMD	COMPLETED	
		1967	NO PROJECTS
FUNDED	4783	1967	1966
UNDUNDED	5000	4637	3578
TOTAL	9783	7280	2103
		11,417	15681

PROVINCIAL REPORTS: SOURCE:
 THE INCREASE IN UNFUNDED SLEFI HELP PROJECTS IS PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING AS THESE PROJECTS HAVE NO PIASTER INPUT FROM THE GOVERNMENT AND HENCE REQUIRE GREATEST LOCAL INITIATIVE AND

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ACTIONINFO AID 100EA 060 SAL 010 SS 100 GPM 030 INR 070 MM 010 FILE 010 SR 010
ORM 010 IO 130 IGA 020 P 030 059* W

P: 030250Z FEB 68 ZFF-6 ZFG
 FM: COMUSMACV
 TO: CINCPAC
 INFO: CUCS
 DOD
 STATE AID
 CIA
 EGI I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
 EGI II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
 EGI III MAF SA I CTZ
 SA IV CTZ

CONFIDENTIAL INFO 03518 FM: MACJ01R
 FOR: ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG
 CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION XI OF VIX.
 SUPPORT. THE PEOPLE'S CONTRIBUTION IN CASH, LABOR AND CONSTRUCTION
 MATERIALS INCREASED BY 150PCT INDICATING STRONG POPULAR SUPPORT.
 (5) TRANSPORTATION:

TABLE TWENTY-FOUR
 MORD VEHICLE PROCUREMENT/SUPPORT

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	PROGRAMMED	DUE IN	IN COUNTRY	DELIVERED
PICKUP	57 (FY66)	38	54	54
5-TON S&P	100 (FY66)	0	100	100
PICKUP	10 (FY67)	108&	0	0
5-TON S&P	68 (FY67)	68	13	0
1/4-TON	50 (FY 68)	50&&1	0	0

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PICKUP:	100 (FY68)	100	0	0
5-TON S&P	100 (FY68)	100	0	0

& 3 COVERED PICKUPS RECEIVED, BELONGED TO CPSA.
& REMAINDER FY67 PROCUREMENT DUE IN JANUARY 1968.

&& FY68 PROCUREMENT DUE IN FIRST QUARTER 1968.
AN INCREASE IN DRIVERS' SALARIES TO VNs4500 PER MONTH
EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 1968 WILL HELP EASE THE RECRUITMENT
PROBLEM WHICH HAS PLAGUED THIS ACTIVITY DURING 1967.

(6) WAREHOUSES:

TABLE TWENTY-FIVE
1967 CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

	NUMBER PROGRAMMED	NUMBER STARTED	NUMBER COMPLETED	PERCENT COMPLETED
DISTRICT WAREHOUSES	72	71	71	98

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PROVINCIAL WAREHOUSES 24 24 23 96

EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 1968, THE SALARIES OF DISTRICT
WAREHOUSE KEEPERS WERE INCREASED FROM \$VN 3200 TO \$VN 3500 AND
SALARIES OF PROVINCIAL WAREHOUSE KEEPERS FROM \$VN 3500 TO \$VN4000.

(7) RURAL EDUCATION:

(A) CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION:

	PROGRAMMED	CONSTRUCTED
	1967	1968
NUMBER OF CLASSROOMS	2266	1571

& APPROXIMATELY 500 CLASSROOMS ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION. MORD AND
USAID/ED-SOURCE.

(B) TEACHER TRAINING:

	PROGRAMMED	TNG COMPLTED
	67	67&
	2959	2968

& MORD-SOURCE.

RUNDS FOR CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION HAD BEEN ALMOST
COMPLETELY OBLIGATED BY 31 DECEMBER 1967, EVEN THOUGH ACTUAL CON-
STRUCTION WILL CONTINUE WELL INTO CY 68. THE GOAL FOR TEACHER
TRAINED HAD BEEN EXCEEDED BY 30 NOVEMBER 1967.

(8) RURAL HEALTH:

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0233B C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R M
(A) MATERNITY/DISPENSARY (MD) CONSTRUCTION

	1967 PROGRAMMED	1967 COMPLETED	UNDER CONSTRUCTION& PLANNED
NUMBER OF FACILITIES	325	120	180
AMERICAN AND USAID/PH-SOURCE			

(B) THE 1967 RURAL HEALTH PROGRAM GOT OFF TO A SLOW START BUT IS MOVING AT LAST. ONLY ABOUT 20PCT OF THE COMPLETED MDS WERE IN OPERATION AT YEAR END. USAID/PH ADVISORS ANTICIPATE THAT 100 OF THE MDS UNDER CONSTRUCTION WILL BE FINISHED BY 31 MARCH 1968. AS THE PROGRAM WAS NEW IN CONCEPT, THERE ARE NO COMPARABLE 1966 DATA.

TABLE TWENTY-SIX

		1967&	1966&
BRIDGES PROGRAMMED FOR CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION:			
A. ABOVE VN\$ 1 MILLION	33	6	
B. UNDER VN\$ 1 MILLION	31	71	
BRIDGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION COMPLETED:			
A. UNDER VN\$ 1 MILLION	30	51	
B. ABOVE VN\$ 1 MILLION	15	3	
ROADS PROGRAMMED FOR CONSTRUCTION/ RENOVATION (KM):			

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THE ABOVE DATA SHOWING STATUS AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1967 INCLUDE ESTIMATES FOR DECEMBER BASED ON FIRM INFORMATION FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY THROUGH NOVEMBER 1967.

(10) RURAL ELECTRIFICATION: THE 1967 PROGRAM AIMED AT THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENERATOR SITES TO PROVIDE LIGHTING AND POWER TO 98 HAMLETS. AT YEAR END, ONE SITE WAS 100PCT OPERATIONAL AND GENERATORS WERE IN PLACE AT TWO OTHER SITES AND WERE 20PCT CONNECTED.

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POWERHOUSES HAD BEEN COMPLETED AT 23 SITES, WITH EIGHT MORE BEING 75P
CT

COMPLETED AT 24 LOCATIONS ALL MATERIALS, INCLUDING GENERATORS AND
HARDWARE, WERE IN PLACE AND TWO ADDITIONAL SITES HAD 50PCT OF THIS
EQUIPMENT. THERE WERE SIX CONSTRUCTION CREWS WORKING IN THE FIELD
ON 13 SITES.

1111 RURAL AGRICULTURE

TABLE TWENTY-SEVEN

PAGE 6 RRUMSMA 0233B C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N
PROGRAMMED 1967 COMPLETED 1967&& COMPLETED 1966
AGRICULTURAL IRRIGATION&

NO. DAMS:

ABOVE VN\$ 1 MIL.	12	10	14
UNDER VN\$ 1 MIL.	30	30	48

KM OF CANALS

ANIMAL HUSBANDRY&

PIGS DISTRIBUTED	15,534	10,600	11,735
POULTRY DISTRIBUTED	38,586	24,800	60,933
FARMERS TRAINED	31,010	28,000	13,703

AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS&

FARMER TRAINING

SESSIONS	939	940	371
NO. FARMERS TRAINED	42,255	42,300	16,721
DEMONSTRATIONS HELD	928	1,020	NOT AVAIL

PLANTING MATERIAL DIS-

DIBUTED VN\$	31,360,000	25,000,000	14,139,017
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FISHERIES&

MARKETS/LANDING STAGES

FISHING EQUIPMENT AND	19	13	31
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ACTION

INFO AID 10, EA 06, SAL 01, SS 10, GPM 03, INR 07, FILE 01, MM 01, SR 01

ORM 01, IO 13, IGA 02, P 03, 059 W

P 030250Z FEB 68 ZFF-6

FM COMUSMACV

TO CINCPAC

INFO CJCS

DOD

STATE AID

CIA

CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ

CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ

CG III MAF SA I CTZ

SA IV CTZ

Chris Steven

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 03518 FM: MACJ01R
FOR: ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG
CUSHMAN, MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. FINAL SECTION OF XIV.

TABLE THIRTY

	1967	1966
CHIEU HOI	27,178	20,242
REFUGEES:		
GAINS	46,108	893,738
NOT RESETTLED (CUMULATIVE)	793,944	809,956

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RESETTLED (CUMULATIVE)

1,320,253

868,133

VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AA) 25,924 29,510

TERRORISM (INCLUDING RDC) 4,2408

CIVIL CASUALTIES (ASSASSINATIONS AND

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ABDUCTIONS) AS A RESULT OF TERRORISM 9,094 5,539 & DOES NOT INCLUDE FIGURES PRIOR TO MAY 1967 FIGURES NOT AVAILABLE PRIOR TO THAT TIME.

6. (C) ENEMY REACTION TO THE PACIFICATION OFFENSIVE: A. THE VC'S DOCTRINAL REACTION TO PACIFICATION IN 1967 CAN BE SUMMARIZED BY A QUOTE FROM COSVN'S GUIDELINE FOR DISRUPTION OF THE RVN PACIFICATION PROGRAM:

"IMPROVE LEADERSHIP, STRENGTHEN FORCES AND ASSIGN CADRE TO PACIFICATION AREAS. DISTRICTS AND PROVINCES SHOULD INVESTIGATE THE ACTIVITY OF VILLAGES AND HAMLETS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THEM WITH TIMELY GUIDANCE. LEADERSHIP AND GUIDANCE SHOULD BE SUITED TO EACH KIND OF PACIFICATION AREA (THE GREATER PART OF PACIFICATION AREAS INCLUDE WEAK AREAS UNDER MIXED CONTROL. THE REST ARE TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED AREAS AND LIBERATED AREAS). TAKE PARTICULAR CARE OF LOWLAND AREAS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE BECAUSE THESE AREAS ARE MAIN OBJECTIVES FOR ENEMY PACIFICATION".

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B. VC PLANS FOR 1967-68 INCLUDE INFILTRATING FALSE RALLIERS INTO THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAMS, PREVENTING REFUGEES AND DESERTERS FROM LEAVING VC-DONATED AREAS, INCREASING ATTACKS AGAINST SVN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, USING THE SO-CALLED DEATH DEFYING OR SUICIDE GROUPS TO KIDNAP OR ASSASSINATE GVN CADRES, AND PENETRATING REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AREAS. THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE FOR THESE PLANS APPEARS TO BE GENERAL UPRISING AGAINST GVN WHICH HAS BEEN MENTIONED IN MANY CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

C. THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, THERE APPEARED TO BE SEVERAL KEY FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE REDUCTION OF VC RANKS AND THE POPULATION BASE IN VC AREAS: MANY OF THE ENEMY SURRENDERED, RALLIED OR DESERTED TO ESCAPE ALLIED BOMBS, ARTILLERY, OR GROUND OPERATIONS; MANY OF THE REFUGEES AND HOI CHANH INDICATED THAT IT WAS NOT UNTIL THIS PERIOD OF THE INSURGENCY THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO RALLY PRESENTED ITSELF. THIS WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY VC PREOCCUPATION WITH OPERATIONS AND SWEEPS CONDUCTED BY FRIENDLY FORCES. IN ADDITION, CIVILIANS LEFT VC AREAS IN ORDER TO AVOID HEAVY VC TAX LEVIES AND POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT INTO VC RANKS. IN-COUNTRY RECRUITMENT, HAMPERED BY A LOSS OF POPULATION CONTROL, WAS MAINTAINED AT ABOUT 3500 PER MONTH DURING 1967 ONLY THROUGH INCREASED USE OF FORCED CONSCRIPTION COUPLED WITH A RELAXA-

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TION OF STANDARDS.

7. (C) ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PACIFICATION: SINCE THE END OF THE DELTA RICE HARVEST SEASON IN LATE FEBRUARY AND EARLY MARCH OF 1967, IT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY APPARENT THAT, IN THE DELTA AT LEAST, AGRICULTURAL REAL INCOME HAS BEGUN TO RISE. PADDY PRICES ROSE ALMOST 100PCT OVER 1966. A MARKED INCREASE IN COMMERCIAL CULTIVATION IS CONSTANTLY ENLARGING THE MARKET FOR OTHER FOOD CROPS WITH THE RESULT THAT FARMERS ARE GETTING HIGHER CASH PAYMENTS FOR PORK, FISH, AND POULTRY AS WELL AS RICE AND VEGETABLES. DURING 1967 SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WAS MADE IN INTRODUCING IR-8 RICE SEED. THIS RICE VARIETY, WHICH HAS A YIELD OF POSSIBLY 5 TIMES THAT OF LOCAL VIETNAMESE VARIETIES, WILL BE PLANTED ON 100,000 HECTARES DURING 1968, IF PRESENT GVN PLANS ARE SUCCESSFUL. AT THE SAME TIME SUFFICIENT AMOUNTS OF HARD CONSUMER GOODS ARE AVAILABLE AND THE PRICES OF THESE COMMODITIES HAVE BEEN HELD AT A FAIRLY STABLE LEVEL. IN EFFECT, WHILE RURAL PURCHASING POWER HAS BEEN GOING UP, PRICES OF CITY SUPPLIED GOODS HAVE NOT. THUS WE ARE WITNESSING A GRADUAL SHIFT IN THE TERMS OF TRADE IN FAVOR OF THE COUNTRYSIDE. THIS IS AN EXTREMELY SIGNIFICANT AND BENEFICIAL DEVELOPMENT. HAPPILY, IT IS A CONSEQUENCE OF POLICIES AND MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE GVN (WITH US ENCOURAGEMENT) WHICH

PAGE 5 RUMSMA 0236B C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
WERE DESIGNED TO PRODUCE THIS RESULT. ONE ASPECT WHICH COULD HAVE A PROFOUND EFFECT ON COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IS THE "FLESHING OUT" OR EXTENSION OF THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FOR GOOD COMING FROM THE SAIGON METROPOLITAN AREA. THESE GOODS, SEEKING THE NEW CASH LIQUIDITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, ARE NOW SELLING IN MANY REMOTE LOCATIONS FOR THE FIRST TIME. WATER PUMPS, TEXTILES, FERTILIZER, TV SETS, TRANSISTOR RADIOS, LAMBRETTA TAXIS, AND MOTORRAKES ARE FILTERING OUT OF SAIGON TO DISTRICT TOWNS AND VILLAGES. RURAL VIETNAMESE APPEAR TO BE GETTING AN ACQUISITIVE URGE. LOOKED AT IN ANOTHER SENSE AN ECONOMIC REVIVAL IS TAKING PLACE WHEREABLE PROVIDE A SOLID UNDERPINNING FOR THE PACIFICATION AND "NATION BUILDING" PROCESS.
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IMMEDIATE

ADDRESSED DJAKARTA 224, REPEATED WASHINGTON 362.

FOR THE MINISTER.

FOLLOWING IS REPETITION OF TELEGRAM NO.030 DATED 5/2/68
 FROM SAIGON.
 BEGINS -

ENEMY TET OFFENSIVE.

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT.

IN THE WEEK BEGINNING

29TH JANUARY VIET CONG AND NVA FORCES HAVE DEMONSTRATED A GREATER MILITARY RESOURCENESS AND DEDICATION TO THEIR CAUSE THAN MOST OBSERVERS HERE WOULD HAVE BELIEVED POSSIBLE. IT WILL BE SOME TIME BEFORE WE KNOW THE REAL OBJECTIVES OF THEIR OFFENSIVE AND WHETHER IT IS TO BE ULTIMATELY RECORDED AS A VICTORY OR A SEVERE DEFEAT.

THERE WILL BE MUCH SPECULATION ABOUT ITS REPERCUSSIONS, BUT NO ONE WILL DENY THAT THE VIET CONG SUPPORTED AND DIRECTED BY HANOI AND ASSISTED BY THE NVA, PUT UP A DRAMATIC, SPECTACULAR AND MEMORABLE PERFORMANCE, AND HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES CAPABLE NOT ONLY OF GREAT SKILL IN PLANNING AND COORDINATING THEIR STRATEGY AND TACTICS, BUT ALSO OF GREAT COURAGE AND MANICISM IN EXECUTING THEIR PLANS.

2. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS ARE WHETHER THIS VIETCONG OFFENSIVE WAS A FINAL ALL-OUT DESPERATION EFFORT TO ACHIEVE MILITARY VICTORY WITH THE AID OF A GENERAL UPRISING, OR AN EXHIBITION OF THEIR STRENGTH TO EITHER TO OFFSET THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN THE SOUTH OR TO PLACE THEMSELVES IN A FAVOURABLE POSITION PRIOR TO ACCEPTING NEGOTIATIONS AN ATTEMPT SIMPLY TO RELIEVE THE HEAVY PRESSURE BEING APPLIED ON THEM IN ALL FIELDS AND SO RESTORE SOME BALANCE IN THE PICTURE BEING PRESENTED OF RELATIVE POWER AND INFLUENCE. IT WILL

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ALSO BE ASKED WHETHER THE GVN AND THE ALLIES HAVE TENDED IN THE PAST TO UNDER-ESTIMATE THE STRENGTH, RESOURCEFULNESS AND DEVOTION OF THE COMMUNISTS, AND WHETHER THE ALLIED EFFORT HERE CAN MAKE A SPEEDY RECOVERY FROM WHAT MUST BE SEEN AS BEING A SETBACK TO OUR EFFORTS LOCALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY.

THE PLAN.

3. WHEN THE ANALYSTS HAVE COMPLETED THEIR RESEARCHES, IT WILL PROBABLY BE SEEN THAT THIS OFFENSIVE HAS FOLLOWED THE DOCTRINAL STEPS LAID DOWN BY GIAP AND THE LEADERSHIP IN HANOI. SUCH A CUNNINGLY CONCEIVED AND COORDINATED CAMPAIGN MUST HAVE TAKEN MONTHS OF PLANNING. THE FACT THAT IT WAS KEPT SECRET POINTS TO THE DEVOTION OF ALL THOSE WHO TOOK PART IN IT, NOT A WORD OF IT SEEMS TO HAVE LEAKED. IN II, III AND IV CORPS, ENEMY DISPOSITIONS DID NOT INDICATE THAT A MAJOR ATTACK ON A WIDESPREAD SCALE WAS IMMINENT, AND THE TIMING - FOR THE TET TRUCE WHICH THE ENEMY HAD SAID THEY WOULD OBSERVE FOR SEVEN DAYS - WAS PERFECT.

4. THE BASIC STRATEGY WAS TO BRING THE WAR SIMULTANEOUSLY INTO ALL THE MAJOR CENTRES OF POPULATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WHERE THERE WAS PLENTY OF COVER, WHERE SCHOOLS, PAGODAS AND HOSPITALS COULD BE USED AS COMMAND POSTS, AND WHERE THE COUNTER FIREPOWER AND STRIKING FORCE OF THE ALLIES COULD NOT BE EFFECTIVELY BROUGHT TO BEAR. THE OVERALL PATTERN IS NOT YET CLEAR BUT IT SEEMS THAT LOCAL FORCES AND GUERRILLA-TYPE SQUADS WERE THE SPEARHEAD OF THE ATTACK, FORCES MADE UP OF MEN WHO IN MANY CASES HAD LIVED OR WORKED IN OR NEAR THE TOWNS AND CITIES BY DAY AND DONNED THEIR UNIFORMS AT NIGHT OR WERE GUIDED TO THEIR GOALS BY LOCAL SUPPORTERS. TARGETS WERE CAREFULLY SELECTED, ACCESS AND ESCAPE ROUTES WERE MAPPED, AND IT WAS PROBABLY EXPECTED THAT THESE FORCES WERE SUFFICIENTLY WELL-KNOWN TO GIVE THE LEADERSHIP REQUIRED TO INCITE THE LOCAL POPULATION TO JOIN IN A GENERAL UPRISING WHICH WOULD BOTH OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT AND PARALYSE THE ALLIED FORCES.

5. THE INFILTRATION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS - PERHAPS RUNNING AS HIGH AS 3,000 IN SAIGON - COULD HAVE EASILY TAKEN PLACE IN THE PRE-TET DAYS WHEN THE TRADITIONAL LARGE SCALE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE CARRYING BULKY PARCELS HAD BEGUN, AND THE POLICE COULD HAVE BEEN RELIED ON TO BE EVEN SLACKER THAN USUAL IN STOPPING VEHICLES AND TRAVELLERS AND EVEN MORE PURPOSEFUL IN FOREGOING INSPECTIONS AT THE OFFER OF A SUM OF MONEY OR A "TET GIFT". IN SOME CASES MAINFORCE UNITS WAITED OUTSIDE, PRESUMABLY TO BACK UP THE UNITS WORKING INSIDE THE POPULATED CENTRES OR TO COVER THEIR WITHDRAWALS IF NECESSARY, OR EVEN TO MOVE IN AND TAKE VITAL INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS AIRFIELDS, PORTS, RADIO STATIONS AND PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS IF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GUERRILLAS BROUGHT THE LOCAL PEOPLE MASSING SPONTAN-

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HOUSLY AND VOCIFEROUSLY TO THEIR SIDE. WE NEED NOT BE SURPRISED ABOUT THE SUCCESS OF THE INFILTRATIONS, THE ENEMY HAD TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES GOING FOR HIM, PARTICULARLY THE LAXITY AND CORRUPTION OF THE POLICE AND THE INEFFICIENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INTELLIGENCE MACHINE.

THE EXECUTION.

6. WE DO NOT KNOW YET WHETHER AN OFFENSIVE IN THE DMZ AND I CORPS WAS TO COINCIDE WITH THE PLAN TO CARRY THE BATTLE INTO THE POPULATION CENTRES. THE BUILD-UP AND THREAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THE OFFENSIVE IN THE CITIES BY TYING UP ALLIED FORCES AND GENERALLY DIVERTING ATTENTION FROM THE CITIES. ON THE OTHER HAND AN ATTACK THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN TEMPORARILY THWARTED BY MASSIVE US BOMBARDMENTS AND BY THE FAILURE OF THE WEATHER TO PROVIDE THE REQUIRED CLOUD COVER.

7. WHATEVER THE CASE, THE FACT WAS THAT THE PENETRATION OF THE POPULATED AREAS WAS SUCCESSFUL, IT SEEMS, IN EVERY INSTANCE, AND DESIGNATED TARGETS WERE HIT. IN SOME PLACES THE DAMAGE WAS GREAT, AS IN PLEI MEU, KONTUM, NHA TRANG, MY THO AND BEN TRE, IN OTHERS, AS IN SAIGON, BAN MEU NGU and DANANG, IT WAS QUITE LIGHT. INSTALLATIONS WERE SOMETIMES OCCUPIED, MOST SEEM NOT TO HAVE BEEN. IN THE DELTA CITIES NO WITHDRAWAL PLANS SEEM TO EXIST, AND - ACCORDING TO WESTMORELAND - MOST OF THE AVAILABLE ENEMY FORCES SEEM TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED. IN SAIGON THE ATTACKERS WERE TO BE RELIEVED, AFTER 48 HOURS, OF THE POSITIONS THEY WERE MEANT TO BE THEN HOLDING, AND, EVEN THOUGH THIS DID NOT OCCUR, THEY WERE BACKED BY MAINTFORCE UNITS WAITING OUTSIDE. IN ALL, INCLUDING I CORPS AND THE DMZ SOME 60,000 TROOPS ARE BELIEVED BY MACV TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED.

THE OBJECTIVES.

8. THE PATTERN OF EVENTS DOES NOT LEAD EASILY TO A CONCLUSION ABOUT OBJECTIVES. IT DOES SEEM AT THIS EARLY STAGE, HOWEVER, THAT THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE, WAS IN FACT LAUNCHED, DESIGNED TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT BOTH BY FORCE AND BY GENERATING A POPULAR UPRIISING. THE LATTER WOULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY A SHOW OF CONSIDERABLE FORCE AND AUDACITY, BY INCITEMENT, BY EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF IMPORTANT INSTALLATIONS AND GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRES, AND BY THE EXPOSURE OF THE HELPLESSNESS OF THE U.S. TO BRING THEIR POWER TO BEAR WHEN THE BATTLE WAS TO BE FOUGHT IN THE VERY PLACES WHERE THE PEOPLE LIVED. THE FACT THAT THE MAIN DAMAGE IN THE TOWNS WAS THE RESULT OF THE FIGHTING ITSELF, NOT OF DELIBERATE SABOTAGE BY THE VIETCONG, SUGGESTS THAT THE VIET CONG WERE CONFIDENT THAT THEY WOULD NEED TO MAKE USE THEMSELVES OF THE MAINS INSTALLATIONS. THIS HERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE

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ATTACKERS OF TAN SON NHUT AIRFIELD IN SAIGON WERE INSTRUCTED NOT TO DAMAGE IT IF POSSIBLE.

9. THE CONCEPTION AND THE PLANNING WERE BRILLIANT.

THE EXECUTION, IF THE ABOVE ANALYSIS IS CORRECT, WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL - AT LEAST IN OUR TERMS.

(FOR THE VIET CONG, PERHAPS IT WAS A GREAT VICTORY.)
FOR THE MOST PART THE INSTALLATIONS WERE NOT TAKEN AND HELD., THE PEOPLE ALTHOUGH FRIGHTENED - DID NOT RESPOND AND FELL UP., THE TET-DEPLETED VIETNAMESE ARMY AND POLICE FORCES FOUGHT BACK WELL., AND THE PHYSICAL AND MORAL SUPPORT OF THE U.S. AND THE OTHER ALLIES DID MAKE ITSELF FELT, NOT ONLY IN THE DEFENCE OF THEIR OWN INSTALLATIONS BUT ALSO IN THE AID GIVEN TO THE LOCAL FORCES IN CURESHIPS, FLARES, AIRLIFTS, TACTICAL ADVICE, COMMUNICATIONS, AND IN THE MANY OTHER TRAPPINGS OF A HIGHLY MOBILE, MECHANISED FORCE.

10. IN LESS THAN ONE WEEK AFTER THE OFFENSIVE BEGAN THE VC/NVA FORCES HELD NOT ONE OF THE TOWNS OR CITIES THEY HAD ATTACKED. (AT NO TIME DID THEY TAKE REAL CONTROL.) SMALL POCKETS OF RESISTANCE CONTINUED IN MANY PLACES, THERE WAS SOME FIGHTING IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, AND IN ONE OR TWO CENTRES THERE WERE UNCOMMITTED MAINFORCES STILL WAITING ON THE OUTSIDE. ENEMY CASUALTIES WERE PLACED AS HIGH AS 20,000 DEAD, BRINGING THEIR TOTAL TO OVER 30,000 SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN LAST NOVEMBER. THEIR FORCES SOME STILL DEFIANT, WERE ON THE RUN OR BEING PURSUED OUT., THEY HAD LOST THOUSANDS OF WEAPONS.

11. IF THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO DEMONSTRATE STRENGTH PER SE - IN AN ELECTION YEAR IN THE U.S. IT WAS SUCCESSFUL, BECAUSE THIS OFFENSIVE REVEALED MORE CLEARLY THAN EVER BEFORE THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF VIET CONG ORGANISATION, DISCIPLINE AND POWER. IT CONFIRMED WHAT HAS BEEN SAID MANY TIMES, THAT THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION OF THE VIETNAMESE PROBLEM MUST BE POLITICAL, NOT SIMPLY MILITARY. VIET CONG LOSSES WERE UNQUOTE HEAVY BUT, ACCORDING TO MACV, THEIR STRENGTH REMAINS FORMIDABLE, AND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE KNOW THIS.

THE EFFORT DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN A DESPERATE, ALL-OUT ONE, ALTHOUGH THE VIET CONG HAVE UNQUOTE BEEN BADLY HURT.

12. IF THE DEMONSTRATION OF STRENGTH WAS TO BRING THE VIET CONG BACK INTO THE PICTURE, TO OFFSET THE GROWING POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONFIDENCE OF THE GVN AND THE WEIGHT OF THE US FORCES HERE, IT WAS AGAIN SUCCESSFUL. IF IT WAS DESIGNED TO OPEN THE WAY TO NEGOTIATIONS (I REMAIN SCEPTICAL ON THIS) THEY WELL PRESUMABLY NOW GIVE SOME SIGN. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY COULD ALLOW EVENTS TO DO THEIR WORK, KNOWING THAT THEIR ACTIONS WILL GIVE RISE TO A FRESH WAVE OF DEMANDS OVERSEAS FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

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AND OF PRESSURE ON THE U.S. TO WAIT OR COMPLETELY STOP THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH. THEY WILL KNOW THAT THE VOICES FAVOURING A COALITION GOVERNMENT WILL BE STRENGTHENED, BECAUSE THE VIET CONG ARE DEMONSTRABLY A POLITICAL AND MILITARY FORCE WHICH CANNOT BE DISMISSED OR TURNED ASIDE.

13. HAVING SAID THIS, THE POSSIBILITY REMAINS THAT THIS OFFENSIVE WAS FORCED ON THE VIET CONG BY THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN THE SOUTH. IF THEY WERE NOT TO REACT TO THE INCREASING PRESSURES UPON THEM THEY WERE IN DANGER OF GRADUALLY LOSING BY DEFAULT THEIR HOLD IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. TOO MANY PEOPLE WERE SAYING THAT THE TREND OF EVENTS WAS NO LONGER IN THEIR FAVOUR. IF THIS WAS THE OBJECTIVE, ITS SUCCESS IS QUESTIONABLE. HAVING BEEN REPULSED WITH GREAT LOSSES AND HAVING USED SUCH QUESTIONABLE TACTICS IN VIETNAMESE EYES, THE VIET CONG MIGHT FIND THAT THEIR CURRENCY WILL BE FURTHER DEBASED BY THIS EPISODE. THEY MIGHT TRY A SECOND WAVE, OR LAUNCH THEIR BIG MOVE IN I CORPS, BUT THEY WILL STILL RUN THE RISK OF HEAVY DEFEATS WHATEVER THE DAMAGE THEY CAUSE OF THE FEAR THEY INSPIRE. THERE IS NO DOUBT A LIMIT TO THEIR ABILITY TO KEEP UP SUCH OFFENSIVES.

VIET CONG STRENGTH.

14. HAS THE POWER OF THE VIET CONG BEEN UNDERESTIMATED? I AM INCLINED TO THINK NOT. IN REPORTING ON MY PROVINCIAL TOUR THREE WEEKS AGO I NOTED THAT THERE WAS A REALISTIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ALMOST EVERYWHERE OF THE CONTINUING STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY, DESPITE OUR OWN GAINS, AND OF THE PROTRACTED NATURE OF THE STRUGGLE AHEAD. THE CONFIDENCE OF THE ENEMY IN HIS OWN MILITARY POWER HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY POINTED OUT, ESPECIALLY IN RELATION TO THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE NEGOTIATIONS ISSUE. IT WAS ONLY LAST YEAR THAT WESTMORELAND MADE HIS PLEA FOR MORE TROOPS. THE DIFFICULTIES OF MAKING THE PACIFICATION PROGRAMME WORK HAVE ALWAYS BEEN EVIDENT. NOR HAS VIET CONG RESOURCEFULNESS EVER BEEN UNDERESTIMATED.

15. WHAT, THEN, WAS AT FAULT? NOT UNDERESTIMATION OF THE VIET CONG STRENGTH, I SUGGEST, BUT FAILURE TO INSIST THAT THE VIETNAMESE MAKE A GENUINE EFFORT TO PROTECT THEMSELVES AGAINST INSIDIOUS INFILTRATION, FOR ONLY THE VIETNAMESE CAN DO THIS WORK, AND UNDUE CONFIDENCE THAT THE VIET CONG WOULD NOT RUN THE RISKS OF CASUALTIES AND LOSS OF FACE WHICH UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACKS ON THE TOWNS WERE ALMOST SURE TO BRING. THE VIET CONG DID WHAT WE HOPED THEY COULD NOT DO, OR WOULD NOT DARE TO DO, ON SUCH A LARGE SCALE.

THE RESULTS.

16. THERE ARE NO EASY ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS.

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BUT ALREADY THE NEXT IS UPON US - WHERE DO WE GO FROM
HERE?

THE CTVN REACTED TO THE CRISIS LIKE A STUNNED MULLET.
IT DID NOT UTTER FOR TWO DAYS, AND THEN ONLY DID SO AT THE
PROMPTING OF THE AMERICANS.

THE PRES, WHICH HAD CLOSE DOWN FOR THE WEEK, WAS NOT
ENOUGH BACK TO LIFE FOR THE EMERGENCY, BUT THE AMERICANS
HAVE GOT THINGS MOVING.

THIEU HAS CALLED ON THE PEOPLE TO BACK THE GOVERNMENT,
AND THE LOWER HOUSE HAS NOW MET AND GIVEN ITS SUPPORT.

THE ASSEMBLY ITSELF WILL NO DOUBT DO THE SAME,
AND THE PRESS WILL, I THINK, FOLLOW SUIT.

ON THE MILITARY SIDE THE VIET CONG WILL BE PURSUED.

37. OUR DEEPEST HOPE PERHAPS IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT, ASSISTED BY
THE U.S. AND THE FRIENDS OF VIETNAM, WILL NOW TAKE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW WHAT IT CAN DO FOR THE PEOPLE IN THE WAY
OF RECONSTRUCTION.

THE ARVN FOUGHT WELL AND WILL CONTINUE TO IMPROVE.

NOW THE CIVILIANS MUST GET TO WORK ON THE PROBLEMS
OF THE REFUGEES AND THE INJURED, AND ALL THE OTHER WORK
INVOLVED IN RESTORING NORMAL/ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE.
THE CHANCE IS OFFERED TO GAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE,
THE VERY PEOPLE WHO PREFERRED NOT TO RISE WITH THE VIET CONG.

SURELY THIS MUST BE SOME STIMULUS TO THE GOVERNMENT TO DO
MORE, SURELY IT MUST GIVE THE GOVERNMENT SOME CONFIDENCE
IN ITSELF.

38. I TAKE SOME COMFORT PERSONALLY FROM THE FACT THAT THE
VIETNAMESE CHARGED WITH RUNNING THE NEW RECONSTRUCTION TASK
FORCE ARE KY AND GENERAL THANG BECAUSE, IN MY BOOK, THEY
ARE AMONG THE FEW VIETNAMESE WHO HAVE THE DRIVE AND ABILITY
AND SENSE OF DECICATION AND NATIONAL SPIRIT TO MAKE A SUCCESS
OF THIS VENTURE AND TO TRY TO EJECT DOWN THE PREVAILING
INDIFFERENCE, CORRUPTION, AND RECKLESSNESS OF THE OFFICIALS
WITH WHOM THEY WILL HAVE TO WORK.

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c/bt
Walter 4 DEC '70

PHUNG HOANG REVIEW

Military Resistance

Command

HISTORICAL REVIEW

July 1967 - Phoenix (originally IGEK - Intelligence Coordinators and Exploitation for attack on the VCI) established in MACV.

December 1967 - GVN Prime Minister issue letter of instruction on the attack on VCI but little activity in field.

July 1968 - GVN Presidential Decree and SOP 1 issued to field. Phung Hoang Committee begin to be established at all levels. Phung Hoang plan officially put into operation.

December 1968 - All Phung Hoang goals for 1968 surpassed

GOAL	ACHIEVEMENT
Establish 44 PIGCC	44 PIGCCS
Establish 200 DIOCC	228 DIOCC
Neutralize 12000 VCI	15,776 VCI

1968 (General) Typified by establishment of physical plants at Province and District levels.

1969 (General) Typified by increased involvement of GVN President, Prime Minister and Minister of Interior

March 1969 - GVN issues Classification and Rehabilitation Guidelines to clarify procedures.

July 1969 - Management/Support of US Phoenix transferred from OSA to ACofs, CORDS. Funding difficulties follow due to reduced allocations.

October 1969 - GVN President initiates National Publicity Campaign for Phung Hoang. PAAS - Sep 70 showed 52.7% not aware, 27.6% adequately informed and 19.1% vaguely aware.

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DECLASSIFIED AT THREE-YEAR
INTERVAL. RECLASSIFIED 12
YEARS AFTER DATE OF ORIGIN

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1970 (General) Phung Hoang firmly established in 1970 P&D Plan as major part of objective 2(of 3) Protection of the People from Terrorism. Accepted aim is not only elimination of VCI but also long lasting/peace time anti-subversion program.

Emphasis on Village/Hamlet levels Phung Hoang Committees and intelligence gathering/operational activities.

January 1970 - VCINIS (VCI Neutralization Information System) initiated.

Greenbook listing communist offender types to be considered VCI is issued by GVN.

February 1970 - SOP #3 issued to field.

July 1970 - Phung Hoang begins to be integrated into Directorate General for National Police at national level.

November 1970 - Supplemental 1970 (Nov 70 - Feb 71) maximum elimination of VCI as one of its two main tasks.

2. VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE RELATIVE STRENGTH OVER TIME (1967-Present)

a. VCI Relative Strength trend compared to other enemy forces (see Graph "A").

b. VCI Strength and the Future.

If the downward trend in VCI strength continues at the present (1970) rate (based on present neutralization rates and a VC replacement rate of 2 for every 3 VCI neutralized) the VCI should be roughly half its present strength at the end of 1973. At that point (1973) it is felt that the VC infrastructure will become seriously crippled. VCI cadre

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replacements will be relatively inexperienced which ^{will} compound ~~the~~ the situation.

c. Concentrations of VCI Strength by Province - October 1970

<u>By TOTAL VCI</u>	<u>By VCI/1000 Population</u>
1 Quang Nam	5,861
2 Quang Tin	4,886
3 Kinh Hoa*	4,211
4 Binh Dinh	3,911
5 Quang Ngai	3,515
6 Dinh Tuong	3,035
7 An Xuyen*	2,415
8 Thua Thien	2,283
9 Vinh Long*	2,108
10 Bien Hoa	1,915
10 Dar Lac	1,902

(See MAP "A")

*Provinces where Phung Hoang is neutralizing only 50% of VCI goal
 based ^{on} their percentage of national total VCI strength.

3. VCI NEUTRALIZATIONS

- Monthly Neutralizations 1968 to Present (See Graph "B")
- Forms of Neutralizations

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	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970 to 25 Sep</u>
CIA	11,283	8,515	8,044
KIA	2,239	6,187	5,813
RALLIED	2,299	4,832	5,597) equals total RALLIED
TOTAL	15,776	19,534	4,391) ^{MS} _{MS} ^{MS} _{MS}
			15,603 TOTAL

c. Specific Targeting vs General Targeting

(January-June 1970)

(1)	<u>Specific Target vs General Target vs Rallies</u>		
Total VCI Neut.	2,500	7,786	4,039
%	17.5%	54.3%	28.2%

(2) Targeting by types of Forces.

<u>Kills and Captures</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
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By Phoenix Forces*

Specific Targeting	1,603	11.2%
General Targeting	1,495	10.4%
TOTAL	3,098	21.6%

By Military Forces**

Special Targeting	897	6.3%
General Targeting	6,291	43.9%
TOTAL	7,291	50.2%

Rallies	4,039	28.2%
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*Phoenix Forces include: NP, PRU, RDC, CG, APT, and MC.

**Military Forces include: ARVN, US, PWMAF, CIDG, RF/PF, and others.

d. Forces' Effectiveness Against VCI

(January-September 1970)

(1) Total VCI neutralized by Forces

<u>RANK</u>	<u>FORCE</u>	<u>TOTAL NEUT.</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL</u>
1	RF	4,820	25.0
2	PF	2,442	12.6
3	NP	1,549	8.0
4	PRU	1,323	6.6
5	US	1,240	6.4
6	ARVN	942	4.3
7	SP	884	4.5
8	NPFF	460	2.3
9	PWMAF	256	1.3
10	MSS	112	.5
11	CIDG	93	.4
12	RDC	72	.3
13	APT	59	.3
14	PSDF	39	.2
Chieu Hoi		4,121	21.0

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(2) Neutralizations per 1000 Strength

<u>RANK</u>	<u>FORCE</u>	<u>NEUT/1000 Strength</u>
1	PRU	422
2	NP, NPFF, SP	36
3	RF/PF	16
4	APT	10
5	CIDG	5
6	FWMAF	5
7	US	4
8	ARVN	3
9	RDC	2

(3) KIA/CIA Ratio by Force (rough)

<u>FORCE</u>	<u>RATIO</u>
APT	5/1
PF	4/3
RF	1/1
US	1/1
ARVN	3/5
PRU	1/2
NPFF	1/3
SP	1/20
NP	1/25

e. Province Security Council - ~~Reviewing Sentencing~~

Judicial processing of suspected VCI in custody has been a continual problem. In the past over 50% of those VCI sentenced were released

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in less than one year. Some VCI were being recaptured and sentenced for a second and third time. From January to June 1970 only 32% or (1,930) of the suspected VCI captured had been tried. One out of eight were released. A remainder of 4,101 were still awaiting trial. ^{private} The high non-conviction rate causes an obvious injustice to the innocent who are forced to long confinement due to the judicial bottleneck. Strong emphasis from Saigon has begun to ease the problem. Sentencing was up from 64 in January to 513 in June but total VCI captured and still unprocessed was still 2956. A second GVN goal is to process all suspected VCI's in custody within 46 days of capture.

A break down of length of Sentence given in 1970 follows:

Less than 6 months	9%
6 - 12 months	14%
1 - 2 years	46%
2 years or more	31%

4. VC REACTIONS

December 1968 - Liberation Radio - "Crush the venomous snake Phoenix"

December 1968 - VC documents describe plans and organization of Phoenix and their counterattack which was aimed at eliminating Phoenix members.

September 1969 - Deputy Secretary of COSVN says at 2nd Congress of PRP that Phung Hoang and the APC of the GVN are the greatest threats to future VC activities.

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April 1970 - Document captured outlines Phung Hoang SOP and aims at activities at village/hamlet level Phung Hoang by raids to get documents and disrupt activities. A possible interpretation is that CVN Phung Hoang Activities at the ^{level} _{thoroughly} village are having greater effect than previously supported.

Spring 1970 - In Dinh Tuong many village/hamlet level VCI were being neutralized and VC order cadre to be armed at all times, operate under guerrilla protection and operate only at night. The VC Security Section was tasked with countering the Phung Hoang net.

5. REPORTS/SYSTEMS

- a. BIG MACK - Submitted from field by DIOCC to J2 MACV and contains information on VCI strength and organizations in particular areas. Data is put in machine and print out of aggregated data is produced. Unfortunately the print out was poorly programmed to meet the retrieval needs of J2 and the system is being reprogrammed to correct this which should be in effect in early 1970.
- b. VCIIS - VCI Information System collects field data on neutralization on a monthly basis. The print out gives detailed analysis of type of VCI neutralized, Friendly forces involved, and means of neutralization.
- c. VCINIS - VCI Neutralization Information System was initiated in January 1970 in order to provide a means of tracking each individual neutralized. Each VCI is given an ID number made up of his name, birth,

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time and place of capture. All future actions such as imprisonment release etc, is to be submitted to Saigon to be added to his record.

6. TRAINING

a. For RVN.

Corps level Phung Hoang training centers were established in I Corps (June 1969); II Corps (Oct 69); III Corps (Jan 69); and IV Corps (Oct 69). Supported by CORDS/MACV they trained District/Province level officials and personnel dealing with Phung Hoang. The classes were held bi-weekly with 40 students per class. Special courses such as IV Corps' Secret Investigation Course for case officers were also held. Appreciation and enthusiasm of the trainees was quite low according to this writer's personal experiences. This was reflected by the frustration of certain corps level officials (e.g., Wilbur Wilson) about the actual effectiveness of the training. IV Corps is closing its school in Dec 70 and it is assumed that other Corps have ^{DO} and will do the same. A National Training School at Vung Tau will hopefully open in early 1971. Short refresher training for Province Chiefs are held at V^ong Tau (1-2 day). A second course was held in February.

b. For U.S.

Training for Phung Hoang advisors and selected element of other U.S. forces has been regularly conducted (Phoenix Coordinator's Orientation Course). It began in November 1968 and schedules classes for 40 students are a bi-weekly basis.

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Training in CONUS began at Fort Bragg, NC on 4 Sep 70 with a class of 35 students in a 12 week course which includes 6 weeks of language training.

7. FUNDING

<u>FY 1970 Dollars</u>		<u>CY 1970 Piastres</u>	
<u>AID</u>	<u>DOD</u>	<u>US Counterpart Funds</u>	<u>GVN Regular Budget</u>
0	667,600	51,700,000 SVN	5,860,000 SVN

In past 50% of funds were spent for construction of facilities and furnishings, and the rest for supplies and personnel. By 1970 this had stabilized at 33% for construction and 66% for personnel.

8. PROBLEM LIST FOR CONSIDERATION

- a. Command emphasis which possibly is being confused with command's poor understanding or disagreement with the "focus" of Phung Hoang.
- b. Coordination between contributing agencies at all levels and between levels. Involves personality and rank/official position, conflicts as well as physical relationship officers etc., of these agencies.
- c. Quality and length of duty of representatives sent by contributing agencies to staff the PIOCC/DIOCC. Lack of interest of the heads of these agencies.
- d. Unwarranted concern at some levels with the methods of operations according to preconceived ideas to the detriment of worrying about substance and necessary meaningful improvements at the lower levels irrespective of SOP's etc.

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- e. Method of specific targeting of high level VCI in relationship to the reality of their location in isolated base camps strongly protected by guerrillas/Local Forces which require large scale operations.
- f. Possible contradiction between emphasis to maximize neutralizations by capture and sentencing/lenient rehabilitation policy.
- g. Parallel intelligence nets at some province distinct levels, some of which are the personal domain of the Province/District chiefs and upon which he relies to the detriment of the Phung Hoang organization.
- h. Inspection System - more substance less form. "What does a 43% effective Phung Hoang office mean?"
- i. Awards (monetary) need to be reviewed with aim of quick response and awards to units and not just individuals such as VIP.
- j. Semantic problems in Vietnamese and between English and Vietnamese.
- k. Maximum utilization of sources e.g., Chien Hoi etc.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATIONS


- a. Increase advisory quality by putting captains in DIOCC and majors in PIOCC and possibly making more use of personnel from Army Intelligence Service and CIC warrant officers with past experience. Put these advisors in civilian clothes.
- b. Reanalyze VCI - VC military relationship in terms of systems analysis as basis of refocusing Phung Hoang and other activities aimed at getting to the enemy in order to coordinate the National and operations and to form basis of new SOP.
- c. _____
- d. _____
- etc
- etc

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SOUTH VIETNAM ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

Top 10 Provinces
Total: V.C. 21


(50% approx.)
100% total



GROUP-4
DOWNGRADED AT THREE-YEAR
INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED 12
YEARS AFTER DATE OF ORIGIN

SOUTH VIETNAM ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

Top 8 Provinces
VCI/mean




GROUP 1
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GRAPH A
VCT RELATIVE STRENGTH

COMPARED TO OTHER ENERGY SOURCES




DEC'66 JUNE'67 Dec'67 JUNE'68 DEC'68 JUNE'69 JUNE'70

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
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INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED 12
YEARS AFTER DATE OF ORIGIN

DECLASSIFIED

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C1, MACV Dir 10-20

HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 // APO San Francisco 96222

CHANGE 1
 DIRECTIVE
 NUMBER 10-20

1 July 1969
 (MACCORDS)

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, AND RESPONSIBILITY
FOR SUPPORT TO THE ATTACK ON THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE (U)
SHORT TITLE: PHOENIX (U)

Directive Number 10-20, this headquarters, 23 May 1969, is changed as follows:

1. Insert Annex I, attached.
2. By pen and ink change, delete that portion on page 10 of the directive pertaining to Annex I, which reads "(To be published)."
3. This transmittal sheet is to be filed in front of the publication for reference purposes.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ELIAS C. TOWNSEND
 Major General, USA
 Chief of Staff

T. B. MANCINELLI
 LTC, USA
 Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE
 NUMBER 10-20

23 May 1969
 (MACCORDS)

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, AND RESPONSIBILITY
FOR SUPPORT TO THE ATTACK ON THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE (U)
SHORT TITLE: PHOENIX (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. This directive prescribes policies, establishes responsibilities and command relationships, and outlines procedures for overt joint US civil/military actions to complement and support the GVN PHUNG HOANG program for elimination or neutralization of the Viet Cong political infrastructure.
2. (U) APPLICABILITY. This directive is applicable to all US and FWMA Forces and agencies engaged in or supporting programs and operations aimed at elimination or neutralization of the VCI.
3. (U) DEFINITION.
 - a. The Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) is defined as the political and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek control over the South Vietnamese people. It embodies the Party (Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP)) control structure, which includes a command and administrative apparatus (Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN)) at the national level, and the leadership and administration of a parallel front organization (the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN)), both of which extend from the national through the hamlet level.
 - b. A more detailed definition of those VC organizational positions identified as VC infrastructure is contained in MACV Directive 381-43 (C) and Intelligence Collection Program - BIG MACK, references 11d and 11e, below.
 - c. The VCI does not include the NVA and VC military forces as defined in reference 11c, below.

GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

*This directive will become effective and supersede MACV Directive 381-41(C) on 1 July 1969. It may be used prior to that date as a reference for planning and programming.

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4. (C) OBJECTIVES. The objectives of this program are:

a. To coordinate and give impetus to GVN, US, and FWMAF civil and military intelligence collection, processing, and exploitation operations directed toward neutralization of the VCI.

b. To insure that overt programs and operations conducted by US components as they relate to identification, location, exploitation, and elimination of the VCI, are integrated, compatible, and coordinated with parallel GVN programs and operations.

c. To achieve, within established priorities, maximum effective utilization of resources available for the sustained, accelerated attack on the VCI.

5. (C) GENERAL.

a. Elimination or neutralization of the VCI:

(1) Is an integral part of the strategy to meet and defeat any VC armed threat, and to extend and maintain the momentum of pacification and development.

(2) Supports tactical military operations by depriving the VC/NVA forces of essential direction, assistance, and support.

(3) Is essential to the GVN's pacification and development programs, including self-defense and local government, in that it:

(a) Renders the VC incapable of coordinated political action, terrorism, and subversion.

(b) Is fundamental to the establishment and maintenance of public security, and law and order.

b. The attack on the VCI will be mounted and sustained in both urban and rural areas. Resources will be marshalled and concentrated to permit a selective rather than shotgun attack on the primary VCI target. Secondary, but also important targets will include associated VC political fronts, VC civil and military support elements, and VC guerrillas and sappers. National and local priorities will be set to guide and coordinate intelligence collection and collation, and operational targeting, for VCI neutralization or elimination.

c. Within capabilities and established procedures and priorities, optimum use will be made of Chieu Hoi and psychological operations resources and techniques. In the conduct of anti-VCI operations, particular care will be taken to avoid unnecessary harassment of the people. Special emphasis will be given to safeguarding

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life and property, to the earliest possible release of innocent persons temporarily detained during anti-VCI operations, and to observance of RVN judicial and legal due process. Civic and psychological actions must be conducted to secure public understanding, acceptance, and voluntary support of GVN and allied anti-VCI/VC efforts.

d. Neutralization or elimination of the VCI is a Vietnamese responsibility, employing essentially police as well as special operations techniques and resources. The President of the Republic of Vietnam decreed on 1 July 1968 a "National PHUNG HOANG Plan," designed "to direct, coordinate, and control all national efforts toward neutralizing the VC infrastructure." This decree stipulates that the National Police shall be the "principal operational element" of PHUNG HOANG. Success of the program requires that the military forces provide support to the National Police until the latter are capable of carrying out their basic internal security mission.

e. Within established procedures and capabilities, optimum use will be made of Regional Force and Popular Force units in collecting intelligence for VCI neutralization or elimination. These forces are indigenous to the area in which they fight and, therefore, have valuable knowledge of the local populace which should be exploited. In addition, they provide assistance to the National Police Forces in maintaining security.

f. Implementation of the National PHUNG HOANG Plan calls for the establishment of a countrywide system of PHUNG HOANG Committees, each supported by a permanent office or center. The operational, cutting edge of this system is at district--the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC), and province--the Province PHUNG HOANG Permanent Center (or "PIOCC"). The DIOCC and PIOCC have a dual mission--to provide intelligence support to both military and anti-VCI operations, and to generate and coordinate intelligence exploitation actions against VCI and other VC targets in their areas.

g. As security and pacification are extended in villages and hamlets, the PIOCC and DIOCC will make a special effort to exploit the potential of "people's intelligence," e.g., information known and available among the local community pertaining to enemy personalities, organizations, and activities.

h. United States and FWMA Forces and agencies will perform basically an advisory, assistance, and support role in the attack on the VCI. This will include military operations against VC and VCI targets, in cooperation and coordination with GVN forces and intelligence and operations coordinating centers.

i. The English translation of Vietnamese "PHUNG HOANG" is "PHOENIX." This is the name given to the US program to support, assist, and advise the GVN in its attack on the VCI.

j. The US PHOENIX management and coordinating structure, to include PHOENIX committees and coordinators at each level of command, will serve as

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the vehicle for coordination of US plans, programs, and operations to support the PHUNG HOANG organization and the attack on the VCI. It will stimulate and coordinate US advisory support to the PHUNG HOANG organization and its member participants. It will aim at producing a self-sustaining GVN organization capable of accomplishing its mission with minimum US support.

k. Responsibility for field implementation of the US PHOENIX program is vested in the senior US commander/advisor at each level. In carrying out this responsibility, he will strike an equitable balance among tactical, security, and anti-VCI requirements for allocation of available assets and resources.

1. At all levels, PHOENIX advisory assistance will be directed toward:

(1) Development of a more extensive knowledge and understanding of VC organization and functioning.

(2) Improved and coordinated collection, collation, and dissemination of VCI intelligence for:

(a) Immediate or timely operational exploitation.

(b) Development of an intelligence data base, local and national, to support operational planning, and investigation and judicial processing of VC suspects.

(c) Preparation of intelligence studies and estimates to assist evaluation of the program, and to meet other intelligence needs of the command.

(3) More selective targeting, and timely and aggressive action operations against VCI and other selected, priority VC targets.

(4) More effective and sophisticated exploitation of intelligence leads (captured enemy documents and potential human resources) acquired through PHUNG HOANG, security, or tactical military operations.

(5) Coordination of PHUNG HOANG activities with those of other military and pacification operations and programs.

(6) To the above ends, improving the capabilities and performance of GVN PHUNG HOANG personnel and centers.

6. (C) US PHOENIX ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT OF THE GVN PHUNG HOANG PLAN. The US PHOENIX organization follows the US chain of command and parallels the GVN PHUNG HOANG structure.

a. National Level (see Annex A).

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(1) US PHOENIX Committee. The US program for support of the National PHUNG HOANG Plan will be guided by a US policy-coordinating and decision-making PHOENIX Committee having the following regular membership:

Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS - Chairman
 Assistant Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS
 Special Assistant to the Ambassador - Deputy Chairman
 Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, MACV
 Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3, MACV
 Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS, MACV
 Director, Territorial Security, CORDS
 Director, Public Safety, CORDS
 Director, Chieu Hoi, CORDS
 Chief, Pacification Security Division, CORDS
 Director, PHOENIX, CORDS - Secretary

This committee will meet at the discretion of the Chairman or on the initiative of any one of its members. The Chairman may form temporary or permanent subcommittees, as required.

(2) PHOENIX Directorate (See Annex B for details of organization and functions).

(a) A PHOENIX Directorate is established under the ACofS for CORDS. The Directorate will consist of a Director, Deputy Director, and three functional divisions: Plans and Operations, Training, and Program Administration. Director, PHOENIX will function as PHOENIX Coordinator at the national level.

(b) The Director, PHOENIX will:

1 Provide staff support to the Chairman, PHOENIX Committee and, based upon the guidance and decisions of the Committee, promulgate programs, plans, doctrine, and implementing instructions for corps, province, and district PHOENIX organizations and actions. Such instructions will take cognizance of existing directives and may be further amplified by the corps PHOENIX coordinators to reflect local conditions and operating experience.

2 Maintain close and continuous liaison and coordination with the GVN Central PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office (CPHPO). Assist and support the CPHPO in carrying out its prescribed functions.

3 Provide overall staff supervision, manage and arrange support for the PHOENIX program, to include program reporting and evaluation. The PHOENIX Directorate will, as required, conduct special surveys and reviews, and assist in the coordination and planning of other major programs as they pertain to the anti-VCI attack. However, it will not assume management responsibility for any program which is the responsibility of another MACV staff division or agency.

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b. Corps Level. The Corps Deputy for CORDS (DEPCORDS, CTZ) is responsible to the corps senior advisor for planning and implementation of the US PHOENIX program within the corps tactical zone. He is the US counterpart to the GVN Chairman, Corps PHUNG HOANG Committee. He will be assisted and supported in the performance of these responsibilities by a Corps PHOENIX Committee, a Corps PHOENIX Coordinator, and a PHOENIX civil/military staff element. (See Annex C.)

c. Province Level. The Province Senior Advisor (PSA) is responsible for planning and implementation of the PHOENIX program within his province. He is the US counterpart to the GVN Chairman, Province PHUNG HOANG Committee. He will be assisted and supported in the performance of these responsibilities by a Province PHOENIX Committee, a Province PHOENIX Coordinator, and a PHOENIX staff element. (See Annex D.)

d. District Level. The District Senior Advisor (DSA) is responsible for implementation of the PHOENIX program in his district. He is the designated District PHOENIX Coordinator and is the US counterpart to the GVN district chief, who is responsible for execution of the national PHUNG HOANG plan at the district level. The DSA will be assisted in the accomplishment of his PHOENIX responsibilities by one or more persons (military and/or civilian) assigned as coordinators to the GVN District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC). (See Annex E.)

e. Autonomous Cities. In a number of autonomous cities, the GVN have established PHUNG HOANG Committees and Permanent Centers ("CIOCC"). In each instance, the DEPCORDS/CTZ will establish a corresponding US PHOENIX Committee, US PHOENIX Coordinator, and PHOENIX staff element, with appropriate command relationships. (See Annex F.)

f. Capital Military District (CMD). The special PHOENIX structure and command relationships established for the CMD are described in Annex G.

7. (C) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

a. General.

(1) At each level of command, the designated PHOENIX Committee Chairmen, PHOENIX Coordinators, and PHOENIX staff elements are primarily responsible for coordination with corresponding GVN PHUNG HOANG officers and elements. (See Annexes A through G. See Annex H for GVN PHUNG HOANG organization.)

(2) Members of the US PHOENIX Committee (national level) will designate representatives of their respective organizations to serve as working-level contacts with the PHOENIX Directorate, CORDS.

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(3) Representatives of FWMAF units will be invited to participate in PHOENIX Committee activities at the discretion of the committee chairman. Presence of FWMAF liaison officers in PIOCC and DIOCC will be encouraged.

b. Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, MACV. ACofS, J-2, MACV, has responsibility for military intelligence matters as they pertain to the VC infrastructure, guerrillas, and other elements of the enemy's forces. With respect to staff guidance and support to the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program, ACofS, J-2, MACV, will:

(1) Provide staff supervision and guidance, as required, for intelligence collection and reporting to be accomplished through the PHOENIX mechanism at province and district level, in support of intelligence collection programs against the VCI, such as BIG MACK (reference 11e, below).

(2) Within capabilities, participate in intelligence training for PHOENIX coordinators and other selected US, FWMAF, and Vietnamese personnel.

(3) Participate in coordination of VCI intelligence matters with other intelligence producing or contributing agencies.

(4) Produce finished intelligence on the VCI as required by COMUSMACV. Intelligence production in support of PHUNG HOANG at lower echelons will generally be limited to non-perishable material more suitable to long-range planning or to add depth to the intelligence base. Subordinate echelons (and DIOCC and PIOCC) must develop their own capabilities for production of VCI intelligence suitable for targeting and operational exploitation.

(5) Provide guidance to assist subordinate echelons and GVN elements in the development of production capabilities.

(6) Insure that military intelligence units under his operational control support the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX effort.

c. Special Assistant to the Ambassador. The Special Assistant to the Ambassador is responsible for coordination of any US clandestine activities planned or conducted in support of PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX objectives. In addition, the:

(1) Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador (OSA) activities will make maximum intelligence input to PHUNG HOANG, and guide and encourage GVN elements to make an optimum, cooperative effort to further PHUNG HOANG objectives.

(2) OSA will generate a special effort toward neutralization and/or exploitation of the hardcore VCI at district level and above, and to this end will be provided optimum cooperation and support from PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX resources.

d. Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS, MACV. The ACofS, CORDS, MACV, will provide appropriate MACV guidance to the respective corps and commands for coordination and support of PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX activities.

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e. Major Commanders. Major subordinate commanders will be familiar with the objectives and coordinating procedures comprising the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program. Consistent with operational priorities they will provide resource support, as available and appropriate, to insure accomplishment of the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX objectives.

f. Field Force Commanders/Corps Senior Advisors. Field force commanders/corps senior advisors will insure that all intelligence elements under their command or control cooperate, coordinate, and conduct exchange of VCI information with appropriate GVN elements at each echelon of command. Field force commanders or equivalent will take full responsibility for conducting US/FWMAF operations to reduce the effectiveness of the VCI. All appropriate province and district level advisory personnel must fully comprehend and support the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX concept.

g. Special Category Units. Commanders/chiefs of US special category investigative and intelligence units/activities, military and civilian, subject to US Mission control are enjoined to support the spirit and intent of the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program through cooperation, coordination, and exchange of overt VCI and tactical intelligence information.

h. RF and PF Advisors. All echelons of advisory personnel concerned with Regional Forces and Popular Forces will, to the maximum extent possible, influence their GVN counterparts to insure active RF and PF participation in the coordination and exchange of VCI information and tactical information, and VCI elimination operations in support of the PHUNG HOANG program.

i. Tactical Units. Tactical unit commanders will support operations against the VCI in coordination with GVN PIOCC and DIOCC in their respective TAOR. Tactical units will coordinate anti- VCI activities with the appropriate DIOCC and/or PIOCC, through the PHOENIX Coordinator to the center for:

- (1) Exchange of intelligence and operational information (to include feedback).
- (2) Development, planning, and conduct of operations.
- (3) Use of GVN PIOCC and DIOCC, and associated, human resources.
- (4) Proper handling and intelligence and operational exploitation of VC civil detainees and returnees, and those PW possessing information useful in the attack on the VCI. Where feasible, tactical units will attach permanent liaison officers or NCO to DIOCC and/or PIOCC in their TAOR.

8. (C) SECURITY.

a. The term PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) and the general concept of the GVN/US/FWMAF action program for elimination of the VCI are unclassified. However, sensitive details should not be discussed with unauthorized persons. The VC are aware of PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX. This awareness and VC

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countermeasures are reflected in VC propaganda and captured enemy documents. The VC can be expected to react forcefully to any individual, organization, program, or action which appears to seriously threaten their essential command and control organization and its political front apparatus.

b. US national security laws, directives, and operating procedures will be observed for protection of intelligence sources and methods. Similarly, operations plans for intelligence exploitation will be afforded maximum possible security to avoid premature or unauthorized disclosure.

c. Briefings of members of the press will be in accordance with guidance provided by DEPCORDS/MACV. In all such briefings, it will be emphasized that PHUNG HOANG is a GVN program, that neutralization of the VCI is a Vietnamese responsibility, and that the US role is one of cooperation and support.

9. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. (See Annex I.)

a. Administrative, funding, logistic, and personnel support of the PHOENIX program is provided as directed by the appropriate MACV staff element and coordinated by CORDS. Support requirements are stated by the Director, PHOENIX/CORDS, programmed by the US military as directed by MACV, and satisfied under monitorship of the Director, PHOENIX/CORDS.

b. Administrative and housekeeping support for US PHOENIX requirements will be provided in accordance with the provisions of references 11a and 11f, as applicable.

c. Under no circumstances will personnel and material resources, including vehicles, assigned to PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX be permanently diverted to other, non-PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX use. Temporary diversions will be authorized by Director, PHOENIX, for emergencies.

d. Guidance for US support to the PHUNG HOANG centers is included in Annex I to this directive.

10. (U) REPORTS. This directive requires no report.

11. (C) REFERENCES.

- a. Joint MACV/USAID/JUSPAO/OSA Directive 1-68.
- b. MACV Directive 10-12.

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- c. MACV Directive 381-4.
- d. MACV Directive 381-43 (C).
- e. Intelligence Collection Program - BIG MACK, promulgated by letter, MACJ212-2, subject: Transmittal of Intelligence Collection Program BIG MACK (U), 28 November 1968.
- f. MACV Logistical Guide.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ELIAS C. TOWNSEND
 Major General, USA
 Chief of Staff

T. B. MANCINELLI
 LTC, USA
 Adjutant General

Annexes

- A. PHOENIX Command and Coordination Chart (National)
- B. Organization, Functions, and Responsibilities, PHOENIX Directorate
- C. PHOENIX - Corps
- D. PHOENIX - Province
- E. PHOENIX - District
- F. PHOENIX - Autonomous Cities
- G. PHOENIX - Capital Military District
- H. GVN PHUNG HOANG Organization Chart
- I. PHOENIX Administration and Logistics Support (To be published)

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
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PHOENIX COMMAND AND COORDINATIONNATIONAL

* DEPCORDS/MACV Chairman of US PHOENIX Committee

— Command, or direct supervision

---- Coordination and policy guidance

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

Annex A

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ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, AND RESPONSIBILITIESPHOENIX DIRECTORATE

1. (C) BACKGROUND. The PHOENIX Staff was established under the Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, by MACV Directive 381-41 (C), 9 July 1967, revised 9 July 1968, and superseded by this directive. The PHOENIX Staff is herewith transferred and reconstituted as the PHOENIX Directorate, ACofS, CORDS, MACV. In the past, in order to facilitate the rapid implementation and development of a high priority but "unprogrammed program," PHOENIX has had to draw heavily upon the resources of existing programs. The basic mission and coordinating functions of PHOENIX are unchanged. Its repositioning as a CORDS directorate will enable it to program future requirements in a more orderly manner, and to insure coordination of program planning and support. At the same time, acting in accordance with the policies and guidelines set by the PHOENIX Committee, Director, PHOENIX will continue to provide timely, day-to-day staff direction, coordination, and support to field operations.

2. (C) MISSION. The mission of the PHOENIX Directorate is stated in paragraph 6a(2)(b) of the basic directive. It may be summarized as:

- a. Provide operational guidance to field activities, in accordance with MACV and PHOENIX Committee directives and policies.
- b. Provide program management, staff supervision and support, and central program administration for the PHOENIX program.
- c. Conduct liaison with, and provide US coordination and support to, the CPHPO.

3. (U) ORGANIZATION. The PHOENIX Directorate shall consist of a Director (normally a senior civilian), Deputy Director (military), and three staff divisions: Program Administration, Plans and Operations, and Training. (See Appendix 1, this annex.)

4. (C) FUNCTIONS.

a. Program Administration.

(1) Ascertain, assemble, collate, and coordinate field requirements for logistics, transportation, funding, and other management support for US PHOENIX elements and activities not otherwise programmed and provided for by other participating or supporting programs or agencies.

(2) Program, supervise, and monitor monetary and logistic support to the GVN National PHUNG HOANG Plan. Operations division assists the CPHPO in formulation of PHUNG HOANG budget and support requirements.

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(3) Ascertain and coordinate US civilian and military, and local national personnel requirements for PHOENIX coordination, management, and advisory positions at all levels; recommend and monitor utilization of personnel resources.

(4) Maintain an office of record and documentation for the US PHOENIX Committee and PHOENIX Directorate.

(5) Provide centralized services of common concern for the Directorate, including but not restricted to:

(a) Mailroom/message center functions; dispatch of training and reference materials.

(b) Administrative, secretarial, and translation support.

(c) Personnel and document security, and security and contingency planning.

b. Plans.

(1) Prepare and coordinate PHOENIX action programs, implementing plans and sub-programs, PHOENIX (or PHUNG HOANG) annexes or appendixes to other plans and programs, and the like, as required.

(2) Study and review current PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX activities, recommend and draft changes or revisions to plans and programs.

(3) Guide and assist the CPHPO in the preparation of GVN PHUNG HOANG plans and programs.

(4) Assist in the formulation and coordination of other programs and plans which relate to PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX plans, operations, and support. These will include J-2, MACV intelligence collection plans (such as BIG MACK), which require action by PHOENIX field elements.

c. Operations.

(1) In accordance with MACV directives and PHOENIX Committee policy guidance, prepare, coordinate, and provide for issuance of implementing directives for operational guidance and aids and staff instructions.

(2) Maintain close and continuous liaison and coordination with the CPHPO, and assist and advise the CPHPO in the performance of its prescribed functions.

(3) Unilaterally, or in combination with the CPHPO, continually review PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program understanding, coordination, and performance

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at all levels; participate in joint US and combined US/GVN field inspections; and submit reports and recommend or initiate remedial or corrective actions, as appropriate.

(4) In cooperation with US and GVN intelligence and intelligence exploitation agencies, monitor intelligence on the VCI, and suggest or recommend for command/policy action, changes in the direction (thrust), emphasis, or techniques of the operational attack on the VCI.

d. Reports and Analysis.

(1) In close cooperation with J-2, CORDS/RAD, OSA, and/or other staffs and agencies as required, design, institute, and administer essential operational reporting systems which will:

(a) Meet command, including ACoS, CORDS, MACV, requirements.

(b) Contribute to J-2 evaluation of the effects of PHUNG HOANG (and other) operations on the VCI, and to the J-2 political (VCI) order of battle intelligence collection and analysis.

(c) Meet management requirements for analysis and evaluation of program progress and effectiveness.

(2) Conduct operations analysis studies to improve effectiveness of coordination and overall operational concepts and techniques. (This does not include reporting or analysis of clandestine or other sensitive intelligence or covert operational activities.)

(3) Coordinate and assist in the development of GVN PHUNG HOANG reporting systems.

(4) As required, develop or contribute to periodic or special analyses of the effectiveness or results of the attack on the VCI.

e. Legal.

(1) Initiate the development of and monitor a combined, comprehensive US/GVN action program to improve the screening of VC civil suspects and judicial processing of VC civil defendants.

(2) Assist Public Safety Directorate, CORDS, in the design and adoption by the GVN of an effective system for reporting and recording the disposition of VC civil detainees.

(3) Monitor legal activities of the GVN as they relate to neutralization of the VCI and VC support elements, to include legislation, declaration of amnesties,

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and other actions by the Executive, court decisions, operation of provincial security committees. Prepare or assist in the preparation of handbooks or other guidances, reports, and studies of GVN national security laws and procedures.

f. Special Studies.

(1) Scan professional literature and intelligence reports; maintain liaison with intelligence and research staffs and agencies; initiate or contract special studies to maintain a current knowledge of enemy organization, methods and techniques, as well as of the "state of the art" of counterinsurgency operations. Arrange for distribution of selected materials to GVN, US, and other Free World Forces and agencies participating in the attack on the VCI.

(2) Maintain working liaison with US, FWMAF, and GVN psychological operations and information services, and promote effective and timely psyops and propaganda exploitation of intelligence against the VCI. Brief members of the press, as required, in accordance with current policies and instructions.

g. Coordination and Training.

(1) Establish and maintain liaison with other US/FWMAF agencies and staff elements, particularly those having counterparts which are PHUNG HOANG member participants.

(2) Conduct regularly scheduled orientation courses, primarily for US PHOENIX Coordinators, with quotas to be allocated for other US and Free World Force personnel having a need-to-know to promote effective field cooperation, coordination, and support for PHUNG HOANG Plan.

(3) Conduct a briefing program, as required, to inform concerned agencies and personnel of PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program concepts, goals, plans, current developments, and achievements, including, as authorized, members of the press and other public information media.


(4) Establish procedures for systematic end-of-tour debriefing of US PHOENIX personnel.

(5) Maintain contact with appropriate out-of-country US and Free World Force military and civilian schools, as required, for exchange of current training material pertinent to the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program.

(6) Assist and support the CPHPO, in cooperation with Operations Division, in matters pertaining to training of GVN PHUNG HOANG personnel and elements.

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3
FPHOENIX DIRECTORATE ORGANIZATION

Appendix 1 to Annex B

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PHOENIX - CORPS

1. (U) PURPOSE. This annex outlines the organization, functions, responsibilities, and relationships of the personnel and elements managing and supporting the PHOENIX Program at corps level. (See Appendix 1, this annex, and Appendix 1 to Annex D.)

2. (U) GENERAL.

a. The positions and elements at corps having management and support responsibilities for the conduct of the PHOENIX Program are:

- (1) DEPCORDS.
- (2) Assistant DEPCORDS.
- (3) PHOENIX Committee.
- (4) PHOENIX Coordinator.
- (5) PHOENIX Division.

b. To support the PHUNG HOANG Plan, the above corps PHOENIX activities will:

- (1) Develop policy and guidance for the implementation of the US PHOENIX Program within the corps based upon guidance from higher headquarters.
- (2) Develop specific plans and instructions for subordinate elements for the accomplishment of the PHOENIX mission and monitor the implementation of these instructions.
- (3) Manage and/or provide for the management of US PHOENIX resources allocated to the corps.

3. (C) CORPS DEPCORDS. The Deputy for CORDS is responsible to the Corps Senior Advisor (CSA) for overall conduct of the US PHOENIX Program within the corps. He will be the US counterpart to the chairman of the GVN PHUNG HOANG Committee, who will normally be the corps commander. He will form and chair a US PHOENIX Committee, the makeup and functions of which are described below. To effectively carry out his PHOENIX responsibilities, the DEPCORDS should:

- a. Establish a routine working relationship with the GVN corps commander in his capacity as the Chairman, GVN Corps PHUNG HOANG Committee.
- b. Convene a US PHOENIX Committee meeting at least monthly; more often if the situation dictates.

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c. Assure that all corps participants in the PHOENIX Program (organizations having membership on the PHOENIX Committee) fully support the program and give the PHOENIX coordinator maximum cooperation in the conduct of his responsibilities.

d. Use the PHOENIX coordinator and his staff as the primary tool for developing, implementing, and monitoring PHOENIX policies and programs within the corps, to include stimulating and participating in the planning of specific anti-VCI operations and/or operational campaigns.

e. Assure that all appropriate consideration is given to providing the resources, support, and emphasis necessary to maintain its momentum.

f. Keep the CSA continually advised of the progress and status of the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program.

4. (U) **ASSISTANT CORPS DEPCORDS.** The Assistant Deputy for CORDS will, in addition to serving as a member of the corps US PHOENIX Committee, be responsible for personnel, administrative, funding, and materiel management and support of corps PHOENIX activities. Funding and materiel support will include that required by GVN PHUNG HOANG facilities, as required. The above will be accomplished in consonance with this and other pertinent directives.

5. (C) **CORPS US PHOENIX COMMITTEE.**

a. The corps US PHOENIX Committee will be formed and chaired by the DEPCORDS to assist him in his role of policy maker, programmer, and evaluator of the corps US PHOENIX Program. The Deputy Chairman of this committee will be the OSA Regional Officer in Charge (ROIC). Regular membership will normally include, but need not be limited to, the following:

DEPCORDS/CTZ - Chairman
OSA ROIC - Deputy Chairman
Corps PHOENIX Coordinator - Secretary
Assistant DEPCORDS
Corps G-2 Advisor
Corps G-3 Advisor
Corps G-5 Advisor
Territorial Security Advisor
MSS Advisor
US Field Force G-2 (or equivalent)
US Field Force G-3 (or equivalent)
Public Safety Advisor
Chief, Chieu Hoi Division, CORDS
Chief, Psychological Operations Division, CORDS
Corps Returnee Liaison Officer

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This committee will meet at the discretion of the chairman or on the initiative of the deputy chairman, secretary, or any committee member. The chairman may form functional subcommittees or special working groups, as required.

b. The committee meetings will provide an opportunity for all members to be updated on developments in PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX and the results thereof. It should be used as a forum for presentation, by any and all members, of the problems and/or accomplishments of their respective activities as they pertain to support to PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX. The primary mission of the committee is the development of general policy, making of decisions as to proposed plans and actions, and proposal of recommendations for future plans and programs.

c. Joint meetings with the Regional GVN PHUNG HOANG Committee, in whole or in part, are encouraged. It would be appropriate for members to take the opportunity to invite their respective counterparts on the GVN PHUNG HOANG Committee to attend the US PHOENIX Committee meetings from time to time. Non-members should be invited to attend committee meetings when such will lead to the overall accomplishment of the mission.

d. To facilitate day-to-day PHOENIX coordination and operation, each committee member must designate an action officer as the element's PHOENIX liaison or action officer.

e. Mutual cooperation of all members of the PHOENIX Committee is essential to the success of the PHOENIX Program.

6. (C) CORPS PHOENIX COORDINATOR. The Chief, PHOENIX Division (see paragraph 7, below) is designated the Corps PHOENIX Coordinator. As such he is directly responsible for overseeing the day-to-day conduct of the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program within the corps. Specifically, he will:

a. Function as senior US coordinator to the Corps PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office (or Region Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center), to energize and coordinate an aggressive attack on the VCI, and to foster Vietnamese interagency and GVN/US/FWMAF cooperation.

b. In accordance with national-level instructional guidelines and those set by the Corps PHOENIX Committee, coordinate US advisory efforts and overt intelligence collection, collation, and exploitation relating to PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX objectives.

c. Disseminate PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX doctrines and concepts for elimination or neutralization of the VCI, and, in particular, recommend, coordinate, and assist in the planning of specific anti-VCI operations or campaigns.

d. Perform duties as Secretary of the US PHOENIX Committee.

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7. (C) CORPS PHOENIX DIVISION. A PHOENIX Division will be established under the staff supervision of the Assistant DEPCORDS. It will function as the corps day-to-day action element for management and conduct of the PHOENIX Program. The senior officer in the PHOENIX Division will be the Corps PHOENIX Coordinator. (See paragraph 6, above.) Some specific functions and responsibilities of this division are:

a. Providing the day-to-day management of the US PHOENIX Program within the corps by:

(1) Recommending, developing, implementing, and monitoring actions undertaken to carry out the Corps PHOENIX Program.

(2) Assisting other corps level staff elements in planning, programming, and managing their support to the PHOENIX Program. This can be done by studying support requirements, recommending solutions, and monitoring their results.

b. Providing assistance, advice, and support to the conduct of the Corps PHUNG HOANG Plan by:

(1) Providing coordination support to the Corps PHUNG HOANG Center.

(2) Monitoring the US PHOENIX coordinator/advisory activities at province and district levels to:

(a) Insure an efficient PHOENIX coordination/advisory effort.

(b) Supervise placement and replacement of coordinator personnel.

(c) Insure a continued emphasis on the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program.


c. Promoting and/or providing coordination between GVN and US/FWMAF engaged in anti-VCI operations and activities.

d. Maintaining a program to emphasize the need for a continued and vigorous attack on the VCI.

e. Keeping the PHOENIX Directorate/CORDS, HQ, MACV, informed of the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX actions within the corps and report problems for which no solution is locally available.

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CORPS PHOENIX ORGANIZATION

— Command or direct supervision

---- Coordination and policy guidance

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PHOENIX - PROVINCE

1. (U) PURPOSE. This annex outlines the organization, functions, responsibilities, and relationships of personnel and elements involved with the PHOENIX Program at province level. (See Appendix 1, this annex)

2. (C) GENERAL.

a. The positions and elements at province having management and support responsibilities for the conduct of the PHOENIX Program are:

- (1) Province senior advisor.
- (2) US PHOENIX Committee.
- (3) US PHOENIX Coordinator and Staff.

b. It is the responsibility of those listed above to assist and support the GVN in their conduct of the PHUNG HOANG Plan within the province and to guide and support subordinate US/FWMA elements in their support of anti-VCI activities. Specific responsibilities are outlined below.

3. (C) PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR.

a. The Province Senior Advisor (PSA) is charged with primary responsibility for the implementation and conduct of the US PHOENIX Program within the province. He will chair the province US PHOENIX Committee and will be the counterpart/advisor to the Chairman, Province GVN PHUNG HOANG Committee (the province chief). He will be assisted in his PHOENIX responsibilities by a US PHOENIX Committee and by a small military/civil staff, the senior military member of which will be the US PHOENIX Coordinator.

b. To accomplish the above, the PSA must:

(1) Call and conduct regular meetings of the province US PHOENIX Committee.

(2) Maintain close and continuous contact with the Chairman, Province GVN PHUNG HOANG Committee concerning the conduct of the PHUNG HOANG Plan.

(3) Assure that all US/FWMA elements involved in direct or indirect support to the PHUNG HOANG Plan are kept aware of the status of the plan, and that they maintain a sense of urgency of the sustained attack on the VCI. These will be essentially the members of the US PHOENIX Committee, but will also include representatives of US/FWMAF tactical or tactical support units whose TAOR includes any area of the province.

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(4) Insure that all elements of the US advisory effort at both province and district are cognizant of the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program and give it their maximum personal support.

(5) Insure the proper utilization of all available PHOENIX assets and resources. Particular attention should be given to prevention of diversion of PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX personnel and equipment to other functions except on a temporary basis dictated by an emergency situation.

4. (C) PROVINCE US PHOENIX COMMITTEE.

a. To assist him in carrying out his PHOENIX responsibilities, the PSA will organize a province US PHOENIX Committee. The OSA Province Officer in Charge (POIC) and the province PHOENIX Coordinator will serve as Deputy Chairman and Secretary, respectively. Members will normally include, but are not limited to:

Province Senior Advisor - Chairman
 OSA Province Officer in Charge - Deputy Chairman
 PHOENIX Coordinator - Secretary
 Deputy Province Senior Advisor
 S-2 Advisor
 S-3 Advisor
 Senior Public Safety Advisor
 Special Police Advisor
 Chieu Hoi Advisor
 Psyops Advisor
 RF/PF Advisor

The committee will meet as required, but not less than monthly. Members will work in close conjunction with PHUNG HOANG counterparts to bring together an effective GVN/US/FWMAF team to optimize intelligence support to and coordination of an accelerated, concerted, and sustained effort against all VC political and armed elements, with special emphasis on elimination or neutralization of the VCI. The chairman may form functional subcommittees' or working groups, as may be required.

b. This committee is primarily a policy and decision-making body as pertains to the conduct of the US PHOENIX Program within the province. However, to accomplish the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX mission, it should also look toward accomplishing the following:

(1) Advising and supporting the PHOENIX Coordinator in his work with Vietnamese counterparts.

(2) Coordinating advice and support on PHUNG HOANG matters to the members' respective Vietnamese counterparts in order to encourage cooperation, exchange of intelligence, and joint operations among Vietnamese agencies.

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(3) Insuring that all Vietnamese agencies are kept aware of the high priority and importance of the attack on the VCI and that US support to Vietnamese PHUNG HOANG efforts is properly coordinated so as to be most effective.

(4) Suggesting, and assisting in planning and supporting, US anti-VCI efforts.

5. (C) US PHOENIX COORDINATOR AND STAFF. A small staff of personnel will be assigned to the province for duty with PHOENIX. Their basic mission will be to implement the US PHOENIX Program within the province as directed by the PSA. The staff will act as the coordinators/advisors to the PIOCC. The chief of the province PHOENIX staff/advisory group is designated the Province PHOENIX Coordinator. He will have the status of special staff assistant to, and will be directly responsible to, the PSA for all matters pertaining to implementation of PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX in the province. In accordance with MACV/PHOENIX directives and instructions, and within the guidelines set by the province US PHOENIX Committee and with the assistance of his staff, he will:

a. Assist and advise the province PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office in the execution of the PHUNG HOANG Plan.

(1) Emphasis must be placed on assisting in the development and operation of a truly effective anti-VCI operational plan and resulting anti-VCI operations.

(2) The need for full participation in the PIOCC by all participating elements must be stressed. Emphasis should be placed on furnishing qualified and enthusiastic representatives to the PIOCC.

(3) Priority must be given to controlled/directed neutralization of specific targets as opposed to exploitation of targets of opportunity and chance. This necessarily involves mission and target analysis in developing operational plans.

(4) Special efforts must be made to assist in development and conduct of a training program so as to insure the capability of PIOCC and DIOCC personnel (GVN).

(5) Recommendation and assistance in planning activities must be with the view toward implementation of province anti-VCI operations and campaigns employing the total anti-VCI resources available to the province in the most effective manner.

b. Perform coordination functions between GVN and US/FWMAF to assure an effective combined attack on the VCI.

c. Supervise the conduct of the US PHOENIX effort in the districts of the province. In this respect, he will:

(1) Assist the PSA and other province level support elements in the management of personnel, administrative, and logistic support to district level PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX effort.

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(2) Provide technical assistance and guidance to the DIOCC Coordinator in the performance of his mission.

(3) Coordinate the provision of US/FWMA force units and resources to district level operations when such are outside the district requiring them, or they are for some other reason not available to the DIOCC Coordinator.

(4) Monitor the use of PHOENIX resources at district level and recommend corrective action where appropriate.

d. Submit reports of the status of the attack on the VCI as required by higher headquarters.

e. Accompany and assist the PIOCC inspection team in its inspection of DIOCC.


f. Within capabilities and as directed, submit intelligence reports in compliance with intelligence collection programs against the VCI, such as BIG MACK.

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CORPS, PROVINCE, DISTRICT
PHOENIX RELATIONSHIPS



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PHOENIX - DISTRICT

1. (U) PURPOSE. This annex outlines the functions, responsibilities, and relationships of the personnel involved in the US PHOENIX effort at district level. (See Appendix 1 to Annex D, for internal and external relationships.)

2. (C) GENERAL.

a. The positions at district having direct responsibilities for the conduct of the US PHOENIX Program are:

- (1) District PHOENIX Coordinator (DSA).
- (2) DIOCC Coordinator(s).

b. The above are responsible for the coordination and/or provision of US support to the GVN PHUNG HOANG Plan at district and for provision of guidance and assistance to the GVN in their execution of the PHUNG HOANG Plan.

c. District level is where the PHUNG HOANG Plan touches the people and will have its greatest effect. It behooves all involved in the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program at this level to give their utmost to its support.

3. (C) DISTRICT PHOENIX COORDINATOR.

a. The District Senior Advisor (DSA) will function concurrently as the district PHOENIX Coordinator, and is responsible for implementation of PHOENIX in his district. He is the US counterpart to the district chief, who is concurrently the Chief of the GVN District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC). (There is no PHUNG HOANG or PHOENIX Committee at the district.)

b. So that the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program will be conducted effectively, the DSA must:

(1) Make every effort to insure that the district chief gives his complete and wholehearted support to the anti-VCI attack. This must include full support to the concepts and operations of the DIOCC.

(2) Monitor the activities of the DIOCC Coordinator to insure effective conduct of the advisory and support function for which the latter is responsible.

(3) Insure that all elements of the district advisory group, as applicable, give their full cooperation and support to the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX effort. These elements must be apprised of the priority of the attack on the VCI and the vital need for their full and continued cooperation and assistance.

4. (C) DIOCC COORDINATOR.

a. To assist the DSA in his PHOENIX responsibilities, a US military officer will normally be assigned for full-time duty as the US coordinator to the DIOCC.

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He may have an officer or enlisted assistant. His primary function is to assist and advise the district chief, or his representative in the DIOCC staff, in accomplishing the dual DIOCC missions as stated in paragraph 5f of the basic directive.

b. Within their capabilities, the DIOCC Coordinators will encourage optimum support of the DIOCC by all concerned GVN agencies in the districts. They will be directly responsible to the DSA, but will receive necessary staff and technical supervision, guidance, and support in PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX matters from the corps and province PHOENIX Coordinators and staffs. They will specifically encourage development and exploitation of the intelligence potential of the RF and PF units; a potential which has been greatly overlooked in the past.

c. It is emphasized that the DIOCC Coordinator's primary function is advising/ coordinating for the DIOCC. His place of duty should be in the DIOCC. It is appropriate that he occasionally participate in anti-VCI operations in an observer/advisor capacity so as to gain first-hand knowledge concerning field operational procedures and techniques, and the capabilities of local resources. This should be held to a minimum, however, so as not to detract from the effective accomplishment of his primary mission of advising and coordinating DIOCC operations.

d. To effectively accomplish his mission, the DIOCC Coordinator should:

(1) Establish a mutual understanding and respect with his counterparts by working with them, not as their supervisor, but as an associate and consultant.

(2) Guide DIOCC activity in such a way as to cause the Vietnamese to develop the ideas and initiate the actions.

(3) Insure that the Vietnamese DIOCC supervisor is aware of and supports the PHUNG HOANG Plan and that all agencies provide personnel to man the center in accordance with guidelines from higher headquarters and in consonance with local conditions.

(4) Take action to insure that all agencies (GVN and US/FWMAF) in the district which should be participating in anti-VCI activities are aware of the importance of the anti-VCI attack and are, in fact, giving their utmost support to the program.

(5) Facilitate coordination between GVN and US/FWMA units or agencies planning or participating in combined or unilateral US/FWMAF anti-VCI operations. GVN personnel must be used for at least the screening and arresting fuctions if at all feasible in all US/FWMAF anti-VCI operations.

(6) Coordinate and arrange for the provision of supplies and equipment needed by the DIOCC but unavailable through GVN resources.

(7) Assist in or coordinate the provision of casual informant funds as required for local use when such are not available through GVN sources.

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(8) Submit reports as required to keep higher headquarters informed of the status of the attack on the VCI.

(9) Expediently report problems in the conduct of the PHUNG HOANG Plan within the district which cannot be solved locally.

(10) Submit current intelligence reports as required and as derived from DIOCC activities.

e. A major goal for a DIOCC Coordinator is eventually to work himself out of a job. He should strive to train the GVN personnel at district to accomplish the task without him. When he advances to the point where he need do nothing, and the attack on the VCI continues to function effectively, he will have accomplished his mission; until then he is only partially successful.

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PHOENIX - AUTONOMOUS CITIES

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1. (U) PURPOSE. This annex outlines the PHOENIX organization, functions, and responsibilities in autonomous cities.

2. (C) GENERAL. The organization and operation of PHUNG HOANG elements vary considerably among the six autonomous cities of South Vietnam. They range from a city, to include its police precincts, having the basic PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX organization of a province with subordinate districts, to the city being merely part of the geographic area of a district. The specific GVN PHUNG HOANG operational status of the autonomous cities (except Saigon, which is subordinate to Capital Military District) will be discussed below. The US PHOENIX method to support PHUNG HOANG will be determined by the corps senior advisor, but should parallel the GVN PHUNG HOANG organization.

3. (C) AUTONOMOUS CITY PHOENIX ORGANIZATIONS.

a. Da Nang - The Da Nang City PHUNG HOANG organization is basically that of a province with subordinate districts, except for element designations. The US PHOENIX effort generally parallels that of the province and district PHOENIX organizations and responsibilities as stated in Annexes D and E. Annex D will be fully applicable to the Da Nang City PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX organization when:

(1) The term "city" is substituted for province.

(2) The term "mayor" is substituted for province chief. The precincts of Da Nang are called districts for PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX purposes and Annex E is directly applicable.

b. Cam Ranh and Vung Tau. The PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX organization here is the same as for Da Nang City except that there are no precinct level organizations.

c. Others. All other autonomous cities in South Vietnam are included within the province and/or districts in which they are geographically located for PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX purposes. The decision as to whether a city will be part of a district or will be covered separately by the province PHUNG HOANG element will be made by the province chief on an individual basis. The US PHOENIX effort will parallel that of PHUNG HOANG.

Annex F

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PHOENIX - CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT

1. (C) PURPOSE AND SCOPE. This annex outlines the organization and relationships of the US PHOENIX elements of the Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC) in its support of the GVN Capital Military District (CMD) PHUNG HOANG effort.

2. (C) GENERAL. The organizations and relationships of CMAC, Saigon Civil Assistance Group (SCAG) and Gia Dinh Province US PHOENIX elements basically parallel those of corps and province, respectively, as outlined in Annexes C and D. CMAC and SCAG PHOENIX elements will be discussed in detail in following paragraphs. Gia Dinh Province need not be discussed individually as its PHOENIX organization and activities follow those of other provinces as outlined in Annex D, except that its PHOENIX activities will be managed and supported by CMAC. (See Appendix 2, Chart A.)

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3. (C) CMAC PHOENIX ACTIVITIES. The organization, functions, and responsibilities of elements at CMAC responsible for managing and supporting the PHOENIX effort generally parallel those outlined in Annex C for corps with the term CMAC substituted for corps (see Appendix 1). Exceptions and variances are:

a. All CMAC activities, to include PHOENIX, are subordinate to III Corps/II FFORCEV.

b. The CMD PHOENIX Coordinator and staff will receive technical and staff guidance through the III CTZ PHOENIX Coordinator.

c. Because of the differing DEPCORDS staff organization at CMAC, the responsibilities of the Assistant DEPCORDS, as stated in paragraph 4, Annex C, will be distributed within CMAC to appropriate elements of the staff.

d. Members of the CMAC PHOENIX Committee will consist of functional elements listed for the corps, as present in CMAC.

4. (C) SAIGON CIVIL ASSISTANCE GROUP (SCAG) PHOENIX ACTIVITIES.

The organization, functions, and responsibilities of elements at SCAG for managing, supporting, and conducting the Saigon City PHOENIX effort generally parallel those for a province as outlined in Annex D, with the term "SCAG" substituted for "province". (See Appendix 2, Chart B.) Exceptions and variances are:

a. The SCAG PHOENIX element will receive technical and staff guidance from the CMD PHOENIX Coordinator.

b. The Director of SCAG is the Chairman of the Saigon US PHOENIX Committee and his counterpart is the Prefect of Saigon.

Annex G

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
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c. The Saigon City PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office is called the City Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (CIOCC).

d. The US PHOENIX Committee is composed of representatives of the same elements as that of province, as present in the city.

e. The SCAG PHOENIX Coordinator is responsible for the direct supervision of the PHOENIX Coordinator at precinct level and of coordination and management of precinct PHOENIX functions.

5. (C) PRECINCT PHOENIX ACTIVITIES.


a. The GVN PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office at Saigon Precinct level is called the Combined Intelligence and Operations Center (CIOC). It operates under the direction of the precinct police chief.

b. Due to the absence of a military advisor team at precinct, the precinct US PHOENIX Coordinator is responsible directly to the SCAG PHOENIX Coordinator (see Appendix 2, Chart B). As such, he is responsible for all PHOENIX functions at district as outlined in Annex E (PHOENIX - District) for both the district PHOENIX Coordinator (the DSA) and the DIOCC Coordinator, as pertain within the precinct.

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CMD PHOENIX ORGANIZATION

* Chairman of the PHOENIX Committee

— Command or direct supervision

- - - Coordination and policy guidance

-x-x- Technical advice and assistance



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Appendix 1 to Annex G

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CHART A - GIA DINH PHOENIX ORGANIZATIONCHART B - SAIGON PHOENIX ORGANIZATION


GROUP 4
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Appendix 2 to Annex G

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GVN ORGANIZATION FOR PHUNG HOANG

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PHOENIX ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Section I	Funding
Section II	Personnel and Force Structure
Section III	Supply and Equipment Maintenance
Section IV	Construction and Facilities Maintenance
Section V	Airlift Support (Passenger and Cargo)
Section VI	Communications Support

This annex is both an index to and an outline summary of the procedures by which administrative and logistic support for the US PHOENIX and GVN PHUNG HOANG programs is obtained. This support is provided under arrangements made by COMUSMACV, who, as of 1 July 1969, is responsible for providing or arranging for such support. Any additional requirements for support coordination for PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG as may arise under the provisions of this annex will be directed to the DEPCORDS at corps level by the corps PHOENIX coordinator, to the CORDS advisory team senior advisor at province level by the province PHOENIX coordinator, and, to the CORDS advisory team senior advisor at district level by the DIOCC Coordinator. This annex supersedes PHOENIX Memorandum Number 9, 15 June 1968, pertaining to PHOENIX Financial and Logistical Support.

SECTION I - FUNDING**1. REFERENCES.**

- a. AR 37-105.
- b. MACV Directive 35-1.
- c. MACV Directive 37-2.
- d. USARV Regulation 37-13.
- e. USMACV Letter, subject: Personnel Policy Manual for US Forces in Vietnam, 1 December 1968.

2. GENERAL.

- a. Concept. Funding support and procedures for the PHOENIX program will be provided in the same manner as provided MACCORDS headquarters and field elements. In brief, the PHOENIX program represents an added increment of support to be attached to the existing support structure.
- b. Types and Sources of Fund Support.
 - (1) There are two sources of funds to support the PHOENIX program:

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(a) Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Program Funds. This is the source of dollars for the purchase of materiel that cannot be acquired on the local economy, the pay of US civilian personnel authorized for the program, and the reimbursement of other US agencies for services and supplies provided. The budget covering O&M fund requirements is prepared and administered by the Comptroller, MACV.

(b) Assistance-in-Kind (AIK) Funds. AIK funds (piastres) are funds provided by the Government of Vietnam for the support of MACV activities through the authority of Chapter 26, Government of Vietnam Defense Budget. AIK funds are authorized for procurement of goods and services available from sources within the RVN only. These funds are used for two major purposes: (1) Direct administrative and logistic support for housekeeping, operations and maintenance, and construction needs. (2) Administrative and logistic support of various other programs and missions principally related to support of pacification.

(2) The CORDS Military Support of Pacification Fund (MACV Directive 37-2) will be used to support the PHOENIX program in support of the PHUNG HOANG program. At the present time, this fund is being administered by the Civic Action Division of the CORDS Community Development Directorate. Therefore, the AIK funds allocated by CORDS to the PHOENIX program will be administered by the CORDS Civic Action Division.

(3) There are presently 52 Pacification Account Imprest Fund cashiers at the locations indicated in Annex E of MACV Directive 37-2. This includes cashiers at each of the 44 provinces, 4 autonomous cities, and 4 CTZ.

(a) The monthly ceilings for these 52 pacification accounts will be increased to provide support for the PHOENIX program. Close coordination will be required between PHOENIX advisors and the Pacification Account Imprest Fund cashiers.

(b) PHOENIX advisors to PHUNG HOANG centers are authorized to receive funds from the local Pacification Account Imprest Fund cashier. The senior advisor of the CORDS advisory team to which PHOENIX advisors are assigned will inform the local Pacification Account Imprest Fund cashier of the name(s) of the PHOENIX advisor(s) authorized to draw funds from the cashier.

3. FINANCIAL PROCEDURES - DOLLAR REQUIREMENTS.**a. Budget Responsibility.****UNCLASSIFIED**

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- (1) The ACofS, CORDS, MACV, is responsible for:
 - (a) Identification of fund requirements.
 - (b) Submission of fund requirements to the Comptroller, MACV, on a timely and coordinated basis and in accordance with instructions issued by the Comptroller, MACV, on budget preparation, budget reviews, and program changes.
- (2) The Comptroller, MACV, is responsible for:
 - (a) Consolidation of PHOENIX program fund requirements into the HQ, MACV, O&M program.
 - (b) Administration of the O&M program in accordance with policies and procedures of HQ, MACV, and the funding agency.

b. Financial Procedures.

- (1) Pay of US Civilian Personnel. The following procedures do not apply to Department of State and AID personnel who are assigned to DOD-authorized US civil service positions on a reimbursable basis. Such people will continue to be serviced for pay in accordance with the instructions and procedures of their parent agency. Pay of US/DOD civilians is triggered by submission of the Time and Attendance (T&A) Report, OICC, RVN Form 7410/4, or equivalent.
 - (a) The T&A Report must be properly prepared and certified to be a valid document. Care must be taken in its preparation to preclude need for reaccomplishment and delays in processing and pay.
 - (b) To assist in identifying employee location, each individual's mailing address will be typed in the upper left corner of the T&A Report.
 - (c) Properly accomplished T&A Reports will be forwarded to the PHOENIX Directorate, CORDS, in time for the report to be hand-carried and delivered, not more than 48 hours from the end of the pay period, to:

Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC)
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
Contracts, RVN Box 101

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Local Address:

Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC)
 176 Hai Ba Trung
 Saigon, Vietnam

- (d) T&A Reports delivered late to OICC will result in the individual being paid normal pay for the period of the late report. Earned pay for the period of the late report will be paid in a subsequent pay period.
- (e) All pay checks for PHOENIX personnel will be picked up at OICC by a designated representative of the PHOENIX Directorate, CORDS. Distribution to payees will be effected by the most expeditious means.
- (2) Supplies and Equipment - Dollar Procurement. All MACV advisory teams have been funded and supported by USARV as of 1 July 1969. Requests for dollar funded supplies and equipment will be forwarded to the servicing property book officer.
- (3) Services/Materiel Provided by Other US Agencies. Payment of such obligations will be on the basis of billings received from the agency supplying materiel and for services in accordance with an appropriate Inter-Service or Inter-Agency Support Agreement (ISSA or IASA).

4. FINANCIAL PROCEDURES - PLASTRE REQUIREMENTS.a. Budget Responsibility.

- (1) ACoS, CORDS, MACV, is responsible for:
 - (a) Identification of fund requirements.
 - (b) Submission of fund requirements to the Comptroller, MACV, on a timely and coordinated basis and in accordance with MACV Directive 35-1 and instructions issued by the Comptroller, MACV.
- (2) Comptroller, MACV, is responsible for consolidation of the PHOENIX program fund requirements into the total MACV AIK requirements.

b. Financial Procedures.

- (1) Pay of Local National (LN) civilian employees funded by AIK funds.
 - (a) Pay of LN civilians in the PHOENIX program is triggered by the submission of the Organizational Time and Attendance (T&A)

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Report (Form DD 594), by the PHOENIX advisor to the CORDS advisory team to which he is assigned. Organizational Time and Attendance Report (Short Form) (DD Form 594-1) may be used when there are six or fewer personnel employed.

- 1 The T&A Report must be properly prepared and certified to be a valid document. Care must be taken in its preparation to preclude need for reaccomplishment and delays in processing and pay. Paragraph 5 and Appendix I, USARV Regulation 37-13, contain instructions for completing T&A Reports in II, III, and IV CTZ. In I CTZ, COMNAVSUPPACT DNG INST. 7410.1 applies. Assistance will be provided by the CORDS advisory team in preparation of the T&A Report, as may be required.
- 2 These T&A Reports will be submitted by the CORDS advisory team to the applicable servicing disbursing office, ATTN: Civilian Payroll Section. In II, III, and IV CTZ, T&A Reports are due not later than 0900 hours on the Tuesday following the end of the pay period. In I CTZ, T&A Reports are due not later than 1200 hours on the Monday following the end of the pay period. The pay period begins on Sunday of one week and extends through Saturday of the following week. The servicing disbursing office determines the beginning dates of bi-weekly pay periods in coordination with appropriate civilian personnel officers.
- 3 A Signature Card (DD Form 577) for each supervisor authorized to certify T&A Reports will be submitted by the senior officer of the CORDS advisory team to the servicing disbursing office, ATTN: Civilian Payroll Section.

(b) CORDS advisory teams already employing direct hire LN employees have selected officers to serve as Class A Agent officers for the purpose of paying these employees. In those areas where LN are not already being employed by the CORDS advisory team, the senior advisor of the team will establish a procedure in accordance with Appendix 1 of this annex.

(c) The procedure to be followed by the PHOENIX Directorate to effect payment of the LN working for the Directorate in

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Saigon will essentially be the same as outlined above. T&A Reports are required. These reports will be submitted to 7th Finance (Civilian Payroll Section) in Saigon. The Directorate will take action to have a Class A Agent officer appointed on orders. This agent will pick up the money and effect payment to the LN

(2) Supplies, equipment, services, and construction - Piastre (AIK). CORDS pacification revolving imprest funds will be used for piastre procurement of supplies, equipment, services, and for construction. The maximum amounts that can be purchased from one vendor at one time when payment is made from this fund is \$VN 30,000 at district level and \$VN 100,000 at province and regional level. Requirements for expenditures in excess of \$VN 100,000 for a single commodity, service, or construction project will be submitted to the PHOENIX Directorate in Saigon for review. All such requirements will contain full, complete justification. If determined appropriate, the PHOENIX Directorate will refer the requirement to the ACofS, CORDS, MACV, for approval and funding. CORDS pacification fund procurement procedures are contained in MACV Directive 37-2. Annex E of this directive lists the pacification fund accounts.

SECTION II - PERSONNEL AND FORCE STRUCTURE**1. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL.****a. References.**

- (1) US Civil Service Commission Federal Personnel Manual.
- (2) Navy Civilian Personnel Instructions.
- (3) Personnel Policy Manual for US Forces in Vietnam.

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- (4) **MACV Directive 380-8.**
- (5) **MACV Directive 690-5.**
- (6) **MACV Directive 690-6.**
- (7) **MACV Directive 690-7.**
- (8) **MACV Directive 690-9.**
- (9) **MACV/USARV, Civilian Personnel Servicing Agreement, 1 July 1966.**
- (10) **MACV/NAVSUPPACT Da Nang, Civilian Personnel Servicing Agreement, 29 April 1967.**

b. Agency Responsible for Providing Support.

- (1) Under an existing civilian personnel servicing agreement, the Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam (CG, USARV), through the Civilian Personnel Director and his staff, provides service for all US citizen DOD employees assigned to MACV as well as all MACV Vietnamese employees, with the exception of those in I CTZ.
- (2) In I CTZ, under a separate agreement, the Commander, US Naval Support Activity, Da Nang (COMNAVSUPPACT, Da Nang), through the Industrial Relations Officer, NAVSUPPACT, Da Nang, provides similar personnel servicing.
- (3) US citizen AID and Department of State employees assigned to MACV are serviced by their parent agencies.

c. Responsibilities.

- (1) The personnel officers servicing the particular areas provide operating officials, civilian personnel management advice and assistance, as required or requested in accordance with the references listed above and other applicable service regulations and policies.
- (2) Commanders and operating officials are responsible for the effective management utilization of authorized manpower resources in accordance with the references listed above.

d. JTD. US-employed civilian personnel supporting the PHOENIX program are included in the MACCORDS/JTD. Personnel to fill spaces authorized in that JTD are being obtained by both DOD direct employment and by reimbursable detail agreement with Department of State.

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2. MILITARY PERSONNEL.a. References.

- (1) AR 614-30.
- (2) MACV Dir 614-1.
- (3) Memorandum, MACJOIR, PHOENIX Military Personnel, 29 September 1968.
- (4) Memorandum, MACJ02, PHOENIX Military Personnel, 18 February 1969.

Agency Responsible for Providing Support. PHOENIX Program Administration Division, in direct coordination with the ACoS, J-1, MACV, and the Adjutant General, MACV, provides military personnel service in support of the PHOENIX program.

c. Responsibilities. As with all CORDS programs, PHOENIX military personnel receive their basic personnel support from their parent agencies. With respect to assignment of personnel, PHOENIX Program Administration Division arranges with the Adjutant General, MACV, for the initial fill of spaces authorized in the MACCORDS JTD for support of the PHOENIX program and for the satisfaction of the continuing requirement for military personnel to replace normal DEROS losses. The following assignment policies pertaining to PHOENIX military personnel are established.

- (1) The Saigon PHOENIX Directorate will provide the Adjutant General, MACV, initial assignment instructions on newly arrived personnel.
- (2) Personnel will be transferred to PHOENIX duties within a corps, from one district to another in a province, or from one province to another, only at the request or with the concurrence of the corps PHOENIX coordinator.
- (3) Personnel will be transferred to non-PHOENIX duties only with the concurrence of the Director, Saigon PHOENIX Directorate.
- (4) Requests for MACV orders effecting reassignment of PHOENIX personnel will include instructions for provision of one copy of the order to the Saigon PHOENIX Directorate.

d. Joint Table of Distribution. US military personnel supporting the PHOENIX program are included in the MACCORDS JTD.

e. Procedures for Obtaining Such Support. Normal personnel procedures are used as indicated in the above references to fill spaces in the JTD and otherwise to manage these personnel.

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f. Pertinent Support Arrangements. Pertinent arrangements regarding personnel support for the PHOENIX program provide that the PHOENIX program receives top priority of all MACV personnel resources. It is most important that there be correct assignment and utilization of PHOENIX military personnel as outlined in MACJOIR Memorandum, 29 September 1968.

SECTION III - SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE1. **REFERENCES.**

- a. Joint MACV/USAID/JUSPAO/OSA Directive No 1-68, 5 January 1968.
- b. MACV Log Guide.
- c. MACV Directive 37-2.
- d. JTA 82-7.
- e. Pertinent Tables of Allowances:

TA 00100-01	Province Type A
TA 00100-02	Province Type B
TA 00100-03	Province Type C
TA 00100-04	Province Type D
TA 00200-01	District Type A
TA 00200-02	District Type B
TA 00200-03	District Type C

2. **GENERAL.**

- a. PHOENIX advisors will be provided support as part of CORDS advisory teams. Supply and maintenance support will be provided to PHOENIX advisory staffs in the same manner as it is provided to MACCORDS headquarters and CORDS field elements.
- b. GVN PHUNG HOANG centers will be provided adequate US support from both Assistance-in-Kind (AIK) piastre fund for pacification programs and US dollar, but without formal accountability below the national level.
- c. As of 1 July 1969, equipment (reference Appendix 2, this annex) provided PHOENIX regional, province, and autonomous city advisory staffs maintaining offices separate from PHUNG HOANG centers, will be accounted for as is all other property provided CORDS advisory teams. This pertains to equipment provided in accordance with procedures outlined in preceding paragraphs of this section.

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- d. Maintenance support for equipment (except for vehicles) utilized by PHOENIX advisors (at district, province, and autonomous city) will be provided for by the CORDS province team logistic support section located at province advisory team level, and by the support element of the Management Support Division (MSD) of CORDS at regional (CTZ) advisory team level for corps PHOENIX advisors.
- e. The PHOENIX Directorate in Saigon will receive complete logistic support (equipment, supplies, and equipment maintenance) in the same manner as do all other Directorates of MACCORDS. This support will be provided for by CORDS/MSD/Administration by submission of an informal request from the PHOENIX Directorate.
- f. The GVN Central PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office in Saigon will be provided complete logistic support (equipment, supplies, and equipment maintenance) by the GVN Director General of National Police (DGNP). Required equipment and supplies will normally be procured through local purchase.
- g. Equipment and supplies provided GVN PHUNG HOANG Centers (at district, province, autonomous city, and regional level) will be primarily obtained through AIK pacification fund local procurement. Required items which cannot be provided in this manner, due to non-availability locally, will be supplied by property book officer action outlined in paragraph 4 of this section.
- h. Equipment maintenance support will be provided to GVN PHUNG HOANG centers at all levels by the DGNP.
- i. The PHOENIX Coordinators' Orientation Course at Vung Tau will be provided complete logistic support (equipment, supplies, and maintenance) by the property book officer of the CORDS Advisory Team for Phuoc Tuy Province who is located at Vung Tau. The equipment authorized the course is shown at Appendix 2 of this annex.
- j. Replacement of equipment and supplies for PHOENIX offices and GVN PHUNG HOANG centers, at all levels, lost or destroyed due to combat will be expedited by radio or telephonic request to the appropriate property book officer with follow-up by informal written request annotated as "combat loss" and as indicated in succeeding paragraphs. Priority will be given to these replacements.
- k. Information regarding support for radios and vehicles is contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this section.

3. **PHOENIX SUPPORT.**

- a. Support of PHOENIX Personnel. PHOENIX advisors at all levels, as part of MACCORDS and CORDS advisory teams, will be supported in accordance with Joint Directive 1-68.

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b. Issue/Replacement of Equipment.

- (1) US Equipment. PHOENIX advisory staffs (at district, province, and autonomous city) will submit informal written requests for issue/replacement of US furnished equipment to the CORDS property book officer located at province advisory team level. The corps PHOENIX advisory staff will submit informal written requests to the CORDS property book officer located at regional (CTZ) advisory team level. The Property Book Officer (PBO) will submit formal requisitions, annotated "PHOENIX," against the appropriate USARV depot system. The PBO will request appropriate fund cite under current procedures utilizing teletype rather than by letter.
- (2) Locally Procured Equipment. PHOENIX advisory staffs will submit informal written requests for issue/replacement of locally procured equipment to the appropriate PBO, who will submit a formal request to the local AIK CORDS pacification imprest fund cashier for local purchase.

c. Expendable Supplies.

- (1) PHOENIX advisory staffs will submit informal written requests for expendable supplies to the appropriate PBO.
- (2) A 30-day stockage of expendable supplies is authorized at all levels to support PHOENIX advisory staffs.
- (3) The PBO is authorized to locally purchase with AIK funds, as provided by the CORDS pacification imprest fund cashier, those items which cannot be made available from normal supply source within 30 days.

d. Establishment of Equipment Accountability.

- (1) Since 1 July 1969, administrative control of equipment (except vehicles) in the hands of PHOENIX advisors, is the responsibility of the PBO, except for the PHOENIX Coordinators' Orientation Course at Vung Tau. Only non-expendable office equipment located in PHOENIX staff offices which are maintained separate and distinct from GVN PHUNG HOANG centers will be accounted for by the PBO in accordance with Found on Post (FOP) procedure.
- (2) Administrative control of equipment for the PHOENIX Coordinators' Orientation Course at Vung Tau will be exercised by the PBO of the CORDS Advisory Team for PHOUC Tuy Province.
- (3) Exception is granted to PHOENIX advisors in joint occupancy of PHUNG HOANG centers, in which case no formal accountability of this equipment will be maintained.

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e. Maintenance.

- (1) Equipment (other than vehicles) held by PHOENIX advisors will be provided maintenance support from US agencies currently supporting CORDS advisory teams.
- (2) Non-standard equipment will be maintained by local contract effected by the CORDS advisory team to which the PHOENIX advisor is assigned, utilizing AIK CORDS pacification funds.

4. SUPPORT OF PHUNG HOANG CENTERS.

- a. Support of PHUNG HOANG Personnel. PHUNG HOANG personnel at all levels are supported by the GVN agency sponsoring them. PHUNG HOANG personnel will not be US supported.
- b. Issue/Replacement of Equipment. Equipment authorized PHUNG HOANG centers (see Appendix 3, this annex) will not be issued/replaced automatically. All requirements for issue/replacement will be reviewed and approved by the center's PHOENIX advisor before he initiates action to obtain the equipment for the center. Requirements will be based on availability of funds and on the actual operational requirements of the particular center and not on the authorized quantities reflected in Appendix 3 to this annex. In no cases, will the quantities authorized in Appendix 3 be exceeded.
 - (1) Locally Procured Equipment.
 - (a) PHOENIX advisory staffs will submit informal written requests for issue/replacement of equipment for PHUNG HOANG centers at all levels (except for the Central PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office in Saigon) to his supporting PBO. The PBO will expeditiously submit a formal request to the AIK CORDS pacification imprest fund cashier and effect local purchase action.
 - (b) Upon procurement of the equipment thus requested, the PBO will make issue to the PHUNG HOANG center through the center's PHOENIX advisor. The latter will obtain Vietnamese signature and a date for the issue on the issue document provided by the PBO.
 - (c) The PHOENIX advisor will then return the completed issue document to the PBO who will file the issue document and originating informal request as a completed action. No property book will be maintained for this equipment.
 - (2) US Equipment.

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- (a) PHOENIX advisory staffs will submit informal written requests for issue/replacement of equipment at all levels (except for the Central PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office in Saigon) to the appropriate PBO.
- (b) The PBO will submit requisitions, annotated "PHUNG HOANG," to the appropriate supporting USARV depot system. The PBO will request appropriate fund cite under current procedures utilizing teletype rather than by letter.
- (c) Upon receipt of the equipment, the PBO will issue to the PHUNG HOANG center through the center's PHOENIX advisor. The latter will obtain Vietnamese signature and a date for the issue on the issue document provided by the PBO.
- (d) The PHOENIX advisor will then return the completed issue document to the PBO who will file the issue document and originating informal request as a completed action. No property book will be maintained for this equipment.

c. Expendable Supplies.

- (1) PHOENIX advisors will submit informal written requests for expendable supplies for PHUNG HOANG centers (except for the Central PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office in Saigon) to the appropriate PBO, who will submit a formal request to local AIK CORDS pacification imprest fund cashier for local purchase.
- (2) The PBO will take appropriate supply action to obtain those items which cannot be made available through local purchase or are peculiar to the US supply system.
- (3) Informal records will be kept by the PBO of all requests for and issues of expendable supplies to PHUNG HOANG centers.

d. Equipment Accountability.

- (1) On 1 July 1969, the majority of equipment listed in Appendix 3 to this annex is assumed to be on hand at PHUNG HOANG centers.
- (2) No accountability for equipment already on hand or issued subsequent to 1 July 1969 for PHUNG HOANG centers is required or will be established.

e. Maintenance.

- (1) Equipment in PHUNG HOANG centers will be provided maintenance support by the local National Police at district, province, autonomous city, region, and national level.

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(2) Reimbursement from the local AIK CORDS pacification imprest fund cashier is authorized to pay for local civilian maintenance service on such equipment in those cases when local National Police maintenance support cannot be provided.

5. **RADIOS.** Radios and allied equipment for use at PHUNG HOANG centers are obtained from local National Police units through the GVN Ministry of Interior's Combined Telecommunications Directorate (CTD) and its services at regional level and radio stations at province level. Maintenance of this equipment is similarly provided by the CTD system.

6. **VEHICLES.**

- a. Vehicles in the PHOENIX program are issued to PHOENIX advisors and are used primarily by PHOENIX advisors and, at times, by GVN PHUNG HOANG personnel for operational purposes. Some of these are military jeeps (M-151) which were distributed through RVNAF supply channels and issued to PHOENIX advisors through the Vietnamese Administrative and Direct Support Logistics Company (A&DSL Co); others are National Police-type vehicles (green and white jeeps) which were programmed by CORDS/PSD into the GVN National Police supply system expressly for use by PHOENIX advisors. Both additional and replacement vehicles as necessary will be programmed into the respective distribution systems by action from CORDS in Saigon and will be sent to the PHOENIX advisory staffs where needed by distribution orders issued from Saigon. At present, no additional or replacement vehicles can be expected until early 1970. Requests or requisitions for these vehicles will be effected upon receipt of vehicles.
- b. Maintenance of these vehicles will be provided by the systems through which they were distributed; by the province A&DSL Co for military-type (M-151) jeeps and by the local National Police for police-type vehicles. Requests for maintenance will be made on the nearest A&DSL Co, and in the case of National Police vehicles, from the local National Police unit from which the vehicle was issued to the PHOENIX advisor.
- c. POL for these vehicles will be issued from resources available to the nearest A&DSL Co for military-type jeeps and the nearest National Police unit for police-type vehicles. Under GVN regulations, the National Police are authorized 300 litres of gasoline per month per vehicle. Therefore, the National Police will provide only 300 litres of gasoline per month for the police-type vehicle issued to PHOENIX advisors. The A&DSL Co will provide 190 litres of gasoline per month for the military-type vehicle issued to the PHOENIX advisor.
- d. The designated support representative of the CORDS advisory team to which the PHOENIX advisor is assigned will arrange for and coordinate

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the support which will be provided in accordance with 6b and 6c, above, with the respective US advisors to the A&DSL Co and to the National Police unit.

- e. Reimbursement from the local AIK CORDS pacification imprest fund cashier is authorized to support PHOENIX POL and maintenance requirements which cannot be provided by the National Police or A&DSL units.

SECTION IV - CONSTRUCTION AND FACILITIES MAINTENANCE1. REFERENCES.

- a. Joint Directive 1-68.
- b. MACV Directive 37-2.
- c. MACV Directive 415-1.
- d. CORDS Administrative Instruction 16-68.

2. PHOENIX ADVISORS. Construction and maintenance of facilities in support of PHOENIX advisors will be requested, as necessary, and accomplished, as for all CORDS advisors, under the provisions of Joint Directive 1-68.

3. PHUNG HOANG CENTERS.

- a. General. Construction and maintenance of facilities in support of PHUNG HOANG centers will be provided under two arrangements:
 - (1) The application of the provisions of MACV Directive 37-2 at district, province, and regional levels for projects of value up to \$VN 100,000.
 - (2) Reference to PHOENIX Directorate, Saigon, for approval of projects of value over \$VN 100,000.
- b. Construction and Facilities Maintenance with CORDS AIK Funds.
 - (1) At the district level, the DIOCC coordinator will submit an informal written request to the district senior advisor for construction and/or facilities maintenance requirements for the PHUNG HOANG center at district. Upon approval by the district senior advisor, the approved request will be returned to the DIOCC coordinator who will then present it to the district imprest fund cashier who will provide the funds up to \$VN 30,000 for any one approved project. For projects in excess of \$VN 30,000 and up to \$VN 100,000, the district senior advisor will request approval of the province senior advisor.

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(2) At province and autonomous city level, the PHOENIX coordinator will submit an informal written request to the province senior advisor for construction and/or facilities maintenance requirements for the PHUNG HOANG center at province or autonomous city. Upon approval by the province senior advisor, the approved request will be returned to the PHOENIX coordinator who will present it to province imprest fund cashier who will provide the funds up to \$VN 100,000 for any one approved project.

(3) At corps level, the corps PHOENIX coordinator will submit an informal written request to the CTZ DEPCORDS executive officer for construction and/or facilities maintenance requirements for PHUNG HOANG center at region. Upon approval by the CTZ DEPCORDS executive officer, the approved request will be returned to the PHOENIX coordinator who will present it to the regional imprest fund cashier who will provide the funds up to \$VN 100,000 for any one approved project.

(4) Since authorization for disbursement of funds in the field is limited to a total cost of \$VN 100,000 per project or transaction, requirements exceeding this limitation will be forwarded through PHOENIX coordinator's channels to the PHOENIX Directorate in Saigon. All such requirements will include full written justification, cost estimate, and job specifications prior to forwarding to the PHOENIX Directorate. The PHOENIX Directorate will review the request and if recommended approval is warranted, the Directorate will forward the request to the ACofS, CORDS, MACV, for approval of the Comptroller, MACV. Once approval is received from the Comptroller, MACV, the CORDS military support of pacification fund control officer issues a fund cite and forwards the required specifications to the appropriate contracting office.

(5) The CTZ DEPCORDS executive officer is the designated regional CORDS AIK contracting officer with contracting authority up to \$VN 2 million for approved projects.

(6) No formal contracts are required for construction, modification, or renovation/repair work costing \$VN 100,000 or less.

c. Projects of Value in Excess of \$VN 2 Million. For projects exceeding \$VN 2 million, the contracting authority of the CORDS regional executive office, referral must be made through MACCORDS to other contracting agencies, e.g., OICC, US Army, USAID, etc. However, project actions of this magnitude are discouraged; in fact, they are currently not being approved.

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SECTION V - AIRLIFT SUPPORT (PASSENGER AND CARGO)**1. REFERENCES.**

- a. USAID Order 56.3, Utilization of USAID-Chartered Aircraft within South Vietnam.
- b. USAID Order 56.3.1, Group Travel on USAID-Chartered Aircraft within South Vietnam.
- c. USAID Order 56.3.2, Priorities Systems for Cargo Air Movement.
- d. MACV Directive 55-4.
- e. MACV Directive 59-1.
- f. MACV Directive 59-2.
- g. MACV Directive 59-3.
- h. 834th Air Division Airlift Schedule, South Vietnam.
- i. CORDS/MSD Administrative Instruction 19-68.

2. GENERAL.

- a. Air support for PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG will be provided through the CORDS Air Operations System, which is managed by CORDS/MSD/Air Operations Branch. PHOENIX will be provided the same services as are all other elements of MACCORDS. The CORDS Air Operations System has access to air support from the following sources:
 - (1) Contract aircraft (Air America).
 - (2) Common Service Airlift System (CSAS).
 - (3) Dedicated Airlift System.
 - (4) Priority Air Transport (PAT).
 - (5) Helicopters provided by field commanders.
- b. Contract Aircraft (Air America). Air America aircraft are under the operational control of CORDS Air Operations and provide cargo and passenger service throughout RVN with a variety of fixed-wing aircraft

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ranging in size from STOL single-engine, light aircraft to large twin engine C-7A and C-46 aircraft. Air America also flies passengers in four 204-B type helicopters which are similar to military UH-1.

- c. Common Service Airlift System (CSAS). The CSAS is a cargo and passenger airlift system operated by the USAF for all authorized users in RVN including CORDS, GVN, and RVNAF. Passenger travel and air cargo movement in the CSAS are governed by MACV Directives 55-4 and 59-3. The CSAS supports both cargo and passenger airlift operations with C-130 and C-123 aircraft. The CSAS operates both scheduled and special missions.
- d. Dedicated Airlift System. The USAF operates a Dedicated Airlift System with C-7A aircraft for users specified by COMUSMACV. CORDS Air Operations has daily use of two flyable C-7A. These C-7A are primarily used to haul cargo and/or passenger groups into and out of short airstrips which are too small to be served by the CSAS aircraft.
- e. Priority Air Transport (PAT). The PAT system operates a limited number of U-21 fixed-wing, twin-engine aircraft and UH-1 helicopters for support of HQ, MACV, including CORDS.
- f. Helicopters Provided by Field Commanders. All of the military helicopters in RVN, excepting the few in PAT, are allocated to the field commanders. The field commander in each CTZ allocates his helicopters to support the military and pacification efforts in his region. The number of military helicopters allocated to CORDS, including PHOENIX, varies from one CTZ to another, depending on the number available and the current CTZ situation. Helicopter support is a critical asset in all regions. Although there are many helicopters flying in RVN daily, the demand for support far surpasses supply.

3. CORDS AIR OPERATIONS.

- a. General. Headquarters, CORDS Air Operations is a subordinate section of the CORDS Management Support Directorate (CORDS/MSD) and is located physically in USAID II. It consists of administrative offices and a passenger booking office. All passengers requiring movement out of Saigon are booked through this office. An Air Operations office is also located in the CORDS warehouse at the Air America Complex, Tan Son Nhut. This office receives Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMD), schedules cargo movements, and is responsible for the day-to-day surveillance of contractor activities. There are four Air Operations Offices located in the respective CTZ headquarters that function essentially the same as the headquarters office.

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b. Contract Aircraft (Air America).

(1) Individual Passengers. Requests for travel from Saigon and the CTZ are submitted on Form VN-13 to the respective booking offices. These requests should be submitted by noon preceding the day of travel. Travel requests from provinces are submitted to the province senior advisor (reference USAID Order 56.3). Phone numbers of Air Operations Offices are as follows:

Saigon - Chief, Air Operations	PTT 93083, Exts 5619/5638
Air Booking Office	Exts 5414/5428
I CTZ	Motley 174
II CTZ	Nha Trang 3307
III CTZ	Bien Hoa 3592
IV CTZ	Can Tho 2612/2376

(2) Passenger Groups. Requests for air movement of passenger groups of nine or more will be submitted to CORDS Air Operations on Form VN-13D in accordance with USAID Order 56.3.1. CORDS Air Operations will determine the method of movement, e.g., CSAS or contract aircraft, and make the necessary arrangements.

(3) Cargo Movements. Requests for cargo movement from Saigon will be submitted to CORDS Air Operations, Tan Son Nhut, on a TCMD (DD Form 1384). CORDS Air Operations will determine whether the cargo will be moved via CSAS or contract aircraft. The TCMD for cargo shipments originating in the region will be submitted to the regional CORDS Air Operations officer. Certain types of sensitive cargo, e.g., weapons, ammunition, etc., will not be stored in CORDS warehouses. Close coordination will be accomplished with the Chief, CORDS Air Operations (Saigon), concerning the scheduling of this sensitive type cargo for movement.

(4) CORDS Air Express (CAX) System. The CAX system is an express system whereby small packages and certain small pieces of cargo can be moved via contractor aircraft on an expedited basis. The central receiving office for CAX parcels is located in USAID II. From there it is moved to the airport and placed on the first available aircraft. It is received at destination by the CAX officer and delivered to the addressee. CAX offices located in the respective CTZ headquarters will accept CAX items for shipment to Saigon as stated in CORDS/MSD Administrative Instruction 19-68.

c. Common Service Airlift System (CSAS) Operations.

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(1) General. The CSAS is available for PHOENIX use, either directly or through the CORDS Air Operations system.

(2) Individual Passengers. Individual passenger bookings can be made in person or by telephone to the nearest TMA Air Traffic Coordinating Office (ATCO) up to 7 days prior to the day of travel. The ATCO passenger information phone numbers are listed on page 5, in the 834th Air Division Airlift Schedule, South Vietnam. One limitation of this service is that advance bookings must be made at each point of origin of any mission, (e. g., to book a round trip from Tan Son Nhut to Cam Ranh Bay, requires an advance booking at Tan Son Nhut for the first leg, and an advance booking at Cam Ranh Bay for the return leg). The CSAS passenger schedules are published monthly. Requests to be placed on distribution for these schedules, together with the number of copies required, should be addressed to:

834th Air Division (DOCTS)
ATTN: Chief of Scheduling

(3) CSAS Passenger Groups and Cargo Movements. CSAS passenger groups and cargo movements are governed by MACV Directives 55-4 and 59-3; however, PHOENIX requests should be submitted as stated in paragraph 3b(1), (2), (3), above. CORDS/MSD/Air Operations Office will determine which groups and cargo will move on CSAS.

(4) Orders. CSAS passengers must have valid orders signed by a competent authority as specified by MACV Directive 59-3. Vietnamese employees must have bilingual orders co-signed by their province, district, or section chief.

d. Dedicated Airlift System. Two dedicated C-7A are centrally managed by the Chief, CORDS/MSD/Air Operations to supplement the contracted support from Air America. The Chief, CORDS/MSD/Air Operations, will apply the C-7A wherever their unique STOL capabilities can be utilized.

e. Priority Air Transportation (PAT) System. MACV Directive 59-2 governs the request for, and the provision of, PAT. This system, with limited resources, supports HQ, MACV, and US governmental agencies within the Saigon area. The CORDS Air Booking Offices described in paragraph 3b(1), above, are central receiving offices for CORDS PAT requests. The CORDS air booking offices will submit requests to the ACofS, J-3, MACV, for PAT only when Air America assets cannot support PHOENIX requirements. Requests for PAT must be submitted by the CORDS air booking office prior to 1200 hours of the day prior to the day of requested travel. Confirmations or cancellations for PAT travel are telephoned to the CORDS air booking office not later than 1800 hours on the day prior to the day of requested travel.

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f. **Helicopters Provided by Field Commanders.** Within each region, including the Saigon area, the helicopters provided in support of CORDS, including PHOENIX, are controlled by the CORDS air operations officers. Flight requests for helicopter support, and current information concerning the availability and restrictions on these helicopters, will be processed with the appropriate CORDS air operations officer at the phone numbers listed in paragraph 3b(1), above.

SECTION VI - COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT**1. REFERENCES.**

- a. MACV Directive 65-6.
- b. MACV Directive 66-1.
- c. MACV Directive 105-1.
- d. MACV Directive 105-5.
- e. MACV Directive 105-7.
- f. MACV Directive 105-9.
- g. MACV Directive 105-11.
- h. MACV Staff Memorandum 105-10.
- i. MACV CofS Action Memorandum 69-31, PHOENIX.
- j. CORDS/MSD Administrative Instruction No. 17-68, 10 Aug 68, Message Traffic.
- k. CORDS/MSD Administrative Instruction No. 19-68, 2 Sep 68, CAX.
- l. CORDS/MSD Administrative Instruction No. 27-69, 4 Apr 69, COMAX.
- m. MACCORDS Notice Number 68-379, 26 Nov 68 (under revision), Telecommunications Procedures.

2. AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING SUPPORT.

- a. The ACofS, J-6, MACV, exercises joint staff supervision over command-wide communications and electronics (C-E) activities. He provides technical assistance and advice to the ACofS, CORDS, MACV, on all C-E matters requiring coordination and he assists operating CORDS elements with coordination of local C-E requirements with the military commander concerned.

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- b. USARV has established the common-user telecommunications system in support of CORDS advisory teams in the RVN.
- c. CORDS/Management Support Directorate (MSD) administers and operates the CORDS telecommunications system and operates the CORDS message centers throughout RVN.
- d. CORDS/Public Safety Directorate, Telecommunications Division (PSD) TELECOM has arranged with the GVN Combined Telecommunications Directorate (CTD) to account for and provide logistic support for radios at Province and District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers.

3. SUPPORT PROCEDURES.

- a. CORDS/PSD/TELECOM has arranged for logistic support as stated in paragraph 2d, above.
- b. PHOENIX advisors will use the communication systems available to the advisory team to which assigned. Advisory teams have available voice radios at all levels and telephone and teletype service at province, region, and Saigon level. PHOENIX advisors will coordinate with local CORDS/PSD advisors for logistic support provided by CTD, as and when required.

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CLASS A - AGENT OFFICERS

1. The CORDS advisory team senior advisor will select an officer to serve as Class A Agent officer for the purpose of paying LN employees. CORDS advisory teams which have the authority will issue appointing orders. Otherwise, they will submit a request for orders to higher authority.
2. Commissioned officers, warrant officers, or US civilian employees of officer equivalent rank may be appointed as agent officers.
3. Appointment orders of agent officers will include the proper classification of the agent officer and show the address of the servicing disbursing officer, such as "Finance Officer, 7th Finance Section (Disbursing), APO 96243."
4. Class A Agent officers will always be appointed as agents of the AIK Custodian. Under no circumstances will anyone be appointed as an agent of a Class A Agent officer.
5. Orders of Class A Agent officers must specify the type of payment to be made and that funds will not be entrusted to others for any purpose.
6. Each order appointing a Class A Agent officer will include the purpose and duration of the appointment. If the appointment is for an indefinite period of time, the order will so state and the Class A Agent officer will continue on such duty until relieved by the appointing authority.
7. Copies of the orders will be furnished to the applicable servicing disbursing office, ATTN: Civilian Payroll Section, and to HQ, MACV, ATTN: MACCO-F, APO 96222.
8. The CORDS advisory team senior advisor will make provisions to ascertain that all public funds in the possession of agent officers will be properly protected at all times, using a field safe that is properly secured to an immovable object and guarded by an armed guard to secure the funds when not in the hands of the agent officers.
9. Disbursing officers will furnish each Class A Agent officer with complete written instructions concerning the following each time funds are advanced:
 - a. Safeguarding of funds.
 - b. Identification of payees.
 - c. Signature of payees.

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- d. Return of funds.
- e. Certification of payrolls.
- f. Penalty provisions for misuse of funds.
- g. Such other instructions as disbursing officers may deem necessary.
- h. Entrustment of funds to others.
- i. Manner of providing employees with payroll slips disclosing to payees data pertinent to their pay.
- j. Disposition instructions pertinent to the periodic notification of leave balance.
- k. Instructions prohibiting commingling of public funds with non-appropriated funds, quasi-public funds, or personal funds.

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PHOENIX ADVISORY STAFF EQUIPMENT

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>DIR</u>	<u>REG</u>	<u>PROV/CITY</u>	<u>DIST</u>	<u>PHOENIX Coordinator Orientation Course</u>		
					<u>ADM</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>PER MDL DIOCC*</u>
DESK, MTL, DBL PDL		13					
DESK, MTL, SGL PDL		4			3	2	2
DESK, MTL			7	3			
DESK, MTL, TW		9				2	
DESK, WOOD				2			
CHAIR, CUSHIONED		13					
CHAIR, ARM CUSHIONED		10					
CHAIR, MTL, ROT, W/ARMS	10		7	3	5	2	
CHAIR, MTL, ROT, W/O ARMS		8					
CHAIR, STU, W/ARM					60		
CHAIR, LOUNGE						2	
CHAIR, WOOD				6			
CHAIR, FOLDING, MTL							14
SOFA & ARM CHAIR SETTEE	3		1				
CABINET, FILE, 4DR W/COMB LOCK	10	3		2	4		
CABINET, STOR, 2DR 36/10/78" W/LOCK	3	2		1	3		1
CABINET, FILE, 5DWR W/COMB		2					
CABINET, FILE, 5DWR W/O KEY	3	2					
CABINET, FILE, W/BAR LOCK							1
TABLE, TW WOOD				4			
TABLE, WORK, WOOD							7
TABLE, OFF, MTL		3					

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NOMENCLATURE	DIR	REG	PROV/CITY	DIST	PHOENIX Coordinator Orientation Course		
					ADM	CLASS	PER MDI DIOCC*
TABLE, CONF, 8 MAN	1						
TABLE, PROJ, 35MM							1
TABLE, COFFEE	3	1					
STAND, TW		5					
STAND, TW, COLAP- LEAF		5					
STAND, TABLE, WOOD		1					
STAND, SMOKING						25	
SAFE, 4 DWR					1		
SAFE, 2 DWR	1						
BOOKCASE, WOOD 4 SHV		4					
FAN, TABLE		2	1				
FAN, FLOOR	3	2	2				
LAMP, DESK	13	3	2				
RACK, MTL. CLOTH, 12HK	1						
HOLDER, CHART, A-FRAME					2	1	
TW, ENG, 14/16" NON E	3	2	1		1		
TW, ENG, 10/21" NON E		1	1		1		
TW, VN, 13", NON E		1	1				
TW, VN, 21", NON E		1	1				
TW, 16", ELEC	5						
TW, 21", ELEC	3						
PROJECTOR, VU- GRAPH	1					1	
PROJECTOR, OPAQUE						1	
PROJECTOR, 35MM CARO	1					1	
PROJECTOR, MOVIE						1	
PROJECTOR, SCREEN	1					1	

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<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>DIR</u>	<u>REG</u>	<u>PROV/CITY</u>	<u>DIST</u>	<u>PHOENIX Coordinator Orientation Course</u>		
					<u>ADM</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>PER MDL DIOCC*</u>
MACHINE, ADDING	1	1	1				
MACHINE, DUPL ELEC		1	1				
MACHINE, MIMEO							1
MACHINE, PHOTOCOPY		1					
MACHINE, XEROX 813 RENTAL		1					
PA SET W/NECK MIKE							1
CAMERA, ASAHI PENTAX	1						
CAMERA, POLAROID	1						
CUTTER, PAPER						1	
SET, LETTERING						1	
MACHINE, NUMBERING	1						
CASH BOX, MTL	1		1				
CARD FILE, 5X8							
BLACKBOARD, 3X3'							
BOARD, BRIEF, COLLAP	1						
BOARD, BULLETIN, 4X8'						1	
COOLER, WATER, DISP W/BOTTLE ELEC		1				1	1
REFRIGERATOR	1	1	1				
COFFEE MAKER, ELEC	1					1	
GENERATOR, 5KW			1				
GENERATOR, 30KW		1					
AIR CONDITIONER 10,000BTU					2		
AIR CONDITIONER 18,000BTU		3					
SEDAN, COMPACT	4						
JEEP, KAISER (NP)	7	3	2		3		
BRONCO, STATION- WAGON	1						
JEEP, M151		3	1				
BUS, 24PAX					1		
JEEP, 1/4 TON				1			

*4 model DIOCC presently authorized

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NOTE: Equipment shown in this appendix is considered essential to the operation of the PHOENIX activities. All items on hand and obtained from PHOENIX funds will be retained. When these items are not now reflected in current CORDS TA, a request will be submitted by the appropriate supporting property book officer for inclusion of such items in the next TA change in accordance with paragraph 514 of the MACV Log Guide.

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PHUNG HOANG CENTER EQUIPMENT

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>CENTRAL PHUNG HOANG CENTER</u>	<u>PER REGIONAL PHUNG HOANG CENTER</u>	<u>PER PROV/CITY PHUNG HOANG CENTER</u>	<u>PER DISTRICT PHUNG HOANG CENTER</u>
DESK, MTL, DBL PDL	20			
DESK, MTL, SGL PDL	20			
DESK, OFF, WOOD		22	18	16
CHAIR, ARM	4			
CHAIR, CSHN	46			
CHAIR, MTL, CSHN	20			
CHAIR, REV, MTL, EXEC	20			
CHAIR, OFF, WOOD		32	26	22
SOFA & ARM CHAIR				
SETTEE		1		
CABINET, FILE, 4DWR	10			
CABINET, FILE, 4DWR, W/COMB	4	3	4	3
CABINET, STOR, 36/18/ 78, 2DWR, W/LOCK	2	3	3	1
CABINET, FILE, 5DWR W/O KEY		4	3	3
CABINET, FILE, W/BAR LOCK		4		
TABLE, TW, WOOD		6	6	4
TABLE, WORK, WOOD		3		
TABLE, COFFEE		1		
BOOKCASE, WOOD, 4 SHELF		2	2	1
FAN, FLOOR	3	4	3	3
FAN, TABLE		2	1	
LAMP, DESK	10	4	3	2
TW, ENG, 14/16"				
NON E	3	1	1	1
TW, ENG, 18/21"	2	1	1	1
NON E				

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<u>MENCLATURE</u>	CENTRAL PHUNG HOANG CENTER	PER REGIONAL PHUNG HOANG CENTER	PER PROV/CITY PHUNG HOANG CENTER	PER DISTRICT PHUNG HOANG CENTER
, VN, 13" NON E	6	2	2	1
, VN, 21" NON E	4	2	2	1
OBJECTOR, MOVIE	1			
CHINE, ADD, ELEC	2	1	1	
CHINE, DUPL, ELEC	1	1	1	1
CHINE, MIMEO	1			
CHINE, PHOTOCOPYING		1	1	
CHINE, THERMO-FAX	1			
DR, TAPE, "NAT"				
501	1			
DR, TAPE, "SONY" 530	1			
MERA, CANON	2			
MERA, POLAROID	2			
CHINE, NUMBERING		2	2	1
EST, METAL, 2DR	2			
DLER, WTR, DISP, 3TL, E		1		
FRIGERATOR, ELEC	1			
FREE MAKER, ELEC	1			
GENERATOR, 5KW			1	1
GENERATOR, 30KW		1		
MOTORBIKE, HONDA 50			3	2
WE, M16	6			
ADIO, FM 5			1	1
ADIO, FM 1			1	1

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PHUNG HOANG CENTER EQUIPMENT

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>CENTRAL PHUNG HOANG CENTER</u>	<u>PER REGIONAL PHUNG HOANG CENTER</u>	<u>PER PROV/CITY PHUNG HOANG CENTER</u>	<u>PER DISTRICT PHUNG HOANG CENTER</u>
DESK, MTL, DBL PDL	20			
DESK, MTL, SGL PDL	20			
DESK, OFF, WOOD		22	18	16
CHAIR, ARM	4			
CHAIR, CSHN	46			
CHAIR, MTL, CSHN	20			
CHAIR, REV, MTL, EXEC	20			
CHAIR, OFF, WOOD		32	26	22
SOFA & ARM CHAIR				
SETTEE		1		
CABINET, FILE, 4DWR	10			
CABINET, FILE, 4DWR, W/COMB	4	3	4	3
CABINET, STOR, 36/18/ 78, 2DWR, W/LOCK	2	3	3	1
CABINET, FILE, 5DWR W/O KEY		4	3	3
CABINET, FILE, W/BAR LOCK		4		
TABLE, TW, WOOD		6	6	4
TABLE, WORK, WOOD		3		
TABLE, COFFEE		1		
BOOKCASE, WOOD, 4 SHELF		2	2	1
FAN, FLOOR	3	4	3	3
FAN, TABLE		2	1	
LAMP, DESK	10	4	3	2
TW, ENG, 14/16"				
NON E	3	1	1	1
TW, ENG, 18/21"				
NON E	2	1	1	1

Appendix 3 to Annex I

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<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	CENTRAL PHUNG HOANG CENTER	PER REGIONAL PHUNG HOANG CENTER	PER PROV/CITY PHUNG HOANG CENTER	PER DISTRICT PHUNG HOANG CENTER
TW, VN, 13" NON E	6	2	2	1
TW, VN, 21" NON E	4	2	2	1
PROJECTOR, MOVIE	1			
MACHINE, ADD, ELEC	2	1	1	
MACHINE, DUPL, ELEC	1	1	1	1
MACHINE, MIMEO	1			
MACHINE, PHOTOCOPYING		1	1	
MACHINE, THERMO-FAX	1			
RCDR, TAPE, "NAT"				
RQ501	1			
RCDR, TAPE, "SONY" 530	1			
CAMERA, CANON	2			
CAMERA, POLAROID	2			
MACHINE, NUMBERING		2	2	1
CHEST, METAL, 2DR	2			
COOLER, WTR, DISP, W/BTL, E		1		
REFRIGERATOR, ELEC	1			
COFFEE MAKER, ELEC	1			
GENERATOR, 5KW			1	1
GENERATOR, 30KW		1		
MOTORBIKE, HONDA 50			3	2
RIFLE, M16	6			
RADIO, FM 5			1	1
RADIO, FM 1			1	1

Page 2 of Appendix 3 to Annex I

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RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ

RFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ

RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ

RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ

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SECTION III OF X

III CORPS	537.5	37.7	84.	678.4	1.85
IV CORPS	833.6	148.3	35.5	1029.7	17.63
RVN	2103.2	331.6	253.1	2769.2	16.20
VC	VC	NONHAM.	SUBTOT.	PCT	TOTAL
I CORPS	773.5	27.7	801.2	25.77	31,090.1
II CORPS	226.2	10.0	236.2	8.25	2,863.2
III CORPS	264.0	37.8	301.8		
	5.72	5,276.6			
IV CORPS	1540.6	59.2	1599.8	27.40	5,838.1
RVN	2804.3	134.7	2939.0	17.20	17,087.0

TABLE THREE
HAMLET STATUS (SECURITY ONLY)

	SECURE		CONTESTED			VC	TOTAL	
	A	B	D	E	OTHER			
I CORPS	115	247	494	369	63	187	982	2457
	0	2	16	1	4	6	14	5
II CORPS	186	716	820	462	86	247	579	3,096
	-23	1	-7	39	4	10	7	3

INFO..CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC/DDO-1 S/DEF-7

ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 DIA-15 W/H-10 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1

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III CORPS	131	378	553	356	39	198	458	2,113
	-2	0	-10	9	3	-1	14	2
IV CORPS	273	734	1036	733	168	70	1970	4,984
	-15	14	16	12	1	4	-5	-1
RVN	705	2075	2903	1920	356	702	3989	12,650
	-40	-11	15	59	4	-12	2	9

TABLE FOUR
POPULATION STATUS (SECURITY ONLY)
(IN THOUSANDS)

	A	B	NONHAM	SUBTOT	PCT	
I CORPS	303.0	457.5	536.3	479.4	1,776.2	57.12
II CORPS	449.9	731.7	683.1	360.6	2,225.3	77.73
III CORPS	309.6	1034.4	925.7	2235.5	4,505.2	85.38
IV CORPS	565.1	1213.9	1325.1	63.0	3,167.1	54.24
RVN	1627.6	3437.5	3470.2	3138.5	11,673.8	68.32
CONTESTED	D	E	OTHER	NONHAM	SUBTOT	PCT
I CORPS	363.3	59.9	23.7	85.0	531.9	17.1
II CORPS	279.3	47.3	26.6	48.1	401.3	14.03
III CORPS	335.6	30.6	18.7	84.5	469.4	8.89
IV CORPS	873.5	149.9	12.3	35.5	1071.2	
18.34						
RVN	1851.7	287.7	81.1	253.1	2473.8	14.47
VC	VC	NON HAM	SUBTOT	PCT	TOTAL	
I CORPS	773.5	27.7	801.2	25.76	3,109.3	
II CORPS	226.3	10.0	236.3	8.25	2,862.8	
III CORPS	264.0	37.8	301.8	5.72	5,276.4	
IV CORPS	1540.6	59.2	1599.8	2.40	5,838.1	
VN	2804.3	134.7	2939.0	17.20	17,086.6	

(2) FOR COMPARISON, POPULATION TABLES DEPICTING
DATA FOR FEBRUARY 1967 ARE PRESENTED FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
COMBINED AND FOR SECURITY ONLY.

TABLE FIVE
POPULATION (SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT) FEBRUARY 1967
(IN THOUSANDS)

	A	B	NON HAM	SUBTOT	PCT	
I CORPS	31.9	299.9	635.5	469.8	1,437.2	49.9
II CORPS	26.4	598.2	813.5	342.1	2,020.2	69.7
III CORPS	0	504.6	1323.8	2231.2	4,059.6	79.2

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IV CORPS	4.5	1224.7	1457.8	136.9	2,903.9	50.9
RVN	382.8	2627.3	4230.6	3180.1	10,421.9	72.7
CONTESTED	D	E	NONHAM	SUBTOT	PCT	
CORPS	491.8					
89.0	85.1	593.9	20.6			
II CORPS	358.9	107.0	18.3	484.1	16.7	
II CORPS	564.9	66.0	122.2	753.2	14.7	
IV CORPS	911.0	22.4	73.0	196.4	#20.9	
RVN	2254.7	484.4	288.6	3027.6	18.2	
VC	VC	NONHAM	SUBTOT	PCT	TOTAL	
I VRPS	820.6	27.1	847.8	29.	2,878.9	
II CORPS	377.0	13.1	390.1	13.5	2,894.4	
PAG 5 RUMSA	2286M	C O N F I D E N T I A L	NOFORN			
III CORPS	228.7	83.0	311.7	6.1	5,125.5	
IV CORPS	1530.8	72.0	1602.8			
	28.1	5,703.1				
RVN	2957.1	15.2	3152.3	19.0	16,601.8	

TABLE SIX
POPULATIN (SECURITY ONLY) FEBRUARY 1967
(IN THOUSADS)

SECURE	A	B	NON HAM	SUBTOT	PCT	
I CORPS	84.6	452.3	530.4	469.8	1,537.1	54
II CORPS	460.7	823.9	527.5	342.1	2,154.2	74
III CORPS	26.5	850.5	922.7	2231.2	4,260.9	83
IV CORPS	259.2	113.6	1343.2	136.9	3,052.7	54
RVN	1,061.0	3440.0	3323.9	3180.1	11,005.0	66
CONTESTED	E	E	NONHAM	SUBTOT	PCT	
I CORPS	325.	65.9	85.1	476.3	16	
II CORPS	265.1	65.8	183	349.2	12	
III CORPS	363.3	66.2	122.2	551.7	11	
IV CORPS	758.8	277.3	63.0	1049.1	18	
RVN	1712.5	425.2	288.6	2426.2	15	
VC	VC	NONHAM	SUBTOT	PCT	TOTAL	
I CORPS	820.1	27.1	847.3	30	2,860.7	
II CORPS	379.0	13.1	392.1	14	2,895.5	
III CORPS	228.7	83.0	311.7	6	5,125.3	
IV CORPS	1524.9	72.0	1596.9	28	5,698.1	
RVN	2952.8	195.2	3147.9	19	16,579.6	

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(3) A COMPARISON OF SECURE AND VC CONTROLLED POPULATION FOR RVN AS A WHOLE IS SHON IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE, ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY ALONE - THE MOST CRITICA FACTOR IN MEASUREING THE PROGRESS OF PACIFICATON - 68 PCT OF THE POPULATION WA IN THE SECURE CATEGORY ON 31 OCTOBER.

TABEL SEVEN
SECURE, CONTESTED AND VC CONTROLLED POPULATION
TOTAL RVN, 31 OCTOBER
(IN THOUSANDS)

	POPULATION (THOUSANDS)	SECURE	VC	CONTESTED
SECURITY ONLY	11673,8	2939,0	2473,8	
SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT	1178,8	239,0	2769,2	
PRCENT OF TOTAL 31 OCTOBER	SECURE	V	CONTESTED	

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RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ

RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ

RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ

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SECTION IV OF XI

	68.3	17.2	14.5
SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT	66.6	17.2	16.2

PERCENT OF TOTAL, 28 FEBRUARY
SECURE VC CONTESTED

SECURITY ONLY	66	19.0	15
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SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT	6.7	19.0	18.2
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(4) ON THE BASIS OF HIS SECURITY RATINGS, TERRITORIAL

SECURITY IMPROVED IN RVN DURING THE YEAR. THE POPULATION UNDER GVN CONTROL ROSE FROM 66 PCT IN FEBRUARY TO 68.32 AT THE END OF OCT. DURING THE SAME PERIOD, VC CONTROL FELL FROM 19 PCT TO 17.2 OF THE POPULATION.

(5) IN GENERAL, SECURITY IMPROVED IN I CORPS DURING

THE MONTH. THERE WAS A DECREASE IN TOTAL INCIDENTS AND A SHARP DECLINE IN THE ASSASSINATION AND ABDUCTION OF CIVILIANS. SECURITY IMPROVED IN QUANG TRI, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE 1ST USMC REGIMENT AT LA VANG AND MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY ARVN. IN THUA THIEN, SECURITY REMAINS RELATIVELY GOOD, WITH THE 3RD ARVN

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REGIMENT'S BATTALIONS OPERATING IN AND AROUND THE THREE PACIFICATION AREAS. SECURITY IN QUANG NAM REMAINS UNDERTAIN EVEN THOUGH VC OPERATIONS AGAINST RD CADRE GROUPS DECREASED SHARPLY. THERE WAS A DECIDED IMPROVEMENT IN QUANG TIN, WHERE SECURITY DURING THE MONTH WAS THE BEST IT HAS BEEN ALL YEAR; THERE WERE ONLY TEN INCIDENTS, NONE OF ANY GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. ENEMY ACTIVITY DECREASED APPRECIABLY IN QUANG NGAI IN OCTOBER; SECURITY IMPROVED SLIGHTLY WITH INCREASED ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF ARVN AND THE RF/PF.

TABLE EIGHT
I CORPS SECURITY JUNE

	OCT	SEP
VC INCIDENTS	1,446	1,658
VC, NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	37,410	37,410
ASSASSINATIONS, ABDUCTION OF CIVILIANS	255	1,013
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	54	42
STATUS OF ROADS - GREEN (PCT)	54.5	58.2
(SEE FOOT NOTE 1) AMBER (PCT)	45.5	40.7
RED (PCTJL)	0	1.1
HES NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (ABC) CATEGORY	856	838
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORY	57	56.3
OCT		SEP
RF STRENGTH	18,608	18,068
PF STRENGTH	23,359	23,200

(6) THROUGHOUT II CORPS, RICE DENIAL OPERATIONS HAD A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON SECURITY. IN EIGHT PROVINCES, ENEMY ACTIVITIES DEOPPED SUBSTANTIALLY BECAUSE OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN RICE - OF WHICH THEY ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY. OTHERWISE, SECURITY IMPROVED IN THE COASTAL PROVINCE OF BINH DINH. MZND THREE OF THE HIGHLAND PROVINCES, KONTUM, DARLAC AND TUYEN DUC. IT REMAINED SUBSTANTIALLY UNCHANGED IN THE REMAINING PROVINCES. ENEMY ACTIVITY IN PHU YEN AND KHANH HOA ACCOUNTED FOR THE BULK OF THE DECLINE IN HAMLET AND POPULATION SECURITY IN II CORPS. CONCERTED VC CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE RD AREAS IN THESE PROVINCES DURING SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHANGE. POTENTIAL SECURITY PROBLEMS ARE BEING CREATED

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BY THE INFILTRATION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF ENEMY MAIN FORCE TROOPS
INTO PLEIKU PROVINCE AND THE HIGHLANDS AREA OF DARLAC.

TABLE NINE
II CORPS SECURITY RESUME

	OCT	SEP
VC INCIDENTS	353	463
VC/NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	20,545	31,695
ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION OF CIVILIANS	99	187
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	24	37
STATUS OF ROADS - GREEN (PCT)	67.4	67.3
AMBER (PCT)	22.3	22.5
RED (PCT)	10.2	10.-

HES NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (ABC)

CATEGORY	NS	1,722	1,751
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGROY		77.73	78.6
RF STRENGTH		36,131	34,670
PF STRENGTH		35,706	35,040

(C) ON BALANCE, THE SECURITY SITUATION IN III CORPS DECLINED SLIGHTLY DURING OCTOBER. THE DECLINE IS MEASURED PRINCIPALLY IN TERMS OF AN OVERALL INCREASE IN ENEMY HARASSMENT AND TERRORISM AND THE ATTACKS IN PHUOC LONG BY ONE NVA REGIMENT AND ON LOC NINH IN BINH LONG BY TWO VC AND ONE NVA REGIMENTS. ENEMY ACTIVITY HAS SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING THE PACIFICATION PROGRAMS IN PHUOC LONG AND BINH LONG TO A VIRTUAL STANDSTILL (THESE PROVINCES, HOWEVER, ARE NOT PRIORITY AND ARE OF MARGINAL VALUE TO THE NATIONAL PACIFICATION EFFORT). LONG AN PROVINCE ALSO SUFFERED AN INCREASE IN VC ACTIVITY, PARTICULARLY IN ATTEMPTS TO INTERDICT NATIONAL HIGHWAY FOUR. BOTH LONG AN AND GIA DINH REPORT INDICATIONS THAT VC LOCAL FORCE UNITS ARE BEING RE-EQUIPPED WITH SOVIET WEAPONS. THE ROYAL THAI ARMY VOLUNTEER REGIMENT (RTAVR) COMPLETED IN-COUNTRY TRAINING AND BEGAN OPERATIONS IN THE NHON TRACH DISTRICT OF BIEN HOA PROVINCE. THE XYOTH US INFANTRY DIVISION DISCOVERED THE LARGEST WEAPONS CACHE EVER FOUND IN III CORPS; 1100 WEAPONS, 200,000 ROUNDS OF SMALL AGBITYI&40489,, 3200 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION FOR CREW-SERVED WEAPONS, AND 3600 GRENADES.

TABLE TEN
III CORPS SECURITY RESUME

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	OCT	SEP
VC INCIDENTS	715	751
VC, NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	29,062	29,512
ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION OF CIVILIANS	86	72
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST ROC	26	14
STATUS OF ROADS - GREEN (PCT)	73.3	68
AMBER (PCT)	15.7	21
43\$ (PCT)	11	11
STATUS OF WATERWAYS - GREEN (PCT)		55
(SEE FOOTNOTE 1) AMBER (PCT)	41	41
RED (PCT)	4	4
HES NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (ABRYL)		
CATEGORY	1,062	1,074
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGROY	85.4	85.5
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RUEPIA/CIA
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SECTION V OF XL


RF STRENGTH	37,689	6,439
PF STRENGTH	25,678	24,439

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(8) DURING THE LAST WEEK OF THE MONTH THERE WAS A RISE IN VC - INITIATED INCIDENTS IN IV CORPS, DIRECTED MAINLY AGAINST THE PACIFICATION EFFORT AND ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION. ONLY TWO PROVINCES, BAC LIEU AND SADEC, REPORTED IMPROVED SECURITY. THE REMAINING 14 PROVINCES REPORTED NO MATERIAL CHANGE IN THE SECURITY SITUATION. THIRTEEN OF THESE PROVINCES REPORT A GENERALLY SATISFACTORY STATE OF SECURITY AND ONE - KHAU DOC - REPORTED A POOR STATE OF SECURITY. INITIATIVES DURING OCTOBER IN CHAU DOC WERE HIGHLIGHTED BY A SPECULAR ATTACK AGAINST THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL ON 12 OCTOBER DURING WHICH THE CHAU PHU DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS WAS CAPTURED AND HELD FOR 45 MINUTES. ON 24 OCTOBER 19 ATTACKS WERE INITIATED THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE, 16 ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY. OTHER VC ACTIONS IN CHAU DOC INCLUDED THE EXECUTION OF AN RD CADRE IN BROAD DAYLIGHT. IN ALL, THERE WERE FIVE MAJOR ATTACKS ON RD AREAS IN IV CORPS DURING THE MONTH CONTRIBUTING TO AN OVERALL DECLINE IN HAMLET AND POPULATION SECURITY. SECURITY PROVIDED BY DIRECT SUPPORT MILITARY UNITS IN MAINLQ STATIC DEFENSE POSITIONS IMPAIRS

INFO...CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC/DDO-1 SDEF-7

ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 W/H-10 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1

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PACIFICATION. VC PRESSURE ON RD AREAS REFLECTS GROWING ENEMY AWARENESS OF THE POTENTIAL OF PACIFICATION. IN TURN, DESPITE ADVISORS' REPORTS OF SOME PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH RVNAF EMPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION, FRIENDLY FORCES ARE BECOMING MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE CHALLENGE OF PACIFICATION AS CHARRASSMENT OF THIS EFFORT INCREASES. RDPG CONTINUE TO BE IN-EFFECTIVE IN MOST IV CORPS PROVINCS. THIS IS PARTLY A REFLECTION OF THE NATION-WIDE PROBLEM OF ARMING THE PEOPLE'S GROUPS, AND PARTLY THE RESULT OF PROV INC CHIEFS' RELUCTANCE TO RELY ON HAMLET PARA-MILITARY FORCES FOR POST-RD SECURITY. THE GENERALLY STADY DETERIORATION OF MAJOR ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION AND THE IMPUNITY WITH WHICH THEY CAN BE INTERDICITED BY THE VC ARE MAJOR PROBLEMS. THIS DOWNWARD TREND IN ADEQUACY OF LAND COMMUNICATIONS WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE PUBLIC WORKS EFFORT IS MADE AT LEAST MINIMALLY EFFECTIVE AND GVN REGULAR AND LOCAL FORCE UNITS LEARN TO OPERATE AT NIGHT. WE ARE SHAPING OUR EFFORT ACCORDINGLY.

TABLE ELEVN
IV CORPS SECURITY RESUME

	OCT	SEP
C INCIDENTS	635	946
VC COMBAT STRENGTH	19,535	19,535
ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION (OF CIVILIANS)	69	139
C INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	30	16
STATUS OF ROADS- GREEN(PER)	23.1	23
AMBER(PER)	76.9	77
RED (PER)	0	0
PAGE 4 RUMSMA 2288M C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F C R N		
STATUS OF WATERWAYS- GREEN(PER)	30	30
AMBER(PER)	51	51
RED (PER)	10	10
HES NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SEKURE (ABC)		
CATEGORY	2,043	2,056
HES PRCENT OF POPULATION IN SEKURE CATEGORY	54.2	54.8
RF STRENGTH	52,810	52,899
PF STRENGTH	59,379	57,936

C. EXPANDED AND SUPPLEMENT RD GROUPS EFFORTS AND ASSOCIATED

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PROGRAMS:

1. ONE OF THE ENCOURAGING NOTES AMONG THE PACIFICATION PROGRAMS HAS BEEN THE STEADY IMPROVEMENT IN PERFORMANCE OF THE RD GROUPS. THEY CONTINUED TO IMPROV IN OCTOBER. AT THE END OF OCTOBER, 149 AP DOI MOI HAD BEEN COMPLETED. INCLUDING FIVE-MAN "STAY BEHIND" ELEMENTS, RD CADRE WERE IN A TOTAL OF 796 HAMLETS (INCLUDING TSRD HAMLET)

AND 38 VILLAGES IN UNGIANG. WE STILL HOPE TO COMPLETE MOST OF THE 1967 HAMLET PROGRAM BY 31 JANUARY 1968.

2. EXPANSION OF RD CADRE CONTINUED DURING OCTOBER. FROM A LOW FOR THE YEAR OF 21,440 (411 GROUPS) IN APRIL, RDC STRENGTH INCREASED TO 26,078 (516 GROUPS) ON OCTOBER 1. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THIS GAIN IS AS FOLLOWS:

TABLE TWELVE

	RDC STRENGTH 31 OCT	RDC STRENGTH 30 SEP	RDC STRENGTH 1 APR	INCREASE APR-OCT 67	PRCNT
I CORPS	7,354	7,331	7,001	4.8	
II CORPS	7,907	7,222	6,188	21.7	
III CORPS	3,618	3,267	2,881	20.4	
IV CORPS	7,199	6,689	5,370	25.4	

IN ADDITION TO RD CADRE THERE WERE 110 TRUONG SON RD (TSRD) (MONT AGNARD) GROUPS AND 6,081 TS CADRE AS OF 31 OCTOBER. THERE ARE ALSO 35 CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMS, 2 OF THEM IN II CORPS.

(3) RD CADRE DESERTION INCREASED AGAIN IN OCTOBER FOR THE SECOND STRAIGHT MONTH. THE DESERTION RATE INCREASED FROM 12.5 PR THOUSAND IN SEPTEMBER TO 14.1 PR THOUSAND IN OCTOBER. TOTAL CADRE LOSSES ARE SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

TABLE THIRTEEN
RD CADRE LOSSES

	OCT	SEP	AUG (CORRECTED DATA)
KILLED	70	69	69
CAPTURED	18	11	7
RESIGNED	105	101	99
DISCHARGED (INCLUDES RETIRED)	148	224	142
DESERTED	370	308	298

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TOTAL 711 713 615

ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF DISCHARGES (RESIGNED, RETIRED, CASHIERED) DECREASED, DISCHARGES AND DISMISSEMENTS CONTINUE TO FORM A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF CADRE ATTRITION. TO DATE MANY PROVINCES HAVE ESTABLISHED TRAINING PROGRAMS TO SCREEN RECRUITS BSV

WHICH ARE SENT TO VUNG TAU. THE VALUE OF THESE PROGRAMS SHOULD BECOME APPARENT DURING 1968.

(G) BY THE END OF OCTOBER THERE WERE 7,644 STUDENTS IN TRAINING AT THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER IN VUNG TAU, INCLUDING RECRUIT CLASSES AND SPECIALISTS UNDERGOING LEADERSHIP, INTELLIGENCE, AND MEDICAL TRAINING. ON 2 OCTOBER, 2,373 RD CADRE GRADUATED FROM VUNG TAU.

(5) THE ARMING OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT POPLES' GROUPS (RDPQ) HAS THUS FAR MISCARRIED. THE INTERMINISTERIAL

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INFO RUEPJS/CJCS

RUEPJS/DOD

RUEHC/STATE AID

RUEPIA/CIA

RUMVF/CG I FF ORCEV SA II CTZ

RUMSF/CG II FF ORCEV SA III CTZ

RUMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ

RUMMT/SA IV CTZ

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DIRECTIVE ISSUED IN SEPTEMBER TO PROVIDE FOR ARMING THE RDPG HAS NOT YET TAKEN EFFECT. WE ARE CONTINUING, HOWEVER, OUR EFFORTS TO SIMPLIFY THE DIRECTIVE AND SPEED-UP THE ARMING OF RDPG.

(6) THE STATIC CENSUS GRIEVANCE CADRE PROGRAM DURING OCTOBER CONTINUED THE RELATIVELY TROUBLE-FREE PROGRESS THAT HAS MARKED IT AS PERHAPS THE MOST SUCCESSFUL OF THE RD PROGRAMS. AT THE END OF THE MONTH THERE WERE 5,365 (5,340 IN SEPTEMBER) CENSUS GRIEVANCE CADRES. THE CEILING SET FOR 1 JANUARY 1968 IS 7,917. THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANH INDUCED TO RALLY BY RD ANC CG ARE:

	OCT	SEP	YEAR TO DATE
RD & TSRDC	43	49	855
RD & TSRDC	86	106	1,551
CENSUS GRIEVANCE			

D. ACCELERATE THE CHIEU HOI EFFORT:

(1) A ONCE ASCENDANT STAR OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM CONTINUES TO DECLINE. THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANH DURING THE MONTH FELL TO 1741, MARKING A NEW LOW IN THE FOURTH STRAIGHT MONTH OF

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FALLING FIGURES. THE TREND IS ILLUSTRATED IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

TABLE FOURTEEN

	MONTHLY OCT	MONTHLY 1ST QTR	MONTHLY AVG	MONTHLY 2ND QTR	MONTHLY 3RD QTR	AVG
I CORPS	170	251	204	181		
II CORPS	322	1,047	792	272		
III CORPS	482	1,101	733	567		
IV CORPS	767	1,183	736	794		
TOTAL	1741	3,916	2,466	1,814		

A COMPREHENSIVE TWO-PHASED CHIEU HOI OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED IN SEPTEMBER IN HAU NGHIA AND BINH DUONG PROVINCES IN III CORPS TO STEM THE DECLINE IN NUMBERS OF HOI CHANH ENDED IN OCTOBER. ALTHOUGH RETURNEE RATES DID INCREASE, THE PROGRAM FAILED TO ACHIEVE EXPECTATIONS.

(2) IN SPITE OF THE DECLINE, CHIEU HOI RESULTS THIS YEAR STILL EXCEED THOSE OF 1966. THE FOLLOWING TABLE SHOWS WHY:

H \$ TABLE FIFTEEN

	1 JAN - 31 OCT 1966 & 71	1 JAN - 31 OCT 1967	PERCENT GROWTH
I CORPS	1,343	2,081	55
II CORPS	6,137	6,656	10
	1 JAN - 31 OCT 1966	1 JAN - 31 OCT 1967	PERCENT INCREASE
III CORPS	157	17	
IV CORPS	143		
TOTAL	15,221	25,329	66

(3) THE CAPACITY OF THE CHIEU HOI CENTERS CONTINUES TO GROW. THE DISTRIBUTION OF CAPACITY AND COMPLETION OF PROGRAMMED CONSTRUCTION IS SHOWN BELOW:

TABLE SIXTEEN

L	CAPACITY	PERCENT INCREASE	PERCENTAGES OF PROGRAM COMPLETED	31

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	31 OCT	SINCE 1 JANUARY	OCTOBER
I CORPS	605,6	95.2	
II CORPS	1930	93	51.3
III CORPS	1135	65.6	54.5
IV CORPS	1715	69.8	77.5

A TOTAL OF 53 CENTERS ARE PROGRAMMED FOR 1967, AND CONSTRUCTION IS ACTUALLY UNDERWAY OR COMPLETED IN 34 CENTERS.

(4) THE NUMBERS OF HOI CHANH IN ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS (APT) DECLINED SLIGHTLY, AS THE FOLLOWING TABLE REVEALS:

TABLE SEVENTEEN

APT STRENGTH

	31 OCT	30 SEP	WEAPONS
I CORPS	331	3805	187
II CORPS	536	455	144
III CORPS	893	864	287 \$ REVISED FIGURES
IV CORPS	850	1023	436
TOTAL	2615	2726	164

THE LACK OF WEAPONS FOR SELF-DEFENSE WHILE PERFORMING PROPAGANDA MISSIONS AND GUARD DUTIES AT CHIEU HOI INSTALLATIONS IS STILL A SERIOUS PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER WHO WERE ARMED ROSE FROM 839 IN SEPTEMBER TO 164 IN OCTOBER. WE ARE GIVING THIS SITUATION OUR CLOSEST ATTENTION.

(5) IN I CORPS THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANH INCREASED FROM THE ALL-TIME LOW REACHED IN SEPTEMBER. THE IMPROVED MILITARY SITUATION, INCREASED MILITARY PRESSURE (ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE CTZ) AND A NOTABLE DECLINE OF VC INCIDENTS APPEARED TO INFLUENCE THE INCREASE IN SPITE OF THE DIVERSIONS CREATED BY THE LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS. RETURNEES CONTINUE TO ENJOY SOME ATTENTION AT PROVINCE CENTERS, E.G., RETURNEES PUNCTUALLY ARE GIVEN CLOTHES, FOOD AND POCKET MONEY AS AUTHORIZED BY GVN POLICY. ADDITIONALLY, THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL (TCN) ADVISORS HAVE RELENTLESSLY MOTIVATED THEIR VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS AND RESPECTIVE STAFF TO FRATERNIZE WITH AND DEVELOP A CONCERN FOR THE RETURNEES DURING THEIR AUTHORIZED STAY AT THE CENTERS. THE "WELCOME KITS" INITIATED IN I CORPS HAVE HAD AN APPRECIABLE IMPACT. BASED ON THE FEEDBACK FROM THE PROVINCES

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CORDS/SAIGON CHIEU HOI HAS DECIDED TO IMPLEMENT THIS APPROACH ON A NATION-WIDE BASIS. SIXTY THOUSAND KITS HAVE BEEN ORDERED FOR THE 1966 CHIEU HOI PROGRAM.

(6) IN II CORPS THERE WAS A GENERAL DECLINE IN THE RETURNEE RATE, PROBABLY BECAUSE MILITARY ACTIVITY WAS RELATIVELY LIGHT AND, AS A CONSEQUENCE, THERE WAS LITTLE PENETRATION OF ENEMY-HELD POPULATED AREAS. IN BINH DINH THERE WAS A SHARP IMPROVEMENT IN SOCIAL AND LIVING CONDITIONS AT ITS CHIEU HOI CENTER FOLLOWING THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW ENERGETIC CHIEU HOI DIRECTOR. A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN THE QUALITY OF FOOD SERVED AT THE CENTER RESULTED FROM REGULAR DONATIONS OF FIREWOOD BY MEMBERS OF THE CIVIC ACTION TEAM AT PHU CAT AIR BASE. KHANH HOA HAS STARTED A PROJECT THIS MONTH WHICH HOLDS GREAT POTENTIAL. TWELVE FAMILIES OF KNOWN VC WERE GIVEN A TOUR OF NHA TRANG, FREE LUNCH, CLOTHES, SEWING KITS, CHILDREN'S CLOTHES AND A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM.

(7) IN OCTOBER, 482 HOI CHANH RALLIED TO THE GVN IN III CORPS. IN TAY NINH, IMPROVEMENTS IN THE CHIEU HOI CENTER HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO CAPITALIZE ON IMPROVEMENTS THROUGH LEAFLETS, POSTERS AND OTHER MEDIA AIMED AT INDUCING

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RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA II CTZ
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RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
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~~MORE VG TO THE HOI.~~ IN PHUOC TUY, RETURNEES DROPPED 25PCT FROM SEPTEMBER. THIS LOSS WAS ATTRIBUTED PRINCIPALLY TO THE ASSASSINATION OF A FEMALE HOI CANH, A DECREASE IN LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS, AND THE MELTREATMENT OF HOI CHANH BY RVN INTERROGATION AGENCIES. THE TATTER WAS REPORTED TO TH PROVINCE CHIEF AND CORRECTIVE ACTION IS ANTICIPATED.

(8) THE NG, II FIELD FORCE, HAS DIRECTED EACH US DIVISION COMMANDER TO EXPAND THE KIT CARSON PROGRAM, AND HAS ESTABLISHED A GOAL OF 200 SCOUTS IN EACH DIVISION. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS IN OTHER DIVISIONS AND OUR GOAL IS 900 BY THE END OF FY 1968.

(9) NV CORPS, 767 HOI CHANH RALLIED IN OCTOBER COMPARED TO 714 IN SEPTEMBER. IN VINH BNH ON 20 OCTOBER, AVC STAFF OFFICER OF THE PROVINCE COMMITTEE, WITH THE RANK EQUIVALENT OF COMPANY COMMANDER, RALLIED. THIS MAN HAD BEEN WITH THE COMMUNISTS SINCE SHORTLY AFTER THE END OF WORLD WAR I, BUT DECIDED TO RALLY BECAUSE OF WHAT HE CONSIDERED TREACHERY ON THE PART OF SOME OF HIS

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FELLOW OFFICERS.

3. IMPROVE THE REFUGEE EFFO

T
(1) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REFUGEE GENERATED DURING THE

MONTH WAS 21,682. AT THE SAME TIME, 18,114 REFUGEES WERE REESTABLISHED, LEAVING THE DIFFERENCE OF 3,568 AS THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF TEMPORARY REFUGEES REQUIRING CARE. IN OCTOBER, AS IN SEPTEMBER, THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES GENERATED WAS GREATER THAN THOSE REESTABLISHED; THE INCREASE IN TEMPORARY REFUGEES, HOWEVER, WAS CONSIDERABLY SMALLER THAN LAST MONTH'S. THE FOLLOWING GIVES COMPARATIVE FIGURES:

CHANGE IN TEMPORARY REFUGEE FROM PREVIOUS MONTH

JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER
PLUS 12,885 PLUS 31,496 PLUS NPUE PLUS 3,568

WE ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO FACILITATE PROGRESS IN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT; WHEN RESETTLEMENT EXCEEDS GENERATION, THE REFUGEE TREATMENT WILL IMPROVE.

(2) PROGRESS WAS MADE IN REFUGEE REESTABLISHMENT.

THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES REESTABLISHED SINCE 1 JANUARY 1964 AND THE CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUS MONTH ARE SHOWN BELOW:

TABLE EIGHTEEN
REFUGEES REESTABLISHED
1 JAN 64 - 31 OCTOBER 67

	REESTABLISHED	RETURNED TO VILLAGE AND INDIVIDUALLY RESETTLED	GVN SUPPORTED RESETTLEMENT
I CORPS	165,286 5,542	69,698 531	95,588 5,01
II CORPS	481,33 3,68	EYNNIP 483	QQTNPY 3,485
III CORP	235,82 1,486	70,414	165,415 1,486
IV CORPS	412,091 7,118	132,342 -320	279,79 7,398
TOTAL	1,294,54 PLUS 18,114	638,734 PLUS 734	655,08 PLUS 17,380

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(3) REFUGEES NOT REESTABLISHED ARE CLASSIFIED AS TEMPORARY REFUGEES. THESE PEOPLE ARE THE OBJECT OF GVN PROGRAMS OF TEMPORARY CARE AND EVENTUAL RESETTLEMENT. THE NUMBER OF TEMPORARY REFUGEES INCREASED IN I AND II CTZ BUT DECREASED IN THE OTHER TWO CORPS.

TABLE NINETEEN
TEMPORARY REFUGEES

1 JAN 64 - 31

CT 67

(WITH CHANGES FROM 30 SEP)

	IN CAMP	OUT OF CAMP	TOTAL
I CORPS	185,076	21,580	401,656
	4,406		4,406
II CORPS	72,440	117,698	191,138
	1,239	6,665	7,304
III CORPS	32,085	5,04	30,889
IV	-311	-104	-41
IV CORPS	8,972	97,445	106,417
	-8,705	9,790	1,85
TOTAL	299,573	492,527	790,100
	-12,183	PLUS 16,751	PLUS 4,568

(4) 32,8,8,8TRYO OVIAL WELFARE AND REFUGEES

WAS CREATED IN THE CABINET WITH DR. NGUYEN PHUC QUE, FORMER SPECIAL COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES AS ITS HEAD. THE NEW ORGANIZATION PROVIDED FOR

AN ADMINISTRATIVE/FINANCE-LOGISTICS BLOC, REFUGEE BLOCK AND SOCIAL WELFARE BLOC IN ADDITION TO A DIRECTOR OF CABINET AND INSPECTORATE STAFF OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IS THE PROVISION FOR A SOCIAL WELFARE-REFUGEE SERVICE NH EF IN EACH OF THE DISTRICTS OF THE PROVINCES WITH A LARGE CONCENTRATION OF REFUGEES. HERETOFORE, THERE WAS ONLY REPRESENTATION DOWN TO PROVINCE LEVEL.

(5) VOCATIONAL TRAINING: BETWEEN THE 11 AND 15TH OF OCTOBER, 16 VOCATIONAL TRAINING SCHOOLS OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION COMMENCED THEIR SECOND CYCLE OF 1967 TRAINING COURSES FOR REFUGEES. ENROLMENT IS 1200 REFUGEES, EACH OF WHOM RECEIVE A MONTHLY ALLOWANCE OF VN\$1500 AS LIVING ALLOWANCE. DURING THE MONTH VN\$ 16,000,000 WAS APPROVED BY THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES TO FUND SPECIAL TRAINING PROJECTS IN SEVERAL PROVINCES. INCLUDED IN THIS WERE CLASSES FOR CONICAL HAT MAKING, TAILORING, BARBERING

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AND BAMBOO HANDICRAFTS. THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES HAS ASKED THAT PROVINCE OFFICIALS PROVIDE HIM WITH SAMPLES OF HANDICRAFT ITEMS MADE BY REFUGEES. THE COMMISSIONER INTENDS TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF PURCHASING THESE ITEMS FROM THE REFUGEES AND TO MARKET THEM THROUGH LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL OUTLETS.

(6) VOLUNTARY AGENCIES; DETAILS OF A CONTRACT AGREEMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF \$500,000 BETWEEN THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES AND WORLD VISION ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION. HEREBY THE LATTER GROUP WOULD ALSO PROVIDE A SIMILAR AMOUNT OF FUNDS FROM THEIR OWN RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF A PROGRAM OF RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES. WORLD VISION WOULD RECRUIT SPECIALISTS IN THE FIELDS OF CONSTRUCTION, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND MEDICINE FOR WORK DIRECTLY IN RESETTLEMENT SITES INVOLVING LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES. INTEREST IN THE NEEDY PEOPLE OF VIETNAM REMAINS HIGH AMONG VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND SEVERAL NEW AGENCIES HAVE EITHER VISITED VIETNAM OR ARE CONSIDERATING SUCH A MOVE TO INVESTIGATE THE AREAS WHEREBY THEY MIGHT BE OF SERVICE. THE INTERNATIONAL YMCA WILL SHORTLY COMMENCE CON-

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STRUCTION OF A COMMUNITY CENTER AT AP BIEN HOA IN III CORPS; A REPRESENTATIVE AT IVE FROM THE DALLAS, TEXAS COMMUNITY FUND AND TWO FROM HOUSTON JC'S VISITED VIETNAM TO DETERMINE HOW THEIR RESPECTIVE GROUPS MIGHT CONTRIBUT TO RELIEF EFFORTS. THE KNIGHTS OF MALTA, A WEST GERMAN VOLUNTARY AGENCY DONATED \$4,500 FOR THE PURCHASE OF RICE FOR REFUGEES. THIS SAME AGENCY IS ACTIVE IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE PROVIDING TWO MEDICAL TEAMS, ONE OF WHICH IS A MOBILE TEAM OPERATING OUT OF THE CITY OF HOI AN.

F. EXPAND POLICE EFFORT;

(1) REORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL POLICE; THE RECENT NATIONAL POLICE REORGAINZATION INVOLVED MAINLY AN ADJUSTMENT OF THE SPAN OF CONTROL AND A REARRANGEMENT OF SEVERAL OF THE SERVICES AND BRANCHES UNDER DIFFERENT AND MORE APPROPRIATE BLOCKS. RESOURCES

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CONTROL IS NO LONGER A SEPARATE BLOCK BUT IS REDUCED TO A SERVICE AND PLACED UNDER THE POLICE BLOCK. THE MARINE POLICE FORCE, FORMERLY UNDER THE OLD RESOURCES CONTROL BLOCK, IS NOW UNDER THE ARMED SUPPORT BLOCK ALONG WITH NPFF. SOME SERVICES AND OTHER UNITS FORMERLY OPERATED ON A SEMI-INDEPENDENT BASIS. THESE HAVE NOW BEEN PLACED UNDER APPROPRIATE BLOCKS. GENERALLY, WE BELIEVE, THE REORGANIZATION SERVES TO MAKE THE SPAN OF CONTROL MORE MANAGEABLE. THE FIVE BLOCKS, EACH UNDER AN ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARE MANPOWER AND TRAINING BLOCK, ADMINISTRATION BLOCK, POLICE BLOCK, SPECIAL POLICE BLOCK AND THE ARMED SUPPORT BLOCK.

(2) CURRENT STRENGTH AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NPFF; THE NPFF FORCE LEVEL CONTINUES AT JUST SLIGHTLY OVER 11,000, WITH 63 COMPANIES ACTIVE. FORTY-SEVEN OF THESE ARE SATISFACTORILY EMPLOYED. A SHORTAGE OF NPFF ADVISORS HAS IN THE PAST LIMITED OUR CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON THE LOCAL LEVEL, BUT THIS TOO IS BEING OVERCOME WITH THE RECENT ADDITION OF SEVEN NPFF ADVISORS. WITH THE ADDITIONAL ADVISORS, A NEWLY-PUBLISHED SOP AND PDS CONTACTS WITH COUNTERPART NP PERSONNEL ON ALL LEVELS, THE RATE OF PROGRESS IN REDUCING IMPROPER EMPLOYMENT OF NPFF SHOULD ACCELERATE.

(3) PRISON REHABILITATION; LACK OF SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF DETENTION PERSONNEL IS STILL A PROBLEM WITH THE PRISON REHABILITATION PROGRAM. OVERCROWDING ADDS TO THE PROBLEM. SOME NEW DETENTION PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED, BUT LOSSES MORE THAN OFFSET THE ADDITIONS. THE PRISON POPULATION HAS DECREASED FROM 36,000 TO JUST OVER 32,000. PRISONS' CAPACITY HAS BEEN INCREASED WITH THE COMPLETION OF FIVE DETENTION BUILDINGS, BUT PRESENT TOTAL CAPACITY IS STILL ONLY ABOUT 23,000. REHABILITATION OF PRISONERS THROUGH VOCATIONAL TRAINING IS PROGRESSING SINCE THE BUREAU OF VOCATIONAL AND ACADEMIC TRAINING PROVIDED FUNDS FOR PURCHASE OF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS. ACADEMIC TRAINING IS NOT YET ADEQUATE, AS IT IS DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN SUITABLE INSTRUCTORS WITH PRESENT FUNDING.

(4) SALARY INCREASES; THE NP MADE A SALARY-INCREASE PROPOSAL THAT RESULTED, IN OCTOBER, IN A GENERAL SALARY RAISE OF ABOUT \$VN 300. RISK ALLOWANCE WAS INCREASED FROM \$VN 200 TO \$VN 800 A MONTH. THESE RAISES WILL HAVE A SALUTORY EFFECT, BUT INSUFFICIENT IMPACT TO PERMIT ATTAINMENT OF PROJECTED FORCE LEVELS.

G. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC WORKS, VILLAGE DEVELOP-

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MENT, AGRICULTURE, SELF-HELP, PSYOPS, ETC;;
 (1) PROGRESS IN VARIOUS ACTIVITIES IS REFLECTED IN
 BUDGETARY PERFORMANCE AS DEPICTED IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

TABLE TWENTY

	PCT BUDGET BUDGETED	PCT EXPENDED \$VN	BUDGET 30OCT	BUDGET 30SEP
VILLAGE HAMLET ADMIN PERSONNEL	31,933,000	39	38&	
SELF-HELP HAMLET DEVELOPMENT	243,688,000	72	66	
RURAL EDUCATION	478,386,000	79	70	
RURAL HEALTH	172,960,000	67	57	
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION	82,031,000	28	19	
ROADS AND BRIDGES	462,563,000	48	42	
AGRICULTURAL IRRIGATION	51,601,000	67	71	
ANIMAL HUSBANDRY	101,795,000	57	50	
AGRICULTURE AFFAIRS & EXTENSION	106,111,000	61	55	
FISHERIES	44,622,000	69	58	

& CORRECTED FIGURE

(2) VILLAGE/HAMLET ADMINISTRATION; A VILLAGE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM EMPLOYED PREVIOUSLY WITH SUCCESS IN PAKISTAN, AND AIMED AT POST-RD ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE AT THE VILLAGE AND HAMLET LEVEL, HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN THE 1968 AID COUNTRY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM SUBMISSION. PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION IS UNDERWAY AND INITIAL STAFFING ACCOMPLISHED. THE PROGRAM WILL PROVIDE FUNDS, COMMODITY SUPPORT AND AD HOC ADVISORY EFFORT DIRECTLY TO RURAL VILLAGES AS A VEHICLE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT. IT WILL ALSO COUNTER REGRESSION IN PACIFIED AREAS.

(3) SELF-HELP HAMLET DEVELOPMENT; COMPLETION OF FUNDED AND UNFUNDED SELF-HELP PROJECTS IS SHOWN BELOW;

	SELF-HELP PROJECTS COMPLETED		
	JAN-OCT 66	JAN-OCT 67	JAN-SEP 67
FUNDED	3032	2981	2487
UNFUNDED	1456	4815	4105&

& CORRECTED FIGURE

(4) RURAL EDUCATION;

	CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMMED	1967 CONSTRUCTED	OCT CONSTRUCTED	SEP
NO. OF CLASSROOMS	2266	1266	11	

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TEACHER TRAINING

TRAINING COMPLETED

PROGRAMMED 1967 OCT SEP

NO. OF TRAINEES 2959 2962 2937

(4) RURAL HEALTH:

MATERNITY/DISPENSARY

CONSTRUCTION

S OCT SEP

325 327

NO. PROGRAMMED

NO. COMPLETED

73 42

NO. UNDER CONSTRUCTION 229 154

AS STATED LAST MONTH, THIS PROGRAM GOT OFF TO A SLOW START BECAUSE
OF DESIGN PROBLEMS AND SELECTION OF SITES, AND CONSTRUCTION DID NOT
BEGIN UNTIL JUN 1967.

(6) ROADS AND BRIDGES: DESIGNED TO DEVELOP LINES OF
COMMUNICATION IN VILLAGES AND HAMLETS AND FROM THEM TO THE SECOND-
ARY ROADS, THIS PROGRAM IS CONCENTRATED IN AND NEAR NEW LIFE HAMLETS.

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TABLE TWENTY-ONE
PROVINCIAL OADS/BRIDGES

	OCT	SEP
BRIDGES PROGRAMMED FOR CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION		
ABOVE 1 MILLION \$VN	33	33
UNDER 1 MILLION \$VN	31	31
UNDER CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION COMPLETED		
ABOVE 1 MILLION \$VN	7	7
UNDER 1 MILLION \$VN	62	56
ROADS PROGRAMMED FOR CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION (KM)		
REPAIR	566	566
NEW CONSTRUCTION	216	216
COMPLETED (KM)		
REPAIRED	299	263
NEW CONSTRUCTION	124	115.6

INFO..CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC/DDO-1 S/DEF-7

ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 DIA-15 W/H-10 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1

CMC-7 FILE-1(83)RBK/DC M-10

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(7) RURAL ELECTRIFICATION; THE PROGRAM FOR 1967 CONSISTS OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF 37 SMALL GENERATOR FACILITIES TO PROVIDE POWER TO HAMLETS AND VILLAGES. US COMMODITY SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRAM TOTALS \$575,000. AS OF END-OCTOBER, 1 PLANT HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND 15 WERE UNDER VHNSTRUCTION.

(3) AGRICULTURAL IRRIGATION; THE OBJECTIVE IS TO PROVIDE FARMLAND IRRIGATION, DRAINAGE, AND FACILITIES FOR WATER SUPPLY CONTROL IN NEW LIFE HAMLETS. THESE PROJECTS ARE LOCALLY SELECTED AND INCLUDE BOTH NEW CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR OF OLD SYSTEMS.

SMALL IRRIGATION CONSTRUCTION

	1967 PROGRAMMED	COMPLETED OCT
--	--------------------	------------------

NO. OF DAMS

ABOVE 1 MILLION \$VN)	19	4
UNDER 1 MILLION \$VN)		10

KM. OF CANALS	107.7	97
---------------	-------	----

(9) ANIMAL HUSBANDRY; THIS PROGRAM PROVIDES GRANT DISTRIBUTION OF IGS, POULTRY, ANIMAL FEED, ETC., AND PROVIDES TECHNICAL GUIDANCE AND TRAINING FOR FARMERS IN NEW LIFE HAMLETS;

TABLE TWENTY-TWO

	1967 PROGRAMMED	COMPLETED OCT	COMPLETED SEP
PIGS DISTRIBUTED	15,534	9,088	8,145
CHICKS & DUCKS	38,586	20,882	16,180
FARMERS TRAINED		21,226	19,797

(10) AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS UNDER RD BUDGET; RURAL HAMLETS ARE ASSISTED BY AGRUCULTURAL CADRE AND TECHNICIANS TRAINED AND ADMINISTERED BY THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE. THESE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL ASSIST RD CADRE IN TRAINING LOCAL FARMERS IN IMPORVED CROP PRODUCTION METHODS AND TECHNOLOGY. THE PAY OF THE AGRICULTURAL CADRE AND TECHNICIANS, AS WELL AS THE COST OF FERTILIZER, INSECTICIDES, SPRAYERS, PUMPS AND THE TRAINING AND DEMONSTRATION COSTS ARE FUNDED FROM THE RD BUDGET AND USAID. THIS PROGRAM IS SUPER IMPOSED UPON THE REGULAR MOA PCOGGRAM.

TABLE TWENTY-THREE

	1967 PROGRAM	COMPLETED OCT	COMPLETED SEP
FARMER TRAINING SESSIONS	982	785	696

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NO. OF FARMERS	35,864	32,447
DEMONSTRATIONS	928	863
PLANTING MATERIAL DISTRIBUTED (\$VN)	20,352,000	18,735,000

(11) FISHERIES; THE COUNTRY WIDE GOAL IS TO INCREASE THE TOTAL FISH CATCH IN 1967 BY 50,000 MT OVER 1966. IN NEWLY SECURED AREAS WHERE FISHING IS THE MAIN OCCUPATION, THE TRAINING OF FISHERMEN, DISTRIBUTION OF FISHING GEAR AND BOAT MOTORS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF FISH MARKETS AND LANDING STAGES ARE SUPPORTED WITH TECHNICAL SERVICES AND COMMODITIES FUNDED BY MORD AND USAID.

TABLE TWENTY-FOUR

	1967 PROGRAM	COMPLETED OCT	COMPLETED SEP
MARKETS & LANDING STAGES (NO.)	17		Y
FISHING EQUIPMENT AND FINGER-LINGS (\$VN)	10,943,000	5,725,614	4,432,000
BOAT MOTORS (NO.)	365	202	168
NO. OF FISHERMEN TRAINED		6,338	5,985

(12) IR-8 RICE; THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN AGRICULTURE OF THE RECENT PAST, AND ONE THAT MAY HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON VIETNAM'S AGRARIAN ECONOMY, IS THE INTRODUCTION OF THE IR-8 RICE STRAIN INTO THE COUNTRY. DEVELOPED ON THE PHILIPPINES, THE RICE IS HARDY AND MATURES IN FOUR MONTHS COMPARED TO SIX FOR THE COMMON VARIETIES. IN TEST PLOTS, IT HAS PRODUCED YIELDS UP TO SEVEN TIMES NORMAL. ITS INTRODUCTION IS PROCEEDING AT A CAUTIOUS PACE AS ITS RESISTANCE TO DISEASE IS MONITORED.

(13) NUI SAP ROCK QUARRY; FOLLOWING APPROVAL OF THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CONSTRUCTION TO PROCEED WITH THE OPENING OF THE NUI SAP ROCK QUARRY IN AN GIAN PROVINCE, A TEAM FROM RMK AND USAID/PW VISITED THE SITE TO SURVEY REQUIREMENTS. THE QUARRY IS SCHEDULED TO BECOME OPERATIONAL IN MAY 1968. THIS WILL BE THE FIRST SOURCE OF ROCK OF ANY SIZE IN THE DELTA, AND WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON MAINTENANCE OF ROADS AND IN RD CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS.

(14) PSYOPS IMPREST FUNDS; IMPREST FUNDS AGAIN ARE AVAILABLE TO ASSISTANT PROVINCE REPRESENTATIVES FOR PSYOPS. THE MONEY IS TO COVER ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AND TO PROVIDE "SEED" MONEY TO ASSIST VIS IN INITIATING OR GETTING MOMENTUM IN LOCAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS. THE USAID TRUST FUND IS THE SOURCE OF THE 7,650,000

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\$VN WHICH WILL BE ALLOCATED TO THE ASSISTANT DEPS CORDS/PSYOPS FOR FURTHER ALLOCATION TO THE APR/PS.

(15) LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS; ELECTIONS FOR THE LOWER HOUSE WERE HELD ON 22 OCTOBER. ON ELECTION DAY, THERE WERE 1172 CANDIDATES FOR 137 SEATS FOR A CANDIDATE TO SEAT RATIO OF 8.6:1. SEVENTY-THREE PER CENT OF THE 5,853,251 REGISTERED VOTERS VOTED IN THE ELECTIONS. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT MINORITIES WERE PROTECTED THROUGH THE ALLOCATION OF 8 SEATS TO MONTAGNARDS, 2 TO CHAMS AND 6 TO CAMBODIANS.

H. BUDGET PERFORMANCE:

TABLE TWENTY-FIVE

Q/N BUDGET PROGRAM	1967 BUDGET (\$VN)	PER CENT EXPENDED	
		OCT	SEP
CHIEU HOI	972,000,000	83 &	81 &
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VIS	40,000,000	68	45
REFUGEES			
TEMPORARY RELIEF	532,900,000	31	19
RESETTLEMENT	760,000,000	24	16
SPECIAL FUND	160,000,000	74	58
TOTAL	1,452,900,000	32	19
MORD			
I CORPS	37,142,000	65	60
II CORPS	484,792,000	56	48
III CORPS	539,784,000	60	54
IV CORPS	810,614,000	53	47
TOTAL	2,172,332,000	58	51

& OBLIGATIONS EXPENDITURE DATA IS UNRELIABLE
 I. IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF UNITS IN SUPPORT OF
 PACIFICATION;
 (1) ON 27 OCTOBER, COMUSMACV APPROVED THE MACV POSITION
 ON REORGANIZATION OF RVNAF. THE FOLLOWING REORGANIZATION MEASURES
 WERE RECOMMENDED:

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- (A) AT JGS LEVEL, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POSITION OF VICE CHIEF OF THE JGS AND RF/PF COMMANDER.
- (B) AT CTZ LEVEL, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POSITION OF DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR TERRITORIAL SECURITY/ RF/PF COMMANDER.
- (C) AT DTA LEVEL, TRANSFER OF APPROVAL AUTHORITY FOR PROVINCE RD CAMPAIGN PLANS FROM DTA COMMANDER TO CTZ COMMANDER, AND DELETION OF THE DTA COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING RF/PF FORCES.
- (D) AT PROVINCE LEVEL, ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMBINED POSITION OF PROVINCE CHIEF/ECTOR COMMANDER WITH A MILITARY DEPUTY TO COMMAND THE RF/PF.

THE ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY THE CHIEF, JGS, AND HQ GH7103;3) &;, ;994\$8,-589, 8S IN PROCESS.

- (2) MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG TURNED OVER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MIGSTRY OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TO HIS GOOD FRIEND MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN BAO TRI ON 2 OCTOBER. THANG LEFT THE GOVERNMENT AT HIS OWN REQUEST TO BECOME VICE CHIEF OF THE JGS AND COMMANDER OF RF/PF. IN THIS CAPACITY HE WILL BE IN CHARGE OF RF/PF AND RD AND CENSUS GRIEVANCE CADRES. THE MRD WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE PERSONNEL, LOGISTIC AND BUDGETARY SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRAM. THANG'S QVINMEN UNIFIES COMMAND OF MOST IVORWNT AF MOY NUMEROUS PACIFICATION RESOURCES, THE RD CADRES WHO ARE THE VANGUARD OF PACIFICATION AND THE RF/PF WHO PROVIDE INDISPENSABLE TERRITORIAL SECURITY.

J. IMPROVE PACIFICATION PLANNING

- (1) THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN PLANNING DURING THE PERIOD IS REPRESENTED BY PUBLICATION OF AB143, THE COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN, WHEREIN THE KEY CIVIL-MILITARY ASPECTS OF PACIFICATION ARE INTEGRATED TO AN UNPRECEDENTED DEGREE.
- (2) SPECIFIC PLANNING FOR CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMS, NOW TERMED MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (MARD) GROUPS, HAS BEEN COMPLETED, BUT THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT GENERAL THANG DOES NOT WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORT THIS CONCEPT. MARD GROUPS ARE NONETHELESS WORKED INTO CORPS PLANS TO AUGMENT RGC GROUPS IN 1968. AT PRESENT THERE ARE 32 MARD GROUPS IN II CORPS AND THREE IN IV COS.
- (3) THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISORS' ASSISTANCE IN

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KIND PI ASTER FUND CONTINUES TO PROVE AN EXCELLENT LEVER TO MOTIVATE DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS, PARTICULARLY IN HAMLETS IN THE POST7LA PHASE.

(4) A PLAN, FEATURING VILLAGE LEVEL FUNDING AND DEVELOPING LOCAL INITIATIVE (THE OMENS-FERGUSON "PAKISTAN" PROGRAM), HAS BEEN WRITTEN INTO THE 1968 AID COUNTRY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM SUBMISSION. THIS APPROACH, WHICH PROVED EFFECTIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IS AIMED AT PROVIDING A MEDIUM FOR TRAINING VILLAGE AND HAMLET OFFICIALS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND AT COUNTERING POSSIBLE REGRESSION IN PACIFIED AREAS.

4. (C) STATUS OF PACIFICATION RESOURCES:

TABLE TWENTY7 SIX

UNITS IN DIRECT SUPPORT	OCT	SEP
ARVN BATTALIONS	54	53
RF COMPANIES	218	219
PF PLATOONS	719	745
GROUPS:		
RD CADRE (INCLUDING 38 20-MAN TEAMS IN AN GIANG)	516	505
TRU ONG SON	110;	106
CIVIL/MILITARY	5	32
QUARTER ZONE TEAM CADRE	2	2
STATIC CENSUS GRIEVENCE	5,366	5,340
NATIONAL POLICE	67,527	67,003

5. (C) INDICATOR TRENDS:

TABLE TWENTY7 SEVEN

VI	OCT	SEP	
CHIEU HOI	1,71	1,448	
REFUGEES:			
GAINS	21,682	54,862	
NOI 43 SETTLED (CUMULATIVE)	790,100	786,532	
RESETLED (CUMULATIVE)	1,294,542	1,276,428	
VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL)	3,149	3,818	
TERRORISM (INCLUDING RDC)	367	567	
CIVIL CASUALTIES (ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS) AS A RESULT OF TERRORISM	479	1,411	
STATUS OF RD PLANS:			
ON SCHEDULE THIS MONTH	(LAST MONTH)	BEHIND SCHEDULE THIS MONTH	(LAST MONTH)

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I CORPS	1	7	4	4
II CORPS	5	4	7	8
III CORPS	1	2	10	9
IV CORPS	2	3	14	13
TOTAL	9	10	35	34

LOC STATUS:

ROADS (MILITARILY ESSENTIAL)	GREEN 61PCT (1711 KM)	AMBER 2PCT (898 KM)	RED 7PCT (196 KM)
RAILROADS (MILITARILY ESSENTIAL)	41PCT (505 KM)	PCT (41 KM)	56PCT (694 KM)
ESSENTIAL WATERWAYS IN NPA OF III CORPS AND IV CORPS	45 PCT	47PCT	8 PCT

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(260 KM) (272KM) (46 KM)

6. (C) ENEMY REACTION TO THE PACIFICATION OFFENSIVE:
 A. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF ENEMY REACTION DURING OCTOBER
 VARIED CONSIDERABLY FROM A DECIDED SLOW-DOWN IN THE NORTH TO IN-
 CREASED ACTIVITY IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS AND IN PARTS OF III CORPS
 AND IV CORPS. FOR THE MOST PART, THE SPECTRUM OF ACTIVITY REFLECTS
 THE ONSET OF THE NE MONSOON (AND A CONSEQUENT DECLINE IN ACTIVITY
 IN I CORPS), THE ONSET OF THE DRY SEASON IN SOUTHERN MOST VIETNAM
 (AND A CONSEQUENT RISE IN ACTIVITY THERE), AND THE BEGINNING OF THE
 FALL-WINTER RICE HARVEST, WHICH ABSORBED MUCH VC ENERGY IN THE
 COASTAL AREAS OF II CORPS.

B. WHERE THE ENEMY INCREASED HIS ACTIVITY, IT WAS GENERALLY
 IN THE FORM OF HARASSING ATTACKS AND ACTS OF TERRORISM, ACTIVITY
 WHICH HAS A DECIDED PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON THE POPULATION AT LARGE.
 THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM THIS PATTERN OF INCREASED LOW-
 LEVEL ACTIVITY WAS IN III CORPS, WHERE THE ENEMY ATTACK ON LOC NINH
 WAS THE FIRST KNOWN ATTEMPT IN III CTZ TO EMPLOY MULTI-REGIMENTAL
 SIZED FORCES AGAINST A SINGLE OBJECTIVE. THE RESULTS OF THE ENEMY

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ATTACKS IN BINH LONG AND PHUOC LONG HAS BEEN A VIRTUAL STANDSTILL IN THE PACIFICATION PROGRAMS OF THESE TWO PROVINCES. THE APPARENT WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE ENEMY TO CMIT MAIN FORCE OR NVA UNITS WHERE HE CONSIDERS THAT THERE IS A CHANCE OF SUCCESS, AND A STEP-UP IN TERRISM DIRECTED SPECIFICALLY AT INDIVIDUALS RATHER THAN HAMLETS, VILLAGES, OR RD GROUPS, MAY REPRESENT HIS STRATEGY IN III CORPS FOR THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN. IN IV CORPS, THE ENEMY GREATLY INCREASED HIS ACTIVITY IN THE LATTER PART OF THE MONTH, PARTICULARLY IN CHAU DOC, KIEN HOA, AND DINH TUONG. THERE WAS A DETERMINED ATTEMPT TO INTERDICT ROUTE 4 (THE LIFE-LINE FROM SAIGON TO THE DELTA) WHICH WAS DISTURBINGLY SUCCESSFUL. WE HAVE ALREADY IMPLEMENTED COUNTERMEASURES, AND ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE IN TRAIN.

C. THERE ARE CONTINUING AGENT AND PW REPORTS WHICH INDICATE SHORTAGES OF RICE AND MEDICINES AND A DECLINE IN MORALE. THE ENEMY'S MILITARY ACTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE FORAY INTO TUY HOA, IN SEPTEMBER, TEND TO SUBSTANTIATE REPORTS OF RICE SHORTAGES. EVIDENCE OF FALLING MORALE, HOWEVER, IS LESS CONVINCING. THE SPIRITED PERFORMANCES AT LOC NINH AND DAK TO INDICATE HIGHLY DISCIPLINED, WELL-LED ENEMY FORCES. IN ADDITION, THERE HAS BEEN A CONTINUING DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANHAM. THIS LATTER PHENOMENON, HOWEVER, MAY BE DUE AS MUCH TO INCREASED CONTROLS OVER VC RANK AND FILE AS IT IS TO CONTINUING ENTHUSIASM FOR PURSUING THE WAR.

FOOTNOTE 1: ROADS DEFINED AS MILITARILY ESSENTIAL INCLUDE 451KM IN I CORPS, 1413 IN II CORPS, 590 IN III CORPS, AND 351 IN IV CORPS. ESSENTIAL WATERWAYS INCLUDE 225 KM IN III CORPS AND 3;4 IN IV CRPS.

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forces in the current quarter. Agency political presence (VCI) has shown no perceptible change over the past quarter and is down somewhat from its level of one year ago; however, VCI activity has increased notably in the current quarter and by March had exceeded the rate of one year ago.

MILITARY REGION ONE, PERCENT POPULATION AB

<u>HES SUBMODELS</u>	<u>31 MAR 70</u>	<u>31 JAN 71</u>	<u>28 FEB 71</u>	<u>31 MAR 71</u>
Enemy Military Presence	57.01	61.44	61.48	57.75
Enemy Military Activity	79.58	85.00	77.43	73.93
Impact of Military Activity	80.02	87.77	85.48	83.74
Enemy Political Presence	81.86	84.77	84.26	85.93
Enemy Political Activity	90.78	95.09	90.64	86.60

c. Three of five MR 1 provinces show a pattern of regression in HES AB population scores over the current quarter; one of these, Quang Nam, has now reached a point below that of its HES AB population level of one year ago.

PERCENT HES AB POPULATION

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>MAR 70</u>	<u>DEC 70</u>	<u>JAN 71</u>	<u>FEB 71</u>	<u>MAR 71</u>
Tonkin	541,961	67.57	92.25	90.21	86.60	84.81
Quang Nam	600,988	50.61	61.29	59.80	55.25	50.35
Quang Tin	405,499	62.92	75.02	75.67	69.36	64.86

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d. While the general trend in MR 1 is gradually upward (64.05% AB population in HES, March 1970, versus 70.68% as of 31 March 1971), there has been considerable volatility among the forty-one districts constituting the Region. Twenty-three (23) districts have improved upon their AB percentage over the past year while eighteen (18) show declines. In one province, Quang Nam, seven of nine districts reflect regression trends.

DISTRICT HES SCORE (% AB):	QUANG TRI	THUA THIEN	QUANG NAM	QUANG TIN	QUANG NGAI	MILITARY REGION 1
Is higher than one year ago	3	8	2	3	7	23
Is lower than one year ago	3	2	7	3	3	18
Total number of districts	6	10	9	6	10	41

e. In the 31 March HES quarterly report, advisors responded to the HES questions relating to Community Development. The results reveal that most areas have nearly made up the loss (in percent AB population in the HES Community Development category) suffered during the period of heavy flooding (October-December 1970); however, two provinces, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai, have not only failed to regain lost ground but have actually dropped below flood period levels. Note that Quang Tri was the only MR 1 province which suffered no regression during the flooding.

PERCENT AB POPULATION, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CATEGORY

PROVINCE	POPULATION (as of 31 Mar 71)	MAR 70 (one year ago)	SEPT 70 (Pre- Flood)	JAN 71 (Post- Flood)	MAR 71 (Current)
Quang Tri	363,561	23.49	27.23	30.42	36.87
Thua Thien	541,961	11.62	37.39	26.31	32.65
Quang Nam	600,986	24.11	30.87	27.15	29.54
Quang Tin	405,499	22.41	37.27	36.29	34.58
Quang Ngai	735,394	29.87	44.21	38.91	31.74

* Figures do not include Hué or Da Nang.

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f. Seventeen (17) MR 1 districts (40% of total) reflect Community Development AB population levels of 10% or below as of 31 March. Every MR 1 province contains at least two such low-rated districts; six of ten Quang Ngai districts fall into this category. Nine of the seventeen districts are located in the highlands, while eight are lowland districts. Further, ten of the districts presently have no regular land (road) access to their respective province capitals. It is of note that none of the highland districts included have road access to the lowlands, a factor which seriously impairs development prospects. For example, Nam Hoa District of Thua Thien Province, which is the only MR 1 highland district with reliable road access to the lowlands, boasts a Community Development AB population rating of 48% and an Economic Activity rating of 77%; on the other hand, Huong Hoa, a highland district of Quang Tri Province without safe road access scores zero AB population in both categories.

PROVINCE	DISTRICT	POPULATIION	SETTING	31 MAR % AB POPULATION COM.DEV.	ROAD ACCESS TO PROVINCE CAPITAL ?
Quang Tri	Dong Ha	25,917	Lowland	0 %	Yes
Quang Tri	Huong Hoa	8,705	Highland	0	No
Thua Thien	Phu Tho	25,937	Lowland	0	Yes
Thua Thien	Phu Loc	66,176	Lowland	10	Yes
Thua Thien	Phong Dien	34,897	Lowland	10	Yes
Quang Nam	Thuong Duc	13,326	Highland	0	No
Quang Nam	Duc Duc	46,295	Lowland	0	No
Quang Nam	Doi Loc	54,869	Lowland	6	Yes
Quang Tin	Hiep Duc	7,729	Highland	0	No
Quang Tin	Hau Duc	14,826	Highland	0	No
Quang Tin	Tien Phuoc	30,201	Highland	3	No
Quang Ngai	Nghia Hanh	41,812	Lowland	0	Yes
Quang Ngai	Duc Pho	75,442	Lowland	6	Yes
Quang Ngai	Son Ha	22,357	Highland	0	No
Quang Ngai	Ba To	13,767	Highland	0	No
Quang Ngai	Minh Long	7,555	Highland	0	No
Quang Ngai	Tra Bong	11,240	Highland	0	No

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2. (C) Developments of Note at Province and District Levelsa. Quang Tri

(1) RSA, Mai Linh District, observed that the RD Cadre's contribution to the Pacification Program over the past quarter has been almost nil due to RD re-organization and re-deployment.

(2) Over forty percent of Trieu Phong District's 121 hamlets have reached the "A" category in the HES effective 31 March. The remaining 71 hamlets in this district of 80,000 persons are rated "B". The DSA's two pages of notes contained only references to development projects; he remarked that he fully expected to be the "last in a long line of advisors at Trieu Phong."

(3) The PSA announced that his counterpart, the Province Chief, has ordered the Secretary General of the P and D Council to compile monthly a listing of all HES-rated "C" and "B" hamlets in Quang Tri as well as an analysis of the causes for the classifications. These are to be distributed to all Service and District Chiefs who will, in turn, be tasked to report on plans they have underway to upgrade these hamlets. Additionally, to insure that the HES data is as accurate as possible, the Province Chief directed that all District Chiefs are to confer with their U.S. advisor counterparts on HES topics on a continuing basis.

(4) As a possible result of the Province Chief's initiative referenced above, the District Chief of Gio Linh District participated actively in the preparation of the 31 March report, providing responses for all questions. According to HES advisors, the District Chief "assisted with the choice of each answer for each village and hamlet. The March HES is thus the District Chief's HES and is perhaps the most accurate ever for the District." (Analyst Note: The District Chief's input to the HES resulted in a dramatic increase in HES Scores, with AB population in Gio Linh advancing from 49 to 76 percent of total; additionally, the HES Military model increased from 58% AB to 76% AB; the Political from 74 to 96% AB; the Community Development from zero to 182 AB).

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(5) The December 1970 census figures were reported in the 31 March HES for Quang Tri and reflect a 23% decline in population (11,243 to 8,705) for Huong Hoa District. The DSA remarks that the loss represents the exodus of Bru Highlander tribesmen to Nam Ha District in Thua Thien and the departure of persons seeking economic opportunity in the lowlands. (Analyst Note: Old geographical Huong Hoa District is totally abandoned; the population and administration are "in-exile" in Cam Chinh and Cam Nghia villages of Cam Lo District).

(6) The DSA, Dong Ha District, reports that the sharp price increase which accompanied the arrival of Lam Son Operation forces was stabilized by direct intervention of the District and Province Administrative councils.

(7) Analyst Comment: The Lam Son (Laos) Operations did not produce the notable fluctuation in Quang Tri Province HES scores anticipated in some quarters. AB population declined from 89.14% of total in January to 83.63% effective 31 March; ABC population increased slightly from 98.66% to 99.31 percent. Apparent reasons for the modest HES reaction to the Operation are: Military contact associated with the Operation occurred only in abandoned areas of Huong Hoa District; heavy troop increments took place in areas (Dong Ha; Cua Lo; the DMZ) which already contained substantial numbers of friendly forces. The regression which did occur was centered in two heavily populated lowland districts, Mai Lang and Mai Linh; these regressions are associated by advisors with the Laos Operations in the sense that the increased enemy activity (unit attacks, propaganda meetings) involved enemy attempts to probe for weak points in the friendly defence and to compensate for the unfavorable psychological impact of the Allied Operation. Mai Lang District regressed in AB population from 93.06% to 86.25% AB and also found enemy base areas moved closer to populated areas in the south-western portions of the district; Mai Linh District AB population declined 99% to 86% AB.

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b. Tuan Thien

- (1) The PEA reports that the "overall security situation regressed during March . . . terrorist incidents were the highest in two years . . . rise in number of abductions and propaganda mission, stressing ARVN defeat in Laos, was noteworthy. . . performance of the PSDF, in particular, was sub-par. . . MAT survey found almost half of the village defense plans to be unacceptable . . . there was a surge of accidents related to increased volume of traffic on QL 1."
- (2) The DGA at Huong Tra District repeated his remark from the previous month that the Pham Haung Program remains at a standstill. Concerted province and district level advisory effort over the past six months has not been to date adequate to shake the District Chief's reluctance to energize the program.
- (3) The PEA writes that the District Chief, Major Tung, of Phuong Dien District is expected to be transferred during April and succeeded by the Deputy District Chief of Phu Vang District. Major Tung "has been one of the least effective District Chiefs in the Province." (Analyst Comment: The US advisory team at Huong Dien was de-activated during February. Sixteen of the district's 21 hamlets are currently rated "B" in the HES and the 5 remaining are "A". Population is 36,000. HES reporting will be accomplished by a liaison officer assigned at neighboring Phong Dien District.)
- (4) The Vinh Loc District MAT and District Advisory Teams were phased out on 31 March. HES reporting for the District will be assumed by a liaison officer working out of Phu Loc District. The 31 March HES report reflects six "A" and twelve "B" hamlets in this District of 57,000 persons. The Phu Vang District advisory team was also deactivated during the March reporting period. HES reporting will be conducted by members of the Huong Thuy District team. All 53 hamlets of this District of 72,000 persons are presently rated "A" in the HES!

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(5) The PEA informs us that the District Chief, Major Han, at Phu Tho District is to be replaced in April. "He has lost his interest and incentive. We are told informally that his replacement will be Major Dung, Deputy at Buong Thuy District."

(6) The PEA at Phu Dien District pointed out in his remarks that the security situation there has reached its lowest point in twelve months. The PEA comments that "the Province Chief has asked for the relief of Major Nghi, the District Chief, since he believes he is not an effective enough leader. We expect a new District Chief in April."

c. Quang Nam

(1) The pattern of gradual decline in AB population in RVN is exceeded by that in Quang Nam Province, where the decline has not only been sharper but has also carried over a longer period of time. AB population in Quang Nam has fallen from 66.46% of total province population in October 1970 to 50.35% effective 31 March 1971, a sixteen point decrease representing a loss of over 100,000 persons to the AB category over a time frame of six months; there has additionally been spillage from the ABC category, with a loss of six points from November 1970 through the current reporting month: 92.86% to 85.92% of total province population, or a loss of some 40,000 persons from the "relatively secure" (ABC) aggregation. The table below summarizes the regression patterns:

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

	Percent AB Population	Percent ABC Population
1970 Lowpoint	37.92% (May)	78.54% (Aug)
1970 Highpoint	66.46 (Oct)	92.86 (Nov)
November 1970	66.16	92.86
December 1970	61.29	92.27
January 1971	59.80	91.81
February 1971	55.25	89.93
March 1971	50.35	85.92

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(2) A study of the HES sub-models (see table below) reveals that a dramatic increase in enemy political and military activity is almost solely responsible for the sharp decline in percent AB population in Quang Nam Province over the past quarter. The ever substantial enemy military and political force presence in Quang Nam has remained relatively constant over the past year; friendly activity has also maintained a steady level.

QUANG NAM PROVINCE, PERCENT AB POPULATION

HES SUBMODELS	31 MAR 70	31 JUN 71	28 FEB 71	31 MAR 71
Enemy Military Presence	39.93%	39.80%	41.43%	38.44%
Enemy Military Activity	70.06	70.76	60.72	40.72
Friendly Military Presence	75.53	88.14	87.29	89.41
Friendly Military Activity	75.30	77.71	82.69	76.04
Impact of Military Activity	66.57	72.12	73.25	72.36
Enemy Political Presence	77.20	79.00	78.74	80.03
Enemy Political Activity	80.33	90.07	85.46	62.16

(3) The most heavily publicized event of the enemy March highpoint in Quang Nam, the savage NVA attack against Duc Duc District, is not reflected in HES AB population regression figures in that the District had contained no "A" or "B" hamlets prior to the attack. The HES did, however, indicate a regression of twenty (20) hamlets.

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containing 38,000 persons from the "C" category; ABC population fell from 91.4% of District total to 8.88%.

d. Quang Tin

An extensive Return-to-Village program has been underway in Thang Binh District (population 127,159) during the quarter; persons are returning from refugee centers along QL 1 to their traditional villages in the western areas of the district adjoining Route 534, which is being re-opened to its terminus in Hiep Duc District. The movement of people from areas of heavy friendly force concentrations to RTV sites (where nearby enemy presence is greater, where public facilities are few, where economic activity is yet dormant, and where friendly security forces consist mainly of RF/IT) has served to at least temporarily reduce HES scores for the district. HES AB population fell from 61.75% of total to 39.92%.

(Analyst comment: US advisors in MR 1 have been concerned that the prospect of diminished HES scores, however temporary, would serve to dampen the enthusiasm of Province and District Chiefs for RTV projects. No tangible evidence of RTV program retardation due to avert concern with HES ratings has been noted to this time.)

e. Quang Ngai

(1) The PEA in his remarks underscored previous comments concerning the deteriorating pacification status of southern Quang Ngai (Duc Pho, Nghia Hanh, and Mo Duc Districts). He reports that "three Territorial Force outposts were overrun with significant losses in the southern parts of the province . . . two of these attacks were directed against OP's along QL 1 indicating that the alleged secure zone is something less than secure and Quang Ngai Province is still far from experiencing freedom of movement during darkness along the national highway." (Analyst comment: The attacks referenced occurred in Duc Pho District, population 75,442, which has reflected a significant decline in ABC population over the current quarter; the district's only AB population is found in the immediate vicinity of the district headquarters compound. See table below.)

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DUC PHO DISTRICT, QUANG NGAI

	MAR 70	DEC 70	JAN 71	FEB 71	MAR 71
Percent RES/SED Population	1.97	7.85	7.85	0.95	6.27
Percent RES ABC Population	76.65	77.69	83.96	70.92	62.13

- (2) The BSA, Tu Nghia District, notes that small enemy units continue to be able to infiltrate at will the resettlement areas in Tu Thuan (HES: C) and Tu Thinh (HES: D) villages of western Tu Nghia to "plant mines, collect money and rice, spread leaflets, and depart." In response, the District Chief is preparing a new security plan which will include "a special, highly-trained platoon."
- (3) The BSA, Nghia Phu District, shifted the populations of sixteen (16) VC-rated hamlets to the non-hamlet population category in his HES report for 31 March.
- (4) The PSA reports that "Major Daak, former Tre Bong BSA, will be assigned with a full team to Ninh Long District this month." (Analyst comment: Ninh Long, population 7,555, has been without an U.S. advisory team since 19 September 1970.)

3. (C) Specific Problem Areas Referenced by Advisorsa. Quang Tri

The PSA points out that the "war veteran situation in Quang Tri presents a dismal picture." He observes, as many NVN I advisors have recently, that only political pressure from private veterans' associations appears effective in prompting action from apathetic CVN agencies . . . Another problem area referenced by the PSA is the "quality of the Village Land Registrars. Of 56 VLR's, the Province Land Affairs Service Chief claims that only 10 are effective; of the 50, twenty-four have requested transfers to the National Police."

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b. Thua Thien

Three Thua Thien districts (Phu Loc, Phong Dien, and Huong Tra) have reflected a pattern of regression over the past quarter, a notable departure from the upward trend evident in other areas of the province. While Phong Dien District showed a gain in HES scores over February, it nevertheless remains below its standing of a year ago.

PERCENT, AB POPULATION IN HES

DISTRICT	POPULATION	MAR 70	DEC 70	JAN 71	FEB 71	MAR 71
Phu Loc	66,176	50.53	73.12	65.36	52.39	39.99
Phong Dien	34,397	69.73	81.16	63.83	48.35	66.95
Huong Tra	67,527	73.07	98.10	97.91	95.74	77.07

c. Quang Nam

During March, three Quang Nam districts (Dien Ban, Hieu Phuoc, and Duy Xuyen) regressed to levels below those of one year ago in terms of HES AB population, as reflected in the table below:

PERCENT, AB POPULATION IN HES

DISTRICT	POPULATION	MAR 70	DEC 70	JAN 71	FEB 71	MAR 71
Dien Ban	64,821	42.76	48.66	56.09	52.94	28.46
Hieu Phuoc	115,941	61.55	57.04	57.04	57.04	50.64
Duy Xuyen	43,419	70.88	76.50	78.13	73.34	25.65

d. Quang Tin

Two Quang Tin districts (Ly Tin and Kien Duc) currently reflect HES scores which are below those carried one year ago. Important lowland, Ly Tin District, site of the large US Chu Lai Base, has experienced substantial enemy activity and HES regression over the current quarter. Isolated, highland Kien Duc District has shown steady deterioration and during March lost the last of its AB population and gained three additional VC-controlled hamlets.

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PERCENT AB POPULATION IN HES

DISTRICT	POPULATION	MAR 70	DEC 70	JAN 71	FEB 71	MAR 71
Hiep Duc	7,729	15.77	21.16	4.73	4.73	0
Ly Tin	65,901	75.09	88.29	94.91	63.39	56.09

c. Quang Ngai

(1) The DSA, Nghia Hanh District, reports that "the pacification program of this district continues at a low ebb. There is no confidence in the District Chief. He has been accused of collusion with the Nghia Hanh Village Chief in defrauding the 1970 development funds of over one million piasters. The farmers of more than one village have come to the advisors to ask for help to prevent the VC from taxing them. The District Chief has taken little or no action. The people routinely blame him for the failure of the government programs. Unless quick action is taken to replace the District Chief, the CVN incumbents will surely be defeated in the forthcoming free elections." (Analyst comment: The PIA, in its March Province Report, observed that "the Nghia Hanh District Chief continues to serve ineffectively, discrediting the CVN; his continued presence lends validity to VC propaganda and seriously undermines all CVN programs in the district" . . . District Chief is Captain Pham Luong Quy assigned 23 July 1969 . . . Current Nghia Hanh population is 41,611; its overall HES rating is "D". There has been no AB population since January 1971; ABC population has fallen from 76.38% of total to 49.54% in the year since March 1970.)

(2) The DSA, Son Tinh District, commented extensively on a development which is likely to have a strong negative impact on the 1971 Return to Village program in the district; as follows: "We have been unable to begin our RTV program for the 1971 P and D Plan. This is due to plans to resettle people in other areas of the district to in effect create free fire zones. This resettlement plan is occurring in the western part of the district, which for the most part has abandoned hamlets and strong VC influence. What in effect is happening is that people who have gone back into the abandoned hamlet areas to farm

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and live will be moved to secure areas. Our RIV program for 1971 was centered on returning 14,500 persons from refugee camps back to their houses in the southwest part of the district and 3,000 refugees to their homes in the East. With the advent of this other resettlement plan generated by the CO of the 2nd ARVN Div, General Toan, we are unable to even begin with RIV." IBA comment:

"A plan directed by the CG, 2d ARVN Div, to 'regroup' some 10,000 CVN citizens in Western Son Tinh into protected areas will adversely affect the 1971 provincial plans." (Analyst comment: The 31 March HES lists Son Tinh with a population of 103,852 and an overall rating of "B". It is the location of My Lai (Son My Village) . . . Quang Ngai Province currently carries 13,000 population identified by advisors as VC-controlled; none of this population is in Son Tinh. However, the HES lists over 15,000 additional persons in the 'non-hamlet population category' for Quang Ngai, who live in areas termed by advisors as being 'residual population under strong VC influence'; 7,400 of these are located in Son Tinh District. Note: Quang Nam Province has no VC population in the HES but lists 23,200 population living under predominate VC influence in 'non-hamlet population' status.)

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