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OFFICE OF THE SENIOR ADVISOR  
// QUANG NAM SECTOR  
ADVISORY TEAM #1, MACV  
APO 96337

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MACTN-QNS

31 December 1966

SUBJECT: Special Joint Report of Revolutionary Development.

TO: Office of the Deputy Ambassador  
American Embassy  
Siagon, Vietnam

1. (U) In compliance with Joint Directive 1-66, MACJ-33, 10 March 1966, Subjects: Preparation of Revolutionary Development Report, the following report for Quang Nam Province is submitted for the period ending 31 December 1966.

2. (C) REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

a. The most significant effort made in the Revolutionary Development Program during the month of December was the Joint Military - GVN activity from 18 to 28 December in the hamlets of Yen Ye, Qua Giang, and Quang Chai of Hoa Vang District. The purpose of the operation was to demonstrate the ability of military forces to work with the government in the pacification effort. Although concept and expectations were not entirely a success, the fact that the program was conceived, implemented, and carried through to completion by GVN and military officials is an indication that there is a sincere effort on their part to support the Revolutionary Development Program. All other efforts on the part of Provincial Officials directed toward final planning and reorganization for the 1967 plan. There were no hamlets verified as secure during the month, consequently the 1966 RD program ended with only 18 secure hamlets out of the revised goal of 38 to be secured during the year.

b. Construction has begun on the new Chiou Hoi center for the province. The center is expected to be completed in March 1967, although attempts are being made to move up the completion date to February in order to accomodate the over-

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flow of ralliers expected during the TET campaign period. If the center is delayed, plans are being made to erect tents in order to house the over flow.

c. Province officials are still unable to cope with the refugee problem particularly in the outlying districts. The majority of support for the estimated 137,000 refugees in the province is being furnished by USAID and US civic action teams in conjunction with USMC elements. It is often necessary for US personnel to react to refugee demands before GVN officials have been notified of the problem. Failure to provide the necessary support presents the GVN in the worst possible light and has forced the people, in many cases, to return to their homes in VC and uncontested areas.

### 3. (C) POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL

a. The open hostility between the various political factions has subsided. Prudent action by OSA reduced the possibility of any outbreak of violence during the recent party elections in Hoi An. The rumor that Mr. Le Nguyen Long, representative to the Constituent Assembly, will be the new Province Chief in Quang Ngai; and thus no longer a leader of one of the major QDD factions, may be the reason for the reduced political turmoil.

b. All PSYOPS agencies in the province are hard pressed to maintain any sort of credibility to their program while presenting the GVN as a reasonable alternative to the VC. Too often grievances are listened to and promises made without the necessary follow through action to make the promise an actuality.

### 4. (C) SECURITY

#### a. Friendly military.

(1) RVNAF. During the period 18-28 December the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 51st Regiment, the 59th RF Battalion, the 21st Ranger Battalion, the 10th PSYOPS Battalion, and the 2nd Troop, 4th Cavalry were committed to support the pacification effort in the hamlets of Yen Ne, Qua Giang, and Quang Chau in Hoa Vang District. Noteworthy, were the accomplishments of the 1st Battalion, 51st Regiment in Qua Gang Hamlet. The success in this hamlet was largely the result of command support by the new battalion commander. During the month of January the 51st Regiment will be redispersed in order to provide better support to the priority areas in the pacification effort in Hieu Nhon, Dien Ban, and Hoa Vang Districts.

(2) FVMAF. USMC elements continued their support of Revolutionary Development during the month by conducting security, search and destroy and county fair operations.

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(3) Formation of a new intelligence center has begun in Dien Ban District. Once operational, the center will coordinate all intelligence facilities operating within the district and provide the district chief with more timely intelligence and of a much broader scope than what he presently has access to. It is planned to install these centers in the other districts if the concept proves successful in Dien Ban.

b. Viet Cong and NVA forces. During the month of December there has been an increase of one VC regiment within the Province as confirmed. The 3rd Regiment of the 620 (320) Division, previously carried as probable, has been confirmed with a strength of approximately 2,500 men and is reported to be operating in the Duc Duc - Que Son area. VC incidents have increased during the reporting period particularly in the Dien Ban District. Twenty-two mine incidents were reported in this area from 20 to 23 December. Only 3 VC initiated incidents were reported in the national priority area of Hoa Vang District.

c. VC Political and Security Infrastructure.  
No Change.

#### 5. (C) ECONOMIC.

Local markets did not appear to have any major changes during the month of December. Shortages, such as at the An Hoa complex, in rice and fuel resources seem to be of a temporary nature and are not indicative of a major trend.

#### 6. (C) PROVINCIAL RESOURCES.

a. RF/PF Forces, No Change

b. Revolutionary Development Cadre Teams. As a result of the reorganization of the cadre teams the Province presently has 20 full strength 59 man cadre groups. With the exception of two teams which were unable to obtain transportation, all teams were given a two week training course in Hoi An on the Revolutionary Development Plan. Five more teams will graduate in January from the Vung Tau Training Center. A problem of coordination and control continues to be one of the major deterrents to a more effective cadre program. The Province staff and District Chiefs are not providing sufficient detail in planning cadre operation. Inadequate supervision and control of the cadre teams is also prevalent throughout the province. Control of the cadre teams is lacking because of the lax disciplinary system. Cadre police have been hired and it is expected they will be placed in the field during the first quarter of 1967. It is evident that more education, particularly at district level, on the mission and employment of cadre teams is necessary if they are to be properly utilized.

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## c. Police.

(1) The National Police continue to participate in joint USMC search and destroy and county fair type operations, which have thus far proven successful in keeping the VC from engaging in any large scale operations. Probably the greatest contribution by the police is in the area of intelligence gathering prior to and during these operations.

(2) During the month the Police special branch, National Police Service, held an intelligence seminar in preparation for expanding the police intelligence effort in the National Priority Area.

## d. Provincial Administrative Personnel and Organization.

(1) Mr. Ly Ky Gioi is the Temporary replacement for Mr. Vu as the Refugee Chief. Mr. Vu was recently drafted for the armed forces.

(2) Mr. Ton Tat Tung is the newly appointed district chief for Duc Duc District.

(3) Captain Nguyen Hoa Phung, chief of Revolutionary Development Administration and Planning, has been transferred to Saigon and to date no replacement has been named. Captain Phung was the key figure in the planning stages of the 1967 RD plan. His transfer will be a great loss to the province as they now begin implementation of the plan.

e. Material Resources and Transportation.  
No change.

## 7. (C) REQUIRED ACTION.

a. A continuous changing of key personnel on the part of the military and GVN is one of the primary obstacles to overall progress and stability in the province. Although it is clearly a sincere effort to get the best people possible, much has been lost in the way of continuity and stability of programs and policies. Conversely, Mr. Bui Van Nhi, remains as the provincial Chieu Hoi chief, despite efforts made to have him removed. Mr. Nhi apparently has strong enough political ties to hold himself in this position and as long as he remains, little progress can be expected in the program during the coming year.

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*JH*  
JAN H. VANDERBIE  
USAID Representative

*Francis B Kane Jr.*  
FRANCIS B. KANE Jr.  
Lt Col, Infantry  
Senior Advisor

Contribution made  
not available for signature

ROBERT J. KELLY  
JUSPOA Representative

*Richard N. Hamasaki*  
RICHARD N. HAMASAKI  
Asst USAI Rep (Cadre)

*Garland L. Easter*  
GARLAND L. EASTER  
OSA Representative

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