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PASS IMMEDIATELY TO C/S, MACY FROM LTGEN CUSHMAN

A. COMUSMACV 210755Z AUG 67 1. SINCE III MAF COMMENCE OPERATIONS IN I CTZ IN MARCH 1965, STEADY PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY FORCES AND IN DENYING HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOUNT LARGE SCALE INVASION FROM HIS HAVEN NORTH OF THE DMZ.

2. IN THIS CORPS AREA OF 12,000 SQ MILES, WHICH INCLUDES 40 MILES NVN BORDER 180 MILES OF LAOTIAN BORDER, U.S. FORCES HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR 30,491 CONFIRMED ENEMY KILLED AND 31,667 PROBABLE KILLS AGAINST U.S. LOSSES OF 3956, DURING THE PAST YEAR ALONE, RVNAF HAVE DESTROYED 12,842 ENEMY AGAINST A LOSSE OF 3597 OF THEIR OWN FORCES KILLED. IN ADDITION, ROK MARINES HAVE ESTABLISH-ED AN ENVIABLE RECORD OF 2551 CONFIRMED CASUALTIES WITH A LOSS OF ONLY 235.

3. THE CONFIRMED LOSS OF OVE 45,000 VC/NVA, HAS PREVENTED A





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BUILD UP OF ENEMY TROOPS IN THE ZONE. TWO YEARS AGO ORGANIZED
ENEMY STRENGTH IN I CORPS WAS ESTIMATED AT \$0,580 AND IN SPITE
OF AN ESTIMATED INFILTRATION RATE OF 1500 PER MONTH, PLUS LOCAL
RECRUITMENT, HIS CURRENTLY ESTIMATED STRENGTH IN ORGANIZED UNITS
IS 26,300. WHILE THE ENEMY ENJOYS A UNIQUE COMBAT SITUATION IN
THE DMZ WHERE HE IS ABLE TO STAGE MAJOR COMBAT FORCEND JGLNECESSARY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN AN AREA SAFE FROM GROUND ATTACKS AND TO A
LARGE EXTENT FROM OBSERVED FIRE, HE HAS NEVERTHELESS BEEN SOUNDLY
DEFEATED IN EVERY ATTEMPT TO MOUNT LARGE SCALE ATTACKS FROM
THAT AREA.
4. WITHIN I CORPS, TWELVE VC/NVA BASE AREA HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED.

4. WITHIN I CORPS, TWELVE VC/NVA BASE AREA HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. THESE ARE THE ENEMY'S LOGISTICAL, TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL BASES FROM WHICH HE SORTIES AND TO WHICH HE RETURNS TO REFURBISH. OFFENSIVE GROUND OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED AGAINST ALL BUT THREE OF THE DEEPET OF THESE BASE AREAS AND HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SUBSTANTIALLY DISRUPTING THE ENEMY'S SUPPLY AND SUPPORT CAPABILITY. TIME REQUERED FOR RECONSTITUTING ENEMY UNITS IS BEING STEADILY INCREASED BY THESE CONTINUING BASE AREA DENIAL OPERATIONS.

5. VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES IN I CORPS HAVE SHOWN VERY ENCOURAGING

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IMPROVEMENT IN THE PAST YEAR AND ARE CARRYING THE FIGHT TO THE
ENEMY WITH AN INCREASED TEMPO OF OPERATIONS. DURING THE FIRST
SEVEN MONTHS OF 1967, ARVN I CORPS UNITS CONDUCTED A TOTAL OF
215 LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS OF WHICH 37 WERE COMBINED WITH US
FORCES. KILL RATIOS DURING THIS PERIOD INCREASED TO 3.5 TO 1
AND WEAPONS CAPTURED/WEAPONS LOST RATIO IMPROVED TO 1.7 TO 1.
THESE SUCCESSES ARE A REFLECTION IN OVERALL IMPROVEMENT OF
MORALE AND FIGHTING SPIRIT AMONG THE VIETNAMESE UNITS.
6. WITH THE INCREASE IN STRENGTH OF REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES
IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, MISSION ORIENTED TRAINING HAS BEEN
EMPHASIZED TO IMPROVE COMBAT EFFECTIVESS. SINCE JANUARY 1966,
THE REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE KILL RATIO HAS AVERAGED 2.5
TO 1 AND 1.3 TO 1 RESPECTIVELY. THIS IS A FAVORABLERATIO
CONSIDERING THAT THE MAJORITY OF THEIR ENGAGEMENTS ARE IN CLOSE
COMBAT.

7. FROM A MODEST BEGINNING OF TWO COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS (CAPS) ESTABLISHED IN AUGUST 1955, THE PROGRAM HAS NOW GROWN TO 75. THESE MARINE AND POPULAR FORCE UNITS ARE LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF RD TEAMS, ALONG LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ADJACENT TO POPULATION CENTERS. THESE CAPS NOW CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY

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OF 260,000 CIVILIANS. THE PLANNED EXPANSION TO 114 CAPS IN THE
FUTURE WILL OFFER SECURITY TO APPROXIMATELY 400,000 CIVILIANS.
8. IN THE PAST YEAR, THE GOVERNMENT CONDUCTED CONSTITUENT
ASSEMBLY, VILLAGE, AND HAMLET ELECTIONS WITHOUT MAJOR INCIDENTS,
WITH OVER 80 PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS IN I CORPS CASTING
BALLOTS.

9. UNLIKE THE PURELY MILITARY EFFORT, DESTRUCTION OF THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE IS A SLOW, DELIBERATE PROCESS WHICH BY ITS VERY NATURE PRECLUDES DRAMATIC RESULTS. SINCE DECEMBER 1966, 16,870 VIETNAMESE HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED WITH THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE, OF THESE 1,197 HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED.

10. OF THE NEARLY 2 1/2 MILLION PEOPLE IN I CORPS, 34.9 PERCENT WERE UNDER GVN PROTECTION AND INFLUENCE IN JULY 1966. THIS HAS RISEN TO 51 PERCENT IN 1967 WITH A CORRESPONDING DECREASE IN VC INFLUENCE.

11. THE HIGH TEMPO OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN I CORPS HAS DECREASED THE PRODUCTIVE LAND AREAS AND HAS CAUSED SOME RURAL POPULATION SHIFTS TO SECURE URBAN AREAS. THIS HAS RESULTED IN A TEMPORARY REDUCTION OF TOTAL LAND UNDER PRODUCTION. HOWEVER, WITH EFFORTS DIRECTED TOWARD INCREASING UNIT PRODUCITITY, SECURE AREA RICE

PAGE FIVE UUMSEA 1446 S E C R E T YIELDS HAVE INCREASED BY APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT. VEGETABLE PRODUCTION AND FISHING HAVE ALSO INCREASED BY 15 AND 20 PERCENT RESPECTIVELY IN 1967.

12. THE AN HOA INDUSTRIAL COMPLES LOCATED IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE IS A UNIQUE FEATURE OF CONTEMPORARY VIETNAM. IT IS RUN ENTIRELY BY VIETNAMESE AND IS DESIGNED AS A DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECT INVOLVING INTENSIVE USE OF LOCAL RESOURCES AND LOCAL PERSONNEL. IN ERIEF, THE PORJECT ENVISAGES USING LOCAL COAL RESERVES AS A MEANS OF PRODUCING FRETILIZER AND GENERATING ELECTRIC POWER FROM A COALTSTEAM PROCESS. THE ENERGY GENERATED WILL BE USED FOR ELECTRIFICATION OF AN INCREASINGLY LARGE AREA OF CENTRAL VIETNAM, PUMPING WATER FOR IRRIGATION TO PERMIT DOUBLE CROPPING, AND USING THE FERTILIZER PRODUCED TO INCREASE CROP OUTPUT. CURRENTLY, THE PROJECT PROVIDES DIRECT INCOME FOR SOME 10,000 VIETNAMESE AND INDIRECT INCOME FOR AN EQUAL NUMBER WHICH IS ALREADY RAISING THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE VILLAGERS OF THE IMMEDIATE AREA.

13. DURING 1967, PROGRAMS INITIATED WITHIN I CORPS HAVE LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEFELOPMENT EFFORT, INCLUDING THE ALL IMPORTANT SECURITY ASPECTS. 120 REVOLUTIONARY



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PAGE SIX UUMSEA 1446 S E C R E T DEVELOPMENT TEAMS ARE NOW FUNCTIONING, AND ADDITIONAL TEAMS ARE IN TRAINING. FOURTEEN ARVN BATTALIONS AND ONE REGIONA FORCE BATTALION ARE ASSIGNED SECURITY MISSIONS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. 14. THE CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) PROGRAM IS HIGHLY ENCOURAGING WITH 1544 RALLIERS AT MID POINT IN 1967 COMPARED TO 1653 DURING OF 1966, AND 1143 IN 1965. 15. CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS HAVE SHOWN A DRAMATIC INCREASE. DURING 1966. MONTHLY MEDICAL AND DENTAL TREATMENTS AVERAGED 99,000 AND 2,070 RESPECTIVELY COMPARED TO CURRENT MONTHLY AVERAGES OF 228,000 AND 8,236. CIVIC ACTION CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS HAVE LIKEWISE CONTINUED A STEADY INCREASE ALONG WITH ASSISTANCE IN INPROVING PRODUCTION IN THE FOOD DEFICIENT AREAS. 16. REMARKABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN OPENING LINES OF COMM-UNICATIONS THROUGHOUT I CORPS. AS OF JULY 1967, COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY TRAFFIC CAN TRAVERSE THE 235 MILES OF HIGHWAY 1 FROM THE DMZ TO THE II CORPS BORDER. FIN ADDITION, VEHICULAR TRAFFIC CAN MOVE OVER THE 42 MILES OF ROUTE 9 FROM DONG HA TO KHE SANH FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THREE YEARS. ALSO THE 23 MILE LINK FROM DA NANG TO THE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX OF AN HOA WAS OPENED IN 1967

PAGE SEVEN UUMSEA 1446 S E C R E T AND TO DATE OVER 2,000 FEET OF NEW BRIDGING HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTED IN THE CORPS ZONE. NUMEROUS SECONDARY ROADS ARE BEING USED DAILY FOR THE FLOW OF COMMERCE. THE IMPACT OF THESE IMPROVED LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS ON OVERALL CIVIL AND MILITARY ACTIVITY IS INESTIMABLE.

17. IN SHORT, GREAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN I CORPS IN ROOTIN OUT THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE, HOLDING OFF THE EXTERNAL NVA THREAT AND DEVELOPING A HEALTHY AND SECURE MILIEU IN WHICH THE LEGITI-MATE GOVERNMENT OF THE COUNTRY IS FUNCTIONING. HOWEVER, THERE IS MUCH YET TO BE DONE; AND AS WE FACE THE DAYS AHEAD IN WHICH THE ENEMY WILL CONTINUE TO POSE A SUBSTANTIAL THREAT ACROSS THE DMZ AND TO MAKE STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO INFILTRATE MEN AND WEAPONS FROM HIS SANCTUARY INTO THE I CORPS AREA, ULTIMATE SUCCESS WILL DEPEND UPON CONTINUED UNRELENTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE GUERRILLA IN THE POPULATED AND PRODUCTIVE COASTAL AREA. STEADY, THOUGH UNSPECTACULAR GAINS ARE BEING MADE DAILY AGAINST THIS ENEMY ASSET WHICH IS MOST DIFFICULT TO REPLACE.

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