

One to Better Position
in Troubled Quang Ngai P.

12 May 69

Msg MG Gettys, CG
Nickerson, ^{CG} MAF.

Americal DIV AED 418 to LTC
140930 May 69, S, Gp. ns. [USMC Incoming
SPECAT]

✓
to contingencies for which
Americal is responsible,
eg Golden Valley,
reinforcement of ISTRAD DIV,
or reinforcement of
Project Delta.

Gettys requested
immediate attachment
of 3 Bn BDE.
With it Gettys would
deploy 2 Bns vic -
Quang Ngai City. 6th
EW BS 60 Grid and
1st Bn BDE and 1 Bn
in Tien Phuoc Valley.

Secret

7 Inf Bns are at 85%
or below authorized strength. Gettys
concerned about EN concentration in
vic. Tam Ky, Western Son Tinh
District, Quang Ngai and Duc Pho.
An NVA Div which can be reinforced
by 7 MF / LF Bns and 9 LF
Co's menaces Tam Ky and Tien
Phuoc. 21st NVA Regt could
attack Binh Son or Quang Ngai.
22nd NVA Regt operates SE
of Quang Ngai City. 2d
NVA Regt has deployed W &
SW of Duc Pho. The ~~US~~
Americals 4-21 Inf, 11th BDE,
was only uncommitted unit available
for use anywhere in TAOI.
Look ~~for~~ a reserve.
Would be difficult to respond.

Secret

WHAT XXIV Corps ^{units} DID
TO SOFTEN HAMBURGER HILL
Before & During ATK
(Arty + Air) (#1)
May 69

Msg, LTC Stillwell, CG XXIV Corps, PHB 0936, to Abrams - 021722

May 1969. S. Gp. n.s. [USMC Incoming SPECAT]

In preparing assault on Hill Allies used
8 Arty BTrys consisting of 4-
105 mm batteries, 2-155 mm batteries,
1-8" battery (203 mm), and 1-175 mm
battery expended ~~4,792~~ total of
21,732 rounds: 14,792 105 mm rds;
5026-155 mm rds; 1218-8" rds;
696-175 mm rds. Allied air
flew 272 TACAIR sorties. These
expended total of 1,005,750
lbs, which included 152,000 lbs
of napalm and 113-1,000 lb
delayed-fuze bombs. There were
no pre DDay B52 strikes directed
against Hill 937. Intell on
EN situation there too sketchy.
After assault B52's not ordered
because of proximity of
opposing sides.

Secret

Secret

new cups measures
to Syster Up, Hamburger
Hill (Other) (#2)

May 69

Msg, LTC STILLWELL, CG XXIV CORPS, PHE 0936, to Abrams, 0211722
May 1969. S. Gp n.s. [USMC training specat]

- Concentrated use of 81 mm mortars and gunships to maintain suppressive / destructive fire in front of advancing Dfs
- continuous tree top recon of Hill 937 by Air Cav Scouts
LOH's to spot En posns
- Precise targetting of supporting fire by Artillery LO's in
LOH's at low level
- Issue of flak jackets to personnel in main effort
- Use of CS in front of 1-506 ~~1-506~~
- Use of airborne Loudspeakers to induce EN surrender.

Secret

Secret

PROPOSE TO SEND
3d MAR DIV INTO
DMZ

11 Nov 68

Msg, CG III MAR TO Abrams, ~~111950Z~~ Nov 68, S. G. I.
[USMC Outgoing Specat]

LTGen Cushman approved ^{possibility} sending 3d
MAR DIV into ~~DMZ~~ Southern DMZ.
Cushman did not consider ARV
and his power a sufficient
response to EN ground force build-
up in DMZ. EN is building
up supplies and combat power
within DMZ. He has been taking
ABF's from within Southern DMZ
indicate EN intent to ATK.
Cushman concluded:

"In my opinion the most
decisive and efficient way
to do this [stop EN
build up] is to chase him
out by infantry action.
I do not believe he will
get the message otherwise."

Secret

*Secret*Cordon & Searches
in Lowlands

Msg, CG III MAF to LTC Stillwell et al. 15 0240Z Nov 68.
C. Gp. 4. [USMC Outgoing Specat]

I Corps must step up tactics of cordon
& search as well as searches for
MF units. Enough US + ARVN
personnel available in Lowlands to
conduct frequent cordon & search
ops. in conjunction w/ territorial
forces, BRU's.

Secret

Secret

NE Monsoon Will Hamper
ABRAM'S SUGGESTED
CAMPAIGN AGAINST BA 112

29 Nov 69

Msg, CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 290048Z Nov 69,

5, 6 p. 4.

[USMC Outgoing Specet.]

Cushman agrees w/ Abrams on need to destroy 2 + 3d NVA Divs and launch ops against BA 112. Cushman considered Abrams' suggested campaign as an acceleration of what III MAF had been doing already. Cushman estimates campaign will take several mos. III MAF would have entered BA 112 earlier but operated against lucrative target of opportunity near Dien Phien which would have aided APC in Quang Nam. Weather for Dec. w/ increased fog and cloud will inhibit tactical ops in BA 112 where cloud ceilings prevail at 2000' or lower. This weather will restrict combat assaults, observation, air support.

Secret

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Against BA 112 Will
Weaken Pacification
Effort 29 Nov 68

Msg, CG III MAP to COMUSMACV. 290048 Z Nov 68, S. Gp. 4.

[USMC Outgoing Specat]

A campaign ~~is~~, as suggested
by Gen Abrams, against BA 112
will include populated areas in
SICTZ of protection needed as
part of A.P.C. Mult. battalion
ops in W will thin out troop
density in the cities.

Secret

Secret

 110000 101000
 RECONNAISSANCE Phase
 of PIERCE VALLEY

14 Apr 69

 Msg, CG III MAF TO CG ISTMAR DIV, 251430Z ~~14~~ Apr 1969.
 S.Gp.4. [USMC Outgoing Specat]

On 14 April Abrams approved Phase I ops for Pierce Valley which provides for Reconnaissance in Khan Duc - BA 614 areas, reconnaissance in Laos, logistic preparations, and prelim. actions by Americal Div cover and deception measures to cover preparatory troop moves.

Secret

(Top) Secret

Why ABRAMS MOVED
1ST CAV DIV SOUTH

28 Oct 1969

Msg, ABRAMS to MAC 14496 TO LTG Cushman CG, III MAF.
280207Z Oct 1969 TS. Gp - n.s. [USMC ~~IS~~ Incoming Spect]

Abrams reassessed EN capacity to reinforce his units from out of country. Capacity to reinforce units in ICTZ has diminished; EN lacks adequate logistic support in ICTZ. Some of his units are absent from that area. Meanwhile he has steadily built up material and personnel in Cambodian sanctuaries. Hence 1ST CAV will be moved down to II CTZ. If situation changes CAV can be returned to I CTZ. Also Abrams believes 1ST ARVN DIV can and should shoulder bigger share of burden in I Corps.

(Top) Secret

(Top) Secret

Guidance on VC/NVA Attacks
Against Population Centers
(#1)

- 3 Nov 68 -

TS LINDS SPECAT 37024
Msg, COMUSMACV, TO ALL, ~~031210~~ 031210Z Nov 68. T.S. Gp. 1.

[USMC INCOMING SPECAT]

In exchange for US bombing halt
Hanoi agreed to cease attacks against
pop. centers. There are two types of such
attacks. Minor attack - center receives
one or few rds of EW mortar, arty, or
rocket fire; center receives small
ground probe, unsupported by significant
firepower, center subjected to a few
small terrorist attacks involving mines and
demolitions. MAJOR ATTACK. P. Center
receives numerous rds over period
of hours. Multi-company ground
attack, one or more acts of terrorism
involving extensive use of mines and
demolitions.

(Top) Secret

(Top) Secret

Guidance on VC/NVA
ATKs Against Population
Centers (#2)

- 3 Nov 68 -

MSG, COMUSMACV TS LINDIS Specat 37024 to All.

031210 Z Nov 68. TS Gp 1. [USMC Incoming Specat]

When EN makes minor ATK on
population centers: Direct action against
 VC/NVA forces and installations within
RVN except for atks against EN
 small arms, SAM's, AA, Rockets,
 mortar or Arty psns, as provided
 for in P 3B, Ref B. [Red Rocket
 Two DTG 010108 Z Nov 68]

When EN makes major ATK on pop-
ulation centers: Use Air strikes
 and shore bombardment against
 targets in NVN.

(T. 1) 15-

(Top) Secret

ABRAMS' GUIDANCE
on PATROLS IN
Southern Half DMZ

22 Nov 69

MSG, COMUSMACV ~~TO CG III MAF~~, TS IVY TREE LHMDS 37096
TO CG III MAF. 220325Z NW-69. T.S. Gp. 1. ^{USMC} ~~INCOMING~~

COMUSMACV alone may authorize US
forces to ~~enter~~ ^{enter Southern half of} DMZ. When so ordered.
III MAF may conduct squad-sized
patrols w/ platoon-sized back up to
assist extraction if required.
Patrol may go as far N. as PMDL.
for 10 days - 2400H 23 Nov to
2400H 3 Dec 1968. Patrols may
walk or be inserted by helicopter.
III MAF Forces or SOG assets
may be used. JCS has authorized use
of ~~USMC~~ ARVN patrols. III MAF
must coordinate latter w/ CG, I Corps.
Purpose of patrols is to capture
PR's and obtain positive proof
that NVA rather than VC are
in Southern portion of DMZ, south
of PMDL.

(Top) Secret

(Top) Secret

CG XXIV Corps Wants
to Resume Ground Ops
in DMZ

2 Dec 68

Msg, CG XXIV Corps 07087 to CG II MAF, 020550 Dec 68,
TS.Gp.1. sub: DMZ Ops. [USMC Incoming Specat]

US patrols in southern portion of DMZ, between 23 Nov and 2 Dec 68 shows EN intent to maintain forces in the southern half of DMZ. CG XXIV Corps believes EN will build up his forces S. of BMDL to at least pre-Nov. levels and continue encroachment S. of DMZ. Southern half of DMZ is far more favorable to EN ops than before bombing halt. EN constitutes serious threat to integrity of US forces. Maintaining a posture to counter EN moves across DMZ detracts from support of pacification and from ops against EN MF units in I CTZ. Patrolling is not sufficient. Must conduct ground ops into DMZ.

(Top) Secret

POSSIBLE IMPENDING
NVA OFFENSIVE IN DMZ
and Northern ± CTZ Area

29 Dec 68

Msg, CG Third Mar Div to CG ~~XIII~~ Corps, Info CG,
III MAF. 29 0200Z Dec 1968. TS. Gp. 1.

Southern no. of two to four
NVA Divs may be underway. Final
destination undetermined. Routes
indicate impending presence in
DMZ or Border areas. Must
be part of moves for significant
EN offensive to be conducted
in early Jan or prior to TET
at the latest in NICTZ.

* They're winding up for
the pitch *

GenDMS, 3rd MAR DIV,
ACG ~~RECOMMENDS~~ recommends preemptive
opns (search + clear) in
Southern DMZ in order to deny
staging, supply and infiltration
areas. Recommend AEC LIGHTS
in and near DMZ. Seek
approval to return 3d MAR DIV
to NICTZ. Recommend AIC,
AECT, and NGF ATK of DIV-size