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Parts III, IV, V & Appendices

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PART III

Dep. of State

ELEMENTS CHARGED WITH
SPECIFIC REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ROLES

GROUP - 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification.

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FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES (FWMAF)

Free World Military Assistance Forces should continue to be employed primarily to destroy North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Main Forces and to protect major military bases. In and around base areas, civic action programs should be closely integrated into the overall Province/District plan.

Combined Operations

FWMAF should give increased emphasis to improving the performance of GVN military forces through combined operations, such as the Combined Action Companies established by the US Marines and the combined operations conducted by the US First Infantry Division. Such activities as these set the example and result in excellent training for GVN forces, and represent the best possible solution to timely and significant operational improvement of Vietnamese military units.

As the increase in FWMAF strength permits, these forces should engage with GVN units in clearing operations in support of RD. "Hamlet Festival/ County Fair" type operations should be encouraged; however, major efforts should be made to obtain maximum participation by GVN military forces and civilian agencies because efforts to "win the people to the GVN" or "pacify an area" through unilateral FWMAF efforts are considered infeasible. Identification and elimination of VC infrastructure must remain a Vietnamese responsibility.

RECOMMEND:

1. That FWMAF give increased emphasis to improving the performance and conduct of GVN military forces (especially ARVN) through combined operations; and
2. That as the increase in FWMAF strength permits, these forces engage with RVNAF in clearing operations in support of RD with the primary objective of improving the associated GVN forces.

NOTE: The current mission of FWMAF is stated in Appendix B. No change in mission is recommended.

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REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF)

The committee has no recommendations for revising the Roles and Missions of the Vietnamese Navy or the Vietnamese Air Force. All revisions proposed pertain to the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam except that comments relative to the necessity to improve the conduct of military forces toward the population pertain to all military forces.

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM (ARVN)General

Considering the massive US advisory and resources support accorded it over the past 12 years, ARVN is not doing its share in the war effort. The performance of certain ARVN units has been satisfactory; however, both statistics and observations indicate that it is the FWMA Forces and the RF and PF that are bearing the brunt of the military effort. Many ARVN units are essentially inactive, morale - particularly of enlisted men and junior officers - is generally poor, and desertions are high. Troop conduct toward the local population in areas where units live and in areas of operations ranges from indifference to barbarity. In general, ARVN units are not sufficiently aggressive, and lack dedicated leaders, motivation, a spirit of involvement, and a spirit of mission.

Mission

The massive introduction of FWMA Forces into South Viet Nam has done much to take the pressure off ARVN. The enemy's momentum has been checked, his string of victories broken, and the danger of losing the war militarily no longer exists. The performance of ARVN has not been the major factor in these military successes against NVA or VC main force units. Neither has ARVN been of significant assistance in the essential task of supporting RD through provision of sufficient forces to ensure the requisite high level of continued security. FWMA Forces must continue their orientation on major enemy forces and cannot be diverted in sufficient numbers to provide the degree of day-by-day security which is essential to Revolutionary Development.

It is recommended, therefore, that the present roles and missions of ARVN be reoriented to emphasize the mission of providing the requisite security for Revolutionary Development to take place, i.e., providing, in cooperation with paramilitary and civilian agencies, security against communist armed force,

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terror, coercion, confiscation, conscription and propaganda. This mission cannot be performed by multi-battalion Division operations "sweeping" an area which is then declared cleared of VC and ready for pacification. The requisite security can best be accomplished with effective control of the bulk of ARVN troops at sector level, in close coordination with Provincial and District Constabulary (presently RF/PF), RD Cadre, and Police. Such assignment of ARVN battalions in support of Revolutionary Development will not result in a lesser burden of the fighting for ARVN. On the contrary, it is specifically intended to multiply the number of contacts and VC casualties caused by these ARVN units.

RECOMMEND:

That ARVN, particularly Divisional combat units, in close cooperation with Provincial and District Constabulary (presently RF/PF) and with National Police, be the principal force in RVNAF to provide the security essential for Revolutionary Development to take place. (It is further RECOMMENDED, however, that, due to Vietnamese national pride, plus possible adverse public reaction in the US, no official statement of change be made in ARVN's present mission, but that the modification in their role be treated as a matter of reorientation and emphasis toward the primacy of RD in winning the war.)

Organization and Deployment

Recognizing the necessity for increased security support to Revolutionary Development, security support that includes close coordination at the sector level among ARVN, Constabulary (presently RF/PF), RD Cadre, and Police; and because this support must be continued for as long as necessary, certain changes in the organizational deployment and command lines of ARVN are necessary.

The bulk of ARVN Divisional combat battalions should be assigned to Sector Commanders for specific extended periods of time (3-12 months), and Division Commanders must not be permitted to remove or replace these battalions during the specified period. Battalions assigned to sectors should be employed in aggressive small unit "saturation" patrolling, day and night, in and around the area of government control and the area that is being added to government control.

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Since appropriate counter guerrilla operations may seldom call for regiments to operate as a unit, the regimental layer of command could well be abandoned in a number of cases with the strong advantage of enhancing unity of command within the sector. (At present some Regimental Commanders are prone to disregard the orders of a Sector Commander even when placed under his operational control, as in Long An, or to go over his head to Division.)

It is the provision of continuous security that renders people or areas susceptible to GVN influence, not a one time show of force. These ARVN units must not be committed to static defenses, but should be mobile and maintain the ability to regroup promptly to react to intelligence anywhere in their area of responsibility.

Only Division battalions not assigned to sector should be under control of Division for operations (including reaction) anywhere in the DTA. The term "assigned" is considered essential. The concept of giving "operational control" would be sufficient in the US Army, but does not have the same meaning or effect in ARVN.

The Division command, administrative and logistical elements should continue to support the battalions assigned to sectors. Within their capability, the Sector A & DSL companies should provide support to assigned ARVN battalions. (It is recognized that the military situation in certain DTA's dictates that initially only a few ARVN battalions can immediately be assigned to sectors.)

RECOMMEND:

That, in view of the deployment and capabilities of FWMAF in Viet Nam and recognizing the necessity for increased security support to Revolutionary Development, the bulk of ARVN Divisional combat battalions be assigned to Sector Commanders with only those Divisional battalions not so assigned to be under the control of Divisions.

Chain of Command

ARVN Division Commanders and their staffs are preoccupied with "fighting" their Divisions and, in our opinion, will not (and possibly cannot) give Revolutionary Development and other sector affairs the attention required of a command headquarters. Furthermore, USAID (Field Operations), USAID (Office

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of Public Safety), JUSPAO, OSA (Cadre Division) and OSA (Liaison Branch) do not have advisors at the Division level, nor do GVN ministries engaged in such RD programs as RD Cadre, Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Irrigation, Education, Chieu Hoi, Public Works and Public Health have representatives at the Division level. Thus the attention that the Division level of command is capable of providing RD is not considered adequate. Division Commanders and their staffs (and sometimes their American advisors) tend to lump the entire RD program in the term "Civic Action" - a "pastime for troops when they are not doing their main job of killing VC." For the above reasons, the point of view that the military phase is a part of RD, and not vice versa, cannot be impressed upon Division Commanders or their staffs.

A long-range goal should be that the power of Corps and Divisions as echelons of government be reduced. Realistically, the political power structure being what it is in the GVN, major progress toward this goal will not be short range nor spectacular. However, the goal is a valid one and should be sought. An important first step is to remove Division from the RD chain of command. (It would be preferred to remove the Corps echelon from the RD chain of command and redistribute their assets; however, this is considered politically infeasible for the foreseeable future.) Corps Commanders should require that Divisions and Sectors cooperate and support each other in the military aspects of RD but in all other matters, Province Chiefs should report to the Central Government through the Regional Delegates.

RECOMMEND:

That Division be removed from the RD chain of command.

Two other recommendations flow naturally from the above:

RECOMMEND:

1. That the role of Province Chief (Sector Commander in most provinces) be upgraded; and that where the Province Chief is an ARVN officer, he be senior in military rank to all Regimental Commanders stationed in the province.

The other concomitant recommendation concerns further strengthening and

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centralizing command in the Province Chief by giving him effective operational control of all VN Special Forces and CIDG units in his sector. This recommendation reemphasizes that the Province Chief has operational control of RD Cadre (including those still acting as PAT's), Provincial Support Units (formerly Counter Terror Teams), Constabulary (currently RF/PF) including Police Field Forces, and any other military or paramilitary forces.

RECOMMEND:

2. That Province Chiefs have operational control (as a minimum) of all military and paramilitary forces assigned to operate exclusively in their sector.

Combat Strength

Throughout ARVN (in some Divisions worse than others), "present for operations" or "rice paddy" strength of combat units runs far less than authorized levels. A certain amount of this slippage is due to sickness, combat losses, administrative processing, and desertions, plus lag in recruiting and training back up to strength. Additionally, ARVN diverts men and their equipment to swell headquarters staffs, to serve in multiple Central Commands, and to serve in special unauthorized units.

RECOMMEND:

That in order to bring ARVN combat battalions' "rice paddy" strength up to authorized levels, pressure be continued to force the GVN to cease diversion of men and equipment into non-MAP supported units or into unauthorized headquarters positions, and that continued high level efforts be made to reduce the desertion rate.

Manpower Priority

Given the present limitations on the Vietnamese national manpower reserves, we believe that ARVN should not have first priority in available manpower. Rather, ARVN must markedly reduce the desertion rate, reduce the personnel strength now in headquarters units, deactivate non-MAP supported units, use

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more women in administrative jobs, and the like. In the foreseeable future, priority in manpower allocation should go to RD Cadre, Constabulary (RF/PF), and National Police.

RECOMMEND:

That considering the limited manpower pool, first priorities in recruiting should go to RD Cadre, Constabulary (RF/PF), and Police.

Troop Conduct

It is considered essential that steps immediately be taken to change sharply the conduct of ARVN troops toward the Vietnamese civilian population. The conduct of some ARVN units (including practically all Ranger units) is so bad that it is felt these units create more VC than they eliminate. The abolishment of present Ranger units is considered a necessary first step with existing Ranger-qualified troops to be integrated into regular infantry battalions.

Through motivational training, rigidly enforced discipline and personal supervision by commanders, all ARVN troops must be induced (forced) to conduct themselves toward the local populace in a manner that will help to win the people to the cause of the GVN. This is by far the most important civic action that ARVN could perform. School or bridge projects, regardless of their number or excellence, will have no effect if ARVN troops continue to rob, insult and abuse the civilian populace, destroy property without compensation, and maintain themselves above law and order. The RVNAF has a code of conduct and it should be enforced.

RECOMMEND:

1. That through motivational training and rigidly enforced discipline ARVN troops be brought to conduct themselves properly toward the populace so that efforts of all other Revolutionary Development elements are not negated; and
2. That Ranger units, because of their frequently intolerable conduct toward the populace, be disbanded with individual Rangers reassigned as individuals throughout the Army.

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Operations

The most effective way to improve the prestige and performance of ARVN, including troop conduct, pride, and morale, is for ARVN to operate in combination (or to the extent the situation permits, integrated) with FWMA Forces.

RECOMMEND:

That whenever possible, ARVN units operate in combination (or be integrated) with FWMA Forces with the objective of enhancing the performance of ARVN.

NOTE: See Appendix C for suggested revision to the text of currently stated mission of RVNAF.

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PROVINCIAL/DISTRICT CONSTABULARY

(Currently RF/PF)

At present, Regional and Popular Force units bear a substantial share of the burden of war in many areas, often without the necessary logistical support and without command interest in their well being. Despite lack of leadership, low morale and poor esprit de corps in many units, RF/PF are contributing a major share of the GVN war effort without receiving the credit or rewards that are rightfully theirs; and despite commendable US advisory efforts to improve the status of RF/PF, they remain the step-children of the GVN. It appears unlikely that significant improvement and support will be attained so long as RF/PF remain under and depend upon the Ministry of Defense for guidance and command supervision.

General

In order to provide a framework within which sufficient GVN command interest could be manifested, the RF and PF should be formed into Provincial and District Constabulary and placed under the Ministry of Revolutionary Development. It is fully recognized that a change of name will not, in itself, improve the capabilities or performance of RF/PF. However, a major change in command structure, a meaningful priority for logistical support and improvement in the leadership provided to a Constabulary can be decisive factors in strengthening this vital force. A very significant advantage in developing a Police/Military Force - not under the Ministry of Defense - is that in the event of a ceasefire, the Constabulary will provide a legal arm to ensure security and to combat insurgents who may remain active.

Current RF/PF performance, even with limited logistical support, leadership and command supervision, has been comparatively successful. Giving RF/PF the opportunity to develop from second class status in the Army to a new and eventually elite Police/Military Force will reinforce this success.

RECOMMEND:

That Regional and Popular Forces become Provincial and District Constabulary, retain current RF/PF missions for the foreseeable future, and remain under the operational control (as a minimum) of Province Chiefs (Sector Commanders).

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Ministerial Control

The Constabulary should not be placed under the Ministry of National Security because in the view of the GVN (and the Study Group) such an assignment would give that Ministry too much power. Hopefully, in the future an appropriate Ministry of Interior, under which the Police and Constabulary rightfully belong, will be reinstituted. If the new Constabulary were left under the Ministry of Defense, there is no assurance that it would be accorded any more support from JGS than it now receives. Additionally, if the Constabulary were left under the Ministry of Defense, its availability for employment under a ceasefire situation would be in question. However, no ministry, other than Defense, has an adequate support capability for such a large force; therefore, logistical support must remain, at least for the foreseeable future, under RVNAF.

RECOMMEND:

1. That the Constabulary be placed under the Ministry of Revolutionary Development with RVNAF continuing logistical support to the Constabulary but on a priority basis and under sufficient US control to insure supplies destined for Constabulary are, in fact, received; and
2. That a logistical element from the Ministry of Revolutionary Development be established in the DCSLOG of JGS to allocate supplies to Provincial/District Constabulary.

Conversion

The conversion to permanent Constabulary will be a long-range program which should include "selection out" of incompetent and corrupt officers, and transformation from second class soldiers to an elite rural police force. To initiate conversion now begins a logical process leading eventually to two main security forces in RVN - the National Armed Forces and the Police. For the present, the roles and missions of the Provincial Constabulary and the District Constabulary should remain the same as those currently assigned to RF/PF. It is envisaged that no basic change in methods of operations would be made for the immediate future (3-18 months). Upon

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completion of retraining, an additional and important secondary mission for the Constabulary will be to augment National Police in population and resources control and other law enforcement operations. Because the National Police (Special Branch) should have the primary mission of identification and elimination of VC infrastructure, the currently assigned mission for RF/PF to destroy VC infrastructure should be deleted.

RECOMMEND:

1. That for units in being, a training program, to include the essential elements of police operations and to be monitored jointly by USAID-OPS/MACV, be initiated and proceed as rapidly as possible without degradation of quality of instruction;
2. That upon retraining, the Constabulary be given appropriate police powers, i. e., power of search and seizure and power of arrest;
3. That the Constabulary be relieved of the mission to destroy VC infrastructure and that this be the primary mission of National Police (Special Branch), with the Constabulary having the mission to provide the local intelligence community all information pertaining to VC infrastructure as may be obtained during operations or through personal contacts with friends or family members; and
4. That the Constabulary be assigned a secondary mission to act at National Police (Special Branch) request in apprehending or destroying VC infrastructure identified by the National Police.

Chain of Command

To give Province Chiefs (Sector Commanders) the necessary authority within their sectors, command of elements primarily concerned with RD (such as the Constabulary) should be decentralized to that level.

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RECOMMEND:

That the chain of command for the Provincial/District Constabulary be from the Commissioner General for Revolutionary Development direct to the Sector Commander; from the Sector Commander to the Subsector Commander; and from the Subsector Commander to the commanders of the District Constabulary units and of those Provincial Constabulary units assigned to Subsector.

Officer Corps

For the short and mid-range period, officers for the Constabulary should come from the regular ARVN Officer Corps. Qualified RF officers should be integrated into ARVN and remain with the Constabulary. Through an extensive indoctrination program, service in the Constabulary must come to be considered by all officers as desirable and not punitive duty. For the long-range period, the establishment of a career service for Constabulary Officer Corps is recommended.

RECOMMEND:

That until such time as a career service for the "Constabulary Officer Corps" is established, ARVN officers provide the leadership for the Constabulary.

Dependent Housing

One of the major morale problems within the RF/PF is the lack of reasonably adequate dependent housing. It is unrealistic to expect RF/PF to engage in civic action projects designed to improve the lot of persons whose living conditions are already better than those of RF/PF dependents. Moreover, the military effectiveness of RF/PF is lessened appreciably if RF/PF soldiers are preoccupied with problems pertaining to their dependents.

Present dependent-housing construction programs to attack this major morale problem are inadequate. A minimum standard for satisfactory housing should be set and observed, and a more ambitious program for construction should be initiated.

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RECOMMEND:

That an adequate Constabulary (RF/PF) dependent-housing construction program be initiated.

Advisory Effort

The Constabulary will have both a military and a police role for the next several years and will require advice in both areas. MACV currently has the capability to furnish advisors down to Subsector level and should continue to do so. It is not considered necessary to make a major change in the advisory structure until such time as Constabulary is functioning as police to a far greater degree. USAID-OPS should continue to advise the Police Field Forces (which are integrated as units into the Constabulary) and assume greater advisory responsibility as more Constabulary personnel are trained and employed in the police role.

RECOMMEND:

1. That the MACV Sector and Subsector Advisory Teams continue to provide military advice for the Constabulary; and
2. That USAID-OPS provide as soon as possible a minimum of one full-time advisor per province (with increases to be made as appropriate) whose duty will be to advise the National Police in all matters and the Constabulary in police functions.

Police Field Forces

Because the role of the Constabulary, as conceived, approximates that of the PFF, the PFF should be integrated as units into the Constabulary with PFF training facilities eventually being used for Constabulary training. Some changes in the organization and equipment of the PFF may be required.

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RECOMMEND:

That Police Field Forces be integrated as units into the Provincial Constabulary.

Reorganization of District Constabulary

The current Popular Force organization does not give the PF soldier a leader at district level who is primarily concerned with the PF soldier's problems or welfare. In at least one province, the RF/PF Commander has organized his PF squads into platoons by appointing one squad leader as the platoon leader for two additional squads. Although this minor change of organization is desirable, placing dual responsibility on a squad leader is not the best solution.

The District Constabulary (PF) should be reorganized into platoons and companies with appropriate leader spaces at each level. This reorganization will not change the locations of squads or platoons now guarding hamlets, bridges, or manning outposts. These units will remain in place; however, there will be regularly appointed leaders who can visit the various locations more often and with greater effect than is now possible.

RECOMMEND:

That District Constabulary (PF) squads and platoons be organized into companies.

District Constabulary Pay

One of the nearly unanimous concerns of US Provincial Teams as well as the Study Group is the low pay of the Popular Force soldiers. Considering the present inflation trend, it is important for the morale and well-being of this force that some financial relief be given.

RECOMMEND:

That District Constabulary (PF) pay scale be raised to 75-85 per cent of the RD Cadre pay scale.

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Future Disposition of District Constabulary

As the security situation permits, the District Constabulary will logically phase into other elements of the Police or Provincial Constabulary, Revolutionary Development Cadre, other GVN military or civilian elements, or return to civil life. It is recognized that due to the current military situation in certain provinces, the District Constabulary should actually increase in strength; in a few others, the military situation is either so poor (Quang Ngai) or so good (An Giang) that most current PF could probably be absorbed into other elements. As RD Cadre enter a hamlet where PF are now located, the RDC group security element would, in certain cases, provide security to the point that the PF could be withdrawn, retrained and reequipped, and then returned to work as cadre in the district. However, in the foreseeable future it does not appear feasible to consider the District Constabulary (PF) on a countrywide basis as a primary recruiting base for other RD elements.

NOTE: See Appendix D for recommended revisions to text of currently stated mission of RF/PF.

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CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUP (CIDG)

The mission presently assigned the Civilian Irregular Defense Group is valid and proper. However, recognizing that the US Special Forces are indeed "special", their unique skills and high degree of training should be put to use in areas where no other forces can do the job. The CIDG, by virtue of its close association with US Special Forces "A" Teams and US-controlled logistical support, likewise has capabilities well suited to and badly needed in remote areas. Accordingly, CIDG assets can best be employed in remote non-populated areas where there is no recruiting base for Provincial Constabulary and District Constabulary (currently RF/PF). In any areas where CIDG's conventional missions can effectively be performed by Constabulary, advised by regular MACV Sector and Subsector advisory teams, US and VN Special Forces should be withdrawn and moved to a more appropriate location. The associated CIDG units also should be withdrawn and sent with the US and VN Special Forces unless it proves feasible to convert them in place to RF (Constabulary).

Present experiments in converting CIDG into RF should be continued and encouraged, although significant problems are involved in such conversion (primarily due to withdrawal of direct US support) and no one should be too optimistic of success.

RECOMMEND:

That CIDG, together with VN Special Forces and their US Special Forces Advisory Teams, be deployed only in remote non-populated areas where there is no recruiting base for RF/PF (Provincial and District Constabulary).

NOTE: See Appendix E for recommended revisions to text of currently stated mission of CIDG.

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NATIONAL POLICE

A multiplicity of forces are currently responsible for identifying and destroying VC infrastructure. Few in fact do so. The National Police, according to an Executive Order of 1962, are charged with the elimination and destruction of infrastructure, but the GVN Joint General Staff interpretation of the police mission (AB-140) does not include this responsibility. It thus appears that GVN military authorities do not consider this critical role to be a function of police. Analyzing evidence, compiling dossiers, handling informants, identifying, arresting, interrogating, preparing cases for trial or disposition are police functions best handled by police. In sifting through streams of unarmed civilian suspects, an understanding of evidence and of law is needed, as is action within a framework of law.

For these reasons it appears that primary responsibility for uncovering and neutralizing the Communist Party apparatus must be assumed by the National Police. Any other military or paramilitary elements now charged with this responsibility should be relieved of it. This will not mean that all other GVN agencies are denied participation in identifying and destroying infrastructure. Special Branch must be supported by Static Census Grievance, MSS, RD Cadre, CIO, and other intelligence collection agencies in supplying raw information to a national intelligence organization. In many cases Constabulary and other paramilitary elements will act on information supplied by Special Branch. Such elements will, of course, continue to eliminate infrastructure as a by-product of their normal military activities.

Special Branch

Within the National Police, the Special Branch (Special Police Bloc) should specifically be assigned the responsibility of identifying and eliminating the communist political apparatus. The Special Branch was designed for collecting and analyzing intelligence and supervising the apprehension of individuals engaged in political conspiracy against the State; and Special Branch remains the only element in the GVN specifically trained and organized for this task.

Personnel and Command

Assigning primary responsibility for the destruction of the Communist Party apparatus and associated infrastructure to the National Police is but a first step. Major attention and resources should be devoted to remedying its personnel weaknesses, providing adequate facilities and support, and improving career incentives. In this regard, to improve the attitude and behavior of the police toward the population, all police personnel should be given motivational training.

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In order to fulfill the requirements of maintaining law and order and of identifying and destroying infrastructure, the National Police will require additional personnel in secure areas as well as in areas newly brought under government control.

Because the police are an essential element of RD and the primary responsibility for accomplishing RD within each province rests with the Province Chief, the Police as all other RD forces assigned to province should be under the operational control of the Province Chief.

RECOMMEND:

1. That National Police (Special Branch) assume primary responsibility for the identification and destruction of VC infrastructure with particular emphasis on the Communist Party apparatus, and that other GVN elements, particularly RD Cadre, support this mission by providing timely information and assisting to apprehend suspects identified by National Police;
2. That all National Police receive motivational training through in-service training programs to be established in each province;
3. That it be clearly established that the Province Chief has operational control of all police within the province; and
4. That the strength of National Police be increased as currently planned, and that particular attention be given to providing additional police in areas newly brought under government control.

NOTE: The current mission of National Police is stated in Appendix F. No change in mission is recommended.

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POLICE FIELD FORCES (PFF)

The future mission of the proposed Provincial Constabulary closely parallels the current mission of the PFF. Therefore, as stated in the section of the report dealing with Constabulary, it is recommended that Police Field Forces be integrated as units into the Provincial Constabulary.

NOTE: See Appendix G for recommended revisions to text of currently stated mission of PFF.

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VIETNAMESE INFORMATION SERVICE (VIS)

No change is recommended in the mission of the Vietnamese Information Service; however, VIS hamlet cadre operations should be terminated and other services continued and expanded.

Discussion

VIS now seeks to carry out its mission in a number of ways, such as urban placards and posters, news bulletins, film showings and hamlet information cadre operations. However, VIS cadre, on those rare occasions when they do visit hamlets, have little effect on the residents, and it appears that a much greater propaganda impact could be made by persons who have a substantive role in the hamlet and who disseminate information as an adjunct of other duties. For example, Technical Service Cadre (Animal Husbandry, Health, Agriculture, etc.) should distribute posters and pamphlets pertaining to their own fields of endeavor. Hamlet officials and RD Cadre should, through personal contact and other media such as motion pictures, leaflets, and posters, explain and publicize the GVN and its policies.

VIS should become a support agency for the cadre of all agencies which operate in hamlets. Through its province and district offices, VIS should supply such items as audio-visual equipment, publications, and printing facilities, together with audio-visual training for the personnel of other agencies. Emphasis should be placed on areas in which RD Cadre are operating or have operated, but other areas should not be neglected. VIS operations in urban areas should continue.

Motivational Training

Technical Service personnel and other GVN employees at province and district level could be improved through motivational training. There is currently no agency of the GVN capable of giving motivational training to employees of civilian agencies on a widespread basis. Provided the quality of VIS personnel were improved and their own training appropriately organized, VIS could well be the agency capable of carrying out "in-service" motivational training for employees of other GVN civilian agencies. Unfortunately, VIS cannot perform this function at present, but as a long-range possibility it is worthy of consideration.

RECOMMEND:

1. That VIS terminate its rural information cadre operations

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and assume a supporting role relative to propaganda activities to be carried out by RD Cadre, Technical Service Cadre, and hamlet officials;

2. That VIS support activities be emphasized in hamlets where RD Cadre are operating or have operated; and

3. That consideration be given to VIS providing motivational training for employees of other GVN civilian agencies, provided significant improvement is achieved in overall VIS capability.

NOTE: The current mission of VIS is stated in Appendix H. No change in mission is recommended.

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TECHNICAL SERVICES

No change is proposed in the roles and missions of the various GVN Technical Ministries, or in the roles and missions of the technical cadre these various ministries employ in the provinces and control through the provincial level Technical Services. However, it is essential that all ministries be more responsive to the Revolutionary Development program, that their field personnel be responsive to direction from Province Chiefs, and especially that those ministries charged with the execution of specific RD programs (i.e., the Ministries of Education, Agriculture and Public Works) give such programs highest priority. (Now that the Ministries of Agriculture and Public Works are under the Commissioner General for Revolutionary Development, the situation should improve, although as yet there is little evidence of this.)

Discussion

It must be recognized that the Ministries of Health, Youth and Sports, Social Welfare, Information and Chieu Hoi, and the Commissariats for Montagnard Affairs, and for Refugees, while not having primary programs funded under the RD budget, have roles, missions and programs that are absolutely essential to the success of RD. The need for emphasis on RD by these other Ministries, not just by the Ministries of Revolutionary Development, Education, Agriculture, and Public Works, is often overlooked.

The first step to be taken is for the Central Government to issue appropriate instructions to all ministries clarifying their obligations to support RD with highest priority. The ministries (every one with province level programs and personnel) should then be required to issue instructions to their representatives in the field requiring them in turn to execute all programs, RD budgeted and otherwise, with the goals of RD uppermost in mind.

Province Chief Authority

Additional authority must be placed in the hands of the Province Chief to ensure performance by and cooperation from Technical Service Chiefs. Submission of formal periodic performance reports on the Provincial Technical Services would be one effective means of increasing the Province Chief's authority. These reports should be sent to the Commissioner General for Revolutionary Development with copies to parent ministries concerned.

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Inspectorate

Another means of encouraging cooperation among all ministries would be the establishment of an inter-ministry inspectorate, chaired by the Ministry of Revolutionary Development. This inspectorate should have roving inspection teams that visit unexpectedly throughout the country to evaluate the support given by Technical Services to Revolutionary Development. The proposed inspectorate would be in addition to or an expansion of the present Ministry of Revolutionary Development inspectorate which looks into RD programs of other ministries but only insofar as they are funded by the RD budget.

RECOMMEND:

1. That the Central Government issue appropriate instructions to the various ministries directing each to support Revolutionary Development with highest priority; and that ministries with representatives in the provinces issue similar instructions to Technical Services instructing them to be fully responsive to the Province Chief in order that coordination of the entire provincial RD effort can be effected;
2. That Province Chiefs be directed to submit regular written reports to the Ministry of RD, with copies to separate parent ministries involved; on the performance of each Provincial Technical Service in supporting RD; and
3. That an inter-ministry inspectorate be created, chaired by the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, for the purpose of reviewing the performance of all Technical Services in supporting RD.

Personnel

One of the most serious staffing shortages in the entire spectrum of RD is in qualified, dedicated Technical Service Chiefs, Senior Assistants, and Technical Service Cadre. This is primarily because the draft has steadily been cutting into the small pool of trained and experienced technicians, and because the output of existing training facilities is too small. Also, there is almost no

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provision for retraining and motivation of existing technical cadre. Efforts have been made by the US Mission to obtain deferment or at least "mobilization-in-place" for key technical service personnel, but often the GVN has stubbornly resisted. The GVN should enforce harsh sanctions to cut down desertions, more rigid population control to uncover draft evaders, and develop internal draft reform to eliminate special conscription privileges and exemptions. Instead, there exists the anomalous situation of highly trained and efficient Provincial Service Chiefs and key assistants being drafted on the premise that the manpower pool is approaching exhaustion.

One excuse sometimes offered by ministries for being unable to recruit technical personnel to replace those drafted is that the ministries' limited budgets must provide for salary differentials to civil servants currently in the armed forces. It is not clear whether this is a real limitation or whether the lack of a recruiting base of qualified people is the overriding problem. The current personnel shortages in Provincial Technical Services are so acute, however, that if budget limitations are really an impediment to recruiting, concerted efforts must be made to remove them.

RECOMMEND:

That recruiting and training of Technical Service personnel be given priority attention; and that provision be made for either draft deferment or mobilization-in-place of key Technical Service personnel.

Agricultural Services

In each province the positions of Technical Service Chiefs are little fiefdoms. The Vietnamese view is to maintain the "sovereignty", the status, and privileges of one's own Service at all costs. Province Chiefs can decree that two Service Chiefs coordinate their efforts; but the complicated protocol of how this is done is left to the dictates of custom and tradition. It is not uncommon that programs requiring action by two or more Service Chiefs will be held up for weeks because of a protocol "stand off" over which Chief should come to the other's office for a conference, or which Chief has delegated action to an insultingly low-level member of his staff. This sort of thing frequently occurs in the field of agricultural programs because there may be in any given province six or eight separate, distinct, and co-equal agricultural Technical Services.

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each with its own agricultural programs and each answerable only to Saigon, with but vague instructions relative to following the guidance of the Province Chief. The appointment of a senior representative of the Ministry of Agriculture for each province is considered essential.

RECOMMEND:

1. That there be in each province a senior Agriculture Service Chief responsive to the Province Chief and responsible for coordinating all the agricultural programs of all services that are under the Ministry of Agriculture; and
2. That this senior Agriculture Chief give priority attention to coordinating those services that have programs funded through the RD budget and those that have agricultural cadre in the field such as the Agricultural Affairs, Animal Husbandry, Hydraulics, NACO, Farmers Association, and Fisheries Services.

Information Activities

If the VIS cadre is eliminated as recommended elsewhere in this report, and VIS talents and facilities are concentrated in the form of a central service organization, Technical Services will have to assume the tasks of organizing information campaigns, coordinating with VIS for technical advice and services, and disseminating the informational materials in rural areas. This is a much more logical approach to dissemination, with qualified and knowledgeable technicians propagandizing the programs they are trained to bring to the people.

RECOMMEND:

That each Technical Service be responsible for disseminating in rural areas, information about its own programs and activities.

NOTE: The current mission of Technical Services is stated in Appendix I. No change in mission is recommended.

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PROVINCIAL SUPPORT UNITS (PSU)*

The proposed mission of the Provincial Support Units appears sound. In several areas the PSU were termed the most effective force in the province in eliminating VC infrastructure, in setting successful night ambushes, in making aggressive penetrations in VC territory and in achieving a high kill ratio. However, in other areas PSU were tied to static defense duties or were used unimaginatively by province authorities who were not sensitive to their strengths or limitations.

Advisory Responsibility and GVN Sponsorship

Advisory responsibility for the PSU should eventually be transferred to the OSA Special Branch (SB) advisor in order that PSU activities be separated from the overt, highly scrutinized and publicized activities of the RD Cadre. Such separation cannot be fully realized until the OSA cadre advisor wears but one hat. If and when USAID assumes operational support of the RDC program and significant numbers of USAID personnel are inserted into the program, OSA should retain control of the PSU program but should support and advise it from another cover. It would appear that the SB advisory role or a modification thereof would offer the most suitable cover mechanism for the operation.

It is recognized that many administrative problems would arise from such a conversion, and that a great deal of time would be required for OSA to insert advisors with paramilitary backgrounds into the more intelligence-oriented SB advisory program. We also realize that the PSU, as unique action assets of the Province Chief, should remain firmly in his control, and that the National Police chain of command would probably not be conducive to good management. However, we believe that an OSA SB advisor or his assistant could support and advise the PSU program from the SB advisory office without undue complication.

We also believe that OSA should eventually find for the PSU a sponsoring GVN ministry, a ministry that would permit the program to retain its necessary flexibility but at the same time provide the program with a degree of protection in the event a provincial operation backfires or receives adverse publicity and requires support or defense at the Central Government level.

* Tentative title of units formerly designated Counter Terror Teams

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RECOMMEND:

1. That operational control of the PSU eventually be assigned to the OSA SB advisor;
2. That OSA find a parent GVN ministry for the PSU.

Areas of Operations

The PSU should operate as much as possible in contested or VC-controlled areas and should leave more routine paramilitary tasks to other services. The PSU are geared and trained to carry out specialized, unconventional paramilitary operations, and talent and training is wasted when they are used for static duty in province or district towns or are used in conventional sector military operations. Strong pressure should be brought to bear on province and district officials who chronically misuse the PSU.

Relationship with Special Branch

The Study Group noted that there was little exchange of information between the PSU and the SB throughout the country. The PSU do, in fact, generate intelligence on the VC infrastructure both in secure areas and in areas undergoing securing. This information should be passed to the SB so that an organization with police powers can take action. In many secure areas or areas undergoing securing, the SB, in coordination with other police elements, presently has this capability, which should permit the PSU to concentrate their activities in areas beyond the reach of the SB. Conversely, the SB should furnish any intelligence it gathers on VC activity in the outer limits of GVN-controlled territory or in VC-controlled areas to the PSU for action.

RECOMMEND:

1. That the PSU concentrate their efforts in contested and VC-controlled areas;
2. That PSU-generated intelligence on the VC infrastructure in government-controlled areas be furnished to the Special Branch so that a GVN element invested with police powers can

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take action; and that PSU not be used in operations where National Police can be used just as effectively.

Finally, the Study Group wishes to make a recommendation of a purely cautionary nature: that the PSU program be suspended if partisan political influence becomes so great that there is a clear and present danger the PSU might be used as an action arm of a political party or one of its factions against the opposition. (The Study Group wishes to emphasize that it knows of no instance where the PSU have been used in this manner.) However, because of the unique structuring of the PSU and because they operate with a degree of clandestinity and without formal GVN charter or without public accountability, we believe there exists a possibility of misuse and that OSA should maintain very tight controls over the PSU in areas where political activity is high or where the Province Chief demonstrates a tendency to regard the PSU as an extra-legal force to deal with opponents other than the VC.

NOTE: The current mission of the PSU is stated in Appendix J. No change in mission is recommended.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE (RDC)

The present mission of the Revolutionary Development Cadre is sound and needs no basic revision. Although the current RDC program is too new to permit even a preliminary evaluation of its effectiveness, comments regarding the program to date plus several specific recommendations for improved performance follow.

Training and Replacement

The success of the RDC program depends, to a large extent, on the ability of the cadre to convince their compatriots that the GVN has more to offer than its enemy. The National Training Center (NTC) at Vung Tau now has the awesome task of turning out, in approximately three months, trained and dedicated cadre capable of carrying out the RDC mission. American and Vietnamese personnel assigned to the NTC have made significant progress in launching this extensive training program and in building a physical plant capable of serving the trainees. However, for the present, a training saturation point has been reached and any major injection of additional trainees into the system will overtax the instructor staff and result in the graduation of cadre who are not qualified to carry out their mission. While part of the trouble may stem from the gross misuse of some teams by province and district officials who do not understand the RDC mission or its operational concepts, an over-extended NTC with overworked and undertrained staff contributed to some of the shortcomings noted in the initial 59-man groups. Some of the new cadre deserted soon after returning to province and were not replaced, and some, with visibly low qualifications, remained to lower the overall level of performance of their groups. Many cadre groups are already operating far below the standard 59-man level and a functional replacement system must soon be found - one that will permit a steady flow of qualified replacements into the pipeline.

RECOMMEND:

1. That the pace of the program be slowed (about 5,000 per course at Vung Tau) until sufficient time has elapsed to permit the careful selection and training of instructors who are able to produce dedicated, capable cadre groups;
2. That emphasis be given immediately to raising the quality of individual RD Cadre through a "selection out" procedure both during and after training and

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that a cadre replacement system be developed; and

3. That where the security situation permits, qualified Popular Force (District Constabulary) personnel who are performing strictly hamlet security duties begin integration into the RDC program upon the deployment of cadre groups in these hamlets and, that during the cadre's stay these former PF be retrained, refitted and retailored along cadre lines at either Vung Tau or in the province and then be returned to the district from which they were recruited.

Security and Site Selection

The Study Group noted that in several provinces RDC groups were positioned in hamlets too insecure for effective operations. In some areas, RDC groups were not sleeping in their assigned hamlets but were returning to a more secure village or district town at night. We submit that no meaningful pacification can be accomplished under those conditions; that, in fact, continued operations in such insecure areas may be counter-productive and make meaningful pacification more difficult to accomplish in the future.

Provincial Teams are often not consulted by province officials on the areas to be selected for cadre operations or are not able to get their views accepted. Some groups have even been moved without the prior knowledge of the RDC advisor. There are many instances where an RDC group has been positioned at the wrong place at the wrong time.

RECOMMEND:

That the US Provincial Team play a greater role in the selection of hamlets scheduled for cadre operations, particularly to ensure that provinces do not deploy RDC groups in hamlets not sufficiently secure for the cadre to remain overnight.

Flexibility

A high degree of operational flexibility is an integral part of this program.

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The 59-man group, while well suited for training and administrative purposes and for field employment in certain areas, is not properly tailored for operations in all hamlets. For example, in areas where a high degree of security exists, a 33-man security element would be excessive, and a portion of this element should reinforce a more exposed group elsewhere in the district.

Flexibility should also be exercised in deciding the length of time an RDC group should stay in a hamlet. The time required to accomplish the program will vary greatly throughout the country, and district and province officials, protected as much as possible from higher-level pressure to speed up the process, should be encouraged to make realistic appraisals of just when, where and if the groups can and should be moved.

RECOMMEND:

1. That special efforts be made to ensure that all concerned understand that the strength and composition of a cadre group is flexible and must be tailored to the needs of a given hamlet, and that province authorities be encouraged to shift cadre assets as needed to best meet local conditions; and
2. That no rigid timetable be established for a cadre group to complete its work in a given hamlet or series of hamlets.

Provincial Team Involvement and Inspection

More attention should be given to the day-by-day activities of the cadre by both Vietnamese and American advisors. Many Provincial Teams reported high AWOL rates and "ghosts" on payrolls. In some areas, civic action projects are not being pushed at a reasonable rate and teams are not properly guarding themselves or their hamlets at night. The Provincial Teams reported that cadre morale was low in some areas and often ascribed this condition to uninspired leadership and a lack of attention and concern for the welfare of the cadre.

A concerted and integrated Provincial Team effort is vital to the success of the RDC program. The only American in a position to monitor the day-by-day activities of the cadre is the MACV subsector advisor. In addition to his other

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duties, he should be given primary responsibility for reporting the activities and progress of the cadre in his subsector to the Provincial Team. Also, subsector team advice on matters of security and the selection of hamlets to undergo cadre operations should be considered before a Provincial Team decision is reached.

A Central Government inspection system would prove beneficial and would prevent some of the abuses that have already appeared in the program. Periodic inspection would also have a beneficial effect on morale and lead to remedial action where needed.

RECOMMEND:

1. That a cadre group assigned to a hamlet get maximum attention and supervision from Province and District Chiefs, especially during the early stages of its operations, and that American advisors visit the group frequently to see that it is adequately supported and properly led;
2. That the MACV subsector advisor be given primary responsibility for monitoring the activities of the cadre in the district and for advising the Provincial Team of the status of the program; and
3. That inspectors, including instructors from Vung Tau and officials of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, make periodic, generally unannounced visits to cadre groups throughout the country to encourage the cadre and to evaluate their progress.

Concentration of RD Cadre Groups

The more successful pacification efforts take place where cadre groups have been concentrated in relatively small areas. This concentration permits a degree of mutual support and makes it much easier for the GVN to protect the cadre with other security units as well as to employ its technical services.

RECOMMEND:

That, to the extent possible, cadre groups be concentrated

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- in areas where they can mutually support each other and saturate an area.

Vietnamese/Montagnard Cadre Efforts.

Placing of cadre groups composed only of ethnic Vietnamese in Montagnard hamlets is believed counter-productive. Given the acute political differences and the social and cultural gaps that now exist between the two groups, such a program only exacerbates relations. However, attempts to use combined Vietnamese and Montagnard teams may be successful provided an appropriate balance of total strength and positions of leadership are maintained.

RECOMMEND:

That cadre groups composed totally or even primarily of ethnic Vietnamese cadre not be assigned to predominantly Montagnard hamlets and if mixed Vietnamese/Montagnard groups are assigned to Montagnard hamlets an appropriate balance of ethnic strength and leadership be ensured.

People's Action Teams (PAT's)

The immediate conversion of People's Action Teams into RD Cadre groups may seriously disturb the balance of military strength in certain provinces. For example, in Quang Ngai the PAT's are now fully engaged as mobile paramilitary units with specifically assigned areas to defend. The PAT's do little, if any, political or civic action but do contribute significantly to the defense of the province. To withdraw too many of the PAT's, regroup and reassign them to the more static duties of the RD Cadre - without assurances that they will be replaced by other forces - is to invite trouble. In such cases, conversion should not take place until the security situation substantially improves.

RECOMMEND:

That, in provinces where PAT's have become vital and integral parts of the paramilitary structure of the province, the PAT's retain their present functions until the security situation improves and permits their release for the more static mission of the RD Cadre.

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Additional Comments

Two brief final comments are indicated, both of which are covered in some length elsewhere in this report. There is a belief, in some quarters, that the RDC can "identify and eliminate" the VC infrastructure in the areas where they operate. The mobile Census-Grievance element should contribute information on the infrastructure to the National Police as will the other elements of the cadre group. Only a professional intelligence organization, solidly based on classic techniques (such as a greatly improved Special Branch) can attack and destroy the long-implanted roots of the Communist Party apparatus in South Viet Nam. It should be noted that the current official RDC mission calls on the RDC only to "gather intelligence on the local VC military and political infrastructure" and realistically, does not expect the cadre to "identify and eliminate" the infrastructure - tasks for which they are not trained or structured.

Another controversial area concerns the degree of organization (in self defense and other type organizations) that is necessary and attainable in the RD program. Some GVN officials believe that a very high level of commitment, total involvement, and organization is feasible and that an all-embracing "People's Self-Defense" effort, launched through the catalytic influence of the RDC, is an essential element of success. Unfortunately, in most areas, such commitment is simply not attainable at the present time. We believe efforts by the RDC to coerce a reluctant populace into total participation in such a program will be counter-productive and may seriously impede the progress of the RDC in reaching more modest attainable goals.

NOTE: The current mission of RDC is stated in Appendix K. No change in mission is recommended.

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PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE (PSD)

An official mission statement for People's Self-Defense does not exist. A proposal to establish PSD as an official program under the now defunct Ministry of the Interior was presented to the Prime Minister in May 1968 but has not yet been approved.

Concept

As incorporated in the Ministry of Interior's proposal to the Prime Minister, the mission of the PSD force (stated as concepts, objectives and responsibilities) is as follows:

"a. The People's Self-Defense is a long-term program likely to be used for the war time as well as for the peace time.

"b. The People's Self-Defense is to be organized in a way it can defend the hamlet and village without hindering its members' livelihood.

"c. The People's Self-Defense is to be organized, kept up and developed by the people themselves.

"d. The PSD will promote union to preserve security.

"e. The PSD will prevent terrorism, vagabondage and plundering.

"f. The PSD will take part in social-welfare work."

Under a proposal agreed to by the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, PSD is to be organized by RD Cadre in hamlets where they operate, and by existing GVN civil officials in urban and rural areas already pacified.

The general operational concept of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development is to include every man, woman and child in the PSD organization; to use the Security and Civil Affairs elements of the RD Cadre Group to organize and train the people, to train selected men in the handling of weapons, and to issue weapons to the hamlet chief under certain conditions (absence of an armed government force, demonstrated need for firepower, establishment of accountability, approval of District and Province Chiefs, availability of weapons).

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Relationship of PSD to Revolutionary Development

The entire concept of PSD is closely allied to and in consonance with the Revolutionary Development Cadre concept. This presupposes that in a selected area the VC potential for attack is less than company size, communications among hamlet, village, district elements exists, and reaction forces are available. In hamlets, PSD would serve as an early warning system and preliminary defense force; in urban areas as organized protection against subversion and in support of law and order.

The concept of People's Self-Defense, according to several ranking officials of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, is at the heart of successful Revolutionary Development. They believe it essential that all able-bodied men, women and children become active members of organizations supporting the GVN so that the Viet Cong cannot single out and terrorize a few individuals as the only supporters of the government in an area.

Although the Study Group believes the PSD program to be worthwhile, we are not convinced that active participation by all residents of a given area is a necessity for the success of either PSD or RD. On the contrary, if reluctant persons are coerced into joining PSD activities for the sake of an all-embracing program, resentment against the GVN may be great and definite harm may be done to the overall RD program. Therefore, slow and selective establishment of PSD is recommended with careful attention given to pilot areas. Weapons could be supplied to hamlet PSD organizations, but not in areas where there is a probability that the VC might be capable of capturing the weapons. In areas where PSD is established, any existing hamlet self-defense units, such as Combat Youth and Hau Bi Quan, should be integrated into PSD to reduce the number of groups with the same purpose. Although US Advisory elements throughout the country may have some dealings with PSD because of its all-encompassing nature, no additional American field advisors are considered necessary for this program.

RECOMMEND:

1. That the PSD program, if established by the GVN, be slowly and selectively committed only in areas already secured or undergoing securing and that no country-wide program, such as the former Hau Bi Quan, be undertaken until pilot projects have been assessed;
2. That in areas undergoing pacification the PSD program develop sequentially from the civil affairs and security

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efforts of the RDC;

3. That PSD be provided arms only in hamlets where there is very limited risk the hamlets might be attacked by VC units capable of defeating the defenders, and that a strict system of weapons accountability be established;

4. That where attempts to arouse popular interest in PSD meet with little response, no attempt be made to force commitment; and

5. That US participation in the PSD program be restricted to furnishing guidance primarily at the Saigon level, and that no additional advisors be assigned to the program in the field.

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PART IV

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

REQUIRING US/GVN AGREEMENTS

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ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS REQUIRING US/GVN
AGREEMENTSAir/Artillery and Revolutionary Development

Although we have not studied the matter in depth, we regard it as important for the USG and GVN to know more about the actual impact of the current pattern of bombing and artillery on rural attitudes relevant to RD. It is possible that the negative impact - particularly, of strikes not in immediate support of ground action - is considerable, sustaining villagers' tendencies to collaborate with the VC and limiting the prospects for progress in RD. At the same time, it is possible that additional constraints on these operations would have serious military penalties. Thus the issue is important; but adequate data is not now available, either on the objective consequences of these strikes in terms of VC and civilians killed and injured, or on the attitudinal consequences. (RAND reports on its prisoner and Chieu Hoi interrogations do not adequately fill this gap.)

RECOMMEND:

That on an urgent basis an adequate research effort be launched to determine the actual physical and attitudinal consequences of present policies and practices concerning air and artillery; by methods including comprehensive sampling of opinions, both in the affected areas and elsewhere, and operations to discover the objective results of sample air and artillery missions.

MAP Support System

The radical changes in the GVN and RVNAF recommended in various portions of this entire study seem most unlikely to occur without a strong, focused, and coordinated exertion of US influence at high levels. The goal of such US "intervention" must be a GVN capable of winning the support of its population and winning the war. In order to improve US leverage needed to force the GVN into reforms, without which it is unlikely to reach its goals, certain of our approaches to military and economic aid to the Republic of Viet Nam need to be changed. One of these is the Military Assistance Program (MAP).

The basic concept of the program is laudable in that it respects the sovereignty of the RVN, it encourages the development of skills and sense of

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responsibility within GVN military organizations, and it provides the training and actual logistics experience needed to continue a viable institution after termination of US support. At the same time, the dangers of the concept are apparent. Since at the time of arrival all equipment and supplies are owned by the recipient government, supplies and equipment can be diverted, and non-authorized military units can be established and equipped with military assistance that was intended and agreed to go elsewhere. In the present emergency the latter considerations are more important than the former.

RECOMMEND:

That in the interest of general US leverage the MAP support system be abandoned and a logistic program be substituted whereunder the USG retains title to equipment and supplies until they reach the end users, with MACV retaining the right to withdraw supplies or equipment which is improperly used.

Allocation of US and GVN Assets

As has often been stated, the war in Viet Nam is, in effect, 43 separate wars with each province having its unique conditions and needs. However, some GVN and US programs and efforts are too rigidly uniform throughout the country. RD programs should be specifically tailored to fit the individual needs of each province, and allocation of US and GVN assets needed to accomplish such programs should be made specifically for each province, taking into consideration such things as logistical accessibility, local manpower reserves, psychological susceptibility of the people to RD, friendly forces and enemy order of battle, terrain, agricultural productivity of land, and religious and ethnic characteristics of the people. The selection of "national priority areas" is a good first step, although the Vietnamese reaction to this concept leaves much to be desired. "Low or no priority areas" should also be recognized where the primary objectives of RD might be to hold and consolidate what the government now controls concentrating on making a vivid contrast in the welfare of those under GVN control as compared to those outside. For example, in some provinces, selected agricultural programs might make the greatest impact on the hearts and minds of the people, in others it might be a rural electrification program. In certain provinces the present unfavorable ratio of friendly to enemy forces makes expansion of the government-controlled areas practically impossible. The full range of RD programs should not be attempted in areas where the requisite security cannot be provided.

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RECOMMEND:

That GVN programs and the strength and composition of US Provincial Teams be specifically tailored to fit the needs of individual provinces, to include consideration of the security situation, ethnic groups, and the like.

Emphasis on Urban Areas

It is unquestionably true that the GVN must win in the hamlets if it is to win at all. But it is equally true that hamlet residents have never caused the collapse of a government in Saigon and that the GVN cannot hope to carry out a meaningful program in the countryside if at the same time it is preoccupied with urban unrest. In like manner, US assistance to the GVN can be greatly impeded if the urban population is hostile to American personnel and policies. For these reasons, both the GVN and the USG should devote additional attention to urban areas and stronger efforts should be made to contact and influence those groups from which both opposition and national leadership are likely to spring. This effort should include development of social programs and close relations with such diverse groups as labor unions, religious and youth/student groups, intellectuals, business and professional groups, women's organizations and opposition elements.

RECOMMEND:

That while retaining primary focus on rural areas the GVN and the US Mission provide additional resources and turn more attention to problems in urban areas, which have produced demonstrations and other activities leading to government instability that has often paralyzed progress in the rural areas.

Intelligence Coordination

Of utmost importance in destroying the Communist Party apparatus and its offshoots among the population is the fullest coordination and prompt, effective exploitation of intelligence at all levels. Neither exists today. At national level, the Special Branch should consolidate information from all

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agencies in a single, national file of intelligence on individual VC members and VC organizations. In each province, there must be genuine consolidation of military/police intelligence files of all sorts, and combined interrogation facilities and operations centers, jointly manned by military, police and their US advisors.

Such coordination of intelligence efforts is badly needed - and badly lacking - among US agencies and forces. It is strongly recommended that a Director of Intelligence for Viet Nam be given the full responsibility for coordinating and giving central direction to all US intelligence activities in Viet Nam.

RECOMMEND:

1. That a Director of Intelligence for Viet Nam be given full authority and responsibility for the close coordination of all US intelligence activities in country; and
2. That strongest US efforts be exerted to achieve consolidation of intelligence files and efforts on the Vietnamese side, to include: a) A centralized file of all intelligence data on VC individuals and organizations to be established at national level, using all sources; and b) Consolidated police/military intelligence files, interrogation facilities and operations centers at province level.

Upgrading Vietnamese Administrative Capabilities

Although the Study Group has recommended measures which would give the USG a more direct, substantive role in Viet Nam, it is extremely important that stronger efforts be made to improve the GVN's administrative capabilities. Strengthening the US hand should not result in weakening the GVN. On the contrary, the US must continue to point toward the day when the GVN manages its own affairs unassisted.

RECOMMEND:

That USAID exert influence toward expansion of the ~~National~~ National Institute for Administration and that a major effort be made to overhaul and modernize the GVN fiscal and administrative systems.

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MACV Subsector Advisors' Fund

Outside of Saigon, universal acclaim exists for the excellent results that were achieved through use of the MACV Subsector Advisors' Fund program. The program was well conceived and well administered. The MACV guidelines were clear and the processing and replenishment of vouchers was prompt. For a relatively minor expenditure of funds and effort, District Chiefs throughout the country suddenly had real opportunities to show concrete, immediate proof of the GVN's responsiveness to the needs of the people. Everywhere in the field, both on the part of US and GVN officials, there is a lack of understanding as to why the program was stopped and universal consensus that it should be reinstated as soon as possible.

We understand that objections to the program on the part of top level GVN officials in Saigon will be withdrawn if it is made clear that the Subsector Advisors' Fund is not a "Revolutionary Development" fund in the sense of competing with, or short-circuiting the formal provincial RD programs included in provincial RD budgets. To our knowledge the funds were seldom used in this fashion, but rather, were usually used to take advantage of ad hoc opportunities to improve the image of the GVN. The availability of this fund is sufficiently important that if other funding arrangements are not feasible, US-purchased piastres should be provided.

RECOMMEND:

That the MACV Subsector Advisors' Fund be reinstated.

Provincial Committee "Sign-Off" in RD Budget Expenditure

The Provincial Committee sign-off system on RD budget expenditures which was in effect in 1963 and 1964 had many advantages. Particularly, the US representation was kept closely informed of the exact status of progress, close coordination between the US advisors and GVN officials was assured, and GVN provincial authorities were "kept honest" should they have been tempted to procrastinate on a program or perhaps to steer funds or commodities in another direction.

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RECOMMEND:

That the Provincial Committee "sign-off" provision be reinstated relative to the RD budget.

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PART V

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCERNING US ADVISORY EFFORT

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ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING US
ADVISORY EFFORT

The recommendations in this section of the report refer to the US advisory effort as it impacts on RD, and can be adopted and implemented without GVN involvement or concurrence.

Provincial Staffing by US Civilian Agencies

MACV has recently taken steps to tailor its sector and subsector advisory teams to fit the specific needs of various provinces and districts. This approach should be expanded with all agencies designing their advisory efforts to fit varying situations. At a minimum, however, there should be one representative of each agency (or each division of those agencies that have multiple advisory efforts) resident in each province. It is not possible for one representative to cover adequately more than one province. In such a situation the inevitable result is too much time lost in traveling, and the representative is so often absent at critical times that he is out of touch with day-to-day events in both provinces. Until such time as the civilian agencies are up to strength it would be much more efficient for a man assigned to two or more provinces to concentrate the great majority of his efforts on one province and leave the others essentially and admittedly uncovered except for infrequent liaison.

RECOMMEND:

1. That USAID/Field Operations, USAID/Office of Public Safety, JUSPAO/Field Operations, OSA/Cadre Division, and OSA/Liaison Branch have at a minimum one representative in each province with additional representatives added according to local situational requirements; and
2. That until such time as there is at least one representative from the above listed agencies in each province, advisors covering two provinces give the great majority of their time and attention to one province and leave the other essentially uncovered to avoid both provinces being neglected.

MACV Advisory Organization

In view of the huge buildup in US field forces, and in the light of US-GVN emphasis on Revolutionary Development, the importance of the entire MACV

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advisory effort and especially MACV's responsibilities in RD should be re-emphasized. Accordingly, at each MACV level there should be an appropriately high ranking officer whose primary responsibility is Revolutionary Development. The member of the Division Advisory Staff charged with RD should also be responsible for supervision of all the MACV sector advisory efforts within the DTA.

RECOMMEND:

That there be established at MACV Division advisory level a Deputy Senior Advisor for RD, at MACV Corps advisory level a Deputy Senior Advisor for RD, and at COMUSMACV level a Deputy COMUSMACV for the entire MACV advisory effort and for RD.

Rating Standard

There is a natural tendency among US advisors from all agencies to become identified with the provinces, units, ministries, or programs they are advising. This often leads to over-defensiveness on the part of the advisor when his counterpart or the counterpart's organization is criticized. Certain aspects of this identification are productive in terms of better personal relationships, better esprit de corps, and more enthusiasm and dedication to the tasks at hand. Conversely, over-identification can lead to loss of objectivity and inaccurate reporting. While it is somewhat natural to give an advisor some credit when his counterpart's organization turns in an outstanding performance, it is usually unnatural and unfair to criticize the advisor when there is failure. The removal of any concern of such criticism will go a long way toward assuring objectivity.

RECOMMEND:

That it be clearly established that advisors are rated primarily on the quality of their advice and the accuracy of their reports rather than on the performance of the organization and/or counterparts they advise.

Reporting

This is one of the most important functions of advisors in the field considering that high-level decisions are often made primarily on reports. However, if reporting requirements become too great the advisor, having many other tasks to perform, has less and less time to be out of his office gathering facts and background necessary to make his reports meaningful

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to decision makers at higher levels. There is considerable overlap in reports required of various US agencies, and some duplication exists in reporting requirements made by separate divisions of the same agency. One very important item that no one requires, however, is reports of advice on major matters given by advisors but not followed by counterparts. This should be valuable to all agencies in evaluating weaknesses in programs, and in applying appropriate pressure at higher GVN levels.

RECOMMEND:

That the reporting burden on all agency representatives and advisors in the field be reduced through continued efforts toward consolidation or elimination of repetitive reports; but that all advice on major matters which is given to counterparts and not followed be reported.

Appraisal of Security

Suggesting that efforts be continued to eliminate reporting overlap in the form of several agencies being required to report the same facts and statistics should not be confused with the need to re-emphasize that all agencies should contribute to the formulation of certain Provincial Team appraisals. For example, only one agency need report the number of Chieu Hoi returnees, or the number of refugees, but all should contribute to an overall appraisal of the security situation in the province. This element, so vital to any success in RD, should include the subjective feelings of the man behind the water buffalo as well as an objective analysis of the friendly forces and enemy order of battle, numbers of VC incidents, security of roads, etc.

RECOMMEND:

That all agencies emphasize to Provincial Teams that appraisals of the overall provincial security situation must include subjective judgment of psychological attitudes of the people and an appraisal of the number of people to whom the GVN and the VC have access.

Biographic Files

The Study Group was unable to discover a central repository of biographic data which included junior GVN officers and officials. For example,

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some District Chiefs may have had ten or more subsector advisors, few if any of whom have been required to file a confidential report on the counterpart they may have worked with for six months. This lack of information could well result in officials being removed from office for cause in one section of the country and reappearing in important jobs in another section with their new local advisors ignorant of past performance.

RECOMMEND:

That the US Mission institute a central, confidential biographic file on all Vietnamese officials and military officers known to US representatives and that frank comments as to the honesty, ability, courage, and potential of their counterparts be required of all advisors.

Extension of MACV Advisory Tour

The success or failure of the US effort in Viet Nam depends in large part upon the quality of the advisors. In addition to professional knowledge, effectiveness as an advisor requires certain personal traits, e.g., dedication, motivation, patience, empathy, that are not possessed by all civilian and military personnel assigned to advisory positions.

The time required for even a well-qualified advisor to establish rapport with his counterpart, to learn the requirements of his job, and to become truly effective varies from province to province; however, it usually must be measured in months and not weeks. It is recognized and accepted that a one year tour in Viet Nam for military personnel is a major morale factor, and no change in this general policy is recommended. However, it is believed there are some outstanding MACV advisors who would extend their tours voluntarily if they received adequate recognition for so doing. The continuity and effectiveness of the military advisory effort gained by having an advisor remain in country 18-24 months or more would result in a major return for the cost, monetary or otherwise. Advisors with Vietnamese language ability particularly should be encouraged to extend their tours of duty.

RECOMMEND:

That consideration be given to granting greater privileges and benefits, such as additional pay, additional home leave, or movement of dependents to safe-havens, to outstanding MACV advisors who voluntarily extend their tours of duty.

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APPENDICES

- A - List of All Recommendations
- B - Mission Statement: FWMAF
- C - Mission Statement: RVNAF
- D - Mission Statement: RF/PF (Constabulary)
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- F - Mission Statement: NP
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- I - Mission Statement: Technical Services
- J - Mission Statement: PSU (CTT)
- K - Mission Statement: RDC
- L - Provincial Advisory Team Questionnaire Analysis

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SECRET - NOFORNAPPENDIX A - List of All RecommendationsFREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES (FWMAF)

1. That FWMAF give increased emphasis to improving the performance and conduct of GVN military forces (especially ARVN) through combined operations.
2. That as the increase in FWMAF strength permits, these forces engage with RVNAF in clearing operations in support of RD with the primary objective of improving the associated GVN forces.

REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF)

1. That ARVN, particularly Divisional combat units, in close cooperation with Provincial and District Constabulary (presently RF/PF) and with National Police, be the principal force in RVNAF to provide the security essential for Revolutionary Development to take place. (It is further RECOMMENDED, however, that, due to Vietnamese national pride, plus possible adverse public reaction in the US, no official statement of change be made in ARVN's present mission, but that the modification in their role be treated as a matter of reorientation and emphasis toward the primacy of RD in winning the war.)
2. That, in view of the deployment and capabilities of FWMAF in Viet Nam and recognizing the necessity for increased security support to Revolutionary Development, the bulk of ARVN Divisional combat battalions be assigned to Sector Commanders with only those Divisional battalions not so assigned to be under the control of Divisions.
3. That Division be removed from the RD chain of command.
4. That the role of Province Chief (Sector Commander in most provinces) be upgraded; and that where the Province Chief is an ARVN officer, he be senior in military rank to all Regimental Commanders stationed in the province.
5. That Province Chiefs have operational control (as a minimum) of all military and paramilitary forces assigned to operate exclusively in their sector.

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6. That in order to bring ARVN combat battalions' "rice paddy" strength up to authorized levels, pressure be continued to force the GVN to cease diversion of men and equipment into non-MAP supported units or into unauthorized headquarters positions, and that continued high level efforts be made to reduce the desertion rate.
7. That considering the limited manpower pool, first priorities in recruiting should go to RD Cadre, Constabulary (RF/PF), and Police.
8. That through motivational training and rigidly enforced discipline ARVN troops be brought to conduct themselves properly toward the populace so that efforts of all other Revolutionary Development elements are not negated.
9. That Ranger units, because of their frequently intolerable conduct toward the populace, be disbanded with individual Rangers reassigned as individuals throughout the Army.
10. That whenever possible, ARVN units operate in combination (or be integrated) with FWMA Forces with the objective of enhancing the performance of ARVN.

PROVINCIAL/DISTRICT CONSTABULARY (Currently RF/PF)

1. That Regional and Popular Forces become Provincial and District Constabulary, retain current RF/PF missions for the foreseeable future, and remain under the operational control (as a minimum) of Province Chiefs (Sector Commanders).
2. That the Constabulary be placed under the Ministry of Revolutionary Development with RVNAF continuing logistical support to the Constabulary but on a priority basis and under sufficient US control to insure supplies destined for Constabulary are, in fact, received.
3. That a logistical element from the Ministry of Revolutionary Development be established in the DCSLOG of JGS to allocate supplies to Provincial/District Constabulary.
4. That for units in being, a training program, to include the essential elements of police operations and to be monitored jointly by USAID-OPS/MACV, be initiated and proceed as rapidly as possible without degradation of quality of instruction.

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5. That upon retraining, the Constabulary be given appropriate police powers, i. e., power of search and seizure and power of arrest.
6. That the Constabulary be relieved of the mission to destroy VC infrastructure and that this be the primary mission of National Police (Special Branch), with the Constabulary having the mission to provide the local intelligence community all information pertaining to VC infrastructure as may be obtained during operations or through personal contacts with friends or family members.
7. That the Constabulary be assigned a secondary mission to act at National Police (Special Branch) request in apprehending or destroying VC infrastructure identified by the National Police.
8. That the chain of command for the Provincial/District Constabulary be from the Commissioner General for Revolutionary Development direct to the Sector Commander; from the Sector Commander to the Subsector Commander; and from the Subsector Commanders to the commanders of the District Constabulary units and of those Provincial Constabulary units assigned to Subsector.
9. That until such time as a career service for the "Constabulary Officer Corps" is established, ARVN officers provide the leadership for the Constabulary.
10. That an adequate Constabulary (RF/PF) dependent-housing construction program be initiated.
11. That the MACV Sector and Subsector Advisory Teams continue to provide military advice for the Constabulary.
12. That USAID-OPS provide as soon as possible a minimum of one full-time advisor per province (with increases to be made as appropriate) whose duty will be to advise the National Police in all matters and the Constabulary in police functions.
13. That Police Field Forces be integrated as units into the Provincial Constabulary.
14. That District Constabulary (PF) squads and platoons be organized into companies.

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15. That District Constabulary (PF) pay scale be raised to 75-85% of the RD Cadre pay scale.

CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUP (CIDG)

and

That CIDG, together with VN Special Forces/ their US Special Forces Advisory Teams, be deployed only in remote non-populated areas where there is no recruiting base for RF/PF (Provincial and District Constabulary).

NATIONAL POLICE

1. That National Police (Special Branch) assume primary responsibility for the identification and destruction of VC infrastructure with particular emphasis on the Communist Party apparatus, and that other GVN elements, particularly RD Cadre, support this mission by providing timely information and assisting to apprehend suspects identified by National Police.
2. That all National Police receive motivational training through in-service training programs to be established in each province.
3. That it be clearly established that the Province Chief has operational control of all police within the province.
4. That the strength of National Police be increased as currently planned, and that particular attention be given to providing additional police in areas newly brought under government control.

POLICE FIELD FORCES (PFF)

That Police Field Forces be integrated as units into the Provincial Constabulary.

VIETNAMESE INFORMATION SERVICE (VIS)

1. That VIS terminate its rural information cadre operations and assume a supporting role relative to propaganda activities to be carried out by RD Cadre, Technical Service Cadre, and hamlet officials.
2. That VIS support activities be emphasized in hamlets where RD Cadre are operating or have operated.
3. That consideration be given to VIS providing motivational training for employees of other GVN civilian agencies, provided significant improvement

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is achieved in overall VIS capability.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. That the Central Government issue appropriate instructions to the various ministries directing each to support Revolutionary Development with highest priority; and that ministries with representatives in the provinces issue similar instructions to Technical Services instructing them to be fully responsive to the Province Chief in order that coordination of the entire provincial RD effort can be effected.
2. That Province Chiefs be directed to submit regular written reports to the Ministry of RD, with copies to separate parent ministries involved, on the performance of each Provincial Technical Service in supporting RD.
3. That an inter-ministry inspectorate be created, chaired by the Ministry of RD, for the purpose of reviewing the performance of all Technical Services in supporting RD.
4. That recruiting and training of Technical Service personnel be given priority attention; and that provision be made for either draft deferment or mobilization-in-place of key Technical Service personnel.
5. That there be in each province a senior Agriculture Service Chief responsive to the Province Chief and responsible for coordinating all the agricultural programs of all services that are under the Ministry of Agriculture.
6. That this senior Agriculture Chief give priority attention to coordinating those services that have programs funded through the RD budget and those that have agricultural cadre in the field such as the Agricultural Affairs, Animal Husbandry, Hydraulics, NACO, Farmers Associations, and Fisheries Services.
7. That each Technical Service be responsible for disseminating in rural areas, information about its own programs and activities.

PROVINCIAL SUPPORT UNITS (PSU)

1. That operational control of the PSU eventually be assigned to the OSA SB advisor.
2. That OSA find a parent GVN ministry for the PSU.

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3. That the PSU concentrate their efforts in contested and VC-controlled areas.
4. That PSU-generated intelligence on the VC infrastructure in government-controlled areas be furnished to the Special Branch so that a GVN element invested with police powers can take action; and that PSU not be used in operations where National Police can be used just as effectively.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE (RDC)

1. That the pace of the program be slowed (about 5,000 per course at Vung Tau) until sufficient time has elapsed to permit the careful selection and training of instructors who are able to produce dedicated, capable cadre groups.
2. That emphasis be given immediately to raising the quality of individual RD Cadre through a "selection out" procedure both during and after training and that a cadre replacement system be developed.
3. That where the security situation permits, qualified Popular Force (District Constabulary) personnel who are performing strictly hamlet security duties, begin integration into the RDC program upon the deployment of cadre groups in these hamlets and, that during the cadre's stay these former PF be retrained, refitted and retailored along cadre lines at either Vung Tau or in the province and then be returned to the district from which they were recruited.
4. That the US Provincial Team play a greater role in the selection of hamlets scheduled for cadre operations, particularly to ensure that provinces do not deploy RDC groups in hamlets not sufficiently secure for the cadre to remain overnight.
5. That special efforts be made to ensure that all concerned understand that the strength and composition of a cadre group is flexible and must be tailored to the needs of a given hamlet, and that province authorities be encouraged to shift cadre assets as needed to best meet local conditions.
6. That no rigid timetable be established for a cadre group to complete its work in a given hamlet or series of hamlets.

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7. That a cadre group assigned to a hamlet get maximum attention and supervision from Province and District Chiefs, especially during the early stages of its operations, and that American advisors visit the group frequently to see that it is adequately supported and properly led.
8. That the MACV subsector advisor be given primary responsibility for monitoring the activities of the cadre in the district and for advising the Provincial Team of the status of the program.
9. That inspectors, including instructors from Vung Tau and officials of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, make periodic, generally unannounced visits to cadre groups throughout the country to encourage the cadre and to evaluate their progress.
10. That, to the extent possible, cadre groups be concentrated in areas where they can mutually support each other and saturate an area.
11. That cadre groups composed totally or even primarily of ethnic Vietnamese cadre not be assigned to predominantly Montagnard hamlets, and if mixed Vietnamese/Montagnard groups are assigned to Montagnard hamlets an appropriate balance of ethnic strength and leadership be ensured.
12. That, in provinces where PAT's have become vital and integral parts of the paramilitary structure of the province, the PAT's retain their present functions until the security situation improves and permits their release for the more static mission of the RD Cadre.

PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE (PSD)

1. That the PSD program, if established by the GVN, be slowly and selectively committed only in areas already secured or undergoing securing and that no country-wide program, such as the former Hau Bi Quan, be undertaken until pilot projects have been assessed.
2. That in areas undergoing pacification the PSD program develop sequentially from the civil affairs and security efforts of the RDC.
3. That PSD be provided arms only in hamlets where there is very limited risk the hamlets might be attacked by VC units capable of defeating the defenders, and that a strict system of weapons accountability be established.

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4. That where attempts to arouse popular interest in PSD meet with little response, no attempt be made to force commitment.
5. That US participation in the PSD program be restricted to furnishing guidance primarily at the Saigon level, and that no additional advisors be assigned to the program in the field.

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS REQUIRING US/GVN AGREEMENTS

1. That on an urgent basis an adequate research effort be launched to determine the actual physical and attitudinal consequences of present policies and practices concerning air and artillery; by methods including comprehensive sampling of opinions, both in the affected areas and elsewhere, and operations to discover the objective results of sample air and artillery missions.
2. That in the interest of general US leverage the MAP support system be abandoned and a logistic program be substituted whereunder the USG retains title to equipment and supplies until they reach the end users, with MACV retaining the right to withdraw supplies or equipment which is improperly used.
3. That GVN programs and the strength and composition of US Provincial Teams be specifically tailored to fit the needs of individual provinces, to include consideration of the security situation, ethnic groups, and the like.
4. That while retaining primary focus on rural areas the GVN and the US Mission provide additional resources and turn more attention to problems in urban areas which have produced demonstrations and other activities leading to government instability that has often paralyzed progress in the rural areas.
5. That a Director of Intelligence for Viet Nam be given full authority and responsibility for the close coordination of all US intelligence activities in country.
6. That strongest US efforts be exerted to achieve consolidation of intelligence files and efforts on the Vietnamese side, to include: a) A centralized file of all intelligence data on VC individuals and organizations to be established at national level, using all sources; and b) Consolidated police/military intelligence files, interrogation facilities and operations centers at province level.

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7. That USAID exert influence toward expansion of the National Institute for Administration and that a major effort be made to overhaul and modernize the GVN fiscal and administrative systems.
8. That the MACV Subsector Advisors' Fund be reinstated.
9. That the Provincial Committee "sign-off" provision be reinstated relative to the RD budget.

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING US ADVISORY EFFORT

1. That USAID/Field Operations, USAID/Office of Public Safety, JUSPAO/Field Operations, OSA/Cadre Division, and OSA/Liaison Branch have at a minimum one representative in each province with additional representatives added according to local situational requirements.
2. That until such time as there is at least one representative from the above listed agencies in each province, advisors covering two provinces give the great majority of their time and attention to one province and leave the other essentially uncovered to avoid both provinces being neglected.
3. That there be established at MACV Division advisory level a Deputy Senior Advisor for RD, at MACV Corps advisory level a Deputy Senior Advisor for RD, and at COMUSMACV level a Deputy COMUSMACV for the entire MACV advisory effort and for RD.
4. That it be clearly established that advisors are rated primarily on the quality of their advice and the accuracy of their reports rather than on the performance of the organizations and/or counterparts they advise.
5. That the reporting burden on all agency representatives and advisors in the field be reduced through continued efforts toward consolidation or elimination of repetitive reports; but that all advice on major matters which is given to counterparts and not followed be reported.
6. That all agencies emphasize to Provincial Teams that appraisals of the overall provincial security situation must include subjective judgment of psychological attitudes of the people and an appraisal of the number of people to whom the GVN and the VC have access.
7. That the US Mission institute a central, confidential biographic file on all Vietnamese officials and military officers known to US representatives and that frank comments as to the honesty, ability, courage, and potential

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of their counterparts be required of all advisors.

8. That consideration be given to granting greater privileges and benefits, such as additional pay, additional home leave, or movement of dependents to safe-havens, to outstanding MACV advisors who voluntarily extend their tours of duty.

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