DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

62352

SECTIONS 1, 2 & 3

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

016 14 38Z

IMMEDIATE

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

VZCZCJCS568
OO RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #3837 3201227
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC "T= AID WASHDC
O 161010Z NOV 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/JCS
RUCRJCS/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/USAID SAIGON
ZEN/JUSPAO SAIGON
RUEJC/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEG
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 63796 (JO1R) SECTION 1 OF 3
SUBJECT: SPECIAL PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN INITIAL WRAP-UP
(1 JULY- 31 OCTOBER 1969) (U)
1. (U) PURPOSE: THIS MESSAGE ASSESSES PHASE II OF THE
1969 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN.
2. (C) SUMMARY: SECOND PHASE OF 1969 P&D PLAN ENDED 31
OCTOBER AS A SUBSTANTIAL SUCCESS. NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER WILL
BE USED FOR CLEANUP AND LAUNCHING 1970 PLAN.
MAIN THRUST OF PHASE II WAS QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN SECUR-
ITY, ADMINISTRATION, AND LAW AND ORDER SO AS TO CONSOLIDATE GAINS
OF RAPID GVEN EXPANSION IN LATE 1968 AND FIRST HALF 1969. PRESI-
DENT THIEU SET PRIMARY GOAL AS 50 PERCENT POPULATION RATED AB BY
HES, AND 90 PERCENT RATED ABC. BOTH GOALS EXCEEDED; END-OCTOBER
RATING WAS 55.1 PERCENT AB AND 92 PERCENT ABC (SECURITY/DEVELOP-
MENT).
MAJOR FACTORS IN SUCCESS OF PHASE II WERE LACK OF SYSTEMATIC
AND EFFECTIVE ENEMY OPPOSITION, AND THE INITIATIVE AND DRIVE SHOWN
BY GVN TO MAKE PACIFICATION PROGRAM WORK.
TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES EXPANDED RAPIDLY, PARTICULARLY
RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF 863 PF PLATOONS AUTHORIZED BY JGS
IN JULY. PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE FORCE GOAL (1,800,000 MEMBERS
ORGANIZED) WAS MET IN MID-SEPTEMBER AND GREW TO 2,750,645 BY
END- OCTOBER.
INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-2 J3-12 J4-3 J5-2 SACSA-4 NMCC-1

SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/I&L-4 ASD/PA-1 ASD/COMP-1 ASD/M&RA-1 ASD/SA-1

W/H-10 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1 (90) HAF/JC

1 OF 9

16 NOV 69

1 cy
IDA C 71-8423

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFE E
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

TERRORIST INCIDENTS DECLINED BY 25 PERCENT, SHORT OF 50 PEER-
CENT GOAL BUT A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION NONETHELESS. PHUNG HOANG

PROGRAM STILL TROUBLESOME, BUT MONTHLY GOAL OF 1,800 VCI
NEUTRALIZED WAS MET IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, AND THERE IS SOME
EXPECTATION PHASE II GOAL OF 7,200 WILL BE MET WHEN OCTOBER
RESULTS ARE TALLIED.
NATIONAL POLICE MAINTAINED A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO
INTERNAL SECURITY BUT RECRUITMENT RESTRICTIONS PLACE YEAR-END
STRENGTH GOAL OF 92,200 BEYOND ATTAINMENT.
CHIEU HOI PROGRAM WAS STAR PERFORMER WITH ALMOST 40,000
RETURNEES BY END-OCTOBER, EXCEEDING ITS PHASE II GOAL OF
14,000 BY 4,654.
REFUGEE POPULATION FELL FROM MORE THAN ONE MILLION AT END-
JUNE TO 536,827 AT END-OCTOBER BECAUSE OF CONCERTED GVN
EFFORT AND MUCH SMALLER GENERATION OF NEW REFUGEES.
STRENGTHENING VILLAGE COMMUNITIES CONTINUED APACE WITH
SEPTEMBER LOCAL ELECTIONS AND TRAINING OF MORE LOCAL OFFICIALS.
MORE THAN 90 PECENT OF TOTAL RVN VILLAGES AND HAMLETS HAVE ELECTED
GOVERNMENTS, WHILE OVER 12,000 LOCAL OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN TRAINED
IN 1969.
SHURTLY AFTER END OF PHASE II, PRESIDENT THIEU SENT 1970
PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN TO FIELD. PLAN CONTINUES
ESSENTIAL STRATEGY OF PHASE II, I.E., CONSOLIDATION OF GVN'S
AUTHORITY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT AS FIRST PRIORITY AND EXPANSION
INTO LAST AREAS OF VC INFLUENCE AS SECOND PRIORITY.
FACTS THUS BEAR OUT 1969 AS YEAR OF CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS.
IN FACE OF REDUCTION IN AMERICAN POWER AND SUSTAINED ENEMY
OPPOSITION. CRITICAL FACTORS NOW ARE MAINTAINING AND STRENGTHE-
NING PRESENT GVN RESOLUTION AND MOMENTUM.
3. (C) PHASE II RESULTS
A. THE FOLLWOING TABLE SUMMARIZES STATUS OF PACIFICATION
IN TERMS OF END-OCTOBER GOALS VERSUS END-OCTOBER ATTAINMENT:

PROGRAM	GOAL END-OCTOBER	ATTAINED END-OCTOBER
(1) EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECURITY		
(A) POPULATION (EST 17,424,900)	90 PERCENT	ABC 92,0 PERCENT
	50 PERCENT	55,1 PERCENT
REMARKS: BOTH GOALS ACHIEVED BY SEPTEMBER.		
(B) HAMLEST (EST 10,775)	9,699@	8,918@@

@ SECURE ADDITIONAL 2677 IN 1969.
@@ 1,679 UPGRADED TO C AS OF 30 SEPT 69 (SEE PARA B 1 BELOW).

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFE E
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 5 RHMSMVA 3837 C O N F I D E N T I A L
(C) REGIONAL FORCES 252,927 (AUTHORIZED) 254,800 (ASSIGNED) 30 SEPT
(D) POPULAR FORCES 308,345 (AUTHORIZED) 206,998 (ASSIGNED) 30 SEPT
REMARKS:BY END-SEPTEMBER THER WERE 1,478 RF COMPANIES AND 5,724 PF PLATOONS. FIGURES INCLUDE 863 OF 863 RF PLATOONS AUTHORIZED IN JULY BY JGS; OF THESE 333 WERE IN TRAINING WHILE 530 HAD COMPLETED TRAINING AND WERE OPERA-TIONAL BY END-OCTOBER.
(2) VC INFRASTRUCTURE RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
16,200 14,161 (30 SEPT)
REMARKS: PHASE II GOAL MAY BE MET WHEN OCTOBER RESULTS TALLIED.
(3) PSDF
(A) ORGANIZED 1,800,000 2,750,645
1 COMBAT 1,271,527
2 SUPPORT 1,479,118
(B) TRAINED 1,225,628
(C) ARMED 391,897 385,905
REMARKS: GOAL FOR ORGANIZED PSDF EXCEEDED; VIRTUALLY ACHIEVED FOR ARMED PSDF.
(4) LOCAL GOVERMENT
(A) VILLAGE ELECTIONS 1,991 (RVN) 2,000(100 PERCENT PLUS
(B) HAMLET ELECTIONS 9,435 (RVN) 9,709(100 PERCENT PLUS
REMARKS: GOALS EXCEEDED, ESTIMATED 93 PERCENT OF ALL VILLAGES NOW HAVE ELECTED GOVERNMENTS AND 92 PERCENT OF ALL HAMLETS.
(5) CHIEU HOI 29,600 40,000 PLUS
REMARKS: PACIFICATION PROGRAM'S STAR PERFORMER, PROGRAM MAINTAINING CONSISTENT WEEKLY RATE OF 800-1,000.
(6) REFUGEES RESETTLED 1,200,000 874,902@
@ RESETTLED OR RETURNED TO VILLAGE SINCE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR.
(7) PSYOPS/INFORMATION NO GOAL SET
REMARKS: PROGRAM CALLED FOR ONE NATIONAL AND ONE PROVINCIAL THEME EACH MONTH. PSYOPS EFFORT, HOWEVER, RE-MAINED CONSISTENTLY WEAK, EVEN THOUGH PRESIDENT THIEU MADE PROGRAM PERSONAL RESPONSIBLITY OF PROVINCE CHIEFS.
(8) RURAL ECONOMY
BT
#3837
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFE E 2 3 5 2
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 2

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE
016 14 382

VZCZCJCS583
OO RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #3838 3201227
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC ?T= AID WASHDC
O 161010Z NOV 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/JCS
RUCRJCS/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/USAID SAIGON
ZEN/JUSPAO SAIGON
RUEJC/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEG
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 63796 (J01R) SECTION 2 OF 3

(A) IR - 8 RICE PLANTED (HECTARES)	200,000	125,521
(B) LAND REFORM (HECTARES DISTRIBUTED)	147,000	42,594
(C) RURAL CREDIT (LOANS TO ASSIST AGRICULTRURAL DEVELOPMENT)	70,000P	53,310
(D) LINES OF COMMUNICATION (SECURE)		
1 ROADS (KILOMETERS)	3,811	3,779
2 RAILROADS (KM)	1,085	607
3 WATERWAYS (KM)	1,754	1,754

REMARKS: RURAL ECONOMIC REVIVAL DURING 1969 ONE OF PACIFICATION PROGRAM'S BRIGHT SPOTS, LARGELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO EXPANDED SECURITY AND POSITIVE PROGRAMS SUCH AS IR-8 RICE EFFORT, INCREASED RURAL CREDIT AND LAND REDISTRIBUTED.
B. EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECURITY
(1) BETWEEN END-JUNE AND END-OCTOBER POPULATION RATED ABC (SECURITY/DEVELOPMENT) BY HES ROSE 6.4 PERCENT FROM 85.6 PERCENT TO 92 PERCENT OR ABOUT 1,199,900 PEOPLE ROSE 18.5 PERCENT FROM 36.6 PERCENT TO 55.1 PERCENT OR ABOUT 3,257,500 PEOPLE, PRESIDENT THIEU'S GOAL WAS 50 PERCENT OFPOPULATIONIS AB, TWO PRIMARY GOALS OF 1969
PAGE 3 RHMSMVA 3838 C O N F I D E N T I A L

62352

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFE E
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN WERE THUS ACCOMPLISHED ONE MONTH IN ADVANCE. DE POPULATION DECREASED FROM 7.5 PERCENT TO 4.8 PERCENT WHILE VC POPULATION DECREASED FROM 6.9 PERCENT TO 3.2 PERCENT.

1969 TARGET HAMLETS

CT4	GOAL END-OCTOBER	ENTERED BY 31 OCTOBER	UPGRADED TO @C@ OR BETTER (END-SEPTEMBER)
I	524	524 (100P)	346 (66.0P)
II	626	629 (P100P)	396 (63.5P)
III	419	419 (100P)	349 (83.5P)
IV	1,108	1,062 (95.8P)	588 (53.8P)
TOTAL	2,677	2,634 (98.4P)	1,679 (66.0P)

(2) AS IN PHASE I, BASIS OF PROGRESS WAS FAVORABLE MILITARY SITUATION, ARVN AND ALLIED FORCES IN GENERAL KEPT ENEMY MAIN FORCE UNITS AWAY FROM HEAVILY POPULATED PACIFICATION AREAS. LOCAL SECURITY IMPROVED LARGELY THROUGH INCREASE IN STRENGTH AND EFFECTIVENESS OF REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES (RF/PF) AND PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE FORCE (PSDF). 39,000- MAN INCREASE IN RF DURING PHASE I WAS TRAINED, EQUIPPED AND DEPLOYED BY EARLY JULY. GVN RECRUITED 863 NEW PF PLATOONS BY 3 OCTOBER, OF WHICH MORE THAN 590 ARE ALREADY OPERATIONAL. M-16 RIFLES AND OTHER IMPROVED WEAPONS HAVE BEEN FULLY ISSUED TO TERRITORIAL FORCES. ADDITIONAL 23 RF COMPANIES AND 137 PF PLATOONS RECENTLY AUTHORIZED ARE BEING RECRUITED AND WILL BE ACTIVATED BY END-DECEMBER.

(3) NATIONAL POLICE FORCE (NP) CONTINUED ITS SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNAL SECURITY, BUT STILL FACES PROBLEMS. MOBILIZATION RESTRICTIONS ON RECRUITING (LIMITED TO THOSE OVER 35) CAUSED ACTUAL DECLINE IN NATIONAL POLICE STRENGTH FROM 78,431 IN JANUARY TO 76,330 IN SEPTEMBER. GVN AUTHORIZED TRANSFER OF 13,000 MEN FROM THE MILITARY, OF WHOM 5,534 HAVE BEEN SELECTED AND 3,225 WERE IN TRAINING BY THE END OF OCTOBER SO STRENGTH NOW UP TO 81,560. POLICE TURNED BACK VC TERRORIST PROGRAM IN SAIGON BY ARRESTING SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF ITS WOULD-BE PERPETRATORS, WITH CLEAR VC INTENT TO INCREASE TERRORIST AND SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES. 25 PERCENT REDUCTION IN TERRORIST INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURRED DURING PAST FOUR MONTHS IS POSITIVE RESULT EVEN THOUGH THE REDUCTION DID NOT MEET 50 PERCENT WHICH PRESIDENT THIEU ESTABLISHED AS GOAL FOR THIS PHASE. NP INDEPENDENT OPERATIONAL RESULTS DURING PHASE II (1 JULY-31 OCT) INCLUDE 1,059 VC KIA; 2,985 VC ARRESTED; 3,621 SUSPECTS DETAINED; AND SUCH CONTRABAND SEIZED AS 1,183 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, 176 CREW-SERVED WEAPONS, AND 1,602 GRENADES.

62352

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFE E
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

C, ELEMINATE VC INFRASTRUCTURE
THE ESTABLISHED MONTHLY GOAL OF 1,800 WAS MET IN AUGUST AND EXCEEDED IN SEPTEMBER; AND NOW SEEMS LIKELY THAT TOTAL PHASE II GOAL OF 7,200 WILL BE MET WHEN OCTOBER RESULTS ARE TALLIED, PROGRAM STILL HAS SEVERAL IMPORTATN PROBLEMS BUT HAS BEGUN TO HARDEN AND PRESIDENT THIEU HAS FOCUSED ON IT AS ONE OF THE MAJOR 1970 PROGRAMS, GVN HAS ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS CLEARLY OUTLINING MANDATORY SENTENCES FOR HIGHER LEVEL VCI, AND IS ARRANGING BRIEFINGS AND OTHER PROCEDURES TO ENSURE FOLLOWUP, GVN ALSO HAS PUBLICIZED PHUNG HOANG AS A PART OF PEOPLE'S PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISM RATHER THAN A SECRET MENACE, ADDITIONAL PUBLICITY FOR THE PROGRAM IS ALREADY HAVING RESULTS IN CAPTURES AND DEFECTIONS, SHORTAGE OF DETENTION SPACE IS BEING MET BY A PROGRAM TO SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE NUMBER OF DETENTION CENTERS AND TO CONTINUE TO INCREASE THEM OVER THE NEST FEW MONTHS, AS OCTOBER PHUNG HOANG OPERATIONS FIGURES NOT YET AVAILABLE, FULL PHASE II REPORT WILL BE CABLED SEPARATELY.
D, ORGANIZE PEOPLE FOR SELF-DEFENSE
PSDF CONTINUED TO MAKE ITS SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO SECURITY, END - OCTOBER GOAL OF 1,800,000 MEMBERS ORGANIZED WAS MET BY MID-SEPTEMBER AND CONTINUED TO INCREASE RAPIDLY TO 2,750,645 BY 31 OCTOBER, TRAINED AND ARMED GOALS FELL JUST SHORT OF COMPLETION BUT BY END-OCTOBER THER WERE 1,225,628 TRAINED, SUPPLIED WITH 585,905 WEAPONS. IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, PSDF WAS DIVIDED INTO @COMBAT@ AND @SUPPORT@ CATEGORIES, THE LATTER ENLISTING WOMEN, YOUTHS 12-16, AND OLDER MEN TO PROVIDE MUCH NEEDED FIRST AID AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, @COMBAT@ PSDF NUMBER 1,269,273, AND @SUPPORT@ PSDF 1,481,372, MEASURED BY TRADITIONAL INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS, E,G., CONTACTS WITH ENEMY, KIA AND EAPONS CAPTURED RATIOS, PSDF NOT OVER POWERING, NEVERTHELESS, REPORTS FLOW IN OF PSDF MEMBERS STANDING UP TO FIGHT FOR THEIR COMMUNITIES, SINCE BEGINNING OF 1969, OVER 2,200 HAVE BEEN KILLED, WHILE THEY CLAIM 2,300 ENEMY KIA.
E, STRENGTHEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERN-
BT
#3838
NNNN

62352

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFE E
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

62352

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

016 1438Z

SECTION 3

VZCZCJCS592
OO RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #3839 3201227
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC "T" AID WASHDC
O 161010Z NOV 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/JCS
RUCRJCS/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/USAID SAIGON
ZEN/JUSPAO SAIGON
RUEJC/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEG
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 63796 (J01R)FINAL SECT OF 3
MENT AND RESPONSIBILITY BY END-OCTOBER RESULTED IN 2,020 OF
2,186 VILLAGES WITH ELECTED GOVERNMENTS AND 9,700 OF 10,750
HAMLETS, OR ABOUT 92 AND 91 PERCENT, RESPECTIVELY. IN ADDI-
TION 14,486 OF THESE LOCAL OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THE
NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER AT VUNG TAU TO RECEIVE A FIVE-WEEK
COURSE IN THEIR NEW RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY. VILLAGE
SELF-DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, WHICH PROVIDES FUNDS TO THE VIL-
LAGE TO BE USED ON THE IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS SELECTED BY
LOCALLY-ELECTED RATHER THAN NATIONAL OFFICIALS, HAS SUBSTANTIALLY
INCREASED THE SELF-CONFIDENCE AND AUTHORITY OF THESE OFFICIALS
AND COMMUNITY COHESION WITHIN THE VILLAGES. APPROXIMATELY
15,000 LOCAL VILLAGE PROJECTS ARE EITHER COMPLETED OR UNDER
WAY AT THIS TIME, UTILIZING THE 2 BILLION PIASTERS BUDGETED FOR
THIS PROGRAM. GENERAL REACTION FROM US ADVISORS AND FROM
THE LOCAL OFFICIALS INDICATES THAT THE PROGRAM HAS PERFORMED
ITS FUNCTION OF SPARKING NEW INTEREST IN COMMUNITY LIFE AT THE
VILLAGE LEVEL.

F. RALLY ADDITIONAL CHIEU HOI

UNQUESTIONED STAR PERFORMER OF PACIFICATION PLAN WAS
CHIEU HOI PROGRAM, WHICH EXCEEDED ITS 31 OCTOBER GOAL
OF 14,000 BY 4,654. BY 15 NOVEMBER, 41,327 RETURNEES HAD
BEEN REGISTERED AS COMPARED TO 18,171 FOR ALL OF 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFE E.
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

OCTOBER TOTAL OF 5,609 WAS HIGHEST MONTHLY TOTAL RECORDED SINCE BEGINNING OF CHIEU HOI PROGRAM IN 1963, SEVERAL RECENT MONTHLY TOTALS WERE SWELLED BY ADDITION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF NON-VC RALLIERS SUCH AS HOA HAO AND KKK. RETURNEES IN JULY, FOR INSTANCE INCLUDED 1,064 HOA HAO OUT OF A TOTAL OF 5,608, CHIEU HOI PROGRAM REFLECTED A LARGE DEGREE OF STABILITY DURING PHASE II, IN SPITE OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL UNCERTAINTIES, O
AVERAGE WEEKLY RETURNEE RATE REMAINED CONSTANT AT BETWEEN 800-1,000, INCREASE IN 1969 DUE LARGELY TO EXPANDED GOVERNMENT PRESENCE, ONLY MINOR SUCCESS HAS BEEN MET IN INDUCING NVA TO RALLY, AT END OCTOBER 304 HAD DONE SO COMPARED TO 253 DURING SAME PERIOD IN 1968, GREAT MAJORITY OF RETURNEES HAVE RALLIED IN THE DELTA WHERE ENEMY APPARENTLY SUFFERS A GENUINE MANPOWER SHORTAGE. RESULTS BY CORPS SHOWN BELOW:

CORPS	TOTAL 1968 RESULTS	1969 PHASE I GOALS	1969 PHASE I RESULTS	1969 PHASE II GOALS	1969 PHASE II TOTALS	69 TOTAL THRU OCTOBER
I	3,059	2,000	1,736	1,600	2,351	4,392
II	1,916	2,300	1,411	1,200	1,108	2,739
III	2,813	4,300	2,346	2,000	3,826	6,630
IV	10,383	7,000	13,179	9,200	11,369	25,817
N IOTALS	18,171	15,600	18,672	14,000	18,654	39,578

INCLUDES 1,046 NON-VC ELEMENTS IN JULY,
G, RESETTLEMENT AND CARE FOR REFUGEES
REFUGEE POPULATION FELL SHARPLY FROM MORE THAN ONE MILLION AT END-JUNE TO 536,827 ON 31 OCTOBER, AT END-PHASE II THERE WERE 364,233 REFUGEES REMAINING IN CAMPS AND 172,594 OUT-OF-CAMP REFUGEES, NEVERTHELESS, THE EFFORT EXPENDED BY THE O
GVN TO REDUCE THE REFUGEE ROLLS FROM 1,449,636 IN FEBRUARY 1969 TO THEIR PRESENT NUMBERS HAS BEEN REMARLABLE, SINCE FEBRUARY, WHIN THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES REACHED AN ALL TIME HIGH, THE DECLINE HAS BEEN STEADY-- WITH THE OCTOBER TOTAL BEING THE LARGEST MONTHLY DROP TO DATE, DURING THE FIRST TEN MONTHS OF 1969, 347,000 REFUGEES WERE RESETTLED IN PLACE, AND 396,000 WERE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL HAMLETS WITH GVN ASSISTANCE, IN THE SAME PERIOD, 73,000 NEW REFUGEES WERE GENERATED, A GVN COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED IN SEPTEMBER SET FORTH PROCEDURES WHICH SHOULD ENABLE PRACTICALLY ALL OUT-OF-CAMP REFUGEES TO BE PROCESSED BY IND-1969.
H, INTENSIFY THE INFORMATION EFFORT
INFORMATION PROGRAM IMPROVED MARGINALLY BUT THERE WAS

62352

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFEN
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

LITTLE OVERALL PROGRESS IN PHASE II, APPOINTMENT OF A NEW MINISTER IN SEPTEMBER HAS YET TO PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES OR RESULTS.
PAGE 5 RHMSMVA 3839 C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENCOURAGING NOTE IS THAT BOTH PRESIDENT THIEU AND PRIME MINISTER KHIEM RECOGINIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROGRAM AND NEED FOR SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES. GVN HAS JUST PUBLISHED A DECREE ON POLITICAL MOBILIZATION WHICH SHOULD BRING MORE INTENSIVE EFFORT TO THIS PROGRAM.
GP-4
BT
#3839
NNNN

9 OF 9 62352

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

94894

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

006 10 20Z

Rufe & Bob
See 2d page

FOWKE

VZCZCJCS575
PP RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #1378 3400716
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC-T-AID WASH DC
P 060541Z DEC 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFORUCRJCS/JCS
RUCHFBEGQKSECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
ZEN6AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/1USAID SAIGON
ZEN/JUSPAO SAIGON
RUF CR/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEG
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L YUQ75 (JO1R)
SUBJECT8Q SPECIAL PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN FINAL WRAP-UP (1 JULY - 31 OC
OBER 1969)
REF: A. MACV 63796 161010Z NOV
Z. MACV 66180 301051Z NOV
CJH MACV 66181 301052Z NOV (NOTAL)
D. MIBB 65930 290233Z NOV (NOTAL)
1. (U) REF A PROVIDED INITIAL WRAP-UP OF THE SPECIAL PACIFI-
ATION CAMPAIGN.
2. (U) REFS B (PSDF), C (RF/PF TRENDS) AND D (PHUNG HOANG)
PROVIDED SUPPLEMENTAL DATA ON SUBJECTS INDICATED.
3. (C) THIS MESSAGE UPDATES APPROPRIATE PORTIONS OF PARA 3,
REF A, AND CONSTITUTES FINAL WRAP-UP OF THE SPECIAL 1 PFDJAGGN
31 OCTOBER PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN PROGRAM:

	GOAL END-OCTOBER	ATTAINED END-OCTOBER
(1) EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECURITY		
(C) REGIONAL FORCES	252,927 (AUTHORIZED)	253,892 (ASSINED) 31 OCTOBER
(D) POPULAR FORCES	208,345 (AUTHORIZED)	206,545 ASSIGNED

INFO: OJCS-1 DIA-3 SJCS-1 J1-2 J3-12 J4-3 J5-2 SACSA-4 NMCC-1
SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/I/L-4 ASD/PA-1 ASD/COMP-1 ASD/M&RA-1 ASD/SA-3
W/H-10 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1 (92) HAT/BM
PAGE 1 OF 2

6 DEC 69

CONFIDENTIAL
INCLUDED IN IDA

DOC # C-71-8423

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

(2) VCI RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 16,200 31 OCTOBER 16,067
REMARKS: END-OCTOBER FIGURE 99 PERCENT PLUS OF PRO-
PAGE3 RHMSMVA1378 C O N F I D E N T I A L
GRAMMED GOAL.
(3) PSDF
NO CHANGE FROMNFIGURES CITEDNREF A.
GP-4
BT
#1378
NNNN

99+%

PAGE 2 OF 2 94894

REF A NOT IDENTIFIED
REF B 84400
REF C 84990
REF D 85152

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BACKGROUND, GENERAL WELLER
PACIFICATION STUDY

Primary inventory done 4/25/75

Box #1

Inventory of documents in Study (Made by Mrs. Rubright)
Microfilm, 2 rolls with indexes - envelope (Conf.)
20 Nov 1967 Evaluation Rpt (Conf.)
I Corps Overview - October 1967 (C)
MACV Corps Overview - July 1967 (C-No Forn)
Corps Overview - August 1967 (C)
MACV Corps Overview - June 1967 (C-No Forn)
Special Joint Rpt. on Rev. Development - Jan 67 (C)
I Corps Overview - Sept 1967 (C)
Memo of Understanding between OCO and OSA - May 1967 (S)
Provincial Reporting: Quang Nam Province 2 Apr (C)
Pacification in South Vietnam During Oct 1967 (C-No Forn)
Pacification: Present Status - 17 Feb 1967 (S)
Pacification Message - 30 Mar 1969 (C)
Pacification Effort - 25 Nov 1968 (S-Working Papers)
Special Joint Rpt on Revolutionary Dev. - July 1966 (C)
New Quang Nam Pacification Program - 26 Nov 1965 (C)
Quang Nam Province-Viewed from Hoi An - 22 Oct 1965 (C)
(2 folders)
Minimum goals of 1969 PD Plan, Phase I - 21 Feb 1969 (C)
Status of Pacification Programs (C)
Ngu Hanh Son Campaign 14 April 1966 (Official Use Only)
Quang Nam Province-Phoenir/Phung Hoang Briefing - Nov 1970 (C)
Status of Pacification Assets (C)
Quang Nam Pacification Program - 21 Mar 1966 (C)
Trip Report-I Corps Tactical Zone #II - 2 Mar 1968 (C)
Status of Pacification - Quang Nam (#) Province (Tet Offensive) 27 March 1968 (C)
Evaluation Rpt - Pacification Progress - I Corps Tactical Zone 27 July 1968 (C-No Forn)
Eval Rpt. Uang Da Special Zone - 20 Nov 1967 (C)
President Thieu's Visit to the Four Corps 1-15 July 1969 (Msg) (C)
1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign - 30 June 1969 (Msg) (C)
Special Joint Rpt on Rev. Dev. - July 1966 (C)
Special Joint Rpt Dev. August 1966 (C)
Da Nang City Rpt - 30 June 1968 (C)
1969 Pacification Planning April 1969 (C)
Implementation of the 1969 PD Plan - 21 Feb 1969 (C)
Presidential Review of Pacification I (TZ Da Nang - 3 Feb 1969 (C))
Accelerated Pacification Campaign Wrap-up - 12 Feb 1969 (C)
Conversation with Mr. Ogden Williams - 23 May 1969 (C)
Remarks of President Thieu - 17 Dec 1968 (C) (Msg)
Current Status of the Pacification Program in South Vietnam 7 Oct 1970 (S)

DECLASSIFIED

Directives on the designs of CT2's - Air Force & Navy 12 Nov 1964 (S)
Embassy Saigon's Mission Weekly - 25 Nov-1 Dec 1969 (C)
Embassy Saigon's Mission Weekly - 29 July-4 Aug 1969 (C)
Embassy Saigon's Mission Weekly - 26 Aug-1 Sep 1969 (C)
Embassy Saigon's Mission Weekly - 30 Sep-6 Oct 1969 (C)
Embassy Saigon's Mission Weekly - 28 Oct-3 Nov 1969 (C)
Study of the Military Support of Pacification in South Vietnam, April 1964-April 1965 (C)
Phung Hoang Review - Dec 1970 (C)
Project Takeoff - Volume II Assessment of Pacification 11 August 1967 (S)
Province Rpts: Quang Nam (U) For 1968 Jan-Dec (C-No Forn)
Plan for Pacification & Development 1970 (C)
Community Defense & Local Development Plan 1971 - (C)
Pacification Priority Area Summary - 3 Sep 1968 (C)

Box #2
Pacification Operations in the 21st Infantry Division (OFO)
Guidances - Pacification Campaign 1969 - 15 Dec 1968 (C)
Special Pacification Campaign Initial Wrapup - 1 Jul-31 Dec 1969 (C)
Special Pacification Campaign Initial Wrapup - 1 Jul - 31 Oct 1969 (C)
MACV Phung Hoang Program (C)
Regression Analysis, MR 1, 31 March 1971 (C)
Pacification 10 July 1969 (C)
Pacification in SVN in 1969 - Discussion Paper - 15 March 1969 (C)
Status of Pacification - End - May 1969 (C)
Eval. Rpt. Pacification in Hieu Nhon and Hoa Vang Districts 25 March 1968 (C)
Background Briefing by Ambassador Bunker - 24 Dec 1968 (LOU)
Implementation of the 1969 Special P&D Plan - 9 Aug 1969 (C)
Memo of Conversation: Thieu/Khiem/Bunker/Colby - 30 Apr 1970 (C)
Pacification: Background/Current Program (C)
1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign July-October 1969 (C)
Excerpts from strategy of Military Assistance - SVN - March 1960 (S)
President Thieu's directive on the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign - 4 July 1969 (C)
Pacification in SVN during November 1967 (C-No Forn)
Monthly Assessment Oct 1967 (S)
Pacification in SVN during August 1967 (C)
Pacification in SVN during Sept 1967 (C-No Forn)
Province Rpt - Status - Quang Nam Province - 31 Dec 1967 (S-No Forn)
Civil Operations & Rev. Dev. Support (CORDS) Jun-Jul 1967
Pacification Attitude Analysis System June 1970 (OUO)
Pacification Attitude Analysis System Sep 1970 (OUO)
Communist Policy Towards Southeast Asia, 1954-1969 A Chronological Compendium - Project (orona Harvest) 1 Oct 1970 (OUO)

DECLASSIFIED

MACV Urban Study - April 1971 (OUO)
Rev. Dev. Airgram - July 1967 Part 1 of 7 parts (C)
Pacification Attitude Analysis System - Dec 1970 (OUO)
Pacification in SVN during September 1968 (C) (Msg)
Pacification in SVN during August 1968 (C) (msg)
Pacification in SVN during July 1968 (msg) (C-No Forn)
Pacification in SVN during Jan-June 1968 (C-No Forn) (msg)
Pacification in SVN during May 1968 (C-No Forn) (msg)
Pacification in SVN during April 1968 (C) (msg)
Pacification in SVN during February 1968 (C-No Forn) (msg)
Pacification in SVN during March 1968 (C-No Forn) (msg)
Pacification in SVN during January 1968 (C-No Forn) (msg)
Pacification in SVN during the period 22 Dec 68-11 Jan 1969 (C)
Enemy Tet Offensive - Preliminary Assessment - 7 Feb 1968 (C)
Embassy Saigon's Mission Weekly 13-19 Jan 1969 (S) (msg)
Embassy Saigon's Mission Weekly 28 April-5 May 1969 (C) (msg)
Embassy Saigon's Mission Weekly 6-12 May 1969 (C) (msg)
Embassy Saigon's Mission Weekly 27 May-2 June 1969 (C) (msg)
Embassy Saigon's Mission Weekly 24-30 June 1969 (C) (msg)
Pacification in SVN during 1967 (C-No Forn)
MACV Viet Cong Infrastructure Neutralization System (VCINS) 31 Jan 1970 & inventory
Section V of XI message Dec 1967 (C-No Forn)
Pacification Tape - Aug 1971 (C) in envelope
Special Joint Narrative Reports on Rev. Dev. 1967-Quang Nam Province for period 30 Apr-May, July, Aug, Oct & Nov 1967
SOP & History of Combined Action Force
Pacification tape in envelope (C)
MACV Combined Campaign Plan 1967 (C)

Box #3

Combined Action Program (Photo Album)
Operation that has terminated folder
Combined Action Program (Photo Album)
VU-graphs
November folder
Official Personnel folder (OJT Summary for CAP)
Official Personnel Folder - Jul 1970
2d CAG VIP Fund March 1969
Official Personnel Folder - June 1970 (CAF Daily OPSums)
Jan-Apr 1971 OPSums)

Box #4

INTSUMS - Dec 1970 (C)
CAF - Daily OPSums Aug 1970 (C)
CAF - Daily OPSums Sep 1970 (C)
2d CAG-Daily OPSums Oct 1970 (C)
February OPSums 1970 (C)
CAF - Daily OPSums Mar 1970 (C)
CAF - Daily OPSums Apr 1970 (C)
CAF - Daily OPSums May 1970 (C)
CAF - Daily OPSums Jan 1970 (C)
2d CAG OP Order 1-70
Miscellaneous sheets/document material unlabeled but in the inventory (C)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Box #5

SEAPC 6/6 (Film)
CAF in action (Film)
SEAPC 2/6 (Film)
SEAPC 1/6 (Film)
SEAPC 5/6 (Film)
American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam, March 1972
Volumes I, II, & III (S)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Military Assistance Command

c/et Weller

CONFIDENTIAL

1. PURPOSE: To enhance the effectiveness of the DIOCC in the PHUNG HOANG program by improving targeting procedures and operational security.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

1. One of the major shortcomings [illegible] program in ICTZ has been the inadequate targeting of individual significant VCI.

2. Operational security has been a major area of concern in connection with DIOCC planning of VCI neutralization operations.

3. Management of the DIOCC in order to accomplish accurate records and counters, maintain necessary security, and record effective operations has been extremely difficult due to lack of homogeneity and control in the ad hoc type organization of the center.

4. The 1970 Pacification and Development Plan stresses the leading role of the National Police in the attack against the VCI.

5. The Special Police of the National Police is the agency of primary concern and possesses the best capability to coordinate and manage the political intelligence assets of the PHUNG HOANG program and to accomplish selective targeting of significant VCI.

6. At present, information concerning VCI and their activities is passively

1 Cy

ID/A 71-134 479

1- CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

received by the DIOCCs and not actively sought in order to fill intelligence gaps.

III. ASSUMPTIONS:

1. Decrease in military activity increases Police orientation of DIOCC missio

2. DIOCC member agencies do not and will not furnish their best personnel to perform DIOCC duties as the DIOCCs are presently established.

3. DIOCC working-level personnel lack motivation due to assignment away from their parent organizations.

4. Fear of security leaks in the DIOCC prevents full and uninhibited coordination and cooperation in exchange of available information among DIOCC member agencies.

5. There will be continuing and increasing interest at the highest levels of the GVN to defeat the VC Infrastructure in order to bring freedom to the people of Vietnam.

IV. DISCUSSION:

1. The Presidential decree establishing the National PHUNG HOANG P[illegible] stipulated that the National Police shall be the "principal operational [illegible] element" of PHUNG HOANG and that the plan was designed "to dis[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

and control all national efforts toward neutralizing the VC infrastructure."

The 1970 Pacification and Development Plan further stresses the key role of the National Police in the attack on the VCI.

2. The PHUNG HOANG SOPs clearly state that in order to insure the well-conducted and successful performance of the plan, close coordination between member agencies is of the utmost importance, and jealousy and selfishness must be dispelled. The progress and success of the PHUNG HOANG Plan requires unanimity and dedication from all personnel.

3. ICTZ has achieved the numerical neutralization goals of the current pacification program; however, such accomplishment has not been accomplished through deliberate, intelligent, aggressive exploitation of the PHUNG HOANG machinery but has been largely incidental to general military operations, fortuitous targets of opportunity and the Chieu Hoi program.

4. Prosecution of the attack against the VCI, of course, must include identification of individuals neutralized through general military operations, whether they be large scale-armed operations or routine daily normal security patrol, ambush, check-point missions. Optimum use must also be made of Chieu Hoi and psychological operations resources and techniques. But what

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

has been the major failure in the program? The National Police are designated as the principal operational element of PHUNG HOANG. The Special Police of the National Police have the competency and basic resources necessary for selective targeting of significant VCI; however, the animation and verve to get on with the job is lacking.

5. The functional organization of the DIOCC must provide a workable flexible framework to accomplish the multiple tasks of attacking the VCI and, equally important, must provide essential security for the processing, handling, and storage of sensitive records.

6. The DIOCC must become an active seeker of essential data that will lead to the neutralization of significant village, district, and province VCI and not, as is the present case, merely be a passive receiver of unsolicited information reports.

7. Full employment utilization must be made of the human resources available to the DIOCC. The District Chief is the DIOCC commander; however, it is obvious that he has many competing demands on his time and must entrust the actual operation of the DIOCC to his subordinates. Human nature and the conflicting special interests of the individual members of the District staff

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

cannot be completely ignored and suppressed regardless of good intentions, [illegible], charters and exhortations to cooperate closely and selflessly. The [illegible] rules of managing people (Unity of Command, Delegation of Authority, Homogeneous Assignment and Span of Control) must be considered in developing an effective, functional JICCC. An "ad hoc" organization, as the parent JICCC, staffed by levies for temporary assignment of the senior agencies has unique motivational and management problems. It is axiomatic that agencies/services will not detail their most capable people to such an organization; in fact, usually the least capable will be detailed. Personnel presently assigned in the DICOM do not identify themselves with the JICCC, but with their parent organization: RD, NSA, ACS, etc. While it is unusual or they still look to their parent organization for pay, promotion, reassignment, etc. only with an unusually strong supervisor can such an organization be expected to function with even minimum effectiveness.

8. The above remarks do not negate the JICCC concept or the key organization in attaining the objectives of [illegible]. With the concept and current broad guidance [illegible] with one basically sound can provide the effective vehicle to prosecute successfully

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

the attack against the VCI. The mission of PHUNG HOANG requires the daily close coordination of the DIOCC member agencies. The National Police cannot accomplish the task without the wholehearted support and cooperation of the other agencies. Tactical military operational activity must continue to progressively broaden the secure area and to meet and defeat any VC armed threat. Territorial forces must maintain their active defense role to provide security for the pacification and development program. The NP, RD, SCG, VIS, and the others in their developmental roles must take full advantage of their contact with the people to collect all intelligence information and make it available promptly to the DIOCC. It is recognized that each area has its individual problems, requirements and interests. Therefore, no uniform standard "TO&E" DIOCC organization is prescribed that will fit all cases and automatically function effectively. The essential DIOCC requirements are:

a. Full participation by all member agencies, particularly in providing all available information on a prompt basis.

b. Responsive to the command of the District Chief.

c. Flexible enough to meet local situation.

d. Organized to provide essential [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

e. Effective in the attack against the VCI.

9. The PHUNG HOANG Committees at the National, Regional, and Provincial levels are composed of the senior officials of the agencies represented on the committee. For example, the ICTZ Commanding General personally chairs the Regional Committee meetings. The national importance of the program demands that member agencies at the district level give priority interest to the DIOCC. It is not expected that chiefs of district-level agencies spend full time on PHUNG HOANG activities. However, neither is it expected nor condoned that member agencies give only hypocritical support to the program by assigning their least effective personnel to work in the DIOCC.

10. The present standard DIOCC organization is composed of three sections (Message, Situation, and Operation) directly under the DIOCC Chief (District Chief). [redacted] According to present directives the message section personnel are provided by the District Chief. The situation section contains the entire [redacted] Police Planning Service of the District, the S-2 and his staff, District NSS, and as minimum, representatives from Chieu Hoi, RD and SCG. The operations section (located away from other sections for security in planning according to SOP) [redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

S-) and his staff and, as a minimum, repre[redacted]

[redacted] Security/Intelligence Regional Forces and PF [redacted]

specific designations is made of individuals to serve as [redacted]

11. In actual operations in ICTZ, the District NP Chief is normally the Assistant DIOCC Chief and the Day-to-Day DIOCC Chief is the District S-2. The actual DIOCC personnel composition and functions vary widely.

12. In order to retain the basic concept of the PHUNG HOANG plan, follow the general guidance of the official SOPs, and make the DIOCCs more effective, the following extension and modification of present operational procedure is suggested:

a. The PHUNG HOANG plan decrees that the District Chief will be the DIOCC Chief. [redacted] recognizing the important role of the National Police in the program many District Chiefs logically designate the District Police Chief to be his DIOCC Deputy Chief.

b. The Message Section which performs basically an administrative and document control type role is placed under the supervision of the Situation Section. This arrangement will increase operational security by limiting access to this information to only those individuals [redacted]

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

to know".

c. The Situation Section is the intelligence portion of the DIOCC and must have professional control and direction if it is to accomplish its important mission. As in any intelligence activity the critical points are operational effectiveness and operational security. Both are essential. Only qualified individuals with a need to know can have access to the Situation Section of the DIOCC.

(1) The Situation Section can be separated into two functional sub-sections, Political Intelligence and Military Intelligence with the Message Section providing administrative support.

(2) The Political Intelligence Sub-section occupies the most critical role in the entire DIOCC and its effectiveness will provide the measurement as to how well the District is carrying out its responsibilities under the PHUNG HOANG Plan. As clearly stated in Central PHUNG HOANG directives this important role in the DIOCC falls to the lot of the Special Police. As noted earlier the Special Police is the agency of primary concern and possess the best capability to coordinate and manage the political intelligence assets of the PHUNG HOANG program and to accomplish

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

selective targeting of significant VCI. The Political Intelligence Sub-Section is composed of two branches: Records Branch and Targeting Branch.

(3) The Military Intelligence Sub-Section in most of the Districts of ICTZ will be rather small and inactive in view of the advanced stage of pacification attained in the populated areas. For this reason and to maintain clear lines of authority in handling the primary task of eliminating the political enemy threat of VCI the Military Intelligence Sub-Section (Sub Sector S-2) can be co-located with the Military Operations Sub-Section (Sub-Sector S-3) which is physically apart from the DIOCC proper as noted in the Central PHUNG HOANG SOP.

d. The Operations Section is organized into Military Operations Sub-Section and Police Operations Sub-Section to facilitate routine control and planning of static security missions, LOC security, recurrent ambush programs, control check points, patrols, etc. Planning for search operations, screening programs, quick reaction operations to targets of opportunity, and targeted apprehension operations will require coordination between military and police officials.

e. The third major functional activity of the DIOCC is a coll[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

and liaison group composed of all the participating Member Agencies of the DIOCC as required by the PHUNG HOANG Plan. This is the District official family and as such is the District PHUNG HOANG Committee. They are the key to an effective DIOCC. They are the ones, who by working together without jealousy, can provide the initial and follow-up intelligence information that will make the attack on the VCI triumph.

f. A diagram showing the present DIOCC organization expanded to demonstrate the above modified operational procedures is attached as ANNEX "A".

13. The personnel composition and mission of the DIOCC sections as modified are still basically as outlined in the official Central PHUNG HOANG SOPs. Detailed description is as follows:

a. Operations Section. General supervisor is of course the District Chief or other individual specifically designated by him. Mission is to supervise operational activities of the sub-sections and with Situation Section Chief coordinate collection activities of the DIOCC member agencies.

(1) Military Operations Sub-Section. District S-3 and staff. Normal S-3 activities to include close liaison with S-2 for maintenance of local security from threat of local and main force VC, NVA military units and VC sappers, etc.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Concurrent mission is operational support to PHUNG HOANG plan in attack on VCI. (Note: If VC/NVA military threat to district population centers overshadows the VCI threat, augmentation may be required for the S-3 Section.)

(2) Police Operations Sub-Section. District Police operations staff including NPFF and PRU representatives. Mission is to plan and carry out approved reaction and arrest missions developed by the Situation Section for purpose of eliminating or neutralizing the VCI.

b. Collation/Liaison Group Section. [redacted] an actual operating section of the DIOCC but is really the District PHUNG HOANG Committee.

(1) With the District Chief as Chairman, the Chiefs or their designated senior representatives of the following will meet frequently in informal session and not less than once weekly in a formal meeting to further the PHUNG HOANG program of the District:

(a) District National Police (NP).

(b) Sub-Sector Intelligence (S-2).

(c) Sub-Sector Operations (S-3).

(d) Military Security Service (MSS)

(e) District Special [redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(f) Regional Forces (RF).

(g) Popular Forces (PF).

(h) Static Census Grievance (SCG).

(i) Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU).

(j) National Police Field Forces (NPFF)

(k) Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC).

(l) Chieu Hoi (CH).

(m) Vietnam Information Service (VIS).

(2) The formal meetings can be a part of daily/weekly staff meetings. The active participation in this collection/liaison section fulfills the PHUNG HOANG Plan SOP requirements of representation to the DIOCC. In fact this type of participation is of much more advantage to the program than the contribution of an uninterested, unenthusiastic clerk to one of the DIOCC sections.

(3) Each of the agencies will designate a responsible individual to deliver information reports promptly to the Chief of the Message Sub-Section of the DIOCC and to report daily at a specified time to the Chief of the Situation Section to receive "Requirement Sheets" and [illegible] specific requests

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

for essential information which are to be levied on this agency for collection.

This element of the DIOCC will provide the vehicle to control the exploitation of village/hamlet PHUNG HOANG intelligence information collection capability and also contain liaison personnel from ARVN, US and FWMAF units.

c. Situation Section. Division Chief will be the District Special Police Chief. Mission is to supervise the operation of the Message and the Political Intelligence Sub-Sections of the DIOCC and coordinate the Military Intelligence Sub-Sections in order to insure proper handling, processing, and storage of intelligence information reports so that prompt and secure exploitation can be made of such information to neutralize the VCI in accordance with the PHUNG HOANG Plan.

(1) Message Section. Section Chief should be a senior police clerk. This individual must have sufficient experience and ability to recognize important reports that call for special handling and possible reaction operations. Translator/Interpreter will normally be a PHOENIX employee. Clerk/Typists in required number will be drawn from either police or PHOENIX resources. Messenger will be provided from District PF resources. Functions of Message Section will include maintenance of [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[illegible]rslation, reproduction, typing, [illegible]rrence files and distribution.

(2) Political Intelligence Sub-Section. Chief of the Situation Section directly controls the operation of the Political Intelligence Sub-Section as this is the heart of the intelligence function of the DIOCC in support of the PHUNG HOANG plan. ONLY personnel with [illegible] will be permitted access to this sub-section.

(a) Records Branch. Chief of Branch will be [illegible]nior Special Police Case Officer. Staff of Section will include required number of clerks drawn from police resources. Number of clerks will depend upon workload. Shortage of clerks might require overstrength assignment of individuals. Functions will include initiation and maintenance of alpha and village cards on identified suspect VCI, black lists, dossiers, organization charts, situation files, source control records, tracking records, and reports.

(b) Targeting Branch. The Chief of the Situation Section will directly supervise the Targeting Branch Case Officers. Personnel will include required number (dependent upon workload) of Special Police Case Officers. These are the key intelligence personnel of the PHUNG HOANG plan. Functions will include reviewing suspect VCI [illegible] information

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

gaps, preparing intelligence collection "Requirement Sheets" to task appropri[ate] collection agencies (also including coordination with neighboring DIOCCs and province PHUNG HOANG Center), studying district, village and hamlet VCI organizations in order to neutralize organizations as well as individuals and preparing target plans to assist planning for neutralization operations. Actual implementation of arrest/mission orders will be accomplished by Operations Section upon approval of District Chief.

14. The above discussion is not considered an exhaustive review and detailed SOPs must be developed for each Section of the DIOCC, using the official PHUNG HOANG SOPs as a basis. An information report flow chart is attached as ANNEX "B". A reaction operation flow chart is attached as ANNEX "C".

V. CONCLUSIONS:

1. That revitalization of the DIOCC, within the general guidelines of the official PHUNG HOANG SOPs, will improve the operational security and effectiveness of the DIOCCs.

2. That the PHUNG HOANG Program in ICTZ can [illegible] improvement by targeting significant VCI as individuals and as VCI organizations.

3. That suggested revitalization will:

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

a. More effectively utilize the capability of the National Police in attaining the objectives of the PHUNG HOANG Plan.

b. Focus attention on the need for DIOCCs to actively seek to fill intelligence gaps rather than merely passively accepting information reports.

c. Return unmotivated, under-employed individuals presently detailed to DIOCC duties to their parent organizations.

d. Improve the coordination of the district official family in fulfilling their responsibilities under the PHUNG HOANG Plan.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That two or three DIOCCs in Quang Nam Province and Danang City DIOCCs be designated as a testing ground for the Revitalized DIOCC.

2. If a three month trial of the Revitalized DIOCCs proves their value, that such modifications be recommended to the Central PHUNG HOANG Committee for implementation on a nation-wide basis.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

INFORMATION REPORT FLOW CHART

UNCLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

REACTION FLOW CHART

UNCLASSIFIED

CASE OFF (TARGET BR)

1. EVALUATE REPORT
2. DETERMINE REACTION.
   A. QUICK REACTION.
   B. COLLECTION FOLLOW-UP
   C. SURVEILLANCE
   D. PREPARE TARGET PLAN
3. RECOMMEND REACTION AGENCY.

CHIEF SITUATION SECTION
DIECC DEPUTY

1. REVIEW C/O RECOMMENDATION
2. COORD W/OPNS SEC.
3. RECOMMEND REACTION MSN.

DISTRICT CHIEF

1. APPROVE/DISAPPROVE MSN.
2. CONCUR IN REACTION AGENCY
3. ISSUE MSN ORDER

OPERATIONS SECTION

1. PASS MSN ORDER TO REACTION AGEN
2. COORD W/SITUATION SEC.
3. FOLLOW-UP.

REACTION AGENCY

(RFPF, NPFF, PRU, NP, SP SCG, RDC, MSS, INTELSQ)

1. REVIEW MSN ORDER.
2. COORD W/CASE OFF.
3. DEVELOP OPN PLAN.
4. CARRY OUT MSN.
5. REPORT RESULTS, AFTER ACTION REP.

SITUATION SECTION

1. REPORT RESULTS.
2. FOLLOW-UP

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

C/LT Weller SACSA

JCS/SACSA

PACIFICATION (U)

Background - End-1967 population "within GVN security"* (A+B+C HES categories) stood at 67.2%.

- VC Tet offensive in January 1968 resulted in a drop of 7% of population "within GVN security" to the "contested" and "VC control" categories.

- Approximately 1,000,000 new refugees/evacuees were created by the VC Tet and May offensives of 1968.

- The three-month "Accelerated Pacification Campaign" (APC) launched on 1 November 1968 gave impetus and focus to the pacification effort and provided a strong base for the 1969 Pacification plan to bring 90% of the population within GVN security. Essentially, most military operations during the APC (including large scale Allied spoiling operations) directly supported the campaign.

Discussion - Current status of pacification:

- Territorial Security is the most important condition for success in pacification. Expansion, improvement, and modernization of the RVNAF continues to be of highest priority. Regional Force companies and Popular Force platoons now number 1,267 and 4,821, respectively.

- Population and Hamlet Security for end-May (%):

	Total Pop.	Rural Pop.	Hamlets
Within GVN Security*(A+B+C)	84.2	76.4	64.9
Contested (D+E)	8.0	11.8	14.2
VC Control	7.8	11.8	15.1
- Other (less than 1% of total pop.)	----	----	5.8

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

- Phoenix/Phung Hoang. A total of 1,462 VC infrastructure (VCI) personnel were neutralized during April, 277 of whom were district level or higher cadre.

- Chieu Hoi (Ralliers). Rallier rate continues quite high with 3,926 Hoi Chanh for May.

- Revolutionary Development Cadre. End-May RD Cadre and Son Thon (Montagnard) Cadre teams numbered 1,477 and 109, respectively.

* Terminology changed from "relatively secure" by MACV.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP - 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

IDA 71-131 196

Prepared by:
LTC R.C. LAZZELL
SACSA/RD.Division
X74435
10 July 1969

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- Refugees. End-May total number of refugees awaiting resettlement stood at 1.2 million. Refugee resettlement remains a critical problem.

- People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF). By 31 May, there were 1,360,000 members of whom 868,607 were trained and 237,000 armed. These forces are becoming increasingly involved as the size of the forces grow. Performance has been fair, but at least as good as could be expected at this stage of development. The PSDF were singled out as special targets by VC terrorists during April (359 killed).

- National Police (NP). End-May National Police strength stood at 77,175. Normal attrition and limited recruitment have resulted in a slight decrease in strength since 1 January (desertions are low; average 3 per thousand per month). To meet the year-end goal of 92,200 force strength, the GVN is transferring 13,000 ARVN recruits to the NP during 1969.

- Village/Hamlet Elections - Beginning in March, the GVN resumed village and hamlet elections. Voter turnout has been high (about 90%) and little VC harassment has been reported. Numbers of villages and hamlets with elected governments are 1,846 (79% of total villages) and 8,440 (65% of total hamlets), respectively.

- 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign 1 July-31 October. Goals:

- Population and Hamlet Security:

a. Within GVN Security -- Bring 979,200 people and 50% of hamlets from a relatively secure status (HES category "C") to a more secure status (HES categories A+B).

b. Contested -- Bring 806,000 people and 1,038 hamlets from a contested status to at least a relatively secure status.

- VC Infrastructure (VCI) and Terrorism: Neutralize 7,200 and sentence 5,000 VCI. Reduce terrorism by 50%.

- People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF): Organize 375,000, train 300,000 and arm 75,897 additional personnel.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- Local Government: Elect 100 Village and 659 hamlet governments.

- Chieu Hoi Program: Induce 14,000 VC to rally.

- Refugees: Resettle 1,033,099 refugees.

- Land Reform: Release 78,510 Hectares of land to tenants.

- Assessment - Although overall trend in pacification is encouraging, a great deal remains to be done. Villages and hamlets must still be effectively linked to the national government; security in the countryside is still inadequate; numerous refugees lack adequate care; many roads, bridges, schools and marketplaces must be built to assist in reaching a sustaining rate of social and economic activity. The GVN's pacification leadership (particularly President Thieu), concept, plans and organization are the best ever. Most pacification indicators point to a better rate of progress during 1969 than in any previous year. It is too early to determine what effect US troop withdrawal is having on GVN pacification efforts.

- Other Views - There are other assessments of the past and current status of pacification by OSD and other Washington agencies. These organizations maintain that the reported gains in pacification are illusory and fragile and will disappear under enemy pressure. Another variance is whether the "C" category hamlet population (5.7 million) is "within GVN security" or "contested." The JCS, COMUSMACV and Ambassador Bunker conclude that some VC influence such as infrastructure still remains in a "C" hamlet; however, GVN presence predominates. Others, such as OASD(SA), (ISA), CIA and State (INR) conclude that the VC presence in "C" hamlets means that 50% of the "C" hamlet population can be considered primarily under VC influence. These varying assessments result in different projections for 1969.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

PACIFICATION (U)

(C) Territorial Security - Territorial Security is the most important condition for success in pacification. Expansion, improvement, and modernization of the RVNAF continues to be of highest priority. Regional Force companies and Popular Force platoons now number 1,445 and 4,731, respectively.

(C) Population and Hamlet Security - Population security continues to improve. HES data from the field indicate that as of 28 February 1969, 80.3 percent of the total population is now considered "relatively secure," which is an increase of 1.1 percent over January. The following are the significant bench marks in population security since January 1968:

	*Jan 68	Feb 68	Feb 69
Relatively Secure	11.6M (67.2%)	10.3 (59.8)	13.8 (80.3)
Contested	2.8M (16.3%)	3.8 (22.0)	1.5 (8.7)
VC Control	2.8M (16.4%)	3.1 (18.2)	1.9 (11.0)

*Pre-Tet Status

HES data for rural population and hamlet status as of end-February 1969 are as indicated:

	Rural Population	Hamlets
Relatively Secure	7.5M (70.4%)	6,965 (54.0%)
Contested	1.4M (12.9%)	1,641 (12.7%)
VC Control	1.8M (16.7%)	2,753 (21.4%)
Other (less than 1% (of Total Pop)	*	1,536 (11.9%)
		12,895

*Included in "Contested"

(U) Refugee Care - From 1964 through 1967, a total of 2,114,192 refugees had come under GVN control, of whom 793,944 were still residing in temporary camps at the end of the year. The 1968 Tet and May attacks added one million evacuees. Through an all-out effort, "Operation Recovery," the evacuees were resettled and their homes rebuilt by 31 December 1968. Since 1 January 1968, more than 1.3 million refugees (including Tet and May evacuees) have been reestablished either through permanent resettlement or through being returned to their original village. End-January total number of refugees awaiting resettlement stood at 1.3 million Refugee resettlement remains a critical problem.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prepared by: Col E.R. Brigham, USA
SACSA/RD Div. X74435
24 March 1969

Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(C) Revolutionary Development Cadre - The numbers of RD Cadre and Truong Son (Montagnard) Cadre teams as of 28 February were 779 and 180, respectively. Numbers of personnel have leveled off due to the GVN decision to emphasize improving quality rather than expanding the total program. However, the number of teams will increase as the recent GVN decision is implemented which will split RD Cadre teams into 30-man teams. RD Cadre teams are being assigned permanently to villages under the control of village councils.

(C) PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG - Attack on the VC infrastructure (VCI) neutralized 2,393 VCI personnel during January of which the majority were hamlet and village level cadre and 605 were city, district, or province level.

(C) CHIEU HOI - The Chieu Hoi (returnee) program despite a slow start in 1968 has improved dramatically since October 1968. During February 2,450 rallied to the GVN. Cumulative totals since 1 January 1969 are 5,679.

(C) People's Self-Defense Forces - The People's Self-Defense Forces continue to expand. By 31 January, there were 1,107,000 members with 659,000 trained to bear arms and 170,000 weapons distributed.

(C) Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) - The three-month successful APC ended 31 January and the objectives to expand GVN presence rapidly and to increase the impetus of pacification programs were achieved in large part. Final results indicated that of the 1,335 target hamlets, 1,055 (containing about 1.2 million people) moved up into the "C" category or higher HES security rating, which is 79 percent of the goal. Support from top GVN leaders was impressive, especially President Thieu's. One of the primary reasons for the APC's success was the enemy's failure to launch sustained attacks in force against the target hamlets. Another, and related, major factor contributing to the campaign's success was the effectiveness of the massive Allied military spoiling campaign launched in support of the APC.

(C) GVN Priority Objectives for 1969 -

a. Bring 90% of the population into the "relatively secure" category.

b. Eliminate 33,000 VC Infrastructure personnel.

c. Establish local government in all villages; elect Village Administrative Committees and Hamlet Managing

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Boards in all secured hamlets and villages; and conduct a large training program for village and hamlet officials.

d. Increase the strength of the People's Self-Defense Forces to 2,000,000 and arm at least 400,000.

e. Rally 20,000 Hoi Chanh (returnees).

f. Decrease the number of refugees to less than 1,000,000 and resettle 300,000.

g. Increase the information and propaganda effort.

h. Stimulate the rural economy and increase rice production from five to six million tons.

(C) Village/Hamlet Elections - On 2, 9, 16, and 23 March, the GVN began the 1969 village and hamlet elections, which are being conducted during the Sundays of March. Voter turnout appears to be high and little VC harassment has been reported. Preliminary reports indicate that on 2, 9, and 16 March, elections were held in 478 villages and 1,547 hamlets (goals for the March elections are 600 villages and 2,800 hamlets). The GVN is holding the results of the elections very close. US efforts are being made to have GVN release the results.

(C) Effects of Current VC Offensive on Pacification - Effects of the current enemy offensive on pacification have thus far been relatively minor. The enemy has not concentrated his main effort against pacification programs to date. The additional friendly forces developed and deployed into the countryside over the past year appear to have done the job they were intended to do. Revisions of 1969 pacification plans do not appear to be required, except perhaps for two provinces. Unless the enemy increases substantially the scale and effectiveness of his present effort, the GVN pacification programs should proceed toward previously set 1969 goals with only minor disruption.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

17 April 1971

MACV/ANA-AR 009

REGRESSION ANALYSIS, MR 1, 31 MARCH 1971

1. Forwarded herein is the requested "Analysis of Significant Province Regressions/Progressions in the HES" for Military Region 1 effective 31 March 1971. Quang Nam Province is highlighted in that its regression of 4.9% in AB population fell within the stated selection criteria of 4.9% progression/regression or higher. Every effort has been made to adhere to the formating guidance provided by Captain Thomas Ingram in his memorandum of 25 March 1971.

2. MR 1 General Overview (Changes as reflected in the HES Reports)

a. As the table below reflects, MR 1 has experienced a decline in the HES AB population category over the past quarter. The current AB population percentage of 70.68% lies midway between the 1970 AB pacification score highpoint and lowpoint; a similar pattern prevails for the ABC population category.

	MILITARY REGION ONE	
	Percent AB Population	Percent ABC Population
1970 Lowpoint	60.92% (May)	88.12% (March)
1970 Highpoint	77.70 (Nov.)	95.69 (Nov.)
31 Jan 1971	76.55	95.40
28 Feb 1971	71.62	92.58
31 Mar 1971	70.68	92.15

b. A survey of the HES sub-models indicates those factors which have contributed most to recent declines (See table below). Enemy military presence is shown to have increased over the past quarter to a level consistent with that of one year ago (March 1970); enemy military activity has escalated at a rate greater than the increase in presence levels and surpasses the activity rate of a year ago. The overall impact of military activity is shown to have grown less favorable to friendly

CONFIDENTIAL

Regraded Unclassified As of 16 July 1971.

IDA 71-134 481 1 Cy

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

forces in the current quarter. Enemy political presence (VCI) has shown no perceptible change over the past quarter and is down somewhat from its level of one year ago; however, VCI activity has increased notably in the current quarter and by March had exceeded the rate of one year ago.

MILITARY REGION ONE, PERCENT POPULATION AB

HES SUBMODELS	31 MAR 70	31 JAN 71	28 FEB 71	31 MAR 71
Enemy Military Presence	57.01	61.44	61.48	57.75
Enemy Military Activity	79.58	85.00	77.43	73.93
Impact of Military Activity	80.02	87.77	85.48	83.74
Enemy Political Presence	81.86	84.77	84.26	85.93
Enemy Political Activity	90.78	95.09	90.64	86.60

3. Regression Analysis, Quang Nam Province (-4.9% AB population, 28 February - 31 March 1971)

a. The pattern of gradual decline in AB population in MR 1 is exceeded by that in Quang Nam Province, where the decline has not only been sharper but has also carried over a longer period of time. AB population in Quang Nam has fallen from 66.46% of total province population in October 1970 to 50.35% effective 31 March 1971, a sixteen point decrease representing a loss of over 100,000 persons to the AB category over a time frame of six months; there has additionally been spillage from the ABC category, with a loss of six points from November 1970 through the current reporting month: 92.86% to 85.92% of total province population, or a loss of some 40,000 persons from the "relatively secure" (ABC) aggregation. The table below summarizes the regression pattern:

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

	Percent AB Population		Percent ABC Population	
1970 Lowpoint	37.92%	(May)	78.54%	(Aug.)
1970 Highpoint	66.46	(Oct)	92.86	(Nov.)
November 1970	66.16		92.86	
December 1970	61.29		92.27	
January 1971	59.80		91.81	
February 1971	55.25		89.93	
March 1971	50.35		85.92	

b. A study of the HES sub-models (see table below) reveals that a dramatic increase in enemy political and military activity is almost solely responsible for the sharp decline in percent AB population in Quang Nam Province over the past quarter. The ever substantial enemy military and political force presence in Quang Nam has remained relatively constant over the past year; friendly activity has also maintained a steady level.

QUANG NAM PROVINCE, PERCENT AB POPULATION

HES SUBMODELS	31 MAR 70	31 JAN 71	28 FEB 71	31 MAR 71
Enemy Military Presence	39.93%	39.80%	41.43%	38.44%
Enemy Military Activity	70.06	70.76	60.72	40.72
Friendly Military Presence	75.53	88.14	87.29	89.41
Friendly Military Activity	75.30	77.71	82.69	76.04
Impact of Military Activity	66.57	72.12	73.25	72.38
Enemy Political Presence	77.20	79.00	78.74	80.08
Enemy Political Activity	80.33	90.07	85.46	62.16

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

c. Five of nine Quang Nam districts regressed in AB population over the month of March 1971; they were Hoa Vang, Hieu Duc, Dien Ban, Duy Xuyen, and Hieu Nhon. Two districts, Duc Duc and Thuong Duc, reflected no change as they have no AB population. Finally, two districts, Dai Loc and Que Son bucked the overall trend and showed increases in the AB category. Population shifts played no role in the percentage changes. Reference the table below for a summary of the more critical AB category changes, 28 February - 31 March 1971.

QUANG NAM DISTRICTS, AB POPULATION CATEGORY CHANGES
FEBRUARY - MARCH 1971

DISTRICT	Population (as of 31 MAR 71)	CHANGE, PERCENT AB POPULATION, FEB-MAR 71 (HES Category)	(Enemy Military Activity)	(Enemy Political Activity)
Hoa Vang	183,862	- 6 points	- 14 points	- 7 points
Hieu Duc	16,845	- 13 "	- 17 "	- 21 "
Dien Ban	64,821	- 24 "	- 44 "	- 35 "
Dai Loc	54,869	+ 15 "	- 10 "	+ 2 "
Thuong Duc	13,326	no change	No change	no change
Duc Duc	46,295	no change	- 28 points	- 89 points
Que Son	61,610	+ 31 points	+ 51 "	+ 21 "
Duy Xuyen	43,419	- 48 "	- 67 "	- 47 "
Hieu Nhon	115,941	- 7 "	- 41 "	- 48 "
QUANG NAM	600,988	- 4.9 points	- 20 points	- 23 points

d. Enemy tactical unit activity during March was largely centered in those areas already holding marginal ("C" or below) HES ratings; as a consequence, regression in most of the forty-five (45) Quang Nam hamlets which dropped from "AB" to lower ratings during March can be traced to attacks by fire or terrorism. For example, rocket attacks regressed two heavily populated (7,500) hamlets within Hoi An City, the Province capital; additional attacks by fire were directed against the District capital town at Dien Ban District, where Vinh Dien Hamlet (population 9,200) fell from "B" to "C", and on several

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

occasions during the month Ha Hoa Vang District's Hoa Hiep Village (population 10,100), which regressed from "B" to "D". A sharp rise in terrorism claimed ten (10) AB hamlets in populous Hoa Vang District and fourteen (14) additional hamlets in Duy Xuyen District. While the majority of the terrorist incidents centered around traditional assassination and kidnapping activity, there was a substantial increase in forced propaganda meetings held to proclaim the "great Communist victories" in Laos.

e. Advisor narrative reports for March clearly substantiate the statistical regression reflected in HES reports for Quang Nam, as follows:

" The month of March was marked by the highest number of terrorist incidents (399) ever recorded in a one month period in MR 1. One third (129) of these incidents occurred in Quang Nam Province." (DEPCORDS, MR 1, in the MR 1 Overview for March).

" The enemy expended great effort to co-ordinate the 2 March - 1 April highpoint. It is believed that the importance of this highpoint is connected to the recent Lam Son (Laos) operations and the necessity of either causing a withdrawal of troops from it or increasing the fears of the local population which would in turn embarrass the government. While he has inflicted serious damages to the Province, it is felt that he will not be able to increase his activities sufficiently to do more than harass the pacification efforts." (PSA, Quang Nam Province Report for March.)

f. Special Note: The most heavily publicized event of the enemy March highpoint in Quang Nam, the savage NVA attack against Duc Duc District, is not reflected in HES AB population regression figures in that the District had contained no "A" or "B" hamlets prior to the attack. The HES did, however, indicate a regression of twenty (20) hamlets, containing 38,000 persons, from the "C" category; ABC population fell from 91.4% of District total to 8.88%.

R. R. Jones III
MR 1 Analyst
CONTROL DATA CORPORATION

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted] Military History Div.

From: BG Cushman

Sent:

C/Gen Weller

PACIFICATION OPERATIONS IN THE 21ST INFANTRY DIVISION

Lieutenant Colonel John H. Cushman

The central problem in South Vietnam is that the Viet Cong insurgents are in control of vital areas of the countryside. Whatever else may be required to cope with the situation in South Vietnam and in Southeast Asia as a whole, regaining control of the countryside by the legitimate government of Vietnam is absolutely essential.

United States advisors, military and civilian, have been working with the Vietnamese government in attempting to meet this requirement for several years. A number of concepts have been applied--some successfully, other with less success. A large body of experience has been built up by U.S. Army officers during these years - experience which can be of value both in solving the problems of Vietnam in the immediate future, and in assisting other countries around the globe who may be confronted with similar situations.

This article should be viewed as a contribution to that body of experience. It describes the problem of pacification as it has existed in one division area of Vietnam over the past year or more, and the manner in which the division, with the advice and assistance of United States military personnel and civilians, attempted to cope with the problem.

The 21st Division Area

A Vietnamese division commander today serves in two roles. First, he commands an ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) infantry division of three regiments each with three battalions, plus normal supporting troops and attachments. For the 21st Infantry Division the ARVN attachments were ranger companies (generally nine) and an M113 troop. Second, he is commander of a territory known as a "division tactical area." It is this latter capacity which causes the Vietnamese division command to be concerned with pacification.

The tactical area of the 21st Infantry Division is located in the southernmost tip of Vietnam - south of the Bassac River. Although this area of rice paddies and countless small waterways is generally considered part of the "Delta," it is actually south of the delta formed by the mouths of the Mekong.

Since the formation of the Vietnamese IV Corps in December 1962, the tactical area of the 21st Division has varied from four to six provinces,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IDA 70- 129428

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

appropriate aptitudes, and depend upon them, through doing course planning in terms, to develop them as discussion leaders and group members. This approach is worth pursuing, even if only as an interim measure. However, the terms should be offered some supplementary assistance on training techniques.

b. The [illegible] & Fifth Special Issues Group program, with its special emphasis on psychological motivation, apparently has capabilities of developing instructor-leaders of extraordinary effectiveness. Although large numbers cannot be expected quickly from this source, the potential should be exploited to the full. One avenue would be to select a Fifth Group-oriented cadre [illegible] "motivation" approach [illegible] and then [illegible] a supplement. Another would be to attempt the application of psychological techniques as a supplement to existing training.

c. [illegible] in order just how practical [illegible] the [illegible] training outlined for [illegible] and [illegible]. The shortness of developed course [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] training appointments would [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] training directors who [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

The programming should, of course, include projections of manpower and instructional requirements, indications of times and places for formal training, and guidelines on policies and techniques.

Since no one is certain how best to train for rural construction the program planning should provide for deliberate experimentation and pilot programs. It should also provide for some imperical research into techniques and materials, as has already been suggested to the MIA.

The fact that the inspection function is not being left out of current planning for Rural Construction, as it has been in past operations, is very encouraging. The inspection will hopefully not be confined to questions of mere conformity but contribute to procedural simplifications and other improvements and to the evaluation of program results. But other means besides formal inspection should be used in the evaluation of training; in fact, the planning of each program and course should provide for follow-up and evaluation. In this way everyone concerned will be kept "on their toes"

4. Organizing for cadre training

A first principle is that each executive and supervisor is responsible for seeing that his subordinates get necessary training. This concept, however, has not been well established in Vietnam. (That is one reason why executive development is so important as a prelude to training at lower levels)

For the staff specialty of training rural construction cadres, current thinking at the Ministry seems to be along sound lines, for example, (a) a division at headquarters would program the training, train instructors and other key leaders, and support and guide training operations, which will be largely decentralized; (b) the province level will have the main operating responsibility for training but the province training director will be encouraged to further decentralize by having mobile training teams out in the districts.

For the training of technical cadres the technical ministries will be relied upon. Some can perhaps be assisted on training techniques in the field and basic specialists should certainly receive orientation in the work of rural construction teams on which many of them will be participating. Likewise, the rural construction supervisors will need continuing orientation in the program goals of various ministries whose accomplishments they will affect, including Interior's goals for the long range strengthening of local government.

A general framework of organizational responsibility for training is suggested by the attached chart (considered to be only a rough start). As the program affects so many ministries it seems desirable to have an inter-agency advisory group in Saigon and at strategic

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

points in the field (This may already be in the Ministry's thinking). The inter-ministerial committee which considered the proposed leadership training programme in 1964 might be built upon for this enlarged purpose.

Ivan Acuy RID/CO

[illegible]

PLACES OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRAINED

TO ACCOMPANY BRIEF, CONFIDENTIAL

	Admin. & Tech.	CDRAO & Dist. Ofs.	Hdqs.	Nos. of B.C. Provincial & Dist.	Other Min. including Crown & Private
Leadership training					
Top level (ndonesian			xxx		x
Prov. Chief & deputies			x		xx
Dist. Chief & deputies	x	x		xx	x
BC cadre supervisor		x	x	xx	
Instructors	x	x	xx	x	
Cadres					
Rural Comst.				x	
Survey		x			
Technical				x	xx

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CADRE PROGRAM

I. The Cause

People will be prepared for democratic government through a program to stimulate individual responsibility. There will be social and political development of village and hamlet. The principle will be to demonstrate that society, represented by the government, has a number of services to offer local people. These services will be most effective when the individual participates in the society.

II. Cadre Mission

The mission of the cadre is to help local people to solve local problems. The cadre will assist in bringing service, on behalf of the society, to the individual; and convince him that his best interest is served by participating in the developing society.

III. The Program

A. Any cadre program should be part of a general reform which will proceed at all levels. If public conscience is not the rule for the highest levels of government there will be a vicious morale problem for the cadre.

B. There are two general divisions of cadre: field and technical service. Field cadre will be combined to form ten man teams for pacification. Technical service cadre will be attached to these field teams on a temporary basis as requested by team leaders.

C. For both categories of cadre there is an urgent need for a civil service system. Regardless of Agency or Ministry there must be one comprehensive salary scale. Per diem rates should be the same for all cadre and paid only for those who operate in the field. There must be a uniform code for promotion, cadre benefits, hiring, and termination of employment.

D. For the employment of pacification field teams to be most successful, certain pre-conditions are mandatory.

1. The new program must be field tested in three separate areas for a minimum period of six months prior to general implementation. A general order without practice of the theory would be a waste of time, resources, and personnel. A test period will permit refinement of concept and principles. A core of cadre for expansion will be developed. There will be time for organization of logistics and administration.

2. The test period should be in areas where the presence of different factors will provide an interesting test, Security should be improving. Suggested areas are:

.../2

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

1. Quang Nam
2. Binh Dinh
3. Chau Doc

3. In the operational area there must be unity of command under the Province Chief.

4. The field team will consist of ten men organized into three cells of three men each and directed by a team leader. Each cell will have a development cadre, intelligence cadre, and propaganda cadre. The number of teams in a district will vary by population.



5. The entire team works with the local village and hamlet leaders. The team cooperates with the local defense unit and everyone on the team is responsible for team security.

6. The team leader must liaison and cooperate with the local leadership and the District Chief to resolve problems.

7. The development cadre must work with the local leadership to determine how assistance can be brought to the people. He will coordinate the activity of technical service cadre assigned to the team.

8. The intelligence cadre will be aware of and report on social and political grievances as well as establish friendly intelligence source.

9. The propaganda cadre will identify and frustrate enemy propaganda. He will work with the local defense unit to promote popular propaganda.

10. The technical service cadre will receive temporary assignment to field teams and work on development projects under the direction of local leadership and the team leader.

11. The field team should stay in an area working with the local leaders until they become self-sufficient. In practice the teams will be semi-permanent. Short tours of less than a year by a cadre team is of marginal value.

12. Unity of resources and planning will be applied to the problem. If the GVN is now prepared to work for a comprehensive program, the United States Mission advisory effort should do the same. Unity of resources includes personnel.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

13. The civilian cadre effort will be coordinated with troop motivation programs in the impact area. Teams and platoons should work together: one team per platoon; but, cadre motivatio is of questionable value if local security forces are unsympathetic. This coordination can be realized by:

a. Making Chau Doc a test area and requesting USSF to place their planned motivation effort for two other provinces into the two other test areas. In Chau Doc USSF is sponsoring an advanced motivation program for Para-Military forces.

b. Direct the Popular Forces Command to send their Corps Instructional Teams to the other two test areas as well.

c. The Special Forces and Popular Forces programs are already integrated in Chau Doc.

IV. Cadre Training Program

A. Technical service cadre who do not meet professional standards must be sent to rural centers for remedial training. Agricultural cadre could go to Lam Dong. Medical cadre could go to Qui Nhon.

B. Technical service cadre who do meet professional standards enter a motivation and self-defense training course of fifteen days.

C. Field team cadre begin a three week training course which prepares them for:

1. Motivation of self and others.
2. Knowledge and practice of duties and government services availat
3. Self-defense.

D. The training for motivation and self-defense will take place in the local area. The instructional staff will be mobile and train the cadre the problem area. Six instructors can work with fifty trainees, utilizi a group dynamics approach at the team level.

E. Thirty days prior to the initiation of the program and its training complement; an operating group of instructors and American advisors must be formed.

1. The Vietnamese instructors must have had previous experience in motivation training. Personnel of this type are available from OSA, MACV, USSF and JUSPAO.

2. The American advisors must be able to speak Vietnamese and be willing to share the same field conditions faced by the teams they work with.

.../4

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

F. With an initial complement as stated above the operating group would take the following steps to develop a program for motivation training.

1. Make an area analysis.
2. Become familiar with trainee characteristics.
3. Know the purpose of the training.
4. Determine training methodology.
5. Develop a training content for approval.

G. Beginning on the first cycle of training the operating group would have the capacity to train 150 cadre, or 15 teams, during each three week cycle. Increase of instructors and advisors would stimulate greater production.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

11-9-65

CONCEPTS PICTURE OF CURRENT CADRE SITUATION
Project Grouping, Selected Items Reported by Prov Reps, Sept/Oct '65.

USOM Province Reps often wonder how much is read and used of what they diligently report. Now that there is much study and discussion of Rural Construction and related cadre matters, we are presenting a "feed-back" of specific items of information from all of the "Cadre" sections of the September and October reports. It is hoped this will facilitate comparison, analysis and idea exchange.

Provinces are identified by using the CDD standard numbering in north to south order. "S" means September report and "O" means October.

Team Organization and Operations

For new Marble Mountains Operation, cadre will be divided into small groups, each attached to one village to assist village committee by classifying, recruiting PF forces, and establishing Peoples Intelligence System to strengthen defenses. In event there is no village committee, cadre will have responsibility while awaiting its appointment. (3-O)

Each of four districts and a city has a cadre team that helps to some extent on self help. They average about eight hamlets per district per month. ( )

Work of Mobile Action Cadre (52 in 12 teams of 2 districts) includes screening the population, choosing permanent cadre, providing political and military training for older people and combat youth, constructing hamlet defenses and organizing hamlet councils (3-S).

Seven MAC teams are operating around the province, two each in two districts, and three in a third (11-S 0)

Seven teams (57 cadre) are working in three flood resettlement hamlets. (13-O)

Mobile Action Cadres are working in presently secured districts (same as in October but rated "Satisfactory" in Sept. and "Unsatisfactory" in Oct. (11-S,O)

Of 40 remaining mobile cadre, 30 were occupied with home guard training and 10 were working in the MSH. (8-S)

All 6 MAC teams are assigned to work with military units providing security for a highway and are supposed to work in nearby hamlets. Observations indicate the cadre are almost completely inactive. (16-S)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

The provinces' 70 MACs are concentrated in two hamlets in one district. Besides this overconcentration, lack of supervision by district officials is a cause of inefficiency. (17-S)

Proposed new plan of Prov. Rep would coordinate all pacification efforts and develop a team of trained individuals, taken primarily from the ministry tech. service cadre, to concentrate all efforts on a single village which is under pacification (17-O)

Cadre fall under the leadership of Sub-Sector ARVN SO and these leaders are only partially effective. (23-O)

12 hamlets of 3 villages were improved during 1967 by a team comprised of Prov Chief, Regional Pf. advisor and Free Forces Coord. (22-S)

Distribution of 107 NCM/TO Cadres ranges from 3 to 10 in 5 districts (25-S)

Most of the 277 cadre are distributed in 3 districts (25-S,O)

Besides 140 AO cadre (32 NCM and 108 GAIO), there are an additional 200 of various sorts: police, info., health, ARA, civil and work cadres (27-O)

The 65 MACs are distributed 25 to Provincial Team and 9-11 to 4 districts each. (31-S)

69 cadre worked in 17 hamlets undergoing pacification (37-S)

Present 9% NC cadre (of 105 authorized) organized in 11 teams. Mainly they are consolidating, with little expansion of pacification (43-S)

Cadre Pattern in One Province

Province has 754 cadre representing 11 specialties: RC 161, Health 98, Animal Husbandry 15, Agric. Extension 15, Land Reform 15, Fishery 15, Administrative 92, Social Welfare 6, Info. 20, Youth 110, Civil Def 27. Some are in process of recruiting more. (45-S)

Special Categories of Politico-Administrative Cadre

Information Cadre, it is reported (717 on them) are mostly living in exile and are low in morale. (3-S)

ATS cadres reduced to 31 by 3 resignations and one death. Hope to find replacements (34-S)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Some slight morale problem for MACs due to profusion of APA, PAT, Trong Son and other cadres but it is being overcome (14-0)

APA strength in province is being doubled through training (25-S)

All various CAS Teams along with CAMO are well organized, coordinated, and very effective. USOM is now working directly with these teams. (34-0)

Coordination and Cooperation

Big training course finished several subjects on Culture: Rural Cadre, VIAG, Psy-War, Lst'n Police, Rural Health workers. (3-0)

Province is sincerely if slowly trying to weld all groups into some sort of cohesive whole. In two areas cadres were used in unusual display of org. and teamwork (14-0)

Prov Rep's plan for restructuring entire operation emphasizes coord. (17-0)

No progress in joining NLM with CAMO (33-0)

MAC having been combined with CAMO and others(?) are potentially more effective (34-S)

Mobile Admin. Cadre operate together effectively with PATs, Census Grievance Teams & Armed Propaganda Teams in pacification efforts. (34-0)

Rural Construction Accomplishment

Criteria of "pacification" lowered to 4 instead of the usual 6, apparently so "progress" can be reported. (1-0)

Pacification Zone

55 hamlets 1st 6 mo.; 34 next 3 mo. of '65 (2-S)

Inspection team agreed the 12 hamlets in 3 villages they inspected all meet pacification criteria (22-S)

8 more hamlets completed bringing total to 46, the highest yet for one mo. 28 are under pacification. (24-S)

Of 17 hamlets programmed for pacification in '65, 15 are reported pacified on all 6 criteria. Also 40 previously pacified hamlets have been repacified or consolidated. (10-0)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

305 hamlets have completed their 6-point criteria. 15 others are underway. (26-0)

MAC continue to remain effective (28A-S)

MAC are working satisfactorily, though inadequate personnel system remains unsolved (29-S)

Of 257 hamlets in prov., 224 have met 6-point criteria and 33 under construction (37-S)

With the outbreak of cadre we are doing a better job with what we have so the cut did no harm. Rural Health and MAC are doing a very fine job (39-S)

Despite loss of Mobile Action Cadre, hamlet and village councils trained to perform the MAC function are doing fairly well. (41-S,O)

Province is on schedule. Of 143 hamlets programmed for '65, 104 have been pacified and 38 more are due by end of year (44-O)

Some Progress Indicated

Province considers 105 of its 124 hamlets to be pacified (33-S)

129 hamlets reported pacified through September (12-S)

17 additional hamlets completed, bringing total to 284 with 36 underway (26-S)

4 hamlets pacified in September, 2 in October (35-S,O)

5 hamlets under construction, 12 reconstructed so far in '65. None during Sept; (MAC cadre operation "satisfactory") (42-S)

Lack of Accomplishment and Observations Thereon

4 new hamlets were pacified to everyone's relative satisfaction. On the other hand, VN inspectors claimed 50 other hamlets pacified, apparently using 4-point criteria (1-O)

Of 256 hamlets targeted for 1965, only 67 are secure under GVN control (6-O)

Progress slow and relatively ineffective (15-O)

Of the total cadres reported (175) only 50% are actually in the hamlets (4-S)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Entirely too much time spent in offices (4-0)

Little is seen of cadre being active in field. Prov Chief found 14 NLH teams not functioning in an area where assigned (6-0)

NLH cadres work at prov. headquarters. Chief of RC council seldom visits projects unless ordered. (18-S)

The whereabouts of the Mobile Action Cadre continues to be a mystery. The only indication that such people exist is a payroll. An agreement was made with the Prov Chief that no additional cadre would be hired when existing cadre resigned. In the past months 20-30 cadre would resign per month. However, since the agreement was made there have been no reports about resignations of the MAC (9-S)

In relation to its numbers, MAC's accomplishments are unsatisfactory. The elimination of this cadre in favor of a better approach is recommended. (17-S)

Cadre continue to be ineffective in ways and for reasons enumerated in previous reports. (25-S,0)

MAC cadre are still ineffective and worthless. Actually, it is most difficult to find something positive. (28-S)

Problems remain the same: lack of personnel due to draft and small wages; inability to live and sleep in hamlets due to inadequacy of security force. (32-S)

Some Mobile Cadres are working in the field but many paid as Cadre are in fact female clerical help in hdqrs. offices. (34-S)

During October there were 7 cadre casualties plus a hamlet chief and assistant. The essential prerequisite of security was lacking. Cadres often spend little time in their assigned hamlets, especially at night. (Prov rating moved from satisfactory in September to unsatisfactory in October) (40-0)

Little expansion is taking place -- just consolidation -- due to sufficient RF and PF protection. (43-S)

Information about RC activities is limited due to lack of informed personnel in RC office (43-0)

It is generally felt among the people that political action cadre are for the most part ineffective, and their existence ignored (32-0)

Performance of NLH Cadres in field is far from satisfactory owing to poor supervision and lack of support & transportation (33-S,0)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

On the other Hand

MAC are still performing satisfactorily: Greatest boon is the 10% salary increase retroactive to January 1, 1965. (29-0)

Some hamlet oriented cadres from various services have developed through experience into reasonably effective teams. It has been urged that the cream be retained and retrained. (14-8)

Mobility Solid?

"Fine" and lauded by recent military successes... The cadres have shown a markedly changed attitude. They have shown more dedication and seriousness..." (5-0)

Motivation on the part of leaders at every cadre level is lacking. (23-0)

Frequent laziness and lack of ability make the mobile cadre a very weak aspect of RC effort (27-0)

Discontentment with low as living costs rise is on the increase, causing a change in MAC cadre rating from satisfactory in September to unsatisfactory in October (28A-0)

Leadership Factors

Weak and ineffective leadership among most service chiefs lowers cadre effectiveness (6-0)

A lack of follow-up actions on this program from the Province level was observed. (12-8)

A good leader for RC program must be appointed in every prov. Prov Govt officials can't visit unmotivable often and cadre of all types must represent them. Most ARVN 25 officers under whose leadership the cadre fall are only partially effective. (23-0)

Poor supervision a cause of GVN ineffectiveness (33-8)

Training

Prov. Chief emphasized training for effectiveness of new plan (3-8)

Large number (344) from 9 categories received training (3-0)

More accent placed on training recently (5-8)

All 3 districts held 1-week programs for retraining MACs. All services took part (9-0)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

About 40 APA recruits were sent to Vung Tau for Training in September (25-S)

Prov Rep is planning to assist Prov in conducting additional training and orientation (33-S)

71 RC cadre recently completed training to fill vacancies (44-S)

Needs and Problems Involving Training

After eliminating deserved, training should be given the remainder (1-O)

25 of the 52 cadre are new and not yet trained (34-O)

Lack of training still limits initiative and effectiveness (13-O)

Had hoped to send 9 key cadre to Saigon for training during November (ed. note: Probably that was the Leader training program planned by Minister Ung and later postponed indefinitely) (15-O)

A II Corps announcement in May that Corps would be responsible for future training of Mobile Action Cadres caused local advanced training to be halted. The issue has been further complicated by an announcement that Saigon would train selected MAC in advanced subjects. The USOM rep. is attempting to resolve jurisdictional responsibility in this key program (15-S)

The only training received by two new MAC teams was to work with the existing teams, the value of which is highly questionable. (16-S)

Intensive retraining for MACs is a must (28-S)

Manpower Problems

CMMD has dropped to 1/2 strength but is still deemed by TT supervisor to be progressing satisfactorily ( )

Of 77 cadres authorized, 62 are on the job (10-O)

Of 112 MACs approved 90 are reported on duty (12-S)

NLM program still suffers from acute shortage of cadres due to draft and resignations. (19-S)

Recruitment of mobile cadres impossible for 1500$. (22-S)

Only 18 of 140 authorized Mobile Admin. Cadres are on hand owing to recruitment problems (25-S)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

With 72 mobile cadre authorized, province has 25, expects to lose 9, leaving 16. No new ones were recruited during Sept. (27-S)

MACs down to 31 of authorized 98. (28-S)

Two MAT teams are now full at strength; it is hoped a 3rd soon will be (28A-S)

Even with salary increase, MAC's scale is still low and cadres jump to other cadre categories for better salaries (29-O)

At least 11 more MAT teams are needed (77 cadres) (32-O)

69 cadre vs 105 authorized (37-O)

1 cadre killed and 2 dismissed (39-O)

Considerable losses of cadre to go to armed forces and nat'l police brought cadre 24 below auth. level but village and hamlet councils continue to perform MAC function fairly well (41-S,O)

Selection Out and Recruiting In.

Need to clear out dead wood (1-O)

Succeeded in recruiting 42 GAMO (3-O)

3 new female cadre recruited during Sept.; 2 in Oct. Most MAT cadre at present are female.

Recently the prov. recruited 35 more MAT cadre, bringing the total to 62. They hope for salary increase early in '66. ( )

Most new recruits are young, inexperienced, poorly motivated. (3-S)

Plans are underway to recruit 10 more cadre teams (7-S)

Two additional MAC teams were recruited (16-S)

Especially difficult to recruit Mobile Admin. Cadres in view of high educational requisites. (29-O)

A long range solution to the recruiting and retention problem is mandatory. (27-S)

Present recruiting effort is expected to bring GAMO to target of 100 (34-O)

With recent recruitment and training RC cadre are up to 161 authorized (44-S)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

A Few Examples of Specific Activities

Among varied activities are encouraging and guiding people to use insecticide, census taking, health and sanitation campaign, defense system and information campaign on govt. policies. (31-0)

Self-help program occupies 1/3 (of 52) cadre (31-0)

MACs have been an arm, not always strong, of Self-Help, e.g., construction of a meeting house and road. Helps with "feed back" on SH priority needs. (14-0)

MACs assisting on Self-Help. (19-S,0)

Refugee processing and assistance: (31-S) (31-0) (7-0) (19-S) (29-0)

The cadres have assisted in getting 38 VC to return to GVN side and have repaired or constructed 320 houses for refugees (14-0)

Relocation work (3A-S) (4-0) (7-0) (19-S,0) (29-0)

Rice harvest operation used 7 cadre (3-S)

Bulgar Wheat demonstration (19-S,0)

Special Survey Cadre

4 survey teams but confined to one district (4-0)

Survey Team operated in 2 villages 1st half of month then moved to another. (23-0)

Functions greatly overlap, particularly Rural Political and Survey Cadres. Consolidation urged. (29-S)

One Survey Team did a relatively good reporting job tho' making exaggerated claims as to relative GVN/VC influence. Deterioration of security inhibits use of results. The second and newer survey team, despite better security, lacks necessary skill and experience. (29-0)

Desire 4 survey teams but recruitment difficult (22-0)

Two survey teams with 22 cadre have surveyed 7 hamlets in 2 districts (27-0)

A move forward will be training of 5 MACs and 2 CASO for Survey Team (28-S). Survey reports are proving to be very enlightening. (28-0)

18 in 2 teams surveyed 4 hamlets in one district. (30-0)

50 in 4 teams surveyed 24 hamlets in 4 districts (36-0)

Survey in one hamlet involved 167 interviews for 890 houses, 1017 pop in secure areas. 3562 total pop. (40-S)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Two Hamlet Survey Teams completed training and conducted surveys in 6 hamlets. Reports provided valuable info in September... (31-S) very useful info in Oct. for cadres and GVN officials. Prov Chief intends to see that district chiefs and others follow through on info and recommendations of survey teams (41-O)

Change in Organization or Approach

A new pacification plan associated with US Marine Clearing operations was devised (3-O). Known as Hurrle (the Pacification Oper., its aim is to clear and hold 5 villages. A training and operations scheme was devised (2-O)

"Return to the Village Campaign" of Prov Chief successfully employed all types of cadres in assisting the villagers (5-S) Pil-t project paved way for full utilization of cadres (5-O)

Although not yet implemented, a plan for reorganization of PSDs seems set. The 110 Provincial Workers will include 70 paid by MAC budget and 40 detached from other services such as Agriculture and Animal Husbandry. (14-S)

Elimination of the Mobile Action Cadre Program and substitution of a more technically proficient staff at village level, with closer and better supervision by district and provincial officials, would more likely produce results. The present approach is merely sending good money after bad. (17-S)

A plan drawn up by Prov. Rep. aims at coord. of all pacification efforts at village level (Preliminary draft copy available in OPO) (17-O)

Proposal submitted by Prov Chief to Gen. Chairman of Hoy Tac I would dissolve all 3 categories of RD cadre and substitute non-cons already trained in psy-war etc. Prov Rep says "It is my opinion we are wasting our time with armed civilian cadre. I recommended we try military cadre and the organization as proposed with perhaps some change, i.e., health cadre ..." (23-S) (Translated proposal is available from OPO)

Consolidation of Rural Political and Survey Cadres has been encouraged by both USOM rep and "MVN office" through written suggestions to their respective offices. (25-O)

Still feel cadre personnel should be made part of normal GVN civil service system (29-O)

Importance of Improvement

"... Cadres are the major key to the success of any pacification program" (3-S)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

" The potential advantage, notwithstanding the ... threat, of ... as terrorists potential as those endure when directly impeached and properly advanced, and those moments ... pin with on their backing and ... ." (C-NF)

Whose most important Soviet line order (regt, radio, service etc.) should not be neglected. Why are the backbone of principal guerrilla-... (2) C)

Summary by Type of Mental and Emotional Stability of Hostile Leaders (Bloc) Since, Mar October

	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Change (Adv., Fell, Both)
U	5 (1 with +)	1 (1 with minus)	1 advanced from U to S
AU	3 (1 with +)	9 (1 with -) (1 with +)	1 fell from S to U
XXX (1 UR)	4	7 (2 with +)	1 advanced from U to S
XV	12 (2 with +) (2 with -)	3 (2 with plus)	1 fell from S to U
Total	24	20	2 advanced, 2 fell.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

FROM ARMY UNITS

Many Sept. Pilots of Invasion with Perfect Fidelity to Mobile Action (MFI) Centre . No reflect favorable and unfavorable trends, as indicated by numerous comments, a plus or minus marking has been added.

	Satisfactory			Unsatisfactory		
	+	✓	-	+	✓	-
X.		2-S,O				1-S,O
		3-O*			3-3	
		34-S,O				
	5-S,O	4-S,O				
X.		7-S,O				6-S,O
		8-S,O				
	10-S,O	31-O*			11-O*	
					12-S	
					13-S	
				14-S,O		15-S,O
					16-S,O	
				17-S,O		
XI.		19-S,O			10-O	
		22-O*			22-S	
		21-O			23-S,O	
					24-S,O	
					25-S,O	
		30-S,O			26-S,O	
						27-S,O
					28A-S,O	28-S,O
XV.		29-S,O			33-S,O	
		31-S,O			34-S,O	
		29-S,O				
		36-S,O	35-S,O			
		37-S,O				
		40-O				
		32-S,O				
		39-S,O				38-O*
	41-S,O	52-S,O				
	44-S,O		43-S,O			

* Shifted between Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory from Sept. to Oct.

Iran Army - ZAS/CAO

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

[illegible]

Mobile to South Order

[illegible]

Alphabetical

[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

NOTE ON CONVERSATION WITH [illegible] TUCKO, SEVENTY YEARS
CONCERNING [illegible] VIET NAM, VICE PRESIDENT OF VIETNAM, MEKONG.

1- Real reform must proceed at all levels simultaneously; .Otherwise there will be vicious descrepency between the trained cadre and high levels.

2- The cadre concept should be to help the local people solve local problems.

3-In a new cadre program there should be a minimum six month test period in two or three different areas . A general order without pratice of the theory would be a waste of time ,effort, and personel. A test period permits development od a core cadre and refinement of concepts. It also permits organization of logistics and administration for expansion.

4- The field team of cadre should stay in an area as long as their presence is required to help train local leaders. This means until the local leaders are self-sufficient. In pratice then the team will be semie- permanent. One to six months tour by a cadre team is not sufficient.

5- The field team will work with the hamlet and village chiefs to assist them.

6- The field team will be work with the local defense unit of the village.

7- The composition of the field team will be:



8- The task of the team leader is to liason and cooperate with the local leadership and District Chief in resolving problems.

9-The task of the development cadre is to work with the local leadership in determining how government assistance can be brought to the people and and coordinate activity of technical service cadre assegined to the team on temporary duty.

10- The job of the intelligence cadre is to be aware of social and political grievances as well as to establish friendly intelligence sources.

11- The job of the propaganda cadre is to identify and frustrate enemy propaganda, at the sametime working with the local defense force to promote

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

I2- The job of technical service cadre is to accept temporary assigment to the field teams and work an development projects under the direction of the team leader and local leadership.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFE E
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

47937

SECTIONS 1 2 & 3
OF 3
CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/HC
SERVICE

6 10 20 33Z

VZCZCJCS202
PP RUEOJFA RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #2052 1611745
ZNY CCCCC
P 101530Z JUN 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEOJFA/JCS
RUEOJFA/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEADDA/AID WASH DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASH DC
RUEHIA/USIA WASH DC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/DIR USAID SAIGON
ZEN/DIR JUSPAO SAIGON
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEGATION
RHMMAFA/CG III MAF DA NANG
RUMLMQA/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
RUMUFQA/CG II FFOR CEV LONG BINH
RUMUJLB/CG DMAC CAN THO
RT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 34388 (JOIR) SECTION 1 OF 3
SUBJECT: STATUS OF PACIFICATION-- END-MAY 1969 (U)
1. (U) INTRODUCTION. IN PREPARATION FOR DETAILED DEVELOPMENT OF PHASE II PACIFICATION GOALS, PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING CENTER STAFF CONDUCTED FIELD INSPECTIONS DURING MAY IN ALL CTZ'A WITH PARTICIPATION BY MACV REPRESENTATIVES. FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF PACIFICATION STATUS AS OF EN-MAY IS BASED ON OBSERVATION BY THESE MACV REPRESENTATIVES AND SYNTHESIS OF OTHER REPORTS ON EACH OF MAJOR PACIFICATION PROGRAMS.
2. (C) SUMMARY. THE FOLLOWING TABLE SUMMARIZES PACIFICATION STATUS IN TERMS OF EXTENT OF ACHIEVEMENT OF EN-JUNE GOALS AFTER FOUR MONTHS OF THE FIVE-MONTH LONG PHASE I (STARTED 1 FEBRUARY 1969) HAVE ELAPSED:

OBJECTIVE	GOAL (END-JUNE)	ATTAINED (END-MAY)	PER CENT ACHIEVEMENT
TARGET HAMLETS	1,691	1,479 (ENTERED)	87 PER CENT
VC INFRASTRUCTURE	9,000	4,506 (END-APR)	50 PER CENT
PSDF: ORGANIZED	1,730,000	1,360,000	36 PER CENT

INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-2 J3-12 J4-3 J5-2 SACSA-4 NMCC-1 SDEF-7
ASD/ISA-9 AS /IL-1 ASD/PA-1 ASD/COMP-1 M&RA-1 ASD/SA-3 WH-10 DIA-15
CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1(92) RBK/JEM

IDA c 71-18443

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

ARMED	295,000	237,000	(PHASE I INCREMENT) 35 PER CENT (PHASE I INCREMENT)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT			
VILLAGE ELECTIONS	569	625	110 PER CENT
HAMLET ELECTIONS	3,117	3,163	101 PER CENT
CHIEU HOI	15,600	11,265	72 PER CENT
REFUGEES RESETTLED	1,083,691	149,862	14 PER CENT
INFORMATION	IMPROVE	MARGINAL IMPROVEMENT	NA
RURAL ECONOMY	STIMULATE	ADEQUATE PROGRESS	NA

COMULATIVE,
CPDC HAS NOT YET AMENDED PHASE I GOAL, PROPOSED END-CY 69 GOAL IS 600,000, WHICH IS MORE REALISTIC, WITH PERHAPS 300,000 AS REASONABLE GOAL FOR PHASE I, ACHIEVEMENT AS OF END-MAY WOULD BE 50 PER CENT,
3, (U) COMMENTS, FOLLOWING ARE BRIEF COMMENTS ON EACH OF EIGHT MAJOR PACIFICATION OBJECTIVES IN 1969 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM,
4, (C) EXPAND TERITORIAL SECURITY, RESULTS HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORY AS POPULATION WITHIN GVN SECURITH (ABC CATEGORIES OF HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM) HAS RISEN FROM 79,2 PER CENT AT END- JAN, TO 83,3 PER CENT AT END-APRIL--A NET GAIN OF 4,1 PER CENT, END-MAY DATA IS NOT UET AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH TREND OVER PAST THREE MONTHS SEEMS
TO HAVE CONTINUED AND ABC POPULATION MAY INCREASE ABOUT 1 PER CENT MOST (IU) OF TERGET HAMLETS HVAE BEEN ETERED BUT NOT ALL BAVE REACHED C LEVEL, WHICH WAS MINIMUM OBJECTIVE, FURTHEREXPANSION INTO ADDITIONAL TARGET VILLAGES AND HAVLETS WILL BE FACILITATED BY DEPLOYMENT OF 278 RF COMPANIES ORGANIZED OUT OF 39,000IN-CREASE AUTHORIZED AT END-1978, BY 20 JULY ALL COMPANIESWILL HAVE COMPLETED TRAINING, WITH ABOUT HALF COMING OUT OF TRAINING CENTERS DURING JUNE AND JULY, ADDITIONAL PF-- THE VIETMANESE JGS HAS ASKED FOR 100,000-- ARE NEEDED TO STAKE DOWN GAINS MADE AND TO MAINQTAIN MOMENTUM OF EXPANSION, WHILE EXTENT OF ABC LEVEL OF SECURITY IS ENCOUAGING, A CLOSER LOOD REVEALS THAT AB LEVEL INCLUDES ONL 34, 4 OF POPULATION, HENCE, A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF THE PEOPLE STILL IS SUBJECT TO SUBSTANTIAL ENEMY TERRORISM, TAXATION AND PROPAGANDA, ADDITIONAL PF, QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN RF/PF, HELP FROM PSDF, AND

MAGNAMAT® BY MAGNETICS INC., BALTO. - IMAGE THIS SIDE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BETTER WORK BY MORE POLICE MUST BE COMBINED TO SOLIDIFY TERRI-
TORIAL SECURITY. OVERALL RATING OF PROGRESS TOWARD PHASE I
GOALS IS ADEQUATE, ON ARBITRATY FOUR-STEP SCALE OF GOOD,
ADEQUATE, MARGINAL, AND INADEQUATE.
5. (C)QQELIMINATE VC INFRASTRUCTURE. PHOENIX/PHUNG
HOANG HAS HAD MODEST IMPACT ON THE ENEMY'S POLITICAL ORGANI-
ZATION AS ELIMINATIONS IN 1969 AS OF END-APRIL QHAVE TOTALED
5800 (BASED ON NEW STRICTER CRITERIA), BUT NEUTRALIZATIONS
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ALONG EITH PRESENT VCI STRENGTH ESTIMATE
(78,900 AS OF 22 APRIL 1969) AND RATE OF ATTRITION, WHICH ON
YEARLY BASIS WOULD AT CURRENT RATE BE ABOUT22 , REPLACEMENT
OF THE LOWER LEVEL(VILLAGE AND BELOW--82 OF TOTAL) VCI LOST TO
PHUNG HOANG SHOULD NOT BE A GREAT BURDEN ON VC, ALTHOUGH
THE DISTRICT LEVEL AND ABOVE (18) LOSSES ARE A MORE SUBSTAN-
TIAL SETBACK, PHUNG HOANDG, LACKS AGGRESSIVE AND
CONTINUOUS COMMAND EMPHASIS BY GVN AND IN SOME AREAS IN-
SUF FICIENT RESOURCES ARE APPLIED, QIN A FEW PLACES, QUANG NAM
AND PHONG DINH FOR EXAMPLE, INTERST BY PROVINCE CHIEF AND
OTHER OFFICIALS, TOGETHER WITH APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIAL
RESUORCES AGAINST LARGE TARGET, HAS PRODUCED SIGNIFICANT
RESULTS. ON THE OTHER HAND , MANY PROVINCES CONSISTENTLY
ELIMINATE FEWER THAN 10 VCI PER MONTH. SUCH SPOTTY PERFORM-
ANCE INDICATES MUCH ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT. IN ADDITION,
DETAINEE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM IS JUST GETTING SARTED, PREPARA-
TION OF DOSSIERS IS INADEQUATE. PREVICE SECRUITY COMMITTEES
ARE MOSTLY SLOW TO ACT, AND MANY VCI ARE RELEASED OUTRIGHT
OR GIVEN LIGHT SENTENCES, OTHERS ARE IMPRISIONED FOR LONG
PERIODS WITHOUT ANY HEARING. MUCH IMPROVEMENT IS NECESSARY
ALTHOUGH RAPID CHANGE IN THIS COMPLEX BUSINESS IS NOT LIKELY.
OVERALL, PROGRESS IN 1969 HAS BEEN MARGINAL.
6. (C) STRENGHTEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT. MEASUREMENT OF
PROGRESS IS DIFFICULT. IN TERMS OFVOLUME AND CONTENT OF
DECREES, DIRECTIVES, INSTRUCTIONS, ETC., PREPARED TO PROMUL-
GATE VILLAGE CONCEPT ADOPTED IN1969 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT GUIDELINES , PROGRESS HAS BEEN GOOD, PILLAGE DEVELOPMENT
FUNDS, AGTER LENGTHY WHILE OFFICIALS WERE TRAINED AND
ADMISISTRATIVE PROCEDURES WERE BEING WORKED OUT, ARE NOW
GETTING IN HANDS OF VILLAGE GOVERNMENTS, SOME PROJECTS HAVE
STARTED, AND MANY VILLAGES ARE BEGINNING PROCESS OF DETERMIN-
BT
#2052
NNNN

MAUNAMAI BY MAURETTE INC. BALTO. — IMAGE THIS BIRD

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFE SE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

47937

SECTION 2 OF 3
CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC.
SERVICE

6 10 20 33Z

VZCZCJCS182
PP RUEOJFA RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #2053 1611745
ZNY CCCCC
P 106530Z JUN 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEOJFA/JCS
RUEOJFA/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEADDA/AID WASH DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASH DC
RUEHIA/USIA WASH DC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/DIR USAID SAIGON
ZEN/DIR JUSPAO SAIGON
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEGATION
RHMMAFA/CG III MAF DA NANG
RUMLMQA/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
RUMUFQA/CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH
RUMUJLB/CG DMAC CAN THO
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 34388 (J01R) SECTION 2 OF 3
ING HOW THEY WISH TO USE THEIR FUNDS, HOWEVER, CONCRETE RESULTS IN TERMS OF VILLAGE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEES EMPLOYING NEW AUTHORITIES TO INSTITUTE SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT MEASURES URGED BY PEOPLE AND PARTICIPATION BY PEOPLE IN THESE ACTIVITIES HAVE NOT REACHED SIGNIFICANT PROPORTIONS, GVN PERFORMANCE IN HOLDING VILLAGE/HAMLET ELECTIONS HAS BEEN GOOD. PRIOR TO ROUND OF ELECTIONS UNDERWAY IN JUNE, 625 VILLAGE AND 3163 HAMLET ELECTIONS HAD BEEN HELD DURING PHASE I. RAISING NUMBER OF VILLAGES WITH ELECTED GOVERNMENTS TO 1737 (82 PERCENT OF ALL VILLAGES) AND HAMLETS TO 7740 (72 PERCENT OF ALL HAMLETS). IN JUNE
ABOUT 150 VILLAGE AND 1170 HAMLET ELECTIONS ARE PLANNED. TRAINING COURSES FOR ELECTED OFFICIALS AT VUNG TAU ARE PROCEEDING SCHEDULE, AND ASSESSMENT OF CONDUCT AND CONTENT INDICATES TRAINING OBJECTIVES ARE BEING ACHIEVED. ON THE WHOLE, PROGRESS ON THIS PROGRAM TO CHANGE LONGSTANDING POLITICAL PATTERNS HERE IS JUDGED ADEQUATE.
7. (C) ORGANIZED PEOPLE FOR SELF DEFENSE. AMBITIOUS QUANTITATIVE GOALS WERE ESTABLISHED FOR PHASE I GENERALLY AS PROJEC-

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TIONS OF 1968 TRENDS WHEN PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE EXPANDED RAPIDLY UNDER CONSIDERABLE COMMAND PRESSURE FROM PRESIDENT THIEU ON DOWN. CONCENTRATION ON BROADER OBJECTIVES AND SHRINKAGE OF POOL OF PROSPECTIV
MEMBERS COVERED BY MOBILI-
ZATION REGULATIONS CAUSED A SLOWDOWN IN RECENT MONTHS SO THAT ONLY ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF PHASE I GOALS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AS OF END-MAY. ORGANIZED STRENGTH INCREASED 96,000 DURING MAY TO 1,360,000; TRAINED MEMBERS INCREASED 69,000; AND 25,000 MORE WEAPONS WERE DISTRIBUTED, RAISING TOTAL TO 237,000. NEVERTHELESS, CONTINUED ENEMY PHYSICAL AND PROPAGANDA ATTACKS ON PSDF INDIIATE HIS CONCERN OVER CONTRIBUTION PSDF PROGRAM HAS MADE TO GVN SECURITY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. RESULTS HAVE NOT BEEN BAD CONSIDERING SCANT TRAINING AND LOW-GRADE WEAPONS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN MAY, 301 ENEMY WERE KILLED BY PSDF AT A LOSS OF 252 PSDF O-A 1, 2 RATIO, WHICH APPROXIMATED 1,1 RATION IN APRIL. OVERALL PROGRAM PROGRESS AGAINST ITS OWN GOALS, HOWEVER, IS MARGINAL.

8. (C) RALLY ADDITIONAL CHIEU HOI. QUANTITATIV
RESULTS OF THE
CHIEU HOI PROGRAM HAVE BEEN A HIGHLIGHT OF THE 1969 PACIFICA-TION CAMPAIGN AND HAVE ALREADY PASSED THE 18,171 TOTAL OF 1968. RETURNEE RATE HAS AVERAGED 858 PER WEEK DURING 1969, REACHING 997 DURING APRIL AND STAYING AT A HIGH LEVEL OF 876 IN MAY. PROBLEMS EXIST, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF REHABILITA-TION AND INTEGRATION OF RALLIERS INTO SOCIETY, A DISPROPORTION-ATE SHARE OF RALLIERS ARE LOW-LEVEL GUERRILLAS, UNIMPORTANT INFRASTRUCTURE MEMBERS, AND SIMPLY PART -TIME WORKERS OR PORTERS FOR THE ENEMY , THE CONCENTRATION OF THE RESULTS IN IV CTZ (APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT) SHOWS WEAKNESSES IN THE OTHER CTZ'S AND FAILURE TO DEVELOPE AN ATTRACTION TO NVA PERSONNEL (ONLY 106 TO DATE THIS YEAR), BUT DO REFLECT AN APPARENT WEAK-NESS IN THE PURELY SOUTH VIETNAMESE VC BASED IN THE DELTA. IN RECENT WEEKS THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS OF A DOWNWARD TREND, WHICH HAS BEEN SEASONAL IN THE PAST. IN SUM, PROGRESS MEASURED AGAINST PHASE I GOALS OR ANY OTHER REASONABLE STANDARDS IS JUDGED GOOD-- THE ONLY PROGRAM GIVEN THIS RATING.

9. (U) RESETTLE AND CARE FOR REFUGEES. GOALS ARE UNREALISTIC. ON THE OTHER HAND, PROGRESS IN RESETTLING REFUGEES OR RETURN-ING THENM TO VILLAGE IS SLOW WHEN JUDGED AGAINST REASONABLE EXPECTIONS AND MAGNITUDE OF REFUGEE POPULATION. UNNECES-SARILY COMPLICATED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES SLOW UP PAYMENT TO REFUGEES, LEADING TO A STATISTICAL PROBLEM OF CLEARING

MAGNAMAT® BY MAGNETICS INC., BALTO. - IMAGE THIS SIDE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

REFUGEE ROLLS, THE UNDERMANNED REFUGEE SERVICE TENDS TO OPERATE IN SPURTS--EITHER CONCENTRATING ON PURIFYING REFUGEE ROLLS AND TAKING CENSUSES, PUSHING RESETTLEMENT, OR UPGRADING REFUGEE CENTERS AND CARE OF PEOPLE IN THEM, IN FEW PROVINCES DOES IT SEEM CAPABLE OF HANDLING ALL THREE ESSENTIAL TASKS SIMULTANEOUSLY, FOR EXAMPLE, DURING THE BATANGAN OPERATION IN QUANG NGAI, THE REFUGEE SERVICE DID A CREDITABLE JOB CARING FOR AND LATER RESETTLING THE 10,000 PEOPLE REMOVED FROM THE OPERATIONSL AREA; BUT, MOST WORK WITH THE 227,000 OTHER REFUGEES PRACTICALLY HALTED, TRENDS, HOWEVER , ARE FAVORABLE AS TOTAL REFUGEES DECLINED 111,000 IN APRIL AND NUMBER RE-SETTLED AND RETURNED TO VILLAGE TOTALED 49,000, AS SECURITY EXPANDS , THERE IS A NATURAL TENDENCY FOR MANY REFUGEES TO VOLUNTARILY RETURN TO THEIR ORIGINAL HOME, UNTIL FULL BENIFITS ARE PAID, THEY ARE CARRIED IN THE CATEGORY @ IN RESETTLEMENT PROCESS @--A GROUP NOW CONTAINING 208,000 PEOPLE, THERE ARE NO APPARENT MAJOR OBSTACLES TO ACCELERATED PROGRESS TOWARD RESETTLEMENT GOALS, AND IT I ESTIMATED 600,000 REFUGEES WILL BE RESETTLED DURING 1969, OVERALL, PROGRESS IS ADEQUATE.

10, (U) INTENSIFY INFORMATION EFFORT, MEASUREMENT OF CHANGE

IN RESULTS OF AN INFORMATION EFFORT EXCEPT BY SAMPLING ATTI-TUDES, WHICH IS NOT YET SET UP SYSTEMATICALLY, IS DIFFICULT, HOWEVER, NATIONAL LEADERS HAVE SPENT MORE TIME IN RECENT MONTHS INFORMING THE NATION BY TV AND RADIO, PRESIDENT THIEU AND MANY MINISTERS HAVE TRAVELED WIDELY AROUND THE COUNTRY EXPLAINING GOVERMENT POLICY AND PACIFICATION, VIS CHIEFS IN THE FIELD HELD A SEMINAR DURING APRIL IN SAIGON, A COURSE FOR INFORMATION CADRE BEGINS AT THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER ON 16 JUNE, BUT MEASURES TAKEN SINCE 1 FEKUARY 1969 TO INSTNSIFY THE INFORMATION EFFORT HAVE NOT ADDED UP TO WHAT COULD BE EXPECTED OF ONE OF EIGHT PRIORITY PACIFICATION PROGRAMS, INTENSITY OF INFORMATION IMPACTING ON TARGET AT VILLAGE/HAMLET LEVEL HAS NOT INCREASED MEASURABLY, LOCAL LEADERS PAY TOO LITTLE ATTENTION TO INFORMATION PROGRAM, LETTING WEAK VIS CARRY MOST OF THE LOAD, MUCH MORE IMPROVEMENT IS NEEDED; OVERALL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MARGINAL, ACCORDING TO ASSESSMENT BY FIELD TERMS, HOWEVER , IN LIGHT OF CRITICAL NEED TO ENHANCE GVN IMAGE AND PREPARE POPULACE FOR THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE, FROM THE NATIONAL VIEWPOING THE INFORMATION PROGRAM AND PROGRESS TOWARD IMPROVING IT ARE INADEQUATE.

BT

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFI SE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

47937

SECTION 3 OF 3

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

6 10 20 33Z

VZCZCJCS203
PP RUEOJFA RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #2054 1611745
ZNY CCCCC
P 106530Z JUN 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEOJFA/JCS
RUEOJFA/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEADDA/AID WASH DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASH DC
RUEHIA/USIA WASH DC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/DIR USAID SAIGON
ZEN/DIR JUSPAO SAIGON
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEGATION
RHMMAFA/CG III MAF DA NANG
RUMLMQA/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
RUMUFQA/CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH
RUMUJLB/CG DMAC CAN THO
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 34388 (J01R) FINAL SEC OF 3.
11. (U) STIMULATE RURAL ECONOMY. GOALS ESTABLISHED INCLUDE IMPROVING LOC'S REDUCING ECONIMIC RESTRICTIONS, INCREASING RICE PRODUCTION, EXPANDING LOW INTEREST LOANS, AND DEVELOPING FARMERS' ASSOCIATIONS. IN EACH AREA, SOME PROGRESS CAN BE NOTED. ROAD AND WATERWAY SECURITY IS REMOARKABLE GOOD. RECENT ESTIMATES INDICATE RICE PRODUCTION MAY EXCEED LAST Q YEAR'S BY 20 PC. PADDY PRICES TO THE FARMER ARE 30-40 PC HIGHER THAN A YEAR AGO. TN-8 PLANTING GOALS ARE BEING MET, LOANS ARE UP, ALTHOUGH WITH CAPITAL AVAILABLE ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THE DEMAND CAN BE SATISFIED, THE GVN IS MOVING RAPIDLY TOWARD ADOPTING A REVOLUTIONARY LAND REFORM PROGRAM, PRESIDENT THIEU HAS INSTRUCTED TANT ALL 147,000 HECTARES OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED LAND BE DISTRIBUTED BY END-1969. IN SUM, PROGRESS IS ADEQUATE.
12. (C) OVERALL ASSESSMENT. IN TERMS OF PROGRESS TOWARD PHASE I GOALS, FOLLOWING OVERALL ASSESSMENT WAS DEVELOPED BY FIELD INSPECTION TEAMS DESCRIBED EARLIER:

PROGRAM	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	RVN
SECURETY	ADEQUATE	GOOD	GOOD	ADEQUATE	ADEQUATE

CONFIDENTIAL

MAGNAMAT® BY MAGNETICS INC., BALTO. - IMAGE THIS SIDE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

(TARGET HAMLETS)
PAGE 3 RHMSMVA 2054 C O N F I D E N T I A L
VCI ADEQUATE INADE- INADE- MARGINAL MARGINAL
QUATE QUATE
PSDF MARGINAL MARGINAL MARGINAL MARGINAL MARGINAL
LOCAL GOV'T GOOD GOOD GOOD GOOD ADEQUATE
ELECTIONS)
CHIEU
HOI ADEQUATE MARGINAL INADEQUATE GOOD GOOD
REFUGEES ADEQUATE MARGINAL ADEQUATE INADE- ADEQUATE
QUATE
INFORMATION ADEQUATE MARGINAL MARGINAL ADE- MARGINAL
QUATE
RURAL ADEQUATE ADEQUATE ADEQUATE ADEQUATE ADEQUATE
ECONEMY
GP-4
BT
#2054
NNNN

MAGNAMAT® BY MAGNETICS INC., BALTO. - IMAGE THIS SIDE

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTIONS 1, 2 & 3

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

7 21 19 13Z

VZCZCJCS6870
PP RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #4945 2021500
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC -T- AID WASH DC
[redacted]
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUAHHOA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/JCS
RUCRJCS/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASH DC
RUEHIA/DIA WASH DC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/DIR USAID SAIGON
RUFNOR/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEGATION
RHMMAFA/CG III MAF DA NANG
RUMLMOA/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
RUMUFQA/CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH
RUMUJLB/CG DMAC CAN THO
ZEN/DIR JUSPAO SAIGON
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 42368 (JOIR) SECTION 1 OF 3
PAGE 2 RHMSMVA 4945 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJECT: STATUS OF PACIFICATION--30 JUNE 1969 (U)
1. (U) PURPOSE: THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF PACIFICATION AND SUMMARIZES THE DEGREE OF ACHIEVEMENT ATTAINED IN PHASE I OF THE CY 1969 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT CAMPAIGN FROM FEBRUARY THROUGH JUNE.
2. (C) SUMMARY: PHASE I OF 1969 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT CAMPAIGN STARTED SLOWLY AS A RESULT OF TET HILIDAYS, ADJUSTMENT TO SOME NEW CONCEPTS AND SOME LETDOWN AFTER THE INTENSE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN FROM NOVEMBER THROUGH JANUARY, BUT PICKED UP STEAM AND ACCOMPLISHED MANY OF ITS GOALS, SO THAT PACIFICATION WAS MARKED BY STEADY IF UNSPECTACULAR PROGRESS AND EXPANSION. OVER 1-MILLION ADDITIONAL PEOPLE WERE BROUGHT WITHIN GVN SECURITY DURING THE CAMPAIGN, AND AS OF 30 JUNE 65.6 PCT OF THE POPULATION AND 65.8 PCT OF THE HAMLETS WERE RATED ABC. ON 15 JUTY, PRESIDENT THIEU COMPLETED VISITS TO THE FOUR CORPS TACTICAL ZONES TO REVIEW PHASE I AND KICK OFF PHASE II, OR THE 1969 ACCELERATED

INFO: OJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-2 J3-12 J4-3 J5-2 SACSA-4 NMCC-1 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/IL-4 ASD/PA-1 ASD/COMP--1 SA-3 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1 (81) CAC--RS

TOM

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN, SCHEDULED TO END OCTOBER INSTEAD OF DECEMBER. IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE ADDITIONAL FORCES NECESSARY TO CONTINUE THE EXPANSION OF TERRITROIAL SECURITY IN 1969 THE GVN, WITHOUT A FIRM COMMITMENT FROM THE U.S. TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL FORCES, AUTHORIZED THE CORPS TO BEGIN RECRUITING, ORGANIZING, EQUIPING AND TRAINING 863 ADDITIONAL POPULAR FORCE PLATOONS BETWEEN 1 JULY AND 31 DECEMBER 1969. AS OF 15 JULY 546 NEW PF PLATOONS HAD BEEN RECRUITED AND 298 WERE ALREADY AT TRAINING CENTERS.

3. (C) PHASE I RESULTS

A. THE FOLLOWING TABLE SUMMARIZES PACIFICATION STATUS IN TERMS OF PHASE I GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS:

OBJECTIVE	GOAL END JUNE	ATTAINED END JUNE	PERCENT ACHIEVEMENT
TERRITORIAL SECURITY			
POPULATION	83 PCT ABCS	85 PCT ABCS	103.0 PCT
HAMLETS	1,691	1,562 ENTERED	92.5 PCT
		1,080 RAISED	63.5 PCT
		TO C	
RF INCREASE	252,675 AUTHORIZED	251,500 ASSIGNED	99.5 PCT
VC INFRASTRUCTURE	9,000	7,262	80.5 PCT
PSDF:			
ORGANIZED	1,730,000$$	1,480,934	85.5 PCT
ARMED	295,000$$	250,527	85.0 PCT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT:			
VILLAGE ELECTIONS	569	794	139.0 PCT
HAMLET ELECTIONS	3,117	4,461	143.0 PCT
CHIEU HOI	15,600	20,924	134.0 PCT
REFUGEES RESETTLED	300,000$$$	200,924	66.6 PCT
INFORMATION	IMPROVE	MARGINAL IMPROVEMENT	N/A
RURAL ECONOMY	STIMULATE	ADEQUATE PROGRESS	N/A

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

$ HES RATINGS
$$ CUMULATIVE
$$$ ORIGINAL PHASE I GOAL REGARDED AS UNREALISTIC BUT NEVER OFFICIALLY AMENDED. 300,000/ GENERALLY REGARDED AS REASONABLE GOAL FOR PHASE I.

B. EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECURITY. RESULTS WERE MORE THAN SATISFACTORY AS POPULATION WITHIN GVN SECURITY (ABC CATEGORIES OF HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM) ROSE FROM 79.2 PCT IN JANUARY TO 85.6 PCT AT THE END OF JUNE -- A NET GAIN OF 6.4 PCT AND EXCEEDING THE ORIGINAL TARGET OF 83 PCT. ALTHOUGH PACIFICATION'S MOMENTUM SLOWED AFTER TET, THERE WAS A STEADY INCREASE IN ABC POPULATION OF ABOUT 1 PCT MONTHLY. MOST (1562 OR 92.5 PCT) OF TARGET HAMLETS WERE ENTERED, ALTHOUGH ONLY 1,080 (BOTH TARGETED AND OTHER) OR 63.5 PCT WERE ACTUALLY RAISED TO ABC STATUS. THE HIGHER RESULT IN TERMS OF POPULATION COMPARED TO HAMLETS PROBABLY STEMS FROM THE HIGHER POPULATION DENSITY IN THE SECURED OR MORE SECURE AREAS. DURING PHASE II, THOSE HAMLETS NOT RAISED ARE ADDED TO THE GOALS. NEVERTHELESS, MORE THAN 1,000,000 ADDITIONAL PEOPLE WERE BROUGHT UP TO C OR OVER THE MID-POINT ON THE SECURITY SCALE, DURING PHASE I. BASIS OF PROGRESS WAS THE FAVORABLE MILITARY SITUATION. ARVN AND ALLIED FORCES IN GENERAL KEPT ENEMY MAIN FORCE UNITS AWAY FROM HEAVILY POPULATED PACIFICATION AREAS. LOCAL SECURITY IMPROVED LARGELY THROUGH THE GVN'S MOBILIZATION PROGRAM AND INCREASE IN NUMBERS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES (RF/PF). SINCE JANUARY, RF INCREASED ALMOST THE FULL AUTHORIZATION OF 39,000 MEN IN 270 COMPANIES. RF AND PF RECEIVED AN ADDITIONAL 113,492 M-16 RIFLES AND EXTENSIVE ADVISORY ATTENTION FROM EETE SMALL MOBILE ADVISORY TEAMS OF TWO U.S. OFFICERS AND THREE NCO'S. RESULTS WERE ADDITIONAL OPERATIONS AND CONTACTS WITH THE ENEMY (RF KIA RATES OF 4.4 TO 1, AND PF OF 3.4 TO 1), AND ENEMY'S DECREASING ABILITY TO ROAM AT WILL TO FORAGE, CONSCRIPT, AND TAX.

C. ELIMINATE VC INFRASTRUCTURE. PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG MADE ONLY MINOR IMPACT ON THE VCI DURING PHASE I. ABOUT 7,262 MEMBERS WERE REPORTED AND ACCEPTED AFTER US REVIEW AS CAPTURED, KILLED OR RALLIED. THIS NUMBER IS ONLY ABOUT 9 PCT OF THE ESTIMATED VCI STRENGTH IN JANUARY. GVN HAS ISSUED A NEW CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM DESIGNED TO TIGHTEN FOCUS ON THE MORE IMPORTANT VCI, AND REQUIRING LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO IMPOSE SENTENCES MEASURED BY THE LEVEL OF THE VC IN THE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

APPARATUS. IT IS WORKING ON SYSTEMS TO FOLLOW INDIVIDUALS FROM THEIR ARREST THROUGH LEGAL PROCESSING TO DETENTION, SO THAT VCI PICKED UP ARE ACTUALLY HANDLED SO AS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF THE WAR FOR THE DURATION AND NOT SLIP BACK THROUGH PREMATURE RELEASES, LIGHT SENTENCES, ETC. IN SUMMARY, OVERALL PROGRESS TO DATE IN 1969 HAS BEEN INADEQUATE WHEN MEASURED AGAINST THE NEED, EVEN THOUGH IT HAS SHOWN MODEST IMPROVEMENT.

NATIONAL POLICE (NP) PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN MORE THAN

BT
#4945
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

31873

SECTION 2
CALL 53337
FOR RMDC/MC
SERVICE

721 19 14Z

VZCZCJCS700
PP RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #4946 2021500
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC -TM AID WASH DC
P 211115Z JUL 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/JCS
RUCRJCS/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASH DC
RUEHIA/USIA WASH DC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/DIR USAID SAIGON
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEGATION
RHMMAFA/CG III MAF DA NANG
RUMLMQA/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
RUMUFQA/CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH
RUMUJLB/CG DMAC CAN THO
ZEN/DIR JUSPAO SAIGON
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 42368 (JOIR) SECTION 2 OF 3.
PAGE 2 RHMSMVA 4946 C O N F I D E N T I A L
ADEQUATE . OPEARATIONAL RESULTS DURING PHASE I INCLUDE 3, 733
VC KIA, 6, 737 ARRESTED; 14,157 SUSPECTS DETAINED AND
CONTRABAND SEIZED AMOUNTINH TO 2,314 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS;
265 CREW-SERVED WEAPONS; 4,057 GRENADES; AND 9,313 EXPLO-
SIVES. PHASE I, HOWEVER, WAS A DIFFICULY PERIOD FOR THE NP AS
RECRUITMENT WAN LIMITED TO INDIVIDUALS NOT SUBJECT TO
MOBILIZATION. MANPOWER ACTUALLY DECLINED FROM 78,431 TO
76,819. NEVERTHELESS, 5,908 POLICEMEN AARE NOW IN 579
VILLAGES AND THIS HOUD INVCREASE DURING PHASE II TO 14,988 IN
1,847 VILLAGES. IN JULY ARRANGEMENTS WERE UNDERWAY TO
SOLVE THE POLICE SKORTAGE BY TRANSFERRING 13,000 PERSONNEL
TO THE POLICE FROM THE MILITARY..
D. STRENGTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT . CONSIDRABLE
PROGRESS WAS MADE DURING THE FIRST SEMESTER, DURING
MARCH AND JUNE, 794 VILLAGE AND 4,461 HMLET ELECTIONS
WERE HELD. THER E WERE 1,219 ,967 VOTERS (86PER CENT,6 OF THOSE
ELEIBGIBLE) IN HAMLET ELECTIONS, AND 735, 594, VOTERS

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(89.7% PER CENT OF THSE ELEIGIBLE) IN VLILLAGE ELECTIONS, BY END-JUNE 1,891 VILLAGE (98.7 PER CENT OF TOTAL RVN VILLAGES) HAD ELECTED GOVERNMENTS AS DID 8, 776 HAMLETS (81.4 PR CENT OF TOTAL RVN HAMLETS), DURING FIRST SEMESTER 2,839 VILLAGE OFFICIALS GRADUATED FROM THE SPECIAL FIVE WEEK VUNG TAU COURSE IN THEIR VILLAGE DUTIES AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF GVN AND ABOUT 2,000 MORE ARE THERE NOW, A VILLAGE DEVELOPEMENT PROGRAM GOT UNDERWAY WHICH PROVIDED FUNDS FOR DEVELOPEMENT PURPOSES TO THE VILLAGE GOVERNMENTS THENSELVES FOR DISPOSITIONS AND SELECTION OF PROJECTS. PROGRAM WAS SLOW IN GETTING SATARTED AS IT WAS REVOLUTIONARY COMPARED TO PAST PRACTICES AND STUMBLED OVER A NUMBER OF BUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS,, BUT IT SEEMS NOW TO BE UNDERWAY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, RD CADRE CHANGED FROM 60 TO 30 MAN TEAMS TO PUT GREATER EMPHASIS ON THEIR POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS AND LESS ON PARA-MILITARY. THEY NOW TOTAL 43,724 IN 1,477 RD CADRE TEAMS, PLUS ANOTHER 7,412 HIGHLANDER CADRES, GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVES HVE MADE IT CLEAR THATELECTED VILLAGE OFFICIALS SHOULD HAVE OPERATIONA DIRECTION OVER ALL CADRE IN THEIR VILLAGE SUCH AS RD CADRE, NATIONAL POLICE , INFORMATION CADRE, BUT THIS CONCEPT WILL TAKE TIME TO DEVELOP INTO POLITICAL REALITY.

E. ORGANIZE PEOPLE FOR SELF-DEFENSE. AMBITION GOALS WERE SET FOR THE PSDF DIURING PJASE I, BASED UPON PROJECTIONS OF 1968 TRENDS. DURING PHASE I ABOUT 473,193 MORE MEMBERS WERE ORGANIZED FOR A TOTAL OF 1,480 939 AND 163,761 ADDITIONAL WEAPONS DISTRIBUTED TO A TOTAL OF 270,527, UNPAID AND ONLY MODERATELY TRAINED, THE COST WS 1,197 PSDF KILLED , BUT THE ENEMY LOST 1,487, STORIES INCREASING OF THEIR EFFECTIVE AND AT TIMES HEROIC FIGHTING ALGTHOUGH WEAPONS LOSS RATIO STILL NEGATIVE (1,508 PSDF, 709 VC), WHILE THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE PSDF OT OVERALL SECURITY IS STILL MODEST , THE POLITICAL DIVIDENDS IN TERMS OF INCREASED POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR HAEVE BEEN SUSTANTIAL.

F. RALLY ADDITIONA CHIEU HOI. CHEIU HOI PROGRAM HAS BEEEN A STAR PERFORMER, THE 20,924 RALLIERS DIURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS ALEREADY EXCEEDS 1968 TOTAL) TREND IS STILL UP,, MUCH OF ICNCREAS COMES AS A RESULT OF THE EXPANSION OF SECURITY OIN RURAL AREAS AND THE CONSEQUENT DECISION OF MANY LOCAL RESIDENTS WHO FORMERLY PARTICIPATDED IN VC ACTIVITIES TO OPT FOR GVN. LITTLE OR NO SUCCESS HAS BEEN MET IN INDUCING NORTH VIETNAMESE TO RALLY. GREAT MAJORITY OF RALLIERS HAVE BEEN IN DELTA WHERE THE ENEMY APPARENTLY SUFFERS A RESULTANT MNPOWER PROBLEM. A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF THE RALLIERS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

ARE LOW-LEVEL GUERILLAS, UNIMPORTANT INFRASTRUCTURE MEMBERS, AND PART-TIME WORKERS OR PORTERS FO THE ENEMY; ALTHOGH A FEW VALUABLE INDIVIDUALS APPEAR, OR RALLIERS LEAD THE GVN TO ARMS CACHES, BASE AREAS, ETC. IN SUMMARY, CHIEU HOI PROGRAM HAS BEEN REMARKABLY SUCCESSFUL.

G. RESETTLE AND CARE FOR REFUGEES. AFTER A SLOW START CAUSED BY GVN BUDGERY SQUABBLE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, NUMBER OF REFUGEES STILL UNDER GOVERNMENT CARE DECLINED FROM ALL-TIME HIGH IN FEBRUARY 1969 OF 1.4 MILLION TO 1.2 MILLION AT END OF MAY. OF THESE, ABOUT 82,300 ACTUALLY WERE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL VILLAGES, WHILE REMINDE R WERE DROPPED FROM THE ROLLS AFTER BEING PAID THEIR FINAL BENEFITS AND CHOSE TO RESUME A NORMAL LIFE IN ANEW AREA. THE GVN ALSO BEGAN ANA INTENSIVE EFFORT NOT ONLY TO CARE FOR CURRENT REFUGEES AND RESPOND TO NEW CRISES BUT ALSO TO START A MAJOR EFFORT TO ASSIST REFUGEES TO RETUERN TO THEIR ORIGINAL AND NOW PACIFIED HAMLETS BY BROADENING RULES TO INCLUDE WITHIN THOSE ELEIGLIBLE FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE NAY INDIVIDUAL RETURNING TO HIS ORIGINAL AREA, AMBITIOUS GOALS HAVE BEEN SEY TO REDUCE REFUGEE PROBLEMS DURING PHASE II.

H. INTENSIFY THE INFORMATION EFFORT. ALTHOUGH MUSCH HAS BEEN DONE, INFORMATION PROGRAM IS INADEQUATE IN THE LIGHT OF CRITICAL NEED TO PREPARE PEOPLE FOR THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE. PRESIDENT THEIU AND OTHER GVERNMENT LEADERS HAVE TROLLED WWIDELY AND SPOKEN OFTEN EXPLAINING GOVERNEMT POLICY AND PACIFICATION. INFROMATION CADRE TRAINING HAS BEGUN, BUT THEESE AND OTHER MEASURES TAKEN DURING PHASE I HAVE NOT ADDED UP TO A DYNAMIC PROGRAM. FOR PHASE II PRESIDENT THEIU HAS LAID PARTICUALAR EMPHASIS ON IMPROVEMENT OF INFORMATION PROGRAM.

I. STIMULATE RURAL ECONOMY. THE EXPANSION OF SECURITY, OPENING OF LOCKS AMD POSITIVE PROGRAMS SUCH AS THE IR-8 RICE EFFORT HAVE CONTRIVBUTED TO A SUB STATIAL RISE IN RURAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY.

4. (C) OVERALL ASSESSMENT

THE CHART BELOW ASSESSES STATUS FO 1969 PD PLAN AT THE END OF PHASE I (1 FEBRUARY -30 JUNE) ON THE FOLLOWING SCALE: GOOD - ADEQUATE - INADEQUATE- POOR

PROGRAM	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	RVN
TERITORAIAL					

BT
#4946
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

31873

SECTION 3

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

7 21 19 14Z

VZCZCJCS718
PP RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #4947 2021500
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC -T= AID WASH DC
P 211115Z JUL 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/JCS
RUCRJCS/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASH DC
RUEHIA/USIA WASH DC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/DIR USAID SAIGON
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEGATION
RHMMAFA/CG III MAF DA NANG
RUMLMQA/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG
RUMUFQA/CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH
RUMUJLB/CG DMAC CAN THO
ZEN/DIR JUSPAO SAIGON
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 42368 (JOIR) FINAL SECTION OF 3.
PAGE 2 RHMSMVA 4947 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECURITY.

POPULATION	GOOD	GOOD	GOOD	ADEQ	GOOD
HAMLETS ENTERED	GOOD	ADEQ	GOOD	GOOD	GOOD
HAMLETS RAISED TO C OR HIGHER	ADEQ	ADEQ	ADEQ	ADEQ	ADEQ
RF INCREASE	GOOD	GOOD	GOOD	GOOD	GOOD
VCI	INADEQ	POOR	POOR	INADEQ	INADEQ
PSDF	ADEQ	ADEQ	ADEQ	ADEQ	ADEQ
LOCAL GOV'T:					
ELECTIVES	GOOD	GOOD	GOOD	GOOD	GOOD
VILLAGE DEV	INADEQ	INADEQ	INADEQ	INADEQ	INADEQ
CHIEU HOI	ADEQ	POOR	INADEQ	GOOD	GOOD
REFUGEES	ADEQ	INADEQ	GOOD	INADEQ	ADEQ
RURAL ECON	ADEQ	ADEQ	ADEQ	ADEQ	ADEQ

RVN RATING IS NOT AN AVERAGE OF THE FOUR CTZ RATINGS BUT AN INDEPENDENT, OVERALL ASSESSMENT.
VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT NOW PROCEEDING APACE, BUT INITIAL DELAYS ARISING LARGELY FROM BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA, RESULT IN INADEQUATE RATINGS.
GP-4 BT

31873

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

20170

SECTION 1 & 2 OF 2
904 12 512

VZCZCJCS547
PP RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #0735 2470615
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC -T- AID WASH
P 0401122 SEP 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/JCS
RUCRJCS/SECDEFD
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAUSA/USIA WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/USAID SAIGON
ZEN/JUSPAO SAIGON
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEGATION
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 50636 (J01R) SECTION 1 OF 2
SUBJECT: STATUS OF PACIFICATION - 31 JULY 1969 (U)
1. (C) PURPOSE, THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF PACIFICATION AND SUMMARIZESSTHE DEGREE OF ACHIEVEMENT ATTAINED DURING THE FIRST MONTH OF PHASE II OF THE CY 1969 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT CAMPAIGN.
2. (C) SUMMARY, THE FIRST MONTH OF PHASE II (OR THE 2969 APC) SHOWED NO STARTLING INNOVATIONS OR DEVELOPMENTS, ALTHOUGH STATISTICAL INDICATORS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CAMPAIGN GOT OFF TO A GOOOD START. AS OF 31 JULY, 87.6 PC OF THE POPULATION AND 75.9PC OF THE HAMLETS WERE RATED ABC. MOREOVER, 52.9PC OF THEPOPULATION (LESS SAIGON) IS NOW RATED AB, THUS EXCEEDING PRESIDEN THIEU'S GOAL OF 50PC RATED AB BY END-OCTOBER. THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THEIR ABANDONED HOMES, CONTINUED HIGH CHIEU HOI RATES, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VILLAGE SELF DELOPMENT PROGRAM, AND A RUSH TOWARDS RECRUITMENT OF THE ADDITIONAL POPULAR FORCES AUTHORIZED BY JFS FURTHER ISSULTRATE THAT PACIFICATION'S PROGRESS CONTINUES APACE.
3. (C) END-JULY/MIDAUGUST RESULTS.
A. THE FOLLOWING TABLE SUMMARIZES STATUS OF PACIFICATION IN TERMS OF PHASE II GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS.

PROGRAM	GOAL END-OCTOBER	ATTAINED END-JULY

INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-2 J3-12 J4-3 J5-2 SACSA-4 NMCC-1
SECDEF-7 ABD/ISA-9 ASD/IL-1 ASD/PA-1 ASD/COMP-1 ASD/M&RA-1 ASD/SA-3
WH-10 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1 (89) ZIM/DT

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

1. EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECURITY
A. POPULATION 90PC ABC 87.6PC

(EST: 17,219,100) 50PC AB 58.0PC
REMARKS: ONE GOAL APPERARS TO BE ACHIEVED, CURRENT TRENDS INDICATE BOTH GOALS WILL BE ACHIEVED.
B. HAMLETS (EST: 10,775) 9,774 ABC (SECURE ADDITIONAL 2,729 IN 1969) DURING 8,348 (1,080 SECURED PHASE I)
HSAARKS: COMMAND EMPHASIS OF 1969 APC ENSURES GOAL EITHER WILL BE MET OR WILL NOT FALL FAR SHORT.
C. RF 252,675 (AUTHORIZED) 251,900 (ASSIGNED)
REMARKS: VIRTUALLY ACHIEVED.
D. PF 5,724 PLATOONS 5,673 PLATOONS (MID-AUG)
REMARKS: PLUS90PC (812 PLATOONS) OF PHASE II GOAL (863) RECRUITED BY MID-AUGUST.
2. VC INFRASTRUCTURE 16,200 RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 10,313
V
REMARKS: ACHIEVEMENT FIGURES SOFT, PROGRESS TO DATE INADEQUATE WHEN MEASURED AGAINST THE NEED, EVEN THOUGH THERE HAS BEEN MODEST IMPROVEMENT.
3. PSDFD
A. ORGANIZED 1,800,000 1,618,085
B. ARMED EQQNIOU EQYNPIQ
REMARKS: CONTRIBUTION TO OVERALL SECURITY IS MODEST, BUT POLITICAL DIVIDENDS SUBSTANTIAL IN TERMS OF INCREASED POPULAR PARTICIPATION I
NTHE WAR.
4. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A. VILLAGE ELECTIONS 1,991 RVN VILLAGES 1,891
B. HAMLET ELECTIONS 9,435 RVN HAMLETS 8,776
REMARKS: 794 VILLAGE ELECTIONS AND 4,461 HAMLET ELECTIONS HELD I
MARCH AND JUNE, VOTER TURNOUT WAS 89.6PC
AND 88.4PC RESPECTIVELY. SUPRISINGLY

20170

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SUCCESSFUL. BEST AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE INDICATES
THAT, AS OF 30 JUNE, VC HAD ELECTED OR APPOINTED
1,148 VILLAGE REVOLUTIONARY COMMMETTEES.

5. CHIER HOI	29,600	27,580

REMARKS: STAR PERFORMER, FIRST SIX MONTHS EXCEEDS TOTAL FOR 1968, DUE PRIMARILY TO EXPANSION OF SECURITY IN RURAL AREAS. LITILE OR NO SUCCESS IN INDUCING NVA TO RALLY.

6. REFUGEEES RESETTLED	1,200,000	160,044 RETURNED TO VILLAGE; 251,419 RESETTLED

REMARKS: SLOW START IN FEBRUARY BECAUSE OF BUDGETARY SQUABBLE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. NUMBERS DECLINED FROM ALL-TIME HIGH OF 1.4 MILLION IN FEBRUARY TO 1.2 MILLION AT END-MAY, GVN EFFORT NOW INTENSIVE, END-YEAR GOAL VERY AMBITIOUS.

8. RURAL ECONOMY		
A. IR 8 RICE PLANTED	200,000 HA	43,000 HA
B. LAND REFORM (LAND DISTRIBUTED)	147,000 HA	11,000 HA
C. RURAL CREDIT (LOANS TO ASSIST AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT)	MORE THAN 70,000	23,586
D. LINES OF COMMUNICATION (SECURE)		
(1) ROADS	3,811 KM	2,755 KM
(2) RAILROADS	1,085 KM	603 KM
(3) WATERWAYS	1,754 KM	1,436 KM

REMARKS: EXPANSION OF SECURITY, OPENING OF LOC'S, AND POSITIVE PROGRAMS SUCH AS THE IR-8 RICE EFFORT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A SUBSTANTIAL RISE IN RURAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. FINAL APPROVAL OF REVOLUTIONARY @LAND TO THE TILLER@ PROGRAM SHOULDD DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE LAND REFORM EFFORT.

B. EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECURITY.

(12 POPULATION RATED ABC BY THE HES ROSE 2PC FROM 85.6PC TO 87.6PC, OR ABOUT 343,900 PEOPLE. INCREASE WAS DOUBLE NORMAL 1PC RISE OF PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND CAN BE ATTRIBUTED LARGELY TO LOW LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY AND MOVEMENT OF GVN INTO NEW HAMLETS DE POPULATION DECLINED TO 7PC AND THOSE UNDER VC CONTROL TO ABOUT
BT NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

20170

SECTION 2 OF 2

VZCZCJCS679
PP RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #0736 2470615
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC -T- AID WASH
P 040112Z SEP 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/JCS
RUCRJCS/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASH DC
RUEAUSA/USIA WASH DC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/USAID SAIGON
ZEN/JUSPAONSAIGON
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS FOR SS DELEGATION
BT

904 12 51Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L 50636 (J01R) FINAL SECTION OF 2
5,4 PERCENT, PRESIDENT THIEU'S GOAL OF 50 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION (LESS SAIGON, NOW MEESURED C) RATED AB BY END-OCTOBER HAS BEEN EXCEEDED
ACCORDING TONTHE JULY FIGURE OF 52.9 PERCENT ALREEDY RATED AB. THIS FIGURE MAY BE REVISED AS OUR READING OF STATISTICAL TRENDS S MORE SHARPLY DEFINED. AMONG THE RURAL POPULATION, 81,6 PERCENT S RAIED ABC
AN NCREESE OF 2,7 PERCENT OVER JUNE, WITH A
NET GAIN OF 260,800 PEOPLE.
(2) TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TOMEXPAND AS FULL ADDITIONAL RF STRENGTB AUTHORIZED N FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1969 BECAME OPERATIONAL, I,E, 278 ADDITIONAL COMPANIES, N ADDITION,H JGS AUTHORIZED RECRUITMENT AND ALLOCATION OF 863 NEW PF PLATOONS (ABOUT 30,000 MEN), OF WHICH (57 RECRUITED BY 8 AUGUST AND 531 IN TRAINING CAMPS.
(3) NATIONAL POLICE (NP) STENGTH DROPPED SLIGHTTY N JULY TO 76,482, LARGELY AS A RESSLT OF MILITARY MOBILIZATION AND A SLOW START N THE TRANSFER OD 13,000 ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL FROM THE MILITARY. OPERATIONAL RESULTS FOR JULY WERE 1,710 VC KIA; 2704 VC ARRESTED; 3,759 SSPECTS DETAINED; AND SSCH CONTRABAND SEIZED AS 542 NDIVIDUAL WEEPONS, 39,CREW SERVED WEEPONS, 549 GRENADES, AND 648 TEMS OF EXPLOSIVES.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DE NSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

C,ELIMINATE VC NFRASTRUCTURE,
(1) PHOENIX PROGRAM APPARENTLY BEGAN TONRESPOND TO PRESIDENT THIEU'S EMPHASIS AS ONE OF THREE TOP PRIORCTY PROGRAMS FOR PHASE , LATEST OPERATIONAL FIGURES (JULY) ACCOUNT FOR 1,7Y0 VCI--UP 33 PERCENT FROM JUNE. N ADDITION, 5,831 VC SSPPORTERS, GUERRILLAS AND SOLDIERS WERE RENDERED INEFFECTIVE AS A RESULT OHD PHOENIX OPERATIONS, THE RESSLTS N JULY WERE ONLY 10 THHERCENT BELOW GVN ESTABLISHED
COUNTRY-WIDE GOAL 0F 1,800,
(2) HOWEVER, THE M0DEST RESULTS MAY BE AIRIBUTED TO:
(A) SENSITIVITY AT PROVINCE LEVEL AND BELOW TO CRITICISM BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND PRESS OF PHOENIS OPERATIONS,
(B) OVERCROWDED DETENTION FACILITIES,
(C) BUREEUCRATIC AND LEGAL PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS N SENTENCING VCI,
(D) RELUCTANCE OF SOME OFFICIALS TO ATTACK DEY VCI N VIEW OF DISCUSSIONS N REGARD TO AN OVERALL SETTTEMENT OR FEAR OF PERSONAL REPRISAL,
(3) F AUGUST RESSLTE ARE COMPARABLE, THE TREND MAY REFLECT PRESIDENT THIEU'S NEW EMPHASIS,
D, STRENGTHEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
(1) DURING JULY, AN ADDITION-L 1,828 VILLAGE AND HAMLET OFFICIALS ATTENDED THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER FOR CLASSES ON THEIR GOVERNING RESPONSIBILITIES AND OVERALL GOVERNMENT POLICY, TOTAL FOR YEAR TONDATE S 6,900,
(2) DURING HIS JULY FIELD TRIPS, PRESIDENT THIEU EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF WELL TRAINED LOCAL OFFICIALS AND NEED FOR GOODCANDI- DATES TO DEFEAT THOSE WHICH MIGHT BE PUT FORWARD BY COMMUNISTS,
(3) VILLAGE SELF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (VSD) PICKED UP SPEED AFTER A SLOW START, FIRST COUNTRY-WIDE STATISTICS (END JUNE) SHOWED 400,000 FAMILIES NVOLVED N VSD GROUPS, PEOPLE'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO VSD PROJECTS AMOUNT TO 70 MILLION PIASTRAS, SIGNIFICANTLY, 1,545 VILLAGE FINANCE COMMISSIONERS (OUT OF ABOUI 2,000 VILLAGES) HAVE RECEIVED CHECKBOOKS, A FURTHER STEP TOWARDS LOCAL CONTROL OVER LOCAL DEVELOPMENT,
(4) REVOLUTIONARY LAND REFORM PROGRAM, LAND TO THE TILLER, NOW BEFORE THE NATIONAL THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, PROGRAM EXPECTED TORECE-
ASSEMLY APPROVAL WITHOUT UNDUE REVISION; BUT A DETERMINED MINORITY OF LOWER HOUSE MEMBERS ARE OPPOSED TO PRESIDENT THIEU'S BILL WITHOUT REVISION, PRESENT LAND DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DE NSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

GOAL OF MORE THAN 10,000 HECTARES PER MONTH FOR REMAINDER OFD 1969, TOGETHER WITH 19,02@ HECTARES DISTRIBUTED DURING FIRST SIX MONTHS, COMPARES FAVORABLY WITH 1967 AND 1968. V CTZ VILLAGE OFFICIALS COMPLETED TRAINING N SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURES NOW USED N DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM.
E. ORGANIZE PEOPLE FOR SELF-DEFENSE. DURING JULY, ADDI-TIONAL 137,081 PSDF WERE ORGANIZED FOR TOTAL OF 1,618,005; AN ADDITIONAL 82,837 TRAINED, FOR A TOTAL OF 1,039,320; AND AN ADDITIONAL
4
,554 ARMED, FOR A TOTAL OF 316,081. NCREESES REPRESENT 36 PRECENT 27 PRECENT AND60 PRECENT, RESPACTIVELY, OF PSDF PHASE GOALS.
F. RALLY ADDITIONAL CHIEU HOI, PROGRAM EXPERIENCED SHARP UPTURN N JULY, THERE WERE 5,608 RETURNEES (NCLUDING 1,045 K K K AND HOA HOA NON-VC ARMED DISSIDENTS), OR BEOMO PERCENT OF PHASE I GOAL OF 14,000. TOTAL NUMBER OF RETURNEES AT END-JULY WAS 27,580 EXCEEDING ANNUAL RECORD OF 2/148 SZ AT END OF 1967. EMPHASES NOW SPON MPROVING QUALITY OF PROGRAM, ESPECIALLY BETTER UTILIZA-TION OF RETURNEES.
G. RESETTTE AND CARE FOR REFUGEES. PROGRAM MAINTAINED FASTER TIMPO NOTICED N LATE SPRING AND EARLY SSMMER, FROM A TOTAL
OF 1.5 MILLION N FEBRUARY, NUMBER HAS DROPPED TON1,093,079 ESTIMATED 251,419 HAVE BEEN RESETTTED AND RECEIVED THEIR FINAL PAYMENTS. ADDITIONAL 160,044 HAVE BEEN RETURNED TONTHIER ORIGCNAL VILLAGES. BARRING UNFORESEEN GENERATION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES. PROGRAM AT THIS RATE SHOULD GONFAR TOWARDS ACHIEVING VERY AMBITIOUS GOJLS SET FOR END-BC
OBER.
INTENSIFY THE NFORMATION EFFORT.
(12 PRESIDENT THIEU GAVE PROGRAM SPECIAL PRIORITY FOR REMAINDER OF 1969. PROGRAM STILL HAS NOT MET EXPECTATIONS. THIEU CARGED PROVINCE SHIFS WITH PERSONAL RESPONSCBILITY FOR INFORMCNG GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND CITIZENS OF GOVERNMENTS PRO-GRAMS. DURING JULY, 425 VILLAGE NFORMATION CADRE WERS N TRAIN-ING AT THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER N VUNG TAU FOR FIRST OF THREE COURSES. N ADDITION, DISTRIBUTION OF 750 COMMUNITZ TV SETS COMPLETED.
(2) CORPS, UNDER GENERAL LAM'S DIRECTION, CONDUC
ED SIX
MAJOR POLITICZL NSTRUCTION AND DISCUSSION SESSIONS N FIVE PROVINCE CAPITALS AND DA NANG CITY. MORE THAN 2,500 COMMUNITY LEEDERS ATTENDED THE SIX MEETINGS, DURING WHICH ALL ASPECTS OF

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

GOVERNMENT POLICY WERE UP FOR DISCUSSION, MOST EIGNIFICANT
ASPECT WAS SPONTANEOUS RESPONSE TONTHIS KIND OF POLITICAL
MOBILIZATION,
GP=4
BT
#0736
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

CORRECTION TO 2 0 1 7 0
SECTION 1

CORRECTION

9 05 06 50Z

SERVICE

VZCZCJCS269
PP RUCRJCS
DE RUEACTA #9785 2480504
ZNY CCCCC ZOC RUEACTA #9785 2480504
PP RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #8000 2481859
ZNY CCCCC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SVC 4UI RUEACSA0170 2471725 ZDK
RHMSMVA0736 2470615
P 0401122 SEP 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/JCS
RUCRJCS/SECDEFD
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAUSA/USIA WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/USAID SAIGON
ZEN/JUSPAO SAIGON
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEGATIONO
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 50636 (JU1G) SECTION 1 OF 2
SUBJECT: STATUS OF PACIFICATION - 31 JULY 1969 (U)
1. (C) PURPOSE. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF PACIFICATION AND SUMMARIZESSTHE DEGREE OF ACHIEVEMENT ATTAINED DURING THE FIRST MONTH OF PHASE II OF THE CY 1969
PAGE 2 RHMSMVA0735 C O N F I D E N T I A L
PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT CAMPAIGN.
2. (C) SUMMARY. THE FIRST MONTH OF PHASE II (OR THE 2969 APC) SHOWED NO STARTLING INNOVATIONS OR DEVELOPMENTS, ALTHOUGH STATISTICAL INDICATORS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CAMPAIGN GOT OFF TO A GOOUD START. AS OF 31 JULY, 87.6 PC OF THE POPULATION AND 75.9PC OF THE HAMLETS WERE RATED ABC. MOREUVER, 52.9PC OF THEPOPULATION (LESS SAIGON) IS NOW RATED AB, THUS EXCEEDING PRESIDEN THIEU'S GOAL OF 50PC RATED AB BY END-OCTOBER. THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THEIR ABANDONED HOMES, CONTINUED HIGH CHIEU HOI RATES, IMPLE-O MENTATION OF THE VILLAGE SELF DELOPMENT PROGRAM, AND A RUSH TOWARDS RECRUITMENT OF THE ADDITIONAL POPULAR FORCES AUTHORIZED BY JFS FURTHER ISSULTRATE THAT PACIFICATION'S PROGRESS CONTINUES

INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-2 J3-12 J4-3 J5-2 SACSA-4 NMCC-1
SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/I/L-1 ASD/PA-1 ASD/COMP-1 MGRA-1 ASD/SA-3
W/H-10 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 AMPS/FILE-1 (89) GHJ/TL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

APACE.
3. (C) END-JULY/MID-AUGUST RESULTS.
A. THE FOLLOWING TABLE SUMMARIZES STATUS OF PACIFICATION IN TERMS OF PHASE II GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS.

PROGRAM	GOAL END-OCTOBER	ATTAINED END-JULY
1. EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECURITY		
A. POPULATION	90PC ABC	87.6PC
(EST: 17,219,100)	50PC AB	58.0PC
REMARKS: ONE GOAL APPERARS TO BE ACHIEVED, CURRENT TRENDS INDICATE BOTH GOALS WILL BE ACHIEVED.		
B. HAMLETS (EST: 10,775)	9,774 ABC (SECURE ADDITIONAL 2,729 IN 1969) DURING	8,348 (1,080 SECURED PHASE I)
HSAARKS: COMMAND EMPHASIS OF 1969 APC ENSURES GOAL EITHER WILL BE MET OR WILL NOT FALL FAR SHORT.		
C. RF	252,675 (AUTHORIZED)	251,500 (ASSIGNED)
REMARKS: VIRTUALLY ACHIEVED.		
D. PF	5,724 PLATOONS	5,670 PLATOONS (MID-AUG)
REMARKS: PLUS90PC (812 PLATOONS) OF PHASE II GOAL (863) RECRUITED BY MID-AUGUST.		
2. VC INFRASTRUCTURE	16,200 RENDERED INEFFECTIVE	10,313
REMARKS: ACHIEVEMENT FIGURES SOFT, PROGRESS TO DATE INADEQUATE WHEN MEASURED AGAINST THE NEED, EVEN THOUGH THERE HAS BEEN MODEST IMPROVEMENT.		
3. PSDFD		
A. ORGANIZED	1,800,000 EOQNIOU	1,618,005 EQYNPIQ
B. ARMED		
REMARKS: CONTRIBUTION TO OVERALL SECURITY IS MODEST, BUT POLITICAL DIVIDENDS SUBSTANTIAL IN TERMS OF INCREASED POPULAR PARTICIPATION I NTHE WAR.		
4. LOCAL GOVERNMENT		
A. VILLAGE ELECTIONS	1,991 RVN	1,891
KJUTTUU HHHHHHHHHHYIYIYIYIYIYYRYRYRY		VILLAGES
B. HAMLET ELECTIONS	9,435 RVN	8,776

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

HAMLETS
REMARKS: 794 VILLAGE ELECTIONS AND 4,461 HAMLET ELECTIONS HELD I
MARCH AND JUNE, VOTER TURNOUT WAS 89,6PC
AND 88,4PC RESPECTIVELY, SUPRISINGLY SUCCESSFUL, BEST AVAILABLE I TELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT, AS OF 30 JUNE, VC HAD ELECTED OR APPOINTED 1,148 VILLAGE REVOLUTIONARY COMMMETTEES,

5, CHIER HOI	29,600	27,580

REMARKS: STAR PERFORMER, FIRST SIX MONTHS EXCEEDS TOTAL FOR 1968, DUE PRIMARILY TO EXPANSION OF SECURITY IN RURAL AREAS, LITTLE OR NO SUCCESS IN INDUCING NVA TO RALLY,

6, REFUGEEES RESETTLED	1,200,000	160,044 RETURNED TO VILLAGE! 251,419 RESETTLED

REMARKS: SLOW START IN FEBRUARY BECAUSE OF BUDGETARY SQUABBLE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, NUMBERS DECLINED FROM ALL-TIME HIGH OF 1,4 MILLION IN FEBRUARY TO 1,2 MILLION AT END-MAY, GVN EFFORT NOW INTENSIVE, END-YEAR GOAL VERY AMBITIOUS,

8, RURAL ECONOMY		
A, IR 8 RICE PLANTED	200,000 HA	43,000 HA
B, LAND REFORM (LAND DISTRIBUTED)	147,000 HA	11,000 HA
C, RURAL CREDIT (LOANS TO ASSIST AGRI-CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT)	MORE THAN 70,000	23,586
D, LINES OF COMMUNICATION (SECURE)		
(1) ROADS	3,811 KM	2,755 KM
(2) RAILROADS	1,085 KM	603 KM
(3) WATERWAYS	1,754 KM	1,436 KM

REMARKS: EXPANSION OF SECURITY, OPENING OF LOC'S, AND POSITIVE PROGRAMS SUCH AS THE IR-8 RICE EFFORT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A SUBSTANTIAL RISE IN RURAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, FINAL APPROVAL OF REVOLU-TIONARY @LAND TO THE TILLER@ PROGRAM SHOULDD DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE LAND REFORM EFFORT,

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

B. EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECURITY.
(12 POPULATION RATED ABC BY THE HES ROSE 2PC FROM 85.6PC
TO 87.6PC, OR ABOUT 343,900 PEOPLE. INCREASE WAS DOUBLE NORMAL
1PC RISE OF PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND CAN BE ATTRIBUTED LARGELY TO
LOW LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY AND MOVEMENT OF GVN INTO NEW HAMLETS
DE POPULATION DECLINED TO 7PC AND THOSE UNDER VC CONTROL TO ABOUT
BT
#9785
NNNN

20170

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

75444

SECTIONS 1 2 & 3
CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

OOH 07 33Z

VZCZCJCS178
PP RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #0796 2770035
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC-T-AID WASH DC
P 030431Z OCT 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/JCS
RUERJCS/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/USAID SAIGON
ZEN/JUSPAO
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 55828 (J01R) FOR US DELEGATION SECTION 1 OF 3
SUBJECT: STATUS OF PACIFICATION - 31 AUGUST 1969 (U)
1. (C) PURPOSE: THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF PACIFICATION AND SUMMARIZES THE DEGREE OF ACHIEVEMENT ATTAINED DURING AUGUST, THE SECOND MONTH OF PHASE II OF THE 1969 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT CAMPAIGN.
2. (C) SUMMARS: DURING THE SECOND MONTH OF PHASE II, THERE WAS A SLIGHT DECLIN IN MOMENTUM TO MORE NORMAL RATE OF PROGRESS, RAPID RATE IN JULY ASCRIBED TO INITIATION OF 1969 APC AND VERY LOW LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY, ENEMY ACTIVITY INCREASED IN AUGUST, ESPECIALLY TERRORIST INCIDENTS WHICH INCREASED 220/0 COMPARED TO JULY AND INTERDICTION OF MAIN LOC'S, EIGHT PROVINCE NOTED THAT MAIN VC PRIORITY WAS ATTACKS ON PACIFICATION AREAS, NEVERTHELESS, AS OF 31 AUGUST, 88.9 0/0 OF POPULATION AND 78, 6 0/0 OF HAMLETS WERE RATED
ABC (SECURITY/DEVELOPMENT), MOREOVER, 56.5 0/0 OF POPULATION (LESS SAIGON) WAS RATED AB IN TERMS OF SECURITY ONLY, REDUCTION OF REFUGEES TO LESS THAN ONE MILLION FOR FIRST TIME SINCE MARCH 1968; CONTINUED HIGH CHIEU HOI RATES; INCREASED TRAINING OF LOCAL OFFICIALS; ADVANCES IN THE VILLAGE SELF-DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM; AND AS INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE PEIPLE'S SELF-DEVENSE FORCE ILLUSTRATE PACIFICATION'S UNSPECTACULAR, UNHURRIED BUT EFFECTIVE PROGRESS.
INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-2 J3-12 J4-3 J5-2 SACSA-4 NMCC-1 SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/I/L-4 ASD/PA-1 ASD/COMP-1 ASD/M&RA-1 ASD/SA-3 WH-10 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 AMPS/FILE-1(92)JRT/TT
1 OF 10

AJC

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

3. (C) END-AUGUST RESULTS:
A. THE FOLLOWING TABLE SUMMARIZES STATUS OF PACIFICATION IN TERMS OF PHASE II GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS:

PROGRAM	GOAL END-OCTOBER	ATTAINED END-AUGUST
(1) EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECURITY		
(A) POPULATION	90 0/0 ABC	88,9 0/0
(EST,: 17,338,600)	50 0/0 AB	56,5 0/0
REMARKS: CURRENT TRENDS INDICATE BOTH GOALS WILL BE ACHIEVED.		
(B) HAMLETS (EST,: 10,775)	9,699	8,530
-SECURE ADDITIONAL 2,677 IN 1969		
-1508, UPGRADED AS OF 31 AUG 69		
REMARKS: SEE PARA 3B(*), EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECURITY.		
(C) RF	252,927 (AUTHORIZED)	253,582 (ASSIGNED)
REMARKS: INCLUDES 278 COMPANIES AUTHORIZED, RECRUITED AND TRAINED DURING FIRST HALF CY 69.		
(D) PF	208,345 (AUTHORIZED)	200,582 (ASSIGNED)
REMARKS: AS OF 23 SEPTEMBER, 5,718 PLATOON OUT OF 5,724 AUTHORIZED, FIGURE INCLUDES 857 OF 863 NEWLY AUTHORIZED PF PLATOONS, 639 ON OF NEW PLATOONS NOW IN TRAINING. 518 WILL COMPLETE TRAINING BY END-OCTOBER.		
PAGE 4 RHMSMVA 0796 C O N F I D E N T I A L		
(2) VC INFRASTRUCTURE RENDERED	16,200	12,156
INEFFECTIVE		
REMARKS: ACHIEVEMENT FIGURES SOFT, PROGRESS TO DATE INADEQUATE WHEN MEASURED AGAINST NEED, EVEN THOUGH AUGUST RESULTS ARE 36 0/0 HIGHER THAN JUNE.		
(3) PSDF		
(A) ORGANIZED	1,800,00	2,099,648 (MID-SEP)
(B) ARMED	391,897	346,162
RMARKS: OVERALL SECURITY CONTRIBUTION REMAINS MODEST, BUT POLITICAL DIVIDENDS SUBSTANTIAL IN TERMS OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR, END-69 GOAL FOR ORGANIZED PSDF ALREADY ACHIEVED.		
(4) LOCAL GOVERNMENT		
(A) VILLAGE ELCTIONS	1,991 (RVN)	1,891
(B) HAMLET ELECTIONS	9,435 (RVN)	8,776
REMARKS: 794 VILLAGE ELECTIONS AND 4,461 HAMLET ELECTIONS HELD IN MARCH AND JUNE, THE REMAINDER TO DE HELD THROUGH-		

75444

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

BUT SEPTEMBER, VOTER TURNOUT WAS 89.6 0/0 AND 88.4 0/0 RESPECTIVELY--SURPRISINGLY SUCCESSFUL, BEST AVAILABLE ITELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT AS OF 31 AUG, VC HAD CLAIMED 1,148 ELECTED OR APPOINTED VILLAGE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES.

(5) CHIEU HOI	29,600	30,439

REMARKS: STAR PERFORMER, AUGUST FIGURE EXCEEDS END-OCT GOAL. RETURNEE RATE FOR AUG (3,907) IS SLIGHT DECLINE FROM JUL.

(6) REFUGEES RESETTLED	1,200,000	461,276

REMARKS: TOTAL DECLINED TO LESS THAN ONE MILLION FOR FIRST TIME SINCE FEBRUARY 1968, GVN MAKING INTENSIVE EFFORT, END-YEAR GOAL VERY AMBITIOUS.

(7) PSYOPS	NO GOAL SET	

REMARKS: GVN PSYOPS EFFORT HAD A ALWAYS BEEN ONE OF WEAKEST LINKS IN THE CHAIN, PRESIDEN THIEU IN JULY MADE PROGRAM PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF PROVINCE CHIEFS, BUT WHILE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, IT IS STILL INSUFFICIENT TO TASK AT HAND.

(8) RURAL ECONOMY		
(A) IR-8 RICE PLANTED (HECTARES)	200,000	121-125,000
(B) LAND REFORM (HECTARES DISTRIBUTED)	147,000	34,225
(C) RUAL CREDIT (LOANS TO ASSIST AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT)	70,000 PLUS	47,569 REG, 35,777 SPECIAL

*RECORDED FIGURE ONLY, ACTUAL IR-8 HECTARAGE PROBABLY MUCH LARGER.

(D) LINES OF COMMUNICATION (SECURE)		
(1) ROADS	3,811 KM	2,633.0 KM
(2) RAILROADS	1,085 KM	282.1 KM
(3) WATERWAYS	1,754 KM	1,221.0 KM

REMARKS: EXPANSION OF SECURITY, OPENING OF LOC'S AND

BT
#0796
NNNN

75444

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

7 5 4 4 4

SECTION 2

VZCZCJCS291
PP RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #0797 2770035
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC-T-AID WASY DC
P 030431Z OCT 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/JCS
RUCRJCS/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/USAID SAIGON
ZEN/JUSPAO
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 55828 (J01R) FOR US DELEGATION SEC 2 OF 3

POSITIVE PROGRAMS SUCH AS THE IR-8 RICE EFFORT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A SUBSTANTIAL RISE IN RURAL ACTIVITY DURING 1969.

B. EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECURITY

(1) POPULATION RATED ABC BY THE HES ROSE 1.3 O/O FROM 87.6 O/O TO 88.9 O/OGN OR ABOUT 249,500 PEOPLE. ABC POPULATION THUS APPROXIMATELY 15,420,000 OUT OF ESTIMATED 17,336,800 TOTAL. DE POPULATION DECLINED TO 6.5 O/O AND THOSE UNDER VC CONTROL TO ABOUT 4.9 O/O AMONG THE RURAL POPULATION, 83.8 O/O IS RATED ABC, AN INCREASE OF 2.7 O/O SINCE END-JULY, OR ABOUT 295,300 PEOPLE. ESTIMATED VC POPULATION DECLINED TO ABOUT 690,000. ON BASIS OF SECURITY RATING ALONE, 56.5 O/O OF NON-SAIGON POPULATION RATED AB. 9,699 ABC HAMLETS ESTABLISHED AS NUMBER REQUIRED TO MEET 90 O/O ABC POPULATION GOAL, GVN TARGETED 2,677 FOR UPGRADING; 1,670 IN PHASE I AND 1,007 IN PHASE II (FIGURES VARY SLIGHTLY FROM MONTH TO MONTH). AT MID-SEPTEMBER, 2,576 HAMLETS HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED BYMILITARY FORCES (1,651 DURING PHASE I AND 925 IN PHASE II TO DATE). ONLY 1,508 OF THESE, HOWEVER HAVESBEEN UPGRADED TO DATE, 1,131 DURING PHASE I AND 377 SO FAR IN PHASE II.

(2) TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED TO EXPAND WITH 154 NEW PF PLATOONS AND THE RETURN OF AUTHORIZED RF COMPANIES FROM TRAINING CENTERS, OPERATIONAL INDICATORS FLUCTUATE CONSIDERABLY.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

BUT IN GENERAL THERE WAS LITTLE CHANGE FROM JULY. RF NIGHT OPERATIONS INCREASED 981 (70,772 TO 71,753) AND CONTACTS INCREASED IN BOTH DAY AND NINGT OPERATIONS, PF OPERATIONS DECREASED, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF PF CONTACTS INCREASED.

AVERAGE MONTHLY RF OPERATIONAL STATISTICS

1969	AUGUST
WPNS RATIO (CAPTURED/LOST)	6.1
KIA RATIO (ENEMY/FRIENDLY)	4.1
AVERAGE TOTAL OPERATIONS/UNIT	32.5
AVERAGE NIGHT OPERATIONS/UNIT	30.1
AVERAGE TOTAL CONTACTS/UNIT	1.6
AVERAGE NIGHT CONTACTS/UNIT	.7
AVERAGE TOTAL CONTACTS/1000 OPERATIONS	51.0
AVERAGE NIGHT CONTACTS/1000 OPERATIONS	18.0

AVERAGE MONTHLY PF OPERATIONAL STATISTICS

WPNS RATIO (CAPTURED/LOST)	4.6
KIA RATIO (ENEMY/FRIENDLY)	3.8
AVERAGE TOTAL OPERATIONS/UNIT	29.4
AVERAGE NIGHT OPERATIONS/UNIT	20.5
AVERAGE TOTAL CONTACTS/UNIT	.6
AVERAGE NIGHT CONTACTS/UNIT	.3
AVERAGE TOTAL CONTACTS/1000 OPERATIONS	19.0
AVERAGE NIGHT CONATCTS/1000 OPERATIONS	14.0

PAGE 4 RHMSMVA 0797 C O N F I D E N T I A L

(3) NATIONAL POLICE (NP) STRENGTH AGAIN DROPPED SLIGHTLY, TO 76,351, THE TRANSFER OF 13,000 MEN FROM THE MILITARY TO FILL OUT THE RANKS OF THE NP HAS BEEN VERY SLOW IN GETTING STARTED AND STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE LARGELY VOLUNTEER NATURE OF THE TRANSFER IS WIDELY PUBLICIZED WITHIN ARVN. OPERATIONAL RESULTS FOR AUGUST WERE 98 VC KIA; 845 VC CAPTURED, 2,653 SUSPECTS DETAINED; AND SUCH CONTRABAND SEIZED AS 373 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, 61 CREW-SERVED WEAPONS, 479 GRENADES, AND 450 ITEMS OF EXPLOSIVES. FIGURES DIFFER SHARPLY FROM PREVIOUS MONTHS' BECAUSE OF IMPROVED ACCOUNTING WHICH SEPARATES NP INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS FROM COMBINED OPERATIONS.

C. ELIMINATE VC INFRASTRUCTURE

DURING AUGUST PHUNG HOANG OPERATIONS ACCOUNTED FOR 1,839 VCI, THE HIGHEST MONTHLY TOTAL OF NEUTRALIZATIONS THIS YEAR. AUGUST FIGURE UP 3 O/O FROM 1,790 IN JULY AND 36 O/O HIGHER THAN JUNE.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

NUMBERS OF VCI NEUTRALIZED EXCEEDED BY 39 GVN ESTABLISHED COUNTRY-WIDE GOAL OF 1,800. TO DATE IN 1969, 12,156 VCI HAVE BEEN NEUTRALIZED, JULY AND AUGUST ACCOUNT FOR 29 0/0 OF THESE NEUTRALIZATIONS. IN ADDITION, 2,795 VCI SUPPORTERS, 2,160 GUERRILLAS, AND 1,950 VC/NVA SOLDIERS (6,905) WERE NEUTRALIZED I A L
AS A DIRECT RESULT TF PHUNG HOANG OPERATIONS, 1,074 INCREASE OVER NUMBER REPORTED IN JULY, PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM OPERATIONAL RESULTS EXPERIENCED A SHARP INCREASE IN JULY AND THE ESULTS FOR AUGUST HAVE CONTINUED AT A HIGH LEVEL. AUGUST RESULTS FOLLOW:

(1) VCI NEUTRALIZED

	KILLED	CAPTURED	RALLIED	TOTAL
I CTZ	111	156	134	401
II CTZ	126	184	65	375
III CTZ	93	191	85	369
INCL CMD)				
IV CTZ	268	252	174	694
TOTAL	598	783	458	1,839
	(32 0/0)	(43 0/0)	(25 0/0)	

THE KILLED AND CAPTURED PERCENTAGES INDICATE THAT OF TOTAL NEUTRA
LIZED, 5 0/0 LESS VCI WERE KILLED AND 4 0/0 MORE VCI WERE
CAPTURED THAN IN JULY, A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IS OBJECTIVE OF THE PROGRAM WHICH IS TO CAPTURE VCI FOR FURTHER INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION, PERMANENCE OF NEUTRALIZATION OF CAPTURED VCI DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE AT PRESENT BECAUSE OF LACK OF A WORKING GVN PRISONER ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM AND PREMATURE RELEASE OF CAPTURED VCI PRIOR TO SENTENCING.

(2) OTHER NEUTRALIZED

	VCI SUPPORTERS@	GUERRILLAS	VC/NA SOLDIERS	TOTAL
ICTZ	684	435	1,233	2,352
II CTZ	516	98	299	913
III CTZ	426	386	385	1,197
(INCL CMD)				
IV CTZ	1,169	1,241	33	2,443
TOTAL	2,795	2,160	1,950	6,905

@INCLUDES COMMO-LIAISON PERSONNEL PLUS HAMLET AND SOME VILLAGE MEMBERS OF FUNCTIONAL SECTIONS, SUCH AS CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PROSELYTING, SECURITY, FINANCE-ECONOMY, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND OTHERS WHO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

TO COMMUNISTS FORCES BUT DO NOT QUALIFY AS VCI,
NEUTRALIZATIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ALONG WITH PRESENT VCI
STRENGTH ESTIMATES. LATEST ESTIMATE (15 AUG 69) WAS 85,039.
ESTIMATED TOTAL
VCI STRENGTH

NEUTRALIZATIONS
BT
#0797
NNNN

7 OF 10 75444

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

VZCZCJCS362
PP RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #0798 2770035
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC-T-AID WASH DC
P 030431Z OCT 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/JCS
RUCRJCS/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/USAID SAIGON
ZEN/JUSPAO
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS
BT

7 5 444

SECTIONS 3

C O N F I D E N T I A L 55828 (J01R) FOR US DELEGATION
FINAL SECTION OF 3
15 AUGUST 69 IN 1969

ICTZ	21,026	3,066 (14 PER CENT)	
II CTZ	16,272	2,405 (15 PER CENT)	
III CTZ	11,702	2,081 (18PER CENT)	
IV CTZ	34,939	4,604 (13PER CENT)	
OSVN	1,110		
TOTAL	85,039	12,156(14PER CENT)	

THE INCRESED NEUTRALIZATIONS IN AUGUST INDECATE THE APPLICA-
TION OF IMPROVED OPERATIONSL TECHNIQUES, CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON
THE PROGRAM BY US AND GVN OFFICIALS FROM NATIONAL LEVEL DOWN
TO PROVINCE, DISTRICT AND RECENTLY VILLAGE LEVELS, AND COMMAND
SUPPORT AND INT
REST, TRAINING HAS IMPROVED AND WILL CONTINUE
TO IMPROVE WITH THE OPENING OF PHUNG HOANG TRAINIG SCHOOLS
IN II AND IV CTZ'S DURING OCTO BER. SIMILAR SCHOOLS HAVE BEEN
IN OPERATION IN I AND III CTZ'S.
THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR PROMULGATED CIRCULAR 2212) SUBJECT
@IMPROVEMENTS IN THE METHODS FOR RESOLVING THE STATUS OF
OFFENDERS@! TO WHICH IS APPUNDED THE OFFENDER DOSSIER FORM.
THE CIRCULAR CONTAINS IN ALMOST ALL RESPECTSPHOENIX DIRECTORATE
PROPOSALS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOI ABC CLASSIFICA-

8 OF 10 75444

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

TION SENTENCING GUIDELINES, USE AND CONTENT OF DOSSIERS FOR PROSE-
CUTION, UST OF EVIDENCE AND INTELLIGENCE FOR CONVICTIONS, SECURITY
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES,, DETAINEE DESPOSTION FEEDBACK, AND SIMILAR
LEGAL PROCESSING MATTERS, IF EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED, THE GUIDANCE
WILL RESULT IN LOGICAL, UNIFORM AND EFFECTIVE PROCESSING, SENTENCING
AND DETENTION OF VCI WHICH HAS BEEN A LONG-STANDING PROBLEM,
D. ORGANIZE PEOPLE FOR SELF-DEFENSE
PROGRAM ALREADY HAS EXCEEDED ITS GOAL, PSDF HAVE BEEN
REPORTED ORGANIZED IN ALL DISTRICTS AND ENGAGED IN COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES. IN THUA THIEN , FOR EXAMPLE, PSDF
REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH WILLAGE CONGREGATED IN A SINGLE HAMLET
OVER A FOUR DAY PERIOD TO COMPLETE A SIZEABLE CIVIC ACTION PROJECT,
IMPHASIS NOW ON TRAINING , WITH ULTIMATE GOAL OF 80 PER CENT TRAINED
OF
THOSE ORGANIZED PRESENTLY 55 VOPERCENT ARE TRAINED ALTHOUGH
STATISTICS
ARE NOT YET AVAILABLE, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR IN RECENT MONTHS HAS
GIVEN INCREASED EMPHASIS TO DEVELOPING PROJECT N
R WOMEN,
YOUTH AND OLD PEOPLE, THIS ASPECT OF PSDF SHOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT
FACTOR IN PSDF 1970 ACTIVITIES.

CTZ	ORGANIZED	TRAINED	WEAPONS ISSUED
I	302,898	172,050	70,789
II	365,741	196,823	71,138
III	747,499	430 ,969	115,924
IV	683,510	367,722	88,311
TOTAL	2,099,648	1,167,564	346,162

E, RALLY ADDITIONSL CHIEU HOI
AIGUST TOTAL ON 3,907 WAS THIRD HIGHEST OF YEAR, IN SPITE OF
DECLINE FROM JULY AND CONTINUING POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY, RATE CON-
TINUES AT VIRTUALLY UNPRECEDENTED LEVEL, HIGH RATE R
FLECTS IN
LARGE PART EXPANSION OF TERRITORIAL SECURITYGM INITIAL @VIETN
MIZA-
T ON@ OF WAR SEEMS TO HAVE HAD LITTLE EFFECT IN KIEN HOA AND DINH
TUONG PROVINCES, WHERE RATE REMAINS HIGH IN SPITE OF US 9TH
DIVISION REDEPLOYMENT,NNI

MONTH OF AUGUST RECAPITULATION

REGION	MIL	POL	OTHERS	TOTAL
I	195	199	84	478
II	58	103	63	224
III	468	154	110	732
IV	1,489	568	416	2,473

75444

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TOTAL	2,210	1,024	673	3,907

F. RESETTLE AND CARE FOR REFUGEES

REFUGEE POPULATION DURING AUGUST DROPPED BELOW MILLION MARK - FOR FIRST TIME SINCE MARCH 1968, FROM 1,093,079 IN JULY TO 961,617. TOTAL INCLUDES 345,919 REFUGEES IN CAMP AND 477,644 OUI OF CAMP. RETURN TO-VILLAGE AND RESETTLTMENT TOTALS CONTINUED TO VIRTUALLY BALANCE, 34,006 VERUS 34,188 RESPECTIVELY, REMAINDER OF 63,000 PRESONS REMOVED FROM ROLLS WERE EITHER SELF-RESETTLED OR ACCOUNTED FOR BY ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. AS PROGESS CONTINUES AND REFUGEE SERVICE CHIEFS GET BETTER HOLD ON THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN THEIR PROVINCES, TOTALS MAY BE EXPECTED TO BE ADJUSTED DOWNWARD AS A RESULTS OF ELIMINATION OF DOUBLE COUNTING AND VERIFICATION OF REGISTRATION LISTS.

	END-JULY	END-AUGUST	CHANGE
I CTZ	495,979	417,225	-42,754
II CTZ	311,993	295,017	-16,976
III CTZ	77,114	62,615	-14,499
IV CTZ	207,993	186,760	-21,233
TOTAL	1,093,079	961,617	-131,462

G. INTENSIFY THE INFORMATION EFFORT

MINOR IMPROVEMENTS NOTICED IN ATTEMPT TO PRODUCE EACH MONTH ONE NATIONAL AND ONE PROVINCIAL THEME, PROGRAM. HOWEVER, STILL HAS NOT MET EXCEPTIONS, PRESDIENT THIEU MADE PROGRAM PRESONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF PROVINCE CHIEFS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE GREATER COMMAND EMPHASIS. RESULTS, (WHILE AN IMPROVEMENT,) STILL FAR FROM SATISFACTORY.

H. STRENGTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT

VILLAGE AND HAMLET OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO ATTEND THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER FOR INSTRUCTION IN THE ARTS OF GOVERNMENT; TOTAL FOR THE YEAR TO DATE IS WELL OVER 7,000.

VILLAGE SELF-DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (VSD) CONTINUED TO MOVE AHEAD AFTER ITS SLOW START EARILER IN THE YEAR, WITH WELL OVER 400,000 FAMILIES INVOLVED IN SD GROUPS. ALMOST ALL OF THE VILLAGE FINANCE COMMISSIONERS (APPROXIMATELY 2,000 VILLAGES) HAVE RECEIVED CHECKBOOKS. A FUTHER STEP TOWARD LOCAL CONTROL OVER LOCAL DEVELOPMENT.

THE SWEEPING LAND REFORM PROGRAM, LAND-TO-THE-TILLER, IS NOW BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, WHERE IT HAS RUN INTO TROUBLE. THE LOWER HOUSE MODIFIED ITS MOST IMPORTANT ASPECTS BY STIPULATING RETENTION LIMITS, LEGAL FARMERS ONLY (WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE SQUATTERS, A DECICIVE ELEMENT) AND GREATER FINANCIAL COMPENSATION TO LANDLORDS. BILL IS NOW BEFORE THE SENATE, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO APPROVE A BILL CLOSER TO THE ONE SPONSORED BY THIEU ADMINISTRATION, GP4 BT PAGE 1 CONTAINS 21 LINES OF TEXT NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFEN
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

4393 P

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

005 17 207

SECTION ONE THRU FOUR

VZCZCJCS797
PP RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #1120 3091300
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC ¤T¤ AID WASH DC
P 050217Z NOV 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/USAID SAIGON
ZEN/JUSPAO SAIGON
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEG
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 61879 (J01R)
SECTION 1 OF 4
SUBJECT: STATUS OF PACIFICATION ¤ 30 SEPTEMBER 1969 (U)
1. (U) PURPOSE: THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF PACIFICATION AND SUMMARIZES THE DEGREE OF ACHIEVEMENT DURING SEPTEMBER, THE THIRD MONTH OF PHASE II OF THE 1969 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT CAMPAIGN.
2. (C) SUMMARY: SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WAS MADE IN SEPTEMBER, AS PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES EXPANDED AND MET ONLY LIGHT OPPOSITION. ENEMY MILITARY ACTIVYT DECLINED THOUGHOUT VIETNAM AS DID ENEMY TERRORIST INCIDENTS, WHICH FELL FROM 937 IN AUGUST TO 791 IN SEPTEMBER, A DROP OF ALMOST 16PCT. THE DECLINE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY AND THE STEADY EXPANSION OF GVN CONTROL RESULTED IN 90.5PCT OF THE POPULATION RATED ABC (SECURITY/DEVELOPMENT) BY THE HES AND 51.5PCT RATED AB. THE PRIMARY GOAL OF PHASE II, TO CONSOLDIATE AND UPGRADE ALREADY SECURE HAMLETS SO THAT 50PCT OF THE POPULATION COULD BE RATED AB BY END OCTOBER, AND THE COUNTER¤ PART GOAL OF 09PCT ABC, WERE THUS ACHIEVED ONE MONTH IN ADVANCE. SIMILARLY, BY MID¤SEPTEMBER, PEOPLES SELF DEFENSE FORCE REACHED ITS END ¤ OCTOBER GOAL OF 2,000,000 ORGANIZED MEMBERS. REFUGEES CONTINUED TO DWINDLE, DROPPING SHARPLY FROM ABOUT 960,000 AT END¤AUGUST TO ABOUT 790,000 AT END¤ SEPTEMBER. THE CHIEU HOI RATE DECLINCED SLIGHTLY (3,524 TOTAL) BUT MAINTAIND THE HIGH WEEKLY RATE OF 800¤1,00, POPULAR

INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-2 J3-12 J4-3 J5-2 SACSA-4 NMCC-1

SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/IL-4 ASD/PA-1 ASD/COMP-1 ASD/M&RA-1 ASD/SA-1

WH-10 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1 (92) RBK/JG

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

FORCES CONTINUED TO ESPAND AS IN OCTOBER THE FIRST OF THE 863 NEW LF PLATOONS RECRUITED SINCE JULY FINISHED THEIR TRAINING AND CAME ON BOARD. THE TROUBLESOME AREAS OF THE PAIFICATION IEFFORT REMAINED THE PHOENIX AND INFORMATION PROGRAMS. PHOENIX HAS BEGUN TO RESPOND, BUT INFORMATION SHOWS LITTLE CHANGE.

3. (C) END-SEPTEMBER RESULTS

A. THE FOLLOWING TABLE SUMMARIZES THE STATUS OF PACIFICATION IN TERMS OF PHASE II GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS:

PROGRAM	GOAL END-OCTOBER	ATTAINED END-SEPTEMBER
(1) EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECURITY		
(A) ROPUALTION (EST 17,310,300)	90PCT ABC 50PCT AB	90.5PCT 51.5PCT
REMARKS: BOTH GOALS ACHEIVED IN ADVANCE.		
(B)HAMLETS (EST 10,775)	9,699	8,642
SECURE ADDITIONAL 2,677 IN 1969. 1,679 UPGRADED TO C AS OF 30 SEPT 69 (SEE PARA 8L BELOW).		
(C) REGIONAL FORCES	252,927 AUTOHEIZED (ASSIGND)	253,582
(D) POPULAR FORCES	208,345 AUTHORIZED (ASSIGNED)	200,169
REMARKS: BY END-SEPTMEBER 5,724 PLATOONS OUT OF 5724 AUTHORIZED. FIGURE INCLUDS 863 OF 863 NEWLY AUTHORIZED PF PLATOONS. 518 OF NEW PLATOONS WILL COMPLETE TRAINING BY END-OCTOBER.		
(2) VC INFRASTRUCTURE RENDERED INEFFECTIVE		
16,200	14,161	
REMARKS:NACHIEVEMENT FIGURES SOFT. PROGRESS STILL INADEQUATE ALTHOUGH IMPROVING.		
(3) PSDF		
(A) ORGANIZED	1,800,000	2,292, 904
(B) ARMED	391, 897	352,287
REMARKS: PROGRAM MARKED BY UNUSUAL RATE OF PROGRESS FURING SEPTEMBER AS SPECIAL EFFOT MADE TO ENLIST WOMEN, YOUTHS 12 -15, AND OLDER MEN (ORVE 50). EN-69 GOAL FOR ORGNAIZED PSDF ALREADY ACHIEVED.		
(4) LOCAL GOBERNMENT		
(A) VILLAGE ELECTION	1,991 (RVN)	2,00 (PLUS100PCT)
(B) HAMLET ELECTIONS	9,435 (RVN)	9,709 (PLUS100PCT)
REMARKS: GOAL EXCEEDED. ESTIMATE 93PCT OF ALL VILLAGES NOW HAVE LECETED GOVERNMENTS AND 92PCT OF ALL HAMLETS.		

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

FORCES CONTINUED TO ESPAND AS IN OCTOBER THE FIRST OF THE 863 NEW LF PLATOONS RECRUITED SINCE JULY FINISHED THEIR TRAINING AND CAME ON BOARD. THE TROUBLESOME AREAS OF THE PAIFICATION IEFFORT REMAINED THE PHOENIX AND INFORMATION PROGRAMS. PHOENIX HAS BEGUN TO RESPOND, BUT INFORMATION SHOWS LITILE CHANGE.

3. (C) END-SEPTEMBER RESULTS

A. THE FOLLOWING TABLE SUMMARIZES THE STATUS OF PACIFICATION IN TERMS OF PHASE II GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS:

PROGRAM	GOAL END-OCTOBER	ATTAINED END-SEPTEMBER
(1) EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECURITY		
(A) ROPUALTION (EST 17,310,300)	90PCT ABC	90,5PCT
	50PCT AB	51,5PCT
REMARKS: BOTH GOALS ACHEIVED IN ADVANCE.		
(B)HAMLETS (EST 10,775)	9,699	8,642
SECURE ADDITIONAL 2,677 IN 1969.		
1,679 UPGRADED TO C AS OF 30 SEPT 69 (SEE PARA BL BELOW).		
(C) REGIONAL FORCES	252,927 AUTOHEIZED (ASSIGND)	253,582
(D) POPULAR FORCES	208,345 AUTHORIZED (ASSIGNED)	200,169

REMARKS: BY END-SEPTMEBER 5,724 PLATOONS OUT OF 5724 AUTHORIZED. FIGURE INCLUDS 863 OF 863 NEWLY AUTHORIZED PF PLATOONS. 518 OF NEW PLATOONS WILL COMPLETE TRAINING BY END-OCTOBER.

(2) VC INFRASTRUCTURE RENDERED INEFFECTIVE		
16,200		14,161
REMARKS: ACHIEVEMENT FIGURES SOFT, PROGRESS STILL INADEQUATE ALTHOUGH IMPROVING.		
(3) PSDF		
(A) ORGANIZED	1,800,000	2,292,904
(B) ARMED	391,897	352,287

REMARKS: PROGRAM MARKED BY UNUSUAL RATE OF PROGRESS FURING SEPTEMBER AS SPECIAL EFFOT MADE TO ENLIST WOMEN, YOUTHS 12 -15, AND OLDER MEN (ORVE 50). EN-69 GOAL FOR ORGNAIZED PSDF ALREADY ACHIEVED.

(4) LOCAL GOBERNMENT		
(A) VILLAGE ELECTION	1,991 (RVN)	2,00 (PLUS100PCT)
(B) HAMLET ELECTIONS	9,439 (RVN)	9,709 (PLUS100PCT)

REMARKS: GOAL EXCEEDED. ESTIMATE 93PCT OF ALL VILLAGES NOW HAVE LECETED GOVERNMENTS AND 92PCT OF ALL HAMLETS.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFEN
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

(5) CHIEU HOI 29,600 33,963
REMARKS: STILL THE STAR PERFORMER, YEAR-END GOAL ATTAINED AT END-AUGUST.
(6) REFUGEES RESETTLED 1,200,00 621,603
RESETTLED OR RETURNED TO VILLAGE SINCE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR.
(7) PSYOPS NO GOA LOET
REMARKS: PROGRAM CALLS FOR ONE NATIONAL AND ONE ROVINCIAL THEMEM EACH MONTH. PSUOPS EFFORT, HOWEVER, REMAINS WEAK EVEN THOUGH PRESIDENT THIEU MADE PROGRAM PESONAL RESPONSIBLUTY OF PROVINCE CHIEFS.
(8) RURAL ECONOMY
(A) IR-8 RICE PLANTED(HECTARES) 200,000 125,521
(B)LAN REFORM (HECTARES
DISTRIBUTED 147,000 42,594
(C) RURAL CREDIT (LOANS TO ASSIST AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT) 70,000 53,310
(D) LINES OF COMMUNICATION S (SECURE)
(1) ROADS (KILOMETERS) 3,811 2,633
(2) RAILROADS (KM) 1,085 1,146
(3) WATERWAYS (CM) 1,754 1,221
REMARKS: CONTINUED EXPANSION OF SECURITY, OPENING OF LOC'S AND POSITIVE PROGRAMS SUCH AS THE IR-8 RICE EFFORT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A SUBSTANTIAL AND CONTINUING RISE IN RURAL ACTIVITY IN 1969.
B. EXPAND TERRITORIAL SECIRUTY
(1) POPUALTION RATED ABC (SECURITY/DEVELOPMENT)
BY THE HES ROSE 1.6PCT FROM 88.9PCT TO 09 .5PCT, OR ABOUT 237,300 PEOPLE. ABC POPULATION THUS APPROXIMATELY 15,657,100 OUT OF ESTIMATED 17,310,300 TOTAL. BY SAME CRITERIA, 51.5PCT OF TOTAL POPULATION OR ABOUT 8,905,300 PEOPLE RATED AB. THUS TWO PRIMARY GOALS OF 1969 PACIFICATIO CAMPAIGN ACCOMPLISHED ON E MONTH IN ADIVANCE.
DE POPULATION DECREASE 0.8PCT (ABOUT 132,800) TO 5.7PCT OF RVN TOTAL, OR APPROXIMATELY 989100 PEOPLE. VC POPULATION DECLINED 0.8PCT TO 3.8PCT OF TOTAL OR ABOUT 663,800. FIVE PROVINECE REGRESSED IN ABC POPULATION; NONE FROPPED BY OVER 1PCT
9,669 ABC HAMLETS ESTABLISHED AS NUMBER REQUIRED TO MEET 90PCT ABC POPLUATION GOAL. GVN TARGETED 2,677 FOR UPGRADING, 1,670 IN PHASE I AND 1,007 IN PHASE II (FIGURES MAY VARY
BT
PAGE 1 CONTAINS 21 LINES
#1120
NNNN

No GVN Quick!

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFEN
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

43936

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

005 17 21Z

VZCZCJCS811
PP RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #1121 3091300
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC -T- AID WASH DC
P 050217Z NOV 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
O
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/USAID SAIGON
ZEN/JUSPAO SAIGON
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEG
BT

SECTION TWO

C O N F I D E N T I A L 61875 (J01R) SECTION 2 OF 4
SLIGHTLY FROM MONTH TO MONTH). BY 10 OCTOBER, A TOTAL OF
1,659 PHASE I TARGET HAMLETS WERE OCCUPIED, OR 99.3 0/0 OF
PHASE I GOAL, ONLY 1,192, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN UPGRADED TO
C. SIMILARLY, 949 PHASE II TARGET HAMLETS WERE OCCUPIED,
OR 94.2 0/0 OF PHASE II GOALS; OF THESE 487 HAD BEEN UPGRADED TO C.
PAGE 2 RHMSMVA 1121 C O N F I D E N T I A L
1969 TARGET HAMLETS

CTZ	GOAL	ENTERED	END-SEMPTEMBER UPGRADED TO C
I	524	524(1000/0)	346 (66.0 0/0)
II	626	629(PLUS 100 0/0)	396(63.5 0/0)
III	419	419(100 0/0)	349(83.5 0/0)
IV	1,108	1,036(93.5 0/0)	588(53.8 0/0)
TOTAL	2,677	2,608(96.5 0/0)	1,679(66.0 0/0)

(2) TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES EXPANDED, RF
COMPANIES CONTINUED TO COME ON BOARD FROM TRAINING CENTERS,
AND AT END-SEPTEMBER ALL 863 PF PLATOONS HAD BEEN RECRUITTED
&-8,@5 -0049;3$,7, 34 -75#948@3$ 6 &;, 9, 1 JULY 1969,
RF TACTICAL UNITS INCLUDED 1,472 RIFLE COMPANIES, 23 BOAT
COMPANIES, 50 MECHANIZED PLATTOON, 44 INTELLIGENCE PLATOONS,
45 HEAVY WEAPONS PLATOONS, AND 243 INTELLIGENCE SQUADS.

	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	CHANGE	0/0

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFEN
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

RF TACTICAL UNITS	1,868	1,877	PLUS 9	0,5
RF COMPANY	1,468	1,472	PLUS 4	0,3
PF PLATOON	5,358	5,405	PLUS 47	0,9

OPERATIONAL INDICAORS FLUCTUATE CONSIDERABLY, BUT IN GENERAL THERE WAS LITTLE CHANGE FROM AUGUST. RF NIGHT OPERATIONS INCREASED BY 429(71,753 TO 72,182). TOTAL CONTACTS DECREASED ALTHOUGH NIGHT CONTACTS IN GREASED.

AVERAGE MONTHLY RF OPERATIONAL STATISITICS

	AUGUST	SEPTMEBER	CHANGE
WEAPONS RATIO (CAPTURED/LOST)	6.1!1	4.0!1	-2.1
KIA RATIO(ENEMY/FRIENDLY	4.1!1	3.8!1	-0.3
AVERAGE TOTAL OPNS/UNIT	52.5	52.4	-0.1
AVERAGE NIGHT OPNS/UNIT	38.1	38.5	PLUS 0.4
AVERAGE TOTAL CONTACTS/UNIT	1.6	1.6	0
AVERAGE NIGHT CONTACTS/UNIT	0.7	0.7	0
AVERAGE TOTAL CONTACTS/10000PNS	SQMP	EPMP	AQMP
AVERAGE NIGHT CONTACTS/1000 OPNS	13.0	19.4	PLUS 1.4

AVERAGE MONTHLY RF OPERATIONAL STATISTICS

	AUGUST	SEPTMEMBER	CHANGE
WEAPONS RATIO (CAPTURED/LOST)	4.6!1	3.8!1	-0.8
KIA RATIO (ENEMY/FRIENDLY)	3.8!1	4.3!1	PLUS 0.5
AVERAGE TOTAL OPNS/UNIT	29.4	29.5	PLUS 0.1
AVERAGE NIGHT OPNS/UNIT	20.5	21.3	PLUS 0.8
AVERAGE TOTAL CONTACTS/UNIT	0.6	0.6	0

PAGE 4 RHMSMVA 1124 C O N F I D E N T I A L

AVERAGE NIGHT CONTACTS/UNIT	0.3	0.3	0
AVERAGE TOTAL CONTACTS/1000 OPNS	19.0	19.0	0
AVERAGE NIGHT CONTACTS/1000 OPNS	14.0	15.2	PLUS 1.2

(3) NATIONAL POLICE(NP) CONTINUED TO FACE DIFFICULTIES IN MAKING ITS SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNAL SECURITY. RECRUITMENT RESTRICTIONS TO THOSE ABOVE 35 YEARS OF AGE CAUSED NP STRENGTH TO DECLINE FROM 78,431 IN JANUARY TO 76,330 AT END SEPTEMBER; THUS PLACING IN JEOPARDY THE END-GOAL OF 1969 AT 92,000. TRANSFER OF 13,000 MEN FROM THE MILITARY TO FILL OUT THE NP RANKS HAS BEEN SLOW TO TAKE EFFECT, AND BY THE END-SEPTEMBER ONLY ABOUT 1,000 HAD BEEN MOVED. NEVERTHELESS, SEPTEMBER STATISTICS INDICATE THE RANGE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NP OPERATIONS: 19 VC KIA; 623 VS CAPTURED; 1,573 SUSPECTS DETAINED; AND SUCH CONTRABAND SEIZED AS 193 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, 8CREW SERVED WEAPONS, 382 GRENADES, AND 602 ITEMS OF EXPLOSIVES. IN ADDITION, 5,275 POLICEMEN HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO 1,535 VILLAGES BY THE END OF THE MONTH.

C. ELIMINATE VC INFRASTRUCTURE

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFEN
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

DURING SEPTEMBER PHUNG HOANG OPERATIONS ACCOUNTED FOR
2,005 VCI--UP 9 0/0 FROM 1,839 IN AUGUST. THIS NUMBER EXCEEDS BY 205 THE GVN ESTABLISHED COUNTRY-WIDE GOAL OF 1,800 AND IS HIGHEST MONTHLY TOTAL THIS YEAR. PERHAPS MORE SIGNIFICANT FOR FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM AGINST THE VCI, HOWEVER, WAS ISSUANCE OF MINISTRY OF INTERIOR CIRCULAR 2212) IT SHOULD PLUG SEVERAL LEAKS WHICH HAVE WEAKENED REAL EFFECT OF THE PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM. PROVINCES ARE NOW REQUIRED TO IMPOSE MANDATORY SENTENCES ON VCI IN HIGHER CATEGORIES, REMOVE THEM FROM OVERCROWDED LOCAL JAILS TO CON SON, AND SIMPLIFY FREQUENTLY DELAYED LEGAL PROCESSING OF THEIR CASES. GVN ALSO BROUGHT PHUNG HOANG COMPAIGN OUT IN THE OPERN SO AS TO ENLIST PUBLIC SUPPORT. A NATIONALIST CHINESE-INSPIRED PROGRAM OF REHABILITAION AND REORIENTAION OF VCI DETAINEES WAS APPROVED TO REDUCE FUTURE PROBLEM OF RELEASING PRISON#-HARDENED VCI AFTER A SETTLEMENT OR DIMINUTION OF THE WAR.
VCI STRENGHT ESTIMATES WENT FROM 85,039 IN AUGUST OT 76,745 FOR SEPTEMBER , CHANGE DUE PRIMARILY TO REFINEMENT IN ACCOUNTING. OF TOTAL ESTIMATED STRENGTH 42,223 HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED BY NAME AS HOLDING VCI POSITIONS. INC REASED NEUTRALIZA-TIONS FOR SEPTEMBER INDICATE A CONTINUATION OF THE APPLICATION OF IMPROVED OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES.

VCI NEUTRALIZED

	KILLED	CAPTURED	RAILLIED	TOTAL
PAGE 6 RHMSMVA 1125 C O N F I D E N T I A L				
I CTZ	173	256	122	551
II CTZ	96	169	126	391
III CTZ (INCL CMD)	87	189	101	377
IV CTZ	302	208	176	686
TOTAL	658 (33 0/0)	822 (41 0/0)	525 (26 0/0)	2,005

DISTRICT AND HIGHER LEVEL

	KILLED	CAPTURED	RALLIED	
TOTAL				
I CTZ	34	54	19	107
II CTZ	20	38	23	81
III CTZ (INCL CMD)	21	70	35	126
IV CTZ	78	35	43	156
TOTAL	153	197	120	470

ESTIMATED VCI STRENGTH VS NEUTRALIZATIONS

ESTIMATED VCI	TOTAL NEUTRALIZATIONS
42,223	2,005

43936

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

	STRENGTH, 15 SEP 69	IN 1969
I C		
Z	20,618	3,617
II CTZ	13,650	2,796
III CTZ(INCL CMD)	8,616	2,458
IV CTZ	32,761	5,290

BT
#1121
NNNN

7 OF 12

43936

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

43936

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

005 17 21Z

FOR
SECTION THREE

VZCZCJCS895
PP RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #1122 3091300
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC -T- AID WASH DC
P 051217Z NOV 69
F COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEHC-T-/AID WASH DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/USAID SAIGON
ZEN/JUSPAO SAIGON
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS FOR US DELEG
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 61875 (J01R) SECTION 3 OF 4
COSVN 1,100 --
TOTAL 76,745 14,161

D. ORGANIZE PEOPLE FOR SELF-DEFENSE
PROGRAM IN SEPTEMBER MARKED BY NORMAL MONTHLY INCREASES IN ORGANIZATION, TRAINING AND WEAPONS ISSUED, AND SPECIAL EFFORT TO RECRUIT WOMEN, YOUTHS AND OLDER MEN. SIZE OF PSDF AT END-SEPTEMBER, AS DERIVED FROM GVN STATISTICS WAS AS FOLLOWS:

ISSUED	ORGANIZED	TRAINED	WEAPONS
I CTZ	386,609	186,555	73,528
II CTZ	375,710	208,546	71,659
III CTZ	777,455	443,241	116,685
IV KTZ	753,130	367,669	90,427
TOTAL	2,292,904	1,206,011	352,287

OPERATIONAL RESULTS, AS REPORTED BY GVN FOR SEPTEMBER ARE AS FOLLOWS:

	FRIENDLY KIA	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	FRIENDLY MIA	ENEMY WOUNDED - CAPTURED
I CTZ	77	155	146	23	29
II CTZ	53	18	56	63	6
III CTZ	27	42	108	7	10
IV KTZ	96	53	171	62	18

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFEN
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SEPT. TOTAL	253	268	481	155	186
TOTAL (1969 TO DATE)	2,219	2,693	3,750	1,432	619

E. RALLY ADDITIONAL CHIEU HOIR

THERE WERE 3,524 RETURNEES IN SEPTEMBER, A SLIGHT DECLINE FROM AUGUST BUT STULL MAINTAINING THE VERY HIGH WEEKLY AVERAGE OF 800-1,000. IV CTZ, WHICH CONSISTENTLY ACCOUNTS FOR 70@ OF NATIONAL TOTAL, REPORTED 1,961 JETURNEES--ITS SECOND LOWEST MONTHLY TOTAL IN 1969. RETUJNEE RATE INCREASED EVEN KURTHER IN DURING LAST WEEK OF SEPETEMBER, INCREASEING EVEN FURTHER IN OCTOBER. LOWER RATE IN SEPTEMBER, AS VERY HIGH OCTOBER RATE INDICATES, NOT INDICATIVE OF A DOWNWARD TREND.

REGIOMAL BREAKDOWN FOR SEPTEMBER:

CORPS	MIL	POL	OTHERS	SUB-TOTAL	NVA REGROUPEE	
I	199	168	68	435	18	0
II	66	162	35	263	4	1
III	528	81	155	865	26	0
IV	1,323	520	118	1,961	10	0
TOTAL	2,117	1,031	376	3,524	54	

1

ONLY I CTZ AND III CTZ EXCEEDED THE MONTHLY AVERAGE REQUIRED TO MEET THE GOALS OF PHASE II OF THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATUON CAMPAIGN. III CTZ, WITH A TOTAL OF 2,458 FOR THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1969 EXCEEDED ITS PHASE II GOAL OF 2,000. I CTZ AND IV CTZ EXCEEDED THEIR PHASE II GOALS BY THE END OF THE FIRST WEE IN OCTOBER. II CTZ WILL NOT ACHIEVE ITS PHASE II GOAL.

CORPS	TOTAL 1968 RESULTS	1969 PHASE I GOALS	1969 PHASE I RESULTS	1969 PHASE II GOALS	JUL, AUG & SEPT TOTALS	1969 TOTAL THRU SEPT.
I	3,059	2,000	1,736	1,600	1,515	3,546
II	1,916	2,300	1,411	1,200	689	2,320J
III	2,813	4,300	2,346	2,000	2,458	5,262
IV	10,171	7,000	13,179	9,200	8,387@	22,835
TOTAL	18,171	15,600	18,672	14,000	13,039	33,963

@INCLUDES 1,045 NON-VC ELEMENTS IN JULY.

F. RESETTLEMENT AND CARE KOR REKUGEES

REKUGEE POPULATION FELL SHARPLY AGAIN FROM 961,617AT

43936

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFEN
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SEPT. TOTAL	253	268	481	155	186
TOTAL (1969 TO DATE)	2,219	2,693	3,750	1,432	919

E. RALLY ADDITIONAL CHIEU HOIR

THERE WERE 3,524 RETURNEES IN SEPTEMBER, A SLIGHT DECLINE FROM AUGUST BUT STULL MAINTAINING THE VERY HIGH WEEKLY AVERAGE OF 800-1,000. IV CTZ, WHICH CONSISTENTLY ACCOUNTS FOR 70@ OF NATIONAL TOTAL, REPORTED 1,961 JETURNEES--ITS SECOND LOWEST MONTHLY TOTAL IN 1969. RETUJNEE RATE INCREASED EVEN KURTHER IN DURING LAST WEEK OF SEPETEMBER, INCREASEING EVEN FURTHER IN OCTOBER. LOWER RATE IN SEPTEMBER, AS VERY HIGH OCTOBER RATE INDICATES, NOT INDICATIVE OF A DOWNWARD TREND.

REGIOMAL BREAKDOWN FOR SEPTEMBER:

CORPS	MIL	POL	OTHERS	SUB-TOTAL	NVA REGROUPEE	
I	199	168	68	435	18	0
II	66	162	35	263	4	1
III	528	81	155	865	26	0
IV	1,323	520	118	1,961	10	0
TOTAL	2,117	1,031	376	3,524	5%	

1

ONLY I CTZ AND III CTZ EXCEEDED THE MONTHLY AVERAGE REQUIRED TO MEET THE GOALS OF PHASE II OF THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATUON CAMPAIGN. III CTZ, WITH A TOTAL OF 2,458 FOR THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1969 EXCEEDED ITS PHASE II GOAL OF 2,000, I CTZ AND IV CTZ EXCEEDED THEIR PHASE II GOALS BY THE END OF THE FIRST WEE IN OCTOBER, II CTZ WILL NOT ACHIEVE ITS PHASE II GOAL.

CORPS	TOTAL 1968 RESULTS	1969 PHASE I GOALS	1969 PHASE I RESULTS	1969 PHASE II GOALS	JUL, AUG & SEPT TOTALS	1969 TOTAL THRU SEPT.
I	3,059	2,000	1,736	1,600	1,515	3,546
II	1,916	2,300	1,411	1,200	689	2,320J
III	2,813	4,300	2,346	2,000	2,458	5,262
IV	10,171	7,000	13,179	9,200	8,387@	22,835
TOTAL	18,171	15,600	18,672	14,000	13,039	33,963

@INCLUDES 1,045 NON-VC ELEMENTS IN JULY.

F. RESETTLEMENT AND CARE KOR REKUGEES

REKUGEE POPULATION FELL SHARPLY AGAIN FROM 961,617AT

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFEN
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

END-AUGUST TO 790,126 AT END-SEPTEMBER, THE LARGEST SINGLE MONTH,S DROP, TOTAL KONSISTS OF 293,142 REKUGEES IN CAMPS, 123,032 IN RESETTLEMENT PROCESS, AND 373,952 OUTAOF-CAMP REFUGEES. RESETTLEMENT AND RETURN-TO-VILLAGE RATES REACHED RECORD HIGHS--81,649 AND 78,678 RESPECTIVELY. GAINS IN RETURN-TO-VILLAGE WERE GREATEST IN BINH DINH PROVINCE, WHERE 49,946 REKUGEES IN THE OUT-OF-CAMP CATEGORY RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL HAMLETS. GENERATION OF NEW REKUGEES AND WAR VICTIMS WAS MINIMAL, THUS REINFORCING REFUGEE PROGRAM ADVANCES. GVN COMMUNIQUE 8924 ESTABLISHES PROCEDURES KOR PROVINCE CHIES TO MAKE RETURN-TOAVILLAGE DISTRIBUIONS WITHOUT PRIOR MINISTRY APPROVAL. NEW GUIDANCE MAKES PROCESSING OF ALL OUT-OF-CAMP (UNREGISTERED) REKUGEES POSSIBLE BY END-YEAR 1969. COMMUNIQUE, WITH GVN CIRCULAR TASKING NINE RELATED MINISTRIES WITH SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARD REKUGEES, IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE GVN RESOURCES ARE MADE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO REKUGEES RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES.

REKUGEE POPULATION

	AUGUST	SEPT.	CHANGE
I CTZ			
IN CAMP@	283,678	256,204	-27,474
OUT OF KAMP	133,547	133,084	- 463
II CTZ			
IN CAMP@	108,699	82,179	-26,520
OUT OF CAMP	186,318	110,860	-75,458
III CTZ			
IN CAMP@	34,109	25,124	-8,985
OUT OF CAMP	28,516	22,382	-6,134
IV CTZ			
IN CAMP@	57,487	52,667	-4,820
OUT OF CAMP	129,273	107,626	-21,647
TOTAL			
IN KAMP@	483,973	416,174	-67,799
OUT OF CAMP	477,644	90,126	-171,491

@INCLUDES REFUGEES IN RESETTLEMENT PROCESS.

G. INTENSIFY THE INFORMATION EFFORT

WHILE PRESIDENT THIEU MADE INFORMATION THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF PROINCE CHIEKS IN ORDER TO ENSURE GREATER COMMAND ATTENTION, IMPROVEMENT HAS BEEN MARGINALM APPOINTA MENT OF A NEW MINISTER IN SEPTEMBER IS TOO RECENT TO OBSERVE ANY BASIC CHANGES, BUT IT IS NOT LIKELY THE PROGRAM WILL IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR.

H. STRENGTHEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

SEPTEMBER ELECTION RESULTS INDICATE THAT 1,953 OUT OF 2,130 VILLAGES HAVE ELECTED GOVERNMENTS, SIMILARLY, THERE ARE

BT #1122 NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFEN
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

43936

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

005 17 212

VZCZCJCS798
PP RUCRJCS
DE RHMSMVA #1123 3091300
ZNY CCCCC
RUEHC -T- AID WASH DC
P 050217Z NOV 69
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUCRJCS/SECDEF
RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEHC/AID WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC
RUEADHW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
ZEN/USAID SAIGON
ZEN/JUSRAD SAIGON
RUFNCR/ADEMB PARIS FOR US DELEG
BT

SECTION FOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L 61875 (J01R)
FINAL SECTION OF 4
ELECTED GOVERMENTS IN 9,435 HAMLETS OUT OF AN ESTIMATED 10,775, ELECTIONS WERE NOT COMPLETED IN SEPTEMBER, SO ADDITIONAH ONES WILL PROBABLY BE HELD IN NOVEMVER AND DECEMBER, SEPTEMBER ELERTIONS WERE HELB WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL ENEMY INTERFERENCE AND RURTHE EXTENDED THE POPULAR BASE LOCAL GOVERMENT.
STATUS OF VILLAGE/HAMLET GOVERNMENTS.
A. VILLAGE

CORPS	ELERTED	EXILE ELECTED	APPOINTED	EXILE (APPT)	NONE ADMIN.
I	369	30	16	46	0
II	566	10	6	1	1
III	352	6	18	9	0
IV	666	1	20	21	19
TOTAL@	1,953	47	60	77	20

B. HAOLET

I	1,633	106	22	41	0
II	2,668	45	3	20	1/
III	1,556	8	43	11	108
IV	3,578	15	86	145	409
TOTAL@	9,435				

174 154 217 534

@ THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR IS PRESENTLY CARRYING ON ITS ROLLS

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFEN
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

2,137 VILLAGES CONSISTING OF 10,514 HAMLETS.
VILLAGE AND HAMLET OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO ATTEN THE NATIONAL
TRAINING CENTER IN VUNG TAU FOR INSTRUCTION IN THE GOVERNMENTAL
ARTS. TOTAL FOR YEAR TO DATE IS OVER 9,300.
LAND REFORM HAS RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES. PROGRAM TO DISTRIBUTE
147,000 HECTARES OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED RICE LAND TO FARMERS NOV
TILLING IT GOT OFF TO SLOW START, AND IT NOW APPEARS NO MORE THAN
100,000 HERTARES WILL BE TRANSFERRED. THE SWEEPING LAND-TO-THE-
TILLER PROGRAO WAS SUBSTANITIALLY MODIFIED BY THE LOWER HOUSE
ONLY TO BE MODIFIED AGAIN BY THE SENATE IN A FORM CLOSER TO THE
PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL RADICAL PROGRAO. FINAL PARLIMENTARY ACTION
IS EXPERTED IN NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER.
GP-4
BT
PAGE 1 CONTAINS 21 LINES.
#1123
NNNN

FINAL OF 12 PAGES 43936

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

MACCORDS-RE

CONFIDENTIAL

25 March 1968

EVALUATION REPORT

PACIFICATION IN HIEU NHON AND HOA VANG DISTRICTS

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

1. (U) PURPOSE: The purpose of this report is to present an assessment of the pacification programs in Hieu Nhon and Hoa Vang Districts, Quang Nam Province, I Corps Tactical Zone.

2. (C) DISCUSSION:

a. General: As part of an extensive series of district pacification evaluations, Hieu Nhon and Hoa Vang Districts, Quang Nam Province (Inclosure 1) were visited during the period 13-18 March 1968. Approximately two days were spent in each district with both GVN and US officials visiting several hamlets and talking to the inhabitants. The following two subparagraphs present the assessment of each of the two districts.

b. Hieu Nhon District (Inclosure 2):

(1) General: Hieu Nhon District includes the Quang Nam provincial capital of Hoi An and has a population of about 145,000. There are a total of 39 hamlets in the district, 17 of which are listed in the January HES with a security category of "C" or higher. These hamlets, as well as the vast majority of the population, lie within the relatively narrow band shown by dotted lines on Inclosure 2, astride Route 538 from the coast to the Dien Ban District border. Route 538 is the major LOC in the district and runs generally east and west through the province capital of Hoi An from the Dien Ban District border to the coast and then parallels the coast

Group 4
Downgraded at three-year intervals; declassified 12 years after date of origin

1 cy
135 544

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

north to the autonomous city of Danang. A major river and system of waterways also run generally east and west just below Hoi An and Route 538, serving as a second major LOC and severely influencing the security of the district. Because of the security situation, the district advisory staff does not live at district headquarters but about two miles away at the provincial MACV compound. Plans are underway for the district staff to move back to district headquarters in the near future.

(2) Security:

(a) General: The most serious problem facing Hieu Nhon District is that of security. In late August and early September 1967 and again on 31 January 1968, VC attacks in force reached the doorsteps of Hoi An, bringing pacification in the district to a virtual standstill. With no effective means for patrolling the waterways, VC were able to cross from Duy Xuyen District in the south, avoid the line of PF platoons deployed along Route 538, and attack into the province capital. In addition to these attacks, there are continual acts of harassment and terrorism. Sniper fire is relatively common along Route 538 in the western portion of the district while mining incidents occur frequently along the road in the eastern portion of the district. During the past four months, there have been four mining incidents along the stretch of road from district headquarters to the coast, resulting in 22 KIA and 10 WIA.

(b) Forces Available: The major force element in Hieu Nhon District is the 2d ROK Marine Brigade, consisting of four infantry battalions and one artillery battalion. The TAOR of the brigade encompasses the entire district except for the very northern tip. Three of the four battalions,

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

along with the brigade headquarters, have their base camps within the district. A second major force is the 1st Battalion of the 51st ARVN Regiment (1/51). This unit normally has a direct support of RD mission with its battalion commander serving as the commander of the Khong Quang II RD campaign area centered in the district. At the present time, this battalion is deployed in close proximity to Hoi An, providing protection for the provincial capital. In addition to the aforementioned forces, there are two RF companies and ten PF platoons, three of which are Combined Action Platoons (CAPs), deployed within the district. In three of the 1967 hamlets, there were trained but unarmed RDPG.

1. 2d ROK Marine Brigade: This unit moved into the province during late December 1967 and early January 1968. To date the activities of the brigade have been defensively oriented. Repeated requests from the provincial advisory staff for search and destroy operations in the southern portions of Hieu Nhon District into areas of known VC presence have thus far been ignored by the brigade. Cooperation between the brigade and province advisors has been marginal. Requests for a field grade liaison officer have thus far been ignored. Requests for a free exchange of intelligence information have similarly been coolly received. There have been other adverse effects of the brigade presence directly impacting on pacification. On one occasion after receiving sniper fire from a hamlet, the ROK forces virtually leveled the hamlet, killing in excess of 80 civilians, the majority of whom were women and children. The deputy province senior advisor reported that there was documentary evidence of atrocities during this action. A second example of adverse Korean impact on pacification

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

was the fear they had implanted in the district farmers, making them reluctant to work their fields even during the day because of a possible Korean attack.

2. 1st Battalion, 51st Regiment: This ~~regiment~~ battalion currently is deployed at the southern end of Hoi An, providing security for the province capital. There was no indication as to when the battalion would be released to perform its normal mission of providing direct support for RD. The RD program, however, was not awaiting the return of the battalion to its normal mission, as six of the seven RD groups assigned to work in the district during 1968 moved to their assigned hamlets on 16 March.

3. Regional Forces (RF): There are two RF companies deployed in the district. The 325th Company is drastically understrength with only about 50 personnel assigned. One platoon of the company occupies an outpost across the river from district headquarters astride a suspected VC infiltration route. A visit to the outpost disclosed several deficiencies. Additional barrier materials are required. Fields of fire need to be cleared of brush out to greater distances. Defensive artillery concentrations should be fired in about the outpost. US district advisors were working on correcting these problems. The second platoon of the company provides defense for the district headquarters. The 706th Company occupies an outpost southeast of Hoi An. A visit was not made to this outpost, but the deputy district advisor reported that the same deficiencies existed at the 706 Company outpost as existed at the 325th Company platoon outpost. Major problems of the RF forces are logistics and training.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

4. Popular Force (PF): There are ten PF platoons deployed in the district along Route 538. Average strength of each platoon is 28 assigned and 22 present for duty. Missions of the PF platoons include both hamlet and route security. One additional platoon is proposed for 1968. A twelfth platoon is comprised of medically handicapped personnel and is ineffective as a fighting force. Three of the PF platoons are formed into Combined Action Platoons. Visits were made to two of these platoons. The positions were found to be well constructed, improvement work was continuing, and in each case the Marine sergeant spoke well of the effectiveness of the associated PF platoon. Again, with the PF platoons as with the RF companies, the major weaknesses were felt to be logistics and training.

(3) RD Program:

(a) In 1967 seven RD groups worked in the district and ultimately succeeded in completing only five Ap Doi Moi. The 1968 program originally called for eight RD groups to complete ten hamlets. The Tet offensive has required a modification of this program. Four of the ten hamlets were deleted because they were in areas of reduced security. Two 1967 RD hamlets which sustained damage during the Tet attack were added to the 1968 list, and it was decided to continue work in 1968 on a third 1967 hamlet which had not been completed. Thus, the 1968 program consists of seven RDC groups which will work in nine Ap Doi Moi. Six of the seven groups entered their 1968 hamlets on 16 March. The seventh group was working in a district refugee camp and was scheduled to commence work on its hamlet during the following week.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(b) Visits were made to two of the district hamlets. One, Son Pho, was scheduled for an RDC group in 1968. The other, Thanh Nam, had had a team in 1967.

1. In Son Pho it was learned from talking with some of the hamlet people that half of the inhabitants, including the hamlet chief, sleep in Hoi An at night because of security conditions. The RD group chief has made liaison with the hamlet, but no list of projects has been decided upon. One individual stated that half of the people did not want an RDC group because they feared there would be too much work. Others expressed fear that there was insufficient security and that the RDC group might not stay. There appeared to be an active farmers' association, but one individual said there were no savings connected with making purchases through the association.

2. In Thanh Nam where there had been an RDC group in 1967, there was an appreciation of the group's activities. Organizations had been formed which were said to have had meetings three times per month. The hamlet had an RDPG of two squads, but the personnel had departed the hamlet since Tet reportedly to join RF or PF units. Inhabitants of this hamlet as well as many officials move to Hoi An for the hours of darkness. Fear was expressed of another contact between the VC and friendly forces.

(4) GVN District Staff: The district staff consists of the district chief, a deputy for security, a deputy for administration, and civil representatives for public health, tax, RD, information, police, Chieu Hoi, refugees, youth service, and farmers' union. Captain Sang, previously a Ranger battalion commander, has been the district chief for about four months and gives every indication of being both energetic and capable. He

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

freely admits to being weak in civil matters but says he is trying to improve himself. From being with him two days, it seemed that he had the respect of the district people, although the US advisor stated that he had some trouble since he issues orders to his civilian subordinates as he would to a soldier. The undersigned attended a meeting which the district chief called with his hamlet and village chiefs and noticed the district chief's authoritarian tendencies, but he also noted a free give-and-take atmosphere in the meeting. The district staff seemed young and inexperienced but appeared to compensate for any weakness with a greater than normal amount of enthusiasm. Although this evaluator is not experienced in judging district staffs, it would be his feeling that this chief and his staff would be somewhat better than one would normally expect to find.

(5) Refugees: The second most serious problem in the district is refugees. About 30,000 refugees reside in 12 camps in the district. The most recent influx of about 2,300 came from northern Hieu Nhon District as a result of a resettlement operation by the ROK Marines. The ROK's claimed that the people were living in such a location that they could not be defended and originally intended to construct a new hamlet in which the people could be resettled. The people were moved to the vicinity of the Hoi An airstrip to await the construction of the new hamlet. After a short period of time, the ROK's abandoned the project and turned the people over to the district chief as refugees. It is to the district chief's credit that rapid action was taking place to resettle the people. Land was made available, and temporary facilities in the form of tents were provided. It was found that MSWR would not issue roofing and cement until housing frames were

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

erected. On Friday morning the district chief directed that by Monday he wanted frames for 70 family units erected. By Saturday noon when the undersigned departed, frames had been erected for about 30 units by the refugees themselves. In the meantime, medical facilities were available (provided by the Koreans), drama teams were working, RDC groups were assisting, and action was underway to get some kind of industry or jobs for at least some of the people. As an example, arrangements had been made for two boys to attend a six month carpentry course given by a Maltese German team in province with an appropriate send-off ceremony attended by the district chief. While admittedly small, it was a step in the right direction.

(6) DIOCC: The district has a DIOCC which appeared to be operating effectively. However, representation was present only from the district S2, Static Census Grievance, and National Police. Efforts to get representation from Police Special Branch, RD, and MSS have so far been unsuccessful. During the visit, a NLF Communist Party chairman from the vicinity was captured from his hiding place in a pagoda as a result of DIOCC intelligence effort.

(7) Police: Only about 30 National Police are present in the district, most of whom are agents or administrative-type people. Two resources control checkpoints are in operation, one east of Hoi An and one west of Hoi An. There is no real police presence in the hamlets.

(8) National Police Field Force (NPFF): No NPFF are assigned to the district. There have been four NPFF platoon-size operations since November but with no real results.

(9) VIS: A fairly active information program was underway in the district. The VIS chief used both an assigned loudspeaker truck and leaflets

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

to convey his message. He said he had been publicising the defeat of the VC and the concern of the government for the people. His leaflet campaign currently was designed to persuade the district people to turn in information which would avert minings and booby traps. There was no real way to measure the effectiveness of the information program in the time available. However, an effort should be made to issue TV sets at the earliest practical date to enhance the VIS program. Only three sets were in district now, all in Hoi An. An additional 12-15 sets were awaited.

(10) Organizations: Several organizations appeared to have some following in the district. These included the Rice Farmers' Association, Boy Scouts, Fishermen's Association, Women's Association, and Youth Association. The most active seemed to be the Rice Farmers' Association. The deputy district senior advisor had assumed the task of working with these organizations to attempt to develop them into viable structures.

(11) Economy: The primary occupation within the district is farming, although there seemed to be a significant fishing industry also. Farmers had just started on the 15th of March to harvest their rice crops, and indications were that the crops would be of significantly lower yield than normal because of the lack of sufficient rain and reluctance on the part of the Vietnamese to work in their fields because of fear of being shot by the Koreans. Prices in the area are still reported to be about 20% higher than normal. Police checkpoints tend to curb trade somewhat, but the US advisor estimated that the district was about 80% back to pre-Tet conditions.

(12) US Advisors: The US district advisory staff gave every evidence of being in complete control of the situation and doing an outstanding job. They were thoroughly familiar with every aspect of the district operation. Unfortunately, the effort cannot help but be hurt somewhat when

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Major John Berry, who has been senior advisor for about four months, is transferred by MACV to the Military Academy at Dalat. However, Captain Bell, the present deputy, gave every indication he would be able to carry on effectively.

c. Hoa Vang District (Inclosure 3):

(1) General: Hoa Vang District lies in the northeastern portion of Quang Nam Province and surrounds the autonomous city of Danang. The HES credits the district with 19 villages, 93 hamlets, and a population of slightly over 133,000. The January HES credited 59 of the hamlets with a security rating of "C" or better. The major line of communication is Route 1, running through the district in a generally north-south direction. A mountain barrier forms the northern boundary of the district with Phu Loc District in Thua Thien Province. The Hai Van Pass provides passage for Route 1, connecting the two districts. Two significant waterways cross Hoa Vang District in an east-west direction: the Song Cu De about five kilometers north of Danang and the Song Cau Do just south of Danang. The population is centered along Route 1 south of the Song Cu De.

(2) Security:

(a) General:

1. A unique feature of the district which impinges upon its security status is its dual chain of command for security matters. While administratively the district is under the Quang Nam province chief, it must look militarily in two directions. The portion of the district between the two rivers is felt to affect directly the security of the

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

autonomous city of Danang, and many of the forces in this area fall under the operational control of the Danang subsector commander, LTC Hiep. Additionally, if Hoa Vang subsector desires to conduct military operations in this area, it must be cleared with the Danang subsector commander. While reverse coordination is also supposed to be effected, it frequently is neglected. Consequently, there have been incidents in which friendly forces have nearly engaged one another by fire when operations were conducted in Hoa Vang District and coordination was not effected by Danang subsector. It is this situation to which the US advisor in Hoa Vang has made reference in his past two monthly reports.

2. A second aspect of the military situation worthy of note is the great numbe of FWMAF within the district. Virtually the entire district is divided into TAOR's for five Marine battalions of the 7th and 27th Marine Regiment, one Marine tank battalion, and the headquarters of the 1st Marine Division. Coordination between these units and district appears good, and their presence significantly enhances the security of the district. In addition to the FWMAF units, there is the 51st ARVN Regiment with three of its four battalions and the 59th RF Battalion with three companies attached. Further, there are 30 PF platoons, 15 of which are CAP's deployed in the district.

(b) Forces Available:

1. 51st ARVN Regiment: LTC Thuc, the regimental commander, is also commander of the Huong Quang I RD Campaign located within the district. The TAOR of the regiment is superimposed upon the TAOR of 27th Marine Regiment forces in the area. This arrangement imposes additional

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

problems of coordination which appear to have been worked out satisfactorily. In addition to providing security for the RD program within its TAOR, the regiment has been responsible for creating "free fire" zones by resettling people in the fringe areas into four resettlement camps. The regimental commander is felt by Major Mears, the regimental advisor, to be strong and effective. Additionally, two of the four battalion commanders are rated as effective, one as effective but impetuous, and the fourth as effective but somewhat panic stricken under fire. A US personnel problem may develop within this regiment as the regimental advisor and all four battalion advisors rotate over the next two months and no replacements are yet in sight.

2. Regional Forces (RF): The 59th RF Battalion (three RF companies) is attached to the 51st Regiment and occupies the northern portion of the regimental TAOR. The major problem with this unit in the past has been ineffective leadership on the part of Captain Thanh, the battalion commander. The district advisor has been recommending his replacement for some months, and it appears now as though his relief may be in sight. Word was received that a major from the I Corps RF/PF staff would soon take over the battalion.

3. Popular Forces (PF): The district has 30 PF platoons, 15 of which are CAP's.

a. The CAP program is felt by the advisors to be worthwhile and an effective training instrument for PF platoons. Although there are occasional incidents between the PF soldiers and the Marines,

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

the rapport between the two seems good. It is interesting to note, however, that none of the Marine NCO's with whom the undersigned discussed the CAP program could foresee the day when their associated PF platoon would be sufficiently trained and motivated so as to be an effective fighting force in its own right.

b. There appear to be two major problems with the district PF forces. One is lack of leadership, which, of course, shows itself in the training and effectiveness of the PF platoon. The second is communications. Only 29 of 60 authorized AN/PRC-10 radios are present. This means there are some PF platoons without any radios. Further, this radio in many cases does not have sufficient range for the PF platoon to communicate with district headquarters. Some additional radios are required with sufficient range to insure communication with district headquarters.

4. RDPG: Ten hamlets in the district had trained RDPG; of these ten hamlets, six had been issued weapons. The following table presents an RDPG summary:

HAMLET	COORDINATES	STRENGTH	ARMED
Liem Lac	022684	69	11
Lo Giang	025705	69	11
Cong Dau	035725	36	33
Phong Nam	005703	60	0
Can Nam	016707	30	11
Quang Chau	006679	35	0
Mieu Bong	015684	47	11
Giang Nam	027657	40	0
Qua Giang	016667	40	0
An Ngai Tay	907783	40	33
		466	110

(3) RD Program:

(a) In 1967, 11 RDC groups worked in 13 RD hamlets. Four district hamlets were severely hit during the T t offensive: Nam O, Lo

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Giang, Giang Dong, and Trung Luong. Of these four, Lo Giang and Trung Luong were 1967 RD hamlets, and Giang Dong was to be a 1968 hamlet. The 1968 program was to include five RDC groups working in eight hamlets. At the current time, the 11 groups from 1967 are still in hamlets in the district and will remain for some time to reestablish GVN presence in 1967 hamlets and then to move to 1968 hamlets. With no further major VC incursion, there is still hope of accomplishing the 1968 program.

(b) Visits were made to two 1967 RD hamlets:

1. Lo Giang had been completely destroyed by allied forces trying to evict the VC. Although the RD group had moved to its 1968 hamlet prior to Tet, the group has returned to the hamlet now and is working there during the day only. Inhabitants of the hamlet were living in a neighboring hamlet at night but returned to work during the day. Those interviewed appeared to respect the RD group and appreciated the RD projects. Again there appeared to be better-than-average success with establishing organizations (although the purposes of the organizations were not clear), and the people commented upon the PSYOPS activities of the RDC group. Lo Giang was noted for its infrastructure and apparently no success was achieved in its elimination. A disquieting feature of the VC attack was the VC ability to enter the hamlet and dig trenches and foxholes without being reported, although the magnitude of the work involved could have been accomplished in a very few hours and could have been done during the night hours immediately preceding the attack. The interviewees expressed fear of further VC attacks.

2. Con Dau is a Catholic hamlet with little infrastructure in which there were only four houses damaged. Again the people

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

appeared to appreciate the RDC group and the resultant projects, and there seemed to have been some success with at least the RD PSYOPS program. No indication was found of organizations except for RDPG. At each of the two entrances to the hamlets, there were two young girls armed with carbines on guard with one ARVN soldier. They stated they were on guard from 0700-1600 hours and expected to be put on duty every seventh day. While their training (one day) and effectiveness were suspect, their enthusiasm was impressive. The undersigned spoke with the hamlet RDPG leader. He had been wounded twice during the attack, was extremely proud of his wounds and the RDPG, and claimed the RDPG had killed "many" VC.

Cithlu hamlet

(4) GVN District Staff: The district staff consists of the district chief, the deputy for security, the deputy for administration, and service chiefs for law (claims), administration, youth, economics-refugees, and general. It was the concensus that both the military and civil staffs were only moderately effective. However, the district chief, Major Hau, had been chief for about two years and, in addition to being highly respected by his advisor, was most impressive. He appeared to have an excellent grasp on both the military and civil sides of the picture and, considering the magnitude of the job to be done in a district of this size and importance, appeared to be in firm control of the situation.

(5) Refugees: Probably the most serious problem in the district is that of refugees. The military situation is such that major disturbances in the refugee situation do not occur. However, with the favorable location of the district about the autonomous city of Danang, the district advisor

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

estimated that as many as 100 refugee families move into the district each month from outlying areas. With a refugee population already measuring in the neighborhood of 40,000, the additional influx only serves to compound the situation. There appears to be an active program in the district to care for the refugees. The district advisor mentioned the possibility of two industries for the district which might help the situation. The first of these is a glass industry. Apparently at some time in the past, a survey was conducted which found that the sand within the district was suitable for making glass and required the addition of only a few chemicals which could be imported. A second possibility is a lumber industry in the mountainous area to the north. Both of these possibilities should be pursued.

(6) DIOCC: The DIOCC has been in operation since last August and appears to be operating effectively. Thus far, it has representation only from the district S2 and Static Census Grievance units. Attempts are being made now to include Police Special Branch and RD cadre. This additional representation is required if the DIOCC is to meet its full potential.

(7) Police: There are about 60 National Police within the district. Each of the 19 villages has at least one policeman with some of the larger villages having two or more. A reserve of about 40 police is retained for operations or as reinforcements. Again, as in the case of Hiep Nhon, with only one policeman in each village, it cannot be considered that there is a real police presence. Additionally, the police chief is a "playboy," ineffective, and will probably be removed by the district chief in the near future.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(8) National Police Field Force: No NPFF units are assigned to the district. Only one operation has been conducted in the district including the NPFF, and it had negligible results.

(9) VIS: The VIS is only moderately active in the district. Operations are conducted with a loudspeaker at the VIS headquarters and with a loudspeaker truck elsewhere in the district. Normal activities include music and political broadcasts, mostly within close proximity to the city of Danang. The VIS program would be enhanced if the authorized TV sets could be delivered. None are now present in the district. The effectiveness of the VIS operations was not assessed.

(10) Economy: The economy of the district is largely agricultural. Of the entire population, 70% is engaged in agricultural activites, 10% in commercial purruits, 6% in fishing, 3% in industry, and 6% in other livelihoods. The economy of the district was not yet back to a pre-Tet condition. Prices were somewhat higher than normal, resources control checkpoints inhibited trade to some extent, and a curfew still was in effect from 2000 to 0600 hours.

(11) US Advisors: The US district advisory staff gave every indication of being effective, efficient, and having a complete grasp of every facet of the district situation. Rapport between the advisor and the district chief was excellent. Cooperation and morale within the team itself was likewise excellent. Major James Swenson has been the district senior advisor for about nine months. He is ably assisted by his principal subordinates, Captain Parker and Mr. Eiffers.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

d. Comments Pertaining to Both Districts:

(1) Schools in both districts opened up on 19 February and have been in operation since that time. There has been some problem with teachers. The province as a whole is short about 40 teachers. About 30 teachers have not returned from Tet leaves while ten have be n called to the Army. Ten more are to be called to the Army next month. Thus, there will be a shortage of about 50 teachers of the approximately 750 authorized.

(2) In both districts, the drafting of critical personnel into the Army will most certainly begin to hurt the personnel picture soon. Personnel affected include district, village, and hamlet governmental staff members, teachers, interpreters, and others. While some of the critical jobs can be performed by woman, this is not possible in all cases. Some program for deferment should be devised to preclude the critical problems which will surely develop.

3. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The following conclusions and recommendations are those of the evaluator and are forwarded to the command/agency concerned for information:

a. Conclusions:

(1) The GVN district staff in each district performs in a satisfactory manner. The district chief in each case is considered to be effective and performs in an excellent manner.

(2) The US advisory staff in each district has a complete grasp of the situation and performs in a superior manner.

(3) Security is the major problem in Hieu Nhon District. Either additional forces or, more preferably, more aggressive action by presently

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

assigned forces is required. Additionally, some means are required to patrol the waterways in the southern portion of Hieu Nhon District to block VC movement. While security is not as significant a problem in Hoa Vang District, action is required to clarify the security chain of command and responsibilities.

(4) Major RF/PF problems in Hieu Nhon District are logistics and training. Major problems in Hoa Vang District include leadership and communications.

(5) The RD program in both districts has resumed, and there exists the possibility that the 1968 program may still be fulfilled.

(6) Both districts have an effectively operating DIOCC. The DIOCC in both cases would be more effective, however, with representation from additional intelligence activities.

(7) In neither district is there a real police presence in the hamlets, and there have been no effective operations with the NPFF.

(8) VIS in Hieu Nhon District appears to be active while in Hoa Vang it is less so. In neither case was the VIS impact or effectiveness measured.

(9) Refugees in both districts constitute a serious problem, but the problem is being dealt with effectively. Efforts for founding additional industry for refugee relief should continue. The glass and timber industries in Hoa Vang appear to have special possibilities.

(10) Drafting of critical personnel into the Army may soon begin creating special problems. Deferments should be created for critical personnel.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

b. Recommendations:

(1) That pressure be brought to bear on RCR forces in Hieu Nhon District to cause them to operate more aggressively. (SA, I CTZ; ACofS, J3)

(2) That patrol forces be introduced into Hieu Nhon District to assist in patrolling the waterways south of Hoi An that are being used as VC infiltration routes. (SA, I CTZ; ACofS, J3)

(3) That responsibilities and required liaison for the defense of Hoa Vang District be better defined between Quang Nam Province Chief, Hoa Vang District Chief, and Danang Special Sector Chief. (SA, I CTZ)

(4) That additional radios be issued in Hoa Vang District so that each PF platoon can be equipped with an AN/PRC-10; moreover, that consideration be given to issuing to PF platoons in Hoa Vang District a number of radios with increased range to assist communications with district headquarters. (SA, I CTZ; RF/PF Division, CORDS)

(5) That all intelligence activities/agencies be represented in district DIOCC's. (SA, I CTZ; Director of PHOENIX, CORDS)

(6) That increased emphasis be placed on combined operations with elements of the National Police Field Force in attacking the infrastructure. (SA, I CTZ; PSD, CORDS)

(7) That the issue of TV sets to the two districts be expedited. (SA, I CTZ; POD, CORDS)

(8) That the possibility of developing glass and timber industries in Hoa Vang District be pursued. (SA, I CTZ; NLD, CORDS)

3 Incl
as

Clarence W Hannon
CLARENCE W. HANNON
LTC, GS
I CTZ Field Evaluator

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

QUANG NAM
AND
DA NANG MUNICIPALITY

INCLOSURE 1





CONFIDENTIAL

55983 9-67

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

HIEU NHON DISTRICT



INCLOSURE 2

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

attached

CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Deficiencies of 2d ROK Marine Brigade with Respect to Pacification

1. Attached evaluation presents glaring deficiencies of the 2d ROK Marine Brigade with respect to cooperation with advisors, liaison with GVN province and district headquarters, and support of pacification.

2. CG III MAF should tell the ROK's in spades to get with it. Let's stop exhorting and be hard-nosed for a change. Maybe if you pass this evaluation to your counterpart at ROKFV something will get done?

R. W. KOMER

PESuplizio:caw

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

MEMO 1 Apr 68

From : Secretary, Joint Staff, MACV

To : RHM

____ Deputy Chief of Staff
with 1 Chief of Staff (Acting)
__2__ DEPCOMUSMACV FOR ~~AIRCOPNS~~ CORDS
_____ DEPCOMUSMACV
_____ COMUSMACV
_X_ Info - CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
_____ Recommend approval AT BLACK FLAG.
_____ Recommend signature at _____
Remarks :

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Pacification in Hieu Nhon and Hoa Vang Districts, Quang Nam Province

THIS IS THE SECOND ADVERSE EVALUATION REPORT ON THE 2ND BRIGADE, ROK MARINES.

FOR W. R. Evans
Secretary, Joint Staff

B-2237

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

in 1140 1 APR
out

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS

MACCORDS-RE

1 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM THRU: CHIEF OF STAFF

FOR: DEPUTY TO COMUSMACV FOR CORDS

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Pacification in Hieu Nhon and Hoa Vang Districts, Quang Nam Province

1. During the period 13-18 March 1968, an evaluation was conducted of pacification in Hieu Nhon and Hoa Vang Districts, Quang Nam Province. This evaluation of district pacification programs is one of a series being conducted throughout the country.

2. Copies of the evaluation are being forwarded to SA, I CTZ; J3; and Director of PHOENIX for information.

For L. WADE LATHRAM
ACofS, CORDS

1 Incl
as

CONFIDENTIAL

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

35
SACSA
4-

CONFIDENTIAL

SACSA
Re: Lt
about
15 March 69
c/Lt
Miller

DISCUSSION PAPER

PACIFICATION IN SVN IN 1969

SUBJECT: Changing Strategy and Tactics in Prosecuting the War

I. GENERAL. Events in 1968 caused the GVN to reassess its pacification effort. These events also provided opportunities for the Government to adopt policies which represent major departures from previous pacification programs. Both the Accelerated Pacification Campaign of 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969, and the 1969 Pacification and Development Program initiated on 1 February, represent significant improvements in strategy and tactics over earlier efforts. A comparison between old and new points of emphasis will demonstrate the nature and extent of the overall change. The new policies emphasize:

A. Expansion into new areas rather than "consolidation" of communities already under GVN control.

B. Local self-government in place of simple government "control."

C. Popular mobilization and political involvement through self-defense and community self-development programs instead of paternalistic government supplied security and economic programs.

D. Self-help in place of government directed programs.

E. Greater emphasis on functional and geographic priorities.

F. Stronger management from the central level down to province, including a single set of guidelines and a single Pacification Plan for each

This document contains information effecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 cy
IDA 71-131 2/0

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

province.

G. And above all, close coordination with the total military effort to provide the climate of security which is a vital prelude to successful pacification.

Aggressive continuation of this campaign within the total spectrum of combined US/GVN efforts (including the Paris talks) should increase involvement in and commitment to the struggle against the VC and expand the government's rising self-confidence and capabilities. At the same time, this effort should continue to erode the enemy's capability to effectively pursue his objectives. All of these factors should substantially strengthen the Allied position in Paris.

II. CURRENT SITUATION/FORECAST OF PACIFICATION.

A. Expansion.

1. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) raised 1122 hamlets from contested or VC-controlled to secure status. Security also improved in 220 other hamlets, not specifically targeted by the APC. This effort brought security to 1,180,000 additional people, raising the total relatively secure population to 13,755,100 (79.2% of the total population) on 31 January 1969. Other APC goals, set primarily for the purpose of creating a sense of urgency and momentum, were largely met.

2. The basic objective of the current campaign is to bring security to the people and to assert meaningful GVN sovereignty over the entire

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

EXPANSION OF SECURITY



FIGURE 1

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

country, while at the same time bringing about substantive involvement of the people. The strategy is to expand into the contested and VC dominated areas by an aggressive utilization of pacification forces in close coordination with regular unit operations. The 1969 Pacification and Development Program (PDP) will extend security to at least 1,875,000 additional people, increasing the relatively secure population to at least 90% of the total population. Fig 1 compares past and projected expansion figures. In order to insure that the minimum 1969 goal will be met, the Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) has set individual province goals for the first semester equal to 75% of the year-end goals.

B. Self-Government.

1. The 1969 Program focuses on the village as the basic unit of government. This is a reversal of policies originated during the Diem regime and continued in subsequent hamlet-oriented programs which undermined the cohesiveness and authority of the village. The aim now is to restore the village to its traditional role. This will result in making the government more responsive to the people and the people, in turn, more responsive to the government. Strengthening the ties between the people and the government will make the formation of NLF "Liberation Committees" more difficult and their existence relatively meaningless, thereby frustrating a significant aspect of Communist strategy.

2. To strengthen the village government and prepare it to function in its new role, the GVN has already initiated programs which call for

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

elections in all secure villages and hamlets without elected governments, and which set up training programs for local officials. Local elections are scheduled for March, June and December, throughout the country. Training classes will begin at once and continue throughout the year, equipping some 42,000 local officials to serve their constituencies more effectively.

3. The village government will have more extensive control over pacification efforts than ever before. For the first time, local security forces, RD Cadre, People's Self-Defense forces and locally assigned National Police will be directed by the local officials. In addition, the village council will control the expenditure of self-help funds, allocated to the village to support local development. The council can approve expenditures up to VN $50,000 on its own authority, and can initiate larger projects with province or CPDC approval.

4. The basic theme of the 1969 plan is the development of community spirit among the people, between the people and the government, and among the civil and military agencies of the government. Pacification forces and the people will work together in a community of interest to develop national unity under the mantle of security provided by RVNAF/FWMAF.

C. Popular Mobilization.

1. The APC raised the total enrollment in People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF) to approximately 1,100,000. The number of trained PSDF

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

members increased to about 700,000 with arms distributed to about 170,000.

2. In 1969, PSDF membership will be increased to at least 2,000,000 of which 400,000 will be armed. (Figure 2) This program reflects the government's confidence in the people; a confidence which they are expected to reciprocate. In addition, the PSDF has proven capable of providing limited, but measurable, security against the enemy. The effectivenss of the PSDF is causing the enemy increasing concern. This concern has caused the enemy to increasingly target PSDF headquarters and personnel for military, terrorist and propaganda attacks. The PSDF is important politically, since, by its very nature, it forms a bond between the people and the government, who join forces to achieve the common objective of securing the community from enemy aggression.

D. Self-Help.

1. In the past, selection and approval of local self-help projects were completely in the hands of the district and province officials who held the purse strings. Goals were chiefly quantitative, focusing attention on the number of projects undertaken, rather than on how they were accomplished or who in fact accomplished them. These projects had little impact in terms of involving the people in their community or in committing them to something outside their immediate family.

2. Self-help in 1969 operates under an entirely new concept. The purpose of the program is to encourage the people to organize themselves

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



FIGURE 2

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

to achieve common objectives. The emphasis is on motivating people rather than on building "things." In order to insure maximum personal benefit from the funds allocated to the village for self-help, the individual must become personally involved in the process of proposing and selecting projects. Since the village council controls the funds, personal involvement necessitates establishment of a dialogue between the people and the government. It also leads, logically, to personal involvement in local self-defense, since it is the natural desire of a man to protect what he has worked to create.

3. Participation in the self-help program, therefore, involves a commitment to the government which, in turn, at least implies a rejection of the VC as the common enemy. The enemy, who has always tried to make propaganda capital from the destruction of government-created public facilities, will now be put in the position of destroying projects created by the will and industry of the people.

E. Priorities.

1. Pacification programs have always utilized priority areas as a management tool for allocating resources. The stress has usually been on geography. In 1969, population density is the most important criterion in determining areas of precedence for pacification. This is a further reflection of the government's enhanced interest in people as opposed to things. The establishment of areas of precedence based on population density

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

assists the government in allocating its resources where they will produce the greatest return. It challenges the enemy precisely where he stands to lose most.

2. The 1969 guidelines unquestionably stress improvement and extension of security as the overriding objective of the entire effort. Emphasis is placed on programs which directly or indirectly enhance the security situation. Populations inhabiting contested or VC controlled communities are targeted for priority attention. Programs increasing popular involvement in security-oriented activities or aimed at the elimination of VC military and political apparatus are singled out for special attention. Programs contributing little or nothing to increasing popular political involvement have been deemphasized or dropped.

F. Stronger Management. A major change, representing a significant step forward in pacification management, occurred in November 1968 when the GVN pacification program came under unified direction for the first time. The establishment of the Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister reflected the Government's recognition that pacification was a national program of the highest priority, requiring high level emphasis and control. The CPDC represents the successful application of the concept of single management to theproblems of pacification. Line ministries which previously implemented individual programs with a minimum of coordination are now being

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

harnessed and directed in a single coordinated effort. The same concept is being applied at the region and province level, where organizations, similar to the CPDC in structure and function, have been established. (Figure 3)

G. Coordination with the Military Effort.

1. One important reason for the success of the APC was extensive involvement of friendly main force units. More than ever before, US, GVN and other Allied regular forces operated in conjunction with other pacification agencies in a combined effort. Regular force units cleared enemy main forces from selected pacification areas. They attacked VC military and political bases, participated in cordon and search operations and, by their very presence, prevented enemy interference with pacification operations.

2. Regular FWMAF are still needed to cope with the NVA. However, if the threat posed by the NVA were to fade and its support to the insurgency diminish, an improved RVNAF could handle the VC main force units. Achievement of the objectives of the current pacification campaign would strengthen the political and security base of the GVN sufficiently to enable RVN to deal confidently with the threat posed by the NLF.

III. EFFECTS OF CHANGES ON KEY PACIFICATION PROGRAMS.

A. General.

1. The CPDC directed the responsible line ministries to incorporate the changes in strategic and tactical policy enumerated above into

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

GVN ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFICATION



FIGURE 3

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

their program planning for 1969. The Council established Community Spirit as the guiding principle for pacification in 1969. Community Spirit emphasizes cooperation among the people, between the people and the Government, and among Government organizations as the means for establishing a more powerful and stable Government. Its stated objective is to involve the people in the Government, so that together, people and Government can defeat the common enemy.

2. The CPDC set up eight integrated national objectives calculated to drive the enemy out of RVN and prevent his return.

a. To bring security to 90% of the population and extend national sovereignty throughout the country.

b. To eliminate 33,000 VCI by the end of 1969.

c. To establish local government in the villages throughout the country.

d. To rally 20,000 Hoi Chanh returnees to the national cause.

e. To reduce the number of refugees to less than 1,000,000, and to resettle or return 300,000 to their homes.

f. To increase the information and propaganda effort to explain national objectives and policies to the people.

g. To encourage the rural economy as security improves, bringing prosperity to the people as well as safety.

3. With this guidance, the ministries reexamined existing programs. Past directives often permitted, or even encouraged, local officials to devote more energy to the appearance of vigorous activity rather than to

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

the achievement of the objectives for which the program was established. But the new objectives clearly emphasized substance over form. Functional organizations charged with carrying out essential programs were strengthened. The attention of every ministry was focused on the village and its people. Local elements were placed under the direction of the village government. In order to insure popular commitment to the program, method became as important as physical accomplishment.

B. Examination of a few key programs will demonstrate the new direction which has been given to the entire effort.

1. Extend Security to 90% of the Population (Fig. 1)

a. After friendly main force units have destroyed enemy main forces, or expelled them from the pacification area, the residual security problem falls into two closely associated parts:

(1) Territorial Security which deals with:

(a) Destruction of any remaining and VC local force guerrilla units.

(b) Protection of the population centers.

(c) Protection of inter-community Lines of Communication (LOC).

(d) Protection of economic resources.

(2) Internal Security, which deals with:

(a) Destruction of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).

(b) Protection of the population against terrorism.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(c) Elimination of banditry.

(d) Maintenance of law and order.

(e) Protection of public installations.

(f) Protection of intra-community LOCs.

(NOTE: By western usage, "internal security" would address the points in both para (2) and para (B) above. The division here follows common usage in Vietnam for the sake of consistency with GVN. In this context, "internal security" is defined operationally as "providing protection against a threat from guerrillas at platoon level or below, bandits, or criminals; and as detecting and destroying or neutralizing subversive political organizations.")

b. Territorial Forces (RF/PF).

(1) In the 1969 concept of operations, the Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) are charged with establishing and maintaining territorial security. Following elimination of enemy main forces, the RF/PF take over responsibility for control of the area from RVNAF/FWMAF main force units. Regional Forces are charged with the following tasks:

(a) Conduct operations to clear pacification target areas, destroying or expelling enemy local force units.

(b) Maintain security by limiting enemy infiltration.

(c) Augment Popular Forces by protected village/hamlet population where PF are insufficient or not available.

(d) Supply reaction forces to support PF platoons and other

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

paramilitary elements attacked by the enemy, as required.

(e) Protect key installations and vital lines of communication (LOC)

(f) Support civilian agencies in psychological operations, especially Chieu Hoi activities.

(g) Support intelligence agencies in operations to destroy the VCI.

(h) Support National Police (NP) resources and population control operations; support enforcement of law and order.

(i) Support Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC), RF and PF in the organization, training and arming of the People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF).

(j) Be prepared to assume greater territorial security responsibilities on withdrawal of ARVN units assigned to direct support of pacification.

(2) The Popular Forces (PF) are charged with these missions:

(a) Provide local security for villages and hamlets under GVN control until relieved by the National Police.

(b) Participate actively in pacification activities as directed by the Village Administrative Committee.

(c) Destroy VC guerrillas by checking their infiltration into the hamlets; operating especially in the areas between the hamlets of their village.

(d) Support the RDC and PSDF operations

(e) Replace RF as soon as practical in securing key installations and LOCs.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(f) Assist in the organization and training of PSDF.

(g) Assist in identification and destruction of the VCI.

(h) Assist National Police resources and population control operations.

(i) Assist information agencies in psychological operations, especially Chieu Hoi activities.

(j) Be prepared to assume RF responsibilities as security improves.

(3) It is readily seen that the rapidity and intent of the pacification effort is heavily dependent upon the effectiveness and availability of RF/PF. Qualitatively, RF units range from excellent to less than adequate. PF are less effective, and their rate of improvement is slower. Leadership is a common problem. Quantitatively, there are not enough RF/PF to insure that the current expansion of pacification will be continued.

(4) It has been a major objective of both JGS and MACV to upgrade the RF and PF to increase their capability. While there has been steady progress toward this objective, the RF/PF still lack sufficient strength to maintain the current rate of expansion. Plans for improving the quality and performance of the territorial forces include:

(a) Improved personnel management.

(b) Increased emphasis on training for leaders and specialists.

(c) Increasing the number of combat operations.

(d) Modernization of equipment including issue of:

* New series of radios

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES



FIGURE 4

13c

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

*M16 rifles (distribution will be complete by 31 Dec 69).

*M60 machine guns.

*New series vehicles

*Increased quantities of M79 grenade launchers.

*Increased numbers of starlight scopes.

(5) In an attempt to keep pace with the expanding pacification effort, territorial forces increased 31% in 1968 and will increase another 9% of the 1968 total in 1969. Fig 4 shows the total two year expansion to the present ceiling of 431,000. Present authorized strength for PF is 178,100. The ceiling on RF was recently raised from 213,900 to 252,900.

(6) Recent policy changes have increased the probability that RF/PF will be able to make a more significant contribution to pacification in 1969, than ever before. In addition to the increase in personnel and the improvement of training and equipment mentioned above, the following points are significant.

(a) While friendly forces increased an overall 28% during 1968, enemy forces decreased 18%, giving friendly forces an advantage of about three to one. This encouraged the GVN to accept a calculated risk in deploying security forces thinly in the rural areas during the APC. Platoon sized units of RF or PF were assigned to security missions in and around the selected target hamlets. The success of the APC confirmed the validity of this strategy in the current situation, and persuaded GVN to extend and strengthen it in 1969.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(b) Command lines will be clarified and strengthened. PF platoons assigned to the village will come under the direct control of the Village Administrative Council. Additional Company Group Headquarters will be established for RF, providing increased ability to coordinate offensive operations against VC local force and guerrilla units. The number of US Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) has increased steadily from 153 in June 68, to 253 in November, and to 353 on 31 January 1969. An additional increase for 1969 is being planned. Most important, aggressive, offensive action is being stressed as the normal posture for all RVN forces.

(c) All province and district forces have been instructed to cooperate closely with friendly main force units in the elimination of enemy military units and infrastructure. Both ARVN and FWMAF units have been instructed to place priority emphasis on pacification oriented operations. The benefits of combined Vietnamese/Free World operations have been stressed by the high commands on both sides. Such operations, linking American/Free World initiative, drive and leadership to Vietnamese knowledge of the local situation, customs, language and prevalent VC modus operandi, have been extremely successful in the past, and will be used more extensively in the future.

C. Internal Security Forces.

(1) In order to permit extensive deployment of territorial forces throughout the countryside, responsibility for maintaining the peace in

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

relatively secure areas will increasingly devolve on the Internal Security Forces (ISF), especially the National Police and PSDF. In addition, the ISF bear the primary responsibility for prosecuting the attact on the VCI.

(2) In establishing law and order, the National Police have proven reasonably effective in urban areas, where they have been deployed in reasonable numbers, and have effective leadership. Their performance during the 1968 TET offensive increased their self-confidence and the respect of the people for them. The NP have not been nearly as effective in the rural areas, where their presence is limited. They lack training in rural operations, and, moreover, require a relatively secure environment in which to operate.

(3) Current plans and programs for improving the effectiveness of the NP include:

(a) Increase in total force.

(b) Increased deployment to rural areas (50% min).

(c) Formal inspections to reduce corruption.

(d) Prompt investigation and action on allegations of wrong doing.

(e) Establishment of internal administrative safeguards.

(f) Increased recruitment of police women.

(g) Higher recruiting standards to improve personnel quality.

(h) More intensive and extensive training.

(i) A career development program.

(j) Improved personnel administration.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

In addition, advisors will assist the National Police Directorate in planning, programming, and budget preparation, in order to obtain a greater share of GVN resources for the police. CORDS is also planning to provide commodity support specifically to improve training facilities, support detention activities, and to maintain and expand transportation and communication facilities.

(4) If strengthened, the NP would have a significant potential as a powerful counterinsurgency force against small scale insurgency and subversion. Fig 5 shows the growth of thepolice from 19,000 men in 1962 to 78,000 men at the end of 1968. This rapid growth took place during a period of political upheaval, governmental turmoil and the substantial militarization of the nation's administrative and security structure. As a result, the police are still afflicted with major problems of management, training and doctrine. It is also true [redacted] that current levels of advisory effort, training and operational support will not have a significant impact on improving the effectiveness of the police, except on a long term basis.

(5) Eliminate the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).

(a) The Phung Hoang program, as the attack on the Infrastructure is called, is aimed at the destruction of the VCI, and ranks with territorial security as first priority for command attention in 1969. The Phung Hoang organization is a coordinating mechanism to integrate the activities of all agencies charged with the identification and elimination of the VCI. It

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

POLICE ACTIVITIES

NATIONAL POLICE STRENGTH



PROGRAM EMPHASIS

50% OF POLICE IN RURAL AREAS

NPFF TARGETED ON VC INFASTRUCTURE

IMPROVED OPERATIONS

OPERATIONAL RESULTS

TWO MONTH PERIOD ENDING:	22 JAN 1968	8 FEB 1969
VC KILLED	86	620
VC CAPTURED	233	1,942
SUSPECTS DETAINED	679	5,081
TOTAL	998	7,643

FIGURE 5

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

functions at every level of administration through a descending system of Regional, Province and District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers. The main operating agencies within the Phung Hoang system are:

*National Police Special Branch (NPSB)

*National Police Field Forces (NPFF)

*Territorial Forces (RF/PF)

*Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU)

*Military Security Service (MSS)

*Chieu Hoi Service, especially the Armed Propaganda Teams (APT)

*Vietnamese Information Service (VIS)

*Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC)

*Static Census Grievance Cadre

*People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF)

In addition, there is a close tie-in with all ARVN and FWMAF combat and intelligence units operating within a province or district.

(b) The Phung Hoang program has already resulted in heightened military attention to the VCI problem, and an increase in combined civil/military operations against the infrastructure. The effectiveness of the Special Branch Police has increased, although they are still hampered by insufficient experience, lack of training and shortage of manpower. The effectiveness of the NPFF has improved markedly since the GVN ordered the deployment of one NPFF platoon to each district to serve as the action arm of the SBP in the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Center (DIOCC). A plan is underway to merge the Provincial Reconnaissance Units into the NPFF, which should considerably strengthen the latter. The PRU, which has been under direct US supervision, is considerably more effective at detecting and apprehending VCI than any of the Internal Security Forces under GVN control. The PRU's are followed by the Static Census Grievance and RDC as effective agents for identifying VCI.

(c) The Phung Hoang Program as a whole has been fully supported by the GVN for about eight months, but has only begun to produce results. In many instances, considerable pressure had to be brought to bear on province and district level officials to overcome their apparent reluctance to conduct effective operations against local VCI. In other cases, local officials attempted to satisfy the requirements of higher headquarters by employing large scale cordon and search and sweep type operations marked by the prodical use of available forces and a paucity of results. Local officials emphasized the scope and extent of these operations, including the size and variety of the forces involved, the extent of the area searched, the size of the population screened, the number of people detained for investigation and the duration of the operations. Little emphasis was placed on the number and relative importance of the VCI actually convicted and sentenced by the Province Security Council on the normal judicial system. The number of "suspects" picked up and later released was almost totally ignored.

(d) In contrast, the APC and, more extensively, the 1969 Pacification Guidelines emphasized the elimination of VCI from the populated areas,

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

the destruction of their political base camps in jungle areas around the villages, and established target priorities based on the relative importance of the enemy cadre. These priorities single out particular elements of the enemy hierarchy for elimination in this order .(Figure 6)

*Members of the National Liberation Councils and Committees; members of National alliances for Democracy and Peace.

*The Finance-Economy cadre of the People's Revolutionary Party.

*All Chairmen, Deputy Chairmen and other executive elements of the People's Revolutionary Committees at province, district, village and hamlet level. These would include the top functionaires charged with Propaganda, Culture and Education, Security, Military Affairs, etc.

[redacted]

The results of these tactics are shown in Figure 7.

(e) The guidelines also established priority areas and a strict quota system. The attack on the infrastructure is to be carried out continuously and energetically everywhere in the country, but with particular attention to the following priority areas:

*Contested areas

*Areas under temporary VC control

*Secure Areas

Monthly quotas totaling 20,580 eliminations during the first semester have been set for the four Corps Commanders, who, in turn, have levied requirements on the provinces. In this way, the GVN aims at eliminating at least

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



FIGURE 9

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

NEUTRALIZATION OF PRIORITY VCI

FIGURE 7

TARGET	NEUTRALIZATIONS			% IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS		
	NOV	DEC	JAN	NOV	DEC	JAN
LIBERATION COMMITTEE MEMBERS	78	141	163	50	41	55
VCI SECURITY PERSONNEL	208	199	299	35	30	18
VCI FINANCE/ECONOMY PERSONNEL	304	360	389	23	20	22
TOTALS	590	700	851			

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

50% of the enemy infrastructure during 1969, greatly reducing the effectiveness of the residue.

(f) In all Phung Hoang activities, operating elements are to make maximum use of available intelligence to target key infrastructure members for selective pickup operations calculated to cause maximum distress to the enemy, while subjecting the population to a minimum of inconvenience. Local officials are instructed to seek the most extensive cooperation of ARVN and FWMAF units in planning and conducting Phung Hoang Operations.

(g) To insure that these instructions are carried out with enthusiasm, dispatch and the greatest possible results, Inspection and Training will receive command emphasis at every level. Each participating agency is expected to contribute sufficient resources and attention to insure the success of the program. Phung Hoang Committee Chairmen at each level will guarantee effective coordination, and the maximum employment of all resources.

d. Current studies to effect further improvement.

(1) MACV studies are now underway to discover additional ways to improve GVN capabilities in the territorial/internal security field under present conditions, and in the post hostilities period. The studies are addressing the following points:

(a) US objectives with respect to territorial/internal security forces.

(b) Roles and missions of security forces.

(c) Political and economic restraints.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(d) Current and projected force structures.

(e) Effectiveness of security forces.

(f) Plans to improve them.

(g) Changes in US and GVN organizations to support security forces.

(2) Some of the more interesting findings to date include the following items.

(a) A significant political restraint on the development of territorial/internal security forces is the predominate influence of the military in the government, with its resultant emphasis on military rather than para-military or civil forces.

(b) Another restraint of importance is the combined effect of an inadequate judicial and penal system and a widespread tendency toward lenient punishment of all except the most clearly identified enemies of the people. The seriousness of the shortage of adequate detention facilities can be seen from the comparison between the number of detainees, and the number of available detention spaces (Figure 8).

(c) Economic restraints on expansion of T&I Security forces relate primarily to budget and inflationary considerations. The national budget is dangerously large and continuing to grow. Further increases in government expenditures could be critical, if too large. This could act as a serious restraint on expansion of forces.

(d) Availability of manpower for induction into military and para-military organizations was developed from estimates of the entire RVN manpower

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DETENTION

TRENDS



PRESENT SITUATION

29.350 POLITICAL DETAINEES

8.900 CIVILIAN CRIMINALS

6.250 MILITARY AND OTHER PRISONERS

FIGURE 8

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

base.

*Total strength of all forces 31/12/68 - 998,000

*Additional available manpower (est)	1969 -	324,000
	1970 -	175,000
	1971 -	114,000
	1972 -	90,000
	1973 -	91,900
	Subtotal -	794,900
Estimated requirements (based on current loss rates and force structure)	1969 -	311,400
	1970 -	197,000
	1971 -	221,000
	1972 -	225,800
	1973 -	219,800
	Subtotal -	1,175,000

Approximately 90% of the projected losses for military forces are the result of desertions. The maximum attainable force level is estimated to be 1,191,000 at the end of CY 1970, declining to 1,030,000 at the end of CY 73.

(e) Shortage of advisors and operational support is inhibiting improvement of National Police effectiveness. An augmentation of advisory personnel, training and operational support, plus application of the Mobile Advisory Team concept to NPFF can be made at a relatively small cost. Such an augmentation would produce significant results. The assignment of additional military advisors and equipment as police advisors requires more detailed study.

(f) Current plans call for an increase in police forces from 78,000 to 120,000 at 10,000 spaces per year from 1969 through 1972. The scheduled increase would have a much greater impact on pacification progress if it

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

were condensed over a two year instead of a four year period, with 12,000 being added in 1969 and 30,000 in 1970. This would permit more rapid expansion of police presence into all districts and villages. The 120,000 should be divided functionally as follows:

*Uniformed Police	84,000
*NPFF	18,000
*SBP	18,000
Total -	120,000

This would facilitate assignment of NPFF platoons to districts still lacking them, to serve as the action arm of the DIOCC. It would also provide for greater SBP presence from district level up, to intensify activities against the VCI. Availability of manpower could be a restraining factor to this move, especially in 1970. However, if pacification progresses satisfactorily, it may be feasible to recruit PF into the police in the most pacified areas. In the meanwhile, PF will be exposed to police operations, which they are required to support. This would give them some exposure to rural police work prior to any transfer of forces.

(g) Accelerated expansion of the NP would require a build up of training facilities, and an increase in US advisory support. Two additional 3000 man training centers would be required. These could possibly be made available from existing US or GVN facilities. The program would require advanced training courses for about 17,000 supervisory personnel.

(h) Funding requirements for an accelerated expansion of NP

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

forces would total about $34 million for 1969 and $37 million in 1970. These figures include $22 million in commodity in FY 69, and $15 million in FY 1970. However, $29.9 million is presently available for FY 69, and $25.6 million is budgeted for FY 70. In addition to dollar costs, a piaster budget of 10.5 billion would be required in CY 69, and 12.9 billion in CY 70. The current 1969 piaster support figure is $9.7 billion. The increase in piasters would have to come from the GVN.

(i) A recommendation has already been made to increase RF spaces by 10,000 to permit the transfer of Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) to the RF. This would utilize trained manpower to expand the RF, while reducing CIDG to programmed levels. (Requested by COMUSMACV message 4883 to CINCPAC, dated 26 Feb 69.) There is a clear indication of an existing requirement even beyond this, based on the considered judgment of the four CTZ Field Commanders/Senior Advisors, that additional RF/PF are required to sustain current pacification momentum. Specific recommendations will be made following consultations with the field.

(3) Specific recommendations on the expansion and employment of Territorial/Internal Security Forces will be made following completion of the studies.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

2. Strengthen Village Government.

a. Many of the most dramatic changes in the thrust and emphasis of the pacification effort center around the establishment of the Village Concept by the CPDC. This concept, focus on rejuvenating the traditional level of local government, the village, to serve as a catalyst and organizer of the local development process. As it was previously pointed out (para IIB), the 1969 program is people oriented. That is, it is focused on inspiring popular organizations and community groups to tackle their own problems of defense and development. Therefore, in contrast to previous years, there is no emphasis on spending funds or implementing a certain number of projects. In evaluating the 1969 effort, the central questions will not be a quantitative "How much?", "How many?", or "How big?", but rather a qualitative, incisive inquiry of the amount of attraction which has developed within a village between people and government. The questions will be:

(1) Is there an elected, trained village government in place?

(2) Are the people organized to accomplish their own defense and development?

(3) Are these popular groups active? Is the government supporting them?

b. The effectiveness of the 1969 pacification campaign, therefore, will be largely dependent on the success or failure of the Government's progress in decentralizing authority to the village, where the interface

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

between government and people take place, and in stimulating popular involvement in the community's defense and development. The village, then, is at the operating end of the pacification operational chain of command, which begins with the President, and passes through the Pacification and Development Councils at each intervening level to the District Chief and ultimately to the Village Administrative Council. (FIG 9)

c. Having adopted the concept, the GVN was faced with several immediate problems:

(1) Establishment of representative governments in as many villages as possible, in the shortest time.

(2) Preparing the village officials to assume their increaded responsibilities.

(3) Establishing effective control and direction of the village effort in the hands of the village government.

(4) Providing the material means for supporting the village program.

d. Elections.

(1) To solve the first problem, the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) issued instructions on 3 January 1969 that all temporary (appointed) Village Councils in GVN controlled areas would be replaced by elected Councils prior to 31 March. On 4 March, the MOI placed a requirement on the Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) that at least 569 villages

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

FIG 9

GVN PACIFICATION ORGANIZATION

PRESIDENT

CORPS

PROVINCE

DISTRICT

VILLAGE CHIEF COUNCIL

PEOPLE

DEVELOPMENT

POLICIES, FUNDS, TECHNICAL SUPPORT, SUPERVISION

ASPIRATIONS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

21

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

would hold elections by 30 June 69. Since MOI reports that 545 villages will hold elections in March, it is anticipated that the semester goal will be raised following the March elections. FIG 10 shows the current situation and benchmarks for elections in 1969.

(2) Hamlet elections will be concurrent with the village contest. The MOI first semester goal calls for elections in at least 3,117 hamlets. At least 2,948 hamlets will elect officials in March. The balance will be elected in June.

e. Training.

(1) The 1969 pacification plan decrees an initial leadership training program for village and hamlet officials either the Maternal Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau or in the provinces, with special emphasis on training in new self-help procedures (FIG 10). While the initial course cannot be expected to turn out administrators well versed in every aspect of their duties, it should, as a minimum, lay the groundwork for more effective dialogues between the local officials and the people and between the elected officials and province and district functionaires. It should instill pride by giving a better understanding of their importance to the trainees. It should initiate them to the jargon and administrative procedures of the GVN, permitting more effective communication between the trainees and higher echelon functionaires. It should expose them to the principle of government for

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

VILLAGE ELECTIONS

1109 ELECTED

599 MARCH ELECTIONS

400 LATER ELECTIONS IN 1969

400 WITHOUT ELECTED COUNCILS AT END 1969

SELF-HELP

2 BILLION PIASTER FUND

1 MILLION TO VILLAGES WITH ELECTED COUNCILS

400,000 TO VILLAGES WITH APPOINTED OFFICIALS

+ PEOPLE'S CONTRIBUTIONS

LEADERSHIP

TRAINING:

NATIONAL 12,000 OFFICIALS

PROVINCE – 18,000 OFFICIALS

CADRE:

RD	48,000
HIGHLANDER	7,000
INFORMATION	3,000

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

the people, and introduce them to the role of the people as collaborators in local government.

(2) The national training program, as enunciated thus far, provides a point of departure for a more extensive program of on the job training, supplemented by formal seminars at district, province and national level. The problem of issuing additional guidance for continued training is being addressed now, so that the program can be implemented immediately upon completion of the initial training, to preserve momentum. This new guidance will address itself to increasing effective relationships between the people and the GVN and between the various levels of government.

(3) This new training will have to be carried out largely through the province/district administration, the RD Cadre and the local advisory teams. The plan for extending the training program will address the capabilities and constitution of these agencies. The immediate need will be to extend the influence of the district administration to each village in a manner which will enhance the importance of the village in the eyes of both the population and the functionaires, without upsurping the authority of the local government, or subverting the preogatives of the people.

f. Control and Direction.

(1) The CPDC has placed directions of all pacification forces including PF, police, RD Cadre, Static Census Grievance and Information

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Cadre in the hands of the Village Administrative Committee. This represents a remarkable decentralization of authority, which simultaneously lays a heavy responsibility on the committee directing the pacification effort - and gives it one means necessary to success.

(2) RD Cadre.

(a) Of the agencies not covered previously, the RD Cadre is probably the most significant. The present function of RD Cadre, in terms of the 1969 Pacification Guidelines, is to initiate and nuture a dialogue among the people themselves and between the people and the Government, with the objective of drawing the population into active participation in local affairs in their own interest, resulting in a de facto commitment to the GVN and at least an implicit repudiation of the VC.

(b) The cadre basically act as catalysts, stimulating interest, encouraging involvement and assisting the people to draw nearer to the Government to their own advantage. In villages where security remains the primary immediate concern of the population, this function is performed by stimulating a spirit of resistance to military, economic and political exploitation of the population by the enemy. In the practical order, cadre assist in recruiting and training Peoples Self-Defense Forces (PSDF), establishing local defense plans, organizing the entire population to actively resist aggression in cooperation with local security forces, setting up local intelligence networks, etc.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

All of these things can be accomplished by RDC Groups as presently trained and constituted, provided they are well led and sufficiently motivated.

(c) In villages where security is progressing, but where development has lagged behind, the Cadre are also equipped to stimulate interest in socio-economic improvement, and to assist the people to identify aspirations, bring them to the attention of the local government and to discuss and decide on solutions that are in the best interests of the community. This involvement may result in a reawakening of interest in residual security problems, and an increase in popular involvement resulting in further security improvement.

(d) In late 1968, in an effort to increase the effectiveness of the available cadre, the CPDC ordered the existing 59 man Cadre Teams split into 30 man groups consisting of one six man control group and three eight man work cells. This stroke enabled the Provinces to assign cadre to twice as many villages as before. The CPDC also promulgated a directive enabling the Village Administrative Committee to assign cadre to work in hamlets in eight man cells, thus permitting one team to operate in up to three hamlets and the village headquarters simultaneously.

(e) To increase effectiveness still further, experienced cadre are being given additional leadership training and assigned as

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

intergroup leaders, coordinating from three to five 30 man Groups, and as mobile inspection/training teams, to provide on the spot correction of operational difficiencies.

(f) Not all of the problems have been solved. Transfer policies presently in effect prohibit transfer of Cadre from one province to another, even with more pressing requirements. This problem along with such questions as what to do with the Cadre when pacification is complete? How to provide cadre where they are needed, without exceeding the present ceiling (47,200)?, etc. are being currently addressed by MACCORDS. Proposed solutions will be presented to the GVN as soon as the present studies are complete.

g. Self-Help. (Village Development).

(1) In another liberal decision in late 1969, the CPDC, gave control of village swlf-help funds to the Village Council. In past years, province and district officials often interfered with the people's right to select their own projects. This year, the program is a local affair. All self-help projects will be selected at public meetings convened by the Village Council, on the basis of majority rule. Province and district authorities are instructed to provide guidance to village officials so that all have a clear understanding of the concepts. But they are specifically ordered not to monopolize the initiative and to avoid ordering people to carry out projects.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(2) Projects under 50,000 $VN do not need prior approval by higher authorities. Projects from 50,000 to 150,000 $VN require approval from the PPDC. Projects over 150,000 $VN require approval by the CPDC. Every village will receive a fund of 400,000 $VN. Villages with an elected council will receive an additional 600,000 $VN.

(3) To minimize irregularities arising from the misuse of funds, the 1969 Guidelines establish a committee to manage self-help operations. The membership of the committee consists of the following:

(a) Chairman, Village Council (Chairman)

(b) Chairman, Village Administration Committee

(c) All Hamlet Chiefs

(d) Two representatives of the PSDF.

(e) One representative from the RDC Group.

(f) Two representatives of the village Notables.

This committee is responsible for implementing projects selected by the people at public meetings by majority rule. The committee handles procurement of materials and implementation of projects. Notice of public meetings to select projects must be posted on a public bulletin board, which shows the details of every approved project.

(4) The emphasis throughout the program is on involvement of the people. The participation of the people in recommending projects, debate, voting for selection, contributing materials or services, etc.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

is intended to develop private involvement in public affairs. The process is intended to be an early step on the road to democratic self government.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

3. Chieu Hoi,

a. The TET offensive coupled with uncertainties in the international situation caused a drop in the number of Hoi Chanh (Ralliers) returning to the Government cause in earlier 1968. Toward the end of the year, however, the GVN adopted several significant measures, which revitalized the program. The new measures included:

(1) A stepped-up psyops program aimed at VC military personnel, VCI and their families.

(2) An incentive awards program which established specific amounts to be paid to anyone inducing an enemy to rally.

(3) Expansion and increased emphasis on the Armed Propaganda Team (APT) program.

(4) A Turn Around Program, which induced Hoi Chanh to voluntarily return to their former areas of operation to induce their comrades to rally.

(5) Increased emphasis on cooperation between Hoi Chanh, especially Kit Carson Scouts and APTs, and RVNAF and FWMAF units.

(6) An education program, bringing the families of known VC to province Chieu Hoi Centers to convince them of the benefits which the program held out to their VC relatives.

The results of these measures and the shift in the situation favoring the GVN, can be seen on the chart at FIG 11.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) RESULTS



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

b. In 1969, the GVN will continue to emphasize and expand these programs. The Pacification and Development Committees at all levels will insure closer coordination between VIS, Psy War agencies and the Chieu Hoi services. The number of Armed Propaganda Teams will be increased. Additional spaces for Kit Carson Scouts will be allocated to FWMAF units, to take still further advantage of the personal knowledge of Hoi Chanh who wish to fight against their Communist former units.

c. In order to insure enthusiastic implementation of the program, the 1969 Guidelines continued the policy, established during the APC, of placing quotas on the Corps Commanders, who, in turn, have set monthly quotas for the provinces. During the APC 8646 Hoi Chanh rallied to the Government. The minimum 1969 goal is 20,000 additional. The 30 June 1969 quotas have been established by the CPDC and approved by the President as follows:

(1)	I CTZ	2000
(2)	II CTZ	2300
(3)	III CTZ	4300
(4)	IV CTZ	7000
		15600

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

4. Refugee Resettlement.

a. The refugee problem in Vietnam has grown up with the war. In the early days, prior to 1965, there was no government agency specifically charged with the care and resettlement of people displaced by the war, or who fled communist agression. By the end of 1965, there were almost 700,000 displaced persons on hand. In mid 1965, a Refugee Commission was established to cope with the growing problem. The Commissioner, however, was forced to draw his staff from established ministries. Not surprisingly, the Commission was relatively ineffective, and the problem continued to grow.

b. Toward the end of 1966, with the total already over 800,000, the Refugee Ministry was created to take the problem in hand. The early days of the Ministry were a repetition of the Commission story. The staff was largely composed of personnel cast off from other government offices. The new Ministry was unable to keep up with the demand for temporary relief, let alone addressing the problem of resettlement.

c. The picture was suddenly brightened in mid 1967, by the appointment of a new, dynamic and capable Minister. The problems of temporary relief were taken in hand and brought under control. Standard policies and techniques were established. There was finally time to begin to organize resettlement. By the end of 1967, about 16,000 refugees had actually been resettled. Plans were formulated to emphasize resettlement in 1968, to reduce the drain on the Government's limited resources.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

d. The Tet offensive began on 29 January 1968. It caused an immediate switch in emphasis. All thoughts of resettlement were placed in abeyance. Instead of reducing the number of displaced persons, the number doubled, as 892,000 people were made homeless. The Government met the challenge with speed and competence. The Central Relief Committee was established, with President Thieu as chairman, to assue instructions initiating recovery measures.

e. Under "Operation Recovery", funds were provided to local relief committees by the Central Committee. The fact that the attack had centered on the cities magnified the problems. Communications with the provinces were disrupted in many cases. In Saigon alone 98 temporary centers were opened to accomodate the city's 173,000 homeless.

f. The GVN brought the situation under control, assisting the people to rebuild their homes and return to a normal, self sustaining existance. The May 1968 offensive created 180,000 victims. At about this time, the Refugee Social Welfare Ministry was merged with the Ministry of Health to form the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief (MHSWR), under Dr. Tran Lu Y, the former Minister of Health.

g. The new Ministry was able to meet all challenges, reduce the total displaced persons figure to managable proportions and again address the problem of resettlement. Dispite the disturbances of Tet and mini Tet, 235,000 people were resettled in 1968. Another 91,000 were returned to their native villages as the ministry got a new solution underway

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

to relieve the pressure on Government resources. As the year ended there were 1.3 million refugees on the books, but there were also extensive plans for 1969. Fig. 12 graphically portrays the 1968 refugee story.

h. The 1969 Guidelines stress the return to village technique for 1969. The dramatic expansion of security during the APC opened up areas which had been insecure or contested, in some cases for years. In many instances people native to these areas wish to return to their old homesites and rebuild their long gone homes. In a radical departure from past practice, MHSWR has authorized standard allowances of cash and commodities for those refugees who do re-establish themselves. They are eligible to recieve:

(1) 6 months supply of rice

(2) 10 bags of cement

(3) 10 sheets of aluminum roofing and

(4) 5000 $VN cash on completion of their homes.

With this as an inducment, MHSWR anticipates groups of up to 10,000 people returning to gether to reconstruct their village.

i. In 1969, the aim of the Refugee program will be to reduce the dependent refugee population to less than 1,000,000. At least 300,000 refugees will be resettled or returned to their old home sites and assisted to become self-sufficient once more. At the same time, the Government will exert every effort to liquidate its outstanding obligations to the current refugee population. Temporary resettlement allowances will be paid, relief commodities issued and other obligations for training and assistance will be met.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DISPLACED PERSONS



Fig. 12

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

j. The minimum goals set by the CPDC for the first semester refugee resettlement and return totals 1,083,691, divided among the CTZ's as follows:

Phase I (from 1 Feb to 30 Jun 1969)

CTZ	Resettlement	Return to Villages
I	301,381	216,639
II	102,631	162,050
III	47,298	33,047
IV	143,347	77,298
TOTAL	594,657	489,034

Resettle	594,657
Return	489,034
Total	1,083,691

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

5. Increase Propaganda and Information Efforts.

a. In the recent past the Vietnamese Information Service has frequently been the "forgotten" province service. Line services rarely availed themselves of the facilities and expertise available in the VIS to review their programs for psychological content and thrust. Efforts began during the APC to insure more extensive utilization of VIS resources. The establishment of the Pacification and Development Councils provided an organization at each level to insure adequate coordination between VIS and other services, and to guarantee consideration of the psyops content of all pacification and development plans.

b. The 1969 Pacification Plan tasks VIS with explaining the impact of the recent policy changes on the lives of the people. VIS is charged to encourage and motivate the people to actively participate in local affairs, and to cooperate with the Government against the common enemy. To insure the accomplishment of this mission, the plan provides for the following:

(1) The appointment of a Village Information Commissioner on every Village Administrative Committee.

(2) The appointment of a Hamlet Information Assistant to each Hamlet Chief.

(3) The establishment of Mobile Information Teams, consisting of two VIS Cadre, the Village Information Commissioner, and the Hamlet Information Assistant from an adjacent hamlet to support the Revolutionary

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Development Cadre Group in its work in the hamlets. The team will be equipped with a PA system, tape recorder, loud hailer and have access to projectors and TV sets. It will operate under the direction of the Village Chief.

c. The 1969 Program will also see the recruitment and training of hamlet information cadre by the Mobile Information Teams; the reestablishment of the hamlet/village TV program; the increased use of local cultural-drama and propaganda teams; establishment of public reading rooms in each village, and public bulletin boards in every hamlet. Distribution of popular newspapers representing a variety of viewpoints on topical questions will continue to be distributed to augment the effects of the public TV and radio programs.

d. A significant part of the campaign will be to encourage private citizens to take some overt action to demonstrate family support for the national cause, or to indicate repudiation of the Viet Cong. This action can take the form of active participation in public meetings on local affairs, contribution of time, money or materials to village development projects, display of the national flag or national slogans about the home, as well as engagement in local political affairs.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
CENTRAL PACIFICATION DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

9 August 1969

CIRCULAR 1275/PThT/BDXD/KHM

SUBJECT : Implementation of the 1969 Special P&D Plan.

REFERENCE : CPDC Circular 924 dated 26 June 1969 President's Directive 939 dated 1 July 1969.

During his review of the results obtained during the first phase in Pacification and Development the President gave the following instructions.

I. GENERAL.

We lost two months during Phase I. The month preceding the Tet holidays was not productive because it followed the completion of the three month Accelerated Pacification Campaign (1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969), during which everyone was pushed to such strenuous efforts that rest was needed thereafter. Following the month of letdown were the Tet holidays, and for one month thereafter we were unable to regain the fervor that had characterized implementation of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

Moreover, the Regional Forces had not yet completed training and military support was still inadequate. During Phase II we don't have the Tet holidays with which to contend, the Regional Forces have completed their training, and we will not repeat those mistakes which we made during the first phase.

The 1969 Special Pacification and Development Plan starts on 1 July 1969 as a continuation of Phase I of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan. The reason that we add the word "Special" to the Phase II Pacification and Development Plan is that we seek to restore the enthusiasm of the 1968 Special Pacification Plan (APC). "Special" as used here also means that implementation must be both rapid and thorough; therefore, we are especially going to exploit the enemy's low morale. The number of VC returnees, a number which increases daily and reaches its peak in IV Corps, gives us ample evidence of the enemy's low morale. We must convert our present military victories into political victories.

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

IDA 71-131 214

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

As the enemy is weak militarily, it naturally follows that he can no longer support his political effort effectively. We must know how to exploit this advantage in pushing the 1969 Special Pacification and Development Plan.

In 1969, after completion of the four month Special Pacification and Development Plan, we still have two months (November and December) remaining in which to complete unfinished objectives, and at the same time begin forthwith on implementation of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan so that Tet will fall in the middle of the Plan and thus not cause a loss of momentum as it did in 1969.

II. OBJECTIVE 1. Extend security to the people and occupy the hamlets.

In 1969 we aimed to improve the quality of security as well as to increase the number of people enjoying security. In other words, both quantity and quality must receive proper emphasis.

A. Quality: This means that we lead the people in such a way as to inspire them with firm nationalist convictions so they will vote for the Nationalists instead of the Communists.

Classification of the people in the ABCDEV hamlets has given us to understand the following:

-- The people in AB hamlets can be trusted. They have strong nationalist convictions and they support the government. In 1969 we must make every effort to raise at least 50 percent of the people to an AB level of security, or stated another way, 50 percent of the people must be living in AB hamlets.

-- The people in C hamlets have a less than firm spirit and an incident such as the 1968 VC Tet Offensive will drive these hamlets into the DE Category. Of the 85.6 percent of the people living in ABC hamlets nationwide, a total of 49 percent of these are living in C type hamlets.

As of the end of June 1969, C hamlets are divided into two categories: strong and weak. We must raise 50 percent of the strong C hamlets to the AB category, and the remaining C hamlets must all be brought into the strong C category.

If this year we don't bend every effort to get 50 percent of the population living in AB category hamlets, in 1970 we have little hope of extending AB level security to 90 percent of the people nationwide.

In 1969 the government will hold elections of the Prefecture, Province and Municipal Councils.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

During 1970 there will be elections for the Senate and in 1971 for the House. The Communists are suffering heavy military reverses and now have no hope of achieving military occupation of free South Vietnam. Thus they will use political means in order to gain control of this land. The Viet Cong never advocates open contests conducted in the light of day, but will cloak their struggle in sinister stratagems. They are not so foolish as to participate in an election under International control. Instead, they will try to infiltrate the elected councils of provinces, cities, and the capitol, as well as infiltrate both the House and Senate. To do this they will surface new faces and these unknowns will constantly play new themes designed to be attractive to the people. The people, at a loss to determine who is a Communist and who is a Nationalist, will tend to cast their ballots at random. This can be catastrophic for the Nationalists. We must actively guide and assist the people in avoiding these dangerous errors. This entails preventing the Communists from infiltrating our legal institutions. We also do not abandon the DEV category hamlets. In other words, we extend security to the hamlets targeted, in order to raise these hamlets to a C level and eventually on to the B and finally the A category. The Pacification Plan requires continuous action in a given hamlet which means that we cannot work in a hamlet for a time, leave to pacify another hamlet, and then return later as we have in past years. Hamlets regress after being abandoned for a time by cadre. In every case returning cadre find that hamlets have regressed during the interval without cadre.

B. Nationwide Military Support:

In general, military support was not as effective as desired during Phase I with the notable exception of the I Corps Tactical Zone. The Regional and Popular Forces of this Corps, owing to effective operating procedures, good management, and tight control by District Chiefs and unit commanders, obtained much success. They were effective in finding the enemy and they had a high ratio between operations and contacts made.

From the beginning of July 1969 the Regional and Popular Forces have completed their training. The ARVN, RF and PF must all be employed properly. In the past the RD Cadre Groups lacked effective military support. The cadre groups are capable of self defense, but they cannot protect the people in the villages and hamlets. The RF and PF must establish a minimum of security both within and without the hamlets and villages so that the RD cadre can work more effectively. This does not mean that RF and PF must spend all their time located physically beside the RD cadre, but rather that they must create conditions favorable to cadre activity. The cadre should, for example, be free from surprise attack.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

The RD cadre must understand that village and hamlet development is a continuous process to bring DE hamlets up to a C rating, then on to B, and eventually to A category. Therefore, upon attaining a C rating for a given hamlet we must neither rest nor move on to another hamlet and then return to the old hamlet. In 1969 we do not have authority to leave and return for the second or third time to the old hamlets. The only exception to this rule is the event of an enemy attack of such strength that AB hamlets are threatened with regression to a lower category.

From last year to the present, our military forces have spread out to flood the hamlets. The aspects most in need of exploitation by these successes are the political and psychological. After entering a hamlet, aside from development activities, we must consolidate the spirit of our people so that their political tendencies are firmly pro-nationalist. The various military forces and the RD cadre must organize the people into groups, and train them thoroughly so that they can transform their hamlets and villages into stable bulwarks against the Communists throughout this protracted resistance warfare.

III. OBJECTIVE 2. Neutralization of the VCI.

The Phung Hoang Campaign is of prime importance. The province chiefs must personally direct this campaign so that the nationalist elements increase with each passing day and, conversely, the enemy infrastructure grows constantly weaker. The Phung Hoang Campaign has yet to be properly implemented.

IV. OBJECTIVE 3. People's Self Defense Forces.

The People's Self Defense Forces, along with the RF and PF of I Corps, were cited for their accomplishments.

General mobilization doesn't mean drafting a lot of soldiers. General mobilization is to mobilize the national will, to marshall the resources, physical and moral, of the home front so that it supports the battle front. The People's Self Defense program aims to make a reality of this concept. Whoever is not a member of the Regular Forces should be strongly encouraged to serve in the PSDF to protect their own home, property and lives. Stimulating the old men and women to participate in people's groups is done with the coming elections, in mind. Every member of the PSDF is also a voter who should be so organized as to insure that his ballot will be cast for the Nationalist camp. Our voters must be organized and educated so as to make them enlightened voters, in which case they will choose Nationalist candidates. Only organization of the people into groups will give us the medium by which we can talk seriously with the people so that our education will have good results. No people's groups, a lack of guidance, and everyone acting haphazardly is the formula for insurrection.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Elections during this political war have a great bearing on our immediate future. Our success will depend on these people's groups. To accomplish this organization of both the combat and support elements of the PSDF must proceed simultaneously.

There are many places where management of PSDF is more difficult than management of a division. Responsibility has been clearly delineated for each Ministry as to matters pertaining to organization, training, arming, and ammunition supply. This must be maintained by a strong system staffed with adequate cadres or specialists with sufficient authority.

OBJECTIVE 4. Organization of Village, Hamlet Government.

1. Assignment of village, hamlet officials up to full strength.

Village and hamlet officials must be assigned up to full authorized strength. Personnel shortages are the rule throughout the country. Therefore, the following priorities are established for assignment as village and hamlet officials:

a) People who are in a legal draft status or draft deferred.

b) Popular Forces.

c) RD Cadre.

People assigned must be local residents of the village, district or province. Recruitment of people outside a province is strictly forbidden. The shortage of a few RF or PF soldiers is not so critical as being short just one village official.

In order that we can immediately have adequate personnel for service in the villages, RF, PF and RD cadre personnel will temporarily be assigned to fill those positions which are vacant. They are authorized to draw from one-fourth to one-half of the salary for the position they occupy in addition to continuing their regular salary from their present organization. (In no case, however, may the total salary exceed that of the village chief or the chairman of the village council.)

Thereafter the local administration must try to fill these positions with retired civil servants and discharged soldiers.

2. Training of village and hamlet officials:

An effective rural administration entails more than a full complement of personnel. They must also be capable. Neither the illiterate nor the untrained can be considered as a capable official.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

3. Village Development:

In the event that there is no capable person to fill the Finance and Economy Commissioner's seat, either the Assistant Village Chief or some other official can hold this position concurrent with his own position.

VI. OBJECTIVE 5. Chieu Hoi.

The Chieu Hoi program is very important. We have received a great number of ralliers and will receive many more. We must employ them to the maximum in our operations. For example, we have received some 140,000 returnees, but of these we are only using 40,000. We can expect that those 40,000 being employed will cast their ballots for the national government, but those 100,000 not being employed could vote for the Communists. We stand to lose both 100,000 cadres and 100,000 ballots in the bargain. The actual number of ballots lost if this second group did vote for the Communists would actually be much greater than 100,000 because they would naturally pull many others along with them.

Employment of ralliers means to exploit their ready capabilities, ready because they have been trained and they have experience. To employ them also means to have them on our side.

Some Province Chiefs are still timid about using ralliers. We must accept the risks in order to obtain better results. Returnees can be used in one of two ways:

a. In Armed Propaganda Companies or Platoons to utilize their propaganda skills.

b. In Mobile Popular Force units. Returnees are placed in units for control of a unit is easier than control of scattered individuals.

In summary, we must have the courage to employ ralliers in order that many advantages accrue to the government in its operations. We must accept the risk involved if they have not truthfully returned to us.

VII. OBJECTIVE 6. Refugees.

The problem of refugees varies between different Corps.

In both I and II Corps we have too many refugees with too little land. In IV Corps the number of refugees living outside camps is too high.

We must help refugees wherever they are. Refugees temporarily resettled, but living outside camps are not provided for in the regulations governing refugees. If,

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

however, they have been duly entered on the refugee rolls and the local government has promised them assistance, then we must fulfill the promise. Effective from the day that the decision to not give assistance to refugees living outside camps is distributed to the field, assistance to any additional people outside of camps will be discontinued. The local government continues to assist the refugees who return to their native hamlets. This class of people, although not in camps, will receive this assistance as a means of rebuilding their homes and continuing a normal life in their home villages.

VIII. OBJECTIVE 7. Information and Propaganda.

Information is the direct responsibility of the Province Chief and cannot be delegated to the Information cadres. The Provincial Chief of Information is a staff officer to the Province Chief.

Information cadres must be present in full, authorized strength in the villages and hamlets. These cadres will be assigned by the Information Ministry to the limit of its capability, after which Province Chiefs and Provincial Chiefs of Information shall have authority to recruit local cadres according to standards established by the Information Ministry. If this still does not satisfy the requirements, RD cadres can be employed and may receive one-fourth or one-half of the salary for an Information cadre in addition to his regular RD cadre salary as specified above.

Information activity is political activity, but national in character as opposed to partisan politics. Our information program must smash the Communists' distorted arguments and spread nationalist policy far and wide. It must guide the people and help them to understand what the government is doing so that they will respond to those programs which benefit the people.

Therefore, the Province Chiefs must plan and direct the Information program so that it is appropriate to the local situation and characteristics.

IX. OBJECTIVE 8. Rural Economic Development.

The Land Reform Program is a sharp weapon which must be employed to the maximum in defeating the Communists in the rural countryside.

The Communists admit that they are being defeated in the rural areas as the people receive land, loans to buy fertilizer, tractors, water pumps, in short, as their incomes and standard of living increase. From poor peasants the people rise to middle class farmers and escape the Communist stranglehold. From the Communist viewpoint the people have fallen into decadence, which means that they can no longer

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

be exploited to carry out their strategy of "taking the countryside to encircle the cities." Threats, kidnappings, and murder have ceased to be effective weapons against the people. Over and above the assistance mentioned above, the government allots each village a million piasters for village development, a sum beyond the fiscal capability of the Communists. Add to this fact of elected local governments working effectively on the long road to building democracy and pushing the Viet Cong out of the rural areas.

The Province Chief must direct the Land Reform Program. The Provincial Chief of Land Reform and Agriculture is a staff officer to the Province Chief.

X. Urban Development.

The suburban areas adjacent to a prosperous countryside are richer sources of men and material than are the rural areas. The Viet Cong having lost the rural areas, like a fish out of water, must seek a new medium of activity. Thus they seek to infiltrate the urban areas by stealth and following very close to the people. Their objective is to convert these areas into their principal bases. The majority of people in these belt areas are poorly educated laborers, all too gullible, and an easy prey to guile. The Viet Cong take advantage of government weaknesses in such areas as poor roads, sanitation, and shortages of electricity, water, schools, etc., to incite the people to legitimate methods of struggle calculated to cause confusion in the cities and make trouble for the local government.

In order to meet this plot we must plan for and then implement an effective urban development plan.

With the Phung Hoang Plan we shall sweep the communists from both the cities and the belt areas so that they cannot initiate guerrilla warfare in the belt areas or infest the cities. As the shelling of cities continues, mines continue to explode, and assassinations and kidnapping remain the rule, the people maintain apathy and skepticism towards their government as its prestige is undermined. Don't forget that presently the Communists consider the city as the front line and the rural area as the home front.

In order to counter the above we must both occupy and develop the countryside and also actively develop the belt areas, raising C category areas up to an A rating.

CONCLUSION:

In order to extend security to 90 percent of the people, that is get 90 percent living in ABC hamlets and 50 percent in AB hamlets, we must properly implement the following standards:

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- Effective Security

- Effective Administration

- Effective Maintenance of Order

As the national pacification and development policy may well decide the future of this land it is vital that it succeed. Of these factors essential for success, the most vital is military support. Presently, the large scale military warfare is giving way to territorial warfare. If we do not rapidly consolidate our own infrastructure, our own outposts, roads, bridges, etc., the situation may well revert to that of 1958 even though big scale warfare has ceased.

All Ministries, the RVN Armed Forces from JGS, CTZ, down to DTA, must directly assist and support the provincial governments to insure the complete success of the 1969 Special Pacification and Development Plan.

Saigon, 9 August 1969
Gen. Tran Thien Khiem
Deputy Prime Minister
Concurrently responsible for P&D
s/s

Distribution:
- Prefectures
- Province Chiefs
- Mayors
- Chairmen of P&D Councils

- Corps Commanders concurrently Chairmen of the Corps P&D Councils

"For Implementation"

- Members of the CPDC

"For Information:

- Office of the President
- Office of the Prime Minister
- Office of the Deputy Prime Minister

"Respectfully Informed"

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER
Management Support Directorate, CORDS
APO 96243
12 September 1969

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Distribution	Number of Copies
JCS	10
CINCPAC	5
Department of State	3
OSD/ISA VN Desk	1
OCSA DEPTAR	5
USA JFK CEN SPWAR	5
American Embassy, Saigon	10
JUSPAO	4
USAID	8
VN Trn Center, FSI, Dept of State, Wash DC	5
COMUSMACV	1
Dep to COMUSMACV	1
Dep to COMUSMACV CORDS	5
Chief of Staff	1
SJS	1
J-1	1
J-2	1
J-3	8
J-4	1
J-5	1
J-6	1
CORDS	45
COC	6
AG	1
MACOI	1
MACPD	1
MACT	1
MACDC	1
MACFWMA	10
MACMA	18
MAC SOG	1
MACIG	1
MACSA	1
CG, USARV	34
Commander, 7th AF	3
COMNAVFORV	3
*CG, III MAF/SA I CORPS	65
*CG, I FFORCEV/SA II CORPS	65
*CG, II FFORCEV/SA III CORPS	71
CG, XXIV CORPS	3
*CG, DMAC	67
White House	3
CIA, Wash DC	3
AID, Wash DC	15
USIA, Wash DC	3
Civil Affairs School, Ft. Gordon	5

* For distribution to PSA's.

CONFIDENTIAL

002765

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

Gen DePuy
This was
o/lst
Gen Wellw complete
35776

SECTIONS 1 2 AND 3

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

E298 KLJCS879/10
3106XD139
OO RUEPJS
DE RUMSOMU7085 2830000
ZNY SSSSS
DE RUMSMA 1543K 2831215
ZNY SSSSS
O 101127Z OCT 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG I FFORCEV
ZEN/CG I FFORCEV
ZENK/SA IV CORPS
ZEN/COMNAVFORV
RUMSBJ/CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE
BT

IMMEDIATE

NOFORN

010 16 314
Packet of cable
7 sections.

This document contains information effecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

EEAAAAAS E C R E T NOFORN 33294. FOR ADM SHARP
INFO GEN JOHNSON, LTG MOMYER, LTG CUSHMAN, LTG WEYAND, LTG ROSSON, RADM VETH AND BG DESOBRY FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND. SEC I OF VII.
SUBJ MONTHLY ASSESSMENT (U)
1. (U) A. THIS IS MY ASEESSMENT FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER AND THE THIRD OF A SERIES ON THE SITUATION HERE INVIETNAM.
B. THE FIRST WEEK OF LAST MONTH WAS MARKED BY ENEMY TERRORIST, ROCKET, AND MORTAR ATTACKS DESIGNED TO INTIMIDATE THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN ORDER TO DISRUPTE THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS. A DETERMINED PEOPLE ANSWERED THATT CHALLENGE UNMISTAKABLY.
C. AGAIN THE ENEMY HAS BEEN DEFEATED IN HIS EFFORTS TO GAIN A MAJOR VICTORY. OUR COMBINED FORCES ARE HOLDING THE LINE IN SOME OF THE BITTEREST FIGHTING OF THIS CONFLICT ALONG THE DMZ, AND AREA SEEKING TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE AND DESTROY THE ENEMY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.
D. IN ORDER TO GAIN AND HOLD THE PEOPLE WE MUST BE ABLE TO AFFORD THEM STABILITY AND PROTECTION. IT IS IN THEEAREA OF PACIFICATION AND IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S CIVIL AND MILITARY LEADERS THAT TWE MUST PROGRESS.

INFO..CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS1 J1-2 J3-8 J4-3 J5-2 SACSA-3
SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASDPA-1 ASD/SA-3 WH-4 STATE-1 DIA-15
CSA-1 ONO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE1 (75) NO/LE

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

1 of 2
Sections I-III

C 71-8363

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

(I CTZ)
2. (S) DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IN I CTZ WERE TO DENY ENTRY OF NNA/VC UNITS INTO THE ZONE, DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, MINIMIZE DISRUPTION OF THE NNTIONAL ELECTIONS, DENY ENEMY ACCESS TO AREAS FROM WHIC VITAL INSTALLATION COULD BE SUBJECTED TO ROCKET, ARTILLERY, AND MORTAR FIRE, AND TO PROVIDE SECURITYDOR THE STRONG POINTTOBSTACLE SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION.
3. (S) A. III MAF FORCES CONDUCTED TWELV BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER OPERATIONS DURING SEPTEMBER. HESE OPERATIONS ACCOUNTED FOR 1,707 ENEMY KILLED, 29 DETAINEES, AND 264 WEAPONS CAPTURED, WHILE FORCES OF III MAF SUFFERED 391 KILLED AND HAD 2,813 WOUNDED. SPECIAL LANDING FORCES CONDUCTED FOUR OPERATIONS IN QUANG TIR AND QUANG TIM PROVINCES. THESE OPERATIONS SUCCESSFULLY PREVENTED THE ENEMY FROM ACCOMPLISHING THREE MAJOR OBJECTIVES LAST MONTH; THE LARGE SCALE ASSAULT ON CONTHIEN, DISRUPTION OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS, AND THE EXTENSIVE PROCUREMENT OK FOOD BY THE 2D NVA DIVISION.
B. KINGFISHER FORCES CONTINUED TO DEVELOQ THE COMUSMACV-APPROVED III MAF ALTERNATE PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF DYE MARKER. CONSTRUCTION HAS PROCEEDED WITH BUNKER, MINEFIELD, AND WIRE CONSTRUCTION TAKING PLACE. ALL ONSTRUCTION HAS BEEN SLOWED BY RAIN AND ENEMY ACTIVITY.PROGRESS ON ROUTE 561 IS NEGLIGIBLE DQE TOO HIGH WATER.
C. DURING SEPTEMBER, 85 ARC LIGHT STRIKES WERE CONDUCTED IN SUPPORT OK I CTZ; 78 WERE AGAINST TARGETS IN THE DMZ AREA. THIS INCREASE INHARC LIGHT TRIKEY WAY NECESSARY TO COUNTEG THE BUILD-UP OF ENEMY ARTILLERY IN AND NOTRTH OK THE DMZ. THA A SHAU VALLEY ROAD WAS RENDERED IMPASSABLE BY AIG STRIKES.
4. (C)A. LAST MONTH COMMENCED WITH MOST AGVN UNITS COMMITTED TO CLOSE-IN SECURITY FOR VOTING PLACES. ARVN, IN CONJUNCTION WITH FREE WORLD FORCES, WERE SUCCESSFUL IN ACCOMPLISHING THE SECURITY MISSION, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NUMEROUS INCIDENTS OF THE VC BLOCKADING SECONDARY ROADS AND TRAILS TO POLLING PLACES AND A FEW INCIDENTS OF HARASSING FIRE ON SLOTED POLLING LOCATIONS. I CORPE CONDUCTED 34 LARGE SCALE OGERATIONS DURINGGSEPTEMBER AS COMPARED TO 47 IN AUGUST, BUT THESE OPERATIONS AND THE SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS RESULTED IN A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN ENEMY CASUALTIES (1,331 KILLED, 128 DETAINEES, AND 317 WEAPONS CAPTURED).

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

B. THE ENEMY HAS GENERALLY BEEN ABLE TO AVOID LARGE UNIT CONTACT WITH ARVN UNITS EXCEPT ON TERRAIN OF THEIR CHO SING. ARV
UNITS HAVE DEMONSTRATED AGAIN THAT THEY CAN BE SUCCESSFUL IN COMBAT AGAINST THE VC. ARVN AND RF/PF FORCES INFLICTED HEAVY CASUALTIES ON ENEMY FORCES CONDUCTING ATTACKS ON COMPOUNDS AND INSTALLATIONS. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, SEVERAL INSTANCES WHERE THE ENEMY SUCCEDDED IN OVERRUNNING ARVN POSTIONS.
C. LEADERSHIP REMAINS THE OOST IMPORTANT AREA REQUIREING IMPROVEMENT. ARVN MORALE REMAINS GOOD;; #923;34, HE DESERTION RATE FOR SEPTEMBER INCREASED, REVERSING TTE AUGUST TREND.
5. (S) A. INTERDICTION AND HARASSMENT DECLINED APPRECIABLY FROM AUGUST. NINE CULVERTS AND 15 BRIDGES WERE DAMAGED OR DESTROYED. REPAIRS OF THE SONG CAU LAU AND NAM O BRIDGES PROGRESSED WITH MINIMAL DIFFICULIES. 1,026 FEET OF NEW BRIDGING AND 1,280 FEET OF BRIDGE REPAIRS WERE MADE. ODERATE PROGRESS CONTINUED ON UPGRADING ROUTE 1. EFFORTS WERE NTENSIFIED TO UPGRADE ROUTE 561 TO ALL WEATHER CLASS 60 FROM ROUTE 9 TO CONNTHEN. WE HAD 26 INCHESOF RAIN IN THIS AREA IN SEPTEMBER.
B. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND SEALIFT ASSESTS REMAINED GENERALLY ADEQUATE DURING THE MONTH. MOWEVER, A BACKLOG OF CARGO FOR NORTHERN I CORPS PORTS HAS DEVLOPED A DEFINITE UPWARD TREND WHICH IS EXVECTED TO CONTINUE THROUGHOUT THE MONSOON SEASON. ADDITIONAL LCU/YFU CRAFT HAVE BEEN REQUESTED.
CGM DYE MARKER MATERCALS HAVE BEEN STOCKPILED BBTH AT DONG HA AND DANANG IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONSTRUCTION FORCES. FREQUENT INTDRRUPTIONS AS A RESULT OF ENEMY ACTIVITY AND EARLY SEASONAL RAINS CREATED A LOSS IN CONSTRUCTION TIME THAT WILL BE MOST DIFFICULT TO COMPENSATE FOR IN VIEW OF THE IMPENDING MONSOON.
6. (S) A. AS IN AUGUST, THE ELECTIONS DOMINATED I CTZ. 787,400 VOTERS, OR 86.3 PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS, CAST BALLOTS ON 3 SEPTEMBER. THE THIEU/KY SLATE RECEIVED THE LARGEST NUMBER OF VOTES (191,405) WITHTHE BUDDHIST BACKED SUU-DAN LIST A CLOSE SECOND (172,667). THE BUDDHISTS SHOWED THEIR STRENGTH IN THE SENATE RACES, WHERE ALL SIX OF THE SLATES THEY SUPPORTED WON.

35776

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

B. PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION DURING SEPTEMBER WAS SLOW (PARTICULARLY IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES) BECAUSE OF THE ELECTIONS, LAGGING GVN INTEREST, THE ONSET OF THE MONSOON, AND SECURITY PROBLEMS IN SOME AREAS. QUANG NGAI'S EFFFORTS SUFFERED A MAJOR SETBACK WHEN THE VC OCCUPIED EASTERN TU NGHAI, THE MOST IMPORTANT RD CAMPAIGN AREA, FOR TEN DAYS FOLLOWING AN ATTACK UPON THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL. IT PROBABLY WILL TAKE SEVERAL MONTHS TO RECOVER FROM THIS SETBACK. QUANG TIN SHOWED A SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT IN MORALE BECAUSE OF THE SUCCESSFUL DENFENSE AGAINST AN ENEMY ATTACK ON TAM KY ON 6 SEPTEMBER. IN QUANG TRI, THE GOOD ELECTION TURNOUT AND RECENT MILITARY SUCCESSES HAVE HELPED THE GVN'S IMAGE. RD IN THUA THIEN IS PROGRESSING ON SCHEDULE. THE AGGRESSIVENESS AND INTEREST OF ARVN UNITS SUPPORTING RD IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES IS A MAJOR FACTOR AFFECTING THIS PROGRESS. ALTHOUGH STILL BEHIND SCHEDULE, THE RD PROGRAM IN I CTZ CONTINUED TT SHOW PROGRESS WITH A TOTAL OF 24 NEW LIFE AND 29 CONSOLIDATED HAXLETS COMPLETED TO DATE. NINETY NEW LIFE HAXLETS AND 35 CONSOLIDATED HAMLETS ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION.
C. THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANH DECLINED STEEPLYDROM 236 IN
BT
NNNN

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

35776

SECTION 2
CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

010 16 322

C359 Y JCS895/10
OPSXB862
00 RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMU7115 2830000
ZNY SSSSS
DE RUMSMA 1544K 2831215
ZNY SSSSS
O 101127Z OCT 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG I FFORCEV
ZEN/CG II FFORCEV
ZEN/SA IV CORPS
ZEN/COMNAVFORV
RUMSBJ/CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE
BT
S E C R E T NOFORN 33294. FOR ADM SHARP
INFO GEN JOHNSON, LTG MOMZER, LTG CUSHMAN, LTG WEYAND, LTG ROSSON, RADM VETH AND BG DESOBRY FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND. SEC II OF VII. AUGUST TO 71 IN SEPTEMBER. VC ASSASSINATIONS DECLINED FROM 198 IN AUGUST TO 122 IN SEPTEMBER, BUT THE NUMBER OF ABDUCTIONEROSE FOR THE FOURTH STRAIGHT MONTH TO 335.
D. LAST MONTH III MAF CIVIC ACTION INCLUDED DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD (338,000 POUNDS), MEDICAL AND DENTAL TREATMENTS (147,000), ASSISTANCE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCHOOLS, WELLS, DISPENSARIES AND RICE DRYING COURTS.
7. (S) A. THE ENEMY MAINTAINED MAJOR ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE DMZ WITH THE PRIMARY CONCENTRATION IN THE VICINITY OF CON THIEN-GIO LI
H.
B. THE ENEMY MADE MAXIMUM USE OF HIS HEAVY WEAPONS ALONG THE DMZ, DIRECTING OVER 7,800 ROUNDS OF MIXED ARTILLERY, ROCKET AND MORTAR FIRE AT UNITS AND INSTALLATIONS IN THAT AREA. THIS IS THE LARGEST NUMBER OF ROUNDS RECEIVED DURING A MONTHLY PERIOD SINCE THE ENEMY'S INTRODUCTION OF ARTILLERY LAST MARCH, AND IS MORE THAN DOUBLE THE VOLUME RECEIVED DURING AUGUST. THE PRINCIPAL TARGET AND CENTER FOR ENEMY GROUND ACTIVITY DURING SEPTEMBER WAS

SECRET

INCLUDED IN IDA
C-71-8363

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CON THIEN. A COMBINATION OF HEAVY AIR, ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE WITH AN ACTIVE DEFENSE AND ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS DISSUADED THE ENEMY FROM MOUNTING A MAJOR ATTACK.
C. ELSEWHERE IN I CTZ DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF SEPTEMBER, THE ENEMY ATTACKED THE FLC INSTALLATION AT RED BEACH (DANANG) AND THE DANANG AIRBASE WITH 122MM AND 140MM ROCKETS. QUANG TIN PROVINCE WAS THE SCENE OF MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS. OPERATION SWIFT EXACTED A HEAVY TOLL OF CASUALTIES ON ELEMENTS OF THE 2D NVA DIVISION IN QUE SON VALLEY, AND ARVN FORCES DECISIVELYREPULSED A COORDINATED ATTACK ON INSTALLATIONS IN AND NEAR TAM KY CITY. FOLLOWING THESE ENGAGEMENTS, THE TEMPO OF ENEMY ACTIVITY DROPPED OFF SHARPLY.
D. INTELLIGENCE
DICATES THAT THE ENEMY IS DEVOTING A MAXIMUM EFFORT TOWARD THE RESUPPLY AND REORGANIZATION OF HIS FORCES PRIOR TO THE MONSOON SEASON. AN INDICATION OF THE ENEMY REQUIREMENT FOR FOOD IS THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE 2D NVA DIVISION IN EASTERN QUANG TIN PROVINCE, OSTENSIBLY TO GATHER RICE FROM THE HARVEST WHICH STARTED IN LATE SEPTEMBER. INTERROGATION OF RETURNEES AND PRISONERS CONTINUES TO POINT UP ENEMY SHORTAGES OF FOOD, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, AND AMMUNITION. ALMOST ALL REPORTS POINT UP A HIGH INCIDENCE OF MALARIA AND A GENERAL LOWERING OF MORALE.
(II CTZ)
8. (C) OUR OBJECTIVES IN II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER WERE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES IN THE ZONE, DENY THE ENEMY ACCESS TO SOUTH VIETNAM THROUGH II CTZ, MINIMIZE DISRUPTION OF THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS, AND LROTECT THE PEOPLE.
9. (C) A. TWO EVENTS OCRUPIED CENTER STAGE, THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND THE NVA PRESSURE ON TUY HOA. DESPITE A WIDESPREAD AND VICIOUS ANTI-ELECTION CAMPAIGN BY THE VC DESIGNED TO DESTROY THE FREE EXPRESSIONOF THE PEOPLE, 91 PERCENT OF THOSE ELIGIBLE IN II CTZ RISKED DEATHOR INJURY TO VOTE ON 3 SEPTEMBER. THE COMMUNISTS WERE THUS COMPLETELY FRUSTRATED IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO USE THE ELECTION TO PROVE THAT THE PEOPLE OFSVN WERE APATHETIC OR HOSTILE TOWARD THEIR GOVERNMENT. NEAR TUY HOA, THE NVA MOVED INTO OUTLYING HAMLETS AND DUG IN WITH THE APPARENT INTENTION TO STAND AND FIGHT. SIMUL-

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

TANEOUSLY, MORE FORCES FILTERED DOWN FROM THE OOUNTAINS TO EXERT DIRECT PRESSURE FROM THE WEST ON ARVN POSITIONS GUARDING THE APPROACHES TO THE TUY HOA COMPLEX. WE BELIEVE T AT THE ENEMY IS MOTIVATED BY HIS APPETITE FOR THE APPROACHING RICE HARVEST AND BY HIS STRONG DESIRE TO DISRUPT THE INCREASINGLY SUCCESSFUL RD EFFORT THERE. ROK AND ARVN FORCES ACCEPTED THE CHALLENGE AND FOUGHT WELL, PUNISHING THE ENEMY SEVERELY. MEANWHILE, THREE US BATTALIONS POUNCED ON THE MOUNTAIN REDOUBTS FROM WHICH THE NVA HAD COME AND BEGAN A SQUEEZE ON THE CENTER.

B. II CORPS INITIATED A PROGRAM TO PROVIDE AN EAGLE FLIGHT OF TWO GUNSHIPS AND FIVE TROOP SHIPS TO THE PHU BON PROVINCE CHIEF FOR A 30-DAY TRIAL PERIOD. THESE AIRCRAFT WERE PLACED ON GROUND ALERT IN CHEO REO WITH THE 752D RF COMPANY TO PROVIDE AN IMMEDIATE REACTION CAPABILITY. THIS PROGRAM HAS BEEN EO SUCCESSFUL THAT EXPANSION TO OTHER HIGHLAND PROVINCES IS ANTICIPATED.

10. (C) A. THE 22D AND 23D ARVN DIVISIONS AND THE 24TH STZ CONTINUED NORMAL OPERATIONS DURING SEPTEMBER CONSISTING OF SEARCH AND DESDESTROY AND SECURITY OPERATIONS AND CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. IN ADDITION, OPERATIONS WERE INITIATED IN PNU YEN AS MENTIONED EARLIER. NUMEROUS CONTACTS WERE MADE BY ELEMENTS OF THE 47TH ARVN REGIMENT WITH ENEMY FORCES IN THIS AREA. ON 17 SEPTEMBER, AFTER CONDUCTING AN AIR ASSAULT TO A LOCATION 12 KM SOUTHWEST OF TUY HOA, THE 3D AND 4H BATTALIONS OF THE 47TH REGIMENT M DE CONTACT WITH AN ESTIMATED ENEMY BATTALION. IN THIS CONTACT ONE ARVN BATTALION COMMANDER WAS KILLED AND ANOTHER BATTALION COMMANDER WOUNDED WHILE 11 MEN WERE KILLED AND 59 WOUNDED. THE US ADVISOR ESTIMATED THAT 35 TO 40 ENEMY WERE KILLED. (30 BOYD COUNT OFFICIALLY REPORTED).

SINCE 19 SEPTEMBER THE TWO ARVN BATTALIONS HAVE PARTICIPATED IN OPERATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH OPERATION BOLLING IN THE TUY HOA BASIN.

B. DURING SEPTEMBER, ARVN UNITS CONDUCTED NINE BATTALION AND 13 MULTI-BATTALION OPERATIONS. SIXTEEN WERE SEARCH AND DESTROY AND SIX WERE ROAD CLEARING OR SECURITY MISSIONS. THESE OPERATIONS RESULTED IN 485 ENEMY KILLED, 143 DETAINEES, AND 164 WEAPONS CAPTURED. FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE 241 KILLED, 584 WOUNDED AND 31 MISSING (ARVN).

C. THERE IS A NOTICEABLE, THOUGH GRADUAL, INCREASE IN THE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

AGGRESSIVENESS OF ARVN FORCES, ESPECIALLY WHERE OPERATING DIRECTLY WITH MAJOR FWMAF UNITS OR WHERE THERE IS A MAJOR FWMAF REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY SUCH AS IN BINH THUAN. WE ARE STRESENG COMBINED OPERATIONS OF THIS TYPE.

D. FREE WORLD FORCES CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE ARENA IN WHICH THE VITAL WORK OF NATION BUILDING MAY PROCEED. ALL OF OUR FORCES INITIALLY WERE PREOCCUPIED WITH PROVIDING AN OUTER SHIELD FOR THE ELECTIONS. IN A SERIES OF OPERATIONS AFTER THE ELECTIONS, BEGINNING WITH SEVERAL SHARP ROK/NVA ENGAGEMENTS AND CONTINUING WITH OPERATIONS BOLLING AND DO KAY BEE 3, COMBINED FORCES THIS MONTH CHALLENGED THE STRONG NVA THREAT TO PHU YEN. BY MID-MONTH A THREE NATION, MULTI-BATTALION ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED IN THE AREA WEST OF TUY HOA. ONE BATTALION OF THE 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE CONDUCTED SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN THE HILLS TO THE WEST WHILE THE OTHER BATTALION FROM THE 173D AND ONE BATTALION FROM THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVI-

BT
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SEC 30F 35776
CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

010 17 482

Q
A328 °:922/10
SXA756
00 RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMU7240 2830000
ZNY SSSSS
DE RUMSMA 1545K 2831215
ZNY SSSSS
O 101127Z OCT 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG I FFORCEV
ZEN/CG II FFORCEV
ZENAYK
YFES
MOZCCYX
GRFKZRBCHSYFS JOJGUISKFZCZQ
JRZNAIR FORCE
BT
S E C R E T NOFORN 33294. FOR ADM SHARP
INFO GEN JOHNSON, LTG MOMYER, LTG CUSHMAN, LTG WEYAND, LTG ROSSON,
RADM VETH AND BG DESOBRY FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND. SEC III OF VII
SION (AM) STRUCK SOUTH AND EAST, POUNDING THE ANVIL PROVIDED BY THE
3D AND 4TH BATTALIONS, 47TH ARVN REGIMENT, ANCHORED IN THE VALLEY
EANWHILE, WOUTH OF THE SONG BA/DAI GIANG RIVER, THE 28TH ROK REGT-
MENT WITH THREE RF COMPANIES ASSISTING CONDUCTED SUCCESSFUL SEARCH
OPERATIONS IN THE HAXLETS, FLUSHING OUT NUMEROUS ENEMY WHO HAD BEEN
EYING THE RICH RICE HARVESTS THERE. THE RESULTS OF THE SEPTEMBER
OPERATIONS WEST OF TUY HOA WERE 370 ENEMY KILLED, 43 DETAINEES, AND
97 WEAPONS CAPTURED. FRIENDLY FORCES LOST 75 KILLED AND 192
WOUNDED.
E. ELSEWHERE IN II CTZ THE ENEMY CONTINUED TO ELECT TO
BREAK INTO SMALL SROUPS WHENEVER THREATENED AND TO MELT AWAY WHEREVER
POSSIBLE. OPERATIONS SUCH AS JOIN HANDS IN THE CAY GIEP MOUNTAINS
DURING THE PERIOD 6-15 SEPTEMBER, ANOTHER JOINT-COMBINED OPERATION

INCLUDED IN IDA
LOG # C-71-8363

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONSISTING OF VN MARINE, ARVN, AND US FORCES SUPPORTED BY THE USAF AND USN, FOUND NO MAJOR FORMATIONS WILLING TO STAND AND FIGHT. NEVERTHELESS, SIGNIFICANT GAINS WERE REGISTERED THROUGHOUT II CTZ FROM THE RELENTLESS PURSUIT AND DESTRUCTION OF SMALL ENEMY GROUPS AND PERSISTENT, CAREFULLY PLANNED LOCAL CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS. THESE AND OTHER OPERATIONS IN SEPTEMBER RESULTED IN A HIGHLY FAVORABLE BALANCE REPRESENTING MODEST, BUT MEASURABLE, PROGRESS.

11. (C) HIGHWAY 11 FROM PHAN RANG TO DALAT AND HIGHWAY 20 FROM DALAT TO THE II/III CTZ BOUNDARY HAVE BEEN GREEN SINCE THE FIRST OF SEPTEMBER, AN INCREASE OF 226 KM OF GREEN ROAD IN II CTZ. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO NETT CHANGE THIS MONTH IN USABLE RAILROAD, THREE VNRS WORK PARTIES INITIATED RESTORATION WORK ON TWO SECTIONS OF RAILROAD TO BE COMPLETED BY MAY 1968, WHICH WILL OPEN THE RAILROAD FROM PHAN RANG TO BONG SON. ON 16 SEPTEMBER, THE 2/1 CAV ASSUMED FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF 87 KM OF HIGHWAYS 14 AND 19 FROM KONTUM CITY TO THE VICINITY OF MANG YANG PASS.

12. (S) A. OUR MODEST BUT STEADY MILITARY PROGRESS MUST BE BALANCED AGAINST A GENERAL SLUMP IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE AND PACIFICATION PROGRAM. THERE APPEARS TO BE A POST-ELECTION "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE AMONG THE PROVINCE OFFICIALS. THE THREATENED "CLEAN-UP" OF ARVN AND CORRUPT OFFICIALS WILL CAUSE THIS GENERAL ATTITUDE TO PERSIST. HOPEFULLY, AFTER THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEWLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON, THE PROVINCE CHIEFS WILL AGAIN CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORST ON THE EXECUTION OF GVN PROGRAMS.

B. THE RD EFFORT SUFFERED ASSERIOUS SETBACK IN PHU YEN PROVINCE AS A RESULT OF VC/NVA ATTACKS ON HAMLETS WHICH WERE PROGRESSING WELL. NONE HAXLETS WERE HEAVILY DAMAGED AND THE SECURITY SITUATION HAS DETERIOATED TO THE EXTENT THAT NUMEROUS RD TEAMS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO COMPLETE THEIR TASKS EFFECTIVELY. AS A RESULT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS IN PHU YEN 3,704 HOMES WERE DESTROYED, LEAVING APPROXIMATELY 20,000 PEOPLE HOMELESS IN TUY AN, TUY HOA AND HIEU XUONG DISTRICTS. AT THEIR OWN REQUEST, THEY ARE BEING RETURNED TO THEIR HOMESITES. CORDS IS PROVIDING FOOD STUFFS AND BUILDING MATERIALS FOR NEEDED REPAIRS AND NEW CONSTRUCTION, AND THE JOB OF REBUILDING IS UNDERWAY. TWENTY-ONE HAMLETS WERE BROUGHT UNDER GVN CONTROL IN SEPTEMBER FOR A NEW TOTAL OF 1,221. AN ADDITIONAL 366 HAMLETS ARE BEING SECURED.

C. COMBATING THE INFRASTRUCTURE CONTINUES TO PROGRESS AS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROCEDURES IMPROVE AND THE TECHNIQUES OF CORDON AND SEARCH UTILIZING POLICE FIELD FORCES ARE APPLIED. WE ARE ENCOUNTERING SOME PROBLEMS, HOWEVER, WITH INCOMPETENT PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS.

D. THE STRENGTH OF RF/PF UNITS IS NOW AT 80 PERCENT BUT THEIR PERFORMANCE IS SPOTTY. TO IMPROVE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS, I FFORCEV HAS IMPLEMENTED A TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM BY US UNITS TO IMPROVE RF/PF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND TO ENHANCE THEIR LEADERSHIP CAPABILITIES AT SQUAD, PLATOON, AND COMPANY LEVELS. COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN OCTOBER. ON 1 SEPTEMBER AN INCREASE FOR CY 68 OF 17 RF COMPANIES AND 30 PF PLATOONS WAS AUTHORIZED, BRINGING THE TOTAL AUZHORIZATION TO 253 RF COMPANIES AND 1,100 PF PLATOONS. IN ORDER TO EXPAND AND SUPPORT THE PACIFICATION EFFORT 1968, THE CG, II CORPS HAS EXPRESSED A NEED FOR THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL FORCES; FIVE ARVN INFANTRY BATTALIONS, ONE ARVN RANGER BATTALION, TWO ARVN ARTILLERY BATTALIONS, 56 RF COMPANIES, AND 88 PF PLATOONS.

3. CIVIC ACTION CONTINUES TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART IN THE PACIFICATION EFFORT. IT WAS A PLEASURE TO NOTE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IN MID-SEPTEMBER AN ARVN ENGINEER BATTALION IN CAM RANH BUILT A BRIDGE FOR THE PEOPLE IN DING LAC VALLEY WITH SUPPLIES PROCURED WITH THE HELP OF CORDS AND THE US ADVISOR. A SKI JUMP TYPE SPILLWAY WAS OPENED ON 9 SEPTEMBER IN NINH THUAN PROVINCE AT THE DA NHIM HYDROELECTRIC PLANT. THIS SPILLWAY WILL PERMIT IRRIGATION OF 10,000 ADDITIONAL HECTARES DURING THE DRY SEASON. IN LAM DONG THE HIGHLAND TEA CO-OPERATIVE CONTINUES TO DELIVER TO SAIGON AND ARVN ON THEIR 410-TON CONTRACT. A NEW TEA FACTORY IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION WHICH, WHEN COMPLETED, WILL BE A BOON TO THE ECONOMY OF THIS AREA.

13. (C) A. THE ENEMY IS CONSIDERED TO HAVE LOW MORALE NOT FROM FOOD SHORTAGES BUT FROM HEAVY LOSSES SUSTAINED IN RECENT MONTHS IN ENGAGEMENTS WITH ARVN, ROK, AND US FORCES. IN PHU YEN, ENEMY MORALE HAS BEEN BETTER DUE TO LIMITED OFFENSIVE SUCCESS. IN BINH DINH, HOWEVER, BOTH THE 18TH NVA REGIMENT AND THE LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE HAE SUFFERED LOSSES AT THE HANDS OF ARVN, ROK, AND US FORCES.

B. THE ENEMY'S MOST IMPORTANT ECONOMIC OBJECTIVE FOR SEPTEMBER WAS TO SEIZE A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE RICE HARVESZ FROM THE SOUTHERN AND COASTAL PROVINCES IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN HIMSELF DURING THE REMAINDER OF 1967 AND EARLY 1968. SHOULD HE FAIL, INCREASING

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

NUMBERS OF ENEMY CAN BE EXPECTED TO RETURN TO GVN CONTROL THROUGH THE CHIEU HOA PROGRAM. IN SO E AREAS THE ENEMY IS ATTEMPTING TO GROW HIS OWN RICE, WORKING INCREASINGLY AT NIGHT TO AVOID AERIAL OBSERVATION. A TREND TO LEVY TAXES IN KIND HAS BEEN NOTICED THROUGHOUT THE AREA DUE TO THE CURRENT FOOD SHORTAGE. THE ENEMY IS MAKING CONTINUING EFFORTS TO CAUSE INFLATION IN GVN POPULAZION CENTERS BY INTERDICTING LOC WITH TAATION POINTS AND BY SABOTAGE OF ROADWAYS AND BRIDGES. THIS EFFORT HAS BEEN GENERALLY UNSUCCESSFUL.
C. THE B-3 FRONT CONTINUED ACTIVE RECONNAISSANCE FORM THE CHU PONG MOUNTATINS TO THE MIDDLE OF PLEI TRAP VALLEY. NO MAJOR GROUND CONTACT BETWEEN ENEMY AND FRIENDLY FORCES HAS OCCURRED SINCE EARLY AUGUST. THE 174TH NVA REGIMENT HAS APPARENTLY WITHDRAWN ACROSS THE BORDER INTO LAOS AND NOW PRESENTS LESS OF A THREAT TO THE CIDG CAMPS IN KONTUM PROVINCE. IN PLEIKU PROVINCE, THE ENEMY HAS CONTINUED TO PREPARE THE BATTLEFIELD IN THE LOWER PLEI TRAP VALLEY. A CONTINUING THREAT IS PRESENTED TO THE CIDG CAMPS AT DUC CO, PLEI DJERENG, AND PLEI MRONG. THE B-3 FRONT IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE A
BT
NNNN

ADV CJCS/ACJCS(GEN GOHNSON)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

10 OCT 67 23 53

SEC 4 AND 5 OF
3 5 7 7 6

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

VV MACV0114
//////W ISE E N O T E ////////
FM CWO COMUSMACV
TO CWO CINCPAC
BT
H/W SEC IV OF SUBJ MSG PER UR REQUEST
OO RUHHHQA RUEPJS RUMSBJ
DE RUMSMA 1546K 2831215
ZNY SSSSS
O 101127Z OCT 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG I FFORCEV
ZEN/CG II FFORCEV
ZEN/SA IV CORPS
ZEN/COMNAVFORV
RUMSBJ/CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE
BT

IMMEDIATE

NOFORN

011 01 23Z

INFO: CJCS-6 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-2 J3-8 J4-3 J5-2
SACSA-3 NMCC/QDO-1 SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9
ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 DIA-15 WHOUSE-4 STATE-1
CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1
(81)JHA/RAD/

S E C R E T NOFORN 33294. FOR ADM SHARP
INFO GEN JOHNSON, LTG MOMYER, LTG CUSHMAN, LTG WEYAND, LTG ROSSON,
RADM VETH AND BG DESOBRY FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND. SEC IV OF VII.
STRENGTH OF SOME EIGHT MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN THE KONTUM AREA AND 12
BATTALIONS NEAR PLEIKU IN VARIOUS STATES OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.
THE OVER ALL ENEMEY GOAL IN THE HIGHLANDS IS TO CAUSE WIDE DEPLOYMENTS
OF FWMAF AND ARVN UNITS AND TO INFLICT UNACCEPTABLY HEAVY CASUALTIES
UPON THEM. IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES, ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING EARLY
SEPTEMBER WAS DIRECTED TOWARD DISRUPTION OF THE GVN ELECTIONS BY

See IV

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 1546K S E C R E T NOFORN
EMPLOYING PROCPAGANDA, TERRORISM, INTIMIDATION AND SMALL UNIT ATTACKS
ON HAMLETS AND VILLAGES. HVING FAILED TO DISRUPT THE ELECTIONS, THE
ENEMY HAS CONFINED HIMSELF TO SMALL ATTACK ON HAMLETS, FRIENDLY
INSTALLATIONS, AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION. IN THE COASTAL REGIONS
THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY MAY BE PREPARING FOR A CONCEN-
TRATED CAMPAIGN DURING THE MONSOON TO REGAIN CONTROL OF BINH DINH
PROVINCE.
D. AT THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER, THE ENEMY TRIED TO
CREATE A CLIMATE FOR FEAR TO DETER THE PROPLE FROM VOTING. TO THEIR
EMBARRASSMENT THE CAMPAIGN TO DUCRUUPT THE ELECTIONS BACKFIRED; THE
ENEMY FOUND THAT INSTEAD HE HAD HARDENED VOTER RESOLVE TO EXERCISE
THEIR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS. SUBSEQUENT TO THE ELECTIONS, THE ENEMY
HUS CONCENTRATED ON REGAINING SOME OF THE CREDIBILITY HE LOST FROM
HIS FAILURE TO CARRY OUT PRE-ELECTION THREATS. THIS PERIOD HAS BEEN
CHARACTERIZED BY INCREASED ATTACKS ON US PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS
IN AREAS SUCH AS KHANH HOA PROVINCE, WHERE A VC ATTACK BY CLAYMORE
(NE ON THE NEPTUNE NCO CLUB IN NHA TRANG KILLED ONE US AFD ONE VN
NATIONAL ANS WOUNDED 45 OTHER US AND VN PERSONNEL.
(III CTZ)
14. (C) OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE DURING

INCLUDED IN IDA

SECRET

LOG # c-71-8363

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 1546K S E C R E T NOFORN
THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER WERE TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY EFFORTS TO SABOTAGE, THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND OPEN LARGE, PREVIOUSLY INACCESSIBLE AREAS TO FRIENDLY FORCES. APPROXIMATELY 80 PERCENT OF THE ELIGIBLE ELECTORATE PARTICIPATED IN THE ELECTIONS, A DRAMATIC DEFEAT FOR THE ENEMY. LARGE AREAS, PREVIOUSLY INACCESSIBLE TO FRIENDLY FORCES, ARE NOW BEING OPENED UP BY JUNGLE CLEARING AND MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE OPERATIONS. THESE OPERATIONS ARE EXPECTED TO HAVE AN INCREASING IMPACT ON THE ATTAINMENT OF OUR OBJECTIVES AS COVER, CONCEALMENT, SECURITY AND RESOURCES ARE DENIED THE ENEMY IN KEY POPULATED AREAS.
15. (C) A. FRIENDLY PROGRESS WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE ADOPTION OF TWO NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS. CONCEPT OF MASSING AVAILABLE ARMY AVIATION ASSESTS (FIVE-SEVEN ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANIEE) IN SUPPORT OF A SINGLE DIVISON FOR A ONE-HALF DAY PERIOD WAS INITIATED. THIS PERMITS THE SIMULTANEOUS TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT OF MUCH LARGER FORCES IN ORDEJ TO FIX THE ENEMY, ACHIEVE SURPRISE, AND INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF CONTAINING AND DESTROYING HIS FORCES. THE RAPID FIRE CONCEPT, ALSO INITIATED THIS MONTH, INVOLVES THE TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT OF COMBINED RECONNAISSANCE TEAAMS (THREE US AFD THREE CIDG PERSONNEL PER TEAM) TO LOCATE VC FORCES, FOLLOWED BY PLATOON-SIZED TEAMS TO CAPTURE AND FIX THE ENEMY FORCES, AND FINALLY THE COMMIT-

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 1546K S E C R E T NOFORN
MENT OF ALARGER MOBILE REACTION FORCE TO DISRUPT OR DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES. THE FIRST OF THESE OPERATIONS TERMINATED ON 21 SEPTEMBER AND RESULTED IN 38 VC KIA, SIX PW'S AND QUANNITIES OF CAPTURED WEAPONS AAD MATTRIEL.
B. TO DATE, A TOTAL OF 75,400 ACRES OF JUNGLE HAVE BEEN CLEARED(INCLUDIN 31,752 ACRES ALONG KEY HIGHWAYS AND 33,026 ACRES IN IMPORTANT VC BASE AREAS). THIS PROGRAM NEUTRALIZES VC BASE CAMPS AND CONTRIBUTES SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE LOCAL SECURITY OF POPULATED AREAS AND THE ABILITY OF THE PEOPLE TO TRAVEL IN SAFETY BETWEEN THESE AREAS.
C. THERE ARE NOW 2 OPERATIONS DISTRICT OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING CENTERS (DOICC). THESE CENTERS ASSIMILATE AND EVALUATE HARD INTELLIGENCE AND COORDINATE REACTION FORCES THAA ARE DIRECTED AGAINST THH VC INFRASTRUCTURE. IN BINH DUONG PROVINCE ON 17 SEPTEMBER THE PHU HOA DOICC, ACTING ON INTELLIGENCE, APPREHENDED 11 INFRASTRUCTURE MEMBERS AND ONE ARVN DESERTER.
16. (C) A. ON 22 SEPTEMBER THE MAIN BODY OF THE ROYAL THA
K
ARMY VOLUNTEER REGIMENT (RTAVR) COMPLETED ITS DEPLOYMENT TO BEAR CAT WHERE IS IS OPCON TO THE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION. THEARRIVAL OF THIS UNIT WILL CONTRIBUTE MATERIALLY TO BROADENING THE BASE OF FREE WORLD

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 5 RUMSMA 1546K S E C R E T NOFORN
SUPPORT.
B. THE RVNAF 533D RF COMPANY, THE SAME COMPANY WHICH ONLY LAST MONTH PREVENTED A MORTAR ATTACK AGGINST THE TAN SON NHUT AIR BASE COMPLEX, CAPTURED THREE VC OFFICERS. THESE PRISONERS REVEALED INFORMATION THAT SUBSEQUENTLY LED TO THE DISCOVERY AND CAPTURE OF TWO WEAPONS CACHES SEVEN KILOMETERS SSW OF TAN SON NHUT.
C. ON 30SEPTEMBER TWO ARVN BATTALIONS, 2/8 AND 1/8, CONDUCTED AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS INTO THE IRON TRIANGLE. CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED THREE TIMES DURING THE DAY. THIS OPERATION IS INDICATIVE OF AN INCREASE IN THE AGGRESSIVENESS AND DESIRE OF ARVN TO GET ON WITH THE JOB.
D. TWO ARVN BATTALIONS RECENTLY COMPLETED THE US/ARVN BATTALION REFRESHER TRAINING BEING CONDUCTED BY EIGHT US BRIGADES AND THE AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE. NINE ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS ARE PRESENTLY IN THE PROGRAM.
17 (C) A. THE COORDINATED AND COMBINED EFFORTS OF ENGINEER TROOPS IN III CTZ HAVE SUCCEEDED INMAINTAINING ALL MAJOR HIGHWAYS OPEN FOR BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TRAFFIC.
B. RECENT TROOP AND JUNGLE CLEARING OPERATIONS HAVE IMPROVED THE SECURITY ALONG HIGHWAY 20 IN LONG KHANH PROVINCE SO THAT IT NOW

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 1546K S E C R E T NOFORN
SUPPORTS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF PRODUCE-BEARING TRAFFIC BOUND FOR MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS. THE ABILITY TO MOVE THESE GOODS FREELY CONTRIBUTES SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE GENERAL MORALE AND WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE. ON 25 SEPTEMBER THE CAU NOI FERRY SERVICE ACROSS THE VAM CO RIIER ON ROUTE 5A WAS RSTROED. THIS PROJECT WAS A COMBINED US/GVN EFFORT THAT WILL PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT BOOST TO THE ECONOMY.
18. (C) A. THE SUCCESS O THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS DOMINATED EVENTS IN III CORPS. OTHERWISE, PACIFICATIION PRESENTED A SPOTTY PICTURE FOR THE MONTH. ON THE ONE HAND, THERE HAS BEEN A CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT IN THE OVERALL MORALE AND WELFARE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE THROUGH INCREASED ROAD SECURITY, EXPANDING EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES, HEALTH PROGRAMS AND THE PLANNED RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES. ON THE OTHER, THE MAJLET CONSTRUCTUION PROGRAM FOR III CTZ REMAINS FAR BEHIND SCHEDULE AND UNDOUBTEDLY WILL REMAIN BEHIND SCHEDULE FOR THE REST OF 1967.
B. IN OTHER AREAS OF PACIFICATION HOWEVER, PROGRESS IS MORE ENCOURAGING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM HAS RECENTLY PROVIDED EQUIPMENT FOR FOUR JUNIOR TECHNICAL HIGH SCHOOLS. OVER 60,000 TEXTBOOKS WERE DISTRIBUTED IN THE III CTZ DURING SEPTEMBER. IN BINH TUY PROVINCE, A 240-GALLON PER MINUTE WATER BT

NNNN

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

-:,965

SECTION FIVE
3 5 7 7 6

MACV Ø113
TO CINCPAC CWO
FM COMUSMACV CWO
HERE WITH IS REQUEST OF SECTION V OF F UR REQUEST

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

Ø11 Ø1 24Z

OO RUHHHQA RUEPJS RUMSBJ
DE RUMSMA 1547K 2831215
ZNY SSSSS
O 101127Z ONE 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG I FFORCEV
ZEN/CG II FFORCEV
ZEN/SA IV CORPS
ZEN/COMNAVFORV
RUMSBJ/CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE
BT
S E C R E T NOFORN 33294. FOR ADM SHARP
INFO GEN JOHNSON, LTG MONYER, LTG CUSHMAN, LTG WEYAND, LTG ROSSON, RADM VETH AND BG DESOBRY FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND. SEC V OF VII TREATMENT PLANT WAS ESTABLISHED. THIS PLANT PROVIDES POTABLE WATER TO THE TOWNS OF HAM TAN AND LA GI. THE JUNGLE CLEARING OPERATION CONDUCTED IN AN AREA ADJACENT TO ROUTE 2 PROVIDED A HOUSING AND FARMING AREA FOR THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES WHILE CONCURRENTLY DENYING THE VC A SOURCE OF TAX REVENUE AND PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS.
19. (C) A. IN OPERATIONS DURING SEPTEMBER THE ENEMY FAILED

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 1547K S E C R E T NOFORN
TO ACHIEVE A SINGLE SIGNIFICANT VICTORY. HIS APPARENT POLICY OF AVOIDING CONTACT WITH LARGE FORCES CONTINUES. ALTHOUGH TO A LESSER EXTENT THAN IN AUGUST, HE CONTINUED TO DEMONSTRATE HIS CAPABILITY TO DELIVER MORTAR FIRES ON FIXED INSTALLATIONS. ON THE 16TH AND 17TH OF SEPTEMBER RESPECTIVELY, THE DONG TAM BASE CAMP AND THE 1ST BDE CP, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, WERE ATTACKED WITH MORTAR FIRES THAT INFLICTED LIGHT CASUALTIES (ALL WIA) AND LIGHT MATERIAL DAMAGE.
B. IN SEPTEMBER THERE WAS A SHARP INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF RALLIERS IN PHUOC TUY AND BINH TUY PROVINCES AND VUNG TAU (36 IN AUGUST VERSUS 102 IN SEPTEMBER). RALLIER REPORTS FROM THESE PROVINCES INDICATE SERIOUS VC FOOD SHORTAGES AND DECLINING MORALE. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF RALLIERS, HOWEVER, DECREASSK TO 380. THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF A TREND THAT WAS NOTED LAST MONTH. THIS DECREASE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE ONSET OF THE RICE-GROWING SEASON AND A "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE FOLLOWING THE RECENT NATIONAL ELECTIONS.
C. A PARTICULARLY ILLUMINATING REPORT THAT REFLECTS ON THE GENERAL WELFARE AND MORALE OF INFILTRATING PERSONNEL RESULTED FROM THE CAPTURE OF A 17-YEAR OLD NVA SOLDIER ON 26 SEPTEMBER. THE SOLDIER HAD SPENT SIX MONTHS INFIILTRATING TO SVN. HIS GROUP ARRIVED WITH ONLY 20 PERCENT OF ITS DEPARTURE STRENGTH (100 OF AN ORIGINAL

INCLUDED IN IDA

LOG # C-71-8363

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 1547K S E C R E T NOFORN
500) AND MANY OF THESE, INCLUDING THE PRISONER, WERE SICK WITH MALARIA AND MALNURITION. THE SOLDIER SPENT THE NEXT FIVE MONTHS RECUPERATING IN A VC/NVA HOSPITAL IN SVN. DURING THE SIX DAYS THAT IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED HIS CAPTURE HIS RATIONS CONSISTED OF SIX POTATOES.
D. A RECENT REPORT (CDEC), LATER CONFIRMED BY A PW STATEMENT, REPORTS SERIOUS MORALE PROBLEMS IN THE PHU LOA BATTALION. INTELLIGENCE INDICATES WAR WEARINESS, LACK OF FOOD, SUPPLIES AND REPLACEMENTS, AND A FEAR OF DEATH.
E. VC CASUALTIES WERE DOWN 20 PERCENT FORM AUAGUST GENERALLY IN LINE WITH A LOWER VC ACTIVITY LEVEL.
(IV CTZ)
20 (C) THE OBJECTIVES IN THE IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE FOR THE LLONTH OF SEPTEMBER CONTINUED WITH EMPHASIS ON THE DESTRUCTION OF VIET CONG MAIN AND PROVINCIAL UNITS AND THEIR PRINCIPAL BASES; FURTHERANCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT EFFORT; UPGRADING THE SECURITY AND PREVENTING INTERDICTION OF THE MAJOR LINES OF COMMUNICATION; AND IMPROVING THE DEFENSES OF OUR MAJOR AIRFIELDS.
21. (C) A. PROGRESS CONTINUES IN IMPROVING THE DEFENSES OF THE AIRFIELDS AT CAN THO, BINH THUY, SOC TRANG AND VINH LONG. DAY

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 1547K S E C R E T NOFORN
AND NIGHT AERIAL OBSERVATION OF THE AREAS AND APPROACHES TO THE AIRFIELDS, THE CONDUCT OF FIREFLY MISSIONS NIGHTLY OVER THESE AREAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY REVETMENTS FOR AIRCRAFT PROTECTION CONTINUES. EACH AIRFIELD HAS ESTABLISHED A JOINT COMMAND POST WHERE ALL INTERNAL DEFENSE, AMBUSHES, PATROLS, HARASSMENT AND INTERDICTION FIRES AND REACTION OPERATIONS ARE COORDINATED AND CONTROLLED.
B. THE ENEMY SITUATION IN IV CORPS CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE SLOWLY. THE VIET CONG PROPAGANDA AND OPERATIONAL EFFORTS AGAINST THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS WERE VIRTUALLY UNSUCCESSFUL AS EVIDENCED BY A TURNOUT OF MORE THAN 85 PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS. CONTINUED GVN PRESSURE, PARTICULARLY AGAINST VIET CONG MAIN FORCE UNITS AND BASE AREAS, HAS AFFECTED THEIR ABILITY TO SIGNIFICANTLY DETER THE PACIFICATION EFFORT AND INTERDICT LINES OF COMMUNICATION. THE VIET CONG HAVE NOT HAD A MAJOR VICTORY THIS YEAR AND INTELLIGENCE SOURCES CONFIRM THAT THEY ARE EXPERIENCING MORALE PROBLEMS. WITHSAHE PRESENT US/GVN FORCE LEVEL IN IV CORPS, GAINS SHOULD CINTINUE AT A SLOW TO MODERATE PACE. THE OVERALL MORALE, COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS,AND FIGHTING SPIRIT OF IV CORPS UNITS CONTINUE TO BE GOOD.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE 5 RUMSMA 1547K S E C R E T NOFORN
22. (C) RVNAF UNITS CONDUCTED A TOTAL OF 146MAJOR UNIT OPERATIONS OF BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER, A 15 PERCENT DECREASE FROM LAST MONTH. THESE OPERATIONS WERE, HOWEVER, OF A LONGER AVERAGE DURATION. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS NUMBERED 56,864, THE HIGHEST NUMBER REPORTED TO DATE. TWENTY-NINE AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED WITH A TOTAL OF 33,970 RVNAF TROOPS BEING AIRLIFTED. CUU LONG 63, A BILATERAL US/RVNAF AIRMOBILE OPERATION DONDUCTED IN BASE AREA 470 AS PART OF CORONADOV, RESULTED IN 70 VC KIA, 52 VC CAPTURED AND 33 WEAPONS CAPTURED. THERE WERE 23 ADDITIONAL OPERATIONS PENETRATING SEVEN OTHER VC BASES AREAS RESULTING IN 118 VC KIA, 129 CAPTURED AND 55 WEAPONS CAPTURED. A 4.1 TO 1 FRIENDLY KULLED VERSUS VC KILLED RATION AND 2.5 TO 1 WEAPONS CAPTURED VERSUS WEAPONS LOAT RATIO COMPARE FAVORABLY WITH PREVIOUS MONTHS.
23. (C) PROGRESS WAS MADE TOWARD IMPROVING AND MAINTAINING THE SECURITY OF MAJOR HIGHWAYS AND WATERWAYS IN THE DELTA. DURING THE MONTH, NATIONAL HIGHWAY 4 REMAINED OPEN TO TWO-WAY COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC WITH ONLY BRIEF INTERRUPTIONS CAUSED BY THE DESTRUCTION OF THE AN CU BRIDGE INDINH TUONG PROVINCE AND FOUR CRATERING INCIDENTS ON ROUTE 4. THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN LOC SECURITY HAVE OCCURRED IN THE PAST 40 DAYS: HIGHWAY 4 FROM IV/III CORPS BOUNDARY TO MY THO

PAGE 6 RUMSMA 1547K S E C R E T NOFORN
WAS CHANGED FROM AMBER TO GREEN, INTER-PROVINCIAL ROUTE 40 FROM VI THANH TO HIGHWAY 4 WAS CHANGED FROM RED TO AMBER, INTER-PROVINCIAL ROUTE 23 FROM SA DEC TO CHO MAI WAS CHANGED FROM RED TO AMBER, THE MANG THIT-NICHOLAI WATERWAY WAS CHANGED FROM RED TO AMBER, THE MY THO RVER WAS CHANGED FROM AMBER TO GREEN, AND INTER-PROVINCIAL ROUTE 30 FROM KIEN VON TO HONG NGU (KIEN PHONG PROVINCE) CHANGED FROM AMBER TO GREEN. THE CHO GAO CANAL IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE AND THE DONG KIEN CANAL IN KIEN PHONG PROVINCE WERE REPORTED FOR THE FIRST TIME AND ARE CARRIED AS GREENLOC'S. ALL AIRFIELDS WITHIN IV CORPS ARE OPERATIONAL. NO AIRFIELDS OR MAJOR LINES OF COMMUNI-7 CATION WERE CLOSED BY THE ANNUAL FLOOD IN SEPTEMBER.
24. (C) A. PACIFICATION
PROGRAMS REMAIN BEHIND SCHEDULE; HOWEVER, RD ACTIVITY IN EACH OF THE PROVINCES BEGAN TO ACCELERATE AFTER THE NATIONAL ELECTION PERIOD. RED TEAMS CONTINUED TO BE SHIFTED FROM FIRST SEMESTER TO SECOND SEMESTER HAMLETS AND BY 30 SEPTEMBER APPROXIMATELY 60 PERCENT OF THE SHIFT WAS COMPLETED. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTED VC ATTACKS ON FIRST SEMESTER HAMLETS. THE VC INITIATED FIVE INCIDENTS AGAINST RD CADRE RESULTING IN FIVE RD CADRE, FIVE RF SOLDIERS AND THREE CIVILIANS KILLED AND 21 RD CADRE AND TWO RF SOLDIERS WOUNDED.
BT

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 6 OF 35776

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/HC
SERVICE

CORRECTED COPY - DESTROY
ALL OTHERS - 10 OCT 67
PREVIOUSLY ISSUED AS
SECTION 4

010 10 28Z

8890 E JCS939/10
CJT26
00 RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMU7242 2830000
ZNY SSSSS
DE RUMSMA 1548K 2831215
ZNY SSSSS
O 101127Z OCT 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG I FFORCEV
ZEN/CG II FFORCEV
ZEN/SA IV CORPS
ZEN/COMNAVFORV
RUMSBJ/CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE
BT
S E C R E T NOFORN 33294. FOR ADM SHARP
INFO GEN JOHNSON, LTG MOMZER, LTG CUSHMAN, LTG WEYAND, LTG ROSSON, RADM VETH AND BG DESOBRY FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND. SEC VI OF VII.
A JOINT US/GVN TEAM HEADED BY GVN BRIGADIER GENERAL HONROMPLETED INSPECTION OF RD ACTIVITIES IN ALL IV CORPS PROVINCES. THIS TEAM REVIEWED EACH PROVINCE'S POTENTIAL FOR COMPLETING THE CURRENT 1967 PROGRAM AND PREVIEWED THE 1968 PLANS TO INSURE CONTINUITY OF EFFORT AND PURPOSE. THE EFFORTS OF THIS TEAM ARE EXPECTED TO GIVE ADDED IMPETUS TO THE PACIFICATION EFDORT IN IV CORPS.
B. THE OVERALL EFFECTIGENESS OF RF/PF UNITS REMAINS SATISFACTORY. THE NUMBER OF RF/PF DESERTIONS AVERAGE APPROXIMATELY 990 PER MONTH, 50 PRCENT LESS THAN LAST YEAR'S RATE. THE PF DESERTION RATE IS ABOUT DOUBLE THAT OF THE RF. A STUDY HAS BEEN INITIATED TO IDENTIFY THE REASONS FOR THIS. IN AN EFFORT TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RF/PF UNITS, A PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION FOR IN-PLACE TRAINING OF THESE UNITS IS BEING DEVELOPED.
25. (C) A. THE GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION DETERIORATED SLIGHTLY AS COMPARED WITH JULY AND AUGUST. ALTHOUGH THE VC INCREASED THEIR ACTIVITIES MARKEDLY DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD, THEY WERE UNABLE TO FULFILL THEIR PLANS FOR DISRUPTION OF THE ELECTIONS. THE RATE OF INCIDENTS REACHED A HIGH POINT ONS SEPTEMBER AND DROPPED APPRECIABLY

INFO: CJCS-6 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-2 J3-8 J4-3 J5-2 SACSA-3 S/DEF-7 /
ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 WH-4 STATE-1 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2
CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1(75) RBK/CF (36043)

INCLUDED IN IDA
LOG # C-71-8363

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS. OF THE 728 VC INITIATED INCIDENTS OCCURING DURING THE MONTH, 320 OF THESE HAPPENED 1THROUGH 4SEPTEMBER.
B. COORDINATED ARVN 7TH DIVISION AND US 9TH DIVISION OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IN WESTERN DINH TUONG PROVINCE RELIEVED ENEMY PRESSURE DIRECTED AGAINST HIGHWAY 4. DOCUMENTS CAPTURED DURING THE PERIOD REVEALED A FOUR-PHASE VC PLAN OF OPERATION IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE. PHASE OF THIS PLAN, INTERDICTION OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION, WAS ACCOMPLISHED ONLY TO A LIMITED DEGREE; PHASES II, III, AND IV (ATTACKS ON REAR AREAS, ARMORED CAVALRY UNITS AND INFANTRY UNITS) WERE NOT ACCOMPLISHED.
C. NO MAJOR VC GROUND ATTACKS WERE INITIATED BUT HARASSMENT TACTICS, SUCH AS SHELLING OF THE DISTRICT TOWNS OF PHONG PHU, THUAN NHONAND KE SACH IN PHONG DINH PROVINCE AND SONG ONG DOC IN AN XUYEN PROVINCE, CONTINUED. AGENT REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE VC HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OVERCOME THEIR SHORTAGE OF QUALIFIED CADRE AND THAT RECRUITMENT PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO INCREASE. LOSSES SUSTAINED BY THE VC TOTALED 944 KIA, 300 CAPTURED AND 377 WEAPONS LOST COMPARED TO AUGUST LOSSES OF 1005 KIA, 332 CAPTURED AND 302 WEAPONS LOST. RETURNEES UNDER THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM TOTALED 778. IN ADDITION TO THE CHIEU HOJS, HYRE WEJ 152 HOA HAO SOLDIERS WHO REGURNED TO GVN CONTROL.
(NAVFORV)
26. (C) A. MARKET TIME CONTINUED TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE INTERDICTION OF ENEMY WATERBORNE LOGISTICS ALONG THE COAST OF SOUTH VIETNAM. BLOCKING FORCES PREVENTED EXFILTRATION OF ENEMY COMBATANTS DURING GROUND OPERATIONS IN I CORPS. ON 3 SEPTEMBER A MARKET TIME PATROL SPOTTED FOR USS BOSTONAND USS DUPONT AND OBTAINED 16$ SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS FROM ENEMY ARTILLERY POSITIONS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE.
B. THE USS HUNTERDON COUNTY, LOADED WITH TEN GAME WARDEN PBR'S, WAS TEMPORARILY DEPLOYED TO THE I CTZ ON 18 SEPTEMBER FOR A PERIOD OF THREE WEEKS IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVNESS OF RIVER PATRON BOAT OPERATIONS IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE NORTHERN PORTION OF SVN. GAME WARDEN PBR'S, SEAL TEAMS AND HELICOPTERS COMBINED WITH VNN UNITS IN NUMEROUS EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS. ON THE LOWER BASSAC RIVER ON TAN DINH ISLAND WHICH IS USED BY THE ENEMY AS A BASE AREA, A SEAL TEAM DESTROYED APPROXIMATELY 75HEUNKERS, 170

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HOUSES AND 120 SAMPANS AND CAPTURED MANY DOCUMENTS, BOAT MOTORS AND WEAPONS. SEAL TEAMS, WITH ASSISTANCE FROM HELICOPTERS, SMALL CRAFT AND SEVENTH FLEET DD, CONDUCTED SHALLOW DRAFT OPERATIONS N KIEN HOA AND VINH BINH PROVINCES. SHALLOW DRAFT OPERATIONS ARE SUSTAINED ABDUCTION/INTELLIGENCE GATHERING MISSIONS IN ENEMY BASE AREAS AND SECRET ZONES. A SEVENTH, AND LAST, HELICOPTER FIRE TEAM WAS ACTIVATED AT CAN THO ON 26 SEPTEMBER.

C. THE RIVERINE ASSAULT FORCE CONDUCTED OPERATION CORONADO V IN LONG AN, DINH TUONG AND KIEN HOA PROVINCES. CORONADO V COMBINED NAVY ASSAULT UNITS WITH THE 2D BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION, TO CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY IN AREAS INACCESSIBLE BY LAND. A FOUR DAY OPRATION IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE RESULTED IN 210 ENEMY KILLED, 23 DETAINEES AND 559 BUNKERS DESTROYED. US LOSSES WERE 15 KILLED AND 128 WOUNDED.

(SEVENTH AIR FORCE)

27. (S) A. IN-COUNTRY, THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE AIR EFDORT WAS ALLOCATED TO DIRECT SUPPORT OF US/FWMAF GROUND OPERATIONS. THE REMAINING CAPABILITY WAS USED TO PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO THESE FORCES, TO LOCATE THE ENEMY AND HIS RESOURCES, TO LIMIT HIS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO RALLY TO THE GVN.

B. A TOTAL OF 10,447 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES WERE FLOWN IN-COUNTRY DURING THE MONT D
F SEPTEMBER, OF WHICH 7,340 WERE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS FOR US/FWMAF GROUND OPERATIONS. OVER 14,000 TONS OFORDNANCE WERE EXPENDED AGAINST ENEMY TROOP CONCENTRATIONS, BASE AREAS, FORTIFICATIONS AND INSTALLATIONS RESULTING IN 265 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, 4,127 MILITARY STRUCTURES DESTROYED, ANOTHER 2,737 DAMGED AND 525 SAMPANS DESTROYED.

C. INCLUDED IN THE OVERALL EFFORT WERE 734 COMBAT SKYSPOT SORTIES FLOWN TO DENY THE ENEMY THE USE OF NIGHT TIME AS A SANCTUARY. IN ADDITION, 297 IMMEDIATE FLARESHIP SUPPORT REQUESTS WERE HONORED BY USAF/VNAF FLARESHIPS. THESE ILLUMINATED BATTLEFIELDS AND PROVIDED FLARING FOR TACTICAL AIR STRIKES IN ALL CORPS OF THE RVN.

D. CONSTANT PRESSURE WAS PLACED ON THE VC/NVA IN THE MOVEMENT OF ITS FORCS BY THE MORE THAN 7,350 VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE SORTIES FLOWN IN 01/02 TYPE AIRCRAFT ALONE. THIS EXTENSIVE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM PRODUCED 1,938 SIGNIFICANT SIGHTINGS. ADDITIONALLY,

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

1,669 RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WERE FLOWN DURING THE MONTH. THESE INCLUDED 575 PHOTO, 456 IR, FIVE SLAR, AND 633 RDF/ELECTRONIC MISSIONS. THE RESULTANT VITAL DATA WAS USED TO LOCATE THE ENEMY AND HIS OPERATING AREAS FOR THE SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT OF TARGETS.
E. INCLEMENT WEATHER HAMPERED HERBICIDE OPERATIONS FOR THE GREATER PART OF5#3 .9,5#; NEVERTHELESS, 406,000 GALLONS OF DEFOLIANT WERE DISPENSED.
F. AIRLIFT FIGURES WERE EQUALLY IMPRESSIVE WITH OVER 295,182 PASEENGERS AND 65,896 TONS OF CARGO BEING AIRLIFTED THROUGHOUT SVN. BOTH FIGURES WERE OVER THE AVERAGE FOR THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF THE YEAR.
G. MORE THAN 3,000 VNAF STRIKE SORTIES WERE FLOWN. RESULTS WERE 1,451 MILITARY STRUCTURES DESTROYED, 915 DAMAGED, 140 SAMPANS DESTFOYED AND 41 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS. VNAF FURTHER ACCOUNTED FOR 868 VR CORTIES AND THE AIRLIFT EVACUATION OF 801
BT
NNNN

ADV CY TO CJCS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 7 OF 3 5 7 7 6

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

G564 W JCS1070/10

0 10 19 38Z

00 RUEPJS
DE RUMSOM U7516 2830000
ZNY SSSSS
DE RUMSMA 1549K 2831215
ZNY SSSSS
0 101127Z OCT 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/CG I FFORCEV
ZEN/CG II FFORCEV
ZEN/SA IV CORPS
ZEN/COMNAVFORV
RUMSBJ/CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE
BT

IMMEDIATE

NOFORN

S E C R E T NOFORN 33294. FOR ADM SHARP
INFO GEN JOHNSON, LTG MCMYER, LTG CUSHMAN, LTG WEYAND, LTG ROSSON,
RADM VETH AND BG DESOBRY FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND. FINAL SEC OF VII.
FRIENDLY CASUALTIES.
2& (S) A. OBJECTIVES OF THE 7TH AF OUT-COUNTRY AIR CAMPAIGN
IN SEPTEMBER CONTINUED TO BE THE DESTRUCTION OR DISRUPTION OF SELECT-
ED WAR SUPPORTING AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT TARGETS IN NORTH
VIETNAM, AND THE IMPEDIMENT OF ENEMY INFILTRATION ND INSURGENCY
ACTIVITIES MOVING THROUGH NVN AND LAOS. AS WAS EXPECTED IN THIS
MONSOONAL TRANSITION PERIOD, ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS THROUGHOUT
THE AREAS OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS HAMPERED EFFECTIVE
B. ON 12 SEPTEMBER, OPERATION NEUTRALIZE WAS INITIATED TO
LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FIELD ARTILLERY AND AAA SITES AND THEIR
ASSOCIATED STORAGE AREAS. THE SEARCH FUNCTION OF NEUTRALIZE IS
BEING CONDUCTED WITHIN WEAPON RANGE OF DONG HA, CON THIEN, AND QUIO
LINH, AND IS CARRIED OUT BY PHOTO RECCE MISSIONS, IR PHOTOGRAPHY,
ARDF FIXES, SLAR, AND VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE. AS OF 30SEPTEMBERR,
1,153AIR FORCE AND 607 MARINE AND NAVY STRIKE SORTIES HAD BEEN FLOWN
IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION. RESULTS OF THE OPERATION INCLUDED
47 FIELD ARTILLERY POSITIONS DESTROYED OR DAMAGED, 15 37/57MM AAA
POSITIONS DESTROYED, 274 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND FIRES, AN

INFO: CJCS-5 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-2 J3-8 J4-3 J5-2 ~~SACSA-3~~ S/DEF-7
ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 WH-4 STATE-1 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2
CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1(79) JHA/CF (36117)

INCLUDED IN IDA
LOG # C-71-8363

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

ESTIMATED 124 KBA.
29. (S) THE WEIGHT OF THE B-52 EFFORT FOR THE ENTIRE MONTH OF SEPTEBMER WAS FREDOMINATELY AGAINST TARGETSSOF ENEMY TROOP CONCENTRATION AND GUN EMPLACEMENTS IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF N/N, IN THE DMZ, AND IN THE NORTHERN PORTION OF SVN. FOUR STRIKES (15 SORTIES) WERE EXECUTED TO INTERDICT TRANSPORTATION ROUTES IN THE A SHAU VALLEY. THERE WERE 22 STRIKES (204 SORTIES) EXECUTED AGAINST 7TH AF OPERATION NEUTRALIZE TARGETS.
(SUMMARY)
30. (S) A. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ACTIVITIES ALONG THE DMZ ENEMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS REMAINED RELATIVELY UNCHANNED OVER MOST OF THE COUNTRY DURING SEPTEMBER. A SINGAL EVENT WAS THE SUCCESSFUL CONDUCT OOF THE RVN NATIONAL ELECTIONS ON 3 SEPTEMBER. ALTHOUGH TERRORIEST, ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS INFLICTED MUCH HIGHER CASUALTIES THAN DURING EARLIER ELECTIONS, THE RECORD 83 PERCENT TURNOUT OF VOTERS ATTESTS TO THE FACT THAT DISRUPTION ATTEMPTS BY THE ENEMY FAILED. THE COMPREHENSIVE AND THOROUGHLY COORDINATED SECURITY BLANKET SPREAD BY VN POLICE/RVNAF/US/FWMAF FORESTALLED ALL MAJOR ASSAULTS AND GREATLY RESTRICTED THE ACTIVITIES OF TTE VC/NVA.
B. THE MOST SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT OF SEPTEMBER WAS HE ATTACK BY FIE CAMPAIGN LAUNCHED FROM THE DMZ ANND ADJACENT AREAS AT OUR MARNE POSITIONS IN THE NORTH. AFTER REACHING A HIGH RATE OF 1127 ROCKET-MORTAR-ARTILLERY ROUNDS PER DAY ON 25 SEPTEMBER, THE PACE DROPPED OFF SHARPLY AND REMAINED INSIGNIFICANT THROUGH THE END OF THE MONTH. CONCURRENTLY, THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF ENEMY WITHDRAWALL FROM HIS FORWARD POSITONS IN THE DMZ. THE EARLY HEAVY RAINS, OUR CONCENTRATION OF ORDNANCE, ND LOGISTICS IMPLICATIONS ARE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN CHIEFLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECREASE IN FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL. SIZEABLE NVA FORCES CONTINUE TO POSE A THREAT TO QUANG TRI CITY. THE DEPLOYMENT OF ONE BRIGADE OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION TO SOUTHERN I CORPS, DIRECTED ON 29SEPTEMBER, WILL ENABLE THE MARINES TO MOVE ADDITIONAL FORCES NORTH TO REDUCE THIS THREAT.
C. THE OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT DURING SEPTEMBER WAS THE UPGRADING OF ENEMY CTIVITY IN PHU YEN PROVINCE. THE 173D ABN BRIGADE, DEPLOYED TO PHU YEN FOR OPERATION BOLLING, WILL BE RETAINED IN THE AREA UNTIL THE ROK AND ARVN FORCES CAN STABILIZE THE SITUATION.
D. ELSEWHERE IN RVN OUR TASK HAS BEEN TO SEEK OUT AN

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

ENEMY THAT CONTINUES TO AVOID DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH MAJOR FRIENDLY UNITS. THE ATTACKS AGAINST THE GRC EMBASSY AND INDIVIDUAL NATIONALIST CHINESE PERSONAGES, AND AN INCREASE IN ACTIVITY DIRECTED AT NAVY RIVER CRAFT CONSTITUTE THE MORE NOTABLE SHIFTS IN THE GENERALLY LOW LEVEL OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.
E. THE RECENT SPATE OF PRESS COMMENTS NOTWITHSTANDING, RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS AND AGRESSIVENESS SHOWS PERCEPTIBLE IMPROVEMENT. CLOSER US TRAINING EFFORTS AND EXPANDING MEASURES TO RESOLVE CORRUPTION AND LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS SHOULD STIMULATE MORE APPARENT PROGRESS IN THIS AREA DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.
F. AS EXPECTED, THERR WAS LIMITED PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION PROGRAMS, IN LARGE PART BECAUSE ANY GVN PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS WER IN A POST-ELECTION "WAIT AND SEE/ MOOD AND WERE NOT SUPPLYING THE IMPETUS NECESSARY FOR SUCCESS. IN THE I CTZ, POOR SECURITY AND THE ONSET OF THE MONSOON FURTHER HINDERED RD PROGRESS. NEVERTHELESS, AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER, 24 NEW LIFE HAMLETS AND 29 CONSOLIDATED HAMLETS HAD BEEN COMPLETED. IN II CORPS THE RD EFFORT SUFFERED A SETBACK ON PHU YEN PROVINCE AS A RESULT OF VC/NVA ATTACKS ON HAMLETS WHICH WERE MAKING GOOD PROGRESSS. THE FACT, HOWEVER, HAT THE PEOPLE OF THESE HAMLETS WANT TO RETURN AND REBUILD AND TO MAINTAIN THEIR LOYALTY TO THE GVN IS HEARTENING. IN III CORPS, THE HAMLET CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM UNDOUBTEDLY WILL REMAIN BEHING SCHEDULE FOR THE REST OF 1967. NEVERTHELESS, MANY INTANGIBLE FACTORS, E.G., CHANGES IN PUBLIC ATTITUDES, IMPROVING MORALE, AND INCREASING COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC INDICATE THAT PROGRESS IS BEING MADE AGAINT THE VC. II IV CORPS, RD ACTIVITY BEGAN TO ACCELERATE AFTER THE ELECTIONS ALTHOUGH, IN GENERAL, RD AND CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS ARE BEHIND SCHEDULE. HE SOMEWHAT SLOW NATIONWIDE RATE OF PROGRESS, HOWEFER, SHOULD NOT OBSCURE THE FACT THAT THE ELECTION SUCCESS MARKS A UNIQUELY IMPRO-TANT STEP TOWARDS THE ULTIMATE AND SUCCESSFUL END OF PACIFICATION EFFORTS A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GVN AND ITS PEOPLE.
GP-4.
ET
NNNN

ADV CY TO CJCS AND ACJCS(GEN JOHNSON)

35776

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

CORRECTION
45876

D442 Q JCS140/28YQ

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

EUK561 EUK561 QS#0439 125
EUK561ZE0037
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSMA 5661S 0270657
ZNY CCCCC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN SVC CITING RUEPJS 105S 0260916 X
ZDK RUMSMA 3251A 0190814 X
DE RUMSMA 3251A 0190814
ZNY CCCCC
P 190717Z JAN 68 ZFF-6 ZFG
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMI/SA IV CTZ
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 02086 KROM MACJ03 R FOR
ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER SEC 1 OF X SECTIONS
SUBJ: PACIFICATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM DURING NOVEMBER 1967 (U)
1. (U) THIS REPORT IS THE TENTH IN A SERIES OF MONTHLY ASSESSMENTS OF PACIFICATION BASED UPON FIELD REPORTING AND ANALYSIS.
2. (C) SUMMARY: THE INCREASED TEMPO OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM WAS MAINTAINED DURING NOVEMBER, ALTHOUGH THE RD PLANS IN MOST
PAGE 2 RUMSMA 3251A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
PROVINCE REMAINED BEHIND SCHEDULE IN RELATION TO THEIR YEAR END GOALS, THE NUMBER OF PROVINCES ON SCHEDULE INCREASED FROM 9 TO 15. THERE WAS A SLIGHT DECLINE (2,005 FROM 2,135) IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VIC INCIDENTS, BUT A SHARP INCREASE IN THE USE OF TERROR (586 INCIDENTS

INFO: CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC-1 S/SEF-7 ASD/ISA-5 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 WH-10 STATE-1 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7
FILE-1(84)JHA/JN (65147)

PAGE 1 OF 4

This document contains information effecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DOWNGRADED AT 8 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL

IDA C 71-8356

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

COMPARED TO 367 IN OCTOBER) ACD THE NUMBER OF ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS (976 COMPARED TO 479 LAST MONTH). IN SPITE OF THESE FIGURES, OUR BEST ESTIMATE OF THE POPULATION UNDER GVN CONTROL (BASED UQON THE HAMLET EVALUTION SYSTEM) REMAINS AT 68.2 PCT (SECURITY FACTORS ONLY.)

A. ICEXCONTINUED TO MAKE HEADWAY IN NOVEMBER, THOUGH TOP-LEVEL GVN ENDORSEMENT WAS NOT FORTHCOMING. A NOTABLE SUCCESS WAS SCORED IN QUANG NAM IN I CORPS, AND III CORPS 148 VC INFRASTRUCTURE (VCI) WERE ELIMINATED BY DOICC OPERATIONS.

B. OPENING OF HIGHWAY 1 IN BINH THUAN FROM PHAN THIET TO TUY PHONG AND COMMENCEVENT OF MUCH NEEDED REPAIR OF ROUTE 20 IN LAM DONG WERE DEVELOPMENTS OF ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE . APPROXIMATELY 100,00 MORE PEOPLE IN PHAN THIET-TUY PHONG AREA NOW HAVE GREATER ACCESS TO MARKETS. FLOW OF DALAT PRODUCE TO SAIGON VEGETABLE MARKET SHOULD BE STIMULATED WHEN REPAIR OF ROUTE 20 IS COMPLETE.

C. EPANSION OF THE RD CADRE CONTINUED DURING NOVEMBER TO A NEW HIGH OF 26,908 (527 TEAMS). IN ADDITION, THERE WERE 6,180 TRUONG SON (MONTAGNARD) CADRE (110 TEAMS) AND 35 MILITARY-CIVIL TEAMS. RD CADRE DESERTIONS, HOWEVER, INCREASED A-8, 8, ,9;3.234. FOR THE THIRD STRAIGHT MONTH, REACHING A RATE OF 16.8 PER THOUSAND. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE DESERTION RATE WILL DECLINE IN 1968 WHEN NEW LEGISLATION DEALING WITH THE CADRE DISCIPLINE BEGINS TO TAKE EFFECT ALONG WITH THE NEW MANDATORY PRE VUNG TAU TRAINING FOR ENLISTEES IN ALL PROVINCES.

D. THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANH FELL TO 960 IN NOVEMBER, MARKING A NEW LOW FOR THE YEAR. CHIEU HOI RESULTS, HOWEVER, STILL EXCEED 1966 WITH AN OVERALL INCREASE OF 48 PCT. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT HOI CHAN OF THE MONTH WAS THE MORTAR CREWMAN FROM THE 66TH NVA RGT. WHO RALLIED THE DAY BEFORE THE BATTLE OF DAK TO BEGAN, DIVULGING IMPORTANT INFORMATION ON THE NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF ENEMY UNITS.

E. UNLIKE SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, THE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES RESETTLED OR RETURNED TO VILLAGES WAS GREATED THAN THE NUMBER GENERATED (11,443 GENERATED; 16,468 REESTABLISHED). MOREOVER, CORDS EFFORTS TO SPUR RESETTLEXENT HAVE RESULTED IN A SIGNIFICANTLY IN-

DECLASSIFIED

PROVED PROCESSING RATE. MINISTER QUE HAS PROVEN SO FAR TO BA NA AGGRESSIVE TASKMASTER DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES HE FACES IN MELDING TWO FORMER MINISTRIES INTO ONE (SOCIAL WELFARE AND REFUGEES).
F. NATIONAL POLICE RECRUITEMENT TOOOK A TURN FOR THE BETTER DURING NOVEVBER. THE INCREASE PROBABLY IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE GVN GENERAL MOBILIZATION DECREE, AND A SUBSEQUENT RUSH TO AVOID THE DRAFT. PRISON OVER-CROWDING WAS SOMEWHAT REDUCED THROUGH THE PRESIDENTS AMNESTY PROGRAM; PRISON POPULATION IS DOWN FROM SLIGHTLY OVER 32,700 TO 30,218.
G. NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES PROGRESSED AS EXPENDITTURE OF THE MORD BUDJET INCREASED FROM 57 PCT (REVISED FIGURE) IN OCTOBER TO 64 PCT BY THE END OF NOVEMBER.
3. (C) IMPACT OF THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE PACIFICATION EFFORT.
A. ATTACK ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE.
(1) I CORPS SCORED NOTABLE SUCCESS THROUGH EMPLOYMENT OF ICE CONCEPT. IN QUANG TRI CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS OF SELECTED HAMLETS USING ICE TARGET FOLDERS NETTED 22 VCI. IN QUANG TIN THE "RIFLE SHOT" APPROACH USING MOST WANTED LISTS RESULTED IN CAPTURE OF THE VC PROVINCE ECONOMY AND FINANCE COMMITTEE CHIEF. IN QUANG NAM 64 VCI IN HOI AN WERE ARRESTED, INCLUDING AN EMPLOYEE OF THE PROVINCE LAND TENURE SERVICE WHO WAS A CHAIRMAN OF THE HOI AN NLF.

ALSO CAPTURED WERE FOUR PENETRATION AGENTS IN GVN MILITARY UNITS.
(2) ICEX ACTIVITIES STILL CENTER ON RESOLUTION OF THE DIFFICUWTIES IN EPANDING AND REFINING THE ORGANIZATION. A MAJOR EFFORT GOES INTO ESTABLISHING A THOROUGH AND PURIFIED DATA BASE, PRIORITY TARGET LISTS, AND EFFECTIVE LOCAL COLLATING SYSTEMS. COORDINATED, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS AGAINST VCI ARE STILL ON THE RISE. WHILE THE LACK OF A NATIONAL PROGRAM EERTS A DRAG, THE EFORT CONTINUES TO ATTRACT SUPPORT FROM INCREASINGLY INFULENTIAL QUARTERS. GBN SUPPORT IN I AND II CORPS IS STRONG AND IN IV CTZ SUBSTANTIAL. IN III CORPS, WHERE GVN COMMITMENT IS LESS EVIDENT, NOVEMBER WAS MARKED BY A VISIT OF GENERAL LOAN TO THREE DOICCS. HIS CURRENT OVERT INTEREST IN ICEX IS HEARTENING.
(3) THE PROGRAM IS STAYING AHEAD OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES. FIELD STAFF STRENGTH STANDS AT 106 OF 126 AUTHORIZED. PERSONNEL FILL HAS BEEN ADEQUATE TO SUSTAIN THE THRUST OF ICE. BASED ON PRESENT ASSESSMENTS OF NEED, ICE HAS REQUESTED 10E ADDITIONAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SPACES.
(4) THE NUMBER OF DISTRICT OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGNECE COORDINATING CENERS (DOICCS) THROUGH WHICH ICEX OPERATES AT DISTRICT GREW FROM 57 AS OF 31 OCTOBER TO 75 AS OF 30 NOVEMBER. TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETION OF THE 115 DOICCS PROGRAMMED IS 31 DECEMBER 1967.

TABLE ONE

	ACTIVATED	PROGRAMMED
I CORPS	20	20
II CORPS	14	20
III CORPS	37	53
IV CORPS	4	22
TOTAL	75	115

THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF PROVINCIAL INTERROGATION CENTERS (PICS) FROM LAST MONTH.

TABLE TWO

	NUMBER OF PICS	CAPACITY (PERSONS)
I CORPS	6	156
II CORPS	9	200
III CORPS	10	260
IV CORPS	13	298
TOTAL	38	914

(5) ICEX MEMORANDA AND OPERATIONAL AIDS AND THE THIRD NEWSLETTER ISSUE, WERE PUBLISY D IN NOVEMBER. THESE PUBLICA-
BT
NNNN

45876

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

45876

SECTION 2 OF ...

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

119 17 10Z

NOFORN

VZCZCJCS878EUK771SXD935
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMV1593 0190000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 3252A 0190814
ZNY CCCCC
P 190717Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNGF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 02086 FROM MACJ01R FOR
ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER SEC II OF X SECTIONS
TIONS HAVE PROVED AN ADEQUATE MEDIUM FOR MEETING FIELD INFORMATION
REQUIREMENTS GENERATED BY PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT.

(6) NEW DETENTION FACILITIES, MEANT TO RECEIVE MAINLY CIVIL DETAINEES GENERATED BY MILITARY AND CIVIL ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE OPERATIONS ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE ICEX CONCEPT. AS THINGS NOW STAND, NEW CONSTRUCTION IS MOVING AT A BARELY ACCEPTABLE RATE. THE MAJOR WEAKNESS IN THEDETENTIONCENTER PROGRAM IS A LACK OF CORRESPONDING SENSE OF URGENCY ON THE PART OF THE VN.

B. EXPAND AND IMPROVE TERRITORIAL SECURITY:

(1) BASED ON THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM (HES), RESULTS AS OF 30 NOVEMBER 1967, THE FOLLOWING TABLES SHOW CHANGES IN HAMLET AND POPULATION STATUS FROM THE PREVIOUS MONTH BY & OR - NUMBERS IN EACH CATEGORY: NOTE; THIS & STANDS FOR THE PLUS SIGN

TABLE THREE

HAMLET STATUS (SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT)

	SECURE	CONTESTED

INFO: CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC/DDO-1 SDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9

ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 W/H-40 STATE-1 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1

CMC-7 FILE-1(84) ETO/RA

CONFIDENTIAL

INCLUDED IN IDA
IM# C-71-8356

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

	A	B		D	E	OTHER	VC	TOTAL
I CORPS	28	265	533	436	72	195	939	2468
	&0	&13	&53	-17	-3	&8	-43	&11
II CORPS	50	524	1002	548	140	298	541	3103
	&1	&8	-6	-4	-5	&51	-38	&7
III CORPS	8	313	644	443	66	199	468	2141
	&1	-9	-12	&35	&2	&1	-10	-28
IV CORPS	133	743	1090	806	168	77	1985	5002
	&1	-21	&38	-2	-20	&7	-15	&18
RVN	219	1845	3269	2233	446	769	3933	12714
	&3	-9	&73	&12	-26	&67	-56	&64

TABLE FOUR
POPULATION STATUS (SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT)
(THOUSANDS)

	A	B		D	E
I CORPS	U4.7	567.2	654.0	414.4	67.6
	-.6	&28.2	&45.5	-11.6	-3.3
II CORPS	213.2	420.2	914.3	301.0	76.0
	&.3	&1.5	&34.9	-5.2	&1.4
III CORPS	32.6	780.7	1249.1	587.4	41.7
	&1.0	-4.2	&4.9	&49.7	&4.2
IV CORPS	345.3	1398.3	1421.2	842.8	131.8
	&5.3	-22.5	&35.9	&9.1	-16.4
RVN	665.8	3466.4	4238.6	2145.6	317.1
	&6.0	&30.	&121.2	&42.0	-14.1

	VC	O	OTHER	NON HAMLET	TOTAL
I CORPS	762.4		30.0	660.0	3230.3
	-11.0		&6.2	&67.9	&121.3
II CORPS	217.7		35.6	430.4	2908.4
	-8.5		&8.9	&11.8	&45.1
III CORPS	257.3		16.6	2356.7	5322.1
	-6.6		-2.2	-1.1	&45.7
IV CORPS	1536.6		16.3	76.7	5769.0
	-4.1		&4.0	-81.0	-69.7
RVN	2774.0		98.5	3523.8	17229.8
	-30.2		&16.9	-2.4	&142.4

45876

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

TABLE FIVE
HAMLET STATUS (SECURITY ONLY)

	SECURE				CONTESTED			
	A	B	C	D	E	OTHER	VC	TOTAL
I CORPS	114	266	518	377	59	195	939	2468
	-1	&19	&24	&8	-4	&8	-43	&11
II CGRPS	190	670	856	458	90	298	541	3103
	&4	-46	&36	-4	&4	&51	-38	&74
III CORPS	118	371	5518	392	42	199	468	2141
	-13	-7	-2	&36	&3	-1	&10	&28
IV CORPS	275	708	1042	770	145	77	19IT	TPPW
	&2	-26	&6	&37	-23	&7	&15	&18
RVN	697	2015	2967	1997	336	769	3933	12714
	-8	-60	&64	&77	-20	&67	-56	&64

TABLE SIX
POPULATION STATUS (SECURITY ONLY)
(THOUSANDS)

	A	B	C	D	E
I CORPS	303.9	473.7	576.7	366.9	56.8
	&1.1	&16.3	&40.4	&3.6	-3.1
II CORPS	462.1	653.6	780.6	272.2	55.9
	&12.0	-78.0	&97.6	-7.2	&8.5
III CORPS	298.8	1925.0	960.1	374.8	32.8
	-10.7	-9.6	&34.4	&39.2	&2.3
IV CORPS	578.2	1169.2	1340.4	922.9	128.7
	&13.1	-44.9	&15.1	&49.5	-20.9
RVN	1643.0	3321.5	3657.8	1936.8	274.2
	&15.5	-116.2	&187.5	&85.0	-13.2

	VC	OTHER	NON HAMLET	TOTAL
I CORPS	762.4	30.0	770.0	3230.4
	-44.0	&6.2	&67.9	&121.4

Y RUMSMA 3252A C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

II CORPS	217.7	35.6	430.4	2908.1
	-8.5	&8.9	&11.8	&45.0
III CORPS	257.3	16.6	2356.7	5322.1

45876

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

	-6.6	-2.2	-1.1	&45.7
IV CORPS	1536.6	16.3	76.7	5769.0
	-4.1	&4.0	-81.0	-69.2
RVN	2774.0	98.5	3523.8	17229.6
	-30.2	&16.9	-2.4	&142.9

(2) A COMPARISON OF SECURE AND VC CONTROLLED POPULATION FOR RVN AS A WHOLE IS SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE. ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY ALONE - THE MOST IMPORTANT CRITICAL FACTOR IN MEASURING THE PROGRESS OF PACIFICATION - 68.2 PCT OF THE POPULATION WAS IN THE SECURE CATEGORY ON 30 NOVEMBER 1967.

TABLE SEVEN
SECURE, CONTESTED AND VC CONTROLLED POPULATION

	TOTAL RVN, 30 NOVEMBER 1967 POPULATUON (THOUSANDS)		
	SECURE S	VC	CONTESTED
SECURITY ONLY	11,747.3	2886.7	2595.1
SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT	11,496.3	2886.7	2846.8

BT
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

45876

SEC 3 OF
CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

119 18492

VZCZCJCS033EUK787SXG602
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMV0110 0190000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 3253A 0190814
ZNY CCCCC
P 190717Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATESAID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II RTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMNAA/CG II MAF SA I CZ
KMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT

NOFORN

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 02086 KROM MACJ01R FOR
ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, HWTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER . SECTION III OF X.
PERCENT OF TOTAL, 30 NOMBER 1967

R	SKURE	VC	CONTE ZED
SECURITY ONLY	68.2	16.7	15.1
SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT	66.7 N	16.8	16.5

(3) ON BALANCE, SECURITY IMPROVED IN I CORPS DKRING
PAGES2 RUMSMA 325$A C O N F I D E N T I A LINOFORN
NOVEMBER. IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE CORPS, SECURITY CONTINUEDD
TO IMPROVE AS A RE ULT OF OPERATIONS BYHTHE MARINES AND THE
AMERICAL DIVISION, ENEMY INTERFERENCE WITH PACIFICATION WAS MINI-
MAL EXCEP IN QUANG NAM, WHERE THERE WAS A GENERAL DETECORATIO
OF SECURITY AND QUANGPWHERSTHERE WAS ANINCREASE IN TERRORISM.
QUNG NGAI AND QUANG TRI NOTED AN IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR OVERALL
SECURITY SITUATION; THUA THIEN EXPERIENCED NO NOTICAABLE CHANGE.
THERE WAS CONTINUD INTIMIDATION OF LOCAL RESIDENTS THROUGHOUT THED
CORPS. PARTICULARLY IN THE QUANG NAM RESETTLEMENT CAMPS. ASSASS-
INATIONS INCREASED FROM 36 LAST MONTH TO 84 IN NOVEMBER, INCLUDING
FOURHAMLET CHIEFS, AND ABDUCTIONS ROSE DRAMATICALLY FROM 87 TO 232.

INFO: CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC/DDO-1 SDEF-7
ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 WH-10 STATE-1 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2
CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1(84)ETO/RD (46170)

1 OF 4

CONFIDENTIAL

INCLUDED IN IDA
IDA CF-71-8356

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

VC ATTACKS AGAINST REFUGEE CAMPS IN QUANG TIN, QUANG NAM AND QUANG TRI RESULTED IN 34 REFUGEESKILLED, 70 WNDED AND 90 ABDUCTED. 885 STRUVURES WERE ESTROYD AND 431 DAMAGED. THE NUMBER OF MININGS ALONG NATIONAL HIGHWAHS1 INCREASED THROUGHOUT THE CORQ. THE ENEMY DESTROYED SEVERAL MAJOR BRIDGES IN QUANG KM.HHE RESULT OF THI INTERDICTION WU THE COMINUAL BLVKING OF THE FLOW OF CIVILIAN GOODS FROM DANANG TO THE PROVINCES AT A TIME WHEN THE MONSOON SEASON PRECLUDED NORMAL COASTAWIJUNK TRAFFIC.

TABLE EIGHT

I CORPS SECURITYHRESUME

	NOV	OCT
VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AA)	574	766
VC/NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	36,850	37,410
ASSASSINATIONS, ABDUCTION OFSCIVILIANS	'10	255
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	EU	TR
STATUS OF ROADS -GREEN (PCT)	41.2S	54.5
(SEE FOOTNOTE 1) AMBER (PCT)	51,5	45.5
RED (PCT)	7,3	0
HES NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (ABC) CATEGORY	898	856
HES PERCENT OFSPOPULATION IN SECURE CAT	946 67.5	57.12
RF STRENGTH	18,973	18,608
PF STRENGTH	23,620	23,359

(4) IN II CORPS, ENEMY ACTION WAS MARKED BY A MAJOR ATTACK IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS, SOME INCREASE IN ACTIVITY IN BINH DINH AND INTENSIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES IN PHU YEN, KHANH HOA, BINH THUAN AND LAM DONG PROVINCES.NCIDENTS OF HIGHWAY INTERDICTION AND XALL SCALE ATTACKS AGAINST LINES OF COMMUNICAZION AND SELECTED INSTALLATIONS OCCURRED HROUGHOUT II VRPS. IN BINH DINH PROVINCE VC ACTVITY INCREASED SOMEWHAT AS THEY ATTEMPB TO REGAIN CONTRG IO 4RUMSMA A V NFI D E N T I A L NOFORN GF THE POPULATION AND RESOURCES . MORE EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON SAPPER ATTACKS AND RESUPPLY ACTIVITY PHU YE PROVINCE'S SECURITY SITUA.- TION DETERIORATED SOMEWHAT DUE TOHHESWITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES TO MEEHTHE DONTUM THREAT AND THE VC SOUGHT TO GAC CONTROL OF GVN SECURED AREAS BY ATTACKING DISTICT HEADQUARTERS AT HIEU XUONG AND SIB-SECTOR HEADQUARTERS AT TUYSAN. C KHANH HOA PROVINCE, ENEMYD ACTIVITY WAS INTENSIFUD AROUND THE POPULWZION CENTERS OF NINH HOA AND NHA TRANG, FOOD SUPPLY CONTINUES TO BE A PROBLZM BUT APPARENT-

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

LY AMMUNITION RESUPPLY AND PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS HAVE BZEN RECEIV-ED, ALLEVIATING SERIOUSSSHORTAGES IN THOSE AREAS. A BATTALION SIZE ATTACK WA LAUNCHED AGAINSZ NINH HOA EARLY IN THE MONTH WHICH RESULTED IN HEAVY ENEMY CASUALTIES. SQPER ACTIVITY AND A SMALL SCALE ENEMY ASSAUWT TOOK PLACE IN THE NHATRANG AREA. INCREASED ACTIVITY WAS DIRECTED AGAINSZ ARVN/RF/UNITS IN MAJOR EFFORTSHO REGAIN CONTROL OF ROUZ 20 IN LAM DONG AND TO DISRUPT THE RD EFFORT IN BINH THUAN, THE MUONG MAN-THIEN-GIAO-PHAN THIET TRAIANGLE WAS THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE IN HU ATTEMPT TO REGAIN COMROL OFHHE POPULATION. HARASSING FIRES, TERRORISM, AND SABOTAGE WARE DIRECTED AGAINST THIS DENSELY POPULATED AREA. BATTALION SIZE ATTACKS WERED LAUNCHED IN BOTH BINH THUAN AND LAM DONG TO OBTAIN A FIRMER CONTROL OF LOC'S IN THESE AREAS SPORADIC INTERDICTION OF ROUTES 1 AND 20 CONTINUED DURIVNOVEMBER ANDSBRIDGES WERE DESTROYED OR DAM3$ 9, 95#3 #8&#2-6,

TABLE NINE
II CORPS SECURITYSRESUMED

	NOV	OCT
VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AA)	284	289
VC/NVA COMBAT SZRENGTH	29,990	30,545
ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION OF CIVILIANS	145	99D
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	-3	24
STATUS OF ROADS- GREEN (PCT) I	58.0	67.4
AMBER (PCT)	30.3	22.3
RED (PCT)	11.7	10.2
HES NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (ABC) CAZEGORY	1,716	1,722
HESSPERCENT X POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORYS	78.33	77.73
RF STRENGTH	36,270	36,131
PF STRENGTH	35,434	35,706

(5) THE VC TERRORISTIRATE IN III CORPSSREKHEDSTHE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE YEAR. ASTOTAL OF 373 ACTIONS AGAINSZ THE CIVILIAN POPULWION (49 OF THESE WERESSELECTIVE) WERE REPORTED DURING NOVEMBER, MORA THAN A 30PCT INCREASE OVER THE FIGURES REPORTED FOR OCTOBER. THERE WERE FEWER PROPAGANDA AND TAX COLLECTION INCIDENTS (DOWN FROM 12 0 111), FEWERIKIDNAQNGS (DOWN FROM 55 TOWYLN BUT ASSASINATIONS (50 NM-QKTIVE KD 3 SWACPVE) AND WOUNDINGS 213 NON-SELEC AFQR SELECLIV) WERSUP SQRPLY A PARTIAL EXPLANATION OF THE UP-SWING

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

IS THE INCRAASE INVVTARY ACTIONS IN BINH GNGIAND PHUOC LONG PROVINCES, MGZAR AND/OR ROCKET ATTACKS ON HE PROVINCIAL CAPITALS AND THE DISTRIV TOWNS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THES PROVINCES HAVED BECOME RATHER COMMONPLACE, RESULTING IN A RISE IN CIVILIAN WOUNDINGS.IIN PHUOC TUY, AN INCREASE WAS ALSO NOTED. IN ALL AREAS, THE PRIMARYSTARGET OF VC TERRORIST ACTION APPEARS TO BE THE PACIFICATION EFFORT IN GENERAL, AND THE RD CADRES AND THE NATIONAL PGLICE. EXAMPLES HAVE RECENTLY OCCURRED IN BINH DUONG AND PHUOC LONG WHERE RD HAMLETS WITH GOOD RD GROUPS HAVE SUFFERED GRIEVOUS CASUALTIES. THESE INCIDENTS INCLUDE HOA MY IN BINH DUONG WYEREC THE VC HIT THE RD GROUP GUARDING A LITERACY CLASS KILLING EIGHT AND WOUNDING FOUR CADRE. DURING NOVEMBER THERE WERE A TOTAL OF 20 ATTACK AGAINY RD TEAMS, RE ULTING IN 11 CADRE KIA AND 34 WIA. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT TO DATE THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNS OF
BT
R
NNNN

45876

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

45876

SEC 4 OF

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

119 18492

VZCZCJCS027EUN954SXC484
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMV0149 0190000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 3254A 0190614
ZNY CCCCC
P 190717Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACVR
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCE SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT

NOFORN

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 02086 KROM MACJ01R FOR
ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION IV OFX.
A GENERAL DETERIORATION OF MORALA AS A RESULT OF THESE ATTACKS,O
AND THERE HAS BEEN NO NOTICEABLE EFFECT ON THE RECRUITMENT OF
NEW CADRE.

TABLE TEN
III CORPS SECURITY RESUMZ

		NOV	OCT
VCIINCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AA)		519	602
VXNVA COM5 TRENGTH		29,002	29,062
USSASSINATION, ABDUCTION OFSCIVILIAN		166	86D
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDK		-,	26
STATUS OF ROADS-SGREEN (PCT)		73.2	73.3
	AMBER (PCT)	15.8	15.8
	RED (PCT)	11.0	11.0
STAZUSSOFSWATERWAYS- GREEN (PCT)		61.3	55
(SEE FOOTNOTES1)	AMBER (PCT)	34.2	41
N	RED (PCT)	4.5	4
HE NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (ABC) CATEGORY		1,040	1,062

INFO: CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC/DDO-1 SDEF-7
ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 WH-10 STATE-1 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2
CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1(84)ETO/RD (46171)

1 OF 4

INCLUDED IN IDA

CONFIDENTIAL

IDA # C-71-8356

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

PES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORY 83.3 85.4
RF STRENGTH 38,278 37,689
PF STRENGTH 26,374 25,678D
YL IN NO DELTA PROVINCE DID SECURITYSIMPROVE DURING NOVEMBER. IN MOST,UIT TOOK A DECIDED DOWNTURN. THERE WASSA STRONG RISE IN VC INCIDENTS DURING THZ MONTH, CONTINUING AN UPTURN THAT BEGAN IN OCTOBER. EERY PROVINCE EXCEPT THREE REPORTED SIGNIFICANT VC REACTION TO PACIFICATION, AND MOST REPORLED STRONG EFFORTS AT LONG-RUN INTERDVON OF LOC'S.SAU IN OCTOBER, VC ATTEMPTS TO INTERDICT NATIONAL HIGHWAY FOUR RESULTED IN NUMEROUS TRAFFIC STOPPAGES ALTHOUGH TRAFFIC FLOW WAS MAINTAINED WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT DELAY. GVN/US COORDINATION IN REPAIRING THE ROAD IS INCREASING ANDD COMMAND ATTENTION IS BEING GIVEN TO ELIMINATING THE MY THUAN FERRY BOTTLENECK. A NUMBER OF LARGE UNIT OPERATIONSSWERE CONDUCTED IN DINH TUONG VOVINCE O RELIEVE VC PRESSURE ON ROUTE 4.STHERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE VC HOPE,SBH STRIKING AT OUTPOSTS, TOWNS, RD AREASD AND LOC, TO DSTROY THE MOMENTUM OFSPACIFICATION, NEGATE THE RESIWTS OF THE LOCAL ELECTIONS, AND ISOLATESTHE LOWER REACHES OF THE DELTA. BRIGHT SPOTS IN THE TERRITORIAL SECURITY PICTURE ARE THE CONTINUED ASCENDANCY OFSARVN OVER THE VC MAIN FORCES, PZRFORMANCE OF RDC GROUPS IN BEATING OFF HARASSING ATTACKS, AND INTRODUCTION OF US MOBILE ADVISORY (MAT) TEAMS WHICH SYOULD RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT UP-GRADING OF COMBAT CAPABILITY OF RF/PF. CORDS COMMANDER IS TAKING INCREASING INTEREST IN TERRITORIAL SECURITYAND HAS INSTITUZD CORPS INSPECTIM OF RF/PFSOUZPOSTS TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS.O

TABLE ELEVEN
IVCORPS SECURITY RESUME

	NOV	OCT
VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AA)	628	RUI
VC COMBAT STRENGTH	18,735	19,53'
ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION OF CIVILIANS	255	69
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	39	30
STATUSSOF ROADSS- GREEN (PCT)	23.1	23.1
AMBER (PCT)	51.4	'1
RED (PCT	0.0	0.0
SZALUS OF WATERWAYS - GREEN (PCT)	38.7	39D
AMBER (PCT)	51.4	51

45876

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

RED (PCT)	9.9	10
HES NUMBER OF HAMLZZS IN SECURE (ABC) CATEGORY	2,025S	2,043
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORY	55.8	54.2
RF STRENGTH	53,675	52,810
PF STRANGTH	60,690	59,379

C. EXPAND AND SUPPLEMENT RD TEAMS EFFORTS AND ASSOCIATED PROGRAMS;

(1) EXPANSION OF THE RD CADRE CONTINUED DURING NOV-EMBER. FORM A LOW OF 21,440 DURING APRIL (411STEAMS), RDC STRENGTH INCREASED TO 26,0PI K527 TEAMS) ON 30 NOVAMBER. THE DISTRIBUTION

OF THE GAIN IS AS FOLLOWS;

TABLE TWELVA

	RDC STRENTH 30 APRIL	RDC STRENGTH 31 OCTOBER	RDC STRENGTH 30 NOVEMBER		PERCENT INCREASE APR-NOV 67
I CORPS	7,001	7,354	7,328		4.7D
II CORPS	6,168	7,907	8,073	#	30.5
III CORPS	2,881	3,618	3,901		35.4
IV CORPS	5,370	7,199	7,606		1.6

IN ADDITION TO RD CADRE,STHERE WERE 11n TRUONG SON RD (TSRD2 MONTAG-NARFTEAMS AND 6,180STS CADRE AS OF 30 NOVEMBER. THERE ARE ALSO 35 CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMS, 32 OF THEM IN II CORPS.

(2) RD CADRSDESRTIONS INCREASEDUGAIN IN NOVEMBER

FOR THE THIRD STRAIGHT MONTH, DESERTION RATESHAVE INCREASED DROM 12.5 PER THOUSAND IN SEPTEMBER TO 14.1 PER THOUSAND IN OCTOBER AND 16.8SPWR THOUSAND IN NOVEMBER. ON 1 JAFUARY 1968, PRE-VUNG TAU TRAINING FOR RD CADRE ENLISTEESSWILL BE MANDATORY IN ALL PROVINCES. IT IS HOPED THAT THIS, AND OTHER RECENTLY PASSED LEGISLWION DEAL-ING WITH CADRE DISCIPLINE U WELPAS MEASKES TAKEN TO IMPROVE RD CADRE MORALE WILL BE FELT IN 1968.STOTAL CADRE LOSSES ARE SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE;

TABLE THIRTEEN
RD CADRE LOSSES

	NOV	OCT
KILLED	113	70
CAPTURED	10	18
RESIGNED	91	8 100

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

DISCHARGED AND RETIRED		157	153
DESERTED	1	441	370
TOTAL		812	711

(3) BY THZSEND OF NOVEMBER, THERE WERE 8,052SSTUDENTS IN TRAINING AT THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER IN VUNG TAU, INCLUDING RACRUIT CLASSES AND SPECIALISTS UNDERGOING LZADERSHIP, INTELLIGENCE, AND MEDICAL TRAINING. ON 6 NOVEMBER, 2,322 RD CADRE GRADUATED FROM VUNG TAU.IIT 7)$ -003-4 5#-5 5#3 049)3. 9 43;4785.3,5, WHICH HAS PLAGUED RD CADRE FOR SOME TIME, HAS RESOLVED ITSELF, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF A WIDESPRAAD MOVE HO AVOID SERVICE IN THE RVNAF UNDER THE NEW MOBILIZATION DECREE.
(4) THE STATIC CENSUSSGRIEANCE CADRE PROGRAM CONTINUES AS ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL OF THE RD PROGRAMS. AT THE END OF
BT
NNN 0
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 5 OF 4 5 8 7 6

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

1 21 15 53Z

NOFORN

VZCZCJCS599EUK124SXD716
PP RUEPJS
DE RUABCMU0172 0210000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 3255A 0190814
ZNY CCCCC
P 190717Z JAN 68 ZFF-6 ZFG
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 02086 KROM MACJ01R FOR
ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION V OF X.
THE MONTH, THERE WERE 5,469 (5,365 IN OCTOBER) CENSUS GRIEVANC
CADRES. THE CEILING SET FOR 1 JANUARY 1968 IS 7,917. THE NUMBER
OF HOI CHANH INDUCED TO RALLY BY RD AND CG ARE:

	OCT	NOV	YEAR TO DATE
RD & TSRD	43	51	906
CENSUS GRIEVANCE	86	63	1,615

D. ACCELERATE THE CHIEU HOI EFFORT
(1) THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANH FELL TO 960 IN NOVEMBER,
MARKING A NEW LOW FOR THE YEAR. THE TREND IS ILLUSTRATED IN THE
FOLLOWING TABLE:
ABLE FOURTEEN

	NOV	MONTHLY AVERAGE 1ST QTR	MONTHLY AVERAGE 2ND QTR	MONTHLY AVERAGE 3RD QTR
I CORPS	172	251	204	181
II CORPS	257	1,047	792	272
III CORPS	206	1,101	733	567

INFO: CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC-1 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-9
ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 WH-10 STATE-1 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1
(84)RB/JC

INCLUDED IN IDA
IDB # C-71-8356

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

IV CORPS	325	1,183	736	794
TOTAL	960	3,916	2,466	1,814

A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE DECLINE IN NOVEMBER IS RECENT VC PROPAGANDA TO THE EFFECT THAT FIGHTING WOULD CEASE IN III AND IV CTZ AFTER TET, AND A COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMED. THE ENEMY ALSO IS APPARENTLY EXERCISING CLOSER PHYSICAL CONTROL OVER LOWER RANKING VC.

(2) CHIEU HOI RESULTS STILL EXCEED THOSE ATTAINED IN 1966.

TABLE FIFTEEN

	1 JAN-30NOV 1966	1JAN-30NOV 1967	PERCENT CHUNGE
I CORPS	1,476	2,253	PLUS 53
II CORPS	7,692	6,913	MINUS 10
III CORPS	3,443	7,891	PLUS 129
IV CORPS	5,113	9,232	PLUS 81
TOTAL	17,724	26,289	PLUS 48

THERE WERE 9,068 RETURNEES IN II CORPS IN 1966, A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE COUNTRY-WIDE TOTAL. OF THESE, 7,122 CAME FROM THE TWO PROVINCES OF BINH DINH AND PHU YEN. IT APPEARS IN RETROSPECT THAT THOSE PROVINCES MAY HAVE BEEN LARGELYN ENUDEJMOF RETURNEES IN LATE 1966 AND EARLY 1967, THEREBY ACCOUNTING FOR THE SHARP DECLINE IN MIDDLE AND LATE 1967.

(3) THE CAPACITY OF CHIEU HOI CENTERS AGAIN INCREASED IN NOVEMBER, PARTICULARLY IN III CORPS. DISTRIBUTION OF CAPACITY AND COMPLETION OF PROGRAMMED CONSTRUCTION IS SHOWN BELOW:

TABLE SIXTEEN

	CAPACITY 30 NOV	PERCENT INCREASE SINCE 1 JANUARY	PERCENTAGE OF PROGRAM COMPLETED 30 NOVEMBER
I CORPS	735	137	137
II CORPS	1998	100	55
III CORPS	1430	94	78
IV CORPS	1745	73	81

A TOTAL OF 53 CENTER S ARE PROGRAMMED FOR CONSTRUCTION IN 1967. CONSTRUCTION IS UNDERWAY OR COMPLETED IN 38 WILL START IN AN ADDITIONAL 10 SHORTLY.

(4) THE NUMBERS OF HOI CHANH IN ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

INCREASED SLIGHTLY AS SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

TABLE SEVENTEEN

	31 OCT	30 NOV	WEAPONS
I CORPS	331	338	216
II CORPS	536	611	316
III CORPS	898	836	299
IV CORPS	850	851	530
TOTAL	2615	2636	1361

PROCEDURES AND DIRACTIVES TO IMPLEMENT ISSUANCE OF WEAPONS TO ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS FROM MAP SOURCES HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND DISSEMINATED BY MACV AND JGS. IMPLEMENTATION HAS BEEN UNDERWAY FOR ONE MONTH WITH MARKED PROGRESS NOTED IN MOST PROVINCES. THE NUMBER F ARMED APT PERSONNEL ROSE FROM 1054 IN GCTOBER TO 1361 IN NOVEMBER.

(5) OUR KNOWLEDGE OF ENEMY PLANS FOR DAK TO WAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED BY A MORTAR CREWMAN FROM THE 66TH NVA RGT. WHO RALLIED ON NOVEMBER 2. IS INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER AND DISPOSITION OF NVA UNITS WAS PARTICULARLY VAUABLE AS IT WAS THE FIRST REAL CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPENDING ATTACK ON DAK TO THE BATTLE BEGAN THE NEXT DAY, NOVEMBER 3.

(6) IT IS ESTIMATED THAT 3,000 HOI CHANH WILL HAVE RECEIVED A COURSE OF VOCATIONAL INSTRUCTIN OR WILLBE IN SUCH A COURSE BY YEAR'S END. HERETOFORE, A TOOL SHORTAGE HAS ADVERELY AFFECTED THE PROGRAM. AN INITIAL PROCUREMENT OF AMERICAN TOOLS TO SUPPORT THE PROGRAM ARRIVED IN NOVEMBER, AND IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION IN JANUARY 1968.

(7) IN III MAF, 104 HOI CHANH ARE EMPLOYED AS KIT CARSN SCOUTS, A SLIGHT INCREASE FORM LAST MONTH, AND 35 PROSPECTIVE RECRUIT ARE BEING SCREENED. FORTY-THREE ARE ON ACTIVE DUTY IN II CORPS, 49 INIII CORPS AND 18 IN IV CORPS. THE PROBLEM OF INTERIM FUNDING IS WELL ON TH WAY TO SOLUTION, A PROPOSAL TO USE AIK FUNDS FOR THE REMAINDER OF FY 68 HAVING RECEVED THE CONCURRENCE OF APPROPRIATE MACV STAFF AGENCIES. UPON FINAL APPROVAL, PLANS WILL BE DEVELOPED TO ATTAIN THE GOAL OF 1,800 KIT CARSON SCOUTS BY THE END OF CALENDAR YEAR 1968.

(8) GVN CHIEU HOI STAFFING REMAINS WEAKN BUT SOME EFFORT IS BEING MADE BY THE MINISTRY TO CORRECT THIS SITUATION. FOURTEEN RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS WERE RECRUITED INTO THE SERVICE. THREE RECEIVED PROVINCIAL ASSIGNMENTS. RECRUITING HAS BEEN SUSPENDED WHILE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

THEMINISTER CONDUCTS A 'PERSONNEL EVALUATION'.
E. IMPROVE THE REFUGEE EFFORT:
(1) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REFUGEES GENERATED DURING THE MONTH WAS 11,448. 16,468 REFUGEES WERE REESTABLISHED; HENCE A DECREASE OF 5,020 REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY RESETTLEMENT STATUS. UNLIKE THE PATTERNS OF SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES 3,34-ATED WAS SMALLER THAN THE NUMBER RESETTLED. THE FOLLOWING ARE COMPARATIVE FI743@:

CHANGE IN TEMPORARY REFUGEES FROM PREVIOUS MONTH

AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV
PLUS31,496	PLUS19,03	PLUS3,568	MINUS5,020

CORDS EFFORTS TO SPUR RESETTLEMENT HAVE RESULTED IN A SIGNIFICANTLY
BT
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 6 OF
45876

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

NOFORN

120 1838Z

VZCZCJCS819EUL216SxD400
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMW4097 0200000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 3256A 0190814
ZNY CCCCC
P 190717Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 02086 KROM MACJ01R FOR
ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION VI OF X.
IMPROVED PROCESSING RATE, AS THE FOREGOING TABULATION INDICATES.
(2) THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES REESTABLISHED SINCE 1
JANUARY 1964 AND THE CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUS MONTH, ARE SHOWN BE-
LOW:

TABLE EIGHTEEN
REFUGEES REESTABLISHED
1 JANUARY 64 - 31 OCTOBER 1967

	TOTAL REESTABLISHED	RETURNED TO VILLAGE AND INDIVIDUALLY RESETTLED	GVN SUPPORTED RESETTLEMENT
I CORPS	16,820	71,985	95,835
	PLUS 2,534	PLUS 2,287	PULS 247
II CORPS	482,648	366,388	116,260
	PLUS 1,312	PLUS 108	PLUS 1,024
III CORPS	246,491	69,689	176,802
	PLUS 10,662	MINUS 725	PLUS 11,387
IV CORPS	414,051	133,395	280,656

INFO..CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC/DDO-1 SEC/DEF-7
ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 WHITEHOUSE-4 STATE-1 DIA-15
CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1 (84) RBK/AS

PAGE 1 OF 4

INCLUDED IN IDA
LOG # C-71-8356

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

	PLUS 1,960	MINUS 1,052	PLUS 907
TOTAL	1,311,010	641,457	669,553
	PLUS 16,468	PLUS 2,723	PLUS 13,745

(3) REFUGEES NOT REESTABLISHED ARE CLASSIFIED AS TEMPORARY REFUGEES. THESE PEOPLE ARE THE OBJECT OF GVN PROGRAMS OF TEMPORARY CARE AND EVENTUAL RESETTLEMENT. THE NUMBER OF TEMPORARY REFUGEES INCREASED IN I AND IV CTZ, BUT DECREASED IN THE OTHER TWO CORPS.

TABLE NINETEEN
TEMPORARY REFUGEES
1 JANUARY 1964-30 NOVEMBER 1967
(WITH CHANGES FROM 31 OCT)

	IN CAMP	OUT OF CAMP	TOTAL
X	203,679	402,422	
	PLUS 13,667	MINUS 12,901	PLUS 776
II CORPS	73,565	117,332	190,897
	PLUS 125	MINUS 366	MINUS 241
III CORPS	28,442	55,109	83,551
	MINUS 3,643	MINUS 3,695	MINUS 7,338
IV CORPS	9,073	99,137	108,210
	PLUS 101	PLUS 1692	PLUS 1793
TOTAL	309,823	475,257	785,080
	PLUS 10,2	PLUS 15,270	MINUS 5,020

(3) REFUGEE REORGANIZATION AT PROVINCIAL LEVEL: THE MSWR (MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND REFUGEES) PUBLISHED A DECREE ON 18 NOVEMBER DEALING WITH REORGANIZATION AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL AND PROVIDING GUIDANCE ADEQUATE TO PERMIT RESTRUCTURING UNDER A SINGLE CHIEF. BY THIS MEANS SERIOUS PROGRAM IMPAIRMENT WAS AVERTED. I CTZ INTERSERVICE RIVALRIES LED TO A TEMPORARY INTERREGNUM, AS SOCIAL WELFARE AND REFUGEE CHIEFS SQUABBLED OVER PRECEDENCE. SUCH TRANSITORY DERANGEMENTS SEEM INEVITABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY DO NOT DIMINISH THE LIKELIHOOD OF A STRONGER REFUGEE PROGRAM UNDER THE REORGANIZED MINISTRY. CROSS-UTILIZATION OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND REFUGEE HUMAN RESOURCES TO ENRICH THE PROGRAM LEADERSHIP, PLANNED BY DR. QUE, FOUNDERED IN THE FACE OF GVN CIVIL SERVICE RULES OF SENIORITY.

(4) EMERGENCY REFUGEE SUPPLIES: A THIRTY-DAY, 1,000-PERSON EMERGENCY LOAD OF REFUGEE SUPPLIES HAS BEEN STOCKPILED AT

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TAN SON NHUT AND WERE DRAWN UPON IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE DAK SON INCI-
DENT. FULL GVN PARTICIPATION IN THIS MEASURE IS UNDER US-GVN DISCUSSION.
(5) JOINT RESETTLEMENT PLANNING: CORDS AND GVN REF-
UGEE STAFFS HAVE ACCELERATED RESETTLEMENT PLANNING WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO LAM DONG PROVINCE IN II CTZ AND TAY NINH, BINH TUY AND PHUOC TUY PROVINCES OF III CTZ. SECURITY FOR RESETTLEMENT AREAS IS THE MOST PERSISTENT PROBLEM. IF APPROVED, THESE PLANS WOULD PERMIT ALLEVIATION OF I CTZ OVERCROWDING. PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY, A PLAN FOR ADVANCE PREPARATION OF PERMANENT REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT SITES IN KEY PROVINCES IS UNDER STUDY. INTENT OF THE PLAN IS TO OBVIATE THE NEED FOR A TEMPORARY RESETTLEMENT PHASE IN REFUGEE PROCESSING.
F. EXPAND POLICE EFFORT:
(1) NATIONAL POLICE RECRUITMENT, LONG A MATTER OF CONCERN, TOOK A TURN FOR THE BETTER DURING NOVEMBER. FROM AN AVERAGE OF 25 NP APPLICATIONS PER DAY IN THE PAST, APPLICATIONS AVERAGED 250 PER DAY DURING NOVEMBER. THIS INCREASE IN APPLICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE NATIONAL POLICE COINCIDES WITH THE PROMULGATION OF THE NEW GVN GENERAL MOBILIZATION DECREE AND IS BELIVED DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTED TO THAT DECREE. WHILE THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A SHORT-AGE OF A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF NATIONAL POLICEMEN TOO CARRY OUT THE NP MISSION DURING A SCREENING AND TRAINING PERIOD, SOME RELIEF SEEMS TO BE IN SIGHT.
(2) NPFF SHOULD BENEFIT BY THE IMPROVED RECRUITMENT POTENTIAL AND ALSO FROM ANOTHER RECENTLY EFFECTED NP DIRECTIVE. THIS DIRECTIVE SETS OUT A PERSONNEL ROTATION POLICY WHEREBY ALL NATIONAL POLICEMEN UNDER AGE 30 MUST ROTATE INTO NPFF FOR A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF NPFF IS ALREADY UP SLIGHTLY IN NOVEMBER; 11,988. WITH THE GENERAL MOBILIZATION DECREE AND THE ROTATION DIRECTIVE, IT IS REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT THE NPFF PER-SONNEL LEVEL WILL RISE APPRECIABLY IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. TEN COMP-ANIES OF THE 67 ACTIVE NPFF COMPANIES ARE STILL EMPLOYED UNSATIS-FACTORILY, BUT PROGRESS IS BEING MADE GRADUALLY IN REDUCING THIS MIS-USE THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW NPFF SOP.
(3) PRISON OVER-CROWDING WAS SOMEWHAT REDUCED THROUGH THE PRESIDENT'S AMNESTY PROGRAM DURING NOVEMBER, AND THE PRISON POPULATION IS DOWN FROM SLIGHTLY OVER 32,700 TO 30,218. REHABILITA-

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TION THROUGH TRAINING IS MAKING ACCEPTABLE PROGRESS IN THE AREA OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING, AND THE PRISONS INDUSTRIES CLOTHING PRODUCTION PROGRAM IS ON SCHEDULE. ACADEMIC TRAINING, HOWEVER, IS STATIC AND STILL INADEQUATE BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING SUITABLE INSTRUCTORS. A DECREE SIGNED 22 NOVEMBER 1967 ESTABLISHES A DIRECTORATE OF CORRECTIONS WITH A DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL, RESPONSIBLE DIRECTLY TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. OTHER CHANGES AMOUNTING TO A RE-ORGANIZATION WERE EFFECTED. THESE CHANGES PROVIDE ENHANCED STATUS FOR THE PRISONS DIRECTORATE, AS WELL AS A MORE MANAGEABLE TABLE OF ORGANIZATION.

TABLE TWENTY
VC INCIDENTS (TERRORISM)

	TOTAL	CIVILIAN

BT
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SEC 7 OF 10

45876

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

1 20 16 26Z

NOFORN

VZCZCJCS640EUN168SXA373
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMU2232 0200000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 3257A 0190814
ZNY CCCCC
P 190717Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUXSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 02086 KROM MACJ01R FOR
ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION VII OF X.

	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS
I CORPS	122	410
II CORPS	184	145
III CORPS	142	166
IV CORPS	138	255

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO NP IN ALL CATEGORIES: 68,131
G. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC WORKS, VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT, AGRICULTURE, SELF-HELP, ETC.:
(1) PROGRESS IN VARIOUS ACTIVITIES IS REFLECTED IN BUDGETARY PERFORMANCE AS DEPICTED IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

TABLE TWENTY-ONE

	BUDGETED $VN	PCT BUDGET EXPENDED 31 OCT	PCT BUDGET EXPENDED 30 NOV
VILLAGE/HAMLET ADMIN. PERSONNEL	31,933,000	39	49

INFO..CJCS-8 DJS-3 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC-1 S/DEF-7 ASD/IS A-9
ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 DIA-10 STATE-1 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7
FILE-1(84)RBK/DC 1 OF4

INCLUDED IN IDA
LOG # C-71-8356

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SELF HELP HAMLET DEVELOPMENT	244,288,000	72	76
RURAL EDUCATION	478,046,000	79	86
RURAL HEALTH	173,530,000	67	72
PUBLIC WORKS	457,833,000	48	56
ANIMAL HUSBANDRY	101,795,000	57	66
AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS	105,641,000	61	69

(2) VILLAGE/HAMLET ADMINISTRATION; TRAINING COURSES FOR ELECTED OFFICIALS WERE INITIATED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE VILLAGE/HAMLET ELECTIONS IN JUNE 1967. THE GOAL FOR CY 1967 WAS TO GIVE J TRAINING COURSE OR SEMINAR FOR 22,900 PEOPLE OR JBOUT 41PCT OF ALL ELECTED OFFICIALS. THE PROGRAM IS CONSIDERABLY BEHIND SCHEDULE. AN ESTIMATED 15,500 WILL HAVE COMPLETED ORAINING BY 31 DECEMBER, WITH 1,500 MORE IN TRAINING, BUT NOT YET GRADUATED.

(3) SELF-HELP; SELF-HELP HAMLET DEVELOPMENT; TMIS PROGRAM CONSISTS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE AT HAMLET LEVEL AND THE GOVERNMENT ON SMALL CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS. THE PEOPLE DECIDE ON THE PROJECTS, RANGING FROM WELLS TO CLASSROOMS, MARKETS AND RICE-DRYING COURTS. CORDS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT OFFICERS AND GVN PROVIDE TECHNICAL AND MATERIAL (AND IN THE CASE OF FUNDED PROJECTS, MONETARY) ASSISTANCE. THE PEOPLE CONTRIBUTE LABOR AND OFTEN MONEY OR CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS. IDEALLY THIS PROVIDES A HEALTHY MIX OF POPULAR INVOLVEMENT, GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE AND CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE. THE PROGRAM HAS BEEN EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL. COMPLETION OF FUNDED AND UNFUNDED PROJECTS IS SHOWN BELOW;

TABLE TWENTY-TWO

SELF-HELP PROJECTS COMPLETED

S	JAN-OCT 67	JAN NOV 67	1967 PGM
FUNDED	2981	3548	4804
UNFUNDED	4815	5679	5000 PLUS

(4) RURAL EDUCATION;

TABLE TWENTY - THREE

CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION

	PROGRAMMED 1967	CONSTRUCTED OCTOBER	CONSTRUCTED NOVEMBER
NO. OF CLASSROOMS	2266	1266	1403

TEACHER TRAINING

45876

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

1967 PROGRAXMED	TRAINING OCT	COMPLETED NOV
NO. OF TRAINEES 2959	2962	2968

(5) RURAL HEALTH;

TABLE TWENTY-FOUR

	MATERNITY/DISPENSARY CONSTRUCTION OCT	NOV
NO. PROGRAMMED	325	325
NO. COMPLETED	73	96
NO. UNDER CONSTRUCTION	229	INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE

(6) ROADS AND BRIDGES;

TABLE TWENTY-FIVE
PROVINCIAL ROADS AND BRIDGES

	OCT	NOV
BRIDGES PROGRAMMED FOR CONSTRUCTION/ RENOVATION;		
ABOVE 1 MILLION VN$	33	33
UNDER 1 MILLION VN$	31	31
UNDER CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION COMPLETED;		
ABOVE 1 MILLION VN$	7	11
UNDER 1 MILLION VN$	62	73
ROADS PROGRAXMED FOR CONSTRUCTION/ RENOVATION (KM);		
REPAIR	566	566
NEW CONSTRUCTION	216	216
COMPLETED (KM);		
REPAIRED	299	327
NEW CONSTRUCTION	124	131

(7) AGRICULTURAL IRRIGATION; THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS PROGRAM IS TO PROVIDE FARMLAND IRRIGATION, DRAINAGE, AND FACILITIES FOR WATER SUPPLY CONTROL IN NEW LIFE HAXLETS. THE PROJECTS ARE LOCALLY SELECTED.

TABLE TWENTY-SIX
SMALL IRRIGATION CONSTRUCTION

	1967 PROGRAMMED	COMPLETED NOVEMBER

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

NO. OF DAMS; ABOVE 1 MILLION VN$		19	4
	H	(COMBINED FIGURE)	
UNDER 1 MILLION VN$			11
KM OF CANALS		107.7	98

(8) ANIMAL HUSBANDRY; THIS PROGRAM PROVIDES GRANT DISTRIBUTION OF PIGS, POULTRY, ANIMAL FEED, ETC, AND PROVIDES TECHNICAL GUIDANCE AND TRAINING FOR FARMERS IN NEW LIFE HAMLETS.

TABLE TWENTY-SEVEN

	PROGRAMMED 1967	COMPLETED H OCTOBER	COMPLETED NOVEMBER
PIGS DISTRIBUTED	15,534	9,088	9,725

BT
L
NNNN

45876

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 8 OF 45876

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

1 19 20 522

VZCZCJCS080EUN961SXC493
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMV0217 0190000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 3258A 0190814
ZNY CCCCC
P 190717Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHCSTATE AID
RUEPU/I
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SUII CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III VB
RUMMWAA/V III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA I CTZ
BT

NOFORN

C O N F I D E N T I ASLINOFBRN 02086 KROM MACJ01R FBR
ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN, RMG
ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SKTION VIII OF X.

CHICKENS & DUCKS	38,586	20,882	22,204
FARMERS TRAINED		21,226	25,492

(9) AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS UNDER RD BUDGENT; RURAL HAMLETS ARE ASSISTED BY AGRICULTRURAL CADRE AND TECHNICKS TRAINED AND ADMINISTERED BY THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE. THESE TKHNICAL PERSONNEL ASSIST RD CADRE IN TRAINING LOCAL FARMERSIN IMPROVED CROP PRODUCTIONMETHODS AND TECHNOLOGY. THE PAY OF THE AGICULTURAL CADRE AND TKHNICIANS, AS WELL AS THE COSZ OF FERTILIZER, INSECTICIDES, SPRAYERS, PUMPS, ANDHE TRACNND DEMONSTRATIONCOSY RJFUNDED FROM HE RD BUDGET AND USAID. THIS PROGRAM IS SUPERIMPOSED UPON THE REGULAR M PROGRAM

TABLE TWENTYEIGHT

	OYU VGR	S COMPLETED OCTBER	COMPLETED NOVEMBER
FARMER TRAINING SESSIONS	982	785	86
NO.OF FARMERS		5,864	40,254

INFO: CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC/DDO-1 S/DEF-7
ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 WH-10 STATE-1 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2
CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1 (84) JHA/JB (46367)

INCLUDED IN IDA
LOG # C-71-8356

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEMONSGATIONS 8 863 S 941
PLANTING MAZERIAL
DISTRIBUTED $VN 24,750,000 $VN20,352,000 $VN22,516,693
(10) FISHERIES: THE COUNTRY-WIDE GOAL IS TO INCREASE THE TOTAL FISH CATCH IN 1967 BY 50,000 MT OVER 1966. IN NEWLY SECURED AREAS WHERE FISHING IS THE MAIN OCCUPATION, THE TRAINING OF FISHERMEN, DISTRIBUTION OF FISHINGOAR AND BOAT MOTOR, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF FISH MARKETS AND LANDING STAGES ARE SUPPORTED WITH ATECHNICAL SERVICES AND COMMODITIES FUNDED BY MORD AND USAID.

TABLSTWENTY-NINE

	1967 PROGRAM	COMPLETED OCTOBER	COMPLETED NOVEMBER
MARKETS AND LANDING STAGES	17		QP
FISHING EQUVENT AND FINGERLINGS ($VN)	10,943,000	8,655,001	9,920,634
NO. OF FISHERMEN TRAINED		6,338	9,625

(11) IR8 RICE: IN THE OCTORR MESSAGE IT WAS REPORTED THAT IR8 RICE, A NEW HIGH YIELD STRAIN, HAD BEEN INTRODUCED INTO SVN ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF YIELDS AS SHOWN BELOW ARE ENCOURAGING, ALTHOUGH INFBRMATION IS LACKING ON VULTURAL PROCLICES AND AMOUNTS OFHPESTICIDE UZILIZED. YIALDS DEPICTED THERFORE, CANNOT BESINTERPRETED AS AN INDICATION OF PRODUCTION POTENTIAL.

TABLE THIRTY

LOCATION	YIELD (KG PJ HA)	AVERAGED YIELD OF LOCAL VARIEZY	YIELD MULTIPLE
TAY NINH	7,000	1,500	5.3
BINH DINH	5,985	1,800	3.3
)9,& /763,, AN GIAV	7,500	2,300	3.3
MY THO, DINH TUONG	5,000	2,200	2.3
PHONG DINH	6,000	2,400	2.5

H. BUDGET PERFORMANCE:

TABLE THIRTY-ONE

GVN BUDGET PROGRAM	1967 BUDGET($VN)	PERCENT EXPENDED OCT.	PERCENT EXPENFOV.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CHIEU HOI	772,000,000	83&	96&
VIS	41,077,384	68	81
REFUGEES;			
TEMPORARY RELIEF	532,900,000	31	36
RESETTLEMENT	760,000,000	24	27
SPECIAL FUND	QYPNPPPNPPP	74	66&&
TOTAL	1,452,900,000	32	35
.94$			
8 :940@	341,465,000	65	70
II CORPS	489,229,000	56	63
III CORPS	540,369,00	60	67
PAGS5 RUMSMA 3256A C O N F I D E N T I A L MFORN			
IV CORPS	817,292,000	53	61
LOTAL	2,188,35,000	57	64

& OBLIGATIONS- EXPENDITKE DATA UNRELIABLE
&& PERCENTAGE XPENDED DECLINED DUE TO INCREASE IN BUDGET
I. IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF UNITS IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION;
(1) NINETY PERCENT OF ARVN BATTALIONS AND 84 PERCENT OF RF COMPANIES HAVE RECEIVED RD TRAINING. SIXTY PERCENT OF PF PLATOONS HAVE UNDERGONE 'NEW' MTP TRAINING. RD TRAINING FOR RVNAF UNITS HAS PROVED FRUITFUL. IT HAS IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING OF PACIFICATION OBJECTIVES, ENGENDERED WARMER CIVIL-MILITARY RWATIONS, KD SHARPEND PACIFIKTION SUPPORT TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES. THERE HAS BEEN NO SHIFT IN TRAINING PROBLEM AREAS, ALL OF WHICH RELAZE TO INADEQUATE ARVN COMMAND INTEREST.
(2) TROOP CARE IS IMPROVING BUT REMAINS A WEAK AREA. BYSTHE END OF NOVEMBER, 60 PERCENTMF THE YEAR-END GOAL OF 2,267 UNIT MESSES WERE ESTABLISHED AND FREE OPERATIONAL JTIONS WERE BEING ISSUED.
(3) EXPANSION AND IMPROVEMENT OF PACIFICATION-SUPPORT RCOMMUNICATIONS IS MAKING EXCELLENT PROGRESS. EQUIPMENT DISTRIBUTION TABLS HAVE BEEN APPROVED FOR MAP FUNDING AND PROCUREMENT REQUESTS ARE BEING PREPARED . PLANS INCLUDE USAID-FUNDED TECHNICAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL, MACCORDS TELETYPE SERVICE AND EXPANDED TELEPHANE SERVICE IN III AND IV CTZ SHOULD BE COMPLETED DURING DECEMBERHE AN/PRC-
0
74 RADIO IS UNDERGOING TEST PRELIMINARY TO ISSUE FOR PROVINCIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

NETS.
J. IMPROVE PACIFCATION PLANNING:
(1) AB 143 THE 1968 COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN, WAS SIGNED ON 13 NOVEMBER. RECONCILIATION OF THE AID CAP AGAINST PACIFICATION PLANS SHOULD PROVIDE, WITHIN THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY THE APPROVED AID BUDGET, A BALANCED MIX OF EARMARKED RESOURCES TO SUPPORT PACIFICATION AS A TOTAL SYSTEM. AS MATTERS NOW STAND, PROVINCE RD PLANS AND PACIFICATION PLANS AT EVERY LEVEL ARE SUBJECT TO BOTH US AND GVN APPROVAL APART FROMTHE FORMALIPES OF REVIEW AND APPROVAL, PROVINCE RD PLANS FOR 1968 WERE GENERALLY THE PRODUCT OF UNPRECEDENTED US-GVN COORDINATION AND ARE CHARACTERIZED BY REALISTIC BUT SUITABLE AMBITIOUS GOALS.THE 1968 PLANNING APPROACH HAS LED TO THE CURRENT DAY-BY-DAY DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLETELY INTEGRATED PACIFICATION PLANS/ ELECTED GVN OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN UNSOPHISTICATED EFFORTS TO LOCATE AND CONSOLIDATED AUTHORITY IN
BT
NNNN

45876

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 9
45876

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

1 20 18 53Z

VZCZCJCS808EUL213SXI440
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMW4090 0200000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 3259A 0190614
ZNY CCCCC
P 190717Z JAN 68 ZFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 02086 KROM MACJ01R FOR
ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN,
MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. SECTION IX OF X.
THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, WHILE THE MILITARY AND THE OLD-LINE PUBLIC
SERVANTS DISPOSE OF IMPORTANT ISSUES WITH REASONABLE DISPATCH.
THUS, WHILE IT IS A BAD PERIOD FOR BROAD COMMITMENTS, NEITHER PLANN-
ING FOR 1968 NOR PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES FOR 1967 HAVE SUFFERED ANY
SERIOUS IMPAIRMENT.
(2) CORPS COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLANS ARE UNDER PREPARA-
TION. THE UNIFIED APPROACH EMBODIED IN AB 143 WAS RECEIVED WITH
ENTHUSIASM AND, AS IT FINDS EXPRESSION IN CORPS PLANS, IS ELICITING
OPTIMISM IN THE FIELD. THREE OF THE CORPS WERE CONFIDENT THAT THE
15 DECEMBER DEADLINE FOR CORPS CAMPAIGN PLANS WOULD BE MET AND
INDICATED EXCELLENT PROGRESS IN THE PREPARATION OF PROVINCE
PACIFICATION PLANS.
(3) THE EXACT PICTURE ON CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMS FOR
1968 WILL EMERGE WITH PUBLICATION OF THE CORPS COMBINED CAMPAIGN
PLANS. ENTHUSIASM FOR THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISORS' AIK FUND
CONTINUES UNABATED. UNQUESTIONABLY, THE FUND WAS VITAL IN
COUNTERING REGRESSION IN MANY PREVIOUSLY PACIFIED HAMLETS, AND

INFO: CJCS-5 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC/DDO-1 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-9
ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 WH-10 STATE-1 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7
FILE-1(84)RBK/JN (48459

INCLUDED IN IDA
LOG # C-71-8356

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HELPED CATALYZE THE FLURRY OF ACTIVITY TO MAXIMIZE THE RD EFFORT DURING PHASE II, 1967.
(4) 1968 PACIFICATION PLANNING HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED THUS FAJ BYYYYYYYYYYYYYYAN UNPRECEDENTED DEGREE OF JOINT US-GVN INVOLVEMENT
AND COOPERATION. IT CAN REASONABLY BE EXPECTED THAT COMMITMENT TO PACIFICATION IN 1968 WILL INCREASE IN THE SAME MEASURE. THE CUSTOMARY INADEQUATE LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION BY PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS IN PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES HAS TURNED UPWARD ONLY SLIGHTLY AS THE YEAR'S END APPROACHES. THIS CONDITION REMAINS A REFLECTION OF INDIFFERENCE TO RURAL PROBLEMS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL. HOWEVER, DEVELOPMENTS IN 1968, AS THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S KEY ORGANS RESOLVE THE PROACTICAL QUESTION OF HOW TO AMASS AND WIELD THEIR APPROPRIATE SHARE OF AUTHORITY, CAN ONLY LEAD TO BETTER INTERMINISTERIAL COORDINATION AND A GREATER IMPULSE TO SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE ELECTORATE.
4. (C) STATUS OF PACIFICATION RESOURCES:

TABLE THIRTY-TWO

UNITS IN DIRECT SUPPORT	NOV	OCT
ARVN BATTALIONS	51	54
RF COMPANIES	218	218
PF PLATOONS	738	719
GROUPS:		
RD CADRE (INCLUDING 38 20-MAN TEAMS IN AN GIANG)	527	516
TRUONG SON	110	110
CIVIL/MILITARY		35
QUARTER ZONE TEAM CADRE		2
STATIC CENSUS GRIEVANCE	5,469	5,366
NATIONAL POLICE	68,131	67,527

5. (C) INDICATOR TRENDS:

TABLE THIRTY-THREE

CHIEU HOI	960	1,741
REFUGEES:		
GAINS	11,448	21,682
NOT RESETTLED (CUMULATIVE)	785,080	790,100
RESETTLED (CUMULATIVE)	1,311,010	1,294,542
VC INCIDENTS (TOTAL LESS AA)	2,005	2,135

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TERRORISM (INCLUDING RDC)	586	367
CIVIL CASUALTIES (ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS) AS A RESULT OF TERRORISM	976	479

STATUS OF RD PLANS:

	ON SCHEDULE THIS MONTH	(LAST MONTH)	BEHIND SCHEDULE THIS MONTH	(LAST MONTH)
I CORPS	2	1	3	4
II CORPS	6	5	6	7
III CORPS	1	1	10	10
IV CORPS	6	2	10	14
TOTAL	15	9	29	35

LOC STATUS:

	GREEN	AMBER	RED
ROADS (MILITARILY ESSENTIAL)	54 PCT (1518 KM)	37 PCT (1023 KM)	9 PCT (263 KM)
RAILROADS (MILITARILY ESSENTIAL)	48 PCT (590 KM)	5 PCT (62 KM)	47 PCT (588 KM)
ESSENTIAL WATERWAYS IN NPA OF III CORPS AND IV CORPS	47 PCT (275 KM)	45 PCT (259 KM)	8 PCT (45 KM)

6. (C) ENEMY REACTION TO PACIFICATION OFFENSIVE:

A. DURING NOVEMBER, 1967, ENEMY GUERRILLA ACTIVITY WAS AT A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL. MOST OF THE ACTIVITY WAS IN THE FORM OF SMALL SCALE ATTACKS ON ISOLATED HAMLETS AND HARASSMENTS OF RD PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS CONTINUE TO INDICATE THAT MORE OF THE MISSION OF NULLIFYING THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM HAS BEEN GIVEN TO GUERRILLA UNITS AND LOCAL FORCES. THESE DOCUMENTS STATE THAT RD PERSONNEL MUST BE ELIMINATED, THE PEOPLE RETURNED TO LIBERATED AREAS, AND PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES NEUTRALIZED.

B. THE EFFECTS OF PACIFICATION, AIDED BY MILITARY OPERATIONS CAN BE SUMMARIZED BY THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT CONTAINED IN A CAPTURED DOCUMENT REGARDING THE PRESENTATION GIVEN TO THE MR5 SUB REGION PARTY COMCTTEE'S 11TH CONFERENCE HELD IN JUNE 1967: IN MANY AREAS, THE PEOPLE WERE ROUNDED UP AND EVACUATED TO OTHER PLACES; AS A RESULT, THERE EMERGED A SHORTAGE OF MEN, LABOR AND MATERIAL RESOURCES.

C. THE ENEMY CONTINUED TO DIRECT ITS PROPAGANDA AT CIVILIANS, ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE THEM INTO TURNING AWAY FROM THE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

GVN REFUGEE CENTERS AND RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES. THE PROPAGANDA DIRECTED AT THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM IS TYPIFIED BY RADIO HANOI BROADCAST OF 15 NOVEMBER COMMENTING ON THE BASIC FAILURE OF THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS PACIFICATION PROGRAM IN THE SUMMER-AUTUMN PERIOD. HE COMMENTARY CLAIMED THAT 7000 PACIFICATION CADRE HAD BEEN ANNIHILATED AND THAT 170,000 PEOPLE HAD ESCAPED THE ENEMY'S BONDS IN STRATIGIC HAMLETS ALL OVER THE SOUTH. HANOI CLAIMED THAT ONLY 70 STRATEGIC HAMLETS HAVE BEEN SET UP OUT OF THE 1100 ORIGINALLY PLANNED.

D. CONTRARY TO THE CLAIMS IN THE HANOI BROADCAST, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE LOSS OF POPULATION CONTROL IS CAUSING THE VC INCREASING CONCERN. IN II CORPS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEAL ENEMY PLANS FORMULATED TO REGAIN

BT
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SEC 10 OF 10
45876
CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

120 1431

NOFORN

VZCZCJCS519EUM893SXD358
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMU2147 0200000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 3260A 0190814
ZNY CCCCC
P 190717Z JAN 68 EFF-6
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/SATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZD
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT
C O N F I DSE N T I A L NOFORN 02086 KROM MACJ01R FOR
ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER,SLTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LLG CUSHMAN,
MG ECKHARDT FROM AMB KOMER. FINAL SECTION OF X.
CONTROL OF THESPOPULATION. BINH DINH AND KHANH HOA PROVINCES WERE
TO COORDINATE THEIR MILITARY ACTIONS WITH OTHER UNITS IN SVN IN
ORDER TO REGAIN CONTROL OF THE POPULAION IN SOUTHERN BINH DINH
PROVINCE.SPLANS FOR THE 1967-68 WINTER-SP
ING CAMPAIGN IN DAR LAC
PROVINCE ALSO CALLED FOR A LARGE SCALE MILITARY OPERAZION TO
IMPROVE TTE CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL POPULACE, IN TUYEN
DUC PROVINCE (II CTZ), PLANS FOR SECURING CONTROL OFSTHE POPULATION
INCLUDED NON-MILITARYSMEANS, I.E. PROSELYTING, TERROR, AND
ASSASSINATION OF GVN VI
LAGE AND HAMLET ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERS.D
E. MOREOVER, A CAPTURED ENEMY COMMU IQUE, DATED 30 AUGUST,
STATEDTHAT DURING JULYSAND AUGUST ALLIED OPERAZIONSSIN III AND IV
CTZS HAVE GAI EDSCONSIDERABLE SUCCESSES IN THEIR PACIFICAZION
PROGRAM. THE DOCUMENT GOES ON TO SAY THAT, IN AN EFFORT TO FOIL
HESPACIFICATION PROGRAM, THE VC HAVE LAUNCHED CONTINUGUS RAIDS ON
ROUZEE 4,S13 AND 20 AND HAVE INCREASED GUERRILLA ACTIVITIESSAND

INFO..CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC-1 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-9

ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 DIA-10 STATE-1 DIA-15 CSA1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7

FILE-1(84)RBK/DC

1 OF 3

INCLUDED IN IDA
LOG # C-71-8356

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SHELLINGS TOFORCE THESALLIES INTO CONCENTRATING HEIRFORCES TO PROTECT REAR BASES. THE VC PLAN FOR IV CORPS CALLS FOR DISRUPTION OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM BYSPANETRATING DEEPLY INTO GOVERNMENT AREAS, SEAYING CLOSE TO THE POPULATION AFD INDUCING THE POPULACE TO REVOLT.

F. REFUGEE MOVEMENT AND ALLIED MILITARYSOPEJATIONS APPEAR TO HAVE ADDED TO THE VC'S DIFFICULTY IN COLLECTING TAXES.R

(1) AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON VC TAXATION INDICAZES THAT U.S. ANDSAJVN OPERATIONS HAVE DENIED THE PEOPLESIN CH CHI DISTRICT TO THE VC BY GIVING THE PEOPLESTHE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE OUT OF CONTESTED AREAS ANDSSEEKSTHE SAFETYSOF SECURE HAMLETS. THE REMAINING PEOPLE ARE VERYSPOORAND THE VC ARE UNABLE TO EXTRACT MUCH IN THE WAY OF TAXES FROM THEM. THESLOCAW POPULATION RARELY SHOWS ANY OPEF OPPOSITION TO VC TAXES, BUT WHEN THESOPPORTUNITY ARISES, THEY FLEE TO GVN SECURE AREAS.

(2) RESISTANCESTO VC TAXAZION IN TAY NINH PROVINCE IS COMMONLYSSHOWN BY SEVERAL FORMS OF TAX EVASUON. ONE SUCH METHOD IS FOR THE FARMER TO TELL THE VC TAX COLLECTOR TEAM THAT HIS CROPS WERE DESTROYEDSBY DEFOLIATION ANDSHERBICIDE OPERATIONS. SOME EVADERSSHAVE ESCAPED TAXATION WITH SUCH A SZORY.

(3) DURING 1967, THE VC RAISEE TAXES 50PCT IN KIEN HOA PROVINCE. THIS CAUSES SOME OF THE WEALTHIER FARMERS TO LEAVE THE AREA TO SEEK SAFETYSIN GVN CONTROLLED AREAS. IN VINH BINH P OVINCE
FARMERS HAVE ALSO BEGUN TO ABANDON THEIR PROPERTIES TO MOVE TO GVN CONTROLLED AREAS FOR REFUGE FROM VC AXES. THE PEOPLE WHO STAY IN VC AREAS ARE THOSE WHO DO NOT WANT TO LOSE THEIR LANDSOR THOSE WITHOUT RELATIVES IN GVN AREAS TO HELP THEM ESCAPE.

G. RACRUITMENT ACTIVITY; THERE ARE INDICATIONSSTHAT THE VC ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING GOLUNTARY RECRUITS IN THOSED AREAS WHERE THE GVN EXERCISES SOMESMEASURE OF CONTROL. RECENT EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE VC ARE RESORTING TO FORCED CONSCRIPTION ANDSABDUCTION TO OBTAIN REPLACEMENTS. CONVERSELY, IN THOSE AREAS WHERE THE VC INFRASZRUCTURE MAINTAIN CONTROL, THEIR RECRUITMENT PROBLEMS ARE OMEWHAT ABATED. PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASI
N, PARICU=
LARLY BY FEMALES, ARE THE PRINCIPAL MEANS USED TO RECRUIT NEW MEMBERS. COERCION AND FORCE ARE USED TO ASMUCH LESSER DEGREE IN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

THESESAREAS, THE ELEVATION OF GUERRILLAS TO MAIN FORCES HAS LED TO THE INCREASED USE OF ADOLESCENTS, THE OLD, AND WOMEN ZO REPLACE THE GUERRILLA LOSS AND IN SOME CASES, TO AUGMENT LOCAL FORCES.D H, FUTURE ENEMY PLANS TO COUNTERACT PACIFICATION: THE ENEMY NO DOUBT WILL INCREASE HARASSMENT OF THE REFUGEE-PACIFICATION PROGRAMS AS THEYSCONTINUE O REDUCE THE POPULATION BASE AVAILABLE TO THE VC, THUS DEPRIVING HIM OF REVENUE, FOOD, LABOR, AND SECURITY. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS ANDSINTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATE THE FOLLOWINGAS SOME OF THE PLANNED MEASURES TO COUNER PACIFICATION;
(1) PENETRATE REFUGEE, NEW LIFE HAMLETS AND CHIEU HOI CENTERS THROUGH US E OF UNDERCOVER AGENTS, SOME DISGUISING THEMSELVAS AS RD CADRE,
(2) STEP UP HARASSMENT ANDSATTACKS AGAINST LOCS AND ASSAESINATE RD CADRE,
(3) INCITE THE POPULACE TO REVOLT THROUGH THE FORMATION OF 'REVOLT COMMITTEES.'
(4) ESTABLISH COMBAT PERIMETERS TO PREVENT MASS MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES,
(5) ORGANIZE A CAMPAIGN TO ENTICE ARVN SOLDIERS TO DEFECT THROUGT THE USE OF LETTERS WRITTEN BY FAMILY MEMBERS.
FOOTNOTE1: ROADSSDEFINED AS MILITARILY ESSENTIAL INCLUDE 451SKM IN I CORPS, 1413 IN II CORPS, 590 IN III CORPS AND 351 IN IV CORPS. ESSENTIAL WATERWAYS INCLUDE 225 KM IN III CORPS AND 354 IN IV CORPS.
GP-4.
BT
NNNN

45876

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SACSA w/Lt Miller

Tel Sec p 3

SACSA
1

PACIFICATION

I Background

II Current Program

III Possible Points to Raise

IV Status of Pacification Programs

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

IDA 71-131 230 1 cy

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

I BACKGROUND

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PACIFICATION

The Communist People's war tactic has three principal phases:

a. Stage of contention, the organizational or subversive effort.

b. State of equilibrium, the guerrilla effort.

c. Stage of the offensive, the military phase.

Vietnam is a classic application of this tactic. From 1957 to 1960 the enemy carried out the first phase. He reactivated many of the subversive and organizational networks he had left behind in 1954 and sent organizers who had gone North for training back into South Vietnam to establish safe bases, agents throughout the country and local logistics arrangements. For morale purposes, some limited operations were undertaken during this period, consisting of individual assassinations, armed propaganda forays, etc., basically aimed at creating the political impression among the population that the revolution was beginning.

By 1960 the process had developed sufficiently to move into the second phase, or guerrilla effort. Instead of five- or ten-man propaganda, recruiting or foraging patrols, 50- to 200-man attacks began against police posts, village centers and military units. Through ambushes and similar guerrilla tactics the object was to erode the power of the government in the countryside so that the safe bases could be expanded into free operating areas for the guerrillas.

By 1964, this process had matured and the time had come to move to the stage of the offensive. Guerrillas may be able to erode a government's authority but they cannot penetrate its seats of power nor contend directly with its major military forces. It was time to bring the regular military forces into the game. This was marked by the advent of ethnic North

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Vietnamese, moving down in units. These units reinforced the efforts of the guerrillas and began to attack the ARVN military units directly with a view to eliminating them and penetrating the heart of the government's authority in the urban areas. During the spring of 1965 this process proceeded and it is reasonable to predict that it would have been successful during 1966.

At this point the enemy's time table was set back by the arrival of the United States combat forces. These moved into position and into action in a short period of time and met the military challenge. Initially they stopped it, but they then began pushing it back and away from the centers of government power. In retrospect, the Tet attacks of 1968 were a convulsive effort by the enemy to penetrate the seats of government power and finish the three-stage process in one thrust. They had hoped to gain military victories, spark a general uprising and cause the disintegration of the GVN and RVNAF. They were overly optimistic in their expectation that they would succeed, and their failure was repeated in the successive offensives of 1968 and 1969. Instead the military forces of the GVN and the US not only beat back the enemy military attack, in most areas of the nation they have driven this military threat to the borders of the country or into the far mountain fastnesses.

The enemy doctrine, however, does not move up a set of stairs from one phase to the other. Instead, each phase is cumulative, and the preceding phases continue to make a full effort when a higher stage is initiated. Thus the organizational and subversive effort continued, as did the guerrilla effort in the countryside. The GVN and US problem

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

over the years has been to develop a multi-faceted defense which will meet each of the enemy's challenges, and move ahead to the development of a viable nation in South Vietnam. During the period of major enemy military threat, the GVN and US were naturally preoccupied by that threat and consequently focussed attention on the military portion of the total answer. As the military threat was met and pushed back, however, we correspondingly have focussed more attention on the other levels of the enemy effort, with a view to following up the military successes by similar successes against the other aspects of the enemy's effort. The entire process has been appropriately called "one war" by General Abrams, as it is clear that the war cannot be brought to a satisfactory conclusion unless each of the enemy's threats are countered. Similarly, effective success cannot be achieved in political, economic or even local security terms without the shield of regular military operations to protect against the enemy's big battalions.

Thus we talk of one war, and pacification as a part of it. Pacification contains three major elements: security, political support, and development. Security includes three sub-elements: military security against the enemy's big battalions, territorial security against the enemy's guerrilla forces, and internal security against the enemy's subversive infrastructure or "mafia," which otherwise could permeate the community. The development of political support of the population is designed to produce that extra force to create a national spirit and cohesion, to go beyond fending off enemy efforts and achieve a positive victory. Development includes the longer term development effort to bring about economic and social improvement and strengthen the

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

nation. In pacification terms, however, it is primarily the initiation of these improvements, to demonstrate clearly to the population that a better life lies down the road offered by the government than that offered by the enemy. These three major categories of pacification can be summarized as self defense, self government, and self development, and this is precisely the focus of the GVN's effort on it at this time.

To turn this doctrine into specific accomplishment, objectives, programs and goals have been developed. For the 1969 program, these include the following objectives:

1. Extend security: Behind the major military shield, this includes the improvement of the territorial forces to provide the local community the permanent security which enables the farmer to sleep at night. This involves the improvement and increase of the Regional and Popular Forces by a variety of specific actions.

2. Attack the VC infrastructure: This includes the improvement of the Vietnamese police and the development of an active collaboration between the civilian and military intelligence and other services capable of taking action against the VC mafia.

3. Improve local government: This includes elections throughout the land so the local communities can have their own government, training new local officials, purging corrupt and inefficient bureaucrats and using the RD Cadre to organize the people better for their own improvement and self management.

4. People's Self Defense: The entire nation is being involved in defending itself on a part-time, unpaid basis. All classes of the population participate not only in defense, but in warning systems, first aid, fire fighting systems, etc.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

5. Resettle the refugees: These 1.4 million individuals are a moral obligation; the government must care for them to confirm their choice of coming to the government rather than to the enemy, and they offer the potential of a positive political force to support the government's effort to establish a decent society throughout the national territory.

6. Chieu Hoi: This also is a process of incorporating into the national community those Vietnamese who were misled to work on the other side, provided they admit their error. This program involves not only offering this way out, it includes receiving those who come in, rehabilitating them and resettling them.

7. Information and Psychological operations: This involves informing all the people of the government's effort, so they may share in knowledge of the trend of the war and the strength of the government and derive further confidence from these.

8. Revive Rural Economy: Land reform, opening roads hitherto blocked, spreading the new miracle rice, and similar efforts to revive the active economic ties between country and urban area all help to weld the diverse settlements into one national community.

Thus there is a doctrine of pacification. There is also an organization for pacification. On the Vietnamese side this now constitutes an inter-ministerial committee headed by the Prime Minister, with a Deputy Prime Minister with major responsibility for the Pacification Program. The President of the Republic himself is in many respects the real leader of the program as it receives his personal attention and stimulus on

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

frequent occasions. On the American side, the various elements contributing to pacification have been placed under one command, so that one coherent and consistent program can be carried out and supported throughout the country without the bureaucratic frictions which previously arose when separate agencies cared for separate pieces of the total picture. In this way, on both the American and the Vietnamese side, the enemy's three-pronged attack is being met and the additional political, economic and social strength is being developed to establish the nation on its own feet. This is a gradual process and there are many weak points still in the machinery. Steady application of the doctrine in an organized manner, however, can be expected to produce a situation in which South Vietnam really does move toward the goal of self defense, self government and self development.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

II PACIFICATION PROGRAM

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CHART 1 - PACIFICATION

TALKING POINTS

Pacification is 99.9 per cent GVN business; it's their program.

We advise and support.

For first time in 1969 there is a cohesive, integrated program.

President Thieu is personally interested and involved.

He appointed General Khiem as Deputy Prime Minister to run the program.

1969 Pacification Guidelines, published by the GVN, describe the concept and set the objectives.

Guiding principle in 1969 is "Community Spirit".

This means that there must be a spirit of cooperation:

-- Among the people.

-- Between the people and the government.

-- Among government agencies.

The concept stresses that everyone must work together to achieve:

-- Self-government.

-- Self-defense.

-- Self-development.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PACIFICATION

- SECURITY
  - MILITARY
  - TERRITORIAL
  - INTERNAL
- POLITICAL SUPPORT
- DEVELOPMENT

DECLASSIFIED

CHART 2 - PACIFICATION OBJECTIVES

TALKING POINTS

The 1969 Guidelines outline the eight main objectives listed.

Goals for each are:

-- Extend security to 90% of the population.

-- Eliminate at least 1800 VC infrastructure each month.

-- Conduct elections in all villages and hamlets.

-- Organize two million People's Self Defense Forces and distribute 500,000 weapons (recently raised from 400,000 by President Thieu).

-- Rally 25,000 Hoi Chanh (will likely be increased to 35,000).

-- Resettle 600,000 refugees.

DECLASSIFIED

PACIFICATION OBJECTIVES

1. EXTEND SECURITY

2. ELIMINATE THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE

3. STRENGTHEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

4. ORGANIZE PEOPLE FOR SELF-DEFENSE

5. RALLY ADDITIONAL CHIEU HOI

6. RESETTLE & CARE FOR REFUGEES

7. EXPAND INFORMATION PROGRAM

8. IMPROVE THE RURAL ECONOMY

1595

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CHART 3 - MILITARY OPERATIONS

TALKING POINTS

Almost all military operations conducted now are in support of pacification under the "One War" concept.

Some examples of the various types of operations and how they support pacification are shown on the chart.

In Binh Dinh, for example, by integrating US, ARVN and Korean operations and increasing the number of US battalions, 12 RF companies and 16 PF platoons have been freed for redeployment to hamlets and villages to provide security for the people.

More can be accomplished in this area and US Corps Commanders have been instructed to improve security for the people.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

MILITARY OPERATIONS

ATTACKS AGAINST ENEMY UNITS & BASES	SCREENING	LARGE CORDON	CORDON & SEARCH	SUPPORT OF DISTRICTS
REDUCE ENEMY CAPABILITIES TO OPPOSE PACIFICATION	PROTECT PACIFICATION AREAS	PREPARE AREAS FOR PACIFICATION	ELIMINATE GUERRILLAS & VCI	REINFORCE TERRITORIAL FORCES
EXAMPLE:				
U.S. 1ST CAV DIV	1ST ARVN DIV	VINH LOC	HUNDREDS PER DAY	U.S. 25TH INF DIV

SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION

ARVN, U.S., AND FREE WORLD OPERATIONS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CHART 4 - TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES

TALKING POINTS

Key to territorial or people security are the RF and PF.

Since the beginning of 1968, the GVN has increased RF/PF strength substantially as shown on the chart.

This expansion has been remarkably well handled. For example, 39,000 additional RF (278 companies) were authorized in December 1968. By the first week in April, all 278 companies had been activated; 271 of these companies will finish training and be in the field by 1 July. All will be ready by 20 July.

At the same time there has been a gradual improvement in effectiveness of the RF/PF. Typical results are shown on the chart. Introduction of M-16 rifles -- 155,000 thus far -- increased morale and effectiveness of the RF and PF significantly. The 353 Mobile Advisory Teams (called MATs) of five Americans -- 2 officers and 3 enlisted men -- have greatly improved the training, confidence and operational capability of territorial security forces. Again, however, much more needs to be done to raise RF/PF effectiveness to the desired level. The GVN is working hard with our advice.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES

STRENGTH



EFFECTIVENESS

(APRIL)

	RF	PF
CONTACTS	2,317	3,574
CONTACTS/1000 OPNS	29	24
ENEMY KILLED	1,504	1,344
ENEMY/FRIENDLY KILL RATIO	4.3	4.1
ENEMY WPN CAPTURED	868	415
ENEMY/FRIENDLY RATIO	3.3	3.1

DECLASSIFIED

CHART 5 - PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE FORCES

TALKING POINTS

Because of budget and manpower constraints, it is not possible to expand RF/PF without limit.

Moreover, one of the key elements of pacification is to get the people to involve themselves in their own self-defense. By doing so, they make a political commitment.

As the chart shows, there were very few PSDF in early 1968. The Tet offensive pointed out the need for a self-defense effort.

Starting initially in urban areas and then expanding to the rural villages and hamlets, PSDF grew rapidly in 1968--largely as a result of President Thieu's personal interest.

Although quite poorly trained and armed by usual military standards, the PSDF acquit themselves very well as April results show.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE FORCES

STRENGTH



TYPICAL RESULTS

(DURING APRIL)

	PSDF KILLED	PSDF WPNS LOST	ENEMY KILLED	ENEMY WPNS CAP.	KILL RATIO
I CTZ	98	79	141	74	1.4
II CTZ	45	98	47	27	1.0
III CTZ	62	191	51	135	0.8
IV CTZ	154	315	183	72	1.2
TOTAL	359	683	422	308	1.1

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CHART 6 - Enemy's Emphasis on PSDF

Talking Points

The effectiveness of PSDF might be measured in terms of the enemy's interest and reaction.

A number of enemy documents began to be captured in late 1968 which directed local VC organizations to oppose the buildup of PSDF.

Thus, we now know that one of the enemy's objectives in the post-Tet offensive was to "smash the Accelerated Pacification Campaign," including the PSDF.

The trend chart shows the enemy's effort in this regard. Yet in terms of the overall force (now 1.2 million) the enemy was unsuccessful.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

ENEMY EMPHASIS ON
THE PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE FORCES



DECLASSIFIED

CHART 7 - POLICE ACTIVITIES

TALKING PAPER

The National Police are an important element of territorial security, although their strength and capabilities aren't yet adequate for the task.

The major reason for police inadequacies has been the rapid expansion of the force from 19,000 in 1962 to 77,000 today. Leadership is weak as a result. Not enough policemen have been trained in necessary technical skills. Too few serve in villages.

GVN is faced with the problem of further expanding the police force, to 92,200 by end-1969 and to 120,000 by end-1970. This will require considerable effort and resources, including additional US funds in 1970 and advisors.

Generally, main program emphasis is centered on the three areas shown.

Despite the shortcomings of the police effort, operation results are quite significant as shown and have improved greatly in the last year.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

POLICE ACTIVITIES

NATIONAL POLICE STRENGTH



PROGRAM EMPHASIS

50% OF POLICE IN RURAL AREAS

NPFF TARGETED ON VC INFRASTRUCTURE

ADDITIONAL ADVISORS

OPERATIONAL RESULTS

QUARTERLY TOTALS

	4TH QTR 1968	1ST QTR 1969
VC KILLED	960	993
VC CAPTURED	3,199	2,962
SUSPECTS DETAINED	8,105	6,769
TOTAL	12,264	10,724

DECLASSIFIED

CHART 8 - ATTACK ON VCI

TALKING PAPER

Measured from the date of the Presidential decree on the subject, the PHUNG HOANG (or PHOENIX) program is 11 months old. The GVN has done a good job putting together the framework--DIOCC's and the like--but much of the detailed work still has to be accomplished, such as developing comprehensive dossiers, training skilled intelligence people, etc.

As shown on the chart, a substantial number of VCI have been neutralized, although the quality has not been very high.

To focus more of the effort on important VCI, the GVN modified the criteria in mid-March so that only significant leaders and cadre eliminated are counted. These are enemy political operators who, under GVN law, will receive a minimum of a year's sentence if captured. Total eliminations increased to 1795 in April, with the May rate running about the same, against a monthly goal of 1800.

PHUNG HOANG is spotty. With an interested province chief and a few effective leaders, the program can be quite effective. For example, 185 VCI were eliminated in Quang Nam during April. On the other hand, there were provinces where no VCI were killed, captured or rallied.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

ATTACK AGAINST VC INFRASTRUCTURE



ENEMY VC INFRASTRUCTURE ELIMINATED OR RALLIED (ATTACKER)

DECLASSIFIED

CHART 9 - TERRORISM

TALKING POINTS

The extent of enemy terrorism--his attack on the GVN infrastructure--is another measure of pacification status.

In terms of overall trends, terrorism has remained at a fairly constant level except for sharp peaks during enemy offensives.

Weekly average terrorism rates for 1968 (less the Tet period) and 1969 are roughly comparable:

	1968	1969 (to date)
Incidents	197	234
Killed	112	145
Wounded	247	369
Abducted	178	183

Deaths from selective terror against GVN officials (including police and RD cadre) run about 20 per cent of the total, or about 40 per week. By comparison, approximately 120 VCI are killed each week by PHUNG HOANG operations.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

VC TERRORIST INCIDENTS

1968-1969



DECLASSIFIED

CHART 10 - EXPANSION OF SECURITY

TALKING POINTS

Despite its weaknesses, the Hamlet Evaluation System or HES gives the best overall measure of pacification status.

Started in January 1967, HES gives a monthly district advisor rating for each of the 12,000 hamlets in SVN based on a six-step scale--A, B, C, D, E and V. Generally speaking, A, B and C hamlets are within GVN security.

The chart shows trends and goals for both population and hamlets. The sharp drop (about 8%) in ABC population and hamlets as a result of the Tet 1968 offensive gave us confidence that HES accurately measured trends.

By contrast to the 8% decrease in population security after Tet 1968, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign in November, December and January resulted in a 10% increase.

The recent post-Tet offensive slowed pacification momentum somewhat. However, population security actually increased--about 1% in February, 2% in March and 1% in April, as compared to the average of more than 3% a month during the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

Although President Thieu speaks publicly of extending security to 100% of the population by end-1969, the GVN's planning goal is 90%. Barring a successful enemy offensive, this goal is within reach.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

EXPANSION OF SECURITY





DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CHART 11 - SECURITY TRENDS

TALKING POINTS

This chart shows population (urban plus rural) security trends by category.

Population in V category has almost been halved since Tet a year ago. The pinch the enemy feels as a result of this loss in population under his control shows up in captured documents; interrogation of prisoners and statements from ralliers. The enemy's tax base has been greatly reduced, he is often hard pressed to find laborers for carrying parties and work details, recruitment has been curtailed, and food supplies are frequently scarce.

The substantial increase in B category indicates a general improvement in population security measured by quite stringent standards.

For our purposes, we generally consider C category population to be within GVN security, although some in Washington argue that not all C population should be so considered. However, most C hamlets have government forces stationed in them. Moreover, GVN officials stay day and night in more than 90% of C hamlets.

The GVN and especially President Thieu use HES for making assessments and planning. According to our district advisor reports, there is very little disagreement with hamlet ratings by GVN district chiefs.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECURITY TRENDS

POPULATION BY HES CATEGORY



DECLASSIFIED

CHART 12 - LOCAL GOVERNMENT

TALKING POINTS

President Thieu has placed considerable emphasis on strengthening local government.

The March elections in 589 villages and 3031 hamlets were quite successful, although a late start on planning and overconcern with security lessened their impact. A June round of elections is underway.

The GVN's goal is to have elections in all villages and hamlets by the end of the year. To meet this goal will require consolidation for administrative purposes of some 300 villages and several thousand hamlets having little or no population into more populous villages and hamlets currently having functioning GVN administrations.

One of the major pacification innovations in 1969 is providing self-development funds directly to villages--one million piasters to villages with elected officials and 400,000 to those with appointed officials. Use of these funds, part of which can be spent without any province approval, is entirely dependent on desires of the people expressed through public meetings.

To carry out their new responsibilities, village officials will need considerable training and assistance from various types of technical cadre. For the first time, the GVN is conducting training at the national level for village officials in an excellent course at Vung Tau. Extensive in-province training programs are underway with instructors who have been trained at the National Training Center.

DECLASSIFIED

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

ELECTIONS

VILLAGE		HAMLET
1705 (509 IN MARCH)	ELECTED ADMIN	7867 (3031 IN MARCH)
510	LATER ELECTIONS IN 1969	1400
321	NO GVN ADMIN	3100

SELF-DEVELOPMENT

2 BILLION PIASTER FUND

1 MILLION TO VILLAGES WITH ELECTED COUNCILS	400,000 TO VILLAGES WITH APPOINTED OFFICIALS

+ PEOPLE'S CONTRIBUTIONS

LEADERSHIP

TRAINING:

NATIONAL CENTERS

12,000 OFFICIALS

PROVINCIAL CENTERS

18,000 OFFICIALS

CADRE:

RD	48,000
HIGHLANDER	7,000
VIS	3,000

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CHART 13 - CHIEU HOI RESULTS

TALKING POINTS

The Chieu Hoi returnee rate is running four times last year's rate to date--17,998 vs 4,640 in 1968.

However, almost the entire increase is accounted for by IV CTZ, where the weekly total has been running close to 500 returnees. This remarkable record is partially explained by (1) expansion of pacification into new areas which have not had any GVN presence in years, (2) a lowering of morale in enemy units and (3) the fact that the enemy's forces are practically all VC.

The 4,984 ralliers in April was the second highest total since the program's inception in 1963. The record month was March 1967, when 5,500 enemy rallied with the bulk coming from the coastal lowlands in II CTZ.

But, the real worth of the Chieu Hoi program is not just measured by the number of ralliers. About half of the able-bodied ralliers join one government force or another. As Kit Carson Scouts, they are highly useful guides for US forces. Ralliers are a prime source of good intelligence. Many caches are uncovered either as a result of information from ralliers or ralliers actually guiding friendly forces to them.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) RESULTS



DECLASSIFIED

CHART 14 - DISPLACED PERSONS

TALKING POINTS

The GVN is making serious efforts to reduce the refugee burden of more than 1.3 million refugees by ambitious plans to resettle at least 600,000 in 1969. At the end of April, 224,000 had been resettled.

Total refugee figures are somewhat misleading. First, the increase since fall-1968 has been mainly the result of a more thorough refugee census. Second, half the refugees are living "out-of-camp". As such, many have jobs and have been largely assimilated in the urban area or village in which they presently reside, with little thought of ever returning to their original hamlet. But, since they are authorized certain benefits, they remain on refugee rolls until they receive them in full. The GVN is beginning to move to clear this group from the rolls.

More than half the refugees are in the five I CTZ provinces and Binh Dinh, in northern II CTZ. Both we and the GVN have concentrated the bulk of our assets for coping with refugees in these six provinces.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DISPLACED PERSONS

TRENDS



1969 PROGRAM

RESETTLEMENT :
GOAL 350,000
TO DATE 178,000

RETURN TO VILLAGE :
GOAL 250,000
TO DATE 46,000

TEMPORARY RELIEF & ASSISTANCE

EXPAND SOCIAL WELFARE ACTIVITIES

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

STRENGTHS

- MOMENTUM OF SUCCESS
- INTEGRATED CONCEPT OF PACIFICATION
- ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFICATION
- PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP
- PREFERENCE FOR GVN
- RESOURCES

VULNERABILITIES

- WAR WEARINESS
- VC INFRASTRUCTURE
- DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE
- THE NIGHT
- MANDARINISM
- DEPENDENCE ON US

DECLASSIFIED

III POSSIBLE POINTS TO RAISE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PACIFICATION - POINTS PRESIDENT NIXON MIGHT MAKE TO PRESIDENT THIEU

1. Congratulate GVN on Pacification Effort.

GVN efforts since the Tet-1968 low point have been outstanding. Under President Thieu's leadership, the country recovered from the Tet offensive, held off two additional enemy offensives, and launched a major counteroffensive, called the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. In just over a year, population within GVN security increased almost 25 per cent--representing over four million people. Pacification resources were greatly expanded under general mobilization, the pacification organization was strengthened, and bold new concepts decentralizing authority and focusing on the village were introduced.

2. Continue Present Strategic Direction.

Basic direction of the pacification effort to extend the constitutional processes at a rapid rate is sound. The bold 1969 campaign goal of expanding security and local government to 90 per cent of the people has rekindled an offensive spirit among the armed forces; permitted widespread elections; restricted enemy recruiting and freedom of movement; stimulated revival of the rural economy; and given the people more confidence in a better future. Continuation of this successful strategy of expansion with priority attention to contested and VC-controlled population seems logical and desirable. Intelligence indicates that the enemy, while capable of limited attacks, will not launch an all-out offensive in the near future. We agree with your plan to launch another special campaign in July-October.

3. Political Development Deserves Continuing Attention.

We applaud the imaginative steps your government has taken in political development, particularly holding elections in 78 per cent of the villages. However, the political process requires careful nurturing. Elected officials must have a real stake in self-development, self-government and self-defense. Giving local leaders greater authority strengthens the whole political structure. Hence, it would be desirable to decentralize further decision making, especially in matters involving the local economy and

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

local government. Training of officials should continue to receive high priority. I can think of nothing as important as completing the constitutional framework and see by your recent decisions that you feel the same.

4. Attacking the VC Political Organization Has Great Importance.

The PHUNG HOANG program is sound and has achieved fair results. But, in preparing for the crucial political contest at the local level, the attack against the VC infrastructure needs even greater emphasis, including a major effort to improve and expand the National Police, which is already underway. It is essential that National Police receive adequate manpower and sufficient priority, despite the competition between essential requirements for armed forces and police. Of course, a program of this nature has the danger of upsetting the system of justice. Hence, your government's efforts to improve the courts, insure speedy hearings for civil defendants, and upgrade detention facilities are highly important.

5. Interest in Refugees.

The US Congress and people have compassion as you do for the 1.3 million war victims, many of whom live under poor conditions in refugee camps. We, therefore, fully support the GVN's efforts to resettle these unfortunate people as quickly as possible and to restore them on their own land as productive members of society.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

IV STATUS OF PACIFICATION PROGRAMS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

STATUS OF PACIFICATION PROGRAMS

PROGRAM	STATUS	PROBLEMS	REMARKS
Central Pacification and Development Council	Monthly meetings Regional and Province Councils	Regular Corps and province meetings Adequate staffs	Integrates and reviews Ministerial programs
1. Extend Secure			
a. HES [illegible]sure	End-April ABC 83.3% DE 7.6% V 9.1%		GVN uses HES for pla[illegible]
b. RF/PF improvement	175,000 M16's issued End-April strengths: RF 245,000 PF 175,000 39,000 RF increase will be operational in July. 353 MAT's deployed	JGS and SA I, III and IV CTZ have requested additional PF	MACV staff currently reviewing 220 personnel being deployed to IV CTZ to split MAT's there
	RF PF Contacts/1000 opers 29 24 KIA ratio 4 4 Wpns capt[illegible]tio 3 3		
2. Attack VCI			
a. PHOENIX	248 DIOCC's established 5,800 VCI in 1969 thru end-April (new criteria)	Inadequate operational focus	

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PROGRAM	STATUS	PROBLEMS	REMARKS
b. National Police improvement	Strength: 77,000 Improved operations during 1968 and 1969 Deploying to villages	Strength increase required: 92,200 end-1969 120,000 end-1970 VC terrorism Leadership, training, etc., deficiencies	Ministry of Defense assistance being arranged for personnel, training, etc.
c. Detentions	VCI classifications issued for detection, sentencing, Con Son, etc.	Systematic supervision of processing needed	Ministry of Interior being pressed
	Construction of additional facilities	Additional facilities required	MACV staff reviewing extra help needed
3. People's Self Defense	1.2 million organized of 2 million 1969 goal 794,000 trained of 1.6 million 1969 goal 212,000 weapons of 0.4 million 1969 goal Operations: KIA ratio (April) - 1.1 Wpns captured ratio - 0.5	Slowness to issue arms	President pressing province chiefs
4. Improve Local Government	589 village elections in Mar 3,031 hamlet elections in Mar 1,023 RD cadre teams deployed	Additional elections in June Need for Province Council elections (postponed in 1968) Review of abandoned villages/hamlets	Political mobilization (and party development)
	Village chief to have authority over PF, RDC, NP and VIS	Reluctance of province and district chiefs	

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PROGRAM	STATUS	PROBLEMS	REMARKS
5. Chieu Hoi	17,998 returnees of 25,000 goal for 1969	70% in IV CTZ Reception and resettlement	Considering special effort in IV CTZ
6. Refugees	487,000 temporary (April) 208,000 resettling 630,000 out-of-camp 1,325,000 Total Resettled or returned to village in 1969: 224,000 by end-April	Reduce total to below 1 million in 1969 Resettle 600,000	
7. Information	Strong interest at top of GVN, low effectiveness at local level	Former over-emphasis on hardware	
	Ministry of Information given responsibility for local cadre	Training for village/hamlet cadre	Training course for 850 village cadre starts 16 June
8. Revive Rural Economy	Village development program-1 million piasters to village with elected officials for projects of people's choice	Bureaucratic problems	Well received
	New land reform program	Just getting started	
	IR-8 rice		Expected to increase rice production 20% in 1969
	Open roads		

DECLASSIFIED

(1970) XIX

CONFIDENTIAL

INFO to Paris file
RAD
cl Lab Wells
D 7/15

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

Military Assistance Command,
MACJOIR

30 April 1970

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: President Nguyen Van Thieu
Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
Ambassador W. E. Colby

Date: 28 April 1970

1. Pacification Momentum: Ambassador Bunker opened by stating that we had requested the meeting to discuss some of our thoughts on the status of pacification. During 1969, considerable momentum and success had been built up. We are concerned that this momentum has faltered. Increased security has permitted the diversion of attention to private pursuits, new economic problems have arisen, political difficulties have preoccupied the Saigon level, and some of the newer 1970 programs have been slow to start. Ambassador Bunker made the point that the kind of spirit and effort that characterized the 1968 Accelerated Pacification Campaign and the 1969 Pacification and Development Campaign are needed.

2. National Campaign for Self Sufficiency. Ambassador Bunker commented that the successful efforts of the government in the security and political development fields should be supplemented by an effort in social and economic development. These should stress the active participation of the people. Thus a "National Campaign for Self Sufficiency" would result, comprising:

a. Self Defense. RVNAF improvement and replacement of US troops, PSDF, National Police and Phung Hoang.

b. Self Government. Village/hamlet elections, provincial council elections, and strengthening of village and provincial government.

c. Self Development. An "Accelerated Development Program" should be launched to include the Village Self Development Program, the Province Council Self Development Program, the Province Development Fund, village budgets and the National Ministries' programs. It should also include the need for austerity and the economic measures needed to continue economic progress.

CONFIDENTIAL

IDA 71-131 651

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

This national campaign should be pressed through the "People's Information" program to rekindle excitement over the improvements in the country's security, self government and development.

3. Accelerated Development Program. Ambassador Colby then outlined in greater detail the concept of an Accelerated Development Program. This would identify the ways in which the various government programs impact upon the local communities at the province and village level. At each community, these programs would be explained in detail and the people's views sought on three questions:

a. Their view of the most important projects which should be undertaken in the community.

b. Their view of the least important projects which should be undertaken in the community.

c. Their view of the resources which could be collected for the purposes of this program, to include a discussion of the need for economic self sufficiency.

These views of the population would be reviewed and consolidated at the province level, together with province level programs and projects, in consultation with the province council. They then would be reported to the national level where they would be used as a basis for the 1971 budget, which of course is subject to full consultation with the National Assembly. The entire effort would bring about the participation of the population in the social and economic planning of the government so that its decisions become their decisions, and they can be fully informed not only as to its programs but also as to its problems. The point was made that this would be a vehicle by which many of the strong economic measures which will be necessary can be fully explained to the people to develop the political base necessary for the government to implement them.

4. The President received the ideas with some interest and then asked what specifics we had in mind for this Accelerated Development Program. Ambassador Colby replied that the focus of the program was on the process, rather than projects. The purpose was to consult with the lowest level of the population, to receive their ideas on what projects should and should not be conducted, and involve them in the problem of locating the necessary resources. Thus no specific list of projects was contemplated, but rather the initiation of a series of meetings, discussions, and explanations to the population, designed to elicit the people's views and participation. The President then stated that the idea would have to be worked down to some kinds of goals so that performance of officials could be measured, as otherwise one could put no faith in their reporting on popular motivation. He stated that the program would have to be tied in closely with the People's Information program. Ambassador Colby commented that public opinion polling as a measurement system is not developed

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

to a high enough degree for this purpose yet. However, other measurable actions, such as numbers of meetings, specific recommendations from the meetings, consideration of review of recommendations, etc., could be worked out to put pressure on lower officials to carry on the process without putting the focus on projects. The President stated that an accelerated program of this nature would have to be launched by July at the latest, so that there is about a month or two in which the necessary preparations can be made. These preparations must include the specifics of the proposal and also the psychological preparation for the launching of such a campaign.

5. National Police. Ambassador Colby raised several items of concern with respect to the future of the National Police. Among these were the need for greater career status for the National Police, need for additional ways of recruiting manpower either from or with the military to achieve National Police strength goals, and the need for a higher rank for the Director General of the National Police. The President stated that the Police gave him considerable concern and he thought the Police should somehow be removed from the Ministry of Interior. He stated that today the Police must report through a series of civil servants to the Minister of Interior. He felt the Police should be a national force rather than a force belonging to one Ministry. He compared the military forces, of which the President is Commander-in-Chief and the senior military officer merely his Chief of Staff. This provides a direct relationship between the forces and the President, rather than the Minister of Defense having full command authority. He commented that asking a general officer or even senior colonel to take over the DGNP job was usually met with all sorts of reasons why he would make a better Corps Commander, Division Commander, etc., largely based on the low bureaucratic standing of the post. Similarly, he stated that the political figures whom he invited to join the government these days were normally only interested in the Prime Ministership, or the Ministry of Defense or Interior. With respect to Interior, their thought is that they can control the Police, use them for political purposes, etc. Thus the President invited our study and comment on a proposal which would separate the National Police from the Minister of Interior's command authority and make it a national and not political force, possibly under the President or the Prime Minister. The President went on to comment on his concept of the role of Ministers. He commented that the current Ministers spend half their time pinning medals at ceremonies, and the other half signing papers which they don't understand about infinitesimal details far out in the country which could be handled by a Province Chief quite adequately. In the Presidential system under the Vietnamese Constitution, the President believed that Ministers should handle policy and supervision and not become involved in day-to-day detail. For this reason he has pressed a program of decentralization, to let the detail be decided by Province Chiefs, so that the Ministers can be freed of it to work on more useful things.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

6. Phung Hoang. Ambassador Colby described our support of the idea of moving the Phung Hoang central staff from the Prime Minister's office to the Director General of National Police. This rather puzzled the President at first as he did not understand what the move entailed. Further explanation, however, appeared to satisfy him that this was an appropriate organizational step but one in which he did not need to be fully engaged.

7. Legal Processing of Security Offenders. Ambassador Colby outlined some discussions in process with the Ministry of Justice to improve the legal processing of security offenders. The need for "stern justice," with equal stress on both words, was outlined. It was pointed out that constitutionally some of these activities require the collaboration of the Supreme Court, especially the appointment of prosecutors who must be attached to tribunals, and that we hope that the Ministry of Justice would be able to arrange this collaboration. The President did not comment on this general subject.

8. Pacification Activities. The suggestion was made that the President resume his 1969 visits to the Corps for meetings with the Province Chiefs, as these have been effective ways of generating activity and giving direct guidance. Ambassador Bunker commented on the degree to which the President's personal leadership had been substantially responsible for the amount of drive which characterized the 1969 program. The point was also made that we hoped the President would resume frequent meetings with the Central Pacification and Development Council. The suggestion was also added that members of the National Assembly and selected members of the press be more involved in these meetings and discussions so that they could be better informed of the nature and importance of the Pacification and Development program.

9. People's Information. Ambassador Colby outlined the People's Information program as a way of contacting the great mass of the nation's population by activating all elements in direct contact with the government, i.e., the military, civil service, cadres, etc. The President accepted this but indicated that he thought the most useful form of indoctrination was bringing the village and hamlet officials to Vung Tau for a four-week course. He suggested that this program should be extended to include province and ministerial officials at all levels. These officials with a four-week exposure to the objectives of the government would then be in a better position to project its activities and aims in their daily work and daily contacts. We concurred with the desirability of doing this and stated that we would look into the specifics of it. We also stated, however, that a weekly system such as People's Information would be necessary to keep the government apparatus up to date on new developments and policies, so that they could appropriately reflect these to the population at large. The President accepted this point.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

10. HES. The President asked how the new HES was getting along. Ambassador Colby replied that it was proving to be quite effective and is somewhat more sensitive than the previous HES to fluctuations in local situations. The President stressed that the main object is to make sure that both Vietnamese and Americans speak the same language when evaluating the situation. Ambassador Colby replied that the new HES was proving to be quite useful in bringing Vietnamese and Americans together to answer its more specific separate questions, instead of giving overall grades to hamlets.

11. Chieu Hoi. The President asked about the current status of the Chieu Hoi program. Ambassador Colby replied that it was running at a lower level than last year, the main reason being that the easier Hoi Chanh obtained as a result of the rapid expansion of pacification last year were no longer available.

12. Province Chiefs. We noted with satisfaction the change of the Province Chief in Phu Yen in the past few days, a move which we believe was required by the situation there. We strongly recommended a change in Province Chiefs in Bac Lieu and Vinh Binh. The Province Chief in Bac Lieu had essentially ceased operating. The Province Chief in Vinh Binh may have improved in recent weeks as the result of a new approach taken there, but we believe the fundamental problems there did require a new man. The President did not comment on these recommendations.

W. E. COLBY
DEPCORDS/MACV

cc: Ambassador Bunker
Ambassador Berger
General Abrams
Chief of Staff
ACofS, CORDS
AmEmbassy/OSA
AmEmbassy/Pol

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

24 December 1968

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 347

PAGE 01 SAIGON 45502 01 OF 09 241606Z JAN

52
ACTION P 04

INFO EA 10,SSO 00,NSCE 00,GPM 04,NSC 10,SP 02,SS 20,RSC 01,L 03,H 02,
IO 13,INR 07,CIAE 00,NSAE 00,ABCE 00,AID 28,ACDA 16,NIC 01,SA 01,
SAH 02,SR 01,ORM 03,EUR 15,RSR 01, E 15/159 W
113202

P 241130Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6548
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DOD
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SA I CTZ
SA II CTZ
SA III CTZ
SA IV CTZ

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 9 SAIGON 45502

FOR DONNELLEY FROM NEWMAN

DOD FOR GOULDING

PARIS FOR US DELEGATION

STATE PASS TO USIA

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY AMBASSADOR BUNKER

1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF A BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY AMBASSADOR BUNKER FOR 27 AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS AT 0830 GMT DECEMBER 21. ATTRIBUTION WAS TO AN "AMERICAN OFFICIAL" OR "MISSION OFFICIAL," WITH THE STIPULATION THAT THE ATTRIBUTION NOT BE IN A MANNER THAT IT WOULD IDENTIFY THE AMBASSADOR. BEGIN INTRODUCTION:

2. I KNOW MANY OF US HAVE BEEN REFLECTING ON WHAT HAS

IDA C.71-8390

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 SAIGON 45502 01 OF 09 241606Z

HAPPENED IN VIET-NAM DURING THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS, WHT IT ADDS UP TO AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE FUTURE. SINCE SOME OF YOU MAY BE DOING YEAR-END ROUNDUPS, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO HAVEN AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ABOUT THE YEAR'S EVENTS. I WOULD LIKE TO TELL YOU HOW THINGS LOOK TO ME AND I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING YOUR THOUGHTS AND APPRAISALS.

3. WHEN THE YEAR BEGAIN, PRESIDENT THIEU'S GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN IN OFFICE ABOUT TWO MONTHS AND THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZING ITSELF HAD JUST GOTTEN UNDER WAY. THOUGH THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF THIS NEW ADMINISTRTION HAD NOT YET BEGUN TO EMERGE, THERE WERE MANY FORECASTS MADE ON ITS LIKELY DIRECTION, ITS LIFE EXPECTANCY AND ITS REPRESENTATIVENESS. WHEN THE TET ATTACK OCCURRED A NUMBER OF EMINENT AMERICANS MADE SOME RATHER DIRE FORECASTS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF PRESIDENT THIEU'S GOVERNMENT. YOU WILL RECALL THAT AMONG THEM WAS PROFESOR GALBRAITH, WHO SAID IN THE BEGINNING DAYS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE THAT THIS GOVERNMENT WAS DOOMED AND WOULD DISINTEGRATE WITHIN THE MONTH. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL AT THE SAME TIME FELT THAT THE GOVERNMENT, IN FACT THE WHOLE VIETNAM EFFORT, MIGHT BE FALLING APART AT OUR FEET. WELL THE GOVERNMENT IS STILL AROUND AND I'M THINKING OF INVITING MY FRIEND GALBRAITH TO VISIT ME ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF HIS PREDICTION.

4. I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFL TO IDENTIFY SOME OF THE EVENTS OF THE YEAR THAT HAVE AFFECTED AND HELPED TO SHAPE THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE COUNTRY.

5. FIRST I SHALL ENUMBERATE THOSE DEVELOPMNTS WHICH IN A SENSE WERE EXTERNAL TO THE GVN. THESE ARE

A) THE TET AND MAY-JUNE OFFENSIVES BY THE ENEMY;

B) PRESIDENT JOHSNON'S MARCH 31ST SPEECH AND THE PARTIAL BOMBING HALT;

C) THE BEGINNING BETWEEN US AND HANOI OF TALKS IN PARIS IN MAY;

D) THE OCTOBER 31ST SPEECH OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND THE COMPLETE BOMBING HALT AND THE REFUSAL OF THE GVN TO GO ALONG WITH US AT THAT TIME.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

E) THE DECEMBER 7 DEPARTURE OF THE GVN DELEGATION FOR THE NEW PARIS TALKS.

ALL OF THESE EVENTS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE TO THE GVN AND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE WELL KNOWN TO YOU.

6. ON THE MORE DOMESTIC SIDE, I WOULD LIST THE FOLLOWING MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS:

A) THE APPOINTMENT OF THE HUONG GOVERNMENT IN MAY,

B) THE GENERAL MOBILIZATION,

C) THE REORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE AND ITS CHANGES IN KEY PERSONNEL,

D) CHANGES IN KEY CIVILIAN OFFICIALS, PARTICICULARLY AT THE PROVINCE LEVELS,

E) THE IMPROVED MILITARY DEFENSES FOR THE SAIGON/GIA DINH AREA--THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT;

F) THE ESTABLISHMENT, TRAINING AND ARMING OF THE PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES,

G) THE FURNISHING OF M-16 RIFLES AND OTHER MODERN EQUIPMENT TO THE RVNAF,

H) THE PHOENIX/PHUONG HOANG PROGRAM TO NEUTRALIZE THE INFRASTRUCTURE,

I) THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM, AND

J) THE PROGRAM TO REDUCE AND ELIMINATE CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC OFFICE.

7. WHILE A NUMBER OF THESE MEASURES HAD THEIR BASIS IN LEGISLATION PASSED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, THERE WERE OTHER LAWS WHICH WILL HAVE A PROFOUND EFFECT UPON THE FUTURE. THESE WERE:

LAWS

A) THE SUPREME COURT LAW AND THE INSEPCTORATE LAW,

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

B) THE WAR RISK INSURANCE LAW,

C) THE MUTUAL AID AND RECONSTRUCTION SURTAX,

D) THE STATE OF WAR AMENDMENT, AND

E) THE 1968 NATIONAL BUDGET.

IN ADDITION, THE PRESS LAW AND THE POLITICAL PARTY LAW ARE ALSMOST THROUGH THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS. THIS VERY NEARLY COMPLETES THE INSTITUTIONS SET UP IN THE CONSTITUTION.

BUNKER

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 409

PAGE 01 SAIGON 45502 02 OF 09 241722Z

41
ACTION P-04

INFO EA-10, SSO 00, NSCE 00, GPM 04, NSC 10, SP 02, SS 20, RSC 01, L 03, H 02,
IO 13, CIAE 00, INR 07, NSAE 00, ABCE 00, AID 28, ACDA 16, NIC 01, SA 01,
SAH 02, SR 01, ORM 03, EUR 15, RSR 01, E 15/159 W
113543

P 241130Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6549
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DOD
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SA I CTZ
SA II CTZ
SA III CTZ
SA IV CTZ

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 9 SAIGON 45502

8. THE YEAR WAS ALSO AN IMPORTANT ONE FOR THE ENEMY FOR HE SAW MANY CHANGES OCCUR. THE MILITARY INITIATIVE HAS PASSED LARGELY TO FRIENDLY FORCES. ENEMY MAIN FORCES HAVE INCREASINGLY BEEN DRIVEN BACK INTO REMOTE AREAS, AND HIS LOCAL FORCES HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERING MORE AND MORE DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING HIS LOGISTIC SYSTEM AGAINST OUR RELENTLESS ATTACKS. BOTH US AND ARVN FORCES ARE OPERATING DEEP IN WHAT HAD ALWAYS BEFORE BEEN REGARDED AS ENEMY BASE AREAS. AS A RESULT, WE HAVE TAKEN FROM HIM UNPRECEDENTED AMOUNTS OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION. IN THE PERIOD JANUARY TO DECEMBER 1968 THESE CACHES HAVE YIELDED 49,125 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, 9,515 CREW-SERVED WEAONS, 2,339 ROCKETS, AND OVER 3,000 TONS OF RICE AND SALT. THIS COMPARES WITH THE TOTAL WEAPONS TAKEN IN 1967-- WE WEREN'T KEEPING CACHE FIGURES SEPARATELY THEN-- OF 28,873 INDUBUAL WEAPONS, 2,856 CREW SERVED WEAPONS AND 817 ROCKETS.

weapons

9. THE ENEMY'S FIRST TWO OFFENSIVES, WHILE THEY WERE MILITARY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEFEATS, SECURED HIM SOME MATERIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES. THE HEAVY LOSS OF LIFE, CIVILIAN AS WELL AS MILITARY, THE CREATION ORIGINALLY OF MORE THAN 1,000,000 EVACUEES, AND THE DESTRUCTION OR SEVERE DAMAGE TO UPWARDS OF 150,000 HOMES AND NUMEROUS INDUSTRIAL PLANTS, CREATED BOTHA PSYCHOLOGICAL STRAIN AND A HEAVY DRAIN ON RESOURCES. IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THERE WAS REDUCED SECURITY IN SOME AREAS, AND THE RELATIVELY SECURE POPULATION FELL FROM 67 PERCENT ON JANUARY 1 TO JUST UNDER 60 PERRENT AFTER TET. AND THESE OFFENSIVES HAD A GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT IN THE UNITED STATES AND AROUND THE WORLD, MUCH GREATER THAN HERE IN VIET-NAM. I WENT BACK FOR 3 DAYS IN APRIL AND WAS FRANKLY SHOCKED WITH WHAT I FOUND.

10. SIGNIFICANTLY, WHAT THE ENEMY HAS CALLED HIS 3RD OFFENSIVE WAS DEFEATED AWAY FROM THE MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS. BECAUSE THE PREVIOUS PATTERN OF WITHDRAWAL OF FRIENDLY FORCES TO DEFEND CITIES AND TOWNS WAS NOT REPEATED AND WE EXCERCISED MORE CAUTION IN THE USE OF FIREPOWER IN POPULATED AREAS, HE WAS DENIED EVEN THE ADVANTAGES HE HAD ACHIEVED, AT A FANTASTIC PRICE, IN THE FIRST TWO OFFENSIVES. AND HE PAID DEARLY FOR THIS THIRD VENTURE. THE TOTAL ENEMY KILLED AUGUST 01TH-OCTOBER 5TH, ABOUT 25,000 WAS OVER 77PERCENT OF THE LOSSES HE SUFFERED DURING THE SAME NUMBER OF DAYS IN THE ATTACKS WHICH BEGAN MAY 5TH. AT THE END OF OCTOBER AND SINCE, HE HAS NOTHING O SHOW FOR THIS MAJOR EFFORT.

11. THE ENEMY'S PROBLEMS ARE GREATER THAN THEY HAVE EVER BEEN. THERE ARE MANY INDICATIONS THAT HE IS FACED WITH A WEAKENING OF MORALE AND OF HIS CONFIDENCE IN VICOTRY. BUT, I DO NOT WISH TO LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAS NO REMAINING ASSETS. HE IS STILL ABLE TO INFILTRATE REGULAR FORCES, MAINLY THROUGH LAOS. THE USE OF LAOTIAN AND CAMBODIAN SANCTUARIES GIVES THE ENEMY GREAT ADVANTAGES. AND HE CONTINUES TO BE SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIETS AND THE CHINESE WITH A WIDE RANGE OF THE MOST SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS.

ENEMY STRAT.

12. DESPITE THESE ADVANTAGES, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THE PRESSURE IS ON THE ENEMY TO CHANGE HIS STRATEGY WHICH HOPED FOR A MILITARY BREAKTHROUGH IN 1968 BY MEANS OF CONVENTIIONALWARFARE. I THINK IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT HE IS SIMPLY RETURNINGTO SAFE HAVENS TO BUILD UP HIS FORCES. PRESIDENT THIEU BELIEVES HE MAY TRY ANOTHER OFFENSIVE ON SAIGON. NOT FOR A MILITARY

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

VICTORY BUT TO WIN A PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE IN AMERICA AND PARIS. I THINK IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT HE WILL DECIDE THAT IT IS TOO COSTLY. HE MIGHT DECIDE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AT THE NEW TALKS IN PARIS. OR HE MIGHT, WITHOUT ADMITTING ANY CHANGE IN POLICY HAS OCCURRED, DROP THE LEVEL OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES BACK TO SOMETHING LIKE WHAT TRUONG CHINH HAD IN MIND WHEN HE WROTE OF "PROTRACTED WAR." IN EITHER CASE, HIS IDEA WOULD BE TO BRING ABOUT US WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM AFTER WHICH HE COULD TAKE IT OVER.

13. WE HAVE FRUSTRATED HIS OFFENSIVES AND HE HAS SUFFERED SERIOUS LOSSES IN KILLED, WOUNDED, CAPTURED AND DEFECTIONS. NEVERTHELESS HE HAS THE CAPACITY TO LAUNCH NEW ATTACKS AGAINST GVN AND ALLIED FORCES AND AT THE POPULATION CENTERS. HE CAN DO THIS IN A DRAMATIC MANNER AND HE MAY WELL TRY TO DO IT. HOPING TO AFFECT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS ANDAMERICAN AND WORLD OPINION.

GVN TASKS.

14. THE DIFFICULTIES AND COMPLEXITIES OF THE PROBLEMS THAT THE GVN FACED DURING THE YEAR, AND STILL FACE, ARE OBVIOUS. THEY
1. AND WE WITH OUR ALLIES ARE ENGAGED IN FIGHTING A LIMITED WAR, FOR LIMITED OBJECTIVES AND WITH LIMITED RESOURCES. AT THE SAME
2. TIME THEY ARE ENDEAVORING TO CARRY OUT A SOCIAL REVOLUTION INVOLVING THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FABRIC OF THEIR SCOEITY.

BUNKER

-J 43:38/3$.
SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 391

PAGE 01 SAIGON 45502 03 OF 09 241704Z

42
ACTION P 04

INFO EA 10,SSO 00,NSCE 00,GPM 04,NSC 10,SP 02,SS 20,RSC 01,L 03,H 02,
IO 13,CIAE 00,INR 07,NSAE 00,ABCE 00,AID 28,ACDA 16,NIC 01,SA 01,
SAH 02,SR 01,ORM 03,EUR 15,RSR 01,E 15/159 w
113455

P 241130Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6550
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DOD
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SA I CTZ
SA II CTZ
SA III CTZ
SA IV CTZ

CONSTIT. & PACIF.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 3 OF 9 SAIGON 45502

15. THE FIRST OBSERVATION I WOULD MAKE IS THAT THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AND PACIFICATION TAKEN TOGETHER SEEM TO ME AS IMPORTANT AS THE MILITARY EFFORT IN GAINING OUR OBJECTIVES. I THINK WE CAN FAIRLY SAY THAT THE WAR IS NOW BEING FOUGHT ON BOTH THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL FRONTS WITH INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS.

16. THE DECISION IN APRIL 1966 TO HOLD ELECTIONS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, WHICH TOOK PLACE ON SEPTEMBER 11 OF THAT YEAR, WAS THE START OF THE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS. THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP, I THINK, MUST BE CREDITED WITH SEEING THE GREAT VALUE OF THAT STEP. THE MOVE TOWARD DEMOCRACTIC INSTITUTIONS HAS PROVED TO BE AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL COMPLEMENT TO OUR MILITARY OFFENSIVE.

17 WITH THE MOVE TOWARD CONSTITUTUIONAL YSVERNMENT, IT BECAME POSSIBLE TO EXPRESS OPPOSITION IN NON-VILENT WAYS. POLITICAL OPPOSITION WAS CHANNELED INTO LEGAL AND ON THE WHOLE CONSTRUCTIVE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

EFFORTS: FIRST TO WIN ELECTION TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, THEN TO INFLUENCE THE WRITING OF THE CONSITUTUION AND THE ELECTORAL LAWS, THEN THE VILLAGE AND HAMLET ELECTIONS, FINALLY TO COMPETE IN THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, AND THE TWO HOUSES OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER LAST YEAR.

18. IBELIEVE THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STABLE ,FUNCTIONING, CONSTITUTUIONAL GOVERNMENT HERE WILL SPEAK LOUDER THAN ANYTHING WE CAN SAY OR DOTO DEMONSTRATE TO THE VIET CONG AND TO NORTH VIET-NAM THATSOUTH VET-NAM IS HERE TO STAY. THE VIET CONG CAN IF THEY WISH ADHERE TO A POLITICAL SYSTEM UNDER WHICH THEY WOULD HAVE THEIR RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTUION, AND THEY CAN BECOME INTEGRATED INTO THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE COUNTRY.

19. THE FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT LAID IN THE ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE FORMATION OF PRIME MINISTER TRAN VAN HUONG'S GOVERNMENT IN MAY. DESPITE SOME WEAKNESSES, IT IS GENERALLY REGARDED AS THE STRONGEST AND ABLEST GOVERNMENT SOUTH VIET-NAM HAS HAD IN A DECADE. IT IS GROWING IN EFFECTIVENESS, GROWIMX IN SELF CONFIDENCE, AND IS BEGINNING TO GENERATE POPULAR SUPPORT AND ACQUIRE POPULAR CONFIDENCE.

20. THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES ARE WORKING FAILRY WELL TOGETHER. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO PARTIES IN THE STRICT SENSE, A SUBSTANTIAL MAJORITY OF BOTH HOUSES SUPPORT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. WHILE THE IMPORTANT NATIONALIST AND POLITICAL FORCES HAVE NOT YET JOINED TOGETHER IN ORDER TO MEET THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL THREAT A LOOSE POLITICAL ASSOCIATION KNOWN AS THE LIEN MINH OR NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR SOCIAL REVOLUTION IS BEING ORGANIZED ON A NATIONAL BASIS TO TRY TO BRING TOGETHER THOSE FORCES IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESENT FORM OF GOVERNMENT. A CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION IS BEING CARRIED OUT. SINCE TET, 24 PROVINCE CHIEFS AND SOME 57 DISTRICT CHIEFS HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND THE MAIN REASON IN MOST CASES WAS CORRUPTION OR INCOMPETENCE. THE POLICE ARE BEING CLEANED UP AND OVER 800 HAVE BEEN FIRED OR DISCIPLINED.

LIEN MINH

21. THE GOVERNMENT IS STRONGER AND MORE EFFECTIVE TODAY THAN IT WAS A YEAR AGO. IT MUST BE MADE MORE EFFECTIVE AND THE ADMINISTRATION MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE PUBLIC NEED.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

22. THIS BRINGS ME TO THE NEXT MAJOR TOPIC--PACIFICATION. IF PACFICIATION EVENTUALLY SUCCEEDS, THERE WILL BE NOTHING LEFT FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO SUPPORT, WE SIMPLY CUT THE GROUND FROM UNDERTHEIR FEET. AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, THE MILITARY POSTURE IS FAVORABLE TO THE GVN IN ITS UNDERTAKING OF ITS "ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM," UNDER PRESIDENT THIEU'S ENTHUSIASTIC LEADERSHIP. I THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY HE KNOWS MORE ABOUT PACIFICATION THAN ANYONE IN THE GOVERNMENT. HE IS INTENSELY INTERESTED IN IT, AND IS FOLLOWING VERY CLOSELY THIS ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN. I ACCOMPANIED HIM TO PHAN RANG LAST SATURDAY AND WE HAD A II CORPS SEMINAR OF ALL THE COMMANDERS, PROVINCE CHIEFS AND DISTRICT CHIEFS. HE WENT VERY THOROUGHLY INTO THE WHOLE PROGRAM-- AND WAS CRITICAL OF MANY ELEMENTS OF IT. HE DOES HAVE A VERY COMPRHENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE GRASP OF THE PROBLEMS.

23. MORE THAN ELEVEN HUNDRED HAMLETS WHICH WERE REGARDED AS "CONSTESTED BETWEEN THE VC AND THE GOVERNMENT SEVEN WEEKS AGO, ARE THE TARGETS OF AN ACCELERATED PROGRAM TO BRING THEM INTO THE "RELATIVELY SECURE" CATEGORY BY JANUARY 31. A STRONGER GOVERNMENT PRESENCE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN NEARLY ALL OF THESE HAMLETS. THE EMPHASIS NOW IS ON TERRITORIAL SECURITY, PRIMARILY THROUGH REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES; CREATION OF PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES; ATTACK ON THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE; A STRONGER CHIEU HOI PROGRAM TO GET THE ENEMY TO RALLY TO THE GOVERNMENT; NEW AND MUCH STRONGER EMPHASIS ON IMPROVED VILLAGE AND HAMLET ADMINISTRATION; AND INVOLVEMENT OF THE PEOPLE IN THEIR OWN DEVELOPMENT.

SIGNIF. PROGS. 4

24. AS IN MANY OTHER AREAS, PACIFICATION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED ONLY BY THE VIETNAMESE. THIS EFFORT REQUIRES PLANNING, ORGANIZATION AND A VAST AMOUNT OF TRAINING. AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF RESOURCES ARE DEVOTED TO THIS EFFORT NOW-THE RF/PF, THE NATIONAL POLICE, THE RD CADRES AND THE SEROUCES OF MANY MINISTRIES. THEY MEET HERE SOME OF THE SAME PROBLEMS WE FIND IN OTHER AREAS THAT IS TO AY A SHORTAGE OF MANAGERIAL TALENT AND IN SOME CASES, LACK OF MOTIVATION. YET PROGRESS IS BEING MADE.

? "RESOURCES"?

BUNKER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 22

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 411

PAGE 01 SAIGON 45502 04 OF 09 241737Z

41
ACTION P-04

INFO EA-10, SSO 00, NSCE 00, GPM 04, NSC 10, SP 02, SS 20, RSC 01, L 03, H 02,
IO 13, CIAE 00, INR 07, NSAE 00, ABCE 00, AID 28, ACDA 16, NIC 01, SA 01,
SAH 02, SR 01, ORM 03, EUR 15, RSR 01, E 15, /164 W
113616

P 241130Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6551
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DOD
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SA I CTZ
SA II CTZ
SA III CTZ
SA IV CTZ

PROGRESS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 4 OF 9 SAIGON 45502

A) IN EXPANDING AREAS OF SECURITY;

B) IN IDENTIFYING AND ROOTING OUT THE INFRASTRUCTURE;

C) IN TRAININING AND IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF THE PACIFICATION CADRES;

D) IN TRAINING THE NEWLY ELECTED VILLAGE AND HAMLET OFFICIALS IN THE PROCESSES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT;

E) IN GETTING PEOPLE MOTIVATED AND INVOLVED IN PROBLEMS OF THEIR OWN DEVELOPMENT AND WELL BEING.

HES

25. I THINK THAT THE REPOTS OF THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM PROVIDE US WITH A REASONABLE INDICATOR OF TREND LINES SO FAR AS THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM IS CONCERNED. YOU WILL RECALL THAT WHEN THE YEAR BEGAIN WE CONSIDERED THAT ABOUT 67 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION WAS UNDER GVN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 2

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CONTROL WITH ABOUT 13-1/2PERCENT UNDER VC CONTROL AND THE BALANCE "CONTESTED." I FEEL THE MORE MEANINGFUL FIGURES ARE THOSE CONCERNING THE RURAL POPULATION. ON JANUARY 1ST ABOUT 52.8PERCENT OF THE RURAL POPULATION WAS CONSIDERED UNDER GVN CONTROL. AFTER TET THIS DROPPED TO 43.9 PERCENT AND BY NOVEMBER 30TH IT HAD CLIMED BACK TO A LITTLE OVER 60-1/2PERCENT. VC CONTROLLED RURAL POPULATION AT THE END OF NOVEMBER WAS DOWN TO 20.6 PERCENT. I CITE THESE FIGURES NOT AS ABSOLUTES BUT RATHER TO DEMONSTRATE TRENDS.

26. I WILL ONLY COMMENT BRIEFLY ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION SINCE MR. MACDONALD HAS BRIEFED YOU RECENTLY ON THE ECONOMIC PICTURE IN 1968. DURING TWO YEARS OF THE RAPID BUILDUP OF THE ARMED FORCES, THE ECONOMY HAS ADJUSTED AS WELL AS COULD REASONABLYBE EXCPECTED. OUR ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF THE LAST TWO YEARS IS WORKING QUITE WELL. MASSIVE IMPORTS COUPLED WITH PORT IMPROVEMENTS HAVE HELD IMPORT PRICES NEARLY CONSTANT FOR THE LAST 18 MONTHS. TIGHT CEILINGS ON US PIASTER EXPENDITURES HAVE HELD DOWN US SPENDING PRESSURE ON THE ECONMY. THE DEVLUATION OF TWO YEARS AGO BROUGHT ABOUT A SHARP REDUCTION IN THE RATE OF INCREASE IN MONEY SUPPLY, ALTHOUGH THIS YEAR THERE HAS BEEN A RISE IN THE RATE, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE MOBILIZATION. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT DESPITE THE INCREASE OF MONEY SUPPLY, PRICES HAVE REMAINED RELATIVELY LOW. WHILE THE MAJOR PORT IMPROVEMENTS OCCURRED IN 1967, THE START OF 1968 SAW THE PORT IN GGRD SHAPE
AND THIS HAS BEEN SUSTAINED ALL THROUGHTHE YEAR.
LOSSES AND DIVERSIONS OF GOODS AND SUPPLIES ARE AT NEW LOWS AND COMPARE FAVORABLY WITH PORTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

27 THE THREAT OF FURTHER INFLATION MUST BE RECOGNIZED. THE MOBILIZATION ENTAILS ADDED EXPENDITURE, ALTHOUGH THIS HAS NOW SLOWD DOWN AS FORCE LEVEL TARGETS ARE BEING REACHED. CONSUMER AND INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE, FOR A LONG TIME DAMPENED BY LACK OF CONFIDENCE, IS REVIVING CAUTIOUSLY. THE MONEY SUPPLY HAS INCREASED OVER 50 PCERCENT THIS YEAR COMPARED TO THE 30 PERCENT INCREASE IN PRICES, AND AS CONFIDENCE GROWS PRESSURE ON PRICES WILL UNDOUBTEDLY RETURN. THE GOVERNMENT HERE IS AWARE OF THE PROBLEM AND HAS TAKEN SOME MEASURES
ANDSOME ARE BEING HELD IN RESERVE. WE DON'T BELIEVE
THAT THEY ARE ADEQUATE AND THE THREAT OF INFLATION CONTINUES TO BE A MAJOR PROBLEM AS WE ENTER 1969.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ECON/POL

28. BUT APART FROM THE CONTROL OF INFLATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MUST BE PURSUED AS A MEANS OF POLITICAL PROGRESS, ESPECIALLY AS IT RELATES TO THE MORE THAN HALF OF THE VIETNAMESE WHO LIVE IN THE VILLAGES AND HAMLETS.

LOCAL GOVT GROWTH

29. A FURTHER STIMULUS TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE RURAL AREAS CAN COME ABOUT THROUGH THE LOCAL ELECTIONS IN THE VILLAGES AND THE HAMLETS--AN OUTGROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTUION AND THE RETURN TO LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT. THIS CAN HAVE AN IMPORTANT EFFECT IN INVOLVING THE RURAL PEOPLE IN THEIR OWN DEVELOPMENT AND IN ACHIEVING PERMANENT PACIFICATION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE. RURAL DEVELOPMENT IS NOT A LUXURY TO BE ENJOYED IN SPITE OF THE WAR: IT MUST BE ACHIEVED TO WIN THE WAR.

NEED VISTAS

30. WE MUST LOOK AHEAD ALSO TO LONG RANGE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SO THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE MAY BE ABLE TO SEE THE PICTURES OF THEIR FUTURE--NEW FERTILIZER PLANTS, REFINERIES, SMALL INDUSTRIES, AND EXTENSIVE WATER CONTROL SYSTEMS IN THE DELTA. THESE PEOPLE NEED DREAMS TOLURE THEM ON TO A VISTA BEYOND THIS SEEMINGLY NEVER ENDING WAR. THESE ARE SENSIBLE DREAMS. THIS SPRING, THE LILIENTHAL GROUP WHICH HAS BEEN WORKING ON POST-WAR PLANS WILL SUBMIT ITS REPORT, AND WE AS WELL HAVE BEEN WORKING ON THIS MATTER WITH THE APPROPRIATE GVN OFFICIALS.

BUNKER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 493

PAGE 01 SAIGON 45502 05 OF 09 241838Z

41
ACTION P 04

INFO EA 10,SSO 00,NSCE 00,GPM 04,NSC 10,SP 02,SS 20,RSC 01,L 03,H 02,
IO 13,CIAE 00,INR 07,NSAE 00,ABCE 00,AID 28,ACDA 16,NIC 01,SA 04,
SAH 02,SR 01,EUR 15,RSR 01,E 15/156 W

113883

P 241130Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6552
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DOD
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SA I CTZ
SA II CTZ
SA III CTZ
SA IV CTZ

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 5 OF 9 SAIGON 45502

INVOLVE VIETS

31. I SUGGEST THERE IS NO BETTER POLITICAL WEAPON THAT THAT OF GETTING THE VIETNAMESE INVOLVED IN THEIR OWN DEVELOPMENT, TO LET THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES PLAN AND CARRY OUT DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITES THROUGH WHICH THEY CAN INCREASE THEIR INCOMES AND IMPROVE THEIR LIVES. WE ARE BEGINNING TO SHIFT MORE AND MORE RESPONSIBILITY TO THE GVN AND LESSENING, EVEN ELIMINATING, THE U.S. ROLE IN SOME AREAS. THIS IS AN ESSENTIAL TASK AND WE HAVE MADE A START.

SECURITY

32. PACFICIATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS CANNOT SUCCEED WITHOUT CONTINUOUS SECURITY IN THE CITIES, VILLAGES AND HAMLETS. THIS CAN ONLY BE PROVIDED BY THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES, THE RF/PF, THE NATIONAL POLICE AND THE PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES. ALL ARE UNDERGOING MORE OR LESS REORGANIZATION AND INTENSIVE TRAINING PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE THEIR CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE. IN THE NEW PERIOD WE ARE ENTERINGTHE RF/PF, THE POLICE AND THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES WILL PLAY AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

33. DURING THE PERIOD THE THIRD OFFENSIVE, AUGUST 18-OCTOBER 5. THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES KILLED 11,700 OF THE ENEMY COMPARED TO 10,400 KILLED BY US FORCES. THEY LOST 2,700 KILLED COMPARED TO LESS THAN 1,500 US KILLED. THEIR PERFORMANCE FOR THE FIRST ELEVEN MONTHS OF THE YEAR SHOWS THAT THEY KILLED MORE THAN 73,000 OF THE ENEMY AND LOST 15,567 KILLED IN ACTION ON THEIR SIDE. THESE STATISTICS ARE MORE IMPRESSIVE WHEN ONE REMEMBERS THE GREAT DIFFERENCE IN ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT WHICH THE US FORCES RECEIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ESTIMATE THAT A US SOLDIER IN A MANEUVER BATTALION GETS MORE THAN TEN TIMES MORE ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY SUPPORT THAN A VIETANMESE SOLDIER IN A TACTICAL UNIT.

ARVN

34. THERE ARE OF COURSE MANY PROBLEMS TO BE OVERCOME BY ARVN. THEY NEED BETTER ARMS AND EQUIPMENT, WHICH WE ARE PROVIDING NOW: BETTER TRAINING; IN SOME CASES BETTER LEADERSHIP, AND DESERTIONS CONTINUE TO BE A PROBLEM. BUT THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE VIETNAMESE DEFENSE FORCES THIS YEAR HAS BEEN DRAMATIC. AT TET, A GREAT MANY UNITS, INCLUDING RF/PF AND POLICE, FOUGHT ASTONISHINGLY WELL. THIS IS PARTICULARLY NOTABLE SINCE IT WAS AGAINST A SURPRISE ATTACK AND THESE UNITS WERE FREQUENTLY UNDERSTRENGTH. PERFORMANCE SINCE THEN HAS IMPROVED UNEVENTLY BUT IN MANY CASES IMPRESSIVELY. AS GENERAL ABRAMS HAS SAID, "THEY ARE PAYING THE PRICE AND EXACTING THE TOLL."

35. IN ADDITION TO THE TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ADDITIONAL MANPOWER, A MAJOR PROBLEM IS TO SEE THAT ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL ARE NOT DRAINED AWAY FROM THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, THUS CAUSING DAMAGE TO SUPPORTING GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS AND TO THE ECONOMY.

36. AS I INDICATED EARLIER, THE ENEMY AT THE END OF 1968, DESPITE SERIOUS LOSSES, REMAINS AS A FORMIDABLE FOE WITH A CONSIDERABLE MILITARY AND INFRASTRCTURE FORCE AT HIS DISPOSAL. IT IS A FORCE OF SUFFICIENT STRENGTH AND CAPABILITY TO PERMIT HIM TO EMPLOY MILITARY OPTIONS FOR PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL PURPOSES, AND HE IS LIKEY TO DO SO. HE CAN MAINTAIN THESE OPTIONS AND AVOID THE PRESSURES AND TOLL OF OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN PART BECAUSE OF THE SANCTUARIES OF CAMBODIA AND LAOS. SO LONG AS HE HAS THEIR USE, THE ENEMY REMAINS A THREAT MILITARILY.

VC CONTROL

37. WITHIN THE COUNTRY ITESELF, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE AN INFRASTRUCTURE THATENABLES THEM TO CONTROL A STILL SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE RURAL POPU-
LATION. RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR CONTROL IN THE NEGOTIA-

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIB. COMMITTEES

TONS IN PARIS, THEY ARE MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO LEGALIZE THIS MECHANISM BY MEANS OF HAMLET VILLAGE, DISTRICT AND PROVINCE LIBERATION COMMITTEES. AS OF DECEMBER, THEY CLAIMED ABOUT 1,986 COMMITTEES, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY SPECIFICALLY THE LOCATIONS OF ONLY 1,028, BUT IWOULD TREAT EVEN THIS LOWER FIGURE WITH CONSIDERABLE SKEPTICISM. MANY OF THESE COMMITTEES ARE SIMPLY EXISTING BODIES UNDER A NEW NAME. OUR ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT OF THIS LAST CATEGORY 65 PERCENT ARE IN VC CONTROLLED TERRITORY 15 PERCENT IN CONTESTED AREAS, 15PERCENT IN GVN CONTROLLED AREAS AND5PERCENT IN ABANDONED HAMLETS. BY VIRTURE OF THESE COMMITTEES THE COMMUNISTS WILL CONTINUE TO CLAIM IN PARIS THAT THEY EXERCISE AUTHORITY IN MAJOR POPULATED AREAS OF SOUTH VIET-NAM--THAT THEY CONTROL80 PERCENT OF THE AREAD AND10 MILLION OF THE POPULATION. I EXPECT THE NLF AND HANOI
TO DO THEIR UTMOST ALONG THIS LINE DURINGTHE NEGOTIATIONS.

NEGOT.

38. FINALLY, ON THE NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS, I BELIEVE THAT TEHEY WILL BE LONG, TOUGH, COMPLEX AND ARDUOUS. I DO NOT LOOK FOR SOLUTIONS TO BE ARRIVED AT SIMPLY AND WITH RAPIDITY. WHILE WE SEEK TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE THROUGH THE TALKS IN PARIS, I WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE ENEMY CAN EASILY ACCOMPLSIH THIS ANY TIME HE WANTS. THE REAL QUESTION IS WHETHER HE SINCERELY WISHES TO TAKE THIS STEP TOWARDS PEACE. I BELIEVE HE WILL PACE HIS STEPS TOGAIN FOR HIMSELF THE GREATEST ADVANTAGE POSSIBLE SEEKING TO USE THE IMPLIED THREAT OF CONTINUEDVIOLENCE AS LEVERAGE ON US.

ENEMY WANTS?

39. CASTING UP A BALANCE SHEET IS OBVIOUSLY A DIFFICULT AND COMPLICATED UNDERTAKING INVOLING AS IT DOES MANY FACTORS, QUESTION OF JUDGEMENT, AND SOME IMPONDERABLES.

40. I HAVE STRESSED SOME OFTHE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE, AND IT HAS BEEN VERY REAL PROGRESS --AND SOME LACK OF PROGRESS. BUT MANY UNSOLVED
PROBLEMS STILL REMAIN. PERHAPS THE GREATEST ISTHE POLICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT WHICH WAS ACHIEVED BY THE TET OFFENSIVE BOTH IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD, AND WHICH THE SUBSEQUENT PROGRESS I HAVE DESCRIBED HERE HAS ONLY PARTIALLY OFFSET. THUS THE ENEMY IS ENCOURAGED TO KEEP UP ENOUGH MILITARY PRESSURE TO ACHIEVE GREATER CONCESSIONS IN NEGOTIATIONSN OR A US WITHDRAWAL UNDER UNFAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.

PSY.

KEY

BUNKER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 678

PAGE 01 SAIGON 45502 06 OF 09 242157Z

82
ACTION EA 15

INFO P 04,SSO 00,NSCE 00,GPM 04,NSC 10,SP 02,SS 20,RSC 01,L 03,H 02,
IO 13,INR 07,CIAE 00,NSAE 00,ABCE 00,AID 28,ACDA 16,NIC 01,SA 01,
SAH 02,SR 01,ORM 03,EUR 15,RSR 01,E 15,/164 W
114763

P 241130Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6553
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DOD
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SA I CTZ
SA II CTZ
SA III CTZ
SA IV CTZ

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 6 OF 9 SAIGON 45502

VIET CAPACITY // PROGRESS

41. THERE IS MUCH WORK STILL TO BE DONE AND MANY OBSTACLES STILL TO BE OVERCOME. BALANCING OUT THE PLUSES AND MINUSES, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE NONE OF THE LATTER ARE INSUPERABLE. THE VIETNAMESE ARE INTELLIGENT, HARDWORKING, AND IF PROPERLY ENCOURAGED AND WELL LED CAN PERFORM EFFECTIVELY. WE HAVE A GOOD MEASURE OF SUCCESS, AND I BELIEVE WE ARE MAKING STEADY PROGRESS, AND THAT WE ARE GRADUALLY ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES IN VIET-NAM. IF WE STICK WITH IT LONG ENOUGH--AND THIS IS NOT A SHORT TERM PROPOSITION--I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE SHALL HAVE REASONABLE SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES.

1969 PROBLEMS

42. FINALLY I WOULD IDENTIFY THE MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS TO BE DEALT WITH IN 1969 AS BEING:

ONE. IMPROVEMENT IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT AT ALL LEVELS;

TWO. COALESCENCE OF NATIONALIST FORCES INTO A VIABLE POLITICAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

ORGANIZATION DEDICATED TO SUPPORTING THE PRESENT FORM OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND CAPABLE OF BESTING THE COMMUNISTS IN A POLITICAL CONFRONTATION;

THREE. ROOTING OUT CORRUPTION WHEREVER IT IS FOUND IN THE GOVERNMENT;

FOUR. ASSUMPTION OF MORE AND MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES BY THE GVN;

FIVE. EXTENDING THE AUTHORITY AND PRESENCE OF THE GVN THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORY OF SOUTH VIET-NAM; AND

SIX. MAINTAINING THE PATIENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE GVN AND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

43. (BEGIN Q AND A).

4. Q. ON THIS PRISONER RELEASE, I WAS WONDERING WHETHER THIS MIGHT NOT BE AN OPENING WEDGE BY THE ENEMY TO FORCE US TO NEGOTIATE REPREATEDLY AND DIRECTLY WITH THEM ON OTHER PRISONERS IN THE FUTURE AND WHETHER THE POSSIBILITY OF USING THE RED CROSS RATHER THAN THE MILITARY MIGHT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT IN TO AVOID THIS TACIT RECOGNITION.

45. A. WELL, I THINK THIS MAY WELL BE ONE OF THEIR OBJECTIVES AND AS YOU NOTICE WE'RE PLAYING IT IN A VERY LOW KEY FOR THAT REASON.

46. Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, WHEN MR. KY WENT OFF TO PARIS AT THE TIME OF OUR DIFFICULTY WITH PRESIDENT THIEU THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIET-NAM WAS ASSURED THIS WAS GOING TO BE A ONE-SIDE, TWO-SIDE CONFERENCE, AND THAT WAS OUR BELIEF. SOMETHING HAS EVIDENTLY CHANGED IN PARIS OR SOMEBODY HAS CHANGED HIS MIND. WHO HAS CHANGED THEIR MIND?

47. A. NO, I DON'T THINK ANYBODY HAS CHANGED THEIR MIND, GEORGE. WE SAID, IF YOU'LL REMEMBER THE STATEMENT, THAT WE WOULD CONSIDER THIS A TWO-SIDED CONFERENCE NO MATTER WHAT THE OTHER SIDE CLAIMED. WE ALWAYS KNEW THEY'D CLAIM ANYTHING. THEY'D CLAIM IT WAS FOUR-SIDED BUT WE WOULD NOT CONSIDER IT OR TREAT IT AS SUCH. WE HAVEN'T CHANGED OUR POSITION. THEY HAVEN'T CHANGED THEIRS. AND THE PROBLEM IS WE HAVEN'T COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 SAIGON 45502 06 OF 09 242157Z

48. Q. IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT WE HAD GIVEN THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIET-NAM CERTAIN ASSURANCES CONCERNING THOSE UNDERSTANDINGS. AND THIS WAS ONE.

49. A. NO, IT IS NOT THAT. WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT THE OTHER SIDE WOULD CLAIM ANYTHING. WE COULDN'T CONTROL WHAT THEY CLAIMED OR HOW THEY ORGANIZED THEIR SIDE.

50. Q. THAT BEING THE CASE, SECRETARY CLIFFORD'S ACCUSATION THAT PRESIDENT(SIC) KY WAS DRAGGING HIS FEET AT PARIS WOULD SEEM TO BE UNFOUNDED.

51. A. WELL NOW, GEORGE, I'M NOT GOING TO COMMENT, IF YOU'LL EXCUSE ME, ON SECRETARY CLIFFORD'S STATEMENT. NOR DO I WANT TO GET TOO MUCH INTO THE PARIS SITUATION.

52. Q. MR AMBASSADOR, JUST THIS MORNING PRESIDENT THIEU AT VUNG TAU STATED CLEARLY THAT HE WOULD NOT TOLERATE ANY BREACH OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S SOVEREIGNTY BY ACCEPTING THE NLF'S TERMS FOR THE RELEASE OFTHE PRISONERS. NOW WE HAVE AGREED TO ACCEPT THEIR TERMS. IS THIS GOING TO CREATE ANY CONFLICT?

53. A. NOT THAT I KNOW OF. I DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH PRESIDENT THIEU YESTERDAY. THIS STATEMENT WHICH WE HAVE ISSUED TODAY HAS BEEN WORKED OUT IN COOPERATION WITH THEM.

54. Q. I WONDER IF HE UNDERSTANDS THIS. HE SAID HE MET WITH YOU, AND TALKED WITH YOU, AND HE FELT WE WOULD HAVE TO FIND OTHER MEANS OF EFFECTING THIS RELEASE.

55. A. WELL, THAT I DON'T KNOW. I HAVEN'T HADANY WORD SINCE TO THE CONTRACY AND OUR STATEMENT WAS PUT OUT THIS AFTERNOON WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT.

BUNKER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 645

PAGE 01 SAIGON 45502 07 OF 09 242116Z

87
ACTION P 04

INFO EA 10,SSO 00,NSCE 00,GPM 04,NSC 10,SP 02,SS 20,RSC 01,L 03,H 02,
IO 13,INR 07,CIAE 00,NSAE 00,ABCE 00,AID 28,ACDA 16,NIC 01,SA 01,
SAH 02,SR 01,ORM 03,EUR 15,E 15,RSR 01,/159 W
114582

P 241130Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6554
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DOD
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SA I CTZ
SA II CTZ
SA III CTZ
SA IV CTZ

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 7 OF 9 SAIGON 45502

56. Q. SOME OF US ARE NOT CURRENT ON WHAT YOU ANNOUNCED ON HOW THE STATEMENT READS.

57. A. WELL, THE STATEMENT READS: AS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS PREVIOUSLY MADE CLEAR ITS READINESS TO MEET WITH ANY REPRESENTATIVES OF OPPOSING FORCES FOR THE PURPOSES OF PRISONER RELEASE, NOT MORE THAN FIVE UNARMED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES SECOND FIELD FORCE COMMAND WILL MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OPPOSING FORCES AT THE DATE, TIME AND PLACE SPECIFIED IN THE ENEMY BROADCAST OF DECEMBER 1, 1968 TO RECEIVE US PRISONERS OR TO DISCUSS THE MEANS OF THEIR RELEASE. THE UNITED STATES SECOND FIELD FORCE COMMAND ASSUMES THAT THE OPPOSING FORCES WILL HAVE PRESENT NOT MORE THAN FIVE UNARMED REPRESENTATIVES. THERE WILL BE NO OTHER US OR GVN MILITARY FORCES WITHIN ONE KILOMETER OF THAT POINT AT THT TIME, AND THE US SECOND FIELD FORCES COMMAND EXPECTS THERE WILL BE NO OTHER ENEMY FORCES WITHIN ONE KILOMETER OF THAT POINT EITHER. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT IS BEING MADE WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE COMMANDER OF THE THIRD

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CORPS TACTICAL ZONE OF THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

58. Q. MR AMBASSADOR, WE HAVE A REFERENCE HERE TO THE FACT THAT THE VIET CONG CAN ADHERE TO THE POLITICAL SYSTEM UNDER WHICH THEY WOULD BE GUARANTEED RIGHTS AND BECOME INTEGRATED. NOW AS I UNDERSTAND THE CONSTITUTUION OF SOUTH VIET-NAM NO COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION CAN EXIST HERE. NOW HOW DO YOU ENVISAGE THE VIET CONG BEING INTEGRATED INTO THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF GUARANTEES?

59. A. NO, NO, THEY CAN COME IN UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF VIET-NAM'S NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROGRAM IF THEY LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS. THEY CAN'T COME IN ARMED, OBVIOUSLY.

60. Q. YES, BUT ACTUALLY SPEAKING, THIS IS NOT WHAT WE ARE OFFERING IN PARIS.....

61. A. WE HAVEN'T OFFERED ANYTHING IN PARIS.

62. Q. IS THIS WHAT WE SERIOUSLY ENVISAGE, A SITUATUION WHERE THE VIET CONG WILL GIVE THEMSELVES UP?

Y3. A. NO, NOT NECESSARILY, AND HOW THIS WILL BE WORKED OUT I CAN'T SAY. I DON'T WANT TO TRY TO FORECAST AT THIS POINT. HE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WILL HAVE TO COME THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND THROUGH ACCOMMODATION OBVIOUSLY ON BOTH SIDES.

64. Q. WE'RE SO AWARE OF THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIET-NAM AND THE US. HOW MUCH TROUBLE DO YOU THINK HANOI IS HAVING WITH THE NLF; IS THERE MUCH DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM?

65. A. I DON'T KNOW. I'D SAY THIS: CINE THE NLF IS CONTROLLED BY HANOI, I WOULD ASSUME THERE ISN'T DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THEM TO ANY LARGE EXTENT. THE GVN IS NOT A CREATION OF THE UNITED STATES. IT'S A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED BY 62 OTHER GOVERNMENTS. IT'S NOT A PUPPET AS YOU CAN SEE.

66. Q. MR AMBASSADOR, USING YOUR BACKGROUNDED OF '68 AS SORT OF A SPRINGBOARD, COULD YOU GIVE SOME DETAIL OF WHAT YOU THINK 1969 MIGHT SHAPE UP TO BE?

67A. WELL, IT SEEMS TO ME, BEVERELY, THAT THE RESULTS OF THIS

Oberdorfer

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

STEPPED-UP PACIFICATION PROGRAM ARE VERY ENCOURAGING. PRESIDENT THIEU'S IDEA, AT THE COMPLETION OF THIS ONE, IS TO STAGE ANOTHER INTENSIVE CAMPAIGN AND TO SPEED UP THE INCREASED ENLISTMENT IN THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES. HE WANTS TO DO THIS RESPECT IN THREE OR SIX MONTHS WHAT WAS PROGRAMMED FOR THE YEAR BECAUSE OF THE RF AND PF'S IMPORTANCE IN TERRITORIAL SECURITY. HE WANTS TO SPEED UP ALSO--AND THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH HE BORE DOWN VERY HEAVILY ON IN THE PHAN RANG SEMINAR--THE TRAINING AND ARMING OF THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES BECAUSE, AS HE POINTED OUT, THEY ARE GOING TO BE NEEDED TO SUPPLEMENT SECURITY IN THE HAMLETS. IF THE STEPPED-UP PACIFICATION PROGRAM CONTINUES AT THE PRESENT RATE--EVEN IF IT DOESN'T KEEP UP WITH THE RATE OF NOVEMBER WHEN A 3-1/2 PERCENT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SECURE HAMLETS WAS RECORDED FOR THE HIGHEST PERCENTAGE INCREASE YET ACHIEVED--WE OUGHT TO GO BEYOND THE TENTATIVE GOAL OF HAVING 90 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION IN THE SECURE CATEGORY NEXT YEAR. THIS WOULD BE A VERY HEAVY PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL. AS I SAID, IF PACIFICATION SUCCEEDS, YOU HAVE CUT THE GROUND FROM UNDER THE VC. ALSO, I'D EXPECT TO SEE FURTHER STRENGTHENING AND FURTHER EQUIPPING OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES. THEY'VE GOT TO HAVE MORE ARTILLEY THEY'VE GOT TO HAVE MORE MOBILITY. (OFF THE RECORD, YOU KNOW, WE WERE SLOW IN EQUIPPING THEM.)

68. Q ON AMERICAN TROOPS. WHAT DO YOU THINK THE TROOP LEVEL WILL BE?

69. A. I DON'T KNOW, I WOULDN'T WANT TO FORECAST IT AT THIS POINT.

70. Q. MR AMBASSADOR, YOU HAD A MEETING OF 2 1/2 HOURS YESTERDAY WITH PRESIDENT THIEU. COULD YOU, ON BACKGROUND, GIVE US SOME IDEA OF THE GENERAL SUBJECT MATTER? DID WE URGE THEM TO STEP UP THE SPEED IN PARIS NEGOTIATIONS... SQUARE AWAY THE TABLE SEATING...?

71. A. (LAUGHTER). SQUARE THE TABLE OR AROUND THE TABLE, JOE (LAUGHTER). I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO THE PARIS SITUATION AT THIS POINT. WE HAVE DISCUSSED VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES; WE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO HANDLE THE PRISONER SITUATION, TOO. I'M NOT TRYING TO EVADE THE QUESTION BUT I'VE MADE IT A CUSTOM, AND I THINK IT'S A PROPER ONE--IT'S A CUSTOM FOLLOWED IN THE UNITED STATES--THAT WHEN YOU TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT HE'S ENTITLED TO GIVE OUT THE INFORMATION.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

72. Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, DO YOU ANTICIPATE THE ARRIVAL HERE IN THE NEXT MONTH OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NEW NIXON ADMINISTRATION?

73. A. WE HAVEN'T HEARD ANY WORD YET. THERE HAS BEEN NO INTIMATION SO FAR, BUT I WOULD THINK SO. I BELIEVE THE NEW SEC. OF DEF.--DIDN'T HE SAY SOMETHING ABOUT COMING OUT HERE AFTER THE INAUGURATION, NOT BEFORE. I HAVEN'T HEARD OF ANYTHING ABOUT SOMEONE COMING BEFORE.

74. Q. ON THIS PRISONER RELEASE SITUATION, THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO US COVERING IT TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE WITHIN THE LIMIATIONS OF THE 1 KILOMETER THAT YOU MENTIONED, IS THERE?

BUNKER

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 768

PAGE 01 SAIGON 45502 08 OF 09 250024Z

87
ACTION P 04

INFO EA 10,SSO 00,NSCE 00,GPM 04,NSC 10,SP 02,SS 20,RSC 01,L 03,H 02,
IO 13,INR 07,CIAE 00,NSAE 00,ABCE 00,AID 28,ACDA 16,NIC 01,SA 01,
SAH 02,SR 01,ORM 03,EUR 15,E 15,RSR 01,/159 W
---------- 115277

P 241130Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6555
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DOD
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SA I CTZ
SA II CTZ
SA III CTZ
SA IV CTZ

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 8 OF 9 SAIGON 45502

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

75. (INTERJECTION FROM THE PRESS): WELL, IN CONTACTING THE MILITARY, THEY'VE BEEN HESITANT TO SAY ANYTHING BECAUSE THEY WERE WAITING FOR...

76. A. WELL, I'LL SAY THIS. WE WOULD HOPE TO KEEP THIS IN THE LOWEST POSSIBLE KEY, WITH THE LEAST POSSIBLE PUBLICITY.

77. Q. AT THE GREATEST DISTANCE FROM US...(LAUGHTER).

78. Q. WILL WE BE ABLE TO SPEAK WITH THE PRISONERS AFTERWARDS... LIKE WE'RE MOST INTERESTED IN FINDING OUT WHERE THEY'VE BEEN, AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS...

79. A. I WOULD ASSUME SO. YES,

80 Q. THE NORMAL PROCEDURES WOULD APPLY...

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

81. (INTERJECTIONS BY PRESS): YES, IT SHOULD.

82. Q. WHAT'S NORMAL?

83. Q. IN TERMS OF BEING ABLE TO SEE THE PRISONERS.

84. Q. WE'D NEVER BE ABLE TO GET TO SEE PRISONERS, NORMALLY.

85. A. THESE WILL ALL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT. WE'LL WORK IT OUT. WE'VE GOT A FEW DAYS.

86. Q. OF COURSE IT'S A UNIQUE SITUATUION. WE DON'T KNOW WHERE THEY'VE BEEN OR WHERE THEY ARE YET. WHAT THE MEETING WAS, WAS TO DESCRIBE ARRANGEMENTS.

87. A. TO DISCUSS THE ARRANGEMENTS, YES.

8. Q. WOULD WE BE WILLING, OR ARE WE WILLING TO TAKE THE POSITION OF EXTENDING THE TRUCE PERIOD AS THEY IMPLIED IN THEIR RADIO BROADCAST?

89. A. WELL, I DON'T KNOW, GEORGE, I WOULDN'T THINK IT WOULD NOT REQUIRE EXTENDING THE TRUCE EXCEPT IN A SPECIFIC CASE, A SPECIFC AREA WHERE THEY ARE BEING RELEASED, AS IN THE CASE OF OUR RELEASING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHEN WE ARRANGED FOR NO HOSTILITIES IN THE AREA OF RELEASE.

90. Q. WE WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO DECLARE A TRUCE IN A LIMITED AREA...

91. A. WELL, THIS IS SOMETHING WE'D HAVE TO CHECK.

92. Q. FOR THE PURPOSE OF AN EXCHANGE WE'D OBVIOUSLY BE WILLING TO PUT A TRUCE IN THAT AREA?

93. A. WELL, THAT WE'VE DONE ALL ALONG...

94. Q. FOR 1969, IN THE MILITARY AREA, IS THERE ANY PROSPECT OF IMPROVING THE SITUATUION IN LAOS WHICH YOU SPOKE OF BY INFILTRATION EITHER BY PUTTING MORE PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT AT VIENTIANE OR...

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

95. A. MY VIEW IS THAT IF YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE A SETTLEMENT HERE THE '62 ACCORDS IN LAOS HAVE TO BE PART OF IT. IF YOU WORK OUT A MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND US FORCES, YOU CAN'T JUST HAVE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WITHDRAW INTO LAOS AND SIT THERE AND BE ABLE TO COME BACK. THIS IS GOING TO BE AN INTRICATE PROBLEM BECAUSE YOU HAVE TO HAVE A VERIFIABLE WITHDRAWAL, AND YOU CAN'T MAKE THE SANCTUARIES AVAILABLE...YES, GEORGE;

96. Q. AT THE LAST SESSION WE HAD, YOU SAID AS A PERSONAL OPINION, AS I RECALL, THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO HAVE A MILITARY SOLUTION BEFORE
YOU BEGIN TO TALK ABOUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION AS A SECRETARY IN THE US CABINET--WHOSE NAME I WILL NOT MENTION--RECENTLY SAID, QUITE STRONGY, THAT WE COULD GO AHEAD AND TALK ABOUT THE POLITICS WHILE AWAITING, OR AFTER HAVING OBTAINED , A CEASEFIRE.

97. A. MY RECOLLECTION IS HE SAID THAT WE AND THE DRV COULD DO IT. NOW, WE'RE TRYING TO WORK TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES, THEY ARE JUST AS CONCERNED ABOUT IT AS WE ARE.

98. Q IN FACT, THE POSITION OF PRESIDENT THIEU IS THAT HE, TOO, WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE FORMAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN HAND BEFORE YOU HAVE A CEASEIFRE.

99. A. YES, I THINK THAT THIS IS PROBABLY TRUE, I THINK THE WHOLE QUESTION OF CEASEFIRE IS A VERY COMPLICATED ONE, AND...

100. Q. (INTERJECTION) PRESIDENT THIEU ONCE AGAIN FINDS HIMSELF AT SOMEWHAT VARIANCE WITH SECRETARY CLIFFORD.

101. A. WELL, IT MAY BE WITH SECRETARY CLIFFORD: BUT I THINK WE PRETTY WELL UNDERSTAND ONE ANOTHER ON THESE POINTS.

102. Q. WE UNDERSTAND ONE ANOTHER, BUT DO WE HAVE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING?

103. A. I THINK WE CAN SAY SO, YES.

104. Q THE AMERICAN IMPACT OF TET, AND SO ON, FOR '69 THE PROBLEMS OF MAINTAINING THE PATIENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE...
WHAT CAN BE DONE IN THIS FIELD:

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

105. A. WELL, THAT'S UP TO YOU PEOPLE. (LAUGHTER). I WOULD HOPE THAT WITH THE TALKS IN PARIS AND THE STEADY IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION HERE, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD BE PATIENT. I HOPE WE WOULD NOT TRY TO PULL OUT FASTER THAN IS REASONABLE. WE HAVE PUT A LOT
IN HERE, AND I DON'T THINK ANY OF US WANTS TO SEE IT GO BY THE BOARD. I DON'T THINK IT NEEDS TO; I DON'T THINK IT WILL.

106. Q. TO FOLLOW THIS A LITTLE FURTHER, YOU SPOKE OF THE IMPATIENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE...

107. A. NO I DIDN'T SPEAK OF THE IMPATIENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. I SAID THAT THE IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAS BEEN GREATER THAN IT HAD BEEN HERE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT.

BUNKER

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 760

PAGE 01 SAIGON 45502 09 OF 09 242331Z

87
ACTION P 04

INFO EA 10,SSO 00,NSCE 00,GPM 04,NSC 10,SP 02,SS 20,RSC 01,L 03,H 02,
IO 13,INR 07,CIAE 00,NSAE 00,ABCE 00,AID 28,ACDA 16,NIC 01,SA 01,
SAH 02,SR 01,ORM 03,EUR 15,E 15,RSR 01,/159 W
115144

P 241737Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6556
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DOD
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SA I CTZ
SA II CTZ
SA III CTZ
SA IV CTZ

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 9 OF 9 SAIGON 45502

108. Q. ASSUMING THE IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AS YOU DESCRIBED IT, AT LEAST AFTER TET, CONTINUED, WHAT WOULD THE EFFECT BE IN THIS COUNTRY?

109. A. I DON'T REALLY ANTICIPATE THE ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF ANOTHER TET IN ANY SENSE OF THE WORD: IN FACT I SERIOUSLY DOUBT THEY CAN EVER GET ANOTHER OFFENSIVE OFF THE GROUND.

110. Q FOLLOWING THAT, SOME OF US WERE IN THIS ROOM A WEEK AGO IN WHICH THERE WERE STRONG ASSURANCES THAT THERE WOULD BE A VERY STRONG OFFENSIVE MOUNTED. I WONDER WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE DIFFERENCE IN THE THINKING DURING THIS WEEK'S TIME?

111. A. WELL, WE GET INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OF WHAT THE ENEMY INTENDS TO DO, BUT THAT DOESN'T MEAN HE'S CAPABLE OF DOING IT. ALSO, I THINK THAT OUR SPOILING OPERATIONS, OUR INHIBITING OPERATIONS, ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE, AND I SAY I DOUBT VERY MUCH IF THEY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
44

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CAN
GET ANOTHER OFFENSIVE OFF THE GROUND. THAT DOESN'T MEAN THEY WON'T TRY.

112. Q. GOING BACK TO THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM, I'VE HEARD REPORTS, ALTHOUGH I DON'T KNOW HOW WIDESPREAD, THAT WHEN THE GVN GOES INTO A CONTESTED AREA TO RE-ESTABLISH THE DOMINANCE OF AUTHORITY THE LAND-OWNERS ARE GOING BACK TO COLLECT BACK TAXES AND RICE...

113. A. NO, THAT'S NOT TURE. THEY NOT PERMITTED TO. THE PRESIDENT MADE IT VERY CLEAR IN BA TRI THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO DO IT, AND THERE HAS BEEN A GOVERNMENT ORDER PUT OUT TO THAT EFFECT.

114. Q. THE PRIME MINISTER TALKED ABOUT IT...DO YOU FEEL CONFIDENT THEN THAT THIS IS A GENERAL PRACTICE?

115. A. YES, I DO. I THINK IT IS A FIRM GOVERNMENT POLICY

116. Q. IS IT POSSIBLE, OR IS THE GVN THINKING OF JUMPING A STEP AHEAD...WHICH IS WHENEVER THEY GO INTO A PACIFICATION PROGRAM THEY WILL DO SOMETHING
SPECIFIC ON GIVING LAND TO THE TENENT FARMERS--

EVEN IF IT REQUIRES BUYING FROM THE LARGE LAND-OWNERS?

117. A. WELL, THEY ARE WORKING QUITE INTENSIVELY NOW ON PLANS FOR
A VERY COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM WHICH WOULD INCLUDE LAND PURCHASE-- BOTH VOLUNTARY PURCHASE, AND IF NOT VOLUNTARY, EVENTUALLY ENFORCED SALE. AND I THINK THAT THEY'RE VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM.

118. PRESS. THANK YOU, MR AMBASSADOR.

119. A. THANK YOU. MERRY CHRISTMAS AND A HAPPY AND BETTER NEW YEAR TO YOU ALL.

BUNKER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

c/Lt Waller

23294

SECTION 1 OF 5

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

0 03 21 5 1 Z

D947 CJCS890/3
IA54SSEU576
OO RUEKDA
DE RUMSCU3417 2760800
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSAW 0337K 2761445ZNY CCCCC
O 031135Z OCT 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHKA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEKDA/CJCS
RUEKDA/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
ZEN/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
ZEN/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMSAK/CG III MAF/SA I CTZ
RUMSAU A/SA IV CTZ
BT

DEXTER

IMMEDIATE
NOFORN

Aug 67

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN FROM; MACJ01R FOR EDM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN, BG DESOBRY FROM AMB KOMER 32489 SEC I OF V.

SUBJ; PACIFICATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM DURING AUGUST 1967

1. (C) THIS IS THE SEVENTH IN THE SERIES OF MONTHLY ASSESSMENTS OF PACIFICATION. IT IS BASED BOTH UPON PROVINCIAL AND CORPS REPORTING AND UPON ANALYSIS DONE IN SAIGONGM IN AN EFFORT TO EVALUATE PACIFICATION ON A MORE COMPREHENSIVE BASIS, THIS ASSESSMENT IS THE FIRST IN A NEW FORMAT. YOUR COMMENTS ARE INVITED.

2. (C) OVERALL STATUS OF THE PACIFICATION EFFORT; NO SINGLE STATEMENT CAN ACCURATELY DEFINE THE STATUS OF PACIFICATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM FROM MONTH TO MONTH. THE DIVERSE SITUATIONS FOUND FROM THE WAR-TORN NORTH TO THE RELATIVE CALM OF THE DELTA SIMPLY DO NOT ALLOW IT. AUGUST, AS EXPECTED, WAS AN UNIMPRESSIVE MONTH FOR MEASURABLE PROGRESS IN PACIFICATIONGN AS THE PREOCCUPATION OF THE GVN WITH THE ELECTIONS CAUSED A SHARP DECLINE IN THE TEMPO OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY. THE GENERALLY INEFFECTIVE VIETNAMESE

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/SA-3

DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-6 FILE-1(60) JHA/CF

EX COPY: CJCS-5(65) 4 OCT 67
ADDED DIST: SACSA-3(68) 4 OCT 67(PER MR DAY-OCJCS)

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR
VALSI DECLASSIFIED
BY [illegible]

IDA C 71-8355
1 cy w/4 letter

NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

INFORMATION SERVICE (VIS) LENT TO GREAT LENGTHS AND PROVIDED PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE SUPPORT FOR THE ELECTIONS-AN INDICATION OF THE CHANGE THAT CAN BE WROUGHT LITH PROPER MOTIVATION AND EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP. IN A NUMBER OF CASES, HOWEVER, ELECTION ACTIVITY HAS BEEN USED TO GLOSS OVER THE NORMALLY APATHETIC PERFORMANCE OF MANY GVN-PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS. THERE ARE, NEVERTHELESS, INTANGIBLE FACTORS SUCH AS THE INCREASE IN CIVILIAN AND COMMERCIANY PARTS OF THE COUNTRY AND SUBTLE CHANGES IN PUBLIC ATTITUDES THAT INDICATE PROGRESS BEING MADE AGAINST THE VC. UNFORTUNATELY, MANY SUCH CHANGES CANNOT BE GIVEN GREATER WEIGHT BY STATISTICS WHICH SHOW PROGRESS IN MANY OF THE SUB-PROGRAMS THAT COMPRISE THE TOTAL PACIFICATION EFFORT. IT IS DOUBTFUL, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE HAMLET CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM WILL MEET UUTS 1967 GOALS BY THE END OF THE YEAR. AND YET LE ARE AT ONCE CONFRONTED WITH A PARADOX. IF PACIFICATION HAS AS ITS ULTIMATE PURPOSE AN ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL END, I. E., THE CONSTRUCTION OF A FRUITFUL DIALOGUE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, THEN AUGUST AND THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF SEPTEMBER MARK A UNIQUELY SUCCESSFUL PRIOD IN THE RECENT HISTORY OF SOUTH VIETNAM. IN THE FACE OF GREATLY INCREASED AND FREQUENTLY VIOLENT ENEMY HARASSMENT, OVER 80PCT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WENT TO THE POLLS--AN IMPRESSIVE FIGURE WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THE NUMBER OF US VOTERS LHO STAY AT HOME BECAUSE OF A LIGHT RAIN. IN ANY EVENT, THE SURPRISING CANDOR OF THE CAMPAIGN-AND THE EVEN MORE SURPRISING RESULTS-INDICATE THAT IF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC EBOUT THEIR PAST AND PRESENT GOVERNMENTS, THEY ARE NOT, AT LEAST, APATHETIC ABOUT THEIR FATE.

3. (C) IMPACT OF MAIN COMPONENTS OF PACIFICATION OFFENSIVE;

A. ATTACK ON THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE; IN GENERAL, THERE WERE ONLY LIMITED RESULTS IN AAGUST FROM ATTACKS ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE, THOUGH OUR REPORTING BASE IS SO POOR THAT MUCH MAY BE HAPPENING OF ZHICH WE ARE UNAWARE. WE ARE WORKING ON A NEW REPORTING SYSTEM TO CORRECT THIS LEAKNESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, ATTEMPTS BY THE INFRASTRUCTURE TO DISRUPT THE GVN ELECTIONS LERE BASICALLY INEFFECTIVE. THE INFRASTRUCTURE RETAINS ITS INTEGRITY AS A WELL-DISCIPLINED, EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONGM THERE LERE A NUMBER OF ARRESTS IN I CO
PS, ALTHOUGH THOSE ARRESTED WERE

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PRIMARILY LOZ-LEVEL VC WORKERS AND NOT HARD-CORE POLITICAL CADRE. CHANG TIN REPORTS THAT 46PCT OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED, BUT THAT NO EFFECTIVE ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THIS 46PCT. IN II CORPS OPERATION DRAGNET, A JOINT US MILITARY AND VIETNAMESE POLICE CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONGN CONTINUES TO ELIMINATE THE INFRASTRUCTURE IN BINH-DINH PROVINCE. MEANWHILE WE ARE MOVING TO SET UP THE NEW INFRASTRUCTURE INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AND EXPLOITATION (ICEX) PROGRAM. ICEX COMMITTEES ARE FUNCTIONING IN MOST PROVINCES IN II CORPS. IN III CORPS, WHILE THERE HAS BEEN A SHARP INCREASE IN HARD INTELLIGENCE AS A RESULT OF THE EXPANDING SYSTEM OF THE DISTRICT OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE AND COORDINATING CENTERS (DOICC), THE INFRASTRUCTURE HAS NOT BEEN PENETRATED SERIOUSLY; HOWEVER, ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE HAMPERED ITS EFFECTIVENESS. IN IV CORPS, NO INCREASED RESULTS CAN BE SEEN AS YET IN THE EFFORT TO IDENTIFY AND TARGET THE INFRASTRUCTURE. THIS IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE FACT THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOICC'S IS JUST BEGINNING, ALTHOUGH SOME 5 ARE NOW IN EXISTENCE.

B. EXPAND AND IMPROVE TERRITORIAL SECURITY; THE NUMBER OF HAMLETS AND POPULATION ON 31 AUGUST IN CATEGORIES ESTABLISHED BY THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM (HES), TOGETHER WITH CHANGE DURING THE MONTH, IS AS FOLLOWS;

HAMLET STATUS

	SECURE			CONTESTED				
	A	B	C	D	E	VC	OTHER	TOTAL
I	23	246	467	443	78	995	195	2447
	PLUS4	PLUS17	MINUS21	PLUS9	PLUS1	MINUS 8	PLUS19	PLUS21
II	50	537	959	574	163	603	214	3100
	MINUS 2	MINUS9	MINUS7	PLUS32	PLUS4	MINUS8	MINUS9	PLUS1
III	0	329	651	399	50	467	216	2112
	0	PLUS17	MINUS36	PLUS12	MINUS1	MINSS6	PLUS14	PLUS0
IV	128	783	1015	828	188	1973	68	4983
	PLUS1	PLUS16	MINUS11	MINUS1	MINUS5	PLUS3	MINUS1	PLUS2
RVN	216	1895	3092	2244	479	4038	693	12642
	PLUS 3	PLUS41	MINSS75	PLUS52	MINUS1	MINUS19	PLUS23	PLUS24

POPULATION STATUS
(THOUSANDS)

A	B	C	D	E

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

I 69.7 13.6 592.6 412.5 70.4
PLUS2;6 PLUS21.4 MINUS25.0 PLUS16.1 MINUS2.5
II 195.0 713.2 875.9 314.3 99.7
MINUS4.1 MINUS3.9 MINUS50.0 PLUS21.1 MINUS1.9
III .0 805.6 1215.3 543.7 34.9
PLUS.0 PLUS30.7 MINUS84.5 PLUS47.3 PLUS .9
IV 335.5 1456.7 1307.3 845.8 155.6
PLUS2.2 PLUS5.5 MINUS19.1 MINSS3.5 MINUS7.0
RVN 600.2 3489.1 3991.1 2116.3 360.6
PLUA18.7 PLUS53.7 MINUS178.6 PLUS81.0 MINUS10.5

	VC	OTHER	HAMLET	NON-TOTAL
I	796.4	34.2	592.2	3081.6
	MINUS8.3	PLUS 28.2	PLUS .0	PLUS 50.5TBT

NNNN

ADV COPY TO CJCS AND NMCC

23294

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 2 OF 5

23294
CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

004 01 07Z

C152 M JCS007/4
WI
OO RUEKDA
DE RUMSOM 03779 2760000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSAW 0338K 2761445
ZNY CCCCC
O 031135Z OCT 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHKA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEKDA/CJCS
RUEKDA/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
ZEN/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
ZEN/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMSAK/CG III MAF/SA I CTZ
RUMSAUA/SA IV CTZ
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN FROM; MACJ3R FOR ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN, BG DESOBRY FROM AMB KOMER 32489 SEC II OF V

II 222.9	22.8	419.	2862.8
PLUS 54.1	PLUS 2.3	PLUS23.0	MINUS 76.6
III 251.0	53.6	2370.5	5274.6
MINUS 4.1	PLUS .5	MINUS 11.1	MINUS 20.3
IV 1551.1	18.3	147.9	5818.2
MINUS 16.2	MINUS 5.4	PLUS 4.1	MINUS39.4
RVN 2821.4	1280	3529.6	17037.2
MINSS 82.7	PLUS 25.6	PLUS 16.0	MINUS 76.8

PACIFICATION PLANS CALL FOR EACH RD CADRE TEAM TO WORK TWO HAMLETS DURING 1967. AS OF 31 AUGUST, 98 OF 491 RD TEAMS (20PCT) HAD MOVED FROM THEIR FIRST TO THEIR SECONDA HAMLET. IN I CTZ 26 OF 222STEAMS HAD MOVED; IN II CTZ, 52 OF 143 TEAMS; IN III CTZ, 11 OF 69 TEAMS; AND IN IV CTZ, 9 OF 157 TEAMS. LITTLE IMPROVEMENT WAS NOTED DURING AUGUST.

(1) THE LIMITED PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE TO DATE IN I CORPS IS THREATENED CONSTANTLY BY THE STRONG POSSIBILITY OF LARGE-SCALE ENEMY ATTACKS ON RD AREAS. NUMEROUS ATTACKS ON

INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/SA-3
DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-6 FILE-1(60) JHA/CF (23583)

PAGE 1 OF 4

INCLUDED IN IDA
LOG # C-71-8355

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

RD INSTALLATIONS, PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS, AND ARVN MILITARY POSTS HAVE UNDERMINED POPULAR CONFIDENCE IN THE GVN AND GENERALLY HAMPERED THE RD PROGRAM. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, NO SIGNIFICANT GAIN IN TERRITORY CONTROLLED OUTRIGHT BY THE ENEMY.

(2) SECURITY IN II CTZ IMPROVED SOMWHAT OVERALL, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PHU YEN PROVINCE WHERE SECURITY WORSENED AFTER IMPROVING DURING PREVIOUS MONTHS. IN PHU YEN, ELEMENTS OF 3RD MF PROVINCIAL BN AND THE 9TH NVA REGIMENT ENTERED THE PLAINS AREA(WHERE THE RD EFFORT IS CONCENTRATED) ON 29 AUGUST. IN GENERAL, SECURITY REMAINED RELATIVELY STABLE THROUGHOUT THE CORPS. THE PRINCIPAL ROADS WERE OPEN DURING THE DAY. IN LAM DONG AND BINH THUAN, SECURITY IMPROVED WITHING THE PACIFIED AREAS.

(3) IN III CORPS, THERE WAS NO MAJOR EXPANSION OF TERRITORIAL SECURITY. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LONG KHANH AND BINH DUONG IMPROVED SECUCTY ALONG HIGHWAYS 1, 13 AND 20.

(4) THERE WAS LITTLE CHANGE IN IV CORPS DURING AUGUST. ADDITIONAL SECURITY WAS PROVIDED FOR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS IN RESPONSE TO INCREASED VC ACTIVITY AND IN PREPARATION FOR THE SEPTEMBER ELECTIONS. THIS INCREASED WAS EXPECTED TO BE TEMPORARY IN MOST CASES. IN PHONG DINH AND KIEN HOA, ARVN BATTALIONS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF RD REDEPLOYED TO EXPAND TERRITORIAL CONTROL. OTHER BATTALIONS PLANNED TO EXPAND THEIR AREAS IN SEPTEMBER AS CADRE GROUPS MOVED INTO NEW HAMLETS.

C. EXPAND AND SUPPLEMENT RD TEAM EFFORT AND ASSOCIATED PROGRAMS; THE PICTURE AS REPORTED FROM THE PROVINCES IS A SPOTTY ONE, BUT IN GENERAL, THE RD TEAMS AND ASSOCIATED PROGRAMS CONTINUE TO MAKE SATISFACTORY PROGRESS. ALL TOLD, 491 RD TEAMS AND 120 TRUONG SON (MONTAGNARD) CADRE TEAMS WERE IN THE FIELD ON 31 AUGUST. IN I CORPS, THE RD PROGRAM IN QUANG TRI HAS OVERCOME THE MURDER OF THE RD CHIEF AND THE ATTACK ON THE RD HEADQUARTERS IN TRIEU PHONG. THERE IS EXCELLENT MORALE, GOOD COORDINETION OF PRODECTS AND A LOT OF EFFORT IN THE RD PROGRAMS. THE PROGRAMS ARE MORE THAN HOLDING THEIR OWN IN THUA THIEN, QUANG NAM AND QUANG TRI. IN QUANG NGAI, THE TRUONG SON TEAMS ARE WORKING PRIMARILY WITH MONTAGNARD REFUGEES. IN II CORPS, INCREASED SUPERVISION ND DIRECTION OF THE TEAMS BY PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS AND THE USE OF REFRESHER, SPECIALIST AND LEADERSHIP TRAINING COURSES AT VUNG TAU WERE PRIMARY FACTORS IN THE SIG-

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

NIFICANT IMPROVEMENT NOTED DURING THEMONTH. IN HANH HOA, ALL THE RD TEAMS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO FULL STRUENGTH, MORALE IS HIGH AND DESERTIONS AND RESIGNATIONS HAVE BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED. THE REVERSE SITUATION, HOWEVER, WAS TRUE IN NINH THUAN, VIZ, UNDERSTRENGTH AND POOR MORALE. IN BINH THUAN, THE TWO QUARTER ZONE TEAMS ARE REGARDED AS HIGHLY EFFOTIVE. QUARTER ZONE TEAMS ARE COMPOSED OF HAMLET RESIDENTS ORGANIZED FOR RD WORK ALONO KINSHIP END FAMILY GROUPS LINES. IN BINH DINH (II CORPS), THE VICIL/MILITARY TEAMS CONTINUED TO CONTRIBUTE MEASURABLY TO THE PACIFICATION EFFORT. AS A RESULT, THE COMMANDING GENERAL, II CORPS, HAS DIRECTED THE OTHER PROVINCE CHIEFS IN THE CORPS TO ORGANIZE SIMILAR TEAMS. THE REMOVAL, HOWEVER, OF THE RD CADRE CHIEF IN BINH DINH PROBABLY WILL HVAE A DELETERIOUS EFFECT UPON THE CADRE PROGRAM IN THAT PROVINCE. II III CORPS DURINO AUGUST, MOST TEAMS LERE EIGHER IN POSITION TO MOVE OR ALREADY HAD MOVED TO THEIR SECOND SEMESTER HAMLETS. MORALE AMONG THE CADRE GENERALLY IS HIGH AND THEY APPEAR ANXIOUS TO MOVE TO THEIR NEW ASSIGNMENTS. THE RD CADRE GROUPS IN BIEN HOA HAVE SHOWN CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT. IN GIA DINH, WHERE RECRUITING HAD BECOME A SERIOUS PROBLEM BECAUSE OF THE COMPETITION FOR MANPOWERE, A NEW APPROACH HAS SHOWN GOOD RESULTS. EACH RD CADRE GROUP LE DER WAS REQUESTED TO RECRUIT FIVE NEW MEMBERS EACH MONTH. THUS FAR, THE QUALITY OF RECRUITS HAS BEEN FAR ABOVE PAST STANDARDS, AND THE PROGRAM PROMISES TO ALLEVIATE PARTIALLY A SERIOUS PROBLEM. IN IV CORPS, AUGUST CONTINUED THE TREND OF GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT OF THE CADRE GROUPS. SIX NEW TEAMS RETURNED FROM VUNG TAU AND WERE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN WORK IN SEPTEMBER IN SECOND PHASE HAMLETS. MANY OF THE OLD TEAMS REACHED THE POINT OF MOVING DURING THE MONTH, BUT MOST WERE HELD UP UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

D. ACCELERATE THE CHIEU HOI EFFORT; THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM IS PERHAPS THE BRIGHTEST SPOT IN THE PACIFICATION EFFORT. HOI CHANH CONTINUEHUO RETURN AT APPROXIMATELY DOUBLE THE RATE OF LAST YEAR. IN I CORPS, 236 VC/NVA PERSONNEL RALLIED TO THE GVN DURING AUGUST; STEPS WERE TAKEN TO INDUCE MORE RALLIERS THROUGH THE USE OF LETTER-WRITING CAMPAIGNS, MONETARY INDUCEMENTS, LEAFLETS, LOUDSPEAKERS, AND ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS; AND HOI CHANH RECEPTION FACILITIES WERE EXPANDED AND IMPROVED THROUGH-

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

OUT THE CORPS AREA. IN II CORPS THE PROVINCES ACHIEVING THE BEST RESULTS WERE BINH DINH,, DARLAC AND PLEIKU, WHICH REPORTED 144, 38 ANN 37 RETURNEES RESPECTIVELY. BINH DINH, PHU YEN AND KHANH HOA PROVINCES WERE TRAINING ARMED PROPAGANDA TEMAS. III CORPS SHOWED THE MOST IMPROVED PERFORMANCE; 581 RETURNEES IN AUGUST BROUGHT THE YEARLY TOTAL TO DATE TO 6792, LHICH COMPARES MST FAVORABLY TO THE 2542 WHO RETURNED DURING THE SAME PERIOD IN 1966. THE SUCCESS OF THE PROGRAM HAS NOT ESCAPED VC ETTENTIONGM THERE WERE THREE MAJOR ATTACKS DURING THE MONTH AGAINST CHIEU HOI INSTALLATIONS. EARLY IN AUGUST THE VC ATTACKED THE CHIEU HOI CENTERS IN TAY NINH AND HAU NGHIA, KILLING A TOTAL OF NINE AND LOUNDING 67. LATER IN THE
BT
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SEC 3 OF

2 3 2 9 4

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/HC
SERVICE

0 04 04 44Z

MINIMIZE
NOFORN

C 164 CJCS 122/4
IEN793CE IB 17JSEE480
OO RUEKDA
DE RUMSCMU4 154 2770900
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSAW 8339K 2761445
ZNY CCCCC
O 031135Z OCT 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHKA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEKDA/CJCS
RUEKDA/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
ZEN/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
ZEN/CG II FFORCBAV SA III CTZ
RUMSAK/CG III MAF/SA I CZ
RUMSAUA/SA IV CTZ
BT
TC O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN FROM; MACJ3 R FOR ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN, BG DESOBRY FROM AMB KOMER 32489 SEC III OF V.

MONTH, THEY LAUNCHED AN ATTACK AGAINST A CHIEU HOI HAMLET IN LONG ANGN INFLICTING HEAVY CASUALTIES ON THE PF PLATOON GUARDING THE HAMLET. THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM IN IV CORPS IS RATED AS THE BEST ADMINISTERED IN THE COUNTRY. BECAUSE IT IS, AND BECUASE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF VC, IV CORPS CONSISTENTLY LEADS THE COUNTRY IN THE NUMBER OF RETURNEES. AS OF 1 SEPTEMBER, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF HOI CHANH REGISTERED WAS MORE THAN DOUBLE LAST YEAR'S FIGURE (7,416 OPPOSED TO 3,619).

E. IMPROVE THE REFUGEE EFFORT; AN ACUTE REFUGEE PROBLEM REMAINS IN I CORPS, BECUASE OF THE INTENSITY OF THE WAR IN THE NORTH. BY THE END OF THE MONTH THER WERE 450,000 THROUGHOUT THE CORPS AREA (50,000 IN QUANG TRI; 160,000 IN QUANG NAM; 20,000 IN THUA THIEN; 60,000 IN QUANG TIN; AND 160,000 IN QUANG NGAI). THE PROBLEM IS A COMBINATION OF LARGE NUMBERS GENERATED WITH LITTLE ADVANCE NOTICE; TEMPORARY SHORTAGES OF FOODSTUFFS AND CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS CAUSED BY THE HIGH LEVEL OF REQUIREMENTS; LIMITED NUMBERS OF US AND GVN OFFICIALS;

INFO...CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/SA-3

DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-6 FILE-1(60)RLL/JB

1 OF3

INCLUDED IN IDA

DOC # C-71-8355

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

APATHETIC AND OVERWHELMED GVN OFFICIALS, AND GENERAL SECURITY CONDICTIONS (SEE PARA 7A BELOW). HOWEVER, A MAJOR REMEDIAL EFFORT GOT UNDERWAY IN AUGUST AT AMBASSADOR KOMER'S DIRECTION. REFUGEE ACTIVITY IN II CORPS CONSITED PRIMARILY OF DISTRIBUTION OF COMMODITIES AND THE PLANNING OF NEW HOUSES. PHU YEN INDICATED THAT LIVING CONDITIONS IN THEIR REFUGEE CAMPS LERE MADE ADEQUATE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF FREE WORLD FORCES; ND PHU BON REPORTED 300 NEW REFUGEES DURING THE MONTH. THE REMAINDER OF THE PROVINCES OF II CORPS REPORTED NO PERCEPTIBLE CHANGE. THERE WERE NO MAJOR CHANGES DURING THE MONTH IN THE REFUGEE PICTURE IN III CORPS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 400 REFUGEES TRANSFERRED FROM TRI TAM TO A RESETTLEMENT SITE IN BINH LONG.

RECENTLY THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED IMPROVEMENT BY REFUGEE SERVICE CHIEFS IN PERFORMING THEIR JOBS, AN IMPROVEMENT DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTED TO THE INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSARIAT FOR REFUGEES, IN IV CORPS DURING AUGUST MORE THAN 11,000 REFUGEES LERE RETURNED TO THEIR VILLAGES OR RESETTLED. EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NEW REFUGEES LERE REPORTED. NO PARTICULAR PROBLEMS WERE NOTED IN THE HANDLING OF REFUGEES, PRIMARILY BECAUSE REFUGEES ARE NOT CREATED IN LARGE NUMBERS AS A RESULT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. IT IS NOTED THAT REFUGEES USUALLY MOVE INTO TOWNS OR HAMLETS IN SEARCH OF BETTER SECURITY RESPITE FROM AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES OF VC AREAS. OR TO BENEFIT FROM GVN ECONOMIC DEVEWOPMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, AN THANH HAMLET IN KIEN HOA HAS INCREASED ITS POPULATION BY 40 PCT SINCE JANUARY.

F. EXPAND POLICE EFFORT; NATIONAL POLICE ACTIVITES DURING THE MONTH WERE DOMINATED BY SECURITY PREPARATIONS FOR THE SEPTEMBER ELECTIONS. IN I CORPS THERE WAS SOME IMPROVEMENT IN RESOURCE CONTROL. PROGRESS IN THE RESOURCE CONTROL PROGRAM, HOWEVER, IS STILL FAR FROM ADEQUATE, AND MACCORDS IS REVIEWING THE ENTIRE PROGRAM AT MBASSADOHEEAA SCRL REQUEST. THERE IS STILL A SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL TO CARRY OUT THE POLICE PROGRAM EFFECTIVELY. ONE REASON IS THE DIVERSION OF POLICE TO REFUGEE SCREENING ACTIVITIES. IN II CORPS, THE POLICE FIELD FORCES IN THREE PROVINCES (BINH DINH, HANH HOA, AND BINH THUAN) WERE ENGAGED SUCCESSFULLY IN CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS IN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

III CORPS,THE ELECTIONS DIVERTED MUCH OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL POLICE AWAY FROM THEIR NORMAL DUTIES. TWO NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE COMPANIES WERE SHIFTED INTO HEAVILY POPULATED BIEN HOA CITY AND VUNG TAU TO HELP PROVIDE SECURITY DURING THE ELECTIONS. SIMILARLY, ALL POLICE BRANCHES IN IV CORPS CONCENTRATED ON ELECTION SECURITY. THESE ACTIVITIES INCLOED THE SECURITY OF LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND VOTING AREAS AND OPERATIONS AGAINST ELECTION SABOTAGE CELLS. CONSIDERABLE MISDIRECTION OF THE NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE EFFORT HAS BEEN NOTED THROUGHOUT IV CORPS, BUT IS BEING ADDRESSED AS PART OF THE ICEX PROGRAM TO RETARGET NPFF AS THE CHIEF ACTION ARM OF THE ATTACK ON VC INFRASTRUCTURE. IN ADDITION, FULL-TIME ADVISORS FOR EACH COMPANY ARE NEEDED AND ARE, IN FACT, BEING RECRUITED.

G. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC WORKS, VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT, AGRICULTUREN SELF-HEOP, ETC.; IN I CORPS, NEW PIG STIES AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF STOCK BY BREEDING SHOULD CONGA TRIBUTE TO PROSPERITY IN QUANG TRI; INSECTICIDE DISTRIBUTION WILL INCREASE RICE PRODUCTIVITY IN THE PROVINCE. HOWEVER, ANY INCREASE IN PROSPERITY IN QUANG TRI BROUGHT ABOUT BY THESE MEASURES PROBABLY LILL BE MORE THAN O ET Y THE GENERATION O 9,000 NEW REFUGEES DURING AUGUST. THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS IN SELF-HELP IN THE RD AREAS. CONSTRUCTION HAS BEGUN ON MATERNITY DISPENSARIES, WHILE CONSTRUCTION WAS COMPLETED ON THE AI TU BRIDGE ON HIGHWAY 1. SLEF-HELP PROJECTS IN THE RD AREAS OF THUA THIEN AD QUANG NAM ARE MOVING ALONG WILL. GOOD PROGRESS LAS NOTED IN THE AGRICULTURE ADVISORY EFFORT OF QUANG TIN PROVINCE. NLD PROJECTS IN QUANG NGAI HAVE SLOWED DOWN BECAUSE OF A LACK OFCONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM IN QUANG NGAI IS HAMPERED BY A CORRUPT AND INEFFICIENT PUBLIC WORKS CHIEF. IN II CORPS THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON THE TEA FACTORY IN LAM DONG WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF COLOMBO PLAN PERSONNEL. SELFPAHELP PROJECTS PRESENT A SCATTERED PICTURE, BUT IN PHU YEN, KHANH HOA, AND TUYEN FUC, 75PCT OF THE FUNDED SELF-HELP PROJECTS SCHEDULED FOR 1967 REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. PUBLIC WORKS PRESENTS A GENSRALLYHUNINSPIRING RECORD (IN COMMON WITH THE REST OF THE COUNTRY)

BT NNNN

ADV TO...OSD

23294

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SEC 4 OF
0933Z 23294

NMD515ZCZCIEM250VZCZCEIA635 SED970
OO RUEKDA
DE RUMSCNU4274 2770000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSAW 0340K 2761445
ZNY CCCCC
O 031135Z OCT 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHKA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEKDA/CJCS
RUEKDA/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
ZEN/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
ZEN/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMSAK/CG III MAF/SA I CTZ
RUMSAWA/SA IV CTZ
BT

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

004 06 062

IMMEDIATE

NOFORN

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN KOM; MACJ01R FOR ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN, BG DESOBRY FROM AMB KOMER 32489 SEC IV OF V.

PORTATION FACILITIES. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF BRIGHT SPOTS. A NEW VARIETY OF RICE BEING TRIED IN DINH TUONG AND KIEN HOA COULD QUADRUPLE PRODUCTION. IN PHONG DINH, SUPERVISED CREDIT TO TWO HAMLETS WAS ESTABLISHED; 80,000 VNS WERE LOANED TO 60 FAMILIES. TWO MILLION VNS HAVE BEEN LOANED TO FARMERS

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 0340K C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
TO PURCHASE WATER PUMPS. PRICES SHOWED A SLIGHT RISE, BUT NO REAL INFLATIONARY TREND WAS NOTED. THE GVN SOLDCICE AT A FIXED, LOW PRICE WHICH HELPED HOLD DOWN THE UPWARD SPIRAL. ROADS IN THE DELTA CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE DUE TO HEAVY USE, LACK OF MAINTENANCE AND CONTINUED DESTRUKTION OF BRKGES BY THE VC. MOREOVER, ROADS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY CRITICAL WITH ADDED TRAFFIC BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF SECURITY ON AND AROUND CANALS (CANALS NORMALLY CONSTITUTE A PRIMARY COMMUNICATION ROUTE IN IV CORPS). THE GVN MUST MAKE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO REPAIR AND IMPROVE ALL LINES OF COMMUNICATION IF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS TO PROCED AT THE DESIRED RATE. A MAJOR EFFORT TO IMPROVE IV CORPS ROAD CONDITIONS HAS BEF STARTED. IN VINH LONG, THE MANG THIT-NICOLAI WATERWAY WAS OFFICIALLY OPENED ON 8 AUGUST, MARKING A POTENTIALLY MOST SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC ADVANCE WHICH GREATLY REDUCES THE DISTANCE CANAL TRAFFIC MUST TRAVEL FROM THE LOWER DELTA TO SAIGON. IN DINH TUONG A NEW 35-TON BRIDGE WAS OPENED ON HIGHWAY 4. ELSEWHERE, THEVVN WAS NEGOTIATING WITH US FIRMS FOR ROAD CONSGUXTION, CANAL DREDGING, AND INCREASED ROCK AND SAND PRODUCTION. THE PROVINCE CHIEF OF GO CONG AND THE RD CADRE OFFICER IN CHAU DOC

INFO...CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-2 CONFIDENTIAL
ASD/SA-3 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-6 FILE-1 (60)REL/ASD

1 OF 3

INCLUDED IN IDA
LOG # C-71-B3[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE 3 RUMSAW 0340K C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
WERE IDENTIFIED AS DETRIMENTAL TO THE RD EFFORT, AND WE ARE SEEKING TO HAVE THEM REPLACED.

4. (C) STATUS OF PACIFICATION RESOURCES

A. UNITS IN DIRECT SUPPORT	JULY	AUGUST
(1) ARVN BNS	54	53
(2) RF COS	204	213
(3) PF PLATS	743	755
(4) TEAMS		
(A) RD CADRE	452	491 (INCL 38 29-MAN TEAMS IN AN GIANG)
(B) TRUONG SON	119	120
(C) CIV/MIL (INCL 2 QTR ZONE TEAMS)	32	32
(5) STATIC CENSUS GRIEVANCE	5224	5234
(6) NATIONAL POLICE	66,837 (AS OF 30 JUN)	66,135 (AS OF 30 JUL)

B. COMMODITIES ISSUED	JUNE	JULY
(1) CEMENT (50 KG BAG)	180,394	207,140

PAGE 4 RUMSAW 0340K C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

(2) ROOFING (ALUMINUM SHEER)	250,133	145,508
(3) ROOFING (FIBRE SHEET)	1,015	12
(4) RE-BARS (KILOS)	510,129	529,725
(5) BULGUR (30 KG BAGS)	58,003	54,006
(6) COOKING OIL (4 KG CANS)	124,864	98,405
(7) CORN (50 KG BAG)	33,419	23,917
(8) DRY MILK (35 KG BAG)	7,029	8,636

C. FUNDS

TOTAL RD BUDGET	EXPENDED CUMULATIVE	LAST MONTH	THIS MONTH
2,161,118,000	917,188,000	36 PCT	42 PCTS

$ THESE FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE THE AUGUST EXPENDITURES OF FOUR PROVINCES UNREPORTED AT THE TIME THE FIGURES WERE COMPILED.

THESE ARE STRICTLY RD FUNDS, I.E., MONIES MADE AVAILABLE TO MORD VIA US COUNTERPART FUNDS. THE PROGRAM WAS STARTED IN LARGE PART BECAUSE OF THE INABILITY OF GVN MINISTRIES (PUBLIC WORKS, EDUCATION, ETC.) TO DISPENSE MONEY WHERE IT WAS NEEDED, WHEN IT WAS NEEDED. MORD IS MORE "STREAMLINED" ORGANIZATIONALLY, HAS THE LEADERSHIP TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION,

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE 5 RUMSAW 0340K C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN
AND HAS CONSEQUENTLY ACHIEVED A BETTER EXPENDITURE RATE THAN OTHER GVN MINISTRIES. THE PLAN ASSUMES THAT THE REGULAR MINISTRIES WILL UNDERTAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE PROGRAMS ONCE THEY ARE "GOING CONCERNS."

5. (C) INDICATOR TRENDS

	JULY	AUGUST
A. CHIEU HOI	1864	2131
B. CEFUGEES		
GAINS	24,575	62,700
NOT RESETTLED	735,963	767,459
RESETTLED	1,209,441	1,240,639
C. VC INCIDENTS		
TOTAL	3,096	3,191
TERRORISM (INCLUDES RDC)	318	610
CIVIL CASUALTIES (ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS) AS A RESULT OF TERRORISM	456	914

D. STATUS OF RD PLANS

	ON SCHEDULE	(LAST MONTH)	BEHIND SCHEDULE	(LAST MONTH)
I CORPS	0	(1)	5	(4)

PAGE 6 RUMSAW 0340K C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN

II CORPS	.5	(5)	7	(7)
III CORPS	1 .3	(1)	10	(10)
IV CORPS	4	(4)	12	(12)
	10	(11)	34	(33)

E. LOC STATUS

	GREEN	AMBER	RED
1. ROADS (MILITARILY ESSENTIAL)	56PCT (1569.5KM)	36PCT (1020.5KM)	7.6PCT (215KM)
2. RAILROADS (MILITARILY ESSENTIAL)	40.2PCT (499.1KM)	4.3PCT (53.1KM)	55.5PCT (688.1KM)
3. ESSENTIAL WATERWAYS IN NPA OF III & IV CORPS	44.9PCT (260KM)	47.3PCT (274KM)	7.8PCT (45KM)

6. (C) ENEMY REACTION TO PACIFICATION OFFENSIVE;
A. IN I CTZ, THE VIET CONG APPRECIABLY STEPPED UP THEIR ATTACKS AND TERRORISM, ALTHOUGH DESPITE A NUMBER OF ATTACKS ON RD AREAS ENEMY EFFORTS DID NOT APPEAR TO CONCENTRATE ON THE RD PROGRAM. THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO MAJOR SETBACKS EXCEPT IN QUANG TRI WAS CONSIDERED A SOURCE OF CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ENEMY'S DEMONSTRATED ABILITY TO CONDUCT ATTACKS AND EXTENSIVE TERRORISM- SEEMINGLY AT WILL THROUGHOUT I CTZ - REPRESENTS AN IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY FOR THE
BT

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SEC 5 OF

2 3 2 9 4

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

004 82 11 7

CONFIDENTIAL
NOFORN

A901 V JCS031/4
CZCE1A611
CO RUEKDA
DE RUMSCMU 129 2760000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSAW 034 1K 2761445
ZNY CCCCC
O 031435Z OCT 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHKA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEKDA/CJCS
RUEKDA/DOD
RUSNC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
ZEN/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
ZEN/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMSAK/CG III MAF/SA I CTZ
RUMSAUA/SA IV CTZ
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN FROM; MACJ01R FOR ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN, BG DESOBRY FROM AMB KOMER 32489 FINAL SEC OF V.
VIET CONG.

B. IN II CTZ, THERE ARE STRONG INDICATORS THAT THE ENEMY HAS ASSIGNED ONE BATTALION TO EACH COASTAL DISTRICT TO ENFORCE POPULATION CONTROL IN SUPPORT OF THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND TO COMBAT GVN ELECTIONS AND TO DISRUPT THE PACIFICATION EFFORT. NUMEROUS RD AND RF/PF INCIDENTS INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY FAVORS GUERRILLA TACTICS TO OPPOSE THE PACIFICATION PROGRAMS HOWEVER, THE PARTICULARLY LARGE ELECTION TURNOUT IN II CTZ CAN BE RELATED TO AN OVERALL IMPROVED SECURITY SITUATION. AGENT REPORTS, UNCONFIRMED, INDICATE THAT 1200 NVA/VC INFILTRATED INTO WESTERN QUANG DUC OVEER A FOUR-DAY PERIOD. THIS WOULD REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF ENEMY FORCES IN THE AREA.

C. IN III CTZ, THERE IS EVIDENCE (E.G.; VC CONTACTS DOWNBN US/FWMAF/ARVN CASUALTIES DOWN, VC (BODY COUNT) KIA DOWN) THAT THE NVA/VC MAIN FORCE UNITSARE AVOIDING SIGNIFICANT CONTACT. A RECENT RALLIER FROM THE 272D VC REGT REPORTED THAT MORALE HAS SUFFERED BECAUSE MOST OF THE OLD, EXPERIENCED

INFO...CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/SA-3 DIA15

CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-6 FILE-1(60)RLL/JB

1 OF 2

INCLUDED IN IDA
LOG # C-71-8353

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SOLDIERS HAD BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED, AND BECAUSE OF THE MISERABLE LIFE, INCREASED AIRSTRIKES, EMPTY PROMISES AND FAMILY SEPARATION. STILL THE ENEMY HAS A FORMIDABLE CAPABILITY TO DELIVER HEAVY ROCKET, MORTAR AND RECOILLESS RIFLE ORDNANCE ON FRIENDLY FIXED INSTALLATIONS. YET, IN GENERAL, THERE IS A VERY APPARENT INCREASE IN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE VIETNAMESE PUBLIC IN THE GVN ABILITY TO WIN.

D. IN IV CTZ, THE VC CONTINUE TO PROBE SUCCESSFULLY AS EVIDENCED BY A VIOLENT ATTACK ON ONE HAMLET IN BA XUYEN WHERE THE RD CADRE HAD BEEN IN PLACE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. IN CHAU DOC 53 FAMILIES IN ONE HAMLET DEPARTED UNDER VC PRESSURE, AND INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY WILL NOT RETURN. THE LATTER INCIDENT ILLUSTRATES A LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE GVN ON THE PART OF THE PEOPLE IN SOME AREAS WHERE ADEQUATE SECURITY FORCES ARE LACKING. ON THE BRIGHTER SIDE, ARVN TACTICAL OPERATIONS HAVE CONTINUED TO KEEP THE VC DISPERSED IN SMALL UNITS.

7. (C) AREAS REQUIRING SPECIAL ATTENTION

A. REFUGEES REMAIN A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR I CTZ. AN ESTIMATED 40 THOUSAND NEW REFUGEES GENERATED DURING AUGUST FURTHER STRAINED ALREADY OVERTAXED REFUGEE RELIEF SERVICES. THIS SITUATION CAUSED THE DEPUTY TO COMUSMACV FOR CORDS TO RAISE THE MATTER WITH THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (SCR). RECOGNIZING THAT ALMOST ONE-HALF OF THE REFUGEES IN SOUTH VIETNAM ARE IN THE I CTZ, MACV INITIATED IN MID-AUGUST CERTAIN ADDITIONAL IMMEDIATE ACTIONS AND URGED ON THE SCR AN URGENT GVN EFFORT. THE GVN RESPONSE WAS ENCOURAGING AND CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT IN I CTZ IS EXPECTED.

B. INFRASTRUCTURE INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AND EXPLOITATION (ICEX); ONE OF THE MOST PERSISTENT AND DIFFICULT PROBLEMS FOR THE ALLIED EFFORT HAS BEEN THE INABILITY TO OBTAIN MEANINGFUL INTELLIGENCE ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE HARDCORE INFRASTRUCTURE. DESPITE THE IDENTIFICATION OF MANY OF ITS LOWER-LEVEL MEMBERS, TOO LITTLE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THE INSTITUTION OF THE ICEX PROGRAM FROM DISTRICT LEVEL ALL THE WAY THROUGH A NEW MACV STAFF AGENCY IN SAIGON HOPEFULLY WILL BEGIN TO PRODUCE THE RESULTS LONG NEEDED. WHETHER THIS WILL IN FACT OCCUR WILL DEPEND ON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE DIVERSE GVN ELEMENTS TO FOLLOW THE US EXAMPLE BEING SET AND WORK MORE EFFECTIVELY AND COOPERATIVELY. GP-4

BT NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

17500

SECTION 1

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

K15 15 482

NOFORN

VZCZCDA4310
PPPPPP PPPPPP 020 951
DE RUMSCMJ0473 3190000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 2391L 3190615
ZNY CCCCC
P 150515Z NOV 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVE/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROM: MACJ01R SEC I OF X
FOR ADM SHARP, INFO GEN WHEELER, LTG ROSSON, LTG WEYAND, LTG CUSHMAN, BG DESOBRY FROM AMB KOMER
SUBJ: PACIFICATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM DURING SEPTEMBER 1967 (U)
1. (U) THIS REPORT IS THE EIGHTH IN A SERIES OF MONTHLY ASSESSMENTS OF PACIFICATION. IT IS BASED UPON FIELD REPORTING AND ANALYSIS DONE IN SAIGON.
2. (C) SUMMARY. THE TEMPO OF PACIFICATION PROGRAMS INCREASED

SLIGHTLY DURING SEPTEMBER AFTER THE LULL INCIDENT TO THE ELECTIONS. ONLY MOSEST IMPROVEMENT WAS NOTED IN HAMLET AND POPULATION SECURITY (SEE HES FIGURES). BUT MUCH OF THE ACTIVITY DURING THE MONTH WAS DIRECTED TOWARD LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE GAINS.
A. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN ICEX - THE ATTACK ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE, AS WE ARE STILL SEEKING GVN ENDORSEMENT AT THE SAIGON LEVEL SO THE PAYOFF STAGE CAN BE REACHED.
B. IT WAS ALSO TRUE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, AS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE CADRES WERE ENGAGED IN MOVING TO THEIR SECOND HAMLET FOR THE YEAR. MOST OF THE MONTH WAS GIVEN TO MOVEMENT, CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENSES IN

INFO..CJCS8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3

NMCC/DDO-1 SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 WH-10

DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE1 (83) RBK/LE

NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL

C 71-8362

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

NEW HAMLETS, AND REDEPLOYMENT OF SECURITY FORCES TO PROTECT THE CADRES IN THEIR NEW LOCATIONS. AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER, FULFILLMENT OF RD PLANS WAS ON SCHEDULE IN 10 PROVINCES AND BEHIND SCHEDULE IN 34. NO CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUS MONTH BECAUSE OF THIS LAG, ALL CONCERNED ON BOTH THE US AND GVN SIDE HAVE BEEN STRONLY URGED TO REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO COMPLETE THE 1967 PROGRAM BY 31 JANUARY, EXPERIENCE GAINED BY THE CADRE SHOULD PERMIT A FASTER PACE OF WORK IN THE SECOND PHASE.

C. THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM DISMALLY RECORDED THE THIRD

SUCCESSIVE MONTHLY DECLINE AND A NEW LOW FOR THE YEAR, ALTHOUGH RETURNEES ARE STILL APPROXIMATELY TWICE THE NUMBER FOR THE SAME PERIOD OF 1966.

D. IN SEPTEMBER THE GENERATION OF REFUGEES EXCEEDED RESETTLEMENT, ADDING TO THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES REQUIRING TEMPORARY CARE. HOWEVER, STRONG COMMAND EFFORTS ON BOTH THE U AND GVN SIDES AIMED AT SPEEDING UP DISTRIBUTION OF COMMODITIES AND PAYMENT OF ALLOWANCES WROUGHT A MARKED IMPORVEMENT IN THE REFUGEE SITUATION AND ABATED THSCRISIS OF THE PAST FEW MONTHS.

E. POLICE PROGRAM ATTENTION CENTERED ON PRESENTATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF PAY PROPOSALS TO EQUALIZE PAY OF POLICE OFFICIALS WITH EQUIVALENT GRADES IN ARVN, AND MEASURES TO IMPROVE CAREER INCENTIVES AND INCREASE RISK ALLOWANCES. THIS PACKAGE IS NEEDED TO RALLY THE LAGGING RATE OF POLICE RECRUITMENT.

F. NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES CONTINUED TO SHOW PROGRESS, AS EXPENDITURE OF THE MORD BUDGET INCREASED TO 51 PERCENT FROM 42 PERCENT THE PREVIOUS MONTH.

G. THE ECONOMICS OF PACIFICATION RECEIVED A MAJOR FILLIP FROM THE OPENING OF ROUTE 20 IN LONG KHANH AND ROUTE 5 BETWEEN SAIGON AND BO CHNG. ALREADY A SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY OF COMMERCIAL

TRAFFIC IS FLOWING OVER THESE ROUTES. RESTORATION OF TRADE BETWEEN FARM AND CITY WILL YIELD HIGHER REAL INCOME FOR BOTH TRADING PARTNERS AS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN PRODUCTION AND EXCHANGE AGAIN COMES INTO PLAY. THUS AN ECONOMIC PULL IS BEING EXERTED WHICH COMPLEMENTS OUR DIRECT EFFORTS TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY. A DARK SPOT, HOWEVER, WAS THE DETERIORATION OF NATIONAL HIGHWAY 4 IN THE DELTA DUE TO HEAVY USE, VC MININGS, AND SHORTAGE OF ROCK FOR REPAIR.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

THIS MATTER IS RECEIVING COMMAND ATTENTION.
H. FINALLY, WHILE POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND THE MONUMENTAL EFFORT TO MAKE THE ELECTIONS A SUCCESS INEVITABLY DAMPENED THE PACE OF PACIFICATION, THERE IS NO GAINSAYING THE IMMEASURABLE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ADVENT OF A GOVERNMENT CLOAKED IN THE MANTLE OF LEGITIMACY.
3. (C) IMPACT OF THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE PACIFICATION EFFORT:
A. ATTACK ON THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE: (1) INFRASTRUCTURE INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AND EXPLOITATION (ICEX) ACTIVITIES CONTINUE CONCENTRATED ON ORGANIZATION. THE US ICEX STRUCTURE IS NOW ESTABLISHED IN THE FOUR REGIONS AND MOST PROVINCES. ORGANIZATION WILL REMAIN A PRIME TASK UNTIL ICEX IS ESTABLISHED IN ALL

PROVINCES, DISTRICT OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING CENTERS (DOICC'S) ARE OPERATING SMOOTHLY, AND LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN SOLVED. THE NUMBER OF DOICC'S OPERATIONAL INCREASED FROM 10 IN JULY TO 20 IN AUGUST AND 48 IN SEPTEM ER. COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF DOICC'S ACTIVATED AND PROGRAXMED FOR 1967 AS OF 30 SEP SHOWS:

	ACTIVATED S	OROGRAMMED
I CORPS	14	20
II CORPS	7	20
III VORP	23	53
IV CORPS	4	22
TOTAL	48	115

IN ADDITION TO MOVING AHEAD WITH DOICC'S ALL REGIONS ARE STRIVING TO UPGRADE CAPABILITIES AND UTILIZATION OF PROVINCIAL INTERROGATION CENTERS (PIC) AFD TO REVIVE THE MORUND PROVINCIAL INTELLIGENCE COURDINATION CENTERS (PICC). STATUS OF PIC'S ON 30 SEP WAS AS FOLLOWS:

	NUMBER OF PIC'S	CAPACITY PERSONS
I	6	156

II	9	201
III	10	260
IV	13	298

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

TOTAL 36 914
TOTAL PROGRAMMED 41
NO. OF DETAINEES IN PIC'S; 550-600
(2) ICEX HAS BEEN ACCEPTED ENTHUSIASTICALLY BY THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND COOPERATIONSIS EXCELLENT. ON THE GVN SIDE, HOWEVER, LACK OF NATIONAL LEVEL ENDORSEMENT OF ICEX HAD A DAMPENING EFFECT ON THE FIELD OWING TO RELUCTANCE OF LOCAL GVN OFFICIALS TO EMBRACE THE ICEX PROGRAM WITHOUT DIRECTION FROM ABOVE. NEVERTHELESS, THERE HAS BEEN INCREASING US/GVN COOPERATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL THROUGHOUT EACH CORPS. SINCE THE GVN IN SAIGON WAS BRIEFED ON THE ICEX PROGRAM IN AUGUST, DISCUSSION WITH INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE GVN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAVE OCCURRED FREQUENTLY, AND EARLIER MISGIVINGS ARE BEING OVERCOME. THE MOST SERIOUS OBSTACLE HAS BEEN RELUCTANCE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE TO ACCEPT THE DOICC CONCEPT. WE ARE ASSURING GENERAL LOAN THAT THE DOICC'S DO NOT THREATEN THE ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRITY OF THE POLICE, THAT POLICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND OPERATIONS NEED NOT BE REVEALED, AND THAT POLICE
BT
NNNN

ADV CJCS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 2,3,4,5,OF..17500

B488 S JCS575/15
XB325
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMU0603 3190000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 2392L 3190615
ZNY CCCCC
P 1905 1Z NOV 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEP/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

K 16 00 31Z

NOFORN

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROMMV MACJ01R (SEC II OF X)
PARTICIPATION IN THE DOICC WILL BE TO THEIR ADVANTAGE.
(3) MEANWHILE, INFRASTRUCTURE INTELLIGENCE IS BEING DEVELOPED AT REGION AND PROVINCE, AND EXPLOITATION OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN MOUNTED AGAINST INFRASTRUCTURE TARGETS. ALTHOUGH THE PRU APPEAR TO BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE "RIFLE SHOT" ACTION ARM, ITHE SPECTRUM OF EXPLOITATION FORCES RANGES FROM ARMED POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH (PSB) SQUADS TO AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES AND PSYOPS LEAFLET DROPS. HOI CHANH ARE BEING WIDELY EMPLOYED OR EXPLOITED IN INCREASING NUMBERS AND WAYS. CONSOLIDATED REPORTING SYSTEM TO PROVIDE AN ACCURATE MEASURE OF PROGRESS WILL BE INSTALLED IN NOVEMBER, BUT CURRENT OSA AND ICEX REPORTING ALREADY SHOW ENCOURAGEING TRENDS.
(4) ICEX STAFF HAS DESIGNED A PROVINCE LEVEL FORMAT FOR REPORTING ON IDENTIFIED VC INFRASOUCTURE WHO HAVE BEEN APPREHENDED, KILLED, OR RALLIED. IT WILL ALSO INDICATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ELIMINATED INFRASTRUCTURE MEMBERS AND IDENTIFY THE US AND GVN AGENCIES WHICH ACCOMPLISHED THE ACTION. IT IS PRIMARILY A MANAGERIAL TOOL AND REPORT OF PROGRESS. ITS DATA WILL BE INJECTED INTO MACV PROJECT CORRAL (AUTOMATED INFRASTRUCUTRE DATA FILE).
(5) THE LEGAL CONSULTANT OF ICEX/SIDE (SCREENING INTERROGATION,

INFO:CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC/DDO-1 SDEF-7
ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 WH-10 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1(83)ETO/KS

(18431)

INCLUDED IN IDA
C-11-8362

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

AND DETENTION OF THE ENEMY) HAS DETERMINED, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY JUSTICE, THAT THE BEST METHOD OF PROCESSING CIVIL DEFENDANTS WAS THROUGH EXPANSION OF EXISTING JURISDICATON OF MILITARY FIELD COURTS OVER CIVILIAN SECURITY OFFENSES. WE DRAFTED A PROPOSED EXECUTIVE DECREE CREATING FOUR NEW MILITARY FIELD COURTS, DOUBLE THE PRESENT NUMBER AND PLACING TWO IN EACH CORPS. IT WAS SIGNED BY THE CHIEF OF STATE.

B. EXPAND AND IMPROVE TERRITORIAL SECURITY.

(1) HAMLETS AND POPULATION ON 30 SEPTEMBER IN CATEGORIES ESTABLISHED BY THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM (HES) TOGETHER WITH CHANGES DURING THE MONTH ARE SHOWV IN THE NEXT TABLE. HES RESULTS ARE PRESENTED FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT COMBINED AND FOR SECURITY ONLY.

AMLET STATUS (SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT)

	SECURE			CONTESTED				
	A	B	I	D	E	VC	OTHER	TOTAL
I	28	254	412	455	77	996	180	2452
	5	8	5	12	-1	1	-15	5
II	50	533	992	539	150	572	257	3093
	0	-4	33	-35	-13	-31	44	-6
III	1	329	659	403	65	444	210	2111
	1	0	8	4	15	-23	-6	-1
IV	134	786	1024	809	191	1975	66	4985
	6	3	9	-19	3	2	-2	2
RVN	213	1902	3137	2206	483	3987	713	12641
	12	7	45	-38	4	-51	21	'0

POPULATION STATUS (SECURITY AND DEMELOPMENT)

NOFORN	A	B	I	D	E
I	75.3	504.5	589.1	426.4	69.2
	5.6	-9.3	-3.4	13.9	-1.1
II	218.4	723.3	837.7	296.1	76.9
	23.4	10.1	-2.3	-18.2	-22.7
III	7.6	804.5	1248.6	531.3	38.2
	7.6	-1.1	33.1	-12.3	3.3
IV	345.4	1457.3	1332.9	833.6	153.0
	10.0	.6	25.7	-12.6	-2.6

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

RVN	646.7	3489.6	40&4.3	2087.4	337.3
	46.6	.3	53.1	-29.2	-23.1
	VC	OTHER	NON-HAVELT	TOTAL	
I	77.6	24.6	593.0	3059.6	
	-18.8	-9.6	.8	-21.9	
II	225.3	29.9	419.0	2862.6	
	2.4	7.2	.0	-.1	
	VC	OTHER	NON-HAMELT	TOTAL	
III	256.0	28.6	2357.8	5272.6	
	5.1	-24.9	-12.6	-1.8	
IV	1550.5	8.6	152.2	5833.5	

PAGE FIVE RUMSMA 2392 C O N F I D E N T I A LINOFORN

	-.6	-9.7	4.3	15.1
RVN	2809.4	91.7	3522.0	17028.4
	-11.9	-37.0	-7.5	-8.7

HAMLET STAUS (SECURITY ONLY

	SECURE						CONTESTED	
	AI	B	I	D	E	VC	OTHER	TOTAL
I	115	245	478	370	68	996	180	2452
	8	6	6	7	-8	1	-15	5
II	209	715	827	423	90	527	257	3093
	-54	79	-3	-34	-7	-31	44	-6
III	133	378	563	347	36	44	210	2111
	-6	2	13	17	2	-23	-6	-1
IV	288	748	1020	721	167	1975	66	4985
	17	-22	18	-17	6	2	-2	2
RVN	745	2086	2888	1861	361	3987	713	12641
	-35	65	34	-27	-7	-51	21	0

I

POPULATION STATUS (SECURITY ONLY)
(THOUSANDS)

	A	B	I	D	E
I	266.3	449.2	524.5	362.6	62.4
	7.6	-10.9	3.3	14.9	-9.2
II	472.7	724.8	692.9	246.0	51.6
	6.5	11.2	16.4	-33.4	-10.5
III	301.7	1029.7	941.1	331.8	26.1
	-6.2	.9	18.9	16.4	.5

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

IV	604.8	1226.6	1294.4	847.0	149.4
	30.1	-43.0	37.4	-3.4	.1
RVN	1645.5	3430.3	3452.9	1787.4	289.5
	38.0	-41.8	76.1	-5.5	-19.2

	VC	OTHER	NON-PAMLET	TOTAL
I	77.6	24.6	593.0	3060.2
	-18.8	-9.6	.8	-21.9
II	225.3	29.9	419.0	2862.2
	2.3	7.1	.0	-.4
III	256.0	28.6	2357.8	5272.8
	5.1	-24.9	-12.6	-1.9
IV	1550.5	8.6	152.2	5833.5
	-.6	-9.8	4.3	15.1
RVN	2809.4	91.7	3522/0	17028.7
	-12.0	-37.2	-7.5	-9.1

BT
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER SECTION 3 OF ..1 7 5 0 0

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

K 16 00 182

A844 SB QJCSWYEYXQT
C630
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMU0748 3190000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 2393L 3190615
ZNY CCCCC
P 150515Z NOV 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJSE JS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 7401 FROM; MACJ01R SEC III OF X
STATS OF NON HAMLET POPULATIO, 0 SEP
R (CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS MONTH)

	SECURE	CONTESTED	C
I	80.8	85.1	27.1
	.8	0	0
II	358.8	50.3	9.
	0	3.3	-3.3
III	2235.5	84.5	37.9
	.1	.0	-12.7
IV	60.1	32.8	59.2
	4.3	0	0
RVN	EQETMW	252.7	134.1
	5.3	3.3	-16.0

(2) COMARISON OF SECURE AND VC CONTROLLED POPULATION FOR RVN AS A WHOLE IS SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE. DATA RE LEVT HE RATING FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT COMBINED, AND FOR SECURITY ONLY. ON THE BASIS OF SECUIRTY ALONE, SHICH IS THE MOST CRITICAL FACTOR IN PACIFICA TION, 69 PERCENT OF THE POPUL ATION WERE IN THE SECURE CATEGORY ON 0 SEP. HIS INCLUDES BOTH HAMLET (A, B, C) AND NON7

(18389)

INCLUDED IN IDA
DOC # C-71-8362

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

HAMLET SECURE POPULATION.

SEURE AND VC CONTROLLED POPULATION
TOTAL RVN, 30 SEP
IN THOUSANDS

	POPULATION SECURE	VC
SECRUITY ONLY	11663.9	2809.4
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT	11315.8	2809.4

	PERCENT OF TOTAL Ø SEP SECURE	VC
SECURITY ONLY	69	17
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT	67	17

	PERENT OF TOTAL 31 AUG SECURE	VC
SECURITY ONLY	68	17
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT	66	17

(3) ON THE BASIS OF HES SECURITY RATINGS, TERRITORI AL SECURITY IMPROVED IN RVN AS A WHOLE DURING SEPTEMBER, AS THE NUMBER OF HAMLETS IN A, B, C, CATEOGRY INCREASED BY 64 ANS POPULATION IN THESE HAMLETS INCREASED BY 72,300. THE PERCENTAGE OF HAMLET AND NON7HAMLET POPULATION IN THE SECURE CATEGORY INCREASED FROM 68 TO 69 PERCENT WHILE VC CONTROL REMAINED THE SAME. TREND DATA WILL BE PRESENTED IN FUTURE REPORTS.

(4) I CORPS SECURITY RESUME.

	SEP	AUG
VC INCIDENTS	1,658	1,455
Ø93 !974 47..- 2393L C O N F I D E N T I A L NCFRN		
VC/NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	37,410	36,895
ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION OF CIV	1,013	417
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	42	71
STATUS OF RACDS - GREEN(PER)	58.2	56.6
(SEE FOOTNOTE1 AMBER (PCT)	40.7	43.4
RED(PCT)	1.1	Ø
HES NO. OF HALETS IN SECURE (A, B, C) CATEGORY	838	818
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN	56.3	55.8

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECURE CATEGORY		
RF STRENGTH	18,068	19,670
PF STRENGTH	23,200	23,345

HIGHLIGHTS INCLUDE A MARKED INCREASE IN VC TERRORISM AGAINST CIVILIANS INCIDENT TO THE ELECTION. THERE WAS A DECIDED DECLINE IN SECURITY IN QUANG NGAI AND QUANG NAM. QUANG NGAI'S PACIFICATION EFFORT SUFFERED A SERIOUS SETBACK WHEN THE VC OCCUPIED EASTERN TU NGHIA, THE MOST IMPORTANT RD CAMPAIGN AREA, FOR TEN DAYS FOLLOWING THE 29-30 AUG ATTACK ON THE PROVINCE CAPITAL. RF/PF AND RD CADRE WERE DRIVEN FROM THE HAMLETS. ARVN REACTION WAS DELAYED AND CAUTIOUS BUT SUCCESSFUL IN CLEARING THE AREA. RF/PF AND CADRE HAVE NOW RETURNED TO THE HAMLETS. QUANG NAM EXPERIENCED A SIMILAR REVERSAL IN HIEU NHON DISTRICT AROUND HOI AN, THE PROVINCE CAPITAL. AT ONE POINT FIVE RD TEAMS WERE WITHDRAWN TEMPORARILY FROM THEIR HAMLETS DUE TO DETERIORATNG SECURITY. VC INCIDENTS INCLUDED 6 ATTACKS AND 1 HARASSMENTS OF PROVINCE AND DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS IN I CORPS IN SEPTEMBER.

(5) II CORPS SECURITY RESUME.

	SEP	AUG
VC INCIDENTS	463	415
VC/NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	1,695	30,025
ASSASSIATION, ABDUCTION OF CIV	187	17
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	7	49
STATUS OF ROADS - GREEN (PCT)	67.3	64.7
AMBER (PCT)	22.5	24.7
43$ (PCT)	10.2	10.6
HES NO. OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (A,B,C) CATEGOR	1,751	1,621
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORY	78.6	77.6
RF STRENG TH	4,670	34,687
PAGE SIX RUMSMA 2393L C O N F I D E N T I A L		
PF STRENGTH	5,040	35,107

SECURITY SHOWED LITTLE CHANGE IN MOST PROVINCES. HOWEVER, A SHARP SETBACK TO PACIFICATION OCCURRED IN PHU YEN WHEN THE 95TH NVA REGIMENT ATTACKED THE MAIN RD AREA IN TUY HOA VALLEY, FORING WITHDRAWAL OF RD TEAMS. NTENSE COMBAT FOLLOWING QUICK REACTION

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BY ROK AND A RVN FORCES RESULTED IN DESTRUCTION OF SEVERAL HAMLETS AND DAMAGE TO OTHERS. PROVINCE REACTED WITH EMERGENCY RESUPPLIES AND PROMPT COMMENCEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION. IN BINH DINH THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE 3D NVA DIVISION IS CONTINUING ITS EFFORT TO REGAI CONTROL OF THE POPULATION, SEIZE SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS OF THE RICE HARVEST AND NEUTRALIZE THE RD PROGRAM. HOWEVER, ARVN, RF AND PF FORES HAE THUS FAR BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN MAINTAIING TERRITORIAL SECURITY.

(6) III CORPS SECURITY RESUME.

	SEP	AUG
VC INCIDENTS	751	640
VC/NVA COMBAT STRENGTH	29,512	32,472
ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION OF CIV	72	135
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	14	21
STATUS OF RADS - GREE(PCT)	68	54

BT
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 4 OF ..17500

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

K 16 01 03 Z

C833 T JCS580/15
SXC614
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMU0622 3190000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 2394L 3-190615
ZNY CCCCC
P 150515Z NOV 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROM; MACJ01R SEC IV OF X.

AMBER (PCT)	21	35
RED (PCT)	11	11
STATUS OF WATERWAYS GREEN (PCT)	55	55
AMBER (PCT)	41	41
RED (PCT)	4	4
HES NO. OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (A, B, C) CATEGORY	1,074	1,065
	SEP	AUG
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORY	85.5	85.1
RF ST ENGTH	36,978	37,631
PF STRENGTH	24,439	24,100

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN III CORPS IMPROVED AS THE ENEMY CONTINUED TO AVOID MAJOR CONTACT, AND FRIENDLY OPERATIONS TO DENY THE ENEMY SECURITY AND RESOURCES IN KEY POPULATED AREAS ARE MAKING PROGRESS. MILITARY SUPPORT FOR RD IMPROVED DURING SEPTEMBER. THERE WERE 11 SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS INVOLVING RD CADRE OR PROGRAMS AND IN EACH INCIDENT A SUPPORT OR REACTION FORCE WAS ON HAND SHORTLY AFTER THE VC WERE ENCOUNTERED. A SHARP IMPROVEMENT IN SECRUTIY ALONG HIGHWAY

(18443)

CONFIDENTIAL

INCLUDED IN IDA
IDA # C-71-8362

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

20 IN LONG KHANH PROVINCE, PRODUCED BY RECENT TROOP AND JUNGLE CLEARING OPERATIONS, HAS ESSLTED IN A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF PRODUCE-BEARING TRAFFIC BOUND FOR MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS. AN EQUALLY IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT WAS THE OPENING AFTER SEVERAL MONTHS OF EFFORT OF ROUE 5 BETWEEN SAIGON AND GO CONG. A KEY EVENT WAS THE RESTORATION OF FERRY SERVICE ACROSS THE VAM CO RIVER AT CAU NOI IN LONG AN PROVINCE. OPENING ROUTE 5 REDUCES THE GO CONG AREA'S FARM-TO-MARKET DISTANCE BY 50 PERCENT.

(7) IV CORPS SECURITY RESUME.

	SEP	AUG
VC INCIDENTS	946	679
VC BOMBAT STRENGTH	19,535	19,135
ASSASSINATION, ABDKUCTION OF CIVILIANS	139	145
VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RDC	16	12
STATUS OF ROADS - GREEN (PCT)	23	23
AMBER (PCT)	77	77
RED (PCT)	0	0
STATUS OF WATERWAYS GREEN (PCT)	30	45
AMBER (PCT)	51	57
RED (PCT)	10	8
HES NO. OF HAMLETS IN SECURE (A, B, C) CATEGORY	2,056	2,043
HES PERCENT OF POPULATION IN SECURE CATEGORY	54.8	54.3
RF STRENGTH	52,899	51,296
PF STRENGTH	57,936	58,031

IV CORPS REMAINS AN ARE OF UNCERTAIN TERRITORIAL SECURITY. LITTLE CHANGE WAS NOTED IN THE SEKURITY SITUATION IN EPTEM ER. VC INCIDENTS ROSE SHARPLY DURING THE FIRST TWO WEEKS AND THEN TAPERED OFF. THE MORTARING O MY THO ON TWO OVVASIONS DURING THE MONTH LED TO THE LAUNCHING OF A NEW PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN NORTH OF THE TOWN. IN CHUONG THIEN THE VC HARASS THE CADRE IN THE RD CAMPAIGN AREA ALMOST DAILY. BA XUYEN REPORTED ONE ATTACK AND SEVERAL MINOR HARRASSMENTS AGAINST RD CADRE IN BOTH COMPLETED AND NEWLY OCCUPIED HAMLETS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THE VC HAVE LAUNCHED A CONCERTED CAMPAIGN AGAINST HIGHWAY 4 THROUGHOUT THE DELTA. SEVERAL PROVINCES REPORTED MININGS AND ROADBLOCKS ON THE ROUTE. THE CHALLENGE TO

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TERRITORIAL SECURITY HAS INCREASED WITH REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES TO SECURE THE HAMLETS NEWLY OCCUPIED BY RD CADRE TEAMS. SECURITY FORCES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MORE HAMLETS AND LARGER AREAS. ALLOCATION OF 18 RD COMPANIES AND 50 PF PLATOONS TO IV CORPS IN SEPTEMBER WILL EVENTUALLY ALLEVAITE THIS SITUATION.

C. EXPAND AND SUPPLEMENT RD GROUPS EFFORTS AND ASSICOATED PROGRAMS; (1) THE RD CADRE (RDC) GROUPS AND ASSOCIATED PROGRAMS CONTINUE TO MAKE GOOD PROGRESS. THE NUMBER OF RD GROUPS WHICH MOVED TO THEIR SECOND HAMLET FOR THE YEAR INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY DURING SEPTEMBER. DEPLOYMENT OF RD GROUPS AND STATUS OF MOVES TO SECOND-PHASE HAMLETSMIZE SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE.

	H RD GROUPS 30 SEP	RD GROUPS 31 AUG	NO. OF GROUPS COMPLETING MOVES 31 AUG	NO. OF GROUPS COMPLETING MOVES 30SEP
I	128	122	26	43
II	148	143	52	90
III	69	69	11	37
IV	160	157	9	95
TOTAL	505	491	98	265

THE 38 RD GROUPS IN AN GIANG WILL NOT MOVE BUT WILL CONTINUE TO WORK ONE GROUP TO A VILLAGE. HENCE THERE WERE 453 RD GROUPS SUBJECT TO MOVEMENT ON 31 AUGUST. OF THESE 265 OR 58 PERCENT HAD COMPLETED THEIR MOVES BY 30 SEPTEMBER.

(2) EXPANSION OF RD CADRE STRENGTH CONTINUED DURING SEPTEMBER. FROM A LOW FOR THE YEAR OF 2,332 (411 GROUPS) IN APRIL RDC STRENGTH INCREASED TO 24,509 ON 30 SEP, A GAIN OF 20 PERCENT. DISTRIBUTION OF THIS GAIN IS AS FOLLOWS;

	RDC STRENGTH 30 SEP	RDC STRENGTH 30 SEP	PERCENT INCREASE
I	7331	7001	4.7
II	7222	6188	16.7
III	3267	2881	1.3
IV	6689	5370	24.6

EXPANSION IN III CORPS WAS NOT AS GREAT AS DESIRED DUE TO RECRUITING DIFFICULTY. IN ADDITION TO RD CADRE THERE WERE 106 TRUONG SON CADRE (TSC) (MONTAGNARD) GROUPS AND 6266 TS CADRE AS OF 30 SEP. ALSO IN OUR ARSENAL ARE 35 CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMS, 32 OF THEM IN II CORPS. CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMS ARE COMPOSED OF TECHNICAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SERVICE CADRE AND RF OR PF PLATOONS.
(3) RD CADRE DESERTIONS INCREASED IN SEPTEMBER FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE MAY. THE DESERTION RATE INCREASED FROM 9.7 PER THOUSAND IN AUGUST TO 12.5 IN SEPTEMBER. TOTAL CADRE LOSSES ARE SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE.

	RD CADRE LOSSES	
	SEP	AUG
KILLED	54	66
CAPTURED	11	10
DISCHARGED	224	142
DESERTED	308	298
TOTAL	597	516

IN ORDER TO IMPROVE DISCIPLINE AND CURB DESERTION THE RD MINISTRY PUBLISHED A REGULATION ON 1 SEP PROVIDING FOR SUSPENSION OF PAY OF
BT
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 5 OF ...1 7 5 0 0

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

K 16 00 28 2

D3 84 X K JCS588/ 15
G706
PP R UE PJS
DE R UMS OM UO 623 3190000
Z NY CCCCC
DE R UM SMA 23 95L 3190615
ZNY CCCCC
P 1505 15Z NOV 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/D OD
RUEHC/ STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROM; MACJ03R SEC V OF X
RD CADRES ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE. THIS IS A USEFUL MOVE BUT DOES NOT DEAL ADEQUATELY WITH CADRE WHO DESERT OR RESIGN. WE ARE DISCUSSING WITH THE MINISTRY APPLICATION OF HARSHER SANCTIONS, SUCH AS IMMEDIATE DRAFTING INTO RVNAF IN APPROPRIATE CASES. DISCHARGES (RESIGNED, RETIRED, CASHIERED) ARE A SIGNIFICANT COMPONENT OF CADRE ATTRITION. THE INCREASING DISCHARGE RATE IS ATTRIBUTED TO IMPORVED DISCIPLINE AND POOR RECRUITMENT AND SCREENING PRACTICES IN THE PAST. TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF RECRUITS ELEVEN PROVINCES HAVE INSTITUTED TRAINING PROGRAMS TO PERMIT SCREENING OUT THE UNFIT AND UNDESIRABLE PRIOR TO SENDING RECRUITS TO THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER. THE MOST PROMISING OF THESE PROGRAMS SEEM TO BE THOSE INVOLVING A SHORT APPRENTICESHIP WITH EXISTING RDC GROUPS IN THE FIELD. OUR GOAL IS TO HAVE PRE-VUNG TAU TRAINING PROGRAMS IN ALL PROVINCES BY THE END OF THE YEAR.
(4) DURING SEP 2060 NEW RD CADRES COMMENCED THE BASIC COURSE AT THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER AT VUNG TAU. THIS WAS 140 SHORT OF OUR GOAL OF 2200 FOR SEP. IN ADDITION 828 CADRES WERE PLACED INTO LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND 505 INTO MEDICAL TRAINING FOR A TOTAL INPUT OF 3393 IN SEP. AS A RESULT VUNG TAU IS NOW BULGING WITH 8000

(18422)

INCLUDED IN IDA
LOG # C-71-8362

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

STUDENTS. IN-PROVINCE TRAINING OF RD CADRES AFTER THEY RETURN FROM VUNG TAU HAS BEEN INSTITUTED IN SEVERAL PROVINCES. THE OBJECT IS TO IMPROVE CADRE EFFECTIVENESS, AT THE SAME TIME INVOLVING THE OLD LINE GVN MINISTRIES AND THEIR TECHNICAL CADRES IN RD BOTH WHILE THE RD CADRES ARE RESIDENT IN A HAMLET AND AFTER THEY MOVE ON. IN II CORPS A RETRAINING PROG TM, BY USING MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS AND SENDING SELECTED CADRE TO VUNG TAU FOR LEADERSHIP TRAINING, HAS IMPROVED THE QUALITY OF THE GROUPS.

(5) BECAUSE OF THE PREVAILING CLIMATE OF SECURITY IN AN GIANG PROVINCE THE DECISION WAS MADE IN JULY TO REORIENT THE RD PROGRAM ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND REORGANIZE THE RD CADRE GROUPS INTO 38 20-MAN TEAMS, ONE FOR EACH VILLAGE. HWEVER, SINCE THE END OF JULY THE NEW TEAMS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED VERY LITTLE. THIS IS DUE TO LACK OF UNDERSTANDING AND SINCERE INTEREST ON THE PART OF THE PROVINCE CHIEF WHO OPPOSES STRENGTHENING VILLAGE AND HAMLET GOVERNMENT, BAD FEELING CREATED BY INTEGRATING THE PROVINCE TECHNICAL SERVICE CADRES INTO THE RD GROUPS AND SENDING THEM TO WORK IN THE VILLAGES, AND CONFUSION AMONG THE CADRES WHO ARE NOT COMPLETELY AWARE OF WHAT THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO ACCOMPLISH. STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO GET THIS PROGRAM BACK ON TRACK.

(6) A RATHER CUMBERSOME INTER-IMINSTERIAL DIRECTIVE PROVIDING FOR THE ARMING OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PEOPLE'S GROUPS (RDPG) WAS ISSUED ON 27 SEP AFTER MONTHS OF URGING ON OUR PART. THE RDPG ARE MILITIA-TYPE POPULAR ASSOCIATIONS ORGANIZED BY THE RD CADRES IN THE HAMLETS. NUMEROUS PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED IN ARMING AND TRAINING THESE ELEMENTS IN THE PAST. WE ARE NOW WORKING ON SIMPLIFYING THE INTER-MINISTERIAL DIRECTIVE TO FACILITATE SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION TO THE RDPG.

PACCADRE PROGRAM IS ONE OF THE MOST TROUBLE-FREE PROGRAMS WE HAVE. DEALING WITH A RESPECTED, MATURE, AND OLDER INDIVIDUAL IN EACH HAMLET MAKES FOR A GOOD PROGRAM. NOT ALL CG CADRES WORK PROPERLY, NOR ARE ALL RESPECTED, MATURE, AND OLDER, BUT THE PROBLEMS ARE OF SUCH A NATURE THAT THEY CAN BEZ HANDLED EXPEDITIOUSLY. ON 30 SEP THE NUMBER OF STATIC CENSU GRIEVANCE CADRE STOOD AT 5340. OUR GOAL IS 6359 BY THE END OF 1967. THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANH INDUCED TO RALLY BY RD AND CG ARE ;

	SEP	YEAR TO DATE
RD CADRE	49	812

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

CENSUS GRIEVANCE 106 1465
D. ACCELERATE THE CHIEU HOI EFFORT: (1) THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANH FELL TO 1781 IN SEP, REACHING A NEW LOW FOR THE YEAR AFTER THREE CONSECUTIVE MONTHS OF DECLINE. THE TREND DURING 1967 IS DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING FIGURES.

	1ST QTR	2ND QTR	3RD QTR	PERCENT DECLINE 1-3 QTR
I	XXXX

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

III	3134	7203	# #	130
IV	3932	8140		107
TOTAL	13,159	23,588	# ##	81

THE LOW RATE OF INCREASE IN II CORPS IS ATTRIBUTED PRIMARILY TO THE FACT THAT MILITARY ACTION INVOLVING PENETRATION AND CLEARING OF ENEMY SANCTUARIES HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY LOWER IN THE LATTER PART OF THE YEAR THAN IN 1966.

(3) CAPACITY OF CHIEU HOI RECEPTION CENTERS CONTINUES TO INCREASE, WITH III CORPS SHOWING THE LARGEST EXPANSION. DISTRIBUTION OF CAPACITY AND COMPLETION OF PROGRAMMED CONSTRUCTION IS SHOWN BELOW.

	CAPACITY	PERCENT INCREASE SINCE	PERCENT COMPLETION OF PROGRAMMED CONSTRUCTION

BT
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

Ø

SEC 6 OF 1 7 5 0 0

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

K17 03 07Z

5/JCS111/17
CN 17500
FD RUEO
PP RUEPIA RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMV7637 3200000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 3143S 3200912
ZNY CCCCC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN SVC ZUI RUMSMT 450S 3192000
ZDK RUMSMA 2396L 3190615 P 150615
DE RUMSMA 2396L 3190615
ZNY CCCCC
150615Z NOV 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT

NOFORN

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROM; MACJØ1C. SEC VI OF X.

	30 SEP	1 JAN	30 SEP
I	590	87PCT	58PCT
II	1575	21PCT	48PCT
III	1335	95 PCT	23.6PCT
IV	1640	62 PCT	59.2PCT

A TOTAL OF 53 CENTERS ARE PROGRAMMED FOR 1967, AND CONSTRUCTION IS ACUTALLY UNDERWAY OR COMPLETED IN 31 CENTERS.
(4) USE OF HOI CHANHIN ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS (APT'S) CONTINUES TO EXPAND, AS REVEALED IN THE STRENGTH DATA OF THE FOLLOWING TABLE.

APT STRENGTH

INFO:CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC/DDO-1 SDEF-7
ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 W/H-10 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1
CMC-7 FILE-1 (83)ETO/AJ

INCLUDED IN IDA
LOG # C-71-8362

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

	30 SEP	20 AUG
I	580	373
II	455	459
II	864	874
IV	1028	928
TOTAL	2927	2634

AS OF 30 SEP, 839 APT WERE ARMED. THE LACK OF WEAPONS FOR SELN-DEFENSE WHILE PERFORMING PROPAGANDA MISSIONS AND GUARD DUTIES AT CHIEU HOI INSTALLATIONS HAS BEEN A SERIOUS PROBLEM. ORTUNATELY, AS A RESULT OF OUR INSISTENT URGING THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE HAS FILLY ISSUED A DIRECTIVE ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES FOR PROVIDING THE NEEDED WEAPONS. ALL ELEMENTS OF MACV HAE BEEN ALERTED AND ARE STANDING BY TO ENSURE THE MOST RAPID POSSBLE DELIVERY OF WEAPONS TOAPT'S.

(5) MORE THAN 1100 HOI CHANH HAVE ENTERED VUNG TAU FOR TRAINING AS RD CADRES. THE FIRST CONTINGENT OF APPROXIMATELY 300 IS ALREADY BACK ON DUTY IN THE FIELD AND FROM ALL REPORTS THEY ARE PERFORMING AS ELITE UNITS. REPORTS FROM VUNG TAU INDICATE THE HOI CHANG GROUP FROM BA XUYEN WAS THE BEST THE PROVINCE HAD SENT TO VUNG TAU.

(6) IN JULY NO HOI CHANG WERE USED AS KIT CARSON SCOUTS ON A REGULAR BASIS. IN AUGUST, APPROXIMATELY 40 WERE BEINL USED BY MARINES IN I CORPOS. RECRUITMENT OF HOI CHANH FOR KIT CARSON SCOUTS CONTINUES. AT THE END OF SEP THERE WERE 92 SCOUTS ON ACTIVE DUTY AND 65 IN TRAINING FOR A TOTAL OF 157. MANY MORE HOI CHANH ARE BEING USED BY US MILITARY UNITS ON A ONE-TIME BASIS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION IS NOT RECORDED. OUR PRESENT TARGT IS 1800 KIT CARSON SCOUTS BY THE END OFFY 1963. WE ARE NOW LAUNCHING A SPECIAL EFFORT TO ASSESS THE KIT CARSON PROGRAM THROUGHOUT ALL MILITARY UNITS, WITH A VIEW TO EITHER GREATLY EXPANDING THE USE OF THESE SCOUTS OR READJUSTING THETARLET TO MORE REALISTI LEVEL .

(7) CONSISTENT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN VOCATIONAL TRAINING FOR HOI CHANH, WITH EMPHASIS ON PRACTICAL SKILLS THAT REQUIRE A COMPARATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF TRAINING AND UTILIZE READILY AVAILABLE MATERIAL AND FEW, IF ANY, COMPLICATED TOOLS. SUCH PROGRAMS INCLUDE CARPENTRY, MASONRY, TAILORING, AND AGRICULTURE-RELATED ACTIVITIES. PROVINCIAL CHIEU HOI SERVICES HAVE BEEN SLOW TO APPLY TO THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CHIEU HOI (MICH) FOR ALLOCATIONS FROM THE 1967 FUND OF 34 MILLION PIASTERS FOR

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

VOCATIONAL TRAINING. WE ARE ENDEAVORING TO REMEDY THIS SITUATION. EXCEPT FOR PROVINCIAL ACTIVITIES NOTED ABOVE, ANY SIGNIFICANT NEW DEVELOPMENT IN VOCATIONAL TRAINING WILL DEPEND LARGELY UPON PROGRAMS SIMILAR TO THAT BEING CONDUCTED BY EDUCATIONAL CONSULTANTS LTD UNER CONTRACT WITH USAID. EDK(2 #- 3)3;3,

PERATING SITES. EIGHT OF THESE ARE IN IV CORPS AND CONSIT OF ON-THE-JOB TRAINING AT CHIEU HOI CENTERS AND HAMLETS WHERE JOI CHANH ARE DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION OF NEW BUILDINGS AND MAKING IMPROVEMENTS ON EXISTING ACTIVITIES. THE EDCON PROGRAM IS CURRENTLY LIMITED BY LACK OF TRAINING MATERIALS TO TEACH CERTAIN TRADES, SUCH AS MOTORMAINTENANCE AND WELDING. THIS AREA IS UNDER REVIEW.

(8) NO MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH HAS YET OCCURRED IN GETTIG JOBS FOR HOI CHANH IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, ALTHOUGH MANY RETURNEES ARE GETTING JOBS, PARICULARLY WHEN TRAINED BY SEABEES, EDCON OR OTHERS. EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE OFFICIAL GVN SUPPORT OF EMPLOYMENT OF HOI CHANH BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR CONTINUE. HE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF SECURITY CLEARANCES TO PERMIT EMPLOYMENT OF RETURNEES IN NON-SENSITIVE OCCUPATIONS HAS YET TO BE RESOLVED.

(9) RVNAF IS NOW EXPERMENTING WITH UE OF HOI CHANH TROOPS EITHER AS INDIVIDUAL UNITS OR AS FILLERS FOR REGULAR UNTS. IN VINH BINH A POPULAR FORCE COMPANY COMPOSED ALMOST ENTIRELY OF HOI CHANH HAS ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS AN OUSTANDING UNIT. PERFORMANCE OF HOI CHANH IN APT'S, KIT CARSON SCOUTS, AND PF HAS DEMSTRATED THEIR SUPERIOR POTENTIAL AS MILITARY UNITS. HOWEVER, ISSUE IS WHETHER ARVN WILL PERMIT SUCH UNITS TO BE ORGANIZED. PRESIDENT-ELECT THIEU IS KNOWN TO PERSONALLY FAVOR HOI CHANH UNITS VN ARVN P TO COMPANY SIZE. QUESTION WILL BE RAISED AGAIN AFTER NEW GVN SETTLES DOWN.

E. IMROVE THE REFUGE EFFORT. (1) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REFUGEES INCREASED DURING THE MONTH BY 54,862. AT THE SAME TIME 35,789 REFUGEES WERE RE-ESTABLISHED, LEAVING THE DIFFERENCE OF 19,073 AS THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF TEMPORARY REFUGEES REQUIRING CARE. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CHANGE IN TOTAL REFUGEES AND THE CHANGE IN REFUGEES RE-ESTABLISHED DURING THE MONTH IS A MEASURE OF OUR PROGRESS IN CONTROING THE GENERATIO OF REFUGEES

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

AND IN RESETTLEMENT. THIS MONTH REFUGE GNERATION WAS GREATER THAN REFUGEE RE-ESTABLISHMENT. AN ACCURATE STATISTICAL SERIES FOR TEMPORARY REFUGEES (DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TOTAL REFUGEES AND THE NUMBER RE-ESTABLISHED) IS AVAILABLE FROM JUNE 1967. HE CHANGE FROM THE PRECEDING MONTH IN THE NUMBER OF TEMPORARY REFUGEES IS SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE.

CHANGE IN TEMPORARY REFUGEES FROM PREVIOUS MONTH

JULY	AUG	SEP
PLUS 12,385	PLUS 31,496	PLUS 19,073

AS REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRESSES AND MEASURES TO LIMIT REFUGEE GNERATION TAKE EFFECT, THE CHANGE SHOULD BE REDUCED TO A NEGATIVE QUANTITY.

(2) MODEST PROGRESS WAS MADE DURING THE MONTH IN REFUGE RE-ESTABLISHMENT. THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES RE-ESTABLISHED SINCE 1 JAN 1964 AND THE CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUS MONTH IS SHOWN BELOW.

REFUGEES RE-ESTABLISHED
Q JAN 64 - 30 SEP 67
(WITH CHANGE FROM 31 AUG)

	TOTAL RE-ESTABLISHED	RETURNED TO VILLAGE AND INDIVIDUALLY RESETTLED	GVN SUPPORTED RESETTLEMENT
I	159,744	69,167	90,577

BT
NNNN

17500

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

17500

SEC 7 OF

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

K 15 19 01 Z

FØØ Z
CS849/15/
ZCEUNS12SXA871
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMV5997 3190000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 2397319Ø615
ZNY CCCCC
P 15Ø515Z NOV 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/$ OD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/:IA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT

NOFORN

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 3740 FROT; MAC JØ1R SEC VII OF X

	2,569	Ø	2,569
II	477,368	365,797	111,571
	13,868	9,293	4,5
8 II	234,343	70,414	163,929
	2,Ø45	Ø	2,Ø45
IV	404,973	132,622	272,351
	17,3Ø7	15,938	1,369
TOTAL	1,276,248	638,ØØØ	638,428
	35,789	25,231	10,558

5 HE SPECIAL COMMISSARIAT FOR REFUGEES CONTINUES PLANNING FOR REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON I CORPS. SCR HAS DIRECTED I CORPS TO EXPEDITE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS. SCR, MACV AND WORLD VISION, INC., ARE WORKING OUT FINAL DETAILS OF A CONTRACT WITH WVI FOR A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION FROM THAT ORGANIZATION IN RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS.
(3) REFUGEES NOT RE-ESTABLISHED ARE CLASSIFIED AS TEMPORARY REFUGEES. THESE ARE THE OBJECT OF GVN PROGRAMS OF TEMPORARY CARE AND EVENTUAL RESETTLEMENT. THE NUMBER OF TEMPORARY REFUGEES INCREASED IN I AND III CORPS AND DECREASED IN II AND IV CORPS

INFO: CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC/DDO-1 SDEF-7
ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 W/H-10 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1
CMC-7 FILE-1(83)RBK/RD (17885)

1 OF 4

INCLUDED IN IDA
LOG # C-71-8362

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

DURING SEP, AS SHOWN IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE.

TEMPORARY REFUGEES
1 JAN 64 - 30 SEP 67
(WITH CHANGE FROM 31 AUG)

	IN CAMP	OUT OR CAMP	TOTAL	NO. OF TEMPORARY REFUGEE CAMPS
I	189,428	216,530	406,062	140
	2979	36,222	36,519	12
II	72,201	111,633	183,834	132
	-7,329	-3,580	-10,909	-1
III	32,396	58,908	91,304	50
	-4,280	6,526	2,246	0
IV	17,677	87,655	105,332	73
	7,904	-16,687	-8,783	8
TOTAL	311,756	474,776	786,532	395
	-3,408	22,481	19,073	19

(4) THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN I CORPS IS STILL SERIOUS, BUT NO LONGER CRITICAL. THE CRISIS OF THE PAST FEW MONTHS ABATED IN SEP DUE TO RELAXATION OF STRINGENT GVN CONTROLS IN REFUGEE ALLOWANCES, BETTER PERFORMANCE BY PROVINCE SCR OFFICIALS, AND INCREASED COMMODITY SHIPMENTS. CAALYST OF THIS MRKED IMPROVEMENT WAS THE 9 SEP I CORPS COMMANDERS CONFERENCE ON REFUGEES CHAIRED BY GENERAL LAM AND ATTENDED BY DR. QUE (HEAD OF SCR), ALL PROVINCE CHIEFS, AND PROVINCE REFUGEE OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS THE AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS. THIS ACTION-ORIENTED MEETING RESULTED IN CUTTING CONSIDERABLE RED TAPE AND FIRM ORDERS BY THE CORPS COMMANDER AND REFUGEE COMMISSIONER TO IMPROVE PRESENT PERFORMANCE. IMCOMPETENT REFUGEE SERVICE CHIEFS WERE REMOVED IN QUANG TRI AND QUANG NAM. CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, SUCH AS ROOFING, ARE STILL NOT IN ADEQUATE SUPPLY BUT STOCKS ARE IMPROVING. STEPS ARE IN TRAIN TO IMPROVE TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT. WE ARE CONTINUING TO GIVE THIS SITUATION CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION, AND HOPE FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENT.

(5) SCR NOW HAS 18 REFUGEE MOBILE TEAMS IN THE FIELD AND 3 IN TRAINING, A TOTAL OF 214 REFUGEE WORKERS. EIGHT TEAMS ARE IN I CORPS AND SEVEN IN II CORPS. PLANS CALL FOR THE CREATION OF 15

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

MORE MOBILE TEAMS DURING THE NEXT THREE MONTHS AND 51 .94E TEAMS DURING THE NEXT 15 MONTHS. ALTHOUGH SCR HAS OBTAINED AUTHORITY TO ARM THE TEAMS, LITTLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THIS RESPECT.
(6) VOCATIONAL TRAINING FOR REFUGEES IS MOVING AT A GOOD PACE. TRAINING PROGRAMS ARE BEING EXPANDED AND PRIMARY CLASSROOMS BY THE END OF SEP REACHED A TOTAL OF 243 WITH A STAFF OF 314 TEACHERS. SCR HAS REQUESTED THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF SCHOOLS ORGANIZING COURSES FOR REFUGEES FROM 16 TO 25. PLANNING WITH PHILCO FORD FOR TEACHER TRAINING AIDS AND DORMITORY CONSTRUCTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED.
(7) DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS, SEVERAL VOLUNTARY AGENCIES HAVE EITHER BEGUN PROGRAMS OR PLANNED EXPANSION OF EXISTING PROGRAMS. THE WORLD VISION, IND $ 500,000 PROGRAM WILL BE LAUNCHED IN 90 DAYS THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE PLANS TO ESTABLISH IN TWO MORE LOCATIONS ITS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WHICH HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL WITH IRON TRIANGLE REFUGEES. INCREASED INTEREST WAS SHOWN BY THE THAILAND, KOREAN AND NEW ZEALAND RED CROSS SOCIETIES. THE INTERNATIONAL YMCA IS CONSTRUCTING A OMMUNITY CENTER IN LAI THIEU AND PLANS TO BEGIN OTHERS ELSEWHERE.
F. EXPAND POLICE EFFORT. (1) THE PRESENT NATIONAL POLICE FORCE LEVEL I 67,000. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE FORCE LEVEL WILL REACH 70,000 BY THE END OF 1967, 4000 SHORT OF THE ESTABLISHED GOAL. LOW SALARIES AND POOR CAREER INCENTIVES UNDER HAZARDOUS JOB CONDI-5IONS CONTINUE TO BE SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO POLICE RECRUITMENT. ONLY 10,000 POLICEMEN OF THE PRESENT FORCE HAVE CAREER STATUS. PAY OF POLICE OFFICERS IS BELOW THE PAY OF EQUIVALENT MILITARY GRADES. A PROPOSED SALARY INCREASE FOR THE TOP GRADES AND AN INCREASE IN CAREER PERSONNEL OF 20,000 HAS BEEN PRESENTED BY THE AMBASSADOR TO THE PRIME MINISTER. THE DGNP HAS ALSO REQUESTED AN ADDITIONAL RISK ALLOWANCE FOR NPFF AND SPECIAL BRANCH POLICE.
(2) THE NUMBER OF NATIONAL POLICE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF PROVINCE CAPITALS IS AN INDICATOR OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH POLICE ARE UTILIZED TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE RURAL POPULATION. CURRENT DATA IS NOT AVAILABLE, BUT RESULTS OF AN EARLIER STUDY SHOW THE FOLLOWING DISTRIBUTION O NATIONAL POLIVE (3XCLUDING NPFF) AS OF 1 JUL 1967;

	NO. OF POLICE IN PROVINCE AT DISTRICT LEVEL	PERCENTAGE OF POLICE IN PROVINCES AT DISTRICT LEVEL
I	1297	23.2

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

II	1842	23.9
III	3934	41.6
8V	3248	26.8

RECENTLY SOME IMPROVEMENT WAS NOTED IN IV CORPS WHERE GO CONG, DINH TUONG, AND SADEC PROVINCES REPORTED THAT ADDITIONAL POLICEMEN WERE DEPLOYED TO DISTRICTS DURING SEP. IN KIEN HOA 165 ADDITIONAL POLICEMEN WERE STATIONED IN THE DISTRICTS DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD BUT SUBSEQUENTLY RETURNED TO THE PROVINCE CAPITAL. ANOTHER CASE OF POOR PERFORMANCE IS CHAU DOC, WHERE 801 OF 1085 NP ARE IN THE PROVINCE CAPITAL OR ON VARIOUS SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS.
(3) AFTER CONSIDERABLE URGING ON OUR PART, THE DGNP PROMULGATED IN AUGUST A NEW SOP FOR THE NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCES (NPFF)MAKING THIS FORCE THE ACTION ARM OF THE PLICE SPECIAL BRANCH IN ELIMINAT-
8T
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

206

2105

SEC 8 OF 17500

CALL 53337
FOR [illegible]/MC
SERVICE

K17 05 49Z

NOFORN

F089 C S016/17
UN588SXJ320
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSCNV7581 3200000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 2398) 3190615
ZNY CCCCC
P 150515Z NO 67 ZFD
FMOMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/OD
RUEHC/ TATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/:G II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF A I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT

NOFORN

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROM; MACJ03 R/SEC VIII OF X.
ING THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE. A REORGANIZATION OF THE NP SPECIAL POLICE
IS DELAYING FULL IMPEMENTATION OF THE NEW CONCEPT. SOM PROVINCES
ARE CONTINUING TO USE NPFFTO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR VILLGES AND RD
TEAMS. HOWEVER, A STRONGCCT
THIS SITUATIONGM THE NPFF FORCE LEVEL HAS REACHED 14,000 MEN, WITH
59 OMPANIES DELPOYED AND 4 IN TRAINING. SOME DEPLOYED COMPANIES
ARE NOT YET AT FULL STRENGTH. AS OF 30 SE29 COMPANIES WRE DE-
PLOYED ACCORDING TO THE NEW CONCEPT.
KRL PRISON REHABILITATON TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE DETENTION CENTERS
FOR CONVICTED INFRASTRUCTURE MEMBERS WAS STALLED DURING SEP. A RE-
QUEST FOR 100 MILLION PIASTERS TO INITATE CONSTRUCTION OF
DETENTION CENTERS WAS SENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON 9 SEP. CURRENT
PLANS CALL FOR CONSTRUCTION OF EIGHT 500-MAN CAMP AND ONE 5,000-
10,000 MAN FACILITY BY JUNE 1968. THE LATER FACILITY ULD BE FOR
CONVICTED CIVIL DEFENDANTS WHILE DETNTION CAMPS WOULD BE FOR THOSE
AWAITING PROCESSING AND SENTENCING. PRELIMINARY SURVYS HAVE BEEN
CO DUCTED TO DETRMIN POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTION SITES, ATERIAL AND
CONSTRUCTIO COST. NUMEROUS SITES HAVE BEEN EXAMINED BUT ONLY ONE
IS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR THE LARGE FACILITY-CON SON ISLAND.

INFO.....CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC/DDO-1 S/DEF-7

ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 DIA-15 W/HOUSE-10 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7

FILE-1 (83) FWC/JW

INCLUDED IN IDA

CONFIDENTIAL

LOG # C-71-8362

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DESPITE OUR EFFORTS, NO NEW PRSONNEL WERE ADDED TO THE ROLLS OF THE DIRECTORATE OF CORRECTIONS. LOS SALARIES ARE PERAPS THEMAIN DETERRENT TO RECRUITING AAD RETENTION OF PRSONNEL WITHIN GHE DIRECTORATE. RECENT BUDGET HEARINGS BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF BUDGET AND FORIGN AID (DGBFA) INDICATE THAT NO PROVISION WILL BE MADE FOR AN INCREASE IN SALARIES OR FORCE LEVELS. ACTION IS NOW REQUIRED AT THE PRIME MINISTER LEVEL.

(5) THE FIRST MEETING OF THE NEWLY FOMED NATIONAL RESOURCES CONTROL COUNCIL WAS HELD ON 6 SEP. ONLY PROCEDURAL MATTERS WERE COVRED. THE NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 6 OCT WILL COVR RESOURCES CONTROL OPERATIONS IN THE IIICORPS AREA. IT IS HOPED THAT A NEW APPROACH TO RESOURCES CONTROL CAN BE FASHIONED, PARTICULARLY IN REMOVING USLESS BOTTLENECKS TO THE FREE FLOW OF COMMERCE AND TRAFFI.

6PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC WORKS, VILLAGE DEVELPLMENT, AGRICULTURE, ELF-#ELP, 3TC. (1) PROGRESS IN VARIOUS ACTIVITES IS REFLECTED IN BUDGETARY PRFORMANCE AS DEPICTED IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE.

	BUDGETED $VN	PCH XUDGET EXPENDED 30 SEP	PCTSBUDGET EXPENDED 31 AUG
VILLAGE/HAMLETS ADMIN PRSONNEL	31,933,000	39	
SELF-#ELP HAMLET DEVELOPMENT	242,988,000	66	56
RURAL EDUCATION	477,591,000	70	59
RURAL HEALTH	172,186,000	57	53
ROADS AND BRIDGES	464,543,000	42	32
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION	82,031,000	19	4
AGRICULTURAL IRRIGATION	51,601,000	61	45
ANIMAL HUSBANDRY	101,795,000	50	43
AGRICULTURE AFFAIRS AND EXTENSION	106,000,000	55	44
ISHERIES	44,922,000	58	43

'(2) VILLAGE/HAMLET ADMINSITRATION. THIS PROGRAM IS RELATED TO THE TRAINING OF LOCAL OFFICIALS. TRAINING COURSES FOR ELECTED OFFICIALS ARE PROGRAMMED IN EACH PROVINCE. THE TRAINING WAS INITIATED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE HAMLET/VILLAGE ELECTIONS. THE GOAL FOR CY 1967 IS TO GIVE A TRAINING COURSE OR SIMINAR FOR OVER 22,900 OR ABOUT 41PCT OF ALL VILLAGEHAMLET OFFCIALS. QUALITY OF TRAINING IS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

GENERALLY GOOD BECAUSE INSTRUCTOR TRAINING HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND TRAINING BOOKLETS HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED AND ISSUED. QUALITY OF TRAINING WILL CONTINUE TO IMPROVE AS EXPERIENCE IS GANED AND AS COURSES ARE DEVELOPMENT AND REFINED TO MEET LOCAL NEEDS.
(3) SELF-HELP HAMLET DEVELOPMENT. COMPLETIN OF UFNDED AND UN-FUNDED SELF-#ELP PROJECTS IS SHOWN BELOW.

SELF-HELP PROJECTS COMPLETED

	JAN- EP 66	'AN-SEP 67	JAN-AUG 67	QOYU PROGRAM
FUNDED	3478	2487	2071	4804
UNFUNDED	1281	6592	5000	5000PLUS'

(4) RURAL EDUCATION.

CLASSROO CONSTRUCTIO

	PROGRAMMED 1967	CONSTRUCTED SEP	CONSTRUCTED AUG
NOOF CLASSROOMS	2266	1148	843

TEACHER TRAINING

TRAINING COMPLETED

MPLETED

	PROGRAMMED 1967	SEP	AUG
NO. OF TRAINEE	2959	2937	2706

(5) RURAL HEALTH.

MATERNITY/DISPENSARY CONSTRUCTION

	SEP	AUG
NO. PROGRAMMED	327	327
NO. COMPLETED	42	18
O. UNDER CONSTRUCTION	154	123

THIS PROGRAM GOT OFF O A SLOW STARTE DUE TO INITIAL DESIGN PROBLEMS AND SELECTION OF SITES, AND CONSTRUCTION WAS NOT INITIATED UNTIL JUN 1967.
(6) ROADS AND BRIDGES. HIS PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO DEVELOP LINES OF COMMUNICATIN IN VILLGES AND HALETS AND FROM THEM TO THE SECONDARY ROADS. THE EFFORT IS CONCENTRATED IN AND NEAR NEW LIFE HAMLET. THIS PROJECT IS CARRIED ON USING THE SELF-HELP PRINCIPLE, WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM PROVINCIAL PUBLIC WORKS CHIEFS.

PROVINCIAL ROADS/BRIDGES

		SEP	AUG
(BRIDGES PROGRAMMED FOR CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION)	ABOV 1 MILLION VN$	33	33
	UNDER MILLION	NSTRUTION/RENOVATION ABOVE 1 MILL	
COMPLETED)	UNDER 1 MILLION	56	42

MILL

17500

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(ROAD PROGRAMMED FOR	REPAIR	566	566
CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION(KM)NEW	CONSTRUCTION	216	216
COMPLETED (KM)	REPAIRED	263	230
	NEW CONSTRUCTION	115.6	97

(7) RURAL ELECTRIFICATION. THIS PROGRAM CONSISTS OF CONSTRUCTION OF 65 SMALL GENERATOR FACILITIES TO PROVDIE POWER TO VILLAGES AND HAMLET. THE PLANTS WILL BE OPERATED BY RURAL COOPERATIVES. AS OF 31 AUGUST 18 SITES WERE COMPLETED AND 26 WERE UNDER CONSTRUCTION.
(8) AGRICULTURAL IRRGATION. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO PROVIDE FARMLAND IRRIGATION, DRAINAGE AND FACILITIES FOR WATER SUPPLY CONTROL IN NEW LIFE HAMLETS. THESE PROJECTS ARE LOCALLY SELECTED AND INCLUDE BOTH

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 9 OF 17500

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

K 16 13 252

B C932 Z JCS679/15
CZ CE UM948SXH069
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSOMV6761 3200000
TNY CCCCC ZOC

VV MAB795
PP RUEPIA RUEQ 47###1-
$3 47..- 2399L EQOPYQT
ZNY CCCCC
P 150515Z NOV 67
FM COMUSMECV
TO
UHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/UA IV CTZ
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROM; MACJ0R (SEC IX OF X)
NEW CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR OF OLD SYSTEMSBM

SMALL IRRIGATION CONSTRUCTION

	1967 PROGRAM	COMPLETED SEP	COMPLETED AUG
NO. IOF DAMS	19	ABOVE 1 MILLION $VN 7	4
		UNDER 1 MILLION $VN 25	16
KM OF CANALS	QPUMU	OW	UR

(9) ANIMAL HUSBANDRY. THIS PROGRAM PROVIDES GRANT DISTRIBUTION OF PIGS, POULTRY, ANIMAL FEEDS, IETC., IAND PROVIDES TECHNICAL GUIDANCE AND TRAINING FOR FARMERS IN NEW LIFE HAMLETS.

	PROGRAMMED 1967	COMPLETED SEP	COMPLETED AUG
PIGS DISTRIBUTED	15,534	8,145	7,809
CHICKEN AND DUCKS	38,586	16,180	12,770

INFO: CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC/DDO-1 SDEF-7
ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 W/H-10 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1
CMC-7 FILE-1(83) LAW/RA(19462) PAGE 1 OF 4

INCLUDED IN IDA
C-71-8362

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

FARMERS TRAINED		19,797	18,418

(10) AGRICULTURE AFFAIRS UNDER RD BUDGET. RURAL HAMLETS ARE ASSISTED BY AGRICULTURAL CADREE AND TECHNICIANS TRAINED AND ADMINISTERED BY THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE. THESE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL ASSIST RD CADRE IN TRAINING LOCAL FARMERS IN IMPROVED CROP PRODUCTION METHODS AND TECHNOLOGY. THE PAY OF THE AGRICULTURAL CADRE ANJ TECHNICIACS AS WELL AS COST OF FERTILIZER, INSECTICIDES, SPRAYERS, PUMPS AFD THE TRAIN NG AND DEMONSTRATION COSTS ARE FUNDED FROM THE RD BUDGET ANJ USAID. THIS PROGRAX IS SUPERIMPOSED UPON THE REGULAR MOA PROGRAM.

	1967 PROGRAM	COMPETED SEP	COMPLETED AUG
FARMER TRAINING SESSIONS	982	696	651
NO. OF FARMERS		32,447	30,643
DEOMONSTRATIONS	928	834	682
	$VN		
PLANTING MATERIAL DISTRIBUTED	24,750,000	18,735,000	17,826,000

(11) FISHERIES. THE COUNTRQ-WIDE GOAL IS TO INCRASE THE TOTAL FISH CATCH IN 1967 BY 50,000 MT OVER THE 1966 CATCH. IN NEWLY SECURED AREAS WHERE FISHING IS THE MAIN OCCUPATION, TRAINING OF FISHERMEN, DISTRIBUTION OF FISHING GEAR, BOAT MOTORS AND CONSTRUCTION OF FISH MARKETS AND LANDING STAGES ARE SUPPORTED WITH TECHNICAL SERVICES AND COMMODITIES FUNDED BY MORD AND USAID.

	1967 PROGRAM	COMPLETED SEP	COMPLETED AUG
MARKETS AND LAFDING SATGES (NL.)	17		R
FISING EQUIP AND FINGERLINGS	$VN 10,943,000	4,432,000	3,827,000
BOAT MOTORS (NO.)	383	168	10R
NO. OF FISHERMEN TRAINED		5,985	5,658

(12) THE MAJOR IR-8 RICE EXPERIMENT IN BINH TUY IS PROCEEDING FAVORABLY. IR-8 TS A RICE WITH POTENTIALLY MUCH GREATER YIELDS. THREE ADDITIONAL PROVINCES HAVE STARTED DEMONSTRATION PLOTS, ALTHOUGH GVN IS RALUCTANT TO INTRODUCE IR-8 ON A MASS SCALE UNTIL A NUMBER OF POTENTIAL CULTIVATION DIFFICULTIES HAVE BEEN SORTED OUT.

(13) HIGHLIGHTS FROM PROVINCE REPORTS INDICATE CONTINUATION OF WEAK PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN I CROPS, ALTHOUGH SOME IMPROVEMENT WAS

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

NOTED WITH APPOINTMENT OF A NEW REFUGEE CHIEF IN QUANG TRI AND NEW RD CHIEFS IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN. IN QUANG NAM A PILOT PROGRAX USING RICE THRESHING MACHINES IS SUCCESSFUL SO FAR. FARMERS REPORT THRESHING NAPABILITIES HAVE BEEN INCREASED FROM 200 TO 500 KILOS PER DAY. IN II CORPS ON9 SEP A SPILL WAY WAS OPENED AT THE DAN NHIM HYDROELECTRIC PLANT (NINH THUAN), PERMITTING IRRIGATION OF 10,000 HECTARES DURING THE DRY SEASON. SEVERAL NEW AGRICULTURAL AND EDUCATION ADVISORS ARE AT WORK IN THE HIGHLANDS; FIVE ELEMENTARQ TEACHER WORKSHOPS HAVE BEEN ATTENDED BY NEARLY 800 TEACHECS. A COORDINATED IMMUNIZATION/SANITATION/HEALTH EDUCATION PROGRAM HAS BEEN INITIATED IN THELOWLAND PROVINCES. IN III CORPS COMPETION OF FUNDED SELF-HELP PROJECTS ROSE 10 PERCENT DURING THE MONTH. NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT (NLD) PROGRESS IN NON-RD AREAS IS BASICALLY SUB-MARGINAL, RANGING FROM POOR TO SATISFACTORY. IN IV CORPS THE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAX, ESPECIALLY VITAL FOR MAINTENANCEOF THE HIGHWA6 LIFELINE, WAS PLAGUED BY LACK OF EQUIPMENT AND THE HIGH PRICE OF ROCK. THE ONLY SOURCE OF ROCK IN THE DELTA IS THE NUI SAP QUARRY IN THE SEVEN MOUNTAINS AREA OF AN GIANG PROVINCE. A START TOWARD SOLVING THIS PROBLEM WAS MADE WITH AWARD OF A CONTRACT TO RMF FOR THE NUI SAP ROCK QUARRY PROJECT. IN GENERAL, THE MAJOR ROADS INIV CORPS DETERIORATED FURTHER UNDEJ HEAY USE AND CONTINUED MINICGS BY THE VC.

H. BUDGET PERFORMADNCE.

GVN BUDGET PROGRAM	1967 BUDGET ($VN)	PERCENT EXPENDED SEP	PERCENT EXPENDED AUG
CHIEU HOI	972,000,000	81&	73&
VIS	40,000,000	45	41
REFUGEES			
TEMP. RELIEF	532,900,000	19	16
RESETTLEMENT	760,000,000	16	13
SPECIAL FUND	50,000,000	58	51
TOTAL	1,342,900,000	19	16
MORD			
I CORPS	337,142,000	60	46
II CORPS	484,792,000	48	40
III CORPS	539,784,000	54	45
IV CORPS	810,614,000	47	39

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

TOTAL	2,172,332,000	51	42

&OBLIGATIONS. EXPENDITURE DATA UNRELIABLE.

4. (C) STATUS OF PACIFICATION RESOURCES

UNITS IN DIRECT SUPPORT	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER
(1) ARVN BNS	53	53
(2) RF COS	213	219
(3)PF PLATS	775	745
(4) GROUPS		
(A) RD CADRE	491 (INCLUDING WEI WPAMAN TEAS IN AN GIANG)	505
(B) ITRUONG SON	107	106
(C) CIV/MILITARY	32	32
(D) QTR AONE TEAM CADRE	WW	W
(5) STATIC CENSUS GREIVANCE	5234	5340
(6) NATIONAL POLICE	66,135 (AS OF BEP JUL)	67,140 (AS OF 30

BT
NNNN

17500

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 10 OF...1 7 5 0 0

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

K 16 02 29 Z

VE200 CS767/15
UM734REG 071
PP RUEPJS
DE RUMSCMV5866 3 190000
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMSMA 2400L 3 190615
ZNY CCCCC
P 150615Z NOV 67
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEPJS/CJCS
RUEPJS/DOD
RUEHC/STATE AID
RUEPIA/CIA
RUMNVF/CG I FFORCEV SA II CTZ
RUMSFF/CG II FFORCEV SA III CTZ
RUMMWAA/CG III MAF SA I CTZ
RUMSMT/SA IV CTZ
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 37401 FROM; MACJ01R (FINASEC OF X. AUG)

5. (C) INDICATOR TRENDS

	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER
A. CHIEU HOI	1798	1781
B. REFUGEES		
GAINS	62,700	54,852
NOT RESETTLED	767,459	786,532
RESETTLED	1,240,639	1,276,428
C. VC INCIDENTS		
TOTAL	3,191	3,818
TERRORISM (INCLUDING RCD)	610	567
CIVIL CASUALTIES (ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS) AS A RESULT OF TERRORISM	914	1411

D. STATUSOF RD PLANS;

ON SCHEDULE THIS MONTH	LAST) MONTH)	BEHIND SCHEDULE THIS MONTH	(LAST) MONTH)

INFO:CJCS-8 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 (SACSA-3) NMCC/DDO-1 SDEF-7
ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 WH-10 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1
CMC-7 FILE-1(83)ETO/KS PAGE 1 OF4
(18568)

INCLUDED IN IDA
C-71-8362

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

I CORPS	1	(Ø)	4	(5)
II CORPS	4	(5)		77)R
III CORPS	2	(1)	9	(1Ø)
IV CORPS	3	(4)	13	(12)
	1Ø	(1Ø)	34	(34)

E. LOC STATUS

	GREEN	AMBER	RED
1. ROADS (MILITARILY ESSENTIAL)	61PCT (1711 KM)	32PCT (898 KM)	7PCT (196 KM)
2.RAILROADS (MILITARILY ESSENTIAL)	42PCT (521 KM)	2PCT (25 KM)	56PCT (694 KM)
3. ESSENTIAL WATERWAYS IN NPA OF III & IV CORPS	45IPCT 261KM)	47PCT (272KM)	8PCT (46 KM)

6. (C) ENEMY REACTION TO PACIFICATION OFFENSIVE;
A. ENEMY REACTION TO THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM IN I CORPS REAXINS AT THE SAME LEVEL. TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND ENEMY INCIDENTS WERE HIGH EARLY IN SEPTEM ER A A REULT O THE VV ATTEMPT TO DI-R RUPT THE ELECTION. THE ENEMY CONTINUED HIS ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT PACIFICATION PROGRAXS BY ATTACKING RCD GROUS, DISTRICT HEAD-QUARTERS AND ROVINCE CAPITALS. THE VC/NVA RETIAN THE CAPIBULITY TO MAKE LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS AGAINST ANY RD AREA. THE ENEMY HAS ALSO CONTINUED TO INTERDICT HIGHWAY NR1.
B. THE ENEMY SITUATION IN THE II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE DURING THE MONTH OF SEQHEMBER WAS MARKED BY A CONTINUED LACK OF SIGNIFICANT ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS; A CONSOLIDA-TION OF THE 3D NVA DIVISION'S FORCES NEAR THE POPULATION CENTERS OF BINH DINH PROVINCE; INTENSIFICATION OF ENEMY ATTACKS ON PHU YEN PROVINCE; AND SMALL SCALE ATTACKS ONHE TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY HIGHWASY INTERDICTION, BRIDGE DESTRUCTION AND MINING INCIDENTS IN THE REMAINDER OF THE CORPS AREA. THE APPARENT LACK OF ACTIVITY IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS SUGGESTS THAT THE ENEMY'S SUMMER MONSOON CAMPAIGN HAS FALED. THE ENEMY AITEMPTED TO DISRUPT THE GVN ELECTIONS IN EARLY SEPTEMBER AND HAS SINCE INCRREASED HIS EFFORTS TO KEEP FIRENDLY FORCES TIED DOWN ALONG THE COAST. HIS APPARENT OBJECTIVES ARE TO SECURE THE MAJOR RICE HARVEST SCHEDULED FOR

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

EARLY OCTOBER AND TO MOUNT MEDIUM TO LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS AGAINST FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS AND THE PACIFICATION PROGRAMS.
C. IN SEPTEMBER THERE WAS IN INCREASE IN VC TERRORISM ATTACKS DIRECTED AT INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE RD PROGRAM, (THIS OCCURREDDESPITE THE OVERALL LOW LEVEL OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS) AND A CONTINUATION OF SAXLL SCALE ATTACKS AND HARRASSMENT OF RD HAXLET AND MILITARY POUPOSTS. VC ATTACKS AND AMBUSHES RESULTED IN THE KILLING OF THE POLICE CHIEF OF PHUOC LONG AND WOUNDING THE DISTRICT CHIEF OF TRANG BANG. THE DUPUTY OOR SECURITY IN HAU NGHIA WAS KILLED BY A LAND MINE. THESE OFFICIALS WERE OGNSIDERED AXONG THE TOP OF THEIR CONTEMPORARIES AND THEIR LOSS IS SIGNIFICANT WHEN CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF THE SHORTAGE OF QUALIFIED LEADERS. PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ANTIONAL ELECTIONS PERIOD THE VC CONDUTED AN EXTENSIVE PROPAGANDA OPERATION OF THREATS IN AN EFFORT TO KEEP THE PEOPLE AWAY FROM THE POLLS, BUT THEY WERE UNABLE TO CARRY OUT THE THREATS IN ANY SIGNIFICANT MAFNER.R THIS FAILURE IS BELIEVED TO BE DUE TO THE SECURITY PROVIDED TO THE POLLING PLACES AND A GREATLY REDUCED CAPABILITY OF THE ENEMY.
D. ALMOST HAF OF THE VC INITIATED INCIDENTS IN IV CORPS DURING SEPTEMBER TOOK PLACE DURING THE PERIOD 1-4 SEPTEMBER MY THO WAS MORTARED FOR THE FIRST TIVE DURING THE WAR ON SEPTEMBER 3, AND AGAIN ON SEPTEMBER 16TH. SEVEAL DISTRICT CAPITALS ALSO WERE VORTARED ON ELECTION DAYM FIVE PROVINCES REPORTED ATTACKS ON RD TEAM DUCING THE MONTH. ROADS WERE NTERDICTED IN BAC LIEU, CHUONG THIEN, AND VINH LONG.
(C) AREAS REQUIRING SPECIAL ATTENTIONC THE PROTECTIGN OF HAMLETS ALREADY CONSTRUCTED AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR REGRESSION ARE PROBLEMS WE ARE KEEPING AN EYE ON. HE REVLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PEOPLES GGOUPS (RDPG) HAVE NOT YET BECOME A VIABLE PART OF THA PACIFICATION PROGRAX; ALL TOO OFTEC THEY ARE NOT TRAINED AND, WHEN TRZINED, NOT ARMED. ATTEMPTS BY THE VC TO REINFILTRATE FIRST SSMESTER HAXLETS WERE NOTED IN VINH BINH ACD CHUONG THIEN PROVINES IN IV CORPS. OUT PROVINCE TEAM IN PHONG DINH HAS EXPRESSED ITS MISGIINGS ABOUT THE LACK OF A VIABLE VILLAGE GOVERNMENT IN GRAI XUAN VILLAGE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THE GAINS MADE BEFORE THE RD GROSPS MOVE BEING LOST.R

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

THESE PROBLEMS ARE GETTING OUR CLOSE ATTENTION. THE IV CTZ COMMANDER AS AGREED TO SEND AN INSPECTION TEAM TO AREAS WITH QUESTIONABLE S-CURITY TO DETERMINE THE STATUS OF THE PACIFIED HAMLET AND ANY CORREC-TIVE ACTION EQUIRED.
FOOTNOTE 1 ROADS DEFINED A MILITARILY EENTIAL INVLUDE GRTQ KM IN I CORPS, 1413 KM IN II CORPS, 590 KM IN III CORPS, AND 351IKM IN IV CORPS. ESSENTIAL WATERWAYS INCLUDE 225 KM IN III CORPS AND354 KM IN IV CORPS.
GP-4.
BT
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET NOFORN

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET - NO FORN

OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR
MACCORDS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE
APO 96337

GES:AJP:ajp

To: Office of the Deputy Ambassador, American Embassy, Saigon
Via: Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor, ICTZ
(Attn: CORDS Joint Staff)

Ref: Joint MACV/JUSPAO/USAID/OSA Directive Number 4-67

PROVINCE REPORT
(RCS-MACCORDS-01-67)

QUANG NAM PROVINCE (03) Period Ending 31 December 1967

1. STATUS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN

(C) Though the 1967 RD Plan remains behind schedule, last month's decision to employ two RD Cadre Teams in each uncompleted hamlet has brought the desired results. It is anticipated that all RD hamlets scheduled for completion will attain a minimum of 80 points by 15 January 1968. Province plans call for the redeployment of RD Cadre Teams to their assigned hamlets for 1968 by mid-January.

(C) The security situation improved during December, allowing for more freedom of movement than in the past month and increasing the flow of materials to RD Team locations. (See Paragraph 4, below).

(C) The 1968 RD Plan has received final approval after several major changes influenced by higher headquarters. Recent developments in the relocation of troops throughout QUANG NAM Province have affected the planning. (See Paragraph 4, below).

2. PROJECT TAKEOFF

a. (U) 1968 Pacification Planning. See Paragraph 1.

b. (U) Mount Attack on VC Infrastructure. See Paragraph 4c.

ID# 71-135-590

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

c. (U) Expand RVNAF Support to Pacification. See Paragraph 4d.

d. (U) Expand RD Team Effort. See Paragraph 6a.

e. (C) Expand Capability to Handle Refugees. Though more refugee relief commodities were moved this month than last, no credit can be given GVN refugee officials. The Refugee Service Chief, Mr. DOAN CU, departed 21 December for reassignment; his interim replacement has yet to arrive in QUANG NAM. Without effective leadership at the province level, the expansion of refugee handling capabilities has been almost exclusively the business of US advisors.

Three Refugee Relief Mobile Teams have worked in the province during December at DAI LOC, DUC DUC and QUE SON Districts. Though a full-time US refugee advisor has been assigned to DAI LOC, the situation in that district requires the attention of a competent GVN team. The majority of refugees generated by Operation FOSTER have left the area of DAI LOC District Headquarters but are still carried on the relief roster; the local GVN refugee worker has been relieved but not replaced.

f. (U) Revamp Police and PFF. See Paragraph 6e.

g. (U) Accelerate Chieu Hoi. A rise in the number of returnees during December has resulted from highly effective US Army tactical operations in southern QUANG NAM; a majority of the new Hoi Chanh have come from QUE SON District.

Additional information on Chieu Hoi activities is contained in Annex F of the CORDS Field Program Report (RCS-MACCORDS-06-67).

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

3. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL

a. (S-NF) General. Speculation on the real motives and actors in the 14 December assassination of Mr. BUI QUANG SAN, Lower House Delegate from QUANG NAM Province, has brought to light several interesting theories. Local government officials and political leaders have expressed various opinions ranging from support of published accounts that the VC were responsible to views implicating the VNQDD Party in general, intra-party factional power plays, and even the American government.

1) Mr. HO VAN ANH, VNQDD Ky Bo faction chairman, commented that rumors in HOI AN link the party with the incident, but denied that this could be possible. He also stated that some people feel SAN was killed by US conspirators in revenge for the PRU trouble of 7 September 1967. Mr. ANH gave strongest credence to the theory blaming the VC.

2) Mr. DO TIEN HOA, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Vu Hong Khanh faction, supported the VC theory and strongly denied there was hatred between factions serious enough to prompt one of the groups to murder.

3) LtCol LE TRI TIN, Province Chief, stated that SAN may well have been eliminated by his own faction (VHK) because SAN and Mr. NGUYEN MINH HUY (a member of the VHK Board of Directors and also the Province Census-Grievance Chief) had proposed that both factions reunite. The positions of such members as NGO HAI QUANG (once leader of the VHK) would have been weakened by such a consolidation.

4) Mr. NGUYEN DAI TOAN, Province Police Chief, supported the possibility of internal VHK faction involvement, but repeatedly stated that he has very little information upon which to base an opinion.

5) Mr. NGUYEN MINH HUY, Province Census-Grievance Chief, named three organizations which would have reason to kill SAN:

a. The VC, because SAN had been an active anti-communist.

b. The Buddhist Struggle Group of 1966, because SAN had led the VHK faction against this group in support of the Government. During the Struggle, SAN had been imprisoned, beaten and wounded by the group; SAN was to have testified against certain group members on trial.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

3) Complaints concerning the prosecution of officers and civilians imprisoned during the Struggle Movement against religious oppression.

4) Complaints concerning injustices practiced by the present government restricting freedom of religion.

5) Complaints that the present government has forgotten the role played by the Buddhists in overthrowing the DIEM regime.

6) Complainst that the present government is trying to label as communists those Buddhists who participated in the 1966 Struggle.

7) Appeals to all Buddhists to pray for peace in Vietnam, and to prepare for drastic sacrifices in the defense of Buddhist law if necessary.

The rally was well organized, relatively quiet and without militant overtones. Yet the issues raised are potentially explosive; such rallies may well be designed to test available support in QUANG NAM for more dramatic protests in the future.

4. SECURITY

a. (C) General. The security situation in QUANG NAM improved considerably during December. There were 61 enemy-initiated incidents reported, as against 124 in November. Incidents this month have not matched those of November in individual magnitude. As noted in Paragraph 1, the resulting freedom of movement has allowed pacification activity to be carried out more effectively. Primary lines of communication (National Route 1 from DA NANG to DIEN BAN; Highway 538 from DIEN BAN to HOI AN; Liberty Road from DA NANG to DAI LOC) remained open except for periodic bottlenecks at construction sites. It is felt that improved security is the result of enemy confusion at recent troop movements into QUANG NAM, increased ARVN and FWMAF patrol activity, and losses sustained by enemy main force units during November.

b. (C) Enemy Situation. Significant enemy actions during the month were:

1. At 10:40 hrs on 2 December, a VC unit of undetermined size ambushed a patrol from CAP D-2 northwest of VINH DIEN Bridge, DIEN BAN District. Friendly casualties were 3 USMC and 2 PF KIA, and 3 PF WIA. Seven weapons were lost in this daylight action.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

2. Early in the evening of 3 December, a mortar round killed 2 PF and wounded 23 civilians at the Catholic Church in TRA KIEU Hamlet, DUY XUYEN District.

3. In the early hours of 6 December, RD Team 15 and CAP B-3 in HIEU DUC District were attacked by a VC unit of undetermined size. Friendly casualties were 2 USMC KIA, 2 RD Cadre and 1 civilian WIA.

4. Also on 6 December, two spans of the new CAU LAU Bridge (BT 079549), DIEN BAN District, were destroyed by a charge of undetermined size and method of delivery. The bridge had not been opened to general traffic.

5. On 7 December, nine civilians were kidnapped from KHUC LUY and DONG KHUONG Hamlets, DIEN BAN District, by a VC squad. As they were being led away, a mine detonated killing 3 of the civilians and wounding the remainder. This area has been the scene of repeated kidnappings, arson and other terrorist incidents.

6. Early in the morning of 8 December, RD Team 6 at THANH NAM Hamlet, HIEU NHON District, was attacked by a VC unit. Friendly casualties were 2 RD Cadre KIA and 4 RD Cadre WIA; 2 weapons and one radio were lost. CAP S-2 located nearby also received small arms fire, but no casualties were sustained.

7. Two more mining incidents involved patrols from C Co, 1st Bn, 5th Marines near HIEU NHON District Headquarters. One incident on 10 December and a second incident on 15 December resulted in 1 KIA and 9 WIA.

8. On 15 December a medical team from the 59th RF Bn in HOA CHAU Village, HOA VANG District, was ambushed while evacuating a wounded civilian. The four-man team and the civilian were killed.

9. At about 20:30 hrs, 27 December, a satchel charge exploded in the Sector S-2 officer's Jeep within the Sector/MACV compound in HOI AN. There were no casualties.

Intelligence reports continue to indicate the strong possibility of coordinated attacks by local and main force enemy units against HOI AN, DIEN BAN and DAI LOC District Headquarters, as well as a rocket attack on DA NANG air base. Captured enemy documents (the result of an extremely significant contact described in Paragraph 4d, below) revealed plans by the 2nd NVA

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Division to mount a three-regiment attack in QUE SON District during December.

c. (C) Infrastructure. The Province Intelligence Coordination Center became operational during December and began dissemination of target data to military, paramilitary and police forces. Two intelligence conferences were held during the month to discuss the role of DOICCs in infrastructure identification and elimination, as well as techniques to be employed. One of the conferences was attended by ARVN unit S-2 officers and GVN District S-2 officers; US military and civilian intelligence officers participated in the second conference.

A combined force of US Marines, RF, National Police and Census-Grievance Cadre conducted an operation in HIEU DUC District which accounted for 2 VC killed, 3 VC captured, five tunnels discovered and a number of weapons, grenades and documents confiscated.

The National Police Field Forces were utilized on five major operations aimed at eliminating infrastructure. The 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry, which operated with the NPFF in QUE SON District, offered high commendations of the unit's performance.

A program has been begun to incorporate Census-Grievance Cadre in each hamlet into the infrastructure identification-elimination effort by instructing cadre to prepare hamlet studies for the use of USMC CAP units located nearby. The study includes a history of the hamlet, a black list, a white list, information on basic hamlet industries, a list of popular aspirations and a roster of hamlet officials showing positions and photos. Such hamlet studies will assist the CAP units in their mission of improving hamlet security and increasing surveillance and identification of infrastructure and active VC.

d. (C) Friendly Situation. Vietnamese military operations continue to be less successful than those of FWMAF units. Lack of contact or sporadic contact between GVN and enemy units suggest either poor planning, untimely execution or a serious security leak. Unlike RVNAF, FWMAF units generally make at least one major contact during each operation.

1. ARVN. Quang Da Special Zone (QDSZ) conducted one major combined operation during December in HOA VANG District. BINH QUANG 12 included the 1st Bn, 51st ARVN Infantry Regiment, elements of the 1st Ranger Group and elements of the 7th US Marine Regiment. The operation was conducted between 5-9 December and brought no results. QUANG NAM Sector conducted 7 operations in December, none of which brought more than minor successes. PHI PHUONG 57 was conducted in areas of DIEN BAN and HIEU NHON Districts on

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

1 December and resulted in 1 VC KIA, 60 detainees, 40 boats and 8 bunkers destroyed at the cost of 2 friendly WIA.

2. Regional Forces. RF units normally support QUANG NAI Sector operations as noted above.

3. Popular Forces. No changes since previous report.

4. US/FWMAF. (a) USMC. The 1st Marine Division conducted one major operation during December in DAI LOC District. Operation CITRUS resulted in:

Friendly	Enemy
36 WIA	10 NVA KIA (C)
	19 VC KIA (C)
	10 NVA KIA (P)
	46 VC KIA (P)
	02 VC POW
	37 Detainees
	02 Weapons Captured

Other USMC operations:

Friendly	Enemy
Unknown	92 VC KIA (C)
	246 VC KIA (P)
	154 Detainees
	05 VC POW
	19 Weapons Captured

(b) US Army. The 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry located in QUE SON District has conducted continuous air mobile operations during the month with the following results:

Friendly	Enemy
Not reported	214 NVA KIA (C)
	243 VC KIA (C)
	56 Indiv. Weapons Captured
	02 Crew-served Weapons Captured

On 5 December elements of the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry, discovered and killed 17 NVA north of QUE SON District Headquarters. Among the dead were the CO, 3d NVA Regiment, all of his battalion commanders and staff officers of the 2d NVA Division. (See Paragraph 4b, above).

Waterways denial operations (Operation TATTOO) continued with

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

limited results. Army helicopter gunships flew night missions over the THU BON River and destroyed 56 boats. This program should be supported by River Assault Group (RAG) forces for daylight control. The Navy Swift-Boat Team utilized several months ago experienced heavy contact in three days of operations, offering proof of the serious need for a RAG unit assigned to HOI AN.

(c) USAF. 35 FAC sorties and 10 fighter-attack sorties were flown in QUANG NAM Province during December, and resulted in 72 VR sightings, 1 VC KIA (C), 4 structures and 10 bunkers destroyed, 2 structures and 6 bunkers damaged, and 23 boats sunk.

(d) ROK. The 3d Bn, 2d ROKMC Brigade moved into HIEU NHON District on 22 December as the first echelon of the Brigade's move from QUANG NGAI Province to replace the 5th US Marine Regiment in QUANG NAM.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

5. ECONOMICS

a. General.

1. (U) Stability of Retail Prices. Retail food prices remained stable during December.

2. (C-NF) Money. While there is presently no significant black market trading of US currency or MPC in QUANG NAM Province, the recent arrival of ROK Marine troops may encourage such trading.

3. (U) Labor. As in past months, skilled and semi-skilled construction workers from QUANG NAM continue to seek high paying jobs in DA NANG. The resulting labor shortage is slight, and has not yet impeded construction in any major provincial projects.

4. (U) Agriculture. Rice yields for the present month have not yet been tabulated. Plantain yields appear unusually bountiful.

b. (U) Transportation. Materials moved into and through the province without major delays during December, and popular consumer items have been readily available in HOI AN. The extremely mild monsoon has left roads relatively undamaged.

c. (U) Economic Development. No significant changes in the general economic situation have been noted since November. As reported last month, a province council for the promotion of industry has been formed.

6. PROVINCIAL RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION

a. (C) RD Cadre Teams. In line with the goals of Project TAKEOFF, meetings were held early in December to complete plans for the deployment of RD Cadre Teams under the 1968 program. General LAM, LtCol LE TRI TIN (Province Chief) and 1/Lt TON THAT BAN (RD Cadre Chief) determined that all teams would move to their assigned hamlets by 15 January 1968. The priority districts of HOA VANG, DIEN BAN and HIEU NHON were divided into two administrative areas of the HUNG QUANG CAMPAIGN. A meeting was held on 20 and 21 December at Provincial Group Headquarters to brief RD Team leaders on the most recent program changes.

An I Corps inspection team visited the province on 12 December to review administrative procedures at Provincial Group Headquarters. Examination of cadre personnel records revealed several incorrect entries and led one inspector, Maj DUONG VAN TU, to suggest improvements in the local administration effort. Major TU also held unannounced inspections of teams in the field. Since the inspectors' departure, 1/Lt BAN has begun to implement the changes suggested during their visit.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

b. (C) Static Census-Grievance. The reorganization and reevaluation of SCG activity initiated two months ago at the QUANG NAM Center has been completed. Elimination of ineffective personnel has bolstered cadre morale and has improved the quality and quantity of SCG reporting. Though there are nine fewer hamlet cadre at work, reports on VC activity rose from 194 last month to 543 in December. Aspiration reports have increased slightly, though the total number of people interviewed has fallen.

In response to a request from SAIGON, a mobile SCG inspection team was sent from HOI AN to canvass refugee camps in QUE SON, DUC DUC and HIEU DUC Districts. Questionnaires were completed for 730 refugees who were questioned on their motives for coming to the camps.

An inspection team from SAIGON visited the province to review SCG reporting, cadre cooperation with provincial authorities and cadre efforts to increase the number of Chieu Hoi returnees. The team found that during November only 2 of the 10 aspirations reported to the Province Chief had been acted on, and that none of the 16 grievances presented had been resolved. In a move to stimulate official interest in SCG activity, the Center Chief has invited the Province Chief to inspect SCG facilities. Future grievance reports will be submitted from the Center directly to the Province Chief to minimize the chance of alteration or loss.

A security problem has been created by SCG cadre using private hamlet homes as offices/headquarters in the field. VC attacks against these houses have increased, and compensation is rarely paid to the owner.

The Center Chief and US advisors are increasingly concerned over the effects of GVN's mobilization order on SCG operations. To date, six SCG and other cadre have been held by the National Police and Military Police for induction, though all have been released for an unspecified time at the request of SCG officials and US advisors.

Requests from US Marine units for SCG assistance have been infrequent during December, though coordination with the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry in QUE SON has increased. One hamlet study with overlay and blacklists has been provided to the Brigade S-2. Further coordination, guides and interpreters will be provided by SCG cadre scheduled to work at the new QUE SON DOICC.

c. (U) Self-Defense Forces. No changes in self-defense forces have been noted during December.

d. (U) Technical Cadre. The effectiveness of technical cadre has neither increased nor declined since last month.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

e. (C) Police. National police activity in QUANG NAM netted 16 draft evaders, 20 VC suspects and 17 illegal residents during December. No major incidents have visibly disrupted law and order in the province capital this month, though security in outlying areas continues to make effective police control impossible.

The National Police Field Forces have participated in five operations during the month with RF-PF units, elements of the 51st ARVN Infantry Regiment, and FWMAF. Two operations were carried out in HIEU NHON District, and one each in DIEN BAN, DUY XUYEN and QUE SON Districts. (See Paragraph 4c, above). A total of 24 NPFF and 1 Uniform Policeman were sent to DALAT for training in December.

7. PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATION

a. (U) Responsiveness of Government to Needs and Aspirations. Instances of poor Government response to needs and aspirations are discussed in Paragraph 2e (Refugee Service) and Paragraph 6b (Static Census-Grievance) above.

b. (U) Influence of Officials in Pacification. A number of incidents involving corrupt local officials have been publicized in the Vietnamese press this month, all suggesting that the influence of many officials in the pacification effort is a negative one.

1. 1/Lt LE VAN DAP was relieved of his duties as QUE SON District Chief on charges of diverting and selling refugee relief commodities. Province and Corps level officials began an immediate investigation of Lt DAP's activities and named a civilian, Mr. DUU UNG, to replace him on 9 December.

2. The former District Chief of DUY XUYEN, Cpt NGUYEN DINH SUONG, was brought to trial in DA NANG at mid-month on multiple charges of corruption. 1/Lt NGUYEN THANH PHAO became District Chief on 14 December, though there is still violent objection among DUY XUYEN officials to SUONG's dismissal.

3. The trial of Cpt DANG VAN MAN, former District Chief in DAI LOC, also began this month; one QUANG NAM newspaper had demanded MAN's trial shortly after the Government announced its campaign against corruption.

c. (C) RD Councils. Of all RD Councils in QUANG NAM, those of HOA VANG, DIEN BAN and HIEU NHON Districts have been most active and effective in 1967. All to frequently, lesser Councils (especially hamlet groups) have surrendered effective control to local RD Team leaders. The 1968 RD program will stress a return to popular participation in these Councils.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

d. (U) Special Coordination Arrangements. Anticipating the arrival of the 2d ROKMC Brigade in QUANG NAM Province, MACCORDS civilian and military advisors have attempted to coordinate the efforts of GVN and US agencies with those of the Korean units. Two MACCORDS representatives travelled to QUANG NGAI Province on 13 December to familiarize the KMC Brigade staff with Allied military and civil operations in QUANG NAM. The Brigade CO, BGen YUN SANG KIM, visited HOI AN on 21 December and was given an extensive briefing by Col NGUYEN DUY HINH (Quang Da Special Zone Commander), LtCol LE TRI TIN (Province Chief) and US advisors. Discussions included not only possible locations of KMC units, but also KMC support of 1968 RD objectives. BGen KIM has assigned a full-time liaison team to MACCORDS, and arrangements have been made for Korean officers to visit RD Cadre Teams and village/hamlet officials.

e. (C) GVN Effectiveness in Pacified Areas. Government effectiveness in previously pacified areas is in part undermined by inadequate planning and support from province and higher-level officials. In mid-December HOA VANG District officials were called on short notice to DA NANG and presented a plan for the resettlement of over 7000 refugees from the city into the critically crowded camps of HOA VANG. Only the firm stand of the District Chief, Maj MAI XUAN HAU, alerted DA NANG officials that the plan was neither adequate nor practical; still the proposed figure was cut only by half. Maj HAU has frequently urged that a district office of the Refugee Service be established in HOA VANG to administer relief, provide vocational training and plan realistically for the needs of over 50,000 refugees. Lack of Government response to obvious needs has encouraged cynicism among HOA VANG's refugees and threatens to weaken GVN control over the population of a vital priority district.

8. USAID/JUSPAO

(U) No questions requiring response have been received during December.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

9. REQUIRED ACTIONS

a. Project TAKEOFF Required Actions

1. (U) QUANG NAM has the largest refugee population of any province in Vietnam, yet for well over a year has been served by four lethargic, incompetent or notoriously disinterested Refugee Service Chiefs. The most recent Chief, Mr. DOAN CU, has left the province and his interim replacement has made clear his intentions of avoiding service in QUANG NAM. The care of refugees has become almost entirely an American effort. Congressional interest in this situation is intense, as is coverage by US news media. The immediate, permanent assignment of an enthusiastic and properly motivated Refugee Service Chief to deal with the present crisis situation is imperative.

b. Other Required Actions

1. (C) Enemy use of the waterways of QUANG NAM Province for troop movement, resupply missions and courier routes cannot be effectively denied without a waterborne, armed and armored, infantry supported task unit. It is highly recommended that a River Assault Group unit be assigned to this province in support of Operation TATTOO. The infiltration routes most in need of waterborne combat patrols are located along the THU BON River south of DAI LOC, DIEN BAN and HIEU NHON Districts, bordering on DUY XUYEN District. Past experience in these areas indicates that the VC virtually control the tributaries and main streams due to our lack of accessibility thereto.

2. (U) In order to take full advantage of the new Government transmitter in HUE, television receivers are immediately required in QUANG NAM. This province's allocation of receivers was cut before adequate tests had been made to determine whether the Hue signal could be received. Since the actual opening of the station, pictures of consistently high quality have been received and a number of public viewing areas completed. Public reaction to the few privately owned sets now in operation more than justifies the reallocation of a full complement of sets for QUANG NAM. Immediate delivery is essential if, as presently planned, this psywar tool is to be introduced in rural areas before the arrival of RD Cadre Teams in new hamlets.

It is further suggested that the responsible advisors encourage television programming which is directly relevant to the Revolutionary Development effort. Rural viewers, including those about to work with RD Cadre Teams, are frequently ignorant of the benefits to which they are entitled under GVN programs. Television is potentially the most appealing and reliable medium for instruction in areas where concern for the mechanics of hamlet development is at least as compelling as international news and Saigon variety programs.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

3. (U) One of the keys to success in pacification and RD programs is the assignment of young, linguistically trained area development officers to Districts. The value of such assignments has been proved by experience in QUANG NAM — programs are initiated, supervised and accomplished on a daily-contact basis, on the ground. There is an urgent need to replace personnel in this category who have completed their tours, and to expand the District Rep concept in conjunction with each new year's RD plan. This province critically needs two highly motivated officers to serve in the two primary RD Districts for 1968.

4. (U) The development of rapport between US advisors and Vietnamese counterparts depends as much upon frequent social contact as upon professional exchanges during business hours. Unlike his counterpart, the US advisor has no adequate source of funds available for legitimate entertainment needs and is obliged to assume these costs personally. It is recommended that a realistic representation allowance be made available to CORDS personnel. Such an allowance would encourage and enhance the requisite extension of American hospitality to host country officials.

5. (U) It is strongly urged that the contents of the Province Report and CORDS Field Program Report be made available within security limitations to potential visitors to the field. Experience indicates that few Saigon-based staff members are aware of the information so tediously collected. A recent group of visitors arrived in QUANG NAM solely to gather data relevant to their assignments; in each case the data requested had been already provided through the monthly narrative or statistical reports.

H.E. Strickland

G.E. STRICKLAND
Acting Province Senior Advisor
Quang Nam Province (03)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

6. Duy Xuyen District.

(U) At present there is not District Advisory Team in Duy Xuyen District.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

4. Dai Loc District.

a. (U) Status of Pacification. The degree of control which GVN is able to exercise in all areas by day and night remains the same: approximately 65% by day, 45% by night.

b. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification. The pacification effort has advanced during the month of December, success being attributed to two major USMC operations in the "Arizona Area"; Operation Foster, 13-30 November and Operation Citrus, 15-23 December. Operation Citrus, a battalion size (3rd Battalion, 7th Marines) search and destroy operation, netted 35 KIA confirmed, 75 KIA probable, and 22 VCS. The proximity of the two operations in the Loc Hiep area has kept the VC off-balance, and interfered with any offensive actions planned by the enemy. Subsector has strengthened its defensive posture around the district headquarters, constructing two bunkers and reinforcing the perimeter of wire. This has had a beneficial impact on the local populace; mass movement at night towards the base of Hill 37, which was characteristic last month, has declined sharply. There still exists however, considerable unrest among the civilian populace who anticipate attacks similar to those on the 2nd and 8th of November in the near future. District officials continue to exhibit a lethargic attitude towards reassuring the populace about their physical safety.

c. (C) Special Problems and Recommendations. The most pressing current problem is the resettlement of refugees generated during Operation Foster. On 19 December, District received a Refugee Mobile Team from Hoi An, which is currently involved in registering refugees and distributing commodities received on 22 and 23 December. The question of where to locate a major resettlement center remains unsolved. The lack of specific plans and the unenthusiastic attitude of District officials make an interesting contrast with the lively concern of US news media and Senator Ted Kennedy's committee in the refugee situation.

DAILOC DIST Q.N.

d. (U) District Chief: Captain Tran Cuoc Dong

JAMES P. WHITAKER
Captain, Infantry
District Senior Advisor

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

9. Thuong Duc District

a. (U) Status of pacification. Pacification within this District appears to be on the increase. The security afforded the population by the RF/PF troops and the CIDG troops as well as the many visible rural development projects are contributing factors.

At present time the GVN is able to control approximately 80% of the District Area during the day approximately 30% of the population area at night.

The pacification effort has made a visible advance during the last month.

b. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification. It is felt that the prudent use of the funds made available to the subsector area is greatly responsible for current pacification advances.

A road, bridge and market place improvements program, using local labor and local resources was initiated, and paid for using the Imprest Fund. Large and enthusiastic local participation was noted.

The local officials appear to actively support the program but are slow to initiate changes or improvements. The local RD Cadre Team have made some important local improvements during the last month, among these are the construction of culverts on main village roads and the start of a new small school for the Montanyard Village.

An increase of Chieu Hoi's into the District during the month was attributed to the increase of Medcap, leaflet drops and patrols within this District as well as the Christmas Holidays.

Military Units or Local Officials involved in Pacification.
RD Cadre Team #25 (1R Cat)
704th RF CO
Cpt Wm King, USSF Co Team A-109
1st LT Dzu, CIDG Camp Co

c. (U) Special Problems and Recommendations. The most pressing problem in pacification at this location is the improvement of living conditions for the local refugees.

d. (U) District Chief. Captain Nguyen Dinh Kham

F. V. Colantuno

FRANK COLANTUNO
Captain, Infantry
District Senior Advisor

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

2. Dien Ban District (National Priority Area)

a. (U) Status of Pacification. There has been no measurable change in the overall status of pacification in the District since last report. Area and population control remain the same, and I can foresee no immediate change in area control until such time as more forces are available in the District. VC activities in the District decreased during the month of December, and were confined mostly to harrassment of outposts and routes of communication.

b. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification. Efforts to improve pacification have been made through five major operations to locate and destroy local VC guerilla cells, to locate and destroy supply caches, and to prevent secure area from being harrassed by VC terrorists. Local friendly forces also utilized extensive ambushes during the month which may have contributed to the decrease in VC activity in the secure area. Friendly forces in the area continues to perform their diversified missions of protecting vital areas, and routes of communication, and patrolling the rocket belt. Therefore operations and patrolling activities have not been of such a magnitude to insure denial of additional land area to the VC.

c. (U) District personnel are very optimistic about the Hung Quang III RD Campaign and are exerting a concerted effort in planning for the reception and security of the RD Cadres that are projected to arrive in District during the month of January 1968.

d. (U) MEDCAPS are currently being conducted throughout the secure areas by teams from the USMC units, District medical personnel, this advisory team, and the German medical team. The MEDCAP program has been a great success especially in the refugee camps and it is anticipated that the program will be of great significance in enhancing the progress of pacification during the Hung Quang III Campaign.

e. (U) Special Problems and Recommendations. None

f. (U) District Chief: Major Hoang-Trung

William A. Jordan

WILLIAM A. JORDAN
Major, Infantry
District Senior Advisor

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

1. Hoa Vang District

a. (U) Status of Pacification. As reported last month the overall status of pacifcation within Hoa Vang is progressing.

b. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification. The refugee situation reported last month in this report, has been aggravated during the month of December. In early December 118 families from refugee camps in Dai Loc and Thuong Duc entered and settled in Hoa Vang District. In mid-December I Corps called a meeting between Danang City and the District Chief of Hoa Vang to discuss the relocation of over 7000 refugees, presently living in Danang, in Hoa Vang. After discussion, the final number decided upon to be moved was approximately 3640. These incoming refugees will boast the refugee population of Hoa Vang to over 30,000. As discussed last month the present refugee population has not been properly cared for. To add over 4000 new refugees will only aggravate an already serious problem. Hoa Vang needs a separate sub office of the refugee service to handle the long range needs of these refugees. Provincial officials are presently too busy "putting out fires" caused by military operations in other districts to look at the long range needs (vocational training, industry, business training, and development of available resources) in Hoa Vang District. As stated before Education, Sanitation and health facilities fall short of criteria established by SCR. Hoa Vang could become a pace setter if attention were paid to this problem by the GVN.

c. (C) Special Problems and Recommendations. The 59th RF Battalion Commander continues to be a problem. For a period of 21 days from 29 Nov to 19 Dec this officer spent only 12 nights with his battalion. He normally departed the battalion in the early afternoon and did not return until the following morning. He has failed to react to intelligence information when it involved his area of operations. One of his company commanders received nothing but a reprimand, after he was directly responsible for a series of incidents causing unrest and dissension in a part of his company that was assigned to a combined action platoon, and culminated in the company commander withdrawing the assigned troops from the CAP, thereby endangering the lives of the US contingent in the compound. When ordered by the Battalion Commander and Battalion Executive officer to return the troops failed to obey the order until he again received a direct order from the Battalion Commander.

d. (U) District Chief: Major Mai Xuan Hau.

JAMES A. SWENSON
Major, Infantry
District Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

5. Duc Duc District

a. (U) Status of Pacification. There has been some advancement in the pacification effort in Duc Duc District. In Xuyen Thu, Loc Quy, and Loc Thanh Villages significant changes in attitude toward GVN were noted. These changes can be classified, to some extent, as delayed reactions resulting primarily from Operation Foster. During this operation approximately 9,242 refugees were relocated to Xuyen Thu Village. Of this number 1,240 families, totaling 4,665 persons, chose to remain in this village - primarily a secure area. Fifty housing units have been constructed to date. Construction, under the supervision of RD Cadre, will commence, in the near future, for 200 additional housing units.

b. (U) Factor Influencing Pacification. During the period 12-22 Dec 1967, fifteen Chieu Hois from Loc Quy and Loc Thanh Villages came over to the Government side. Their professions ranged from school teacher to village economic secretary. It is felt that influence exerted by relatives and friends, on the Government side, convinced these persons to desert VC controlled areas. In some cases the constant shelling of VC infested hamlets was a convincing factor. For the first time the District Chief has agreed to conduct weekly meetings to plan, discuss, and provide the necessary guidance for the execution of selected projects. A council, consisting of the District Chief, Senior Advisor, Platoon Leaders, 5th Platoon, 29th CA Company, An Hoa Industrial Complex Manager, has been formed to assist the District Chief. Other personnel will be invited to attend and discuss plans and progress pertaining to their respective areas of operation. I feel that this is a big step in the right direction and clearly shows a position of mutual trust, understanding, interest, and concern on behalf of the District Chief. Many pressing problems in the pacification effort will thus be resolved.

c. (U) Special Problems and Recommendations. One problem is paramount at this time. No jobs, rice land, or garden plots are available for refugees. Plans are being developed to alleviate this problem.

d. (U) District Chief. Captain Dang Van Triem

JOHN GREEN
Major, Infantry
District Senior Advisor

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FOR

7. Hieu Duc District.

a. (U) Status of Pacification. The VC attack against CAP B4 and the homes of GVN officials in Tuy Loan Hamlet on 6 Dec 67, has undermined the local pacification effort. In the other areas of the District the situation is about the same as it was in November.

b. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification. An increase in the number of RF/PF operations (many of them were conducted with Marines from 1/7) have aided the pacification effort in Hoa Hung and Hoa Luong. The loss of RD Cadre Team 15 January will reduce the units taking part in pacification within the District. The [illegible] situation remains the same. There remains a lack of interest by the people in civic action projects. This lack of interest is also making it difficult for me to use the money available from the Imprest Fund.

c. (C) Special Problems and Recommendations. Again this month there has been an unfortunate incident between [illegible] and VN personnel. Regardless of the facts, the VN personnel feel that the [illegible] are to blame. I believe that the establishing of a CAP in Hoa Loc would greatly assist the pacification program in that area.

d. (U) District Chief: Captain Nguyen Van Thuan.

J[illegible]. DILLIS
JOHN F MAY
District Senior Advisor

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

8. Que Son District

a. (U) Status of Pacification. Que Son District is sub-divided into three political and geographic zones: Zone I bordering the Eastern 1/3 of the District to include the Moc Bai Vital Area along Highway 1; Zone II is the central zone contiguous to the District Headquarters; Zone III includes the Western villages of the District approximately West of the BT01 Grid Line. In Zone I, the government's control has changed little in the past month. There is still frequent mining and sniping along Highway 1. This area can only be considered to be under marginal government control during the day. US forces operating in this area have helped to increase the security of this area. Zone II is under government control. The pacification in this area has tended to stagnate due to the influx of some 1500 refugees since the last reporting period and due to the absence of the District Chief during all but four days of the reporting period. Zone III is not under government control. US forces continue to operate against enemy units in this area.

b. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification. US forces operating in Zone I and Zone III have tended to increase the security of Zone I and Zone II to some extent. The start of work on the road between Highway 1 and Que Son District Headquarters by US forces engineers should when completed make a significate contribution to the total pacification of the District. The RD Cadre continue to progress slowly.

c. (U) Special Problems and Recommendations. The most pressing problem in the pacification effort is that the VC dominate more than half of the people and land in the District and, as a result of this, transportation of all goods is greatly restricted.

d. (U) District Chief: Mr Buu Ung.

CHARLES D. MEARS, JR.
Major, Infantry
District Senior Advisor

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

3. Hieu Nhon District (National Priority Area)

a. (U) Status of Pacification. The pacification effort in the district for the month of December suffered no important set back and experienced moderate success in a few areas. Arrangements have been made to repair the road, cut previously by VC mines, that leads to two refugee camps, two hamlets, a CAP unit, and Coastal Group 14. A VIC booth has been completed, a school roof repaired, and a small bridge initiated through USMC Civic Action and the Imprest Fund. Discussion and some planning has begun on several other projects. The most notable being a program to install 21 TV sets in the district at selected locations. VC activity during the month consisted primarily of small unit guerrilla actions; command detonated mines, sniping, and distribution of propaganda. The only attack conducted by the VC consisted of a raid on an RD team resulting in 2 KIA (RD) and 3 houses damaged by explosives. The area under effective GVN control has not changed during the month.

b. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification. Sufficient friendly military units are present in the district to permit the GVN to conduct the pacification program in the areas it now controls without excessive harassment. The enemy retains the capability to strike any where in the district with units up to battalion size, as his attacks in March, August and September have indicated. RF/PF units are generally assigned the mission of static security. These units can be used to conduct operations providing the operation terminate in time to permit return to positions by night fall.

The seven RD teams are attempting to finish their project before the end of the year. Emphasis is being placed on the creation of RD People's Group to defend the hamlets after the RD teams depart.

MEDCAP programs are conducted regularly by GVN and German Malteser Health Service Teams. There have been no increases in the refugees population, but there has been considerable delay in delivery of supplies and cash payment to the refugees now living in the district.

c. (U) Special Problems and Recommendations. The greatest problem in the pacification of Hieu Nhon district remains the inability of the military forces to interdict the movement of VC units from Duy Xuyen District to the south into Hieu Nhon.

d. (U) District Chief: Captain Vo Van Sang

JOHN A. BERRY
Major, Infantry
District Senior Advisor

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

REPORTS MADE BY STAFF SECTIONS PERTAINING TO PACIFICATION

CONTROL SYMBOL	SUBJECT	REQUIRING DIRECTIVE	FREQUENCY	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
MACCORDS-02.1-67	QUARTERLY REPORT OF PERIODIC REPORTS	JOINT DIRECTIVE 4-67	QUARTERLY	
MACCORDS-03.1-67	HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM	JOINT DIRECTIVE 4-67	MONTHLY	CONFIDENTIAL
MACCORDS-03.1-67	AREA ASSESSMENT SYSTEM	JOINT DIRECTIVE 4-67	MONTHLY	CONFIDENTIAL
MACCORDS-03.4-67	RF/PF EVALUATION SYSTEM	JOINT DIRECTIVE 4-67	UNKN	UNKN
MACCORDS-04-67	MONTHLY CIVIC ACTION REPORT SYSTEM	JOINT DIRECTIVE 4-67	MONTHLY	UNCLASSIFIED
MACCORDS-09.2-67	VERIFICATION OF IMPREST FUNDS	MACV DIRECTIVE 37-2JD	MONTHLY	UNCLASSIFIED
MACJ3-41	SENIOR ADVISOR MONTHLY EVALUATION 2&3	MACV DIRECTIVE 335-13	MONTHLY	SECRET NO FORN
MACPC-2	RF/MIL IN SUPPORT OF RD	MACPC LETTER 8 APRIL 67	MONTHLY	AS REQUIRED
	RF ORDER OF BATTLE	MACTN LETTER I CORPS 1 MAY		
MCS: MACJ3-21	OUT POST INSPECTION REPORT	I CORPS DIRECTIVE 335-5	QUARTERLY	CONFIDENTIAL
TELEPHONIC	SPOT REPORTS	MACV DIRECTIVE 335-13	N/A	N/A
TELEPHONIC	PSYOPS REPORTS	I CORPS G-5 SOP	WEEKLY	
	MEDCAP REPORT	I CORPS MEDCAP SOP	DAILY	CONFIDENTIAL
TELEPHONIC	DAILY OPERATION SUMMARY	I CORPS DIRECTIVE 335-2	DAILY	CONFIDENTIAL
	GOLD REPORT FROM SUBSECTORS	ANNEX A	DAILY	CONDIDENTIAL
	REPORT OF MAN BN	I CORPS TOC	DAILY	CONFIDENTIAL
	INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION VC MILITIA RITZ	MACJ213	QUARTERLY	CONFIDENTIAL
MACJOIB-01	SUMMARY OF PWS	MSG MACTN-ICIC 5294 DT6040207	weekly	UNCLASSIFIED
	ICEACINPUT	MACV DIR 381-21	DAILY	CONFIDENTIAL
	BIOGRAPHIC REPORTING	MACV DIRECTIVE 381-9	AS ORDERED	CONFIDENTIAL
	PRELIMENARY INTERROFATION REPORT	MACV DIRECTIVE 381-4	AS ORDERED	CONFIDENTIAL
	INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY	MACV DIRECTIVE 381-16	DAILY	CONFIDENTIAL
	INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM	MACJ21 LETTER	MONTHLY	CONFIDENTIAL
	SPECIFIC INTELL REQ. COLL PROGRAM	MACV DIRECTIVE 381-16	AS REQUIRED	CONFIDENTIAL-SECRET
	INTELLIGENCE ESTMATE	SIA, I CORPS	MONTHLY	CONFIDENTIAL
	INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM	MACJ21 LETTER 31 OCT 66	MONTHLY	CONFIDENTIAL
	UC POLITICAL ORDER OF BATTLE CORRAL ELIM	MACJ21 LETTER 31 OCT 66	MONTHLY	CONFIDENTIAL