

S-2 and MAU Assets

1. Item. Map Assets of the RLT

a. Discussion. The importance of maps was emphasized by the ever changing missions of this operation. The situation reached near crisis proportion with regards to BLT 3/9's probable commitment to the Can Tho evacuation. The RLT S-2 had put together a map package for 3/9, but the alert status precluded its delivery to the USS DENVER from the USS BLUERIDGE. While there was a MAU map package aboard the USS DENVER, it could not be opened without permission of 9th MAB. Though permission was received, it cost valuable time that could have been spent in planning.

b. Recommendation. That authority to get into the MAU map package be delegated to the MAU or RLT command level.

2. Item. U. S. Embassy Saigon HLZ

a. Discussion. During the planning phase of this operation, the HLZ on the embassy was one of the lowest probabilities for potential extraction of a large amount of evacuees. The capability of this HLZ was assessed as one HUEY LZ on the roof, and one potential CH-53 LZ in the parking lot. The result was lifting people out of the embassy with CH-46's from the roof and CH-53's from the parking lot. In this makeshift mode, more than 1500 evacuees were extracted from the Embassy HLZ's. In conclusion, it is reasonably certain that the NVA were in control of the DAO compound area several hours before the actual fall of the city of Saigon. During a country's period of national crisis, western embassies, especially an American embassy, will be points of refuge.

b. Recommendations. Future operational and contingency planning for operations similar to "Frequent Wind" must consider potentiality of U. S. Embassies being the primary extract points. Lack of planning by authorities may require combat engineers going in on first waves to blow obstacles.

One Time Situation Report - Operation Frequent Wind

At 291246H April 1975 RLT-4 received an EXECUTE message for Option IV of the Frequent Wind Operation Plan. RLT-4 EXECUTE order to subordinate units was published at 291252H informing BLT 2/4 to land in the DAO Compound and alerting BLT 1/9 to land a command group and 2 companies, on order, in the Air America Complex. An advance party of RLT-4 on the scene at the DAO Compound prior to L-Hour proved to be advantageous since the plan as envisioned by the ground security forces was fully coordinated and, in fact, integrated with the DAO plans for the processing and marshalling of U. S. citizens, third country nationals and designated Vietnamese refugees. Because of the prepositioning of radio operators within the DAO compound all communication links were established immediately upon the order to EXECUTE, thus eliminating any initial confusion upon arrival of the main elements of the ground security forces.

At 291315H Commanding Officer RLT-4 departed USS Blue Ridge for the DAO compound arriving at 291346H. BLT 2/4 commenced loading aboard CH-53 helicopters from HMH-462 and HMH-463 and initial elements touched down in the DAO compound at 291506H to the cheers of awaiting evacuees almost all of whom were overcome by emotion at the sight of the organized and well disciplined Marines. The sight of these Marines signified to the evacuees that there would be a tomorrow. The immediate extract of evacuees commenced immediately in a smooth and orderly fashion.

The forces of BLT 2/4 under the command of LtCol G. P. SLADE deployed to their assigned security areas. The planning for this operation proved to be completely coordinated and understood down to the fire team level. This execution can be attributed to the excellent small unit leadership and numerous briefings that had been conducted under the continuing

direction of the Commanding Officer BLT-4 Colonel A. M. GRAY. The BLT 2/4 forces augmented the 3rd Platoon, Company C, BLT 1/9 under the able leadership of First Lieutenant THOMPSON-BOWERS. This platoon operating under the most trying of circumstances from 261100H, had been subjected to incoming artillery and rocket fire until relieved about 291900H.

Coincident with the insertion of 865 Marines from BLT 2/4 a ready reaction Sparrow Hawk platoon from Company A, BLT 1/9 was launched aboard 2 OH-46 aircraft. The high state of readiness of both BLT 1/9 and BLT 3/9 was apparent as each was poised with Sparrow Hawk teams and a command group with two companies waiting for the call to launch if required.

As the evacuation process at the DAO compound continued the situation at the American Embassy began to unfold. The number of evacuees present far exceeded any planned anticipations by the ground security force. The security provided by the Marine Security Guard detachment at the embassy proved to be inadequate to control the large crowds. Three Platoons (130 Marines) from BLT 2/4 were helolifted from the DAO compound to the American Embassy between 291900H and 292100H. This total force of 171 Marines proved to be a saving factor for the continued orderly evacuation at the embassy. A total not to exceed 100 evacuees had been anticipated from the embassy, however, when the evacuation terminated a total of 978 U. S. citizens and 1,120 third country nationals and Vietnamese refugees had been evacuated.

At the DAO compound a total of 395 U. S. citizens and 4,475 refugees were evacuated in an orderly manner. The ground security forces began to withdraw at 292250H from the ^{area} annex without any significant problems.

The first elements of BLT 2/4 were extracted from the DAO compound at 292250H to return to amphibious shipping. At about 292250H BGEN CAREY, the Ground Security Force Commander, returned to the U. S. S. Blue Ridge and passed control ashore to Colonel A. M. GRAY Commanding Officer RLT-4. This transition was smooth since the austere staff which had functioned during the initial phases of the operation under the direction of BGEN CAREY continued under Colonel GRAY. At 300012H the last ground security force elements from the DAO compound conducted a successful extraction as the noise of tank firing began to draw ever closer to the DAO compound. As the last two CH-53 helicopters lifted off, smoke and flames spread in the compound as a result of the activation of previously positioned thermites.

The evacuation at the embassy continued throughout the early morning hours. The evacuation of ground security forces began at about 300400H and continued on until the last CH-46 lifted off the embassy rooftop at 300753H with 11 Marines aboard. The performance of the Marines at the embassy was excellent. They maintained a cool attitude throughout despite receiving small arms fire from nearby buildings.

No combat casualties occurred within the ground security force. Only three non-serious, non-combat casualties occurred throughout the operation. The execution of Operation Frequent Wind was a successful undertaking but sad since many of those who participated were also veterans from previous years of the Vietnam war.

UNCLASSIFIED

CHANGE 1

ENTERED BY CAPT

[REDACTED] CLARKE

NOFORN

ZNY SSSSS

1/9

CO	NO	OPS	SAID	CVN	NAV
X	X	X	X	3	
EXEC	SUPP	WEIS	ENG	DECK	AIR
ASST	SFTY	COMM	CMF	PUS	CHAP
ASST	INTD	IDENT	COO	CIC	8/0

AN BCT 1/9 00592

U.S.C.D.	
CMF	
MS	

MMHVV BTB 118

KNJ2208

OTTSZYUW RUHSGG5225 1111811-SSSS--RUHGULD.MH

O P 211818Z APR 75

FM CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO

TO ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE

RUHGULD/CTE SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO PT ONE

RUHGGRK/CTE SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO PT TWO

RUGAYR/CTE SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO PT THREE

INFO RUAJMAD/CTF SEVEN TWO

RUHGPTA/CTF SEVEN THREE

ZEN/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUHGPA/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUMRADA/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMRABA/CTG SEVEN NINE PT TWO

RHARSAA/CTG SEVEN NINE PT THREE

RUAOARA/CTG SEVEN NINE PT SIX

ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT THREE

ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT FOUR

B

S E C R E T NOFORN //NO3120// SECTION ONE OF TWO

CHANGE ONE CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO OPLAN 1-75 (FREQUENT WIND) (C)

A. CTU 79.1.2 MSG 192130 APR 75

1. (S) REF A FORWARDED SUBJECT OPLAN. THIS CONSTITUTES CHANGE ONE

PAGE 02 RUHSGG5225 S E C R E T NOFORN

TO REF A. CORRECT REF A AS FOLLOWS:

✓ A. PARA 2 LINE 3 DELETE REFERENCE TO NEWPORT PIER AND ON LINE FIVE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE WORD FOR AND BEFORE THE WORD LANDING INSERT THE WORD AMPHIBIOUS.

✓ B. PARA 3 DELETE IN ITS ENTIRETY AND SUBSTITUTE NEW PARA 3 AS FOLLOWS:

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

READDRESSAL: FILL IN THE BELOW BLOCK, HEADING, AND PRECEDENCE BLOCKS OF DRAFTER'S MESSAGE

ORIGINATOR:

DTG/MONTH/YEAR

UNCLASSIFIED

DRAFTER'S MESSAGE

4 MAY 75 00 32Z

PRECEDENCE			CLASSIFICATION		SPECIAL INST: (I.E., PERSONAL FOR, LIMDIS, MAIL, ETC)	
	ACT	INFO		TOP SECRET	FGO <i>In-house</i> BELOW BLOCKS FOR RADIO USE ONLY SSN: 0735 DTG: 040634Z	
FLASH						
IMMEDIATE				CONFIDENTIAL		
PRIORITY	XX	X		UNCLAS EFTO		
ROUTINE				UNCLAS		
CLASSIFY EACH PARAGRAPH						

FM: CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO

TO: CTE SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO PT ONE
 CTE SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO PT TWO
 CTE SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO PT THREE

INFO: CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE

BT

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) FOR NEMVAC OPERATIONS (U)

A. USSAF/7AF OPLAN 5060V-2-75 181230Z APR75

B. USSAF/7AF MSG 211205Z APR75
 212206Z

C. USSAF/7AF MSG 212062Z APR75

D. USSAF/7AF MSG 231115Z APR75

E. CINCPACFLT MSG 191722Z APR75

F. JCS WASHINGTON MSG 191336Z APR75 (PASEP)

(G) SUMMARY

THIS MESSAGE REFLECTS THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) WITH ALL CHANGES INCORPORATED THERETO FOR NEMVAC OPERATIONS AS PUBLISHED BY USSAF/7AF.

DRAFTER'S NAME AND SIGNATURE	CODE	EXT	COORDINATION/CONCURRENCE
<i>James C. Smith</i>			in accordance with the provisions of CNO 1tr Ser 009D323/232095 of 21 Feb 1979
RELEASEER'S NAME AND SIGNATURE	CODE	EXT	
<i>J. B. Smith</i>			

UNCLASSIFIED Date: 8/12/86

CONTINUED

PAGE ___ OF ___

USE PLAIN BOND FOR TYPE RULED PAD FOR HAND

200752Z APR 75

FM CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO

TO ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT

CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO PT ONE

CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO PT TWO

CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO PT THREE

CTG SEVEN TWO

CTG SEVEN THREE

ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX

CTG SEVEN SEVEN

CTG SEVEN NINE

CTG SEVEN NINE PT TWO

CTG SEVEN NINE PT THREE

CTG SEVEN NINE PT SIX

ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT THREE

ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT FOUR

BT

SECRET NOFORN //NOJ120//

CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO OPLAN 1-75 (FREQUENT WIND) (C)

A. CTU 79.1.2 192136Z APR 75

B. CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO 200158Z APR 75

SUMMARY (S)

(C) REF A FORWARDED ORIGINATORS

OPLAN 1-75 (FREQUENT WIND) AND STATED ANNEXES WOULD BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY. ANNEX (B) (INTELLIGENCE) TO SUBJECT OPLAN WHICH FORWARDED BY REF (S) APPENDIX FIVE (ESCAPE AND EVASION) TO ANNEX B IS FORWARDED HERewith.

(1) (S) THE MOST PREFERRED ESCAPE PURPOSES OF AVIATION PERSONNEL IS TO GO DOWN "FEET WET", AND BE PICKED UP BY U.S. NAVY SURFACE WAR ELEMENTS.

(2) (S) THE AREA OF OPERATION IS CHARACTERIZED BY MANGROVE SWAMP, CANALS AND RIVERS, AND RICE PADDIES. THE DRY SEASON PREVAILS UNTIL LATE APRIL OR EARLY MAY, DURING THIS PERIOD TRAVEL THROUGH PADDY AREAS WILL BE RELATIVELY EASY. CAUTION SHOULD BE USED IN EVADING IN PADDY AREAS, HOWEVER AS COVER IS SPARSE, AND SUCH AREAS ARE DENSELY POPULATED, MANGROVE WILL OFFER GOOD COVER, BUT MOVEMENT WILL BE DIFFICULT.

(3) (S) IF SAR PICKUP IS NOT IMMINENT AFTER GOING DOWN, THE EVADER SHOULD MOVE TOWARD THE MAIN SHIPPING CHANNEL AND OPT FOR RESCUE VIA MSC SHIPPING BRINGING REFUGEES FROM SAIGON.

(4) (S) EVADER MUST BE VARY OF LOCALS GATHERING ABOUT HIM, WHO WILL ATTEMPT TO BOARD SAR AIRCRAFT. THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY THAT INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL WILL TRY TO USE DOWNED AIRCREW MEMBERS AS HOSTAGES TO OBTAIN EVACUATION. IN A "FEET DRY" DOWNING SITUATION, IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT NO LOCAL ELEMENTS MAY BE TRUSTED.

(5) (S) AIRCREW SHOULD INSURE THAT THEY HAVE PROPERLY CHECKED ALL SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES BEFORE BOARDING AIRCRAFT. SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SURVIVAL RADIOS AND SIGNALLING DEVICES.

(6) (S) EVADERS SHOULD REMEMBER THAT THIS AREA IS INHABITED BY SNAKES, AND LEECHES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE KING COBRAS, ALL SNAKES WILL ONLY BITE AS A DEFENSIVE MEASURE. IF SNAKES ARE NOT SURPRISED, THIS HAZARD IS GREATLY NEGATED. LEECHES ARE MOST COMMON IN BODIES OF WATER. EVADERS SHOULD CHECK THEIR BODIES AS SOON AFTER MOVING THROUGH WATER AS POSSIBLE.

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TOP

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ZTTSZYUW RUHGPMAS416 1190445-SSSS--RUHGSUU.

ZNY SSSSS

Z 290448Z APR 75

FM CTF SEVEN SIX

TO CHFLTCOORDGRU NKP TH

BT

//N03120//

PASS TO COMUSSAG/7AG

CIF 76/SPECIAL FREQUENT WIND EXECUTION SITREP/SERIAL 001/AS OF
290330Z APR 75

A. USSAG/7AF 181230Z APR 75

1. (U) THIS SITREP SUBMITTED IAW REF A.

2. (S) THIS IS THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF SPECIAL FREQUENT WIND
EXECUTION SITREPS WHICH WILL BE SENT DURING EXECUTION PHASE
OF THIS OPERATION.3. (S) FREQUENT WIND EXECUTION MESSAGE COMSEVENTHFLT 290100Z
APR RECEIVED. L-HOUR IS SET 290600Z APR 75.

SDS 83

BT

3416

1400H

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TERM	TERM
Notelle	05240

CIF-76
SITREPS

290448

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ZNY SSSSS

Z 290522Z APR 75

FM CTF SEVEN SIX

TO CHFLTCOORDGRU NKP TH

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//N03120//

PASS TO COMUSSAG/7AF

PASS TO COMUSSAG/7AF
CTF 76 /SPECIAL FREQUENT WIND EXECUTION SITREP/SERIAL 002/MAS OF
290512Z APR 75
E

A. USSAG/7AF 181230Z APR 75

1. (U) THIS SITREP SUBMITTED IAW REF A.

1. (U) THIS SITREP SUBMITTED TAW REF A.
2. (S) FOLLOWING VIP PERSONNEL ON BOARD IF 76 SHIPPING ARRIVED VIA VNAF OR AIR AMERICA HELO

AIR VICE MARSHALL KY., ABOARD DENVER

AIR VICE MARSHALL RT., ABOARD DENVER
MRS MARTIN, WIFE OF AMBASSADOR, ABOARD DENVER
STA: CKT

GO 5 83

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ZTTSZYUW RUHGPM3427 1190545-SSSS--RUHGSUU.

ZNY SSSSS

Z 290546Z APR 75

FM CTF SEVEN SIX

TO COMSEVENTHFLT

INFO CINCPACFLT MAKALAPA HI

CG FMFPAC CAMP H M SMITH HI

CTF SEVEN SEVEN

CTF SEVEN NINE

ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE

BT

//N03120//

CTF 76/SPECIAL FREQUENT WIND EXECUTION SITREP/SERIAL 003/AS OF
290642Z APR 751. (S) REF CTF 76 SPECIAL SITREP 001/1, CHANGE L-HOUR
TO 290700Z/8 VICE 290600Z/7 APR 75.2. (S) CTG 79.1, COMMANDER GSF FEET DRY AT 290520Z/8
GDS 83

BT

#3427

NNNN

C	COG
O Staff <i>Gold</i>	Draft
L	Rel <i>Church</i>
R	
P	Yes
RE	STO
ST	ST <i>LFC/ST</i>
Name <i>th</i>	Time <i>0620</i>
Serial No <i>3427</i>	

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05

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