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From: Brigadier General Edwin H. SIMMONS, USMC
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Debriefing, Viet Nam service 15 June 1970 to 24 May 1971

Ref: (a) 1st Marine Division/3d Marine Amphibious Brigade Command
Information Notebook, April 1971

1. (U) Scope. These observations and comments are submitted in response to verbal instructions from CG FMFPac. During the period concerned, the undersigned served as Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division, from 15 June 1970 until 14 April 1971, and as Deputy Brigade Commander, 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade, from 14 April until 24 May 1971. The following topics are discussed in the paragraphs which follow:

- a. Paragraph 2. Marginal Marines
- b. Paragraph 3. Racial Problems
- c. Paragraph 4. Drug Abuse
- d. Paragraph 5. Crimes of Violence
- e. Paragraph 6. Ground Safety
- f. Paragraph 7. Combat Intelligence
- g. Paragraph 8. Combat Effectiveness
- h. Paragraph 9. Unity of Command
- i. Paragraph 10. Mines and Booby Traps
- j. Paragraph 11. Combined Unit Pacification Program
- k. Paragraph 12. Artillery Employment
- l. Paragraph 13. Tactical Air Support
- m. Paragraph 14. Helicopter Support
- n. Paragraph 15. Materiel Readiness

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- o. Paragraph 16. Preventive Medicine
- p. Paragraph 17. Civic Action
- q. Paragraph 18. Staff Organization and Functioning, 1st Marine Division
- r. Paragraph 19. Staff Organization and Functioning, 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade
- s. Paragraph 20. Redeployment
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2. (U) Marginal Marines. Close observation of many thousand Marines this past year in a combat environment has reinforced my feeling that 90 to 95 per cent of our internal problems are caused by our marginal and sub-marginal Marines. I would put the number of Marines in this category at from 5 to 10 per cent. Most of these sub-marginal Marines never emerge from the lowest enlisted ranks, but some few do because of the vagaries of our promotion system, and in the grade of corporal and sergeant there are some "non-NCO's" who view their position as a pay grade rather than a rank. The greatest boon to our efforts at solving the marginal Marine problem has been the liberalized use of administrative discharges. During 1970 there were 809 administrative discharges from the 1st Marine Division. During the first three and a half months of 1971 there were 130 such discharges. The rate of discharges has hovered in the vicinity of three to five Marines per thousand per month. This rate tends to confirm my own impression that 5 to 10 per cent of our enlisted Marines are in the marginal or sub-marginal category. In addition to being a liability rather than an asset, these Marines absorb a disproportionate amount of staff and command attention which in itself saps the vitality of the command. Hopefully, the continued liberal use of administrative discharges, the return to civilian life of the short-term, draft-driven, marginally-motivated Marine, and heightened enlistment standards will combine to purge our ranks and give us once again a Corps in which substantially every Marine is a Marine because he wants to be a Marine. I endorse wholeheartedly and enthusiastically the new recruiting theme that "The Marine Corps Needs a Few Good Men."

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3. (C) Racial Problems. Statistically, the 1st Marine Division had 37 racial incidents in 1970 and no incidents in the first three and a half months of 1971. Twenty-nine of the 37 incidents occurred in the first six months of 1970. From these statistics it can be concluded that the racial climate in the 1st Marine Division greatly improved during the 15-month period. This is undoubtedly true but it should not be regarded as evidence that racial problems have been eliminated in the 1st Marine Division. The comments with regard to the sub-marginal Marine in the foregoing paragraph have particular application in the area of race relations. I would place the percentage of sub-marginal black Marines at a much higher figure than the 5 to 10 per cent I have given for the general Marine population. I would estimate that 15 to 20 per cent of our black Marines are not functioning at an acceptable level. While we have not kept such statistics, I am certain that an examination of the 930 administrative discharges given in the period January 1970 through March 1971 would show that a disproportionately large percentage went to black Marines. Meanwhile, the percentage of black Marines within the 1st Marine Division has continued at about 11 per cent. Again, while no precise figures have been kept, it is apparent to even a casual observer that the percentages are higher in the infantry and combat service support units and lower in the headquarters and combat support units. I am firmly convinced that the crux of the racial problem in the Marine Corps is the manipulation of the frustrated sub-marginal black Marine by aggressive, militant elements. I am equally convinced that 75 per cent of our black Marines are proud to be Marines and willing to compete with white Marines on an equal footing. But all of these black Marines, and particularly those of the lower enlisted ranks, are subjected to tremendous peer pressures which exhibit themselves in such outward forms as Afro haircuts, "power passing," and Black Power ornaments. These symbols are indicative of the divided nature of our Corps and in themselves exert a divisive effect. (I do not concur in the simplistic explanation that these symbols are nothing more than an affirmation of black pride.) Certainly, we do not want a polarized Corps, with different sets of rules and behavior for black and non-black Marines. Despite allegations to the contrary, I have seen little real evidence of white racism in the 1st Marine Division. It is true, however, that inbred beliefs and prejudices die hard. Even so, from my observation I believe most white Marines fully accept the black Marine who performs well as a Marine. But I am also certain that the average white Marine resents bitterly any double standard which seems to permit a lesser standard of behavior, appearance, and performance on the part of the black Marine. I am very optimistic with regard to future race relations within the Corps. The key to it is one set of standards equitably applied. Again, comparable to what was stated in the previous paragraph, the weeding-out of the sub-marginal black Marine and the militant black, plus heightened enlistment standards, should go far toward eliminating future racial problems.

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4. (C) Drug Abuse. Drug abuse statistics are notoriously unreliable. No one knows how big the drug problem is in the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade. The current consensus among commanders seems to be that about 30 per cent of the Marines smoke marijuana at least occasionally and that about 5 per cent use heroin. (The rise in the use of heroin is particularly frightening. Until last summer there was no heroin problem in the 1st Marine Division. Then cheap and plentiful heroin, which already was a problem amongst U. S. forces to the south, made its appearance in Military Region I. Since November there have been several Marine deaths ostensibly caused by heroin overdoses.) It is also impossible to quantify just how debilitating drug use may have been to the 1st Marine Division. There is, however, a demonstrably high correlation between drug use and sub-marginal performance. For example, 211 of the 809 administrative discharges in 1970 were drug-related. In general, poor performance attracts attention which leads to revelation of drug use. But this does not "prove" that drug use caused the poor performance nor does it give any indication of how many "good" performers use drugs. The picture is further obscured by the elastic envelope called "drug abuse" which includes everything from ambiguous marijuana to killer heroin. For the present the best course of action, in addition to a hopefully effective educational program, is strict adherence to the Commandant's dictum that those who experiment with drugs be punished and that those who become addicted be separated.

5. (U) Crimes of Violence. During the 15-month period, 1 January 1970 through 13 April 1971, there were 884 reported major offenses in the 1st Marine Division. Over half were drug violations. Of the remainder, 115 cases could be called "crimes of violence." Included were 11 murders, 23 attempted murders, 17 aggravated assaults, 34 assaults, 20 unlawful ordnance detonations, 4 rapes, and 6 armed robberies. Within those numbers there were 49 so-called fraggings. Forty-seven of these occurred in 1970 and, encouragingly, only two in the first three and a half months of 1971. Operation Freeze techniques (the swift isolation of the area in which the incident occurred followed by an exhaustive investigation) instituted in the latter half of 1970 did much to ensure solution of these crimes once committed. However, more important than the solution of the crime after it has happened is the prevention of the crime before it occurs. Division efforts in this respect centered on the identification of potential offenders. A thorough study of these incidents (not fraggings alone, but crimes of violence of all sorts) showed a fairly conclusive pattern of relationship between the sub-marginal Marine who was a trouble maker (or emotionally or mentally disturbed) and the commission of these crimes. Again, as the quality of the individual Marine remaining in the Corps goes up, the number of crimes of violence should go down. Further, now that all Fleet Marine Force Marines are departing Viet Nam, the undisputed influence of a combat environment upon the commission of crimes of violence will disappear.

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6. (U) Ground Safety. "Ground Safety Program" is really not an appropriate label but it was the term used by the Division to cover a wide range of effort aimed at cutting down the number of non-battle casualties. Throughout 1970, as battle casualties went down, non-battle casualties stood out in sharper relief and demanded more attention. The 1st Marine Division had 6,269 battle casualties and 2,163 non-battle casualties in 1969; a ratio of 2.9 to 1. (In addition to deaths, only those wounded who were evacuated and non-battle injuries requiring at least four days hospitalization were counted.) In 1970 there were 2,657 battle casualties and 1,698 non-battle casualties; a ratio of 1.6 to 1. On the other hand, for the first three and a half months of 1971, there were 303 battle casualties and only 95 non-battle casualties; a ratio of 3.2 to 1. More importantly, while the rate of battle casualties actually went up in these three and a half months (because far fewer Marines were covering the same area of operations), the rate of non-combat casualties was only about half what it was in 1970. (This definite trend in non-battle casualties is demonstrated more conclusively in Tab 1-6a to reference (a).) This would seem to indicate that the Division's strenuous efforts to reduce these losses did bear fruit. Categories of non-battle casualties include friendly fire incidents, accidental discharges, explosive ordnance incidents, motor vehicle accidents, and a Hatchall called "operational/occupational incidents" (which account for about half the non-battle casualties and include such things as falls, burns, and drownings). Nearly all non-battle casualties and certainly those caused by weapons and motor vehicles involve some element of carelessness. "Carelessness kills Marines" was the theme of the educational effort and it was continuously stressed to leaders at all levels that failure to supervise or enforce safety regulations was a form of carelessness. Non-battle casualties were demonstrably reduced but still remained unnecessarily high. The two major contributors to the non-battle casualty rate, in my opinion, are the overly casual or careless small unit leader (who doesn't inspect weapons after patrol, or who doesn't keep close control of vehicles entrusted to his charge) and the marginal Marine (who is accident prone).

7. (S) Combat Intelligence. When I first came in-country in 1965 we were half-blind and nearly deaf. We were almost totally dependent upon Vietnamese generated intelligence and this in turn was largely based on agent reports of dubious value. Radio intercept procedures were so encumbered with security safeguards as to almost destroy their product's timeliness and usefulness. Our early reconnaissance efforts were highly tentative. There was a great debate over the respective roles of the Division Reconnaissance Battalion and the Force Reconnaissance Company. Our organic interpretation and translation capability was virtually non-existent. We moved upward along the learning curve fairly fast in 1965 and 1966 but even so I was not prepared for the tremendous advances in Marine combat intelligence which I found when I returned in 1970. The quantity and quality of signal intelligence was simply unbelievable. Our reconnaissance efforts had matured into a highly effective system. Our interrogation-translation teams and our counterintelligence teams had

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achieved great sophistication. The OV-10A provided a superb platform for aerial reconnaissance. About the only thing that was a disappointment to me was the sensor program. This, I believe, was the fault neither of the equipment nor of the operators, but because we did not control the battlefield. We were only the users of a battlefield owned by the host Vietnamese government. Thus any sensing had to be regarded as highly tentative, subject to confirmation as to identity, friend or foe. In the future, the battlefield must be less ambiguous if sensors are to be really effective. As we leave Viet Nam, my chief thought with regard to combat intelligence is how do we keep these highly developed skills from atrophying? What kind of a peacetime program can we develop to keep alive our current level of capability?

8. (S) Combat Effectiveness. Although there were some interruptions and variations, 1970 and the first three months of 1971 reflected a more or less steady and continuing reduction in combat intensity as measured by any of a number of indicators (enemy casualties, friendly casualties, ordnance expended, etc.). Examination of these indicators will also indicate that the comparative effectiveness of the Division's combat operations actually increased during this period. These comparisons are made in considerable detail in the G-3 section of reference (a). In gross terms, the Division lost 1,031 killed and 9,286 wounded in 1969 as opposed to 403 killed and 3,625 wounded in 1970, a decrease of some 61 per cent. The enemy, meanwhile, lost 9,643 men killed and 2,502 weapons captured in 1969 as opposed to 5,225 killed and 1,382 weapons captured in 1970, a decrease of 46 per cent killed and 45 per cent of weapons lost. Kill ratios are always invidious, but it can be seen that while enemy losses went down in 1970 they did not decline at the same rate as Marine losses. So we can conclude that the combat effectiveness of the Division actually improved during 1970. (These comparisons are made in considerable detail in the G-3 section of reference (a).) On the other hand effectiveness (getting desired results) should be distinguished from efficiency (getting desired results with minimum expenditure of energy, time, money, or material). If this distinction is made, then I think we would have to conclude that 1st Marine Division operations (and for that matter all Marine operations in Viet Nam) while effective have not been particularly efficient. This is a rather disturbing hypothesis but I think it is one that deserves searching inquiry in the post-Viet Nam years. Viet Nam has been too expensive, too time consuming for the results obtained. How can we do better? How do we sift out the hyperbole from our combat reports and really get at the efficiency of our component parts? Did our sophisticated and complex weapons systems really pay their way? Or would greater emphasis on simpler systems (perhaps more light infantry) have been more efficient? These things need to be explored.

9. (S) Unity of Command. Of all the principles of war which were violated in the prosecution of the Viet Nam War, no violation was more damaging than the attempted substitution of cooperation for the time-proven principle of unity of

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command. Whatever political purposes might have been served by the continued insistence on the sovereignty of the Saigon government, the military effects were that the U. S. forces were literally guests on the battlefield. Two parallel military chains of command, linked only by coordination and good will (which sometimes wore thin), attempted to function on the same ground. These problems were particularly acute in the 1st Marine Division's area of operations, Quang Nam Province, where the fundamental division between U. S. and Vietnamese command was further compounded by the semi-autonomous presence of the 2d ROK Marine Brigade and the division of the Vietnamese forces into sometimes competing segments; that is, regular forces under I Corps, territorials under Quang Nam province, and the special status of Danang Special Zone, all exhibiting some degree of independence. To bring these component parts together into a cooperative whole, the 1st Marine Division inter alia sponsored the Quang Da Special Zone conferences (later called Quang Nam Commanders Conferences). Supposedly these were weekly conferences but they were often cancelled or postponed. They were useful but required constant re-energizing as Vietnamese commanders changed and interest lagged. The fabric of the conference system is fragile and it is not known whether it will survive the departure of the 1st Marine Division.

10. (C) Mines and Booby Traps. The most insidious, cheapest, and most efficient casualty-producing agent at the enemy's disposal in Quang Nam province was always the anti-personnel mine. This was so in 1965 when the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade came into country and it was true in 1971 as the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade leaves country. As the enemy retreated from conventional operations and reverted more and more to guerrilla tactics, the percentage of total casualties caused by so-called "booby traps" went up. In 1969 the 1st Marine Division had 2,124 casualties from these devices or 20.6 per cent of its total casualties. In 1970 the corresponding figures were 1,868 casualties or 46.4 per cent of the total. Obviously then, the 1st Marine Division's strenuous efforts - including troop indoctrination, land mine warfare school, contact teams, and mine and booby trap dogs - did not solve the problem. (The best we can conclude is that these efforts greatly reduced what might have been the casualty figures if they had not been vigorously pursued.) Since these devices are the classic weapon of the Asiatic guerrilla, how can we expect to do better in possible future campaigns? I would suggest that the root of the problem lies in what I have mentioned earlier concerning control of the battlefield and unity of command. If we had had absolute control of the mine-infested area south of Da Nang and if we could have instituted positive population control measures, the mine threat could have been reduced to negligible proportions. Of this I am positive.

11. (C) Combined Unit Pacification Program. The CUPP program was of course the 1st Marine Division complementary effort to the Combined Action Program. The program, which was begun in November 1969, demonstrated that regular Marine rifle squads, when paired off with Regional Force or Popular Force platoons, could perform in a manner comparable to the more highly selective and specially

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trained Combined Action Platoons. The performance of the CUPPs formed from Company G, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, which were deployed along the highway from Ba Ren Bridge to Baldy Combat Base and from Baldy to Ross Combat Base from October 1970 until April 1971 were particularly noteworthy. (In terms of pure efficiency, I think this was the most efficient rifle company we had during this period.) In some ways the rifle company structure gave the CUPPs advantages that the CAPs did not have. This then was a remarkably successful program, given the environment and constraints present in Quang Nam province. But both the CAP and CUPP programs were necessarily compromises developed to circumvent the problems caused by the lack of unity of command. The problem addressed was how do we improve the performance of the territorial troops, given the present awkward command arrangements? The answer was the CAP and CUPP programs. For future contingencies there may be better answers.

12. (S) Artillery Employment. The 11th Marines turned in a superb performance in 1970 and the first four months of 1971. During this period the total number of artillery tubes dropped from 156 in January 1970 to 122 in May, to 74 in October, to 28 in April 1971, to zero on 7 May. A total of 1,333,000 rounds was expended in 1970, with a high of 179,100 rounds in January and a low of 21,500 rounds in November. The number of rounds fired was less a function of the number of tubes available than of enemy sighted and targeting criteria. Until late summer 1970 the 11th Marines continued a rhythm of firing 4,000 to 5,000 rounds daily, much of it against "pre-emptive/intelligence" targets (an euphemism which had replaced "harassing and interdiction fires"). But the enemy had dropped back from conventional tactics to guerrilla tactics and analysis showed that this heavy volume of fire had little effect on his operations. These fires therefore were strictly curtailed and the larger shoots reserved for confirmed targets and systematic attacks by fire such as CATAWBA FALLS. With its well-established artillery cantonnments and artillery "fans" covering most of the eastern third of Quang Nam province, the 11th Marines could have lapsed into fortress artillery. This tendency was offset by frequent deployments to temporary fire support bases to support such operations as PICKENS FOREST, CATAWBA FALLS, IMPERIAL LAKE, and SCOTT ORCHARD. The question which requires further exploration is how can artillery be employed most efficiently in a counter-guerrilla role? 1st Marine Division experience would indicate that number of rounds fired is an indication only of technical proficiency, not of effectiveness or efficiency.

13. (S) Tactical Air Support. My remarks here pertain only to the fixed wing support provided the 1st Marine Division in its low-intensity, essentially counter-guerrilla operations conducted by the 1st Marine Division from June 1970 until April 1971. In my mind, the fixed-wing aircraft most valuable to the 1st Marine Division was the OV-10A "Broncho." (This is not such a remarkable conclusion; the Broncho was performing in exactly the environment for which it had been designed.) Following the philosophy of "we have it, so let's use it," tremendous weights of ordnance were delivered by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing attack

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aircraft for the 1st Marine Division. (I don't have statistics on these weights at hand, but a total of 8,562 attack sorties was flown in 1970 in support of the Division.) During late summer 1970 the targeting of these sorties was given the same kind of close scrutiny as described above for the artillery and the same conclusions were reached. Random bombing of soft intelligence targets was not materially affecting the enemy's guerrilla operations. What fixed wing could do best was to go after the enemy's base areas and command and control apparatus. Targeting was concentrated on these objectives. Particularly good results were obtained in CATAWBA FALLS, the preparatory phase of IMPERIAL LAKE, the air/artillery attack in the vicinity of Thuong Duc in October which caused the 38th NVA Regiment to abort its attack, and the continued neutralization of Base Area 112.

14. (S) Helicopter Support. I cannot help but wonder if we have not over-worked the helicopter in the Viet Nam War. I think we have used it too often when a truck or jeep or a pair of feet would have sufficed. (If we are honest with ourselves we must admit that our lightly-armed, elusive enemy in his Ho Chi Minh sandals has, in some ways, greater tactical mobility than do we with all our helicopters.) In this past year in the 1st Marine Division the tactical march, either on foot or by vehicle, has been virtually non-existent. Movement by helicopter has been considered safer, quicker, and easier. There have been sufficient helicopter resources to support this policy. But here again I raise the questions of effectiveness and efficiency. There can be no doubt of the effectiveness of our use of helicopters. The efficiency of their use, however, can be challenged. And I don't think we can allow the other means of tactical mobility to atrophy.

15. (C) Material Readiness. The level of logistic support given the 1st Marine Division has been superb. The Division has never seriously wanted for anything. On 14 April 1971, at the time of its departure from Viet Nam, the operationally ready status of all combat essential equipment in the Division stood at 96 per cent. The question in my mind is not whether we had enough, but if perhaps we did not have too much. The Marine Division as presently constituted is a very heavy division. I would guess that it is the heaviest infantry division in the world. For twenty years after World War II our doctrine taught that we would hold our logistic support commands outside the objective area, but in Viet Nam we found it necessary to create a base depot equivalent in the form of the Force Logistic Command. This was possible in the relatively benign, semi-garrison environment of Viet Nam. I am not sure that it was economic and I am not sure that it would be either desirable or feasible in a future expedition.

16. (U) Preventive Medicine. I am certain that the Marines in Viet Nam have enjoyed better health than did the members of any previous expedition in our history. There are many reasons for this which don't need to be belabored here,

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but I do want to give a nod of appreciation in the direction of the preventive medicine functions of the 1st Medical Battalion. There are many threats to health endemic to Viet Nam; malaria, dengue, hepatitis, rabies, and the ubiquitous venereal diseases to name a few. A few statistics will serve to illustrate how well the preventive medicine efforts have served to keep these things under control. In 1969, the malaria rate per thousand Marines per month averaged out to 9.1 cases. In 1970, the average rate was 9.2 cases. That means, roughly, that at any one time fewer than one Marine out of a hundred was suffering from malaria. The figures for venereal disease are almost precisely the same, an average monthly rate per thousand of 9.0 cases in 1969, 10.1 cases in 1970. For any future expedition we must continue to recognize the importance of preventive and environmental medicine.

17. (C) Civic Action. It may be heresy to even suggest such a thing, but I have some serious doubts as to just how effective our civic action programs have been in Viet Nam. I wonder how many "hearts and minds" we have really won over to the side of the Government. I am sure that my current, somewhat pessimistic, view is colored by the rising tide of anti-American feeling that is expressing itself in Da Nang and Quang Nam province. There are a few good solid things we leave behind such as the Hoa Khanh Children's Hospital but I am afraid that most of our civic action projects were more evanescent. Some of the villagers have made it evident that they are sorry to see our CAP and CUPP teams leave their hamlets, but most seem apathetic. There have been numerous acts of arrogance and even active belligerence on the part of the ARVN as well as the RF and PF. Da Nang is becoming increasingly unsafe for Americans. Time will provide perspective and may prove me wrong, but for now, at this point, I must regard civic action as a poor substitute for more positive forms of civil affairs/military government.

18. (U) Staff Organization and Functioning, 1st Marine Division. To my knowledge, neither the 3d nor the 1st Marine Division headquarters ever really operated "in the field" in Viet Nam. Certainly the Headquarters, 1st Marine Division, was entrenched in a garrison type base camp outside of Da Nang from October 1966 until its departure in April 1971. During that time, many functions unforeseen by the Staff Manual or the Tables of Organization accreted to the Division staff. There were air-conditioned working spaces, good billeting, first-class messing, adequate recreational facilities, good clubs, and excellent administrative support facilities (such as reproduction facilities, photography laboratory, etc.) all in turn supported by commercial type utilities and a significantly large local national work force. Probably a whole generation of Marines thinks that is the way a Division command post in a combat zone should look and operate. (I have heard far more senior officers say that our experience in Viet Nam "proves" that MMS will work in the field, or that we have demonstrated that the present cumbersome system of military justice will "work" in a combat

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environment.) The headquarters of the 1st Marine Division took the shape and form that was needed in the Viet Nam environment. Now I think we must take a hard look at what is needed in a Division headquarters in a pure military environment; the headquarters of the future must be primarily a tactical headquarters, and we must find ways of keeping the extraneous administrative functions somewhere in the rear out of the objective area.

19. (C) Staff Organization and Functioning, 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade. The headquarters of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade was singularly fortunate in the personnel who were assigned to it. The functions performed by the headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and 1st Marine Division were all telescoped together, reduced in scale, and in most cases continued to be performed by the same persons who had had the job all along. The primary mission of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade has been to retrograde the remaining Marines and materiel from Viet Nam by 30 June 1971. This retrograde has gone remarkably smoothly, a success in no small part attributable to the high level of talent to be found on the Brigade staff. The operational life of the Brigade was short - from 14 April until 7 May. In a way that was unfortunate because there was no chance to test in a combat environment what might have been a truly integrated air-ground brigade. Some of the things that have happened in the Viet Nam War give a clue as to just how effective such a combat organization might be. Our original entries into Da Nang and Chu Lai were made by the 9th and 3d Marine Amphibious Brigades. The WESTPAC strategic reserve for much of the war was the 9th MAB. Our Task Forces, such as Delta, X-Ray, Yankee, and Hotel, were rudimentary brigades. Our collocation of the DASC from the Wing with the FSCC in the 1st Marine Division was a significant step toward an integrated air-ground combat operations center. The positioning of a quick reaction helicopter package at Baldy to support the 5th Marines was a kind of de facto direct support air-ground task organization. The possibilities of the Marine Amphibious Brigade as a basic air-ground tactical organization deserve further examination and testing.

20. (U) Redeployment. Increment VI and Increment VII redeployments were characterized by (1) turnover of real estate to U. S. or Vietnamese forces or agencies, (2) reduction of unwanted minor bases and outlying positions, and (3) preparation of materiel for transfer or retrograde. Increment VII personnel redeployment differed from Increment VI in that a degree of unit integrity was maintained in the outgoing drafts. Marines leaving the country were subjected to increasingly rigid inspections to insure that they looked and acted like Marines (boots, haircuts, uniforms, etc.) and that all necessary administrative processing had been adequately completed (SRE's, pay records, shot cards, ID cards, dog tags, malaria pills, etc.). In the aggregate, personnel redeployment proceeded smoothly. At the individual level, however, there was much uncertainty and turbulence. Many Marines, both officer and enlisted, on leaving the

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country either didn't know or had just learned their ultimate destination. Curiously, this was largely accepted as inevitable and with little visible evidence of resentment. In the three redeployment increments which have occurred in the past 12 months, much thought was given to tour equity; that is, to establish eligibility to return to the United States largely on the basis of the number of months spent in Viet Nam or the Western Pacific. This has been done at the expense of unit integrity. As stated above, more emphasis was given to unit integrity in Increment VII than was previously the case. Certainly from the viewpoint of regaining combat readiness of redeployed units, this is desirable.

21. (U) Command Information Notebook. Reference (a), forwarded under separate cover, is the last edition of the 1st Marine Division/3d Marine Amphibious Brigade Command Information Notebook. Most of the statistics used in this debrief have been derived from this notebook. The Command Information Notebook was begun in August 1970 and attained essentially its present form in October. It has proven a very useful command and management tool. It is a manual information system and therefore, unlike most automated information systems, it not only permits but invites subjective manipulation of its data. Essentially, the notebook uses a dual approach: (1) a statistical display of data, and (2) an analysis of that data.

22. (U) Conclusion. I believe that the purpose of the FMFPac debriefings in the past has been to explore how we might do better in the fighting of the Viet Nam War. Viet Nam is now past for the Marine Corps. What we must do now is analyze the Viet Nam experience and see what lessons can be derived from it. I remember the exciting and productive years at Quantico from 1946 until 1950 when World War II was dissected in just this way. I had this in mind as I wrote this debrief. I have written hurriedly, candidly, and without restraint. Along the way I have suggested some hypotheses which might bear further investigation. The central theme of my comments, as I think is obvious, is that Marine participation in the Viet Nam War was effective but costly. In the future, when we can expect much greater constraints in terms of men, money, and material, we must not only be effective, we must be more efficient.

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1. (U) Scope. These observations and comments are submitted in response to verbal instructions from CG FMFPac. During the period concerned, the undersigned served as Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division, from 15 June 1970 until 14 April 1971, and as Deputy Brigade Commander, 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade, from 14 April until 24 May 1971. The following topics are discussed in the paragraphs which follow:

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- b. Paragraph 3. Racial Problems
- c. Paragraph 4. Drug Abuse
- d. Paragraph 5. Crimes of Violence
- e. Paragraph 6. Ground Safety
- f. Paragraph 7. Combat Intelligence
- g. Paragraph 8. Combat Effectiveness
- h. Paragraph 9. Unity of Command
- i. Paragraph 10. Mines and Booby Traps
- j. Paragraph 11. Combined Unit Pacification Program
- k. Paragraph 12. Artillery Employment
- l. Paragraph 13. Tactical Air Support
- m. Paragraph 14. Helicopter Support
- n. Paragraph 15. Materiel Readiness

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- o. Paragraph 16. Preventive Medicine
- p. Paragraph 17. Civic Action
- q. Paragraph 18. Staff Organization and Functioning, 1st Marine Division
- r. Paragraph 19. Staff Organization and Functioning, 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade
- s. Paragraph 20. Redeployment
- t. Paragraph 21. Command Information Notebook

2. (U) Marginal Marines. Close observation of many thousand Marines this past year in a combat environment has reinforced my feeling that 90 to 95 per cent of our internal problems are caused by our marginal and sub-marginal Marines. I would put the number of Marines in this category at from 5 to 10 per cent. Most of these sub-marginal Marines never emerge from the lowest enlisted ranks, but some few do because of the vagaries of our promotion system, and in the grade of corporal and sergeant there are some "non-NCO's" who view their position as a pay grade rather than a rank. The greatest boon to our efforts at solving the marginal Marine problem has been the liberalized use of administrative discharges. During 1970 there were 809 administrative discharges from the 1st Marine Division. During the first three and a half months of 1971 there were 130 such discharges. The rate of discharges has hovered in the vicinity of three to five Marines per thousand per month. This rate tends to confirm my own impression that 5 to 10 per cent of our enlisted Marines are in the marginal or sub-marginal category. In addition to being a liability rather than an asset, these Marines absorb a disproportionate amount of staff and command attention which in itself saps the vitality of the command. Hopefully, the continued liberal use of administrative discharges, the return to civilian life of the short-term, draft-driven, marginally-motivated Marine, and heightened enlistment standards will combine to purge our ranks and give us once again a Corps in which substantially every Marine is a Marine because he wants to be a Marine. I endorse wholeheartedly and enthusiastically the new recruiting theme that "The Marine Corps Needs a Few Good Men."

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3. (C) Racial Problems. Statistically, the 1st Marine Division had 37 racial incidents in 1970 and no incidents in the first three and a half months of 1971. Twenty-nine of the 37 incidents occurred in the first six months of 1970. From these statistics it can be concluded that the racial climate in the 1st Marine Division greatly improved during the 15-month period. This is undoubtedly true but it should not be regarded as evidence that racial problems have been eliminated in the 1st Marine Division. The comments with regard to the sub-marginal Marine in the foregoing paragraph have particular application in the area of race relations. I would place the percentage of sub-marginal black Marines at a much higher figure than the 5 to 10 per cent I have given for the general Marine population. I would estimate that 15 to 20 per cent of our black Marines are not functioning at an acceptable level. While we have not kept such statistics, I am certain that an examination of the 930 administrative discharges given in the period January 1970 through March 1971 would show that a disproportionately large percentage went to black Marines. Meanwhile, the percentage of black Marines within the 1st Marine Division has continued at about 11 per cent. Again, while no precise figures have been kept, it is apparent to even a casual observer that the percentages are higher in the infantry and combat service support units and lower in the headquarters and combat support units. I am firmly convinced that the crux of the racial problem in the Marine Corps is the manipulation of the frustrated sub-marginal black Marine by aggressive, militant elements. I am equally convinced that 75 per cent of our black Marines are proud to be Marines and willing to compete with white Marines on an equal footing. But all of these black Marines, and particularly those of the lower enlisted ranks, are subjected to tremendous peer pressures which exhibit themselves in such outward forms as Afro haircuts, "power passing," and Black Power ornaments. These symbols are indicative of the divided nature of our Corps and in themselves exert a divisive effect. (I do not concur in the simplistic explanation that these symbols are nothing more than an affirmation of black pride.) Certainly, we do not want a polarized Corps, with different sets of rules and behavior for black and non-black Marines. Despite allegations to the contrary, I have seen little real evidence of white racism in the 1st Marine Division. It is true, however, that inbred beliefs and prejudices die hard. Even so, from my observation I believe most white Marines fully accept the black Marine who performs well as a Marine. But I am also certain that the average white Marine resents bitterly any double standard which seems to permit a lesser standard of behavior, appearance, and performance on the part of the black Marine. I am very optimistic with regard to future race relations within the Corps. The key to it is one set of standards equitably applied. Again, comparable to what was stated in the previous paragraph, the weeding-out of the sub-marginal black Marine and the militant black, plus heightened enlistment standards, should go far toward eliminating future racial problems.

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4. (C) Drug Abuse. Drug abuse statistics are notoriously unreliable. No one knows how big the drug problem is in the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade. The current consensus among commanders seems to be that about 30 per cent of the Marines smoke marijuana at least occasionally and that about 5 per cent use heroin. (The rise in the use of heroin is particularly frightening. Until last summer there was no heroin problem in the 1st Marine Division. Then cheap and plentiful heroin, which already was a problem amongst U. S. forces to the south, made its appearance in Military Region 1. Since November there have been several Marine deaths ostensibly caused by heroin overdoses.) It is also impossible to quantify just how debilitating drug use may have been to the 1st Marine Division. There is, however, a demonstrably high correlation between drug use and sub-marginal performance. For example, 211 of the 309 administrative discharges in 1970 were drug-related. In general, poor performance attracts attention which leads to revelation of drug use. But this does not "prove" that drug use caused the poor performance nor does it give any indication of how many "good" performers use drugs. The picture is further obscured by the elastic envelope called "drug abuse" which includes everything from ambiguous marijuana to killer heroin. For the present the best course of action, in addition to a hopefully effective educational program, is strict adherence to the Commandant's dictum that those who experiment with drugs be punished and that those who become addicted be separated.

5. (U) Crimes of Violence. During the 15-month period, 1 January 1970 through 15 April 1971, there were 884 reported major offenses in the 1st Marine Division. Over half were drug violations. Of the remainder, 115 cases could be called "crimes of violence." Included were 11 murders, 23 attempted murders, 17 aggravated assaults, 34 assaults, 20 unlawful ordnance detonations, 4 rapes, and 6 armed robberies. Within those numbers there were 49 so-called fraggings. Forty-seven of these occurred in 1970 and, encouragingly, only two in the first three and a half months of 1971. Operation Freeze techniques (the swift isolation of the area in which the incident occurred followed by an exhaustive investigation) instituted in the latter half of 1970 did much to ensure solution of these crimes once committed. However, more important than the solution of the crime after it has happened is the prevention of the crime before it occurs. Division efforts in this respect centered on the identification of potential offenders. A thorough study of these incidents (not fraggings alone, but crimes of violence of all sorts) showed a fairly conclusive pattern of relationship between the sub-marginal Marine who was a trouble maker (or emotionally or mentally disturbed) and the commission of these crimes. Again, as the quality of the individual Marine remaining in the Corps goes up, the number of crimes of violence should go down. Further, now that all Fleet Marine Force Marines are departing Viet Nam, the undisputed influence of a combat environment upon the commission of crimes of violence will disappear.

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6. (U) Ground Safety. "Ground Safety Program" is really not an appropriate label but it was the term used by the Division to cover a wide range of effort aimed at cutting down the number of non-battle casualties. Throughout 1970, as battle casualties went down, non-battle casualties stood out in sharper relief and demanded more attention. The 1st Marine Division had 6,289 battle casualties and 2,163 non-battle casualties in 1969; a ratio of 2.9 to 1. (In addition to deaths, only those wounded who were evacuated and non-battle injuries requiring at least four days hospitalization were counted.) In 1970 there were 2,657 battle casualties and 1,698 non-battle casualties; a ratio of 1.6 to 1. On the other hand, for the first three and a half months of 1971, there were 303 battle casualties and only 95 non-battle casualties; a ratio of 3.2 to 1. More importantly, while the rate of battle casualties actually went up in these three and a half months (because far fewer Marines were covering the same area of operations), the rate of non-combat casualties was only about half what it was in 1970. (This definite trend in non-battle casualties is demonstrated more conclusively in Tab 1-6a to reference (a).) This would seem to indicate that the Division's strenuous efforts to reduce these losses did bear fruit. Categories of non-battle casualties include friendly fire incidents, accidental discharges, explosive ordnance incidents, motor vehicle accidents, and a catchall called "operational/occupational incidents" (which account for about half the non-battle casualties and include such things as falls, burns, and drownings). Nearly all non-battle casualties and certainly those caused by weapons and motor vehicles involve some element of carelessness. "Carelessness kills Marines" was the theme of the educational effort and it was continuously stressed to leaders at all levels that failure to supervise or enforce safety regulations was a form of carelessness. Non-battle casualties were demonstrably reduced but still remained unnecessarily high. The two major contributors to the non-battle casualty rate, in my opinion, are the overly casual or careless small unit leader (who doesn't inspect weapons after patrol, or who doesn't keep close control of vehicles entrusted to his charge) and the marginal Marine (who is accident prone).

7. (S) Combat Intelligence. When I first came in-country in 1965 we were half-blind and nearly deaf. We were almost totally dependent upon Vietnamese generated intelligence and this in turn was largely based on agent reports of dubious value. Radio intercept procedures were so encumbered with security safeguards as to almost destroy their product's timeliness and usefulness. Our early reconnaissance efforts were highly tentative. There was a great debate over the respective roles of the Division Reconnaissance Battalion and the Forse Reconnaissance Company. Our organic interpretation and translation capability was virtually non-existent. We moved upward along the learning curve fairly fast in 1965 and 1966 but even so I was not prepared for the tremendous advances in Marine combat intelligence which I found when I returned in 1970. The quantity and quality of signal intelligence was simply unbelievable. Our reconnaissance efforts had matured into a highly effective system. Our interrogation-translation teams and our counterintelligence teams had

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achieved great sophistication. The OV-10A provided a superb platform for aerial reconnaissance. About the only thing that was a disappointment to me was the sensor program. This, I believe, was the fault neither of the equipment nor of the operators, but because we did not control the battlefield. We were only the users of a battlefield owned by the host Vietnamese government. Thus any sensing had to be regarded as highly tentative, subject to confirmation as to identity, friend or foe. In the future, the battlefield must be less ambiguous if sensors are to be really effective. As we leave Viet Nam, my chief thought with regard to combat intelligence is how do we keep these highly developed skills from atrophying? What kind of a peacetime program can we develop to keep alive our current level of capability?

8. (S) Combat Effectiveness. Although there were some interruptions and variations, 1970 and the first three months of 1971 reflected a more or less steady and continuing reduction in combat intensity as measured by any of a number of indicators (enemy casualties, friendly casualties, ordnance expended, etc.). Examination of these indicators will also indicate that the comparative effectiveness of the Division's combat operations actually increased during this period. These comparisons are made in considerable detail in the G-3 section of reference (a). In gross terms, the Division lost 1,051 killed and 9,286 wounded in 1969 as opposed to 403 killed and 3,625 wounded in 1970, a decrease of some 61 per cent. The enemy, meanwhile, lost 9,643 men killed and 2,502 weapons captured in 1969 as opposed to 5,225 killed and 1,382 weapons captured in 1970, a decrease of 46 per cent killed and 45 per cent of weapons lost. Kill ratios are always invidious, but it can be seen that while enemy losses went down in 1970 they did not decline at the same rate as Marine losses. So we can conclude that the combat effectiveness of the Division actually improved during 1970. (These comparisons are made in considerable detail in the G-3 section of reference (a).) On the other hand effectiveness (getting desired results) should be distinguished from efficiency (getting desired results with minimum expenditure of energy, time, money, or material). If this distinction is made, then I think we would have to conclude that 1st Marine Division operations (and for that matter all Marine operations in Viet Nam) while effective have not been particularly efficient. This is a rather disturbing hypothesis but I think it is one that deserves searching inquiry in the post-Viet Nam years. Viet Nam has been too expensive, too time consuming for the results obtained. How can we do better? How do we sift out the hyperbole from our combat reports and really get at the efficiency of our component parts? Did our sophisticated and complex weapons systems really pay their way? Or would greater emphasis on simpler systems (perhaps more light infantry) have been more efficient? These things need to be explored.

9. (S) Unity of Command. Of all the principles of war which were violated in the prosecution of the Viet Nam War, no violation was more damaging than the attempted substitution of cooperation for the time-proven principle of unity of

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command. Whatever political purposes might have been served by the continued insistence on the sovereignty of the Saigon government, the military effects were that the U. S. forces were literally guests on the battlefield. Two parallel military chains of command, linked only by coordination and good will (which sometimes wore thin), attempted to function on the same ground. These problems were particularly acute in the 1st Marine Division's area of operations, Quang Nam Province, where the fundamental division between U. S. and Vietnamese command was further compounded by the semi-autonomous presence of the 2d ROK Marine Brigade and the division of the Vietnamese forces into sometimes competing segments; that is, regular forces under I Corps, territorials under Quang Nam province, and the special status of Danang Special Zone, all exhibiting some degree of independence. To bring these component parts together into a cooperative whole, the 1st Marine Division inter alia sponsored the Quang Da Special Zone conferences (later called Quang Nam Commanders Conferences). Supposedly these were weekly conferences but they were often cancelled or postponed. They were useful but required constant re-energizing as Vietnamese commanders changed and interest lagged. The fabric of the conference system is fragile and it is not known whether it will survive the departure of the 1st Marine Division.

10. (C) Mines and Booby Traps. The most insidious, cheapest, and most efficient casualty-producing agent at the enemy's disposal in Quang Nam province was always the anti-personnel mine. This was so in 1965 when the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade came into country and it was true in 1971 as the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade leaves country. As the enemy retreated from conventional operations and reverted more and more to guerrilla tactics, the percentage of total casualties caused by so-called "booby traps" went up. In 1969 the 1st Marine Division had 2,124 casualties from these devices or 20.6 per cent of its total casualties. In 1970 the corresponding figures were 1,868 casualties or 46.4 per cent of the total. Obviously then, the 1st Marine Division's strenuous efforts - including troop indoctrination, land mine warfare school, contact teams, and mine and booby trap dogs - did not solve the problem. (The best we can conclude is that these efforts greatly reduced what might have been the casualty figures if they had not been vigorously pursued.) Since these devices are the classic weapon of the Asiatic guerrilla, how can we expect to do better in possible future campaigns? I would suggest that the root of the problem lies in what I have mentioned earlier concerning control of the battlefield and unity of command. If we had had absolute control of the mine-infested area south of Da Nang and if we could have instituted positive population control measures, the mine threat could have been reduced to negligible proportions. Of this I am positive.

11. (C) Combined Unit Pacification Program. The CUPP program was of course the 1st Marine Division complementary effort to the Combined Action Program. The program, which was begun in November 1969, demonstrated that regular Marine rifle squads, when paired off with Regional Force or Popular Force platoons, could perform in a manner comparable to the more highly selective and specially

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trained Combined Action Platoons. The performance of the CUPPs formed from Company G, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, which were deployed along the highway from Ba Ren Bridge to Baldy Combat Base and from Baldy to Ross Combat Base from October 1970 until April 1971 were particularly noteworthy. (In terms of pure efficiency, I think this was the most efficient rifle company we had during this period.) In some ways the rifle company structure gave the CUPPs advantages that the CAPs did not have. This then was a remarkably successful program, given the environment and constraints present in Quang Nam province. But both the CAP and CUPP programs were necessarily compromises developed to circumvent the problems caused by the lack of unity of command. The problem addressed was how do we improve the performance of the territorial troops, given the present awkward command arrangements? The answer was the CAP and CUPP programs. For future contingencies there may be better answers.

12. (S) Artillery Employment. The 11th Marines turned in a superb performance in 1970 and the first four months of 1971. During this period the total number of artillery tubes dropped from 156 in January 1970 to 122 in May, to 74 in October, to 28 in April 1971, to zero on 7 May. A total of 1,333,000 rounds was expended in 1970, with a high of 179,100 rounds in January and a low of 21,500 rounds in November. The number of rounds fired was less a function of the number of tubes available than of enemy sighted and targeting criteria. Until late summer 1970 the 11th Marines continued a rhythm of firing 4,000 to 5,000 rounds daily, much of it against "pre-emptive/intelligence" targets (an euphemism which had replaced "harassing and interdiction fires"). But the enemy had dropped back from conventional tactics to guerrilla tactics and analysis showed that this heavy volume of fire had little effect on his operations. These fires therefore were strictly curtailed and the larger shoots reserved for confirmed targets and systematic attacks by fire such as CATAWBA FALLS. With its well-established artillery cantonments and artillery "fans" covering most of the eastern third of Quang Nam province, the 11th Marines could have lapsed into fortress artillery. This tendency was offset by frequent deployments to temporary fire support bases to support such operations as PICKENS FOREST, CATAWBA FALLS, IMPERIAL LAKE, and SCOTT ORCHARD. The question which requires further exploration is how can artillery be employed most efficiently in a counter-guerrilla role? 1st Marine Division experience would indicate that number of rounds fired is an indication only of technical proficiency, not of effectiveness or efficiency.

13. (S) Tactical Air Support. My remarks here pertain only to the fixed wing support provided the 1st Marine Division in its low-intensity, essentially counter-guerrilla operations conducted by the 1st Marine Division from June 1970 until April 1971. In my mind, the fixed-wing aircraft most valuable to the 1st Marine Division was the OV-10A "Broncho." (This is not such a remarkable conclusion; the Broncho was performing in exactly the environment for which it had been designed.) Following the philosophy of "we have it, so let's use it," tremendous weights of ordnance were delivered by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing attack

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aircraft for the 1st Marine Division. (I don't have statistics on these weights at hand, but a total of 8,562 attack sorties was flown in 1970 in support of the Division.) During late summer 1970 the targeting of these sorties was given the same kind of close scrutiny as described above for the artillery and the same conclusions were reached. Random bombing of soft intelligence targets was not materially affecting the enemy's guerrilla operations. What fixed wing could do best was to go after the enemy's base areas and command and control apparatus. Targeting was concentrated on these objectives. Particularly good results were obtained in CATAWBA FALLS, the preparatory phase of IMPERIAL LAKE, the air/artillery attack in the vicinity of Thuong Duc in October which caused the 38th NVA Regiment to abort its attack, and the continued neutralization of Base Area 112.

14. (S) Helicopter Support. I cannot help but wonder if we have not over-worked the helicopter in the Viet Nam War. I think we have used it too often when a truck or jeep or a pair of feet would have sufficed. (If we are honest with ourselves we must admit that our lightly-armed, elusive enemy in his Ho Chi Minh sandals has, in some ways, greater tactical mobility than do we with all our helicopters.) In this past year in the 1st Marine Division the tactical march, either on foot or by vehicle, has been virtually non-existent. Movement by helicopter has been considered safer, quicker, and easier. There have been sufficient helicopter resources to support this policy. But here again I raise the questions of effectiveness and efficiency. There can be no doubt of the effectiveness of our use of helicopters. The efficiency of their use, however, can be challenged. And I don't think we can allow the other means of tactical mobility to atrophy.

15. (C) Materiel Readiness. The level of logistic support given the 1st Marine Division has been superb. The Division has never seriously wanted for anything. On 14 April 1971, at the time of its departure from Viet Nam, the operationally ready status of all combat essential equipment in the Division stood at 96 per cent. The question in my mind is not whether we had enough, but if perhaps we did not have too much. The Marine Division as presently constituted is a very heavy division. I would guess that it is the heaviest infantry division in the world. For twenty years after World War II our doctrine taught that we would hold our logistic support commands outside the objective area, but in Viet Nam we found it necessary to create a base depot equivalent in the form of the Force Logistic Command. This was possible in the relatively benign, semi-garrison environment of Viet Nam. I am not sure that it was economic and I am not sure that it would be either desirable or feasible in a future expedition.

16. (U) Preventive Medicine. I am certain that the Marines in Viet Nam have enjoyed better health than did the members of any previous expedition in our history. There are many reasons for this which don't need to be belabored here,

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but I do want to give a nod of appreciation in the direction of the preventive medicine functions of the 1st Medical Battalion. There are many threats to health endemic to Viet Nam; malaria, dengue, hepatitis, rabies, and the ubiquitous venereal diseases to name a few. A few statistics will serve to illustrate how well the preventive medicine efforts have served to keep these things under control. In 1969, the malaria rate per thousand Marines per month averaged out to 9.1 cases. In 1970, the average rate was 9.2 cases. That means, roughly, that at any one time fewer than one Marine out of a hundred was suffering from malaria. The figures for venereal disease are almost precisely the same, an average monthly rate per thousand of 9.0 cases in 1969, 10.1 cases in 1970. For any future expedition we must continue to recognize the importance of preventive and environmental medicine.

17. (C) Civic Action. It may be heresy to even suggest such a thing, but I have some serious doubts as to just how effective our civic action programs have been in Viet Nam. I wonder how many "hearts and minds" we have really won over to the side of the Government. I am sure that my current, somewhat pessimistic, view is colored by the rising tide of anti-American feeling that is expressing itself in Da Nang and Quang Nam province. There are a few good solid things we leave behind such as the Hoa Khanh Children's Hospital but I am afraid that most of our civic action projects were more evanescent. Some of the villagers have made it evident that they are sorry to see our CAP and CUPP teams leave their hamlets, but most seem apathetic. There have been numerous acts of arrogance and even active belligerence on the part of the ARVN as well as the RF and PF. Da Nang is becoming increasingly unsafe for Americans. Time will provide perspective and may prove me wrong, but for now, at this point, I must regard civic action as a poor substitute for more positive forms of civil affairs/military government.

18. (U) Staff Organization and Functioning, 1st Marine Division. To my knowledge, neither the 3d nor the 1st Marine Division headquarters ever really operated "in the field" in Viet Nam. Certainly the Headquarters, 1st Marine Division, was entrenched in a garrison type base camp outside of Da Nang from October 1966 until its departure in April 1971. During that time, many functions unforeseen by the Staff Manual or the Tables of Organization accreted to the Division staff. There were air-conditioned working spaces, good billeting, first-class messing, adequate recreational facilities, good clubs, and excellent administrative support facilities (such as reproduction facilities, photography laboratory, etc.) all in turn supported by commercial type utilities and a significantly large local national work force. Probably a whole generation of Marines thinks that is the way a Division command post in a combat zone should look and operate. (I have heard far more senior officers say that our experience in Viet Nam "proves" that MMS will work in the field, or that we have demonstrated that the present cumbersome system of military justice will "work" in a combat

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environment.) The headquarters of the 1st Marine Division took the shape and form that was needed in the Viet Nam environment. Now I think we must take a hard look at what is needed in a Division headquarters in a pure military environment; the headquarters of the future must be primarily a tactical headquarters, and we must find ways of keeping the extraneous administrative functions somewhere in the rear out of the objective area.

19. (C) Staff Organization and Functioning, 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade. The headquarters of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade was singularly fortunate in the personnel who were assigned to it. The functions performed by the headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and 1st Marine Division were all telescoped together, reduced in scale, and in most cases continued to be performed by the same persons who had had the job all along. The primary mission of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade has been to retrograde the remaining Marines and materiel from Viet Nam by 30 June 1971. This retrograde has gone remarkably smoothly, a success in no small part attributable to the high level of talent to be found on the Brigade staff. The operational life of the Brigade was short - from 14 April until 7 May. In a way that was unfortunate because there was no chance to test in a combat environment what might have been a truly integrated air-ground brigade. Some of the things that have happened in the Viet Nam War give a clue as to just how effective such a combat organization might be. Our original entries into Da Nang and Chu Lai were made by the 9th and 3d Marine Amphibious Brigades. The WESTPAC strategic reserve for much of the war was the 9th MAB. Our Task Forces, such as Delta, X-Ray, Yankee, and Hotel, were rudimentary brigades. Our collocation of the DASC from the Wing with the FSCC in the 1st Marine Division was a significant step toward an integrated air-ground combat operations center. The positioning of a quick reaction helicopter package at Balay to support the 5th Marines was a kind of de facto direct support air-ground task organization. The possibilities of the Marine Amphibious Brigade as a basic air-ground tactical organization deserve further examination and testing.

20. (U) Redeployment. Increment VI and Increment VII redeployments were characterized by (1) turnover of real estate to U. S. or Vietnamese forces or agencies, (2) reduction of unwanted minor bases and outlying positions, and (3) preparation of materiel for transfer or retrograde. Increment VII personnel redeployment differed from Increment VI in that a degree of unit integrity was maintained in the outgoing drafts. Marines leaving the country were subjected to increasingly rigid inspections to insure that they looked and acted like Marines (boots, haircuts, uniforms, etc.) and that all necessary administrative processing had been adequately completed (SRB's, pay records, shot cards, ID cards, dog tags, malaria pills, etc.). In the aggregate, personnel redeployment proceeded smoothly. At the individual level, however, there was much uncertainty and turbulence. Many Marines, both officer and enlisted, on leaving the

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country either didn't know or had just learned their ultimate destination. Curiously, this was largely accepted as inevitable and with little visible evidence of resentment. In the three redeployment increments which have occurred in the past 12 months, much thought was given to tour equity; that is, to establish eligibility to return to the United States largely on the basis of the number of months spent in Viet Nam or the Western Pacific. This has been done at the expense of unit integrity. As stated above, more emphasis was given to unit integrity in Increment VII than was previously the case. Certainly from the viewpoint of regaining combat readiness of redeployed units, this is desirable.

21. (U) Command Information Notebook. Reference (a), forwarded under separate cover, is the last edition of the 1st Marine Division/3d Marine Amphibious Brigade Command Information Notebook. Most of the statistics used in this debrief have been derived from this notebook. The Command Information Notebook was begun in August 1970 and attained essentially its present form in October. It has proven a very useful command and management tool. It is a manual information system and therefore, unlike most automated information systems, it not only permits but invites subjective manipulation of its data. Essentially, the notebook uses a dual approach: (1) a statistical display of data, and (2) an analysis of that data.

22. (U) Conclusion. I believe that the purpose of the FMFPac debriefings in the past has been to explore how we might do better in the fighting of the Viet Nam War. Viet Nam is now past for the Marine Corps. What we must do now is analyze the Viet Nam experience and see what lessons can be derived from it. I remember the exciting and productive years at Quantico from 1946 until 1950 when World War II was dissected in just this way. I had this in mind as I wrote this debrief. I have written hurriedly, candidly, and without restraint. Along the way I have suggested some hypotheses which might bear further investigation. The central theme of my comments, as I think is obvious, is that Marine participation in the Viet Nam War was effective but costly. In the future, when we can expect much greater constraints in terms of men, money, and material, we must not only be effective, we must be more efficient.

E. H. SIMMONS

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General Simmons, Orientation

Tape One, Side One.

Simmons:

First Lieutenant, Pronge, OCO2, third MYD, to
Third Marines, right?

Lieutenant Carpenter, Second Marine Division;
do you have your assignment yet?

Answer: Yes, sir, (B Corps?).

Lieutenant Patterson, O302, Third MYD, for
First Marines.

Lieutenant Langton, also O302, third MYD, for
First Marines.

Lieutenant Kelley, O302, Third Marine Division,
First Marines.

Lieutenant Kimber, O802, Third Marine Division;
going to First Battalion, Fifth Marines.

Lieutenant Dubler, o3o2, Third Marine Division,
Fifth Marines

Lieutenant McGare; ~~EX~~ O302, Third Marine Division-
Fifth Marines.

Second Lieutenant Gildyn, 2501 First Marines.

Warren Officer Schultzer; 11th Marines.

Simmons: What is a 59-10 and a 59-05?

Schultzer: 59-10 is radar officer and 59-05 is
communicating officer.

Simmons: This, your first tour?

Schultzer: I was here in '66 and '67.

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Simmons, Orientation

Schultzer: I was here in '66 and '67.

Simmons: Good to have you back. Anybody else out here on second tour? You are? When were you here, before?

Answer: I was ^{3/9}~~third time~~, Ninth Marines, sir.

Simmons: When were you with them?

Answer: '66 and '67. Major John Peters was battalion commander at that ~~KXOM~~ time.

Simmons: Major Irons was the regimental ~~communicati~~
communications officer.

Now, I take it that your briefings have been completed with G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and G-5. We all know where the Division is, what it's doing administratively, ^{ely}~~ely~~, tactically and logistically. Do you have any questions in those areas that you'd like to ask, before we go on? Alright.

I'm going to spend the next hour with you, talking about something that we'll put under the general heading of Leadership. That's not a very good title for the talk, but it will have to do.

Really, what I'll be talking about is problem areas, and though problem areas are not in the tactical or logistical field, they're in the people field, as you'll see to a large extent.

Before getting down to the specific problem ~~KXOM~~

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areas that I want to discuss with you, I would like to establish a little back-drop of my idea of where we ~~now~~ now stand in effect to today's Marine and the role that you'll be expected to play in the First Marine Division. I usually start off by giving my impressions of today's Marine. Now, in many ways, you know the lower rank Marines better than I do because you're working with them more closely and you're closer to them in age, and you have much ~~more~~ more daily contact than I do with a significant number of privates ~~first class~~, ^{some} ~~ninth~~ corporals, and so on. On the other hand, I have the advantage of a certain degree of perspective resulting from 29 years of Marine service, in which I've seen a great many thousands of Marines in combat and out of combat.

So, from my viewpoint--maybe limited--I'd like to say that today's Marine measured against ^{the} World War II Marine, for example, tends to be bigger, stronger, better educated; and this might surprise you, he's more responsive to command and he's better disciplined than was the World War II Marine. I'm speaking about most of today's Marines. On the other hand, perhaps the World War II Marine was a little more aggressive, a little more apt to solve his problems with his own resources, and perhaps a little more self-reliant.

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I say perhaps because not everybody agrees with me in that assessment.

You also note that I said, Most of today's Marines, because it is also true that we have a certain percentage of marginal or submarginal Marines, who seem to cause us most of our problems--most of our trouble. When I get into these specific problem areas a little later, I think this will demonstrate itself. I wouldn't be able to put a precise figure on it, but I would guess that from five to ten percent of the Division cause us ninety to ninety five percent of our problems, and I think this has been recognized throughout the Marine Corps. It's certainly the stimulus behind the very liberal administrative discharge program that we are apparently pursuing. Incidentally, some 900 Marines were administratively discharged from this Division during the course of 1970, and that tends to substantiate my estimate that I'm talking about, something like five to ten percent of our strength being in the marginal or submarginal cast.

So much for that.

Now, let's look at you for a moment; and this is intended for those of you who are out here for the first time, but the refresher probably won't hurt the three who've been out here before. First, I'd like to stress the need for confidence--confidence in yourself, confidence in your own individual capabilities and

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First I'd like to stress the need for confidence-- confidence in yourself, confidence in your own ~~XX~~ individual capabilities and the preparation that you bring to the job at hand, and I don't think that this confidence will be misplaced. Our junior officers have done splendidly in this ~~war~~, almost without exception.

Now there have been some exceptions. Some few officers have not measured up. I made a rough count of these the other day--nothing precise about it, just the cases that I could recall in the last seven months that I've been back. I came out with a count of nine officers--nine junior officers who had failed in seven months. Three of them were ~~Naval~~ officers, and six were Marine officers. I think probably, in every case, a mistake had been made; a mistake had been made by an individual, who never should have sought a Marine or ~~Naval~~ commission. Conversely, the Navy or the Marine Corps should not have made the mistake of commissioning them. It was a fatal flaw, to begin with there. Without getting into specifics, a man who had come into the Navy medical service under the misunderstanding or misapprehension that the Navy had no role to play in Vietnam--therefore, he would not be sent to Vietnam--this was a kind of mental reservation that, I think, our commissioning oath was meant to prevent.

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Anyway, statistically, the odds are all in your favor. We're talking about a microscopic percentage of junior officers who don't cut it out here.

Then, I'd also like to say that there's no "magic" in combat. We're in a low intensity combat situation, as I'm sure you know and was explained to you by the G-3. In some ways, low intensity combat situation can be more dangerous than a high intensity situation, because people tend to relax a little too much. On the other hand, don't expect anything miraculous to happen to you. It isn't going to happen. Great changes in combat that come about through bad movies and bad novels don't happen in real life. The chief effect of your exposure to combat will be to reinforce your own thoughts about yourself; it will be a reassuring proposition.

Next, I would like to warn you about the cardinal military sin, which is simply carelessness. Carelessness kills more Marines than any other ~~kind~~ single fault. In your individual case, carelessness is your failure to do everything that you know you should do. Carelessness can take the form of being too

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embarrassed to ask a question because it might reveal that you don't know everything there is to know about Vietnam. Carelessness might take the form of being too tired at night to make that last final check, or carelessness might take the form ^{of} presuming that somebody else is taking care of the situation. As we get into some of the specifics later on, we'll see that in practically every case that I'll present to you, there was an element of carelessness that didn't need to happen.

A moment ago, I mentioned questions. One of the best antidotes ~~that~~ that I know for the prevention of carelessness is to keep a continuing estimate of the situation going in one's head. Don't limit the estimate of the situation just to the tactical situation. I'm speaking about the total picture--administrative and otherwise. In other words, anticipate what might happen, and if you do this, you'll be well prepared to take care of it, if and when it does happen. This is a technique that works.

The way to keep that estimate of the situation turning in your head is to ask questions of yourself and others. Now, you ask questions, however, to get information or to stimulate other people into thinking or into acting.

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Don't ask questions to shift responsibility.

Don't ask questions to shift the burden of responsibility from your shoulders to your platoon sergeant's shoulders, or push it up to your company commander's or battery commander's shoulders. Understand what I mean? In other words, you don't say, "what do I do about it? Or can you take care of it?" You keep the responsibility that's given to you; you make the decisions within your area of command.

Alright, so much for background. Incidentally, that question asking extends to this period here. Any time you hear something that doesn't sound quite right to you or you don't understand, you ask ~~me~~ question.

Here's my list of problem areas. These aren't the only things that cause us problems in the Division. This particular list does represent the kinds of things that General ~~Whitely~~^{Widdicks} spends a great deal of each day thinking about; I spend a good deal of each day thinking about. Certainly it absorbs a great deal of the ~~Division's~~ Divisions's time and energy. I'll read you the list and then we'll go back and discuss each one of them in a little more detail, and we'll try to

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outline for you what your particular role is--what you're expected to do about each of these problem areas.

Racial tension; drug abuse; venereal disease; malaria; crimes of violence; misapplication of ^R fiendly fire power--(what we call ^R fiendly on ^R fiendly): ^A accidental discharges; and motor vehicle accidents. Were there any surprises on that list? I didn't think so.

These are the same kinds of problems that we have back in Camp Pendleton and Okinawa, ^W accentuated and ^A aggravated ~~MAX~~ because we're in a combat environment. Were there any problem areas that were on the list that I didn't mention?

Well, we have a meeting of the minds here. Thirteen people in perfect agreement as to what the list of problem areas might be. We're going to get along splendidly, I can see.

Let's talk about racial tension. It exists; it's here. Now, if I were to ask Lieutenant Gildon if we had a racial problem in the Ninth Marines in 1966, he probably would say no, because we didn't. There was no racial problem then, was there, Lieutenant? Answer: No, sir.

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Simmons: 1965, 1966, there was no racial problem.

But there is one today in the First Marine Division. ~~We're~~
 We're not unique in that; it's true for the Marine
 Corps, as a whole. It's a ~~product~~ product of our
 society at home and it's been aggravated by conditions
 out here.

I wouldn't want to overdraw this. I wouldn't
 want you to think that it's worse than it is. So
 let me give you some statistics, to put it into per-
 spective. We had 37 racial ~~instances~~ ^{incidents} during the
 course of calendar year 1970.

What makes a racial incident? Well, just because
 a black Marine gets into trouble doesn't make it a
 racial incident, ~~just because~~ any more than just
 because a white Marine gets into trouble which doesn't
 make it a racial incident. If racial antagonisms are
 at the base of the incident, then you have a racial
 incident. There's an element of judgment, here.
 We don't always call them right, but by applying this
 criterion as best we can, we think we had 37 incidents
 during calendar year 1970, ranging anywhere from
 organized petitions, assault, group confrontations,
 and so-called "fragging". Again, I'd hasten to say,
 not as many fraggings as rumor would have it.

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I'm going to talk about fraggings a little while later. They're a separate kind of a specialized problem. Only three of the fraggings we had in 1970 were definitely racially related. If I had a graph here and checked off these incidents by month, it would plot out about as follows--eight in January; five in February; five in March; two in April; three in May; six in June; two in July; none in August; one in September; one in October; three in November; one in December. That's promising. That looks pretty encouraging. It would indicate that we are doing some things right to relieve racial tensions in the First Marine Division.

What are some of the things we've done? Early last year, we distributed a platoon leader's pamphlet, called The Racial Situation. Ordinarily, you would get a copy of that, as part of this orientation, but we're a out of print and we're revising it--making a new publication out of it, trying to distil out our experience of the past year. Eventually, in a week or so, you will get a copy because it will be distributed to all officers in the Division, under cover of a Division order.

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We also had since last spring, leadership councils, (which probably wasn't a very good name for them). The leadership councils were created on ~~the~~ ^{XXIV} Corps order to deal specifically with racial tensions and conflict, so leadership was just an euphemism ^{enigm} for race relations; and we had these councils at the company level, battalion level, regimental level, division level. Once a month I meet at Corps with commanders or representatives of all defensible organizations--Navy, Air Force, Army and Marines-- in ~~I~~ ^{XXV} Corps.

Now, I think these leadership councils have served their real purpose. ~~TX~~ They've provided a form for the ventilation of real or ~~imagined~~ imagined grievances and problems, and here in the Division we've seen their scopes have widened out so they're no longer oriented just on ~~XXXX~~ race relations. They cover the ~~GAUNT~~ ^{GAUNT} of all sorts of complaints and problems; starting from the problem of sour laundry being returned from the concessioner to Headquarters Company, working their way ^f up from there.

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There's considerable debate right now as to whether these councils are not a circumvention of the chain of command, whether they might not become counter-productive. Well, they they will be counter-productive, if we allow them to become a circumvention of the chain of command--if we allow these councils to assume an authority of their own. They're not a decision-making body; they're simply a forum. Therefore, probably the word "council" isn't very good wither because that implies some sort of a corporate entity that has a degree of authority.

They're also indulged on a number of other experiments--human relations seminars, workshops, and black studies programs--all of which, I think, help communications and help break down artificial barriers.

Now, what's your responsibility with respect to this? Well, simply this. Be alert to potential racial conflict, so that they can be diffused before they can occur and we have another incident to mark off on the graph. You can spell it--"defuze" or "diffuse". The idea is to alleviate the cause for conflict before the cause evokes an incident, and sometimes the underlying causes are mighty ridiculous.

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As you all I'm sure know, the aggravation doesn't always come from the black side. It's very often ^{conquered} by the white side.

Let's move on to drug abuse. It would be impossible for me to ^{quantify} the marijuana and hard drug problem of the First Marine Division; I don't know how big it is. Again, if we were to talk about 1965 or 1966 and you were to ask me, "Did we have a drug problem in the Third Marine Division at that time?" I would say, "No." We knew vaguely that marijuana was easy to get and there probably were some Marines experimenting with it, but that was about the extent of it.

Now, five years have passed and a lot of things have happened in the United States. I have a harder time remembering, probably, than you do, but we have to remember that the Marine, who is arriving in Vietnam today in 1971, was probably only thirteen, fourteen, or sixteen years old when this thing first began back in 1965. So he grew up in a different high school environment than his predecessor did, five or six years ago, and he brought many of the attitudes of that environment into the Marine Corps with him-- including a much more permissive attitude toward drug use.

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As I say, I don't know how big the problem we have. I can't tell you how many Marines smoke marijuana; I can't tell you how many are using various other things like speed derivatives. We have a local variety called basatal out here, which is supposed to be a reducing medicine. I've never seen it. It's here; one dollar can buy a bottle and it's a form of speed.

Of course, heroin has made its appearance up here ~~in~~ now. I'll knock on wood; we haven't had any significant number of Marines involved in it. At least, none has been revealed yet, but it is available.

You can go down to the recreation area and you can find a ^{Mama-San} ~~manisome~~ who will sell you a cap of pure heroin, from three to five ~~dollars~~ dollars. The same cap would cost you fifty dollars in Washington, D.C. So we're living in a drug-drenched environment.

I can give you some statistics on the amount of attention we're giving the problem--statistics on the disciplinary and administrative actions that have been drug related. In 1970, we had 52 ~~AM~~ drug related nonjudicial punishments; 426 investigations; 142 court ^{Marshall} ~~marshals~~; and 211 drug related administrative discharges.

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About one out of four of those administrative discharges I mentioned earlier was drug related, for a total of 831 drug related disciplinary and administrative action. That represents a good many thousands of man hours of effort. If drugs had no other effect than this on the vitality of the Division, they would still be a ~~de~~habilitating agent.

In a more positive vein, we do have an educational program that takes the form chiefly of a comprehensive drug lecture series that we have; also, counseling, for anybody who wants it. We try to point out the moral, legal, and physical dangers of drug use, and with regard to the lecture alone, some 18,000 Division Marines heard this lecture during the course of the year. In other words, just ~~XX~~ about every Marine hears this lecture at least once during his tour in Vietnam. How much good does it do? I'm not sure.

I would guess you're familiar with the Commandant's policy on drug abuse. I'm sure you've been exposed to it, but there's always a chance that there's someone who's not familiar with it. A couple of those nine junior officers I mentioned earlier who had failed-- apparently didn't understand the Commandant's position on drugs.

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So that we won't have that problem here, I'm going to read the policy statement to you and then if you have any questions about it, you can question me on it. This was published in message form, on the tenth of October, and it reads as follows.

"Drug Abuse: the following is provided for information and guidance. Extraordinary degree of coordinated professional skills and team work required to maintain Marine Corps air-ground team readiness for amphibious operations and the resulting degree of responsibility borne by each individual Marine does not allow for anything but the highest performance. This is why the Marine Corps can not tolerate drug use within its ranks. ~~THAT~~ Those who experiment with drugs can expect to be punished. Those who become addicted will be separated. It is clear that both types of user introduce unnecessary operational risk, as well as an unwholesome environment.

On the specific matter of rehabilitation, the Marine Corps is neither funded nor equipped to carry the burden of noneffective members for the inordinate length

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of time that civilian institutions are finding necessary to achieve rehabilitation of addicts.

Even when the reversion rate is discouragingly high, in any case our medical resources are sufficiently taxed by duty-connected physical problems without intentionally taking on clinical or rehabilitative responsibilities for which we are neither funded, structured, nor qualified. Further, as Marine Corps strength reduces to a post-Vietnam commitment level, the ~~XXXXX~~ premium on professionalism goes even higher. We will only enlist or retain those will consciously (correction--conscientiously) meet and maintain high standards. Drug users do not simply fit into that category."

I'll repeat three key phrases in this policy statement. The Marine Corps can not tolerate drug use within its ranks. Those who experiment with drugs can expect to be punished. Those who become addicted will be separated. Are there any questions on that policy statement?

I'll state categorically the Marine Corps does not have an amnesty program, and the Marine Corps does not contemplate having an amnesty program. Any questions on that?

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Now, what's your responsibility in this area?

Well, simply this. Do not condone drug use in your unit. Don't look the other way. If you do, you may well have cause to regret it, and I'm not speaking now of disciplinary action imposed on you. I'm talking about regret in terms of tragedy that might occur within your unit. I can demonstrate some of that with some of my specific examples a little bit later.

Again, our statistics are far from firm in this area. As I said in the beginning, I can't tell you how many people in this Division are using pot; how many are taking speed; how many are shooting heroin. I don't know, but I do know this. There's a remarkable high correlation between Marines who get in trouble and Marines who use drugs. These marginal Marines, I've talked about. Almost invariably, when we investigate a crime of violence or one of the other things I'm going to talk about, we'll find that the man is a user. That's remarkable.

So that you won't misunderstand me on that, I'll draw another analogy. It's not precise, but I think I'll make the point here. Everybody who drinks is not necessarily a drunken driver, but all drunken drivers drink. Understand the point I'm making there?

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Any questions on drug abuse?

Let me talk now about venereal disease. Now, that makes me sound old-fashioned because this is the age of easy sex, Playboy Magazine, and "the more you get, the better it is" ~~is~~. Out here in Vietnam, prostitutes are cheap and plentiful, and there's also, R. and R. There's a myth that if you go to Sydney, it's perfectly safe because they're all white in Sydney; but I see the VD ~~and~~ incidence reports and I know that the rate in Sydney is higher than in Hong Kong or Singapore.

The rate of infection in this Division hovers around ten cases per thousand Marines per month. Now, ~~that~~ that doesn't sound so bad, does it? That means one Marine out of one hundred getting it every month and that ~~that's~~ that's what we're talking about primarily. In one sense, it's not bad--it's not a bad rate. Those of you *from the* ~~In~~ Third Marine Division would probably be delighted if you had a rate like that in Okinawa. But all things are relevant, you see. When you add this together, you'll find that we had 2,860 reported cases of ~~venereal~~ venereal disease in the Division in 1969 and 2,532 cases in 1970. So we do have a sizeable body of VD cases in the ~~XXXX~~ course of the year in the Division.

Now, what's your responsibility with respect to VD? First off, keep track of your men.

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If you know where ~~you're~~ your men are and you keep them busy, then they won't be out laid up in the bush, and if they're not laid up in the bush, they're not going to be exposed to venereal infection.

Now, if you like, you can also reassure your men that the prostitutes in this country are one hundred per cent infected. Now, at this point--when I make that statement--there's usually some skeptic who says, "Surely, General, there must be a prostitute somewhere in this country who's not infected." There may be, but I haven't found her yet. You can also reassure your men that we have succeeded in greeting several strains of ~~gonorrhea~~ *gonococcus* out here that are resistant to penicillin; so, if a Marine gets a dose, it's not a matter of getting a shot of penicillin and forgetting about it. Sometimes there is long lasting, ~~XXXXXX~~ residual infection.

Any question on VD? You're a remarkably uncommunicative group. Of course, we had that meeting of the minds in the very beginning, so I see you're tuned in entirely on my frequency.

Let's talk now about malaria. Malaria is not a social disease, like VD, but some of the aspects are the same. Malaria is largely preventable, if the right

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things are done about it. If you take the ^{C&P} ~~EMP~~ pill weekly; and if you observe the proper practice of good, personal hygiene and camp hygiene, your chances of getting malaria are reduced way, way down.

Now, there are two kinds of malaria here.

One is ~~Vivax~~ ^{Vivax} which is in the lowlands, the populated areas that we're presently occupying here and the ~~CNP~~ ^{C&P} pill is one hundred per cent effective against ~~Vivax~~ ^{Vivax} or again, if the skeptic wants to raise the question, it's 99 point 9 per cent effective against ~~Vivax~~ ^{Vivax}. If you take your pill every week, you will not get ~~Vivax~~ ^{Vivax} malaria.

Unfortunately, there's another kind here, called ~~Falciparum~~ ^{Falciparum} ~~balsiperum~~ which is found chiefly in the mountainous areas, the heavily wooded areas. Those of you who go to the Fifth Marines will find that there's quite a bit of ~~Falciparum~~ ^{Falciparum} malaria in the ~~Quaison~~ ^{Que Sanh} Mountains and the ~~Quaison~~ ^{Que Sanh} Valley. Unhappily, the pill isn't much good against ~~Falciparum~~ ^{Falciparum}, so this makes these other things, more important--the ~~XXXXXXXX~~ maintenance of good personal hygiene and good camp hygiene. This means such things as using mosquito ² repellent; staying covered up during the hours the mosquitoes are flying; spraying

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fruit with bug spray to kill the adult mosquito;
sleeping with a mosquito net, if circumstances permit
it; ensuring that the area is as ~~well~~ well drained as it
possibly can be; listening to the preventive medicine
team when they come around to make suggestions for
keeping the incidence of malaria low.

Curiously, we have had about the same number of the
cases of malaria as we have of VD in the Division. Not
necessarily the same number of individuals, however.
2,900 cases in 1969, 2,387 cases in 1970.

Now, you remember with VD I said that the case
rate ran ten cases per thousand ~~Marines~~ Marines
per month--virtually, a straight line throughout
1970. Well, the curve moves up and down for malaria.
Generally speaking--and I don't think ~~this~~ this will
be a surprise to you--in a dry month, you have less
malaria than you have in a wet month. Now, you'll
jump to the conclusion that this is because in a wet
months you have ~~more~~ more places for mosquitoes to
breed. That's partially true, but this is always a
wet place. Even a dry month, it's wet out here, and
there's always paddies and ditches and so forth.
So there are always mosquito breeding places.

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I think more important than this, that during a wet month--such as the Monsoon Season which we're just emerging from now--the Marine gets wet and chilled, and his resistance goes down; and he's more susceptible to infection of any type, (respiratory, intestinal, or malaria). Also, we have found that if we do the right things, we can push this rate way down, even in the wet, cool months. For example, our summer low was 7 cases per thousand in July; July was a dry month. The rate jumped up to 21 point 5 cases per thousand in September--the beginning of the Monsoon.

Then, we did a lot of things about it. Including command attention, including doing just what I'm doing here--talking to every junior officer who joined the Division. And we pushed that rate down, so that in November which was still a Monsoon month--a cold, wet month--we had ^{6.4} ~~6 point 4~~ cases per thousand, less than the July rate. In December, we did even better. We had ^{5.1} ~~5 point 1~~ cases in December. So you see, if you do the right things, you push that malaria rate way down.

Now, have any of you had malaria? Well, I usually manage to find one old timer who's had it. I've ~~ne~~ never found anybody who's had malaria who said that they enjoyed it, and I'm saying that because there's a rumor that goes through units from time to time that really having malaria is not so bad. You go down to First Med. Battalion; you lie around, watch television,

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~~I'm saying that because there's a rumor that goes through units from time to time that really having malaria is not so bad. You go down to First Med. Battalion; you lie around, watch television, play cards, eat good chow. Sort of like a free R and R. Well, if you ever hear that rumor being circulated, you can scotch that. The average time lost for malaria is 21 days; some people would run 35. But they are not a happy 21 days. Malaria makes you feel most unpleasant.~~

I've never had malaria myself; I've had dengue fever and some other tropical fevers, but because I'm from South Jersey and therefore, the mosquitoes don't have a chance to get to me, I've never had malaria. But I've talked to a lot of malaria patients and I've observed a lot of them, here and elsewhere, and I've never found anybody enjoying their bout with malaria.

Alright, I ~~XXXX~~ think your responsibilities in this area are self-evident. Do you have any questions?

Also, the ^{C4P}~~GNP~~ pill is not only a ~~prophylactic~~ ^{prophylactic} it's a curative, and it's important that people who leave this area continue to take the ^{C4P}~~GNP~~ pill for eight weeks, to get rid of it.

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If it recurs after that time, then it requires hospitalization and examination. Unfortunately, malaria can leave bad residual effects; can damage the liver, can damage the kidney, and in some cases, it can damage the brain. So anybody leaving Vietnam, who continues to show malaria symptoms, most certainly needs post-medical attention.

There are also other kinds of fevers out here--vague kinds of fevers, which are called fevers of unknown ~~XXXX~~ origin, (FUOs). You'll get them. Every once in a while you'll feel feverish; maybe, you'll have stomach cramps, bad headache, ache down your back and so on. This won't necessarily be malaria. Don't take a chance on it. I would guess that some of the lads in Okinawa would be having those kinds of fevers. Lots of this around.

Of course, a person in this situation in Okinawa--the time he's going ~~XXXX~~ through the chills and the fever--they should take a blood sample at that particular time to see whether the pasmodium is active. That will tell them whether it's malaria or something else. Any other questions?

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Let's move on to crimes of violence. Unhappily, in this Division, we have rape, murder, assault, armed robbery, and most ~~d~~ispicable of all, the so-called fraggings or bombings. We have these kinds of violence directed against other Marines, against other U.S. service men, and against the Vietnamese. Every time, one of these things happen, I just a little bit less proud of being a Marine, just a little bit less proud of being in the First Marine Division. I would hasten to say, though, that we didn't invent these things. I suppose, ever since war became an international pastime, there's been murder, rape, and assault, because war brings out the worst in some human beings.

Even the fragging is not new, although it has become more popular and more publicized in this War. We had fraggings in World War II, and we had fraggings in Korea. So we're not dealing with something that's unique to Vietnam, but that doesn't mean that I like these things any better and that I can find any excuse for them. Let's talk specifically about fraggings. We had some 42 fraggings last year in this Division. One Marine was killed and 43 Marines were wounded.

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In almost every case, the device used was a fragmentation grenade, sometimes a CS Grenade. We call a CS Grenade, a fragging, too. Sometimes it's in composition C, or C4 is used. ⁹Most times it's a Frag Grenade. The target is usually a figure of authority--the gunny sergeant--(gunnery sergeant)--is the traditional target and so is the company commander.

Let me tell you about the one incident that did cause a fatality. It began about midnight on the twenty second of October on Hill 190; you can see where 190 is, here--~~the~~ position occupied by Lema Company, Third Battalion, First Marines. A good, young sergeant--young man, year of college, white, small child--was checking the perimeter. He found two Marines asleep; he suspected that they had been smoking marijuana. He woke them and told them they were on report. He went back to his bunkard--^{ER}he was living in an old, concrete French bunkard^{ER}--sharing it with two other sergeants; and he told the other two sergeants what he had done and the three of them went to sleep.

About an hour and a half later, someone pushed a grenade through the ^{APC}~~aperture~~^{ER} of the bunkard. It exploded, killed the sergeant, and wounded the other two sergeants slightly.

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Well, we had no trouble finding out who did it. We had a technique there which we called Operation Freeze, which means that if you had a crime of violence of this kind, everything in that unit stops. Everyone is regarded as a material witness, until the investigation has been completed. This means nobody goes on R and R; no one rotates back to the States; no one even goes to the post exchange, until investigators are satisfied that they've wrung out every bit of information that's available.

In this case, it wasn't hard. In an hour and a half, they had identified the offender, and he's being tried by a general court ~~marshall~~^{MARTIAL} for murder, premeditated murder. If he's found guilty, he will, of course, be appropriately ~~RM~~ punished.

But I don't think it's much consolation to his widow, to know that we've caught her husband's murderer. I think she would much rather ~~may~~ have her husband back, alive. She's still a widow and the child is still an orphan.

So we would much rather prevent these fraggings, before they occur, than catch the offender after they occur. In a surprising number of cases after it happens, then we learned things like, "Oh yeah, we were worried about Bill. He'd been acting funny." Or so-and-so said he was going to frag the gunny. Or the corporal or sergeant says, "Well, I put the man

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General Simmons, orientation

In a surprising number of cases after it happens, then we learn things like--"oh, yeah, we were worried about Bill; he'd been acting funny. Or so-and-so said he was going to frag the gunny. Or the corporal or sergeant says, well I put the man on report to the platoon leader but he didn't do anything about it." Or the^c they say, "We were watching him."

Well, you can't watch a person like this.

Let me tell you about another incident which, I think, will illustrate this point very well. This one happened on the sixth of December. This man of Spanish-American origin ~~MAN~~ had been a good Marine out here for six months. He was in Alpha Company, First Battalion, First Marines. He went home on emergency leave; his mother died.

Apparently, he was very close to his mother. He came back and he was a different person. He was highly emotional, nervous, jittery, complained of bad dreams. His nervousness communicated itself to the other Marines in the company. The company commander did a wise thing. He said, this man is not in a mental state to be with the rifle company. So his company commander arranged to have him transferred back to ~~HMS~~ ^{HMS} Company with the battalion. The man had also talked to the chaplain.^A

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General Simmons, orientation

But nobody referred him to a psychiatrist. No one saw to it that he got medical help.

When he arrived back in the ~~HMS~~ Company, he was assigned routinely to the security platoon. The security platoon was commanded by an experienced rifle platoon commander, who was finishing out his tour as a security commander. The platoon commander interviewed him; said fine, you're an experienced rifleman; I'll put you on main gate security.

First night, he was standing watch. He was told by somebody in the ~~XXXXXX~~ security platoon bunker-- "Say, you're new, so it's your turn to go down to the mess hall and draw the ratio for the security platoon".

So the lad went on down to the mess hall--this happened on Hill Ten, which is right about here--and asked the cook on watch for the "mid-racs" and the cook on watch told him very shortly, I guess, "Look, we don't make up mid-racs for you fellows; if we have something left from the evening meal, you're welcome to it, but we don't make up special ____." Whereupon, the Marine left the mess hall and went back to the security platoon bunker and threw a hand grenade.

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General Simmons, orientation

See, that wasn't a rational response to a stress situation. Fortunately in this case, no one was injured. The bunker looked like a collender afterwards, with the number of holes in it; but no one was injured, by a miracle. Of course, there was no big trick catching this offender, either. Again, we used Operation Freeze; they left the mess hall and had time to get back to their bunker and so on.

So he also is being tried. I'm not sure how that trial is going to turn out, but it depends, I suppose, on how he's defended--whether he would be considered rational at the time or not. He was found mentally competent to stand trial.

This could have been avoided, you see. All sorts of strong flags were flying there. We had two men commit suicide in recent weeks, who were being watched and who were actually supposed~~ly~~ in physical custody; being held while some one made up their mind what they were going to do about them, whether they were going to put them in the "brig" or turn them into First Medical Battalion for observation. Two Men. One took his belt and hanged himself; the other man took a massive dose of drugs.

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General Simmons, orientation

It had a ~~synergistic~~ ^{synergistic} effect; he had been drinking and the drugs killed him.

Any questions on this, what your responsibility is? Simply be alert to the potential offender, and never take lightly a report from one of your NCOs that he has a problem or problem Marine. If one of your corporals or sergeants turns in a Marine and says, "Look, I've got a guy who is a drug user," or "Look I've got a guy who says he's going to frag the gunny," or "Look I've got a guy who seems like he's going off his rocker," You do something about it. That doesn't mean that the corporal or sergeant will always be right. They'll make mistakes and ~~they'll~~ ^{There'll} be personality conflicts, but you still need to do something about it. Maybe all that needs to be done is to have that Marine suspect transferred elsewhere in the company or elsewhere in the battalion without any prejudice whatsoever, just to get the two of them apart. Maybe that's all that needs to be done, but something needs to be done.

If you don't do it, you're--one, inviting tragedy; or two, you have nullified the value of one NCO, because if you don't back him up you'll train him insecure. We've got numbers of NCOs in this Division who've done exactly that. They say, "I did my job and they didn't back me up; I'm just going to go along with the crowd from here on in." Any questions on that?

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Simmons, orientation

Alright, let's talk about a different kind of a problem now. Let's talk about misapplication of friendly fire power. We have two kinds--casualties from supporting weapons and casualties from individual weapons. I'm talking about deliberately aimed fire; I'm not talking about accidental discharges. I'll talk about those in a minute.

I'm talking about the artillery that hits the infantry or the air that hits the infantry, or the intramural fire fights between patrols. Starting with the supporting weapons; of course, I mean, air, artillery, mortars.

In 1969, 57 Marines were killed and 265 were wounded in this Division by friendly supporting fires. That's the equivalent of two rifle companies being taken out of action. In 1970, we had 10 killed and 157 wounded--that's the equivalent of another rifle company being taken out of action.

How do these things happen? Sometimes it's an error in clearance procedure. We've got good clearance procedures to ensure that a target should be engaged by supporting weapons--both through military channels and political channels. Every once in a while, someone will make a mistake. He'll go through the motions, without really getting an area cleared. I'll give you an

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General Simmons, orientation
example of this in a moment.

Sometimes we have gunnery errors, not very often. Very often we have land navigation errors on the part of the infantry; the infantry isn't where it's supposed to be. One example, a squad leader took out a squad to set in an ambush and he set it in eleven hundred meters from where he thought he was. Let me stress the importance of map reading, land navigation, and use of the compass. Ensure yourself that your men know ~~MM~~ how to do this. Just don't take their word for it. Every Marine will claim that he's able to do everything, ~~s~~ see.

"Can you find that force?"

"Sure, I can find that force."

"Can you use a compass?"

"Sure, I can use a compass."

Test him! You don't have to do it in an embarrassing way, but you can test him and make sure that he knows how to do these things. Make sure you know, yourself.

I'll give you a couple examples of supporting arms fire. This one happened on 12 October. 1-11 or 1-55 battery--and I say 1-11 because although it's a 4-11 battery, it's ^{TASK} ~~part~~ organized with the First Battalion-Eleventh Marines now--was firing counter-rocket fires

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General Simmons, orientation

_____. We had had about six rockets land on the air base. They didn't do any damage. These rockets are just 122 millimeter shells, and there's a couple of them on display outside the bunker here, you may have looked at them. They didn't do any damage.

We have real good counter rocket procedures-- automatic fires and so forth for taking under fire real or suspected rocket type.

It's sometimes thought that they saw a launching site out in this vicinity. So a fire mission was called, you see, and went through the clearance procedure. But somewhere along the line, the coordinates got transposed and the coordinates as transmitted put the site at ~~Hudeg~~ ^{Hieu Duc}. Now, ~~Hudeg~~ ^{Hieu Duc} was a district headquarters when Lieutenant Gildon was out here before. It still is a district headquarters. But someone didn't bother to check those coordinates and look at his map. So the fire mission was called, and 34 rounds of 155 milimeter ammunition were dumped on ~~Hudeg~~ ^{Hieu Duc} before a check fire was called.

We ~~managed~~ "managed" to kill a United States Army Major; we wounded five more U.S. soldiers; we killed a Popular Force Trooper; and we wounded ~~XX~~ another PF trooper. In this particular case, there was also a gunnery error. One gun was improperly laid-- it laid its rounds on Hill Ten, which I indicated

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General Simmons, orientation

earlier we were ~~XXXXX~~ occupying with Marines at the time. So that we caused three more Marine casualties on Hill Ten.

Another example, this was on 6 November, and we're back to Hill 2-90 again. Let me pull out another map, here. I wanted a map that showed the reconnaissance spots. The significance of ~~KXX~~ these yellow boxes, I think, was probably explained to you by the G-2 or the G-3. Is that correct? These are reconnaissance operating areas, and reconnaissance teams can regard as anything that moves in there ^{AD} is fair game, you see.

Well, the squad ^{size} ~~sites~~ patroller moved out from 1-90 up this ridge line towards Dong ^{Dep} ~~bin~~ to cover the activities of an engineer team that was going out to blow up some ^{over name} ~~ordinates~~, and their patrol ^{route} ~~group~~ took them peril/essly close to the reconnaissance team, see.

What happened, recon, saw the movement--this happened in broad daylight--recon, saw the movement and called an artillery mission. Technically, our gunnery is excellent out here. It's first class--it ought to be; we've been ~~XXXXX~~ shooting at the same targets for five years and we get first round kills, but it isn't very nice when you get first round kills on Marines!

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General Simmons, ~~XXXXXX~~ orientation

In this case, 4 WP and 6 HE rounds were fired from a ^{155'}

~~1-5-5~~, we killed three Marines and we wounded three more.

Now, what went wrong in this case?

Well, apparently someone erased an overlay. Apparently the patrol ^{route}~~group~~ never got back to the fire support coordination center; and the artillery and the infantry are still arguing as to whose mistake it was. It was a careless mistake--~~XX~~ and as a result, three Marines are dead and three more are wounded.

You see--just on the face of it--anything that took Marines to the reconnaissance box should have been extraordinarily, carefully watched. The Marines up on DongDinh should have been told that there was a Marine squad approaching them in this direction; and the Fire Support Coordination Center should have been watching that one like a hawk,

Alright, individual weapons. I'm speaking now of the M16, .45 ^{caliber}~~Caliber~~ Pistol, and ^{M-}~~79~~ Grenade Launcher. We'll put the M-60 Machine Gun in this category.

^{VA} Intermural fire fights. In 1969, we killed 15 Marines and we wounded 72--almost a rifle company. In 1970, we killed 20 and we wounded 89.

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General Simmons, orientation

I hope you listen to those figures, because we did more damage in 1970 than we did in 1969 and that's with a much smaller Division and much lower intensity of combat.

Now, these things are almost always the result of poor fire discipline--failure to identify the target, before you start shooting; failure to challenge.

I'll give you a couple of examples. 19 November,

a 10~~v~~ man patrol departed the Gulf/2-1 patrol base.

They set up an ambush ^{of two} at ~~25~~ 25 man teams, some 10 to 15 meters apart. Shortly after midnight, a lance corporal in one position saw movement in the other position and threw a hand grenade. Three Marines were wounded.

^{Que Smiths} 26 December, Charlie 1-5 was operating in the Quaisons at that time. A sergeant went out into the front of his perimeter about two o'clock one morning.

God knows why! A machine gunner yelled, "halt!"

The sergeant apparently didn't reply; the machine gunner fired, stitched the sergeant across the legs with an M60.

^{Que Smiths} On 31st of December, Delta 1-5 also in the Quaisons. A platoon sergeant was redistributing ammunition about ^{1:30} 1-30 in the morning. A corporal heard noises and started firing, without challenging. The platoon sergeant was ~~seriously~~ seriously wounded.

Another case happened about the same time, up here

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General Simmons, orientation

up here above Namor Bridge, Third Battalion--First.

A Marine was waking up his relief in a platoon position, and the next thing he knew he was hit ~~R&K~~ four times by a .45.

So if you join a platoon and the platoon sergeant says, "We don't challenge here. Everybody knows everybody else."

You say, "Well, that may be, but we're going to start challenging, and we're going to be real sure about those targets before we engage them."

Let's move on to accidental discharges. Really, I should call them careless discharges, because it's almost impossible to conceive of circumstances where a weapon accidentally discharges itself--all of itself--without some ~~degree~~ degree of carelessness on someone's part. In 1969, 29 Marines were killed and 205 were wounded by so-called "accidental discharges". That's a great big rifle company, reinforced rifle company. I wish our companies were that big. In 1970, we killed 17 we ~~were~~ wounded 104, almost a rifle company--almost always the consequence of careless handling of the weapon, particularly the .45 ^{caliber} Calavier pistol. Forty per cent of these cases were caused by ~~Forty Five~~ ^{caliber} Calavier pistols, failure to inspect, and a round in the chamber when it wasn't authorized.

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General Simmons, Orientation

These are the things that cause _____

H/S I'll give you some examples of this. 27 November,
HNS Company 2-5--the Lance Corporal on patrol lay down
and was taking a break. He leaned his M-16 against a
post or the trunk of a tree. M It was on full
automatic. It fell over. It left out bursts; the
Lance Corporal got it in the chest. It killed him.

You see, for that to happen, a number of things had
to be wrong. Why did he had ^{he} a round in the chamber?
He was on patrol, so there was justification for him to
have a magazine in the piece. If he was so relaxed that
he could take a break, why around in the chamber?
Why wasn't the safety on? Why was it on full automatic?
We don't use full automatic, except under exceptional
circumstances. If you want to fire a ^{burst} ~~person~~ into a
cave, full automatic is a good idea--(correction, if
you want to fire a burst into a cave)---and you're
routinely patrolling the unit. What engaged the
trigger?

On the 24th of December, Christmas Eve, this
happened in the Second Battalion-First Marines.

A PFC was playing with an ARVN soldier's ^{Colben} 45 ~~Calavier~~
Pistol. He fired two rounds--apparently in celebration
of Christmas Eve. He then inserted a new a new magazine,
and I will guess that the slide was back and he

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Then, he playfully put the pistol to his head and squeezed the trigger.

On 5 January, notice these dates; I'm not telling you something that happened last year or two years ago. These things happen every week. Every day, I read these things. 5 January, ~~my 3-1~~ ^{Mr. Ke/3-1} A Corporal Squad Leader was getting ready to go out on a night ambush, and he noticed one man, a Lance Corporal, with an unauthorized pistol; and that's something we're cracking down on, now. We're examining every pistol in the Division to ~~XXXXXX~~ ensure--one, that the man is authorized to have a pistol; two, that he's qualified to have it; and three, is it really necessary? I'm speaking both about ~~to~~ weapons and also, these weapons that have been accumulated over the past five years.

Anyway, the Corporal Squad Leader said, "you don't rate it; I'm going to take it away from you," and the Lance Corporal pulled the pistol from the holster and accidentally shot the Corporal through the stomach.

9 January, ~~Lima 3-1~~ ^{Lima 3-1}, a Lance Corporal chambered around in his pistol and he was supposed to be armed with a pistol. You can guess for yourself how well qualified he was. He attempted to put it on half cock. Now, the first thing that was discovered about a pistol in 1911--when it was designed--that the half cock was not a reliable safety.

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General Simmons, orientation

He apparently had his hand over the muzzle while he was trying to jockey that hammer into position, and you can guess what happened. The round went through his hand; what a .45 ^{caliber} ~~caliber~~ slug does to your hand, it gives the sergeant great problems.

I've already mentioned one earlier incident involving a grenade that was tossed. Let's talk about some of these careless explosions of ^{ordnance} ~~ordnance~~-- primarily grenades but sometimes Composition C gets into it. In 1970, for the first eleven months--and I haven't carried out my figures here for the whole year--we had 164 explosions; we had killed 15 Marines and we had wounded 194, (a company and a half).

Now, this was a big problem back in the Korean War; when I was ~~Company~~ ^{8th} Commander, I had a hard time from keeping my Marines from wearing their grenades on their harness, you know. We had a General then--commanding the ^{8th} Army--General Matthew Ridgeway, who wore two grenades up here, see? Only his were disarmed and ~~polished~~ polished; they couldn't go off. My Marines' grenades could go off and they did go off. We had a hard time breaking people of that habit.

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General Simmons, orientation

I had a hard time breaking people of that habit back in the 9th Marines back in '66, too; and those of you who have been out here before know that the PF and the RF _____, (tape skipped).

Now, let's talk about motor vehicle accidents. In 1969, we had twelve Marines killed and one hundred and twenty injured, another rifle company. We also managed to kill 45 Vietnamese and injure one hundred and twenty six. In 1970--again, with a much smaller Division--we killed three Marines and we injured ninety four, almost a rifle company; we killed 44 Vietnamese and we injured 101.

Now, the worst example I have at hand occurred on the Fourth of July. An element of the First Marines was having a beach party--a good thing to do and to spend Fourth of July, if circumstances permit! One of the Marines had too much to drink and he appropriated an M-37 Personnel Carrier. He went into DaNang, which is out of bounds. He literally ~~rickshotted~~ *rickshotted* down the main street of DaNang. He had five separate collisions; and when the personnel carrier finally came to rest, he had killed two Vietnamese, injured nine more, and he had injured one U.S. Navy *corps* man.

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General Simmons, orientation

In a remarkable number of these accidents, we find this combination or some element of it-- unauthorized driver, alcohol, unauthorized runs, or appropriated vehicle. So if you have any vehicles under your charge, you make sure you know where they are, and make sure no one's using them unless you know about it and make sure your drivers are qualified.

Stress defensive driving. The Vietnamese are just entering a "gasoline age" and they're entering it with a vengeance!

Lieutenant Gildon and all those people ~~XXXX~~ all those people who were on bicycles the last time you were out here ~~XXXXXX~~ are now on Hondas. Of course, enforce safety regulations and traffic regulations.

We also have another effect. There's increasing anti-American feeling out here that manifests ~~XXXX~~ itself in kind of a blackmail, that when we do have an accident it almost always provokes an instinct with the populus, and sometimes the ARVN, PF, or RF gets mixed up into it. Sometimes these things get to be real nasty. The driver is physically held for a kind of ransom, before they will release him and so forth.

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General Simmons, orientation

It gets real sticky at times.

Every driver is supposed to have in the vehicle, a list of instructions as to what he's supposed to do if he does have an accident.

Okay, I've talked to you now for over an hour-- about fifteen minutes longer than I had planned. I've given you a lot of statistics and I don't really expect you to remember any of them. Except you might remember that I checked off a great number of rifle companies or rifle company equivalents that we've lost through all these things I've talked about. I will give you one statistic that I will expect you to remember. That is, our casualty ratio at present is four to one. What do I mean by that? At the present time, with our combat casualties way down, for every four Marines killed by the enemy, we're killing one ourselves by accident or design. For every four Marines wounded by the enemy, we're wounding or injuring ~~one~~ one ourself by accident or design. That's just too many.

Now, I hasten to add that we're not doing any worse on a rate basis than we were a year ago. In fact, in many areas we've ~~improved~~ improved on a rate basis. But we've only improved that much, if you can see the angle of my arm.

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General Simmons, orientation

Combat casualties have come way down. These nonbattle casualties stand out in much sharper relief. We have to concentrate on them and get them down.

That's your job, and that's really the whole purpose of this hour's talk. Do you have any questions you would like to ask me?

Well, in summary, remember what I said at the very beginning. You're well prepared for the job at hand. I'm confident of that, and I want you to be ~~c~~ confident. Remember what I said about carelessness. Remember the thread of carelessness that ran through all these things I talked to you about. Remember what I said about keeping that running estimate of the ~~XX~~ situation going in your head-- anticipate, plan, be prepared for what's going to happen--and finally, if you do these things, I think I can assure you that you will do well in the First Marine Division.

I want your time in the First Marine Division to be time of pride and satisfaction. So that, after we leave this place and you look back on it, whether you stay in the Marine Corps or whether you

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General Simmons, orientation

return to civilian life, you'll say, "I was in the First Marine Division; it's a great outfit and it gave me something that I wanted to remember for the rest of my life."

I'm very proud of this Division. I want you to be, also! Thank you very much.

What we'll do now, I'll meet you all at the door. Repeat your name for me and maybe, I'll get a chance to remember it the next time I see you.

Supposed to have 3 at Kaneshi & 3 at Quantico

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Standard Aircraft Characteristics

NAVY MODEL SH-3A AIRCRAFT

(TITLE UNCLASSIFIED)

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1 MAY 1955 IN PART AND ALL ADDENDA THERETO

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1 JULY 1967


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STANDARD AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS SH-3A

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

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ARMAMENT AND TANKAGE

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POWER PLANT

NO. & MODEL..... (2) T38-CE-6
 HPR General Electric
 ROTOR GEAR RATIO..... 0.0319
 TAIL ROTOR RATIO 0.0633

RATINGS

	ASR	RFM	ALT
MIL.	-1050	19,555	SSL
NORM.	900	19,555	SSL

Eng. Spec. No. E-1013
 of 11 April 1957

ORDNANCE

Four fixed launching stations provide for armament.

Primary mission armament:

2 Torpedoes MK 44, (Mod. 0)

Armament carried in any combinations:

4 MK 43 (Mod. 1) Torpedoes
 4 MK 44 (Mod. 0) Torpedoes
 1 MK 101 (Mod. 0) Depth Bomb
 (Forward H.H. Station Only)

Space provisions are made to carry:

4 MK 14 (Mod. 0) Depth Charge
 4 MK 54 (Mod. 1) Air. Depth Bomb

MISSION AND DESCRIPTION

The primary mission of the helicopter is to detect, identify, track and destroy enemy submarines. It is capable of all weather operation from carriers, cruisers and from other naval and merchant ships which have adequate landing provisions and from land bases.

This helicopter is a twin-engine, single-main-rotor type with one anti-torque tail rotor and a fixed trim surface. All-metal construction is used throughout the aircraft. A large door toward the rear of the cabin and a personnel door toward the front of the cabin provide entrance for the crew. The fuselage of semi-monocoque construction has an amphibian type hull bottom to provide emergency water landing capability. A sponson is provided on the outer end of the landing gear support to increase lateral stability during emergency water landings. The main rotor blades are pretracked and shall be manually foldable in winds up to 40 knots to reduce the overall length for stowage. The tail pylon is also foldable. A rotor brake provides stopping of the rotor blades from hovering RPM to prevent windmilling. Flight controls include hydraulic servo systems for the main and tail rotor. Automatic stabilization equipment is provided and is capable of being engaged or disengaged at any time during flight without disturbance.

Personnel include pilot, co-pilot, sonar operator and relief sonar operator.

DEVELOPMENT

First Flight April 1959
 Service Use March 1961

DIMENSIONS

DISC AREA 3019 sq. ft.
 BLADE AREA 222.5 sq. ft.
 NO. OF BLADES (MAIN) 5
 MAIN ROTOR DIA. 62' - 0"
 LENGTH (BLADES FOLDED) 56' - 9"
 LENGTH (BLADE & PYLON FOLD) . 46' - 6"
 LENGTH (BLADES ROTATING) 72' - 6"
 HEIGHT (BLADES FOLDED) 16' - 6"
 TREAD 13' - 0"
 SPAN (BLADES FOLDED) 16' - 0"
 STABILIZER AREA 21 sq. ft.

WEIGHTS

LOADING	LBS.	LtL
EMPTY	10814
BASIC	11196
DESIGN G.W.	17196	2.36
OVERLOAD G.W.	19000	2.14

All weights are actual

FUEL AND OIL

GAL.	NO. TANKS	LOCATION
658	2	Internal

Fuel Grade..... JP-4
 Fuel Spec..... MIL-P-5624

OIL

Capacity (Gal.)..... 6.1
 Fuel Spec. MIL-C-7808

ELECTRONICS

RADIO SET (UHF)..... AN/APC-52
 RADIO SET (HF)..... AN/AIC-39
 INTERPHONE, TRANS. AMP. AN/AIC-4A
 RADAR IDENTIFICATION SET AN/APX-68
 CODER GROUP AN/APA-89
 LOW FREQUENCY ADF..... AN/ARN-59
 RADIO SET..... AN/ARN-21A
 RADAR ALTIMETER AN/APN-117
 SONAR AN/AGS-10
 RADAR NAVIGATION SET AN/APN-130
 NAVIGATION COMPUTER GROUP ... AN/ASA-13A

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PERFORMANCE SUMMARY					
TAKE-OFF LOADING CONDITION		(1) ASW SEARCH & ATTACK 2 MK-44	(2) ASW ATTACK 4 MK-44		
TAKE-OFF WEIGHT	lb.	17196	18088		
Fuel (JP-4)	lb.	4425	4425		
Payload	lb.	882	1764		
Dive loading	lb./sq.ft.	5.69	6.00		
Vertical rate of climb at S.L.	(A) fpm.	680	320		
Absolute hovering ceiling	(A) ft.	5200	2900		
Max. rate of climb at S.L.	(B) fpm.	1450	1280		
Service ceiling (100 fpm)	(B) ft.	12100	9900		
Max. Speed/Altitude	(B) kn.	133/S.L.	130/S.L.		
Min./Maximum Speed at S.L.	(A) (C) kn./kn.	38/98	52/90		
Combat Range	n.mi.	500	483		
Average cruising speed	kn.	120	120		
Cruising altitude	ft.	S.L.	S.L.		
Max. Endurance	hr.	—	4.90		
Average cruising speed/Alt	kn./ft.	—	61/S.L.		
ASW Endurance	hr.	4.35	—		
Cruising speed	kn.	100	—		

NOTES

- (A) MILITARY POWER (Transmission Limit 2000 HP)
 (B) NORMAL POWER
 (C) ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE

PERFORMANCE BASIS: Calculation, contractor flight test data and NATESTORM
 NPS flight test data

ENDURANCE is based on engine specification fuel consumption data
 increased by 5%

MAXIMUM ENDURANCE MISSION

WARM UP AND TAKE-OFF: 5 min at sea level at
 normal rated power
 CRUISE: at sea level at speed for test endurance
 RESERVE: 10% of initial fuel load





ASW SEARCH AND ATTACK MISSION

WARM-UP AND TAKE-OFF: 3 minutes at sea level
 at Normal Rated Power
 CRUISE AND HOVER: Cruise and Hover alternately
 Cruise at 100 knots 50% of time - Acceleration,
 Deceleration, and Hover 50% of time - ASW
 Endurance equals Cruise, Acceleration,
 Deceleration, and Hover time
 RESERVE: 10% of initial fuel load

COMBAT RANGE MISSION

WARM UP AND TAKE-OFF: 3 min at sea level
 at normal rated power
 CRUISE: At sea level at speed for best range
 RESERVE: 10% of initial fuel load

CONFIDENTIAL



○ LOADING CONDITION COLUMN NUMBER

NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Released by
L. F. CHAPMAN JR.

FROM: CMC

TO: ALMAR

022300Z/65(SEP 1969)

UNCLAS

MCEUL 5350. RACIAL RELATIONS AND INSTANCES OF RACIAL VIOLENCE
WITHIN THE MARINE CORPS

- A. SECNAVINST 5350.6A
- B. PAR 5390 MARCORMAN
- C. PAR 1244 U. S. NAV REGS
- D. PAR 1701 MARCORMAN
- E. MCO P1020.34B PAR 1101

1. DURING THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS THERE HAVE BEEN INSTANCES
AMONG MARINES OF VIOLENCE AND OTHER UNACCEPTABLE ACTIONS
WHICH APPARENTLY STEM FROM RACIAL DIFFERENCES. SUCH PROBLEMS
ARE ALMOST UNHEARD OF AMONG MARINES IN COMBAT. IT IS WHEN MARINES
MOVE TO OTHER AREAS OR RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES THAT THESE
DIFFERENCES ARISE. AND IT IS THERE WHERE ACTS OF VIOLENCE
BETWEEN MARINES ARE OCCURRING, ACTS WHICH CANNOT BE TOLERATED,
AND MUST STOP

2. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE RECENT EVENTS ARE TYPICAL. IN
FACT, LITERALLY THOUSANDS OF MARINES HAVE QUIETLY MADE THE
ADJUSTMENT FROM COMBAT, AND CAPABLY SERVED STERN AND
DEMANDING TOURS OF DUTY, IN A NATIONAL ATMOSPHERE WHERE
EXPRESSIONS OF APPRECIATION FOR THEIR SERVICES ARE HARD TO
FIND. IT IS EVIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT DESPITE OUR SUBSTANTIAL

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

Marine Corps Historical Center

PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL PARITY, DIFFICULTIES OF A SIGNIFICANT NATURE DO EXIST IN OUR CORPS

3. IT IS NOW AND HAS LONG BEEN OUR POLICY IN THE MARINE CORPS THAT DISCRIMINATION IN ANY FORM IS NOT TOLERATED. IT HAS SIMILARLY BEEN OUR POLICY THAT A FIGHTING ORGANIZATION SUCH AS OURS MUST HAVE A SOLID FOUNDATION OF FIRM, IMPARTIAL DISCIPLINE. IT IS IN THE CONTEXT OF THESE TWO BASIC POLICIES THAT WE MUST TAKE MEASURES TO DISPEL THE RACIAL PROBLEMS THAT CURRENTLY EXIST

4. WE MAY ARGUE THAT THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF OUR RACIAL DIFFICULTIES PARALLEL THOSE OF THE NATION AT LARGE, BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT THEY ARE REAL, AND THEY CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR CORPS. WE MUST SEEK IN EVERY MANNER POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING AMONG ALL MARINES, STRESSING THE CONCEPT THAT WE ARE A BAND OF COMRADES IN ARMS, A LOYAL FRATERNITY WITH A TRADITIONAL ESPRIT THAT SPANS AN ERA OF NEARLY TWO HUNDRED YEARS. THE TRULY INTEGRATED SPIRIT THAT PERVADES ON THE BATTLEFIELD, MUST PERVADE IN THE BARRACKS AND ON LIBERTY AS WELL. THE CAUSES OF FRICTION, RATHER THAN THE SYMPTOMS, MUST BE IDENTIFIED BY ALL COMMANDERS, FRANKLY AND OPENLY DISCUSSED, AND ELIMINATED WHERE POSSIBLE. POSITIVE AND OVERT EFFORTS TO ERADICATE EVERY TRACE OF DISCRIMINATION, WHETHER INTENTIONAL OR NOT, MUST BE CONTINUED. ACTIONS OR INFLUENCES THAT TEND TO AROUSE ANTAGONISM BETWEEN FELLOW MARINES MUST BE COMBATTED. EVERY MARINE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE MARINE CORPS DOES GUARANTEE EQUAL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND EQUAL

PROTECTION, WITHOUT REGARD TO RACE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. WE TAKE CARE OF OUR OWN, CONTINUING TO RECOGNIZE, AS THE FOUNDATION OF OUR CORPS, THE IMPORTANCE, INTEGRITY, AND DIGNITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL MARINE

5. EQUALLY VITAL, EACH MARINE MUST UNDERSTAND WHY THE MARINE CORPS HAS ALWAYS DEMANDED THE HIGHEST STANDARDS IN MILITARY APPEARANCE, MILITARY COURTESY, AND PROFICIENCY, AND WHY WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. THESE HIGH STANDARDS BREED PRIDE, AND PRIDE, IN TURN, BUILDS THE KIND OF DISCIPLINE THAT IS ESSENTIAL TO BATTLEFIELD SUCCESS WITH MINIMUM CASUALTIES. THESE QUALITIES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN THE HALLMARK OF MARINES AND NO RELAXATION IN OUR PROVEN HIGH STANDARDS WILL BE CON-
DONED. FOR EXAMPLE, UNIFORMS WILL BE WORN CORRECTLY WITH NO NON-REGULATION ITEMS IN EVIDENCE; HAIRCUTS WILL CONFORM TO REGULATIONS, NO MORE, NO LESS; PROPER MILITARY SALUTES WILL BE RENDERED ON APPROPRIATE OCCASIONS; THE HIGHEST QUALITY OF PROFESSIONALISM MUST BE EXHIBITED IN EVERY ASSIGN-
MENT; BREACHES OF GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE WILL BE DEALT WITH FAIRLY, EXPEDITIOUSLY, AND FIRMLY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE FOR THOSE MARINES WHO INSTIGATE OR EXECUTE VIOLENCE AGAINST THEIR FELLOW MARINES

6. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OFFICERS AND STAFF NCOs TO PROVIDE THE LEADERSHIP AND SET THE EXAMPLE FOR THOSE JUNIOR TO THEM, PARTICULARLY FOR THE COMBAT VETERANS WHO HAVE HAD LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN OTHER DUTIES. WE MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES DEMAND AFTER-HOURS AVAILABILITY

AND SUPERVISION. I CANNOT IMPROVE UPON THE EXPRESSION OF PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OFFICERS, STAFF NCOs AND MEN AS THEY ARE WRITTEN IN THE MARINE CORPS MANUAL. IF THESE WERE CONSCIENTIOUSLY CARRIED OUT, MANY OF OUR PROBLEMS WOULD DISAPPEAR

7. SOME COMPLAINTS ABOUT DISCRIMINATION I HAVE HEARD APPEAR TO BE VALID, BUT MANY ARE BASED ON RUMOR OR MISAPPREHENSION. NEVERTHELESS, SOME MARINES BELIEVE THEM TO BE TRUE. MOST ARE CONCERNED WITH PROMOTIONS, MILITARY JUSTICE, DUTY ASSIGNMENTS, AND REQUEST MAST. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ALL COMMANDERS LEARN OF THESE ERRONEOUS BELIEFS AND SYSTEMATICALLY AND CONTINUOUSLY INFORM THEIR MEN OF THE FACTS. COMMANDERS AND STAFF NCOs MUST COMMUNICATE WITH THEIR MEN, AND SEE THAT THEY GET THE STRAIGHT WORD, SO THAT TRUST IN THE CORPS CAN BE RESTORED IN THOSE WHO DOUBT

8. TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PROBLEM OF RACIAL FRICTION, THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS WILL BE IMMEDIATELY UNDERTAKEN

A. THE CONTENTS OF THIS ALMAR WILL AT ONCE BE READ AND EXPLAINED TO ALL MARINES, EXCEPT TO THOSE IN COMBAT, BY IMMEDIATE COMMANDING OFFICERS PERSONALLY

B. ALL OFFICERS AND NCOs WILL REVIEW THE COMPLETE CONTENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY'S MANUAL ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND TREATMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL (REF A APPLIES)

C. ALL OFFICERS AND STAFF NCOs WILL READ, CAREFULLY ABSORB, AND PRACTICE THE CONTENTS OF THAT SECTION OF THE MARINE CORPS MANUAL DEALING WITH MILITARY LEADERSHIP (REF B APPLIES)

D. EVERY COMMANDING OFFICER WILL REVIEW HIS REQUEST MAST PROCEDURES TO ENSURE THAT ALL MARINES UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THEIR RIGHT TO AIR THEIR GRIEVANCES WITHOUT HINDRANCE OR PREJUDICE. I EMPHASIZE THAT NO HARASSMENT, EITHER REAL OR IMPLIED, WILL BE PERMITTED TO OCCUR AT ANY LEVEL BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL REQUESTING MAST AND THE COMMANDER WITH WHOM HE IS REQUESTING MAST. INDIVIDUALS MAY REQUEST MAST WITH ANY COMMANDING OFFICER/COMMANDING GENERAL IN THEIR CHAIN OF COMMAND AT THEIR BASE OR LOCATION. I WANT TO INSURE THAT CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN EVERY MARINE AND HIS COMMANDING OFFICER ARE OPEN, THAT EVERY MARINE UNDERSTANDS THAT THEY ARE OPEN, AND THAT LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES WILL RECEIVE SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION AND RAPID RESPONSE

E. COMMANDERS WILL PERMIT THE AFRO/NATURAL HAIRCUT PROVIDING IT CONFORMS WITH CURRENT MARINE CORPS REGULATIONS (REF E APPLIES)

F. NO ACTIONS, SIGNS, SYMBOLS, GESTURES, AND WORDS WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO TRADITION WILL BE PERMITTED DURING FORMATIONS OR WHEN RENDERING MILITARY COURTESIES TO COLORS, THE NATIONAL ANTHEM, OR INDIVIDUALS. INDIVIDUAL SIGNS BETWEEN GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS WILL BE ACCEPTED FOR WHAT THEY ARE -- GESTURES OF RECOGNITION AND UNITY; IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS MARINE CORPS POLICY THAT, WHILE SUCH ACTIONS ARE TO BE DISCOURAGED, THEY ARE NEVERTHELESS EXPRESSIONS OF INDIVIDUAL BELIEF AND ARE NOT, IN THEMSELVES, PROHIBITED. HOWEVER, THEY ARE GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION IF EXECUTED DURING OFFICIAL CEREMONIES

OR IN A MANNER SUGGESTING DIRECT DEFIANCE OF DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITY

G. EACH COMMANDER WILL REVIEW HIS PROMOTION PROCEDURES
TO VERIFY THEIR FAIRNESS AND EMPHASIS ON MERIT AND POTENTIAL,
AND WILL CORRECT ANY ERRORS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE
PAST, IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT REGULATIONS.

H. COMMANDING GENERALS AND COMMANDING OFFICERS WILL
IMMEDIATELY, CONSCIENTIOUSLY, AND PERSISTENTLY EXECUTE THE
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THIS ALMAR, AND REPORT
PROGRESS TO ME FROM TIME TO TIME THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

9. THIS ALMAR IS APPLICABLE TO THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE

10. THIS BULLETIN IS CANCELED 31 MAR 1970

Marine Corps Historical Center

*negro Marines - Race Rela-
tions File, Pop. Sec.*

RACE RELATIONS
in the
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

June, 1970

A Report By:

Maj. A. S. Painter, USMCR
Maj. G. S. St. Pierre, USMCR
Maj. H. C. Sweet, Jr., USMCR
Public Affairs Unit 1-1
New York, New York

Marine Corps Historical Center

Purpose. This report is an effort to summarize the current status of race relations in the Marine Corps, to identify problem areas relating to minority groups, to analyze the effectiveness of the Equal Opportunities Branch and to evaluate present methods of recruiting Black officers. Certain objectives and goals are set forth for consideration, along with a suggested program designed to increase the numbers of Black officers in the Marine Corps.

2. Background. Headquarters Marine Corps has recognized the existence of racial tensions throughout the various commands and the increase of racially related incidents which has occurred over the past several years. ALMAR 65 addressed the problem and outlined steps to be undertaken at all command levels to hopefully improve the situation. An Equal Opportunities Branch has been established to deal with minority group problems affecting the entire Corps.

3. Findings. Compliance with ALMAR 65 varies greatly among the commands. Some units have recognized the sensitivity of the problem and demonstrated particular initiative in coming to grips with the situation. Other commands have given ALMAR 65 token consideration and in some instances failed to acknowledge that a problem exists. Interviews with officers of the Equal Opportunity Branch, and with other officers at Headquarters and elsewhere, have variously characterized the problem as the "green Marine syndrome", a "white backlash", "a negative white attitude", and a "refusal" to admit that certain incidents recorded over the past several months have underlying racial causes. The "refusal" to recognize that a problem persists over a wide base manifested itself in interviews with both black and white officers and enlisted personnel, and, would appear to be the central roadblock to achieving the goals set forth in ALMAR 65 and the broader objective of achieving racial equality and tranquility within the Marine Corps.

Another finding, based on interviews, review of Congressional mail and press clippings, indicated that the provisions of ALMAR 65 were widely misinterpreted and misunderstood within and outside the Corps. In particular, the sections dealing with haircuts and greeting signs between groups or individuals have caused strong negative reactions among certain white officers and NCO's who state in vigorous terms that "Blacks" are being accorded special consideration and treatment.

The polarity which exists can perhaps be summarized in terms of the following:

White Marine:

"We are continuing to work steadily to build a Marine Corps in which every Marine is accorded equal treatment and equal consideration for promotion. We have made considerable progress toward that objective, but social progress, even in a controlled universe such as the Marine Corps, does not come quickly. Those to whom we seek to bring equality hurt their own objectives by attempting to pressure us for special consideration or by resorting to communication means which are not indigenous to the Marine Corps command structure. They should 'play by the rules' as all of us have done, and take advantage of all of the opportunities which the Marine Corps makes available to them. Then we will have

Marine Corps Historical Center

get a second-rate education in second-rate schools. In the Marine Corps, where things are supposed to be equal for everybody we've seen promotions and duty assignments go to less qualified whites while our people get dirty jobs. We can't buy proper cosmetics in the PX to meet the needs of the black man and woman. In the clubs we hear white man's music and little or none of our own. We rarely get satisfaction for grievances through the chain of command, particularly through the "request mast" procedure. Daily incidents, such as name calling, label us as second class Marines. Our court-martial sentences are frequently more severe than those of white Marines for similar offenses. We're not going to stand for this kind of treatment any longer."

Whether the attitudes expressed in the foregoing statements have substantive validity is not relevant to a solution of the problem. However, those statements do characterize apparent differences in attitude and, irrespective of the truth contained in them, must be considered as part of the central core of racial unrest in the Marine Corps.

The Equal Opportunities Branch, since its establishment in the ~~May~~ summer of 1969, has identified a number of problem areas, both from a substantive and operational standpoint, which have tended to detract from its potential effectiveness in meeting and dealing with various types of racial problems and incidents within the Marine Corps.

There is no official mandate specifically setting forth the authority of the Branch with respect to assisting and/or intervening in existing or potential racial problems. For that reason, the Branch has been "reacting" to situations, rather than exercising initiatives in planning an affirmative program of action.

This perhaps, can be partially explained by the understandable reluctance of senior unit commanders to have the Branch interfere in what are essentially command problems. Therefore, at present the Equal Opportunities Branch primarily functions as a letterwriting service answering Congressional mail and as a tabulation center for field reports and complaints. Personnel staffing the Branch are experienced and competent in the area of human relations and, given the proper mandate, could be highly effective in assisting all commands to accomplish the following recommendations.

4. Recommendations. Assuming the validity of the foregoing findings, it would appear desirable for the Marine Corps to establish certain objectives and goals to be monitored and partly carried out by the Equal Opportunities Branch."

- A. Objective The establishment of an environment within the Marine Corps which will create and sustain an attitude of equality among all Marines, regardless of race, creed or color, thereby minimizing racially motivated incidents which detract from the efficient performance of the Corps.

Those recommended goals follow:

1. Develop and carry out an educational program at all command levels to create an awareness of individual human values and cultural differences between blacks and whites. The program developed by Chaplain Beddingfield appears to have been successful where used. The American Institute for Research study is a second step forward. Its shortcoming, however, is that final educational materials will take many months to prepare. Nevertheless, strong reliance on AIR for interim guidance would be beneficial. AIR's findings should not in any way preclude or delay effective action by HQMC, through the Equal Opportunities Branch, pending submission of the AIR report.
2. Initiate a program to disseminate race relations information on a routine and emergency basis to counter rumors being circulated among the troops and to advise unit commanders of current events and successful techniques to improve race relations. Such a vehicle would provide intra-Corps communications and could be handled as a "newsletter" in a joint Branch/command effort.
3. Provide professional race relations counseling support to field commanders training unit personnel in human relations and providing skilled "action teams" to assist field commanders in determining the underlying causes of racial incidents. The Equal Opportunities Branch should be responsible for providing advisory support in that regard.
4. Make available to all Marines, black or white, relevant recreational facilities, activities and opportunities. This includes not only traditional sporting and athletic activities, but also social events. For example, importing dates onto the base or providing transportation for Marines to engage in outside social activities.
5. Provide government quarters for all Marines, including married personnel, which cater to individual human dignity and supply an identifiable measure of prestige for rank attained, particularly in the junior enlisted grades. Every effort should be made to eliminate the concept of the open "squad bay" and to provide reasonable privacy for even the lowest of ranks.
6. Effect an unbiased procedure for reviewing and evaluating alleged racial prejudice and discrimination in disciplinary proceedings and promotion.
7. Improve opportunities for upward mobility of blacks and other minority groups within the Marine Corps. In many instances this may entail special instruction or intensive on-the-job training to qualify minority personnel for advancement.

8. Intensify Black officer recruiting efforts to increase representation in the officer corps.

Each of the foregoing goals calls for a detailed analysis of existing practices and implementation of conclusions drawn there from. A suggested approach to such analysis may be derived from the following communications support program for Black Officer Recruitment.


Marine Corps Historical Center

4

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6P05D

SERVICE



STANDARD AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS

R3Y-2 "TRADEWIND"

CONVAIR

Standard Aircraft Characteristics MATHEMATICAL DATA (1955-1-105)

10 OCTOBER 1955

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
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
SERVICE

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R3Y-2



DESCRIPTIVE ARRANGEMENT



ARMAMENT AND TANKAGE

Standard Aircraft Characteristics NAVAER 1335B (Rev. 1-55)

834-2

CONFIDENTIAL

15 OCTOBER 1966

DECLASSIFIED

POWER PLANT

NO. & MODEL..... (4) T40-A-10
 MFR..... Allison
 TYPE..... Turbo-Prop
 PROP GEAR RATIO..... 0.0630
 PROP MFR..... AeroProducts
 PROP DES. NO..... AD 8664TH-B1
 NO. BLPS/Dia..... 6/15"

RATINGS

All Ratings Static Sea Level

	SHP	LBS THRUST	RPM
T.O.	5,332	1,296	14,300
MIL.	5,332	1,296	14,300
NORM.	4,444	1,240	14,300

Spec. No. 300-2

ORDNANCE

CREW (on duty)..... 5
 (off duty)..... 2
 PASSENGERS or TROOPS..... 103
 LITTER PATIENTS..... 92
 ATTENDANTS..... 12

SPACE DIMENSIONS

LENGTH..... 89'-0"
 MAX. WIDTH..... 9'-6"

LIMIT FLOOR LOADS

LOGAL..... 300 lb/ft²
 RUNNING..... 1500 lb/ft

MISSION AND DESCRIPTION

The principal mission of the airplane is to transport cargo, passengers, troops or litter patients.

The model R3Y-2 airplane is designed for bow loading and is a development of the model R3Y-1 flying boat. It is a high wing, full cant; lever monoplane, having two fixed auxiliary floats and a single tail. The hull is of high length/beam ratio design and incorporates a large moveable nose section for bow loading and a large cargo door on the after port side.

The cargo floor is equipped for cargo tie-down and handling equipment and includes attachment for seats for 103 passengers or troops, or litters for 92 patients and seats for 12 medical attendants. Maximum cargo load is 44,000 pounds.

Slotted type flaps are installed at the wing trailing edge between the hull and the inboard end of each aileron.

DEVELOPMENT

First Flight..... October 1954
 Service Date..... March 1956

WEIGHTS

LOADINGS	LBS	L.F.
EMPTY.....	86,410"	
BASIC CARGO.....	88,245#	
Passenger 93,239		
DESIGN.....	145,000	3.0
*MAX.T.O.	overload 135,000#	2.5
**MAX.LANDING	overload 105,000#	4.4

*Limited by hull strength
 **Sheltered water

FUEL AND OIL

GALS.	NO. TANKS	LOCATION
5,500	2	Right Wing
5,500	2	Left Wing
FUEL GRADE.....		110/130
FUEL SPEC.....		applicable MIL-F-5572

OIL

CAPACITY (GALS)..... 81
 SPEC..... applicable MIL-L-7808

DIMENSIONS

WING
 AREA..... 2100 Sq. ft.
 SPAN..... 145'-11"
 MAC..... 15'- 8"
 HEIGHT "..... 51'- 5"
 LENGTH..... 139'- 8"
 PROP WATER CLEARANCE..... 8'- 9"

*On beaching gear.

ELECTRONICS

VHF..... AN/ARC-1 or 1A
 UHF TRANS REC..... AN/ARC 27A
 HF REC EQUIP..... AN/APR-15 or 15A
 COMM TRANS..... AN/ARN-13
 LORAN..... AN/APN-7C
 RADAR ALTIMETER..... AN/APN-22
 RANGE RECEIVER..... R-23A/ARC-5
 ADF RECEIVER..... 2 AN/ARN-6
 MARKER BEACON..... AN/ARN-12
 VISUAL OMNI - RANGE..... AN/APN-14A
 LOW FREQ ADF..... SCR-718C
 RADAR..... AN/APS-42
 IFF..... AN/APX-6
 INTERPHONE..... AN/ATC-5B
 AN/ARC-38, AN/ARN-21, AN/APA-59, and
 MK-141/APX-6 will be added when
 available.

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



Standard Aircraft Characteristics NAVAR 1335E (Rev. 1-55)

12 OCTOBER 1988

CONFIDENTIAL

R3Y-2

SERVICE



○ LOADING CONDITION COLUMN NUMBER

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES

R3Y-2


TRANSPORT COMBAT RANGE PROBLEM (GAS TURBINE)

WARM UP, TAKE-OFF, ACCELERATE: 5 Minutes at normal rated power at sea level.

CLIMB: On course to cruise altitude at normal rated power.

CRUISE: At altitudes for maximum range - cruise with optimum number of power units operating.

RESERVE: 30 Minutes at speed for maximum endurance at sea level plus 5% of initial fuel load.



○ LOADING CONDITION COLUMN NUMBER

Standard Aircraft Characteristics NAVAER 13357 (Rev. 1-55)

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R3Y-2

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15 OCTOBER 1955

PERFORMANCE SUMMARY

TAKE-OFF LOADING CONDITION		(1) CARGO	(2) TRANSPORT 103 Passengers			
TAKE-OFF WEIGHT	lb.	145,000	162,000			
Fuel	lb.	50,000	47,974			
Payload	lb.	5,463	21,520			
Wing loading	lb./sq.ft.	69.2	73.6			
Stall speed - power-off	kn.	92	93			
Take-off time in calm (A)	sec.	24	32			
Take-off run at S.L. kn. wind	ft.	---	---			
Take-off to clear 50 ft. - calm	ft.	---	---			
Max. speed/altitude (B)	kn./ft.	299/21,000	292/18,000			
Rate of climb at S.L. (B)	fpm.	2,300	1,900			
Time: S.L. to 20,000 ft. (B)	min.	11.5	15.2			
Time: S.L. to 30,000 ft. (B)	min.	24.6	41.0			
Service ceiling (100 fpm) (B)	ft.	34,500	29,000			
Combat range	n.mi.	2,320	1,840			
Average cruising speed	kn.	290	285			
Cruising altitude(s)	ft.	33,000/40,500	28,000/36,500			
Combat radius	n.mi.	---	---			
Average cruising speed	kn.	---	---			
COMBAT LOADING CONDITION						
COMBAT WEIGHT	lb.					
Engine power						
Fuel	lb.					
Combat speed/altitude	kn./ft.					
Rate of climb/altitude	fpm/ft.					
Combat ceiling (500 fpm)	ft.					
Rate of climb at S.L.	fpm.					
Max. speed at S.L.	kn.					
Max. speed/altitude	kn./ft.					
LANDING WEIGHT	lb.					
Fuel	lb.	102,300	123,556			
Stall speed - power-off	kn.	6,800	6,820			
Stall speed - with approach power	kn.	77	84.5			

NOTES

(A) Take-off Power.

(B) Normal Power.

PERFORMANCE BASIS: Performance is based on contractor's estimates unsubstantiated by BUARR.

RANGE AND RADIUS are based on engine specification fuel consumption increased by 5%.

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NVA/M-1330D (Rev. 1-55)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

SE VICE



STANDARD AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS

HTE-2




HILLER

1 June 53

SERVICE

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

SERVICE

POWER PLANT

NO. & MODEL.....(1) O-335-6
 MFR.....Franklin
 ROTOR GEAR RATIO.....0.109
 TAIL ROTOR RATIO.....0.629

RATINGS

	Bhp. @	Rpm	@	Alt.
T.O.	200	3100		S.L.
NORMAL	200	3100		S.L.

SPEC. NO. 19261A

ACCOMMODATIONS

CREW.....2
 PASSENGER.....1
 LITERS.....2

MISSION AND DESCRIPTION

The HTE-2 helicopter is procured primarily for use as a trainer. It is similar in general configuration and rotor dimensions to the HTE-1 helicopter but has a 200 HP engine in place of the 178 HP engine and quadricycle instead of tricycle landing gear. These changes result in an increase in gross weight.

The model HTE-2 helicopter is a three-place (side-by-side) aircraft equipped with dual controls operated from the left and center seat positions. The aircraft has a two-bladed, teetering main rotor, a two-bladed, anti-torque tail rotor, and is equipped with an aerodynamic servo control rotor, whereby cyclic control is obtained through the aerodynamic action of two small airfoils mounted to the rotor hub at right angles to the main rotor blades.

DEVELOPMENT

Service use.....January 1951

DIMENSIONS

DISC AREA.....962.0 sq.ft.
 BLADE AREA.....32.3
 BLADE DIA.....35'
 SPAN *.....10'
 LENGTH.....40' - 5"
 HEIGHT.....9' - 6"
 TREAD.....7' - 8"
 CONTROL ROTOR
 BLADE AREA....3.55 sq.ft.
 STABILIZER AREA.2.49 sq.ft.
 *Rotor stationed fore and aft.

WEIGHTS

Loadings	Lbs.	L.F.
EMPTY.....	1,762.....	
BASIC.....	1,769.....	
DESIGN.....	2,500.....	2.84
MAX.T.O....	2,400 *	
MAX.LAND..	2,400.....	

* Limited by performance

All weights are actual

FUEL AND OIL

Gals.	No. Tanks	Location
28	1	Fuselage
FUEL GRADE.....91/96		
FUEL SPEC.....MIL-F-5572		

OIL

CAPACITY (Gals.).....2.5
 GRADE.....1100
 SPEC.....MIL-O-6082

ELECTRONICS

Receiver.....R-19
 Transmitter.....T-11A
 Transmitter.....T-13
 Receiver.....R-11A

SERVICE

RESTRICTED

PERFORMANCE SUMMARY					
TAKE-OFF LOADING CONDITION		(1) TRAINER 1 Pilot 1 Student	(2) UTILITY 1 Pilot 1 Passenger		
TAKE-OFF WEIGHT	lb.	2,338	2,400		
Fuel	lb.	168	168		
Payload	lb.	190	252		
Disc loading	lb./sq.ft.	2.4	2.5		
Vertical rate of climb at S.L. (A/B) fpm.		0	--		
Absolute hovering ceiling (A/B) ft.		0	--		
Max. rate of climb at S.L. (A) fpm.		780	740		
Service ceiling (100 fpm) (A) ft.		7,400	7,000		
Speed at S.L. (A) kn.		73	72		
Max. speed/altitude (A) kn./ft.		73/S.L.	72/S.L.		
Combat range	n.mi.	110	105		
Average cruising speed	kn.	67	67		
Cruising altitude	ft.	1,500	1,500		
Max. Endurance	hrs.	2.0	2.0		
Average cruising speed	kn.	40	41		
Cruising altitude	ft.	1,500	1,500		

NOTES

- (A) Normal power
(B) Take-off power

Performance is based on NATESTCEN flight test of the HTE-2

Combat range and maximum endurance are based on engine specification fuel consumption data increased by 5% and allowing fuel for warm-up and take-off (5 minutes at NRP) and a 10% fuel reserve. 3100 RPM is used at all speeds.

All performance is out of ground effect.

DECLASSIFIED

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