

Early Edit 24 June 1976

Part II -- Main Edition -- 23 June 1976

NATIONAL REVIEW 11 JUNE 1976 (23)
WAR AGAINST TIME

A year ago Indochina went down the drain. Four weeks ago General Dung, who masterminded the climactic battle, confirmed Mr. Hannah's cogent analysis. The U.S. lost because it used counterinsurgency tactics to fight a war of aggression

Vietnam: Now We Know

NORMAN HANNAH

READERS OF General Westmoreland's book, *A Soldier Reports* (Doubleday, 456 pp., \$12.95), may approach it from two different angles. Some may see it as what it is on its face: a personal military memoir of the sort written by many distinguished military men—or politicians or diplomats, for that matter. Others may read the book in search of the missing link in the American policy and strategy in Indochina—the missing link that might have spanned the gap between means and ends, between E for Effort and V for Victory.

The organization and style of the book favor the former group of readers, interested in an account of a generation of staggering military change as reflected in the life and experiences of one of the leading professionals of the period. Those who are looking for what went wrong in Vietnam will have harder going, but if they are prepared to study the book rather than skim it, they will find some clues between the lines.

Those who read the book as a memoir will be struck by General Westmoreland's calm, embracing manner, his patent dedication to his job and his country. He is a "straight arrow." Naturally, the war in Vietnam absorbs at least three-fourths of the book and no doubt the General feels as if Vietnam had consumed three-fourths of his life-force. This is characteristic of an age of high-velocity history, and of men devoted to a cause larger than themselves.

The Vietnam chapters are organized on a quasi-topical basis rather than as a rigorous chronological recounting of events, or an analysis of causes and effects, of challenges and responses. This complicates things for the analytical reader, although it enables us to see the multi-layered complexity of the war reflected in the personal experience of a professional soldier, a soldier who is competent, devoted, straightforward, possessed of patience and tolerance for the views of others, a man who modestly did his best for his country.

One particular quality of Westmoreland's deserves special mention because of its relevance to the Vietnam War: his sense of the responsibility of a military commander to his government—the responsibility not only to carry out orders but to speak up frankly when he questions the wisdom of those orders. Under a glass panel on his desk Westmoreland kept a quotation from Napoleon:

A commander-in-chief cannot take as an excuse for his mistakes in warfare an order given by his sovereign or his minister, when the person giving the order is absent from the field of operations and is imperfectly aware or wholly unaware of

Mr. Hannah, who served as United States Consul General in Sydney, Australia during the final phases of the Vietnam War, will retire from the Foreign Service this summer. He speaks for himself, not the State Department, in this piece.

the latest state of affairs. It follows that any commander-in-chief who undertakes to carry out a plan which he considers defective is at fault, he must put forward his reasons, insist on the plan being changed, and finally tender his resignation rather than be the instrument of his army's downfall.

Putting this stricture in his own terms with respect to Vietnam, Westmoreland writes:

I was sharply conscious that I was a military man, charged not with making policy but with executing it. Yet, if the National Security Council and the President deemed it in the interest of the United States to save South Vietnam from Communism, I bore the responsibility as the American military commander in Vietnam to advise from a military standpoint what had to be done to achieve that goal.

He did not resign or threaten to do so. On the contrary, he makes it clear that even with all the frustrations and tactical errors, "I suffered my problems in Vietnam because I believed that success would eventually be ours despite them, that they were not to be, as Napoleon put it, instruments of my army's downfall." And, narrowly interpreted, he was right. The American Army was not defeated in Vietnam.

One is struck by how well the American forces fought under difficult and maddening conditions. The book is studded with the code-names of successful operations—Cedar Falls, Junction City, Fairfax, and many more. Militarily, the defeat of the Tet offensive itself was one of the greatest victories over North Vietnam. The appendix tabulates by their code-names numerous imaginative and daring new military techniques and tactics such as the SEAL commando teams, the Prairie Fire and later Tiger Hound reconnaissance missions, the Market Time anti-maritime-infiltration operations, etc. From an inside military viewpoint, the Vietnam War was a prolific spawner of invention.

How can the U.S. Army have fought so well and retired undefeated, and still have the cause for which it fought totally lost? Westmoreland mentions several factors that prolonged the war, but, since he did not submit his resignation in accordance with Napoleon's admonition, we are entitled to conclude that he did not regard these factors as likely to be decisive. Indeed, he tells us that he suffered these impediments because he believed that "success would eventually be ours." But it was not. Why not?

General Westmoreland does not directly answer the question but the answer emerges without being stated. We ran out of time. This is the tragedy of Vietnam—we were fighting for time rather than space. And time ran out. Westmoreland strikes out at the strategy of "graduated response . . . one of the most lamentable mistakes of the war. . . . Faced with escalating pressure, the North Vietnamese could adapt to each new step and absorb the damage. . . ." But the General fails to draw the central conclusion, although it emerges obliquely in this sentence from page 112. "Ambassador Taylor [retired former Army Chief of Staff] and some civilian officials in Washington were also tending to think of bombing in terms of a gradually escalating campaign, of twisting the enemy's arm until eventually, so the theory had it, the North Vietnamese leaders would cry uncle."

In other words, the bombing was valued not primarily for its direct contribution to our own military campaign but rather as a pressure to induce the enemy to give up without our having actually defeated him. This strategy converted the war into a test of endurance—a test of North Vietnam's ability to absorb the punishment of our bombing while continuing to fight in the South as against America's ability to withstand the politically debilitating effects of a war with no clear end. We know the result.

IT WAS NOT only the bombing campaign that was aimed at "inducing" Hanoi to quit. In July 1965, Secretary Mc-

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Namara asked Westmoreland how many Allied and American troops were required to "convince the enemy he would be unable to win." A curious formulation of a military equation. Why did the Secretary not simply ask how many troops were needed to win? The same basic formulation was applied to the various bombing halts and holiday truces. All were supposed to send a "message to Hanoi." Westmoreland caustically scorns the concept: "It was all a matter of signals, said the clever civilian theorists in Washington." But it is not sufficient simply to lay the blame on civilians in Washington. Westmoreland himself accepted the major premise that our object was to induce Hanoi to back down. He balked only at the minor premise that Washington civilians should have their fingers on the up-down graduating screw. In the summer of 1965, he was planning "how to keep the South Vietnamese in the fight until the bombing campaign might convince the North Vietnamese to desist . . ." But estimating how the highly politicized Communist leadership in Hanoi will react is a political judgment, and there is no reason to suppose that a civilian expert in Washington would be any less qualified to make such a judgment than a military expert in Saigon.

Apart from graduated response, Westmoreland's book is replete with references to our critical dependence on time. Indeed, shortening time stalked us relentlessly and finally overtook us.

And though circuitous and obscure,

The feet of Nemesis, how sure!

At the Guam Conference in March 1967, General Westmoreland reported, "If the VC organization failed to disintegrate, which I saw as unlikely, and we were unable to find a way to halt North Vietnamese infiltration, *the war could go on indefinitely*" (emphasis added). There were, he tells us, "looks of shock"—but, incredibly, the conference listened to this estimate and then moved on to consider "the basic subject, the organization of the U.S. Mission to assure a coordinated pacification program."

In a public speech at the Waldorf a month later, the General said, "The end is not in sight. . . . We will have to grind him down. In effect we are fighting a war of attrition. The only alternative is a war of annihilation" (emphasis added).

Why? Why were attrition and annihilation the only alternatives? Why could we not have defined the area or space whose independence we intended to defend and then proceed to defend it as we did in Korea? In the Korean War we nearly ran out of space twice and once we took more than we were prepared to defend. But that war was fought in a dimension of space—not time. Time was a secondary dependent variable, a function of our success in winning and holding space. As a result the war in Korea ended much faster than the Vietnam War, and when it ended we and the South Koreans had clearly defined the space we held, space we proved we could hold, would hold—and still hold. Not so in Vietnam, where the war was waged in a dimension of time; when time ran out, space ran out shortly afterward. Why?

Because, beginning in the early 1960s, the doctrine of insurgency and counterinsurgency had completely pervaded our interpretation of the war. A genuine insurgency is waged between opposing social, economic, or political classes vying for control—not seeking to conquer new space. A true insurgency is therefore, in a real sense, a test of endurance. Even though the war in Vietnam was not a true insurgency but a thinly disguised aggression, the concept of counterinsurgency thoroughly conditioned our response. Leading from their own strength, the North Vietnamese launched their attack indirectly through Laos, so that their clandestine entry into South Vietnam would appear to be an insurgency movement, using insurgency tactics. Saturated with the vocabulary and doctrine of insurgency, we responded in kind and thus accepted a test of endurance—a war against time.

In the June 20, 1975 issue of NATIONAL REVIEW, I sug-

gested that "in South Vietnam we responded mainly to Hanoi's simulated insurgency rather than to its real but concealed aggression, as a bull charges the toreador's cape, not the toreador." Hanoi's was an assault of contrived ambiguity and ours was a response of reflexive ambiguity. Hanoi's ambiguity was on two levels, regional and tactical.

On the regional scale, Hanoi introduced the aggression semi-clandestinely through Laos (and later Cambodia), without effective challenge (the air campaign against infiltration through Laos was never decisive). The ambiguity that made this possible flourished under the multi-tiered political canopy of the Laos "settlement" predicated on the 1962 Geneva Accords. This included a Lao troika coalition that did not exist after a few months, under a neutralization that was fictitious from the outset, and a de facto porous partition through which the aggressors entered Laos from the north, then moved under the triple canopy and emerged in the south as Vietcong revolutionaries under the banner of the National Liberation Front.

Someday this will be recognized as one of the most sophisticated political structures of our time—a structure that in effect "processed" an advancing army as it passed from home base through an intervening "neutral" country, and emerged deep in the victim's territory, in the role of a civil insurrection. Our vulnerability to this structure was due to our own failure to perceive that the Ho Chi Minh trail bore the same strategic relation to South Vietnam that Belgium bore to France under German attack in two world wars.

On the tactical level, a fundamental aspect of Communist protracted warfare was overlooked: i.e., that the object of an individual battle is to fight it and only secondarily to win it. An engagement that levels a village, cuts a road, yields hostages to the enemy, or causes civilian deaths contributes to the Communist goal even if the battle is militarily "lost"—even if the guerrillas lose both ground and men. Underlying all the theoretical strategy of Communist "insurgency" as practiced in Vietnam, the effect was progressively to destroy the apparatus of the state—not in the classical Lennineque way, from the top downward, but piece by piece from the bottom upward. Every schoolteacher or policeman assassinated, every boy kidnapped, every battle fought, every city block rocketed destroyed a small cell in the infrastructure of the state and society—upsetting the social order and leaving a tiny vacuum into which the Communists could move at the proper time. The process can be compared to the one by which wood is petrified. Under certain conditions moisture will slowly dissolve the cellulose molecules of wood, one by one, while depositing minerals in their place, so that eventually the whole organic structure has been replaced—the structure has exactly the same form but an entirely different content.

The gradual intensification of large unit warfare in the South served the Communist purpose—even though we "won" most of the battles—by contributing to the destruction of the society we sought to defend. And as that society was destroyed, the Vietcong sought to fill the porous structure. As the result of our efforts to prevent this, the society became increasingly dependent on U.S. forces to the point where it was difficult to accomplish even a gradual shift of strength without creating a new vulnerability to attack. Thus our forces became committed to fighting what appeared to be a "suppression" campaign against an ambiguous and ubiquitous enemy who had the advantage of appearing as a political revolutionary rather than an aggressor.

THE simulated insurgency did not change the real aggression: most of the enemy forces were trained and equipped in North Vietnam and dispatched from there through Laos to South Vietnam. If Hanoi's purpose was to destroy the existing socio-political structure by low-level infiltrated warfare, a logical response would have been to stop the aggressors before they reached their target, i.e., to separate the

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attacker from his victim. This, of course, would have meant stopping them when they were still in their role as aggressors in Laos, not after they had emerged in South Vietnam in their spurious role as insurgents.

The concept of separating the enemy from his victim was fully recognized in counterinsurgency doctrine, and our concepts of pacification included "separating the VC from the people." But the sights of a counterinsurgency are necessarily set low, focused on the hamlet, village, and sometimes provincial levels. The doctrine could not absorb the challenge of a massive clandestine aggression from outside. The only way to have separated the people from such an enemy would have been to separate the whole of South Vietnam from the steady input through Laos and Cambodia. Instead of this, the number of South Vietnamese, American, and other forces was increased steadily to provide security on a lower level and simultaneously to pursue the enemy's large units. We defeated the enemy countless times within South Vietnam, but the steady flow of men and supplies continued while the socio-political erosion exacerbated the problem, causing us to dig in ever more indispensably.

If I may be allowed one personal allusion, I recall one of those Honolulu conferences on ways of increasing the attrition of infiltration through Laos—usually estimated at about 20 per cent. Afterward, I asked General Westmoreland what we would do if the enemy simply increased the infiltration enough to offset the attrition that we inflicted. "We'll just continue to grind them up as we are doing," he replied. The figure of speech was an apt one. Our strategy was sometimes called "a meat grinder." The question was: Who would tire first, he who feeds the machine or he who grinds? And here we come full circle to the test of endurance again, a test that has now been settled. We, the grinders, tired first. And the critical reversal was the Tet offensive of 1968.

THE MAIN THING about the Tet offensive was that it happened. It was a tactical military victory for our side but a devastating political setback because it proved that, in a test of endurance, the other side had more time than we had and that, moreover, our side had no really secure space to fall back on. If Tet proved that the Communists could not take Saigon, hold any provincial capital, or defeat the forces of the U.S. or South Vietnam (and it did), it also proved that after three years of unremitting operations by U.S. forces, including massive air attacks, the enemy was still able to replenish and reinforce from North to South and throw us on the defensive. If it proved that the people and the government of South Vietnam were gaining political strength (and it did), it also proved that the American people were losing their stomach for a war that ground on interminably without securing even the space necessary for a ceasefire line. And on March 31, 1968, Tet also proved that it had administered the final stroke that critically influenced a transfer of power in the most powerful country in the world.

The central issue of the war was to make a clear judgment as to whether what we faced was primarily a South Vietnamese insurgency or a North Vietnamese aggression "processed" to look like an insurgency. If it was primarily an insurgency, we had no business ever sending in U.S. forces. If it was primarily an aggression, our forces could have been most effectively deployed against the aggression where it occurred, not against the subsequent simulated insurgency. But so deeply were we conditioned by the doctrine of "insurgency" that long after we had half a million troops fighting North Vietnamese divisions, we still spoke of "insurgency" and "counterinsurgency." Writing later about the heavy bombing of 1972, General Westmoreland can still speak of the "condition of the insurgency."

Long before that, even before we had any U.S. forces in Vietnam, "counterinsurgency" had become an all-purpose

word to cover situations it could not meet. In the early 1960s, aid programs were recast in the vocabulary of counterinsurgency. Programs were monitored in Washington by the "Special Group—CI," which included Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Assistant Secretary of State Averell Harriman. With such high-level interest, "counterinsurgency" became one of those terms that Tocqueville compares to "a box with a false bottom; you may put in what you please and take it out again without being observed." The phrase was stood on its head and transmuted "to please one faction by the sound and the contending faction by the meaning." To some it sounded like the end of massive retaliation and nuclear confrontation. But to others it meant expanded military assistance and whatever else could be slipped in, from teacher training to arms, resupply, thousands of military advisors, and eventually the deployment of U.S. divisions and other foreign contingents.

We said, and rightly so, that Hanoi was committing aggression against South Vietnam. We launched heavy air attacks against North Vietnam, designed primarily not to stop the aggression, but to induce Hanoi to stop it. At the same time, we committed U.S. ground forces to South Vietnam to suppress a simulated insurgency. In both cases, we committed ourselves to a test of time. Meanwhile, the funnel from North to South Vietnam—the Laos Corridor—continued to function despite harassment.

Our ground forces were progressively increased in line with ad hoc reasoning, always to meet a new immediate need, not to launch a new strategy. Concerning the first deployment of Marines to the air base at Danang, Westmoreland says, "I saw my call for Marines at Danang not as a first step in a growing American commitment but as what I said at the time it was, a way to secure a vital air field . . ." Shortly thereafter he asked for an Army brigade for similar purposes at Bien Hoa and Vung Tau and more Marines for Phu Bai. But still, he recalls, "I fervently hoped—as it turned out, wishfully—that additional American ground troops would prove unnecessary." But they were necessary and at each stage deployment had its own internal rationale arising out of immediate requirements.

Was no consideration given to using some of these ground forces to cut the routes through Laos? Yes, and General Westmoreland seems to have favored the idea. But there was always a greater, more immediate need for each increment of U.S. forces. In one particularly revealing paragraph, we can see starkly how decisive action to separate the enemy from the people and win space was overtaken by the inexorability of a war waged against time. On page 148, the General says:

From the first I contemplated eventually moving into Laos to cut and block the infiltration routes of the Ho Chi Minh trail, and in 1966 and 1967 my staff prepared detailed plans for such an operation. When Henry Cabot Lodge returned to Saigon in the summer of 1965 for another tour as American ambassador, he enthusiastically pressed for the move, and his eventual successor, Ellsworth Bunker, also supported it. Yet I recognized that blocking the trail would require at least a corps-sized force of three divisions, and I would be unable for a long time to spare that many troops from the critical fight within South Vietnam. When at last, in 1968, our strength had increased sufficiently and the enemy had been depleted enough to make the move possible, President Johnson was so beset by war critics that he would take no step that might possibly be interpreted as broadening the war, which he had publicly announced he would not do.

Monday morning quarterbacking is dangerous, but with the advantage of hindsight one cannot help thinking of Napoleon's injunction against carrying out a defective plan. One wishes Westmoreland's book had included an estimate of how many U.S. divisions within South Vietnam might have been rendered unnecessary by the timely commitment of the three divisions the General estimates would have been needed in the Corridor.

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But apparently Westmoreland did not see the issue of blocking Laos as one involving a radical change of strategy or of our concept of the war. To him, the deployment of forces in Laos to insulate South Vietnam from aggression was simply one degree on a graduated scale of pressures against North Vietnam; as such it was to be judged by how much it might reduce the time needed to bring the war to an end. Thus, he was pleased with plans developed for Laos that "would have eliminated the enemy's steady flow of men and supplies through the Laotian Panhandle and would have *materially shortened American involvement in the war*" (emphasis added).

Westmoreland does not discuss the possibility that such a step would have radically changed the war, forcing North Vietnam to come out and fight in the open in the Laotian Panhandle or else abandon the whole effort. The result might have been to create the basis for an effective ceasefire line across Laos, comparable to the DMZ in Korea. It might well have shortened the war by forcing a settlement along lines defining space rather than on the winner-take-all basis that characterizes a war against time. But it would not necessarily have shortened the American military involvement, which might have continued along a ceasefire line as it has in Korea.

Somehow the issue of blocking reinforcements through Laos got tangled up with another issue, that of obtaining other foreign troop contingents. There was much talk and planning for a multinational force south of the DMZ, but time consumed this idea too. Westmoreland reports that when Australia and Korea agreed to send troops, he saw the possibility of a multinational force for the DMZ, "but for the time being [I] bowed to a more pressing need elsewhere." He revived the idea in July 1966 but it was rejected. He then makes the following curious remark: "I still believe that using such force would have had worldwide psychological impact helpful in countering North Vietnamese refusal to admit that North Vietnamese troops were inside South Vietnam." An idea that would have been a radical change of strategy from a war based on time to one based on space was being measured by the incidental or peripheral advantages it might have had in a war of attrition.

In December 1967 and January 1968, American forces began to move in preparation for a series of operations code-named YORK, designed to sweep to the Laotian border opposite the four northern provinces of South Vietnam. By these operations, Westmoreland tells us, he expected "to set the stage for the invasion of Laos that I hoped a new Administration in Washington would approve and possibly an amphibious hook around the DMZ à la the Inchon landing in Korea." Since a new Administration would not come into office for another year, there was apparently no urgency about moving into Laos. But a few weeks later, Tet happened and everything was overtaken—not only YORK, but the plans for Laos. And in the end, time overtook the United States.

YET, on finishing the book, one has the feeling that even today, General Westmoreland is perplexed as to what happened and why. In a rather wistful paragraph on page 410 he looks backward and says:

Yet, even with the handicap of graduated response, the war still could have been brought to a favorable end following defeat of the enemy's Tet offensive in 1968. The United States had in South Vietnam at that time the finest military force—though not the largest—ever assembled. Had President Johnson changed our strategy and taken advantage of the enemy's weakness to enable me to carry out the operations we had planned over the preceding two years in Laos and Cambodia and north of the DMZ, along with intensified bombing and the mining of Haiphong Harbor, the North Vietnamese doubtlessly would have broken. But that was not to be. Press and television had created an aura not of victory but of

THE RETIRED OFFICER JUNE 1976 (23)**Recruiting Advertising**

THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE says military spending for recruit advertising, up from \$7 million to \$96.1 million in four years, has made only a modest contribution to the all-volunteer force.

GAO told the Congress that the individual services "may be only competing with each other" in their expensive advertising campaigns.

In its report, GAO said a single ad campaign aimed at recruiting for all services rather than four separate ones would be cheaper and less duplicative. The services in the past have contended that each has different things to offer that might appeal to a potential recruit, and that they must be permitted to communicate their own needs to meet manpower requirements.

Another area of duplication, GAO said, is in mailing to high school seniors "Over 8.5 million pieces of direct mail were sent to male high school seniors last year, indicating that each student may have received up to six or more letters," they said.

GAO also said that recruiting advertising has done little to change civilian attitudes toward the military in the last four years.

According to DoD, personnel recruiting costs, which includes advertising and the operation of Armed Forces Examination and Entrance Stations, have increased from about \$140 million in FY 1970 to a current level of approximately \$500 million. This funding level, excluding future inflation, is expected to be adequate to attract the 400 to 450 thousand recruits required annually for the next five years. However, DoD says, more money may be needed if the unemployment rate drops or elimination of G.I. Bill benefits make recruiting more difficult.

defeat, which, coupled with the vocal anti-war elements, profoundly influenced timid officials in Washington. It was like two boxers in a ring, one having the other on the ropes, close to a knockout, when the apparent winner's second inexplicably throws in the towel.

One can sympathize with the frustration of a loyal, honest military leader over the tragedy that befell his mission. One can also sympathize with his dismay over the jackal-like behavior of certain elements in the U.S. who relished the spectacle of their country in distress. But in a democratic country we cannot separate the armed forces in the field from the population at home; there can be no dichotomy between the military force as the fighter and the homefront as the "second." An American armed force is part of the nation and the nation is in the force. No "second" threw in the towel. The referee—a bearded and bent old man in a white cloak leaning on a stick—intervened and called, "Time."

Epilogue

Even so, the American people allowed another four years of time in which to phase out U.S. forces while building up the South Vietnamese. But the corridor through Laos continued to function for the passage of North Vietnamese divisions. Having waged a war against a simulated insurgency in a dimension of time, rather than against an aggression in a dimension of space, we could not impose a ceasefire line like the Korean DMZ. So, when our forces left, time raced very fast indeed.

The final North Vietnamese victory of 1974-75, of course, was beyond General Westmoreland's scope of command or responsibility and is beyond the scope of his book. But it is safe to say that, had the war been waged for space, not time, and had the route of aggression through Laos been closed off, neither the Tet offensive nor the disaster of 1975 could have happened. □

FRIDAY MORNING, 11 JUNE 1976

A030

P 1

PM-LEBANON SKED 6-11

EDITORS: UPI COMMUNICATIONS WITH BEIRUT HAVE BEEN CUT SINCE THURSDAY AFTERNOON. THE FOLLOWING STORY INCORPORATES OUR LATEST INFORMATION FROM LEBANON.

BY UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

PALESTINIAN OFFICIALS IN CAIRO CHARGED THURSDAY THAT SYRIAN FORCES ROCKETED SECTIONS OF BEIRUT AND A PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMP, VIOLATING AN UNOFFICIAL TRUCE THAT TEMPORARILY HAD STILLED FIGHTING ON LEBANON'S FOUR WAR FRONTS.

AT THE SAME TIME, ARAB LEAGUE OFFICIALS MET IN THE EGYPTIAN CAPITAL TO BEGIN ASSEMBLING A 4,500-MAN JOINT ARAB FORCE TO POLICE A LEBANESE CEASE-FIRE.

CAIRO NEWSPAPERS SAID LIBYA AND ALGERIA -- TWO OF SIX CONTRIBUTORS TO THE JOINT SCHEME -- ALREADY HAVE BEGUN SENDING TROOPS TO DAMASCUS, FROM WHERE THEY WOULD BE TRANSFERRED SOON TO LEBANON.

BUT ARAB DIPLOMATS SAID THEY FEARED SYRIAN REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM LEBANON AND FIERCE OPPOSITION FROM LEBANON'S LAMEDUCK PRESIDENT COULD SCUTTLE THE FORCE.

ADDING TO THE APPREHENSION WERE REPORTS FROM BEIRUT, DISTRIBUTED BY PALESTINIAN OFFICIALS IN CAIRO, OF A SUDDEN FLARE-UP OF FIGHTING BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND SYRIAN FORCES LATE THURSDAY NEAR BEIRUT AIRPORT.

THE OFFICIALS SAID SYRIAN FORCES ROCKETED SECTIONS OF THE CAPITAL AND THE REFUGEE CAMP OF BORJ AL PARAJNEH AND SEVERAL SYRIAN GUNBOATS APPEARED OFF THE COAST OF BEIRUT.

EARLIER THURSDAY, FIGHTING SUBSIDED THROUGHOUT LEBANON ALTHOUGH ALL SIDES INSISTED THERE WAS NO FORMAL CEASE-FIRE.

PALESTINIAN, LEFTIST AND INDEPENDENT SOURCES ALL SAID THE KEY ISSUE HOLDING UP A FORMAL CEASE-FIRE WAS THE ISSUE OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

PALESTINIAN AND LEFTIST LEADERS HAVE DEMANDED A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN TROOPS, WHICH SYRIAN PRESIDENT HAFEZ ASSAD HAS REJECTED, THE SOURCES SAID.

ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY-GENERAL MAHMOUD RIAD, IGNORING THE LATEST DIFFICULTIES, DECLARED A MILITARY MISSION WOULD TRAVEL TO DAMASCUS WITHIN 48 HOURS TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE JOINT FORCE.

THE DECISION TO SET UP THE FORCE -- TO BE DRAWN FROM LIBYA, ALGERIA, SAUDI ARABIA, SUDAN, SYRIA AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION -- WAS APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY THURSDAY BY AN EMERGENCY CONFERENCE OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS.

LEBANESE PRESIDENT SULEIMAN FRANJIEH, A CHRISTIAN, REACTED BY VOWING TO FIGHT ANY ARAB PEACEKEEPING FORCE "WITH ALL OUR MEANS AND RESOURCES."

FRANJIEH, WHO HAS REFUSED TO RESIGN AND LET PRESIDENT-ELECT ELIAS SARKIS TAKE OFFICE, SAID LEBANON WAS NOT INVITED TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT BE BOUND BY ANY DECISIONS REACHED AT THE MEETING.

IN TEL AVIV, GOVERNMENT SOURCES SAID ISRAEL COULD ACCEPT A "SYMBOLIC" JOINT ARAB PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN LEBANON IF IT DID NOT THREATEN ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

THE SOURCES SAID ISRAEL WOULD BASE ITS POLICY TOWARD LEBANON ON CONSIDERATIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERVENING ONLY IF IT FELT THREATENED.

CLASHES BETWEEN SYRIANS AND LEFTISTS IN THE RUGGED CENTRAL MOUNTAINS 12 MILES EAST OF THE CAPITAL, AROUND THE ANCIENT SOUTHERN PORT OF SIDON AND ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF NORTHERN TRIPOLI DIED DOWN THURSDAY AFTER A DAY OF DEADLY ARTILLERY DUELS.

IN BEIRUT, RIGHTIST AND LEFTIST HEAVY GUNS FELL STILL AFTER FIERCE OVERNIGHT EXCHANGES.

UPI 06-11 03:23 AED

THIRD SUMMARY-TAKE 3

APB041

036

(MEXICO CITY) -- SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER IS SCHEDULED TO HOLD TALKS FRIDAY WITH PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA (EH-CHEH-VAY-REE'-AH) AND OTHER MEXICAN OFFICIALS. THE DISCUSSIONS IN MEXICO CITY ARE TO CENTER ON GLOBAL AND WESTERN HEMISPHERE ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE TREATMENT OF AMERICANS HELD IN MEXICAN JAILS.

MORE THAN 500 U-S CITIZENS CURRENTLY ARE IMPRISONED IN MEXICO, MOSTLY ON DRUG CHARGES. AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS SUBSTANTIATED ABOUT 250 COMPLAINTS OF MISTREATMENT. KISSINGER ARRIVED IN MEXICO CITY THURSDAY NIGHT FOLLOWING VISITS TO SEVERAL OTHER LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS.

02:22AED 06-11-76

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Foreign Policy After Kissinger

By ROBERT KEATLEY

WASHINGTON — As he meanders abroad these days, Henry Kissinger tries to convince friends and allies that U.S. foreign policy won't change much during the next four years—no matter what would-be Presidents are saying back home in America.

To the degree that successful prophecy is possible, he most likely is right. And, in large measure, he is also responsible.

If the Secretary of State is anything these days, he is controversial. Yet, despite all the political furor, it can be argued that Mr. Kissinger has set the main lines of American diplomacy for the years just ahead, when he will probably be gone. He has established basic policies which the President elected in November—be he Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford or even Ronald Reagan—will find difficult, even undesirable, to change significantly. While some of these approaches aren't fundamentally different from those which Mr. Kissinger inherited nearly eight years ago, others have been modified greatly during his term as chief U.S. diplomatic operator.

"Any future foreign policy must be affected by what Kissinger did, and by what outlines for the future he will leave," concedes a historian who is at best a lukewarm admirer of the Secretary.

The narrow range of available options may explain why this presidential campaign has heard little serious debate about foreign policy. Most candidates promise to do things better rather than make fundamental changes. Even the conservative Mr. Reagan says he is in favor of détente and, except when talking about the Panama Canal, doesn't depart significantly from existing policies. Thus it seems unlikely these will change much in the post-Kissinger period.

This prospect doesn't mean the Secretary has directed foreign affairs with anything like perfection. Even close aides agree he has made serious mistakes and misjudgments, more than he cares to admit. He greatly underestimated the restlessness of Vietnamese Communists and overestimated U.S. capabilities against them. He has only begun considering some important issues—such as black African aspirations and most economic matters—rather late in his tenure. Closer attention earlier might have minimized or even prevented some problems, such as Angola, aides suggest.

A Sense of Direction

But Mr. Kissinger has given American foreign policy an overall sense of direction and purpose which were sadly lacking in the years preceding his arrival here. America's diplomacy then was dominated by Indochina wars, which Washington found increasingly expensive to fight and difficult to justify. Occasional stabs at other issues were tried; among these was the first serious U.S. effort at strategic arms control. However, the 1960s in general were not notable for diplomatic innovation and enlightened strategic thinking.

That situation changed for the better, though, during the Kissinger years with Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. What Henry Kissinger calls "conceptual thinking" began—an effort to analyze what was possible and desirable in foreign policy. (It's an effort for which Mr. Nixon doesn't get proper credit, thanks to the crimes and follies of that peculiar man in other fields.) Some new directions became clear.

The assumptions behind them included the realization that America's world power was declining in relative terms. This was due less to United States weakness than to increasing influence of the Soviet Union and China, among others, and the growing complexity of international relations, including the need to deal with Third World and OPEC nations. America's ability to

lead, and its desire to do so, ebbed together.

Most of all, the change was caused by the Russians' attainment of true superpower status. Not only did Moscow increase its numbers of guns and missiles but it expanded its ability to project this strength abroad via airlift and seafight. It also showed expanding economic strength, despite farm problems and general inefficiency at home. As Mr. Kissinger says repeatedly, there was no way for the U.S. to prevent this increase of power, for it reflected domestic decisions and national resources of the Soviet Union. The American task now, he maintains, is to limit ways this power is used.

From such considerations, and many others, has evolved the foreign policy outline which the next President will inherit. A brief look at its main features indicates little scope for fundamental departures, however much tinkering with details is ordered.

He has established basic policies which the President elected in November—be he Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford or even Ronald Reagan—will find difficult, even undesirable, to change significantly.

DETENTE. Democrats often complain, a bit sourly, they began that policy long before Mr. Kissinger moved into the White House back in 1969. They're right, of course, but in recent years the effort to get along better with the rival superpower has taken more coherent form. A mix of carrots and sticks has been devised to try to bring the Soviets into more civil discourse with the Western world. The Russian intervention in Angola proves it doesn't always work, and the policy suffered from Nixon-Kissinger overkill in earlier years.

Yet there seems to be no escape from it. A relationship of mutual restraint appears to be the only alternative to dangerous confrontation, and the next President must act accordingly. He may be a "better bargainer," as many candidates promise, and he may prevent detente from "being a one-way street," as some sloganize.

But the policy hasn't worked all that badly to date. Among other things, Moscow has shown restraint in the Middle East and Berlin, and the U.S. has benefited from last year's grain sales accord with Russia. As a thoughtful article by Daniel Yergin in *The New Republic* concluded recently, "When the rhetoric and the outrage subside, we will see that detente is deserving of some modest praise and further effort."

STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL. This is the single most important aspect of Soviet-American relations, and one which any administration must continue—or run great risks. One useful, if oversold, agreement has been completed and another is nearly finished—stalled for 1976 by politics. The next President can tinker with the numbers, and demand more or accept less, but he is unlikely to abandon the sophisticated and comprehensive approach developed in recent years. That system will be part of the Kissinger legacy even if others bring off more significant results.

CHINA. Official U.S. policy is to seek full diplomatic relations with Peking, and will remain so; even Mr. Reagan says he wants improved ties with mainland China, though of course he worries more about the welfare of the Nationalists on Taiwan than do his political rivals. During 1977, it seems probable, the U.S. will recognize the Communist government, derecognize the Nationalists and sever the military treaty with Taiwan but also pledge to help keep the peace in the Taiwan area—partly by

selling defensive weapons to the island government.

These changes would have little immediate practical effect on Taiwan, and would bring only symbolic improvements in U.S. relations with Peking. But they would complete a process which enables the U.S. and China, for separate reasons, to conduct parallel policies in areas where both worry about the Russians. As with SALT negotiations, the need to continue seems inescapable.

THE MIDEAST. When Mr. Kissinger came to Washington, he knew little about that region. For him, it was another arena for Soviet-American rivalry, with the U.S. backing its Israeli clients and the Russians backing their Arab clients. But he learned otherwise, and American policy changed, perhaps irrevocably.

Now the Secretary sees the basic point: rival nationalisms are at work in the region, with the great powers serving as accessories. Thus Washington now tries to deal with specific Mideast issues in an "even-handed" way, to Israel's discomfort. Step-by-step diplomacy may be dead, and the amount and manner of future U.S. involvement can vary, but the next President, it would seem, must persevere with peacemaking. If new wars and oil boycotts are to be avoided, there can be no reversion to the Mideast policies of the 1960s.

U.S. ALLIES. There have been notable ups and downs in Washington's relations with them during recent years, including a foolish confrontation with France on energy and other issues and several Nixon shocks for Japan. But many observers think—as Mr. Kissinger claims—that relations with the main allies are as good now as they have ever been. There seems to be wider recognition of the basic interests which bind the industrial nations together, and less stress on the minor issues which separate them. The extra emphasis on interdependence, particularly in the economic area, seems sure to continue—as most presidential contenders promise it will.

For years, Mr. Kissinger was criticized for ignoring friends in his eagerness to hobnob with adversaries, and with some justification. But he is now a convert to close alliances in practice as well as theory, and he will leave behind a web of cozy relationships the next Chief Executive will find useful.

THE POOR NATIONS. Meeting their need for help may be the greatest frustration in foreign affairs these days. The world's poor states demand that the rich alleviate their problems. Yet they issue incoherent and conflicting demands, colored by often-fuzzy ideology. They don't like what they're offered but aren't totally clear about what they want.

However, these aren't demands which the rich can ignore safely, and for the first time U.S. policy recognizes the need to deal with fundamental economic relations between the rich and the poor—and by means other than conventional foreign aid. Though Mr. Kissinger came to this position only recently, he will leave the next President with a commitment to take action, though not a successful program as yet.

There can and will be infinite variations on these policy themes. Washington can be more or less nasty to the Russians, more or less flexible on arms control, more or less forthcoming on foreign trade, and so forth. But these are the topics which any future President will continue to find inescapable as he ponders the world scene.

And he will find what Mr. Kissinger calls "America's permanent interests" will prevent him from taking major detours from the road maps the present Secretary of State will leave behind.

Mr. Keatley, a member of the Journal's Washington bureau, covers foreign affairs.

FRIDAY MORNING, 11 JUNE 1976

BOSTON GLOBE

10 JUNE 1976, Pg 1 (11)

Boston probe set by US in sales of meat to Army

By Stephen Wermiel
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—A Federal grand jury in Boston will soon begin looking into allegations of fraud and bribery in Army meat purchasing and inspection procedures.

The probe is being run by the Justice Department Criminal Division in Washington, but the focus is on practices in the Boston meat-packing industry—the subject of three days of Senate subcommittee hearings last month.

The grand jury presentation which sources here said could start as early as next week will be handled by James T. Graham of the Justice Department here with assistance from the office of US Atty. James Gabriel in Boston.

A Federal grand jury in New Haven, Conn., had already heard testimony from witnesses on the same subject, according to several sources, but the "extensive transactions" in the Boston area have prompted a shift in focus for the investigation.

On May 10, 12 and 13, a Senate subcommittee heard a string of allegations involving the payment of bribes to military meat inspectors by the owners of G and G Packing Co. in Roxbury, who were using low grade cuts to fill military orders for top quality beef.

Other testimony from Ferdinand (Fred) Romano, one-time manager of the now defunct G and G, outlined allegations of a price-fixing scheme between G and G owners and another Boston firm, State Beef Co. of South Boston, which enabled the two firms to both win and increase the value of military contracts for diced beef.

NEW YORK TIMES 11 JUNE 1976, Pg 20

SENATORS TO LOOK AT ACADEMY CASE

By JAMES FERON

A subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee announced yesterday that it would begin hearings later this month in Washington on the operation and possible abuse of the West Point honor code. Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia and chairman of the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, said the hearings would begin June 21 and include testimony from officials and cadets at the United States Military Academy.

He said the subcommittee also would "examine in detail the operation of the honor codes at all of the military academies." Senator Nunn said later that the aim was to determine if the code "can be made more compatible with reality."

"The question is not whether to discard the honor code, but whether it can be properly enforced, whether it is being properly enforced and who is responsible for the latest abuses of the code," the Senator said.

The decision to conduct Congressional hearings stems from a growing controversy over the role of the honor code in a cheating scandal at West Point.

It began with the discovery by faculty members of widespread collusion on a graded electrical engineering home assignment in March. Cadets among the first 48 second classmen, or juniors, to be accused complained that prosecution by publicity-conscious Academy officials had been selective and minimal.

Led by Sen. Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.) and Sen. Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.), the subcommittee heard testimony that the owners of G and G Packing and Blue Ribbon Frozen Foods in Hamden, Conn. were substituting a lesser cut of beef called knuckle for top sirloin in filling military contracts and were using ungraded cattle and passing these off as US Department of Agriculture (USDA) choice.

The two owners, unrelated, are Harry Goldberg and Frank Goldberg, both of suburban New Haven.

Testimony alleged both co-owners were aware of cash bribes paid to a military inspector and a civilian employee of the Army Veterinary Inspection Service in Boston to look the other way as the military contracts were filled. Other former inspectors told of gratuities received

Results of New Inquiry

A new inquiry has since produced more than 100 additional suspects, as well as charges by a larger number of cadets and their Army lawyers that "hundreds" more were involved in the casually and seemingly acceptable exchange of what the cadets said was more an exercise than a test.

The inquiry is expected to be welcomed by those cadets who have sought for the last two months to encourage Congressional interest in what they felt had been an attempt by West Point to obscure a growing dispute over the role of the code.

Declaring that "a cadet will not lie, cheat or steal, nor tolerate those who do," the code is enforced by cadets at its preliminary stages. Critics have argued that it is selectively and unfairly administered, often without regard to due process of law.

Senator Nunn, a grandnephew of former Representative Carl Vinson, who was chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said, "It is important to determine if the Army is going about the investigation of the honor code violations in the right way." He added:

"We want to hear from the Secretary of the Army [Martin R. Hoffmann] and others about what they plan to do about it."

Secretary Hoffmann last month rejected a request by 10 Army lawyers at West Point for an outside inquiry into the Academy's conduct in the cheating scandal.

The Secretary said later that a review of the code might be in order, but that any investigation would remain within the military establishment.

from Romano such as paid weekends on Cape Cod and in New Hampshire, perfume, free liquor and suits of clothing.

Romano was eventually granted "use immunity" by the subcommittee but only after a sealed packet of information was turned over to the Justice Department on April 28. The immunity means Romano's testimony in public at the subcommittee hearings cannot be used to prosecute him.

But sources here say virtually all the testimony given by Romano in public was previously obtained through investigation and placed in the sealed packet for Justice Department use.

There remains an unanswered question of whether the Justice Department will grant Romano immunity for the grand jury probe or end his immunity now and leave him open to possible prosecution.

BALTIMORE SUN

11 JUNE 1976

Pg 2

Rebels open new front in Rhodesia

Salisbury, Rhodesia (AP)—A band of black nationalist guerrillas entered Rhodesia from neighboring Zambia, opening up a second front in their fight against the white minority regime, a government spokesman said yesterday.

The Rhodesian defense minister, Pieter Van der Byl, said 1,300 black guerrillas had previously crossed into the country from Mozambique.

"More are going to come in and are getting ready to come in and will come in," Mr. Van der Byl warned.

He said the blacks operating from Zambia were responsible for the explosion that damaged three aircraft at a remote airstrip near the Zambian border over the weekend.

Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda announced recently his government would let the guerrillas operate from Zambian territory.

Rhodesian security forces said yesterday four African children were killed when their toy cart detonated a mine. The announcement also said guerrillas burned several huts at a government-protected village, the first successful attack on a fenced and protected town.

The government said three more guerrillas and one Rhodesian soldier have been killed in fighting since June 7, bringing the total for the month to 38 guerrillas and 4 soldiers.

Swiss authorities said they were considering halting all exports to Rhodesia.

WASHINGTON POST

11 JUNE 1976, Pg 21

Moscow Outlines Troop-Cut Proposal

VIENNA, June 10 (UPI)—The Soviet Union today presented a "major new initiative" on reducing forces in central Europe, that apparently still fell short of meeting the West's criteria for an ultimate balance.

A Soviet spokesman declined to give details of the proposal presented on behalf of the Warsaw Pact states, but he said it contained additions to previous proposals introduced by the East bloc.

The Warsaw Pact previously has insisted on equal percentage reductions of forces and weapons by all participants, but the West said this would perpetuate the current preponderance of Soviet-led forces in the area.

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NEW YORK TIMES

11 JUNE 1976
Pg 9

U.S. CHALLENGED OVER INDIA BLAST

By DAVID BURNHAM

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 10—Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff said today that there were "strong indications" that despite public assurances to the contrary, the United States supplied India with material essential to its detonation of a nuclear device.

Mr. Ribicoff said that investigators for the Senate Government Operations Committee, which he heads, had discovered that the United States had supplied India with 21 tons of heavy water, an essential ingredient for enabling a reactor, supplied by Canada, to transform natural uranium into plutonium. Natural uranium is not directly suitable as a nuclear explosive and plutonium is.

The State Department, in response to inquiries from Senator Ribicoff, acknowledged that the heavy water had been provided but contended that it had been used up four years before the explosion, in 1974.

"Serious Questions"

Senator Ribicoff, Democrat of Connecticut, said that the role of the United States in the Indian nuclear explosion "raises serious questions about our intentions to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons capability around the world." The Ribicoff committee recently approved a bill designed to tighten control over American export of nuclear equipment and material.

The Senator said in a prepared statement that the explosion, in May 1974, "was a turning point in world history, marking the first time that a nation applied peaceful nuclear technology—in this case, a research reactor and heavy water—to set off a nuclear explosion."

"The United States, he went on, "never publicly acknowledged exporting the heavy water to India. Instead, U.S. officials said only that Canada supplied the research reactor used by India to produce plutonium for its explosion."

Kissinger Disavowed Cited

On June 17, 1974, according to the Senate committee staff, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said that "the Indian nuclear explosion occurred with material that was diverted not from an American reactor under American safeguards but from a Canadian reactor that did not have appropriate safeguards."

Senator Ribicoff said that there was "considerable evidence that the American heavy water was the material used to make the plutonium for the explosion."

Last May 18, after long negotiations, the Canadian Government announced that it had decided to make permanent its suspension of nuclear cooperation with India as a result of the 1974 explosion.

New Shipment Waits Ruling

A decision by the United States on whether to permit the

WASHINGTON POST

11 JUNE 1976, Pg 18

CIA, Not Mercenaries Target of Angola Trial

By Rubin Wright

Special to The Washington Post

LISBON, June 10—"The Americans, they are nothing . . . We are not out to get them, only the people who sent them in."

In saying this, Rui Monteiro, Angolan prosecutor for the trial of 13 foreign mercenaries in Luanda, zeroed in on the government purpose in holding the trial, which has become a media event in Angola, even overshadowing coverage of the new nation's first election, two weeks from now.

The real "verdict" at the end of the tribunal is expected to be a strong warning to Western powers—issued in the name of all new and "progressive" governments—that they can no longer expect to be able to promote their systems or sympathizers through military involvement and mercenary troops.

The 13 mercenaries, including three Americans, were captured in the last days of the Angolan civil war which pitted the pro-Soviet Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola against two pro-Western groups. As to the Americans, Monteiro said, "They were there only a few days and committed no atrocities. One is a baby." Technically all are threatened with death sentences.

Perhaps the most ominous sign of the tone of the event is the official attitude toward the foreign press.

London Daily Telegraph reporter Gerald Kemp was officially reprimanded by Angolan Director of Information Luisa de Almeida, yesterday, for an editorial his paper ran on the trial.

The authorities resent any charges that the tribunal will be a "show" affair. They have struggled to give it legitimacy by inviting the foreign press to attend, allowing an American lawyer to defend two of the mercenaries and a British official to witness the trial, and by establishing an international commission of inquiry to ob-

serve the event and afterward write a report on the mercenary phenomenon."

The government asked me to testify at the trial about information I obtained when I spent four days with the mercenaries in San Antonio do Zaire in early February. One of them, Derek Barker of Aldershot, England, is among the 13 going on trial Friday.

"It gives special credibility to the evidence to hear from a Western journalist who saw them in action," the state prosecutor explained during one of three interviews when he demanded my testimony.

I refused, on grounds that I went to Angola as a journalist, not as a participant, and that it would break the journalists' code of professional ethics to get involved in an event I was covering. I added that all the information I had was published and on public record.

On Tuesday, four days after the third interview I was arrested and detained for 28 hours by the secret police, the DISA, who tried to intimidate me into giving testimony.

The DISA official who interrogated me for four hours yesterday used several tactics to coerce agreement. At first, he said the government was still considering pressing charges against me for being with the mercenaries and that they believed I was an American intelligence agent.

He said I could bargain for my freedom on 14 by testifying. I refused.

He also said I would be released if I agreed to provide regular intelligence reports to his office on developments in the United States and the southern African countries I cover. I refused.

The official, who would not divulge his name, then said he would let me see the entire seven volumes of evidence if I agreed to verify the material with which I was charged. I refused.

The official, who would not divulge his name, then

said he would let me see the entire seven volumes of evidence if I agreed to verify was familiar. I refused again.

At that point he abruptly left the room without telling me my status or how much longer I would be detained.

Before my return to Luanda, officials of the victorious Popular Movement for the Liberation were aware that I had reported from the north on the alleged execution of 14 British mercenaries by mercenary commander "Colonel Callan," the war name of Cyprus-born Costas Georgiou. One MPLA official even congratulated me on the story shortly after my arrival June 1.

There was never any attempt to harm me bodily. I was allowed a meal from the Tropic Hotel, for which I had to pay. I was even allowed to call my parents in Michigan when I expressed concern about how the news of my detention would affect my father's heart condition. I was expelled early this morning.

The best explanation for the action my have come from the MPLA army commander who escorted me to the airport—and who led the attack on San Antonio do Zaire.

"This trial is very important to us and our progressive allies," he said. "At the most important time, when we are trying to etch the big powers that they cannot force their ways on new nations through military aid to our enemies or mercenaries, you refused to help verify the facts."

"That weakens our case in the eyes of the people we are trying to send a message to. If you won't help us tell the truth, we can't let you stay."

That message was clear. The Angolan government plans to make a strong case and wants nothing to stand in the way.

Far from centering on specific criminal charges against 13 individuals, the trial will pointedly focus on "mercenaryism"—foreign intervention. It will be a political trial, Almeida admitted this week, "with a message your people should listen to."

export of 40,000 pounds of uranium to India is pending before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The proposal to approve the shipment was challenged in March by representatives of three environmental groups

who said it would be "inimical to the interests of the United States" and could endanger "the health and the safety of the public."

In response to this challenge, the commission agreed to hold

hearings on the proposed shipment to allow the groups—the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club and the Union of Concerned Scientists—to state their objections. Those hearings are scheduled for July 20.

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE 11 JUNE 1976 Pg. 6

300 POWs held in Laos, detective says he was told

GRAND RAPIDS, Mich. [AP]—A private detective says he was offered the chance to ransom two American prisoners of war from Laos two years ago and was told then that up to 300 others might be held in the Asian country.

Theodore R. Grevers, who runs the Fatman International Detective Agency, said he decided to talk about his secret mission after North Viet Nam insisted this week that it no longer holds any Americans captive.

Grevers said he agrees the North Vietnamese probably have no American prisoners. "I believe they are in Laos near the Chinese border," he said.

THE DETECTIVE said he met three times in May, 1974, with Pathet Lao officials in Vientiane, Laos, before negotiations broke off after the American Embassy there learned about them.

"It just died because I was no longer private," Grevers said about the negotiations he said he conducted with a woman and three men he would not identify. He said the woman was the wife of Pragna Khamsouk Keola, vice chairman of the Pathet Lao Party and of the then newly formed National Coalition Political Council in Laos.

Grevers said he was told he could ransom two Americans for \$225,000. Later, there were indications others might be freed without ransom, he said.

"They had almost a burning desire to negotiate with someone who had the ability to unburden them from the care of these POWs in an honorable, private, nongovernment manner," Grevers said.

THE 200 TO 300 Americans Grevers said he was told about purportedly were at four camps, in the Plain of Jars, near Samneua, and in northern Laos near China.

The Pentagon currently lists 816 Americans missing in Indochina.

Besides Americans, Grevers said he heard the Pathet Lao was holding 600 or 700 Thai prisoners, who he said may have been mercenaries hired to fight in Laos by the Central Intelligence Agency.

During negotiations, Grevers said he wrote a letter to Keola, who was also private secretary to Prince Souphanouvong, seeking release of all American POWs on humanitarian grounds. He said Mrs. Keola told him she was touched by his letter.

ANOTHER SESSION was scheduled 10 days later in Thailand, where Keola was to meet Grevers and arrange a direct appeal to Souphanouvong.

"I was told that if the prince could be convinced of my sincerity, the request likely would have been granted," Grevers said.

But before that meeting, Grevers said he received a private note at his hotel in Vientiane from an American Embassy official indicating his mission was known. After that, he said, the Pathet Lao severed contact.

Grevers was in the news last year when his long-standing claim that a Navy plane with 10 men aboard was downed in the Baltic in April, 1950, was confirmed by the Pentagon. His agency has offices in Los Angeles, Detroit, Zurich, and Hong Kong.

WASH POST 11 JUNE

U.S.-Philippine Talks

MANILA, June 11 (UPI)—The United States and the Philippines will resume negotiations on a new military bases agreement Tuesday, the Foreign Office announced today.

WASHINGTON POST 11 JUNE 1976 Pg. 18

Vietnam Says Former Foes Will Be Tried

BANGKOK, June 10 (UPI)

—South Vietnam will bring to trial "lackeys for the U.S. imperialists" and other past and present enemies of the Communist government, official Vietnamese reports said today.

Hanoi and Saigon Radios and the two official press agencies of Vietnam spoke for the first time of retaliation against opponents.

A policy statement signed by South Vietnamese President Huynh Tan Phat on May 25 pledged that those convicted "will be severely punished."

The broadcasts said that 95 per cent of former soldiers and civil servants who had reported for re-education have been released from the camps and have recovered full citizenship rights, although many will be subjected to surveillance for six months and more.

Some 40,000 still in the camps will have to remain there for at least three years, according to the announcement.

At least 32 former generals are known to be in the camps, along with senior civil servants and senior and junior officers who performed intelligence, propaganda and infantry duties against the Communists during the war. Describing those who will be tried, the statement said:

"These people deliberately served as lackeys for the U.S. imperialists, opposed the revolution and relied on the power of reactionaries to exploit, plunder, oppress and kill people and enrich themselves on the blood and bones of our compatriots."

The statement said they include:

- Those in re-education camps who served with pro-American governments and who do not repent their

anti-Communist feelings

- Former Communist troops and officials who had defected to the Americans or the Saigon government.

- "Those who committed many crimes against the people and dangerous chief evil-doers who incurred many blood debts."

- Persons still involved in the anti-Communist resistance.

- Anti-Communist refugees who fled in the American evacuation and who returned to Vietnam.

This last category apparently includes at least some of the 1,531 Vietnamese who returned to Vietnam last October from Guam. It excludes "those who went astray (or) became panicky," left Vietnam and who now wish to return, the statement said.

Also slated to undergo "appropriate punishment" are Vietnamese who are caught trying to flee the Communist nation.

Until now, government officials had stressed forgiveness toward those who had worked for the pro-American government.

Reporters in South Vietnam, who were ordered to leave just a month ago, had been unable to document any case of revenge killing by the new authorities during their first year in power in Saigon.

Meanwhile, 19 Vietnamese rescued from a sinking fishing boat in the South China Sea May 28 arrived in Hong Kong today and the immigration department granted them a one-month stay "on humanitarian grounds." Seven claimed to have friends or relatives in the United States and three said they had relatives in Hong Kong.

WASHINGTON POST 11 JUNE 1976 Pg. 24

Six More Guilty at West Point

WEST POINT, N.Y., June 10—Officer boards sitting at courts at the U.S. Military Academy have found six more cadets guilty in the current cheating scandal, officials reported.

In New York, a federal judge, rejecting an accused cadet's motion, refused Wednesday to halt the proceedings.

Maj. F. W. Smullen, the academy spokesman, said Wednesday a board of five Army officers returned the latest findings Tuesday night. He said hearings for two more cadets were postponed.

The board recommended that the six cadets be expelled.

Another board had returned a similar finding against two cadets and had cleared one.

The decisions leave 155 cadets awaiting hearings by officer-cadet internal review panels. Four cadets resigned rather than fight the charges.

A third board began taking evidence and hearing witnesses today. Officials have said several boards may meet simultaneously as the summer goes on.

A motion for a preliminary injunction against the investigation was rejected Wednesday by U.S. District Court Judge Richard Owen on the grounds that the accused cadets have not exhausted their administrative remedies.

Cadet Timothy Ringgold, a 23-year-old junior from Arizona, filed the complaint earlier this month. He says the honor code should be abolished because it deprives cadets of their right to due process.

The honor code states that "a cadet will not lie, cheat or steal, or tolerate those who do." Those charged with violations by cadet honor committee panels are asked to resign.

In Washington, a Senate Armed Services subcommittee announced it will hold hearings beginning June 21 on the reported cheating by cadets.

Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, said the hearings also will examine the operation of the honor code system at all the service academies.

FRIDAY MORNING, 11 JUNE 1976

**COST
(CONTINUED)**

shipyards had come to terms with the Pentagon negotiators, Clements said that the government and Newport News and Litton were "close to \$200 million" and "just under \$100 million" apart respectively.

Adm. H. G. Rickover, head of the Navy's nuclear propulsion program, and Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) are allied in opposing the use of Public Law 804—with Proxmire accusing the Pentagon of trying to bail out the shipbuilders.

Clements said yesterday that "the somewhat vocal opposition" to using that law "played no part at all" in the Pentagon's decision to call off the effort to settle the \$2 billion in back bill.

He said Congress would have supported the legislation, however. "I have no question" about it, Clements said.

But Proxmire yesterday credited his Joint Economic subcommittee and Rickover for Clements' reversal on Public Law 804. Said Proxmire: "It was the admiral's testimony before my committee which demonstrated to Congress that he paid."

Unaudited claims should not, Navy leaders, who were stung by Clements' earlier criticism of the way they had treated shipbuilders, expressed worries yesterday that the latest breakdown in negotiations would strengthen the hand of lawmakers trying to reduce the amount of shipbuilding money in the fiscal 1977 Navy budget now under consideration.

Other Pentagon officials interpreted Clements' press conference as an attempt to put more pressure on shipbuilders to come to terms with his negotiators.

"One way or another,"

**WAR
(CONTINUED)**

effective cease-fire and political accommodation by the parties in Lebanon that will preserve the independence, sovereignty, unity, political cohesion and territorial integrity of Lebanon."

When an official was told that the State Department's statement seemed a "classic example of diplomatic fence-sitting," Mr. Brown said that the United States, which previously had publicly opposed any outside intervention in Lebanon, did not want to undercut an inter-Arab effort that might prove successful.

At the same time, he said, the United States wants to keep the Arabs aware of the possibility that if fighting flares up again, there is always the risk that either Israel or other Arab states might become involved.

Washington has felt frustrated by the continuing destruction in Lebanon and the failure of its own and other mediation efforts.

Although publicly warning against outside intervention,

in his press conference, said Clements at one point "we intend to get those ships" built which are now snagged on how much is owed on them. There are about 70 ships involved in the \$2 billion in claims, with \$1.4 billion of that dollar total claimed by Newport News and Litton.

Clements said the government could resort to special war powers, if necessary, to get the ships built. He said "there is a strong likelihood" the dispute will wind up in the federal courts.

Diesel said in a telephone interview that Newport News during the negotiations had offered to forget about the \$800 million it claims the Navy owes the company if the Pentagon would cover the cost of inflation on past and future work.

With that offer rejected,

**PLANE
(CONTINUED)**

viewed as a growing Warsaw Pact capability in Europe.

The whole question is tied up in the broader consideration of standardization of NATO armaments and the purchase of arms manufactured in Western Europe. West Germany, although a supporter of the system, is awaiting an American decision on the purchase of the West German-made Leopard tank.

American officials tacitly supported the Syrian military moves in the last few weeks in the hope that they would compel the warring factions to stop fighting.

But the Syrians clearly underestimated the militancy of the leftist forces in Lebanon who refused to accept their intervention and actually dealt some sharp blows against the Syrian armored force.

Diesel said "we will have to do everything we can to disengage from government business."

Newport News is still disinclined to accept a contract to build the third Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Vinson, Diesel said. He said the yard has received about \$150 million for work on that carrier, so far, but "we haven't got a contract" for the entire ship because of "complete chaos" in contracting.

"We're going to press to go into court," Diesel said, because "we have now exhausted every administrative remedy."

Clements said he hoped the shipyards would come forward with a proposal to break the impasse—making it clear throughout his press conference that the Pentagon considers the next move up to them.

**NEW YORK TIMES
11 JUNE 76 Pg. 6****Israeli Chief of Staff
Says Beirut Battles
Fortify Arab Force**

Special to The New York Times

TEL AVIV, June 10—Israel's top military commander said today that Palestinian guerrillas fighting in Lebanon were gaining battle experience that they would use against Israel after the war.

Lieut. Gen. Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense forces, said Yasser Arafat's forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which were fighting alongside the Lebanese Moslem leftists, as well as Saiga guerrillas who were on the Syrian side, were both practicing street fighting and combat against regular forces. They were also learning to operate in larger formations, General Gur added. "So we must expect if the fighting ends in Lebanon, these forces will be turned against us," he said.

General Gur spoke at the close of an exercise by a minority formation consisting mainly of soldiers of the Druse community, a breakaway sect from Islam. He congratulated the formation on its record in eliminating terrorist marauders from Lebanon before they could reach inhabited areas, but he said they must not rest on their laurels.

Israeli settlements in the Galilee area, which had been targets of terrorist raids from Lebanon, have enjoyed a respite since the guerrillas across the border have been preoccupied in the civil war.

Israelis have not concealed their pleasure at seeing their enemies—the guerrillas and the Syrians—fighting each other but they have expressed concern and sympathy for the Lebanese Christian community threatened with extermination.

General Gur's remarks reflected a widespread opinion here that events in Lebanon would make the northern border more difficult for Israel.

NEWS SUMMARY -- CONTINUED

keeping force sent by the Arab League arrived at Beirut airport. But Lebanese President Franjeh, a right-wing Christian, vowed to fight them. Syria, meanwhile, agreed to pull back 2,000 Syrian and Syrian-controlled Saiga guerrilla forces from the edge of Beirut, turning the positions back to Lebanese leftists. On the country's war fronts fighting died down, and the toll was one of the lowest in the 14-month-old civil war.

The Syrian move was the first major concession by any side since it, the Palestinian guerrillas and their Lebanese leftist allies began peace talks.

Israel could accept a "symbolic" joint peacekeeping force in Lebanon as long as it didn't threaten Israel's security, Israeli government officials said. The sources reiterated that Israel would base its policy toward Lebanon on considerations of national security.

Wayne Hays became unconscious and was hospitalized after apparently taking an overdose of a sleeping medication prescribed for a stomach ailment. The Ohio Congressman, center of a sex scandal, was said by his physician to be in an "extremely weakened condition," though his vital signs

were described as stable. Earlier, the House voted 400 to 0 to speed an Ethics Committee investigation of the charges against him.

The Supreme Court ruled public employees have no right to a hearing before they are fired unless a contract provides for one. The five-to-four decision said public employment isn't a property interest protected under the Constitution from arbitrary loss. The ruling was seen spurring further attempts by such employees to join unions and obtain collective bargaining rights to hearings.

An order closing public schools in New Jersey was let stand by the Supreme Court. The state court's order will close the schools July 1 unless the legislature appropriates funds for school refinancing.

Kissinger proposed reforms to the Organization of American States' charter at the close of meetings in Santiago, Chile. He called for more frequent general assembly sessions, such as the one just ended, the abolishment of separate councils in the organization, a more equitable system of national assessment and for universal membership.

The federal job-safety program will be the focus of a White House task force to be sent in to help deregulate the Labor Department's agency. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has been widely criticized by the business community, Republicans and conservatives.

Daniel P. Moynihan, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, announced he will seek the Democratic nomination for U.S. Senator from New York.

A North Atlantic Treaty Alliance report said there is a dangerous military vacuum in the south Atlantic and Indian oceans. The chairman of NATO's military committee said that in the event of hostilities, Soviet sea and air attacks could disrupt allied supply lines for oil and other raw materials. U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, in Brussels for the annual spring NATO meeting, said that, despite earlier reports, there isn't any sign that Cuban troops have begun to leave Angola.

Died: Adolph Zukor, pioneer movie-maker and chairman emeritus of Paramount Pictures, at the age of 103

FRIDAY MORNING, 11 JUNE 1976

WASHINGTON POST - 11 JUNE 1976 Pg 20

Kissinger Urges Cutbacks In Bureaucracy of OAS

By Joanne Omang

Washington Post Staff Writer

SANTIAGO, Chile, June 10— Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger today proposed drastic changes in the structure and financing of the Organization of American States to prevent it from becoming what State Department officials have called "increasingly irrelevant."

Kissinger left the proposal behind for submission when the subject comes up for discussion at the 6th OAS General Assembly meeting here. He left today for Mexico City, saying that in the three days he was here he found the OAS session to be "the most harmonious one I can remember."

Kissinger's proposal, not yet made public in detail, hinges on strengthening the authority of the General Assembly of foreign ministers at the expense of the three bureaucratically top-heavy permanent councils.

The plan would also restructure OAS finances so that the United States would no longer pay two-thirds of the OAS' \$40 million annual budget. In addition, it would open the doors of the organization to all nations in the Western hemisphere, regardless of boundary disputes that now exclude some of them from membership.

The proposal is the last of three initiatives Kissinger made at the OAS session in his continuing construction of what the State Department is calling an energetic, forward-looking Latin American policy.

Many Latin diplomats here do not agree that the policy is clearly defined yet, and the elements proposed here face a mixed reception.

Resistance is certain to be stiff on Kissinger's suggestion to give much more importance to the General Assembly. The proposal would open the General Assembly's closed, informal sessions to finance and education ministers and meetings would be held more frequently.

The economic, science and cultural and educational councils "can meet either less frequently or not at all," in the words of a State Department official.

Their effective elimination would probably chop several hundred jobs from the OAS bureaucracy in Washington, which at present is often a convenient place for Latin American

BALTIMORE SUN - 11 JUNE 1976 Pg 2

U.S. said to lack proof that Cubans quit Angola

Brussels (AP)—Donald H. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Defense Secretary, was reported to have told Atlantic alliance leaders yesterday the United States had no evidence that a single Cuban soldier had been withdrawn from Angola.

A high American official told reporters of Mr. Rumsfeld's remarks after a closed meeting of North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense ministers and intelligence officers. He said half a dozen others in the session also said they had seen no such evidence.

The Yugoslav news agency Tanjug, however, reported yesterday from the Angolan capital of Luanda that another unit of Cuban soldiers had returned to Havana from Angola.

Fidel Castro, the Cuban premier, told Sweden's prime minister, Olof Palme, last month he would withdraw Cuban forces slowly from Angola, where they have been assisting the Marxist government of Agostinho Neto.

The U.S. official said Angola and the rest of Africa had been the main topics at the meeting of defense officials from 12 NATO countries.

government officials to deposit relatives, rivals or relief cases.

Any drastic shift in the financing is also likely to be opposed, both because of strained budgets in most member nations and because assessed payments are now levied more or less on the basis of each country's population, according to OAS staff members. The United States now pays \$23 million to the regular budget and an additional \$20 million in voluntary contributions to special projects.

Earlier in the session, Kissinger called for strengthening the Inter-American human rights commission and for the creation of three new organizations to pro-transfer and expansion of exports.

There is expected to be some resistance to the idea of allowing the human rights commission to probe conditions in any country. Opposition to the economic develop-

NEW YORK TIMES

11 JUNE 1976 Pg 8

WARSAW PACT GIVES TROOP LEVEL DATA

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 10 — The Soviet Soviet-bloc Warsaw Pact countries today gave an accounting of their troop strengths in Central Europe to Western powers at the Vienna talks on mutual reduction of forces, an Administration official reported.

The officials said the information on troop strengths and definition of various military units in the region was the first supplied by the Warsaw Pact groups since the talks on reduction of forces began in October 1973.

The information had been formally sought by the Western participants in the 19-century Vienna negotiations, and was considered a supplement to an Eastern European proposal on reduction put forth last February.

The Administration official said the United States and other Western participants would study the data supplied by Oleg Khlestov, the Soviet delegate and compare it with their own estimates on troop strengths in Eastern Europe.

The official stressed that the East Europeans had not made a new proposal in Vienna.

NEW YORK TIMES

11 JUNE 1976 Pg 8

Laotian Students to Return

VIENTIANE, Laos, June 10 (Reuters) — More than 3,000 students sent to China and North Vietnam to continue their studies during the fighting in Laos are returning home, an official spokesman said today.

NEW YORK TIMES

11 JUNE 1976 Pg D5

Ousted U.S. Reporter Says Angola Tried to Recruit Her

LISBON, June 10 (AP)—An American reporter expelled from Angola for alleged links with the American Central Intelligence Agency arrived here today and said today that the Angolans had tried to recruit her as an agent before expelling her out.

Robin Wright, 28 years old,

ment items has focused on what was not offered: some kind of mechanism to govern the behavior of the multinational corporations.

N.Y. TIMES 6/11 Pg 3

Manila and U. S. Will Begin Talks On Bases Tuesday

Special to The New York Times

MANILA, June 10—The Philippine Government announced today that negotiations with the United States for a new agreement for American bases here would open Tuesday in the northern city of Baguio.

With the Philippines aiming for a reduction in both the areas covered by the installations and the term of lease, there have been predictions that the search for mutually acceptable terms would prove difficult.

At stake in the talks, which will be a continuation of negotiations begun in April in Washington, is the future use of the naval station at Subic Bay, the largest American naval base outside the United States mainland, and Clark Air Force Base, the United States Air Force's largest foreign base.

The negotiators hope to complete an agreement before August, when Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is scheduled to come here for a signing ceremony.

Ambassadors on Team

The Philippine panel of negotiators is to consist mostly of ambassadors to be headed by Eduardo Z. Romualdez, the Philippine Ambassador to Washington. The American team, to be headed by Ambassador William H. Sullivan, will include negotiators who participated in similar talks with Spain and Turkey.

The main issue will be the matter of Philippine sovereignty over the bases, which though long conceded by the United States is felt by Filipinos to be infringed in certain respect.

The Philippines will also seek greater jurisdiction over Americans accused of violating its laws. Under present rules, they cannot be tried in Philippine courts if they hold certificates of duty from United States commanders.

President Ferdinand Marcos sought negotiation of the bases pact soon after the American withdrawal from South Vietnam, saying new realities required new arrangements. The existing accord was concluded 30 years ago and has been revised to some extent since then.

of Cambridge, Mass., a freelance journalist based in Africa, said that a secret policeman who interrogated her had "asked if I would be an agent for the M.P.L.A." The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola won the civil war that followed Angola's independence last fall.

Miss Wright said that her expulsion had followed a 28-hour detention in a basement room where the Angolans threatened to imprison her or put her on trial with 13 foreign mercenaries on charges of war crimes.

She said that her coverage of mercenaries and of rival Angola nationalist groups had led the Government to suspect her of serving the C.I.A. She denied working for the C.I.A.



CURRENT NEWS

PART I - EARLY BIRD EDITION - 0730

PART II - MAIN EDITION - PUBLISHED AT 1130



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FRIDAY, JUNE 11, 1976

GENERAL NEWS SUMMARY

FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
JUNE 11, 1976

World-Wide

CARTER COLLECTED more endorsements, gaining a spate of new delegates.

The former Georgia governor neared the 1,300 delegate mark, pushing still closer to the 1,505 he needs for the Democratic presidential nomination. Pennsylvania Gov. Milton Shapp, who won 19 delegates during his presidential bid, released them and endorsed Carter. Sen. Robert Byrd released the 31 West Virginia delegates committed to him, though he didn't make an official endorsement. Also endorsing Carter were Philadelphia Mayor Frank Rizzo, Kentucky Senators Wendell Ford and Walter Huddleston, Mississippi Senators James Eastland and John Stennis and District of Columbia Mayor Walter Washington. Carter also picked up the backing of the National Marine Engineers union.

Carter appeared to have far greater delegate strength. If all the currently released delegates voted for him, he would have enough to win the nomination with more than 100 to spare.

The only setback suffered by Carter was in Louisiana, where Gov. Edwin Edwards threw his block of 19 uncommitted delegates to Gov. Jerry Brown of California, conceding the action might be like "buying the last ticket on the Titanic."

Ford and Reagan are heading for Missouri, where 19 at-large delegates will be selected at a state convention Saturday. The Missouri meeting is one of 11 state conventions between now and the Republican National Convention in August. An expenditure report filed by Ford showed that as of May 31, he had spent nearly \$8.5 million of the \$10.8 million allowed under the law for his campaign for the nomination.

ANTITRUST-LAW CHANGES were approved by the Senate.

The Senate approved 65 to 19 a compromise measure involving major changes in antitrust legislation. The measure gives added powers to antitrust authorities to block corporate mergers before they are completed, and it provides states with new powers to punish price fixers. However, these provisions were significantly diluted during a lengthy filibuster. The bill also broadens the Justice Department's powers to investigate possible antitrust violations.

The legislation faces an uncertain future in a House-Senate conference committee. The House has passed a bill containing only the provision for added state powers, and the conferees could discard the Senate bill's other features.

ARAB LEAGUE FORCES began to arrive in Beirut.

The first units of a multinational peace-

(See NEWS SUMMARY, Pg. 3)

WASHINGTON POST 11 JUNE 1976 Pg. 2

Cost Disputes Peril Navy Ships Program

By George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Pentagon effort to get the Navy and its shipyards working together on a new fleet by settling \$2 billion in old bills has run aground, Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements said yesterday.

The dispute is so serious from the standpoint of national defense, Clements told a Pentagon news conference, that it constitutes "a national security issue. We can't go on indefinitely on this basis."

There is a real danger, because of the argument over bills for past work, that private yards will refuse to build any more Navy ships until their bills are settled, Clements said.

John Diesel, president of the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., the only yard that can build nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, said yesterday that this was his company's attitude.

A month ago Clements told Congress that he was dissatisfied with the Navy's drawn-out negotiations with shipbuilders over back bills and that he therefore had established a task force to break the impasse.

To assist that effort, Clements on April 30 sought congressional approval to use a law that enabled the Pentagon to take a legislative shortcut to pay off back bills—Public Law 804.

But the whole question of taking that shortcut has been mooted, Clements said yesterday, because the Pentagon and Navy shipbuilders have been unable to reach a compromise.

Although the Electric Boat and National Steel

(See COST, Pg. 3)

NEW YORK TIMES
11 JUNE 76 Pg. 6

U.S. BACKS MOVES IN LEBANON WAR

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 10—The United States cautiously endorsed today the latest Arab efforts to bring about a ceasefire in Lebanon and forestall a major clash between Syria and Palestinians.

But a carefully worded statement by the State Department combined the tentative approval of the Arab League's plans for a joint Lebanese security force with another in a series of warnings that the outside military intervention into Lebanon risked a wider Middle East conflict.

"We welcome efforts that have a possibility of gaining an effective cease-fire and political accommodation among the parties in Lebanon," Frederick Z. Brown, a State Department spokesman said. "And we continue to warn that outside military intervention carries with it the risk of escalating the strife in Lebanon into a regional conflict."

As to the specific Arab League meeting in Cairo that with seeming Syrian approval has authorized other Arab states to send forces into Lebanon to help the Syrians there, Mr. Brown said:

"We have noted the decision of Arab foreign ministers and are watching closely the actions flowing from it. At this point, we have no comment on inter-Arab positions, including these efforts to form an inter-Arab force for a peace-keeping role in Lebanon."

Example of Fence-Sitting

"I'd emphasize that we judge what happens in Lebanon as to whether it contributes to or makes more difficult an ef-

(See WAR, Pg. 3)

WASHINGTON POST
11 JUNE 76 Pg.21

U.S. Pushes NATO on New Plane

By David Fouquet

Special to The Washington Post

BRUSSELS, June 10—Supporters of a controversial U.S. proposal for a fleet of battlefield surveillance planes pressed their NATO allies today to commit themselves by the end of the year to sharing the cost of the \$2.2-billion system.

The United States, Great Britain and West Germany are seeking to include as many of the NATO allies as possible in the project to keep the costs down.

Although no decisions emerged from today's opening day of the semi-annual NATO defense ministers' meeting, one official noted that "the Americans haven't even begun to pull all the del Castro to Swedish Prestriings."

The proposed Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) consists of a complex of radars and computers crammed into a Boeing 707 that would ferret out enemy aircraft and other targets below it.

The system has been a subject of controversy ever since it was proposed in the United States in the late 1960s. Critics claim the costly system is too vulnerable to jamming or hostile fire while supporters argue that it is urgent and necessary in light of what is

(See PLANE, Pg. 3)

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EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the
NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION to

AMPHIBIOUS EVACUATION SECURITY FORCE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious service from 26 April 1975 to 13 May 1975 while participating in evacuation operations in the Republic of Vietnam. Throughout this period, the Amphibious Evacuation Security Force (AESF), both ashore and embarked aboard ships of the Military Sealift Command and the United States Navy, was charged with the maintenance of security and care of Vietnamese refugees escaping invading communist forces in the Republic of Vietnam. Despite the hardships and overcrowded conditions aboard the various ships, the personnel of AESF continued to maintain order and provide food and water, as well as medical care to an average of 4,000 refugees aboard each ship. In addition, while ashore at the Naval Base, Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, members of AESF screened, searched, and processed in excess of 19,000 refugees arriving aboard Vietnamese Navy vessels. By their superb teamwork, human compassion, and selfless devotion to duty, the officers and men of the Amphibious Evacuation Security Force contributed significantly to the success of the evacuation effort; thereby reflecting great credit upon themselves and upholding the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Secretary of the Navy

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EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the
NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION to

COMMANDER TASK GROUP 79.1

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious service on 29 and 30 April 1975 during Operation FREQUENT WIND, the emergency evacuation of Saigon, Republic of Vietnam. Operating from various United States ships, the units of Commander Task Group 79.1 employed all available air assets and ground security forces to effect the safe evacuation of nearly 7,000 United States citizens, Vietnamese refugees, and third country nationals from the Defense Attache Office Compound and the American Embassy in Saigon. Despite darkness, inclement weather, constant small-arms fire, and a continuous threat of anti-aircraft weapons, the personnel of Commander Task Group 79.1 provided the means for the safe escape of the beleaguered personnel in the landing zones. By their courage, resolute determination, teamwork, and selfless devotion to duty, the officers and men of Commander Task Group 79.1 contributed significantly to the success of Operation FREQUENT WIND; thereby reflecting great credit upon themselves and upholding the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Secretary of the Navy

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Hometown Buries Marine, One of Last Vietnam Dead

By JOHN KIFNER

Special to The New York Times

WOBURN, Mass., March 6—

Three sharp cracks of a rifle salute echoed in the chilly morning air. Taps was played as a Marine honor guard stood at attention.

Cpl. Charles McMahon Jr. of the Marine Corps, one of the last American service men killed in the Vietnam war, whose body had been left behind in the confusion of the United States withdrawal, was finally laid to rest here today.

Around town, he was known as a kid who spent almost all his time at the Woburn Boys Club, where he was on the swimming team and once played Santa Claus at the Christmas party for the younger boys.

Last April 28, while on embassy security duty at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, he was caught in a rocket attack, just 12 hours before the Marine evacuation teams ended the American presence in Vietnam. He was 22 years old.

Somehow, while the Marines barricaded the embassy compound, pushing back terrified erstwhile Vietnamese allies as the helicopters rose from the roof, his body and that of Lance Cpl. Darwin L. Judge of Marshalltown, Iowa, who also died in the rocket attack, were left behind.

When the oversight was discovered, it was difficult for Capt. Michael Maloney of the Marines to have to come back a second time to tell the family about it, because the corps has a tradition that it brings out its dead.

But in December, through the efforts of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, arrangements were made with the Provisional Revolutionary Government to return the bodies of Corporal McMahon and Corporal Judge. They arrived in the United States this week.

In Marshalltown this afternoon, Corporal Judge was also buried with a Marine honor guard after services at the Hope United Methodist Church.

War Now Long Way Off

The war seemed so very far away, now, one of Corporal McMahon's friends was saying the other night at his wake. The flags in front of Woburn's Town Hall were at half staff today. The people who clustered on the main street of this working man's town, north of Boston, in front of Brigham's ice cream store, Sunshine Subs and the hockey shop, where there is a sale on skates, were silent. So were the several hundred who gathered at the cemetery.

No one spoke about the war.

Along a wall of the boys club are framed photographs of those who were named "Boy of the Year." The award was set up to honor PFC. Joseph L. Drew, also a marine, who was the first Woburn man killed in Vietnam, and the trophy on which the winners' names are engraved is studded with the eagle, globe and anchor emblem of the corps.

Corporal McMahon's picture is there for 1971. He set some records for the club pool, friends said, but most of them are broken now. He was in a rock band five years ago, playing guitar with Dave O'Rourke, who said it was mostly just for fun, you know, to play at parties — we played "Light My Fire," some of the early Beatles.

The corporal was the 13th young man from Woburn to

die in the war, 1,423d from Massachusetts and one of more than 50,000 Americans and uncounted Vietnamese. Near the World War monument, the Woburn High School Class of 1969 put up a granite marker bearing the names of the 13. It says, "They are not dead, they are just gone."

Eulogy by Club's Leader

The boy's club was the center of his life, and its director, Charles Gardner, a big, husky man who had been a marine himself and is called "the boss" around the club, gave the eulogy at the white frame First Congregational Church, in front of the flag-draped coffin.

"Let there be no more violence, no more weapons, no more hurt, no more deaths, no more wars," he said. "Charlie, God bless you."

There was a Marine honor guard in dress blues at the cemetery, composed of recruiting sergeants from the Boston area. There were American Legionnaires, too, older men, with pins from various conventions in their overseas caps.

Corporal McMahon's younger brother Scott, who had gone on active duty shortly after his brother's death, was in a wheel chair in his Marine blues, crippled in an automobile accident. The dead youth's father stood with his wife, Edna, red-eyed but silent, another son, Michael and his daughter, Susan.

The others who had been "Boys of the Year" marched along with the hearse — Fred Callahan, Chris Glazer, Victor Souza, Jamie McKeon, Charlie Morgan and the rest. Mike Mulrenan could not make it because he was in Marine boot camp at Parris Island, S. C. George Holland, Corporal McMahon's inseparable ebst friend, was with the family. He is a Marine, too.

New York Times

7 March 1976

Sunday, page 47

CURRENT NEWS

PART I - EARLY BIRD EDITION - 0730

PART II - MAIN EDITION - PUBLISHED AT 1130



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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1976

BALTIMORE SUN 10 NOVEMBER 1976 Pg. 9

\$11.6 billion for defense unspent

BALTIMORE SUN
10 NOVEMBER 1976 Pg. 1

U.S., Vietnam to hold first talks since '73

By HENRY L. TREWHITT
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—United States and Vietnamese diplomats will meet in Paris Friday for their first direct formal exchanges since mid-1973, U.S. sources reported yesterday.

The meeting will be the culmination of almost a year of maneuvering on both sides. But it is expected to yield few concrete early results.

Robert L. Funseth, the State Department spokesman, refused to confirm the date of the meeting, by agreement with the Vietnamese. But as he has before, he emphasized that the first order of business for the Americans will be to demand an accounting for the 700 Americans still missing in action in Vietnam.

For their part the Vietnamese are expected to demand American contributions to the postwar redevelopment of Vietnam, as specified in the ill-fated Paris cease-fire accords of 1973. Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, has called the proposal "preposterous," citing the collapse of the accords and the subsequent Communist victory in most of Southeast Asia.

(See TALKS, Pg. 2)

GENERAL NEWS SUMMARY

FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
NOVEMBER 10, 1976 Pg. 1

World-Wide

THE U.S. AND VIETNAM will discuss normalizing relations.

The talks, scheduled to begin Friday in Paris, will be the first between the two countries since the Paris peace accord was signed almost four years ago. Vietnam's chief objective in the talks is securing U.S. war reconstruction aid. The U.S. had promised this, but the Ford administration has said Vietnam disqualified itself because of its invasion and conquest of South Vietnam 18 months ago. Officials said it is doubtful that significant progress can be made before the Carter administration takes office.

Vietnamese officials also announced an application by Hanoi for admission to

BALTIMORE SUN
10 NOVEMBER 1976 Pg. 5

Pentagon details losses of U.S. equipment to Hanoi

Washington (AP)—North Vietnamese troops captured more than 550 U.S.-made tanks, over 1,300 artillery pieces, about 16 million rifles and enough other military equipment to field an entire army, air force and navy, a Pentagon report showed yesterday.

The newly declassified report provided the first detailed breakdown of an estimated \$5 billion in U.S.-supplied military hardware which Hanoi's forces took over when South Vietnam's government collapsed in the spring of 1975.

"A substantial amount of this equipment could be unserviceable," the Defense Department said. "The list does not take into account the degree of damage inflicted upon portions of the equipment left behind by retreating Republic of Vietnam forces during the final days."

The department noted that the captured equipment may have deteriorated from climate and weather conditions in South Vietnam, but it said it does not know to what extent this may have happened.

Shortly after the fall of South Vietnam, defense spokesmen told Congress they calculated about \$2 billion of the \$5 billion worth of military equipment taken by North Vietnam was in serviceable shape.

Military officials have said that aircraft, tanks, armored personnel carriers, ships and some other gear probably would be of value only until they needed spare parts, which would not be available from the only supplier, the United States.

Among the items listed were 48,000 radios. U.S. Army National Guard and reserve forces still have a shortage of radios.

Despite persistent rumors that North Vietnam was shipping some of the captured gear to insurgents in Thailand, Pentagon sources have said they have seen no definite evidence of major North Vietnamese gifts or sales of the American war materiel to other countries or Communist rebel groups.

the UN will come up at the Security Council Friday

The Ford administration has said it will veto such an application if there is no sub-

(See NEWS SUMMARY, Pg. 2)

By CHARLES W. CORDRY
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The Defense Department preparing to defend its financial performance to the next Congress, yesterday issued revised estimates intended to show that its contracting shortfall in fiscal 1976 was \$11.6 billion, or about \$5 billion less than earlier figures indicated.

The unobligated weapons and related funds carried over at the end of the fiscal year June 30, nevertheless were "more than would normally be expected," the department's comptroller, Fred P. Wacker, conceded at a press conference.

He granted that it will be "legitimate to ask, when Congress takes up the next military budget, whether the Pentagon had been authorized more money than it could use."

Officials are increasingly apprehensive that lagging performance in placing new orders, resulting in funds being carried over, will jeopardize expanded budget requests next year.

This is particularly so because unobligated funds piled up despite claims that Congress had caused grave damage by cutting \$7 billion from requests for the year in question.

The defense secretary at the time, James R. Schlesinger, called the cuts "savagely and arbitrary," but the department under his successor, Donald H. Rumsfeld, has not obligated all the money that was authorized.

Mr. Wacker contended yesterday, however, that revised estimates have "isolated" problem areas and the financial situation can readily be explained to Congress.

Of the \$11.6 billion in contracting shortfalls, he said, \$4.8 billion was simply money that was to have been used for foreign arms sales with reimbursement from purchasing countries. That was how much the sales target was missed.

While that shortfall does not have anything to do with the readiness of United States forces, it is money that would have gone into the American economy.

The other part of the shortfall, which does affect U.S. forces, amounted to \$6.8 billion, according to Mr. Wacker's figures, and appeared to be mainly in the shipbuilding and aircraft categories.

Alan Woods, the Pentagon spokesman, said there were lags in placing new orders for a half dozen types of combat planes, including the Air Force's prized new F-15 fighter. Such lags, observers said, can cause Congress to cut funds and slow programs in succeeding fiscal years.

(See DEFENSE, Pg. 2)

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**DEFENSE
(CONTINUED)**

There were shortfalls across the board, even including the spending of funds appropriated for daily operation and maintenance of the forces, a category usually represented to be tightly financed. In construction funds, Mr. Woods said the Pentagon saved \$500 million by getting better-than-expected deals from builders.

The question remaining after yesterday's explanations, however, was how persuasive they will be with the House Appropriations Committee, which was hotly criticized for the fiscal 1976 cuts.

Regardless of the revised estimates, that committee was told in the winter of 1975 that funds carried over at the end of fiscal 1976—June 30—would stand at an estimated \$18 billion. That was one of its assumptions in passing judgment on the budget request.

The Pentagon's latest "monthly report on status of funds" showed, however, that the actual amount carried over was \$34.6 billion, or \$16.6 billion more than originally estimated. The figures issued yesterday did not change the total amount though they cut \$5 billion from the unexpected or shortfall part.

The unobligated funds piled up in spite of what one economist called "a mighty lunge" in contract awards in June, the last month of the fiscal year. Figures showed that obligations that month reached \$16.5 billion, almost double those for May and \$3.5 billion more than the next highest month of the year.

The defense program in fiscal 1976 "simply did not move as fast as planned," the economist said. Pentagon managers were "either too optimistic about what they could do or they did not push the program hard enough. It could have made a difference in the country's economy."

**NEWS SUMMARY
(CONTINUED)**

stantial progress toward obtaining an accounting of the 800 Americans listed as missing in action in Vietnam. The President-elect has expressed support for this position.

NATURAL-GAS cutbacks are expected to hit industry hardest.

Federal Power Commission officials predicted this winter's projected curtailments of gas deliveries aren't likely to affect homeowners and small businesses. But the Federal Energy Administration reported that commercial customers, who were about 4% short of gas requirements last year, can expect a 6% cutback this winter. The FEA told a House Energy and Power subcommittee hearing most industries will be able to substitute oil—though at a higher price—and avert closedowns. At least nine states, primarily southern, may be vulnerable to temporary fuel shortages, however, and some layoffs could result.

FPC Vice Chairman John Holloman emphasized at the hearing that the natural-gas shortage continues to get worse and that current figures are "stark and extremely unsettling."

Large industrial customers will again be allowed to make direct emergency gas purchases from producers at prices exempt from FPC ceilings, an exemption designed to lessen the impact of the pipelines' curtailments.

A federal appeals court ruled that gas producers can collect under new, higher FPC ceilings so long as they make provisions to refund money if the ceilings are later ruled out. The court scheduled further hearings on a consumer group challenge to the ceilings tomorrow.

The Rhodesian talks' British chairman, Ivor Richards, returned to the Geneva conference after a one-day trip to report home.

**TALKS
(CONTINUED)**

But both governments are committed basically to progress toward workable relations. American diplomats assume Vietnam's leaders know they will not get American cash—but may settle eventually for American approval of Vietnamese membership in the United Nations.

For its part, the Ford administration acknowledges privately that the Vietnamese victors probably do not know the fate of most Americans still missing in action. American officials do insist, however, that Hanoi can account for some of the missing and that it must convince the American public of its good faith on that score.

The Defense Department lists 699 men as missing in action, with a total of 2,500 recorded as missing or killed in action whose bodies were never recovered.

Friday's meeting, at an undisclosed location, will be the first formal, face-to-face exchange between American and Vietnamese diplomats since June, 1973. The occasion then was a meeting of an economic commission created by the overall peace accords signed earlier that year.

Continued fighting nullified the accords and finally ended with the North Vietnamese entry into Saigon April 30, 1975.

Privately, sources in Washington acknowledge that both governments are interested in eventual development of normal diplomatic relations. The U.S. hopes to influence Hanoi against further Communist expansion in the area, and American businessmen are interested in Vietnam's trade and oil potential.

For its part, Hanoi is believed to be hoping for American capital and for political ties that will help it remain free of Chinese or Soviet domination.

The meeting Friday is expected to be concerned with less sweeping issues, however. The U.S. will be represented by Samuel R. Gammon, the deputy chief of the embassy in Paris.

denying a stalemate. The meeting has bogged down over the issue of fixing a date for Rhodesian independence under black majority rule. Richards conceded the talks are going slower than expected but said he didn't bring back new instructions.

In Salisbury, Rhodesian Premier Ian Smith said the conference was wasting its time in trying to fix a date. Smith believes the meeting should concentrate in setting up an interim government.

The UN General Assembly passed 10 resolutions against South Africa's apartheid policy of racial discrimination by landslide margins. Among the measures were resolutions calling for an arms, trade and sports embargo against the white minority regime, including a ban on further foreign investments.

Moscow charged Western interference in its visa policy and defended its record of granting exit permission. The statement followed widely publicized demonstrations by Jews in Moscow against the refusal of visas and coincided with the arrival in Europe of a congressional commission to investigate the Helsinki accord. East bloc countries have denied the group entry.

Fighting in Beirut erupted anew, bringing prospects for a major confrontation between advancing Arab League peace troops and Christian commanders who vowed to open fire on them. The troops are massed in the mountains around the city.

Jimmy Carter will begin appointing his

BALTIMORE SUN
10 NOVEMBER 1976 Pg. 4**Taiwan denies
unification bid**

Taipei, Taiwan (AP)—Nationalist Chinese Premier Chiang Ching-kuo said yesterday a Japanese newspaper report that he had sent a delegation to Peking to discuss unifying Taiwan and mainland China was "an utterly groundless lie."

Mr. Chiang made the remarks when he met with a congressional group led by Representative Thomas E. Morgan (D., Pa.), the government Information Office reported.

WASHINGTON POST
10 NOVEMBER 1976 Pg. 18
Warning on Media Laws

NAIROBI, Kenya—Ahmadou Mahatar M'bow, director general of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, advised member nations against adopting mass media proposals without the "widest possible consensus."

M'bow's warning came after a Soviet-sponsored proposal was referred to a special committee after apparently irreconcilable differences emerged. It is not expected to come up again for two years. Many delegates, especially from Western countries, had argued that the document threatened world press freedom by recommending state control of news going abroad.

White House staff within the next week and will give "high priority" to urban problems during his term as President, his press spokesman said. The President-elect is vacationing on St. Simons Island, Ga., until tomorrow, when he will return to Plains. His spokesman said Carter "appreciated the tone" of the requests made to him by the U.S. Conference of Mayors.

House Ways and Means chairman Al Ullman said Congress should approach any tax-cut proposal with "great caution." Carter has said there is a strong possibility he will seek such a measure, but Ullman said the American people shouldn't expect any major relief.

Government pay raises for top career personnel were urged by the chairman of the Civil Services Commission, who said their wages have fallen far behind the economy. Top federal jobs now carry salaries ranging from \$37,800 to \$65,000 a year. One of Ford's last presidential acts will be to decide on such raises.

The Viking mission has amassed evidence that Mars once had the basic ingredients for living systems and could still support life in some form, project scientists said. But they noted they were unable to draw further conclusions. The two landers and their orbiters will cease activities until next month because the sun's position will soon block radio transmission.

Amphetamines are ineffective for controlling weight and should be banned for that purpose, a panel of doctors told a Senate subcommittee. In 1975, doctors wrote 25 million prescriptions for amphetamines and related drugs, almost all for weight control.

Snokey Bear, the retired symbol of the U.S. Forest Service's fire prevention campaign, died at 28 in Washington's National Zoo, of old age.

WEDNESDAY MORNING, 10 NOVEMBER 1976

WASH STAR 9 NOV (10) Pg. 3

Mysterious Radio Signals End Abruptly

By Stephen M. Aug

Washington Star Staff Writer

A mysterious high-powered radio signal that has been playing havoc for months with international communications apparently has disappeared as suddenly as it appeared.

Officials at the Federal Communications Commission said yesterday that the interference apparently vanished around noon on Nov. 2. There have been no complaints since then.

"As far as we're concerned, we consider the matter closed," said Robert L. Cutts, chief of the FCC's International and Operations Division.

THE INTERFERENCE was believed to have come from perhaps three very powerful transmitters in the Soviet Union, on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea, perhaps near Minsk, the capital of Byelorussia, about 300 miles southeast of the Baltic.

Cutts said the FCC had written four complaint letters to the Russians since Aug. 25, but never had any reply. He said yesterday the commission still doesn't know for certain what was causing the interference that had been heard around the world, but added, "we have our ideas."

"We just suspect it was probably a new type of over-the-horizon radar, but it could be any of several other things."

A check with officials at RCA Global Communications, Inc., indicated that the interference indeed may have stopped. An RCA spokesman said the firm's ship-shore station at Chatham, Mass., which had been severely bothered by the signal for months, reported the interference stopped last Tuesday.

AT&T, however, was less certain. Laurie Temple of AT&T's Long Lines Department said the company's radio station at Point Reyes, Calif., reported that last Saturday it experienced "the same type of interference that has caused disruptions in service the past one and a half to two months."

KING T. HALL, chief watch officer at the FCC's monitoring branch, said there have been no complaints since last Tuesday. He said he believed the last complaint may have come from an amateur radio operator.

The interference — which sounded like a rapid ticking (10 times a second) — was heard through a wide range of high frequencies, from about 6 to 28 megahertz. It disrupted ship-shore, aeronautical, telephone, amateur and international broadcast services around the world, although it was particularly severe in Europe and across the North Atlantic.

The first widespread publicity about the transmissions was given in The Washington Star's editions of Friday, Oct. 29. The story was published in other newspapers later and

WASHINGTON STAR 9 NOVEMBER 1976 (10) Pg. 12

Justice Tries to Void Navy-Shipbuilder Pact

By Vernon A. Guldry Jr.

Washington Star Staff Writer

Overriding a Pentagon endorsement, the Justice Department has attacked a controversial settlement proposed for construction of a nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser by the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co.

The Justice move came in a brief filed in U.S. District Court in Virginia yesterday. It was the latest salvo in the fight over the cruiser — CGN41 — which is being built by the yard under court order.

The court development is likely to increase concern in Congress over the manner in which this and other shipbuilding disputes are being handled.

Rep. Melvin Price, D-Ill., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has asked the General Accounting Office to examine the circumstances surrounding the proposed settlement, which is a modification of the contract under which the vessel is being built.

AMONG OTHER THINGS, the modification would increase the money allowed the yard for inflation and push back the delivery date, two actions that eventually would increase the price by \$20 to \$30 million.

The Justice Department position revealed yesterday was a defeat for Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements Jr., who had written Justice lawyers on Oct. 15, saying, "In view of the long-standing, acrimonious and disruptive controversy between the Navy and its sole present new construction surface nuclear warship contractor . . . I consider the proposed modification a reasonable solution to this complex matter."

Clements in midsummer had suggested to the Navy a new face in the negotiator's role, that of Gordon Rule, the Navy's chief civilian contract review official.

By Aug. 20, Rule had negotiated a settlement in principle with Newport News, and by Oct. 7 had turned over a signed copy to the shipyard — much to the consternation of his Navy superiors, who said the settlement required legal and business reviews within the Navy. The shipyard has refused to turn over the document despite repeated Navy requests.

ALTHOUGH RULE is a Navy official, the position taken by the Justice Department attacking the validity of the proposed settlement and of Rule's authority to hand it over to the shipyard closely followed the views of factions within the Navy. These factions believe the Navy has a valid contract with Newport News that the

shipyard wants to rewrite to realize more money.

Other viewpoints, represented by Clements and Rule, hold that some action must be taken to end the combative relations between the Navy and shipbuilders so that the Navy can get its warships built.

According to papers filed with the government brief, Rule told lawyers that Clements' views supplied some of the reasons for his turning over the signed modification to Newport News despite being told by Navy superiors that review by others was required.

"When he wraps that mantle of national defense to the extent that he has done around the negotiation of this ship and the other ships, I'm frank to say I fall in line," Rule testified, according to the transcript of his deposition in the case.

LAST SUMMER, a federal court judge ordered the Navy and Newport News to negotiate in good faith over the CGN41, and in the meantime the shipyard was to continue to build the cruiser. Armed with the Rule modification, the shipyard went back into court last month and asked the judge to accept it as the product of negotiation. As an alternative, the yard asked that the case be dismissed to the Navy's detriment because the service had not negotiated in good faith.

Yesterday's filing by the Justice Department was an answer to that move by the shipyard. The department said, in sum, that Rule lacked the authority alone to settle the issue, that he failed to comply with purchasing regulations, and that the Navy was indeed bargaining in good faith.

As to the merits of that dispute, the Justice Department says it is still studying the case.

What brought the parties into court in the first place was a dispute over whether the Navy had a valid option to build the CGN41. The service says that it does. The shipyard says the option is not valid and that the construction should be renegotiated.

Opponents of that view within the Navy say it could lead to rewriting other contracts for other ships, and that the precedent could add hundreds of millions to the already soaring cost of acquiring warships.

In requesting the GAO examination of the issue, Price said the committee "wants assurance that the Navy's action will not set a precedent for the modification of other defense contracts resulting in needless expenditure of funds or the cancellation of programs." Price asked for an interim report by Dec. 1.

was picked up by some broadcast services.

The Russians have never publicly acknowledged that the transmissions originated with them. A spokesman at the Soviet Embassy here said last

week that he didn't know what was causing the interference. He said the first he had heard of the transmissions was Thursday, Oct. 28, when an amateur radio operator called to complain about them.

WEDNESDAY MORNING, 10 NOVEMBER 1976

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 10 NOVEMBER 1976, Pg 3

NATO tests meshing of allied troops

Fall maneuvers geared to a conventional 'attack'

By David Mutch
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

This is the kind of situation NATO military strategists plan for:

Western intelligence sources have been picking up "anomalies" that suggest a rapid attack by Warsaw Pact forces. No one is sure where or when the attack will come.

It comes suddenly in northern Germany, across an area of the inter-German border guarded and commanded by the Netherlands. Since NATO forces are spread out all up and down the German border, and the enemy forces are high in number and very mobile, this combat sector needs immediate reinforcement.

NATO's fall exercises, most of which ended in October, were designed to deal with just such a crisis as this.

Communist forces have developed great conventional power, flexibility, and ability to move quickly. NATO's earlier reliance on atomic capability was just not adequate to deal with the new situation.

In short, the strategic threat to NATO has changed in recent years, military strategists say. In addition to the massive Soviet strategic missile buildup, Warsaw Pact conventional forces are said to be stronger, quicker, and better equipped than ever before.

As Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., NATO commander, has said, "It is a situation in which we will have reduced warning time."

New emphasis

These strategic changes have led General Haig to give a new emphasis to NATO, a "realism" of meshing the forces of different countries in practical situations to increase the alliance's conventional fighting ability.

At a briefing with this newspaper about the results of the fall exercises involving NATO troops, a group of military strategists from the U.S. European Command here, directly under General Haig, made the following points:

- NATO's ability to use forces of different nations together was thoroughly tested and found quite successful.

As in the example above, a combat sector under Netherlands command might use U.S., West German, Belgian, and British forces all at the same time to repel an attack. Differences of language, terminology, and equipment (to name a few) would have to be bridged. Before this year, this meshing of forces existed more "on paper than in practice."

- NATO commanders saw and for the first time worked with the unique 101st Airborne Division from Ft. Campbell, Ky. This is said to be the only unit of its kind in the world. It is highly mobile and can move troops, mortars, machine guns, 105-mm. howitzers, and two types of anti-armor weapons systems all by helicopter. It was developed in part in Vietnam.

Enthusiasm expressed

U.S. analysts told this newspaper that the allies were "highly enthusiastic" about the division's capabilities. In fact one ally has already indicated interest in adding such mobility to some of its fighting units as a result of the fall's exercises.

- Sources within the U.S. Command here say they are more than pleased with the smoothness with which massive amounts of equipment was brought over from the United States for the exercises. In earlier years the 10,000 or so U.S. troops brought over annually drew their equipment in Europe. This year the 101st brought its own. Months of planning was necessary.

Ships were unloaded in Belgium and the Netherlands. Some 4,000 troops were brought over by plane to receive and assemble the equipment. Helicopters were then flown to West Germany. Other equipment was moved by convoys.

One officer said: "The host nations did all they said they would and more, and now they are asking about what they can do next year. For years we have wanted to test the procedures for moving masses of equipment by sea into Europe and then on into Germany. Now we proved we can do it."

Information 'invaluable'

These sources said the information gathered in these activities is "invaluable." In the event of war, much more would be known about how to coordinate "almost endless details."

- There is this year much more willingness to identify problems within each nation's forces and also problems that arise at "interface," when forces of different nationalities come together.

The air assault capabilities of the 101st Airborne are so unusual that European commanders had to see it to begin to comprehend how they might use its units in their areas.

This unit has the Cobra helicopter as its "tank." The Cobra is equipped with the lethal TOW missile, which can knock out tanks at a 94 percent rate of accuracy. It was tested in Vietnam.

One officer says: "Commanders using this unit have to get over the idea of putting a fighting unit in a foxhole. This kind of a unit just moves and fights. And its tremendous capability to knock out whole tank units must be understood to be utilized."

CHICAGO TRIBUNE 10 NOVEMBER 1976, Pg 1

Soviets still beaming radiation at embassy

BERLIN [AP]—The Soviet Union is continuing its microwave bombardment of the American Embassy in Moscow, and the former U.S. ambassador there says "we would like to see it stopped."

Walter J. Stoessel Jr., now ambassador to West Germany, emphasized, however, that the present level of microwave exposure does not constitute a health hazard. He also said a screen put in use at the Moscow legation helps cut down the microwave inflow, which was first reported last winter.

Stoessel was interviewed by the Associated Press Monday at the West Berlin residence maintained for American envoys to Bonn. Stoessel, whose duties

also include being senior U.S. official for Berlin, was on a three-day visit here after taking over his Bonn post on Oct. 20.

"WE CERTAINLY have a microwave problem," Stoessel said. "It's still going on. The level is lower. I do not think there is any danger to health. We would like to see it stopped."

Asked whether his departure from Moscow to take up his new post last month was a result of his own health being affected by the microwave flow, Stoessel replied: "No, I was told to come here. I serve at the wish of the President."

He added that the Russians have not admitted that they engage in the microwave eavesdropping.

Stoessel, a 56-year-old career diplomat, is rated both as an expert on Soviet and East European affairs and as a specialist in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the Soviets that have been stalled for some time.

BEFORE GOING to Moscow in 1974 Stoessel was ambassador to Poland and was instrumental in making contact with representatives of the Peking government before the warming in U.S.-Chinese relations. He served two earlier terms in Moscow, as a consular officer in 1947 and as minister-counselor in 1963-65.

He said he expects no basic policy changes in American relations with West Germany or with the rest of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance when President-elect Carter takes office.

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NEW YORK TIMES - 10 NOVEMBER 1976 Pg. 9

U.S. Says It Finds No Improper Activity by Iranians

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 9—The State Department said today that an inquiry had failed to turn up evidence confirming "any illegal or improper activity" by the Iranian Government in the United States.

Officials said that despite these findings, Alfred L. Atherton Jr., Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, met yesterday with Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi to stress that the United States would not countenance any shadowing, harassment or other police activity by Iranians.

The issue arose last month when the Shah said in a television interview that

Iranian agents were checking on subversive activities by Iranians in the United States and this was known to the American Government.

Appearing on the CBS program "60 Minutes," the Shah said that Iranian agents in the United States were checking up on the activities of Iranian students. Under accepted diplomatic practice, representatives of foreign countries are not supposed to carry out any activity against their own nationals living in the host country.

The inquiry into Iranian activities came at a time when Federal agencies are reported to be investigating questionable activities. South Korean intelligence agents, ranging from harassment of Ko-

reans to payments made to members of Congress.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, when asked about the Shah's statement last month, said, "It is not correct that the United States is aware of the fact that Iranian intelligence personnel are checking on individuals living in the United States or keeping them under surveillance." He said an inquiry had been started.

Today, in answer to a question on how the inquiry had gone, a State Department official said no evidence had been found to confirm "allegations of any illegal or improper activity and the Iranian Embassy has assured us that none of its officials are committing any such activities."

WASHINGTON STAR - 9 NOVEMBER 1976 Pg. 2 (10)

Studies on U.S., Russians Inconclusive

Civil Defense Plans Compared

By Henry S. Bradsher

Washington Star Staff Writer

Two parallel official studies of the Soviet and U.S. civil defense efforts have come to inconclusive results, leaving the subject for further consideration by the incoming Carter administration.

The studies examined the Soviet ability to shield populations and essential military and civilian facilities from attack, and the possible need for some shielding of the now-unprotected United States.

They were undertaken as a result of growing concern in U.S. intelligence circles over reports on the Soviet Union's civil defense program. Some officials have interpreted the available information to indicate that the Soviets have the ability — or are working hard to achieve it in the near future — to reduce damage from any likely attack to survivable limits.

Such an ability would erode the value of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. If the United States could not inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, but was virtually unprotected from such damage by a Soviet attack, then the "balance of terror" which has existed between the superpowers would be ended and this country left vulnerable.

ACCORDING TO sources familiar with the two studies, the one on Soviet civil defense did not come to a firm conclusion on whether this balance had been upset. The study of whether the United States should launch a major civil defense effort decided that it was too early to call for any significant change in the current, low-level standby program.

The Soviet study was conducted by the CIA, military intelligence and the State Department. Evidence from satellite photography and published Soviet documents and training manuals pointed to a massive civil defense effort. But this seemed to be denied by evidence available to foreigners living and visiting in the Soviet Union.

Because of the lack of firsthand confirmation, some officials wanted the study to conclude that the military balance has not been affected by Soviet civil defense. This was hotly resisted, however, by others who argued that photographic and other evidence could not be dismissed.

So new efforts are being made to collect intelligence on what the Soviets are doing. Civil defense had long been virtually ignored by the CIA, but it has now been made a priority target.

Aware of this, Soviet authorities have taken steps to try to restrict information on their civil

defense programs. One private American writer who collected civil defense books and pamphlets on open sale in the Soviet Union was searched on leaving the country. All the materials were confiscated.

SENIOR OFFICIALS say a more definitive view of the extent and implications of the Soviet civil defense program should be reached by next summer. Its finding on whether the arms balance has been upset could be an important factor in the Carter administration's decisions on both U.S. military budgets and arms control talks with Moscow.

The study of American civil defense was in the form of a National Security Study Memorandum ordered by the White House. Originally scheduled to have been completed Sept. 30 by the office of Donald R. Cotter, an assistant to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, it was finally sent to the National Security Council last Friday.

It reviews the present withered remains of past U.S. civil defense efforts. Aside from signs pointing to fallout shelters in public buildings and a federal and state structure of civil defense officials with some peacetime disaster relief functions, little exists here.

Sources said the memorandum found no reason for launching a major effort now.

THERE IS A widespread feeling among military policy experts that it probably would be impossible to get this country to implement a meaningful civil defense program, which would cost many billions of dollars. Such a program would require a reversal of the Nixon-Ford administrations' public assurances that it is possible to live peacefully with the Soviet Union.

Some officials feel that these assurances have created a bias at policy-making levels of the government against facing all the available evidence of a destabilizing Soviet civil defense program.

"There is a general tendency to mute the portrayal of these problems," according to one official. "Various uncertainties are decided in favor of not concluding that there are major policy difficulties facing us, in favor of not needing to do anything."

Few officials familiar with the available intelligence deny the potential of a large problem. But there is a strong inclination to await further intelligence before raising any official alarms.

WEDNESDAY MORNING, 10 NOVEMBER 1976

NEW YORK TIMES
10 NOVEMBER 1976 Pg 29

Where the Quarrel Points

By C. L. Sulzberger

ANKARA, Turkey—The emotional impact of the Greek-Turkish quarrel over Cyprus and contradictory claims on Aegean air and sea space has produced distressing effects on the foreign relationships and the internal stability of both countries.

In terms of ties with other nations, both disputants have to some extent (more in Greece than in Turkey) weakened their connection with NATO. Each is suffering from a massive popular case of anti-Americanism and each is also courting the Soviet Union. As a result, Western unity and defense have been seriously damaged and the future of these ancient, bickering neighbors has been placed in jeopardy.

If they don't in the end destroy each other—and NATO to boot—they may very well destroy themselves. While one Greek opposition leader, the demagogic Andreas Papandreu, calls simultaneously for war with Turkey, severing all ties with the United States and the Atlantic alliance, even hinting Greece should obtain nuclear arms by its own means (presumably a terrorist raid), Turkey disintegrates politically, socially and economically.

Greece at this moment technically has the strongest parliamentary Government in the West with a massive majority for Prime Minister Caramanlis. Nevertheless, despite his personal preference for close ties with both the United States and NATO, the pressure of public opinion has forced Mr. Caramanlis to delay a new military bases agreement with Washington and to start bilateral talks with Moscow.

Turkey is likewise engaged in a Soviet flirtation which was tangibly confirmed when Ankara permitted a Russian aircraft carrier to pass through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean. One of the two Turkish labor union federations openly acknowledges its preference for a Marxist type of social-economic system.

The Turks have an old record of antipathy toward the Russians but during the early years of Kemal Ataturk's revolution, relations with Moscow were warm. The current wave of affability has produced approximately \$1 billion of Soviet economic assistance that will be paid for by exports over a long term and on a low-interest basis.

Parallel to a new look at the U.S.S.R. rising hostility toward the U.S.A. and internal pressures, the Turks have also developed friendlier relations with the third world, above all the Arab states. Last year Ankara supported an Arab resolution attacking Zionist "racism" in the United Nations Assembly, despite previous Turkish sympathy for Israel.

Undoubtedly this Government's intention to improve its ultimate position vis-a-vis the West by flirtations with the East, a kind of implied blackmail. One reason for this is to hint to the

BALTIMORE SUN - 10 NOVEMBER 1976 Pg 2

Key nations improve links with Moscow

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—With United States foreign policy frozen by government transition, nations important to world stability are cautiously improving their relations with the Soviet Union.

American diplomats are watching with concern, but not yet alarm, Moscow's apparent success in courting China, Egypt and Yugoslavia. To some extent, in their informed judgment, all are hedging against possible changes in U.S. policy after Jimmy Carter becomes President January 20.

No one suggests that the American transition is the only element in the diplomatic maneuvering. Each case has its own peculiarities. But neither do American officials believe the timing is entirely coincidental.

For the first time since the estrangement of 1960, there is noticeable warmth in Sino-Soviet exchanges. Moscow began to sound more cordial months ago as China began its post-Mao power struggle, even before the death of the Communist party chairman in September.

But not until earlier this week did Moscow strike a responsive chord in Peking. By muting their criticism of China during Communist anniversary celebrations last week, Soviet leaders prevented a walkout by Chinese diplomats for the first time in five years.

It looked briefly like a momentary aberration to American observers. But earlier this week, China's ritual ideological message to the Soviet Union contained noticeable warmth.

Mr. Carter will have to make decisions early in his administration about balancing U.S. relations in the Western Pacific among Japan, China, Taiwan, Korea and the Soviet Union. A true reconciliation between the Communist giants would require a high-risk reappraisal of American interests throughout Europe and Asia.

So far, American diplomats believe the possibility of Sino-Soviet detente is limited. As one put it: "They might find a way

to tolerate each other, but their ideological and territorial differences are too great to permit real political alliance."

More important to American policy, at least one foreign policy adviser to Mr. Carter agrees. But he speculated that the so far frail evidence of limited reconciliation may grow sufficiently to set off a brisk policy debate in Washington.

Ray S. Cline, former deputy director of central intelligence, now at Georgetown University, agrees with the forecast of limited Sino-Soviet detente.

The intensity of the conflict may fade, he said, but "there are still good reasons—territorial, ethnic and psychological—for continuing some kind of dispute, but there will be an easing of tensions."

Is the shift related to the transition in Washington? "Probably," said a State Department official. "But it is probably related more to the transition in Chinese leadership."

The tentative approach to Soviet-Egyptian reconciliation appears to be based more visibly on uncertainty about Mr. Carter's policies. Their relations had been damaged severely—first when President Anwar Sadat expelled thousands of Russian advisers in 1972, then when he further reduced the Soviet presence in 1975.

Throughout that period Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, was successfully crafting improved Arab-American ties and encouraging Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. But always Egypt was believed to be looking to the U.S. as a source of replacement for its aging military equipment, and Mr. Carter's election increases normal doubts in Cairo on that score.

Egyptian commentators have worried openly about Mr. Carter's strong commitment to Israel. American officials believe the incoming President's judgment will be tempered with time by Arab control of oil and the need for Israeli compromise on a territorial settlement.

European Community (Common Market) that it had better give Turkey treatment comparable to that now being meted out to Greece, whose full membership is under negotiation.

Turkey realizes that it faces more potential danger from its Soviet neighbor than from any other quarter, since Greece is hardly a major military threat. Also, Ankara knows it relies on Western (primarily U.S.) equipment to keep its armed forces up to date.

These fundamental facts are hard to escape. Nevertheless, if an excited

Prime Minister Demirel depends upon an unstable coalition catering to a super-nationalistic minority faction. Every time this minority demonstrates its jingoism, Mr. Ecevit seeks to outflank it from the left and the Demirel Cabinet creaks along behind.

The wholly irresponsible press in both countries helps this steady push toward disaster. Therefore new—and so far low-level—bilateral negotiations started by Turkish and Greek experts in Berne and Paris meet in a psychological atmosphere unfavorable to settlement.

About all the two sides agree on is that the situation is explosive and that the United States is somehow responsible; that therefore America's existing military base structure in each country should be reduced.

Turkey's students (often a catalyst for trouble) are restive. Turkey's major alliance—with the U.S. and NATO—is in disrepair. Turkey's economy has a case of the staggers. And Turkey's voting public is in such a disoriented state as a result of accumulated and continued crises that the prospects of choosing any majority government at the ballot box are presently most dim.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

public opinion continues to press for changed essential policies in Greece and Turkey, facts could be forgotten. Passion is one trait vigorously shared in both lands.

Such passion is being continually heated up by the political opposition in each case—by the momentarily weak but clever and potentially dangerous Greek, Papandreu, and by the strong, vigorous and shrewd Turk, Bulent Ecevit. The Turkish Government, moreover, is decidedly weak.

WEDNESDAY MORNING, 10 NOVEMBER 1976

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
10 NOVEMBER 1976, Pg 8

West eyes Soviet tack in Mideast

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Athens

Uncertainty about U.S. President-Elect Jimmy Carter's Mideast policies and delay in implementing last month's Arab peace plan for Lebanon are focusing new attention on Soviet Mideast moves.

Western Arab-world watchers are following carefully these developments.

The Soviet and Egyptian Foreign Ministers, Andrei Gromyko and Ismail Fahmy, met in Bulgaria recently for their first conference since the deep freeze in Egyptian-Russian relations began nearly two years ago. They announced afterward that the Geneva conference on Mideast peace ought to resume quickly.

They promised new and more frequent contacts. East Mediterranean capitals from Belgrade to Cairo are buzzing with speculation about the possibility of a summit meeting in early 1977 between Egyptian President Sadat (who was visibly disappointed that his friend U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger will be leaving office) and Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev.

In Damascus, the official Syrian newspaper Al-Thawra and government television broadcasts have expressed the fear of Syrians and other Arabs that Mr. Carter's administration may move with less than deliberate speed toward Arab-Israeli peace after it takes office in January.

Signs of Soviet disapproval

Since the Arab summit agreements of last month, giving Syria's 22,000-man army in Lebanon the main role in trying to restore peace there, there have been signs of continuing Soviet disapproval of this arrangement.

Moscow Radio in Arabic continues to express disapproval of the aid given Lebanese rightists by Syrian forces, along with that given by Israel and "the Arab reactionaries" (Russian for Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil states, instrumental in pushing through the Arab summit agreements).

Soviet aid to the Syrian economy has been stalled for some months. Soviet military aid may have slowed, although this reporter was unable to verify this during a recent visit to Damascus.

Last summer, say intelligence sources, communications monitoring by high-powered equipment in the Soviet Embassy in Damascus reached such a level that it was disrupting telephone, radio, and wire communications around the Syrian capital. It stopped after Soviet diplomats suddenly found themselves subjected to unexplained harassment.

Commercial attachés expelled

Hungarian and Czechoslovak commercial attachés, responsible in part for continuing East-bloc aid projects in Syria, were expelled. A Hungarian military attaché was mysteriously beaten by unknown assailants.

In contrast to slowdowns in Eastern aid, Mideast financial sources report that the recent reconciliation of Syrian President Assad with President Sadat of Egypt has renewed the flow of slowed-down Saudi and Kuwaiti credits to both states. For Syria, which has had to cut

WASHINGTON 10 NOVEMBER 1976, Pg C2

MIKE CAUSEY

Army to Cut 930 Top Jobs

Army plans to whack at least 930 of its senior-level jobs—all in the \$24,000 to \$39,000 pay range—over the next two years.

That will mean many high-grade jobs will be restructured so that lower-level people can do them. It will have the effect of slapping a semi-freeze on promotions for everybody—from secretary to supervisor—in Army's 300,000-plus civilian work force.

Many of the cuts will be here, because Washington has such a heavy concentration of both civilian and military brass. The military side of the Army also will undergo cuts (these already have been announced) in the number of colonels and general officers during fiscal years 1977 and 1978.

Most of the jobs to be abolished are

ing board for similar top-level grade reductions.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense will be monitoring grade reduction programs by Army, Navy and Air Force, which also is planning to trim its top staff. And civilian and military managers have been told that OSD will step in and make cuts if they don't do what it considers to be a satisfactory job.

Normally, plans for cuts like this might be delayed for a time while the federal establishment is between Presidents. But not this time.

Defense managers say there won't be any foot-dragging this time, because President-elect Carter has indicated he will push various fat-trimming programs begun by President Ford. In fact, they expect the Carter administration to be harder on Defense—from a grade and staffing position—than the present White House.

Washington could be especially hard-hit by the top-grade reductions, and the rippling effect that will amount to a promotion freeze in some sections. Part of the reason is that the high grades tend to be located here. Also, Congress in recent years has been after Defense (especially Navy) to move more of its functions, people and jobs into the field.

The Army program will reduce the number of supervisors, lead to abolition of "marginal" layers of command and make managers work harder to justify any job they want upgraded.

All three services—Army, Navy and Air Force—have drawn up tentative plans to close some bases. But they want to wait until the Carter people take over before dropping a bombshell like that. Although the White House and congressional majority will be from the same party for the first time in eight years, that isn't likely to make individual members of Congress more agreeable to closing of bases and the resulting job loss.

In the meantime, Defense civilians will begin feeling the job squeeze and many promotion actions—unless already in the personnel pipeline—will be blocked or at least delayed for months—maybe years—to come.

The Federal Diary

now held by civilians in Grades 13 through 18, although the majority of the cuts will be in GS-13 through 15. Currently, Army has 14,189 Grade 13 employees (\$24,308 to \$31,589), and 5,348 Grade 14 workers (\$28,725 to \$37,347); nearly 1,900 Grade 15 workers (\$33,789-\$39,600); 152 workers in Grade 16; 26 at Grade 17, and 8 at Grade 18. All those so-called super-grade levels pay the same \$39,600 salary because of the long-standing lid on career civilian salaries.

On Oct. 18, this column reported that Navy had decided to adopt a hard-line policy to reduce its top-grade ranks, a move that could mean downgrading nearly 25 per cent of its top civilian staff and one that will certainly tighten promotions. Navy is the largest employer in the Washington area, and Army ranks among the top five, along with Congress and HEW.

The Navy and Army top grade cuts are important to federal workers in other agencies that will quickly follow suit, in one way or another. Defense has nearly half of the 2.6 million federal civilian jobs, and most other agencies now have plans on the draw-

NEW YORK TIMES 10 NOVEMBER 1976, Pg 5

Cuba Denies It Holds U-2 Pilot in Ice Block

Special to the New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 9.—The Cuban Government has officially denied a report that it has the body of an American U-2 reconnaissance pilot in a block of ice, the State Department said today.

The report emerged when members of the Ripon Society, a liberal Republican organization, visited Havana last month and were advised by a Cuban Foreign Ministry aide named Rinaldo Legon of the existence of "a U-2 pilot in a block of ice."

John Head, a Denver lawyer who was a member of the Ripon group, said Mr. Legon volunteered the information in a discussion of Cuban political prisoners. He quoted him as saying, "We've got one nobody wants—he's in a block of ice." Later, according to Mr. Head, the Cuban said the body was of a U-2 pilot named Johnson who was shot down 14 years ago.

The State Department inquired through the Swiss Embassy, which represents its interests in Havana. The embassy replied that it had been informed that the report had no foundation. The Central Intelligence Agency said no pilot named Johnson was missing.

around \$1 billion out of its development budget this year because of Lebanese war expenses, this may include up to \$250 million in Saudi

government aid and close to \$1 billion in investments from the private Saudi Research Development Corporation (SRDEC)

WEDNESDAY MORNING, 10 NOVEMBER 1976

A050

D W

PM-ARMS SKED 11-9

BY ROBERT KAYLOR

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM OWNS ONE OF THE WORLD'S BIGGEST WAR MACHINES, THANKS LARGELY TO U.S. EQUIPMENT IT CAPTURED WHEN SOUTH VIETNAM FELL.

BUT DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS BELIEVE A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF IT MAY BE UNUSABLE, PARTICULARLY AIRCRAFT THAT WOULD GIVE THE VIETNAMESE THE WORLD'S FOURTH BIGGEST AIR FORCE IF THEY ALL WERE AIR-WORTHY.

THE PENTAGON TUESDAY GAVE A FINAL ACCOUNTING OF U.S. MANUFACTURED EQUIPMENT AND WAR SUPPLIES LOST WHEN THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT SURRENDERED IN APRIL 1975, LISTED ON A "BEST ESTIMATE" BASIS.

THE FIGURES ARE LARGE, INCLUDING SUCH ITEMS AS MORE THAN 1.7 MILLION SMALL ARMS, ABOUT 1,000 AIRCRAFT OF VARIOUS TYPES AND 130,000 TONS OF AMMUNITION. A TOTAL OF 940 NAVAL SHIPS AND CRAFT OF VARIOUS TYPES WERE ALSO SEIZED AS WELL AS 1,750 ARMORED VEHICLES AND 42,000 TRUCKS, THE PENTAGON SAID.

IN SOME RESPECTS, THEY MAKE VIETNAM THE BIGGEST OWNER OF WAR SUPPLIES IN ASIA, OUTSIDE OF CHINA.

AMONG AIRCRAFT LISTED AS CAPTURED WERE 76 F5 JET FIGHTER PLANES, THE NEWEST OF WHICH COST ABOUT \$2.5 MILLION APIECE.

ALSO CAPTURED WERE 113 A37 JET ATTACK PLANES, SOME SEIZED IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY BEFORE THE FINAL SURRENDER AND USED TO DROP BOMBS IN THE FINAL ASSAULT ON SAIGON -- FLOWN BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE PILOTS WHO CHANGED SIDES.

A TOTAL OF 466 HELICOPTERS WERE LISTED AS CAPTURED. IN NUMBERS OF PLANES, VIETNAM RANKED BEHIND THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA AS THE WORLD'S FOURTH BIGGEST AIR FORCE. BUT THE PENTAGON SAID A LACK OF SPARE PARTS IS EXPECTED TO KEEP MANY OF THEM ON THE GROUND UNDER THEIR NEW OWNERSHIP.

SPOKESMEN SAID THEY WERE UNABLE TO GIVE DETAILED COSTS OF THE EQUIPMENT. THEY ESTIMATED THAT ABOUT \$2 BILLION OF SERVICEABLE EQUIPMENT WAS LOST WHEN SOUTH VIETNAM FELL.

IN ADDITION TO 1.64 MILLION RIFLES, 791,000 OF THEM AUTOMATIC M16'S, THE PENTAGON ALSO LISTED 15,000 MACHINE GUNS, 90,000 PISTOLS AND 1,330 ARTILLERY PIECES OF VARIOUS SIZES CAPTURED.

- UPI 11-10 05:22 AES

A051

D W

PM-TOXIC GAS SKED 11-10

BY JIM ANDERSON

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- THE FORMER CHIEF OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SAYS A LARGE PROPORTION OF SOVIET WEAPONS IN EASTERN EUROPE CARRY TOXIC GAS.

LT. GENERAL DANIEL O. GRAHAM, WHO RETIRED AS DIRECTOR OF THE DIA WHEN JAMES SCHLESINGER WAS FIRED AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SAID IN AN INTERVIEW THAT UNTIL THE EARLY 1960S, WHILE THE RUSSAINS HAD TROUBLE MANUFACTURING ENOUGH NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THEIR TACTICAL MISSILES, "AS MUCH AS ONE-HALF OF ALL THEIR BOMBS AND MISSILES CARRIED POISON GASES."

HE SAID "A LARGE PROPORTION" OF THE SOVIET STOCKPILES ARE STILL CHARGED WITH TOXIC GAS.

THE SOVIETS, HE SAID, HAVE STOCKPILED TWO PRINCIPAL KINDS OF GASES:

-- MUSTARD GAS, WHICH WOULD BE SPRAYED OVER NATO AMMUNITION DEPOTS, FOR EXAMPLE, DENYING THEIR USE TO WESTERN FORCES. MUSTARD GAS IS EXTREMELY PERSISTENT, GRAHAM SAID; GAS MANUFACTURED IN WORLD WAR I IS STILL ACTIVE AND POISONOUS.

-- "V GAS", A NEW AND POTENT NERVE GAS WHICH, GRAHAM SAYS, "WORKS ON MEN THE WAY DDT WORKS ON INSECTS." AN ANTIDOTE IS AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT IN GENERAL SUPPLY AMONG NATO FORCES. THE FORMULA WAS LEARNED, SAID GRAHAM, WHEN WESTERN INTELLIGENCE STOLE A SAMPLE FROM SOVIET FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE.

HE SAID THE WARSAW PACT FORCES NORMALLY CONDUCT MILITARY MANUEVERS WITH TROOPS WEARING GAS-PROOF CLOTHING AND THEIR VEHICLES ARE INVARIABLY EQUIPPED WITH FILTERS SO TROOPS CAN OPERATE IN A TOXIC GAS ENVIRONMENT.

NATO TROOPS, HE SAID, "WOULD MUTINY IF WE TRIED TO MAKE THEM WEAR GAS-PROOF OUTFITS AND WESTERN MILITARY VEHICLES ARE NOT SEALED AGAINST POISON GAS."

GRAHAM THINKS THE ANSWER TO THE OVERWHELMING ADVANTAGE HELD BY THE SOVIETS IN CHEMICAL WARFARE IS "TO MAKE IT CLEARLY KNOWN THAT WE WOULD REGARD A POISON GAS ATTACK AS THE SAME THING AS A NUCLEAR ATTACK AND WE WOULD HAVE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE."

HE SAID, "I DO KNOW THAT THE ANSWER DOES NOT LIE IN ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS. FEAR AND PANIC ARE NOT THE ANSWER. TOXIC GAS IS ANOTHER WEAPON. SYSTEM THAT NEEDS TO BE DETERRED."

UPI 11-10 05:29 AES



RADIO - TV DEFENSE DIALOG



RADIO TV REPORTS INC. WASH., D.C., SUMMARIES NOT TO BE QUOTED.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1976

(BROADCASTS OF NOVEMBER 9, 1976)

SUMMARY OF NETWORK NEWS IN THIS ISSUE

Walter CRONKITE, CBS Evening News, and David BRINKLEY, NBC Nightly News, both report on the opening of talks between Vietnam and the US later this week. It will be the first formal talks between the two nations since the signing of the Paris agreement ending the Vietnam war.

Richard C. HOTTLET, CBS Evening News, reports on the activities of the United Nations General Assembly in passing resolutions condemning South Africa for its racist policies.

Walter CRONKITE, CBS Evening News, reports that a recently retired chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff warned CARTER that he cannot expect his orders always to be obeyed.

Ike PAPPAS, CBS Evening News, and Harry REASONER, ABC Evening News, both report on the fact that the Defense Department is saying it has more money than they can spend. But the Pentagon says, don't worry, the money is earmarked for defense programs and will be spent.

Bettina GREGORY, ABC Evening News, Ike PAPPAS, CBS Evening News, and John COCHRAN, NBC Nightly News, all report the Newport News Shipbuilding Company announced it does not want any more contracts with the Defense Department and the Navy. They charge the Navy with owing them millions of dollars in part for changes in contracts for which payments were never made. A spokesman for the company charges the cost overruns are mainly because of the Pentagon changing its mind and delaying production.

Walter CRONKITE, CBS Evening News, reports a Pentagon report says that the North Vietnamese captured five billion dollars worth of US equipment when they took South Vietnam.

Carl STERN, NBC Nightly News, reports the Justice Department is advising US attorneys to shelve pending cases against Vietnam war draft resisters, as Jimmy CARTER says he will grant them a pardon.

Bruce MORTON, CBS Morning News, reports Secretary of State KISSINGER may personally enter into the Rhodesian talks going on in Geneva as they appear to have reached a stalemate.

Marvin KALB, CBS Morning News, reports Secretary KISSINGER is not willing to enter into new negotiations with countries in the Middle East pending the take-over of policy making by the CARTER Administration.

Bruce MORTON, CBS Morning News, reports Senator Stuart SYMINGTON is about to retire - and retire with very different views than he had years ago regarding the Pentagon and war efforts.

Hughes RUDD, CBS Morning News, reports there was another theft aboard a Navy aircraft carrier - this time about ten thousand stolen aboard the carrier, USS America.

PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE (SAFAA) AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL MATTERS WITHIN THEIR OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES.
FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THIS PUBLICATION CALL MR. HARRY ZUBKOFF, OX 52864

CBS EVENING NEWS

CBS-TV

7:00 PM

November 9, 1976

US And Hanoi Open Talks

WALTER CRONKITE: The United States and the seventeen month old communist government of Vietnam will open talks in Paris Friday to discuss establishing diplomatic relations.

They will be the first formal talks between the two countries since the Paris peace agreement was signed almost four years ago.

A US official in Washington said of the talks, we're going to be hard-nosed, but not belligerent. It's not going to be a friendly meeting.

The possibility of establishing relations between Washington and Hanoi has been bouncing around since last April - the one year anniversary of the communist take-over. But a sore point with the United States has been Vietnam's refusal to help locate American soldiers missing in action.

Despite the day's announcement of diplomatic talks, a US delegation member at the United Nations said American opposition to Vietnamese membership in the UN remains unchanged and the US most likely would veto such membership when it comes before the Security Council tomorrow.

UN Passes Resolutions On Southern Africa

WALTER CRONKITE: Today, the UN General Assembly by overwhelming margins passed ten resolutions against South Africa's apartheid (?) policy of racial discrimination. The United States voted against five of the resolutions, abstained on three others and the remaining two were adopted without a vote.

RICHARD C. HOTTLET: An enormous majority of Afro/Asian non-aligned and communist states voted drastic measures against South Africa. They aim not only to end apartheid but also to sweep away what is called the illegitimate racist regime.

One resolution affirms that the two black national liberation movements are the authentic representatives of the South African majority. And it affirms the legitimacy of their struggle to seize power by all possible means, including obviously, guerilla warfare.

Another denounces France, Germany, Israel, Britain and the United States as the natural allies of South Africa, accusing them of giving it weapons for repression at home and aggression against

other states.

The western nations angrily repudiated what they called propaganda attacks.

MAN: Such one sided and arbitrary approach runs counter to the efforts aiming at constructive and objective cooperation and fair reconciliation of interests in this world organization.

The session today revoked the confrontations of recent years and it seems clear that the anti-colonial coalition will try to follow-through with action.

Today's resolutions are not binding but they are not academic either. They help to create reality.

Portugal's African empire collapsed under the weight of resolutions like these. The coalition has the same in mind for South Africa.

Will There Be A Role For Joint Chiefs Of Staff In Carter Administration?

WALTER CRONKITE: A recently retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has warned President-elect CARTER that he cannot expect his orders always to be obeyed:

Retired Admiral Thomas MOORER, speaking to the commodity club in Washington, cited the example of a 1971 India/Pakistan war. When the White House desired to tilt US support in favor of Pakistan, got nowhere with the bureaucracy.

The Admiral did not say who blocked this but he did say that CARTER will find, quote, he's going to give a lot of orders and nothing is going to happen.

MOORER's warning evoked memories of President EISENHOWER's farewell White House speech more than fifteen years ago - a warning to be alert to the grave implications of a military industrial complex. And its, quote, potential for the disastrous rise of mis-placed power, end quote.

Pentagon Fails To Spend All Of Its Money

WALTER CRONKITE: In that regard, new questions have been raised in the past few days about the Pentagon's failure to spend all of its ninety-eight billion dollar budget last year.

A budget that this year is one hundred and eleven billion. But the Pentagon seeking yet more for next year, the question is what happens to the unspent funds?

IKE PAPPAS: Defense Department officials have admitted the Pentagon failed to use more than eleven and a half billion dollars authorized by Congress in last year's budget to buy military

equipment and other items.

One of the main reasons for the surplus they said, was a lag in the granting of contracts - a deficiency Secretary of Defense RUMSFELD is only now attempting to correct by ordering a speed-up in contract awards.

Defense Department Comptroller, Fred WACKER, told reporters most of the money was earmarked to be spent within the next few months and that only about five hundred million will be returned to Congress as unspent funds.

Left over money cannot be carried to the next year's budget nor can any of it be diverted to other programs.

Nevertheless, the situation may prove to be embarrassing for the Pentagon when it attempts to sell what could be a one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and thirty billion dollar 1978 budget to Congress next January.

The Defense Department is also expected to have a tough time explaining to Congress how it is handling its ship building program. The Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company today issued an ultimatum to the Navy to either come up with the eight hundred and eighty-five million dollars the company says is due it or takes its business elsewhere.

The company says the Navy delayed key decisions and made design changes on contracts to the point where ship delivery schedules were thrown off and millions of dollars charged in over time work and extra material.

The Navy says the ship building firm is to blame also for the mishandling of those contracts and wants the courts to settle the matter.

Newport News said, they would assist the Navy in removing the fourteen ships now are building (?) in its yards.

Vietnam Captures Billions Of US Equipment

WALTER CRONKITE: It may not be a financial page story but it could be - a Pentagon report released today says that the North Vietnamese captured five billion dollars worth of US equipment when they took South Vietnam.

They captured enough American military equipment to field an entire army, navy and airforce. Among the booty of the war were five hundred and fifty US made tanks, more than thirteen hundred artillery pieces and one point six million rifles.

ABC EVENING NEWS

ABC-TV

7:00 PM

November 9, 1976

Pentagon Announces They Have Too Much Money

HARRY REASONER: Pentagon officials made an unusual announcement about money today - they have too much in a strange way.

For largely technical reasons, more than eleven and a half billion dollars that is available for various weapon systems, has not been committed.

But the Pentagon says, don't worry, the money is earmarked for defense programs and will be spent.

Much more usual when you talk about the Pentagon and money is something called a cost overrun. That is a project that ends up being more expensive than originally anticipated.

Right now the Navy is involved in a dispute with a major contractor over nearly one billion dollars in cost overruns. In this case, the contractor claims it was the Navy that caused the problem.

Navy Involved In Billion Dollar Dispute Over Cost Overruns

BETTINA GREGORY: Newport News Shipbuilding is the largest yard in the US for nuclear powered ships and the only one that can build nuclear powered aircraft carriers like the Admiral Nimitz (?) and guided missile cruisers like the Virginian.

The shipbuilders claim the government owes them some eight hundred and eighty-five million dollars for ships built since 1969. They say these cost overruns were caused by the Navy for such things as design changes and late delivery of components.

But these cost claims have been going on for some time. They are not the whole story.

Executives of Newport News Shipbuilding tell me the Navy is purposely trying to under estimate the contract costs for nuclear powered ships.

JOHN DIESEL: It is my opinion that the Navy has knowingly and willfully under estimated the cost of nuclear ships in the past.

Or ships that are under contract now, let me put it that way.

GREGORY: Why would they do that?

DIESEL: To aid and abet the program to get all Navy ships or a high percentage of Navy ships nuclear power.

You got to fit the nuclear powered ships within to some fixed budget and if you haven't got enough money, the best way to make the budget look good is to underestimate the cost of a ship.

GREGORY: The Navy acknowledges the disputes of cost claims have caused some problem. I asked whether any of these huge cost overruns could have been caused by deliberate cost underestimates.

DAVID MACDONALD: I'm not aware of that and I - I kind of doubt that that is the case.

The fact is that escalation has been unprecedented over the last two or three years.

GREGORY: Not everyone shares the view that Navy is dealing fairly with Newport News.

Gordon RULE is the chief civilian procurement officer for the Navy and a man not known to be soft toward government contractors.

GORDON RULE: The Navy is not negotiating in good faith and hasn't been with Newport News - or the - or the elected vote - the other nuclear yard hasn't been for some time in my opinion.

And they are making unfair contracts with both those yards.

GREGORY: Newport News has in effect issued an ultimatum said if there is no progress, they won't bid on any new ships including a nuclear powered aircraft carrier. And they'll ask that fourteen ships now being built for the Navy to be transferred to another shipyard.

The problem is, there is no other shipyard equipped to build nuclear powered surface ships. The future of this shipyard really poses the question where government or private contractors should build ships.

The government's own study shows it would cost more if the government builds these nuclear powered ships.

NBC NIGHTLY NEWS

NBC-TV

7:00 PM

November 9, 1976

Ship Builder Doesn't Want Pentagon's Business

DAVID BRINKLEY: The US Navy use to have its own shipyards but they tended to become over staffed, expensive, inefficient, and so it now relies on private ship builders.

Today, one of the biggest of these

said it did not want anymore Navy business. Because it is slow, wrapped in red tape. The Navy keeps making changes and refusing to pay for them.

JOHN COCHRAN: The Navy says it needs more new ships like this nuclear carrier to keep pace with the Russians.

The goal, a six hundred ship Navy by 1988.

To do that, the Navy must rely on commercial contractors like the Newport News Company, which has built Navy ships since 1895. But now, the company claims the Navy keeps changing its blueprints and that, they say, results in extra costs which the Navy refuses to pay.

The shipyard's president says he wants the Navy to take its business elsewhere.

J. P. DIESEL: It is not a negotiating bluff. The Navy is far behind our company in paying their bills. And I want to notify the Navy now that we are not going to undertake new contracts.

I don't think there is any logic or reason to add more business on top of the administrative paraphernalia that doesn't work.

COCHRAN: Opinion at the Pentagon is divided between hardliners who want to fight the company in court and those who want to negotiate.

The Under Secretary of the Navy, take the official moderate line - he says the Navy will not beg but he also said a compromise must be worked out.

DAVID McDONALD: Newport News is our sole present contractor for surface nuclear ships. It is an extremely important matter that must be resolved or it will impinge.

I think on the national security.

COCHRAN: But hardliners within in the Navy led by Admiral H. RICKOVER, favor a get tough approach with the shipyard.

The FORD Administration has told RICKOVER to stay out of the disputes but he may have better luck with incoming members of the CARTER Administration.

One of them, a former naval officer, says RICKOVER had perhaps more influence on him than anyone except his own parents.

The man who said that was Jimmy CARTER.

US And Vietnam My Begin Discussions

DAVID BRINKLEY: This Friday in Paris, the United States and Vietnam will begin talking about the possibility, if there is any, of resuming normal relations.

It will be the first time the two countries have talked since the peace agreement was signed about four years

ago.

Nobody knows what will come of it, if anything.

Carter Would Pardon Vietnam Draft Resistors

DAVID BRINKLEY: Jimmy CARTER has said from the beginning that he would pardon the Vietnam draft resistors, not a blanket amnesty but pardon for those who resisted the draft.

Since that will be his policy beginning in January, Carl STERN (?) has asked the Department of Justice if it will try to prosecute any evaders between Now and January.

And here is what he has found out.

CARL STERN: The answer David is no. Suggesting that Mr. CARTER is already having an impact on policy.

NBC News has learned that because of CARTER's election and campaign promise, the Justice Department is advising US attorneys to shelve pending cases against Vietnam war draft resistors.

US attorneys in New York San Francisco and elsewhere indicated they would wait for Mr. CARTER to define which if any cases should still be prosecuted.

Arrest warrants are still active for about four thousand draft law violators, most of them, living in Canada. But the US attorneys say there is no use in prosecuting draft resistors if Mr. CARTER is going to pardon them.

And that is why this week, the word has gone out to hold off on such cases.

CBS MORNING NEWS CBS-TV
8:00 AM November 9, 1976

Kissinger May Have To Intervene In Geneva Talks On Rhodesia

BRUCE MORTON: Almost everybody is away from Washington these days - the President, the president-elect, as you noted, and the Congress, so there is really not much going on here.

Two men came back to town yesterday - Assistant Secretaries of State, William SCHAUFLE and John REINHARDT, who have been at the Geneva conference on Rhodesia.

That conference is not going well and SCHAUFLE and REINHARDT said yesterday it is possible that Secretary of State KISSINGER might intervene to try to get it going again.

But they added they will first want to see whether black nationalists are willing to accept a British proposal for a transition to complete independence over a fifteen month period.

In general, KISSINGER seems anxious not to do anything in these lame duck months which would limit the new administration next year.

Marvin KALB says that rule also applies when it comes to the Middle East.

Kissinger Signals Arabs And Israelis To Cool It

MARVIN KALB: Secretary KISSINGER signaled both the Arabs and the Israelis to cool it. To expect no American initiatives or leadership in the Middle East until the CARTER Administration comes to power.

His spokesman, Robert FUNDSET (?) told reporters that the State Department would do its utmost to protect the new Administration's flexibility.

Arab leaders have recently indicated a strong desire to reconvene the Geneva conference. And to try arranging a comprehensive settlement with Israel based on total Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 boundaries.

President SADAT of Egypt is reported to have warned that of new Arab/Israeli war, unless dramatic progress toward his goal is made next year.

The Soviet Union supports the Arab view and it may be very difficult for the United States to withstand the Arab and Soviet pressure for quick change.

But that appears to be KISSINGER's current intention. To hold off on any new initiatives while protecting diplomatic possibilities; recognizing that as a lame duck, he is really in no position to implement them.

Symington Talks About Disarmament

BRUCE MORTON: Stuart SYMINGTON Held a little hearing yesterday, probably the last one the seventy-four year old Missouri Senator will chair.

The subject, fittingly enough was disarmament, which has been a principle concern of SYMINGTON's over the last few years.

More than a lot of men in Washington, SYMINGTON's views have changed as the years went by. He was, you may remember the first Secretary of the Air Force. A big bomber man back in those days, arguing for a seventy group Air Force at a time when many other officials wanted a smaller one.

He resigned that Air Force job to

November 9, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS

After the end of the war in Vietnam on April 30, 1975, there were a number of press inquiries concerning the amount and types of U.S. military equipment captured by North Vietnam. The following is a best-estimate list of types and quantities of military equipment captured by North Vietnam forces in South Vietnam. A substantial amount of this equipment could be unserviceable. The list does not take into account the degree of damage inflicted upon portions of the equipment left behind by retreating Republic of Vietnam forces during the final days. Also the degree of subsequent deterioration of the captured equipment resulting from prevalent climate/weather conditions in South Vietnam and other factors is unknown.

M-41A3	300
M-48A3	250
M-113 APCs	1,200
105mm HOWITZERS	1,000
155mm HOWITZERS	250
175mm SELF PROPELLED GUNS	80
M-16 RIFLES	791,000
RIFLES (various other types)	857,580
M-60 MACHINE GUNS	15,000
M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHERS	47,000
LIGHT ANTI-TANK WEAPONS (LAW)	63,000
45 CAL PISTOLS	90,000
60, 81, 90mm* MORTARS	12,000
PRC 10/25 RADIOS	42,000
VRC-46 RADIOS	6,000
F-5A/B AIRCRAFT	51
F-5E AIRCRAFT	22
A-37 AIRCRAFT	113
A-1 AIRCRAFT	36
C-130A AIRCRAFT	10
C-119 AIRCRAFT	40
C-7 AIRCRAFT	40
UH-1 HELICOPTER	430
CH-47 HELICOPTER	36
O-1/O-2	159
AC/EC/VC/RC-47 AIRCRAFT	36
T-41 AIRCRAFT	22
AMMUNITION	130,000 tons
TRUCKS (1/4, 3/4 and 2-1/2 ton)	42,000
NAVAL SHIPS/CRAFT	940

*There is no 90mm Mortar in the US inventory; however, some 200 90mm recoilless rifles of US manufacture are estimated to have been captured by the Vietnamese Communists.

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION ROUTING SHEET (CODE HD)

X—ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET

A—APPROPRIATE ACTION

B—GUIDANCE

C—SIGNATURE

D—COMMENT

E—RECOMMENDATION

F—CONCURRENCE

G—INFORMATION

H—RETURN TO **H0H-2**

I—INITIAL

J—DISPOSITION

K—DECISION

L—RETENTION

O—(OTHER)

ROUTING Use numbers to show order of routing

Rtg	Opr Code		In	Out
2	G	Director, Marine Corps History and Museums		12/10
		Head, Historical Branch		
1	G	Chief Historian		1/10
3	GH	Histories Section		12/10
X		Reference Section		12/10
		Oral History Section		
		Head, Support Branch		
		Administrative Section		
		Security Section		
		Publications Production Section		
		Archives Section		
		Library Section		
		Still Photo Archives Section		
		Motion Picture/TV Archives Section		
		Head, Museums Branch		
		Chief Curator		
		Registrar		
		Curator, Marine Barracks and Special Projects		
		Artist in Residence		
		Exhibits Section		
		Collections Section		
		Officer in Charge Quantico		
		Aviation Section		
		Ordnance Section		

Remarks

Copy of the
Requested list is
attached

Vietnam unit V.R.
should be. S
Gay Lufkin

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION ROUTING SHEET (CODE HD)

X- ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET

A- APPROPRIATE ACTION

B- GUIDANCE

C- SIGNATURE

D- COMMENT

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F- CONCURRENCE

G- INFORMATION

H- RETURN TO _____

I- INITIAL

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K- DECISION

L- RETENTION

O- (OTHER)

ROUTING Use numbers to show order of routing

Rtg	Opr Code		In	Out
		Director, Marine Corps History and Museums		11/10 S
		Head, Historical Branch		
1	G	Chief Historian	11/5	11/10
		Histories Section		
2	A	Reference Section		
		Oral History Section		
		Head, Support Branch		
		Administrative Section		
		Security Section		
		Publications Production Section		
		Archives Section		
		Library Section		
		Still Photo Archives Section		
		Motion Picture/TV Archives Section		
		Head, Museums Branch		
		Chief Curator		
		Registrar		
		Curator, Marine Barracks and Special Projects		
		Artist in Residence		
		Exhibits Section		
		Collections Section		
		Officer-in-Charge Quantico		
		Aviation Section		
		Ordnance Section		

Remarks

We should get a copy of that list/report.
V.R.
S

*M. Gordon*HDH-1/GAC/srp
3 Dec 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Records and Archives Committee Meeting,
3 December 1976~~Present: LtCol Tiffany, Mrs. Bonnett, Mr. Shulimson, and~~
~~Dr. Cosmas~~

Next Meeting: 7 January 1977 at 1500

1. The meeting convened at 1510 in Mr. Shaw's office.
2. Lieutenant Colonel Tiffany reported that a memorandum has been sent to ISSM via Headquarters Support requesting insertion in the records disposition manual of a requirement that copies of disposition sheets from Central Files and S&C be provided HDS-4.
3. Lieutenant Colonel Tiffany stated that a draft letter to the National Archives on the question of the muster rolls is under consideration by the Director.
4. Lieutenant Colonel Tiffany reported that, at the request of the division, ISSM will obtain master copies of the 1959-1966 muster rolls and turn them over to Headquarters Support for the purpose of copying them for the division. Action is pending on the 1956, 1957, and 1958 muster rolls.
5. Mrs. Bonnett provided a list of selected new documentary accessions (copy attached).
6. Lieutenant Colonel Tiffany recommended deletion of the number "341" from Paragraph 10 of the MR for the 5 November 1976 Records and Archives Committee Meeting, as the National Archives has negatives of over 18,000 Marine Corps photographs. This was agreed to.
7. Mrs. Bonnett reported that her informal arrangement with S&C for obtaining copies of their disposition sheets is working smoothly.
8. The meeting adjourned at 1535.

Respectfully submitted,

Graham A. Cosmas
GRAHAM A. COSMAS

Enclosure

Distribution:

All Officers, All GS-7 and above, All mentioned

NEW ACQUISITIONS IN ARCHIVES SECTION

MONTH OF NOVEMBER 1976

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR</u>	<u>DATE OF DOCUMENT</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>DONATED BY : (IF APPLICABLE)</u>
Historical Monograph - The Cambodia Airlift, 1974-75, USAF (S603809)	Office of PACAF History	31 Oct 1976	(S) NOFORN	AF History
CINCPAC Command History, 1975, Vols. I & II (T8187)	CINCPAC	7 Oct 1976	(TS) NOFORN	CINCPAC
History of U. S. Forces, Japan, 1975 (S603825)	HQ, U.S. Forces, Japan	30 Jul 1976	(S) NOFORN	HQ, U.S. Forces, Japan
Commander, U. S. Taiwan Defense Command History, 1975 (S603826)	U.S. Taiwan Defense Command	20 Aug 1976	(S) NOFORN	U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
1975 Annual Historical Report - HQ, United Nations Command, U. S. Forces, Korea, Eighth U. S. Army (S603822)	HQ, United Nations Command	17 Jun 1976	(S)	HQ, United Nations Command

CINCPAC (1975)

Command History VII
TS

Sept. 2

- see Linda

New history of
Mazagay.

Previous parts are
Coffee Pull
Frequent Wind
etc

Part II -- Main Edition -- 18 NOVEMBER 1977

MILWAUKEE JOURNAL 23 OCTOBER 1977 (18 NOVEMBER)

Dutch Military Unions Don't Please Everyone

By Sam Martino
of The Journal Staff

Amsterdam, Netherlands — To Theo Stronks, 22, an artillery private in the Dutch Army, the length of his blond hair, which goes to his shoulders, is not important.

What is important, he says, is the individual welfare of soldiers who have been drafted and whether they can perform their military functions without harassment.

"We do our job regardless of the length of our hair," he said in an interview outside the Ripperda Kazerne training installation near here.

But to outsiders who see Dutch soldiers looking like hippies and compare them with the more trim soldiers of the United States, Britain and other NATO countries, the sight of long-haired soldiers brings up objections.

Called "Associations"

Criticism is lodged against military unions, which gained increased influence after military conscripts staged a work stoppage in 1975. The soldiers won the abandonment of the spiffiness normally associated with the military, particularly hair styles, saluting and polished shoes.

The Dutch government forbids the unions from striking, and is careful to call them "associations." Officials

contend that the unions have no power to negotiate with the defense ministry, but they recognize what are called formalized consultations.

A committee for formal consultations meets with a dozen different unions, including the Association of Military Conscripts that represents 23,000 soldiers. There are an estimated 104,000 men in the Dutch armed services.

The actions of the associations are taken seriously. Often there are demonstrations by more militant soldiers both in the streets and in barracks.

The basic function of the associations, according to the government, is the dialog that develops between them and the government.

"Everybody seems to agree that major results have been achieved," said a military spokesman. "Rules and regulations which have been called 'Mickey Mouse' are abolished. The Dutch serviceman enjoys an individual freedom hitherto unknown, mainly restricted by functional requirements."

Meanwhile, American military officers and politicians have become increasingly concerned about the issue of unions. There is a fear of a breakdown in discipline if the US military were to become unionized.

Declared Offlimits

Defense Secretary Harold Brown issued a policy directive this month declaring unions and strikes offlimits for the military. A bill pending in Congress also would bar union activities in the armed forces.

Last year, Gen. George Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress that "every country that has had unionization within its uniformed side of the military establishment has paid a terrific price in operational effectiveness."

Sensitive to such views, the Dutch Ministry of Defense at The Hague in September issued a lengthy report on the unionized army.

"Often people abroad judge solely on the outward appearance of Dutch military men," said the report. "Long hair and unconventional behavior are believed to be harmful for the military effectiveness of the forces. There is no evidence for this whatsoever."

"There are still many problems to be solved . . . But these problems cannot be tackled by closing the door for new developments in our society. The Dutch approach is aimed at keeping the right balance between tolerance on the one hand and military effectiveness on the other."

Dutch officials point to the praise its military forces have received from Gen. Alexander Haig, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. And they cite the way Dutch forces handled themselves during recent troubles involving South Moluccan terrorists who last spring held 53 persons hostage in a train and school. The hostages were rescued by Dutch marines.

The Retired Officer • November 1977 (18)

THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT has issued DoD Directive 1354.1 which prohibits commanders and supervisors from negotiating or engaging in collective bargaining with any person or organization about terms or conditions of military service.

The directive establishes specific policies and procedures with respect to organizations whose objective is to organize or represent members of the Armed Forces on active duty, inactive duty training, or members of Reserve components serving in their military capacities, for purposes of negotiating or bargaining about the terms or conditions of military service.

"Negotiation or collective bargain-

ing" is defined by DoD to mean a process whereby a commander or supervisor engages in discussions with individuals or groups purporting to represent members of the Armed Forces for the purpose of resolving bilaterally such matters as wages, hours, grievances, disputes, assignments or other terms or conditions of military service.

The directive

- prohibits commanders and supervisors from engaging in negotiation or collective bargaining
- prohibits members of the Armed Forces from engaging in strikes, slowdowns, work stoppages, or other actions by two or

more persons which are intended to and do obstruct or interfere with the performance of military assignments, and picketing for the purpose of causing any of the foregoing, when such actions are related to terms or conditions of military service

- proscribes specific efforts on military installations to recruit members of the Armed Forces into certain types of organizations and, in specific circumstances, prohibits membership by members of the Armed Forces in certain organizations
- vests responsibility for assuring compliance in the heads of the various departmental components.

C.I.A. -- CONTINUED

Thailand, as "a springboard for long-range agent penetration into Vietnam," Mr. Sneed says.

"As a result," the Sneed account continues, "when South Vietnam did collapse, the C.I.A. had no significant intelligence networks in place to keep it informed of the policies and eccentricities of the new Communist regime."

A similar intelligence failure took place in Cambodia, which also fell in the spring of 1975, Mr. Sneed writes, but for a different reason.

C.I.A. planners in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, had chosen to focus "their stay-behind operations on the cities, establishing all of their secret radio terminals and clandestine spy cells there," Mr. Sneed says. "When the cities

themselves were cleared, the networks collapsed, leaving us with almost no way of gathering intelligence in postwar Cambodia."

Ironically, the Sneed account adds, that failure was the direct consequence of the inability of the C.I.A. to heed its own intelligence reports.

C.I.A. officials had known for years, Mr. Sneed writes, that Khieu Samphan, who emerged as the Khmer Rouge postwar leader of Cambodia, "intended to raze the cities and turn the society into a great rural estate." "This was one of the main tenets of a dissertation he had written as a student," Mr. Sneed noted.

"Moreover," he adds, "in the last months of the war the Communists had systematically depopulated every major town they had captured, thus providing further proof of their overall aim."

The C.I.A. secretly operated no less than five clandestine radio stations in South Vietnam that were set up in the days immediately after the 1972 Paris cease-fire. "Soon after wrapping up the Paris agreement," Mr. Sneed writes, "Kissinger had directed the C.I.A. to set up a clutch of 'gray' propaganda radio stations to harass the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong."

The stations, built in a ramshackle old building in Saigon, broadcast in Cambodian and Vietnamese until the fall of Saigon, Mr. Sneed writes. Most of the Vietnamese connected with that operation were evacuated, the most successful C.I.A. evacuation effort of the downfall, Mr. Sneed says.

As "gray" stations, they were representing themselves to the world as non-Communist radio voices with no Government affiliation.

C.I.A. ----CONTINUED

As Mr. Snapp saw it, Mr. Polgar and Mr. Martin were in effect victimized by members of the Hungarian delegation to the four-nation International Commission for Control and Supervision teams that were set up under the 1972 Paris peace agreements on Vietnam.

Mr. Polgar, a native of Hungary, held strong anti-Communist feelings, but he nonetheless became friendly with the military attache to the Hungarian delegation, writes Mr. Snapp, and enjoyed "months of cocktail parties and friendly socializing."

Mr. Polgar justified his relationship by explaining to C.I.A. headquarters that the Hungarians had promised to provide him with warning if the North Vietnamese decided to launch a major new offensive, Mr. Snapp writes.

The Snapp account continues: "By early April the (Hungarians) were telling him precisely what Moscow and Hanoi wanted him to hear, dropping hints that the war need not end in disaster and humiliation for the Americans. Polgar was too devoted an anti-Communist, and too experienced an intelligence officer, to accept everything they said at face value. But since he now so much wanted to believe that Saigon could be saved from the holocaust, his well-developed skepticism began to fail him."

A similar ill-fated desire to believe in the possibility of last-ditch negotiations also prevented Ambassador Martin and his superior, Secretary Kissinger, from moving quickly to initiate the inevitable evacuation, Mr. Snapp says.

As late as April 28, the Snapp account says, Mr. Martin told an astonished senior associate that a cease-fire in place would be agreed upon with Saigon getting 30 days to form a new coalition government with the Communists.

The official glanced "hurriedly through the cable traffic," Mr. Snapp writes, and "could find nothing in it that seemed to justify such optimism."

In a similar incident a week earlier, Mr. Snapp writes, Secretary Kissinger received a bland note from the Soviet Union relaying North Vietnamese assurances that it had "no intention" of posing obstacles to an American evacuation and indicating that the North Vietnamese had no desire to "humiliate the United States."

The highly classified Russian message was relayed to Saigon with Mr. Kissinger's interpretation. Among other points, the Secretary of State had concluded that the message meant the North Vietnamese would permit the maintenance of an American presence in Saigon as well as begin negotiations for a coalition government.

Mr. Polgar and Mr. Kissinger were convinced, Mr. Snapp writes, that the main stumbling block to last-minute negotiations lay in removing the Government of President Nguyen Van Thieu and installing Duong Van Minh as President.

Throughout the last week, Mr. Snapp says, Mr. Polgar repeatedly sought permission to use covert means—bribery, for example—to overthrow President Thieu. he was rebuffed by Ambassador Martin as well as by William Colby, the Central Intelligence Director.

In those weeks, Mr. Snapp says, Mr. Polgar and Mr. Martin also repeatedly authorized the release of classified materials and the alteration of other intelligence data in an effort to convince Congress that additional military aid to Saigon was essential if the South Vietnam Government was to be maintained.

Concern Over Intelligence Disclosures

Mr. Snapp writes that he was often ordered to prepare "special memoranda" for visiting Congressmen, and was particularly pressed to participate in what he terms as a "Barnum and Bailey extravaganza" of briefings for a Congressional fact-finding group that visited Saigon late in February 1975.

"The trifling way we handled intelligence throughout this period troubled me deeply," Mr. Snapp reports. "Seldom had the Ambassador or Polgar had any qualms about declassifying and publicizing agent reports that might win support for additional (Congressional) aid, but now, with the military situation so fluid and confused, this continued outpouring of confidences did our allies a considerable disservice."

His account continues: "Beyond the wisdom of these excesses there was also a question of their legality. Under the National Security Acts the C.I.A. is expressly enjoined from involving itself in domestic politics in the United States. And yet every memo and briefing I prepared for the delegation was a feat in this direction—an effort to change Congressional minds on a matter of domestic concern."

Mr. Snapp acknowledges that his concern over the misleading intelligence being provided to Congressional delegation subsequently led him to set up some private meetings with the legislators in order to convey more accurate information.

As the situation worsened in terms of evacuation planning, Mr. Snapp further writes, he went a step further and arranged a meeting with a group of newsmen in which he "leaked" classified information about North Vietnamese plans. None of the newsmen subsequently wrote an account, he relates, in part because they checked with Mr. Polgar or Ambassador Martin for confirmation.

In the weeks and months before the first North Vietnamese offensive in 1975, Mr. Snapp acknowledges, his analyses often were faulty and misleading, but "more from ignorance than from outright stupidity."

Corruption in C.I.A. Reported

One reason for the ignorance, he writes, was "corruption—within the ranks of the C.I.A. itself." C.I.A. auditors had discovered that a senior officer in the key agency outpost at Nhatrang in South Vietnam had been abusing operational funds that should have been used to set up an agent network. The officer was quickly removed from Vietnam, Mr. Snapp notes, but the effects of his mismanagement on the subsequent intelligence estimates were never overcome.

While the quick removal of the agent may have been commendable, Mr. Snapp writes, what happened later was not. He was forced to retire but, "because his superiors wanted no embarrassing publicity, they decided not to take him to court and even allowed him to leave the agency with full retirement pensions and benefits."

"Although the man's misconduct had contributed directly to one of our most critical intelligence failures in Vietnam," Mr. Snapp adds, "the C.I.A. remained unwilling [after Saigon's fall] to take any further action against him, lest its on public image suffer in the process."

The Snapp book is replete with important disclosures about the agency's activities in South Vietnam and elsewhere.

Mr. Snapp directly acknowledges, for example, that the C.I.A.'s Phoenix Program resulted in many murders. "The object of the Phoenix Program was to capture Communist cadres and bring them in alive so they could be interrogated and exploited for intelligence purposes," Mr. Snapp writes. "But as had so often happened in the past, the American game plan was more than our Vietnamese allies could handle. For lack of finite guidance, the Phoenix strike teams opted for a scatter-shot approach, picking up anyone who might be a suspect, and eventually when the jails were filled to overflowing they began simply taking the law, such as it was, into their own hands."

Another significant disclosure is that C.I.A. officials learned in 1974 that more than 100 intelligence agents who had been recruited in prior years "were fabricators; clever Vietnamese entrepreneurs who knew nothing of Communist plans

but who had been able to patch together enough information from newspaper stories and soup-kitchen gossip to keep us supplied with what looked like valid intelligence—at great cost to the Government," Mr. Snapp writes.

Mr. Snapp also says that the efforts of the Thieu Government in 1970 to paint a non-Communist nationalist leader, Tram Ngoc Chau, as a subversive and a Communist agent. At the time, Mr. Chau was emerging as a leading critic of the Thieu regime.

Jailed for 10 Years

Mr. Chau, eventually sentenced to jail for 10 years by the Thieu regime, accused the United States of betraying him, charges that United States officials denied at the time.

After Mr. Chau's release from prison, Mr. Snapp writes, some C.I.A. men, with whom Mr. Chau had cooperated in the years before his arrest, sought permission to evacuate him. But the request was vetoed and Mr. Chau was left behind.

Another incident reported for the first time was the C.I.A.'s refusal, in 1971, of a Communist request to exchange an American prisoner of war for a high-ranking Communist official who had been captured. The offer was refused because, as Mr. Snapp writes, the C.I.A. considered its terms unfair: The Vietnamese was "a top Communist intelligence operative," while the American, Douglas K. Ramsey, who had been captured in 1966, was "no more than a Foreign Service Officer."

The refusal later became a source of embarrassment to the C.I.A. and the Government when a second trade offer arose at a critical time in the 1972 Paris peace talks, Mr. Snapp writes. If Mr. Ramsey, once released, knew of and told the world about the earlier refusal, so the theorizing went, "the result undoubtedly would be a massive popular backlash in the United States," Mr. Snapp says, with more resulting pressure for a peace agreement. Mr. Ramsey was not released until 1973.

Supply Buildup Recalled

Other disclosures in the Snapp account include the following:

North Vietnam, despite repeated United States assertions to the contrary, did "not engage in much offensive activity" in the year following the negotiated cease-fire in 1972, Mr. Snapp writes. What they did accomplish, according to his account, was a major buildup of supply caches inside their territories in South Vietnam.

Although the United States publicly protested the supply buildup, Mr. Snapp notes, "We were hardly in the strongest position to object. In the months directly preceding the cease-fire we had set a provocative example for Hanoi by ramming huge quantities of war matériel into the south."

Ambassador Martin sent his staff a memorandum shortly after moving to Saigon in 1972 in which he clearly sought to discourage concern over corruption in South Vietnam.

Mr. Snapp notes that with that attitude, "in the Ambassador's office, few of the rest of us felt comfortable or justified in nurturing our own worst suspicions."

At least one critical intelligence document, a major article in the January 1975 issue of the North Vietnamese party journal, was delayed two months due to a "foul-up" in the international mails and did not arrive until early March, Mr. Snapp writes.

The article, which made clear that North Vietnamese would seek to take Saigon by early or late 1975, "might have [helped the C.I.A. be] in a better position to anticipate what was in the offing," Mr. Snapp writes. By the time the article arrived, he adds, "it was too late."

C.I.A. officials refused permission, shortly before the final downfall in Saigon for the recruitment of some "stay-behinds" and the establishment of a Vietnamese emigre organization in Bangkok.

(See C.I.A., Pg 12-F)

C.I.A. ---- CONTINUED

States left behind 400 members of the South Vietnamese special police branch; another 400 working members of the Central Intelligence Organization, the C.I.A. counterpart in Saigon; a large staff of C.I.A. code clerks and computer operators; at least 70 translators, and hundreds of high-level Communist defectors who had served as informers.

In addition, Mr. Snapp says, the C.I.A. also failed to "insure the destruction of the personal files and intelligence dossiers" that had been assembled with the aid of the South Vietnamese Government "and which identified so many" of those left behind.

Among those thus singled out, he adds, were as many as 30,000 Vietnamese who were specially trained by the C.I.A. to participate in its Phoenix Program. That much-criticized operation was aimed at identifying and then jailing or "neutralizing" suspected members of the National Liberation Front, the Communist Party in South Vietnam.

Mr. Snapp's book provides the most detailed account to date of the activities and operations of the C.I.A. inside South Vietnam, as well as giving a first-hand account of high-level disagreements between Washington and Saigon over the use and integrity of intelligence.

Among the other major allegations in Mr. Snapp's account are the following:

¶The C.I.A. prepared a series of misleading analyses and other materials that were used by the United States Embassy in an attempt to knowingly mislead a Congressional fact-finding delegation that visited Saigon in February 1975 to study a Ford Administration request for more military aid.

¶Secretary Kissinger and James R. Schlesinger, then the Secretary of Defense, repeatedly and openly fought over Mr. Kissinger's insistence on delaying a full evacuation in Saigon.

¶Mr. Polgar, now stationed in Mexico City, was in effect "duped" by Hungarian diplomats into believing until the last few days that a coalition Government was possible in Saigon.

¶The South Vietnamese Government abandoned \$220 million in gold bullion, its state treasury, that somehow did not get shipped to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, as it was supposed to be.

'An Institutional Disgrace'

"It is not too much to say that in terms of squandered lives, blown secrets and the betrayal of agents, friends and collaborators," Mr. Snapp writes, "our handling of the evacuation was an institutional disgrace. Not since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 had the agency put so much on the line, and lost it through stupidity and mismanagement."

Mr. Snapp's book was edited and printed by Random House under stringent secrecy in fear that the C.I.A. would learn of its imminent publication and seek an immediate restraining order barring its distribution.

In 1974 the C.I.A. did delay publication of the "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," by Victor Marchetti and John Marks, and then censored major segments of the expose.

The concern at Random House was complicated by the fact that high-level C.I.A. officials, including Adm. Stansfield M. Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, had permitted Mr. Snapp to interview present agency employees as part of his research. They did so on the basis of Mr. Snapp's assurance that he would submit his manuscript to the agency for clearance before publication.

In a postscript to his book, Mr. Snapp explains that he decided not to keep that agreement after learning that the agency had selectively "leaked" some details of its role in the evacuation to two newsmen in an effort to "protect its image."

Worked for C.I.A. Eight Years

Mr. Snapp, a native of Charlotte, N.C., who is 36 years old, served eight years with the C.I.A. after joining the agency

in 1968. Six of those years were spent in the United States Embassy in Saigon.

Because of its central accusation and the dozens of other disclosures, the Snapp book poses an immediate problem for the C.I.A., which has been under repeated Congressional criticism and investigations in recent years.

In addition, Admiral Turner is now in the process of dismissing more than 800 employees of the C.I.A.'s operations divisions, which was responsible for covert operations overseas. Those dismissals, which reportedly will be spread out over the next two years, have created anger among many senior agency officials, raising the possibility of more books and more disclosures.

The evacuation of more than 55,000 Vietnamese and 6,700 Americans in April 1975, though widely criticized, was defended as a success at the time by the Ford Administration. Ambassador Martin told a House subcommittee in January would be judged as "a hell of a good job."

In directly challenging that thesis, Mr. Snapp accuses some senior C.I.A. officials of callously walking away from agency outposts around South Vietnam without destroying sensitive documents and without making arrangements for the evacuation of employees and agents. In addition, he writes, two American C.I.A. agents were captured by the North Vietnamese and talked freely under interrogation, exposing even more secrets and more aches.

Mr. Snapp notes that he was careful to avoid identifying agency personnel by name, except in some obvious cases. He writes little about the operations of the National Security Agency, the Pentagon's communications intelligence group that had more than 40 men assigned in South Vietnam. And he makes "a special effort not to betray the identities of Vietnamese agents abandoned in Vietnam."

Despite these qualifications, the Snapp book appears to provide a detailed account of the activities and operations of the C.I.A. inside South Vietnam.

Because of the C.I.A.'s failures, Mr. Snapp charges, full-scale planning for the evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese allies from Saigon did not begin in earnest until April 19, 1975, eleven days before the North Vietnamese made their formal entrance into Saigon.

Mr. Snapp writes bitterly of the confused scene at the United States Embassy on the afternoon of April 30, the last afternoon of the American presence in Saigon, where thousands of Vietnamese waited for a helicopter evacuation that never came.

Many of them "were long-time C.I.A. employees," Mr. Snapp reports, adding, "Some of them were bonafide agents or relatives of those who were."

Familiar Names on Detention Lists

In June 1976, Mr. Snapp writes, the North Vietnamese announced that 12 categories of people were still under detention, including those who were "lackeys of imperialism" and those who "owed blood debts to the people."

"The list read like a roster of those the C.I.A. station and the Embassy had left behind," Mr. Snapp says. "In fact, some of the names that surfaced in subsequent refugee reports were not unfamiliar to C.I.A. management."

Shortly after the fall of Saigon, Mr. Snapp writes, he returned to C.I.A. headquarters in McLean, Va., and was awarded the agency's Medal of Merit for his role in providing a steady flow of intelligence reports until the last few hours in Saigon.

Mr. Snapp writes, however, of his dismay at learning that two of his colleagues who had abandoned both C.I.A. employees and documents in South Vietnam were rewarded with important new jobs, one becoming chief of a major agency station in Asia and the other being named to the high level agency staff that was set up to defend the C.I.A. from its critics in Congress.

BOOK ---- CONTINUED

these were amenable to the creation of a tripartite government and possibly a modest American diplomatic presence, Snapp writes.

Meanwhile, the intelligence from the field, mainly from intercepted North Vietnamese communications, indicated that the Communist forces intended to take Saigon by force in an unconditional military action, the intelligence officer contends.

In mid-April, 1975, Martin was balking at Washington's instructions that plans be drawn for mass evacuation of Americans and at least 200,000 "locals." It was at this time that Snapp relates he made contact with an important agent who had authoritative word on the North Vietnamese strategy for the final Saigon push.

The North Vietnamese, he said, would fight on until total victory, whether or not Thieu was overthrown or the United States supplied additional aid. There would be no negotiation and no coalition, he emphasized, writes Snapp.

It was in this period, Mr. Snapp says, that he reported candidly to the C.I.A. inspector general—at his request—about the abuses of intelligence he says were condoned by Mr. Polgar as station chief in Saigon. William E. Colby was then Director of Central Intelligence.

"I acknowledged that Polgar had at times blocked reports that might have put the South Vietnamese Government in an unfavorable light," Mr. Snapp writes.

He subsequently learned, Mr. Snapp writes, that the agency's inquiry had been initiated "simply to give Colby 'ammunition' with which to fend off any Congressional probes into C.I.A. activities in Vietnam."

No such investigation apparently took place and, Mr. Snapp notes, he resolved to write his own report. He resigned three weeks after receiving the C.I.A. award, and began researching his book.

Earlier, while still on duty with the agency, Mr. Snapp adds, he was "directed by his C.I.A. superiors" to fill out an affidavit which in effect attributed the breakdown of the evacuation to "local enemy action."

"I refused to sign it," Mr. Snapp writes.

Intelligence Reports Altered

Throughout his book, Mr. Snapp repeatedly describes how Mr. Polgar, who is now the C.I.A. chief of station in Mexico City, not only blocked reports but also altered vital intelligence for political reasons.

In one critical case, Mr. Snapp writes, he received a highly reliable, detailed report on North Vietnam's intention to seek a total victory from one of the C.I.A.'s best-informed agents. The information also indicated that last-minute negotiations, which were frantically being sought by the embassy and the Ford White House, were impossible.

Mr. Polgar initially refused to permit him to disseminate the information to Washington, Mr. Snapp writes, describing as "nothing new."

Ambassador Martin similarly "chose simply to shrug off what the agent had told and to proceed as if nothing had changed," the Snapp account says.

These dealings "left me bitter and frightened," Mr. Snapp writes. "As long as (Polgar) and Martin refused to accept the inevitability of a Communist assault, it seemed likely they would continue to subordinate the evacuation effort to their peace gambit."

(See C.I.A., Pg 11-F)

Part II -- Main Edition -- 18 NOVEMBER 1977

NEW YORK TIMES

18 NOVEMBER 77, Pg 1

SAIGON FLIGHT HELD 'DISGRACE' TO C.I.A.

Ex-Analyst Says Agency Failed to
Heed Intelligence on Evacuation

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

A former senior analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency in Vietnam has charged that the agency's 1975 evacuation from South Vietnam was "an institutional disgrace" that abandoned thousands of Vietnamese employees and collaborators and exposed them to North Vietnamese retaliation.

Frank Snepp, who was the C.I.A.'s principal analyst of North Vietnamese political affairs and prepared the agency's intelligence estimates in the final years of the war, further alleges in a book to be published next week—amid close secrecy and without Government clearance—that high-level officials of the C.I.A. and other Government agencies later prevented an investigation into the evacuation.

Major Failure in Evacuation

The central thesis of Mr. Snepp's 580-page book, titled "Decent Interval," is that there was a major failure to plan for the evacuation and that this failure occurred because United States officials—including Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger; Graham A. Martin, the last United States Ambassador to South Vietnam, and Thomas Polgar, the last C.I.A. station chief in Saigon—had refused to heed intelligence showing that the North Vietnamese would directly attack Saigon.

Asked for comment on the Snepp charges, a C.I.A. official said that Admiral Stansfield M. Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, had investigated some of the allegations "and asked for more." None of the Snepp allegations had yet been verified, the C.I.A. official said.

Mr. Kissinger, speaking through an aide, dismissed the allegations as "non-sense."

Mr. Polgar said that, although he had always held Mr. Snepp "in the highest regard, what he's giving is the private's view of the war."

Mr. Martin, said by a family member to be traveling in Italy, could not immediately be reached.

A number of high-level Government officials, in recent conversations, expressed praise for Mr. Snepp's qualifications and reputation as an intelligence analyst. The New York Times was also able to verify independently some of the specific conversations and meetings described by Mr. Snepp.

The North Vietnamese offensive, launched early in March 1975, routed the Army of South Vietnam in 55 days, leaving it panicked and in full retreat. The evacuation program climaxed on the last day with the airlifting of thousands of Vietnamese and Americans from the roof of the United States Embassy in Saigon, as the North Vietnamese forces were poised outside the city. The vast confusion and disarray of the evacuation were sharply criticized at the time.

Allies Exposed to the Enemy

As a result of the evacuation planning failure, Mr. Snepp writes, the United

(See C.I.A., Pg 10-F)

WASHINGTON POST

18 NOVEMBER 1977, Pg 1

Book on Saigon's Fall Alleges CIA Failures

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

A former Central Intelligence Agency officer has charged that major intelligence failures by U.S. officials in Vietnam and Washington contributed heavily to the humiliating American evacuation from South Vietnam.

This first unauthorized account by an American intelligence official of the final period of the Vietnam War is about to be published by Random House. The writing and publication of the book has been handled with strict secrecy by the publishing house in order to minimize the possibility of government injunction to prevent its appearance. It was not cleared with the agency.

Frank Snepp, the 34-year-old former analyst who spent five years in the CIA's Saigon station, makes a number of new and detailed allegations bearing on U.S. diplomatic and intelligence activity in the final years of the American involvement.

Among the assertions made by Snepp in the book entitled "Decent Interval," are these:

- The chief of the CIA's Saigon station, Tom Polgar, as well as ambassador Graham Martin, were lulled by Hungarian and French diplomats and intelligence officers into believing—even on the eve of the Vietnamese Communist attack on Saigon—that a negotiated settlement and orderly evacuation of Americans was possible.

- The top officials of the American Embassy in Saigon doctored the intelligence product of their own analysts during 1974 in an effort to induce a recalcitrant Congress to approve higher military and economic aid levels for the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu.

- In the 1971 South Vietnamese presidential elections, former U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker offered a \$3 million bribe to moderate opposition leader, General Duong Van (Big) Minh, in order to create the semblance of a contested election for President Thieu. Minh, writes Snepp, found the money "less compelling than the prospect of assured defeat" and declined.

- Secret efforts by Kissinger to use trade concessions to the Soviets to get them to play a moderating role with the North Vietnamese were unwittingly torpedoed in 1973 by Congress with passage of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. When Congress failed to support Kissinger's private commitments to the Russians, Snepp wrote, the Soviet toughened their stand in Vietnam.

- At the beginning of the final Communist drive in 1975 the North Vietnamese troops, in a major intelligence coup, used decoy radio traffic to throw Thieu's army

off balance and conceal their first major military target—Ban Me Thuot in the highlands. From that point the Communist forces led by North Vietnamese General Van Tien Dung began rolling toward Saigon in a demoralizing series of defeats for the South Vietnamese armed forces.

Snepp's account is a far more detailed chronology of the final period of the war than had been written by any American, which he says, was drawn from his own briefing notebooks, diaries and interviews with his colleagues in Vietnam and Washington.

Two of the main critical targets of Snepp's narrative are Martin, the Ambassador, and Polgar, the CIA station chief.

He describes Martin in the final stages of the war as a proud and obstinate figure, resisting plans for evacuation of Americans and dependent Vietnamese because of his concern that it would adversely affect South Vietnamese morale.

Snepp quotes one angry cable by Martin to Kissinger, after receiving orders to cut the American community to the lowest number possible in April, 1975. Martin complained that the intelligence community was veering toward "worst case" productions, Snepp wrote, and that everyone in Washington seemed to be "trying to cover his ass." The back-channel message to Kissinger went on according to Snepp's account, the only "ass which isn't covered is mine."

When the message reached Washington, Snepp relates, a formal memo was prepared calling on Kissinger to fire the Ambassador. Snepp quotes Kissinger as replying by return cable, "When this thing is finally over I'll be hanging several yards higher than you." But the Secretary declined to fire the Ambassador or send someone else to hold his hand.

Snepp contends that Polgar, a veteran CIA operative of Hungarian descent, was persuaded by Hungarian delegates to the International commission established under the 1973 truce accords that the North Vietnamese were amenable to a negotiated settlement. This occurred early in 1975 after the breakdown in the cease-fire agreements.

"Polgar immediately cabled a summary of the Hungarians' remarks to Washington. The Hungarians in turn alerted Hanoi to our thinking so that the Politburo could adjust its plans and strategy accordingly."

"In effect, out of the best of North Vietnamese another intelligence coup, one that provided an invaluable insight into what we expected of them," writes Snepp.

Later in the spring, when some members of the U.S. mission were pressing for active evacuation planning, both Polgar and Martin were again persuaded by the Hungarians and French that the North Vietnamese

(See BOOK, Pg 10-F)

CONGRESS/ADMINISTRATION

AFJ Commentary and Background:

Mayaguez, The President, and History

Use of Armed Forces to Protect American Lives and Property Abroad

WHEN PRESIDENT FORD ORDERED the use of U.S. armed forces to recover the *S.S. Mayaguez* and her crew, he was following ample precedents in U.S. and international law and practice. The solid domestic support given to his application of measured force in response to piracy demonstrated that the action was right instinctively, as well as legally, for this country at this time.

The President's actions in the *Mayaguez* affair showed a clear understanding of his authority, of his need to inform Congress and the people, and of the value of swift — but clearly limited — response. He asked for no open-ended Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, nor could he have obtained one. He exerted full diplomatic efforts, while preparing for the contingency of using force. He was patient, to a point. When that point was passed, he acted, forcefully and legally.

Before other tinhorns or terrorists decide to try another *Mayaguez*, it seems useful to lay out the legal reasoning and precedents governing the President's authority to commit armed forces to protect American lives and property beyond the national boundaries.

Rights to Protection

International law recognizes the right of a state to protect its citizens, even in

foreign jurisdictions. The use of armed forces to provide that protection is permissible when the foreign land is either unable or unwilling to do so. The use of armed forces in such an action does not constitute an act of war, or a declaration of war.

The Supreme Court has held that the privileges and immunities of United States citizens include the right of protection abroad. (1873, in the *Slaughter House Cases*)

Finally, the 1973 War Powers Act updates and defines the President's authority more clearly, including imposition of time limits and Congressional consultations upon his actions, without tying his hands in a fast-moving situation.

Precedents

Our nation's brief history contains ample precedents for using force to protect citizens and property abroad. A useful 1970 compilation by the Library of Congress lists more than 160 entries, many being multiple use of force. Several pertinent ones:

+ 1801-05: The First Barbary War, which included landing U.S. Marines with United States Agent William Eaton against Tripoli to free the crew of the *Philadelphia*.

+ 1814-25: Three thousand pirate attacks on merchantmen were reported in

the Caribbean, 1815-23. Commodore James Biddle employed a 14-ship squadron against the pirates in 1822.

+ 1831-32: Troops were landed in the Falkland Islands to investigate the capture of three American sealing vessels. *USS Lexington* released the vessels and crews.

+ 1849: In July, an American naval force gained release of an American seized by Austrian officials.

+ 1871: Troops landed in Korea, 10-12 June, to punish natives for "depredations on Americans, particularly for murdering the crew of the *General Sherman*."


+ 1888: Force was used on 20 December to persuade the Haitian government to release an American ship which had been seized on the charge of breach of blockade.

And now, 1975: Landing Marines on Koh Tang Island to free *S.S. Mayaguez* and her crew. ■■■

Editor's note: Major sources for this AFJ background report were Memorandum of the Solicitor for the Department of State, Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces, 5 October 1912 (updated to 1933), third Revised Edition, US GPO 1934; and Background Information on the Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries, 1970 Revision by Library of Congress, US GPO 1970.

"Monumental"*

This definitive history of guerrilla warfare, from Darius of Persia to the war in Indo-China is "excellent in every respect" (Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway); "superb ... comprehensive" (Gen. James M. Gavin), "a reference book for scholars and an enthralling book about some of the world's classic battles" (Robert Shaplen*). 1622 pps; 2 vols., in slipcase, index and bibliog.; \$35.00 at bookstores or postpaid from Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, N.Y. 11530



Defense Manpower Commission Files Interim Report

CURTIS W. TARR, CHAIRMAN OF DEFENSE MANPOWER COMMISSION, submitted the group's interim report on 16 May to the President, Speaker of the House, and President of the Senate. The report, filed midway in the commission's two-year life, details work already done by the group, arrives at recommendations and conclusions on specific issues, and sets out future efforts to be pursued.

Two sets of the five "specific issues" which the commission discussed in the report are certain to ignite controversy; they are a recommendation to alter the present system of postretirement adjustment of military and Federal Civil Service retired pay, and a recommendation to terminate the DoD medical school, the

Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences.

In analyzing postretirement adjustments to retired pay, the DMC staff tried to devise a system which would preserve the purchasing power of retirement annuities, while neither increasing or decreasing it. At issue is the so-called "one percent kicker," which was intended to compensate retired persons for the lag between the Consumer Price Index's increasing enough to cause an upward adjustment and the effective date the increased pay begins. The staff compared present methods with alternatives, assessed them, and then arrived at one of their own. They propose a one-time catch-up payment when annuities are adjusted,

(continued on p. 34)

armed forces JOURNAL international/June 1975

7th AF
USAG

"Assault on
Koh Tang"

DCS/Plans & Ops
Hq PACAF
23 June 75 (9)

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A. CMC WASHINGTON DC 162309Z APR 75 (U) (PASEP) *SN*

B. FMFPAC 5750.88

1. (U) REQUEST TAKE REF A FORAC.

2. (U) FOR CG III MAF: REQUEST DESIGNATE THOSE III MAF UNITS AND DETACHMENTS AS SPECIFIED BY PAR 4A(1)(C) REF B. PAR 4A(3) REF B ALSO GERMANE.

3. (C) FOR CG 1ST MARBDE: REQ COMPLY WITH PAR 2 ABOVE AS PERTAINS TO THOSE 1ST MARBDE FORCES DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF III MAF CONTINGENCIES.

PAGE 02 RUHQHQA1042 C O N F I D E N T I A L

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History and Museums in accordance with the
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TOPICAL OUTLINE FOR INTERVIEW SESSION WITH
LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE NGUYEN KHANG, RVNMC

I. 1954-1964

A. Early RVNMC

1. Origins
2. Training, equipment, etc.
3. USMC influence (Croizat, Wilkes, Wilkinson)
4. Relationship w/USMC advisors

B. 1958-1962

1. When did VC really come out?
2. Development and expansion of RVNMC during period
3. Movement of RVNMC from Nha Trang to Saigon, when?
4. Role of 4th Bn at Vung Tau
5. Role of RVNMC in 1960 coup vs Diem

C. The 1963 Coup

1. Personal relationship to Diem
2. Who wrote Diem coup plan?
3. Assignment as military attache, Philippines
4. Relationship to Khanh
5. The Battle of Go Cong Province
6. The Battle of Binh Gia

D. The Chain of Command/Control vis a vis JGS and RVNMC

II. Jan-Jun65

A. Role of RVNMC in escalation of war

1. Marines in Bong Son

B. VN view of American insertion of troops

C. Relationship to Ky/Thieu regime

D. SVN officer corps internal relationships (southerners vs northerners; Catholics vs Buddhists; other sects)

III. Jul-Dec65

A. Duties/responsibilities as commandant of RVNMC and Capital District Command/III Corps command

B. Montagnard rebellion, Oct65

C. Relationship of RVNMC w/USMC in Da Nang area and elsewhere; Ba Ghia

IV. 1966

- A. Buddhist revolt; role of RVNMC in controlling same
- B. Relationship w/Ky
- C. Relationship with III MAF
- D. Nature of USMC/RVNMC/GVN relations within period

V. 1967

- A. DECKHOUSE operations and involvement of RVNMC; under opcon of USMC?
- B. RVNMC operations in IV CTZ
- C. Operation JUNCTION CITY
- D. Nature of multiple duties and effect on RVNMC operations
- E. M-16 in RVNMC

VI. 1968

- A. Tet offensive in Saigon area
- B. Ascension of Thieu to presidency; effect on personal career
- C. Change of assignments

VII. 1969

- A. Status of RVNMC in period
- B. Nature of operations in period
- C. Expansion of RVNMC; nature of organization

VIII. 1970

- A. Cambodian incursion; role of RVNMC
- B. Deployment of RVNMC brigades to I Corps in summer

IX. 1971

- A. Incursion into Laos/Lam Son 719; success or failure?
- B. Deployment of RVNMC to Dong Ha

X. 1972

- A. Easter '72 attack

- B. Nature of RVNMC organization for combat in period
 - 1. Did RVNMC ever fight as a division?
 - 2. Did RVNMC have same command and control capabilities as ARVN?

C. JGS response to Easter '72 attack

D. Overall evaluation of USMC advisory program

XI. 1973-

- A. RVNMC reaction to formal withdrawal of U.S. advisors
- B. What informal U.S. advisory effort continued
- C. What happened in I Corps in 1975?
- D. What was your reaction to the term and concept of "Vietnamization?"
- E. How did you interpret "Vietnamization" of the war?
- F. How did you leave Vietnam in April 1975?
- G. How did Lam get to Phu Quoc?
- H. What were the last battles of the RVNMC?
- I. Was there any NVA/VC infiltration of RVNMC?

HD/HIS/cas
1 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Subj: Meeting of Defense Historical Officers

Present: OSD (Goldberg, Tucker); AFCHO (Peck); CMH (Collins, Allen); NHD (Allard); JCS (Davis); HQ (Shaw)

Ref: (a) OSD Historian Memo to Service Historical Chief of 19 June 1975

1. In accordance with your instructions, I attended the subject meeting as your representative. Dr. Goldberg approached the subject of a Vietnamese refugee interview program as a project suggested at AsstSecDef/SecDef level and that he just wanted to find out service views on the subject. Service positions are summarized below:

a. General Collins said he had been considering such a program for a couple of months. Among other things he found he could not hire Vietnamese unless they were classed as "resident aliens," and that status was far away in many instances. He had received, on 20 June, an unsolicited proposal from General Research Corporation to run an oral history interview program for refugees to the tune of about \$70-77,000. Cd Allen was tasked with obtaining the money and indicated it would be forthcoming before the end of FY 75.

The General then spoke of a much longer project, several years in length, to employ, through a contractor, senior Vietnamese military who in turn would subcontract to other Vietnamese to develop a series of monographs on various military subjects similar to those developed by German and Japanese officers. Col Allen indicated that the Comptroller for the Army had indicated that money for this would be available, although the concensus was that this would be an expensive program. General Collins stated that he would rather run the show from his own office than contract, but that personnel ceilings and the "resident alien" restriction, would probably prevent this. He indicated that this contract would be put out for bids for about a month and that the program could possibly get started in September.

He indicated that Army interest in the program was greater than just historical and that it was viewed as an excellent medium to obtain "lessons learned" information for the Army school system. He also stated but did not emphasize that other services might participate in the project if they wanted to

HD/WIS/cas

Subj: Meeting of Defense Historical Officers

by providing administrative support or perhaps financing a particular monograph. He said that Army intelligence was interviewing refugees already but with the primary concern of damage assessment.

b. Gen Peck stated that Air Force intelligence was also interviewing VNAF refugees and that the information gained was being used by his historians and that they considered it sufficient for their purposes. He reminded the conferees that he had considerable oral history assets but that they were being used for Air Force purposes; Dr. Goldberg was quick to indicate that he did not want the Air Force to take its people away from what they were doing. The general indicated that AFCHO had marginal additional interest in developing a refugee interview program. He also said he had checked with DIA and that the VNAF interviews would be made available to all service historians.

c. I stated our position as being interested only in a few selected individuals who would support our operational histories and that we could interview them with our own assets. Any high-level, direction-of-the-war information we needed could be obtained from existing MACV, JCS, and DOD sources available to us. I made it clear that our interest in a Vietnamese refugee interview program was parochial and that we did not see any point in our direct participation in a wider program of little practical value to us.

d. Dr. Allard indicated that Adm Hooper was willing to explore an interview program, but that the Navy had already made preliminary contacts to interview the senior Vietnamese Navy officer and did not contemplate a larger program. He also pointed out that the NHD had very limited assets for an oral history program.

e. Mr. Davis indicated that JCS Historical had not been able to identify any subject profitable to follow through on for interview purposes and that he agreed with me that they had access to the information they needed. He also stated that JCS funds were severely limited and that the office was not in any shape to support new enterprises.

2. In summarization of the above presentations, Dr. Goldberg stated that it was obvious that each service wanted "to do its own thing" and was not interested in participating in or supporting a joint program of Vietnamese refugee interviews. He stated that he would report this "as usual," "as in the past," reaction to his bosses but that he did not know what the OSD-level reaction would be in view of SecDef interest.

HD/HIS/cas

Subj: Meeting of Defense Historical Officers

3. Dr. Goldberg then alluded to an interest on the part of SecDef in having a history of the Vietnam War written, an OSD-level history written by OSD, not a joint enterprise. Goldberg said he was going to try to dissuade SecDef about the history because he didn't have the assets to do it. His attitude and comments, however, indicated that if he got the necessary bodies he would undertake the history.

4. He then reported on several other DOD projects, saying the first two volumes of the OSD history were coming along well and that he expected to start the third covering the Eisenhower years shortly. He also indicated it would be about three years before the first volume was ready for review.

5. On the POW volumes, he indicated that several draft chapters of the policy volume were done and that a very detailed chronology had been completed to serve as the basis for the other volume. He stated that the volumes would initially be classified, but it was expected that they would be printed after they had been "sanitized."

6. The special project on strategic arms competition was nearing completion. Most of the supporting studies with the hard core data were in. The final summary study would probably be finished by the end of the year in a highly classified form. SecDef wants to publish a version of the study, but has not yet been confronted with the obstacles to such publication including FOI requests for release of back-up data.

7. One additional point in relation to the Vietnamese refugee interview program, Dr. Goldberg indicated that he would explore with DIA the possibility of conducting such interviews, perhaps with input from the services on the type of information desired. He also said he would contact the State Department to see what it was doing or intended to do in the interview line.

Respectfully submitted,

Henry I. Shaw, Jr.

FBIS-APA-76-110

Monday

7 June 1976

Vol IV No 110 Supp 38

DAILY REPORT

Supplement

ASIA & PACIFIC

SEN GEN VAN TIEN DUNG ARTICLE: "GREAT SPRING VICTORY"

[Volume I of Two-Volume Supplement]



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

HDR:MKG

Precedents for Marine Corps guards being placed on merchant ships

1. Background: Before the Joint Chiefs of Staff came into existence which was at the same time as modern means of communications, "on the scene" commanders had much greater freedom of action. Thus, no exact precedence can exist for an order from Washington for Marines to serve on merchant shipping.

2. There are two precedents for Marines performing in a disciplinary capacity on ships other than United States warships.

a. 11 September 1853

At Blenheim Beach, in the Canton River about 60 miles from Hong Kong, Commander S. S. Lee of the U. S. Steamer Mississippi, and ten Marines of the Marine Guard, boarded a Siamese ship in answer to a request from her captain and put down a mutiny.

--Ellsworth, Calendar of Important Events

b. 30 April 1866

The Marine Guard of the sloop St. Marys in the Caribbean boarded the Panama mail steamer USS Golden City, at the request of her captain, to quell a riot.

--A Chronology of the U. S. Marine Corps

Moyague, Precedent? - R.P. found this

20 December 1888

Admiral S. D. Luce, USN, arrived at Port au Prince, Haiti with Marines under command of Lieutenant Benjamin R. Russell in order to retake the US ship Haytian Republic which had been seized by the Haitian man-of-war Dessalines. (52 Chron).

Marines were serving aboard the steam barks USS Galena and USS Yantic at Port-au-Prince, when the ships secured the release of an American steamer which had been seized by the Haitian Republic. (Metcalf, p. 229).

Weekend Edition -- 2 May 1976

Confidential 9 May 76

FEATURES COLUMNISTS

NATIONAL OBSERVER - 8 MAY 1976(2) Pg 4

Vietnam: Views From Both Sides

By Michael T. Malloy

IT WAS the first anniversary of a momentous event, but April 30 passed in the United States without speeches, ceremony, or public comment. It was just one year since the last Americans scrambled from the roof of the Saigon embassy and the Communist North Vietnamese achieved victory in the longest and most distracting war that the United States had ever participated in. Since then, two military leaders of the opposing North and South Vietnamese armies have written their own accounts of the events that led to the debacle. Here is an interview with one and excerpts from the memoirs of the other.

General Dung:
'The U.S. Could
Hardly Return'

♦ Communist victories in Vietnam were rarely attributed to firepower but more often to moral and political superiority, to barefoot guerrillas overwhelming the heavily armed minions of capitalism. But firepower—and the lack of it—plays a key role in the way that North Vietnam's own battlefield commander describes the final stages of the war. The following excerpts are taken from a serialized account of the last Communist offensive currently appearing in North Vietnamese newspapers; a translation was provided by the U.S. Government's Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

The account was written by North Vietnamese chief of staff, Gen. Van Tien Dung, who personally commanded the Communist forces in South Vietnam. The account carries the campaign through the decisive battle of Ban Me Thuot, the loss of which led South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu to order a precipitate withdrawal from the Central Highlands, igniting a panic that spread through his entire army.

IN 1974 ARMY corps were gradually formed and deployed. . . . Great quantities of material such as tanks, armored cars, missiles, long-range artillery pieces, and antiaircraft guns, which the U.S. imperialists had unsuccessfully sought to destroy during their 12-day B-52 blitz against the North, were gradually sent to the various battlefields. For the first time, our mechanized long-range artillery and good tanks made their way to the very rubber forests of Nam Bo [the southern part of South Vietnam].

★ ★ ★

The reduction of U.S. aid made it impossible for the puppet troops [South Vietnamese] to carry out their combat plan and build up their forces.

In fiscal 1972-73 the United States had given the puppet troops \$2.168. (See GENERAL DUNG, Pg 2-F)

General Ky: 'Nobody Listened to Me'

♦ With his rakish black flying suits and his six guns, the flamboyant Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky was probably better known to American audiences than any other leader of South Vietnam. Talkative as ever, in the dapper civilian suits he now wears, Ky supports himself in the United States these days by lecturing, and he gives as many as six interviews a day to promote his new book *Twenty Years and Twenty Days*. Ky was gradually stripped of his power as premier, vice president, and air force commander long before the fall of Saigon. Other writers have found the cause of the defeat in profound social and political ailments in South Vietnamese society, but Ky blames the collapse entirely on poor leadership by those who replaced him. Here are excerpts from an Observer interview with him last week:

WHY DID South Vietnam lose the war so suddenly? Did you see the story in the paper today, in which the North Vietnamese general said even they were surprised?

I think everyone was surprised, including the North Vietnamese and Americans. Everyone but me. Remember, I predicted that thing . . . a fast quick collapse of South Vietnam. But at that time nobody listened to me. Oh, some foreign reporters said it was because I was jealous of Mr. [President Nguyen Van] Thieu. But I said it based on my deep knowledge of the Vietnamese armed forces' military leadership. I knew each of them.

It was leadership that was responsible?

Completely. That's the only reason. Leadership.

What about the Americans? Did they make any errors?

Oh, many errors. The fact that the Vietnamese military had weak military leaders [headed by] Mr. Thieu was a part of American responsibility. You know that when the American military presence was still half a million in South Vietnam, promotion of military leaders, most of the time, must have approval, agreement, from Americans.

So they promoted the wrong lead-

ers?

Every time. It's very funny that often high-ranking American officials would come to me and point out a Vietnamese general: "He's a tiger. He's No. 1." I know one who was commanding a corps, very important, big responsibilities, and for the Americans he was a No. 1 tiger. In the 1972 campaign, when nothing had happened yet in his area . . . he came to my home [and] said: "You must find a way to settle, right now, a cease-fire or some sort of settlement with the Communists, otherwise they are going to attack . . . my headquarters and we are going all to be killed!"

Who was running things then, the Americans or Vietnamese?

Most of the time you had to acknowledge American influence was really powerful, decisive. Both in the military and the politics. So, you know, sometimes I think the Communists were right when they blame us, the South Vietnamese government, as a lackey, or puppet, of America. Without [U.S. Ambassador Graham] Martin, without American support, Thieu couldn't stay so long.

That was the only problem, just Thieu and some senior officers?

That's the whole thing. Leadership. We know that when you speak about ideology, of course, freedom is better than Communist dictatorship. But on the other side they kept their people united and strong because of strong leadership. . . . After many years of bombing and all kinds of destruction they stood on their own feet and continued to accept the suffering. It's not because of ideology but purely of leadership.

Why did one side have those kind of leaders and the other side didn't?

Well, there are many reasons. Speaking for myself, I think I can offer stronger leadership than Mr. Thieu. Take the air force, a good example. It was nothing when I became the chief of the air force. I built it and made it the strongest and best among the three armed forces. Speaking of fighting spirit and fighting capability, no one de-

(see GENERAL KY, Pg 2-F)

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GENERAL DUNG - CONTINUED

000,000 in military aid. This aid was reduced to \$964 million in fiscal 1973-74 and to \$700 million in 1974-75. Nguyen Van Thieu was then forced to fight a poor man's war.

Enemy firepower had decreased by nearly 60 per cent because of bomb-and-ammunition shortages. Its mobility was also reduced by half due to lack of aircraft, vehicles, and fuel. Thus, the enemy had to shift from large-scale operations and helicopter-borne, deep-thrust, and tank-mounted attacks to small-scale blocking, nibbling, and searching operations.

☆ ☆ ☆

The Political Bureau and Central Military Party Committee held a conference [in October 1974] to hear the General Staff present its strategic combat plan. . . . At this conference a problem was raised and heatedly discussed: Would the United States be able to send its troops back to the South if we launched large-scale battles that would lead to the collapse of the puppet troops?

After signing the Paris agreement on Vietnam and withdrawing U.S. troops from Vietnam, the United States had faced even greater difficulties and embarrassment. . . . The Watergate scandal had seriously affected the entire United States and precipitated the resignation of an extremely reactionary President-Nixon. The United States faced economic recession, mounting inflation, serious unemployment, and an oil crisis. . . . The conferees unanimously approved the General Staff's draft plan, which chose the Central Highlands as the main battlefield.

☆ ☆ ☆

While the Political Bureau was meeting [in January 1975], great news came from the South: The main-force units in eastern Nam Bo, in co-operation with the provincial forces, had attacked and liberated Phuoc Binh city and all of Phuoc Long Province. This was the first province in the South to be completely liberated.

At first the United States aggressively sent the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, leading a special Seventh Fleet force from the Philippines toward the Vietnamese coasts, and ordered the Third U.S. Marine Division into emergency alert status. The warlike clique in the Pentagon threatened to resume bombing the North. Finally, U.S. Defense Secretary [James R.] Schlesinger, who wanted to ignore the Phuoc Long event, stated that this was not a massive offensive by North Vietnam. He ignored Thieu's pitiful cries. U.S. Ambassador [Graham] Martin in Saigon told Thieu that the United States was not yet ready to provide support.

It was obvious that the United States was in this position: Having withdrawn from Vietnam, the United States could hardly return. All the conferees analyzed the enemy's weakness, which in itself heralded a new opportunity for us.

☆ ☆ ☆

We received reports that the enemy had dispatched an airborne division from the Central Highlands to Da Nang. This indicated that the enemy had not yet discovered the presence of our forces and our preparations in the Central Highlands. . . . The enemy was also mistaken in his assessment of us. He believed that in 1975 we were not strong enough to attack major provincial capitals. . . . Therefore, although Ban-Me Thuot was a vitally important

WASHINGTON POST
1 MAY 1976 Pg 9
Vietnam Victors
Note Anniversary

Reuter

SAIGON, April 30—More than 100,000 persons demonstrated here today to mark the first anniversary of the Communist victory in the South.

Politburo member Pham Hung told the crowd gathered at the palace of Former President Nguyen Van Thieu that the determination of the people had made it possible for Vietnam to advance strongly toward socialism and reunification.

He said one of the major achievements during the past year was the "re-education" of about 1 million soldiers, military officers and members of the political party of the former regime.

position, prior to our attack the enemy had not deployed very strong forces there, and those that were there had many gaps.

☆ ☆ ☆

The strategic route [between North Vietnam and the battlefields], which was completed in early 1975, was the result of the labor of more than 30,000 troops and shock youths. The length of this route, added to that of the other old and new strategic routes . . . is more than 12,500 miles. The 26-foot-wide route of more than 600 miles, which we could now see [as Dung drove south], is our pride. With 3,000 miles of pipeline laid through deep rivers and streams and on mountains . . . we were capable of providing enough fuel for various battle fronts. More than 10,000 transportation vehicles were put on the road.

☆ ☆ ☆

A comparison with the enemy over the entire area of the campaign showed that our infantry was not much superior to the enemy's. However, because we concentrated the majority of our forces in the main area of the campaign, we achieved superiority over the enemy in this area. As for infantry, the ratio was 5.5 of our troops for each enemy soldier. As for tanks and armored vehicles, the ratio was 1.2 to 1. In heavy artillery, the ratio was 2.1 to 1.

☆ ☆ ☆

At 0200 sharp on the morning of 10 March, the offensive on Ban Me Thuot was heralded by the fire from sapper units directed against the Hoa Binh and city airfields. Long-range artillery began destroying military targets in the city. From a point 25 miles from Ban Me Thuot, our tank unit started their engines, cut through trees, and headed for Ban Me Thuot. Modern ferry boats were rapidly assembled, while tanks, armored vehicles, anti-aircraft guns, and antiarmored-car guns formed queues to cross on the ferries. The mountains and forests of the Central Highlands were shaken by a fire storm.

☆ ☆ ☆

Basically the battle was over by 1030 on 11 March 1975. . . . The fact that it took us only a little more than a day and a night to attack and occupy so large a city proves that the enemy can find no means to resist our strength.

GENERAL KY - CONTINUED

nied that the air force of that time was the No. 1 outfit, because [in the first] bombing raid in North Vietnam, I was in the first plane.

I was not corrupted. I did not take money from the young officers to get them promotion. And to be very frank, on some trips overseas when they tried to bring back goods like hair spray to resell for a few dollars . . . I told them: "I know you don't have enough money to keep your families. So I'll allow you to do it. But not much. Just enough to feed your family." Personally, I never was involved in any traffic. That's why they liked me and respected me.

About corruption. You were prime minister for a while and vice president. Why were you unable to stop it?

First as vice president for four years, I didn't have the authority to stop it.

As prime minister?

Okay, for 2½ years. First . . . the priority concerning my government was to bring back stability. There were fights between Buddhists and Catholics, between the various military factions, and I was alone at that time. I couldn't make it quick and fast because otherwise the reaction from others, from the corrupted people, was very strong. And they will kill me.

Why couldn't you get the ordinary people to support the government?

Because . . . the leaders, both civilian and military, were corrupted. Once the leaders were always thinking about their own pockets, it was very simple. Many young officers came to me at the end and said, "I don't see any reason why I have to take a risk, get shot, die, for this regime."

And they said to me: "When you were commanding officer, even though we don't pay attention about ideology, or freedom, or dictatorship, but because you go and we love you, so we go with you. But with this regime . . ." That's why in the end they would drop bombs at 40,000 feet. One came to me and said: "Why should I go lower? Why should I risk my life for a man like Thieu or some commanding officers?" And I think he was right.

Are there any American individuals you are bitter about?

Maybe, the only one, the last American ambassador in Saigon.

Why him?

I don't want to say he was stupid. But I have the feeling he knew nothing about what happened around [Vietnam].

Is that one of the reasons the collapse happened that way?

Yes, yes, yes. Because Graham Martin was stubborn to support Thieu. Thieu could have stepped down years ago. And I am sure that any kind of change without Thieu—I'm not speaking of myself, but of anyone else but Thieu—could have been better.

Do you still see any of the Americans you knew in Vietnam?

Oh yes. They invite me, or they call me at home. But I never ask to see them. No, never.

Why?

Well . . . I don't want to embarrass people.

Why should they be embarrassed?

To some or many of them, even a month before the end, I told them; "This will happen. This will happen. And here is what we must do." And they told me, "No, no, no." And now I speak again with them and say, "You remember what I told you?" And they're very embarrassed.

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NEW YORK TIMES - 5/2/76 Pg E2

Lebanon Is a Vacuum that May Not Be Filled at All

By JAMES M. MARKHAM

BEIRUT—The savage effects of a year-long civil war have turned Lebanon into something that nature abhors and diplomats exploit: a vacuum.

Lebanon's army has divided along religious lines, its police force has vanished, its governmental institutions have ceased operating, its economy is in ruins and its numbed citizens live either in the lawless two-thirds of the country run by Palestinian and Moslem irregulars, or in a tight Christian ghetto centered on the port town of Jounie.

"The problem with this country," said one of Beirut's few remaining ambassadors, "is that it cannot exist, but it won't disappear either."

In physics, vacuums are usually filled. But there is some doubt that Lebanon will follow the laboratory example, unless its traditional political leadership can cease bickering and repair the ruins. Palestinian guerrilla organizations have filled part of the vacuum. Yasir Arafat's Al Fatah, which now contains many Lebanese, provides something of a police force. So do units of the Palestine Liberation Army and the Syrian-run As Salqā. In the Christian zone, the Phalange Party is building what it calls a "shadow government." But on neither side of the divide is there a credible authority.

Lebanon's large eastern neighbor, Syria, which has long suppressed irredentist feelings about Lebanon, is the natural candidate to fill the vacuum.

But a review of the interests, suspicions and inclinations of the major players in the Lebanese crisis suggests that this will not be easily done.

The United States: In an election year, President Ford presumably wants to prevent the Lebanese chaos from sparking a Middle East war. This means urging restraint on both Israel and Syria, which already has perhaps 4,000 regular troops and a sizable force of armor just inside Lebanon. Washington would also like to see Syria extend the mandate of the United Nations observer force on the Golan Heights.

Israel: Like Washington, the Israelis must be quietly pleased to see the Palestinians bogged down in Lebanon and the Syrians preoccupied. Israel's border with Lebanon has not been so quiet in years. Israel would not like to see Syria take over Lebanon and has warned that if an unspecified "red line" believed to be the Litani River, is crossed it might intervene. Informed Arabs believe that the Israelis want to keep everyone guessing, which tends to reinforce the status quo and deter the Syrians. "We're killing each other, we're committing national suicide," said one Lebanese intellectual, "and the Israelis love it."

The Palestine Liberation Organization: Obsessed with Lebanon, the Palestinian leadership gathered around Mr. Arafat wants to preserve its autonomy in the last Arab state where it has freedom of operation. It remains fearful of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon; in Syria the guerrillas are well controlled. The Liberation Organization reiterates its dedication to the integrity of Lebanon, but it provides the military backbone of the Moslem and leftist groups that have battled the Christian right in the civil war. The Liberation Organization, like the Phalangists, constitutes a kind of shadow government. "Arafat is doing an apprenticeship in governing a country," said one Palestinian.

Syria: It is certain that President Hafez al-Assad would like to see a Lebanese Government responsive to Syrian wishes. He would also like to be the most

VIETNAM - CONTINUED

wild and disconnected charges against the Ford administration. He has called the country second in national defense, about to give away the Panama Canal and ready to foster the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.

Mr. Ford, while occasionally hitting out at Mr. Reagan, has replied to these charges as if they were true. He has dropped the word "detente" from his vocabulary, increased defense spending, and allowed his closest political advisers to wipe out Henry A. Kissinger, the chief protagonist of American foreign policy in the past seven years.

Mr. Reagan, in other words, though a sure loser, sets the pace for a national security debate. The President of the United States, in keeping with the post-Vietnam mood, is on the defensive.

The phenomenon is less apparent on the Democratic side. Since there is no candidate to blame for losing Vietnam, neither can any candidate turn the subject to advantage in the primaries after the fashion of George McGovern. But there is the curious case of Daniel P. Moynihan, the former American ambassador to the United Nations.

Mr. Moynihan, while actually achieving nothing at the U.N., did stand up and talk tough on behalf of American interests. He thus appealed to the chauvinistic instincts humbled by Vietnam. He was far more popular than the candidate he supported, Henry M. Jackson, and at one point President Ford himself tried to put aside an attack on detente by telling a Florida audience that "I appointed Moynihan to the U.N."

The upshot is a curious paradox. Events have demonstrated with a vengeance that Vietnam was too small and remote a place to engage this country's vital interest. But the opposite story, flogged for years by leaders of both parties, haunts public opinion. The country is obsessed by Vietnam, and beneath the surface resentment smolders.

visible Arab champion of the Palestinian cause and at the same time have the greatest influence in the Liberation Organization. Mr. Assad moves cautiously, and reports from Damascus indicate that he is not eager to send his army in strength into Lebanon, thinning his Golan defenses and on his uncertain frontier with Iraq. The Syrians would probably be willing to help rebuild the Lebanese Army, but full-scale policing of a nation with the highest gun-per-capita ratio in the world seems unlikely.

These forces tend to cancel each other out, reducing the likelihood that Lebanon will fall under anyone's sway.

France, once the League of Nations mandatory power in both Syria and Lebanon, has offered to participate in international peacekeeping machinery. But the French seem to be thinking of only a token force and after other United Nations experiences few other states are eager to join a similar Lebanese operation. After all, Lebanon has six armies, a score of private militias and nine Palestinian organizations—all armed to the teeth.

The civil war is far from over: It has halted with the Moslem-left-Palestinian alliance in the ascendant, but not winning; the Christian right thrown on the defensive, but not vanquished. Without a winner or a loser, the war has bloodily riven Lebanon, which now resembles its Western Mediterranean neighbor, the partitioned island of Cyprus. But there the Turkish Army has sealed the division. There are no would-be Turks in Lebanon.

The question now before the Lebanese is: Do they have the resources to fill the vacuum that they, the Palestinians and all those who armed them have created in the last twelve months of killing?

MIDEAST - CONTINUED

of a joint Arab attack. One is the previously cited possibility of dismemberment of Lebanon and war with Syria if that should occur. The other stems from the recent rise in civil disobedience by Arabs—not only in the occupied West Bank, but in Israel proper as well. Such disorders, if they continue and spread, would seriously undermine the Rabin government domestically as well as damage its image abroad.

The Israeli government also faces a major debate over its handling of the 650,000 Arabs within its control and over the establishment of settlements in Arab territories.

It's not impossible of course, that all of those bleak situations will turn out well. Anything is possible in the Middle East.

The following apocryphal story is told by Arabs and Israelis alike to impress upon the outsider the irrationality of their region:

A scorpion approached a crocodile and asked if he could ride across a canal on the crocodile's back.

"Do you think I'm crazy?" snapped the crocodile. "You'll sting me and I'll die."

"But if I did that, I too would die," said the scorpion, "because I can't swim."

So the crocodile agreed. Midway across the canal the scorpion stung his benefactor. "But why?" demanded the dying crocodile.

"You've forgotten the nature of the scorpion," he answered, "and of the Middle East."

WASHINGTON POST

3 MAY 1976

(2) Pg 4

Japanese Stragglers Reported in Solomon

Agence France-Presse

HIROSHIMA, May 2—A former imperial army officer has volunteered to cooperate in a search for World War II Japanese soldiers reportedly hiding in the jungle on a southern Pacific island.

A Japanese expedition brought the news from Vella Lavella Island, one of the Solomon Islands, over the weekend that at least two men believed to be imperial army stragglers have been spotted.

Tsuneo Yoshinaka, a former lieutenant who took command of about 60 soldiers among the Japanese forces in the fight against a 13,000-man U.S. army division on the island in the summer of 1943, hopes to join the search.

WASHINGTON POST

2 MAY 1976 Pg 16

Burmese troops, backed by air and artillery support, killed nine rebels in eastern Burma, the Burmese news agency reported.

Weekend Edition -- 2 May 1976

Joseph Kraft

BALTIMORE SUN - 2 MAY 1976 Pg K5

Still Obsessed With Vietnam A Year After Withdrawal

Washington. No domino has even wobbled. Still less has any major crisis supervened since the ignominious American withdrawal a year ago from the ignominious intervention in Vietnam. So the anniversary of that event, last week, proves once again how wrong the war-lovers were.

But though rarely mentioned—though almost a taboo subject—Vietnam is plainly shaping domestic opinion. The repressed reaction to the first American defeat finds expression in many crazy features of the national mood and the presidential campaign.

What falsified the domino theories of the war-lovers was the Sino-Soviet split. Peking has tended to regard Hanoi as a protégé of Moscow. As part of their efforts to contain the Russians, the Chinese have worked to restrain the Vietnamese.

The Chinese have dominated the regime in Cambodia and steered it away from dependence on Vietnam. They have encouraged leaders in Japan, the Philippines and Thailand to maintain their American connections, including the American troop presence.

Apart from the drive toward reunification with South Vietnam, there has been as a result no outward push by Hanoi. On the contrary, as the resumption of negotiations with oil companies holding concessions from the former Saigon government shows, the Vietnamese Communists are moving toward normalization of relations with Washington.

In these conditions, the spectacle of American defeat has had only the most limited impact on the rest of the world. Countries looking to Washington in Europe, South Asia and Latin America and elsewhere have not suddenly concluded the Americans were paper tigers. If anything, they have been looking more and more to this country for help in defense and economic problems. "Our allies," as the Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, put it the other day, "are glad we're out of a war they all opposed."

As to the impact of Vietnam on domestic opinion, the subject is occasionally raised to mislead, as in the wholly different case of Angola. But an issue otherwise dominant in American politics for nearly a decade, a matter pivotal in the presidential elections of both 1968 and 1972, has suddenly gone to ground. Hardly any political figure, whether Democratic or Republican, has been dwelling on Vietnam in any of the primary elections.

The reason for this taboo does not defy imagination. The country is truly ashamed of what happened in Vietnam. Any candidate who harps on the issue rubs salt into fresh wounds. So the candidates avoid the subject.

Directly, anyhow. Indirectly, however, the unavowed popular fixation on Vietnam opens the field to those who know how to play upon feelings of national humiliation.

The undoubted star in the crowd is Ronald Reagan. He has been throwing (See VIETNAM, Pg 4-F)

BOSTON GLOBE - 2 MAY 1976

Mideast just won't stop smoldering

William Beecher, *The Globe's* diplomatic correspondent, is about to return to the Mideast for a month-long reporting assignment. Beecher recently won an Overseas Press Club citation for his interpretive reports from that area last year.

By William Beecher
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—Nine months ago the prospects for a new emphasis on constructive, peaceful solutions to the burning problems of the Middle East seemed promising.

Egypt and Israel had just agreed to a second disengagement in the Sinai—making a revived Suez Canal hostage against another resort to war.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had turned pointedly away from Soviet support in favor of a determined quest for economic and military help in the West, and his shift away from periodic wars toward economic rebuilding was very popular at home.

King Hussein seemed to have restored himself to the good graces of the Arab world without readmitting Palestine guerrillas to his land, from which they might operate against Israeli settlements across the border and against Hussein's political base at home.

President Assad of Syria voiced anger at Egypt's separate deal with Israel for he well realized it undermined the credibility of the threat to joint military action, but he was being coaxed and pressed by the United States and Saudi Arabia to move to a second-stage agreement on the Golan Heights.

Israel by then had more than made up its weapons losses from the 1973 war and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, after a shaky start, appeared to be fashioning a solid political base for his government.

Today that relatively idyllic picture is changing dramatically and unpredictably.

Full scale civil war in Lebanon first diverted Assad's attention and political efforts and finally occupied some of his troops. Recently, a bold US-Israeli diplomatic initiative aimed at a major return of captured territory to Jordan, Egypt and Syria in exchange for de facto peace arrangements has become totally stalled because of Assad's preoccupation with civil strife.

It remains to be seen whether the grisely events in Lebanon will result in a relatively orderly redistribution of power within a single state or in the

carving up of Lebanon into two or more states.

On that could hinge the possibility of another Arab-Israeli war. If Lebanon were dismembered, Israel would have a hard time sitting still for the establishment of a radical Arab "confrontation" state on its northern frontier and might well go to war to create a more defensible border.

Possible partition and resultant war aside, if the political outcome in Lebanon should appear less than a success Assad's own political fortunes in Damascus could become uncertain. The regime which preceded his was ousted following the failure of its efforts in 1970 to back the Palestinian guerrillas with tanks in their attempt to unseat King Hussein.

Additionally, Jordan's King Hussein suffered a setback in prestige second only to that suffered by the Israelis from the recent overwhelming vote on the West bank of the Jordan River in favor of young nationalists, many espousing Palestine Liberation Organization affinity.

The on-again-off-again deal to provide US Hawk air defense batteries to Jordan could figure mightily in the state of Hussein's prestige at home. Should he feel compelled to turn to the Soviet Union for the first time for major weapons systems, Hussein could be undermined among many of his conservative generals (who perhaps would be egged on by the Saudis, who would fear entry of Soviet equipment and advisers into Jordan). Even if a last-minute compromise is worked out to provide Hawk missiles, Hussein might nonetheless open the door to some Soviet weapons during his planned trip to Moscow in early June as a means of showing the US that he has an alternative source of arms.

In Egypt, President Sadat appears to be meeting with modest success in finding alternative sources of arms in Europe and China, but for at least a few years it's hard to imagine how Egypt's armed forces can become anything but increasingly weaker as Soviet jets and tanks break down for want of spare parts before significant quantities of replacements can be obtained. That can hardly make the Egyptian military anything but unhappy.

And the opening to the West economically has been disappointingly slow to date, while inflation, unemployment and birth rates are soaring.

In Israel two new dangers have supplanted the previous perennial fear

(See MIDEAST, Pg 4-F)

Part II -- Main Edition -- 27 May 1976

WASHINGTON STAR 26 MAY 1976, Pg 10 (27)

Accounts by Victors, Vanquished On Saigon's Fall Raise Questions

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

New questions about American policy in the final weeks before Saigon fell have been raised by a recently published account by the victorious North Vietnamese commander.

Discrepancies between the account and testimony to a congressional panel by the last U.S. ambassador, Graham A. Martin, suggest that policies which Martin helped formulate were partly based on misunderstandings on his part.

Martin explained his control of the evacuation of Americans and some Vietnamese from Saigon in April 1975 as based upon an assurance that the Communists would not interfere with evacuation. But the victor's account said checking that evacuation was a priority goal.

Martin also blamed actions of a senior Pentagon official on April 28 for provoking the Communist shelling of Tan Son Nhut airbase near Saigon early April 29, thus forcing the final helicopter departure of Americans. The Communist account said the shelling had been planned for well over a week.

DESPITE SEVERAL still-disputed aspects of the way the long American involvement in Vietnam wound up, however, there has been little interest in Washington in re-examining the subject. The Ford administration has tried to cut off possibly embarrassing or politically damaging further discussion, and Congress has turned away.

The account by the commander, Senior Gen. Van Tien Dung, supported Martin on one major point. The reduction of U.S. aid after the January 1973 Paris cease-fire agreement weakened Southern armies while the Communists grew stronger, Dung said. "(President) Nguyen Van Thieu was then forced to fight a poor man's war."

In his only public statement on the fall of Vietnam since he was taken by helicopter off the roof of his embassy April 30, 1975, Martin told a House International Relations Committee panel in January that the basic reason for South Vietnam's fall was the cut in American support.

The subcommittee was

openly skeptical, alluding to reports of corruption and incompetence in Thieu's command. Dung also referred to the Thieu regime as rotten and many of its generals unwilling to fight, but he put this more in the context of standard Communist condemnation of an opponent than analysis of the reasons for its defeat.

A DETAILED account of the final months of the war, as related to a Hanoi journalist by Dung, the North Vietnamese army chief of staff, has been broadcast serially by Hanoi for the past month. It pictures the war in the South as having been commanded from Hanoi as early as 1964, contrary to long Communist efforts to depict it as a struggle of Southern patriots.

In addition to NVA generals, Hanoi's Communist party politburo was represented in the South during the final campaign by a special overseer, Le Duc Tho, who negotiated the Paris agreement with Henry A. Kissinger but refused to accept a share of the Nobel peace prize for it, was in the forward command post as the climactic attack on Saigon began at 5 p.m. April 26.

Surprised by the collapse of Southern resistance in the Central Highlands and the Hue-Da Nang area of northern South Vietnam during March, the politburo decided March 24 "to liberate Saigon before the rainy season — that is, in early May 1975," Dung said. He described a rush to get NVA troops and equipment into position in time.

BY APRIL 18, preparations had begun to shell Saigon's airbase "in order to reduce the combat capacity of the enemy air force, to shake the enemy's morale, to check his evacuation plans, and to create favorable conditions for the general offensive against Saigon. . . ." Dung also decided to use a defector pilot to lead captured A37 warplanes in an attack on the airbase.

"On April 22 the campaign command reviewed for the last time the official plan for the Ho Chi Minh Campaign . . . (this) decided the enemy's fate,"

Dung said.

Martin testified that "the North Vietnamese had undertaken, around April 22, that they would not militarily interfere with our evacuation. . . . The Soviets had informed the United States" of this.

Other officials of the U.S. Embassy have said that Martin believed as late as April 29 that there would be a truce during which an orderly evacuation could be conducted.

Martin testified that there were intelligence reports of a Communist determination to capture Saigon rather than make any compromise, but they were difficult to evaluate. He preferred to believe the truce messages through various Communist channels and to think North Vietnam had been frightened out of interfering.

HANOI WAS warned indirectly that "any interference with our action (the evacuation) would be a very costly affair," Martin said.

But twice in his lengthy account Dung said the politburo had concluded that the United States would not intervene and could be ignored. Dung referred scathingly to efforts by Thieu and the Americans, "including perfidious diplomatic maneuvers, to check our troops' advance and avoid total defeat."

Dung said that at some unspecified time in April Martin asked to meet the Communist liaison group living at Tan Son Nhut under terms of the Paris agreement. "We rejected his request."

Until the night of April 29, "Martin had thought that the puppet administration could survive and a cease-fire could be negotiated," Dung said. "This was why he had been reluctant to order an evacuation, adopting a wait-and-see attitude" until the airbase was bombed and then shelled. Dung did not give the sources for this information.

DUNG SAID his air force of captured U.S. planes was told the day before the final attack began April 26 that it had to bomb Tan Son Nhut by April 28 or lose the chance, because by the next

day artillery would be within range and would begin shelling.

The air raid did occur April 28 and the airbase was shelled at 4 o'clock the next morning. These attacks halted the evacuation by fixed-wing planes and caused the beginning of the final helicopter departure, which ended April 30 just before Communist troops took over the city.

What Dung described as long-planned actions were explained by Martin as reactions that messed up his own plans.

The ambassador told the House subcommittee that it was not certain that the air raid was intended to halt the fixed-wing evacuation. He suggested that it was related to American efforts to remove military equipment from Vietnam.

ERICH F. von Marbod, a U.S. principal deputy assistant secretary of defense in charge of military aid to Indochina, was in Vietnam trying to salvage as much equipment as possible from Communist capture. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger had sent him after the congressional uproar over American aid equipment lost when the Communists overran the northern part of South Vietnam in March.

Martin said that after the air raid Von Marbod had the South Vietnamese air force fly their warplanes to Thailand.

This removal of planes that the Communists hoped to capture for themselves, Martin said, "was the reason for the rocketing on the morning of the 29th . . . I think it was designed to impede that operation . . . I do not think it was specifically designed to interfere with our evacuation."

HOWEVER, aside from Dung's contrary account, records from Thailand indicated that most, if not all, the warplanes that got away from Tan Son Nhut left after the April 29 shelling, not before.

The planes were later flown to U. S. aircraft carriers off Thailand.

Martin is now officially listed as a special assistant to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. State Department spokesmen refuse to say what he is doing.

Part II -- Main Edition -- 2 March 1976

DEFENSE SPACE BUSINESS DAILY - 1 March 1976 (2)

RUMSFELD: SOVIETS 'PULLING ABREAST AND AHEAD'*Spent \$135 Billion For Defense In 1975*

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, declaring that he was "not given to overstatement," said last week that "steadily, and in some areas swiftly, the Soviet Union is pulling abreast and ahead of the United States in military capability, both strategic and conventional."

He said the nation must act to arrest the trends that "are clearly evident. . . I see the trends -- the massive effort by the Soviet Union, and the downward trends now well established in the U. S."

Rumsfeld said the people of this nation "do not want to change our policy from 'equivalence' (he began his administration with reference to a U. S. posture "second to none") to inferiority."

He explained that the Soviet resources allocated to national defense have increased from \$102 billion in 1965 to \$135 billion in 1975, a rise of 32 percent over 10 years.

Rumsfeld also echoed Dr. Malcolm Currie's warning that, given current trends, "and unless there is appropriate action by the U. S., the Soviet Union could attain dominance in deployed military technology in the 1980's."

He said that, despite an understanding of detente's meaning, "many have misread this approach to dealing with the Soviets, and they have supported cuts in the Defense budget -- cuts which amount to more than \$34 billion over the past 5 years alone -- believing that because we were not at war we could do so. . .

"There are those who claim not to be alarmed by the prospect of slipping to second place as a world power. I can only conclude that such people have either too narrow a view of U. S. interests and concerns, or too little insight into history and the role of power in the workings of the world."

* * *

\$2.2 BILLION SALE OF AWACS TO NATO. The Pentagon has notified the Congress of a Letter Of Offer to sell NATO 32 Boeing E-3A AWACS aircraft for up to \$2.2 billion. The number of aircraft, configuration and value of sale to be negotiated.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT - 8 MARCH 1976(2)

Infighting over the Pentagon budget has put Defense Chief Donald Rumsfeld at odds with the White House, where he was once chief of staff. Insiders say that Mr. Rumsfeld gave the Navy the green light to ask for 55 ships, to cost 21 billion dollars over a five-year period, after the President's budget officers slashed the military more than Mr. Rumsfeld liked.

* * *

Little noticed in President Ford's intelligence reorganization was the drastic downgrading of Mr. Kissinger, who previously ran intelligence operations virtually as a one-man show. Now he is simply one member of a committee headed by the President's national security adviser.

* * *

A Western diplomat returning from a recent visit to China reported this attitude among officials: "They have no interest at all in superpower competition—they say it's just a waste of resources. What dominates their thinking all the time is how to feed 800 million people."

U.S. DEFENSE - CONTINUED

Military satellites, furthermore, must resist jamming and radiation damage to assure that they will work in case of enemy attack. Such equipment adds both cost and weight, and requires much more advanced technology than commercial satellites need.

Officials at both the White House and the Defense Department point out that when the present communications system is working, it can be spectacular.

During the evacuation of Saigon and the *Mayaguez* affair last May, for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington were in direct contact with local commanders. President Ford and other officials were able to listen in on radio conversations between Navy pilots and their commanders about 10,000 miles from the White House.

Such dramatic developments, however, can be a sometime thing, and improvements have a way of slipping.

Cited is the Navy's Fleet Satellite Communications System.

The first satellite for this program was scheduled for launching from Cape Canaveral last year. Now that date has been pushed back to 1977, and could be delayed further. At one point, top civilian officials considered scrapping FLTSATCOM because of an array of technical problems.

Pentagon experts insist the troubles can be resolved. More than 80 million dollars has been spent of a projected cost of 362 million for the system. If the first of these satellites is a success, the Navy is planning to buy up to four more from TRW Corporation of Redondo Beach, Calif.

Technology is even more complicated in a related navigation-satellite project. While not strictly a communications system, the 1-billion-dollar NAVSTAR global-positioning system is still another element in the attempt to get informa-

tion to military units.

U.S. military ships, planes and ground units would be able to contact one of the six satellites in the system and determine their position on earth to within 30 feet of true location. With the aid of such a system, strategic bombers, land-based missiles and shipboard weapons could achieve unprecedented accuracy, say authorities, and would be a great boon to fast-moving ground forces.

The big question with NAVSTAR as with the whole military-communications system, however, is, will it work?

Blessing . . . bane. For military commanders, the on-again, off-again state of their communications is a constant frustration: space-age convenience on some days, but on others little better than World War II systems.

What it comes to, military critics say, is that communications is a weak link in the U.S. chain of command.

Part II -- Main Edition -- 2 March 1976

Early Bird 2 Mar 76

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FEATURES COLUMNISTS

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT - 8 March 1976(2)

A 16-YEAR-OLD BOTTLENECK THAT COULD JAM UP U.S. DEFENSE

Breakdowns, failures, delays . . . Despite millions in outlays, the Pentagon hasn't yet devised a satellite network it can count on.

Add one more item to today's growing concerns on the state of American defenses.

After spending hundreds of millions of dollars over the past 16 years, the Pentagon is still trying to put together its own reliable, secure and jamproof system of satellite communications.

So unsatisfactory is today's network that military leaders say they could find themselves out of touch with their Commander in Chief if a grave emergency arose while the President was airborne outside the country.

A major reason for that: Electronic measures in the hands of potential enemies could disrupt present means of military communications.

That is only part of the problem.

Many military messages today are subject to delay by overloaded circuits. Some communications lack all the security that defense officials prefer.

As things stand, the military—by national policy—relies on commercial cable and satellite circuits for a major share of its messages. As long as these commercial channels are operating, experts insist, the nation's defenses are not crippled.

In addition, however, the Pentagon wants its own complementary communications system for more secret and urgent messages, as well as for handling high volumes of voice and telegraph signals in times of emergency.

Heart of the worries. This separate defense-communications system is where the problems lie. Key parts keep breaking down—or they simply have not yet been devised to the Pentagon's liking.

What's more, projects designed to cure these ills keep falling behind.

The situation is so worrisome that former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger last June ordered the Defense Department to complete a network with four more operational satellites and to back them up with two spares in orbit. But the first two "birds" in this project are not scheduled to be launched until spring, 1977. Beyond that, a series of still more advanced satellites is planned for the 1980s.

The Navy also hopes to put up in 1977 a satellite system of its own for communicating with its ships. The Air

Force will piggyback aboard the Navy satellites its own system for contacting strategic forces.

Despite this activity, more and more questions are being raised about the delays and costs in building a reliable communications system for the military's special needs.

Since 1960, the Pentagon has orbited 83 satellites for communications purposes without getting what it wants. Of these, only 13 are still in orbit, and not all of those are fully functional.

This tally doesn't include earlier research by federal civilian agencies into the use of huge reflectorized globes in space that could bounce signals from one spot to another over long distances.

The current links. What does the military's communications system look like today?

The network on which military commanders now rely to keep in touch with Washington and other centers consists of the commercial cable and satellite channels plus two unreliable remnants of what was to have been the Pentagon's own global satellite circuit.

Important messages are sent in code by whatever transmission method used. Secret voice conversations can be scrambled to make them unintelligible to unauthorized listeners. But those communications using other than the military's own system are considered especially vulnerable to interruption, as well as eavesdropping at the receiving end. Cables can be cut or tapped and satellites jammed in a crisis.

The parts of the military-communications-satellite system in place are two super-high-frequency instruments that are known as DSCS II (Defense Satellite Communications System, Phase II). Each weighs 1,100 pounds and relies on the sun for power.

One is stationed 22,300 miles over the Atlantic Ocean at the Equator and the other is in a similar position over the Pacific. Originally, six of these satellites were to be orbited at a cost of 250 million dollars. Two were lost in launching, however, and two others failed after entering orbit.

The new satellites planned for 1977 and later are designed to supplement this system.

Even now, the two DSCS II satellites in operation have a limited capacity when they are working properly.

At the height of the crisis in Southeast Asia last spring, for instance, the Pacific satellite became overloaded. The U.S. borrowed a satellite normally used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and shifted it to the Pacific. It helped to maintain communications during the fi-

nal days of the fighting in South Vietnam, the American evacuation and the *Mayaguez* ship incident off Cambodia.

The NATO satellite has since been returned, but bugs remain in the DSCS II system. On September 13, the one over the Atlantic failed completely and was not returned to service until October—subject to intermittent problems. Even now, only routine messages are routed over its circuits; important messages go by commercial channels.

Today, Pentagon officials estimate, about a third of military messages overseas uses commercial cable, another third uses commercial satellites and one third goes by defense satellites.

The Defense Department has leased 196 commercial channels at a cost of more than 1.2 billion dollars for the three years 1975 through 1977. When the Atlantic DSCS II failed, 20 commercial channels were added at a cost of 1.9 million a month.

The critics' points. Some observers, seeing the way in which the military has been forced to rely increasingly on commercial channels because of the failure of its own satellites, contend that the Defense Department system is less reliable than that of the 91-nation International Telecommunications Satellite Organization—known as Intelsat. That system is being operated for Intelsat by the company that developed it—Comsat, the American-owned Communications Satellite Corporation.

One critic writing in the industry publication *Electronic News* makes the point that he routinely dials telephone numbers in England via commercial satellite—which is more than the Secretary of Defense can do using military circuits.

Noted, too, is the Defense Department's apparent failure to put up satellites on a regular schedule so that spare facilities are available in case of trouble. Intelsat does this, preparing for deterioration of satellites in orbit.

Charges also are made that the Pentagon has been slow to learn from experience the technology and operating practices that private companies have developed.

The Pentagon's side. Against such criticism, telecommunications experts at the Pentagon reply that requirements for defense are much more stringent than those for civilian messages.

The military "birds," they say, must be powerful enough to reach small, mobile receiving stations anywhere in the world. Commercial systems rely largely on fixed-position ground stations.

(See U.S. DEFENSE, Pg 2-F)

DEFENSE SPACE BUSINESS DAILY 11 FEBRUARY 1976 (12)

'THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONSERVATIVE REMNANT'

Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth recently told a meeting in Montgomery, Alabama there are three basic false or erroneous doctrines feeding on each other regarding military force and political influence in "an age of peace."

One, he said, is the "Doctrine of Declining Utility," which "holds that because of its great destructive power, military force now largely lacks political utility." There is also the "Doctrine of Primary Determinacy, which holds the exact opposite of Declining Utility: i. e., that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

Then, there is the "Doctrine of Conservative Remnant": according "to which military forces may or may not have utility in today's world, but in any case the national defense is (politically) entitled only to that which is left over after social services and other politically demanding government programs have gotten 'theirs.' This is a doctrine which already has supporters in some countries where further defense cuts of varying magnitude have been initiated on the ground that such cuts are politically necessary in order to 'balance' the cuts being imposed on social services, public works, etc. . . Here in the United States, I hope we are not drifting into the dire clutches of this false and dangerous doctrine."

As for the doctrine of "Primary Determinacy," Ellsworth noted: "No one wants nuclear war, but the history of Soviet behavior since May 1972 (the date of SALT I, a landmark of detente) shows that Russia is not yet prepared to play the international game by rules we are used to, rules we are dedicated to. Our military force can neither determine nor enforce the rules of the game, but that doesn't mean we have to abandon those rules in order to avoid nuclear war with the Soviet Union."

* * *

PENTAGON TO ASSESS FAILED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM.

To recon-

struct in detail the administration and effectiveness of U.S. military assistance efforts prior and during the rapid collapse and disintegration of South Vietnam's armed forces is the objective of a study being undertaken by Rand Corp. for the Pentagon.

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E.B. 12 Feb 1976

Rhodesia, and South Africa.

The U.S. Government is hardly in a position to influence the immediate course of events since Congress has tied the Ford administration's hands on the spending of funds directly or indirectly for Angola. This leaves only South Africa as the outside power in a position openly to intervene in Angola in any

yet of Moscow's intention to continuing the MPLA and other "national liberation" movements in Africa, despite American objections.

Without saying that U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has protested Soviet intervention in Angola as inconsistent with detente, the Pravda article vigorously denied any linkage between the two.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 12 FEBRUARY 1976, Pg 1

UNITA retreats but gains French, South African aid

By Robin Wright
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Kinshasa, Zaire

The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has captured Silva Porto, the military headquarters of the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA). This is UNITA's second major loss this week: the first was the fall of Huambo, its political capital.

But reaction from within UNITA territory, as reported by French mercenaries with connections there, indicates:

1. A growing French involvement on UNITA's side.
2. The arrival of the first effective antitank equipment in UNITA hands.
3. The possibility of South Africans once again being involved in the Angola fighting
4. Continued cool heads on the UNITA side, presumably because of hope that guerrilla warfare can still halt the MPLA and that more outside help will arrive in time.

Silva Porto was abandoned by midday Wednesday. UNITA President Jonas Savimbi has moved his staff 210 miles south to Serpa Pinto, according to French mercenaries who had to return to Kinshasa, Zaire, after trying to fly into Silva Porto and finding it occupied by the MPLA.

The French also claim that South African forces are in Serpa Pinto and will help the pro-Western troops if the MPLA advances further south.

This report was given added credence late Wednesday by British intelligence sources who said that two battalions of South Africans were in the Serpa Pinto area.

After 3½ months' involvement with the southern liberation movement, South Africa claimed last month to have withdrawn all its troops to the Cunene River Dam on the Angola border with Namibia

WASHINGTON POST
12 FEBRUARY 1976

—Venezuela's leftist-controlled press workers' union declared U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger unwelcome in Venezuela, six days before his arrival on the start of a five-nation Latin American tour.

In the attack on Silva Porto, UNITA force reportedly managed to destroy three Cuban manned tanks with new anti-tank missile recently provided by Western governments. But two French mercenaries were reportedly unable to get out of the city, according to their colleagues. If they are captured, they will be the first French mercenaries to be taken by the MPLA.

The French now in Kinshasa do not appear to be discouraged by the loss and plan to rejoin the UNITA forces in Serpa Pinto Thursday.

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UNCLAS//N01850// CMC FOR CODE MED
ADVANCEMENT POINTS FOR SEA DUTY (SEA POINTS)

A. CNO 242336Z DEC 74

1. REF A PROVIDES SPECIAL ADVANCEMENT POINTS FOR DUTY ABOARD DESIGNATED SHIP TYPES AND ATTACHED AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS. IN THE SAME WAY THAT DUTY ABOARD SHIP IS PARTICULARLY VALUABLE IN DEVELOPING PROFICIENCY AND IMPROVING THE INDIVIDUAL'S CAPABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT, DUTY IN THE FIELD IS VITAL TO MEDICAL

PAGE 02 RUHQHQA6894 UNCLAS
AND DENTAL SUPPORT FOR THOSE ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN PROJECTING SEA POWER ASHORE. IN THE RECENT VIETNAM WAR, MORE THAN 600 HOSPITAL CORPSMEN DIED FROM HOSTILE ACTION, AND MORE THAN 4,500 PURPLE HEARTS WERE RECEIVED BY THEM. OF THOSE, MORE THAN 95% WERE MEMBERS OF THE FLEET MARINE FORCE.

2. TO PERFORM SUCH HAZARDOUS DUTY, NAVY MEN ASSIGNED TO THE FLEET MARINE FORCE ARE HEAVILY COMMITTED TO A RIGOROUS TRAINING SCHEDULE, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN WESTPAC UNITS. THIS TRAINING INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, NUMEROUS COMMAND-SPONSORED SCHOOLS, AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS, HELICOPTER MOVEMENTS, DEPLOYMENT ABOARD CARRIERS WITH MARINE AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS (BOTH FIXED AND ROTARY WING), AND FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES. THESE EXERCISES ARE CONDUCTED IN DESERT, MOUNTAIN, AND JUNGLE ENVIRONMENTS IN ALL TYPES OF WEATHER BOTH DAY AND NIGHT.

3. FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE BOTH THE VALUE AND ARDUOUSNESS OF THIS TYPE OF SEA DUTY WOULD BE AN INJUSTICE TO A LARGE SEGMENT OF NAVY MEN, SOME OF WHOM DO NOT SERVE THEIR SEA DUTY WITH THE FLEET MARINE FORCE VOLUNTARILY. THE ADVERSE EFFECT ON MORAL COULD BE FAR-REACHING.

4. IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT

NAVY PERSONNEL SERVING WITH THE FLEET MARINE FORCE, ESPECIALLY

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THOSE ON UNACCOMPANIED TOURS OR DEPLOYED WITH FMF UNITS RECEIVE CONSIDERATION AT LEAST EQUAL TO THAT GIVEN THOSE SERVING ABOARD SHIP.

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Part II -- Main Edition -- 29 April 1976

FEATURES COLUMNISTS

NEW YORK TIMES - 29 APRIL 1976 Pg 12

Excerpts From the North Vietnamese Chief of Staff's Account of the Spring Offensive in 1975

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, April 28—Following are additional excerpts, in unofficial translation, from the account of North Vietnam's Chief of Staff, Gen. Van Tien Dung, of the spring offensive of 1975 that led to the Communist victory in South Vietnam. Earlier excerpts were published in Monday's New York Times.

Puppet Col. Pham Duy Tat, commander of the ranger force in the second Military Region, made the following declaration to us about the puppet units withdrawing from the Central Highlands:

"On the afternoon of March 14, while I was going to various units to re-examine the defense situation in Pleiku, I received a call from the military region headquarters telling me to attend a meeting at the office of Pham Van Phu, commander of the Second Corps. Phu said he had just come back from a meeting in Cam Ranh with Nguyen Van Thieu, Tran Thien Khiem, Cao Van Vien and Dang Van Quang. Here is Phu's account of the meeting.

"Thieu asked Vien: 'Do we still have reserve forces to reinforce the Second Corps?' Vien replied: 'No.'

"Thieu then turned to Phu, asking: 'If there are no reinforcement troops, how long will you be able to defend the area?' Phu answered: 'I can defend for a month on the condition that I will get maximum air support, sufficient airborne materiel, weapons, ammunition and reinforcement troops so as to make up for our recent heavy losses. I will say in Pleiku to fight and I will die there.'

"Thieu said: 'These conditions cannot be met, and the P.L.A.F. is conducting violent attacks; therefore we must withdraw from Kontum and Pleiku so as to preserve our forces and use our troops to defend the Delta and the coastal area.'

"Then it will be more convenient for us regarding supplies."

Withdrawal Routes Weighed

"Thieu then asked: 'Could Route 19 be used for our withdrawal?' Vien answered: 'In the history of the Indochina war, no forces have been able to withdraw along Route 19 without being badly mauled by the revolutionary forces.'

"Thieu again asked: 'How about Route 14?' Vien answered: 'Withdrawal is all the more impossible along

Route 14.'

"All those attending the meeting then realized that the only choice left was Route 7, which had not been used for a long time and was in bad condition, but it could provide an element of surprise. Brig. Gen. Tran Van Cam asked: 'How about the province chiefs, the regional forces and the local people? Shall we also organize their withdrawal?'

"Phu replied: 'According to Mr. Thieu's order, the regional forces should be left behind, and no information of the withdrawal should be given to the province chiefs. Let them continue to defend. Let us complete our withdrawal and let them find out about that later on. The regional forces here consist only of highlanders. Let them return to the highlands.'

"After completing his explanation, Phu ordered Cam and Ly, chief of staff of the Second Corps, to work out a withdrawal plan."

Following the enemy's serious defeat in the Central Highlands, the Political Bureau and the Central Military Party Committee promptly assumed leadership over the Tri-Thien front and directed the Second Army Corps to rapidly change the direction of its offensive. On March 17, the Tri-Thien military zone was ordered to send its forces at once from the mountain areas to the coast to motivate the masses in intensifying the people's war, to press closely on communications lines and the outskirts of Hue, to intensify military proselytizing activities and so forth. At the same time, the Second Army Corps was ordered to intensify its attacks from the (Chuoi) area and to strategically sever Hue from Da Nang.

Victory Stirs Emotion

On being told that Hue had been liberated, I could not control my emotions. My eyes were filled with tears. I remembered that on the day of liberation of Ban Me Thuot, Comrade Phan Ham returned to the command post from Ban Me Thuot City to report on the situation. Comrade Phan Ham saluted, shook hands with me and then embraced me.

He was choked with emotion, his eyes filled with tears. He could say just one sentence: "Our victory is extremely great, brother."

I lit a cigarette. I had quit smoking long ago, but each

time we succeeded in solving a thorny problem, won a victory or achieved particular success, I smoked a cigarette with particular satisfaction. When the comrades around me, including the guards, saw me smoke a cigarette, they knew that I was enthusiastic.

After our great victories in the Central Highlands, the regional party committee and the Fifth Military Zone Party Committee, anticipating a new opportunity, cast aside plans to develop the offensive toward the south and shifted the direction of our offensive to the north with the aim of creating conditions for our attacks on Da Nang.

On March 24 and 25, the Second Division of the military zone, in cooperation with the regional forces, annihilated and disintegrated the Fourth and Fifth Regiments of the second puppet division and liberated Tam Ky and Tuan Duong. The Quang Ngai regional forces, in cooperation with the masses, attacked, rose up and liberated the northern part of the province. We annihilated the enemy and liberated the Chu Lai base.

Attack on Da Nang Ordered

On March 26 I cabled Brother Hoang Van Thai, deputy chief of the general staff, requesting him to order the Second Army Corps to bring its long-range artillery immediately to within striking distance of the airfield and port of Da Nang, urgently mount a siege on this city and boldly advance into this city to destroy all the enemy forces massing there. If this plan was achieved, we would be able to facilitate future operations on the Nam Bo battlefield. I asked the Central Military Party Committee to send Brother Le Trong Tan, deputy chief of the general staff, to supervise the Second Army Corps' attack on Da Nang to insure victory.

The Second Corps operating on the Tri-thien front was composed of the 304th, 324th and 325th Divisions and a number of technical units.

On March 27 the Central Military Party Committee decided to set up the Quang Dai Front Command with Comrade Chu Huy Man as political commissar and Comrade Le Trong Tan as commander. Comrade Tan boarded a helicopter in Hanoi to

(See EXCERPTS, P2-F)

NEW YORK TIMES

29 APRIL 1976 Pg 12

HANOI AIDE CITES KEY THIEU 'ERROR'

By FOX RUTTERFIELD

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, April 14—North Vietnam's chief of staff, drawing on the testimony of a captured South Vietnamese colonel, has described how South Vietnam's President decided on the "error in strategy" that led to the rout of his forces a year ago.

In a new installment of a continuing narrative of the war's final battles, the chief of staff, Gen. Van Tien Dung, said President Nguyen Van Thieu suddenly decided on March 14, 1975, to abandon the Central Highlands out of panic at the surprise capture by Communist forces of the highlands town of Ban Me Thuot four days earlier.

"Once an error in strategy was committed, defeat in the war was certain," General Dung said.

"It would come sooner or later. The only thing is that it was we who led the enemy to commit this error and created that turning point in the war."

General Dung's account, titled "Great Spring Victory, a Summation of Senior Gen. Van Tien Dung's Accounts of the Combat Situation in the Spring of 1975," is being carried in serial form in Hanoi's newspapers and broadcast by the Hanoi radio. So far about 45,000 words have appeared, bringing the story up to the fall of Da Nang on March 29.

Earlier parts of General Dung's narrative, in which he described how North Vietnam's senior political and military leaders planned last year's offensive, were published in The New York Times on Monday.

Among the points emerging from General Dung's account in the latest installments are these:

According to two captured South Vietnamese colonel, President Thieu reached his decision to abandon the Central Highlands at a meeting with his top military aides at Cam Ranh Bay only the day before the beginning of the panicky exodus that led to the fall of Saigon on April 30.

The South Vietnamese Army's total collapse at Da Nang, the country's second largest city, where soldiers stampeded over one another to run away before the Communists at-

(See HANOI, Pg 2-F)

Part II -- Main Edition -- 29 April 1976

EXCERPTS - CONTINUED

fly to Gio Linh.

To attack Da Nang, it was necessary to set up the command headquarters west of Da Nang. Upon his arrival in Quang Tri, Comrade Tan took a road east of the Truong Son Range to go to A Luoi, where he proceeded to an area west of Da Nang. While en route, he stopped at a general telephone switchboard station to contact the various units. Thus, the command and the party committee of the Quang Dai front had not yet met each other.

City in 'Chaotic Situation'

Beginning on March 26 Da Nang City was in a chaotic situation. Our forces quickly advanced to close in on the city. The enemy was forced to abandon his plan to hold up in Da Nang and began using Boeing-727's and helicopters to evacuate some American advisers and part of the puppet forces. The puppet troops fought among one another for places on the plane, causing noisy, brawling scenes at the airfield. Some of them were run over by taxiing aircraft on the runway.

Our big artillery guns began bombarding Da Nang airfield, Hoa Tinh base, the headquarters of the third puppet division command, Son Tra port and the command headquarters of marine division in Non Nuoc, thus driving enemy troops in the city into a more panicky state.

On March 29 ground troops and tanks of the second Army Corps, together with the armed forces of the fifth Military Region, advancing in four directions — north, northwest, southwest and south, rapidly and directly attacked the city.

The city was not subject to destruction. The airfield, military barracks and government buildings remained intact; public utilities were still in service and ferries were still in operation. We seized 26 aircraft, 20 tanks and 40 artillery pieces. Within 32 hours we had destroyed or disbanded more than 100,000 enemy troops, captured a strong military base complex and liberated Da Nang, the second largest city in the South.

Southern Corps Destroyed

With the liberation of Da Nang, we had completed the destruction and disintegration of the first Corps and totally liquidated the puppets' Military Region One, creating conditions for speeding up the total collapse of the puppet army.

I also received news about the situation on the Nam Bo battlefield through a letter sent by Comrade Tran Van Tra, commander of the Nam Bo armed forces and the Sixth Region.

Comrade Tra regretted that he had not had sufficient forces to proceed immediately with capturing Blao and Da Lat after liberating Lam

HANOI - CONTINUED

tacked, look even worse in retrospect, for General Dung says that he ordered a Communist commander from Hanoi to fly south to take charge of the battle only on March 26. The city fell without a fight, on March 29.

The North Vietnamese might have ended the war even more quickly, after the rout in the Central Highlands in mid-March, but General Dung decided to use his four divisions to advance eastward into Binh Dinh Province on the coast rather than head south for Saigon. The Communists' commander in the Saigon area, Gen

Dong.

At the Central Highlands Front Command headquarters, on March 18—when the enemy was retreating from the Central Highlands—we discussed the trends for developing the operations of the Central Highlands forces. We came to the following assessment of the situation facing the enemy and ourselves:

Our victories in the Central Highlands had had a very strong impact on the enemy's strategic deployment of forces and his morale, by going on the offensive and quickly developing battle gains, we could speed up the enemy's disintegration.

Our victory in the Central Highlands was extremely great as it had been realized beyond our expectations. Our forces had sustained only marginal losses in combat; the fighting spirit of our troops had increased many-fold.

We were still strong logistically—only part of the ammunition earmarked for the plan had been used and a fairly large quantity of ammunition had been seized from the enemy. Our strategic communications lines now allowed smoother and quicker passage for trucks.

There still remained a month and a half of the dry season for us to continue our operations. All our battlefields throughout the South had developed their operations with good coordinations. In the short term, the question was to determine the correct direction for developing the operations of the Central Highlands forces in the most continuous, rapid and effective manner in order to make fullest use of their might and spend the least time possible.

After intense discussions, we agreed that the direction for strategic development of the operations of the Central Highlands forces was to advance eastward. Specifically, our forces swept toward the coast and joined the armed forces of the Fifth Military Region in liberating Binh Dinh and Phuyen Provinces and part of Khanh Hoa Province, destroying a good part of the enemy's vital forces and liberating more than one million people.

By this time, filled with excitement, our troops wanted to advance rapidly toward the lowlands in the flush of victory.

Tran Van Tra, sent General Dung a message in which he "regretted" that "he had not had sufficient forces" to capture more territory himself at the time.

A Second-Hand Account

The South Vietnamese colonel quoted by General Dung in his account of how Mr. Thieu made his "error in strategy" was not himself present at the President's meeting at Cam Ranh Bay.

But the officer, Col. Pham Duv Tat, who commanded the large force of rangers in the highlands and who was highly regarded by other South Vietnamese officers, was reportedly informed of the meeting later that same day by his own superior officer, who did attend.

That officer was Gen. Pham Van Phu, the commander of the South Vietnamese forces in the highlands.

According to the account attributed to Colonel Tat, others who took part, besides President Thieu and General Phu, were Premier Tran Thien Kiem, the South Vietnamese chief of staff, Gen. Cao Van Vien, and President Thieu's special assistant for military intelligence, Gen. Dang Van Quang.

All these participants were later to leave South Vietnam before the Communists' final victory on April 30. None has offered a public explanation of what happened.

Colonel Tat says, according to General Dung's account, that the crucial factor in Mr. Thieu's thinking was that there were not enough reinforcements that could be sent to bolster the highlands and enable General Phu to hold out against a Communist attack on Pleiku and Kontum. At that point the

North Vietnamese had four divisions in the highlands, against two for the South Vietnamese, and the Communists had cut the only two usable highways into the vast, sparsely populated region.

The Communists had also severely shocked the Saigon command by capturing Ban Me Thuot, a town of 100,000, in only a day's fighting.

Although Colonel Tat did not refer to it, President Thieu is said by other knowledgeable South Vietnamese to have had before him an evacuation plan for the highlands drawn up half a year earlier by a retired Australian officer. The plan was based on an assumption that Mr. Thieu would put it into effect well before a Communist offensive.

But Mr. Thieu, always slow and cautious, had procrastinated, and evidently decided to act only when it was too late.

In Colonel Tat's version, President Thieu said: "The regional forces should be left behind, and no information of the withdrawal should be given to the province chiefs. Let them continue to defend."

"Let us complete our withdrawal and let them find out about that later on."

While it is impossible to confirm Colonel Tat's account without word from any of the actual participants, Americans and Vietnamese who were in Pleiku when the withdrawal began the next day, March 15, have reported that the province chiefs, were not informed of the move. The only persons who received instructions to pull out were the senior officers of the highlands command, but word of their evacuation quickly spread around the town, setting off the mass exodus.

**WASHINGTON STAR - 28 APRIL 1976(29) Pg 5
Scientist Discounts Soviet CD Efforts**

An atomic scientist told Congress today that the United States has no reason to imitate the Soviet Union's increasing emphasis on civil defense against nuclear war.

Dr. Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, testified there is no evidence that the Soviets' civil defense program is any more effective in decreasing possible casualties than the current "low profile" U.S. program.

Former Pentagon official Paul H. Nitze said the Soviets spend about \$1 billion a year on civil defense, compared with \$80 million in the United States.

Both testified at the opening of a series of hearings before the congressional Joint Committee on Production, which is reviewing the nation's civil preparedness in "limited" nuclear war.

**DEFENSE & FOREIGN AFFAIRS DAILY
23 APRIL 1976 (29)
DIEGO GARCIA: WORK GOES AHEAD**

Work on upgrading US facilities on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean is continuing at maximum rate. Last year's bitterly contested appropriation for the improvements — \$32-million — is now being funnelled into the project, following February's signing of a treaty arrangement with the UK, the official owners of the island.

The main improvements are concentrated on three main areas: lengthening the present runway (from 8,000 to 12,000 ft.); dredging the lagoon to make it sufficiently deep for the largest naval vessels and increasing oil storage. Housing is also being provided for up to 600 men. •

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Early Edit 26 April 1976

Part II -- Main Edition -- 26 April 1976

NEW YORK TIMES - 26 APRIL 1976 Pg 1b

Excerpts From Hanoi General's Account of Drive

Special to The New York Times
HONG KONG, April 25—Following are excerpts, in unofficial translation, from the account of North Vietnam's Chief of Staff, Gen. Van Tien Dung, of the spring offensive of 1975 that led to the Communist victory in South Vietnam.

From July through October 1974 the General Staff agencies were busily and urgently working. The battlefield situation was changing to our advantage.

The morale and combat strength of the puppet troops were clearly declining. Since early that year, 170,000 men had deserted. Their total manpower had decreased by 15,000 men since 1973, with a heavy loss in combat strength.

In fiscal 1972-73 the United States had given the puppet troops \$2.168 billion in military aid. This aid was reduced to \$964 million in fiscal 1973-74 and to \$700 million in 1974-75. Nguyen Van Thieu was then forced to fight a poor man's war.

Enemy fire power had decreased by nearly 60 percent. Its mobility was also reduced by half. The enemy had to shift from large-scale operations and helicopter-borne and tank-mounted attacks to small-scale blocking, nibbling and searching operations.

Strategy Conference

The cool fall weather of October 1974 reminded our military cadres of the coming campaign. The Political Bureau and Central Military Party Committee held a conference to hear the General Staff present its strategic combat plan.

At this conference a problem was raised and heatedly discussed: Would the United States be able to send its troops back to the South if we launched large-scale battles that would lead to the collapse of the puppet troops?

After signing the Paris agreement on Vietnam and withdrawing U.S. troops from Vietnam, the United States had faced even greater difficulties and embarrassment. The internal contradictions within the U.S. Administration and among U.S. political parties had intensified. The Watergate scandal had seriously affected the entire United States and precipitated the resignation of an extremely reactionary President—Nixon. The United States faced economic recession, mounting inflation, serious unemployment and an oil crisis.

Comrade Le Duan drew an important conclusion that became a resolution: Having already withdrawn from the South, the United States could hardly jump back in, and no matter how it might (EXCERPTS, Pg. 8-F)

NEW YORK TIMES - 26 APRIL 1976 Pg 1

Hanoi General Was Surprised At Speed of Saigon's Collapse

Says He Didn't Plan Final Victory in '75

By FOX BUTTERFIELD

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, April 25—North Vietnam's leaders did not expect their offensive last year to achieve complete victory and were surprised by the speed of Saigon's collapse, according to a lengthy new account by Hanoi's Chief of Staff of the war's final battles.

Gen. Van Tien Dung, the Chief of Staff, reported that when hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese troops and civilians fled in panic from Pleiku in the Central Highlands, beginning the rout, he was almost incredulous.

"Why such a retreat? And who had given the order for it?" he writes Hanoi's Politburo and top generals had planned only a series of attacks that would set the stage for a general offensive and uprising in 1976 to "completely liberate the South."

General Dung's disclosure is contained in a remarkably detailed and candid account of how Hanoi planned and achieved its final victory in South Vietnam last year. The report, written in the first person, is being carried in serialized form by two of Hanoi's official newspapers, Nhan Dan and Quan Doi Nhan Dan, under the title "Great Spring Victory—A Summation of Senior General Van Tien Dung of the Combat Situation in the Spring of 1975."

So far nine installments totaling about 40,000 words have appeared, bringing the narrative up to the sudden abandonment of Pleiku on March 16, six weeks before the fall of Saigon. It is not known how many more articles will appear.

General Dung's account is evidently timed to coincide with the first anniversary of the Communists' triumphant entry into Saigon on April 30 and with today's election in North and South Vietnam for a unified national assembly.

General Dung and Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnam's Minister of Defense, jointly published last July a much shorter and less detailed report of the victory.

Directed From Hanoi

Apparently because the Com-

munist have now essentially achieved reunification of the North and the South, General Dung makes no effort to preserve earlier Communist statements that there was a separate movement in the South, which they called the National Liberation Front and Americans termed the Vietcong.

On the contrary, General Dung, who is a member of the Politburo of the Lao Dong or Workers' Party, provides a vivid description of how the Politburo and the Central Military Party Committee, operating from what he calls "Dragon House" in Hanoi, directed the war.

For instance, the general reports that to supply their forces in the South 30,000 North Vietnamese troops and "Shock youths," including women, built a network of roads inside South Vietnam after the 1973 Paris peace agreement ended American bombing. The new network, which he says was 12,000 miles long replaced the less convenient Ho Chi Minh Trail father west in Laos and Cambodia.

Included in the new system were one 25-foot-wide highway from the North Vietnamese border to Loc Ninh near Saigon, 3,000 miles of oil pipelines and a cable-telephone system linking Hanoi with Loc Ninh. As a result of this system, General Dung says, when the 316th North Vietnamese Division was ordered to move from North Vietnam to the Central Highlands in the South, it was transported directly in 500 trucks.

General Dung, a 59-year-old native of North Vietnam, records that he was delegated by the Politburo to go to the South to take personal command of the main part of the 1975 campaign, which was to be launched in the Highlands.

Southerners Called to Hanoi

To conceal his involvement and to prevent American or South Vietnamese intelligence from discovering that a major offensive was about to occur, General Dung took elaborate precautions. His personal Soviet-made Volga sedan continued to make its regular rounds to his house and office after his departure, and "late in the afternoon, the troops would come to the courtyard at my house to play volleyball as usual, because I have the habit of playing volleyball after the afternoon working hours with them."

The general's secretary, who accompanied him to the South, feigned illness and was taken by ambulance to a hospital, from which he could leave without his neighbors suspecting anything.

General Dung makes several other disclosures and important points.

Hanoi reached its decision to attack in the Central Highlands, and to begin with an assault on the town of Ban Me Thuot, at a series of Politburo meetings from Dec. 18 to Jan. 8. The senior Communist officials in South Vietnam, including Pham Hung, the fourth-ranking member of the Politburo, and Gen. Tran Van Tra, whom recent Communist articles have identified as the southern military commander, were called to Hanoi to attend the meetings.

The Central Highlands and particularly Ban Me Thuot were selected as the theater of battle, General Dung related, because Hanoi had learned that President Nguyen Van Thieu believed the Communists would attack Tay Ninh, near Saigon, and had stationed fewer troops in the highlands than in any other area.

Moreover, Saigon's commander in the highlands, Gen. Pham Van Phu, "miscalculated" that if the Communists did attack in the highlands, they would strike Koonlum and Pleiku farther north and he had left only one regiment at Ban Me Thuot. But General Dung says that he secretly concentrated three divisions at Ban Me Thuot alone.

Notes U. S. Reductions

General Dung confirms statements by President Thieu and American officials that reductions ordered by Congress in American aid seriously impaired the South Vietnamese Army's ability to fight. By General Dung's estimate, Saigon's firepower was cut by 60 percent because of lack of bombs and ammunition, while its mobility was reduced by half, "due to lack of aircraft, vehicles and fuel." "Nguyen Van Thieu was then forced to fight a poor man's war," the general wrote.

Throughout the fall of 1974, Hanoi's leaders "heatedly discussed" whether the United States would intervene again if the Communists staged a new offensive. Finally, Le Duan, the first secretary of the party, concluded that "having already withdrawn from the south, the United States could hardly jump back in." General Dung says that the Watergate scandal and America's economic troubles were important factors in Hanoi's thinking.

Collective Leadership

The general's account of lengthy meetings and lively debate seems to confirm what specialists have long believed, that Hanoi's leaders do function collectively and that Mr. Le Duan, while the most powerful figure in the North, is far from being a dictator. General Dung says that "unanimity" had to be reached before the campaign plan could be put into operation, and he describes a military (COLLAPSE, Pg 9-F)

EXCERPTS - CONT'D

intervene, it would be unable to save the Saigon administration from collapse.

The conferees unanimously approved the General Staff's draft plan which chose the Central Highlands as the main battlefield in the large-scale, widespread 1975 offensive.

Many meetings preceded the Political Bureau's extremely important conference lasting from 18 December 1974 to 8 January 1975.

Great News From South

While the Political Bureau was meeting, great news came from the South: The main-force units in Eastern Nam Bo [the three around Saigon], in cooperation with the provincial forces, had attacked and liberated Phuoc Binh City and all of Phuoc Long Province. This was the first province in the South to be completely liberated.

The Political Bureau was resolved to mobilize the greatest efforts by the entire party and all troops and people in both parts of the country during the 1975-76 period, to step up the military and political struggle in coordination with the diplomatic struggle with a view to quickly and comprehensively changing the balance of power in our favor.

This strategic determination was reflected in the two-year 1975-76 strategic plan. According to this plan, widespread, large surprise attacks would be launched in 1975, creating conditions for the general offensive and uprising in 1976. Thus in 1976 we would launch the general offensive and uprising to completely liberate the South.

On Jan. 9, 1975, one day after the conclusion of the Political Bureau conference, the standing body of the Central Military Party Committee went into session.

While in session, we received reports that the enemy had dispatched an airborne division from the Central Highlands to Da Nang. This indicated that the enemy had not yet discovered the presence of our forces and our preparations in the Central Highlands. Only at this conference of the standing body of the Central Military Party Committee did the idea about mounting an attack on Ban Me Thuot become clear-cut.

Enemy Misjudged

The enemy misjudged our designs. He believed that if we attacked the Central Highlands we would attack its northern part. Therefore he concentrated forces to defend Pleiku and Kontum. He left lesser forces in Darlac in the southern Central Highlands. Ban Me Thuot City, the Darlac provincial capital, with a population of 150,000, was a political and economic center of the enemy, and the 23d Division headquarters was located there. The enemy was also mistaken in his assessment of us. He believed that in 1975 we were not strong enough to attack major provincial capitals and cities and that even if we attacked them we would not

be able to defend them from counterattack. Therefore, although Ban Me Thuot was a vitally important position prior to our attack the enemy had not deployed very strong forces there, and those that were there had many gaps.

When the decision to attack Ban Me Thuot was definitely taken, I hastily prepared to go to the front.

I promptly organized a group of cadres to accompany me to the western Highlands. The group had the code name A-75. Due to the importance of the campaign, my movements had to be kept under the strictest secrecy and everything had to be done to distract the enemy's intelligence. According to plans, after my departure the press would carry a number of reports on my activities as if I were still in Hanoi. Daily, the Volga sedan would make the trips from my house to the general headquarters at 7 A.M. and 2 P.M. and from the general headquarters to my house at 12 noon and 5 P.M. sharp. Late in the afternoon the troops would come to the courtyard at my house to play volleyball as usual, because I have the habit of playing volleyball after the afternoon working hours with them.

A Pretended Illness

My personal secretary, who lived with his family in a community area, would pretend serious illness on the eve of the departure. An ambulance would bring him to a hospital, and the next morning he would begin his journey from the hospital. According to what had been decided upon, in all communications, information, liaison and discussions during this campaign, Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap would be referred to as Chien, and I as Tuan.

According to our intelligence reports, on 9 and 10 December 1974, on the fourth story of the Independence Palace, Thieu held a meeting with the commanders of army corps of military regions of the puppets so as to assess our activities in 1975. They arrived at the following conclusion:

In 1975 we might fight on a scale larger than that of 1974, but it would not be as large as that of 1968 and would be less than that of 1972. We still were incapable of striking at big provincial capitals or cities, and even if we did strike at them we would be unable to hold them. We were only able to attack small and isolated provincial capitals such as Phuoc Long and Gia Nghia.

Our aim was to achieve success to pressure them to implement the Paris agreement on Vietnam. They believed that in early 1975 our direction of attack would be to strike at the Third Military Region, mainly Tay Ninh, in an attempt to use Tay Ninh as the capital of the P.R.G.S.V. [Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam].

COLLAPSE - CONT'D

meeting at which Le Duc Tho, a civilian member of the Politburo, came in unexpectedly to check on what targets were being selected.

General Dung himself frankly admits that despite the Communists' quick victory in seizing Ban Me Thuot, some mistakes were made. One problem was the habit of caution developed after years of fighting against overwhelming American airpower and artillery.

"Our side, before launching an attack still proceeded with the full routine, made night time preparations and waited till morning to attack," he wrote. "Though the enemy air force made only limited attacks, flew at a high altitude and dropped bombs inaccurately, our troops were not allowed to move about in daytime but were compelled to wait, delay and waste time."

When the South Vietnamese unexpectedly began to flee Pleiku on March 15 before it had been attacked and headed toward the coast over an old, abandoned road, General Dung blamed the commander of the 320th Division, whose troops were in the area, for not heading off the enormous column of trucks, carts and bicycles.

'A Reproachable Mistake'

The Chief of Staff relates that he called the officer, whom he identifies as Comrade Kim Tuan, on the telephone and said: "This is a shortcoming, a reproachable mistake. At this time the slightest hesitation, mistake, fear of hardship or delay would mean failure. If the enemy escapes, you will be responsible."

In fact, the Communist failure to act faster against the refugee column gave the South Vietnamese troops and civilians a few extra days, but the group bogged down at a river crossing, which the South Vietnamese Army took almost a week

to cover with a bridge. Few escaped in the end.

General Dung narrates dramatically his efforts to insure that the movements of the three North Vietnamese divisions — the 10th, the 316th and the 320th — around Ban Me Thuot would be kept secret. On March 5 a South Vietnamese unit captured a Communist artillery officer who was on a reconnaissance mission, along with his diary.

"We will attack Ban Me Thuot within four days," General Dung decided.

Mistaken Intelligence

Actually, American and South Vietnamese intelligence officers had been aware of the Communist troop movement for some time, but they assumed that they were either going to cut the few highland roads, which they also did, or move farther south to assault the town of Gia Nghia.

General Dung's own efforts to gather intelligence on Ban Me Thuot were not entirely successful either. Although Ban Me Thuot was a sleepy provincial town of fewer than 100,000 people, one Communist agent returned and reported that it was "very large, as large as Haiphong." Haiphong is North Vietnam's major port and second largest city.

When General Dung's troops overran Ban Me Thuot on March 10, he immediately dispatched a cable to Defense Minister Giap in Hanoi. In it he proposed to move north toward Pleiku, the major city of the Central Highlands.

But before he could move, President Thieu, in a move still not fully understood, ordered his forces to abandon the highlands.

General Dung, meeting with his aides outside Ban Me Thuot, was surprised. "Why such a retreat?" he wondered. "The Enemy had again made another grave strategic mistake."

30,000 Built Road

Because of this assessment, they did not change their strategic deployment of maintaining strength at two ends—the first and third tactical zones. Neither did they greatly reinforce the second tactical zone that included the western Highlands.

The strategic route east of the Truong Son [Annamite] range, which was completed in early 1975, was the result of the labor of more than 30,000 troops and shock youths. The length of this route, added to that of the other old and new strategic routes and routes used during various campaigns built during the last war, is more than 20,000 kilometers. The eight-meter-wide route of more than 1,000 kilometers, which we could see now, is our pride. With 5,000 kilometers of pipeline laid through deep rivers and streams and on mountains more than 1,000 meters high, we were capable of providing enough fuel for various battlefronts. More than 10,000 transportation vehicles were put on the road.

As for us, we continued to

go farther into the area our vehicle's number plate was repainted and the marking TS-50 was added to it. This marking meant priority No. 1 for the Truong Son troops.

On the way, we met Division 316 going on a military operation. This was the first time this division had used 500 trucks to move its men and equipment to the battlefront. An order had been given to this division: From the time its men set out until the time they opened fire, they must have absolutely no radio contact, so as to keep their operation secret. We intercepted an enemy radio message saying Division 316 could no longer be seen and no one knew where it was going.

Leaves and Elephants

On arrival in the Central Highlands, I established the command post west of Ban Me Thuot, near the headquarters of the front command. Our residence was in a green forest adjacent to a forest. The dry leaves of the trees covered the ground like a yellow carpet. Whenever

(EXCERPTS, Pg 9-F)

NEW YORK TIMES
25 APRIL 1976(26) Pg E15

Seoul's Repression

By Richard A. Falk

PRINCETON, N. J.—Coming at a time of relative calm between North and South Korea, President Park Chung Hee's recent moves against prominent political moderates and civic leaders cannot fairly be attributed to any alleged security threat. What, then, is the real source of Mr. Park's anxiety?

South Korea is widely heralded as an "economic miracle" second only to Brazil; virtually the entire political spectrum is committed to defending the country against possible attack from North Korea; and critics of the regime (unlike their past South Vietnamese counterparts) do not even seek an American military withdrawal.

In my judgment, South Korea's strategy of economic development accounts for the new round of repression. In a resource-poor third-world country, economic miracles (as measured by the rising gross national product) require substantial foreign investment, loans from outside, and capital assistance, which can be attracted to such a setting only by assured and short-term profits.

South Korea's economic attractiveness is peculiarly dependent upon outrageously low wages, large-scale corruption in the bureaucracy, staggering foreign economic debts and — concomitantly — on progressively harsher governmental repression.

The effort to sustain "growth" when the cost of oil and other imports was rising and the demand for exports was declining produced a trade deficit of \$4 billion in 1974-75. The Korean Government, falsely assuming that its difficulties were temporary and rightly regarding its attractiveness to foreign investors as a factor of its "miraculous" growth, has borrowed almost \$4 billion in the last three years, thereby increasing its external debt to \$5.9 billion, a very high figure for a country of Korea's economic scale.

At the core of domestic opposition to Mr. Park is the dual conviction that these economic policies are deepening existing inequities and undermining national autonomy by leaving South Korea's economic fate at the mercy of foreign investors and bankers. In these circumstances, those who criticize the role of Japanese and American financial operations are understandably labeled enemies of the state and treated as "Communist sympathizers."

Labor agitation, not Communist subversion, is perceived as the real threat to internal security. Students, religious leaders and cultural figures deliberately provoke such agitation to protest injustice, corruption and further erosion of independence.

In short, South Korea's economic policies help explain why these moderate groups bear the brunt of governmental repression, and why Mr. Park tries so hard to mislead both Korean and American public opinion about the

WASHINGTON POST (PARADE)
25 APRIL 1976(26)

NUKE THREATS

Atomic facilities have become a major target of threats and acts of violence in the U.S.

A Nader-sponsored organization some weeks ago disclosed a list of threats and acts of violence against nuclear facilities obtained from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a Freedom of Information request.

The list is startling:

--A pipe bomb was found in the reactor building of the Illinois Institute of Technology.

--Dynamite was found at the Wisconsin Michigan Power Company's (WI) Point Beach nuclear reactor.

--A break-in took place at the fuel storage building of the Duke Power (N.C.) Oconee facility.

--An incendiary device was detonated in a public area of the Boston Edison Pilgrim atomic reactor.

--A fire, possibly arson, occurred in an equipment storage barn at Nuclear Fuel Services, West Valley, N.Y.

nature of the opposition's demands and political orientation.

Up to now, the serious opposition, led by the courageous and respected Kim Dae Jung (among those recently detained and charged with political crimes), has been moderate, nonviolent, anti-North Korean, anti-Communist and pro-American.

When I interviewed Mr. Kim in Seoul in September, he explained that Mr. Park's brutal measures of governance, far from increasing the nation's security, have instead provoked widespread opposition, thereby making South Korean society increasingly vulnerable to infiltration from North Korea and rapidly leaving the steadily growing opposition little alternative but armed insurrection. Mr. Park's accusations of a subversive Communist-inspired opposition would thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Mr. Kim is also convinced that Mr. Park's anti-Communist crusade adversely affects broader issues of peace and even the possibility of Korean reunification. Mr. Park's domestic governing strategy requires maintaining a sense of tension by exaggerating the dangers from North Korea, but such tactics are obviously incompatible with negotiations and normalization.

In effect, then, the democratic opposition to Mr. Park rests part of its case, too, on the security issue—but through the more appealing and persuasive ideal of building a genuinely strong country that the South Korean people will freely support.

Given Seoul's dependence on foreign loans and multinational corporate investment, United States policy-makers have powerful leverage.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
3 MAY 1976 (26 APRIL)
CONCERN GROWS
AMONG AMERICAN
SERVICEMEN, TOO

Child abuse is a staggering problem for many families of American servicemen, according to recent studies.

One survey indicates that there are 218 cases per 100,000 population in the military community, slightly higher than fragmentary reports indicate for the U.S. civilian populace as a whole.

Medical officials say that child-abuse figures for service families appear higher than for civilians, partly because the armed forces encourage reporting of all suspected cases. And family tensions sometimes are aggravated in the services by frequent moves and the father's long absences.

In West Germany, for example, the problem is so acute that 150 U.S. Army and Air Force doctors, lawyers, social workers, teachers and chaplains met there to pool resources to handle such situations. Among the incidents reported by military authorities:

- A soldier faces charges of aggravated assault for allegedly beating his 12-year-old stepdaughter unconscious.

- Another GI was confined on charges of murdering his 3-month-old stepson. His wife is accused of being an accessory after the fact, and both are charged with possession of dangerous drugs.

Dudley Strasburg, an American civilian living in Germany who organized the meeting, says the problem is getting worse. He notes that many young parents are frustrated by being abroad for the first time, and explains:

"They can't speak the language. They're short of transportation. They have a money problem. The wife, often barely in her twenties, can't cry on mother's shoulder."

"Add to that that a lot of these young parents aren't happy with each other and it's not too surprising that they take out all their unhappiness on the kids."

They can follow the path of least resistance, as they did in South Vietnam, by lending their support to political repression and economic policies that bring profits for the few and misery for the many. Or they can condition further economic and military assistance upon minimal respect for human rights and political independence.

South Korea provides our foreign-policy-makers with precisely the challenge and opportunity they need to demonstrate that they have learned the principal lesson of Vietnam.

Richard Falk is professor of international law at Princeton.

Part II -- Main Edition -- 26 April 1976

JERPTS - CONTINUED

someone walked on these dry leaves, they cracked as crisp griddle-cakes do, and the noise could be heard in every part of the forest. A small spark might set the forest afire. Combatants of signal and communications units had to work hardest here. Whenever a fire broke out and destroyed communication wires, these combatants set out to quench the fire and returned with their bodies as black as coal miners'. Another problem was caused by herds of 40 to 50 elephants which snapped communication wires, even though some of these had been hung on high tree branches.

A comparison with the enemy over the entire area of the campaign showed that our infantry was not much superior to the enemy's. However, because we concentrated the majority of our forces in the main area of the campaign, we achieved superiority over the enemy in this area. As for infantry, the ratio was 5.5 of our troops for each enemy soldier. As for tanks and armored vehicles, the ratio was 1.2 to 1. In heavy artillery, the ratio was 2.1 to 1.

The enemy had not yet clearly realized that our forces were on this side of Ban Me Thuot since he could not detect our movements. In the coming days it would be necessary to continue to make the enemy believe that our main thrust would be toward Kontum and Pleiku to provide an opportunity for our plan. It would be necessary to intensify activities in Kontum and Pleiku in the coming days to further confirm the enemy's mistaken belief.


By maintaining the element of surprise concerning the target, the time and the fighting method, isolating the enemy and bringing into play a decisively superior force without the enemy's knowledge, we would insure fewer losses and quicker victory in battle.

A Lost Diary

The front command reported that a group of officers of our artillery regiment had had an engagement with the enemy west of Ban Me Thuot on 5 March while on a reconnaissance mission. One of our combatants was wounded and captured with his diary. I thought: "We will attack Ban Me Thuot within four days. What will the enemy do in the coming days? So far, he has misunderstood us as far as our main offensive target is concerned, but if similar incidents revealing our secrets continue to occur, the enemy will certainly reassess the situation. He is now intensively seeking to understand our intentions." I telephoned comrade Vu Lang to remind him to closely check the implementation by each soldier of all regulations on the preservation of secrecy.

At 0200 sharp on the morning of 10 March, the offensive on Ban Me Thuot was heralded by the fire from

1975 Communist Advances From Hanoi Strategy Talks to Fall of Saigon



The New York Times/April 26, 1976

GEN. VAN TIEN DUNG: "Great news from the south: The main-force units, in cooperation with the provincial forces, had attacked and liberated Phuoc Binh city" . . . "Ban Me Thuot was a rapid victory" . . . "On 16 March the enemy was retreating from Pleiku" . . . "Was it true that the thunderous blow we had dealt at Ban Me Thuot had produced such a shattering impact?"

sapper units directed against the Hoa Binh and city airfields. Long-range artillery began destroying military targets in the city. From a point 40 kilometers from Ban Me Thuot, our tank unit started their engines, cut through trees and headed for Ban Me Thuot. Modern ferries were rapidly assembled, while tanks, armored vehicles, antiaircraft guns and anti-armored car guns formed queues to cross on the ferries. The mountains and forests of the Central Highlands were shaken by a fire storm.

From the command post, I could clearly hear the regular and rapid explosion of our shells. I called Hoang Minh Thao and we talked over the telephone. Here is a report on some aspects of the situation that day.

No sooner had the artillery opened fire than the lights in the city went off. The city airfield was ablaze, and so was the airfield depot. Tanks were moving under trees and waiting. Sappers had occupied the city airfield.

"The Battle Is Over"

Basically, the battle was over by 1030 on 11 March 1975. "Basically, the battle is over"—these words were jotted down on the incoming message record by an operations cadre at our command post. Our men's elation cannot be described. I told our men present at the command post: The fact that it took us only a little more than a day and a night to attack and occupy so large a city proves that the enemy can find no means to resist our strength.

On 15 March and on the morning of 16 March we received a number of technical news items and some comments by Western radio stations. For example, a United States news agency reported that on 15 March the price of a Pleiku-Saigon air ticket rose to as much as 48,000 piasters. Why were there so many people competing for air tickets to Sai-

gon on 15 March?

At 1500 on 16 March Hanoi sent a message saying that the forward command post of the enemy in III Corps had moved to Nha Trang.

At that time we were still concentrating on Ban Me Thuot.

Enemy Retreating

At 2100 on 16 March the comrade on alert duty received the news that the enemy was retreating from Pleiku: A convoy of trucks had passed the Vinh Thawh crossroads to move along Route 7. The ammo dump in Pleiku was exploding, fires had broken out in the city. Our command headquarters was alive with activity. A map of communications lines in the Central Highlands was spread out on the table. Flashlights and magnifying glasses were traced along Routes 19, 14 and 7 on the map to determine blockade points, shortcuts and attacking directions, and the nearest units and Route 7 were calculated to set the time for action.

Our unit had not yet any concrete information about this route and had yet to enter into close pursuit of the enemy. I severely criticized the top unit leader. I emphatically told Comrade Kim Tuan: "This is a shortcoming, a reproachable mistake. At this time the slightest hesitation, mistake, fear of hardship or delay would mean failure. If the enemy escapes, you will be responsible."

Now a whole regular corps of the puppets was hastily fleeing in retreat, abandoning the Central Highlands — a strategically important region.

Why such a retreat? And who had given the order for it? Was it true that the thunderous blow we had dealt at Ban Me Thuot had produced such a shattering impact on the enemy? It was true that the enemy had been stunned and rendered strategically confused. The enemy had again made another grave strategic mistake.

NEW YORK NEWS

26 APRIL 1976

Pg 8

Cut-Rate Missiles

Amman, Jordan, April 25 (AP)—The United States reduced the price of a Hawk missile system from \$800 million to \$500 million to keep Jordan from going to the Soviet Union for an antiaircraft system, officials said today.

The Jordanian government, they said, was in touch with Saudi Arabia to study the new offer. The officials said Jordan was trying to persuade the Saudis to put up the \$500 million.

NEW YORK NEWS

24 APRIL 1976

(26) Pg 17

Egypt to Sign For 6 Planes

Washington, April 23 (UPI)—Egypt will sign a contract within the next 10 days for the purchase of six C-130 military transport aircraft from the United States, informed sources said today. A delivery date will be set when the contract is signed.

Congress opposed the sale of the planes to Egypt but was persuaded by Secretary of State Kissinger that it would show U.S. appreciation for an end of Egypt's arms supply relationship with the Soviet Union.

The Congress had 30 days in which to prevent the sale, but took no action.

Opponents of the sale did win State Department assurances that only between 15 and 20 Egyptian military officers would be trained in the operation of the planes at U.S. schools. They also received assurances that the Egyptian officers would not be given any information regarding U.S. tactics or sophisticated weapon systems.

FMF Pac debriefings re SEA '73-'75

Blgen	Carey	5502449
Blgen	Coffman	5502452
Col	Dionisopoulos	5502450
Col	Bregerson	5502748
col	Hollier	5502453
col	Steinberg	5502451
col	Rockett	5502189

Part II -- Main Edition -- 26 August 1975

WASHINGTON STAR 25 AUGUST 1975 (26)

Comes the Blame, Too With Kissinger's Power

Called Strong in Secrecy of Indochina Policies

By Richard Dudman

Special to the Washington Star

A former high Pentagon official tried to sum up Henry A. Kissinger's impact on American military policy: "Henry has a tendency to be pastie using military hardware."

Another criticism links him closely with the secrecy and deception of the Nixon administration, particularly in managing the Vietnam war.

Still another complaint has to do with Kissinger as a negotiator. While conceding his brilliance, some critics question the value of the end product of the spectacular deals.

PARTLY through his own expertise and the force of his personality, partly through his dual role as secretary of state and assistant to the president for national security affairs, Kissinger exerts great power on the policies and actions of the United States government. These criticisms bear on what he does with that power.

As for the Vietnam war, Kissinger and former President Richard M. Nixon worked so closely on it that former aides now find it hard to distinguish their views and impacts on events. Together, they kept the war going for an additional four years, plus another two years without American troops but with U.S. arms and dollars, in the hope that eventually they could extricate the United States in a way that would leave an anti-Communist government in South Vietnam.

Persons familiar with policy formation through the first Nixon term say Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird and Secretary of State William P. Rogers were secret doves, trying above all else to get the U.S. troops out as soon as possible.

They say that Kissinger, on the other hand, was always thinking he could negotiate a settlement that would provide a good chance for the survival of an anti-Communist government, and that he was willing to risk thousands of additional U.S. casualties and eventual political disaster at home in that hope.

In late 1968, according to one of the participants in the Johnson-Nixon transition arrangements, leading Democrats offered what they thought would be a solution to the stalled war that was tearing this country apart.

They proposed to support a move by Nixon to drop the dream of a successful conclusion of the war, stop worrying too much about whether the Communists would take over, and negotiate a quick peace that would get the United States out of the Indochina morass. They argued that Nixon could make himself a national hero by stopping the bloodshed and the divisive national debate.

Richard Dudman is chief of the Washington bureau of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. This is the last of three articles by him on Henry Kissinger.

One of those who presented the idea says Kissinger appeared interested and said, "President Nixon must hear this." But nothing came of it. There was no sign that Kissinger or Nixon ever considered anything but their long and ultimately unsuccessful quest for what Nixon called "peace with honor."

THEIR METHODS included the secret bombing of neutral Cambodia, which started two months after Nixon took office, the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970 and furious raids by B-52 bombers against North Vietnamese cities as a stick applied at crucial points in the intermittent negotiations.

Sources in the Pentagon, State Department and White House agree that although Kissinger persuaded friendly newspaper columnists and members of Congress that he was a force for moderation, he actually was pressing for extended bombing raids and other ways to expand the war.

The former officials say Laird and Rogers consistently pressed for accelerated "Vietnamization" of the war—as a euphemism for U.S. withdrawal—and opposed many of Kissinger's proposals to escalate U.S. attacks.

"Laird and Rogers were doves, but Henry clearly was in control of the process," says a former member of Kissinger's National Security Council staff. "He understood that the person who was first with a memo to the President carried the day. Laird's and Rogers' memos went through Kissinger, who would write a covering memo and control the action."

The former staffer said Kissinger was always present when Rogers saw the President: "Rogers would call Haldeman and say he needed to see Nixon. Haldeman would say Nixon was busy. Rogers didn't fight it, and when I saw that I said to myself, 'Boy, the ball game's over.' As Henry became more and more operative, Rogers sort of evaporated and became a central-casting version of secretary of state."

Kissinger declines to discuss such matters on the record. His position is known to be that he never suppressed or short-circuited the views of Rogers and Laird; that they never raised serious or sustained objections to the war policy as did George W. Ball in the Johnson administration; and that, insofar as Rogers was push-

ed aside, the President wanted it that way.

Rogers declines to discuss the matter. He says he has decided not to give any interviews or write his memoirs. The only writing he is considering, he says, is a book on the lighter side of government service.

LAIRD fought it out with Kissinger time after time on proposed troop withdrawals and bombing raids, sometimes winning a point, sometimes losing, according to a former aide. He says they remained friendly, although Laird now has begun attacking Kissinger's nuclear policies and is said to be one of those spreading the view that Kissinger has had too much power too long.

Planning for the Cambodia invasion of 1970 was handled in a sort of axis between Kissinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Nixon giving the final approval, according to several who took part.

Military leaders long had been advocating a U.S. ground strike to break up Vietnamese Communist sanctuaries across the Cambodian border. With the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in March 1972, it suddenly appeared politically feasible.

A former official says that Laird and Rogers strongly opposed any use of U.S. troops in Cambodia but were cut out of the planning meetings that led up to the decision. So was a Pentagon Vietnam task force that was meeting three or four times a week in strategy sessions.

At one point, the former official recalls, Kissinger sent word to Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chief of naval operations and acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to come to one of the final planning meetings—as the military adviser to the President, not in his role as assistant to the secretary of defense.

Moorer is said to have asked bluntly, "Does this mean Laird is not coming?"

That was exactly what it meant. At the crucial meeting, apparently on Thursday, April 23, the only participants are said to have been Kissinger, Moorer, CIA Director Richard Helms and his deputy, Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr.

At a final meeting the following Sunday, after the decision had been formulated and all but completed, Laird and Rogers, as well as Nixon and Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, were present at a formal meeting of the National Security Council.

One of Kissinger's aides at the time recalls a telephone call from Nixon to Kissinger from the presidential helicopter for a final word as the operation was about to get under way. After Nixon had spoken, Nixon's crony, Bebe Rebozo, took the phone and added a comment of his own: "And, Henry, if this doesn't work, it's your ass."

KISSINGER would not discuss the episode for the record, but his version is said to show that Laird and Rogers were part of the decision-

(SEE BLAME, Pg. 4-F)

BLAME -- CONTINUED

making process at all stages. A main point of the Kissinger version is that Nixon, not Kissinger, was the one who insisted on the use of American troops.

According to this version, the plan formulated at the Thursday meeting involved only South Vietnamese troops, but with U.S. air support. On Saturday, however, Nixon is said to have summoned Kissinger to Camp David and told him, "This is ridiculous. If we're going to do it, we should do it right. We should use American troops."

At the Sunday meeting of the National Security Council, with Laird and Rogers present, the decision on U.S. troops was still open, according to the Kissinger version, although Nixon was leaning toward using a U.S. ground force.

In this version, Nixon met again with Laird and Rogers on Monday morning, the 27th, and told them he would make the decision that night. In the meantime he asked the judgment of Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam. Abrams is said to have recommended the use of American troops. Nixon's speech announcing the start of the "incursion" was delivered Thursday, April 30.

Was Kissinger an advocate, or was he merely the conveyor of opinions, as his version suggests? One of the group of his dovish aides whom Kissinger used to call "my bleeding hearts" still can't decide. He remains puzzled about whether Kissinger's strong support for the incursion was because of heavy pressures from above or because he truly favored the plan.

"There were occasions on other issues where a staff member would object and Kissinger would sympathize in some overt way," the former staff member said. "He didn't do it this time. But even if he had said, 'Drop down inside I sympathize with you,' it still wouldn't necessarily be conclusive."

BOMBS and bombing were among Kissinger's principal tools in trying to drive the Communists to agreement and trying to persuade President Nguyen Van Thieu to accept it. Some former officials believe an important aim of the Christmas bombing raids of 1972 was to demonstrate to Thieu that Nixon would keep his secret promise to send back the B52s if he signed the cease-fire agreement and the Communists later mounted a major offensive.

A former aide quotes Kissinger as saying, "We have to show them we can be brutal."

Another controversial show of U.S. armed might was the nuclear alert of October 1973, during the Yom Kippur war. It was decided by the famous booby-trapped National Security Council meeting of "Kissinger, Kissinger and Schlesinger" — Kissinger, wearing his two hats, and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger — and ratified afterward by President Nixon.

No one yet knows the facts of the alert. Some observers now think it was more to persuade the Israelis to accept the cease-fire than it was a response to any imminent Soviet troop movement. Kissinger promised to tell the full story in about a week, but he has never done so.

NATIONAL OBSERVER 30 AUGUST 1975 (26)

Americans to the Sinai?

Plan Envisions Civilian Volunteers

By James M. Perry

American boys, it was always said, would never be sent to the front lines in the Middle East. Soon, though, it is now anticipated here, as many as 200 American "volunteers" will be sent to the Sinai Peninsula to operate sophisticated electronic gear at listening posts in either the Gidi or Mitla passes, or both.

Israel is demanding the deployment of the American technicians, a ubiquitous, high U.S. Government official told reporters last week. No Americans, he seemed to indicate, no agreement between Israel and Egypt.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger left Washington last week to mediate the final details of the agreement be-

The high U.S. official believes the agreement—which, he says, stands a better-than-even chance of adoption—should pave the way for further talks leading to an ultimate solution of the Middle East problem.

Paying the Price

To get the pact, though, the United States will pay a price.

First, the volunteers. They will be civilians, the high U.S. source insisted. They will perform no military functions whatsoever. Not a single man would be sent, or be allowed to volunteer, without prior approval by Congress.

The Israelis already man listening stations in the Sinai, and, the high official indicated, they would like to continue to man those stations, even as their soldiers pull back from the two strategic passes as part of the agreement. But it is expected that other, more sophisticated stations would be built to make sure the Egyptians don't violate the agreement. Those new sta-

News Analysis

tween the two nations. It would be the first evidence of progress since Kissinger's celebrated shuttle diplomacy broke down last March.

(SEE SINAI, Pg. 5-F)

Kissinger has been accused by some Pentagon officials of advocating a B52 strike against Cambodian cities in the Mayaguez crisis last May. A White House official, however, calls this a "bum rap."

According to the Pentagon version, Kissinger, backed by Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller, pressed for the use of the big eight-engine bombers if it was decided to start military operations before the carrier Coral Sea reached the island where the captured U.S. merchant ship was being held.

Schlesinger and the present chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. George S. Brown, were said to have opposed the plan, as did the individual chiefs of staff.

The plan got so far that the planes were on the runways in Guam, with the bombs on the racks and the crews beside the planes, ready to take off in records on the two-hour bomb run. But, according to this version, President Ford vetoed the use of the B52s.

Kissinger's version, it has been learned, is that someone — apparently in the Defense Department — had made an error in computing the arrival time of the Coral Sea. Kissinger, realizing that the carrier could launch its planes while still some distance away, asked for a new computation and told the President it was senseless to proceed with the B52 option. The president then scrubbed the B52 plan, although the alert on Guam was not canceled for fear of indicating U.S. indecisiveness in the crisis.

In the Kissinger version, Kissinger thus was the preventer rather than the advocate of an escalation of the incident that could have inflamed a new national debate.

EVEN Kissinger's critics acknowledge his brilliance as a negotiator. He has a quick, acquisitive mind. Those who have watched him bargain say that he often is far better

prepared than those with whom he is dealing. One of his former aides says this is true six or seven times out of 10.

Some of Kissinger's admirers, as well as his critics, however, fear that his desire to make a deal can sometimes lead him to make unwise concessions or make a public show of agreement by concealing basic differences.

They cite his settlement with North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho, in which Kissinger gave the impression that peace had been achieved while, on the one hand, permitting North Vietnam to continue to keep its troops in South Vietnam and, on the other, giving the Saigon government an extra \$2 billion in arms to continue fighting.

They cite also his deal with Sen. Henry M. Jackson over Soviet emigration policies, in which both parties now seem to have given a public impression that the Soviet Union had made promises that in fact it had not made.

Timing as well as content of Kissinger's diplomatic breakthroughs also bothers some students of diplomacy. They point to the abrupt announcement of the Nixon trip to China, which so shocked the Japanese and damaged Japanese-American relations, just in time to help with the Nixon re-election campaign. Another example is Kissinger's "Peace is at hand" speech a few days before the 1972 election, when, as became known later, Thieu was still adamantly blocking an agreement.

Such questions cause worry about what future deals Kissinger may make, in the Middle East or with the Russians over nuclear weapons — agreements that could be shaping up for announcement just in time for effective use in President Ford's 1976 campaign.

Part II -- Main Edition -- 29 January 1976

FEATURES COLUMNISTS

Victor Zorza

WASHINGTON POST - 29 JANUARY 1976 Pg 19

French-Kremlin Debate

The modernization of the French Communist Party, designed to make it acceptable to the more democratically inclined segments of the electorate, could take a major step forward as a result of the party congress being held next week. The debate which the party leaders have ordered the rank and file to hold in preparation for the congress, on whether the party should drop or retain the slogan calling for the "dictatorship of the proletariat," could prove to be the beginning of real change—or it could prove to be a sham.

The party leaders have instructed the faithful to engage in "debate" in order to improve the party's image with the electorate. They know that so long as the party's policy seems to be made in secret by the Politburo, with the rank and file allowed only to approve what is decided at the top, the Communist party cannot expect to attract the many voters who believe in open decisions, openly arrived at.

But can the debate on the "dictatorship of the proletariat" give the party the image it wants? The debate was initiated only after the party leadership had made known its view that the slogan should be dropped, and after it had intimated that the party's electoral chances would be improved thereby. In a party with a tradition of sheeplike obedience to the leadership, going back all the way to its approval of the Hitler-Stalin pact, this was enough to weigh the vote heavily in favor of the leadership's decision.

Of course, some party militants object to the change, perceiving it as a departure from the party's principles—which is precisely what the Politburo wanted them to say. The Politburo wants the public to believe that the party is departing from some of the "principles" which put off the voters.

The party's secretary general, Georges Marchais, knows that the rank-and-file "debate" cannot do much to change the party's image unless it is also followed by a debate in the party leadership. The "debates" held at the party's lower levels, he concedes, do not as a rule "carry over into the congress." They do not, or they did not in the past, because party bureaucrats like himself have stage-managed the congress to exclude any real clash of opinion. But this time he has announced that "we want this to happen—and I believe it will," which means that he has stage-managed the proceedings once again, but in the opposite direction.

While the mechanics of the debate may be contrived, the issue itself is real enough. But the more important debate on this issue is between the French Communist party and the Kremlin rather than within the French party itself. The French party wants to drop the "dic-

(See DEBATE, Pg 2-F)

WASHINGTON STAR - 28 JANUARY 1976(29) Pg 5

Ex-Envoy Martin Lays Saigon Fall To Critics in U.S.

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

The overriding factor in the fall of South Vietnam to the Communists was the reduction of aid by Congress which resulted from antiwar propaganda in this country, according to the last American ambassador to Saigon.

It was not shortcomings of the South Vietnamese government which led to its defeat last April, Ambassador Graham Martin said in his first public statement since Saigon fell April 30. He said there were no failures of the Thieu regime nor of his own controversial handling of U.S. policy in Vietnam and of the American evacuation.

The basic problem, Martin said, was a failure here to counter "one of the best propaganda and pressure organizations the world has ever seen." He held the Nixon and Ford administrations responsible because they did not follow his advice cabled from Saigon.

MARTIN IDENTIFIED the organization as the Indochina Resources Center, a small group set up by former volunteer relief workers in Vietnam and Laos. A spokesman for the center said last night it was honored to be given such credit for bringing the war to an end.

Martin's assertions met with some disbelief from the House International Relations Committee's investigations subcommittee. "Surely there were reasons for the reversal other than the U.S. economic cuts," said Pierre S. du Pont IV, R-Del.

The white-haired ambassador replied that for the sake of the consciences of congressmen, he would like to say there were. "But I

cannot in good conscience say" that anything in the fabric of South Vietnam's war effort was responsible for the defeat, he declared.

"You really believe," asked an incredulous du Pont, "the overriding factor was a lack of bullets" after aid was reduced by Congress? "Yes," replied Martin.

Congress cut the request for \$1.6 billion in military aid to \$700 million in the fiscal year that ended June 30, 1975. At the same time, increased oil costs and related inflation reduced what South Vietnam could buy for the money, Martin pointed out.

MARTIN'S LONG-DELAYED appearance on Capitol Hill had a strong tone of self-justification. He asserted twice that in retrospect he felt he had handled the situation correctly last April.

Martin ended his prepared 48-minute statement on a maudlin note of hoping his wife's personal mementos could be recovered from the Communists now in Saigon. He returned to this point twice in answering almost three hours of questions.

Several times Martin insisted that he is "a totally honest and candid man."

During the two years he was ambassador in Saigon, storms of controversy swirled around him. He was repeatedly accused of trying to deceive Congress and the American press about what was happening in Vietnam, and some U.S. officials felt he lied to them about the final evacuation plans.

In arguing yesterday that the South Vietnamese army was doing well until Congress chopped the aid, Martin said that in June

1974 even Communist observers reported that "the military initiative was clearly in the hands of the South Vietnamese."

OFFICIAL SOURCES have said that at that time Martin was censoring reports to Washington in order to hide Saigon's initiatives because they violated the 1973 cease-fire agreement. Martin did not mention the cease-fire agreement yesterday.

What Martin presented to the subcommittee as a good sign was viewed by some U.S. experts at the time as a weakness. In its eagerness to capture territory in defiance of the agreement's stand-still provisions, South Vietnamese troops became dangerously overextended.

Martin said aid cuts forced the South Vietnamese to reduce their ammunition usage to just a tenth of the U.S. Army's firing rate on inactive fronts, leaving them vulnerable to Communist attacks.

This, too, was an unclear point at the time. Experts disagreed about the level of available military supplies, with some Americans contending that Saigon's forces were better supplied than they admitted or than Martin argued to Washington.

The subcommittee chairman, Lee H. Hamilton, D-Ind., asked Martin a number of detailed questions about events in April leading up to the evacuation.

ANSWERING THEM, Martin confirmed that CIA agents had reported the Communist intention to capture Saigon without any compromise with a new government there. "The question was how much credibility to put" on this report while other sources were saying there could be a compromise settlement.

These other sources included the Hungarian and Polish Communist delegations on the cease-fire supervisory team. Martin said he used the delegations to send messages to Hanoi warning against any North Vietnamese interference with the U.S. evacuation.

(See CRITICS, Pg 3-F)

Part II -- Main Edition -- 29 January 1976

NEW YORK TIMES
29 JANUARY 1976 Pg 33

Frustration

By Dick Clark

WASHINGTON—Recent disclosures of our year-long involvement in the Angolan civil war raise serious questions about Congressional oversight of foreign policy, particularly the conduct of covert operations.

Administration leaders argue that Congress was given an oversight role in covert operations when an amendment sponsored by Senator Harold Hughes and Representative Leo Ryan passed in December 1974. Actually, the matter is much more complex. The amendment provides for nothing more than an ex-post-facto communication to Congress of decisions already reached. There is still nothing in existing law giving Congress a voice in covert operations; there is no provision for advice or consent.

Indeed, classified briefings actually become an impediment to effective oversight. Once the information is made available, there is no way the Congress can properly use it to oppose or influence policy without taking public action. Congress is saddled with the illusion of co-responsibility for the covert action without having any say in the decision. This is the worst of all possible arrangements.

I found out how inhibiting the possession of classified material can be during hearings held before the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As subcommittee chairman, I had asked for and received a briefing late in July on our covert activities in Angola. A short time later in public hearings the then Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Nathaniel Davis, asked not to be pressed on certain points because, as he indicated in a note passed to me, "we both know" about these covert activities. Therefore, I was cautious in my questioning. Had I not had the classified briefing, I could have proceeded on the basis of newspaper reports with much more vigorous questioning, which would have put a more honest statement of United States policy into the record.

Later, in an effort to express objection to what I considered an unwise involvement in a tribal war in Angola, I asked Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll at a closed session of the subcommittee to explain United States policy. The objections were ignored.

Determined to get a first-hand view of the situation in Angola and southern Africa, I traveled there during the August recess and talked with the heads of each of the three Angolan liberation factions plus the heads of state in Zambia, Zaire and Tanzania, and the South African foreign minister. I returned convinced that our involvement was a mistake, could only end in embarrassment, and could only

Dick Clark, Democrat, is senior Senator from Iowa.

DEBATE - CONTINUED

tatorship of the proletariat" slogan, because this formula belies its claim that it favors the continuation of the multi-party system. The formula also contradicts its promise that, after winning power, it would be willing to give up office if the elections should go against the Communists.

The Kremlin, on the other hand, insists that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is a basic element of Communist policy, obligatory for all parties. The quarrel on this issue began coming to the surface last summer when a Pravda article by Konstantin Zarodov criticized certain unnamed comrades for wanting to forego the dictatorship of the proletariat. Because the article was published at the height of the Communists' push to power in Lisbon, the Kremlin's words were generally taken to refer to Portugal. But the evidence between the lines suggested that the Kremlin was in fact attacking the French Communist party, and this interpretation has now been confirmed.

What was not generally known at the time was that the French Communist party's representatives had attended a secret meeting at which the Kremlin had tried to impose on other parties its own interpretation of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" formula. At the meeting, Zarodov made it clear to the French and other Western Communist parties that their new-found belief in the multi-party system was compatible with Communist orthodoxy only if they retained full dictatorial control over the other parties—which is a contradiction in terms. The multi-party system was only acceptable, he said, "if it is directed by the

working-class Marxist-Leninist vanguard," that is, by the Communist party.

He ruled out the toleration of real political opposition which the French Communist party proclaims as its own policy. "Encouragement," he said, "even passive acceptance, of opposition parties pursuing policies hostile to the people is incompatible with the interests of the revolutionary proletariat."

The French Communist party has not replied publicly to this argument, even though the Kremlin has since published an account of the meeting in the World Marxist Review. But the French Communists continue to evade these basic questions. They try to gloss over the argument with the Kremlin on this issue, instead of debating it publicly, at length, and in the kind of detail that a debate on this question calls for. As long as they substitute sham debates for real ones, misgivings will persist about the party's protestations of loyalty to the democratic system.

But if the French party congress should lead to a genuine debate on this issue, both within the party and between the party and the Kremlin, it could prove to be the beginning of a real change of heart within the party. A Communist party which has really changed so fundamental an aspect of its faith would necessarily make changes in many of its other policies, all of which are interconnected, to the point where it would no longer be a "Communist party" as the term has been understood in the West—and at that point it might indeed begin to compete for power, in the eyes of the electorate, on equal terms with other parties.

C 1974, Victor Zorza

impede the development of the rational African policy we need.

Upon returning I met with the Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby, told him what I had learned, and registered my discord with United States policy. To no avail. Later in the month I learned that the Administration had doubled the funding for military equipment to pro-Western Angolan factions.

In frustration, I went to the full Foreign Relations Committee, reported on my trip and explained my objections. The committee called Mr. Colby and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger for a complete review of Angolan and African policy.

When they appeared—with Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco sitting in for Mr. Kissinger—many of us expressed doubts about the deepening involvement. But the warnings went unheeded. Within a month the Administration had decided to significantly increase our covert commitment for the fourth time in four months.

Having tried to oppose this policy through every avenue available to me within established channels, I took the only course remaining—I offered an amendment to the pending Security Assistance Act to prevent any funds from being spent in Angola without specific Congressional approval. This

brought our concern, though not the secret details, out into the public.

Subsequently, the Senate passed an amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act that barred further funds in that bill for intervention in Angola. The House on Tuesday accepted the same restriction. My amendment, broader in that it would bar all expenditures in any category, is in the bill about to go to the Senate.

The Angolan experience convinces me—and I believe the majority of my colleagues—of the inadequacy of the present oversight system. It does not allow for Congressional consultation or veto. In practice, access to classified information after a decision has been reached and action initiated becomes in itself a restriction on a member's action and leaves no alternative for influencing policy except to go public through legislative action.

I am convinced that the nation is better served by not conducting covert military or political activities (as opposed to information collection, which I support). But Congressional and public sentiment probably does not support that view. Thus it is vital that in the restructuring of its oversight apparatus the Congress define for itself a more responsible and unambiguous role in covert activities.

Part II -- Main Edition -- 29 January 1976

BALTIMORE SUN - 29 JANUARY 1976

Mr. Colby's Unwelcome Truth

By JOHN E. WOODRUFF

In the welter of controversy that characterized William E. Colby's final weeks as director of the CIA, no statement has so aroused the true believers in the prevailing national mythology as his assertion that South Vietnamese guerrillas did not win the war.

Mr. Colby's assertion, in an interview with *Time* last week, reflected a reality that has yet to permeate the national consciousness—that the Vietcong spent themselves against American firepower in the 1968 Tet Offensive and then were slowly bled by Mr. Colby's hideous but modestly effective Phoenix program and were never again a serious challenge.

The true believers came on in angry righteousness to remind Mr. Colby of the Higher Truth of one of the prevailing national myths. Here is columnist Garry Wills, writing last Saturday on the page opposite:

"Even a West Point military lecturer, in the very week when Mr. Colby's interview appeared, was comparing the success of guerrilla warfare in Vietnam to our own revolutionary warfare against King George's Redcoats."

By mid-1969, when this writer arrived in Saigon, Tet of 1968 had long since shocked Americans with the unwelcome truth that many Vietnamese were ready to die to throw us out. The natural American assumption, which still seems to prevail, was that this meant the guerrillas were winning.

But it soon became clear that few in either Saigon or Hanoi then believed in "the success of guerrilla warfare in Vietnam."

It was not a Nixon administration sycophant but Robert Kaiser of the *Washington Post* who wrote then about "The New Optimists." He told of uneventful auto trips in the Mekong Delta, and diminished Vietcong ability to dominate daytime rural life.

Mr. Kaiser was first to see an important story in what reporters were doing, but not writing about, daily. Despite embarrassment at being beaten to an obvious story, and with significant variations, the *New York Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Los Angeles Times* and *The Sun* had to catch up.

About the same time, *The Sun* reported

on night border crossings by long columns of North Vietnamese regulars from bases at the southern end of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Cambodia. Green Beret officers said the movements, begun a few weeks earlier, were the first injection of North Vietnamese maneuver units that far south. It was an admission that Hanoi no longer counted on the southern guerrillas to win.

By then, Mr. Nixon was committed to a "Vietnamization" meant to enable Saigon to handle the debilitated Vietcong. Saigon could not have been ready for North Vietnamese regulars for another decade; South Vietnamese corruption, fueled by egregiously bloated American war budgets, left doubt that it ever could. So the Politburo did a deliberate balancing act: on one side, encouragement to Mr. Nixon to follow the American public out of Vietnam; on the other, preparation for early conventional war.

Once Mr. Nixon was well into the American withdrawal, every Communist offensive was headed by North Vietnamese units. Finally, last spring, conventional, tank-led at-

tacks by North Vietnamese divisions exposed the hollowness of the "Vietnamized" Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

Too many South Vietnamese had floated up to command through the ocean of dollars in which Washington tried to drown Communism. Generals evacuated refrigerators and televisions on planes and boats that should have carried junior officers and non-coms. The final battle was not won by North Vietnam so much as it was conceded by South Vietnamese commanders who never meant to fight, having risen not by combat but by graft and intrigue.

They were the creatures of U.S. Presidents who went to war with too little attention to home opinion and got caught between an enemy with stamina and voters horrified by lengthening casualty lists. The Presidents could neither bomb nor buy their way out.


Mr. Wills concludes that "Mr. Colby is walking proof that the agency has not learned a thing from the whole dreary episode. The agency breeds its own internal fantasies that endanger us."

The Pentagon papers say otherwise—that the CIA saw from the outset that no one would beat the Vietnamese Communists with bombs and dollars. In effect, the CIA paraphrased Chairman Mao: political power in South Vietnam would grow out of the barrel of a rifle.

Rejection of that advice by successive Presidents, who knew better than to tolerate the American casualties required to hold the ground, is silent testimony that war in Vietnam offended American ideals and pursued no real American interest.

But it does not support the romantic notion of guerrillas fighting off the foreigners. What happened was unromantic. The richest nation on earth exported stupefying firepower to a small, distant land, shot away most of a generation of guerrilla leaders and deepened for decades the domination of South Vietnamese by northerners.

Mr. Woodruff, deputy editorial page editor of *The Sun*, was Saigon correspondent until 1970 and often returned as Hong Kong bureau chief until 1973



JUST ANOTHER BILLION, JUST ANOTHER BILLION, JUST—

CRITICS - CONTINUED

On April 22, while transport planes were flying out refugees and a week before the helicopter evacuation was ordered, an offer was received from Hanoi through the Soviet Union not to obstruct an American withdrawal from Vietnam, Martin said.

Other sources earlier insisted that this was not so clear a promise as Martin represented it yesterday.

Martin said he tried to delay a visible evacuation in order to avoid panic and possible South Vietnamese efforts to obstruct their departing allies.

THE AMBASSADOR

added that another factor was lack of authority from Washington to evacuate Vietnamese to the United States. "I was informed after the April 26 meeting (of the top-level Washington Special Action Group, which coordinated policy here) that there was no support for my position that we had a moral obligation to get Vietnamese employees (of U.S. government) out," he said.

But when the helicopter evacuation began, he kept it going as long as possible to remove all Vietnamese at the landing zones," Martin added.

He refused several times to estimate how many Viet-

namese who had been promised or had reason to expect American evacuation were left behind. Finally Martin said it was "many."

The Communists since then have been too clever to carry out a frequently predicted bloodbath, Martin said, but people have disappeared. He dissociated himself from predictions of a bloodbath. Sources have said he was having his embassy collect evidence to support administration warnings of a bloodbath in April.

MARTIN SINGLED OUT two persons for the main credit — or blame — for ending the war. They were Don Luce and Fredric R.

Branfman of the Indochina Resources Center.

"Those individuals deserve enormous credit for a very effective operation." They "twisted and distorted" American humanitarian concern into opposition to continuing support for the war, Martin said. "I have enormous respect for the abilities of Mr. Branfman and Mr. Luce."

There were other factors, Martin added, such as trying to fight a protracted war with a drafted army and television coverage. But he strongly implied that the war effort had been stabbed in the back by what his prepared testimony called "the anti-Saigon lobby."

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IRA C. EAKERSAN DIEGO UNION 19 JANUARY 1976, Pg 6B
(29)

Foreign Policy Not Reassuring

NBC's much-heralded three-hour television review of our foreign policy, on the evening of Jan. 5, confirmed John Chancellor's image as a uniquely fair-minded news commentator and panel moderator. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of some of his network collaborators, several of whom revealed their partisan prejudices.

We can agree with Chancellor that there have been at least four distinctive diplomatic periods in our 200-year history. The colonial period, when we sought to avoid international alliances while devoting our national energies to pressing domestic and economic concerns.

The second, or expansionist period, found us tearing chunks out of Mexico, fighting a war with Spain and pursuing "gunboat" diplomacy in Central and South America.

The third period found us pursuing the most vigorous economic expansion ever known among modern nations, while choosing, reluctantly, to join in two world wars and several lesser wars, including a "cold war" with the Soviet Union.

The fourth period began

with our defeat in Southeast Asia and included neo-isolationism, detente with Russia, SALT I and II and U.S. unilateral disarmament. It is this fourth period with which we are now primarily concerned, since it will determine our future as a world power and, probably, our survival in freedom.

The one fact which comes through loud and clear from a pragmatic review of the current status of U.S. foreign policy is that we are in full retreat everywhere in the world.

It is equally clear that the primary reason for this national and international tragedy is the bitter and unparalleled divisiveness here at home. There is the battle between the Congress and the President, which stymies economic recovery and sound foreign policy.

There is the euphoria of detente, which leaves our people apparently unconcerned about Russia's obvious determination to dominate the world through superior military power.

There is our failure to engage in economic warfare. We supinely submit to the oil holdup imposed by the OPEC. Our superior po-

sition in food and technology gives us unique opportunities for economic reprisal or negotiation, now completely neglected.

As John Chancellor pointed out, there are now 150 nations. Only 24 of them are republics, where the people select their leaders in free elections.

The diplomatic review shows a succession of failures all around the world during the last four years. The Paris Treaty, which concluded the Vietnamese war, was promptly broken by Hanoi. NATO's Southern flank was lost when Greece and Turkey defected. The Indian Ocean fell to Soviet influence when Congress canceled our base in Diego Garcia. The new African nations are rapidly falling into the Communist orbit. The Helsinki agreements were callously broken by Brezhnev in Angola.

Red China, which once had hopes that detente with the United States might protect her from Russia, is now making conciliatory overtures to the Kremlin.

A valid review of current U.S. foreign policy is not reassuring.

L.A. Times Syndicate

NEW YORK NEWS

29 JANUARY 1976, Pg 12

SALT Talks On in Geneva

Geneva, Jan. 28 (UPI) — The United States and Soviet Union resumed nuclear arms control talks in Geneva today, sitting May as the latest deadline for a new pact.

The one-hour meeting between chief U.S. negotiator U. Alexis Johnson and Vladimir S. Semenov of the Soviet Union came a week after the Soviets proposed a compromise formula to resolve a number of deadlocked issues during a visit to Moscow by Secretary of State Kissinger.

U.S. officials have said the United States would rule on the compromise by the middle of March. They hope that a final treaty will be ready for signing in May. Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev is expected to sign the treaty in Washington.

Today's session was the 140th for Johnson and Semenov since the current round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks began in November 1972. They agreed to meet again on Friday.

WASHINGTON POST

29 JAN 1976, Pg 20

For the Record

— Thailand said there three of its border police were killed and five wounded when they stumbled on a landmine planted by Communist guerrillas near the Cambodian border.

WASHINGTON POST 29 JANUARY 1976, Pg 22

Bonn Views Puzzle Israel

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Jan. 28 — Despite new assurances from West Germany that its policy toward Israel and the Middle East has not changed, Israeli diplomats here and in Jerusalem are confused and uneasy about statements made here last week by top Bonn Foreign Ministry officials.

The initial cause of concern for the Israelis came during a joint press conference here last Thursday with West Germany's Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and the visiting Prince Saud ben Faisal of Saudi Arabia.

Under questioning about Middle East policy, Genscher reiterated the need for a peaceful solution based on both the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and Israel's right to secure and recognized borders. But Genscher added, almost casually, that as a condition Israel should end the territorial occupation of Arab lands it has held since 1967 and withdraw from "all" of those areas.

The next day at a press

conference, Foreign Ministry spokesman Klaus Terloth was questioned about this and said, in what he called a precise explanation of policy, that Genscher meant all territory. This would imply, although Terloth did not go into details, the old section of Jerusalem, the West Bank of Jordan and the Golan Heights.

In the past, the West Germans have publicly stuck to the more obscure interpretation of United Nations and European Common Market statements that Israel should terminate its occupation of captured lands. In some of those interpretations, it is left unclear whether this should be construed to mean all lands, including the extremely sensitive areas of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.

The publication of the Foreign Ministry statements here and in Israel caused a considerable stir, drawing protest from the Israelis and criticism of the Bonn government from some opposition political leaders here.

Most observers viewed the

remarks as indicating an attempt by West Germany to move further toward the Arab position in the dispute with Israel and closer to the position of other European countries, especially France, which have been far more critical of Israel in the aftermath of the 1973 war and oil crisis than have the West Germans.

Israel's ambassador here, Yohanan Meroz, was instructed by the Israeli government to call on Genscher for further clarification of Bonn's policy.

Meroz met with Genscher yesterday and was told, according to Israeli sources, "categorically, officially and solemnly" that there had been no change in West Germany's long standing positions on the Middle East conflict and its possible solutions.

West Germany, Meroz reportedly was told by Genscher, was not interested now or in the future in expressing any views on how new borders should be established between Israel and neighboring Arab countries and that this was to be left entirely up to the

Middle East parties.

Meroz is personally said to believe Genscher's private assurances that his press conference remark was simply a misunderstanding and that Bonn's policy had not changed.

Meroz is understood to feel that the initial statement by Genscher was a lapse, perhaps fostered by the presence of Prince Faisal. But other officials here and in Israel are known to be concerned that Genscher's and Terloth's public statements reflect one more step in Israel's increasing problems with Western nations.

If West Germany is weakening in its post-war "special relationship" with Israel, which has had strained moments before in recent years, it could be a serious blow to Israel, which ranks the West Germans as its most important economic, scientific and political ally among West Europe's major powers.

Israeli officials say there is no sign of that on any other front, however.

NEW YORK TIMES - 23 NOVEMBER 1977 Pg. 38

1-3 Encl. 23 Nov 1977

Another Ex-C.I.A. Official Alleges Agency Failed Some Saigon Allies

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

A second former official of the Central Intelligence Agency who served in South Vietnam accused the agency yesterday of leaving behind its Vietnamese allies and collaborators and then covering up the evacuation failures.

John R. Stockwell, who resigned from the agency earlier this year, confirmed in an interview many of the major allegations published last week in a book by Frank Snepp, another former C.I.A. official who served in Vietnam at the fall of Saigon in April 1975.

Meanwhile, William G. Miller, staff director of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said that the committee had begun looking into the Snepp allegations. A C.I.A. official confirmed that the agency had already begun providing materials to the committee.

Confrontation Recalled

Mr. Stockwell, who spent 12 years with the C.I.A., two of them in South Vietnam, said that there had been widespread disillusionment among younger C.I.A. officers over the agency's failure to evacuate its allies and its decision not to investigate that failure.

While in Vietnam, he said, "I was in a standing and open confrontation with the chief of station over the subject of saving our locals. They were telling me that we didn't have permission from Washington and that we did not have an obligation to them and that there was nothing we could do."

"I still wake up in the middle of the night worried about them," Mr. Stockwell, who now lives in Austin, Tex., said. "We dumped them."

His feelings were so strong, Mr. Stockwell said, that he later considered refusing a special C.I.A. medal that was awarded him in mid-1975 by William E. Colby, then the Director of Central Intelligence.

Not Allowed to Refuse Medal

"I called Colby's office and asked what I should do in order to refuse the medal," Mr. Stockwell recalled. "And I was told

that Colby had given an order that no one could refuse medals.

"I went there (to the awards ceremony) thinking that there could be an equal number of courts-martial instead of medals being handed out—except that the agency has no provision for courts-martial."

He was eventually given another C.I.A. assignment in Africa, Mr. Stockwell said, but before he left he was ordered to fill out a form and "air his grievances from Vietnam."

He was later told, Mr. Stockwell said, that the forms he and other Vietnam veterans had filled out were "filed" in the safe of a senior C.I.A. officer.

Congress 'Went Along'

"They made a decision that there would be no investigation" of the evacuation failures, Mr. Stockwell said of the agency's senior managers. "The Congressional committees went along with this and this made it easy for Colby to bury it inside the C.I.A."

Mr. Stockwell said he served nearly two years in South Vietnam, much of that in charge of the agency's outpost in Tay Ninh City.

In an earlier interview, Mr. Snepp, whose book "Decent Interval," depicted the C.I.A.'s handling of the Saigon evacuation as an "institutional disgrace," also told of widespread dismay inside the agency over the failure to protect its former allies.

"Most of the young officers I knew in Vietnam were very concerned about what had taken place," Mr. Snepp said, "but did not know how to register their complaints."

Many of those young officers, Mr. Snepp added, subsequently cooperated with him in his research for the book. And at least one agency veteran of Vietnam service did refuse to accept his C.I.A. medal, he said.

"It was one of those times when people

would walk around and say, 'Oh My God, what happened?'" Mr. Snepp said.

In his book and in a subsequent television interview, Mr. Snepp also accused Mr. Colby of deliberately disclosing classified documents to two journalists after the fall of Saigon in an effort "to protect its image."

In a telephone interview yesterday, Mr. Colby, now in private law practice in Washington, denied the Stockwell-Snepp allegations.

"There was not a cover-up," the former director said. "We knew what had happened. It was very obvious. We knew that not all of the allies got out, but 130,000 of them did."

Mr. Colby acknowledged that some former allies "were left there," but he explained that the Government had set up three different priority categories for the evacuation: Vietnamese C.I.A. employees and, finally, Vietnamese employees of the South Vietnamese Government.

All of the Americans were evacuated, as were most of the C.I.A.'s Vietnamese employees, Mr. Colby said. He suggested that those Vietnamese left behind were in the third category.

"As I remember," Mr. Colby said, "we did conduct a post-mortem on our performance." A copy of that report is still in C.I.A. files, he said.

Mr. Colby also denied providing any classified documents to journalists after the Saigon evacuation, as Mr. Snepp alleged, but he did acknowledge: "As you well know, I've talked to a lot of journalists." He constantly sought to avoid discussing classified materials in such conversations, Mr. Colby said.

On another issue, agency officials conceded privately that the chances had dwindled for a major Justice Department intervention in an attempt to prevent distribution of the 580-page Snepp book, which was shipped to booksellers last week by Random House, its publisher.

One issue still being discussed, an official said, was the possibility of seeking some sort of monetary damages from Mr. Snepp and his publishers as a bar to publication of similar works by other ex-C.I.A. employees.

More than 800 members of the agency's clandestine services section, which has conducted covert operations against foreign governments, are in the process of being forced to resign or retire.

Build on

By Murray Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Carter administration called yesterday for "evidence of tangible progress toward peace" from "leaders of vision in the Middle East" to "build on" Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's initiative in Israel.

This strongly indicated that the private talks between Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin last weekend did not produce enough movement for a Geneva conference on the Mideast at least by U. S. judgment. Reports from Israel and Egypt indicate the same conclusion.

That was the implication behind a call for new action sounded by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher in a San Francisco speech yesterday. State Department officials said the Christopher speech, and private messages by Carter to Arab and Israeli leaders, was a concerted attempt to push the barriers still impeding a Geneva conference.

Christopher, making the first comprehensive speech on the Middle East since Sadat's venture into Israel, said the initiative was a beginning, "a first movement" in "the peace process."

President Carter does not intend to miss this moment, Christopher said. "He intends to build on the momentum of the weekend to help move toward the goal of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East."

Christopher, acting Secretary of State while Cyrus R. Vance is in South America, was addressing 4,000 delegates of Europe's Judaism's Union of American Jewish Congregations convention in San Francisco.

His call for "evidence of tangible progress toward peace" was directed in part at Israeli administration sources said, but also to Arab nations beyond Egypt—and particularly to the Soviet Union as well.

The Soviet Union back of extremist Arabs in criticizing Sadat's unprecedented trip to Israel. The Carter administration has told the Soviet Union, privately and publicly, that it is displeased with that attitude.

Sadat's Initiative

BALTIMORE SUN

22 NOV. 1977

Red assails Kremlin

By GILBERT A. LEWTHWAITE

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Santiago Carrillo, leader of the Spanish Communist party yesterday combined a renewed attack on the Kremlin with an acknowledgment of "change" in the United States attitude toward Eurocommunism.

Mr. Carrillo, an ideological warrior who was refused permission to speak at Moscow celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution this month, said "I don't approve of a political system that limits the possibility of democratic development and which centers power in a very small group of people."

The balding, bespectacled former political fugitive, who now serves in the Spanish parliament, is also being pointedly ignored by the Carter administration during his 11-day speaking tour here.

But at a news conference at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, he said:

"I believe my presence here signifies in certain circles something has changed."

Asked about the contrastingly warm official welcome given last week to another Spanish leftist, Felipe Gonzalez, first secretary of the pro-Carter Socialist Workers party, Mr. Carrillo said he had not requested any interviews of the White House or State Department because they would "interfere with the logic of international relations."

Mr. Gonzalez had sessions with President Mondale, Cyrus R. Vance, the Secretary of State, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser.

"As of now it would be unexpected for an interview to be held between representatives of the U.S. government and rep-

resentatives of our Communist party," he said.

Some U.S. officials, he said, shared reservations with the Soviet Union over Eurocommunism, which he characterized as "an attitude of independence from the Soviet Union."

"I believe that these people from the United States and the Soviet Union are looking upon today's world as if it were that of 40 years ago. They are thinking in terms of military power, military blocs."

Eurocommunism represents a tendency transcending the policy of blocs and of recovering the European personality," he said.

The Spanish Communist, whose party was legalized earlier this year as part of the post Franco political process in Spain, said that as long as the military blocs survived on both sides of the iron curtain, the Spanish Communists would not oppose U.S. bases in Spain.

But, he said, the party favors disbanding both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. He ruled out Spanish membership in NATO, explaining: "The American bases provide enough security. It would not be a proper time for Spain to take on the extra responsibility and expense of membership of NATO."

"In Spain today there is not a party that functions more democratically than the Communist party," he said.

"The future will be some time yet, before there could be a policy of exclusive friendship," he said. "Under present conditions in Spain, a popular front is not possible."

Asked about the apparent break-up of the Communist-Socialist front in France, Mr. Carrillo said "I would prefer that the unity in France not be lost or destroyed. I believe the break-up of leftist unity in France would be bad for all the left in Europe."

Victory for Eurocommunism would not involve "an extension of Soviet power," but would mean "independence from the influence of the Soviet Union and all other powers in the world," he told a Johns Hopkins seminar following his press conference.

Geneva conference. (Continued on page 2)

6 Mar 78
 Confidential report
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WILL C. WILHE - past in charge

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Birai Field Mission
 Major Donald Rame USMC (Ret)
 Major Marshall Lantz USMC (Ret)

the night, the 50 defense jets were in the air. Inside the Long Binh ammunition dump was exploding. Red fire balls shot high into the night. Out of the air bay, I saw the lights of Saigon distantly—for the last time.

Back in Washington, the evacuation was closely monitored by President Ford. After issuing the order to go, the President walked over to the White House Situation Room where Henry Kissinger briefed him on the pullout. The President returned to his quarters shortly after midnight. Running into a television correspondent who remarked that Ford was keeping late hours, the President replied, "With good reason." As the President prepared to go to bed, Kissinger phoned to get some advice on the evacuation announcement. Ford crawled into bed. Twenty minutes later Kissinger called again to read him the final draft. Once more, the President tried to go to sleep. Shortly after 1 a.m., the Secretary of State phoned a last time. Operation Frequent Wind, he told Ford, had begun.


Not all the Americans in Saigon were evacuated from the U.S. Embassy. Along with scores of others, NEWSWEEK correspondent Nicholas C. Proffitt was lifted out from Tan Son Nhut airport aboard a Jolly Green Giant. Proffitt's report:

As our evacuation motorcade of two buses, led by a U.S. Marine jeep, wound through the streets of Saigon, Vietnamese stopped and stared at us with dead eyes. None smiled. None waved good-by. Approaching Tan Son Nhut airport, we could see thick columns of smoke rising from around the field and hear incoming Communist shells and small-arms fire. As the buses pulled up to the U.S. Defense Attaché's Office, a 122-mm rocket slammed into the base only a few hundred yards away.

pany of marines lying prone around the perimeter—tense behind their M-16s and machine guns. Our chopper was loaded in less than two minutes and we lifted off at full power, climbing to 6,000 feet, and headed south skirting the Mekong Delta before swinging west toward the coast. Two young marines hunched over the port and starboard 50-caliber machine guns, scanning the terrain below. As we crossed the coast the two young gunners eased their fingers off their triggers, broke into tight grins, and gave each other—and then the passengers—the thumbs-up sign.

Aboard the USS Blue Ridge, command ship of the evacuation armada, NEWSWEEK correspondent Ron Moreau was with 5,000 marines who were prepared to storm ashore if necessary to protect the American pullout. Moreau's report:

As night fell Monday, the signal to proceed with Operation Frequent Wind still hadn't come. So everybody aboard the Blue Ridge was startled when the vessel's sirens began wailing shortly after dusk, and the call "Armed refugee reaction crews on the main deck" rang through the passageways. Sailors and



by Thomson


America choppers descended on the Blue Ridge in almost a dead heat. One of the Air America choppers landed first, then a Vietnamese Chinook put down virtually

flying around the Blue Ridge—touching down several times, then abruptly pulling up—he finally jumped out and the helicopter slammed into the starboard

found them to be loaded with gold bars. Before the evacuation was even half over, the Blue Ridge was jammed to overflowing. Announcements blared



One for the memory book: Marine mans the wall



The big escape: Atop a building in downtown Saigon, a U.S. crewman she

even Japan and Britain planned to recognize the Communist regime in Saigon. Of greater concern to the U.S. was the possibility that North Korea might loose an attack on South Korea, thus forcing America to decide whether to embroil U.S. troops in another Asian war—or renege on another commitment.

Not everyone viewed America's post-Vietnam position so pessimistically. Some held that with the pullout from Saigon, America had at last freed itself to deal with other, more important, foreign-policy problems. They pointed out that Ford was scheduled to travel to Europe later this month for visits to Spain and Italy, a meeting with Western leaders at a NATO conference and crucial talks with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat on the prospects for progress in the Mideast.

In his travels, President Ford will inevitably be dogged to some degree by the ghost of Vietnam. The lift-off of the last U.S. marines from Saigon was seen by some as a symptom of the exhaustion of a foreign policy that the U.S. had pursued since the second world war. Now, it was uncertain just what policy would replace the old activism. One thing, however, was clear. For years to come, the tragic and tormenting experience of the war in Vietnam—and the decisions taken by six American Presidents—would continue to resonate in international affairs. America had lost its bearings in Vietnam and now its task was to find a new direction.

—RICHARD STEELE with HENRY HUBBARD and TOM JOYCE in Washington

Eleven marines crouched on the flat roof of the U.S. Embassy, nervously fingering their M-16 rifles. From time to time, shots rang out from below, where thousands of Vietnamese milled about angrily in the embassy courtyard. Other Vietnamese were already rampaging through the lower floors of the six-story building, trying to make their way up tear-gas-filled stairwells. Suddenly, the whine of a helicopter could be heard in the distance and the marines fired a red-smoke grenade to mark their position. As the U.S. CH-46 Sea Knight touched down on the roof, the marines piled into the chopper. The last man scrambled aboard with the embassy's American flag—neatly folded, and stuffed inside a brown-paper bag.

At long last, America's military involvement in Vietnam was over. While Operation Frequent Wind, the final American evacuation, was a logistical success, four U.S. marines were killed on that final day—bringing to 56,559 the number of Americans who died in Vietnam. One more horrifying picture, too, was added to the tortured American memory book: U.S. marines using rifle butts to smash the fingers of desperate Vietnamese trying to make it over the wall of the embassy to safety. At the end, even indomitable Graham Martin, the last American ambassador to Vietnam,

seemed, like most of his countrymen, drained of emotion. When he arrived aboard the evacuation command ship Blue Ridge, Martin was asked how he felt. He replied: "I am hungry."

It was the biggest helicopter lift of its kind in history—an eighteen-hour operation that carried 1,373 Americans and 5,595 Vietnamese to safety. Yet in sheer numbers, the feat was overshadowed by the incredible impromptu flight of perhaps another 65,000 South Vietnamese. In fishing boats and barges, homemade rafts and sampans, they sailed by the thousands out to sea, hoping to make it to the 40 U.S. warships beckoning on the horizon. Many were taken aboard the American vessels, while others joined a convoy of 27 South Vietnamese Navy ships that limped slowly—without adequate food or water—toward an uncertain welcome in the Philippine Islands. Hundreds of South Vietnamese also fled by military plane and helicopter, landing at airfields in Thailand or ditching their craft alongside American ships.

The last dramatic act in the Vietnam drama began when Communist shells started raining down on Tan Son Nhut Air Base. Not satisfied with reports from the scene, Ambassador Martin—in a singular act of bravado—decided to drive out to the airport to take a look for himself. When he returned to the embas-

The Day of the (



UPI



UPI

vman shepherds a line of evacuees into a waiting helicopter

Martin arriving on the Blue Ridge: Drained of all emotion

e Copters

sy, Martin called Secretary of State Kissinger and Adm. Noel Gayler, commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific, to discuss evacuation. They decided the military situation had deteriorated too far to use Options One, Two or Three, which were all based on transport planes flying out of Tan Son Nhut. They had to go with Option Four—the much riskier helicopter evacuation.

When NEWSWEEK correspondent Loren Jenkins received the coded signal that the evacuation was on, he gathered up a small bag of belongings and drove to the side gate of the U.S. Embassy. Jenkins's report of the embassy's last day.

Inside the 15-foot concrete fence, an assortment of CIA agents, State Department volunteers and security guards roamed the embassy grounds armed with an amazing variety of weapons. Some carried grenade launchers, several toted antiquated submachine guns and a few even had bone-handled hunting knives stuck in their belts. Marines barked orders into walkie-talkies.

As I walked across the courtyard, I noticed marines were finally sawing down the giant tamarind tree in the rear parking lot to clear a landing zone for Jolly Green Giant helicopters. When Admiral Gayler made a secret visit to the embassy two weeks earlier, he had urged

Ambassador Martin to have the tree cut down. Martin ignored the advice. "To Martin, cutting down the tree represented the final acceptance that the jig was up—and he was constitutionally unable to do that," one embassy official told me. So for the past several days, embassy staffers had been sneaking out with axes and chipping away at parts of the tree trunk not visible to Martin.

Behind the parking lot in the swimming-pool area, several thousand Vietnamese waited with piles of suitcases and bundles of clothing. There were at least three generals in uniform, assorted South Vietnamese senators, a former mayor of Saigon, the police chief, a fire chief and all of his firemen wearing their back-flap hats, and Vietnamese employees of the embassy and their families. While they awaited the helicopters, hundreds of Vietnamese pushed into the unstaffed embassy cafeteria and helped themselves to everything from candy bars to bottles of California wine.

Within an hour of the alert, the embassy's tall white gates were besieged by hundreds of people desperate to get in. At one point, a trickle of Vietnamese was let through a side gate—touching off a small riot. So when Bui Diem, a former South Vietnamese ambassador to Washington, was spotted pushing up to the gate, he was quietly told to go around to the front where Marine guards quickly let him in. Gen. Dang Van Quang, a former corps commander who was once fired for corruption, also showed up at the side gate. The portly Quang was

allowed to squeeze in through the gate while his two Samsonite suitcases were passed over the fence. Once inside, he carefully dusted off his navy-blue suit before being led to the staging area by the embassy swimming pool.

Some Americans weren't so lucky. Four of them tried to get to the rear gate only to be turned back at gunpoint by South Vietnamese soldiers. Despite their pleas to be let in the side gate, they were refused entry or help and told by embassy officials to keep trying the back. "But I am an American citizen and this evacuation is supposed to be for me," Albert Steinberg shouted through the gate, waving his green passport. "If you don't let me in, you are going to leave me behind." I never saw him again.

'YOU KNOW THE OLD MAN'

In the midst of the growing chaos outside, Ambassador Martin decided he wanted to be driven home to pack his bags and pick up his black poodle, Nitnoy. His chauffeur's efforts to get out through the gate failed when the Marine guards were nearly overrun. So Martin left by a back way and walked the three blocks to his house. "You know the old man," one of his aides explained. "He doesn't like anyone to think he is ruffled by anything." Martin returned to the embassy compound an hour and a half later, trailed by his cook, two flak-jacketed security men carrying his suitcase and briefcase and another leading Nitnoy on a leash.

When it became obvious that the op-

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THE WAR IN INDOCHINA

eration was going to drag into the night, two choppers brought in another 50 marines to beef up the embassy defense perimeter. One squad of marines was deployed with fixed bayonets just inside the side gate to keep Vietnamese from trying to clamber over it. At the back gate, marines were forced to use their rifle butts to knock back Vietnamese trying to scale the fence.

At nightfall, cars and a fire engine were lined up in a square so their headlights would illuminate the helipad. Suddenly, an explosion rocked the front of the embassy. A passer-by on a motorbike had thrown a grenade into the crowd. There were many wounded, but nobody dared venture out to help them. In the darkened embassy lobby, marines checked their pistols and unsheathed bayonets. A short time later, the crunch of another explosion triggered fears that a mortar shell had hit the embassy. It turned out to be the CIA detonating an explosive device on communications equipment.

'OKAY, LET'S GO'

By midevening, the embassy was almost deserted of U.S. civilians. Open doors revealed offices stripped of everything important. Three days earlier, the embassy's most sensitive electronic gear had been loaded aboard a freighter docked in Saigon and sent downriver to safety.

Going up the back stairs toward the roof, I spotted Ambassador Martin outside his third-floor office saying good-bye to a few close aides. He had a soft word or two for each, and a hesitant pat on the back. Then we scurried up the crowded steps to the sixth floor to wait our chopper. Finally, we heard the order: 'Okay, let's go.' Just before I rushed aboard, I looked down toward the pool area. A couple of thousand Vietnamese were still waiting their turn. Soon, we were

high over the dark Saigon River. A bright yellow flare arched up and hung in the air. Off to the east, the Long Binh ammunition dump was exploding. Red fire balls shot high into the night. Out of the rear bay, I saw the lights of Saigon distantly—for the last time.


Back in Washington, the evacuation was closely monitored by President Ford. After issuing the order to "go," the President walked over to the White House Situation Room where Henry Kissinger briefed him on the pullout. The President returned to his quarters shortly after midnight. Running into a television correspondent who remarked that Ford was keeping late hours, the President replied: "With good reason." As the President prepared to go to bed, Kissinger phoned to get some advice on the evacuation announcement. Ford crawled into bed. Twenty minutes later, Kissinger called again to read him the final draft. Once more, the President tried to go to sleep. Shortly after 1 a.m., the Secretary of State phoned a last time. Operation Frequent Wind, he told Ford, had begun.

Not all the Americans in Saigon were evacuated from the U.S. Embassy. Along with scores of others, NEWSWEEK correspondent Nicholas C. Proffitt was lifted out from Tan Son Nhut airport aboard a Jolly Green Giant. Proffitt's report:

As our evacuation motorcade of two buses led by a U.S. Marine jeep wound through the streets of Saigon, Vietnamese stopped and stared at us with dead eyes. None smiled. None waved good-bye. Approaching Tan Son Nhut airport, we could see thick columns of smoke rising from around the field, and hear incoming Communist shells and small-arms fire. As the buses pulled up to the U.S. Defense Attaché's Office, a 122-mm. rocket slammed into the base only a few hundred yards away.

Originally, each of the Jolly Green Giants was to take 50 evacuees. But the marines, unsure how rapidly the military situation might deteriorate, decided to push the load up to 65 to get as many people out as possible. Consequently, we were told we would have to jettison our baggage. I watched Vietnamese take thick wads of money from their suitcases and stuff it into their shirts, blouses and pants—their stakes for building a new life when they got to America.

As we trotted across what had formerly been a basketball court to the waiting helicopters, we could see a com-



Americans and Vietnamese evacuated from DAO


Vietnamese pilots fly other refugees to Thailand

pany of marines lying prone around the perimeter—tense behind their M-16s and machine guns. Our chopper was loaded in less than two minutes and we lifted off at full power, climbing to 6,000 feet, and headed south, skirting the Mekong Delta before swinging west toward the coast. Two young marines hunched over the port and starboard .50-caliber machine guns, scanning the terrain below. As we crossed the coast, the two young gunners eased their fingers off their triggers, broke into tight grins, and gave each other—and then the passengers—the thumbs-up sign.

Aboard the U.S.S. Blue Ridge, command ship of the evacuation armada, NEWSWEEK correspondent Ron Moreau was with 5,000 marines who were prepared to storm ashore if necessary to protect the American pullout. Moreau's report:


As night fell Monday, the signal to proceed with Operation Frequent Wind still hadn't come. So everybody aboard the Blue Ridge was startled when the vessel's sirens began wailing shortly after dusk, and the call "Armed refugee reaction crews on the main deck" rang through the passageways. Sailors and marines racing toward the stern of the Blue Ridge saw a South Vietnamese Air Force CH-47 Chinook settling down on the small helipad on the aft deck. The door of the copter swung open and out scrambled twenty Vietnamese—including two women and two babies—dragging with them everything from mosquito nets to Hondas. As the pilot, Lt. Trung Ma Quoi, stepped from his helicopter, he told me: "The generals, colonels, majors and captains have left. I thought it was about time for the lieutenants to head to safety."

By midmorning of the next day—still hours before the start of the U.S. evacuation—the entire horizon was dotted with helicopters heading for the American fleet. Five olive-drab Vietnamese copters and two silver-and-blue Air



Nik Wheeler—Star-Liaison

Marines push a copter off the USS Hancock



America choppers descended on the Blue Ridge in almost a dead heat. One of the Air America copters landed first, then a Vietnamese Chinook put down virtually on top of it. The whirling blades of the two copters clanged together and disintegrated, sending jagged pieces of metal flying across the deck. As the crew of the Blue Ridge dived for cover, the Vietnamese chopper teetered precariously. Finally its door opened, and crying women clutching their children scrambled out.

After sweat-stained sailors shoved the disabled craft over the edge, the other helicopters came in one by one and discharged their refugees. The pilots were then told to ditch in the sea. While several pilots did indeed ease their copters into the steel-gray ocean, a few of the cocky Vietnamese chose to make more spectacular exits. One took his Chinook up to 100 feet, pushed the stick to the left, and dived out the right side. The pilot of one Air America helicopter had trouble making up his mind. After

flying around the Blue Ridge—touching down several times, then abruptly pulling up—he finally jumped out and the helicopter slammed into the starboard side of the ship.

When Operation Frequent Wind got under way, all South Vietnamese helicopters were turned away from the Blue Ridge and only American choppers were allowed to land on the command ship. The vessel's surface-to-air missile batteries tracked all unscheduled copters until they headed elsewhere to seek sanctuary. In early afternoon, a Navy helicopter brought aboard former Premier Nguyen Cao Ky, who only the week before had termed any Vietnamese planning to flee his country a "coward." A short time later, an Air America helicopter arrived carrying a load of high-ranking generals. One of them, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Manh, was accompanied by two aides who were straining under the weight of their attaché cases. When the ship's security officers took a look into the cases, they

found them to be loaded with gold bars.

Before the evacuation was even half over, the Blue Ridge was jammed to overflowing. Announcements blared out over the ship's public-address system, urging the new arrivals to double up and sleep in shifts in the triple-deck bunks below. Many of the exhausted marines returning from Saigon bedded down on deck or in passageways. As the Blue Ridge's security officers confiscated bottles of cognac and whisky from the evacuees and tossed them into the sea, loud groans went up from the crew. Many of the evacuees—both Americans and Vietnamese—were also carrying .45 automatics or pistols, and the security officers took these away as well. When one Vietnamese balked at handing over his weapons, a U.S. officer brusquely declared: "You won't be needing these any more. The war is over for you."

Through the long night, the evacuation continued. Finally, word came from the embassy that helicopter "Lady Ace

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THE WAR IN INDOCHINA

09" was in the air with "Code Two"—Ambassador Martin. A faint blue dawn was slowly breaking behind a black band of rain clouds when I spotted the flashing red light of the copter. The Sea Knight set down and a group of U.S. Embassy officials scrambled off. The last passenger to emerge from the chopper was Martin, wearing dark glasses and carrying a battered black-leather case, his silver-gray hair blowing in the helicopter's prop wash. He looked suddenly old and beaten. While the last marines wouldn't be out of Saigon for another two hours, America's role in Vietnam was clearly at an end.

In Washington, the President awoke at 5:27 a.m. and was immediately on the phone—anxious to hear the latest word from Vietnam. Throughout the morning, he kept close tabs on the progress of the evacuation, hoping to be able to tell Americans the final pullout was over at about noon. The regular White House briefing was canceled so Kissinger could make the announcement in the auditorium of the old Executive Office Building at 1 p.m. But the briefing had to be postponed: Ambassador Martin was still shuffling Vietnamese aboard helicopters at the embassy.

"There was a constant flow of cables back and forth with Ambassador Martin," a White House aide later said. Finally, Ford laid down the law. A strongly worded message told the ambassador that he would be sent one final flight of nineteen helicopters—"and no more." Martin was also informed that the Secretary of Defense wanted the last lift to depart at 3:45 p.m. The hour came and went, however, and still the embassy evacuation continued. Finally, at 4:45, Martin received a message that couldn't have been much blunter: "Load only Americans from now on." Fifteen minutes later, Kissinger told Ford it was time to go ahead with the long-delayed announcement. At 5:22, White House press secretary Ron Nessen told newsmen: "The last helicopters are in the air."

While the formal American evacuation was over, however, tens of thousands of Vietnamese were still putting out to sea. For two days, many of the ships of the U.S. armada lingered off the coast of Vietnam, plucking men, women and children from jerry-built rafts, sampans and fishing boats. At night, there were so many candles and lanterns burning on the water that from the air the offshore waters appeared to be a densely populated city. Most of the refugees set sail without taking on supplies, and radio

messages picked up by the American task force painted a picture of despair. One Vietnamese vessel radioed that it was carrying "about 200 children who might die of hunger and exhaustion if no help is forthcoming."

The refugees in small boats were worried about being left behind, and some set their small fishing smacks ablaze in hopes of being picked up immediately by the U.S. fleet. The Navy, too, was anxious to conclude Operation Frequent Wind. Rear Adm. Donald B. Whitmire told his men: "The sooner we get out of here, the faster we'll get a

Budweiser." By the end of the week, the Seventh Fleet armada was steaming toward Subic Bay and Guam to deposit its evacuees. As the coast of Vietnam disappeared, South Vietnamese Army and Air Force officers—clustered on the deck of the Blue Ridge—tuned in a shortwave broadcast from Saigon. They stood, heads bowed, staring at their feet as the Saigon radio paid tribute to the late Ho Chi Minh and exulted over the fall of South Vietnam.

—MILTON R. BENJAMIN with LOREN JENKINS and NICHOLAS C. PROFFITT in Saigon, RON MOREAU on the U.S.S. Blue Ridge and LLOYD H. NORMAN in Washington



Lester Sloan—Newsweek

Operation New Life: Vietnamese arrive in the U.S. to find a mix of kindness and resentment

The New Americans

At Guam's Asan Annex Naval Base, Tony Lam Quang, a 39-year-old Vietnamese refugee, proudly wears a plastic tag that announces his status as a camp manager. "Where will I go?" a middle-aged woman asks Tony. "I have no place to work. I'm afraid." "No, madam," replies Tony, putting his arm around her shoulder. "Everybody is treated equal in the States. Not like it used to be in our country. That's why we lost the war. It's cold in America right now, so don't be so impatient."

The mood in the community of Barling, Ark., near Fort Chaffee, is venomous and a group of residents gathers to complain about the refugees. "They say it's a lot colder here than in Vietnam," says Mrs. Ohnnie Calhoun. "With a little luck, maybe all those Vietnamese will take pneumonia and die."

Even as the first Vietnamese refugees began arriving in their new homeland last week, the outcry began to swell. A Gallup poll revealed that an astonishing 54 per cent of Americans thought that the dispossessed should be resettled—somewhere else. The predominant reason for all the hostility and resentment seemed to be a fear that the new arrivals would quickly join the welfare rolls and perhaps even compete with out-of-work Americans for scarce jobs. But beyond a doubt, there was also an ugly blend of racism mixed with sourness over the nation's long and bitter Indochina venture. In one of the crueler and more mindless attacks, high-school children at Fort Walton Beach, near Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, spoke of forming a "gook klux klan."

In Congress, liberals who had long been in the forefront of the antiwar



NEWS RELEASE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MSG TELLS OF SAIGON'S LAST DAYS
Release No. BAM-179-75
Tel: OX-4-4309

WASHINGTON, D.C., June 13, 1975 (USMC) -- The last U.S. Marine to leave Saigon as it toppled to virtually unchecked communist forces spun a tale of human suffering, chaos, danger; and the semblance of order his 45 Marine Security Guards managed to maintain through it all at the U.S. Embassy before successfully directing the final evacuation of thousands of Americans and Vietnamese.

MSgt. Juan J. Valdez, NCOIC of the Marine Security Guard Detachment with the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, said his Marines performed magnificently through the trying last hours of the Saigon government's death throes. He told his story during an interview at Headquarters Marine Corps where he is awaiting reassignment.

The 37-year-old Marine said that during the last two weeks of the Vietnam exodus his men burned and shredded tons of documents-- including personnel files of Vietnamese employed by the U.S. Embassy-- day and night while others on the embassy staff packed some of the embassy's equipment.

- more -

2-2-2-2-2

Protection of classified material is the primary mission of MSGs, with the protection of life and U.S. property a close second. Yet, as Valdez' poignant story unveiled, the MSGs not only efficiently handled those two vital missions, their professional expertise in other areas and each Marine's endurance was called to the fore as more Americans than were anticipated reported to the embassy seeking exit visas.

"Many of those Americans had in-laws with them," Valdez, who had served in Budapest before the Saigon assignment, recalled. "It seemed impossible to figure how many (people) there'd be in the long run and there were more Vietnamese applying for visas than Americans."

Valdez said he placed two Marines, Sgts. Kenneth Geagley Jr. and Gregory E. Hargis, on the Consulate Gate to control the applicants for visas. The sergeants were able to maintain control at first, but as reports of the VC and NVA encirclement of Saigon increased during the last days, the orderly lines swelled into desperate mobs.

"There was a mood of fear of being left behind, especially in the last week," Valdez said of the Vietnamese people.

A native of San Antonio, Valdez said the National Police tried to control the crowds, but he finally had to put more guards on the gate.

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3-3-3-3-3

Other MSGs, including some from the U.S. Consulates in the cities of DaNang and Nha Trang--which had already fallen to the communist push along the coast--were on duty at the U.S. Defense Attache Officers Compound located on Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airport. The 16 MSGs were there to protect American officials.

The embassy was comparatively safe, but the DAO compound was under sporadic rocket attack from communist forces and was even bombed and strafed by "unknown" aircraft which Valdez witnessed. He said that in the evenings, a glow could be seen from his embassy vantage point as rockets smashed into the airfield.

Valdez continued to maintain radio contact with his guard chief, GySgt. Vasco D. Martin, (originally the DaNang consulate detachment NCOIC) who was supervising the Marines in the DAO compound and at the same time organized his men in the embassy into four 10-man reaction teams. (On April 25, 40 riflemen from a 3d Marine Division battalion landing team landed to assist the MSGs in protecting the DAO area.)

Equipped with combat gear, the MSGs at the DAO compound controlled pedestrian and vehicular traffic into the area, manning a small, unprotected roadblock.

A massive rocket attack rocked Tan Son Nhut on the morning of April 29. One of the first rounds from the initial salvo fell near the DAO compound, killing two MSGs.

- more -

4-4-4-4-4

"Cpl. (Charles) McMahon and LCpl. (Darwin) Judge were killed immediately when a rocket landed only a few feet from their DAO posts," Valdez related grimly. "Another MSG, LCpl. (Otis L.) Holmes caught some shrapnel in the thigh, but he wasn't badly wounded. However, we couldn't get him treated until we'd been lifted out to the ships later."

It was later in the afternoon of the day on which McMahon and Judge died that the first evacuation choppers were sighted, making their way in from U.S. 7th Fleet ships sailing the South China Sea.

The MSGs were ready to conduct an orderly evacuation of American civilians and Vietnamese citizens, as the first waves of Marine CH-53 Sea Stallion and CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters flew overhead, straight to the DAO compound.

"When it became obvious on the 28th that we were going to evacuate, we organized the civilians into helo teams," Valdez pointed out. "They had very little luggage with them as they well knew how limited space on the choppers would be."

Though the modern embassy had been constructed with a helipad rising above the roof, the MSGs and other embassy personnel had felled a lofty tree in an adjacent Combined Recreation Association compound to clear landing space for giant CH-53 helicopters.

By this time, Valdez had ordered his Marines to provide security on all four gates in the embassy compound.

- more -

5-5-5-5-5

"We had to secure them when it looked like the crowd would get out of hand," Valdez explained. "The people didn't seem dangerous, though, just desperate to get themselves or their children out.

"We had orders to let in those who had American passports, third country passports, foreign allied passports, Vietnamese with embassy admission cards and those with evacuation authorization documents. We had trouble figuring out which were legal."

Valdez said the entrances became so congested that the Marines locked the gates and Americans who showed up were pulled over the walls.

Meanwhile, even though the MSGs had popped yellow smoke grenades to signal the evacuation choppers, the Marine aircraft flew straight to the DAO compound to evacuate the Americans there.

When the first evac choppers began arriving at the embassy a few hours later, they brought with them Marine riflemen who took over the perimeter security. At this point, Valdez and his Marines had been on constant duty around the clock for seven days, grabbing what sleep they could and shaving when they had time. Most of them had worn the same utility uniforms for a week.

"During this time, Ambassador Martin, strolled through the compound a number of times, trying to bolster everyone's confidence and maintain calm," Valdez said. "And the Seabees were burning all the American money on hand."

- more -

6-6-6-6-6

Several million dollars were reported burned by CPO James E. Martin Jr. and PO Thomas H. Hoge under the supervision of an embassy official.

Meanwhile, the evacuation from the embassy continued with MSG Cpl. David E. Norman directing the choppers to safe landings after the LZ director flown in from the carrier fell from the helipad to the roof and was injured.

"We kept evacuating until after 5 in the morning," Valdez recalled. "Then we noticed the flow of choppers was getting thinner."

Marine Maj. James Kean, CO of Co. "C" to which all Southeast Asia MSG detachments belong, had flown in earlier from Hong Kong to advise the Saigon MSGs during the last week. He yelled up to the LZ on the roof, asking if the ambassador had left. He was told yes. Kean went to the roof to talk to a helo pilot and returned with the word that no one but Americans would load aboard the choppers from that point on.

Valdez began withdrawing his men from the compound.

"We had to push our way back until, finally, we were able to button up the big teakwood doors and lower an iron grill over them," Valdez related.

The Marines formed three lines of defense in the embassy lobby.

"We hopscotched through the lines to the roof."

- more -

7-7-7-7-7

By now, the Vietnamese outside the building had become panicky and poured into the lobby. Those still outside the gates began climbing over the walls.

Valdez told the two Seabees to each take an elevator to the embassy roof, then to lock them in place there. The Marines went up the stairwells, blocking every exit behind them but some Vietnamese managed to find a way up.

The helipad, elevated above the roof, had only a stairway access.

"The Vietnamese couldn't get to the helipad because we used wall lockers and everything we could find to jam against the door leading to it," Valdez reported.

There were some 150 Marines on the helipad by now and everything seemed to come to a standstill on top of the embassy. In the streets below, there was sporadic shooting as ARVN soldiers fired their weapons in the air "cowboy style."

Saigon, as thousands of Americans once knew it, was dying.

While crowds milled about below in the early morning light, the Marines searched the sky to the east for choppers. Valdez said, however, he never feared being left behind.

"My only fear was that the enemy would redirect his fire to the roof," Valdez said. "We could see rockets landing again at Tan Son Nhut and there were firefights on the roads."

Valdez refuted news reports that had said those Marines on the rooftop had come under enemy fire and returned it.

- more -

8-8-8-8-8

"We didn't fire or use gas," Valdez said, "like some newsmen reported."

The Marines were on the LZ for about an hour before the last choppers flew into sight.

"Then the (helicopter) waves started again and about nine choppers took us off," Valdez said. "Nobody was stranded."

Before boarding the last chopper, Valdez took one last look around the helipad. He was the last Marine left, so he dashed to the chopper as the ramp began to close and leaped inside.

Some 30 minutes later, Valdez said his weary MSG Marines were safely aboard ship. And on the first leg of a trip that returned them to the states or new MSG assignments.

Through those last hours of the evacuation, Valdez said the morale of his men never faltered. He pointed out their MSG School training and each man's devotion and attention to duty made for superb performance and teamwork during those hectic days.

"They were great," Valdez said of his men. "Each Marine had a job to do and he did it professionally...they all deserve the highest recognition!"

- USMC -

*The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the
NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL to*

COLONEL DAN C. ALEXANDER


UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For meritorious service while serving as Chief of Staff, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade, Third Marine Amphibious Force from 3 April to 22 May 1975. Throughout this period, Colonel Alexander continually exhibited exceptional professionalism and sound judgement in the performance of his demanding duties. Tasked with the diverse planning requirements for four separate and distinct evacuation contingencies, Colonel Alexander worked tirelessly ensuring the coordination and liaison necessary to support the operations. During the operational phase of Frequent Wind, he maintained a constant operational link with the Ground Security Force Commander in Saigon, the Provisional Marine Aircraft Group evacuating refugees and the Amphibious Evacuation Security Force embarked aboard Military Sealift Command shipping. Subsequently and until the deactivation of the brigade, he worked long and arduous hours to accomplish post operation staff requirements and to promulgate vital and timely lessons learned from the highly successful operation. Colonel Alexander's efforts contributed significantly to the success of the operation. Colonel Alexander's professional expertise, untiring determination, and steadfast devotion to duty reflect great credit upon himself and upheld the finest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service."

FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY



JOHN N. MCLAUGHLIN

*LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
COMMANDING GENERAL, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC*



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting
the LEGION OF MERIT to

COLONEL SYDNEY H. BATCHELDER, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS


for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service from February to April 1975 as Senior Ground Security Force Commander during the planning and execution phases of Operation EAGLE PULL, the evacuation of American citizens from Phnom Penh, Cambodia. In this capacity, Colonel Batchelder developed comprehensive plans for the evacuation and executed those plans when the moment came. With exceptional foresight and keen perception, he formulated several alternate courses of action which would accommodate a variety of eventualities. Working closely with members of other United States Armed Forces and personnel of the Department of State, Colonel Batchelder coordinated plans which changed almost daily under the very real threat of hostile interference and daily shelling of Phnom Penh and its airfield by enemy forces. Despite the rapidly deteriorating situation, he took charge when the execution phase was ordered and personally directed all facets of the airlift evacuation. By his superb leadership, resourcefulness, and total devotion to duty, Colonel Batchelder upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The Combat Distinguishing Device is authorized.

For the President,


Secretary of the Navy



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL (Gold Star in lieu of the Second Award) to

COLONEL JOHN M. JOHNSON, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For meritorious achievement as Marine Liaison Officer to the Commander, United States Support Advisory Group for Southeast Asia evacuation operations, Operations EAGLE PULL and FREQUENT WIND, and as Commander Task Group 79.9 for SS MAYAGUEZ and Koh Tang operations from 6 April 1975 to 16 May 1975. Throughout this period, Colonel Johnson was directly responsible for the coordination of planning for Southeast Asia emergency evacuation operations. Faced with this complex assignment, he exhibited the professional competence, dynamic leadership, and physical stamina which contributed significantly to the interservice cooperation necessary for successful accomplishment of the mission. Subsequently assigned as Commander Task Group 79.9, he was tasked with the recovery of the SS MAYAGUEZ and crew. Displaying mature judgment and inspiring leadership, Colonel Johnson planned and directed Landing Force Operations in the highly complex combat assault on Koh Tang Island and the ship-to-ship boarding party operation that resulted in the successful recovery of the SS MAYAGUEZ and her crew. By his superb performance, resourcefulness, and steadfast devotion to duty, Colonel Johnson upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

For the President,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'J. M. ...', positioned above the printed title of the Secretary of the Navy.

Secretary of the Navy

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS 1 DECEMBER 1974

Visitor Sees Signs of Lon Nol's Control

By Tammy Arbuckle
Star News Special Correspondent

PHNOM PENH — In this Cambodian capital the possibility that the United Nations might someday choose Prince Norodom Sihanouk and his Communist supporters over the present Lon Nol government to represent Cambodia in the U.N. seems unreal.

Both here and in two weeks spent traveling the Cambodian countryside it appeared that President Lon Nol's republican government, however inefficient and corrupt it may be, is in firm control of most of Cambodia's five million people and of much of the territory that matters.

The closeness of the recent 56-54 vote in the U.N. to put off for a year any change in Cambodia's representation, however, indicates the seriousness of Sihanouk's challenge in the world body.

In the wake of the U.N. vote, Lon Nol yesterday renewed his offer of unconditional peace talks to the Communist-led insurgent army opposing him. He called on the Khmer Rouge to test his sincerity by agreeing to talk.

PHNOM PENH, a bustling city, seems firmly in republican control, even though the city is bursting with people and there are grass shacks housing refugees along some streets.

Lon Nol's government

also controls 14 out of 16 provincial capitals. Some of these capitals—such as Sway Rieng in eastern Cambodia—are surrounded by Communist forces, but in most cases the Communists occupy only a thin belt around the besieged area, with the rest of countryside virtually free of troops of both sides.

Sway Rieng, like Phnom Penh itself, is packed with people, the currency of a right to the U.N. seat. In areas under Communist control the population is thinly scattered as many

Analysis

have fled to the republican-controlled cities.

The weakness of the Communist and Sihanouk claim to being the paramount political group in Cambodia is highlighted by the large refugee flow and by a certain Communist military weakness.

WHICHEVER province capital in Cambodia one visits, there are the inevitable grass hootches of the refugees. Their stories of the places they fled always are the same. Food shortages, no clothing, no medical treatment—with punishment sometimes by murder with axe or hammer for those who protest.

Most villagers say they did not personally know the Communist cadres who har-

assed them. They were not local men, a sign of lack of a Communist grass roots organization.

The refugees say their move to republican controlled territory usually came when government troops entered their area, making it necessary to flee from fighting.

In some instances, villagers also moved to republican areas after the Communists revealed plans to relocate their villages deeper in the forest.

THE SURPRISING military weakness of the Communists is very noticeable, for instance, on the convoys plying up the Mekong River from South Vietnam to Phnom Penh. The Communists fail week after week to stop these vulnerable vessels although they provide easy targets.

A LOOK at military maps showed that one reason for this is that republican forces are stationed on or control virtually the length of the river from the South Vietnam border to Phnom Penh, a distance of about 30 miles.

A trip up the Mekong on one convoy recently led a reporter to estimate that less than 20 Communist soldiers were involved in attacks on the convoy and that warnings of the attacks were provided by the Cambodian military.

Another sign of Communist military weakness has been their inability to mount more than one large-scale offensive at a time or at more than one place at the

same time. This is interpreted by Western military diplomats as a sign of Communist numerical weakness.

These sources believe that if the republicans took the offensive in several areas of Cambodia simultaneously, the Communists would be hard put to stop them and that it's only the government forces' inefficiency—combined with a defensive posture—that allows the Communists to retain the appearance of military initiative.

APART from all this doubt of Sihanouk's fitness to represent Cambodia in the U.S. is raised here by the ambiguity of his position with the Communists.

Prisoners and defectors have indicated that in many units fighting against Lon Nol there are Communist cells and cadres who do not support Sihanouk, supporting instead Communist old-timer Khieu Samphan.

Efforts at negotiating with the Communists by the republicans also have shown Sihanouk's support to be fragmented.

In pragmatic terms, a U.N. vote in favor of Sihanouk would be valueless as Lon Nol would control Phnom Penh, most of the population and the provincial capitals despite this. But diplomats here say a pro-Sihanouk vote would be a heavy morale blow to republicans and severely damage their will to fight.

On other hand, a vote for negotiations would have "an upbeat effect on the Cambodian elite," those sources said.

*Early Bird
December 1, 74
P. 11-F*

NEW YORK TIMES
1 December 1974 P19

LON NOL PROPOSES PEACE TALK AGAIN

By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG
Special to The New York Times

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia, Nov. 30—At an elaborate ceremony today, President Lon Nol renewed his offer of unconditional peace talks to the Communist-led insurgents, using language even more conciliatory than that of the original proposal last July.

With pomp and solemnity aimed at capitalizing on his Government's success this week in saving its seat at the United Nations, Marshal Lon Nol said he would welcome Secretary General Waldheim's help in the search for negotiations.

Like many major happenings in Cambodia, the ceremony, in an ornate high-ceilinged hall of Government House, was arranged under the guidance of the United States Embassy, Gunther Dean. Cambodian headed by Ambassador John newsmen covering the event made the American influence obvious by taking more pictures of Mr. Dean than of the Cambodian President.

A huge honor guard and a military band also graced the occasion, filling the street outside.

Security Elaborate

The security was even more elaborate than the ritual. Two hours beforehand armored cars and trucks full of armed soldiers began sweeping the two-and-a-half-mile route the President would take across the city from his palace to Government House.

Mobile antiaircraft guns were also moved into place around the building. The insurgents have no planes.

The 61-year-old marshal, who was partly paralyzed on his right side by a stroke three years ago, began by thanking the nations that gave him the two-vote majority in the General Assembly over the exile government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who was ousted in 1970 and who now lives in Peking.

This was the second consecutive year that the Phnom
LON NOL...Pg. 2

LON NOL...

Continued

Phnom government had staved off a Chinese-backed attempt to oust it from the United Nations.

The President said "some people" had doubted the sincerity of the July peace offer and had contended it was simply a tactic for saving the United Nations seat. He then added:

"If by chance anyone still has doubts, I would like to affirm again, solemnly and categorically, that we are ready to enter into negotiations with the Cambodians of the other side, without prior conditions, at a time and place agreeable to the parties."

Partition Ruled Out

In a conciliatory gesture to the insurgents, who are tutored by Hanoi and provided with arms from Peking and Moscow, the marshal said he was just as opposed as they to a partition of the country.

He concluded his statement by calling on the insurgents, generally known as the Khmer Rouge, or red Cambodians, to test his sincerity by agreeing to talk.

So far in this grinding, nearly five-year-old civil war, the insurgents have been publicly adamant in rejecting any idea of negotiations until all American aid to Phnom Penh is stopped and the Lon Nol Government is removed.

Both before and after the United Nations vote, which came early Thursday, Prince Sihanouk and other insurgent leaders repeated their rejection of talks.

The General Assembly resolution requests Secretary General Waldheim to "lend appropriate assistance to the two contending parties," states that the Cambodian people "should be allowed to solve their own political problems peacefully, free from outside interference," and "calls upon all the powers which have been influencing the two parties to use their good offices for conciliation between these two parties."

Early Bird
Dec. 30, 74
P. 1

3 Americans Held Hostage By Laotians

15 May 1975
By Bruce Palling

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, May 14—The compound of the U.S. Agency for International Development in the royal capital of Luang Prabang was sacked today and three AID officials were taken hostage in the provincial capital of Savannakhet in a new outbreak of anti-American protests.

The three men taken hostage are not thought to be in any personal danger, though the exact status of their detention was not clear, U.S. embassy officials said.

Later an embassy spokeswoman said that there would be a reduction in the size of the American mission in Laos, which now numbers 320 officials and about 500 dependents.

State Department spokesman Robert Funseth said a "thinning-out process" would be under way at the American mission in Laos by this weekend "if it has not already started." Funseth said that there are no

See LAOS, A23, Col. 1

Chile to Allow Access To Jailed Torturers

By Joanne Omang

Washington Post Foreign Service

SANTIAGO, May 14—Chilean President Augusto Pinochet has for the first time authorized access in jail to convicted torturers as some evidence that Chile does not condone mistreatment of political prisoners.

The graying army general agreed in an interview to "facilitate" such access by The Washington Post, although he said he had given up hope of convincing the world he is not "bloodthirsty."

In a jovial mood, the uniformed Pinochet struck few new themes in a 35-minute interview Monday at his tightly guarded, modern government headquarters office. He said polls showed his popularity had risen "in spite of everything" since he took office as head of the four-man military junta that overthrew the leftist government of the late President Salvador Allende in September 1973.

During "the first days and months" of his government, Pinochet said, "there were some activities, and some people exceeded [their duties] in these actions and now they're in jail, including an officer.



PRESIDENT PINOCHET

... "normal, tranquil"

Did you know that there is an officer in jail?"

Pressed for evidence, he authorized an interview with the officer, which took place at the Santiago penitentiary on Tuesday. The officer, former army Lt. Juan Martinez Oyanedel, turned out to have been charged with killing a civilian in an automobile accident and not with any crime relating to torture.

See PINOCHET, A35, Col. 7

Viet Officials Get Special Camp Exit

15 May 1975
By Leroy F. Aarons

Washington Post Staff Writer

CAMP PENDLETON, Calif., May 14—The former police chief of metropolitan Saigon and at least a dozen other former high-level South Vietnamese officials and their families were allowed to depart Camp Pendleton last week without the knowledge of the camp's commanding general or State Department officials, it was learned today.

Immigration and Naturalization Service authorities here confirmed that these officials were processed out of the camp without the security clearance and sponsorship required of all refugees. This special arrangement was ordered by INS headquarters in Washington.

The departure of the special group was accomplished without informing other departments integrally involved with the refugee operation. It came, also, at the time officials here and in Washington were insisting that no refugee, regardless

See DEPART, A26, Col. 1

*Remains
not covered*

Congress Explores Ford's Evacuation Authority Bid

DIPLOMACY, From A1

sought broad authority to carry out President Ford's requests to Congress, but Congress appeared headed in exactly the opposite direc-

To "clarify restrictions" on funds to employ American troops in Vietnam, the White House late yesterday asked Congress to waive all limitations on American armed forces "to aid, assist, and carry out humanitarian evacuation, if ordered by the President."

A group of 33 first-term House Democrats caustically questioned an assistant secretary of state about President Ford's intentions, suggesting that the President is trying to "set up" Congress for the blame if Vietnam falls under total Communist control.

Two staff investigators of the Senate Foreign Relations committee reported from Saigon that it already may be too late to remove Americans from South Viet-

nam and their Vietnamese employees, under "highly volatile" conditions there.

On Monday, the Senate caucus of 61 Democrats is scheduled to meet at request of Sen. James Abourezk (D-S.D.). He said he will press for rejection of the President's money requests and elimination of plans to evacuate South Vietnamese. Aides said Abourezk will urge cease-fire negotiations with North Vietnam to permit evacuation of Americans.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) and Majority Whip Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) both said they oppose the \$722 million request. Mansfield said he is very leery of authorizing troops to evacuate any South Vietnamese, and Byrd expressed even stronger misgivings.

Mansfield said he is concerned about what may develop in such an evacuation attempt, "because you don't know what's involved. I'm primarily interested in the rescue of the Americans."

Byrd said, "I'm very much opposed to the use of the armed forces to evacuate any South Vietnamese personnel. You'd be all over the country." But Byrd said "we have a duty" to evacuate Americans.

Byrd said he is drafting legislation that would confine the use of U.S. troops to evacuation of Americans. Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton (D-Mo.) said he is working on a proposal to let troops rescue South Vietnamese as well, but only if they are in areas controlled by U.S. forces for the evacuation of Americans.

In the Senate and in the House members expressed concern yesterday that any broad grant of evacuation authority could turn into another 1964 Gulf of Tonkin

Resolution, pulling the United States back into the war.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said he hopes Congress will comply with the President's request for "clarifying legislation" to permit the double evacuation, but that the administration believes it will still be able to take some action without it.

"There is a legal opinion," Kissinger told reporters at the State Department, "that holds that the President has the inherent constitutional power to protect American lives even in the absence of such clarification," which the administration strongly desires.

"If American lives would be endangered" before such legislation could be passed, Kissinger said, "then the President would have to act on his conception of his constitutional authority."

However, Kissinger said, "There is no question whatever that we have no legal authority to remove South Vietnamese or other foreign nationals unless it is in connection with some American evacuation and there is space available."

Mr. Ford asked for all legislative action to be completed by April 19. This would be extraordinary speed for congressional action.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was informed yesterday by two of its staff investigators in South Vietnam that the situation in Saigon already may be too critical to permit any massive evacuation.

Investigators Richard M. Moose and Charles F. Meissner, due to return to Washington today, cabled the committee that the situation in Saigon, which faces the threat of overwhelming at-

tack by North Vietnamese forces, is "highly volatile."

"There is a growing feeling here in Saigon," they reported, "that . . . it may already be too late — if indeed there was ever time — to get the more than 5,000 remaining Americans out of Saigon safely—let alone remove many Vietnamese friends. Even a strong use of U.S. force would not improve prospects for a mass evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese."

Under restricting legislation passed by Congress in 1973 in multiple forms after U.S. troops were withdrawn from Indochina, there are special bans on further use of troops in the area.

There are prohibitions on the direct or indirect use of American forces in "combat activities" throughout Indochina; on any "involvement of United States military forces in hostilities in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia," and on the use of American funds to finance "military or

paramilitary operations" in the region.

In addition, the War Powers Act limits presidential use of American troops in hostile situations to 60 days and requires reporting of any involvement that might lead to war.

Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.), a chief sponsor of the war powers legislation, said the legislative history shows it permits the United States to use limited force to rescue endangered American civilians. But, Javits said, "It is crystal clear that there is no such emergency authority for the purpose of evacuating foreign nationals."

The Ford administration, in its request to Congress last night, proposed legislation stating that nothing in existing law "shall be construed as limiting the availability of funds for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States to aid, assist, and carry out humanitarian evacuation, if ordered by the President."

Several Senate sources demand much more specific

limitation on evacuation authority.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) said the President should order Americans out of South Vietnam now, "while there is still time to do so without the use of force."

Resolutions circulated in the House call for evacuation of American nationals "solely utilizing civilian personnel and transport."

Rep. Berkley Bedell (D-Iowa) said there is concern that use of American troops should "not be used as a pretext, unintentional or otherwise, for any involvement of American combat forces in Vietnam."


Both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee scheduled hearings for Tuesday on the President's request, with Kissinger due to appear in open session before the foreign relations group.

The United States, in its diplomatic note to North Vietnam yesterday, said that nation "should have no doubt that it will be held responsible for the consequences" if it "does not reverse its present military course in South Vietnam."

No indication was given of what the consequence might be, in view of the Ford administration's position that there is no intention to reintroduce U.S. combat forces into Vietnam.

The United States charge North Vietnam with "total contempt" of the 1973 Paris cease-fire accord by launching an offensive in South Vietnam which has produced "a human flight of refugees which is of historic proportions."

Staff writers Richard Lyons and Spencer contributed to this



Tomb of the Vietnam Unknown

The Unknown Soldier of Vietnam will be buried at the spot marked by the wreath at the Tomb of the Unknowns at Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia, just outside Washington, D.C. The crypt at top honors the World War I soldier, the one at left, Korea, and World War II at right. (AP)

8 Pacific Stars & Stripes
Monday, May 17, 1976

WASHINGTON STAR - 22 JULY 1976(23) Pg 6

U.S. Softens Stand On Sale by Hanoi Of Seized Arms

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Ford administration has reversed its attitude on possible sales by Vietnam of captured U.S. weapons and is now willing to help friendly countries that might buy them.

This decision has been made in anticipation of foreign governments' asking Washington whether they could get spare parts and other support for weapons purchased from Hanoi. The decision also covers possible sales by Cambodia or Laos.

But so far there are no definite signs that any of the victorious Communist regimes in Indochina intends to sell anything from the stockpiles of military equipment which they acquired when American-supported regimes collapsed last year.

IN THE FIRST few months after Saigon fell April 30, 1975, the administration expected Hanoi to begin fairly quickly to sell captured weaponry. Officials here were determined to try to discourage any government from buying them and possibly to take steps to prevent their falling into the hands of terrorists or guerrilla movements.

As a result of a decision made "at the highest level" of the administration, according to official sources, this policy has now been changed. While still hoping to keep the weapons out of the hands of terrorists or guerrillas, the government would quietly acquiesce in the purchase of them by responsible governments.

The value of armaments

captured in Vietnam varies from an officially used figure of \$6 billion down to about half that, depending upon whether acquisition prices or depreciated values are used. American weaponry taken over by the winners in Cambodia and Laos was worth only a fraction of that.

THE VIETNAM weaponry covers the entire range of equipment for a modern armed force of several hundred thousand men, from F5 jet fighters through armored vehicles and small naval craft to artillery pieces and hand weapons, plus cases of spare parts and other ancillary material.

Much of this was lost in the precipitous withdrawal of South Vietnamese troops from the northern part of their country in March 1975, which touched off the final collapse of President Nguyen Van Thieu's government.

As North Vietnamese troops massed to capture Saigon, the U.S. Defense Department tried to "back haul" as much weaponry as possible out of the southern part of the country around Saigon and in the Mekong Delta, so as to prevent its capture too. Not much was saved, however. In addition to military and logistical difficulties, the operation was hindered by some American officials who accepted a Communist-planted story that there would be a cease-fire to permit orderly evacuation later.

THE VICTORIOUS government in Hanoi — which now runs the unified Socialist (SEIZED ARMS, Pg 2-1

SEIZED ARMS - CONT'D

ist Republic of Vietnam — was expected here to view the massive stockpile of weapons as a resource which could be exploited for badly needed foreign exchange. It was expected to sell weapons in order to buy civilian equipment for post-war reconstruction.

There were some signs of this in the first few months after Saigon fell. Contacts were reported with Singapore on selling naval craft, with Iran on other equipment, possibly F5s to supplement those which Iran already had, and with a wide range of other countries. The reports trailed off into vague rumors.

Most of the reports were never confirmed, according to U.S. sources who said considerable efforts were made to check them. It is possible that enterprising third parties were trying to promote such sales in order to earn commissions without ever having Hanoi's authorization.

INITIAL FEARS that the weapons would be exported to Communist guerrillas in countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have waned. Some sources report that American weapons have turned up in Malaysia during the past year, and Thai guerrillas have long used them, but

the available information is not conclusive proof of Hanoi's official involvement.

A deputy foreign minister of Vietnam, Phan Hien, is now touring Southeast Asia assuring governments of Hanoi's desire for good relations. He was quoted as telling reporters in Manila on July 13 that the captured weapons would be used by the Vietnamese people for the defense of their own country.

Defense against whom? Vietnam is now the strongest land power in Southeast Asia! But on its northern border is a still stronger power, China.

THE TWO COUNTRIES have tense, potentially explosive relations over several groups of small coral atolls in the South China Sea whose ownership gives control of shallow sea beds thought to be rich in oil. China occupies one group, the Paracels, and Vietnam another, the Spratlys. While Vietnam has muted its claims to the Paracels, Peking has loudly asserted its claim to the Spratlys.

THE CHANGE in the U.S. attitude on Hanoi's sales came recently after repeated inquiries from friendly governments and international arms dealers. The new flexibility has not been publicly announced

and, in fact, the government has tried to keep it quiet, only responding to official inquiries from abroad. Officials here prefer tacit acquiescence in any purchase of captured weapons rather than public approval.

But from now on the government is prepared to consider requests from friendly governments to provide American support for weapons systems bought from Hanoi. This could mean selling spare parts or even giving training in the use of such weaponry.

Before such support would be given, the U.S. government would expect foreign governments to accept the same restrictions as are imposed upon nations that get American weapons directly. These include promises not to pass

them on to other users without Washington's approval.

THE NEW POLICY still prohibits Americans from trading in the arms, however. In the murky world of international "merchants of death," however, the control of some semi-clandestine weapons companies is unclear.

The administration is especially anxious to keep the weapons out of the hand of terrorists and such non-governmental groups as the Palestine Liberation Organization. There have been official discussions here of the possibility of trying to seize on the high seas or at neutral airports any American-made weapons known to be en route from Vietnam to such potential users.

Early Bird
July 26, 76
P. 2

PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1976

Nurse Honored In Viet Rescue

WASHINGTON (UPI) — The Air Force Tuesday presented an award for "heroism in the service of a fellow man" to a flight nurse who played a major role in rescue efforts when a huge C - 5A transport plane carrying Vietnamese orphans crashed shortly before the fall of Saigon last year.

The Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. David C. Jones, presented the Cheney Award to Capt. Regina C. Aune, 31, in ceremonies at the Pentagon.

Capt. Aune was one of the crew members aboard the big plane when it crashed shortly after takeoff on April 4, 1975.

She was credited with playing a large part in the rescue of 176 orphans and other passengers who survived the crash.

The Cheney Award is given each year in memory of a U.S. Army Lieutenant, William A. Cheney, who was killed in Italy in World War I. Capt. Aune is the first woman to receive it in its 49 year history.

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United States Marine Corps



Certificate of Commendation

The Commandant of the Marine Corps takes pleasure in commending

NINTH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION (-)

for

outstanding achievement while participating in support operations on Okinawa from 27 March to 23 May 1975. Ninth Motor Transport Battalion (-) contributed significantly to the mission of the Third Marine Division (-) (Reinforced), Fleet Marine Force, by ~~conducting numerous successful transport missions in~~ ~~relocating entire infantry battalion landing teams to and from shipping and aircraft.~~ Through their continuous display of professionalism, determination, and resourcefulness, the Marines of Ninth Motor Transport Battalion supported the Third Marine Division at a pace normally required of two motor transport battalions, making a major contribution toward the timely achievement of United States objectives in Southeast Asia relative to operations involving the evacuation of two country capitals and the rescue of a United States merchant ship during Operations EAGLE PULL, FREQUENT WIND, and MAYAGUEZ. Ninth Motor Transport Battalion's performance reflected great credit upon itself and the United States Marine Corps.

11 August 1976

File

Lawrence
Commandant of the Marine Corps

File

UP-079

(MANSFIELD)

(BY STEVE GERSTEL)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER MIKE MANSFIELD SAID TUESDAY THAT EXPANSION OF JAPAN'S MILITARY FORCES AND A LOSS OF FAITH IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE "PLAYING WITH FIRE" IN THE PACIFIC.

CALLING JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES "MILITARY PARTNERS," HE SAID IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT JAPAN TRUSTS IN THE VALIDITY OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ITS SECURITY.

IN A SENATE SPEECH, MANSFIELD SAID: "THERE OUGHT NOT TO BE GROUNDS FOR JAPAN TO HAVE TO DOUBT THE U.S. SECURITY GUARANTEE AND NO COMPELLING REASON FOR THE JAPANESE TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THEIR DEFENSE POLICY.

"ANY OTHER COURSE, IN MY JUDGMENT, IS PLAYING WITH FIRE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC."

MANSFIELD DELIVERED AN 11-PAGE SPEECH ENTITLED "ASIA -- A YEAR AFTER THE FALL OF INDOCHINA" IN WHICH HE SAID, "THE UNITED STATES' POSITION IN ASIA IS MORE FAVORABLE THAN IT HAS BEEN SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II."

"AMERICA'S PRINCIPAL LONG-RANGE INTERESTS IN THE FAR EAST ARE TO AVOID DOMINATION OF THE REGION BY ANY SINGLE POWER, TO MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH CHINA, JAPAN AND OTHER NATIONS AND TO LESSEN TENSIONS WHICH COULD TRIGGER EITHER A LOCAL OR A GREAT POWER CONFLICT."

HE ALSO CALLED FOR REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA "OVER A PERIOD OF TIME," THE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND POSSIBLY A WIDER DEMILITARIZED ZONE.

"THE UNITED STATES MUST DO MORE THAN IT HAS IN THE PAST TO BREAK THE IMPASSE IN KOREA," MANSFIELD SAID.

HE SAID THE OBSTACLE TO REACHING "NORMAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA IS THAT THE "UNITED STATES, OFFICIALLY, STILL TREATS THE GOVERNMENT OF TAIWAN AS THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA."

HE CALLED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN "THE FUNDAMENTAL PILLAR OF AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA."

AND HE WARNED THAT A DISTRUSTFUL JAPAN "EMBARKED IN SEARCH OF SECURITY ON ITS OWN BY WAY OF A MAJOR MILITARY EXPANSION WOULD UNSETTLE ALL OF ASIA. ASIAN MEMORIES OF THE GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE ARE STILL NOT FORGOTTEN.

"THERE ARE NOW PRESSURES FROM THE PENTAGON FOR JAPAN TO EXPAND ITS MILITARY FORCES. I URGE THE GREATEST CAUTION IN PUSHING JAPAN IN SUCH A DIRECTION."

UPI 04-13 02:52 PES

The Secretary of State



Press Conference

April 22, 1976
Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

MAJOR TOPICS: Relations with U.S.S.R., Africa, Byrd Amendment, Cuba, Middle East, Viet-Nam, OAS Meeting

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, in January you gave a very optimistic report on the status of detente and SALT. Since then it is evident that the situation has deteriorated. Can you tell us what happened and what are the prospects for improvement, if any?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The principal element in the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union is Soviet action in Angola. We pointed out at the time, and we repeat, that we consider those actions irresponsible, inconsistent with the principles that govern the conduct between our nations, and the introduction of Cuban surrogate forces a very dangerous development.

On the other hand, the basic necessities of preserving peace in the nuclear age and of regulating the relationship between the superpowers remain. And, therefore, the United States will continue to pursue the dual policy that we have emphasized over recent months.

That is to say, first, we will resist irresponsible actions or the expansion of Soviet political influence by military power or the use of surrogate forces. Secondly, we remain ready to work for a more peaceful world and more just international arrangements on the basis of strict reciprocity. We will pursue both of these strands and we remain ready to pursue both of these strands.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the United States today is capable of resisting irresponsible action by the Soviet Union? Does it have that kind of unity and coherence?

A: The United States has the military capacity, and it has the political will to resist irresponsible actions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could I follow up the African part of that question? You and the President have been urging the Soviets to act with restraint in Africa. How do you define restraint? Does it require

the removal of the last Cuban and Soviet military person?

A: Our basic view with respect to Africa is that African problems should be settled by African nations and that Africa should be kept free of great-power rivalry.

The United States is prepared to act according to this principle, and it hopes that other major countries will act in the same manner. The United States would be extremely concerned, as we have pointed out on a number of occasions, if the use of surrogate military forces, which could only take place with the support of a superpower, became an accepted pattern of dealing with issues in Africa.

Now, we will make clear during my visit what our position is with respect to southern Africa and our strong support for majority rule in southern Africa. We will also make clear our support for the development objectives of African nations. And finally, we will make clear our support for the unity of African nations.

We have no interest in splitting the African nations or lining them up into groups, some of which support one superpower and others another superpower. But we believe, of course, that this requires restraint by all sides, and this must be our definition.

Q: Specifically on that, how will the Soviets have to act to convince the United States that they are acting responsibly in Africa?

A: They would have to act to live up to these principles of not interfering with military force and/or large-scale military equipment in internal African problems. And we believe, of course, that Cuban troops should be withdrawn from Africa.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what are the Cubans and the Soviet Union doing at this particular time? Angola is now more or less over. Is there still a flow of Soviet arms? Is there still a replacement or

continuing level of Cuban forces in Angola? And what is your perception of what the Cuban surrogate forces will be doing next?

A: The present level of Cuban forces in Africa, including all the countries, is in excess of 15,000. Our estimate of Cuban forces in Angola is 13,000 or 14,000. There has been some rotation. That is, some troops have been replaced by other, more technical personnel. But the total number of Cuban forces in Angola is roughly at the level at which it has been since the end of January.

We receive conflicting reports about what Cuban forces are doing in other parts of Africa or whether Cuban forces from Angola are being moved from Angola to other areas. We have had no confirmed reports, but we have warned repeatedly that the use of Cuban surrogate forces is going to increase international tensions enormously and is going to be incompatible with the relaxation of tensions and is going to be a very dangerous course.

Q: Mr. Secretary, may we assume that the chances for a SALT agreement in the present political climate for the foreseeable future are pretty much eliminated?

A: As the President pointed out yesterday, we remain prepared to continue the SALT negotiations, and we believe that an equitable SALT agreement is possible and is desirable. We are not operating against an artificial deadline. We are studying the Soviet reply.

We have had several meetings on the subject. And we will answer it in due course. I would not preclude the possibility that significant progress can be made this year.

Q: Mr. Secretary, some observers have noted that there may be a contradiction in the American pledges of support for black majority rule in southern Africa and your warnings against Cuban or Soviet interference in that some of the black nations may be hoping or relying on Cuban or Soviet help in achieving the objective of black African rule.

I want to ask you whether you feel on this trip you can make credible the American commitment to support black African majority rule.

A: Of course, the achievement of African objectives has to be primarily an African problem, but I will be prepared to discuss with my African hosts the concrete policies that could be implemented to bring about majority rule. And I will be prepared to put forward what the United States in its turn is prepared to do or to support.

I do not accept the proposition that the use of extracontinental military force supported by one of the superpowers is the only way of achieving the aspirations of the black African coun-

tries. And it is indeed our belief that it is the way that leads to the greatest danger that Africa will become a part of the great-power rivalry.

So we recognize that this strong desire exists on the part of the black African nations, that it must be given a realistic perspective, and we believe that this is achievable.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you think that majority rule in Rhodesia is possible in the next decade?

A: Yes, I do.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could we go back to detente for a moment? I would like to read to you and invite your comment on a question from a Tony Lewis [N.Y. Times, April 19] column last week. He's speaking—he's writing about your speeches across the country. He says: 'The Kissinger roadshow has a desperate tone, and no wonder. For the Secretary of State is campaigning at the same time on behalf of a policy and of a President who has effectively abandoned that policy.'

How much is your own Administration responsible for the slow progress in detente at this point, leaving aside the Reagans and the Jacksons?

A: I have noticed that the Op Ed page of the New York Times is not unanimous in support of me. The policy that I have stated is, of course, the policy of the President. The statements about the objectives of the United States with respect to relations with the Soviet Union are the views of the President as, of course, they are my own views. Therefore, I cannot accept the particular statement that you have read.

We have, as I pointed out at the time—as a result of Watergate, of the aftermath of Watergate, of a series of congressional-executive disagreements—we have suffered from a lack of clarity in other countries' minds about what the United States can and will do in given circumstances. For this we have paid a price. This we are attempting to rectify. And this, any administration will have to overcome. But the basic objective of seeking to prevent Soviet expansion and at the same time to build a safer world than one that depends entirely on nuclear confrontation, those objectives are fixed and will have to be pursued by any administration.

Q: A brief follow, if I may. But aren't you making any concessions on your own to the fact that there is a political campaign going on now? Isn't detente slowing down by U.S. desires, by Administration desires, to avoid a campaign problem?

A: The primary problem in relations with the Soviet Union has been the irresponsible Soviet action in Angola. The basic foreign policy of the United States depends on the national interests of

the United States, and it is not a partisan matter.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you talked about Watergate. Going beyond Watergate, given the fact that we are now in the Presidential campaign with the inevitable attacks on foreign policy, are you finding that these attacks are affecting the perception of the United States abroad and affecting America's ability to operate in the international arena?

A: Inevitably, when the United States is described as second-rate, when it is alleged that senior officials of the United States Government are resigned to getting the best deal they can from a nation that is perceived to be dominant—all charges which are wrong and irresponsible—inevitably, this is bound to affect the perceptions of other countries.

On the other hand, I believe that other countries have seen enough of American political campaigns to know that candidates sometimes get carried away with the exuberance of their speech writers; and, therefore, I think it will be seen in the correct perspective as the campaign—

Q: Mr. Secretary, on your remarks about U.S.-Soviet relations, you said the United States has the military capacity and the political will to resist. Other than rhetoric, how has the United States demonstrated either of those capacities in the past few weeks?

A: In the past few weeks there has been no occasion to demonstrate that capacity.

Q: I am speaking more of will than military capacity.

A: I can only speak for the Administration. The Administration believes that we have the military capacity. And we certainly have the will to resist any expansionist moves, any irresponsible actions.

We believe also that, after an understandable readjustment in the executive-congressional balance, that within the Congress there is a growing realization that, in times of crisis, decisive American action may be necessary. What the congressional reaction will be in specific circumstances can, of course, not be determined until the circumstances arise.

Q: Well, one of the charges that's been leveled against the Administration is of an unwillingness to use some of the web of relationships that you've built up over the past couple of years with the Soviet Union, to withhold from the Soviets, for example, some of the scientific information—or the wheat, as in the grain deal. Can you give one instance where the United States, over the past few months, has implemented any of these tools?

A: The fact is that as a result of legislative actions, this web of relationships exists more in the

imagination of some writers than in reality. There are no technological exchanges of any significance that could have been interrupted. The only item of any significance that was available for interruption was the sale of grain.

As you know, the Administration is already being accused of having interrupted that for four months last year. And it is obvious that a major trading relationship cannot be interrupted every three months and still be available as a part of a fabric of the overall relationship.

Except for that, there are no significant exchanges in which the government participates that could have been interrupted. We did interrupt those items that were mostly of a discussion nature that were available to us to indicate our displeasure with the actions that had been taken. But, I repeat, the United States will use the tools it has available. And it would have used more tools had they been made available, in case there were irresponsible actions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you seeing any reaction whatsoever—in any positive form—to these warnings that you have been sounding since February? You have said that U.S.-Soviet relations cannot survive another Angola. Are you not having greater difficulty distinguishing between the validity of maintaining these two tracks than you have had before, if the weight that you are putting, and you are emphasizing, here is so heavy on the danger the Soviet Union is putting on the maintenance of the total relationship?

A: I'm not absolutely sure that I understand all the ramifications of the question.

Q: Try any one of them.

A: But as I understand the question, of course there haven't been any more Angolas since January. I would not consider that conclusive within any four-month period. And I believe that the Soviet Union is taking stock, just as we are, of the significance of recent events.

I can only repeat that the basic validity of our two-track approach remains in effect. Of course, in specific periods, it may be that one has to put more emphasis on one side rather than the other.

At this point, we have to warn against the dangers of irresponsible actions because there is a danger of irresponsible action. But we would also emphasize that we are prepared to work for a better relationship and the choice is essentially up to the Soviet Union.

Q: Mr. Secretary, if I can go back to an earlier question here and your answer about the American commitment to black majority rule in Africa: the Administration is on record as opposing the Byrd Amendment, but doesn't really do anything to get

it repealed. You made strong statements reaffirming the commitment to black majority rule only after the Soviet Union and Cuba intervened in Angola. And the only question was: How are you going to make credible, now, in view of this past history, this commitment and this desire for change in southern Africa?

A: Well, that will be one of the problems on my African trip. And I think that the decision that will have to be made by African countries, as by us, is to what extent they want to continue discussions about the past or to what extent they are willing to turn to the future.

There have been periods, for example, in our Middle East policy, when it would have been equally correct to say that the United States did not pursue an extremely active Middle East policy. When we decided that the time was right to move, for whatever reason, we became more active.

The same is true in Africa. I am going to Africa with an open mind and with the intention of working together with African nations to achieve those objectives which we share. It is now up, in part, to the African nations to see with what attitude they will respond.

We will certainly go with an attitude of goodwill and with an open mind and with some concrete ideas, which we are prepared to modify, of how these objectives—both in the political field and in the economic field—can be realized.

Q: Mr. Secretary, President Kaunda [Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia] and President Nyerere [Julius Nyerere of Tanzania] have both advocated that war is probably the only solution for the racial problem. The leaders of the black African movement in Rhodesia have described your visit as an attempt to set up a puppet regime of Africans. Do you think you might be missing the boat on this one? Are you going in a little bit too late?

A: Well, that remains to be seen. We certainly do not go to set up a puppet regime. It is beyond our capabilities, and it is beyond our intentions.

The only successful African policy is one in which African nations can achieve African objectives without outside intervention. Whether war is the only means available depends in part on the progress of negotiations between especially the Rhodesian regime and the black liberation movements in that area.

We have strongly supported the urgent resumption of negotiations. We have also supported the proposals put forward by the then British Foreign Secretary Callaghan.

So I believe that it may be possible to achieve these objectives by peaceful means, and that is certainly our preference.

Q: Before you go ahead, may I ask three related Mideast questions?

First of all, has any compromise been reached on the transition funds for Israel?

A: To the best of my knowledge, no.

Q: Secondly, has there been any change in the U.S. position regarding whether Israel should negotiate with the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]?

A: No.

Q: And third, what's your current assessment of the situation in Lebanon and the number of Syrian troops now in Lebanon?

A: Well, the situation in Lebanon remains precarious. You have many factions, with partially incompatible objectives. You have the total absence, at this moment, of a central authority with its own means of enforcing its directives. Now, you have a precarious cease-fire. You have an attempt to work out a constitutional solution. And over all of this hangs the threat of various kinds of outside intervention, some by countries in the area, some by countries outside of the area.

Now, we're attempting to assist the parties in walking through this minefield, in avoiding outside intervention, in achieving a political solution that preserves a degree of autonomy for both of the communities and that preserves the integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon.

There has been some Syrian military intervention in the border areas. There has not been a massive military intervention in the key areas. We are opposed to the military intervention of outside countries, and we have repeatedly pointed out the factual situation that there is a flashpoint at which events could become irreversible.

Up to now, we think that the general evolution in Lebanon has moved in the direction of a constitutional solution which preserves a position for both of the communities. And we believe also that the best way to prevent outside intervention is to bring about this constitutional solution within Lebanon as rapidly as possible.

I think we have announced that Ambassador [L. Dean] Brown—who has done an outstanding job—is returning for consultations. I'm meeting with him in London tomorrow night, and then he's coming back to the United States. His assignment was always to be a temporary assignment. He will return briefly to Lebanon, and then he will be replaced by Ambassador Meloy [Francis E. Meloy, Jr.] in the first part of May.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could take us into your confidence and share some of your private thoughts with us.

What are you not doing in order to accommo-

date to the political requirements of President Ford under attack by Senator Jackson and Governor Reagan? What areas of American foreign policy are now languishing—loitering, so to speak—because you find yourself hampered by political requirements?

A: Well, it would be very difficult to answer this in absolute terms. There are no occasions when the President and I meet where he would say "We cannot do this for political reasons."

On the other hand, it is clear that when there are so many candidates in the field and when there's a possibility of being accused of political motivations in making a dramatic move, that there is a temptation—or a tendency—to defer dramatic moves that could be seen as being politically motivated until that particular element of discord is removed. And that is not so much because of any immediate controversy, but because of the necessity that our foreign policy be seen as the foreign policy of a unified country and not as being inspired by partisan maneuvers.

So, on the whole, I think it is true that as foreign countries look at the United States every four years, there is a certain slowdown in new initiatives that can be carried out. This is part of the price we pay for our free political process. It seems to happen every four years. And it is unavoidable, to some extent—though compressing the political campaign would not hurt our foreign policy.

Q: Mr. Secretary, just a second ago, when you said that there was a threat of some outside intervention in Lebanon from countries outside of the area—not only from countries—were you referring to the Soviet Union?

A: I do not believe that there is any immediate threat of Soviet intervention in the area. There's the general danger that, in case of a Middle East war, that outside powers might be drawn in, at least, in the form of confrontations, as has happened in every other Middle East confrontation.

Q: With respect to your forthcoming trip to Africa, you state you're in favor of majority rule. Why hasn't the Administration made a concerted effort to repeal the Byrd Amendment? There was an attempt by some Congressmen to do that in the last two weeks, but they said they couldn't do it unless there was Administration support.

A: In the last few weeks there was an attempt to hang a repeal of the Byrd Amendment on another piece of legislation. I would expect that after my return from Africa we will take another look at the Byrd Amendment, and we will make our position clear to the Congress insofar as it isn't clear today.

Q: Mr. Secretary, to follow up that, is the United States ready to do anything to limit our economic relations with South Africa? And are we ready to give any kind of support, economic or otherwise, to any of the liberation groups, particularly Rhodesian groups?

A: Well, the United States has already restricted its economic contact, its governmental economic contact with South Africa. But we will announce an integrated policy after my trip to Africa, after I've had an opportunity to meet with key leaders and after I have had an opportunity to report to the President for any decisions that he may want to make.

Q: Will it be any specific objective, Mr. Secretary, of yours on this trip to try to get negotiations between the Smith regime and the black nationalist government of—

A: I would not say this is a specific objective by which you can measure the trip. We strongly favor the resumption of negotiations on Rhodesia at the earliest possible occasion. The primary objective of the trip is to establish with African leaders a community of concerns with respect to the problem of the political evolution of southern Africa and with respect to the problem of development which affects Africa more than any other region of the world, since all of its countries are really developing countries.

It's for this reason that I'm returning from Dakar clear across the continent to head our delegation at the UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] Conference in Nairobi—to put forward what I hope will be considered constructive American proposals to the general problem of development.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in what country will you meet with the black leaders of Rhodesia?

A: Probably in Zambia.

Q: Mr. Nkomo [Joshua Nkomo, leader of the internal faction of the African National Council]? And who else?

A: We will see as the trip develops. But certainly Mr. Nkomo.

Q: Mr. Secretary, it has been nearly a year since the fall of Saigon. You have had an exchange of messages with the leaders in Hanoi. What is your evaluation of the prospects toward normalization?

A: The leaders in Hanoi developed certain patterns of dealing with us during the Vietnamese war which are not always conducive to improving relations between the United States and Hanoi. They have a tendency to proceed by the formulation of ultimatums and to suffer from the misapprehension that we need an improved relationship with Hanoi in order to affect the outcome of

our elections. I have read this in various newspaper accounts in Hanoi.

As far as the United States is concerned, our principal interest is to get an accounting for the missing in action. And there is no possibility of improving our relationship without an accounting for the missing in action.

If Hanoi believes that we are doing this in order to affect the outcome of the election, we are perfectly prepared to wait for discussions until after the election, and thereby remove this particular issue.

We have stated publicly that we are, in principle, prepared to have talks with Hanoi in which each side will be free to raise any issue that it wishes, and that then the outcome of these talks can determine whether there is a sufficient basis for normalizing relations.

As far as we are concerned, the absolute precondition is a complete accounting for the missing in action.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there seems to have been something of a disparity between your statements on relations with Cuba and the President's. The President said that it was all over in attempts to achieve some kind of normalization; you said it was interrupted. And the President said that Castro was an international outlaw, and you didn't.

I ask now, in light of this apparent disparity, what has to be done to get some kind of attempt at normalization with Cuba going again? And how do you implement the hijacking agreement with a man who has been termed an international outlaw?

A: The President has a more plastic way of expressing himself than I do. Or I may have a more complicated way of expressing myself.

We, of course, are prepared to implement the hijacking agreement. And we do not approve of any activities that may be mounted from American territory against Cuban shipping.

There is no possibility of continuing any discussions with Cuba about normalization of relations as long as Cuban military forces are stationed in Africa, and as long as Cuba continues the attacks on America, on American policy in Puerto Rico and elsewhere.

So, unless there is a substantial change in Cuban attitudes, the process of improving relations can be considered suspended.

Q: Mr. Secretary, let me ask you about the status of the Hawk missile deal with Jordan. Has it fallen through? Is it true that it is out of the question?

A: The Hawk missile deal with Jordan, which was originally computed primarily on the basis of hardware, when the additional collateral costs

became evident, went beyond what Saudi Arabia had originally promised to Jordan. There are now discussions going on between Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and between the United States and Saudi Arabia, to see whether Saudi Arabia would be prepared to support the additional costs that would be involved in the Hawk deal.

These discussions are still going on: and until we have conclusive answer, we cannot tell whether the Hawk deal can be implemented.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what did you mean when you said the President has a plastic way of expressing himself?

A: You are absolutely determined that I ruin myself before I get off to Africa. [Laughter.]

Q: Plastic melts in heat. I don't understand the term.

A: I am not aware that plastic melts in heat. I think that the President's use of adjectives is more graphic than mine because, being from the Teutonic tradition, you cannot tell what a sentence of mine means until I place the verb at the end of it. [Laughter.]

Q: Mr. Secretary, is it a fair summary of your response to Bernie Kalb's [CBS] question that there will be no new initiatives in dealings with the Soviet Union—what? Until the Republican Convention or until the election? Until Reagan is out of the way? What are you saying exactly?

Q: Mr. Secretary—

A: Wait a minute. Do you want to answer the question?

Q: No. [Laughter.]

A: As I understood Bernie Kalb's question, it was in the great philosophical tradition of these press conferences.

Q: Yes.

A: And he asked me to give a brief political science lecture on the impact of political campaigns on the conduct of foreign policy. And I stated, as a general proposition, that those new initiatives that might be considered by the public as being motivated by partisan considerations would tend to be deferred until it is clearer that they are not motivated by partisan considerations—if they can be deferred.

On the other hand, there are many well established policies, including SALT, which the President reaffirmed again yesterday, basic relationships with Western Europe, basic relationships with Japan and other areas, as well as new African policies, that will of course be pursued with energy and conviction during the campaign.

I simply responded in a philosophical way to a philosophical question, and you should not draw—

Q: Mr. Secretary, can I strip my question of the philosophy now, and take you to the specifics? Can you itemize, for example, what initiatives might in fact be deferred because they might be perceived, as you suggest, as deriving from partisan consideration? What would you feel is being in fact put off until the election?

A: First of all, I didn't say that matters would be put off until the election. I stated the fact that, as far as foreign governments are concerned, the perception of the United States in an election year, with all the controversy that is going on about basic policies and our basic intentions, tends to be that in an election year there is a slowdown on great new initiatives.

There is no specific initiative, as I specifically pointed out, which has been deferred as a result of the electoral campaign. But it is obvious that the attention of key personnel is focused not exclusively on foreign policy. At least that is my impression.

Q: Assistant Secretary [of State for Inter-American Affairs William D.] Rogers called in Chilean junta Ambassador Manuel Trucco to criticize the continuing violations of human rights in that country, and particularly harassment of the Chileans who had met with U.S. Congressmen in Chile recently. This would seem to indicate Administration displeasure with the military regime's policies. But at the same time, it has been announced that you plan to attend the OAS [Organization of American States] meeting in Santiago in June; and that possibility has been criticized by some as one that would legitimize that dictatorship's policies. Do you plan to attend the meeting? And could you please respond to the criticism?

A: The meeting in Santiago is a meeting of all the foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere. It is a meeting of the OAS in Santiago. All other foreign ministers, with one possible exception, are planning to attend.

The purpose of my visit to this meeting would be to continue discussions about our Western Hemisphere policy with my Latin American colleagues. And when I go, if I go—which is highly probable—I would plan to visit those countries in Latin America, or most of those countries in Latin America, that I did not have an opportunity to visit on my first trip.

Q: Mr. Secretary, isn't the negotiation on the Panama Canal an example of the sort of thing that is being deferred until after the election? And in that connection, doesn't the controversy over the Canal, in a way, help your negotiating position to

show how much opposition, and how slowly you have to go?

A: Well, I don't want to encourage any more of the statements which we have suffered with respect to the Panama Canal.

With respect to the Panama Canal, there are a number of key issues that have to be settled before we can be sure that an agreement is possible. We believe that the basic issue is under what conditions the free and open and neutral access through the Canal, which is essential for the United States, can best be guaranteed and under what conditions our relationships with the Western Hemisphere, with other nations of the Western Hemisphere, can best be preserved.

It is our judgment that the negotiations that are now going on are the best way of doing this. Their pace is importantly determined by the ability to settle specific issues, and the degree to which the current debate influences the negotiating process can be argued on both sides.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there is a recent report that the State Department not only knew of some overseas payoffs by American corporations regarding arms sales but also, in some cases, the Department asked officials to assist in those arms sales. Ambassador Akins [James Akins, former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia] is supposed to testify on that next month.

A: I think those statements are absolutely irresponsible. The only case that has come to my attention, which was after it was published in a newspaper, involved a request to us by the Defense Department to clarify some requests that, in turn, had been made to the Defense Department with respect to some fees, not with respect to some payoffs.

We sent a routine cable, which was done at a very low level on a routine basis, to find out the Saudi perception of their legal obligations. It was quite the opposite of what has been alleged. It was not an attempt to bring about a payment, but to determine what the legal status of this particular incident was.

And I welcome Ambassador Akins testifying about this.

Q: Why do you think he had a different perception of those cables than you do?

A: Because he has retired as Ambassador, and he has been going through his cables at a frantic rate. [Laughter.]

Q: Mr. Secretary, concerning your stopover in Paris, will you be discussing with the French Government the proposal by a group of French parliamentarians that the French set up some kind of

safeguarding peace force in Lebanon once the new government has been formed?

A: I have no particular agenda to discuss in Paris. Of course, France, with its long tradition of relationships in Africa, will—I would expect its leaders will want to discuss my impressions of the African trip.

Also, we are look forward to the visit of President Giscard to this country and I expect to discuss with him in general terms a possible agenda of his meeting with President Ford.

Finally, with respect to Lebanon, France again has had an historic relationship. There have been French missions to Lebanon. We have exchanged information during this recent crisis. I do not plan to discuss any particular solution or any particular French role in Lebanon or in the solution of the Lebanese crisis, but I will be prepared to discuss it if my French hosts would care to raise it.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the President said, as I understand him, that his purpose in the Panama Canal negotiations is to retain U.S. rights to control, maintenance, and defense through the life of

the pending treaty. Is that your perception of the negotiations? Is that the perception of the Panamanians, as you understand it?

A: That is substantially my perception of the negotiations. But in any event, the United States, regardless of control and defense arrangements, will insist on the permanent, free, and neutral and open passage of American ships through the Canal.

Q: Is the United States willing to share control and maintenance during the life of the treaty?

A: That is correct.

Q: Since you are going to see black Rhodesian leaders on this trip, will you also see white Rhodesian leaders anywhere?

A: I do not plan to see white Rhodesian leaders on this trip. I do not consider this trip to be the last word in our African policy. I expect it to be the basis from which an integrated African policy will be developed and therefore, we expect to be in contact with other leaders in both black African countries, as well as in white southern African countries, or with southern African regimes, after I return to the United States.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.


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MR. JENIS M. FRANK
HEAD OF AL HISTORY UNIT
HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS US MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON

20220

Subsisty**COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS**

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the NAVY ACHIEVEMENT MEDAL to

GUNNERY SERGEANT EDWARD J. CAMERON, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For professional achievement in the superior performance of his duties while serving as the Administrative Chief, San Onofre Refugee Camp, Military Coordination Center, Operation NEW ARRIVALS, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California, from April to October 1975. Gunnery Sergeant Cameron consistently performed his demanding duties in an exemplary and highly professional manner. Displaying exceptional skill and resourcefulness in the initial urgent phase of the operation, he supervised the billeting, issuance of supplies, and feeding of thousands of Southeast Asian refugees. He subsequently developed and maintained a highly responsive locator system for the more than 6,000 refugees processed through the camp. His section was immediately responsive in providing accurate data to the numerous agencies of the Inter-Agency Task Force under whose auspices all alien registration and sponsorship actions were accomplished. Gunnery Sergeant Cameron's performance throughout was characterized by initiative, imagination, resourcefulness, and selfless devotion to the myriad duties assigned. He gained the respect and admiration of all with whom he served and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

For the Secretary of the Navy,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Lansdown", is written over a horizontal line.

Commandant of the Marine Corps



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting
the MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL to


CAPTAIN WILLIAM V. COWAN
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For outstanding meritorious service as Operations Officer, Refugee Affairs Section, and subsequently as Camp Commander, San Onofre Refugee Camp, Military Coordination Center, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California during Operation NEW ARRIVALS from 27 April 1975 to 5 November 1975. Captain Cowan exhibited exemplary leadership and organizational ability in forming a highly responsive and dedicated Refugee Affairs staff capable of effectively responding to hundreds of queries in connection with the arrival of thousands of refugees from Indo-china and of solving a myriad of unique problems associated with the arrival of the initial influx of refugees. As Camp Commander of the San Onofre Refugee Camp, the only camp housing both Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees and the only camp geographically separated from the Inter-Agency Task Force complex, he appointed English speaking refugees as coordinators between his staff and the more than 2,000 refugees billeted in the camp, as well as orchestrating a harmonious relationship between the peoples of the two disparate cultures. His camp was selected as the site for temporarily billeting a group of repatriates, a sensitive and potentially explosive situation. Though the possibility of disorder and confusion existed, Captain Cowan's organized manner, calm disposition, compassion, and sound judgment were prime factors in the success realized. Throughout his tenure, Captain Cowan directed his total efforts and energy toward the assignment; thereby reflecting great credit upon himself and upholding the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

For the President,


Secretary of the Navy



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

The President of the United States takes pleasure in
the MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL to

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEPH H. OLIVER, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For outstanding meritorious service as Assistant Officer in Charge, Military Coordination Center, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California during Operation NEW ARRIVALS from 31 July 1975 to 15 November 1975. An extremely competent and resourceful leader, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver consistently displayed exceptional managerial and leadership abilities. In addition to routinely supervising and coordinating the functions of the Center's staff, he coordinated with officials of the Departments of State and Health, Education, and Welfare, as well as Immigration and Naturalization Service in controlling the flow of refugees to those federal and civil agencies of the Inter-Agency Task Force where all processing was accomplished. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver conducted frequent visits to each of the seven refugee camps, ensuring that accommodations were adequate, high sanitary standards maintained, security was responsive, and all supply and logistical requirements were satisfied. He supervised the processing and movement to point of departure of a large group of repatriates, a highly sensitive and potentially explosive situation with an intense news media interest. Though the possibility of disorder, confusion, and adverse media coverage existed, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver's organized manner and sound judgment ensured execution of the process with diplomacy and discretion. Further, he coordinated the drafting and publication of a comprehensive plan for the incremental phasedown of operations that contributed significantly to the orderly closure of the Coordination Center. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver's professionalism and selfless dedication under the most arduous conditions reflect the highest credit to the United States Marine Corps and the Department of Defense.

Service.

For the President,

James M. McInerney
Secretary of the Navy



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting
the MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL to

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DOMENICK MUFFI
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For outstanding meritorious service as Officer-in-Charge, Logistic Support Group, Military Coordination Center, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California during Operation NEW ARRIVALS from 2 May 1975 to 15 November 1975. An extremely competent and resourceful leader, Lieutenant Colonel Muffi continuously displayed superb managerial abilities in coordinating all aspects of the supply, motor transport, food service, engineer, medical, and baggage sections' efforts in support of the processing of more than 50,000 refugees from Indochina. He supervised a food service operation employing at its peak in excess of 900 Marine Corps and Navy personnel preparing and serving over 54,000 meals at a cost approximating \$31,000 daily. Further, Lieutenant Colonel Muffi directed and supervised procurement and emplacement of 1,049 general purpose tents, over 100 mobile homes, and the employment of more than 60 rental vehicles and thousands of other supply items, as well as refurbishment and construction of additional facilities required by the Inter-Agency Task Force. In preparation for the closing of operations, he established a massive and complex program for ensuring that all supplies and equipment were properly repaired, serviced, preserved, and packed prior to return to lending agencies. Lieutenant Colonel Muffi's exemplary performance and total devotion to duty reflected great credit upon himself and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

For the President,

Secretary of the Navy



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting
the LEGION OF MERIT to

COLONEL OWEN L. OWENS
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service as Deputy Inspector General, Staff, Commander-in-Chief Pacific from June 1974 to May 1976. During his tenure, Colonel Owens discharged his responsibilities with exceptional judgment, initiative, and perseverance in conceiving and developing procedures for evaluating joint operational readiness and nuclear weapon security, resulting in improved security and readiness in the Pacific Command. He was instrumental in achieving improved efficiencies and reductions of U. S. military presence abroad through survey and analysis of Department of Defense activities in the Pacific Command area. Additionally, his inquiry into recovery operations of the SS MAYAGUEZ and crew led to improved operational and intelligence procedures. Colonel Owens consistently demonstrated outstanding professional competence, perception, and a broad and comprehensive knowledge of the complex and intricate coordination required at Unified Command and higher levels. By his distinctive achievements and steadfast dedication in an important and demanding position, Colonel Owens reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

For the President, *H. G. P. 16*

William M. Montgomery
Secretary of the Navy

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NEWS RELEASE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

VIETNAM EVACUATION LAUDED
Release No. DLS-152-75
Tel: OX-4-4309

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 21, 1975 (USMC) -- While the evacuation of Saigon and South Vietnam is history, Marines and other servicemen associated with the mammoth effort continue to receive praise from federal and military levels.

Marines participated in Operation Frequent Wind (the Saigon evacuation), and served as security detachments aboard American merchant ships. The ship security forces were the prime target of Seventh Fleet Commander Vice Adm. George P. Steele's laudatory comments.

"The use of Marines in this role," Steele noted, "while not new in our nation's history, is one that we seldom associate with the normal activities of the Corps."

"The presence of the detachment...assured that there would be no riots or mutinies on the ships they were assigned. Besides offering a stabilizing influence, the Marines performed humanitarian acts too numerous to count," the admiral wrote.

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The majority of Marines assigned to the evacuation, however, participated in the Saigon rescue operations. William E. Colby, Director, Civilian Intelligence Agency, highlighted the actions of the servicemen assigned to that mission in a letter to Gen. George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"All our personnel were evacuated as well as substantial numbers of Vietnamese who worked with this agency over the past years and whose very lives would have been forfeit had they been left behind," Colby proclaimed.

Colby also singled out the courage, precision and flexibility of the Saigon operation.

"While we may have become accustomed to this quality," he said, "it will not pass without a deep vote of appreciation from your colleagues in this agency."

- USMC -



NEWS RELEASE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINES SWOOP INTO BESIEGED PHNOM PENH, EVACUATE CIVILIANS
Release No. BAM-111-75
Tel: OX-4-4309

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 17, 1975 (USMC) -- A ground combat force of U.S. Marine infantrymen and two squadrons of Marine helicopters, launched from U.S. Seventh Fleet carriers steaming in the Gulf of Siam, teamed up Saturday (April 12) to evacuate nearly 300 Americans and foreign nationals from the embattled capital of Cambodia.

The rapid evacuation from Phnom Penh was termed an impressive success because of surprise and good planning, along with "teamwork and coordination under rather difficult circumstances" by Adm. Noel Gayler, commander of U.S. Pacific forces, a news dispatch from Camp Smith, Hawaii, reported.

Code-named "Operation Eagle Pull," Marine riflemen, under the command of Col. S. H. Batchelder Jr., were lifted in Marine helicopters from the USS Okinawa to a soccer field near the American Embassy during the early morning hours. The choppers were escorted to the improvised landing zone by aircraft of the U.S. Seventh Air Force. Marine CH-53 Sea Stallions, flying from the USS Hancock, later gave support to the ground and air elements of the Marine Amphibious Unit which conducted the evacuation.

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As the troop-carrying choppers landed, the combat equipped Marines charged out of them, immediately ringing the LZ with a defensive perimeter. No shots were fired during the more than two hours the Marines manned the lines.

As the last civilians to be evacuated were leaving, a Marine security guard permanently assigned to the American embassy hauled down the U.S. flag before boarding a chopper.

No incidents marred the swift evacuation. However, three rounds of high caliber enemy fire exploded in the LZ as the last Marine chopper launched. There were no casualties and none of the aircraft received damage.

- USMC -



NEWS RELEASE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

SIT-UP RECORD FALLS TO MARINE?
Release No. DG-113-75
Tel: OX-4-4309

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 118, 1975 (USMC) -- Capt. Wayne E. Rollings and the 49 persons observing him believe that he has set a world sit-up record.

On April-Fools-Day the Elloree, S.C., Marine set down in the United Nations Tiberias Control Center, Israel. When he got up 15 hours 32 minutes later, the two recorders and two supervisors had counted 35,000 non-stop continuous-motion, hands-behind-the-head straight-legged, elbow touch opposite knee sit-ups.

Guinness' Book of Sports Records says the record holder is FBI Special Agent John R. Greenshields who did 15,011 sit-ups in 6 hours while at the FBI Academy, MCB, Quantico, in 1966.

An observer with the U.N. Truce organization in the mid-east, Rollings, started training in January by doing 1,000 sit-ups, 500 push-ups and running at least six miles daily. The next month he upped his output to 2-3,000 sit-ups, 750 push-ups, 300 pull-ups and eight miles a day. In March he was doing 4,000 sit-ups, 1,000 push-ups, 300 pull-ups and running 10-16 miles per day.

The 35-year-old captain ended his training program by running 10 miles, resting 10 minutes, then he maxed the Marine PFT.

Rollings rested 10 days before making his bid for the sit-up record.

- USMC -



NEWS RELEASE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MERIT PROMOTIONS
Release No. DLS-117-75
Tel: OX-4-4309

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 18, 1975 (USMC) -- Meritorious promotion opportunities will increase for hundreds of lance corporals and corporals in the coming months according to a recent HQMC announcement.

ALMAR 28, announcing a forthcoming change to the Marine Corps Promotion Manual (MCO P1400.29A), authorizes meritorious promotions for an additional one-half percent of the on-board lance corporals and corporals each month. The added promotions are designed to recognize highly qualified Marines and to create a broader NCO base.

The promotions are in addition to those okayed for FMF commands in January 1974. FMF commands, at that time, were authorized to promote an additional one percent of the lance corporals to corporal. Under the latest change, FMF commands can meritoriously promote 3.5 percent to corporal and one percent to sergeant.

All other commanding generals may now meritoriously promote 2.5 percent of the lance corporals and one percent of the corporals.

- USMC -



NEWS RELEASE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

SPECIAL ELECTIONS
Release No. DG-112-75
Tel: OX-4-4309

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 18, 1975 (USMC) -- Marines and dependents who are residents of either California's 37th, or Chicago's 5th Congressional Districts, should register soon if they plan to vote in special elections slated May 27 for those two locales.

A special California primary April 29 to nominate candidates for U.S. Representative will precede the May balloting in the 37th District, formerly the 33d. Illinois has no special primary scheduled.

California Marines and dependents may apply for registration when requesting absentee ballots by sending a completed Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) to their home county clerk, indicating "Request Registration."

"Chi-town" residents of the 5th District need send only a completed FPCA to the City's Board of Election Commissioners, Room 308, City Hall, Chicago, Illinois 60602.

FPCA forms and additional voting information are available through unit voting officers.

- USMC -



NEWS RELEASE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MAY PICKED FOR SAVINGS BONDS PUSH
Release No. BAM-115-75
Tel: OX-4-4309

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 18, 1975 (USMC) -- Most Marines and civilian employees of the Corps can expect eyeball-to-eyeball contact from canvassers asking them to consider signing up for U.S. Savings Bonds in May.

During the month-long special effort, canvassers will stress the voluntary nature of the program, leaving the choice to sign up for deductions by allotment to the individual being canvassed.

A Secretary of Defense memorandum outlined the campaign objective, stating: "As we enter into a year in which the short range economic outlook continues to be somewhat bleak...purchase of Savings Bonds is not only a safe investment, but it is a substantial benefit to the Government..."

Individual purchases of bonds underwrite government spending programs, returning money to the economy and at the same time yielding no-risk, high dividends to the buyer when the bonds mature.

-- USMC --