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DC/S (AIR)

19 AUGUST 1966

SUBJECT: Consolidation of TAOCs in I Corps (U)

REFERENCE: Paragraph 34, CMC Trip to WestPac, 2-13 August 1966

SUMMARY OF PROBLEM REPORTED: General Westmoreland comments that there was no need for two TAOCs in I Corps, that those of the 7th AF and USMC should be consolidated.

COMMENT:

a. Marine Air is an integral component of III MAF. The close integration of air and ground operations is a basic tenet of Marine Corps combat doctrine.

b. The requirement for Marine Air to be immediately responsive to requests from Marine ground units engaged in operations in the I Corps area requires a control center familiar with Marine operations and the Marine air/ground concept.

c. The requirement for two TAOCs in I Corps is suspect, however, to effectively support the requirements of III MAF in carrying out his responsibilities as I Corps Commander, the TAOC operating in I Corps must of necessity be Marine oriented and controlled.

d. The responsibility of the Air Force Component Commander for air defense and coordinating authority for the Joint Force Commander for air operations of air units operating in the force commander's area is recognized and can be effectively supported through the Marine TAOC in the I Corps area.

RECOMMENDATION: No action required.

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals,
Declassified after 12 years

Orig: LCol Redmond
Typed: 19Aug66/cullen

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ITEM: Position Paper regarding Armed Helicopters in the Republic of Vietnam

PROBLEM:

1. JCS 2343/425 of 23 July 1964 (TAB A) contained a memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force in which the validity of the request by COMUSMACV for additional armed helicopters is questioned. Specifically, the memo requests that:

a. The entire problem of utilization of armed helicopters in RVN be examined prior to augmenting the existing force.

b. The rules of engagement applicable to commitment of the force be reviewed.

c. Priority of application of forces to the close support mission be reviewed.

d. The JCS evaluate the number of armed helicopters applied to a combat mission as opposed to helicopters required for transport functions to see if the present proposition reflects an unwarranted emphasis on the armed helicopters.

e. The Joint Staff develop specific questions to obtain information on which the above issues may be judged.

2. The questions were developed (TAB B) and submitted to CINCPAC (TAB C) with a request that answers be provided by 18 August.

BACKGROUND. The Marine Corps doctrine provides for tactical fixed wing aircraft to perform offensive and defensive fire mission in support of ground troops and helicopter movement.

In South Vietnam, Marine Corps helicopter units have been faced with a special situation in which Marine Corps tactical fixed wing aircraft have not been available to perform their normal support missions. Consequently, Marine helicopter units have employed that fire support which has been made available to them. This support has consisted of United States Army armed helicopters to provide escort for troop carrying helicopters, and to furnish protection in the landing zones.

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This armed configuration is effective against the relatively light ground fire in the vicinity of the landing zone particularly under the existing combination of rough terrain, low cloud cover, and limited visibility.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

1. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in May (TAB D), reaffirmed U. S. policy that U. S. military personnel will not take part in combat. He emphasized that helicopters are for use as transports and that their weapons are for protection of vehicles and passengers. Armed helicopters are not to be used as a substitute for close support air strikes.
2. COMUSMACV in Directive #95-2 of 19 June 1964, Subj: Operational Restrictions on U. S. Military Aircraft in RVN states that U. S. Army Armed Helicopters will not be used as a substitute for close support air strikes.
3. There are five Army Armed Helicopters in Danang under operational control of the Marine Task Element Commander. They escort the transport helicopters and provide protection in the landing zone on missions where, in the opinion of the Element Commander, protection is required.
4. CG FMFPAC reports from his recent visit to Vietnam, that the combination of low cloud cover, and rough terrain makes armed helicopter escort essential. The Task Element Commander reported that without the five Army helicopters, his level of operation would have to drop off by fifty percent. General Krulak recommends we gain the flexibility to meet the need for armed helicopter escort by procuring a simple, readily installable, weapons kit which can quickly convert a troop carrier to a weapons carrier and vice versa.
5. The ratio of armed helicopters to transport helicopters varies according to the missions. A medical evacuation may require only one transport and possibly two to four escorts. A troop lift of 20 transport helicopters could be adequately protected by the same number of escorts. Size of landing zone and degree of enemy opposition are primary factors.
6. The Marine Corps previously stated position on procurement of armed helicopters is that while they are effective against the relatively light ground fire currently encountered in Vietnam, due to its

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 ty, low performance and instability as a weapons platform
 eluated against any significant spectrum of ground fire
 nition, we do not intend to procure this type aircraft for the
 mary purpose of providing aerial fire support.

7. While we are interested in a VTOL capability, we believe there is a requirement for a light armed reconnaissance aircraft (LARA) as a predecessor to VTOL. The Marine Corps has developed a LARA which is a very light, two-place, STOL with sufficient flexibility to augment attack aircraft in support of helicopters or to provide primary support where political or other considerations deny the Marine Corps its normal means of helicopter support as in Vietnam.

8. Chief of Staff, USAF notes the recently approved increase of four VNAF A-1H fighter-bomber squadrons. He points out that the validity of this requirement must be recognized and given consideration before action is taken to increase the U. S. population in RVN.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. There is a requirement in Vietnam for escort and protection of transport helicopters particularly in the landing zones.
2. Because of low cloud cover, limited visibility and rough terrain, protection is best afforded by armed helicopters.
3. The success of the armed helicopters in Vietnam in that operational environment is insufficient cause for the Marine Corps to alter its decision not to buy armed helicopters.
4. The operational considerations and political limitations have confirmed the need for a fixed-wing light armed reconnaissance aircraft that can provide protection for transport helos and survive in an area of significant ground fire.
5. The rules of engagement, as worded, do not permit close air support missions by armed helicopters. However, protection of the transport helicopters and passengers should be a proper function for armed helicopters.
6. A high ratio of armed helicopters to transport helicopters is necessary to provide flexibility in Vietnam since other normal supporting arms are not available.

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7. If the Armed armed helicopters were to be withdrawn from support of Marine transport helicopters, substitute protection measures must be taken. We believe that, initially, this would consist of arming transport helicopters, thereby reducing troop transport capacity.

RECOMMENDED POSITION AND JUSTIFICATION:

1. **Position:** That armed helicopters are necessary for support of transport helicopters in Vietnam.

Justification:

1. Lack of normal supporting arms
2. Low ceiling and visibility, together with rough terrain, limit existing fixed wing support.

2. **Position:** That the rules of engagement be interpreted to permit protection of transport helicopters and passengers by armed helicopters.

Justification: Je;ocplters are vulnerable to any type of ground fire. Self protection reduces the transport capacity. The Army armed helicopter is the most efficient vehicle considering terrain, weather and availability.

3. **Position:** That a high ratio of armed helicopters to transport helicopters be maintained.

Justification: The absence of adequate normal supporting arms requires a higher ratio of armed helicopters to provide flexibility to the commander.

4. **Position:** That the Marine Corps retain the position that the armed helicopter is not the long range means of protection for transport helicopters. Fixed wing attack and a light armed reconnaissance aircraft should be obtained.

Justification: LARA has a much greater chance for survival on the battlefield than a helicopter. It has greater flexibility for employment.

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POSITION PAPER REGARDING ARMED HELICOPTERS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

7. The Marine Corps doctrine ^{provides} calls for tactical fixed wing aircraft to perform offensive and defensive fire mission in support of ground troops and helicopter movement.

In South Vietnam, Marine Corps helicopter units have been faced with a special situation in which Marine Corps tactical fixed wing aircraft has not been available to perform their normal support missions. Consequently, Marine helicopter units have employed that fire support which has been made available to them. This support has consisted of United States Army armed helicopters to provide escort for troop carrying helicopters, and to furnish protection in the landing zones.

This armed configuration is effective against the relatively light ground fire in the vicinity of the landing zone particularly under the existing combination of rough terrain, low cloud cover, and limited visibility. Marine Corps field commanders currently estimate that without the support of the 5 Army armed helicopters, the level of Marine Corps operations would drop ~~off~~ by fifty percent.

? Present rules of engagement preclude the use of armed helicopters as a substitute for close support air strikes. Armament is permitted on transport helicopters for defensive purposes only. Armament on Marine Corps transport helicopters consists of crew manned hand held weapons. While they are of limited benefit, they are not sufficient for protection of the aircraft and passengers. However, additional armament for adequate protection would derogate the transport function substantially. Use of the

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Army armed helicopters in a defensive role as a protective measure for the transport helicopter is warranted.

The ratio of transport helicopters to armed helicopters in the Marine Corps area varies with the location and type of mission. Medical evaluations requiring a single transport helicopter may need considerable protection. Troop transport or supply missions of twenty helicopters need protection by armed helicopters at a much lower ratio. There are 5 Army armed helicopters supporting a 24 plane UH34D Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron. This ratio is the minimum the Marine Corps could accept without instituting ^{protective} substitute measures that would derogate the transport function.

~~However,~~ Due to its vulnerability, low performance and instability as a weapons platform when evaluated against any significant spectrum of ground fire opposition, the Marine Corps does not intend to procure ^{an armed} ~~this type~~ ^{helicopter} ~~aircraft~~ for the primary purpose of providing aerial fire support.

The Marine Corps does not believe that any of the currently available helicopters can provide effective escort for transport helicopters over a sufficient range of operational environments to justify significant procurement for that purpose alone.

The Marine Corps has initiated the development of a fixed-wing light reconnaissance aircraft (LARA) as a predecessor to a VTOL aircraft. LARA is a very light, two-place, STOL with sufficient flexibility to augment attack aircraft in support of helicopters or to provide support in such areas as VietNam. *where ground fire poses a serious danger to the Marine Corps and its need for helicopter support.*

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CHAS STATEMENT FOR INSERTION IN RECORD OF COMMITTEE
HEARING IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST BY MR. FLORE

For the past 15 years, the Marine Corps has conducted experiments and tests to determine tactics and equipment requirements to decrease the vulnerability of the helicopter. Escort of assault helicopters by light attack (A-4) aircraft, T-28 propeller aircraft and armed helicopters have been studied, tested, and evaluated by Marine squadrons. Tests of helicopters equipped with anti-tank weapons, Bullpups, and guns were conducted and evaluated. Tactics including helicopter assaults under bad weather conditions and in rough terrain have been investigated both by test units and operational squadrons.

As a result of these tests and operational experience, it was quite apparent that a helicopter escort must possess a considerable speed advantage over the assault helicopter to render effective fire support. In addition, the escort aircraft must be very maneuverable, provide a good field of observation and carry a reasonable amount of offensive ordnance. The A-4 light attack aircraft, now in the Marine Corps inventory, is used for helicopter support. This aircraft has proved to be very effective for this purpose.

The Marine Corps has procured the Iroquois helicopter for the Observation Squadron in each Marine Aircraft Wing. These aircraft perform missions of artillery spotting, observation, liaison, medical evacuation, wire laying, and similar utility tasks. It is possible to equip this aircraft with light weapon systems for defensive and fire suppression purposes without appreciable degradation of its primary mission. This armed configuration has proved to be effective against the relatively light ground fire currently encountered in South Viet Nam, particularly when used for enemy fire suppression around the periphery of a helicopter landing zone. Under such circumstances, and where political considerations have prohibited the employment of attack aircraft in a helicopter support role, the flexibility afforded by arming the Iroquois has proved useful. However, due to its vulnerability, low performance, and instability as a weapons platform when evaluated against any significant spectrum of ground fire opposition, the Marine Corps does not intend to procure any aircraft of this type for the

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primary purpose of providing aerial fire support. Should very significant improvements in performance, payload, and stability be developed in aircraft of this type in the future, they will be fully evaluated.

Recognizing that there are frequent requirements for conducting observation missions over portions of the battlefield where significant ground fire opposition will be encountered, and in view of the vulnerability of light helicopters operating in such an environment, the Marine Corps has initiated development of a fixed-wing Light Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (LARA/COIN) for this purpose. This will be a very light, two-place, STOL aircraft with sufficient performance (275 kts.) to survive in such an environment. It will carry light ordnance and guns for defensive, fire suppression purposes. When available this aircraft will be further evaluated for its capability to augment the A-4 in providing helicopter escort.

In conclusion the Marine Corps does not believe that any of the currently available helicopters, due to their lack of maneuverability, speed advantage, vulnerability, and instability as a weapons platform, can provide effective escort for transport helicopters over a sufficient range of operational environments to justify significant procurement for that purpose alone. Even though the speed advantage of the KAMAN UH-2B over the Iroquois would provide some improvement, the increased costs involved do not appear to be offset by the improvement offered.

~~SECRET~~STUDIES ON AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY

1. Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc.

Subj: Generalized Attrition to Conventional Antiaircraft Weapons, with
Special Application to Light Surveillance Aircraft

date: 15 January 1959, Report No. GJ-1191-G-10

This report may be considered as the first in a series devoted to attrition studies. In particular this one investigates attrition due to conventional antiaircraft weapons. Subsequent reports are planned for the evaluation of the effectiveness of surface-to-air missile systems, attrition due to airborne air defense systems, and the role of decoys and jamming techniques in reducing the attrition of aircraft to both ground-based and airborne air defense systems.

This study attempts to serve two purposes: (1) Provide a parametric study which would answer questions concerning the importance of altitude, speed and maneuvers in determining survival probability; (2) Examine the relative capabilities of various reconnaissance aircraft against the weapons which intelligence sources consider as common in the conventional AA defense for a Russian Army. The emphasis has centered around the employment of drones as the reconnaissance vehicle. However, Mohawk has been considered as an example of a manned Army reconnaissance aircraft.

The results were obtained by setting up a mathematical model to determine the expected number of lethal hits and, hence, the survival probability as a function of the many parameters of the systems involved: aircraft speed and altitude, weapon effect radius, rate of fire, vulnerable area of aircraft to the defensive weapon. The model also took into account the effects of weapon slewing rates, time delays between detection and firing the first round and obstructions in the line-of-sight between weapon and aircraft due either to topographic features or radar horizon (masking).

Within the scope of the limitations stated in the study, certain general conclusions can be stated: (1) Flight altitudes under 1000 ft. (while obviously not optimum from a reconnaissance standpoint) provide significant improvements in survival probability. (2) Maneuvers of the order of 1g (RMS) will permit an aircraft to operate at the 4000-6000 ft. altitude levels with approximately the same survival probabilities as at the 500-1000 ft. levels. (3) The expected number of lethal hits is inversely proportional to a power of the velocity with the exponent varying between 1.5 and 2.0 for many cases. (4) If the defenses postulated by intelligence sources prove to be realistic, the survival probabilities of Army reconnaissance type aircraft at altitudes of 3000-10,000 ft will be low.

(The degree of improvement in survival probability that can be realized when

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suitable passive defense measures (ECM, decoys, etc.) are employed is not discussed in this report.)

2. Hayes Aircraft Corporation, Birmingham, Alabama

Subj: Project Red Skin

Date: June 1, 1959, Engineering Report Number 423

This is the first monthly report of Project Red Skin, which is a research study of the Bell Aircraft Company "Iroquois" turbo-shaft powered helicopter and the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation "Mohawk" turbo-prop powered aircraft, to determine their current vulnerability to infrared detection and heat seeking missiles and to propose methods of reducing this vulnerability. Specifically, the contract calls for the following:

1. Perform calculations on the infrared energy emitted by the exposed hot metal parts.
2. Study means for suppressing infrared energy by shielding and cooling aforementioned parts.
3. Perform studies on suppressing infrared energy by specially treating the surfaces of the hot metal parts.
4. Determine the infrared energy emitted by the aircraft in the wavelength region of 1.8 to 5.5 microns.
5. Study the effects of rotating propeller blades on the forward and aft aspects of the infrared radiation pattern.

During this reporting period, Project Red Skin personnel sought the cooperation of all interested technical parties. The Bell Aircraft Company and the Lycoming Division of AVCO Manufacturing Corporation Engineering and Management personnel have provided the only specific data received to date. In the case of the engines, all available and pertinent data has been received directly from Lycoming. While additional data is desirable for the proper conduct of the program, it does not now exist and is not available from any source. Accordingly, propulsion system specialists in Hayes Aircraft Corporation are developing this data from Lycoming measurements and calculations.

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Bell Aircraft Corporation personnel have provided data essential to the proper conduct of the program over and above that normally required in a new aircraft development program. They have screened the appropriate engineering design data and reports with Hayes' personnel and Hayes has requested the pertinent reports and drawings from the Air Force Project Officer by Hayes' letter with Serial No. 9-2887, dated May 25, 1959.

To obtain data on the Mohawk aircraft, it was necessary to direct a letter to the appropriate Bureau of Aeronautics "Class Desk". This letter requested all available design information on the "Mohawk" aircraft, inasmuch as Grumman Engineering Corporation personnel were unwilling to meet with Hayes Aircraft Corporation personnel during the reporting period. It is hoped that this matter can be resolved during the coming month, and that adequate "Mohawk" data can be obtained.

With the information made available by Lycoming and Bell, Project Red Skin has been initiated and first vulnerability patterns computed for the "Iroquois" and the "Mohawk". Both aircraft present no unusual suppression problems. Sources of infrared radiation of the Bell "Iroquois" include: the engine, together with its associated exhaust and cooling system; the main and tail rotor gear boxes; tail boom skins; and the cabin air heater installation. With the limited framework of available information, sources of Grumman "Mohawk" infrared energy include but are not limited to the engine exhaust system, the after nacelle skins, and the outer vertical tail planes.

3.

U. S. Army Combat Development Experimentation Center, Fort Ord, Cal.

Subj: Aircraft Vulnerability Experiment

date: 30 November 1959, Serial No. 123698

The experiment "Vulnerability of Low Flying Aircraft to Forward Area Ground Fires" was conducted by the US Army Combat Development Experimentation Center for the purpose of investigating the vulnerability of several types of low flying aircraft, expected to be available to the Army in 1965, to ground fires from forward battle area weapons of types expected to be available to an Aggressor during the same period.

In the course of the main experiment, data were collected on six types of weapons, three types of aircraft, four aircraft speeds, two altitudes, and three aircraft formations. In addition, four side experiments involving additional types of aircraft were conducted to obtain data on subjects relating to the aircraft vulnerability problem. This report, which supersedes the

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preliminary Aircraft Vulnerability Report, provides an enumeration of the objectives of the experiment; a presentation of findings, conclusions, and recommendations resulting from analysis of data obtained; a discussion of questions and comments generated by the preliminary report of the experiment; an evaluation of the results of the experiment; an analysis of the data obtained; a discussion of the methodology employed in designing the experiment and collecting the data; a description of the experiment as it was conducted in the field; and a summary of the side experiments.

Translation of tracking data to realistic levels of vulnerability is beyond the scope of this report for the conventional hand-held and optical-tracking, fixed-sight weapons. Kill probabilities are presented for a predicted-fire weapon, the VIGILANTE, and an infrared homing missile, the REDEYE.

THE Conclusions contained in this report are as follows:

- 1) Aircraft in the speed range of 75 to 450 knots operating under conditions of good visibility over areas defended by REDEYE-type infrared homing missiles and within effective range of such missiles, will be susceptible to high kill probabilities unless provided with effective counter-measures.
- 2) Aircraft in the speed range of 75 to 200 knots operating within 1200 yards of VIGILANTE-type weapons will encounter high kill probabilities unless provided with effective countermeasures.
- 3) High performance aircraft at contour altitude will have a low vulnerability to VIGILANTE-type weapons due to insufficient periods of good tracking.
- 4) At ranges of 1200 yards or greater, aircraft flying contour at speeds of 75 to 450 knots are not highly vulnerable to optical-tracking, fixed-sight weapons. At ranges less than 1200 yards aircraft flying at these speeds can be tracked by this type weapon.
- 5) Aircraft of the types employed in this experiment are not vulnerable to any appreciable degree to aimed fire from conventional hand-held weapons.
- 6) Vulnerability of all aircraft to all weapons may be reduced

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by contour flying at speeds in excess of 200 knots.

7) There may be a point of diminishing returns at which increases in speed, with attendant increases in contour altitude of operation and consequent increased time under fire, will not achieve the anticipated reductions in vulnerability.

The recommendations contained in this report are as follows:

- 1) Emphasis should be placed on the development of airborne and ground based countermeasures effective against REDEYE and VIGILANTE-type weapons.
- 2) Military characteristics for Army aircraft to be employed in the time frame under discussion should include the capability of speeds in excess of 200 knots with maximum maneuverability at low altitudes.
- 3) Combat development efforts should be directed toward maximum exploitation of night operations, conditions of limited visibility, and operations over forested and impenetrable terrain areas.
- 4) Further study and experimentation should be conducted to investigate factors which reduce aircraft vulnerability such as suppressive fires, both ground and air and evasive action by aircraft.
- 5) Further experimentation should be conducted to examine new weapons systems other than REDEYE and VIGILANTE.
- 6) No further experimentation should be conducted to determine vulnerability to conventional hand-held weapons using aimed fire.

4. Ballistic Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

Subj: Vulnerability of Army Aircraft and Helicopters to Impacting Projectiles (U)

Date: February 1960, Technical Note No. 1305

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This report presents the vulnerable areas of several Army aircraft and helicopters to impacting projectiles. The projectiles considered for this study are the Soviet 7.62mm (Caliber 0.30 API), 12.7mm (Caliber 0.50 API), and 14.5mm (Caliber 0.60 API) and the 37mm HE.

The aircraft and helicopters included in this study are the T-37, OF-1 Mohawk, L19 Bird Dog, L-23 Seminole, H-21 Shawnee, H-23 Raven, HU-1 (H-40) Iroquois and the Soviet MIG-17.

The information presented in this Technical Note is the result of a study made for The Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office and the U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimental Center. Tests were conducted by the CDEC to obtain the probability of acquiring and hitting various aircraft by ground troops. To provide additional information on the terminal effect of the hits on different types of aircraft, the Ballistic Research Laboratories made a cursory study of the aircrafts' vulnerability and reported the results of this study in letter form.

Since that time, however, the demand for information of this type, by other agencies, has been so great that the data are presented here as a report so that it may be available for rather general distribution.

These results are estimates based on existing data and available information on the aircraft. The lack of time, data and information did not permit a thorough study; however, the accuracy of the results may be sufficient for many users.

5. Ballistic Analysis Laboratory

Subj: Project THOR.

Date: May 1960. Technical Report No. 45.

Shielding by Aircraft Cabin Structures, III: H-21, H-40, L19
Analytical Evaluations (U)

6. Ballistic Analysis Laboratory

Subj: Distribution of AA Weapons in a Russian Motorized Rifle Division

Date: September 1960. Memorandum Report No. 1303

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7. Ballistic Research Laboratories

Subj: Passive Protection of Aircraft

Date: October 1961, Report No. 1151, by R.G. Bernier, H. Kostiak,
D. W. Mowrer

This report is presented as a guide to designers in minimizing the vulnerability of new aircraft. It does not attempt to dictate configurations, components or materials. It is intended as a "primer" to acquaint designers with the major considerations in aircraft vulnerability, as well as the many "pitfalls" in design details. Its purpose is to emphasize combat survival and to stimulate thought on "built-in protection" throughout the design of military aircraft. Special emphasis is placed on light observation helicopter (L.O.H.) but the report is applicable to all types of planes.

The need for protection in Army aircraft should be evident. Protection is a means of increasing survivability which is a very important factor in the Army concept of air mobility. If the aircraft has a high survival probability it will be able to perform a greater variety of missions and also will be more likely to be available when required.

The probability that an aircraft will not survive in combat because of enemy action is dependent primarily on three factors; namely, detection, hitting and killing. Each of these factors is important and each should be considered regardless of the enemy weapons that are employed. An increase in survivability is gained by a reduction in the probability of being detected, being hit or being killed. The probability of being detected is influenced by terrain, weather, speed, altitude, radar reflectivity, noise, etc. The probability of being hit when detected is influenced by altitude, speed, size of aircraft, etc. Many of these influencing factors (for example, altitude, speed, and size of aircraft) are dictated by the mission of the aircraft and cannot be altered significantly. However, a factor which is just as important as or perhaps even more important than any of these in terms of combat survival is the ability of the aircraft to withstand the effect of hits from enemy gunfire. It is very difficult to visualize aircraft performing such missions as target recognition and acquisition, suppressive fire, medical evacuation, surveillance, etc., without being exposed or coming within range of the enemy weapons. Other missions would also be possible if the chance of survival were sufficiently good. It must be remembered that with the light aircraft in the Army that every man with a rifle or carbine is capable of inflicting damage to the aircraft. (The threat is discussed in a separate section).

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The chance of survival can be increased easily and economically by reducing the probability that a hit results in a kill (vulnerable area). One of the reasons for studying the vulnerability of aircraft and helicopters is to be able to assist the designers in making aircraft less susceptible to damage from enemy ordnance. Based upon firing tests of many different types of ordnance weapons against all types of aircraft and aircraft components, knowledge of how aircraft are destroyed when hit was obtained. Tests have been conducted against many different types of power plants and fuel systems and, in general, against any component employed in an aircraft that could contribute to its vulnerability. This knowledge is available to designers so that aircraft can be made tougher and more capable of withstanding hits from enemy weapons.

The main message of this report is that vulnerability can be reduced without weight penalty, if, and only if, it is considered in early design. In fact, weight can sometimes be saved. Consideration of survivability on a par with performance, safety, and other factors, throughout design, will result not only in a more efficient aircraft, but a more efficient combat vehicle.

In considering a kill on an aircraft from one or more hits, a description of how the kill occurs is necessary. For example, if one hit defeats one component in an aircraft such as the engine, the result can be a kill on a single engine aircraft. The engine is denoted as a singly vulnerable component. If multiple hits are necessary for an aircraft kill such as in a two-engine aircraft where both engines must be defeated, then these components (engines) are called multiply vulnerable.

8. CANADAIR LIMITED, P.O. Box 6087, Montreal, Canada

Subj: Survivability of Aircraft Flying Nap of the Earth

Date: March 1961, CLASP-1013

Survivabilities of aircraft flying nap of the earth on reconnaissance missions in forward battlefield areas are given as functions of type of terrain, size and performance of the aircraft, and the weight of the threat from ground elements armed with single .60 cal. machine guns, quad .60 cal. AAMG, 57mm LAA guns and REDEYE-type A/A missiles.

Assumptions are made concerning the effect of the interplay of probability of detection of ground elements by the aircraft and vice versa,

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characteristics of terrain, operational use of the weapons.

With these assumptions it is found that present day helicopters can operate in close cover terrains with a high level of survivability. Aircraft with increased maximum speed and acceleration/deceleration performance maintain high survivability when operating in a wider variety of terrain. In very open terrain the effect of increased aircraft performance is negligible; target size is the important factor.

Aircraft operating in close support of ground forces in forward areas of a future battlefield will be forced to fly at altitudes less than 100 feet to avoid detection and possible subsequent destruction from hostile missiles of the NIKE or HAWK type. This low altitude flight brings the aircraft well within the effective range of small calibre machine gun and LAA fire from enemy ground troops, not to mention the small shoulder launched contact-fuzed homing missiles such as REDEYE.

To avoid the possibility of alerting the enemy and to minimize exposure if detected, aircraft will fly close to the ground and where possible within the cover of wooded areas, utilizing every terrain feature to obtain as much concealment as flying skill permits. Such tactics are now being taught to army helicopter pilots, so that they operate in wooded areas below average tree-top level. This type of flight, where an aerial vehicle is flown within a few feet of the ground or within the tree-tops, has been given the name of "nap of the earth flying". The objective of such flying is to enhance the probability of survival of the aerial vehicle by utilizing the principles that gunners have decreased chances of hitting a target they do not detect or which is exposed for such a short time that accurate firing is made very difficult.

Hover capability is desirable for flying nap of the earth because it is necessary for an aircraft to be able to remain within the concealment afforded by a wooded area, for example, while the crew surveys the open terrain beyond. This would be done while searching for hostile elements during reconnaissance and while estimating the route providing the most cover if it should be necessary to leave the present area of cover, and fly towards another. Terrains differ in the degree of concealment they afford, and they do not often provide continuous concealment. In flying within a terrain, the aircraft may be expected to fly within the cover of one wooded area, for example, and then if the mission requires it, fly to another area of cover passing across a more or less open area. Thus, in passing between these cover points, the aircraft may be unavoidably exposed to action by hitherto undetected hostile forces. The time of exposure will depend on the transit speed of the aircraft, and it is here that the aircraft with a high speed and

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acceleration/deceleration capability can be expected to gain over a more sluggish aircraft, other things being equal.

Considerable previous work has been done to calculate the kill probability of aircraft flying straight and level courses at various altitudes when fired upon by anti-aircraft guns. This work has been undertaken in studies whose primary objective was a comparative evaluation of several proposed or existent anti-aircraft weapon systems, rather than an absolute assessment of the survivability of aircraft against anti-aircraft guns. While some crude estimates of the survivability of aircraft flying nap of the earth have been made under the assumption that the aircraft is flying across the open area between two cover points and is engaged by a twin 57 mm SP gun, these results are only useful insofar as they underline the degree of dependence of survivability upon time of exposure and the time required to bring the aircraft under fire. Further analytical work attempting to estimate the survivability of aircraft flying nap of the earth in territory possibly containing hostile elements is not known to exist.

An experiment to measure the vulnerability of aircraft flying contour and at 300 feet was recently held at CDEC, Fort Ord. In this trial, the aircraft were flown along a pre-determined straight course, and measurements were made with various weapons which, upon data reduction, should allow estimates to be made of the probabilities of hit and kill of the aircraft by the weapons. However, conditions in the experiment are not believed to have been sufficiently realistic and it appears fairly clear that the aircraft in the experiment were not flying nap of the earth as defined by the US Army Aviation School. Consequently these CDEC results are not very useful in assessing the survivability of an aircraft performing nap of the earth reconnaissance.

The present work was undertaken to provide a more realistic evaluation of the interplay of aircraft characteristics such as size, acceleration, and speed capability, and the degree of openness of a terrain in determining the exposure time and consequent probability of survival when an aircraft, in performing nap of the earth reconnaissance, attempts to cross an open area between cover points, and is taken under fire by previously undetected enemy elements.

9. REPORT. Ad Hoc Committee to Study The Vulnerability of Army Aircraft.

Date: 19 September 1962. SPECIAL NOTE: This is an all

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encompassing report. If you do not have a copy on hand, I recommend that you take steps to obtain one. It contains the type information for which you are looking.

10. The Kaman Aircraft Corporation, Kaman Nuclear, A Division of Kaman Aircraft Corporation, Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Subj: Vulnerability of Helicopters to Small Arms Fire (Revised)

Date: 13 December 1963. KN-63-59A(R). SPECIAL NOTE.

This is another excellent report and I recommend that you obtain a copy from Kaman Aircraft Co.

Analysis of the vulnerability of the UH-2A Seasprite and the UH-1B Iroquois helicopters has indicated the Kaman UH-2A to be the least vulnerable to small arms fire in several differing modes of operation. Only a minor part of this reduction in vulnerability is due to the difference in vulnerable areas; the major factor is the operational speed difference between the two aircraft. With armor protection for critical components of both aircraft, the UH-2A is considered to be less than one-half as susceptible to small arms fire as the UH-1B.

Since the addition of armor to protect, at least partially, the vulnerable components of a helicopter is not completely successful, the effect of suppressive fire from the helicopter upon defensive troops was investigated. Of the several classes of weapons considered, the most useful suppressive weapon was found to be a white phosphorous loaded fragmentation grenade, with the standard offensive grenade a close competitor.

11. Ballistic Research Laboratories

Subj: Reduction of Army Aircraft Vulnerability

Date: August 1963. Memorandum Report No. 1496

This report consists of a briefing given by BRL personnel to the LOH contractors on the vulnerability of Army aircraft. Although the briefing primarily concerns the LOH, it is sufficiently general to be applicable to all Army aircraft.

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The report includes discussion on vulnerability and survivability of Army aircraft, protective materials and techniques for reducing vulnerability, and application of such methods to aircraft.

12. Ballistic Analysis Laboratory. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.

Subj: A Survivability Study of Transporting Troops by HRB-1 Helicopter in a Combat Environment.

Date: November 1963. Project THOR Technical Report No. 53

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15. Ballistic Protection Survey Team's Activity Report 1 August 1962 - 20 September 1962, Vietnam (U) ARPA (C 1199-63) (Protective Armor for Helicopters, Aircraft Protective Systems).
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17. Vulnerability of UH-2A Helicopters - Armor Protection and its Effect on Mission Survival (U), Air Warfare Research Department Report No. NADC-WR-6315, July 1963 (C 4172-63).
18. Command Control and Protection of Helicopters (Unapproved) First Interim Report - Protection 15 Dec 1959 - MCLFDC.
19. Hit Probabilities and Vulnerability of the UH-1B/SS-11 Weapons System Versus Stationary and Moving Tanks Under Simulated Tactical Conditions, 26 Nov 62. USCDC (Project Directive) (3504-62).
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23. Passive Protection for the Personnel of HU-1A Helicopters BRL Memorandum Report No. 1367 September 1961 (MCS 39791).
24. Assault Helicopter Vulnerability Analysis Report No. ARD-152, 30 Oct 1957, Hiller Helicopters (VTOL Amphibious Assault Transport System 1962 - 1967) (MCS 25280).
25. French Army Helicopter Operations in Algeria June 1956 - September 1959, Vertol Aircraft Corporation, 1 November 1959 (MCS 33743).

26. Current Quarterly Reports, MCLnO, Natick Laboratories.
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28. Groin Armor, Protective Helmet, Body Armor, RDT&E Project (Task) Card, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1960.
29. Selection of Aircraft Armor, Jackson and Moreland for Instrumentation Laboratory, MIT, Issued by Wright Air Development Center, Apr 1953.
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31. Efficient Armoring of Military Aircraft, Target Missile Study No. 1, Naval Research Laboratory Rept No. 16, May 1952.
32. Lightweight Armor, BRL ltr 33103, 15 May 1963.
33. Vulnerability of Army Aircraft and Helicopters to Impacting Projectiles BRL, 18 April 1960.
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35. Design Studies of Helicopter Armoring, CMC ltr Ser. 08A9359 to Chief, BuAer, 8 Apr 1959.
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Fort Rucker, Alabama**

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Vulnerability BR WSL BRL-U-Lightweight Armor A/C Weapons and. Aberdeen Proving Ground APG	2-63	C	C10036
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SUBJ: Buildup of RVNAF UH-34 Sqdms

S&C No. 92435

Additional Information:

From: *Commander, Task Element 79.3.3.6*
To: *CG, Air FMFAC*
Dated 28 Nov 1963

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

SUBJ: JOEG-V's Operational Evaluation of Armed Helicopters (C)
Short Title: OPENAH (U)

S&C No. JCS 2343/279 (2 Oct 1963)

Additional Information:

From: Note by the Secretaries to the JCS

To:

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

SUBJ: JOEG-V's Operational Eval of Armed Helicopters (C)
Short Title (OPENAH) (U)

S&C Nb90617

Additional Information:

From: Office of Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Field
~~Ex~~ Unit, Vietnam & Joint Opn Eval Group Vietnam

To: C/S Army dtd 29 Jul 1963

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AAP-3-bwz

POINT PAPER

Subj: Operating procedures for Marine Aircraft in South Vietnam

1. CINCPAC Instruction 003120.3 provides policy to govern the establishment of combat operations centers (COC) and air operations centers (AOC) in the Pacific Command for the exercise of command and control. Command, control and coordination of combat forces assigned to CINCPAC will be exercised through component commanders, or through subordinate unified commanders and joint task force commanders established by CINCPAC. Command, control, and coordination of forces assigned to subordinate unified or task force commanders will be exercised through their assigned Army, Navy and Air Force component commanders. Air Force component commanders will act as the coordinating authority for their force commander to coordinate air operations of air units operating in the area but not assigned to the Air Force component commander.

2. On 26 April 1965, CINCPAC issued instructions to promulgate CINCPAC policy and prescribe procedure for the conduct and control of close air support operations. It is applicable throughout PACOM, and Vietnam in particular. First priority of in-country air elements is the close air support of ground forces actually engaged in operations against the Viet-Cong. Stated principles are:

- a. There are 3 components of CAS:
 - (1) Support aircraft,
 - (2) FAC,
 - (3) CAS control agency.
- b. Aircraft will be maintained on alert for CAS.
- c. Alert aircraft will be subject to direct call by supported ground units through the control agency.
- d. Response of CAS aircraft will not be subject to mission evaluation at levels higher than the CAS control agency.
- e. CAS missions will be controlled by either a FAC or a TAC(A).

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f. COMUSMACV Air Force component commander (CG 2d Air Division) shall act as coordinating authority for matters pertaining to tactical air support and air traffic control. The coordination process will not degrade the responsiveness of CAS activity.

3. COMUSMACV message 270813Z April 1965 revises the procedures for operational coordination and control for forward air control in relation to 9th MAB units. Previous rules were designed for U. S. support of ARVN units by U. S. and VNAF aircraft. CG 9th MAB exercises operational control of 9th MAB air elements except for one helicopter squadron assigned to general support of I Corps and under OPCON of I Corps Senior Advisor.

4. The following rules apply:

a. Control of Jet aircraft.

(1) Marine jet aircraft will operate under the Tactical Air Control System of the 2d Air Division as exercised by the Air Operations Center (AOC).

(2) Marine Combat forces have first call on Marine aircraft.

(3) CG 9th MAB reports daily to AOC the aircraft availability together with Marine requirements. Available aircraft not required by Marine forces may be employed by AOC for other in-country missions.

(4) CAS strikes may be conducted under control of any one of the following:

(a) TACP

(b) TAC(A) (Marine or Air Force)

(c) If no TACP or TAC(A), an airborne U. S. Army observer may mark target. No Vietnamese observer is necessary with an airborne FAC, but his presence is desirable.

b. Direct Air Support.

(1) Marine elements may call directly on the I Corps Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) for Marine, USAF or VNAF fighter

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aircraft. ASOC will inform I Corps Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and determine whether there are friendly forces in the area. However, TOC cannot veto the launch of U. S. aircraft in close support of U. S. troops engaged in combat.

(2) TACP's, with battalions and separate companies, will utilize Vietnamese liaison parties to avoid strikes on friendly troops or civilians.

c. Interdiction strikes.

(1) Controlled area. Aircraft will conduct interdiction strikes (not involving CAS) only with approval of the TOC and will be controlled by a FAC or ALO aircraft with a Vietnamese observer aboard.

(2) Free Areas. Strikes require approval of TOC.

d. Employment of Utility (Transport) helicopters.

(1) 9th MAB controls directly the helicopters which are in direct support of 9th MAB. TOC will be informed of activities.

(2) 9th MAB requirements for helicopters additional to those in direct support will be forwarded to the I Corps TOC.

(3) Requests for 9th MAB direct support helicopters from other sources will be approved by the CG 9th MAB.

(4) One Marine helicopter squadron will be in general support of I Corps but available to 9th MAB as specified in paragraph 5d(2) above.

5. Representatives of COMUSMACV, III MEF, CINCPACFLT, and 7th Fleet agreed to the following rules for CAS of III MAF Landing operations.

a. TAC(A) will have a Vietnamese observer on board who can communicate with the RVNAF commander.

b. Liaison Officers.

(1) One RVNAF with TACP's.

(2) One RVNAF in the TACC afloat.

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(3) A TACP will be provided to the RVNAF Security Force Commander to control CAS of his forces.

c. Requests for CAS will be made to the TACC afloat or TACC ashore depending on location of control.

d. Control of shore based U. S. aircraft will be passed by the III MAF DASC to the TACC afloat while control is afloat. TACC afloat will direct those aircraft reporting for support to a TAC(A) or TACP. III MAF DASC will keep I Corps ASOC informed of missions assigned.

e. When control is ashore, the III MAF DASC will direct those aircraft reporting for support to the TAC(A) or TACP.

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TAB A (S) CINCPAC INST 003120.3, Policy governing the establishment of COC and AOC.

TAB B (S) CINCPAC msg 242345Z APR 1965, Conduct and control of CAS operations.

TAB C (C) COMUSMACV Directive No. 95-4 of 7 Sep 1964 on operating procedures and responsibilities for command, control and coordination of U. S. air operations in Vietnam.

TAB D (S) COMUSMACV msg 270813Z APR 1965, Rules of engagement and operating procedures for Marine jet aircraft in South Vietnam.

TAB E (TS) COMUSMACV msg 030128Z MAY, Report of coordination conference.

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TO COMUSMACV

CTF 76

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CTF 79

COM2AIRDIV

BT

S E C R E T

CHU LAI LANDING -AOA

A. MX 050318Z

Z. CTF 76 070002Z NOTAL

1. ESSENTIALLY THAT COMMAND AND CONTROL OF FORCES OPERATING VICINITY NIO BEACH 9 (CHU LAI LANDING BEACH) BE AGREE TO.

2. PARA 3 REF A STATES AMPHIBIOUS OBJ AREA AS MUTUALLY AGREED TO BY COMPHIBGRU ONE AND COMUSMACV. REF B INDICATES AOA STILL NOT FIRM.

3. FOR COMUSMACV: IN ORDER TO AVOID POSSIBLE MUTUAL INTERFERENCE REQ USAP AND VNAF AIRCRAFT NOT OPERATE WITHIN 25 MILE ARC LANDWARD CHU

PAGE 2 RUHLHL 2322 S E C R E T

LAI LANDING BEACH UNLESS UNDER CONTROL CATF (CTF 76 UNTIL AMPHIB OPERATION TERMINATED.)

4. FOR CTF 76: DO NOT ATTEMPT TO EFFECT OPCON OF RVN NAVAL SURFACE UNITS OPERATING WITH AOA.

5. FOR CTF 70.2.1.1: MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CONVINCE COM2AIRDIV TO KEEP USAP AND VNAF AIRCRAFT OUT OF AOA UNTIL AMPHIB OPERATION TERMINATED.

GP-4

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OPERATIONS VTC HU LAI CUD

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1. IN VIEW COMUSMACV REPORT (REF A) THAT FACILITIES CAPABLE FOR THE CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF THE LANDWARD PORTION AOA ARE IN POSITION AND ARE OPERATIONAL AND SUBJECT TO THE CONCURRENCE OF CATF (CTF 76), CTF (CTF 79) AND 38 III MAW, CONCUR THAT CONTROL OF AIR SHOULD BE HANDLED ASHORE IAW PARA 3.D (3) OF REF B AT 111600Z.

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1. REFERENCES:

a. REFERENCE

b. REFERENCE: COMUSMACV

c. REFERENCE: JCSM 1000.10, 1000.11, 1000.12, 1000.13, 1000.14, 1000.15, 1000.16, 1000.17, 1000.18, 1000.19, 1000.20, 1000.21, 1000.22, 1000.23, 1000.24, 1000.25, 1000.26, 1000.27, 1000.28, 1000.29, 1000.30, 1000.31, 1000.32, 1000.33, 1000.34, 1000.35, 1000.36, 1000.37, 1000.38, 1000.39, 1000.40, 1000.41, 1000.42, 1000.43, 1000.44, 1000.45, 1000.46, 1000.47, 1000.48, 1000.49, 1000.50, 1000.51, 1000.52, 1000.53, 1000.54, 1000.55, 1000.56, 1000.57, 1000.58, 1000.59, 1000.60, 1000.61, 1000.62, 1000.63, 1000.64, 1000.65, 1000.66, 1000.67, 1000.68, 1000.69, 1000.70, 1000.71, 1000.72, 1000.73, 1000.74, 1000.75, 1000.76, 1000.77, 1000.78, 1000.79, 1000.80, 1000.81, 1000.82, 1000.83, 1000.84, 1000.85, 1000.86, 1000.87, 1000.88, 1000.89, 1000.90, 1000.91, 1000.92, 1000.93, 1000.94, 1000.95, 1000.96, 1000.97, 1000.98, 1000.99, 1000.100

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 CONCEPT FOR US/ ALLIED COMBAT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT
 OF RVNAF

REF: MACVJ3 11682 DTG 116348Z CTG

1. (S) GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS BY US/ALLIED GROUND
 COMBAT FORCES IN SUPPORT OF RVNAF WAS INTRODUCED DURING THE
 1968 HONOLULU CONFERENCE. PROCEDURES AND RELATIONSHIPS
 INVOLVED IN COMMITTING US FORCES TO SECURITY AND OFFENSIVE
 OPERATIONS WITHIN RVNAF AS INDEPENDENT ELEMENTS OR IN COMBINATION
 WITH RVNAF AND /OR ALLIED FORCES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED HERE, AS
 FOLLOWS: M

2. DEFINITIONS: THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS APPLY TO
 TERMS USED IN THIS CONCEPT:

- (1) OPERATIONAL CONTROL- (THE EXERCISE OF US MILITARY
 TERMS FOR JOINT USAGE) - "THE EXERCISE OF COMMAND INVOLVING
 THE COMPOSITION OF SUBORDINATE FORCES, THE ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS,
 THE DESIGNATION OF OBJECTIVES AND THE AUTHORITATIVE DIRECTION
 NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION. OPERATIONAL CONTROL SHOULD
 BE EXERCISED BY THE USE OF THE ASSIGNED NORMAL ORGANIZATIONAL
 LINES THROUGH THEIR RESPONSIBLE COMMANDERS OR THROUGH THE COMMAN-
 DERS OF SUBORDINATE FORCES ESTABLISHED BY THE COMMANDER EXERCIS-
 ING OPERATIONAL CONTROL. IT DOES NOT INCLUDE SUCH MATTERS AS
 DISCIPLINE, INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND UNIT
 TRAINING, EXCEPT WHEN A SUBORDINATE COMMANDER REQUESTS ASSISTANCE.
- (2) TACTICAL DIRECTION- (AS SPECIALLY APPLIED IN
 THE CONCEPT) - "THE DEVELOPMENT BY A SENIOR TACTICAL COMMANDER
 OF PLANS, COORDINATES, AND OTHER INSTRUCTIONS NECESSARY FOR THE
 COORDINATED EXECUTION OF COMBAT OPERATIONS BY MULTI NATIONAL
 FORCES UNDER INDEPENDENT OPERATIONAL CONTROL WHICH NONETHELESS
 ARE COORDINATED BY MUTUAL CONSENT TO COORDINATE THEIR COMBAT ACTION.

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(TACTICAL DIRECTION IS A MORE PALATABLE TERM TO THE VIETNAMESE THAN OPERATIONAL CONTROL ALTHOUGH THE TACTICAL ARRANGEMENT IS THE SAME).

(3) COMBAT SUPPORT- (AS SPECIALLY APPLIED IN THIS CONCEPT) - - THE SUPPORT OF ONE COMBAT ELEMENT IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ITS MISSION BY ANOTHER COMBAT ELEMENT OF THE SAME OR DIFFERING NATIONALITY. THE NATURE OF THE SUPPORT IS MUTUALLY AGREED BETWEEN SENIOR COMMANDERS CONCERNED.

B. ASSUMPTIONS:

(1) NATIONAL FORCES WILL RETAIN THEIR COMMAND IDENTITY.

(2) US WILL NOT PLACE ITS FORCES UNDER THE OPCON OF RVNAF OR ALLIED COMMANDERS BUT WOULD IN AN EMERGENCY SUBMIT TO TEMPORARY TACTICAL DIRECTION OF TACTICAL ELEMENTS BY THE SENIOR COMMANDER ON THE SCENE.

(3) RVNAF MAY IN SOME SPECIAL CASES PLACE ITS FORCES UNDER US OPERATIONAL CONTROL OR TEMPORARY TACTICAL DIRECTION.

(4) ALLIED FORCES WILL ACCEPT OPCON BY US COMMANDERS, AND COMBAT UNITS WILL NORMALLY BE PLACED UNDER

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OPCON US COMMANDERS AT BRIGADE LEVEL OR HIGHER.

(5) OVERT, LARGE-SCALE PAVN/.CHICOM INTERVENTION WILL NOT OCCUR.

C. DISCUSSION:

(1) MISSION OF US FORCES AND ALLIED FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS TO RENDER ADVICE AND/OR COMBAT SUPPORT TO RVNAF. THIS RELATIONSHIP IS RESULT OF EVOLUTION OVER PAST SEVERAL YEARS; IS THOROUGHLY UNDERSTOOD BY RVNAF; AND IS AN ACCEPTED MILITARY RELATIONSHIP RECOGNIZED AND UNDERSTOOD BY MILITARY FORCES. EVOLUTION AS FOLLOWS:

(A) INITIALLY, US FORCES IN REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FULFILLED A STRICTLY ADVISORY AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE ROLE. THIS INVOLVED SUPPLY OF MAP MATERIEL COUPLED WITH TRAINING AND ADVICE IN ITS EMPLOYMENT AND UPKEEP.

(B) WHEN COMMUNIST INSURGENTS RENEWED ACTIVITY IN 1960, 1961 AND 1962, ADVISORY EFFORT WAS EXTENDED AND INCREASED SO THAT US ADVISORS WERE POSITIONED IN LARGER NUMBERS AT LOWER ECHELONS WHILE AT SAME TIME AMOUNT OF MATERIEL SUPPORT WAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED. AT THIS TIME, US GOVERNMENT AGREED TO FURNISH CERTAIN MILITARY CAPABILITIES WHICH

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WERE NOT PRESENT AND COULD NOT BE QUICKLY CREATED WITHIN RVNAF. THESE INCLUDED TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS, AS WELL AS DEPLOYMENT IN VBAT SUPPORT ROLE OF US ARMY HELICOPTER COMPANIES AND MARINE HELICOPTER SQUADRON.

(EO) AS DEMANDS FOR OPERATIONS INCREASED, US INSTALLED EXTENSIVE SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK WITHIN COUNTRY AND ALSO INSTALLED AND OPERATED ALONG WITH VNAF A TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM.

(C) AT THIS POINT IN TIME- THAT IS, UP UNTIL END OF 1964 - US SUPPORT OF RVNAF ENCOMPASSED FOLLOWING CHIEF ACTIVITIES:

1. STAFF SUPPORT IN CONNECTION WITH PLANNING, INTELLIGENCE, OPERATIONS, AIR SUPPORT, LOGISTIC SUPPORT, ADMINISTRATION AND COMMUNICATIONS.

2. OPERATION, BOTH UNILATERALLY AND COOPERATIVELY, OF A BACKBONE, LARGE-CAPACITY, LONG-LINES COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.

3. PROVISION OF AIR MOBILITY AND MEDICAL EVACUATION TO RVNAF WITH HELICOPTER UNITS AND TRANSPORT SQUADRONS.

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MOST RECENTLY, SEVENTH FLEET FORCES HAVE BEEN INVITED BY GVN TO PARTICIPATE IN COASTAL ANTI-INFILTRATION OPERATION IN ORDER TO SUPPORT VNN FORCES SO ENGAGED. IN ORDER FURTHER TO SUPPORT RVNAF IN ITS DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE MISSION AND TO FREE RVNAF FORCES FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATION, SUBSTANTIAL DEPLOYMENT OF US GROUND FORCES HAS BEEN MADE AND OTHERS ARE PLANNED.

(F) THIS CONCEPT PAPER SETS FORTH PROCEDURES AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS INVOLVED IN THE COMMITMENT OF THESE ADDITIONAL US GROUND FORCES IN COMBAT. SUPPORT OF RVNAF AS A LOGICAL EXTENSION AND EXPANSION OF ROLE ALREADY PERFORMED BY A WIDE RANGE OF US UNITS AND FORCES THROUGHOUT RVN.

(2) THERE IS A RECIPROCAL ASPECT TO RENDERING SUPPORT TO RVNAF. US ADVISORS AND FORCES THROUGHOUT COUNTRY ARE SUPPORTED BY RVNAF IN TERMS OF VEHICLES, SECURITY, LOCAL COMMUNICATIONS, HOUSING, REAL ESTATE, INTERPRETERS AND INDEED RECIPROCAL TACTICAL ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE. RELATIONSHIP HAS EVOLVED INTO TWO-WAY SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE IN MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES.

D. INTERNATIONAL MOBILE SECURITY TASK FORCE (INSTAF) CONCEPT:

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(1) ALLIED FORCES WILL NORMALLY BE BRIGADED WITH US FORCES UNDER A US COMMANDER AND A COMBINED STAFF. ONE OR MORE SUCH INSTAF'S WILL BE FORMED AS APPROPRIATE, AND WILL OPERATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONCEPT AND PROCEDURES PRESCRIBED BY THIS MESSAGE.

(2) NORMALLY, A US BRIGADE WILL FORM NUCLEUS OF INSTAF. THERE MAY BE SOME ALLIED REPRESENTATION ON TASK FORCE STAFF.

(3) AN INSTAF WILL BE UNIT OF COMPLETE TACTICAL INTEGRITY WHICH CAN BE EMPLOYED IN MANNER SIMILAR TO STANDARD US BRIGADE.

(4) IN EFFECT US AND ALLIED FORCES, EITHER SEPARATELY OR AS INSTAF, WILL PROVIDE COMBAT SUPPORT TO RVNAF. AN RVNAF UNIT MAY BE ASSOCIATED WITH AN INSTAF IF APPROVED BY CINCRVNAF AND LOCAL ARVN CORPS OR DIVISIONAL COMMANDER. IN THIS CASE RVNAF UNIT WOULD BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OR TACTICAL DIRECTION OF INSTAF COMMANDER.

E. GENERAL MISSION OF US AND COMBINED FORCES IN COMBAT SUPPORT OF RVNAF. SPECIFIC MISSIONS ARE:

(1) SECURITY OF BASE AREA.

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- (2) DEEP PATROLLING AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.
- (3) REACTION OPERATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH RVNAF.
- (4) US CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED.

F. MISSIONS REPRESENT LOGICAL PROGRESSION FOR NEWLY ARRIVED UNITS. THIS MESSAGE CONSIDERS ONLY FIRST THREE MISSIONS OR STAGES.

G. STAGE I: SECURITY OF BASE AREA

(1) ARVN CORPS COMMANDERS ARE CHARGED BY RVNAF HIGH COMMAND WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF ENTIRE ZONE. WITHIN THAT ZONE BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT US FORCES MAY ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEGMENTS OF DEFENSE PERIMETERS AND FOR LARGER SECURITY ZONES OR TACTICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY (TAOR).

(2) IN BASE AREAS SUCH AS DA NANG AND QUI NHON, US/ALLIED FORCES WILL NORMALLY ACCEPT LARGE BUT NOT TOTAL SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY. PARTICIPATION OF VIETNAMESE MILITARY, PARAMILITARY AND POLICE FORCES WILL BE NECESSARY SINCE US/ALLIED FORCES MAY BE COMMITTED OUTSIDE BASE AREAS ON OFFENSIVE AND/OR REACTION OPERATIONS, THUS REQUIRING ARVN COMMANDER TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR PORTIONS OF US TAOR.

(3) COORDINATION WITH RVNAF FORCES AND POLICE

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IN AREA WILL BE EFFECTED THROUGH SENIOR ARVN COMMANDER AND THROUGH SECTOR OR SUB-SECTOR ADVISORY CHANNELS.

(4) IN BASE AREA THERE MAY BE THREE ZONES:

(A) CLOSE-IN PERIMETER AROUND SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS (DEPOTS, AIRFIELDS, AMMO DUMPS, COMMUNICATIONS INSTALLATIONS) TO PREVENT SABOTAGE OR DIRECT ATTACK.

(B) INTERMEDIATE EXTENDED ZONE (TAOR) PREFERABLY OUT TO MORTAR RANGE.

(C) OUTER ZONE (EXTENDED TAOR) PREFERABLY EXTENDING OUT TO LIGHT ARTILLERY RANGE AND COVERING MOST LARGELY AREAS OF ASSEMBLY AND AVENUES OF ATTACK. AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING WILL TAKE PLACE IN THIS ZONE.

H. STAGE II: DEEP PATROLLING AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

(1) FOLLOWING ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE SECURITY AREA, AND CLOSE-IN COORDINATION WITH CORPS AND LOCAL RVNAF COMMANDERS, US/ALLIED FORCES WILL INITIATE RECONNAISSANCE AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST VC BASES AND FORCES. INITIALLY THESE WILL BE CONDUCTED UNILATERALLY IN EASILY IDENTIFIABLE TACTICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY FROM WHICH, FOR DURATION OF OPERATION, ALL ARVN AND REGIONAL FORCES HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED. THESE OPERATIONS

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SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO SECURITY OF BASE AREAS, AND SERVE AS MEANS TO PREVENT MASSING OF ENEMY FORCES FOR SURPRISE ATTACK ON BASE SECURITY AREA.

(2) DESIGNATION OF THESE AREAS MAY BE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AS DETERMINED BY ARVN CORPS OR DIVISION COMMANDER IN COORDINATION WITH US/ALLIED FORCE COMMANDER. SELECTIONS WILL BE BASED ON AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE.

(5) MOVEMENT TO AND FROM TAOR'S WILL BE COORDINATED WITH ARVN CORPS AND WITH SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS AS NECESSARY

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THROUGH APPROPRIATE US ADVISORS. RVNAF LIAISO

PERSONNEL MUST ACCOMPANY US UNITS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE IDENTIFICATION OF FRIENDLY TROOPS AND AS A MEANS OF CONTACT WITH AND IDENTIFICATION OF CIVILIANS.

(4) WITH EXPERIENCE, SCOPE OF OPERATIONS MAY BE INCREASED. EVENTUALLY, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO EFFECT COORDINATION BETWEEN US/ALLIED OPERATION IN ONE TACR WITH RVNAF FORCE IN ADJACENT BUT SEPERATE AND CLEARLY DEFINED TACR'S.

1. STAGE III: SEARCH AND DESTROY AND RESERVE REACTION OPERATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH RVNAF.

(1) STAGES I AND II CONTINUE.

(2) US/ ALLIED FORCES WILL PROVIDE COMBAT SUPPORT TO RVNAF ON BASIS OF OPERATIONAL COORDINATION TO INCLUDE SEARCH AND DESTROY AND RESERVE REACTION OPERATIONS. INITIATION OF RESERVE REACTION OPERATIONS WILL GENERALLY BE AT THE REQUEST OF A SENIOR RVNAF UNIT COMMANDER AND APPROVED BY THE CORPS COMMANDER FOR SUPPORT OF RVNAF FORCES IN CONTACT WITH AN ENEMY FORCE.

(3) UPON RECEIPT OF REQUEST FOR COMBAT SUPPORT US/ALLIED COMMANDER AND PRINCIPAL STAFF OFFICERS WILL MOVE TO APPROPRIATE RVNAF CP, MEET WITH THEIR OPPOSITE NUMBER

X AND

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JOINTLY DEVELOP OPERATIONAL

GSS AGREEMENT ON DETAILS OF OPERATIONS(OBJECTIVES, TIMES, FIRE SUPPORT WHORDINATION, COMMUNICATIONS AND SIGNALS), WILL BE DEVELOPED AS PLANNING PROGRESSES. TACTICAL PLAN MUST BE AS SIMPLE AND CLEAR AS POSSIBLE.

(4) BECAUSE OF THE COORDINATION PROBLEMS AND THE ABSENCE OF A POSITIVE COMMAND CHAIN CONTROLLING ALL UNITS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PLAN AVOID CLOSE AND INTRICATE MANEUVER AND AVOID CLOSE TACTICATUINXOERDEPEGHZVTBE BETWEEN US/ALLIED AND RVNAF FORCES WHICH WOULD JQUERE PRECISE EXECUTION TO INSURE OPERATIONAL SECESS. THEREFORE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT CLEARLY DEFINED ZONES AND OBJECTIVES BE ASSIGNED WHICH ARE READILY IDENTIFIABLE ON THE GROUND AND ON THE MAP.

(5) ASSUMING AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC PLAN, EACH COMMANDER EXECUTES HIS POLCION OF THE PLAN. THE COMMANDERS AND STAFFS REMAIN CO-LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION INSCFAR AS POSSIBLE AND AS AMINIMUM RETAIN SENIOR AND RESPONSIBLE REPRAGENTAT PFLUTT THE COMBINED CP. COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN US/ALLIED FORCES AND ADJACENT RVNAF UNITS THROUV

THE 1094 205 5 03 7,85 2NO, ACTING AS COMBAT

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LIAISON OFFICERS, WILL REPORT POSITIONS, ASPTIODU AND INTELLIGENCE DIRECTLY TO THE US COMMANDER OR HIS STAFF.

(6) SUPPORTING GROUND WEAPONS AND TACTICAL AIR ELEMENTS WILL BE CLOSELY CONTROLLED IN ORDER TO AVOID FIRE ON FRIENDLY POSITIONS. A FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATING (FSCC) IS DESIRABLE AND, IF ESTABLISHED, WILL BE A COOPERATIVE UNDERTAKING. IN *THS BARD* *AS* TOP OF AN FSCC THE CONTINUITY FIRES

WONNESSA32PROHEEM OF KEEPING CURRENT EXCHANGE OF GROUND FIRE SUPPORT AND COMMON USE OF AIR SUPPORT MUST BE ANTICIPATED.

J. GENERAL COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) VIETNAMESE LIAISON PERSONNEL WILL BE PROVIDED AT BATTALION LEVEL AND WITH ARTILLERY UNITS AS NECESSARY TO IDENTIFY AND PREVENT FIRING ON FRIENDLY FORCES OR CIVILIANS. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO PROVIDE VN LIAISON PERSONNEL TO TACTICAL ELEMENTS OPERATING SEPARATELY.

(2) WHEN OPERATING IN A SECTOR (PROVINCE) OR SUBSECTOR (DISTRICT), LIAISON WILL BE ESTABLISHED WITH US ADVISORS AND LOCAL MILITARY AUTHORITIES. PERMANENT LIAISON WILL BE MAINTAINED WITH APPROPRIATE CORPS OR DIVISION COMMANDERS.

PAGE 5 RUMSMA 939E S E C R E T

(3) US COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS MUST ACCOMMODATE TO A NEW ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH RESPONSIBILITY IS SHARED AND COOPERATIVELY DISCHARGED WITHOUT BENEFIT OF TRADITIONAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS. IN PLANNING FOR AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS INVOLVING THE EMPLOYMENT OF COMBINED FORCES, IT IS DESIRABLE TO PROGRESS SEQUENTIALLY FROM THE RELATIVELY SIMPLE TO THE MORE COMPLEX AND THUS DEVELOP EXPERIENCE. INTRICATE MANEUVERS ARE TO BE AVOIDED. BOUNDARIES, PHASE LINES AND OTHER CONTROL MEASURES MUST BE UNMISTAKEABLE AND UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH COMMANDERS AND THEIR STAFFS. SIMPLE, EASILY UNDERSTOOD TACTICAL PLANS ARE A PREREQUISITE TO SUCCESS.

K. COMMAND RELATIONS.

(1) COMUSMACV WILL ASSUME AND RETAIN OPCON OF US/ALLIED FORCES UPON ARRIVAL IN RVN.

(2) THE BASIC CONCEPT UNDERLYING COMMAND RELATIONS BETWEEN US/ALLIED FORCES AND RVNAF WILL BE ONE OF COMBAT SUPPORT THROUGH COORDINATION AND COOPERATION IN THE MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST OF BOTH COMMANDS.

(3) AS A MATTER OF POLICY, US FORCES WILL NOT BE PLACED UNDER THE COMMAND OR OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ALLIED

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POINT PAPER

Subj: Operating procedures for Marine Aircraft in South Vietnam

1. CINCPAC Instruction 003120.3 provides policy to govern the establishment of combat operations centers (COC) and air operations centers (AOC) in the Pacific Command for the exercise of command and control. Command, control and coordination of combat forces assigned to CINCPAC will be exercised through component commanders, or through subordinate unified commanders and joint task force commanders established by CINCPAC. Command, control, and coordination of forces assigned to subordinate unified or task force commanders will be exercised through their assigned Army, Navy and Air Force component commanders. Air Force component commanders will act as the coordinating authority for their force commander to coordinate air operations of air units operating in the area but not assigned to the Air Force component commander.

2. On 26 April 1965, CINCPAC issued instructions to promulgate CINCPAC policy and prescribe procedure for the conduct and control of close air support operations. It is applicable throughout PACOM, and Vietnam in particular. First priority of in-country air elements is the close air support of ground forces actually engaged in operations against the Viet-Cong. Stated principles are:

- a. There are 3 components of CAS:
 - (1) Support aircraft,
 - (2) FAC,
 - (3) CAS control agency.
- b. Aircraft will be maintained on alert for CAS.
- c. Alert aircraft will be subject to direct call by supported ground units through the control agency.
- d. Response of CAS aircraft will not be subject to mission evaluation at levels higher than the CAS control agency.
- e. CAS missions will be controlled by either a FAC or a TAC(A).

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f. COMUSMACV Air Force component commander (CG 2d Air Division) shall act as coordinating authority for matters pertaining to tactical air support and air traffic control. The coordination process will not degrade the responsiveness of CAS activity.

3. COMUSMACV message 270813Z April 1965 revises the procedures for operational coordination and control for forward air control in relation to 9th MAB units. Previous rules were designed for U. S. support of ARVN units by U. S. and VNAF aircraft. CG 9th MAB exercises operational control of 9th MAB air elements except for one helicopter squadron assigned to general support of I Corps and under OPCON of I Corps Senior Advisor.

4. The following rules apply:

a. Control of Jet aircraft.

(1) Marine jet aircraft will operate under the Tactical Air Control System of the 2d Air Division as exercised by the Air Operations Center (AOC).

(2) Marine Combat forces have first call on Marine aircraft.

(3) CG 9th MAB reports daily to AOC the aircraft availability together with Marine requirements. Available aircraft not required by Marine forces may be employed by AOC for other in-country missions.

(4) CAS strikes may be conducted under control of any one of the following:

(a) TACP

(b) TAC(A) (Marine or Air Force)

(c) If no TACP or TAC(A), an airborne U. S. Army observer may mark target. No Vietnamese observer is necessary with an airborne FAC, but his presence is desirable.

b. Direct Air Support.

(1) Marine elements may call directly on the I Corps Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) for Marine, USAF or VNAF fighter

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aircraft. ASOC will inform I Corps Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and determine whether there are friendly forces in the area. However, TOC cannot veto the launch of U. S. aircraft in close support of U. S. troops engaged in combat.

(2) TACP's, with battalions and separate companies, will utilize Vietnamese liaison parties to avoid strikes on friendly troops or civilians.

c. Interdiction strikes.

(1) Controlled area. Aircraft will conduct interdiction strikes (not involving CAS) only with approval of the TOC and will be controlled by a FAC or ALO aircraft with a Vietnamese observer aboard.

(2) Free Areas. Strikes require approval of TOC.

d. Employment of Utility (Transport) helicopters.

(1) 9th MAB controls directly the helicopters which are in direct support of 9th MAB. TOC will be informed of activities.

(2) 9th MAB requirements for helicopters additional to those in direct support will be forwarded to the I Corps TOC.

(3) Requests for 9th MAB direct support helicopters from other sources will be approved by the CG 9th MAB.

(4) One Marine helicopter squadron will be in general support of I Corps but available to 9th MAB as specified in paragraph (d)(2) above.

5. Representatives of COMUSMACV, III MEF, CINCPACFLT, and 7th Fleet agreed to the following rules for CAS of III MAF Landing operations.

a. TAC(A) will have a Vietnamese observer on board who can communicate with the RVNAF commander.

b. Liaison Officers.

(1) One RVNAF with TACP's.

(2) One RVNAF in the TACC afloat.

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(3) A TACP will be provided to the RVNAF Security Force Commander to control CAS of his forces.

c. Requests for CAS will be made to the TACC afloat or TACC ashore depending on location of control.

d. Control of shore based U. S. aircraft will be passed by the III MAF DASC to the TACC afloat while control is afloat. TACC afloat will direct those aircraft reporting for support to a TAC(A) or TACP. III MAF DASC will keep I Corps ASOC informed of missions assigned.

e. When control is ashore, the III MAF DASC will direct those aircraft reporting for support to the TAC(A) or TACP.

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SECRET 13796 FROM MACJ3

SUBJ: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR
MARINE JET AIRCRAFT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. THE CURRENT PROCEDURES FOR OPERATIONAL COORDINATION
AND CONTROL FOR FORWARD AIR CONTROL WERE DESIGNED FOR THE
SUPPORT OF ARVN UNITS BY US AND VNAF AIRCRAFT. THE
EMPLOYMENT OF US FORCES IN A COMBAT ROLE REQUIRES MODIFICATION
OF THOSE RULES AND PROCEDURES.

2. WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE 9TH MEB, AOC, AND THE I
ASOC, THE FOLLOWING RULES WILL APPLY:

INFO.....DJS-3 CJCS-1 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACS-5 NMCC-2 SEC DEF-5

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A. MARINE JET AIRCRAFT WILL OPERATE UNDER THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM THROUGH AOC REPRESENTING IN THIS CASE THE COMMANDER, 2D AIR DIV.

B. ~~MARINE COMBAT FORCES WILL HAVE FIRST CALL ON~~ MARINE AIRCRAFT AT ALL TIMES. THE 9TH MEB MAY REQUEST FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FOR PRE-PLANNED STRIKES AND FOR STRIP OR OTHER ALERT AS DEEMED NECESSARY BY THE CG, 9TH MEB AND SUCH REQUESTS WILL BE HONORED BY AOC AND I ASOC.

C. EACH DAY CG 9TH MEB WILL INDICATE TO AOC THROUGH I ASOC, MARINE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT "AVAILABLE" FOR THE FORTHCOMING 24 HOUR PERIOD. THESE AIRCRAFT, LESS THOSE ON ALERT FOR THE SUPPORT OF MARINE COMBAT FORCES ON OPERATIONS, MAY BE FRAGGED BY AOC FOR IN-COUNTRY MISSIONS.

D. MARINE AIRCRAFT MAY CONDUCT STRIKES IN CLOSE SUPPORT OF MARINE COMBAT FORCES ON THE GROUND UNDER THE CONTROL OF A TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY ON THE GROUND OR A MARINE OR US AIR FORCE CONTROLLER IN THE AIR. IN THE ABSENCE OF A TACP OR AIRBORNE FAC, US ARMY AIRBORNE OBSERVER MAY MARK TARGET. NO VIETNAMESE OBSERVER IS NECESSARY WITH AN AIRBORNE FAC ON A CLOSE SUPPORT MISSION ALTHOUGH THE PRESENCE OF SUCH AN OBSERVER IS DESIRABLE.

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECENTLY PUBLISHED ARVN DIRECTIVE ON AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM OPERATED BY THE VNAF AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPTIMUM OPERATING PROCEDURES, THE MARINE GROUND ELEMENTS MAY CALL DIRECTLY ON I ASOC FOR AIR SUPPORT WHETHER IT BE BY MARINE, US AIR FORCE OR VNAF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. I ASOC WILL INFORM I CORPS TOC AND DETERMINE WHETHER THERE ARE FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, I CORPS TOC DOES NOT HAVE VETO POWER OVER THE LAUNCH OF US AIRCRAFT IN CLOSE SUPPORT OF US TROOPS ENGAGED IN COMBAT ON THE GROUND.

TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTIES ON THE GROUND WILL UTILIZE

VIETNAMESE LIAISON PARTIES WITH BATTALIONS AND SEPARATE COMPANIES TO AVOID CALLING AIR STRIKES ON FRIENDLY TROOPS OR CIVILIANS.

4. INTERDICTION TARGETS NOT INVOLVED IN THE CLOSE AND IMMEDIATE SUPPORT OF US GROUND FORCES WILL ONLY BE STRUCK AFTER APPROVAL BY THE TOC AND UNLESS IN FREE STRIKE AREA, WILL BE CONTROLLED BY A FAC OR ALO AIRCRAFT, WITH VIETNAMESE OBSERVER ABOARD.

5. PRIORITIES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO EMPLOYMENT

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OF UTILITY HELICOPTERS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE 9TH MEB WILL CONTROL DIRECTLY THAT UTILITY SQUADRON WHICH IS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE 9TH MEB. THE SUPPORTING CTOC WILL BE KEPT APPRISED OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THIS SQUADRON BY THE USMC OPERATIONS OFFICER IN THE CTOC.

B. IN THE EVENT THE 9TH MEB REQUIRES UTILITY HELICOPTER SUPPORT IN ADDITION TO THAT AVAILABLE FROM THE ONE DIRECT SUPPORT SQUADRON, REQUESTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO US ELEMENT OF THE CTOC AND WILL BE PROCESSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING PROCEDURES.

C. IF HELICOPTERS FROM THE UTILITY HELICOPTER SQUADRON PROVIDING DIRECTSUPPORT TO THE 9TH MEB ARE REQUIRED ON OTHER MISSIONS, THEY WILL NOT BE VMMLTTED UNTIL RELEASE IS SECURED FROM THE 9TH MEB. *comm. 17 Feb*

D. ONE USMC UTILITY HELICOPTER SQUADRON WILL BE IN GENERAL SUPPORT OF I CORPS. THESE HELICOPTERS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR SUPPORT OF THE 9TH MEB AS OUTLINED IN B ABOVE.

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 CONDUCT AND CONTROL OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
 OPERATIONS (U)

1. THIS INSTRUCTION FORMALIZES CINCPAC POLICY AND PRESCRIBES PROCEDURES FOR THE CONDUCT AND CONTROL OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS. WHILE THIS INSTRUCTION IS APPLICABLE THROUGHOUT THE PACIFIC COMMAND, IT APPLIES IN PARTICULAR TO TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

2. THE PRIORITY TASKS OF IN-COUNTRY OFFENSIVE AIR ELEMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM ARE TO PROVIDE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND TO DELIVER ATTACKS ON

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VIET CONG RESOURCES AND INSTALLATIONS. OF THESE, THE FIRST PRIORITY IS CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES WHICH ARE ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VIET CONG.

3. IN THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS IN CLOSE SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES, THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES WILL APPLY:

A. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THIS DIRECTIVE WILL BE CONSIDERED TO INVOLVE THREE COMPONENTS--SUPPORT AIRCRAFT, A FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER WITH THE SUPPORTED GROUND UNIT, AND A CLOSE AIR SUPPORT CONTROL AGENCY, WITH WHICH BOTH FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER AND SUPPORT AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE CAN COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY.

B. AIRCRAFT WILL BE MAINTAINED ON ALERT FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING ON-CALL CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT AND DEGREE OF ALERT SO MAINTAINED WILL BE DETERMINED AS PRESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 4 BELOW.

C. ALERT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AIRCRAFT WILL BE SUBJECT TO DIRECT CONTROL BY THE SUPPORTED GROUND UNIT, THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF THE RELATED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT CONTROL AGENCY, WHOSE RESPONSIBILITIES EXTEND TO A PRESCRIBED GEOGRAPHIC AREA.

D. RESPONSE OF THE CLOSE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT TO CALLS FOR SUPPORT FROM THE SUPPORTED GROUND UNIT WILL NOT BE SUBJECTED TO ANY DELAY FOR PURPOSE OF MISSION EVALUATION OR MISSION CLEARANCE AT LEVELS HIGHER THAN THE RELATED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AGENCY.

E. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS WILL BE CONTROLLED BY A FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER STATIONED WITH THE SUPPORTED UNIT, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, BY AN AIRBORNE TACTICAL AIR COORDINATOR.

F. NOTHING HEREIN VITIATES THE PRIOR CINCPAC PROVISION THAT COMUSMACV'S AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER SHALL ACT AS COORDINATING AUTHORITY FOR MATTERS PERTAINING TO TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE COORDINATION PROCESS SHALL NOT IN ANY WAY DEGRADE THE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE CLOSE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT NOR OF THE RELATED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT CONTROL AGENCY. COORDINATING AUTHORITY IS DEFINED IN PARAGRAPH 30281-30283 OF UNAAF.

4. IN APPLYING THE FOREGOING PRINCIPLES, THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES WILL BE FOLLOWED WITH RESPECT TO APPORTIONMENT OF AIR RESOURCES BETWEEN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND OTHER IN-COUNTRY OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS:

A. TACTICAL GROUND UNITS WILL, ON THE DAY PRECEDING, STATE THEIR ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS FOR PREPARATORY AIR ATTACKS AND FOR ON-CALL CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, INCLUDING DEGREE OF ALERT REQUIRED.

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B. THESE REQUIREMENTS WILL BE INTEGRATED BY THE COORDINATING AUTHORITY WITH THOSE FOR GENERAL AIR ATTACKS AND MEASURED AGAINST MEANS AVAILABLE, AS REPORTED BY IN-COUNTRY AIR UNITS.

C. SHOULD THE MEANS AVAILABLE BE INADEQUATE TO FULFILL ALL REQUIREMENTS, APPORTIONMENT OF MEANS WILL BE MADE BY COMUSMACV, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL PRIORITY ESTABLISHED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE.

5. IN THE CONDUCT OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS EACH CLOSE AIR SUPPORT CONTROL AGENCY WILL FULFILL ON-CALL REQUESTS FROM FORCES OPERATING WITHIN ITS ASSIGNED AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY TO THE LIMIT OF THE MEANS WHICH HAVE BEEN ALLOCATED. SHOULD CONTINUING REQUESTS FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT EXCEED THE MEANS AVAILABLE, THE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT CONTROL AGENCY WILL NOTIFY THE COORDINATING AUTHORITY, WITH A REQUEST FOR FURTHER ALLOCATION OF MEANS TO FULFILL THE REQUIREMENT OF THE ENGAGED FORCES. THE COORDINATING AUTHORITY WILL RESPOND TO THE LIMIT OF HIS CAPABILITY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRIORITY ESTABLISHED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE. WHEN AIR ASSETS BASED IN SOUTH VIETNAM ARE INSUFFICIENT FOR THE TASK, THE COORDINATING AUTHORITY SHOULD IMMEDIATELY INFORM COMUSMACV SO THAT HE CAN REQUEST ADDITIONAL AIR SUPPORT ASSETS FROM CINCPAC. UNDER THESE

CIRCUMSTANCES, CINCPAC WILL DIRECT CINCPACFLT TO SUPPORT COMUSMACV WITH CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT, THAI BASED AIRCRAFT ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR USE IN SOUTH VIETNAM BUT MAY BE TEMPORARILY TRANSFERRED TO FIELDS IN SOUTH VIETNAM IF THERE IS SUFFICIENT AIRFIELD CAPACITY.

6. SHOULD ANY SUPPORTED U.S. GROUND ELEMENT COMMANDER DETERMINE THAT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MEANS ARE REPEATEDLY INADEQUATE FOR HIS PURPOSES, OR THAT PROCEDURES IN EFFECT ARE INADEQUATELY RESPONSIVE HE SHALL BE OBLIGED TO SO ADVISE COMUSMACV, WHO WILL EITHER REQUEST THE PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL MEANS OR RECOMMEND ALTERATION IN THE PROVISIONS HEREOF TO ACCELERATE THE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT PROCEDURES. IN ANY EVENT, COMUSMACV WILL MAKE A MONTHLY REPORT TO THIS HEADQUARTERS, SUMMARIZING ANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN EXECUTING THE PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES PRESCRIBED HEREIN.

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CINCPAC 003120.3

(J51)

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CINCPAC INSTRUCTION 003120.3

From: Commander in Chief Pacific
To: Distribution List

Subj: Policy Governing the Establishment of Combat Operations Centers
and Air Operations Centers (U)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this Instruction is to set forth guidance and establish policy relating to the establishment of Combat Operations Centers (COCs) and Air Operations Centers (AOCs) in the Pacific Command (PACOM) for the exercise of command and control responsibilities by appropriate commanders.

2. General.

a. The Combat Operations Center and the Air Operations Center are facilities which are established and operated for certain operational commanders to assist them to exercise their command, control and coordinating responsibilities. These operations centers are facilities to assist and facilitate command decision under combat conditions and to make these decisions known to all forces concerned. The centers have no command or control responsibilities per se.

b. Command, control and coordination of combat forces assigned, allocated or made available to CINCPAC will be exercised through his Component Commander or through Subordinate Unified Commanders and Joint Task Force Commanders established by CINCPAC. Command, control and coordination of combat forces assigned, allocated or made available to Subordinate Unified Commanders, Joint Task Force Commanders, and SEATO Force Commanders will be exercised through their assigned Army, Navy and Air Force component commanders. Air force component commanders will

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act as the Coordinating Authority for their force commanders to coordinate air operations of air units operating in the force commander's area but not assigned or attached to the air force component commander. Where coordinating authority is assigned to a component commander (CC) by his force commander for coordinating the operations of combat forces other than those assigned, allocated or made available to him, the CC will exercise this authority with discretion. In the event essential agreement for coordination between the coordinating authority and the commanders of the combat forces concerned is not reached, the CC will not have authority to compel agreement; he shall refer the matter to his force commander for decision.

c. In the event of a major emergency in his area of responsibility which necessitates immediate use of any or all available PACOM resources, the force commander may authorize the appropriate CC to assume temporary operational control of these resources. The determination of the existence of such an emergency is the responsibility of the force commander concerned and shall not be delegated or assigned.

3. Combat Operations Center. A Combat Operations Center (COC) is a command and control facility established by CINCPAC, and/or one of his Subordinate Unified Commanders, a Joint Task Force Commander or a SEATO Force Commander for the purpose of assisting the force commander to:

- a. Direct, control and command the strategic and tactical combat operations of major assigned and attached combat forces, and those Allied combat forces made available;
- b. Maintain current information on ground, naval and air operations and the status of his assigned and attached combat forces;
- c. Exchange battle information and coordinate and/or modify battle plans in order to enhance mutual support and to exploit inherent capabilities of the air, ground and naval forces;

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- d. Coordinate the operations of assigned and attached forces;
 - e. Maintain liaison with POLO in order to keep abreast of planned atomic strikes on critical targets in the areas of concern and to assure coordination of on-call nuclear strikes against targets recommended for attack;
 - f. Maintain plots of nuclear detonations;
 - g. Maintain target information on principal targets within the operational area of concern.
4. Air Operations Center. An Air Operations Center (AOC) is a command and control facility established by an Air Force component commander, maintained and operated by him with assisting personnel provided from the other CCs, for the purpose of assisting the Air Force component commander to:
- a. Receive and evaluate requests for close air support from various ground forces' headquarters and establish the priorities of such requests in accordance with the guidance of the Force Commander.
 - b. Direct and control those combat forces within his area of responsibility assigned to him by PACAF and/or allocated and made available to him by his commander.
 - c. Act for his commander as a Coordinating Authority in coordinating the operations of air units not assigned or made available to him, but which are operating in the area of responsibility of his commander.
 - d. Control, assign missions to or divert in a major emergency, any or all air resources assigned, allocated or made available to his commander in accordance with the policy stated in paragraph 2 above.
5. Alternate command and control centers will be established in

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accordance with current CINCPAC OPLANs and guidance and policy promulgated in this Instruction.

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UNCLAS E F T O

COMMAND RELATIONS-USMC RVN OPERATIONS (U)

A. CINCPACFLT 050351Z

1. TAKE REF A FORAC.

BT

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AC7

INFO

1. IT HAS BEEN OBSERVED THAT USAF AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING AIR
 STRIKES WITHIN THE ACA AS DESCRIBED IN REF A WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF
 TACO AFLOAT.
 2. CARRIER BASED AND USMC AIRCRAFT BASED AT DANANG ARE CONDUCTING
 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS WITHIN THE ACA. TO REDUCE DANGER OF
 AIR-AIR COLLISION AND CONFLICT IN ALL OPERATIONS, IT IS ESSENTIAL

PAGE 2 RUMLHL 2327 S E C R E T
 THAT ALL OTHER IN-COUNTRY AIRCRAFT, BOTH FIXED WING AND HELICOPTER,
 OPERATING WITHIN THE ACA CHECK IN AND OUT WITH TACO AFLOAT (CALL
 SEVEN ICE PACK) ON 209.8 Mhz UNTIL CONTROL OF AIR IS PASSED ASHORE.
 3. IT IS REQUESTED THAT COMUSMACV AGAIN BE AWARE OF REQUIREMENT
 FOR CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF AIR IN THIS AREA TO REDUCE THE
 DANGER INHERENT IN THIS TYPE OPERATION.

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
AAP-mog
17 Feb 1966

FOR MAJOR GENERAL WALT:

POINT PAPER

Subj: Control of Marine Air Support In Vietnam

1. Attached for reference is a schematic which compares the USMC and the USA/USAF air control systems as they function in SVN.
2. The following relationship exists between the principal Marine Air Control agencies and the USAF overall air control system in SVN.



POINTS:

- a. Marine Air is an integral component of III MAF. Close integration of air and ground operations is a basic tenet of Marine Corps combat doctrine.
- b. The Marine Air Control system is designed to provide the CG III MAF with the means to exercise through his Tactical Air Commander rapid and positive control of his aviation forces and to effectively coordinate their air support operations with the fire and maneuver of the ground elements; to include heliborne operations.
- c. The USMC Wing G-3 allocates aircraft in coordination with the MAF/ Div G-3. The Marine TADC is the agency through which the coordinated air support requirements are executed. The TADC is essential for the CG III MAF to effectively direct the operations of his aviation forces particularly in rapidly changing combat situations where air support must be diverted from one effort to another.
- d. The two Marine DASC's are the primary air control agencies in the Chu Lai and Danaang TOARS respectively.

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AAP-mog

Subj: Control of Marine Air Support in Vietnam

e. The DASC's are collocated with the FSCC's (Fire Support Coordination Centers) of the ground commanders of each TAOR.

f. The DASC is essential to maintain positive control of all air support operations in the TAOR, and in conjunction with the FSCC, insure that air support is coordinated with artillery support and the maneuver of the ground forces.

g. The DASC controls both helicopter and fixed wing aircraft, coordinating fixed wing support of helicopters and integrating helicopter movements with other supporting fires.

h. The DASC's have scramble authority over aircraft allocated, for rapid response to the air support requirements of the ground units.

i. The Marine Air Control System is tied in with the 2d Air Division TACC through the I Corps USAF DASC. At any time Marine Air is required to support emergency missions for other than Marine Forces they can be rapidly diverted through the existing USAF/Marine Air control agencies. (For example, during the siege at Ple Me and the ambush in the Ia Drang Valley, Marine aircraft were diverted at the request of the 2d Air Division TACC to augment the support that was provided by USAF and U. S. Navy aircraft.

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III MAF air control is in accordance with JCS conceived doctrine for airspace control. This doctrine provides that the Air Force component commander will be the coordinating authority for the Joint Force commander, thus recognizing the requirement for a single coordination point to enable all components to operate in the airspace as necessary to support combat operations. I understand that this JCS conceived doctrine is presently being written as Joint Doctrine by the cognizant Services, but the wisdom of such a doctrine is being proven daily in SVN. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps are each operating their own aircraft in a most effective manner to support their combat operations. Of course, the responsibility for air defense is vested in a single authority as is the authority to take control of all air in an emergency. Again, I might say, that this procedure for control of air is proving highly satisfactory in South Vietnam in supporting Army and Marine Corps ground operations. I believe the record speaks for itself. As a matter of fact, I find it difficult to envision one agency controlling all Army and Marine Corps air in the country. The capability of massing air power has been demonstrated at such places as Plei Me and Iadrang Valley.

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S E C R E T

PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN WALT INFO GEN GREENE FROM LTGEN KRULAK

COMBAT OPERATIONS CONTROL STRUCTURE FOR USMACV (U)

A. YOUR 030616Z (PASEP)

1. AGREE WITH REF A THAT STUDY GROUP SUBJECT IS OF FAR REACHING IMPORTANCE.

2. OF PRIMARY INTEREST IS PROTECTION OF MARINE COMMAND AND CONTROL AUTHORITY OVER MARINE FORCES IN VIETNAM. FOR THE MOST PART OUR REACTIONS ARE PRETTY OBVIOUS. HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS GIVE YOU MY VIEWS.

PAGE 2 YVNA 620 S E C R E T

3. WITH REGARD TO SUBPARAS OF PARA 1 OF REF A, THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES SHOULD GOVERN OUR CONFEREES:

A. COMBAT OPERATIONS

(1) RETENTION OF COMMAND OVER U.S. OPERATIONS IN I CTZ. III MAF SHOULD BE A MAJOR COMMAND DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE ONLY TO THE OVERALL COMMANDER, COMUSMACV, OR WHATEVER TITLE HE MAY BE ASSIGNED.

(2) ADEQUATE MARINE REPRESENTATION IN RANK AND NUMBERS ON THE OVERALL COMMAND LEVEL.

B. IF DIRECTORATE OF COMBINED OPERATIONS OR EQUIVALENT AGENCY SHOULD BE FORMED AT THE OVERALL AND MAJOR SUBORDINATE (III MAF/ IOTZ) COMMAND LEVEL, III MAF SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED IN RANK AND NUMBERS.

C. WITH REGARD TO ALLOCATION, COORDINATION AND METHOD OF CONTROL OF SUPPORTING FORCES:

(1) III MAF SHOULD RETAIN THE NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND AUTHORITY.

(2) AIR SUPPORT

(A) PROTECT THE PRESENT POLICY WHEREBY MARINE AVIATION SUPPORTS III MAF REQUIREMENTS FIRST, AND IS UTILIZED TO MEET 2D

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PAGE 3 YVNA 620 SECRET

AIR DT) REQUIREMENTS, ONLY IF IN EXCESS OF III MAF REQUIREMENTS.

(B) SEEK TO OBTAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROVISION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OF ALL U.S./THIRD COUNTRY/ARVN FORCES IN I CTZ.

(C) GAIN AN AGREEMENT THAT WILL PROVIDE FOR USE OF MARINE UNITS FOR AIR DEFENSE OF THE DANANG AIR DEFENSE SUB SECTOR, REALIZING THAT THE OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIR DEFENSE OF SEA RESTS IN MAINLAND SOUTH EAST ASIA AIR DEFENSE REGION. SPECIFICALLY, III MAF LAAMS AND MAGS ARE INTEGRATED INTO THE OVERALL SYSTEM; MARINE F4D'S SHOULD ASSUME ALL OF THE ALERT/CAP TASKS IN DANANG SUB SECTOR.

(D) AVOID THE LOSS OF CONTROL OF MARINE AIRCRAFT BY MACV FORMATION OF AN AIR FORCE CONTROLLED JOC, SUCH AS THAT OPERATED IN KOREA.

(5) III MAF SHOULD COMMAND ALL U.S. ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT, ENGINEER AND CHEMICAL SUPPORT IN I CTZ.

(4)(5)(6) THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR AIRLIFT, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT SHOULD CONTINUE. IN PARTICULAR, THE STATUS QUD ANTE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED REGARDING LOCATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL OF VMGR AIRCRAFT.

4. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST FOR A WORKING MEMBER OF THE STUDY

PAGE 4 YVNA 620 SECRET

GROUP, I AM SENDING LTCOL OWENS (646868) BY THE FIRST AVAILABLE TRANSPORT TO SAIGON. HE WILL REPORT DIRECTLY TO THELL FISHER FOR INSTRUCTIONS AND ASSIGNMENT, AND REMAIN AS LONG AS YOU NEED HIM.

GPM

BT

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HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
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DIRECTIVE

11 November 1966

NUMBER 95-5*

(MACJ322)

ATTN: 77 MTA

AVIATION

FLIGHT FACILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

1. PURPOSE.

a. To prescribe policies and procedures for the establishment of airfield flight facilities, navigational flight facilities, and air traffic control at US operated airfields.

b. To designate predominant users of airfields and assign responsibilities to insure that assigned airfields meet minimum essential criteria for safe and efficient air traffic control.

2. GENERAL.

a. The term "predominant user" is defined as one of the following:

(1) The command specified in Annex A hereto for those fields listed; or,

(2) The command having an aviation company/squadron, or larger unit occupying an airfield; or,

(3) The corps senior advisor for those airfields serving advisor teams and special forces camps where no aviation unit is based; or,

(4) The senior US commander of the supported unit at forward air strips as provided in MACV Directive 95-9.

b. Airfield flight facilities are required to meet minimum criteria to assure adequate safety of flight for all aircraft. Certain facilities require periodic flight checks. Direct coordination between units requesting flight checks and 7th Air Force (ATTN: DEF) is authorized.

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 95-5, 15 December 1965

MACV Dir 95-5
11 November 1966

c. Where close geographical proximity of separate airfields exists to the extent that terminal areas overlap, the predominant users concerned will coordinate procedures and installation of facilities to avoid conflicts and to preclude unnecessary duplication.

d. Notices to airmen (NOTAMS) procedures will be as set forth in AFM 55-13.

e. Operational requirements:

(1) Unless operational requirements dictate otherwise, all flight facilities will be operated in accordance with pertinent flight regulations published by the cognizant service, GVN or the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

(2) The following facilities are considered to be essential elements necessary for safe and efficient operations of all-weather, high density traffic airfields. Predominant users will determine which of the facilities listed below are necessary for the conduct of safe operations at other airfields under their jurisdiction:

(a) Tower equipped with UHF/VHF/FM radios.

(b) Approach control.

(c) Capability to procure IFR clearance.

(d) Terminal navigation facility.

(e) Approved instrument approach.

(f) Approved standard instrument departure.

(g) Runway lights.

(h) Crash and rescue unit.

(i) Capability to procure weather information.

(j) Wind sock.

(k) Back-up generator.

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 95-5, 15 December 1965

MACV Dir 95-5
11 November 1966

3. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. USARV.

(1) Designated predominant user, as listed in Annex A.

(2) When requested by MACV, conduct airfield technical inspections to determine what facilities and/or control personnel are needed to operate airfields used predominantly by advisor teams and US special forces.

b. COMNAVFORV. Designated predominant user, as listed in Annex A.

c. 7th Air Force.

(1) Designated predominant user, as listed in Annex A.

(2) Accomplish required flight checks of all US NAVAIDS and Air Traffic Control (ATC) facilities on a regularly scheduled basis in accordance with US Standard Facilities Flight Check Manual (Army: TM 11-2557-25; Navy: NAVWEPS 16-1-520; Air Force: AFM 55-8), and as requested by units establishing new facilities.

(3) Designated coordinating authority for matters pertaining to ATC within the MACV area of responsibility.

d. III MAF. Designated predominant user, as listed in Annex A.

e. Corps Senior Advisors.

(1) Designated predominant users for those airfields serving advisor teams and special forces camps where no aviation unit is based, and except for those listed in Annex A.

(2) Forward requirements for facilities and control personnel to COMUSMACV for approval.

4. REFERENCES.

a. MACV Directive 95-9, subject: Joint Airborne/Airmobile Air Strip Operation.

MACV Dir 95-5
11 November 1966

b. MACV Directive 95-4 (C), subject: US Air Operations in RVN (U).

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

E. D. BRYSON
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

Annex

Predominant Users

DISTRIBUTION:

I, II - A
IV - B
Less CH, CO, HC, IG, JA, OI, MD, Dir of MAP, Dir of Tng, PD, Combined
Studies, Hop Tac, ACTIV, AFTU, and TMA
Plus 200 - USARV
10 - NAVFORV
60 - 7AF

18 - III MAF

MACV Dir 95-5
11 November 1966

PREDOMINANT USERS

AIRFIELD

PREDOMINANT USER

An Thoi	COMNAVFORV
Bien Hoa	7th Air Force
Binh Thuy	7th Air Force
Cam Ranh Bay	7th Air Force
Chu Lai	III MAF
Da Nang	7th Air Force
Dong Ha	III MAF
Hue/Phu Bai	III MAF*
Marble Mountain	III MAF
Khe Sanh	III MAF
Nha Trang	7th Air Force
Phan Rang	7th Air Force
Phu Cat II	7th Air Force
Pleiku (Cu Hanh)	7th Air Force
Tan Son Nhut	7th Air Force*
Tuy Hoa (South)	7th Air Force
Qui Nhon	USARV

All airfields in the Corps areas which serve as bases for company size or larger Army aviation units, except those airfields specified above for other Services.

*In coordination with RVN Directorate of Civil Aviation.

Annex A

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cmc

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 95-4*

6 February 1966
(MACCOC)

AVIATION
AIR OPERATIONS IN RVN (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. To establish operating procedures and assign responsibilities for command, control, and coordination of US air operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

2. (C) CONCEPT.

a. The mission of US military forces in the RVN is to assist and support the Government of Vietnam (GVN) in their efforts to defeat the Viet Cong and extend government control over all the RVN.

b. It is not the intent of this directive to alter or modify current Service concepts for allocation and control of air resources. All Services, however, operate through portions of the same airspace and are frequently employed on joint and combined operations. Each possesses, to some degree, the capability to accomplish missions normally assigned to another Service. Close cooperation and coordination are therefore required to assure that efforts are complementary, integrated, and achieve the most effective results.

3. (C) GENERAL.

a. US Air Force air resources will be employed under the USAF concept of centralized control and decentralized operations. A Tactical Air Control System (TACS) has been established in RVN for use as both an operational and a training vehicle. Allocation and control of USAF/VNAF air resources and coordination of USMC/USN aircraft will be exercised through the elements of this system. Aircraft and units operating under the TACS will be allocated through the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) to Direct Air Support Centers (DASC's) as appropriate, for operations in support of Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ's).

b. US Army Aviation resources will be allocated to Senior Corps Advisors and US commanders for employment in support of ARVN/US/Free World Military Assistance Forces (FVMAF) operations. Aviation resources so allocated will be assigned, insofar as practicable, missions of direct support of ARVN divisions and zones, and US/FVMAF divisions, brigades, and regiments. Senior Advisors will establish an Army Aviation Element (AAE) within each Corps and Division Tactical Operations Center (TOC). US commanders will establish AAE's at unit TOC's. A DASC will be collocated with each Corps TOC to assure coordination of US/VNAF air activities.

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 95-4, 13 July 1965 248 793

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Directive Number 95-4, HQ MACV (Cont)

6 February 1966

c. Aviation assets will be allocated as directed by COMUSMACV. US Army resources are subject to relocation, recall, or diversion through the Army Aviation Division (AAD), Combat Operations Center (COC), with priorities established by this headquarters and the RVNAF JGS. USAF/VNAF resources are subject to relocation, recall, or diversion through the TACC. USMC resources will be allocated through Marine command channels for the support of USMC operations. Aircraft in excess of USMC requirements will be reported to and allocated by TACC.

d. US Army Aviation resources assigned in general support and not allocated to support a specific ARVN Corps, Division, or US unit will remain under operational control of COMUSMACV. Resources in this category will be controlled and allocated by AAD, COC, MACV, in accordance with priorities established by this headquarters and the RVNAF JGS. When committed to operations, such resources will be under operational control or in support of the commander of the US unit, or the Senior US Advisor of the ARVN unit concerned until released by the US commander or advisor, or recalled by MACV through the AAD.

e. US/FWMAF units assigned to a CTZ or major US unit will request US Army Aviation support through the respective TOC.

f. US military aircraft will operate under a single coordinated Air Traffic Control System. This system identifies and regulates aircraft that are performing tactical air support. It does not exercise mission control or denial, but will make maximum coordinated use of communications, facilities, personnel, and equipment organic to each of the Services. The provisions of the reference cited in paragraph 6c, apply.

g. For planning purposes, the employment of available air support will normally be committed in the following order of priority:

- (1) Troops engaged with the enemy in combat.
- (2) Relief convoys and spray aircraft escort on crop destruction and defoliation missions.
- (3) Units on major ground operations (pre-strike and air cover).
- (4) Air cover for trains, convoys, ships, and aircraft.
- (5) Other targets:
 - (a) Targets directly affecting current operations.
 - (b) Lucrative perishable targets.
 - (c) Lucrative targets expected to exist for a period of time.

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Directive Number 95-4, HQ MACV (Cont)

6 February 1966

h. In the event of a major emergency or disaster, COMUSMACV may direct the Commander, Second Air Division, to assume operational control of all US air resources. The responsibility for determining the existence of such an emergency rests with COMUSMACV and will not be delegated.

4. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Commander, ^{7 AF}~~Second Air Division~~, will:

(1) In his capacity as MACV Air Force Component Commander, coordinate all US air operations and VNAF activities necessary for the conduct of active air defense.

(2) Establish and operate, in conjunction with the RVNAF, a Tactical Air Control System for command and control of USAF/VNAF strike aircraft and for the coordination of USMC/USN strike aircraft.

(3) Provide essential training for VNAF in offensive and defensive tactical air operations.

(4) Conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations to include maintenance of air superiority, interdiction, close air support, reconnaissance, search and rescue, air transport, and other supplemental air support as required.

(5) Establish, in conjunction with other US and RVN agencies, an Air Traffic Control System which:

(a) Provides optimum freedom of movement for all aircraft consistent with the priority of their mission and the degree of risk considered to be operationally acceptable.

(b) Provides the capability to warn airborne aircraft of conflicting usage of the airspace.

(c) Is compatible with air defense requirements to include identification and air defense warning.

(d) Incorporates provisions for accepting flight planning information from other Services.

(6) Provide meteorological support for air operations.

(7) Be responsible for and coordinate all search and rescue (SAR) activities.

(8) Prepare joint instructions in conjunction with CG, USARV; CG, 1st MAW, as the Tactical Air Commander for CG, III MAF; and in coordination with Commander, 7th Fleet, to assure integrated and coordinated air operations.

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Directive Number 95-4, HQ MACV (Cont)

6 February 1966

b. Commanding General, US Army, Vietnam, will:

- (1) Provide US Army Aviation resources to support ground operations including airmobile operations, aerial surveillance, aerial fire support, search and rescue, air transport, and other supplemental air support, as required.
- (2) Exercise command, less operational control, of those US Army Aviation resources allocated to Corps Senior Advisors, US commanders, and those under operational control of COMUSMACV.
- (3) Provide qualified aviation personnel to operate Army Aviation Elements at Corps and Division TOC's.
- (4) Provide US Army Aviation support for Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
- (5) Establish and operate an Army Air Traffic Regulation and Identification System, coordinated with and responsive to the Air Traffic Control System.
- (6) Prepare in conjunction with the Commander, Second Air Division, joint operating instructions to assure integrated and coordinated air operations.

c. Commanding General, III MAF, thru his Tactical Air Commander, the CG, 1st MAW, will:

- (1) Exercise operational control over all USMC aviation resources except as provided for in paragraph 3h, above.
- (2) Conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations, to include close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, maintenance of air superiority, air transport, search and rescue, and other supplemental air support, as required.
- (3) Identify to the Commander, Second Air Division, through the TACS, those air resources not currently required for support of III MAF operations so that such resources may be used to support other forces.
- (4) Provide aircraft to support US 7th Fleet operations as directed by COMUSMACV or higher authority.
- (5) Establish and operate an organic Tactical Air Control System to include a Tactical Air Direction Center. Coordinate and integrate this system with the TACS operated by VNAF/USAF.
- (6) Prepare in conjunction with the Commander, Second Air Division, joint operating instructions to ensure integrated and coordinated joint effort.

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Directive Number 95-4, HQ MACV (Cont)

6 February 1966

d. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet: Provides strike aircraft as directed by CINCPAC to operate in coordination with the USAF/VNAF TACS.

e. US commanders will:

(1) Exercise operational control over allocated US Army Aviation resources.

(2) Establish within allocated personnel resources an Army Aviation Element at each Corps TOC.

f. Corps Senior Advisors will:

(1) Exercise operational control over allocated US Army Aviation resources.

(2) Establish within allocated personnel resources an Army Aviation Element in the Corps TOC. A DASC will be collocated with the Corps TOC.

(3) Establish within allocated personnel resources an Army Aviation Element at each ARVN Division TOC.

(4) Within allocated resources provide essential aviation support for ARVN military and paramilitary forces in zone of responsibility, including units of the General Reserve and Special Forces when committed.

5. (C) OPERATIONAL PLANNING.

a. Joint preplanning of US/VNAF aviation support will be conducted on a daily or more frequent basis at Corps and Divisions. Air Liaison Officer, representatives of DASC's, and Army Aviation Elements will participate in tactical ground operations planning to assure that air support requirements are fully considered and to assure a coordinated air-ground effort. USMC officers and 7th Fleet Liaison Officers will also participate on appropriate occasions.

b. Senior Advisors and US commanders will assure that preplanning considers the use of air support for all ground operations. Plans for movement of convoys and trains, ground reconnaissance patrols, security forces, and quick reaction units will include provisions for using air support. In the conduct of airmobile operations, pre-strikes or aircover by strike aircraft will be used when possible in all landing zones where there is a possibility of VC opposition.

c. Planning of air operations in support of III MAF ground operations will be conducted within III MAF channels, but coordinated with TACC, DASC's, and CTOC's by USMC Liaison Officers, as appropriate.

d. Air request channels: Annexes A, B, and C.

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Directive Number 95-4, HQ MACV (Cont)

6 February 1966

6. (U) REFERENCES.

a. JCS Publication 1, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage (JD).

b. JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

c. Letter of Agreement between DCA, VNAF, and MACV, dated 5 February 1965, subject: Special Procedures for Tactical Operations Flights, MACJ311, Serial 395.

d. MACV Directive 95-2 (C), Employment of and Operational Restrictions on US Military Air Delivered Firepower in RVN (U).

e. MACV Directive 95-3 (C), USA/USMC Aviation Support (U).

f. MACV LOI governing operations of III MAF in RVN, dated 6 May 1965.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

L. M. HARRIS
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

3 Annexes

- A - USMC Emergency Air Request Channels
- B - VNAF/USAF Immediate Air Request Channels
- C - VNAF/USAF Preplanned Air Request Channels

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Directive Number 95-4, HQ MACV (Cont)

6 February 1966

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
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Plus 20 - JCS
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10 - COMDT USAWC
10 - USAF AWC
10 - CINCPAC
5 - CINCUSARPAC
5 - CINCPACFLT
5 - CG, FMFPAC
5 - CINCPACAF
25 - Cdr, 2AD
50 - CG, USARV
25 - CG, III MAF
25 - CG, FFORCEV
25 - CG, 1st Inf Div
30 - MACJ3
25 - Cdr, III Corps Adv Gp
25 - Cdr, IV Corps Adv Gp
2 - Sr Adv, Rung Sat SZ
25 - COMSEVENTHFLT

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USMC EMERGENCY AIR SUPPORT REQUEST CHANNELS



NOTE:

1. Ground unit notifies any aircraft of emergency situation.
2. Aircraft receiving emergency request for air support relays to CRC/CRP.
3. CRC/CRP passes emergency request to DASC. DASC coordinates with TOC for approval and diverts airborne FAC and fighter aircraft; or passes scramble request to USMC TADC.
4. FAC may be scrambled if not with ground unit. If FAC not available, ground commander may accept responsibility for strike provided he can mark target and/or can communicate with strike aircraft.
5. USMC unit notifies USMC DASC of emergency situation.
6. USMC DASC request scramble/divert aircraft. FSOC coordinates/clears mission. Attack aircraft report to ground FAC or Tactical Air Coordinator Airborne (TAC(A)) for control of strike.

LEGEND

- Hot Line
 ↗ Air-Grd, Grd-Air

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 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
 DOD DIR 5200.10

Annex A to MACV Directive 95-4, 6 February 1966

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NOTE: Abn Bde or Marine Bde may submit air support requests directly to TACC through the VNAPAFBN if operating as an independent force. Otherwise requests will be submitted to DASC of CTZ being supported.

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
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DOD DIR 5200.10

Annex B to MACV Directive 95-4, 6 February 1966

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VNAF/USAF PREPLANNED AIR REQUEST CHANNELS



* Special task forces such as the Abn Bde and Marine Bde units may submit preplanned air support requests to their TOC or another TOC depending on the concept of operations for the assigned task and area of operation.

LEGEND:

ARVN Air Ground System

Ground to Ground Comm —X— (Request) --X-- (info)

Frag Order

Requirement

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DDO DIR 5200-10

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Annex C to MACV Directive 95-4, 6 February 1966

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HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS ROUTING SHEET
NAYMC HQ 335h-CMC (REV. 9-64)

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17 Nov 66

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(For additional remarks attach plain paper)

ROUTING - Use numbers to show order of routing

OPERATION CODE

X - ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE
AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET

A - FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION

B - FOR COMPLIANCE

C - PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE
OF _____

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, 96602

IN REPLY REFER TO

3T/PCR/mbk
00118166

8 NOV 1966

SECRET

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Training Capability of FMFPac Aviation Forces (U)

Ref: (a) MCCRTC Conference at HQMC of 5-7 Oct 65
(b) CMC 241438Z/SEP66

Encl: (1) Schedule for input of trainees
(2) Schedule for output of replacements
(3) Recommended on board strength
(4) WestPac Aviation Officer requirements

1. During reference (a), the distribution of Marine Corps aviation assets, the shortage of Marine Corps pilots, possible reorganizations and the assignment of future quotas for WestPac pilot replacements were briefly discussed.

2. Following the above meeting a study was undertaken to determine additional pilot training that could be accomplished over that programmed for CY 1966 within FMFPac resources. The results of the study establish that a substantially larger training load can be borne by this command. Specifically, a total of 633 pilots can be trained during CY 1967 as compared with 274 during CY 1966. The results of this FMFPac study on training capabilities are provided for your use in assessing the overall Marine Corps capability to fulfill WestPac pilot requirements.

3. In the development of the FMFPac capabilities study, the following assumptions were made:

a. MAC-56 will be activated in a cadre status and remain in this status until CY 1968.

b. MAC-24 will not be transferred to FMFPac until CY 1968.

c. VMO-3 will deploy with 24 UH-1E helicopters during FY 1967.

d. VMO-5 will be activated with 12 UH-1E helicopters during the 1st quarter of CY 1967.

e. FMFPac will not be tasked with assisting NATC in the training of helicopter pilots.

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INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER
12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

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f. VMT-103 will have eleven TA4F aircraft on 1 Jan 67 and subsequently will receive two per month until a total of 24 aircraft are on hand.

4. Utilizing the present FMFPac assets and those programmed by reference (b), FMFPac has the capability to accomplish the following during CY67:

- a. Deploy HMH-463 (-) with 48 NAs.
- b. Deploy VMFA-122 with 21 NAs and 21 NFOs.
- c. Deploy VMO-3 (second increment) with 21 PQMs.
- d. Deploy HMM-364 with 53 NAs.
- e. Provide WestPac replacements as follows:

<u>MOS</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>LEAD TIME REQUIRED (MONTHS)</u>
		First Tour/Second Tour
7302	24	6/2
7304	6	5/1
7307	23	6/3
7308	24	3/11/2
7332	16	6/2
7333	81	4/11/2
7335 (UH-1E)	56 - 4.6/mo	5/2
(UH-34)	144 - 12/mo	4/2
(CH-46)	98 - 8.1	4/2
(CH-53)	18 - 1.5	4/2
7352	22	6/2
7354	22	6/2
OF67	68	6/2

NOTE: The above replacement figures are predicated on approximately 20% of the personnel being second tour pilots. Approximately two second tour pilots can be substituted for each first tour pilot deleted and vice versa.

5. Enclosure (1) contains the necessary schedule for input of trainees to support the replacement training capability stated above. Any slippage of this input will result in a corresponding slippage in output or in a reduction of the training given to the replacement. Enclosure (2) contains the output of replacements based on input contained in enclosure (1).

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6. Enclosure (3) contains the recommended on board strength reflecting input and output of replacement pilots plus the required instructor personnel. The experienced pilots assigned to the squadrons have been reduced to an instructor cadre. The number of trainees on board may, in some cases, result in an increase in the manning level of the squadron. This balance of permanent/transitory personnel is deemed to be the most economical and the most efficient method of training WestPac replacement personnel. To monitor effectively this instructor/trainee program it would be stabilized for a period of time and be maintained by input of WestPac returnees, while the replacement manning level would be maintained by input from NATC and other CONUS sources.

7. Enclosure (4) contains the CY67 WestPac Aviation Officer personnel replacement requirements and depicts both the hard and soft seat requirements. Not included in these requirements are three factors which must be considered. These factors are internal rotation between staff/tactical billets, attrition and transit time (TP&P). The following is a recapitulation of FMFPac capabilities versus the WestPac hard seat requirements. These hard seat requirements reflect minimum requirements and do not include allowances for aforementioned factors.

<u>MOS</u>	<u>CY67 WestPac Requirements</u>	<u>FMFPac Capabilities</u>	<u>Shortfall/Excess</u>
7302	0	24	+24
7304	6	6	0
7305	35	0	-35
7307	155	44	-111
7308	41	24	-17
7332	9	16	+7
7333	181	81	-100
7335	733	438	-295
UH-1E	(139)	(77)	(-62)
UH-34	(234)	(144)	(-90)
CH-46	(287)	(151)	(-136)
CH-53	(58)	(66)	(+8)
CH-37	(15)	(0)	(-15)
7336	13	0	-13
7352	155	43	-112
7354	21	22	+1

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WestPac Air Forces/Ground Forces Aviator replacement requirements Fiscal Year 1967.

1. Hard Seat Requirements:

a. The following breakdown represents minimum tactical hard seat requirements within the WestPac Aviation Forces by MOS.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>MOS Qualification</u>	<u>Strength Req</u>
(1) VMF(AW)	7305	21 (42) Note 1
(2) VMFA	7307	105 (84) Note 1
(3) VMGR	7308	36
(4) VMCJ-1	7332	8 Note 1
	7336	13
(5) VMA	7333(A4)	112(140) Note 2
	7333(A6)	17 (34) Note 2
(6) HMM	7335 (UH-34)	212(265) Note 3
	(CH-46)	265(212) Note 3
	(CH-53)	58 Note 4
	(UH-1E)	129 Note 5
	(CH-37)	15 Note 6

TOTAL 991

b. The following operational billets are considered mandatory hard seat requirements in addition to those listed above.

<u>Billet</u>	<u>MOS Qualification</u>	<u>Strength Req</u>
(1) ASO	7383 (7305)	1
	(7307)	5
	(7308)	2
	(7333)	5
	(7335)	6
(2) Test Pilot	7379 (7305)	1
	(7307)	2
	(7333)	2
	(7335)	2
(3) LSO	7381 (7307)	2
	(7333)	2

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8. The information contained herein is intended as a training capabilities study. It is recognized that changes in deployment dates, activation of new units and fluctuations in aircraft delivery schedules subject this capability study to constant revisions and updating.



V. W. KRULAK

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CO 1stMarBrig

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SCHEDULE FOR INPUT OF REPLACEMENTS

	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
7302	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7304	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
7307	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	3	2
7308	4	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
7332	4	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3
7335 UH1E	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
UH-34	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
CH-46	0	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	10	12	12	12	12	12
CH-53	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7333	0	4	4	5	6	7	7	8	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
7352	4	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
7354	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
6701	4	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
1st Mar Brig															
7302	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
6701	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

ENCLOSURE (1)

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	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
HMMT-301												
Instructors	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
Trainees	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48	48
Total	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78
HMMT-302												
Instructors	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
Trainees	24	32	32	32	32	32	34	38	42	44	44	44
Total	54	54	62	62	62	62	64	68	72	74	74	74
SU//1 H&MS-30/ VMO-5												
Instructors	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14
Trainees	18	19	20	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
Total	32	33	34	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35
VMT-103												
Instructors	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24
Trainees	15	17	19	21	24	26	27	27	27	27	27	27
Total	39	41	43	45	48	50	51	51	51	51	51	51
HMM-462												
HAC	6	6	6	6	6	10	12	14	16	18	20	21
H2P	0	0	0	6	6	8	12	16	22	24	26	26
Total	6	6	6	12	12	18	24	30	38	42	46	48

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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RECOMMENDED ON BOARD

	JAN NA/NFO	FEB NA/NFO	MAR NA/NFO	APR NA/NFO	MAY NA/NFO	JUN NA/NFO	JUL NA/NFO	AUG NA/NFO	SEP NA/NFO	OCT NA/NFO	NOV NA/NFO	DEC NA/NFO
NSA-122												
Qualified	13/13	14/14	15/15	16/16	17/17	18/18	20/20	21/21				
Trainees	13/13	14/12	13/11	11/9	8/6	5/3	3/1	-		DEPLOY		
Total	26/26	28/26	28/26	27/25	25/23	23/21	23/21	21/21				
NSA-334												
Qualified	8	8	8	8	5/5	5/5	6/6	7/7	8/8	9/9	10/10	10/10
Trainees	17	15	13	11	17/12	17/14	19/16	18/15	17/15	16/14	15/13	15/13
Total	25	23	21	19	22/17	22/19	25/22	25/23	25/23	25/23	25/23	25/23
VMP-212												
Qualified	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Trainees	6	7	8	9	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Total	22	23	24	25	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26
VMCJ-3												
Qualified	4/4	5/5	6/6	7/7	8/8	9/9	10/10	10/10	10/10	10/10	10/10	10/10
Trainees	18/18	19/19	20/20	21/21	20/20	19/19	18/18	18/18	18/18	18/18	18/18	18/18
Total	22/22	24/24	26/26	28/28	28/28	28/28	28/28	28/28	28/28	28/28	28/28	28/28
MASS-5(OF67)	27	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29
MACS-1(OF67)	28	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
MACS-4(OF67)	16	16	16	16	DEPLOY							
MACS-2(OF-67)	22	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24
VMO-3												
Qualified	10	12	16	21								
Trainees	11	9	5	0	DEPLOY							
Total	21	21	21	21								

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
HMM-463												
HAC	18	19	20	DEPLOY								
H2P	25	24	23									
Total	43	43	43									
VMGR-352												
TPC	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24
T2P	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Trainees	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Total	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45

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3 ENCLOSURE (3)

SCHEDULE FOR OUTPUT OF REPLACEMENTS

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
7302	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
7304	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7307	0	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2
7308	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
7336	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
7333	0	4	5	6	6	7	8	9	9	9	9	9
7335												
UH1E	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
UH-34	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
CH-46	0	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	10	12	12
CH-53	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	8
7352	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
7354	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
6708	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
6709	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
1st Mar Brig												
7302	0	0	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
6709	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

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ENCLOSURE (2)

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<u>Billet</u>	<u>MOS Qualification</u>	<u>Strength Req</u>
(4) Cols	9907 (7307)	5 Note 7
	(7333)	5
	(7335)	7
(5) Tactical Grps	(7305)	5 Note 8
	(7307)	11
	(7308)	3
	(7333)	13
	(7335)	14
	(7304)	6
(6) ALO/FAC	7305	7
	7307	25
	7333	25
	7335	25
<u>TOTAL</u>		<u>181</u>

c. Total recap by MOS of hard seat requirements:

<u>MOS</u>	<u>REQ</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>REQ</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>REQ</u>
7304	6	7308	41	7335	733
7305	35	7332	8	7336	13
7307	155	7333	181		

TOTAL REQ: 1172

Notes:

1. MOS 7305/7307 requirements reflect replacement of VMF(AW)-232 by one VMFA squadron during Sept67. NFO requirements are identical to those of the NAS (7307/7332/7336) and have not been addressed separately.

2. MOS 7333 replacement requirements will vary during Apr67 as a result of replacement of an additional A4 squadron by a A6 squadron.

3. Except for CH-46 trained replacement requirements resulting from attrition, normal replacements will be required commencing in Apr67. (HMM-164)

4. The CH-53 Det (10 NA's) will close RVN during Dec66. The remainder of the squadron to deploy during Mar67.

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5. VMO requirement reflects a total of three squadrons with 24 UH-1E aircraft each.

6. CH-37 requirements are listed in view of the indeterminate "phase out" date.

7. Reflects authorized Col billets.

8. Requirements for group billets have been taken from within authorized 9912 billets, and represent XO, OPO NATOPS, one aviation maintenance officer billet per group.

2. Soft-seat requirements:

a. The following MOS's/billets are not considered to be hard seat requirements in that currency in at least one of operational aircraft located in RVN, while desirable, is not mandatory. Requirements are based on those NA MOS's authorized by M/L and considered non-tactical.

(1) WPAF

<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTHORIZATIONS</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTHORIZATIONS</u>
0102	7	6402	16
0202	6	6702	13
0240	3	6708	12
0402	8	6709	16
3060	1	6720	8
5702	1	9903	2
5715	1	9912	51
5903	1	7337	1
	<u>28</u>		<u>119</u>

Sub Total: 147

(2) WPGF

<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTHORIZATIONS</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTHORIZATIONS</u>
0202	3	7332	1
4302	1	7333	4
6602	1	7335	1
7304	1	7336	1
9907	2	9912	17
	<u>8</u>		<u>24</u>

Sub Total: 32

Total soft-seat requirements: 179

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (4)