

715

No, except we did fill out one form for the New Sect.

W15 No - but I feel that a copy to Hq. or a sheriff ~~can~~
would be imp.

Assignment after town is imp to make sure none of his div.

2/6

N.A.

W/6 #15

214

Need min. gm ~~of~~ on next ops.

Need 1 Bu - 2 LSM ready force, depends upon good intelligence

Need common sense application of principle on the ground.

Need to insure depend upon roads & heavy equip (w/ps)

W14 Yes - w/ what the high-level command in def. of VM was
at that time.

We concentrated on small-unit tactics. Perhaps at that
time more stress on civic action.

Z17 LANA - don't use Fr tag but VN at Anovio. Same course, Fr tag / hi low
 @ Regard - CO ref ~~ex~~ by staff job. w/lets as
20/1/1944

QJT Tag w 45th Commando vice Ft Bagg school (Sp France)

Debriefing would be good ideas.

Next assignment is map, so that people can put in knowledge.

W17 know of some personnel not reg'd; MA1 ~~was~~ ^{is} to help for
 Prep - ~~little value~~ big picture. Two courses of Ft. Bagg
 good. V. set good would help

VNAC ~~at~~ status of CACO VN N

Time of year is not complete but more than 1 year is a good bit back
 of 1 year. 2 years about equal to good fact.

21

Name

Room - Build up Plain Seas & Lakes

No-Fr civil ditch runs

Can pick up SVI working vac. of VN in about 1 mo

W1

No - Now set up at Post #me. Feb 58 - Sep 60 (32 mos)

32 No further notes

Report by the 6/11/68 Dark at the Seal Meyer Card of
Met for a time.

Chapter 4 Small War Memo. River Warfare

Should be included in schools + field

River warfare in M.C. dead

WR As of the war, the 557-600 H3 Co, 1st Bn

Base M.C. bkgrd (CG. + Bn 53) + Com am Sec + F.M.

ZAA

3^d Also w/ 1st + Reco Co in full form
Also By rule of 1st + 2^d + 3^d section

Tu VN Feb 58 - Sep 60

WAA

All 3^d

2^d

1st

3^d after it was formed

23

Report to MAFB to front of Report to MAFB to assist in ops
 An Op - note notes & report returns inform Bn Co.

Log - make recommendations for paper of to have

Prod - except this; they have own system) Mostly 2, 3, 4, 5 (log work +
 vid. a. r. i.)

(Bos + Jr Seal the gun helped to to get on V1 & W) in same
 frequency)

W3 An address job not defined interpreted in all eyes by B1 ops, they found
 log. & dependencies (V1 Bn C, has respns. of dependencies), politics, personalities

24 VMAC 4 in Gen Pascom (study states) (probably showing how to use diff areas)
 Found out defecation correct w/ instructions + applicator
 But teach UK of how to apply what they learned to schools back

w4 We tried to put on command by prog. Much like we do in States.
 Mission by Thang; picked up by rest of AF in VN.
 In fact - we were over - committed; maybe because we were so
 successful when compared to rest of VM units.

(Can Khay - 35k sq. Mha. Prog.)

I did get a tour of MAFG Hqs + attended a few lectures; MAFG was
 not on mission. We had to attend too. Limited value in Sp, but little
 value.

25

No copies of MCOs to provide try of MCOs.

(Off try - school + 30 days in MC + try in field. Later Dr Sgt. & Platoon MCO, just go to school in MC, excellent) Diff w/ 3rd Div - good.

Personal prob - for forced drafters prob. After M.C. has post camp outside Thun Doc good remark to S. Diego, complete w/ confidence. Deserters - May be caused partially by op's continuously + seldom close to home. Deserters mostly young unmarried

Log - gear in good shape. Added in gear's gear in shape by Army Mobile Contact Tms.

WS Initially we had to take drafters were, MMS had just called in #9 VMA. Bn, were at low strength. Later we did get a B¹ Bn after making a good survey in try, see funds, & in the field.

No deserter prob.

Some on dip housing

26

After adm rpt after ea. ops
 Other ped. rpt on leg. serv. see a while

W6 We were authorized to do our security. We did get some Fed. Army
 units & transferred into Marine security. We went to 7009 vols. no draft.
 And fl. services in fld but the community uses - housing, schools,
 library,

87
see 6

W1 The Puff Report, E.g. status reports, R

Defendant means to know in many matters were very imp.

We were not permitted to advise in of manners

WFR

Parade - Contested by DVM, SCHK, Red Chi, Phil
 for Gorman

Red Chi had forage, 1 part took to DANANG, but Am Emb got
~~best~~ turned loose. Am Emb ~~took~~^{was} Marine out to advise on
 OPA matters.

2-8

WS

29

~~Based~~ Navy + more by Holm. Long delay in receipt of items -
 proc by Army receipts. Could be some foul-up. Receipts will diff
 by term + registration.

W9 Based on Army Sp1t memo (May 8/ May rec items)

Very little Marine Corp per items.

We got mostly what we needed. I did have to keep checking on
 the status of registrations, some of which had not been filed at some time.

Z10

Rpts made & passed on
 Estbl close con w/ Army holding people;

W10 Parts were constantly in ~~short~~ short supply, because of long
 field time. We finally got allowance increase!
 (See card of allow)

It was diff to maintain the WWII parts. The new Jap. vehicles
 helped solve some of these probs.
 There was a inspect prog to help.

211

16

W 11

16

Z 12

N.A.

W 12

NA

W13 - Some probs ^{W.M.C.} (Schell ~~had~~ VN ~~sent~~ accepted ad readily.

Law + personalities.

In most cases pt gets home, maybe not immediately.

W13A - No more ^{hand} serv. records.

Yes, with ~~plg of the~~ ^{and a W.M.C. advisor} ~~and the~~ ^{monitoring} in planning ph.

W13 of 4 diff B4 Cmdr - extremely receptive. If he was in doubt, if well-explained, would be ~~sent~~ ^{accepted} unless B4 Co was under diff adre from higher up.

W13A - No

We did send some to Jr Seal in ^{summer 58} ~~the~~ US first. They had

been giv to B4 Seal at that time. One tried to get NCO to meet camp

at S.D. at that time. They had no conting fl books, so B4 had to do it.

Later ARVN took over the ground base tax, fuel which was 90% new men.

TS-14

II

MAAG

Major PARKER

Do you believe the C.I. tests you accepted to have integrity were valid?

IA-15

II

MAAG

Maj PARKER

Were you ^{was} (are) advised
~~that~~ you are subject to any spec preparations when your tree is
W.I. was completed?

IP-16

II
MAA-6
Maj PARKER

(debrief)
What is the value of the spec preparations, f/ the advisor killed?

EP-17

II

MAAG

MAJ PARKER

Do you have any suggestions that might improve the value of
a MAJ Altes's job?

IP-1

~~IP-1~~

II
MAAG
Maj. P. ALTER

What special preparations do you undergo before assuming the
advisor billet?

TP-2

II

~~#2~~

MAAG

Major PARKER

Where do you learn the particular tactics of C-I ops to teach to
the W/MC?

PPA

II
MAAG

My PARKER

What Bu did you advise?

P13

II
MAAG
Maj PARKER

What is a WMAc BA advisor's job?

IP-4

TL

MAAG

May Parker

What does ^{MC} a VII^{MC} Bn consist of?

1.

2.

3.

21-5

II

MAAG

Maj PARTER

What personal papers did he have about you? Dear?

2/1/6

II
MAG
Maj PARKER

What was done about the personal probs?

217

II
MAAG
Maj PARKER

What rpts did you submit to The Sr Mar Adbr?

219

11

MAAG

Maj PARKER

What log book did you observe the MAC to have

14 The FIS ?

14 The Bks ?

TP-10

II
MAAG
MAY PARKER

What action has been taken to do away w/ ~~the~~^{his} probes?

IA-11

TS

MAAG

MAJ BARBER

Did you ever have a WSMC observer w/you in VM?

IA-12

II

MAAG

My CAREER

What do ^{WJ-MC} observers do that is beneficial to the individual
and the USMC

7/13

II

MAGE

Mag PARSER

How do VMAC Bn Edrs receive advise & given?

IP13A

II

MAGE

Major PARKER

In your opinion, was the Bon com ^{medical} ~~by~~ ^{an} ~~graph~~ ^{aph} ~~aph~~?

IT-10

See IT-9

LFTU gave presentation
loads of open - get ahead, peak people on who report
to how they come off

PT-11

When I was there 8 Lt/Capt's there

4 - 1st Corps

4 - WMC

I would get 1 of 4, depends on scheduling at the time

Increased Avsrs responsi

Gen RBTB + Lt Col Moody ^{responsi f/ health} removed ~~it~~ the opsul prog.

IT-12

To Indo + MC excellent.

TP-13

For 2^d Bq - Just like @ Brothers

I advised & he did it.

II Gradually ~~interests~~ by ~~himself~~ became resp'd
less & less. As the Bq Cdr became more proficient.

IP-13A

May per students = No - 20 Bu made no opposed graph leads
By them - Yes.
LiLi = junkies, 11 per ea junk

IT 14

II Placed inf, ^{small unit} tactics plus a little imagination will get
the job done every time.

IP-15

No depreziy

IT-16

Exposure of risks should be documented, but isn't
a) a matter

II-17

Teach. III learn ^{1/2 mos} use Fr before go'g to country

Teach. II learn to learn basic lang
 3 mos to learn enough to gett along in a III lang by self

TT-1

Capt. Richard B TAYLOR OCS 69 USMC

25 Nov 62 - 31 Oct 1963 Asst to 2d Bn

Present Post (8 Apr 64) Asst Def Monitor, Personal Dept HQMC

① States - Mil Asst, Tour - 25 days) DOD
 ② 125 hrs of fr. lang. ~~reception~~) Regt

1) VN - 2 das brief summary on admin details

Other considerations f/ BA also considerations

Rec'd substantially

~~from [unclear]~~

IT-2

If learned basic inf small units taken on Be Scof +
in the field in FMT since then, plus imagination.

IT-2A

2d

LT-3

Superimposed ^{BA} C.O.

Same Response

ii) Teach, Advise, Correct on all areas of admin. ^{for} ADPR

IT-4

II In field all the time except for brief times to reequip the team while we're in the field by doing things right & correcting mistakes as we go along.

The 2d Bn improved tremendously during the two years while in the field that it could respond immediately to an emergency w/ professional excellence. This is attributed to [in part] to the constant practice & improvement.

II-5

II slow really. ^{about} 134-1100 men in rolls; about ~~200~~ ⁷⁵⁰ to take to field. Best security of these camps ^{at}

II Loose 125 per 3 hrs of Opn approx, no prob of replacements

Home Base - Dan Ba ^{Thien} ~~Phu~~ 300 km N of Sg

Temp Thu Duc - 10 km west Sg

13 Apr (via UCI memo)

A/N/AF dropped man after cert pd of time (10-30 days)
UNMC kept him on books indef - ~~no longer on book~~ ^{always} begged to
come back at some time.

IT-6

See IT-5

2^d Bn had few deserters. V/MC declared a man a deserter if he was to be at a cert time at a cert place ^{would show up} of V/M Army
 let a man go longer (2^d sent subj to verification) to

Morale - Some away from front 4/2 yrs or so, might have had home in hands but no way of getting to home (perma camp) to see their family.

Esprit - excellent, outstanding

IT-7

After action Rpt after ea opn.

Opn = ce def mission, may be 2 deep or 3 mor
Sent interim ^{case} radio rpts to USR Mar edasr

B1

B2

B3

SECRETCopy No. 1 of 6 Copies

Summary of the Presentation by Major General Richard G. WEEDE, USMC, Chief of Staff, Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command (Vietnam) on 12 July 1963 during the 1963 General Officers Symposium at Headquarters Marine Corps. Compiled on 12 July 1963 by Major J. M. YINGLING, USMC, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC

I. Introduction

A. Major General WEEDE greeted the conferees and then stated that his talk on Vietnam would be divided into two parts--Marines' contributions to date and their expected future participation. The general stated that the marines were making a significant contribution to the overall U. S. effort and that they were carrying on in the tradition of their Corps.

II. Present Contributions

A. General WEEDE introduced a slide to show the number of marines currently assigned to Vietnam, the total U. S. personnel assigned there, and the percentage of Marines among the U. S. Armed Forces Personnel (Figures are approximate):

<u>Agency</u>	<u>USMC/Total U. S.</u>	<u>% Marines</u>
MAC(V)	21/ 332	6
MAAG	16/ 3159	.4
Support Elements	<u>-530/12000</u>	<u>4.5</u>
Totals	567/15,491	4

B. Before speaking briefly on the performances of marines in each of the agencies listed above, Major General WEEDE highlighted the contributions, stating that, in the case of the staffs of both MAC(V) and MAAG, marines held key billets, that within the MAAG the marine advisors were carrying

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

Page 1 of 5 pages

SECRET

SECRET

out a well-directed program of advising the Vietnamese Marine Corps, that the U. S. Marines are supporting the Vietnamese Armed Forces with a Marine Helicopter Task Element that has compiled an enviable record, and that other U. S. Marines are receiving valuable training and making a small but significant contribution to the total effort.

C. MAC(V)

1. The Chief of Staff, MAC(V) pointed out that his section is manned entirely by marines except for one Navy captain, who serves as Deputy C/S, and that the remaining Marines on the MACV staff, officer and enlisted, are represented in all the "J" Divisions. A Marine serves as Deputy Asst C/S J2, and in each of the J3, J4, J5 and J6 Divisions marines are serving as Branch Chiefs. In conclusion, General WEEDE remarked that we were spread thinly, but in the right places.

D. MAAG

1. In the headquarters of the MAAG a Marine colonel is Chief of Staff, another Marine is in the MAP Division of MAAG headquarters. The remaining 14 marines in the MAAG serve as advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps and comprise the Marine sub-section of the Navy Section, MAAG. Major General WEEDE pointed out that the readiness of the Vietnamese Marines attests to the quality of the work that our marines have done.

E. Support Elements

1. General WEEDE said that a detachment of the 1st Composite Radio Company, FMFPac, was working with the Army's

SECRET

SECRET

3d Radio Research Unit in Vietnam. These 15 marines were there for training, primarily, but they were contributing significantly to the take of that unit. The general pointed out that these marines were integrated into the Army ranks and that they were getting valuable training that could not be obtained elsewhere.

2. The largest group of marines in the country is the marine Helicopter Task Element, "SHUFLY", composed principally of a headquarters, a MABS detachment, and an HMM Squadron. General WREDE continued by stating that by reason of its excellent organization and record of performances, "SHUFLY" had become the envy of all the Army helicopter companies in Vietnam.

3. Next, the general presented a slide that portrayed "SHUFLY's" contribution during the first half of 1963 and another which compared for a half-year period USMC-USA rotary-wing aircraft efforts:

a. SHUFLY Cargo-Troop Lifts, Jan-Jun 1963

<u>Month</u>	<u>Cargo (Tons)</u>	<u>Troops Lifted</u>
Jan	325	7,600
Feb	350	11,300
Mar	375	9,800
Apr	560	10,700
May	500	14,200
<u>Jun</u>	<u>340</u>	<u>6,600</u>
Totals	2,450	60,200

SECRET

SECRET

b. USMC-USA Helicopter Flight Comparisons

<u>Period</u>	<u># A/C Assigned</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Sorties</u>
<u>Oct-Dec 62</u>			
USA	100	11,872	13,091
USMC	24	5,143	7,250
<u>Jan-Mar 63</u>			
USA	100	9,804	11,423
USMC	24	5,712	8,775
<u>Six month totals</u>			
USA	100	21,676	24,514
USMC	24	10,855	16,025

4. Before departing the subject of "SHUFLY" operations, General WEEDE read parts of a letter which bore out earlier remarks on the significance of the contributions the marines were making. This letter was written by a U. S. Army Senior Advisor to a Vietnamese Corps and transmitted another letter written by the Vietnamese corps commander. Both were written in an attempt to reclaim the decision to relocate "SHUFLY" out of their area of interest. These letters extolled the squadron's efforts, and enumerated several advantages that the Vietnamese receive when they are supported by a Marine helicopter squadron instead of an Army helicopter company.

F. Observer Program

1. As a final measure of marine participation, Major General WEEDE stated that only recently General Paul D. HARKINS, ComUSMAC(V), had reinstated the USMC observer program

SECRET

SECRET

for junior officers. In this program 10 Marine Company grade officers from 3rd MarDiv & 1st MAW spend approximately one month in Vietnam observing the U. S. Marine advisory and helicopter support efforts in support of operations of the Vietnamese armed forces.

2. General WEEDE stated that a similar program for senior officers is pending. When initiated this program would permit five or six field grade Marine officers to observe MACV and MAAG staff functions and corps and division advisory efforts.

III. Future Participation

A. The MAC V Chief of Staff opened this portion of the presentation by stating that marine participation in the future probably would not be increased. General WEEDE told the conferees that the U. S. helicopter units are due for phase out as the Vietnamese become proficient and take over. The general said that an increase of Marine advisors could only be accomplished by our assuming some of the current Army advisor billets, however is not likely since the one year lead time required to get ~~a~~ proficient advisors into the country would run into the era of the planned decrease of U. S. advisors.

Note: The information within these five pages corrects and replaces the summary prepared on 12 July 1963. Changes to the earlier document resulted from General WEEDE's review of it on 18 July. Copies of the first summary have been destroyed. The original of the 12 July document, upon which the general made his comments, has been retained in the historical archives.

DATE: 23 July 1963
J. M. Yangling
 J. M. YANGLING
 Major, USMC

Page 5 of 5 pages

SECRET

SECRETCopy No. 1 of 6 copies
003A19763

Summary of the Presentation by Major General Richard G. WEEDE, USMC, Chief of Staff, Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command (Vietnam) on 12 July 1963 during the 1963 General Officers Symposium at Headquarters Marine Corps. Compiled on 12 July 1963 by Major J. M. YINGLING, USMC, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC

I. Introduction

A. Major General WEEDE greeted the conferees and then stated that his talk on Vietnam would be divided into two parts--Marines' contributions to date and their expected future participation. The general stated that the Marines were making a significant contribution to the overall U. S. effort and that they were carrying on in the tradition of their Corps.

II. Present Contributions

A. General WEEDE introduced a slide to show the number of Marines currently assigned to Vietnam, the total U. S. personnel assigned there, and the percentage of Marines among the U. S. Armed Forces Personnel (figures are approximate):

<u>Agency</u>	<u>USMC/Total U. S.</u>	<u>% Marines</u>
MAC(V)	21/332	6
MAAG	16/3159	.4
S Support Elements	<u>530/12000</u>	<u>4.5</u>
Totals	567/15,491	4

B. Before speaking briefly on the performances of Marines in each of the agencies listed above, Major General WEEDE highlighted the contributions, stating that, in the case of the staffs of both MAC(V) and MAAG, Marines held key billets, that within the MAAG the Marine advisors were carrying

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

Page 1 of 6 pages

SECRET

SECRET

out a well-directed program of advis^{ing} to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, that the ^{U.S.} Marines are supporting the Vietnamese Armed Forces with a ^{Marine Helicopter Task Element} ~~reinforced helicopter squadron~~ that has compiled an enviable record, and that other ^{U.S.} Marines are receiving valuable training and making a small but significant contribution to the total effort.

C. MAC(V)

1. The Chief of Staff, MAC(V) pointed out that his section is manned entirely by Marines except for one Navy ^{who serves as Deputy,} captain, ^{on the MACV staff} and that the remaining Marines, ^{officer and enlisted,} ~~occupy important positions~~ in all the "J" ^{Divisions. A marine serves as} billets, ^{and in the} Deputy Asst G 32, and in ^{each of} the 33, 34, 35 and 36 Divisions ^{Marines are serving as Branch Chiefs.} ~~J 3 and J 4, Marines hold the top posts,~~ In conclusion, General WEEDE remarked that we were spread thinly, but in the right places.

D. MAAG

^{On the Headquarters of the MAAG a marine colonel is}
 1. ~~Two Marines are assigned in the~~ Chief of Staff, ^{another Marine is in the MAP Division of MAAG headquarters.}
~~section.~~ ^{The remaining 14 perform as advisors to the Vietnamese} Marine Corps and comprise the Marine sub-section of the Navy Section, MAAG. Major General WEEDE pointed out that the readiness of the Vietnamese Marines attests to the quality of the work that our Marines have done.

E. Support Elements

1. General WEEDE said that a detachment of the 1st Composite Radio Company, FMFPac, was working with the Army's 3d Radio ^{Research} ~~Relay~~ Unit in Viet Nam. These 15 Marines were there for training, primarily, but they were ~~making some~~ ^{contributing} significantly to the ~~task~~ ^{take} of that unit.

Page 2 of 6 pages

SECRET

SECRET

~~[to the cause]~~ The general pointed out that these Marines were integrated into the Army ranks and that they were getting ^{valuable} training that could not be obtained elsewhere.

2. The largest group of Marines in the country is the ~~reinforced helicopter squadron~~ ^{Marine Helicopter Task Element} "SHUFLY", composed ^{principally} of a headquarters, a MABS detachment, and an HMM Squadron. General WEEDE continued by stating that by reason of its excellent organization and record of performances, "SHUFLY" had become the envy of all the Army helicopter companies in Viet Nam.

3. Next, the general presented ^a ~~two~~ slides that portrayed "SHUFLY's contributions ^{during the first half of 1963 and another which} and compared for a half-year period ^{rotary-wing aircraft} USMC-USA efforts:

a. SHUFLY Cargo-Troop Lifts, Jan-Jun 1963

<u>Month</u>	<u>Cargo (Tons)</u>	<u>Troops Lifted</u>
Jan	325	7,600
Feb	350	11,300
Mar	375	9,800
Apr	560	10,700
May	500	14,200
<u>Jun</u>	<u>340</u>	<u>6,600</u>
Totals	2,450	60,200

SECRET

SECRET

b. USMC-USA Helicopter Flight Comparisons

<u>Period</u>	<u># A/C Assigned</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Sorties</u>
<u>Oct-Dec 62</u>			
USA	100	11,872	13,091
USMC	24	5,143	7,250
<u>Jan-Mar 63</u>			
USA	100	9,804	11,423
USMC	24	5,712	8,775
<u>Six month totals</u>			
USA	100	21,676	24,514
USMC	24	10,855	16,025

4. Before departing the subject of SHUFLY operations, General WEEDE read parts of ~~two~~ ^a letters which bore out earlier remarks on the significance of the contributions the Marines were making. ~~One of the~~ ^{This} letters was written by a senior U. S. Army ^{Senior} Advisor, ^{to a Vietnamese Corps and transmitted another letter written by the} ~~the other by a~~ Vietnamese corps commander. Both were written in an attempt to ^{reclaim the decision} ~~influence a plan~~ to relocate "SHUFLY" out of their area of interest. These letters extolled the squadron's efforts, and enumerated several advantages that the Vietnamese receive when they are supported by a Marine helicopter squadron instead of an Army helicopter company.

F. Observer Program

1. As a final measure of Marine participation, Major General WEEDE stated that only recently General Paul D. HARKINS, ComUSMAC(V), had reinstated the ^{USMC} observer program for junior officers. ^{for this program} ~~As a result,~~ 10 Marine ^{Company grade} officers ^{from 3rd Mardiv B. ^{MAW}} ~~in a month will~~

Page 4 of 6 pages

SECRET

SECRET

spend approximately one month in Vietnam observing the U.S. Marine ~~(be able to take note of the ground advisor and air support)~~ advisory and helicopter support efforts in support of operations ~~(efforts)~~ of the Vietnamese armed forces.

2. General WEEDE stated that a similar program for senior officers is pending. ^{When initiated} ~~(If approved)~~ this program would permit five or six ^{field grade} Marine officers to observe MACV and MAAG staff functions and corps and division advisory efforts.

III. Future Participation

A. The MACV Chief of Staff opened this portion of the presentation by stating that Marine participation in the future probably would not be increased. General WEEDE told the conferees that the U. S. helicopter units are due for phase out as the Vietnamese become proficient and take over. The general said that an increase of Marine advisors ^{could only be accomplished by an assuming some of the current Army advisor billets, however} is not likely since the one year lead time required to get a proficient advisor into the country would run into the era of the planned decrease of U. S. advisors.

IV. Question and Answer Period

A. ~~During this portion of the presentation it was pointed out that upon phase out, the planned turnover of "SHUFly" aircraft and associated equipment to the Vietnamese not only would hurt the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing financially~~

SECRET

SECRET

but also would, in effect, leave the wing one squadron short.
General WEEDE remarked that the Marine Corps would receive
an amortised reimbursement for the material left in Viet-Nam.

J. M. Yingling
J. M. YINGLING
MAJOR USMC

APPROVED:

R. A. Weede
R. A. WEEDE
Major General, USMC

DATE: 18 July 63**SECRET**

S E C R E T

THIS IS A COVER SHEET

*BASIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ARE CONTAINED
IN OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5510.1B*

THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED
IN THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) COULD RESULT IN SERIOUS
DAMAGE TO THE UNITED STATES

RESPONSIBILITY OF PERSONS HANDLING THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S)

1. This cover sheet will be used whenever Secret documents on permanent retention are routed, whether routed in a file folder, envelope or other container. The cover sheet will be fastened to the document, or container, in such fashion that it cannot be removed during transmission. When routing in a container, the classification of the cover sheet will be that of the highest classification of the material enclosed.
2. Exercise the necessary safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure by never leaving the document(s) unattended except when properly secured in a locked safe.
3. Transfer document(s) only to persons who need to know and who possess the required security clearance.
4. Obtain receipt whenever relinquishing control of the document(s).

STORAGE

Store as prescribed in OPNAV Instruction 5510.1B.

REPRODUCTION

1. SECRET material originating in an agency outside the Department of Defense will not be reproduced, copied, or extracted without the consent of the originating agency.
2. The reproduction, extraction or copying of SECRET material originating within the Department of Defense is authorized except when the originator or higher authority has specifically denied this authority.
3. Reproduction of Joint Chiefs of Staff papers is not authorized.

DISPOSITION

This cover sheet should be removed when document(s) are filed in a permanent file, declassified, destroyed, or mailed.

(This cover sheet is unclassified when separated from classified documents)

S E C R E T

NAVMC HQ 418-ADM (Supersedes NAVMC HQ 376-GS which is obsolete and will not be used)

~~SECRET~~
NO FORNAO302-kps
003020763

AUG 2 1963

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
 To: Major General R. G. WREDE, USMC, Headquarters,
 United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,
 APO 143, San Francisco, California

Subj: Review of notes taken during interview on 18 July
 1963; request for

Encl: (1) Copies No. 1 and 2 of HQMC S&C No. 003020763
 (Subject notes)

1. Enclosure (1), prepared immediately after your interview on 18 July, is provided you for review as to the accuracy of the material therein.

2. Should you agree with the contents, please sign copy number one and return to this Headquarters for permanent filing in the archives. Copy number two is provided for your retention if you so desire. If copy number two is retained and subsequently destroyed, no report of destruction is required.

3. Your giving of valuable time for the interview is appreciated by all of us committed with this project.

4. This letter is regraded, unclassified, upon removal of enclosure (1).

R.

70 Apr 64
Original copy w/enccl returned
to S&C files for permanent retention

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
 DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN

SECRET

NO FORN

003020763

NOTES OF AN INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD G. WEEDE, USMC, CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM BY MAJOR J. M. YINGLING, USMC, AT HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS, 18 JULY 1963

Initially, the interviewer requested General WEEDE to review a typed summary, prepared by the undersigned, of a presentation the general had made on 12 July during the 1963 General Officers Symposium at Headquarters Marine Corps. General WEEDE made extensive penciled comments and deletions on the original of this document and thereafter signed it.

The undersigned then provided General WEEDE with a list of questions relative to U. S. Marines' participation in United States activities in Vietnam since 1954. The questions propounded and the general's remarks thereto appear below:

Question 1: What features of individual and unit U. S. Marine Corps participation in Vietnam should be emphasized in the account of Marine Corps activities in that country from 1954 through 1963?

General WEEDE stated that in the period to 1962, he knew of no Marine activities that should be emphasized and that he believed the accounting of their efforts to that time should be indicated as being the normal advisory duties similar to those performed in any other country where Marines were engaged in like roles. The SAC V Chief of Staff continued by noting that there has been no significant increase in the number of U. S. Marines assigned as advisors and that the moderate increase in 1962 was incident to the enlargement of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. It was

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET
NOFORN

SECRET

NO FORN

Major General WENDE's opinion that the emphasis of U. S. Marine activities in Vietnam should be on "SHUPLY", for the reason that the helicopter task elements have done a tremendous job and have established a very fine record.

Question 2: What prompted the decision to send a Marine helicopter VICE an Army helicopter company to Vietnam as the fourth U. S. helicopter unit for that country?

Major General WENDE said that when he arrived in South Vietnam on 11 February [1962], there had been prepared in MAAG a letter to CINCPAC^{ac} inviting the U. S. Marine Corps to send into Vietnam for experience two helicopter pilots per Army helicopter company then supporting the Vietnamese. (The general remarked that the invitation was in consonance with the policy of participation in South Vietnam by all the services.) The Chief of Staff, MACV continued, stating that he suggested to MACV that it either could send the pilots or initiate a request to send a unit of its own. The latter, General WENDE added, is what MACV decided to do.

Question 3: When will the phase out of SHUPLY begin? And? Will the entire unit be phased out during this period?

The general emphasized that the plans for the phase out of SHUPLY are in the formulative stage only, but as envisioned presently, the concept for such action calls for a rapid departure in the third or fourth quarter of calendar '64.

SECRET
NO FORN

SECRET

NO FORN

General WEDE stated that the entire task element would leave the country, but added that one portion of SHUFLY is scheduled to vacate South Vietnam by the end of 1963, and that the function of this segment would be taken over by the Vietnamese.

Question 4: Information regarding USMC advisor efforts and activities is almost totally lacking at HQMC. What type reports and other correspondence would the general recommend the Marine sub-section be required to submit to CMC?

What should be the frequency of each?

Major General WEDE began his answer by stating that the Marine sub-section was making adequate reports and that he would recommend no additional ones be initiated. The general pointed out that most of the sub-section reports are included within the Navy section's portion of the MAAG reports, and within other higher echelon reports. General WEDE added that naval attache reports contain excellent information on the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

Question 5: When will USMC advisors begin and end phase out?

Will the entire Marine sub-section be phased out within this period?

The MAC V Chief of Staff again emphasized that such plans at present are in the development stage only, but that the long-range thinking is that marine Corps advisors will be reduced coincident with the paring down of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, tentatively set for fiscal year '65. The general noted that

SECRET
NO FORN

SECRET

NO FORN

some U. S. Marine advisors will remain in the country as long as there are Vietnamese Marines.

Question 6: What is the value of the observer program to the USMC?

What is the policy regarding observer's becoming involved in situations whereby they might have to shoot to defend themselves?

General WENDE stated that the program, which in his opinion was extremely valuable, has provided U. S. Marine Corps officers with first hand knowledge of that geographic portion of the world and permitted scrutiny of the activities of the advisors and the results of their efforts through observance of Vietnamese operations. Another benefit, the general pointed out, was that this program provided the opportunity for the observers to witness the helicopter support operations of SHUFLY.

In answer to the sub-question, Major General WENDE said that the policy is that observers may shoot to defend themselves, a position that stems from the age-old right, which every man has, to protect himself.

Question 7: To what extent do the following become involved in Vietnamese combat operations:

USMC advisors?

USMC observers?

General WENDE stated that Marine advisors do not participate in the fighting, but that they do accompany Vietnamese combat elements, including patrols. The general added that the position

SECRET
NO FORN

SECRET

NO FORN

of the advisor is with the commander of the element being advised, and that the advisor went where the commander went. With respect to the USMC observers, Major General WEEDE said that their involvement closely paralleled that of the advisors, except the observers' mission was solely to witness, not advise.

Question 8: To what extent have U. S. Marines participated in the Junk/small boat programs?

Major General WEEDE mentioned that LtCol DALBY was assigned to the H&D Unit in Vietnam to assist in the development of the junk and swimmer support boat projects, but that no U. S. Marines were, or are, committed to the operational phase of these programs. The general pointed out that LtCol DALBY, reassigned to Major General KRULAK's office, could provide much information on these programs.

Question 9: What problems burden the Vietnamese Marine Corps in each of the below areas:

Personnel?

Logistics?

General WEEDE asserted that, essentially, the Vietnamese Marine Corps' personnel problems do not differ from those of the country's army, but that, generally, the Marines get higher calibre men.

Concerning the logistical question, the general stated that the Vietnamese Marines are equipped in a manner similar to that of

SECRET
NO FORN

SECRET*NO FORN*

the U. S. Marines, and that, in the field, the Marines
(Vietnamese) draw from the army unit with which they are working.

As further sources of good information in these subjects,
General WEEDS offered the names of the below listed U. S. *Marines*:

Maj PARKER -- HQMC

Capt BIALZAK -- MCS

J. B. Yingling
J. B. YINGLING
Major USMC

APPROVED:

15/R.G. WEEDS
R. G. WEEDS
Major General USMC

DATE: *26 Mar 1964*

SECRET
NO FORN

HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 APO 143, San Francisco, California

26 March 1964

Major J. F. Wagner, Jr., USMC
 G-3 Division (AO3D)
 Headquarters Marine Corps
 Washington, D. C.
 20380

Dear Major Wagner:

To my chagrin I found today, at the bottom of my in-
 basket the enclosed which should have long since been returned
 to you. I regret the inexcusable delay.

R. G. Weede
 R. G. WEEDE

Major General, U. S. Marine Corps

Major YINGLING

Gen WEEDE returned this
 to CMC on 6Apr64. I
 feel that this approved
 copy signed by Gen WEEDE
 should stay in CMC S&C
 files.

Maj BRILL

CMC S&C