

SECRET

CIVIL AFFAIRS BRANCH
G-3 DIVISION

INTERNAL ROUTING	DATE	INITIAL	DEADLINE
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ADMIN CHIEF	28 Jun	27	
SECRETARY			

(REMARKS)

SUBJ: *Background material*

Disposition:

Return to

File

Destroy

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Action Officer

G-3 DIVISION ROUTING DATE INIT

ACofS G-3 A03		
Deputy G-3 A031		
Asst G-3 A032		
Admin/Fiscal A03A		
Plans&Prog A03B		
Training A03C		
Historical A03D 41		
Comd, Cont & Comm A03F		
Operations A03H		
Combat Pictorial A03P		
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RECOMMENDED ROUTING OUTSIDE OF
 G-3 DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:

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NAVS0 5216/5 (7-00) S/N 0104-904-1760

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

A03E-fws

DATE : 28 Jun 68

Memorandum

FROM : Head, Civil Affairs Branch
TO : Head, Historical Branch
SUBJECT : Background material on civil affairs
Encl : (1) Background material on Civil Affairs

1. The material contained in enclosure (1) is from the files of the Civil Affairs Branch and of no further use. It is provided as matter of possible historical use in the origin and development of Marine Corps Civil Affairs operations in Vietnam.

2. In the event that the enclosed material is not suitable for retention, its destruction is recommended.

D. P. Wyckoff
D. P. WYCKOFF



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OF ENCLOSURES.

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HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96243

MACV332

Ser No 01406
26 October 1965

SUBJECT: Concept for Military Civic Action and Military Civil Affairs
in the Republic of Vietnam

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Attached is the MACV concept for military civic action and military civil affairs in the Republic of Vietnam. It will be used as a basis for MACV and subordinate element planning and direction of civic action and civil affairs activities.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

W B Rosson
W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

- A
Plus 10 - Dep CG, USAFV
5 - CG, MACV
5 - III MAF
5 - SA, I Corps
5 - SA, II Corps
5 - SA, III Corps
5 - SA, IV Corps
5 - SA, CMR
10 - POLMAR Directorate
2 - CINCPAC
2 - CINCUSARPAC
2 - Civil Affairs School, Ft Gordon, Ga
5 - JUSPAO
5 - USCM

REGRADING UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO U.S. Forces, 96243

MACJ32

SUBJECT: Concept for Military Civil Affairs and Civic Action in the Republic of Vietnam

SECTION I: MACV MILITARY CIVIL AFFAIRS CONCEPT

1. (C) GENERAL: It is essential to joint United States-Government of Vietnam (GVN) objectives in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) that the GVN extend its authority and influence throughout the rural areas, and that the Vietnamese people gain confidence in their government's ability to provide them security and the benefits of economic and social development. As a consequence, programmed US participation in governmental activities is limited to advice and assistance on the invitation of the GVN. Among the US agencies, USOM has been assigned primary responsibility for advising, assisting and supporting GVN non-military governmental organs by the Mission Council, and therefore has the primary US civil affairs responsibility in RVN.

2. (C) CONCEPT: Programmed US military civil affairs operations will be limited to base areas and will be restricted in scope to those government functions which have a direct bearing on the welfare of US/3d Country troops, e.g., public safety. In geographical areas adjacent to or away from the base areas, US tactical unit civil affairs requirements will be met by working with the existing GVN and local administrative officials. Normally, these are the province and district chiefs. The sector and sub-sector advisory detachments will assist US/3d Country troops (and their integral civil affairs staffs) in dealing with these authorities.

3. (C) COORDINATION:

a. In the logistical base areas designated installation coordinators will serve as focal points for contact with GVN officials. Coordinators will work with the local officials to arrive at solutions to problems in such areas as population control, off limits areas, prices of services and commodities and local labor procurement resulting from the presence of US/3d Country military forces in the area. The Community Relations Committee or Friendship Council will serve as the primary forum for discussions with local governmental officials.

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b. In tactical base areas, the primary channel of liaison and communication with GVN officials is through the sector and sub-sector advisory detachments. When required by the tactical commander, sector advisory detachments will provide liaison teams to the tactical unit commanders to assist them in accomplishing their civil affairs and civic action responsibilities. At division and separate brigade level, USOM and JUSPAO will also provide a representative to work with the US/3d Country tactical units and make available to them necessary advice, assistance and support.

c. US/3d Country tactical operations in areas adjacent to and distant from tactical unit bases will necessitate advance civil affairs planning. This planning will be accomplished by organic civil affairs staff sections working jointly with the local USOM/MACV/JUSPAO advisors, local province officials, and the RVNAF. US commanders will not be responsible for the control of the civilian population during operations; that responsibility normally will be retained by the province and district governmental officials and discharged by employment of available province or RVNAF resources. Occasionally, GVN agencies may be unable to function effectively due to lack of security or resources, and as a consequence battlefield refugees could interfere with ongoing tactical operations. To enable the US commander to accept and fulfill the task of managing such refugees, he will be given an operating civil affairs capability, the refugee relief team, with the following composition:

- 1 Civil Affairs Specialist (Capt)
- 1 Doctor (Capt)
- 1 Supply/Construction Specialist (Lt)
- 1 Counterintelligence Specialist (Lt)
- 1 Medical NCO (E5 or higher)
- 1 Clerk/Interpreter (EM)

These teams generally will be attached to brigade or regiment for the duration of an operation. When not working with US tactical units, they will be attached to a sector advisory detachment and given a refugee area support mission.

4. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS:

Province/sector and sub-sector/district level MACV advisory detachments will monitor USOM operations in their areas so that advisory and support efforts can be continued by the MACV advisory detachment should USOM withdraw its representatives due to deteriorating security conditions.

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SECTION II: MACV CIVIC ACTION CONCEPT

1. (U) GENERAL: The point of departure for the MACV military civic action operational concept is the attitude of courtesy and helpfulness displayed by the individual soldier in his daily contacts with the Vietnamese people. Unit military civic action projects complement individual actions and will be performed in accordance with existing service doctrine and normally within the limits of existing service funds and personnel, e.g., medical civic action, refugee relief and emergency transport. Combined civic action projects, with US and Vietnamese military or paramilitary units working together, are desirable and encouraged where US and GVN troops are collocated or engaged in combined operations. Whenever possible, the initiative for military civic action projects will come from the lowest practicable military echelon. Civic action activities are considered successful if they encourage a local Vietnamese attitude of self help and if the arrival or continued stationing of US units in an area is welcomed for the positive and tangible benefits that accrue to the common people. Civic action fails when the total impact of constructive projects is overburdened by careless or thoughtless unit or individual actions.

2. (C) INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS:

a. The main thrust of the orientation to be given the US soldier is that his role in Vietnam is positive; he is here at the request of the GVN to help its people win their struggle against the Viet Cong. He should be told that the Viet Cong will attempt to alienate him from the people and that he can defeat them by the understanding and generosity he displays in his daily life. Emphasis is placed on making personal friends among the Vietnamese soldiers and common people and helping them individually; using phrases from their language; honoring their customs and laws; making no special demands; and treating women with politeness and respect. Loud, rude or unusual behavior, and open displays of wealth are discouraged because they alienate the soldier from the people.

b. Occasionally, individual incidents will occur that necessitate joint US-GVN meetings to adjudicate claims or settle differences of opinion. These situations are handled at the hamlet or village level by meetings between the local US and GVN officials. In urban areas such situations are handled by Friendship Councils chaired by the principle local GVN official, the district or province chief or the city mayor, and composed of the senior MACV advisor in the area, the local US unit commanders and local USOM, JUSPAO, and CSA representatives. Councils will be established in all areas where US forces are or will be present in force, so that incidents can be settled expeditiously, at the lowest governmental or command level possible, and with minimal publicity. These councils also serve constructively in furthering over-all civic action objectives. They provide a forum for discussions with the GVN concerning the impact of the US troop presence in a locality. Agreements on off limits areas, prices of goods and services, police checkpoints, population control, and local labor procurement can be sought. Whenever possible, limits on the number and hours during which US troops are allowed liberty will be set so that the Vietnamese are not denied enjoyment of the facilities of their own towns.

CONFIDENTIAL3. (C) MILITARY CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS AT PROVINCE LEVEL:

a. Commanders of US/3d Country units will participate in military civic action programs within their areas of operation to the extent that the military mission will permit and in accordance with existing service doctrine. Emphasis will be placed on projects already initiated by the hamlet or village officials on a "self-help" basis in order to reinforce GVN efforts to extend governmental influence. Whenever possible, US unit commanders will insure that RVNAF military or paramilitary units participate with the US in military civic action projects.

b. The normal liaison link between US/3d Country unit commanders, local GVN officials and MACV/USOM/JUSPAO advisory detachments, at province level, will be provided by the sector liaison team. These teams consist of officers and non-commissioned officers selected by the sector advisor from his detachment on the basis of the contribution they can make toward providing unit commanders with information on the local situation, disposition and capability of local GVN agencies and military units, and the civic action program that would have the greatest appeal in a particular area.

c. When possible, US/3d Country unit commanders will meet with the local provincial committee consisting of the province chief, the sector advisor, the JUSPAO representative and the USOM provincial representative, to determine the specific civic action projects that would have greatest impact on and contribute the most to provincial rural construction/pacification programs. The province chief is central to military civic action project planning at the local level through his control of programs dealing with rural construction/pacification, and because of his administrative staff which can determine requirements, establish local GVN priorities and allocate resources.

4. (C) COORDINATION AT THE CORPS TACTICAL ZONE LEVEL:

a. The senior advisor of the corps advisory group is charged with responsibility for coordinating all US/3d Country military civic action projects with the GVN/RVNAF government delegate/corps commander in order to insure that such projects contribute constructively to the rural construction/pacification programs of the province in the corps tactical zone. USOM, JUSPAO and ODA corps regional supervisors have been instructed to work with him, giving him any assistance, advice or support he requires to accomplish his mission. When US tactical units are present in large numbers in a CTZ, normally the corps advisory group will be placed under the operational control of the senior US tactical commander in the CTZ. Overall responsibility for coordinating civic action projects will pass to the tactical commander. In practice, however, he will continue to discharge his civic action coordination responsibilities through the senior advisor of the corps advisory group.

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5. (C) COORDINATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL: At the national level, US/3d Country civic action projects are coordinated with the GVN and integrated into national rural construction programs by the responsible US agencies at the working level, and by the Mission Council at the policy level. Overall coordination of such programs on the GVN side is handled by the Rural Construction Ministry and the Central Rural Construction Council. The latter GVN agency is responsible for coordinating, at the inter-ministerial level, all GVN rural construction/pacification policy and programs. Within MACV, specific staff responsibility for coordinating, monitoring and evaluating military civic action projects is assigned to the POLMAR Advisory Directorate. This directorate operates under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3.

6. (C) PROJECT EVALUATION:

a. At province level, the MACV/USOM advisory detachments are charged jointly with responsibility for monitoring and evaluating all US civic action projects within the province. An evaluation of the overall impact of the US military presence on the province is included in the Provincial Team Report submitted jointly by MACV, JUSPAC and USOM each month. In addition, sector advisers, individually, are responsible for monitoring the progress of province level US/3d Country military civic action projects to insure that they are systematically integrated into the provincial rural construction/pacification programs. The sector adviser's evaluation of the effectiveness of US/3d Country civic action projects will be prepared after consultation with the tactical unit commanders and local GVN officials and included in the following reports: MACJ3-01 and MACJ3-03. Spot reports on a particular military civic action project or incident will be submitted if necessary or requested.

b. Senior US tactical commanders in each corps tactical zone are given the responsibility for evaluating specific military civic action projects undertaken by subordinate units to insure that such projects are coordinated with GVN province plans and are consistent with MACV military civic action guidance. Reports on civic action projects required by tactical unit standing operating procedures or necessitated by special circumstances will be evaluated and forwarded to MACV POLMAR Directorate if MACV action or assistance is required.

c. At the national level, MACV component service commanders are responsible for monitoring the progress and evaluating the effectiveness of specific military civic action projects being performed by the components to insure that these projects are consistent with service doctrine and MACV policy guidelines. In-country training and orientation of US/3d Country unit commanders and/or staff officers on civic action is the responsibility of the service component commanders.

d. Systematic monitoring of major US-GVN military civic action projects is accomplished by the responsible US agencies working jointly with the appropriate GVN agencies, normally the GVN Rural Construction Ministry. Final evaluation of the success of such projects is a subject of joint meetings of the Mission Council and the Central Rural Construction Council.

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CONFIDENTIAL7. TYPE US/3d COUNTRY MILITARY CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS:

Type US/3d Country military civic action projects are listed in the inclosure hereto.

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ENCLOSURE TO MACV CONCEPT FOR MILITARY CIVIC ACTION IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Type US/3d Country Military Civic Action Projects

1. (C) Examples of US/3d Country military civic action projects in which local Popular Forces would participate are listed below. Such projects will normally be coordinated with the local GVN hamlet, village, or district chief as appropriate, and with the local US sub-sector advisor.

- a. Improve existing area drainage.
- b. Improve waste disposal methods.
- c. Destroy insect and rodent breeding places.
- d. Assist in rebuilding and new construction within self-help programs.

2. (C) Examples of military civic action projects in which the participation of local Regional Forces can be expected are listed below. These projects will normally be coordinated with the local GVN village, district, or province chief as appropriate, and with the local MACV and/or USOM advisory detachment.

- a. Improve area drainage.
- b. Teach first aid, personal hygiene and sanitation.
- c. Destroy insect and rodent breeding places.
- d. Improve area waste disposal methods.
- e. Supplement local youth education.
- f. Assist in repairing roads and bridges in accordance with capabilities.

3. (C) Examples of military civic action projects in which the participation of local ARVN forces and/or RF/PF, as well as local GVN provincial agencies, can be expected are listed below. These projects will be coordinated with the local village and district and/or province chief, and with the local MACV and/or USOM advisory detachment.

- a. Transport community materials.
- b. Provide outpatient medical care to local inhabitants.
- c. Provide technical training for adults.
- d. Supervise and assist in immediate rehabilitation efforts.
- e. Contribute to emergency refugee relief.


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4. (C) Type military civic action projects that may involve RVNAF military and paramilitary forces and GVN local and national government resources are listed below. Such projects will normally be coordinated with the province chief at the local level, and the Central Rural Construction Council at the national level on the GVN side; and the MACV/USOM/JUSPAO provincial and corps/regional advisory detachments, and the responsible US agencies on the US side.

- a. Disaster relief.
- b. Assistance in the development of planned communities in and around logistical and tactical base areas.
- c. Transport of emergency supplies.

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Prepared by

**The Civil Affairs Directorate
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff**

For

**Military Operations
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C.**

23 September 1964

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HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS ROUTING SHEET

NAVMC HQ 335-CMC (REV. 11-63)

1 Feb 65

OPR. CODE	DATE		INITIAL	ADDRESSEES	FROM
	IN	OUT			
				COMMANDANT	DC/S(RD&S)
				ASSISTANT COMMANDANT	TO
				MILITARY SECY TO CMC	AC/S G-1
				CHIEF OF STAFF	SUBJECT
x	1/2		MA	DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)	Civil Affairs Study
				DC/S (RD&S)	
				DC/S (AIR)	
1-GI	1/2			SECY OF GEN STAFF	REMARKS (Entries to be dated and signed)
				G-1	AX
				G-2	Attached pamphlet: Review of Civil
				G-3	Affairs Doctrine and Military Civic
				G-4	Action were furnished by Col. Duffy
				ADMINISTRATIVE	DCSOPS Army who is their CA action
				DATA PROCESSING	officer. He states that Army has
				MCCC	no contract studies underway in the
				FISCAL	CA field but that SORO, American U.
				INFORMATION	and Institute of International Studies,
				INSPECTION	U. of So. Carolina have proposed studies
				PERSONNEL	in this area.
				POLICY ANALYSIS	
				RESERVE	
				SUPPLY	
				WOMEN MARINES	
				LEGISLATIVE	
				COUNSEL	
				STAFF DENTAL	
				STAFF MEDICAL	
				STAFF CHAPLAIN	
				OP-09M	
				DC/S(RD&S)	
				Scientific Advisor	
				ADC/S(R&D)	
				Programs Officer	
				Asst Programs Officer	
				Budget Officer	
				Admin Chief	
				ADC/S(Studies)	
				Staff Assistant	
				Research Assistant	
				Director, MCOAG	
				Team #1	
				Team #2	
				Team #3	
					(For additional remarks attach plain paper)
					ROUTING - Use numbers to show order of routing
					OPERATION CODE
				X - ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE	F - FOR CONCURRENCE
				AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET	G - FOR INFORMATION
				A - FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION	H - RETURN TO
				B - FOR COMPLIANCE	I -
				C - PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE	
				OF	
				D - FOR COMMENT	INITIAL FOR FILE
				E - FOR RECOMMENDATION	

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FORWARD

This review has been undertaken at the direction of the Chief of Staff to measure the responsiveness of the existing body of civil affairs doctrine to the variety of situations which the U. S. Armed Forces may expect to encounter in today's changing world.

The review is based on an analysis of historical sources of civil affairs operations by U. S. and allied forces in North Africa and Europe during World War II, the Civil War in Greece during the late 1940's, the Korean War and the operations of Great Britain during the emergency in Malaya. These operations furnish a valid variety of past experience in the kinds of situations and problems that are most relevant to contemporary civil affairs requirements.

Definition

Civil Affairs - Those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area, or occupied country or area when military forces are present. Civil affairs include, inter alia: a. matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area and the civil authorities and people of that country or area usually involving performance by the military forces of certain functions, or the exercise of certain authority normally the responsibility of the local government. This relationship may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to military action in time of hostilities or other emergency and is normally covered by a treaty or other agreement, express or implied; b. military government: the form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory. (JCS Pub 2).

REVIEW OF
CIVIL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE

1. Summary of Historical Studies

a. World War II: North Africa and Europe

The United States entered World War II with no one governmental organization charged with the responsibility for handling the civil affairs aspects of impending military operations. Responsibility of U. S. military commanders to conduct civil affairs operations were to be held to a minimum based on recommendations of the War Department and of General Eisenhower.

U. S. operations in North Africa in 1942 quickly demonstrated that some type of civil affairs support of military operations was required. This requirement first evidenced itself when the need arose to provide relief supplies and some measure of support for the local population in North Africa. Initially, U. S. attempted to provide these relief supplies by using civilian agencies of the government which were completely separate from the Armed Forces. However, the efforts of these civilian agencies were uncoordinated and detracted from military operations instead of supporting them. As a result of this experience, it was decided in Washington that in subsequent military operations the civil affairs requirements of these operations should be placed under the overall authority of the military commander.

Fundamentally, the North African experience emphasized that in addition to a commander's responsibilities for combat operations he has an equally important responsibility regarding the peoples and governments in his area of operations. It had been learned that failure to provide for humanitarian control and support of persons in the area of operations as required by international law and U. S. policy could result in serious interference with strictly military operations.

In the European campaign which followed, the need for a more realistic approach to the civil affairs responsibilities of the commander was reflected in the advance planning to meet those responsibilities. A coordinated civil affairs plan, based on intra-governmental agreements, was developed by the Army. Civil affairs staffs (or military government staffs as they were then called) and units were organized and trained. A complete list of civil affairs tasks was identified and properly trained personnel resources were developed through especially established civil affairs schools in CONUS and overseas and by on-the-job training. Basic civil affairs tasks were translated into civil affairs functions and functional teams.

were made a part of the civil affairs unit organizations. The Army's attention to this basic responsibility of the military commander proved very productive. As our armies moved into enemy territory they brought with them a capability to establish and maintain peace and order and were able to begin the restoration of government and the revitalization of the economies of the rear areas.

At the conclusion of hostilities, the Army's capability to conduct civil affairs operations in the post war period contributed to the development of sound governments and growing economies, which stand as a tribute to the ability of the United States Armed Forces to fulfill their occupation responsibilities.

Civil affairs operations in World War II contributed significantly to the evolution of current civil affairs operational doctrine. This doctrine forms the basis for the "41" Series field manuals and encompasses staff and organizational concepts, types, missions and utilization of civil affairs units and includes operational guidelines for the performance of the civil affairs mission in twenty-one functional areas.

Some of the most basic and important points of doctrine contained in these series are that:

- (1) Civil affairs activities are an integral part of the military effort.
- (2) The responsibilities for planning and for executing these activities must be clearly assigned by the National Government under unified control.
- (3) The commander must have an adequately organized and trained staff and units to assist him in fulfilling his civil affairs responsibilities.

Two characteristics of World War II civil affairs experience, however, tend to limit general applicability of the doctrine evolved. First, World War II civil affairs operations were conducted for the most part in developed countries having well-educated and urbanized populations, highly industrialized economies and a governmental framework of long duration extending from the local to the regional to the national level. Thus much of the accumulation of civil affairs doctrine has been based on experience with a specific type of advanced country and a sophisticated military-political situation. It would be imprudent to assume that this doctrine can be applied without modification to the types of situations in underdeveloped countries which arise from U. S. involvement in contemporary international conflicts.

Second, the role of the commander has changed to the point where it involves participation in the conduct of civil affairs operations in sovereign states to which official representatives of the President are accredited. Within the U. S. governmental structure the necessity of acting in close cooperation with other civilian agencies or under the direction of U. S. ambassadors is in contrast to the kind of supreme authority which the commanders possessed in Europe and Japan.

b. Greece

During World War II the Communists in Greece played an important part in the resistance movement against German occupation. In 1944 they were the best organized of the resistance groups and began their attempt to take over the Greek Government, in a war that was terroristic, political, military and above all economic. Their activities impeded and paralyzed agriculture, all but stopped internal economic processes by cutting lines of communications and reduced credit and confidence in the central government to the point that it was unable to obtain sufficient revenue to pay its civil servants.

On March 3, 1947 the Greek Government formally asked the United States for economic, technical and administrative aid. In response to the Greek request, a U. S. military and economic assistance mission entitled the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) was sent to Greece. This mission was headed by a civilian, was under the State Department and had both a Civil and a Military Program Section.

When the original AMAG was formed, the Greek Government agreed that officials of the Mission should hold controlling positions with respect to the expenditure of U. S. funds in all Greek Ministries. In this way the American Mission could enforce as well as advise. Mission personnel could withdraw funds for any purpose at any time. No national budget could be utilized until it was approved by the Chief, AMAG. It was soon learned that Greek politics could not be separated from the Greek economy. Thus, the U. S. authority was felt in the political as well as the economic field.

The normal functions of government in Greece had to be performed and services had to be provided for the population if the National Government was to be sustained. During the years of war, occupation and internal strife, the Greeks experienced the systematic disruption of their social institutions and their government administrative machinery. Education was neglected; public health efforts were severely curtailed; new social legislation was rendered impossible and labor organization was ineffective. The Greek Government under the directions and guidance of AMAG, responded by providing these

functions through the ministries of Transportation, Communications, Agriculture, Commerce, Supply, Industry, Mining, Health, Relief Labor, and Interior. Consequently, it was necessary for the Greek National Army to play a very limited role in the area of civil affairs. Civil administration functioned from the ministries through normal governmental channels and organizations. For the most part, vestiges of local governments were responsive to national direction. After areas under Communist control became "safe" through successful military operations, the Greek refugees were permitted to return to their homes and the governmental structure was reinstituted.

Throughout this period of insurgency, strict measures were taken by the Greek Government to insure both population and resource control. Governmental decrees were enforced primarily by the Greek police department and gendarmerie with the exception that in areas where hostilities were imminent, the senior Greek military commander was in control.

The Greek experience is particularly important because it represents one of the few successes that Western powers have had in defeating a strong Communist insurgency and because it demonstrates how effective the advice and assistance of mixed civilian-military U. S. governmental personnel can be when it is based on realistic agreements with the host country and between the U. S. agencies operating under unified leadership - in this case the U. S. Ambassador.

c. Malaya

During World War II the Communist underground organization in Malaya actively resisted the Japanese occupation with support and assistance from the Allies. Members of this organization did not give up their arms upon termination of hostilities and by the summer of 1948 had increased their terrorist activity to such an extent that it constituted a rebellion against British rule and against the form of independence that the British had proposed. The British instituted the "Emergency" which became an all-out drive against the Communists.

The Malayan "Emergency" stands out as an example of insurgency which: (1) occurs in a society which does not have a homogeneous well integrated population, and in which the government does not have uniform relations with all class elements; (2) is led by a Communist party dedicated to the Leninist principles of organization and guided by Communist doctrine; (3) is countered by a government strongly committed to efficient administration and Western principles of justice.

The responsibility for countering the insurgency in Malaya rested squarely with the civil government which in turn utilized the civil police as the primary arm for exercising authority rather than

the Army. However, the interrelation between the military and civilian agencies required such close and detailed coordination at all levels that the relative degree of predominance becomes barely distinguishable. This close coordination and support was necessary because the military decisions had a direct and immediate impact on the social and political life of the country and the actions of the civilian population had great influence on military operations. The British always had the triumvirate of civil government, police and army throughout their organization.

The most important factor in defeating the insurgency was the existence of a responsive system of local government which effectively controlled the people, offered efficient administration, and gave hope of moving toward democratic processes with improved conditions. Good local government was the key to winning this war, which was fought on the military, social, political and economic fronts.

At the top of the government was the High Commissioner who was a representative of the British Government and was the supreme authority. He had the dual role of Head of State and Director of Operations. Normal administration of the government was exercised through the State governments which were administered by Malayan officials assisted by British advisors.

Operations against the insurgents reflected the same pattern of cooperation at all levels of government. Actually the civil affairs operations in the Malayan campaign could be chiefly characterized by the close integration of the civil and military organizations into a combined organization for implementing counterinsurgency policies.

d. Korea

In the Korean Conflict U. S. Forces were fighting on soil of a friendly sovereign nation, thus requiring consultation with political officials of both Korea and the U. S. The U. S. commander had a multinational force. He was charged as Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINUNC) with the administration of all military and economic assistance provided by the United Nations. Yet the UN set up separate agencies to work in the political and economic fields, viz. United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA).

Locally the situation was characterized by food shortages, health and sanitation problems, an agriculturally oriented economy with tenant farmers and land problems requiring agrarian reform, incidents

of misunderstanding of civil affairs motives and a desire for administrative autonomy. These problems had no easy solution. Civil affairs operations, as a result, were difficult to implement.

The organizational structures developed for civil affairs operations during the Korean Conflict were complex and difficult to manage. Frequent major changes in organization caused jurisdictional misunderstanding leading to inefficiencies in operations. No standard TO&E civil affairs units were ever utilized. (Three TO&E civil affairs units were dispatched to the Far East but were broken up and never operated as units.)

Early during the Korean Conflict it was learned that even though our military forces were operating on the soil of a friendly sovereign nation, the mere establishment of liaison with the government was insufficient. It was necessary for the military commanders of units down to and including assault divisions at times to take action to establish local government and to meet essential civilian services. They found themselves involved with procurement of local labor and supplies, administration of public welfare to include relief feeding, supervision of public health, evacuation of friendly public servants and people, restoration of public utilities, reestablishment of civil government, the establishment of liaison with local government at all echelons of command, the promotion of public safety, public transportation and communication, wage and price controls, control and regulation of refugees and the prevention of large-scale theft by the local population.

The refugee problem was tremendous. The U. S. Army had past experience with the handling of large numbers of refugees, but not under a withdrawal movement. Roads and transportation facilities became clogged. The mass exodus caused the food, medical service and sanitation problems to assume hitherto unequalled proportions in scope and magnitude. Success of military operations depended on their solution and as in the past, it was learned that the proper conduct of these civil affairs functions was necessitated by more than mere humanitarian motivation. Consequently, it became necessary to use military organizations and agencies for civil affairs functions in Korea during the combat phases, when combat operations and civil affairs operations were so directly interdependent. It was also necessary to use these same organizations during the post-combatant period for an extended period of time before effective indigenous government, assisted by U. S. civilian and military assistance agencies, could be established at the local levels.

2. General Analysis

The preceding historical analysis indicates that the scope and type of civil affairs operations in North Africa, in Europe, in Greece, in Korea and in Malaya differed materially. One primary difference lay in the type of government with which the U. S. commander worked. In North Africa there was a mixture of quasi-sovereign Vichy French government and independent de facto authority exercised by individual French military and naval officers. In Greece there was a sovereign government and a national commander of the armed forces engaged in the combat operations. In Korea a legally sovereign government was sustained. The U. S. commander was in control of the military operations, including command of the indigenous military forces. Finally, in Malaya the British exercised both political and military control through a single individual.

The second difference in the nature of these operations was the corollary of the first. Since the degree of authority claimed or exercised by the indigenous government varied, the authority and responsibility of the military likewise varied considerably, ranging from that of Supreme Commander to that of military advisor.

A third major point of difference lay in the character of the governments of the countries in which the operations took place. Most of U. S. World War II experience was with countries that had a long tradition of effective government. Even in North Africa, the French had a reasonably efficient colonial administration in operation. Greece fits into this World War II type of situation and this may be one of the principal reasons for success in the Greek civil war. There, as in earlier European operations, the problem of maintaining effective government in areas of combat operations was made easier by the availability of qualified personnel to perform essential governmental functions. The same was true in Malaya where the British had helped the indigenous population to prepare for self-government. In Korea, however, operations were conducted in a country lacking such tradition and experience. Consequently, the availability of local and regional talent, qualified to serve in positions of responsibility, was very limited. This magnified the complexity and difficulty of the civil affairs mission.

These major differences in each operation should have determined the general nature of the civil affairs methods that were employed. Critical evaluation shows that some of the methods used worked well; some did not. Despite the major differences in the operations reviewed and the dissimilar methods used in carrying out the civil affairs mission, there are a number of common points of civil affairs doctrine which are logically derived from the lessons learned.

3. Lessons Learned

a. General. The major lesson that emerges from the preceding review is that the proper performance of the civil affairs mission is a positive requirement for meaningful victory. This lesson is especially true in wars against insurgency. (It is out of context but important to note that in this regard General Harkins said recently that 75% of the problem in the South Vietnamese war lay in the civil affairs field.)

Other important lessons can be derived from the review, such as, the necessity for cognizance of the nature of the over-all civil affairs mission and the requirements necessary for its accomplishment by agencies of the U. S. Government responsible for foreign and military affairs. Without this cognizance neither civil affairs doctrine nor personnel alone can assure the success of the civil affairs mission.

These higher echelons of government must provide policy and objectives to major military commanders through command channels upon which military objectives, strategy, and tactics can be based. Policy guidance may also dictate the responsibilities of U. S. civilian agencies for certain civil affairs operations. This broad policy guidance will not, however, define types of military supporting organizations required nor the manner of their employment. This remains the basic responsibility of the commander. Each commander will be responsible for the development of specific plans of action in support of directed operations, utilizing existing resources or developing and submitting for consideration appropriate supporting requirements.

Situations precluding the enunciation of detailed civil affairs policy from higher U. S. governmental levels, do not relieve the military commander of his basic responsibilities in this respect. The dictates of military necessity, as well as the requirements of international law and U. S. policy, will demand positive action to establish and maintain an appropriate degree of civil/military relationships suitable to the situation.

Commanders charged with strategic and tactical responsibilities in designated geographical areas are ipso facto responsible for maintaining current civil affairs estimates of the situation. Such estimates will serve as the basis for planning, and should also delineate those areas in which policy guidance must be solicited. It is a responsibility of command to seek this guidance and provide such recommendations pertaining thereto, as appropriate, based on the commander's concept of operations and supporting requirements.

Civil affairs command responsibilities must include planning for the provisions of military support of any other U. S. agencies charged with responsibility for the achievement of political and

economic objectives in an area. This support may range from the provision of personnel security, to the assignment of military personnel and material resources to other U. S. agencies. Such limited participation may be the full extent of the commander's civil affairs authority or responsibility. His responsibility also demands planning for those circumstances where deterioration of conditions may require full assumption by the military of civil affairs operations.

b. Specific. Also of key importance are the following specific lessons, supported by the preceding review, and having special significance in current civil affairs operations in subversive warfare:

(1) In wars of insurgency the political and military objectives are indivisible. Victory cannot be attained by military measures alone. The conduct of such wars must be a completely integrated military, political, social and economic effort conducted in concert with the military and civilian governmental agencies under unified direction.

(2) The overriding civil affairs objective in a counter-insurgency war is to gain and maintain stability of government and control of the people of the country under insurgent attack. While this may require coercive measures the ultimate key to success is the establishment of popular support for the government at all levels. This support may often differ markedly from the kind of support accorded to governments in mature countries. But support - in whatever form that is appropriate to the characteristics of the country and people - must be present if the insurgency is to be defeated. All military and civilian policies and activities must be carried out with an acute realization of this fundamental truth.

(3) As areas are pacified it may be necessary to conduct military government operations until civilian control by the legitimate, responsible government can be developed and renewed. The military commander must be prepared to meet such a requirement.

(4) A U. S. civil affairs organization supporting a counterinsurgency effort within the borders of a developing sovereign nation may consist of representatives from both U. S. military and U. S. civilian agencies. However, civil affairs operations should be under military control where active insurgent warfare is taking place.

(5) The military civil affairs organization should facilitate orderly turn-over to competent and responsible civilian control as soon as possible after the termination of hostilities.

(6) Organization must adhere to the principle of a single command with proper authority. It should include a focal point at each echelon of command for the resolution of civil-military problems and coordination with civil government.

(7) Civil affairs planning, organization and training must be done well in advance of the necessary application. Civil affairs operations cannot be successfully accomplished on an improvised basis. The effectiveness of civil affairs will vary in direct ratio to the selection, prior training and judicious operations of the personnel involved.

(8) Control and proper application of U. S. military and civilian aid funds and materials requires a degree of political and military operational control by U. S. personnel. Economics cannot be separated from politics and military operations; consequently, economic control, instituted through adequate prior agreements, can provide the necessary degree of political and military operational control within a developing sovereign nation.

(9) Coordination with the indigenous government may consist of direction at times, particularly at the local government level. Good local government is the key to winning an insurgency war as it is only at this local level that the people can be satisfied and effectively controlled. If such direction is deemed necessary, it must be provided for in an international agreement with the host state.

(10) Any system of indirect control by U. S. personnel requires supervision of a teacher-student nature. Developing nations do not have trained personnel available. Training of their governmental officials must be provided concurrently with other operational advice.

(11) Military support must take precedence over long-range civil assistance during active insurgent warfare.

(12) Standards of civil assistance must lean toward rehabilitation rather than mere relief. The standard of living must be maintained at a degree high enough to establish a desire on the part of the population to support the existing government and its military forces and a willingness to resist the insurgents.

(13) Successful military operations are dependent upon a good intelligence net. The establishment of this net is directly dependent upon proper civil-military cooperation.

(14) The most effective operations are those aimed at the insurgents' lines of food and supply. These operations require close civil-military cooperation and coordination. The degree of cooperation obtained from the population is often determined by the quantity and quality of civil assistance.

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(14) The most effective operations are those aimed at the insurgents' lines of food and supply. These operations require close civil-military cooperation and coordination. The degree of cooperation obtained from the population is often determined by the quantity and quality of civil assistance.

(15) Military civil assistance must be integrated with indigenous government follow-on programs in liberated areas if it is to have a measurable and lasting effect. The transient nature of military presence during a war against insurgency does not provide the sense of permanency necessary to ensure popular support of the government as a product of purely military civil assistance programs.

(16) Finally, the basic necessity for defining the scope of U. S. civil affairs responsibilities by international agreement with the host country and of specifying clearly the division of these responsibilities among the pertinent departments and agencies of the U. S. government by authoritative directives stands out as a fundamental lesson that is of prime relevance today.

4. Conclusion: Effect on Current Civil Affairs Doctrine

The possibility will continue to exist that situations requiring the conduct of "seize and occupy" operations, of the World War II military government type will arise. By JCS directives, the Department of the Army must be prepared to conduct such operations in support of pertinent Joint Plans. No other service or agency of government has been charged with developing this capability. Furthermore, future civil affairs operations must be viewed and planned for against the ever present possibility of nuclear war.

The U. S. Army has a current applicable body of joint civil affairs doctrine and, in its Reserve components, a current capability for "seize and occupy" military government operations which may become necessary. It has also developed concepts for the conduct of civil affairs operations in various types of nuclear war. However, these types of operations do not present the same civil affairs problems that are present in wars of insurgency. In these insurgent wars the dynamics of the political and social changes taking place in the world today will in a great measure shape the nature of U. S. civil affairs operations in the foreseeable future.

A more immediate approach to civil affairs doctrine is one which foresees civil affairs operations taking place in an environment of revolution, insurgency and political, economic and social disturbances. Purely national U. S. military and political objectives and the rights of successful belligerency in a traditional hot war will not be the factors determining the basic nature of these possible civil affairs operations. On the contrary, such operations will in all likelihood be planned for and conducted in a manner affording full recognition of the sovereign rights and prerogatives of the nation in whose boundaries such operations take place. Moreover,

such operations will be conducted in support of sovereign states, to serve their basic national interest, in those areas in which the U. S. has an interest either in terms of indirect support of U. S. national goals or of U. S. legal and moral commitments or both. The political objectives of these operations will not seek the ultimate imposition of U. S. dictated economic, political and social objectives, but rather will be ones designed to assist selected countries in the achievement of a national fulfillment according to their own needs or inclinations.

U. S. Army support for future operations must be responsive to the varied nature of the civil affairs missions, and responsible commanders must be prepared to provide such support on short notice. Organizational development must be consistent with anticipated missions. Personnel selected for assignment and training in this field must be of the highest caliber, and be provided with continuous and intensive training to equip them to function in this operational area. Operational and consequent training emphasis will vary and thus require flexibility in organization and training. The civil affairs mission must be construed by commanders as entailing all aspects of civil affairs operations ranging from exercising direct control to the advisory, training and liaison roles.

Future operations may require that military civil affairs elements be provided to support U. S. civil agencies and, while in this role, come under their control.

Conversely, a situation may require the assimilation into a basically military organization of the various functional agencies and personnel assigned to economic assistance missions in an area.

Organizationally, civil affairs staffs and units must be prepared to accept broader missions and more diverse types of duties. Members of units, in particular, must be capable not only of performing their normal functional roles but also of training and advising others in these roles. Units themselves may expect to function together or be divided into smaller teams as the situation may require.

The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army has already issued instructions to insure that detailed civil affairs doctrine be reoriented where necessary to conform to this predictable panorama of civil affairs operations.

It is equally essential that major commanders and higher governmental officials acquire a common understanding of this subject.

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HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96243Ser No 01406
26 October 1965

MACJ332

SUBJECT: Concept for Military Civic Action and Military Civil Affairs
in the Republic of Vietnam

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Attached is the MACV concept for military civic action and military civil affairs in the Republic of Vietnam. It will be used as a basis for MACV and subordinate element planning and direction of civic action and civil affairs activities.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*W B Rosson*1 Incl
asW. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO U.S. Forces, 96243

MACJ332

SUBJECT: Concept for Military Civil Affairs and Civic Action in the Republic of Vietnam

SECTION I: MACV MILITARY CIVIL AFFAIRS CONCEPT

1. (C) GENERAL: It is essential to joint United States-Government of Vietnam (GVN) objectives in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) that the GVN extend its authority and influence throughout the rural areas, and that the Vietnamese people gain confidence in their government's ability to provide them security and the benefits of economic and social development. As a consequence, programmed US participation in governmental activities is limited to advice and assistance on the invitation of the GVN. Among the US agencies, USOM has been assigned primary responsibility for advising, assisting and supporting GVN non-military governmental organs by the Mission Council, and therefore has the primary US civil affairs responsibility in RVN.

2. (C) CONCEPT: Programmed US military civil affairs operations will be limited to base areas and will be restricted in scope to those government functions which have a direct bearing on the welfare of US/3d Country troops, e.g., public safety. In geographical areas adjacent to or away from the base areas, US tactical unit civil affairs requirements will be met by working with the existing GVN and local administrative officials. Normally, these are the province and district chiefs. The sector and sub-sector advisory detachments will assist US/3d Country troops (and their integral civil affairs staffs) in dealing with these authorities.

*civil Affairs
staff*

3. (C) COORDINATION:

✓ a. In the logistical base areas designated installation coordinators will serve as focal points for contact with GVN officials. Coordinators will work with the local officials to arrive at solutions to problems in such areas as population control, off limits areas, prices of services and commodities and local labor procurement resulting from the presence of US/3d Country military forces in the area. The Community Relations Committee or Friendship Council will serve as the primary forum for discussions with local governmental officials.

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b. In tactical base areas, the primary channel of liaison and communication with GVN officials is through the sector and sub-sector advisory detachments. When required by the tactical commander, sector advisory detachments will provide liaison teams to the tactical unit commanders to assist them in accomplishing their civil affairs and civic action responsibilities. At division and separate brigade level, USOM and JUSPAO will also provide a representative to work with the US/3d Country tactical units and make available to them necessary advice, assistance and support.

* From MACV?
** advised by
civil affairs
* Annex 12.1
functional teams

* Civil Affairs
staff

c. US/3d Country tactical operations in areas adjacent to and distant from tactical unit bases will necessitate advance civil affairs planning. This planning will be accomplished by organic civil affairs staff sections working jointly with the local USOM/MACV/JUSPAO advisors, local province officials, and the RVNAF. US commanders will not be responsible for the control of the civilian population during operations; that responsibility normally will be retained by the province and district governmental officials and discharged by employment of available province or RVNAF resources. Occasionally, GVN agencies may be unable to function effectively due to lack of security or resources, and as a consequence battlefield refugees could interfere with ongoing tactical operations. To enable the US commander to accept and fulfill the task of managing such refugees, he will be given an operating civil affairs capability, the refugee relief team, with the following composition:

- 1 Civil Affairs Specialist (Capt)
- 1 Doctor (Capt)
- 1 Supply/Construction Specialist (Lt)
- 1 Counterintelligence Specialist (Lt)
- 1 Medical NCO (E5 or higher)
- 1 Clerk/Interpreter (EM)

These teams generally will be attached to brigade or regiment for the duration of an operation. When not working with US tactical units, they will be attached to a sector advisory detachment and given a refugee area support mission.

4. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS:

Province/sector and sub-sector/district level MACV advisory detachments will monitor USOM operations in their areas so that advisory and support efforts can be continued by the MACV advisory detachment should USOM withdraw its representatives due to deteriorating security conditions.

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SECTION II: MACV CIVIC ACTION CONCEPT

1. (U) GENERAL: The point of departure for the MACV military civic action operational concept is the attitude of courtesy and helpfulness displayed by the individual soldier in his daily contacts with the Vietnamese people. Unit military civic action projects complement individual actions and will be performed in accordance with existing service doctrine and normally within the limits of existing service funds and personnel, e.g., medical civic action, refugee relief and emergency transport. Combined civic action projects, with US and Vietnamese military or paramilitary units working together, are desirable and encouraged where US and GVN troops are collocated or engaged in combined operations. Whenever possible, the initiative for military civic action projects will come from the lowest practicable military echelon. Civic action activities are considered successful if they encourage a local Vietnamese attitude of self help and if the arrival or continued stationing of US units in an area is welcomed for the positive and tangible benefits that accrue to the common people. Civic action fails when the total impact of constructive projects is overburdened by careless or thoughtless unit or individual actions.

2. (C) INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS:

a. The main thrust of the orientation to be given the US soldier is that his role in Vietnam is positive; he is here at the request of the GVN to help its people win their struggle against the Viet Cong. He should be told that the Viet Cong will attempt to alienate him from the people and that he can defeat them by the understanding and generosity he displays in his daily life. Emphasis is placed on making personal friends among the Vietnamese soldiers and common people and helping them individually; using phrases from their language; honoring their customs and laws; making no special demands; and treating women with politeness and respect. Loud, rude or unusual behavior, and open displays of wealth are discouraged because they alienate the soldier from the people.

b. Occasionally, individual incidents will occur that necessitate joint US-GVN meetings to adjudicate claims or settle differences of opinion. These situations are handled at the hamlet or village level by meetings between the local US and GVN officials.* In urban areas such situations are handled by Friendship Councils chaired by the principle local GVN official, the district or province chief or the city mayor, and composed of the senior MACV advisor in the area, the local US unit commanders and local USOM, JUSPAO, and OSA representatives. Councils will be established in all areas where US forces are or will be present in force, so that incidents can be settled expeditiously, at the lowest governmental or command level possible, and with minimal publicity. These councils also serve constructively in furthering over-all civic action objectives. They provide a forum for discussions with the GVN concerning the impact of the US troop presence in a locality. Agreements on off limits areas, prices of goods and services, police checkpoints, population control, and local labor procurement can be sought. Whenever possible, limits on the number and hours during which US troops are allowed liberty will be set so that the Vietnamese are not denied enjoyment of the facilities of their own towns.

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3. (C) MILITARY CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS AT PROVINCE LEVEL:

a. Commanders of US/3d Country units will participate in military civic action programs within their areas of operation to the extent that the military mission will permit and in accordance with existing service doctrine. Emphasis will be placed on projects already initiated by the hamlet or village officials on a "self-help" basis in order to reinforce GVN efforts to extend governmental influence. Whenever possible, US unit commanders will insure that RVNAF military or paramilitary units participate with the US in military civic action projects.

b. The normal liaison link between US/3d Country unit commanders *(Civil Affairs Staff)* local GVN officials and MACV/USOM/JUSPAO advisory detachments, at province level, will be provided by the sector liaison team. These teams consist of officers and non-commissioned officers selected by the sector advisor from his detachment on the basis of the contribution they can make toward providing unit commanders with information on the local situation, disposition and capability of local GVN agencies and military units, and the civic action program that would have the greatest appeal in a particular area.

c. When possible, US/3d Country unit commanders ** Represented by Civil Affairs Staff officer.* will meet with the local provincial committee consisting of the province chief, the sector advisor, the JUSPAO representative and the USOM provincial representative, to determine the specific civic action projects that would have greatest impact on and contribute the most to provincial rural construction/pacification programs. The province chief is central to military civic action project planning at the local level through his control of programs dealing with rural construction/pacification, and because of his administrative staff which can determine requirements, establish local GVN priorities and allocate resources.

4. (C) COORDINATION AT THE CORPS TACTICAL ZONE LEVEL:

a. The senior advisor of the corps advisory group is charged with responsibility for coordinating all US/3d Country military civic action projects with the GVN/RVNAF government delegate/corps commander in order to insure that such projects contribute constructively to the rural construction/pacification programs of the province in the corps tactical zone. USOM, JUSPAO and OSA corps regional supervisors have been instructed to work with him, giving him any assistance, advice or support he requires to accomplish his mission. When US tactical units are present in large numbers in a CTZ, normally the corps advisory group will be placed under the operational control of the senior US tactical commander in the CTZ. Overall responsibility for coordinating civic action projects will pass to the tactical commander *(In practice, however, he will continue to discharge his civic action coordination responsibilities through the senior advisor of the corps advisory group.)*

** Civil Affairs Staff G. will be responsible for overall coordination. G-5 will coordinate units with specific Civic Action projects.*

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5. (C) COORDINATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL: At the national level, US/3d Country civic action projects are coordinated with the GVN and integrated into national rural construction programs by the responsible US agencies at the working level, and by the Mission Council at the policy level. Overall coordination of such programs on the GVN side is handled by the Rural Construction Ministry and the Central Rural Construction Council. The latter GVN agency is responsible for coordinating, at the inter-ministerial level, all GVN rural construction/pacification policy and programs. Within MACV, specific staff responsibility for coordinating, monitoring and evaluating military civic action projects is assigned to the POLWAR Advisory Directorate. This directorate operates under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3.

CIVIC
ACTION

6. (C) PROJECT EVALUATION:

a. At province level, the MACV/USOM advisory detachments are charged jointly with responsibility for monitoring and evaluating all US civic action projects within the province. An evaluation of the overall impact of the US military presence on the province is included in the Provincial Team Report submitted jointly by MACV, JUSPAO and USOM each month. In addition, sector advisors, individually, are responsible for monitoring the progress of province level US/3d Country military civic action projects to insure that they are systematically integrated into the provincial rural construction/pacification programs. The sector advisor's evaluation of the effectiveness of US/3d Country civic action projects will be prepared after consultation with the tactical unit commanders and local GVN officials and included in the following reports: MACJ3-01 and MACJ3-03. Spot reports on a particular military civic action project or incident will be submitted if necessary or requested.

b. Senior US tactical commanders in each corps tactical zone are given the responsibility for evaluating specific military civic action projects undertaken by subordinate units to insure that such projects are coordinated with GVN province plans and are consistent with MACV military civic action guidance. Reports on civic action projects required by tactical unit standing operating procedures or necessitated by special circumstances will be evaluated and forwarded to MACV POLWAR Directorate if MACV action or assistance is required.

c. At the national level, MACV component service commanders are responsible for monitoring the progress and evaluating the effectiveness of specific military civic action projects being performed by the components to insure that these projects are consistent with service doctrine and MACV policy guidelines. In-country training and orientation of US/3d Country unit commanders and/or staff officers on civic action is the responsibility of the service component commanders. *

Civil Affairs
Staff Off. can
do this.

d. Systematic monitoring of major US-GVN military civic action projects is accomplished by the responsible US agencies working jointly with the appropriate GVN agencies, normally the GVN Rural Construction Ministry. Final evaluation of the success of such projects is a subject of joint meetings of the Mission Council and the Central Rural Construction Council.

398-65

7. TYPE US/3D COUNTRY MILITARY CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS:

Type US/3d Country military civic action projects are listed in the inclosure hereto.

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ENCLOSURE TO MACV CONCEPT FOR MILITARY CIVIC ACTION IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Type US/3d Country Military Civic Action Projects

1. (C) Examples of US/3d Country military civic action projects in which local Popular Forces would participate are listed below. Such projects will normally be coordinated with the local GVN hamlet, village, or district chief as appropriate, and with the local US sub-sector advisor.

- a. Improve existing area drainage.
- b. Improve waste disposal methods.
- c. Destroy insect and rodent breeding places.
- d. Assist in rebuilding and new construction within self-help programs.

2. (C) Examples of military civic action projects in which the participation of local Regional Forces can be expected are listed below. These projects will normally be coordinated with the local GVN village, district, or province chief as appropriate, and with the local MACV and/or USOM advisory detachment.

- a. Improve area drainage.
- b. Teach first aid, personal hygiene and sanitation.
- c. Destroy insect and rodent breeding places.
- d. Improve area waste disposal methods.
- e. Supplement local youth education.
- f. Assist in repairing roads and bridges in accordance with capabilities.

3. (C) Examples of military civic action projects in which the participation of local ARVN forces and/or RF/PF, as well as local GVN provincial agencies, can be expected are listed below. These projects will be coordinated with the local village and district and/or province chief, and with the local MACV and/or USOM advisory detachment.

- a. Transport community materials.
- b. Provide outpatient medical care to local inhabitants.
- c. Provide technical training for adults.
- d. Supervise and assist in immediate rehabilitation efforts.
- e. Contribute to emergency refugee relief.

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4. (C) Type military civic action projects that may involve RVNAF military and paramilitary forces and GVN local and national government resources are listed below. Such projects will normally be coordinated with the province chief at the local level, and the Central Rural Construction Council at the national level on the GVN side; and the MACV/USOM/JUSPAO provincial and corps/regional advisory detachments, and the responsible US agencies on the US side.

- a. Disaster relief.
- b. Assistance in the development of planned communities in and around logistical and tactical base areas.
- c. Transport of emergency supplies.

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FOR:

A C 15, G-1

FROM:

Head, PP+P

DATE:

7 JAN 1966

SUBJECT: (What is this package about? Where did it come from?)

Working copy notes on Civil Affairs operations in VN.
 Army Col. Watsons + Lt. Col. Livingston from CA School, Ft Gordon
 made notes on study trip to RVN.

PROBLEM: (What does the basic correspondence want? What are the essential questions to be answered?)

The working copy notes were received via Lt. Col Evans
 and Col Stanford as a courtesy of Lt. Col. Livingston. These
 notes do not cover the whole trip, only III MAF area.

KEY: (Upon what essential, or obscure facts does the solution hinge?)

Pertinent points in notes have been identified by
 red pencil

RECOMMEND SOLUTION: (Views of the action officer)

For info only. Since notes do not have any official
 stature, do not recommend they be used for reference.

CONCURRENCES/NONCONCURRENCES: (Views of other interested parties)

ACTION RECOMMENDED: (What do we want the reviewer to do - sign, confer, forward, etc.)

Scan and return to ACIC for record/file purposes.

ACTION OFFICER:

Maj Morley

Col Watson / Lt Col. Livingston

Report. (Army)

Rough draft of notes
on CA

late that afternoon at Regional 10 we met Mr. Rudolph Ramp, one of three CARE reps in VN. (all CARE reps are based in Saigon). He was in Da Nang to coord a shipment of CARE supplies to 3d MAF and a visit of the Exec Dir of CARE from New York. We went with him to hq 3d MAF to meet Major Keever, 3d MAF CA officer, his point of contact. They made arrangements for CARE material to be distributed the following day in the presence of the CARE Exec Dir, Gen. Walt, and GVN officials. A luncheon was arranged, hosted by Gen. Walt. The party was flown in two helicopters to lower units of the Div. Discussions with Mr. Ramp brought out the following: (1) CARE is not interested in duplicating the efforts of other agencies, ie they do not distribute bulgur or other PL 480 feedstuffs; (2) CARE relies on the mil for much of its transportation and to oversee the distribution of materials; (3) CARE does not expect or want the mil to actually make the dist, but merely to observe the dist and do what it can to insure that materials get to people for whom intended, dist is made wherever possible thru local officials; (4) CARE is interested in getting a report and publicity material which it uses to support its campaigns in the States (they have a questionnaire they furnish to units designed to elicit some of this info.) (5) Ramp's personal method of opn is to rely heavily on social contacts to assist him in transportation and dist. Questioning brought out that he was very knowledgeable in USOM opns and relief activities in general (he is a young man who formerly served in Malaya with the Peace Corps and spoke of having spent his leave to go back there and follow up on projects he had started). He felt that CARE could best be utilized to cover gaps in the various relief programs and meet immediate needs for which more cumbersome programs could not provide. Overall he demonstrated a great enthusiasm for U.S. mil units requesting CARE supplies and seemed to feel that the more they asked for the better.


(Note that should have been included on p 103: Johnson says that 1F hq is under MACV or adv and that they have had no problems with them.)

On the first afternoon of our visit with the Marines, we had a discussion with Col. Wertman, Dep C/S, and a briefing by Major Charles Keever, 3d MAF CA officer. Keever described his job as coming under the staff cognizance of the G-1, but for all practical purposes he comes under the dep C/S and the G/S (We noted that in two days visiting with the Marines we did not meet or see the G-1, but found the DC/S and C/S ~~uninterruptedly~~ always on hand to discuss A matters.)

In the briefing, Keever displayed a chart showing the objectives of the CA program: (1) To build respect of VN people for the legal government; (2) To obtain mil intelligence. He described the local gov't structure, in which he spoke of a "village council" (first mention we had heard of this council.) In his description of the VN gov't he demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the structure and the responsibilities of the Corps cadre, including his being a gov't delegate in the area.

He said the Marines have been operating primarily at district level in Civac. In the areas that they have taken over there was

U.S. MISSION



3 MEF CHART ON US MISSION ORGANIZATION
(CA BRIEFING CHART SEP 65)

no govt control since these areas have been under V.C. domination for two years or more. He said that while they had been working through the district chief in making contacts, that they had come to the realization that the Prov Chief actually has the resources, and as a result they are dealing more and more with him. He realizes that the Prov committee, composed of USOM, MACV, Prov Chief is the key to many of their CA activities.

Keover displayed a chart entitled "Peoples' Needs:" (1) Determined through GVN Chiefs (2) Medical, Pub Works, and individual relief. He said the Marines were meeting these needs through medical teams. In this he discussed the problem of what happens when the Marines pull out. He said that when the Marines first went to an area, they provide initial heavy medical impact and then taper off medical activities. They advise doctors against overtreating civilians. He feels they have to do something dramatic at first to break the people away from the V.C., but U.S. doctors have training that causes them to have a tendency to treat too high.

In regard to pub works, they use direct engineer assistance in providing wells, dikes, roads, bridges -- they have high impact. In relief supplies, the C.R.S. and CARE are felt to be particularly useful. He recognized that USOM materials are under the control of the Prov Chief.

He displayed a chart, "Rural Construction," which listed 3 objectives, to clear, secure, and develop. Said that Gen. Walt was concerned in having the Marines look at the entire spectrum of rural cont and not just the security aspects.

Next he showed a chart on the Joint I Corps Coordinating Council whose purpose he gave as to determine U.S. policy in I Corps with respect to Rural Const; to develop a joint program; to define problems; ~~and~~ to determine how the entire U.S. effort could be best utilized in accomplishing the mission; and to establish priority of efforts. Representatives of U.S. agencies on the council are; ~~MACV~~ MACV Rural Const Adv (Col. Johnson), USOM dep reg dir (Wahmann), J3 PAO reg adv (Floyd Wade), 3d MAP (Wertman and Keover), U.S. Pub consul in HUE, -- CAS has been invited but has so far declined to attend. The council has organized subcommittees in 8 areas of interest: Pub Health, Pub Safety, Pub Works, Finance (claims), Psywar, Edu, Ag, Logistics. These committees are staffed with tech people from the agencies in the council. In some cases, such as Ag, it was noted that the committee consisted of one man, the Reg. Ag tech of USOM. ~~the~~

Under the Finance sub-committee, Keover discussed claims. He says there are three types, "negligence," arising out of an incident of non-combat action, "Land use and occupancy," which is both temp and extended use, there is no machinery in-country now to pay these claims, "Combat action claims," these are paid thru the GVN milcap budget and people in Saigon say the money is available to pay these claims, but in Quang Nam there is a 900,000 P milcap budget, which is divided into 3 sub-budgets, one of which is to pay combat claims. The Prov Chief has authority to transfer funds within the milcap budget, but is reluctant to do so -- when one armed Huey strike did 700,000P damage, the budget for combat claims was wiped out and until

the Prov Chief will transfer further funds, the payments are stalled.

He says the Paystar committee is supposed to keep itself informed on all the programs and to feed ideas into the council. Under logistics, he said the biggest problem this committee is to attack is getting supplies into the districts --we need to make sure we don't have an empty plane going somewhere where supplies are needed.

Keover described a separate council on "Community Relations" in Da Nang --relations between USMC and VN people. It is composed the mayor and his 12 officials, Keover, a rep of the USN hosp, a rep of Nav Sup activity, a USAF rep, and MACV. It's concern is ameliorating the U.S. mil presence in Da Nang and seeing that neither the VN people nor the Marines run over one another.

He then described the "four phases of civic action" as follows: Phase I is the initial contact with the people wherein you are trying to break them away from the V.C. or get them out of the battle area. It is typified by being tactical, supported within the unit's own means, and following pre-arranged concepts that come within the approved policies of GVN officials (usually involves giving people food, shelter, medicine etc.) He mentioned that every Ops Order has a Phase I civic action annex to it and that during the recent opn "Pirhanna," all civic action was conducted by ARVN teams. Phase II: (a) First stages of rural construction, plans will be fed into joint council committees. (b) Marines take the initiative, (c) Action is always in accordance with GVN desires, (d) Herein they develop local security. Phase III: (a) It begins as soon as possible depending on local security (b) it transfers the functions to GVN. Phase IV: Marines revert to Community Relations.

((Noted that Marine P.I.O. has no CI training.))

Keover's additional remarks about organization and personnel: His replacement is going to be a Lt. Col. Sommerfeld, who is a grad of the CA school (year and a half ago). Assisting him is a warrant officer, MSC, working in the public health area, and one EM clerk, and a driver. At 3d Marine Div (Keover is on MAC staff) there is a major under the staff cognizance of G-4. Assisting him are three EM: a med corpsman, clerk, and a driver. Regiments and battalions have CA officers who are performing full time CA duties --spaces are not provided for under FOE, with the result that they have been pulled from various staff sections with the units. There are no full time CA personnel at company level, however, some units have given specific CA responsibilities to the Co XO.

He gave a bit of description on Lt. Ek's joint action company at Phu Bai and made arrangements for us to see it several days later.

In response to questions on what CA organization should be, Keover said it is desirable to have full time S-5's down to bn level if units are going to be engaged in current type of ~~war~~ war. (It is apparent that they are building an organization as they go instead of coming in with a planned organization.)

Keever mentioned putting PF in uniform and said that they had been asked not to do this themselves because the GVN wanted to do it --as a matter of pride, he thought.

He also described what they call "rules of engagement," wherein Marines are instructed to fire only when they have a specific target, and not to carry a round in the chamber of a weapon. He says he believes that most of the men realize that the enemy is not the usual type.

Major Keever and the 3d MarDiv CA officer attended the joint USOM-MACV 6 day seminar in Saigon. At this course they rec'd orientation from USOM tech divs, SF, J-2, J-3, JUSPAO, MACV Rural Const, OPO (Wilson), and other agencies. CAS did not contribute to the course. As a result of having attended this course, Keever sold the idea of having a 3-day course of generally the same content at Da Nang. This was attended by Marine unit CA officers, some regtl, bn, and co cmdrs, two prov reps, MACV surgeon and others. Instruction was put on by U.S. elements within the mission. Third day consisted of a workshop which brought together the sector and subsector advisors with Marine Corps personnel operating in their areas. Conf was judged to be highly effective and plans are being made to have a similar one every two months. In addition, within various enclaves, they plan to have a monthly conference. As a result of this conference and improved coordination, one Dist Chief who had a surplus of food in his area was persuaded to lend food to another district that needed it. The USOM rep was on the scene and agreed to replenish the food to support this loan --it solved an immediate need type problem.

Keever says that Gen Thi has taken over the Provincial hospitals because they were in such a shape and that the MAC surgeon is working with him to improve their condition.

Marines are using ARVN sergeants as interpreters. Said the Marine Corps is weak on languages.

In medical aid, the Marines provide treatment but do not issue medicine. The 4th Marines have a three-week school which operates six days a week to train VN hamlet workers in basic sanitation and first aid. Women make up 60-70% of the trainees. On graduation they get a certificate and a first aid kit and work in the dispensaries. Four of these trainees have been certified by the Rural Health Dept which entitles them to be placed on the GVN payroll. A conflict of interest has developed between utilizing surplus health workers located in the city of Da Nang who may not be from a hamlet needing a worker and therefore don't want to go to it, as opposed to the more efficient indigenous workers trained by the Marines. The latter will lose face if they do not work hard in their own hamlets. Gen. Thi has stated that he will throw in jail health workers who do not produce. The Marines feel it is essential to take VN rural health workers into newly cleared areas.

Chieu Hoi is not very strong in I Corps. The Quang Nam Prov center is in Hoi An and is very poor. Gen Thi is not particularly interested in Chieu Hoi.

Keever favored a scheme to select ARVN officers who speak English and assigning them to liaison duties with U.S. tactical units. He points out that the Marines have had some unfortunate experiences because they know neither the customs nor the language of the areas they go into. For example, one unit ripped up a 1000 year old dike system because they didn't know what it was or how important it was in the minds of the people nor could they understand the VN farmer who was trying to explain it to them and got them to stop.

In a discussion with the Div protocol officer, who has also been involved in GA matters, a concern was expressed for the fact that Marines don't know what the local laws and customs are on punishment for certain crimes --for example, he said there was some confusion on how serious the VN regarded the rape case they had had. Apparently, the woman's husband only wanted an apology --this, of course, was forbidden by the two alleged rapists defense councils.

One problem that was giving the Marines concern was giving immediate aid to villages which Marines have taken over from V.C. Their position is that they should give aid and repair damage with priority to those citizens who had supported the government. GVN and some U.S. advisors prefer to funnel aid into loyal hamlets and let those that had been disloyal to the GVN wain. The latter position was supported by Gen Thi, whom Keever feels that some compromise solution to this will be found, such as the rapid screening of personnel coinciding with rebuilding destroyed facilities. Before taking the matter up with Gen Thi, the Marines want to get a united U.C. position.

Sunday morning we went out to the 3d Marine Regt and attended Worship services in a tent with Col. Norman R. Nickerson, C.O. After services he talked to us over coffee --describing his own feelings about getting his men to understand the nature of the VN people, "They are living like they did in the year 1000 A.D. and you can't change them overnight. (The offering taken up during the services was said by the chaplain to be partially allocated to VN relief.) Col. Nickerson emphasized the importance of understanding the various religions in the area of opns. For instance, he said that men over here have to be able to recognize religious monuments and objects, even graves --for they look different depending on what religion did the burying. (It was noted that the Marines had marked off the very un-grave like round-mound mounds of dirt the Buddhist use, so that their men would not disturb what would not otherwise be recognized as a sacred spot. They used white engineer tape to do this in the bivouac areas.) He said they had become quite aware of the enemy being mixed with friendly or innocent people and that they had altered their opns to take care of this --one of his lieutenants had lost his life because he refused to use artillery on an area he was receiving sniper fire from, because the lieutenant knew the area to be occupied by PP and friendly civilians. Also it is important that the local population understand our intentions in a given area --whether we are there to stay or to sweep and depart.

Otherwise the people may be misled into cooperation with us that will subject them to V.C. reprisal after we have passed on and then when we do come to stay it will be harder to get to the people.

He described an operation where they protected rice harvesters and then carried the rice out of the area for them. This sort of thing interferes with our tactical mission, but we decided we must not let this rice fall into the hands of the V.C. He was generally concerned with follow-on action and follow-on forces to do noncombat tasks of organizing the people into law abiding ~~mountain hamlets~~ hamlets, villages, etc. He said that a U.S. combat division can go anywhere in VN it wants to -- the firepower is that overwhelming -- but he is worried about who is going to follow the division and take over the administration and security of the uncovered areas to prevent V.C. re-infiltration and general lawlessness in places where there is no local government. He says the Marines are spread thin now and that there is some concern that if they push any further forward that they will find that the situation to their rear has lapsed so badly that they will find themselves fighting in two directions.

Col. Nickerson said that in the traditional role of the USMC, no regt or bn needed a full time CA officer -- additional duty basis is good enough -- but in the type of situation he has in VN, he needs -- and has -- full time CA officers at both levels. While he was explaining this to him, one of his staff stopped in to tell him that he had heard a nearby district chief was being replaced. Nickerson was very upset by this news. He had great faith in this particular district chief and was upset that the Prov Chief was thinking of relieving him and giving them a new, unknown man, without even consulting ~~the~~ the Marine tactical commander in the area. He sent an officer to register his feelings at MACV sector. He then told us that he was still upset about the Prov Chief switching ~~2~~ PF units out of his area without his knowledge -- the Marines had learned to know the individuals in those units, could communicate with them, had improved their training, and were counting on those improved conditions as part of the area security; all of a sudden they had a new bunch of PF without any of those advantages.

The Colonel then ~~from~~ flew us out to the Union Duc district in his chopper. This district's chief is the one mentioned above. The Marines think very highly of him. This man, Capt Trung has been fighting the Viet Minh and Viet Cong for about twenty years. Until very recently the V.C. had controlled his entire district except the area immediately around district hq. Trung had stayed there with his PF and fought them off, with his only contact to friendly forces being by air. Capt Trung himself gave us a short briefing in which he explained that he now has 62 PF and 236 PF, that the district had formerly been composed of 14 villages, but 8 were montagnard. He said the local major industry had once been charcoal making but that it was not active now because the people had not been able to get their product to market.

We left the district hq with 1st Lt Swartz, 3d Marine Regt CA officer, and 1st Lt Keely, CA officer for the 1st Bn, 1st Marines and jeeped down to a couple of hamlets and a restored bridge, then proceeded to Keely's battalion's hq. This outfit had been in-country only three (bns were switched between divisions) and had a little different training background. When we arrived Major George, the Bn XO was talking over the radio to a Marine officer at the scene of a VN child's death -- it was not clear as to whether the V.C. or the Marines had killed this child -- and he was in the process of arranging to get some people down there to talk to the parents and take some rice to them.

George and Keely then gave us an informal briefing on their CA structure and ops. A CA team has been formed in each of the four companies. The Co XO is responsible for CA activities and is assisted by a medic. Everyday sick call for the people is held, throughout the area, with coord with the BN S-5. The bn surgeon also goes out everyday with a corpsman and a trailer full of medical supplies, and an interpreter. He follows a routine with times established so the people will know when and where to come. There is only one VN nurse in the area and they use her in her own location. There is a pharmacist or doctor at a crossroads who has been very upset at the Marines holding sick call and providing medicine and treatment free that he wants to charge for -- Marines did not even know he existed and they are now trying to work with him. The surgeon has developed a routine for holding sick call wherein he treats the old people and children first -- some he really can't do anything for, but he doesn't tell them that, he sees that they get something they can take that will help them psychologically anyway. Then he gives out a bar of soap per person and 2 1/2 canteen cups of rice per person. *Wdy?*

They then described a fund they have obtained by asking for voluntary contributions from the men in the company -- \$1 per man on payday, which is turned into P's and administered by the Co CA officer (Co XO). They feel they need a mileage fund for their paying gas claims on the spot and buying small items they need or paying for damages -- instead of the voluntary contributions. They emphasized their belief that these claims have to be paid on the spot or the effect is lost. They use a figure of 2500 P's for a death claim on a child -- they don't know where the figure came from, but say the VN people seem satisfied with it for a child, but for a carabou it is 7000 P's. Neither do they know how they arrived at the 2 1/2 cups of rice. The soap bars incidentally are hotel size, supplied with various brands and advertisements on them. Another unusual item was injected by the Chaplain who bought 1000 VN flags and gave them out to the children -- the saved them around so much that finally the people organized a parade in front of the Marine hq.

The Bn Cmdr is working out a proposition with Capt Trung, the District Chief to provide Marine security for a rice harvest, while the RV/PF help the people cut the rice and then haul it out. Capt. Trung will give each farmer a receipt for the amount he brings in.

so that it can be centrally stored and protected from the V.C. Farmers can later draw for their needs against the amounts of their receipts. The V.C. are putting out propaganda saying that such deals are really to provide food for ARVN and that no farmer will get any rice without buying it back.

They described another situation where the fleeing V.C. threw a grenade into a house and killed a mother and son. The Marines came in, treated the surviving father and paid him for his loss from their contribution fund. "We don't mind doing some of these things because it is these villagers who are going to tell us where the V.C. and boobytraps are. But, it does not seem right to ask money from the same man who risks his life to fight the war."

~~XXXXXXXX~~ Lt. Kooley showed us his "goodie locker," a jeep trailer that he pulls around the hamlets containing various supplies for the people and white paint for eradicating V.C. propaganda slogans when ~~they~~ the Marines clear a new area. Kooley is also the Dn S-2 and described his liaison with the district chief and his helping him obtain six agents who perform such tasks as getting children to show ~~him~~ them the location of mines. He also said that the idea gets around among some of the adults and he had one old man who found a Marine before each V.C. night attack and told him "V.C. come tonight." They always did what the old man predicted. Kooley is a very personable, young officer who came up from the ranks, went to OCS, has no college education, but has taken all of the Bragg correspondence courses and has been on two exercises where Army CA platoons functioned and has practically memorized the CA guidebook of do's and don'ts the Marines put out at Pondletch.

We flew back to 3d Marine hq with Col. Nicholson and had lunch before taking off with Keever for 9th Marines where we talked with Colonel Gorman, C.O., his XO, and Capt. Martin, Regtl CA officer. Col. Gorman said that Keever's three day seminar had been a great boon to them. He felt that they had gotten no assistance from USOM. Division is developing a CA S.O.P. and he is anxious to get it, but in the meantime he is developing his own CA procedures. He was concerned about various U.S. agencies working along separate paths toward the same goals. He was having difficulty in getting the Prov Chief to release supplies and had attempted two meetings with him, both of which had been aborted --he was going to try again the next day and hoped the Prov Chief would show up this time.

In the case of a village called "Sam Nhi," Gorman was trying to get permission from the villagers thru the district chief to scrap it, bulldoze down the village and start a new one. We have a Marine rifle squad with this village chief at all times because we know he has been fingered. 7

The greatest thing we do is the medical program. 200-300 people are treated daily. But, we have learned some things about distributing supplies. We had a lieutenant distributing some dolls and the women and children literally tore the dolls apart fighting over them and the Lt. could not control the situation. Now we know the hamlet chief could have done a better job of this and it would

build him up with the people also.

This regt has put in a roadnet between villages so that the people can exchange goods. The XO added that "we are still missing the boat in the units -- combat comdrs are the ones who have to implement the program."

Col. Gorman said we have already asked for full time CA officers at Regt and Bn --additional duty types can do it at Co. There are 30,000 civilians in our area, there will be 100,000 before it is over --this can't be handled on an additional duty basis. The workload is here for the full-time CA man.

*we have
no sub
request*

This situation is different from Korea to the extent that U.S. Forces must live with an among the civilians. In Korea the civilians could be herded and pushed aside and kept out of the way of combat operations. Here there is a constant stream of problems and ARVN can't help us in handling them.

We believe that CA is winning the minds of the people, getting them security, and convincing them that they have it. We believe that kind, humane treatment will win the people from the V.C. Our initial contact is usually with the children, then the mothers, finally the males. Every effort must be made to keep bad incidents down. One incident can screw up the deal.

We have attempted to build up the prestige of the village chief by putting in communications to him. This enables the chief to call for artillery fire. We got additional EMS's to do that. But, we have got to get the GVN to come behind us.

Colonel Gorman said we don't have enough interpreters to assist us. They have found however that a friendly courteous attitude does much to reassure the people of the marines intentions.

CA is the beginning of an operation. We move out under the cover of darkness, surround a village, set up loudspeakers, and tell the people that we don't want to hurt them. We drop leaflets asking them to come out --sometimes maybe 200 come out. ARVN was against this at first, saying that other villagers would steal their belongings after they left their huts, but we feel it is more important not to kill or hurt the people. ARVN seems now to agree to this principle. But, even so we can't guarantee the safety of the people in a village. This getting the people to our side is the first step ~~start~~ in civil affairs. The people are frightened, we have both the village chief and the cmdr of the mil forces speak to them. People that are evacuated are provided tarps to sleep under and pots to cook with. In such an operation it is essential to sit with the hamlet chief to determine what is really needed. But, you have to be impressive right then, because you win the people right then or not at all.

Civil Affairs officers must be reminded that they are also intelligence officers and must react quickly to intelligence.

Major Koeber interjected the thought: "We have run into some blocks. The rest of the U.S. mission must understand that we in the Marines don't want to act unilaterally, but we also don't stop and sit on our cans." He added that a staff officer from the regiment sees the subsector officer almost daily, and a direct phone line has been established between the sub-sector of Pico and regiment. But, the two MACV sub-sector advisors have not been to the USOM-MACV seminar and really know less about the programs than we do, yet they are supposed to advise Col. Gorman. ((We also wondered why a Marine unit clearing a district where there was no sub-sector team should not have such a team attached to it ~~minimum~~ so that it could be left in place when the U.S. tactical unit moves forward.))

The regimental XO kept mentioning that what is needed in the CA field is more workers not more staff officers.

Col. Gorman said any unit coming over here must be prepared to deal with CA. They must have a plan and bring materials with them because the first day's ops create problems. Even in the first Marine Div exercises out of Camp Pendleton these things were planned but we tend to forget them in actual ops. In the present situation, TO's and TD's were stripped for combat, as a consequence neither the people nor the equipment is available to support CA. Since CA is essential in this situation, it is necessary to support combat support to civil affairs. He emphasizes that the CA mission is as important as the military mission. It is impossible to conduct mil ops without CA and vice versa.

They all felt that language is important because misunderstandings and ill feelings are caused because of lack of communications. It must be remembered that the people are frightened and it is essential for us to communicate to them that we mean them no harm. Col. Gorman recommends that a rifle company have at least two interpreters because its frontage can extend up to 5000 meters. What is really needed is one per platoon. Some field expedients have been developed; for example, a list of VI-English medical phrases has been published to aid the corpsman in medical activities in making simple diagnoses by being able to ask them phrases as, "have your bowels moved."

The Marines have experimented in integrating some PF personnel into their fire teams. They have found that it speeds up the bring of PF and helps teach language skills to both Marines and VI. The PF are weak in fire fights ~~and~~ but are very useful in looking for booby traps and other tricks of the V.C.

When we returned to MAF hq, Major Koeber told us of Gen Walt's daily morning briefin. He said he requires that Koeber brief on some aspect of CA daily. The purpose of this is to orient the general staff on CA and Civac activities. This has been highly effective in bringing to the GS an awareness of CA problems. This has worked very well and the GS now brings info of interest to the CA officer without his requesting it.

((Protocol officer: Major Ernie Graham, USMC))

Colonel George Axtell, C/S 3d MAF, took us into the war room and gave us some pointers on the opn and policy of the headquarters. He indicated that some of the officers in the division had initially found it difficult to accept the idea that this is a new kind of war and requires a departure from some of the traditional tactics. He said, however, that the commanding general had given a great deal of personal attention to the civil affairs aspects of the operation and had insisted that officers at all levels receive thorough orientations in these matters. Further, the CG has continually kept the emphasis alive and has demanded that everyone participate or support this facet of the IAF's operation. Col. Axtell was quite interested in the fact that the Army has been re-examining CA doctrine and was well-informed on the number of Marine officers who have been attending courses at the CA school. He was acquainted with the incoming 3d MAF CA officer, Lt. Col. Sommerfield, and knew that he was a graduate of the CA school. He then referred to the maps in the war room and said that they were in the process of developing a system for reflecting civilian info on the maps as well as conventional tactical info.

The next morning we sat in on a regular weekly meeting of the Joint I Corps Coordinating Council. In attendance were Mr. Wahrmand, Dep Reg Dir, USOH, Mr. Floyd Wade, JUSPAO Reg rep, Mr. Phil Thomas, incoming Prov rep for JUSPAO at Mac, Lt. Col. Johnson, Rural Const Advisor, MACV I Corps Team, Col. Wortman and Major Keever from the 3d MAF. (A copy of the prepared agenda and copies of three of the pre-written committee reports are attached.) Committee reports were turned ~~in~~ in with very little discussion except in the case of Psywar and Pub Works. The Psywar report was unsatisfactory to the council members and the USOH Pub Works man felt that he was miscast as chairman of the Pub Works committee and wanted someone else to take the job. It was decided that Wahrmand, Wade, and Keever would get together later and draft a mission statement and brief charter for each of the functional committees to help them get into action quicker.

The discussion turned to claims and the Finance committee's activities in this respect. USOH said that the attention needed to be put on non-combat claims because combat claims were a lesser problem. USMC said, "We would challenge the existence of machinery for paying even combat claims --it simply isn't working." USOH: The point is that there is a limited amount of Milcap money for paying noncombat claims. USMC: But as we have discussed before it is hung up in budgetary red tape.

((Wahrmand seemed to chair the meeting and was pinch-hitting for the absent recorder. Minutes are kept and they are sent to senior officials such as Gen. Walt so that problems beyond the power of Council members can receive the proper command attention. For example, there was one point which could be handled by members only after a meeting of the minds between Gen Walt and Gen Thi, this fact was outlined in the minutes so Gen Walt would be prepared to inject himself at the appropriate time.))

Prior to taking up the prepared agenda, matters of old business were handled including previous proposals for similar coordinating council meetings at Province level. This is felt to be particularly important to insure that Marine, MACV advisors, and USOM effort is coordinated in the field. Keover stated that the Marines were in favor of these meetings but that they would like to have the ones for Quang Tien and Quang Ngai together because for tactical reasons they were unable to separate these two provinces in their thinking. The Marines also wanted to have the appropriate regtl emdrs attend these meetings. They also wanted to include discussions of the newly acquired sub-sectors imprest funds and their use. Both USOM and the Marines were interested in what guidance MACV had put out regarding these funds. Lt. Col. Johnson, MACV, seemed reluctant to contribute info on this point. One of the other products they were looking forward to from these province meetings was the clarification of some differences in policy between certain USOM and MACV reps. Wahrmond pointed out that they were aware of this and he felt that the particular case that caused this concern was the result of one USOM rep being influenced by the Prov Chief rather than being able to exert USOM influence over the Prov Chief.

The Marines brought up the necessity of getting Gen Thi to support the Marine concept of taking unilateral action to repair damage and assist the people in hamlets and villages that they, the Marines, had operated through. It was determined that the matter was beyond the capability of council members and that the minutes would be so written that Gen. Walt would see that he should take this up directly with Gen Thi. Mr. Wade of JUSPAO agreed to assist in writing this portion of the minutes so that the problem would be definitively laid out in the fewest words. Wahrmond said that if this not do the job, that pressure from above -- Mr. Mann or Mr. Lodge -- might be sought to get to Gen Thi.

Members then turned their attention to the prepared Agenda:

1. "Adopt Statement of Purpose of Council:" It was pointed out that the present statement does not carry a sufficiently clear meaning for all agencies to understand why or how they should participate. Wahr said that CAS has been contacted and they don't want to be associated with the Council, however, they say they can support us with some assets. He said PAT teams are beginning to get in the way -- out of hand. "I can see the time when we may have to rely on a common superior to us all to straighten this out." Werthman: We need to decide what to do with our decisions and recommendations. Now they go to Gen Walt. Wahrmond: They do in your case. In ours, they go to our bosses. Wade: At the moment I don't see any requirement for my doing anything but sending up an info copy of the minutes.

2. "Formulate specific committee requirements:" Wahrmond, in the case of USOM personnel, I had to tell the Pub Works man over and over what his committee mission is. I feel that if we had had a man at Chu Lai to recommend a drainage system it might have helped. I think he understands that now. We sometimes have to get over to these people

that while more sophisticated heavy equipment might be desirable to do a particular job, where we need immediate impact type action, we have to use whatever equipment is available at the scene --we have too many transportation problems to do otherwise.

Wahrmond suggested that meetings of the Council be scheduled bi-weekly. Wortman suggested that initially the meetings be weekly --we need to move quickly on getting this thing better organized, because for one thing Amb Lodge is enthusiastic about them and has already reported them to State. Lodge also indicated that it was intended that the VII sit in on the Council. It was agreed to meet weekly and to try to hasten organization so VII could be worked in.

3. "Formulate Policy to be followed in connection with Reconstruction effort in villages cleared and held by the Marines:" Discussion here was merely an amplification of ideas covered in the second paragraph on p 115. Col. Wortman re-emphasized one point: "I like for these problems to get in the minutes so Gen. Walt will read them and get the idea of what to take up with Gen Thi."

4. "Formulate policy on advisability of ~~mixing~~ getting 'High Command Assistance Teams' into I Corps Provinces to get the Milcap funds squared away:" Koever: Gen Walt is vitally interested in this. There is a directive from GVN explaining how ~~the~~ Milcap funds can be transferred and Saigon says that if needed we can call for high command assistance teams. All I want to do is to get this Council to agree that we need these teams and get the Prov Chiefs to ask for them. Wortman: Doesn't this money split into various accounts and the Prov Chiefs are afraid to transfer funds between these accounts. Johnson: Actually this isn't the problem. We are getting reports which show that people here say that Saigon is at fault, but Prov Chiefs don't have proper documentation. I did find out where one bottle neck is --there is one Army man in Saigon who is still geared to the old system. I would prefer to wait on getting these teams in until we get all our facts together. Wortman: The problem is down below. They have funds but have used up those designated for combat claims. Koever described the 4/1 R's system of voluntary-collected funds for use in settling small claims and personal injuries. Wortman and Wahrmond: The guys giving their lives should not have to pay money too. Koever: Another unit puts the claimant in a jeep and takes him to District Hq. This is not the answer either because these people get no action at District. All members finally agreed to get the Finance Committee to look further ~~into this matter and MACV would also get additional facts on it.~~ into this matter and MACV would also get additional facts on it.

5. "Formulate policy on getting sub-sector mil advisors in Hieu Duc and Dien Bon Districts:" Col. Johnson said one of these districts has already received its team and another team is coming in in November.

6. "Discuss Quang Ngai proposal for rice harvest program:" Wahrmond: The government's work in rice harvests may have caused more harm than good. The V.C. is pushing the idea that farmers will get cheated. At Hoi An, the V.C. sent a group of old men and women in to demonstrate

against GVN rice handling. The police chief had their head knocked together and painted anti V.C. slogans on their hats and umbrellas and turned them around and marched them out of town in the rain. The people had to throw their hats and umbrellas away because they knew the V.C. would beat them up if they came back home wearing such slogans. Walhund conceded, however, that some form of this program is necessary but that it must be handled carefully. Koovert: At Le My it is being done and the V.C. are propagandizing about it, but we have brought rice in and out by boat and air to prove good faith. Walhund: What should be done is to pay the man cash for his rice and then let him buy it back when he needs it. Unfortunately the GVN has a poor history of keeping promises. ((Our own thought: Are not we, U.S. agencies, aiding and abetting the GVN in throwing promises around loosely and not following them up by having the Psywar and Civil Affairs functions separated at the Saigon level and by putting so much emphasis on talking first and acting later rather than concentrating our psywar on things that have already been accomplished or are unquestionably within the intent and capability of GVN.))

7. "Discuss Regional meetings with field reps:" Covered in pre-agenda discussions.

The meeting closed with a brief discussion of sub-sector impost funds. Johnson said that these funds could be used for almost anything except long range projects, and that they are to be revolving funds, replaced as they are spent. Walhund said that there was bound to be some misuse --there was when USOM had similar funds, but that the overall impact would be good. He said he was careful with them because he had to account for them to the U.S. comptroller. As examples of things he used them for: once he bought 100,000 P's worth of childrens' T shirts made up to look like the GVN flag --it got the GVN flag into places it had never been before. He also bought motorbikes for some of the local officials back when it was a practice for them to go out to the families of sons killed and offer condolences.

That afternoon we visited the 1st ARVN CA Co., commanded by Captain Hoang and advised by MACV 1st Lt. (Sig Corps) Ellison. This advisor was TDY from U.S. B.V.A. in Okinawa and he had attended the Psyops course at Bragg but had had no CA training. He said it would be highly desirable for the officer in his job to have had CA trng. The mission of the company is to support pacification ops and help local people in hamlet organization --there is one such CA company and one Psywar Bn in each corps. We were supplied with an organizational chart of the company and a list of its authorized equipment (attached). --it was noted that auth strength is 40 officers, 82 NCOs, 10 other EM for a total of 140, but present for duty were only 32 officers, 24 NCOs, and 61 EM, for a total of 117. The status of equipment board showed that a great deal of the auth equipment was missing.

One of the company platoons of seven CA teams is supporting CA activities in Saigon. One platoon is in Hue, and another in Da Nang. The functional platoon is in general support, but is badly understrength. One of the VN officers had been to the CA school and Gordon and one (the Co. cmdr) had only been to the Psyops course at Bragg. The men of the company had received their training in Saigon at the Psywar Center.

The adviser described some of the current activities of the company. Their primary tasks are in military consolidation; CA teams go along with ARVN and RF to handle the civilians, assist the military in interrogating them, assist the village in reorganization and re-settlement, and ~~assist in the organization~~ give some first aid. The determination of whether or not to resettle a village is made at various higher levels of command. In Chu Lai, Saigon was involved, and three teams from the CA company assisted the Prov, District, and village chiefs in the distribution of supplies and allocation of land. One team concentrated on medical aid. The CA Co frequently receives its guidance from the Prov S-5, who is primarily interested in Psywar.

In response to a question as to how a U.S. unit like the Marines could receive support from this company, we were told that they should go from 3d MAF with a request to the Psyops/CA advisor (MACV) at Corps, who would in turn go to the Corps S-5.

Additional info about employment of the CA company: currently 3 teams are in Chu Lai aiding in resettlement, 4 are in Da Nang, of these one of these is assisting a U.S. Navy MD who is working in Hodgep within the Marine FAOR; 3 are working in hamlets, of these, one runs a dispensary, and two are supervising the building of roads and working with the 7th Marine Bn in civic action. The hamlets that are being constructed are part of the refugee resettlement program. They are being constructed from scratch with USOM materials made available thru District. (There are 3000+ people in this program) Each refugee family receives a plot of land, twenty pieces of tin, and 2000P's to build a house, then each person gets 7P's per day for six months and, in this area, the District chief has the authority to extend this for one year. (Hoa Vang District). There is one platoon working for the 1st Div S-5 (a captain). Within this Div a CA team is attached to each regt and works for the regtl S-5. Two teams are assigned to each Prov S-5. One team is performing instruction duties within the Div, and one team is in the Hue area working on hamlets. The U.S. adviser estimated that one CA company could be employed in support of each ARVN Div and two companies could be used to support the Marine Div. He also thought that one U.S. CA Co. could well be used in support of the Marines. The possibility of mixing a U.S. CA Co. and an ARVN CA Co. was thought to be worth experimentation. The adviser thought that some of the Mobile Action cadre might be drafted directly into CA units to help expand ARVN CA effort.

((It was noted that no U.S. Army personnel anyway connected with the training, control or employment of this CA company have any CA training whatsoever.)) Further, the 1st Lt. advising the company does not work directly under the Rural Const Advisor, but works under the Det Cdr of the 1st U.S. Psyops detachment (Provisional), who is responsible to the Psyops/CA ADV. GEN US MACV team (Major Higgins, who has only psyops training)).

We visited the 1st Psyops Det, met the S-3 and the Det Cdr. This Det has the mission of (1) Providing Psywar support, advice, and tech assistance to ARVN and U.S. forces throughout the I Corps zone. (2) Advising and assisting the ARVN 3d Psywar Bn. (3) Preparing the Psyops annexes to opns orders and contingency plans as directed.

For

Personnel from the unit come from U.S. D.V.A., organization is based on TOE 33-500P. There is a command and control element of one off and 2 EM, an intell and propaganda section of 2 off and 5 EM, a printing and processing section of one off and 8 EM, and an audio section of 3 off and 2 EM.

Next we visited two of the three hamlets in which elements of the CA company were supporting refugee resettlement in the Da Nang area (Hoa Vang District). One of the hamlets we visited was Catholic, and had a priest for hamlet chief, and the other was Buddhist. At the Catholic hamlet a grader and dump truck from the ARVN 115th light construction co (Engr) were trying to put a road in on soil that was so soft and sandy that the ~~extraordinary~~ dump truck finally became stuck so fast that the grader could not pull it out and work had to be suspended for the day. The young U.S. advisor explained that he had been lucky to get this equipment at all as he had no direct means of such support and had to "promote" everything he got along this line. From talking with the VN CA lieutenant and the American advisor, and looking over the poor, sandy, (perhaps even salty soil) on which the hamlets were being constructed, it was apparent that they needed some real engineer supervisory assistance. The U.S. lieutenant pointed out that one of the problems he was worried about was that the soil was so poor the people could not farm and that there was no work for them to do --he described some efforts to get small crafts and laundries going, but was fearful that those businesses would be gobbled up by the more clever entrepreneurs and that the people themselves would still have no means of livelihood. The houses were well spaced, so that there was ground for people to move around on, and space for children to play, they had a rather large aluminum sheeted catholic church built in the middle of the area, but other community facilities were lacking. They had built barrel-type privys surrounded by straw matting, but these were built one per long street and if used by people would not possibly serve the surrounding houses.

That evening we had a get together with Floyd Wade, Phil Thomas, and Mr. Underlind of JUSPAO. In discussing the overall JUSPAO effort, it was learned that 10% of the USIA foreign service is now in VN. Three JUSPAO men in I Corps with a captain from Bragg joining them. Since in I Corps, JUSPAO has the ultimate say over Payson, this is in their charter. Wade agreed that each province is different, even many districts have different situations and needs. In establishing SACR's, province politics must be considered. In connection with psyops, he questioned the necessity of so many heli-borne operations, says psyops people spend too much time in the air. They felt that there are two factors that cut the effectiveness of the sub-sector: short tours, and lack of language capability. Wade was of the opinion that we are not doing enough to disseminate to the field the tricks of how to be effective, lessons learned, information about techniques that VN officials use in corruption and how in general to be effective in the non-military aspects of the advisor's role. On advisorship, it was suggested to find out what you and your counterpart both want and pushing it, leaving other areas for secondary effort --Underlind illustrated this concept by comparing the concept to the location of the point of interception of two lines --where do our interests coincide?

The comment was made that the district chief wants a hazy advisor and looks upon his job in part as teaching his advisor about VII. The district chief who has an advisor has more prestige than one who does not. In working with cadres, it is essential to discover the natural leader within the group. This is a question of personality, but once this individual is identified the advisor can provide guidance and technical advice. Capt. Savageot's opn was discussed and Underlind confirmed that his was the exception rather than being typical of survey cadre opn. ((Wade is now in country and came to the job with no CI training. Discussion with the JUSPAO reps about the various paywar assets, particularly within ARVN and the U.S. adv effort, it was evident that they were only generally aware of their capabilities and activities. It was also evident that Phil Thomas does not believe in the Chieu Hoi program and prefers to look for holes in it rather than trying to promote it. One gets the impression that JUSPAO field reps are concentrating on propaganda rather than "information." That is they are devising themes which they hope to convince the people of and not relating their material to the realities of the day to day life --the effect is that they are not addressing the issues the people are most vitally interested in, but are trying to re-orient the peoples interests to matters of their own choosing.))

The next day we visited the Marine Bn headquartered at Phu Bai (vic of Huo). Bn is commanded by L/C Taylor, he had a 1st Lt. Mullen as Bn CA officer, and Major Zimmin as XO. We talked with the three of them and then went out to look at some of the units with Mullen. Before the outfit left the States they sent Lt. Mullen to the MATA course at Bragg. There are 7 VN officers from the ARVN 1st Div serving as liaison officers with Taylor's Bn. Taylor commented that the MACV see adv, Major Martin, works very close with them and felt that he and Maj. Bosman, his assistant are fine officers. The Prov Chief is the former C/S of the 1st ARVN Div. The people in the area are not hungry and food distribution is not one of the Marine activities. The USOM Prov rep did help them a great deal in getting radios for the PF. "Our relations with all elements of the Province and U.S. effort have been outstanding." Taylor said, "This war is going to be won with small units. As far as V.C. killed, is concerned, I expect Maj. Martin with his PF/RF have killed more V.C. than ARVN." "The PF in our area now have uniforms, but we had a hell of a time getting them. Most PF are armed with carbines and they like them because they are light and have auto fire. We have been trying to train them, however, in using aimed fire rather than spraying an area with auto fire --some of this training has taken effect." This Bn has organized a joint action company ("CI company") which is composed of six PF platoons with a Marine squad with each platoon. A Marine officer, Lt. Ik, acts as company commander and a VN 1st Lt is his exec officer. He is fluent in VN --he studied the language in Chinawag. They also explained a system of "military-civilian councils" they use in the villages. They find that from these they get a lot of intelligence. They said that there orders were to evacuate POW's to Da Nang, but this is not really practical --all POW's are not the same and we

simply can't evacuate some of them. Those of little or no significance we turn over to the District Chief and they usually go out thru VII channels.

Lt. Mullen made the point that VII lower officials have been most cooperative and usually get the job done. Maybe they are a little slower than we are, but the thing we have to do is convince them we are here to help. You can't give them things, or do things for them, they'll let you do it. They are pretty well indoctrinated as to why the Marines are here. We don't get very much involved in local government, but if the village chief were not to be functioning very well we would get the district chief on him. Village leaders have been elected in this area --not sure how the elections were run, but they were. He said, "We have a good slice of the police power. There is a village police chief, but he uses PT to execute his authority. He reports to the village chief and also to the district chief." The only taboos the Marines have run into are religious. Old farmers may take offence to patting children on the head, as it drives in evil spirits, but an artillery bn initially bivouaced in a cemetery and they found they were getting fired on at night. When they moved their bivouac area, the firing ceased --they concluded that local villagers were expressing their displeasure.

On claims, they say they go through the regular foreign claims procedure. ~~Richardson said that the claims procedure is a long and slow process and that the government is not always forthcoming in paying claims.~~ Nothing has come back from the government, though. If a claim is not a battle claim, it goes through "foreign claims," but if it is a battle claim, it goes through ARVN. Supposedly, the people will get paid eventually. There have been one or two occasions when we had to take up collections from our own men to meet an immediate crisis.

Major Zimin (Bn X O) said you need a full time CA officer at least at regt. And then in situations such as they now face, one at battalion --but he pointed out that when Lt. in a few weeks, Lt. Mullen will have to act both as Bn CA officer and Co commander for the joint action company. He made a strong point that CA officers should be at the "executive and not special staff level." Another point he felt strongly on was that the first thing that must be done when a unit comes into an area is to neutralize the people --get them to stop helping the V.C. (We noted that this ties in with Major Keever's "First Phase of Civic Action.").

He had previously made arrangements to meet Lt. M: at the battalion C.P., but he had had to leave before we got there to go to the scene of serious injuries sustained by two small VII children who had somehow been burned with phosphorus (at the end of the day no one had yet learned how this happened, whether it from from playing with a flare, or a V.C. trap or what). M: took the children in a chopper to the Marine clearing company and they were later evacuated to the Prov hospital. He had had to leave that situation right away to check on an official who had had an automobile accident.

So Lt. Mullen took us and a jeep of Marines to see some hamlets

and to find Lt. As we drove down the road we came upon an overturned Citroen with a crowd of people around it --the Marines stopped and ascertained that there were no injured people still around. Then we stopped at a village headquarters and met the village chief who had served in the French Army for seventeen years. The Marines had installed communications to him and he was able to use this system to call for artillery fire when required. This chief was an older man, but he was dressed in clean khaki clothes and his offices were clean and well ordered, although quite simple. The Marines said they use this building for "sick call" on a regular schedule.

In another village we visited a market, crowded with women and produce. The people were not rattled by the Marine presence at all and were quite at ease as we walked through.

While driving across a rice-paddy dike road, we were hailed by two old women who wanted a ride. The Marines stopped, loaded the old women and their two poles with jugs and baskets on them, into the two jeeps and took them to their hamlet. Shortly after this we drove into a grove of trees and found Lt. Et and a Marine squad with some PF tropps in and around a small masonry building and a long open-sided thatch hut. It turned out that the Marines and PF are building the thatch hut for quarters for themselves so that they can move completely out of the masonry building and tell the village chief that the area is secure and that the masonry building can now be used for a dispensary for which it was originally intended. We were introduced to Lt. Et and the Marine squad ldr in that location. Both of them described their ops: The joint action company was begun slowly. The method was devised as they went not based on a pre-conceived plan. The Marine personnel participated are carefully selected from volunteers; each man's service record is reviewed by the battalion exec for any indication that he should not be used, and if any Marine shows that he is not working out, he is eliminated from the program immediately. The Marine squad and PF platoon conduct joint operations. The two are intermingled and stand guard, one Marine, one PF, etc. The Marines are not advisors, but command. In planning ops, they will discuss the plan with the PF; if the PF disagree they will sit down and come to some mutually agreeable decision. None-the-less, the Marines are in command according to an arrangement specifically cleared with the District Chief. This Chief has pushed for expansion from 4 to 6 platoons of PF. The PF in this group look better, carry their weapons better, and appear to have better discipline and morale than any we have seen before --they seem to imitate the Marines. The Marines sleep in the village an average of five nights a week, sharing facilities with the PF. It was emphasized that they do not try to create a "compound within a compound" --Et had visited a SF camp and had noted that SF had created its own security zone within the CIDG general security zone. He felt that this would not work in his case and would not develop the mutual trust he felt he had to have to motivate the PF and the people watching --and to produce the type of intelligence he needed.

Lt. Et stated that the basic policy they operate under is "We are here to help you, but in turn we need your help." Initially,

they did not attempt to carry out civic action. If the villagers indicated they wanted something, the Marines tried to help them, but they let the initiative come from the VN people. The longer this operation continues the more civic action requests are generated and it is now beginning to snowball. They made a point of trying not to do anything that would fall down when they leave, and working through the village and hamlet chiefs. Their initial impetus was in Medcap, which they still push strongly. Lt. stated that their biggest successes, though, had been through common decency and courtesy which developed mutual trust along with security. They are now picking up info from the villagers on V.C. cadre and infrastructure. The Marines themselves are able to recognize strangers because they are around the people so much and have entered in the day to day life of the community. The Marine squad leader said that they had made a number of improvements in sanitation in the area and that they found that the only way to institute such things was by personal demonstration. As examples, he said they have cut some fifty-five gallon drums in half lengthwise, and set up a "baby laundry" -- Marines would get the mothers together and show them how to soap a child in the first "tub" and rinse them in the other two and get the people running kids through on an assembly line basis. Then individual Marines took interest in the sanitation of children and stop a child on the path and ask him why he hasn't had a bath -- none of the Marine EM spoke VN to begin with, but the sergeant says they have now picked up a word or two here and there, the Lt. holds periodic classes, and they have developed an elaborate sign language. The sergeant showed the locations of a couple of latrines and said that the people really didn't get the idea until a Marine would drop his trousers and show them -- following that the Marines would catch a child using the field and take him to the latrine; older people got the idea from children.

Lt. stated they varied the patterns of their military ops, patrols, guard changes, ambushes, resupply etc. to keep the V.C. agents coming in and out of the area from being able to second-guess them. He now feels that they have the capability to infiltrate people into adjacent areas and is laying plans to capture a V.C. district chief, as soon as they have received detailed info.

Lt. evidenced perception of political realities in living and working with a VN community. He has been given strong command support and is able to operate with a great deal of flexibility. He displayed confidence in his squad leaders and PW -- and their conduct, as we observed it, seemed to merit it. He emphasized that the important thing in his operation was the quality of the Marine personnel he was allowed to use and felt that this should never be sacrificed for mere expansion.

We left Lt. still working with the organization of a series of patrols and touched base with battalion once more before being driven to the by a Marine driver. Since we didn't know anything about the city, we had to stop at the MACV compound ~~xxxx~~ to find out where the USON Prov rep had his office. It was worth noting that although we contacted four commissioned officers and seven enlisted men scattered about the place, not one of them knew where USON was. Finally, a passing soldier happened to know.

~~SECRET~~

~~CMC Trip Book~~
~~prepared by FMFPAC Hqs.~~
 CMC Trip Book
 prepared by FMFPAC Hqs

Pool II, 19611
 AolC-11

~~No action~~
~~Refused~~

TOPIC: PLANNED UTILIZATION OF ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS
 COMPANY BEING ATTACHED TO III MAF (PART I)

BACKGROUND:

1. CMC 292143Z October 1965 advised that an Army Civil Affairs unit would be attached to III MAF by May 1966 and provided the planned structure of the unit, which includes a company headquarters, six platoon headquarters, seven interpreter teams, and eight functional teams specializing in civilian supply, food and agriculture, public safety, public health, legal, labor, and refugees.
2. It is envisioned that this unit will concentrate on matters involving relationships with local civilian governments and will coordinate with, and complement the efforts of, U. S. civilian agencies operating in Vietnam. In addition, there will be occasions when the Army Civil Affairs Company, or one or more of its elements, will provide active assistance to the III MAF Civic Action Program.
3. The structure of the Civil Affairs Company permits employment of the company headquarters at the MAF level, the platoon headquarters with each infantry regiment, division or wing, or separately employed battalion, and the functional teams attached to platoons, retained under company control or employed separately if required. Interpreter teams are available to support each platoon and the company headquarters.
4. The Civil Affairs Company, or its separate elements, will operate under the staff cognizance of the S-1 or the staff Civil Affairs Officer, if one has been designated.

STATUS:

1. CG FMFPAC 032203Z November 1965 concurred in the proposed organization of the Army Civil Affairs Company.
2. This headquarters has informally sighted a COMUSMACV proposal to modify the composition of the Civil Affairs Company by deleting four platoon headquarters and four interpreter teams, by substituting a claims team for the legal team, and by adding four refugee teams to provide additional assistance to the U. S. Operations Mission in combating the refugee problem. A copy of this proposal will be obtained and forwarded to CMC under separate cover. This headquarters

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and USARPAC concur in the substitution of the claims team for the legal team and in the addition of the refugee teams, but do not concur in the deletion of the four platoon headquarters and four interpreter teams. These latter elements are required for employment as noted above.

RECOMMENDATION:

Assuming that any modification of the Civil Affairs Company composition would be referred to HQMC or the JCS, it is recommended that CMC concur in the substitution of the claims team for the legal team and in the addition of the refugee teams, but not concur in the deletion of the four platoon headquarters and four interpreter teams.

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File Cy.

SECRETAOIC/sll-11
17 January 1966**G-1 Division****Subject:** Planned Utilization of Army Civil Affairs Company
being attached to III MAF (Part I)**Ref:** Trip Book prepared by Hq., FMFPac for CMC MIDPAC/
WESTPAC Trip. Part II, Tab 11 (Part I).

Summary of Item Reported: Described planned utilization of Army CA Company in III MAF and also referenced a COMUSMACV proposal to modify the composition of the CA Company by deleting four platoon headquarters and four interpreter teams, by substituting a claims team for the legal team, and by adding four refugee teams. Headquarters, FMFPac recommends that CMC concur in the substitution of the claims team for the legal team and in the addition of the refugee teams, but not concur in the deletion of the four platoon headquarters and the four interpreter teams.

Comments: On the action officer level, G-1 had informally contacted the Civil Affairs Directorate, DCSOPS, Department of the Army, to discuss the possibility of adding additional teams to the Army CA Company being assigned to III MAF. The CA Directorate recommended that no changes to the organizational structure be made until the Company became operational with III MAF and recommended changes were forthcoming through JCS channels based on experience. The informal contact was to propose the addition of the following teams to the Army CA Company:

- 1 Religious Relations Team
- 1 Public Education Team
- 1 Public Works and Utilities Team
- 1 Public Welfare Team

Recommendation: That CMC take no action until official recommendation has been forwarded.

Staff Coordination:**G-3 Division;****Concur/Nonconcur**

Col. Rouse

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*Ref: Sec Gen Staff memo of
Jan 66**AOIC File Cy.***SECRET****TOPIC: III MAF CIVIC ACTION/CIVIL AFFAIRS AUGMENTATION
REQUIREMENTS (PART II)****BACKGROUND:**

1. CMC 032207Z December proposed that a formal civic action organizational structure be created to refine III MAF civic action programs and to clearly differentiate between civil affairs executed by the Army Civil Affairs Company to be assigned to III MAF and civic action performed by Marines.
2. Message is being prepared concurring in the proposal to provide civic action personnel on a primary duty basis and submitted the following comments:
 - a. Creation of separate staff sections at all echelons of command is not necessary in order to accomplish the purpose expressed by CMC. Civil Affairs/Civic Action Officers, as appropriate, can be employed in the S-1 or S-3 Sections at the regimental and battalion level without sacrificing efficiency.
 - b. Primary duty civil affairs/civic action officers are not required in combat support units, combat service support units, and aviation units below the Wing level. The contribution of these units is not denied; however, the extent of their participation does not warrant the additional personnel. Coordination of the civil affairs/civic action efforts of these units can be coordinated by the senior tactical commander in areas where they operate.
 - c. Phase II deployments dictate that EastPac and MidPac units be considered in determining overall requirements for personnel augmentation.
 - d. The addition of the Army Civil Affairs Company to the III MAF task organization will provide an additional civil affairs operational capability. However, Marine Corps staff civil affairs officers will be required to conduct necessary civil affairs planning and to exercise staff cognizance over the Civil Affairs Company and its elements.
3. Based on the foregoing comments, the following organizational structure for civil affairs/civic action was proposed:

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Headquarters, FMF Pacific - Addition to G-1 Section

<u>Billet</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
*Civil Affairs/Civic Action Officer	LtCol	0107	1	
Asst Civil Affairs/Civic Action Officer	Maj	9910	1	
*Admin Man	Sgt	0141		1
Statistical NCO	Cpl	0141		1
Total			<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>

III MAF - Special Staff Section

*Civil Affairs/Civic Action Officer	Col	9906	1	
*Asst Civic Action Officer	LtCol	9910	1	
*Asst Civil Affairs Officer	Maj	0107	1	
*Asst Civic Action Officer	Capt	9910	2	
*Section Chief	GySgt	0141		1
*Interpreter (Viet Lang)	GySgt	8611		1
*Interpreter (Fr Viet Lang)	Sgt	8611		1
*Civil Affairs NCO	Sgt	0121		1
*Civic Action NCO	Sgt	0121		1
*Admin Man	LCpl	0141		1
Total			<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>

Each Division Headquarters

Civil Affairs/Civic Action Officer	LtCol	0107	1	
Asst Civil Affairs/Civic Action Officer	Maj	9910	1	
Asst Civil Affairs/Civic Action Officer	Capt	0107	1	
Admin Chief	SSgt	0141		1
Admin Man/Civic Action NCO	Cpl	0141		1
Interpreter (Viet Lang)	Cpl	8611		1
Admin Man/Driver	PFC	0141		1
Total			<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>

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Headquarters, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

<u>Billet</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Civil Affairs/Civic Action Officer	Maj	0107	1	
Asst Civil Affairs/Civic Action Officer	Capt	0107	1	
Admin Chief	SSgt	0141		1
Admin Man/Civic Action NCO	Cpl	0441		1
Interpreter (Viet Lang)	Cpl	8611		1
Admin Man/Driver	PFC	0141		1
Total			2	4

Each Infantry Regiment, FMF Pacific

Civil Affairs/Civic Action Officer	Capt	0107	1	
Civic Action NCO	Cpl	0141		1
Total			1	1

Each Infantry Battalion, FMF Pacific

Civic Action Officer	Lt	0302	1	
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* Manning Level Previously Provided

4. Personnel requirements to support the above structure total 39 officers and 26 enlisted men. However, considering manning level authorization previously provided, total increased personnel requirements generated by the above organization total 33 officers 19 enlisted men.

5. This headquarters had previously submitted a request for thirteen school trained Marine Corps Civil Affairs Officers. This number was increased to fourteen with the inclusion of EastPac units in the recommended organizational structure.

STATUS:

1. Awaiting Headquarters Marine Corps action on the proposed organization and increase in manning levels.

RECOMMENDATION:

Expedite action on the recommended organization.

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17 January 1966
E

G-1 Division

Subject: III MAF Civic Action/Civil Affairs Augmentation Requirements (Part II).**Ref:** Trip Book prepared by Hq. FMFPac for CMC MIDPAC/WESTPAC Trip. Part II, Tab 11 (Part II).

Summary of Item Reported: Subject item differs from the information contained in CG, FMFPac msg. 980440Z which is assumed to super-code this topic. This message responded to CMC msg. 982207Z (Dec) which proposed that a formal civic action organizational structure be created in III MAF. CG, FMFPac has stated a requirement for 22 officers and 19 enlisted Civil Affairs/Civic Action personnel for assignment to staff billets in addition to the 18 Civil Affairs school trained officers previously requested and allocated to WESTPAC forces; those previously allocated to FMFPac Headquarters; and also the additions authorized by III MAF Headquarters T/O. CG, FMFPac also states that creation of separate staff sections at all echelons of command is not necessary.

Comments: There appears to be no basis for objecting to the recommended organization. However, the required personnel to satisfy the additional billet requirements are not presently available. If the requirement is to provide the personnel as soon as possible, then a draw-down must come from 2dMarDiv and training centers.

Recommendation:

a. That the billets be established (allocated) as required in WESTPAC/FMFPac for Civil Affairs/Civic Action personnel in accordance with CG FMFPac msg. 980440Z.

b. Notify CG FMFPac that personnel (gross numbers) will not be available prior to 30 June 1966.

Action Required:

a. Allocate billets to FMFPac/WESTPAC in Manning Level documents.

b. Assign required personnel to Civil Affairs School and to FMFPac/WESTPAC on an as available basis.

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ACIC/all-11

Action Will Be accomplished By:

- a. -a. above -AC/S, G-1 (ACIE)
- b. -b. above -Director of Personnel

Staff Coordination:Director of PersonnelConcur/NonconcurAC/S, G-3Concur/Nonconcur

Note: G-1 will coordinate with G-3 and attempt to reconcile the non-concurrence.

SECRET

SECRETfrom HQ
13 Feb 66To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
From: Head, PP&P Branch5080-3
Prepared in Jan 66
Was Not Signed

Subject: Civil Affairs/Civic Action interrelationships

Ref: (a) A Strategic Appraisal - Vietnam dtd 27 December 1965

Encl: (1) Planned utilization of the Army Civil Affairs Company
being attached to III MAF (S)
(2) The planned billet assignments for the Marine Corps
Officers School trained in Civil Affairs (C)
(3) CMC msg. 032207Z December 65 (S)
(4) CG FMFPac msg 080440Z January 1966 (S)

1. Last fall, the Chief of Staff assigned the Staff responsibility for Civic Action within HQMC to AC/S, G-3. Since that time, G-3 has attempted to differentiate between the responsibility for Civil Affairs (G-1) and Civic Action (G-3) contrary to doctrine published by JCS, Department of the Army (JCS Executive Agent for Civil Affairs) and Joint Manuals (FM 41-5 and Army FM 41-10). Published doctrine indicates that Civic Action is an aspect of civil affairs and military civic action programs are to be promoted and supported as a part of civil affairs operations.
2. Also last fall, and in response to a CMC request, CG FMFPac established a requirement for 13 Civil Affairs School trained officers for assignment to WESTPAC FMF in addition to the Army Civil Affairs Company being assigned. CG FMFPac was requested to submit the planned billet assignments and functions of these officers and the planned utilization of the Army Civil Affairs Company being attached to III MAF. His responses (enclosures (1) and (2)) indicate assignments of the officers to a General Staff Section, G-5, Civil Affairs and Psychological Warfare

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at III MAF Headquarters level and to a special staff section for Civil Affairs on the division level. These officers will, among other things, "coordinate the civic action program" and "exercise staff cognizance over the civil affairs company"/

3. Prior to receipt of enclosures (1) and (2), AC/S, G-3 questioned the establishment of a Civil Affairs staff structure vice a civic action staff structure which resulted in a CMC message, enclosure (3), being sent to CG FMFPac which requested his views as to number/ranks/billets to satisfy the "requirement" for "a formal Civic Action organizational structure". CG FMFPac response, enclosure (4) states: "Requirement for Marine Corps Staff Civil Affairs officers at appropriate levels of command will remain. Staff CA Officers can be expected to exercise staff cognizance over Army unit and conduct necessary Civil Affairs/Civic Action planning." Requirements for Marine Corps Civil Affairs/Civic Action Staff personnel was increased to a level of 39 officers and 26 enlisted in FMFPac. Also, "Civil Affairs/Civic Action officers, as appropriate, can be included in Executive Staff sections at Battalion and Regimental level without sacrificing effectiveness."

4. Reference (a) indicates that winning the people and putting full weight into the pacification program should be two of the three main thrusts of U.S. strategy. These two items are in the realm of Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs operations (including military civic action) has become a major function of the overall III MAF operations in RVN. Civil Affairs is no longer an administrative or personnel (manpower) function.

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5. The arbitrary separation of Civic Action (G-3) from Civil Affairs (G-1) within HQMC has tended to slow down and confuse staff action in the critical area of Civil Affairs, including civic action.

a. For information, the Civic Action Branch Head (Colonel Stanford) is planning on calling together the ad-hoc committee on Civic Action to discuss CG FMFPac Civil Affairs/Civic Action personnel requirements, enclosure (4). Action on this message was originally to AO1E and has since been changed to AOS.

6. Based on the above, as well as the organization within the Department of the Army and the information contained in FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, it is recommended that the necessary action be taken to assign responsibility for Civil Affairs within HQMC to the AC/S, G-3 and the Civic Action Branch, G-3 be changed to Civil Affairs Branch, G-3. It is further recommended that any formal changes to the USMC staff manual, FMFMs, etc., be held in abeyance until analysis of the Civil Affairs Study, currently in progress, can be completed.

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G-1

ITEM: Planned Utilization of the Army Civil Affairs Company
being attached to III MAF

BACKGROUND:

CMC 292143Z October 1965 provided the structure of the
Army Civil Affairs Company to be attached to III MAF by May 1966.

HQMC has posed the following questions with regard to
the Civil Affairs Company.

- a. What is the planned utilization of the Company?
- b. Where will it be assigned?
- c. What staff agency will exercise cognizance over it?
- d. What authority will it have with agencies in and
out of III MAF?

RECOMMENDED POSITION:

Utilization, assignment and authority of the Civil Affairs
Company are matters that will ultimately be resolved by the
Commanding General, III MAF based on his evaluation of the
capabilities of the Company and local requirements. However,
FMEPac plans envision that the Civil Affairs Company will
concentrate on matters of relationships between III MAF and local
civilian governments and will devote its efforts to providing
aid in the restoration or establishment of effective, self
supporting governmental entities. In many ways, it will parallel
and complement the efforts of U. S. civilian agencies, such as
the U.S. Operations Mission, while maintaining liaison with

these agencies. Also, there may be occasions when the Army Civil Affairs Company, or one or more of its elements, will provide active assistance to the III MAF Civic Action Program since civic actions are geared to civil affairs requirements.

FMFPac plans also envision the assignment of a platoon headquarters and an interpreter team to each infantry regiment. The remaining two platoon headquarters with interpreter teams attached will be available for employment in the HUE PHU BAI TAOR or assigned to the Headquarters of the 3d Marine Division or 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, as dictated by local requirements. The Company Headquarters is ideally suited for employment by III MAF in a general support role. The functional teams will probably be retained under MAF control, with that control exercised through the Company Headquarters, and employed in areas where their special qualifications are required.

The Commanding General, III MAF has established a separate General Staff section with cognizance over Civil Affairs and Psychological Warfare and designated it as the G-5. It is anticipated that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 will exercise staff cognizance over the Civil Affairs Company. Elements attached to subordinate commands of III MAF may properly be placed under the cognizance of the S-1 or the Staff Civil Affairs Officer, if one has been designated.

It is anticipated that the Civil Affairs Company will have normal coordinating authority for civil affairs matters when implementing the policies of the Commanding General, III MAF. This authority will apply to civil affairs contacts with III MAF units and U. S. civilian agencies. When authorized, the Company may represent the Commanding General, III MAF in contact with Vietnamese civil or military agencies.

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G-1

ITEM: The Planned Billet Assignments for the Marine Corps
Officers School Trained in Civil Affairs.

BACKGROUND:

CG FMFPAC 242028Z OCT as amended by CG FMFPAC 032203Z
NOV and subsequent telecon established a requirement
for the following Civil Affairs school trained officers
for WestPac:

	Col	LtCol	Maj	Capt
Ground Forces	1	1	2	7
Aviation Forces		1		1

CMC has advised that the desired level will be attained
by February 1966.

HQMC has requested the following information:

- a. What are the planned billet assignments for
these officers by grade and command level?
- b. Will these officers be special staff officers or
assigned to an existing staff section?
- c. Brief resume of billet function.

RECOMMENDED POSITION:

The eventual assignment of these officers will be at
the discretion of the CG, III MAF; however, the follow-
ing assignments are considered appropriate.

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	Col	LtCol	Maj	Capt	Total
III MAF	1		1		2
1st MarDiv		1		1	2
3d MarDiv		1		1	2
1st MAW			1	1	2
Each Inf Regt-WestPac				1	5

The extensive contacts maintained by commanders of the above commands and organizations with the local government and supporting agencies requires a level of experience and training in the broad field of civil affairs. This same level of experience is not normally required in subordinate units because the civil/military relationships are not as involved at lower echelons. The CG, III MAF has designated a General Staff Section as G-5, Civil Affairs and Psychological Warfare. The CG, 3d MarDiv has established a special staff section for Civil Affairs. It is anticipated that the remaining organizations will also accord special staff status to Civil Affairs.

The Staff Civil Affairs Officer will:

- a. Coordinate those matters relating to civilian/military relationships.
- b. Establish and maintain liaison with appropriate agencies and representatives of the Government of Vietnam and with representatives of U. S. civilian agencies operating in the area assigned to the unit or command.

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c. Determine requirements for aid and support of local civilian governments and agencies, and submit recommendations for satisfying these needs.

d. Prepare plans for the control of indigenous personnel, in coordination with Government of Vietnam representatives, during tactical operations.

e. Exercise staff cognizance over Civil Affairs specialist units assigned to the command or organization.

f. Coordinate the civic action program.

g. Maintain Civil Affairs records and submit appropriate reports.

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COL STANFORD/whs

A03E

4219

4-2489

☐ PA DAILY☒ POSTAL☐ DEFENSE

3 DEC 1965

L. F. CHAPMAN JR.
Chief of Staff

032207

(Date File Group) (ZCF)

RUHLBP RUM NMF

FROM: CMC

RUHLBP
TO: CG FMFPACRUM NMF
INFO: CG III MAF (~~XXXXXXXX~~)**SECRET**

CIVIC ACTION (U)

REF A. MY 202229Z OCT

B. YOUR 242028Z OCT

C. YOUR 032203Z NOV

1. REF A INFORMED THAT ARMY WILL PROVIDE CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY TO III MAF BY MAY 1966 AND REQUESTED YOUR VIEWS CONCERNING REQUIREMENTS FOR MARINE CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS IN WESTPAC GROUND AND AVIATION BILLETTS. REFS B AND C STATED REQUIREMENTS AS 13 SUCH OFFICERS.

2. CONTINUING STUDY AT THIS HQ HAS LED TO FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:

A. III MAF WILL BE REQUIRED TO CONTINUE PRESENT CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES BY EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE PERSONNEL UNTIL ARRIVAL OF ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY.

B. SUBSEQUENT TO ARRIVAL OF ARMY COMPANY, CIVIL AFFAIRS FUNCTIONS SHOULD BE PASSED TO THAT COMPANY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENT BY MARINE CORPS TO ACCEPT ARMY COMPANY.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

OUTGOING

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MESSAGE

0-91019

4 DEC 65 02 12Z
HAS BEEN SENT

A859

SECURITY INFORMATION (PAGE 2 OF 3)

STANFORD/whs

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X

(Data from Group 1 (CCT))

FROM: CMC

TO:

INFO:

SECRET

CIVIC ACTION (U)

C. THERE REMAINS A REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IN WESTPAC FMF UNITS FOR CIVIC ACTION BILLETS TO BE FILLED BY MARINE PERSONNEL. THE RATIONALE FOR THIS REQUIREMENT FOLLOWS.

3. THE NECESSITY FOR THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MILITARY ACTION IN COMBINED POLITICAL-MILITARY OPERATIONS HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. EVENTS IN RVN HAVE VERIFIED THE REQUIREMENT FOR SIMILAR INTEGRATION AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL IN THE FIELD.

4. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING AND THE EXCELLENT RESULTS OBTAINED TO DATE BY THE III MAF CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM IT IS APPARENT THAT POSITIVE ACTION MUST BE INITIATED TO ENSURE CONTINUING MARINE CORPS IDENTIFICATION WITH THIS PROGRAM. ACCORDINGLY A FORMAL CIVIC ACTION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE APPEARS INDICATED FOR TWO BASIC REASONS. FIRST, TO IMPROVE AND REFINE III MAF CIVIC ACTION CAPABILITIES. SECOND, TO CLEARLY

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

OUTGOING

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MESSAGE

POWER

CWO

GOTTER

SEDER

C-81000

FORM 100-100-100 (Rev. 12-57)

COL STANFORD/whs

AO3E

4219

4-2489

X

(Data File Group) (000)

FROM: CMC

TO:

INFO:

SECRET

CIVIC ACTION (U)

DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN CIVIL AFFAIRS EXECUTED BY ARMY UNIT AND CIVIC ACTION EXECUTED BY MARINES.

5. ACCORDINGLY, THE [REDACTED] T/O FOR HQ III MAF [REDACTED] DEVELOPED BY THIS HQ INCLUDES A CIVIC ACTION SECTION OF 5 OFF AND 6 ENL. IN ADDITION TO STAFF REPRESENTATION FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS AT THE SENIOR HQ IN EACH ENCLAVE, THERE APPEARS TO BE A FURTHER REQUIREMENT FOR MARINE CIVIC ACTION OFFICERS ASSIGNED ON A PRIMARY DUTY BASIS AT BLT, RLT, DIV AND APPROPRIATE AVIATION UNITS IN WESTPAC FMF UNITS.

6. YOUR VIEWS, PARTICULARLY AS TO NUMBERS/RANKS/BILLETS TO ~~SATISFY~~ ^{SATISFY} THIS REQUIREMENT ARE SOLICITED.

GP-4

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

OUTGOING

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MESSAGE

ROUTER	CWO	CUTTER	SENDER

U-88119

(When filled in)

SECRET

A. CREATION OF SEPARATE STAFF SECTIONS AT ALL ECHELONS OF COMMAND IS NOT CONSIDERED NECESSARY. CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION OFFICERS, AS APPROPRIATE, CAN BE INCLUDED IN EXECUTIVE STAFF SECTIONS AT BATTALION AND REGIMENT LEVEL WITHOUT SACRIFICING EFFECTIVENESS.

B. CONSIDER IT UNNECESSARY TO PROVIDE PRIMARY DUTY CIVIC ACTION OFFICERS FOR COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS. THE CIVIC ACTION OPPORTUNITIES AFFORDED THESE UNITS IS RECOGNIZED. HOWEVER, THEIR EFFORTS CAN, AND SHOULD, BE COORDINATED BY THE SENIOR COMMAND IN REAR AREAS AND BY THE TACTICAL COMMANDER IN OUTLIER AREAS. FURTHERMORE, CONSIDER THAT COORDINATION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS IN AVIATION UNITS BELOW WING LEVEL DOES NOT REQUIRE AUGMENTATION.

C. REGION DEVELOPMENTS DICTATE THAT EASTPAC AND SMD PAC UNITS
BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING OVERALL REQUIREMENTS.

D. WHILE REF A DID NOT SPECIFICALLY REQUEST COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING ENLISTED PERSONNEL, APPROPRIATE ENLISTED STAFFING IS REQUIRED IF THE COMPLETE CAPABILITY IS TO BE PROVIDED.

E. ADDITION OF ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS UNIT IN MAY 1966 WILL PROVIDE
OF III MAF WITH AN ADDED CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY.

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PAGE 3. BUILDUP WILL BE DONE IN THE
HOWEVER, REQUIREMENT FOR MARINE CORPS STAFF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS
AT APPROPRIATE LEVELS OF COMMAND WILL REMAIN. STAFF CAN BE
EXPECTED TO EXERCISE STAFF COGNIZANCE OVER ARMY UNIT AND CONDUCT
NECESSARY CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION PLANNING.

2. THIS BUREAU CURRENTLY MONITORS THE CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM IN
DATA AND ACTIVITY ALDATE AND OFFICERS ROUTE LINE AND

TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF WHAT IS CLEARLY AN EVER GROWING PROGRAM,
AN INCREASE IN TRAINING LEVEL AS SET IN PARAG 3 BELOW IS REQUIRED.

2. BASED ON THE FOREGOING, RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION. READ IN FIVE COLUMNS - BILLET, RANK, MOS, OFFICER, ENLISTED:

4. MOBILE PUFFBAG - ADDED TO G-1 SECTION

CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION OFFICER

ASST CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION OFFICER

ALM 13 00AM

3-60529

LTCOL 0197 1

MAJ 99 10 1

SGT 0141

0-171

CA 0141

22

TOTAL

B. III WAF - SPECIAL STAFF SECTION

CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION OFFICER

COL. 9996

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SECRET

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SECRET

72021000101010273 PH0660VV KMC249
 RR: RUCEN
 DE RANLEY 919 0330440
 ZNY 080000
 R 080000Z

FM CO RUEPAC
 TO RUEEN/CNC
 INFO RUHNN/CSS JII NAF
 RUHNL/ON FIRST MANDIV
 RUHNN/ON THIRD MANDIV
 RUHNN/ON FIRST NAF
 RUHNN/ON FIRST MANDIV (CRAD)
 RUHNN/ON FIRST MANDIV

BT
 CIVIC ACTION, SECTION 1 OF 2

- A. CMC 030207Z (S) NOTAL
- B. CMC 110 AGO-NGO OF 2000000 NOTAL
- C. CMC 030207Z (S) NOTAL
- D. BY 030207Z OCT (S) NOTAL
- E. BY 030207Z NOV (S) NOTAL

1. CONCUR IN THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN REF A TO INCREASE THE
 MANNING LEVEL OF RUEPAC FORCES TO PROVIDE CIVIC ACTION PERSONNEL
 ON A WEEKLY BATTLE BASIS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

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SECRET

1/2

ACT
~~ACT No 3~~
 INFO
 D
 AD

03021000101010273
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ASST CIVIC ACTION OFFICER
 ASST CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER
 ASST CIVIC ACTION OFFICER
 SECTION CHIEF
 CIVIL AFFAIRS NCO
 ASST CIVIL AFFAIRS NCO
 ASST CIVIC ACTION NCO
 ADMIN NCO

LTJG 9910 1
 MAJ 0107 1
 CAPT 9910 2
 GYSGT 0141 1
 GYSGT 0121 1
 SGT 0121 1
 SGT 0121 1
 LCPL 0141 1

TOTAL

5 6

C. EACH DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (2) - SPECIAL
 CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION OFFICER
 ASST CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION OFF.
 ASST CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION OFF.
 ADMINISTRATIVE CHIEF
 CIVIC ACTION NCO
 CIVIL AFFAIRS NCO
 ADMIN NCO/DRIVER

STAFF SECTION
 LTCOL 0107 1
 MAJOR 9910 1
 CAPT 0107 1
 SSGT 0141 1
 CPL 0141 1
 CPL 0121 1
 PFC 0141 1

TOTAL

3 4

D. HQRS FIRST MAW - SPECIAL STAFF SECTION
 CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION OFFICER

MAJ 0107 1

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ASST CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION OFFICER
 ADMINISTRATIVE CHIEF
 CIVIC ACTION NCO
 CIVIL AFFAIRS NCO
 ADMIN MAW/DRIVER

CAPT 0107 1
 SSGT 0141 1
 CPL 0141 1
 CPL 0121 1
 PFC 0141 1

TOTAL

2 1

E. EACH INFANTRY REGIMENT - FMFPAC (6) - ADD TO EXECUTIVE STAFF
 CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION OFFICER
 CIVIC ACTION NCO

CAPT 0107 1
 CPL 0141 1

TOTAL

1 1

F. EACH INFANTRY BATTALION, (10) - ADD TO EXECUTIVE STAFF
 CIVIC ACTION OFFICER

LT 0302 1

G. RANK/MOS SUMMARY
 (1) OFFICERS

MOS	COL	LTCOL	MAJOR	CAPT	LT	TOTAL
0107		3	2	9		14
0302					18	18
9900	1					1
9910		1	3	2		6
TOTAL	1	4	5	11	18	39

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