OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

'emorandum

AI UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

SUBJECT: Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned

Ref:

(a) HQBul 3000 of 8 Oct 1965; same subjact

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10

<u>Item</u>: That intelligence information received from higher echelons is frequently received too late to be effective.

Discussion: Paras 807.d and 807.d of LFM-3 are quoted for information: "The PIR... is a summation of the enemy situation at the end of a given period, and of the intelligence produced during that time... it is normally issued daily by division, wings, and amphibious corps (i.e. MEF's)... Distribution should extend to squadrons and battalions as a minimum... Usually the period 1800 to 1800 is established in order that current detailed intelligence will be available to all commanders in time to facilitate planning for the following days operations."

"The...ISUM is a brief report of enemy activities during a prescribed period, usually every 6 hours during combat operations...It is normally issued by regiments, and higher, and immediately adjacent commands. It is prepared in dispatch (message) form and disseminated by radio, or radio relay/teletype... an ISUM should include a statement of the period covered and of such of the following as are applicable...(2) New identifications of enemy units...(4) Pecularities and weaknesses of the enemy forces...(5) Enemy capabilities." (Italics supplies)

While it is true that the PIR and ISUM constitute largely "historical" information, these two reports become the basis of tomorrow's collection plan, the intelligence estimate for tomorrow's activities, and most importantly, the means by which new intelligence or information may be correlated. These reports, then, if not issued in timely and accurate manner, become meaningless to the commander. There are many other means of acquiring intelligence—interrogation of PW's, refugees, patrol reports, aerial photography reports, etc., in order to support tactical planning, but these must be used in conjunction with and not in lieu of the PIR and ISUM if a realistic up-date of the intelligence data base and estimate is to be accomplished.

The specific problem, of improving the dissemination of these reports is a local one. Local commanders should take steps to improve their courier service to lower commands in the case of written reports, and communications in the case of electronically transmitted messages. The item in the basic correspondence concurs comments in post exercise reports (Silver Lance/Steel Pike) for the need of an intelligence net.

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Recommendation: That the re-establishment of a Division/Wing/MEF intelligence net as a matter of doctrine be considered.

Action required: That G-3 and G-4 develop communication plans obtained necessary communication equipment to establish an intelligence net.

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<u>Item</u>: That a requirement exists for a Polaroid type camera in the S-2 section of the Marine Infantry Battalion.

Discussion: The Marine Corps recognizes the requirement for a light, hand-held camera for ground use. NIKONOS 35mm cameras are presently being field tested to determine if they will meet Marine Corps requirements for a small format ground hand-held camera for use by infantry, reconnaissance, aviation and counterintelligence personnel. Also, contracts have been let to provide small lightweight processing/printing/seviewing equipment which should provide an immediate photographic intelligence response at battalion level. Such techinques as Polaroid are being considered by MCLFDA in connection with this project.

Recommendation: Delay purchase of a camera pending results of the field testing of the NIKONOS 35mm and receipt of tests reports by MCLFDA on the Polaroid cameras.

Action Required: None

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Item: That continual screening, effective distribution and maximum utilization of interpreters and translators at infantry battalion level is essential to successful counterinsurgency operations.

Discussion: History has proved that success in anti-guerrilla campaigns and civic action programs is clearly expedited by the ability to communicate with the natives, i.e., Vietnamese. This is especially necessary for the collection of intelligence. The ideal situation would be to have the Force saturated with Vietnamese-speaking Marines, in all commands and through all echelons. While this ideal cannot be met in any reasonable time-frame, a maximum effort is being made to train a greater number of Marines not only in the language, but in interrogation techniques as will. The employment of proficient indigenous interpreters provides a limited alternative to training Marines in the language. However, great care must be taken in screening such personnel due to the fact that the loyalty of any Vietnamese may be subject to question, and no assurance can be made that the interrogator is in fact asking the desired questions and/or giving the correct answers. The problem of linguistics works both ways. The native interpreter must have a sound knowledge of English to provide an accurate translation. The numbers of these types of interpreters are undoubtedly limited.

Recommendation: Continue to use indigenous interpretors at battalion to the maximum extent possible to augment Marine interpreters and translators.

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<u>Item</u>: That a requirement exists for the creation on implementation of a means to provide monetary compensation for intelligence information provided by indigenous personnel.

Discussion: Action has been completed on this item. Funds have been made available at the small unit level by CG, III MAF. Detailed information on the availability and accountability of funds has been received from III MAF.

Action Required: None

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