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HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS ROUTING SHEET

SA NO. 007035165 #2

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COMMANDANT ASSISTANT COMMANDANT MILITARY SECY TO CMC CHIEF OF STAFF DG/P (PLANS/PROGRAMS) DC/S (RD&S) DC/S (AIR) SECY OF GEN STAFF (C) G-1 G-2 G-3 G-4 ADMINISTRATIVE MCC FISCAL INFORMATION PERSONNEL POLICY ANALYSIS RESERVE SUPPLY SEC FILES JOINT PLANNING GROUP JOINT CONTROL DG/H <i>op to Air-ops Admin</i>					
RECORD OF DISCLOSURE ALL PERSONS WHO HANDLE THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT, SIGN AND DATE IN NUMERICAL ORDER BELOW					
DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME	12/17 1 <i>R. Reed</i> 11 <i>R. Reed</i> 2 <i>Miller</i> 12 20 <i>Conrad</i> 13 21 <i>W. Monroe</i> 14 12/18 <i>For</i> 15 12/19 <i>Adams</i> 16 12/20 <i>Thompson</i> 17 12/21 <i>Farbman</i> 18 12/22 <i>Conrad</i> 19 12/23 <i>Reed</i> 20	
REMARKS (Entries to be dated and signed)					
ACTION: <i>Refile to Commandant</i>					
<i>On Dec 17, 1965, report to</i> SENSITIVE MATERIAL FOR MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY					
For additional remarks attach plain paper ROUTING - Use numbers to show order of routing OPERATION CODE X - ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE A - FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION B - FOR COMPLIANCE C - PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE D - FOR COMMENT E - FOR RECOMMENDATION F - FOR CONCURRENCE G - FOR INFORMATION H - RETURN TO I - INITIAL FOR FILE <i>W. Monroe</i>					
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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

25 Jan 1966

From: Secretary of The General Staff

To: Distribution List

1. The attached comments and proposed actions have been reviewed and approved by the Chief of Staff.

2. The Chief of Staff desires that necessary follow up action be taken where appropriate.

Respectfully,

Webster

G. D. WEBSTER

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actions &
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lly,

AN
AN, JR.

DISTRIBUTION:
DC/S (P&P)
DC/S (Air)
AC/S, G-1
AC/S, G-2
AC/S, G-3
AC/S, G-4

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Orange Tab 7.....

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Note a

* Indicates assignment as- COORDINATOR FOR
OVERALL ACTION /

22 Dec 1965

FROM: SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF

For: Distribution List

1. The Chief of Staff desires that the attached Trip Report to WestPac (Joint Coordinator, Office of DC/S, P&P) be referred to you as a matter under your staff cognizance for information and/or appropriate action.
2. Where action is required, or explanation desirable, the Chief of Staff desires that you make, by 14 Jan 66, a report of action taken or contemplated and appropriate comments (on the items as indicated on the attached Index Sheet) using the attached format guide in preparing your reply (a separate report is desired for each item, original and one copy).

Very respectfully,


G. D. WEBSTER

Distribution:

- DC/S (P&P)
- DC/S (AIR)
- ACoFS, G-1
- ACoFS, G-3
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7. Blue Tab G - Memo of Agreement between CG, 2d AirDiv and CG, 1st MAW

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mail to appropriate
staff for comment/rec/
action -

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~~SENSITIVE MATERIAL~~

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21 Feb 1979

J. L. Shaw Signature Date 14 Mar 29

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AC/S, G-3

6 January 1966

SUBJECT: WESTPAC trips by HQMC representatives.

REFERENCE: Page 2, paragraph 5 of basic report.

SUMMARY OF ITEM: The report recommends that CMC continue to send a staff officer from HQMC with each trip CG FMFPAC makes.

COMMENTS:

a. It is considered that the substance of the information obtained from this trip, as well as achievement of equivalent action on extant problem areas can normally be achieved through the currently programmed bimonthly HQMC staff visits.

b. Nevertheless, problems amenable to resolution through personal liaison will occur at other times. Should CG FMFPAC be scheduled to visit WESTPAC at these times, the opportunity to expedite problem resolution by arranging for the appropriate HQMC staff officer to accompany CG FMFPAC should not be ignored.

RECOMMENDATION: That arrangements be made with CG FMFPAC for a HQMC action officer to accompany him on his WESTPAC trips on an as required basis.

ACTION REQUIRED: Preparation of letter to CG FMFPAC.

ACTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY: AC/S, G-3.


E. J. ROUSE
By direction

SECRET

SECRET

6 January 1966

JOINT PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT: MACV Staff

REFERENCE: Orange Tab 1 to Col Roy L. REED's Trip Report of 22Dec65

SUMMARY OF PROBLEM/ITEM REPORTED:

1. MACV staff is oversize, geographically fractured, growing and lacks effective staff coordination.
2. HQMC must make a decision concerning those billets in JTD that should be filled by Marines.

COMMENTS:

1. The following are current and MACV proposed strengths for Hq MACV:

	<u>CURRENT JTD</u>	<u>MACV PROPOSED</u> <u>(15Nov65)</u>
Off	722	1,110
Enl	951	1,319
Civ	5	10
(USMC Off)	(31)	(75)
(USMC Enl)	(35)	(53)
TOTAL	1,678	2,439

2. As indicated above, the Hq MACV staff is ponderous and escalation continues. (For comparison, the HQMC staff strength is 1,137 military and 1,084 civilians.) No comment has been received from CINCPAC on the 15 November MACV proposal. This recommendation will be reviewed by the Joint Staff and Services prior to approval.

3. There is a requirement that HQMC formulate a position on billets we desire to fill on this Joint Staff to insure the most effective Marine Corps participation.

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SECRET

6 January 1966

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That upon Joint Staff/Service review of the 15 November 1965 proposal by MACV the Marine Corps planning officers conduct a critical review of current and proposed strengths.
2. That MACV JTD staffing objectives be developed within this Headquarters to insure coordinated effort to place Marine officers in those billets which will provide most effective Marine Corps representation.

ACTION REQUIRED:

1. A critical review by the Marine Corps action/planning officer of the MACV proposal with appropriate recommendations to CMC.
2. Development of a staffing objectives list for Hq MACV.

ACTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY:

1. Review of JTD - G-1.
2. Staffing objectives - G-1/JPG.



C. S. ROBERTSON
Head, Eastern Regional Team
Joint Planning Group

STAFF COORDINATION:AC/S, G-1

Concur

APPROVED: Cgy**SECRET**

SECRET

11 January 1966

JOINT PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT: JTOC/COC

REFERENCE: Blue Tab A, Orange Tab ² ~~4~~, Trip Report to WESTPAC,
dated 22Dec65SUMMARY OF PROBLEM/ITEM REPORTED:

An informational breakdown of progress in the development of MACV's COC.

COMMENTS:

A useful addendum to other information received.

ACTION REQUIRED:

No action is required by this item. The whole subject of COC operations will, of course, continue to be monitored by cognizant agencies of this headquarters.


C. S. ROBERTSON
Head, Eastern Regional Team
Joint Planning GroupSTAFF COORDINATION:DC/S (Air)

CONCUR

AC/S, G-3

CONCUR

APPROVED: 
SUBJECT

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ITEM 3 DPP
REPORT OF
INVESTIGATIVE

INVESTIGATIVE REPORT OF
ITEM 3

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SECRET

11 January 1966

JOINT PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT: III MAF HEADQUARTERS

REFERENCE: Blue Tab A, Orange Tab 4, Trip Report to WESTPAC
dated 22Dec65SUMMARY OF PROBLEM/ITEM REPORTED:

CG, III MAF should be a separate billet filled by a three star officer. This might cause some difficulty with US and RVN staffs. We are overstaffed at the colonel level. III MAF staff is split as to advisability of holding the NCC billet.

COMMENTS:

1. T/O 4931 has been approved. This T/O upgrades CG, III MAF to LtGen rank. When and if the LtGen billet is approved this will automatically upgrade the NCC to three star rank and separate him from the division/wing commands.
2. No difficulty with US staffs is anticipated. General Thi (The I Corps Commander) has been redesignated a LtGen, consequently, anticipate no difficulty here.
3. As of 1Jan66, the strength of colonels on board in III MAF was within two of those authorized. On board strengths are based on approved T/Os.
4. The NCC billet and a T/O for a separate NCC staff are subjects of separate staff action.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN:

None required.

C. S. Robertson
C. S. ROBERTSON
Head, Eastern Regional Team
Joint Planning Group

STAFF COORDINATION:AC/S, G-1

CONCUR

AC/S, G-3

CONCUR

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AC/S, G-3

6 January 1966

SUBJECT: III MAF Headquarters.

REFERENCE: Enclosure (4).

SUMMARY OF PROBLEM: Adequacy of the III MAF staff.

COMMENT: The recently approved III MAF tables of organization provides two general officers who should more than adequately be able to cover the assignments after the Division Commander's responsibilities are split off. This T/O provided for a lieutenant general as CG, who will function as Naval Component Commander, as an additional duty, with a brigadier general as Chief of Staff.

RECOMMENDATION: None.



E. J. HOWSE
By direction

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TOP SECRET

12 January 1966

FROM: JOINT PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT: Field Force Command (FFC)

REFERENCE: Blue Tab A, Orange Tab 5, Trip Report of 22Dec65

SUMMARY OF PROBLEM:

There is considerable concern that Army officers in RVN and in higher echelons may push for the establishment of a Field Force Headquarters which would command all US/Third Country ground forces in RVN. This would have the effect of splitting the air and ground components of III MAF, with the ground component being under the Field Force Headquarters and the air component being under the 2nd Air Division. This latter situation could be expected to receive US Air Force support.

COMMENTS:

1. On 14 May 1965, the JCS informed CINCPAC that SecDef had approved the establishment of a combined field force headquarters under the present Deputy COMUSMACV at such time as the US IX Corps Headquarters is deployed to RVN. This headquarters would exercise operational control over all US, Allied, and assigned ARVN ground forces in the northern combat zone. CINCPAC was directed to plan for the activation of this headquarters.

2. On 16 June 1965, CINCPAC stated that a US Field Force should be built around the nucleus of a tailored US Army Corps Headquarters when two or more US divisions are deployed to RVN. This headquarters would assume operational control of US Army and US Marine Corps ground forces in the Northern Combat Zone. In view of the joint nature of the ground operations and the need for close air support, staff composition would include Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force representatives.

3. On 24 June 1965, the JCS informed CINCPAC that his concept for a field force headquarters was noted and would be

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considered when the subject is addressed by the JCS. Further, CINCPAC was directed to proceed with planning the organization of a joint US field force headquarters, and continue the detailed plans now in preparation for activation of a combined field force headquarters.

4. In September 1965, the US Army deployed a corps headquarters to Nha Trang. This headquarters was designated as "Field Force, Vietnam" and assumed operational control over US and ROK forces in II CTZ.

5. Current CINCPAC requirements include the deployment of an US Army corps headquarters to Bien Hoa as a field force headquarters. Presumably, this headquarters will assume operational control of the 3 US divisions, 173rd ABN Bde, and ANZAC Bns, which will be operating in III CTZ.

6. III MAF will be elevated to a corps level during the same time frame. Therefore, since each of the three northern CTZ will be occupied by a US Corps, it would appear that any subsequent discussions regarding an overall field force command will also include a field army headquarters.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN:

Continue to monitor the situation closely and, if the subject is raised again, argue that the US structure should parallel the RVNAF; that is, MACV with the RVN JGS and a US corps headquarters with each ARVN corps headquarters.

ACTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY: ADC/S (Plans)

C. S. Robertson
C. S. ROBERTSON
Head, Eastern Regional Team
Joint Planning Group

STAFF COORDINATION: None

APPROVED: CPY

M P R
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6 Dec 1961

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AAP-1-gjb
12 JAN 1966

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (AIR)

SUBJECT: Air Component/2d Air Division

REFERENCE: Paragraph 1, Miscellaneous Subjects to Trip Report to WestPac of Joint Coordinator, DCS (P&P).

SUMMARY OF ITEM REPORTED: 2d Air Division staff handles numerous actions relative to air operations that should be accomplished by the MACV staff.

COMMENTS: The establishment within the COC of a J-3, Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) will provide the MACV staff the capability to function as a type of Field Army G-3 section and to make decisions and take actions on air support requirements which are not within the capability or the responsibility of the Air Force Component Commander. See Orange TAB 2.

RECOMMENDATIONS: No action required at this time.
A. J. ARMSTRONG
By directionSTAFF COORDINATION

Plans and Programs

CONCUR/NONCONCUR


INITIALS**SECRET**

SECRETATA14-jrg
10 January 1966

JOINT PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT: The Worth of the B-52 Effort

REFERENCE: Paragraph 2, Orange Tab 7, of Trip Report to
WESTPAC, dated 22Dec65**SUMMARY OF PROBLEM REPORTED:**

The report indicated that the worth of the B-52 effort is a subject of disagreement among the Marines - the split being about 50-50. General Krulak is for the strikes, and believes that as time goes by and the intelligence improves they will be much more effective.

COMMENTS:

1. Under present conditions, the military worth of the B-52 strikes cannot be evaluated. The VC continue to control areas in SVN which are used to mount attacks against friendly and US forces and which serve as command/logistics support bases for the VC. The objective of the B-52 strikes is to assist COMUSMACV in the defeat of the VC in SVN through maximum disruption of the VC support facilities and personnel within the target areas. MACV considers it essential that we maintain steady pressure and constant harassment of the VC base areas, since intelligence reports are indicating that the VC fear air attack and their plans are often upset by unexpected bombings.

2. COMUSMACV is in the best position to determine the need for specific strikes. He has established procedures for nominating, reviewing, and approving Arc Light targets. His approved programs are briefed to ARVN high command for their concurrence and to AmEmb, Saigon, who indorses program prior to forwarding to CINCPAC and JCS. In each case, these briefings present all known intelligence; RDF, infra-red, photo coverage (when available), and the latest knowledge from the units in the field. COMUSMACV has pointed out that targets

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SECRETATA14-jrg
10 January 1966

are in VC stronghold areas, which are often in mangrove swamps and under two and three canopies of jungle. The kind of intelligence available and the nature of the terrain make it difficult, if not impossible, to identify precise point targets for fighter-bomber attacks, and area coverage is required in order to increase the probability of target destruction. Ground exploitation is accomplished whenever conditions permit.

3. COMUSMACV continues to improve his intelligence base in these areas. Priority is given to targets having good intelligence and no targets are recommended without supporting intelligence. Plans have to be modified from time to time, and sometimes on short notice, because of new intelligence and VC initiatives requiring the diversion of troops. COMUSMACV continues to review and approve personally all targets requested for Arc Light strikes.

4. GVN has completely concurred in the B-52 program and has contributed many of the forces to the follow-up operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That, in view of the extensive study of each Arc Light target prior to its nomination for execution approval and of SAC's proven ability to strike targets with accuracy, the Arc Light program continue to be supported.

2. That any expansion of the Arc Light program be contingent upon a careful analysis of supporting intelligence to insure that strikes are on confirmed targets, and that potentially scarce munitions are not wasted.

ACTION REQUIRED:

Continue to indicate support of the Arc Light program in the JCS arena.

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ATA14-jrg
10 January 1966

ACTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY:

G-2 and JPG.

C. S. Robertson
C. S. ROBERTSON
Head, Eastern Regional Team
Joint Planning Group

STAFF COORDINATION:

G-2

Concur

S

APPROVED: C. S. Robertson

SECRET

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12 January 1966

FROM: JOINT PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT: Navy Mobile Construction Battalions

REFERENCE: Blue Tab A, Orange Tab 7, paragraph 5, Trip Report
of 22Dec65SUMMARY OF ITEM/PROBLEM:

CG, FMFPAC will propose a 15-20% increase in the in-country NMBC (4), and request 4 additional NMBC, at the same strengths, to be deployed to RVN.

COMMENTS:

1. There are currently 4 NMBC in I Corps Tactical Zone, with an average strength of about 584 each.

2. On 16 December 1965, CINCPAC stated a requirement for 6 additional NMBC to be deployed to I Corps Tactical Zone, with a strength of 712 each. He further requested that each of the in-country NMBC be augmented by 128 additional personnel.

3. The U.S. Navy currently has 10 NMBC, and is in the process of activating 4 more. With a total of 14 NMBC, the Navy states that only 8 can be supported in RVN, with the remaining 6 being located in CONUS as the training/rotation base.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN:

At the Honolulu Conference to be held 17-31 January 1966 representatives of the Joint Planning Group will support the U.S. Navy position to deploy 4 additional NMBC to RVN and to augment the current in-country NMBC.

ACTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY: ADC/S(Plans)

C. S. Robertson
C. S. ROBERTSON
Head, Eastern Regional Team
Joint Planning Group

STAFF COORDINATION:

AC/S, G-3

Concur/Nonconcur

AC/S, G-4

Concur/Nonconcur

APPROVED: *2nd Lt. [Signature]*~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

7 January 1966

JOINT PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT: Requirements for 10 VMF/VMA Squadrons in SVN

REFERENCE: Paragraph 6, Orange Tab 7, of Trip Report to WESTPAC,
dated 22Dec65SUMMARY OF PROBLEM/ITEM REPORTED:

General Krulak states that his requirements for in-country VMF/VMA squadrons stand at 10 squadrons, regardless of a compromise reached elsewhere. Stated he felt he could justify them and would continue to do so.

COMMENTS:

1. At the Phase II conference in October 1965, COMUSMACV recommended the use of 10 VMF/VMA squadrons. CINCPAC reduced this number to 8, based on reasoning that sortie rate/Bn did not justify 10 squadrons. The JCS went along with the 8 squadrons, but noted that the decision on number of squadrons was a matter for further study.

2. At the MACV Phase IIA conference on 9 December 1965, the requirement for 8 VMF/VMA squadrons was given, and it was noted that the use of a 9th squadron was under consideration.

3. In CINCPAC's CY 1966 Force Requirements letter of 16 December 1965, it was determined that 10 VMF/VMA squadrons would be required in-country.

4. CMC is supporting CINCPAC and FMFPAC on the requirement for 10 VMF/VMA squadrons in-country, although this is considered maximum available without new activations. Exact determination of force requirements is to be made at the CINCPAC conference to be held the latter part of January 1966.

RECOMMENDATION:

That requirement for 10 VMF/VMA squadrons in-country continue to be supported.

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6 January 1966

ACTION REQUIRED:

HQMC and FMFPAC representatives reaffirm requirement and support for 10 VMF/VMA squadrons in-country at the CINCPAC conference on force requirements in January 1966.

ACTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY:

DC/S (Air) and JPG.



C. S. ROBERTSON
Head, Eastern Regional Team
Joint Planning Group

STAFF COORDINATION:DC/S (Air)

Concur

WSAPPROVED: CJR**SECRET**

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AAP-1-gjb
12 Jan 1966

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (AIR)

SUBJECT: Viet Cong 50 Caliber MG

REFERENCE: Paragraph 7, Miscellaneous Subjects to Trip Report to
WestPac of Joint Coordinator, DCS (P&P)

SUMMARY OF ITEM REPORTED: There is serious concern in III MAF and FMFPac quarters that the appearance of 50 caliber MG will create serious problems to our helicopter operations and will require additional A4 support.

COMMENTS: It is agreed that the appearance of a more effective VC anti-aircraft weapon will require positive counter-measures, including increased helicopter escort requirements. This is directly related to the requirement for 10 VF/VA squadrons which is reflected in current planning in DCS (Air).

RECOMMENDATIONS: No action required at this time.


J. ARMSTRONG
By direction

STAFF COORDINATION

Plans and Programs

CONCUR/NONCONCUR


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AAP-1-gjb
12 Jan 1966

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (AIR)

SUBJECT: Armed Huey (UH-1E)

REFERENCE: Paragraph 8, Miscellaneous Subjects to Trip Report to WestPac of Joint Coordinator, DCS (P&P)

SUMMARY OF ITEM REPORTED: General KRULAK believes that we are using the UH-1E as the Army is doing in landing zone preparation and that this is wrong.COMMENTS:

a. It is fully agreed that the UH-1E should not normally be employed in preparation of landing zones, but that the F4s and A4s be employed in this role. These are current tactics of the 1stMAW.

b. CG, FMFPac 250345Z Nov 65 states: "It is the policy of III MAF to provide fixed-wing escort and to prepare for all elements going to unsecured LZ. Armed UH-1Es are valuable supplement to fixed-wing providing suppressive fire while troops are debarking and moving from LZ. Armed helo cannot be considered a substitute for fixed-wing support because of their limited firepower and vulnerability to small arms fire."

c. Earlier III MAF messages have also described helicopter escort tactics which are being employed and continually refined by the 1stMAW.

RECOMMENDATIONS: No further action required.

A. J. Armstrong
A. J. ARMSTRONG
By direction

STAFF COORDINATION

Plans and Programs

CONCUR/NONCONCUR

CJR
INITIALS**SECRET**

SECRET

6 January 1966

JOINT PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT: Army/Marine Tactics

REFERENCE: Orange Tab 7 miscellaneous subjects, page 2 item 9,
Col Roy L. REED's Trip Report of 22Dec65SUMMARY OF PROBLEM/ITEM REPORTED:

1. General Krulak desires that his views be made known that:
 - a. It is difficult to expect an 18-20 year old Marine to be a tiger one minute and an ambassador the next.
 - b. The Marines have a balanced (tactical) approach but the Army has not yet faced up to their civic action responsibilities.
 - c. General Westmoreland and DePuy are "scared" by the VC tenacity when faced with US troops and that their desires for the troop increases stems from this reaction.

COMMENTS:

1. The Marines appear to be functioning very effectively in both tiger and ambassador roles even though the transition is very difficult.
2. The Marine Corps "balanced approach" has been emphasized by CMC and the Marine Corps briefing officers in JCS presentations.
3. No comment.

RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

C. S. Robertson
 C. S. ROBERTSON
 Head, Eastern Regional Team
 Joint Planning Group

STAFF COORDINATION:

G-3 Concur/None MS
 INITIALS

Approved: CJS**SECRET**

SECRET

SECRET

AAP-1-gjb
12 JAN 1966

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (AIR)

SUBJECT: Close Air Support (CAS) Definition

REFERENCE: Paragraph 10, Miscellaneous Subjects to Trip Report to WestPac of
Joint Coordinator, DCS (P&P)

SUMMARY OF ITEM REPORTED: For their own purposes, the 2d Air Division does not use the JCS approved definition of CAS. Their approach consists of two parts: the use of FAC or FAC(A) and instantaneous fuzing of the ordnance. The requirement for troops to be supported or even in the area is disregarded.

COMMENTS: The Marine Corps is generally aware of the 2d Air Division Policy and will use this information to advantage in working JCS papers related to sortie classification and CAS requirements. In this regards, LtCol W. DEEDS from JPG is currently on a trip to WestPac with a study group that is working on command and control problems (JCS 1800/698-26, Support of World-Wide Standardization Efforts in Tactical Command and Control Procedures, Terms and Titles.)


RECOMMENDATIONS: No action required at this time.


A. J. ARMSTRONG
By direction

STAFF COORDINATION

Plans and Programs

CONCUR/NONCONCUR



INITIALS

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AAP-1-gjb
12 Jan 1966

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (AIR)

SUBJECT: HMM-363

REFERENCE: Paragraph 11, Miscellaneous Subjects to Trip Report to WestPac of Joint Coordinator, DCS (P&P)

SUMMARY OF ITEM REPORTED: Army Aviation Companies have been in country for 2-3 months and are not yet operational and additional companies due in December are not expected to be operational. At the same time, HMM 363 has been requested by FFV to remain in support of the ROK and RVN forces at Qui Nhon until April 1966.

COMMENTS: This appears to be an operational decision to be made by the Commander on the scene and responsible for over-all operations. If III MAF is in dire need of the capability provided by this squadron, it would appear prudent for him to take the matter to COMUSMACV.

RECOMMENDATIONS: No action required.


A. J. ARMSTRONG
By directionSTAFF COORDINATION

Plans and Programs

CONCUR/NONCONCUR


INITIALS**SECRET**

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AAP-1-gjb
12 Jan 1966

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (AIR)

SUBJECT: F4 Loss in NVN

REFERENCE: Paragraph 12, Miscellaneous Subjects to Trip Report to
WestPac of Joint Coordinator, DCS (P&P)

SUMMARY OF ITEMS REPORTED: An F4 was recently lost in NVN while escorting an EF10B. General Moore questioned the authorization of the aircraft being in NVN. His staff denied fragging the mission, but when evidence showed otherwise, the issue was dropped.

COMMENTS: NoneRECOMMENDATIONS: None required.
A. J. ARMSTRONG
By directionSTAFF COORDINATION

Plans and Programs

CONCUR NON CONCUR
INITIALS**SECRET**

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AC/S, G-3

6 January 1966

SUBJECT: Visitors to RVN.REFERENCE: Enclosure (7), page 4, paragraph 13.SUMMARY OF ITEM: It is noted that visitors to WESTPAC are creating problems.COMMENT:

a. It is considered that the CMC austere HQMC staff visit program is organized and conducted with least interference. It is further noted that the basic report states that General Krulak feels it useful to have HQMC staff officers visit RVN.

b. The efficacy of the current program, however, can be increased by a discerning selection of a few significant problem areas, most susceptible of solution by personal liaison, with the team composed of the most knowledgeable action officers in those areas.

Not necessary
L. F. CHAPMAN, Chief of Staff

RECOMMENDATION: None.
R. J. BOWSE
By direction

SECRET

11 January 1966

JOINT PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT: Keeping III MAF Informed

REFERENCE: Paragraph 14, Orange Tab 7, of Trip Report to
WESTPAC, dated 22Dec65SUMMARY OF PROBLEM REPORTED:

The trip report indicates that the Plans Officer of III MAF would be assisted in his dealings with COMUSMACV if he were notified whenever positions are changed with respect to Marine Forces.

COMMENTS:

1. Normally changes in force deployments to SVN emanate from recommendations of CG, FMFPac. The instance referred to was occasioned by astute forethought of ACoS, G-3, concerning Phase I Add-ons. The Army volunteered in a JCS meeting however, to furnish the Civil Affairs Co proposed as an add-on.

2. It is believed that in most cases CG, FMFPac will be in a better position to keep III MAF informed.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the matter of informing III MAF be left in the hands of CG, FMFPac.

That no further action be taken on this matter.


C. S. ROBERTSON
Head, Eastern Regional Team
Joint Planning Group


STAFF COORDINATION:

G-3

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AAP-1-gjb
12 Jan 1966

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (AIR)

SUBJECT: OV-10A

REFERENCE: Paragraph 15, Miscellaneous Subjects to Trip Report to WestPac of Joint Coordinator, DCS (P&P)

SUMMARY OF ITEM REPORTED: General KRULAK is still opposed to the OV-10A. He feels that:

- a. It duplicates the mission of attack aircraft and VMO type helos and may eventually cost us attack aircraft.
- b. We would be better off with O-1s or Piper Cubs than the OV-10A.
- c. OSD will note OV-10s performing limited CAS missions and decide we can do with fewer attack aircraft.

COMMENTS:

- a. This is consistent with General KRULAK's previously expressed position on this subject. CMC ltr 008G25065 of 13Sep65 to CG, FMFPac replied to previous comments of the latter.
- b. 1stMAW staff concurs with LARA program and wish they had LARA now.
- c. Our position continues to reflect the concept that LARA in the VMO is primarily an observation aircraft which has limited capability to attack fleeting soft targets. Additionally, LARA can increase the effectiveness of helicopter transport escort and protection and in this role fills a performance gap existent between the helicopter and jet aircraft. It complements rather than replaces the attack aircraft.

RECOMMENDATIONS: No further action required.


A. J. ARMSTRONG
By direction

STAFF COORDINATION
Plans and Programs

CONCUR/NONCONCUR

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TRIP REPORT

From: Joint Coordinator, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
(Plans and Programs)
To: Chief of Staff
Via: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs)

Subj: Trip Report to WestPac

Encl: (1) MACV Staff
(2) JTOC/COC
(3) NCC
(4) III MAF Headquarters
(5) Field Forces Command (FFC)
(6) Unit Rotation
(7) Miscellaneous Subjects

1. On 28 November 1965, I departed the Washington area for Camp Smith, Hawaii, to join the CG, FMFPAC for his trip to WestPac. During the trip the following places were visited:

FMFPAC Headquarters
MCAF Futeama
FMFPAC/I MAC (Forward)
1st Marine Division Headquarters
III MAF, Danang
MACV Headquarters, Saigon
MCAS, Iwakuni

2. The trip was very rapid. Because of this, I missed seeing a number of places that I wanted to visit, such as Chu Lai; and ~~missing~~ some individuals that I wanted to see, notably Colonel Williams in Saigon. I did see most of the key Marines on the MACV and III MAF staffs and completed my mission of absorbing all I could learn on the JTAC/COC and Command Relationships. Enclosures (1) through (7) cover the major points (Orange Tabs 1 through 7).

3. In addition to the above, I was able to pick up some interesting documents which I believe will assist the staff in future efforts. These are reflected at Blue Tabs B through G. Also attached is a copy of the presentation given to General Krulak at Camp Courtney by FMFPAC/ I MAC (Forward), 1st Marine Division, 3d FSR and Camp Butler.

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DATE 10-12-2018 BY 64165

4. In my opinion my trip was well worth the effort and was very educational for me. A great number of things and ideas were absorbed which cannot be put down in writing in a trip report, but which will be useful and useable during the coming phases of our staff efforts in the JCS arena. One has to see the operations in RVN before the problems and complexities can be fully appreciated, and I barely scratched the surface.

5. General Krulak indicated that he felt it was useful to have HQMC staff officers visit the RVN. He has some part of his staff in-country at all times. It is therefore recommended that we continue to send a staff officer from HQMC with each trip he makes. Additional background can be gained just by association with the problems his staff is attacking, and from hearing his viewpoints on the myriad subjects discussed along the way.

R. L. Reed
R. L. REED

M-3

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SECRET *MACV staff presently
separated, accurate
about 2300
to Reed! No*

AT-5-jrf

MACV STAFF

My overall impression of the MACV staff is one of amazement and concern. It is fantastically large, functionally complex and geographically fractured - this geographical separation coupled with an insecure telephone system imposes a very significant problem in staff coordination. The staff is tremendously large in size and continually reorganizing - ever upward. It was pointed out to me that it was larger in officer numbers than Eisenhower's staff for planning the Normandy landing and subsequently the land campaign in Europe.

The staff is torn apart by U. S. Service parochial viewpoints with the Air Force leading the fight for positive control of all air, the Army desire for a COMUSSEA and the Army/Air Force/Marine Corps doctrinal concepts problems.

The problems are of such significance that resolution seems almost an exercise in futility.

It is the common opinion of the Marines that I contacted that HQMC has to make a decision as to what we want in billets on the MACV staff. For instance, Colonel Sawyer occupies a key J-4 billet which adequately covers and protects Marine Corps interests - he is being relieved by Colonel Chase who, though fully qualified is relatively junior. Colonel Sawyer does not believe that he will be able to retain the billet due to relative seniority of the officers of the other Services.

Colonel Parry believes that one of the Lieutenant Colonel J-5 billets could be deleted and/or moved to the J-3. He further believes that all but one O6 billet in MACV SOG could be eliminated - that we are wasting personnel in that Group since it has never paid its way.

All the Marines feel the need for the immediate assignment of an O6 in the J-2. He should have a good background in intelligence if he is to be immediately useful.

General Krulak agrees with all of the above, but does not feel strongly about the J-5 billet.

Practically all Marines on the staff believe that we have a friend in General DePuy, the J-3, and really in General Westmoreland. For instance, General DePuy blocked his staffs recommendations to put the

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Enclosure (1)

AT-5-jrf

Marine RLT moving January/March in the II Corps area. In an open meeting he said, "No, III MAF needs the RLT to provide increased flexibility". Had the emergency alerted Marine BLTs been moved last November, they would have gone to Bhon Son which is just below the I CTZ.

There is a new rumor in the MACV staff that General DePuy will leave in February - if true we should go all out for the J-3 billet. General Krulak's order of priority is J-3/J-5/J-2. ✓

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JTOC/COC

The COC will be the hub of all air/ground planning if it actually functions under the concept envisioned. The COC is designed to coordinate and consolidate the capabilities of the entire MACV staff in the planning, coordination and supervision of Joint and Combined Operations at Theater level. The control element of the COC will deal directly with the major subordinate headquarters, and will speak with the authority of COMUSMACV. It will function directly under the Commander through the Chief of Staff, but under the supervisory authority of the J-3.

While the COC currently calls for coordination and control of only U. S. and third - country forces, the Joint Operations Division (RVNAF JGS) will serve as an advisor to the VN JGS in operational matters and provide the coordination link between all in-country forces.

From a Marine Corps point of view, the addition of a J-3 Air Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) is the most significant aspect of the COC concept. It represents a new capability within the MACV staff for coordination of tactical air support with ground operations. This addition will take back unto MACV decisions and actions concerning ground force air requirements which currently are made by General Moore and his 2d Air Division staff under his hat as MACV air component. We can expect the Air Force to fight against this element of the COC when reviewing the MACV proposed JTD which looks approximately as follows:

:	A	:	AF	:	N	:	MC	:	TOTAL
07	:	:	:	:	:	:	1	:	1
06	:	8	:	1	:	:	1	:	10
05	:	12	:	4	:	2	:	3	21
04	:	32	:	9	:	7	:	8	56
03	:	5	:	1	:	1	:	:	7
	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	
Total	:	57	:	15	:	10	:	13	95

General Krulak expressed the opinion that General Westmoreland recommended a Marine Brigadier General as the Head of the COC because it was the only course open to him. He really wanted an Army Brigadier General to head it up, but knew that he could never sell this to the other Services because of the predominance of Army already on the staff.

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WHITE CORPS EYES ONLY

Enclosure (2)

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AT-5-jrf

Further, he positively did not want an Air Force officer; therefore the Marine was the only solution left to him.

Currently Colonel Parry is organizing and shaking down the COC with the personnel currently available to him. CG, FMFPAC is providing two 05's and two 04's TDY until they can be replaced by permanently assigned personnel. Colonel Parry is enthusiastic over the possibilities of Marine Corps influence that can be exercised through the COC.

The desirability of a Ground versus Air Marine Brigadier General to head the COC was discussed. Colonel Parry insisted that it had to be a Ground general rather than Air. His reasoning is that if an NA were nominated the Army (J-3) would not allow him to really control ground plans and operations; and that General Moore would ensure that he had little to say about air operations.

In discussing this subject with General Kruak, he immediately had his hackles up, but after thinking about it for a while, he tended to agree.

He further declared that the most important aspect of a Marine heading the COC is that he will be able to read everybody's mail and will have to know everything that goes on if he is to do his job; therefore the MACV staff will not be able to get away with things that they have gotten away with in the past.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

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NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER (NCC)

The NCC is one subject on which there is no agreement among Marines in VN. This includes III MAF as well as Saigon Marines.

Opinions vary on the job's importance from "none" to the single most important title among General Walt's many hats. The one common point that all did agree on was that Admiral Ward was a lame brain and must be kept in his place. That since he was the ranking Navy officer in Saigon, he tried to influence all naval matters including those under the purview of the NCC. It was also generally agreed that General Walt was so very busy that his visits to MACV were not as frequent as needed, but were as frequent as humanly possible.

Of all the components, the NCC is unique in that Marine forces constitute the bulk of the in-country commitment. The Naval Advisory Group and the Naval Support Command only serve to complicate the command relationships with some officers believing these units to be the only concern of the NCC. To tidy up this package the following solutions were suggested:

- a. Do nothing - float with the tide.
- b. Send a Marine Brigadier General to Saigon as Deputy III MAF, NCC.
- c. Ask the Navy to provide a Rear Admiral as Deputy III MAF, NCC to be stationed in Saigon.
- d. Ask the Navy to provide a Navy Vice Admiral to be stationed in Saigon as the NCC.
- e. Designate Commander 7th Fleet as NCC with representation in Saigon.

General Krulak stated that courses of action a, b, and c each had some merit. That if we really wanted to tidy up the package that course of action c was best. However, he believed that we should stick with a. because it was best for the Marine Corps. He believed the real problem was that Commander 7th Fleet who had been told to provide MACV with advice on U. S. Navy operations was the fly in the ointment, since he seldom visited Saigon and did not provide the needed advice. Because he

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Enclosure (3)

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AT-5-jrf

did not, the Dagger Thrust operations were almost totally ineffective - this ineffectiveness is also a result of very poor MACV intelligence in selecting targets.

Colonel Barrow (From G-3 FMFPAC) told me that CINCPACFLT had conducted a study on the subject of NCC for MACV. They supposedly have come up with a solution of a Rear Admiral Deputy III MAF, NCC stationed in Saigon as the best solution.

General Krulak indicated that our salvation to the NCC problem rested with CINCPAC.

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AT-5-jrf

III MAF HEADQUARTERS

I believe that the Commanding Generals of the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions and the 1st MAW should be totally separated from the III MAF Headquarters. General Walt is currently wearing five hats:

Commanding General, III MAF

Commanding General, 3d Marine Division

Naval Component Commander (NCC)

I MAC Senior Advisor

Area Coordinator

All are important and require a considerable amount of command attention - in fact, almost any one of them requires the full time attention of a general officer. Because of this, priorities are established, certain functions delegated to other officers and certain areas of interest bypassed or overlooked. There are only 24 hours in each day and regardless of his desire to do so, General Walt cannot attend all of the three weekly Commanders Conferences held at the MACV Headquarters. However, the III MAF is the only major commander in each of his ~~hats~~ not represented at each and every conference. By default, Admiral Ward representing the Naval Advisory Group, influences most naval matters, the majority of which are within the purview of the NCC. This, in my opinion, is bad for the Marine Corps.

It is also my personal opinion that we need a three star general in-country to head a separate III MAF staff who would assume all hats currently worn by General Walt, except Commanding General, 3d Marine Division. This however, is a complex and somewhat complicated problem. General Westmoreland, General DePuy, and General Thi, the RVN I Corps Commander, have high regard and great confidence in General Walt. Inserting a three star over General Walt would cause some concern on both the U. S. and RVN staffs. Regardless, however, I feel strongly that a three star should move in-country with the additional buildup of Marine forces in January. I doubt that General Krulak shares my views on this matter.

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Enclosure (4)

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I also feel personally that we are somewhat overstaffed on all of the staffs that I visited - there are too many Colonels in action officer jobs that should be carried by Lieutenant Colonels and Majors. I fear that this tends to create unnecessary work and delays in staff functioning.

There is a complete split among the III MAF staff officers as to the relative importance of the NCC, I MAC Senior Advisor and Area ~~Co~~ Coordinator. The NCC, for example, varies from the most important responsibility of the Commanding General, to no importance at all. I consider that the total importance of this function in-country is tied to whether or not a Field Forces Command is ever established.

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AT-5-jrf

FIELD FORCE COMMAND (FFC)

The subject of the establishment of a Field Forces Command (FFC) covering all four CTZ in RVN was discussed with staff officers at every stop. The reactions at all Headquarters except MACV and FMFPAC generally indicated either that they were unaware of the problems or were too busy with other problems to be concerned about it.

The Marines at MACV feel that we have nothing to fear because General Westmoreland does not personally want such a command inserted between him and the operating forces. He has argued that the RVN JGS controls the VN war from Saigon and that we must parallel the RVN channels to provide proper advice, responsiveness and coordination. The Marines on the MACV staff generally feel that General DePuy is a friend of the Marine Corps and that General Westmoreland is as much of a friend as an Army four star general could ever be. This may be so, but in my opinion, every other Army staff officer on a "Joint Army Staff" is dedicated to bringing the Marine ground elements under the control of the Army just as General Moore (CG, 2d AirDiv) is dedicated to gaining operational control of all air in the area. They work 24 hours per day at this task regardless of orders to the contrary or any semblance of basic honesty in their approach.

The Army and Air Force staffs between MACV and the JCS can be assumed to be dedicated to this same task. The Navy is an ally because they fear that the Air Force will gain control of carrier air as the next step.

General Krulak does not have the same confidence of protection of the Marines by Generals Westmoreland and DePuy. He believes that General Westmoreland's egotism is the factor that prevents him from agreeing completely with the Army viewpoint for a FFC wherein he would have to relinquish operational control of the fighting forces to a subordinate commander. He would then be relegated to the position of an advisor rather than an operational commander.

However, the argument for paralleling the RVN, JGS is a good one that the CMC can use in the JCS arena as in the past, if and when this subject is raised again. The MACV desire to use Marines in the II Corps area can be expected to increase as additional forces are phased in-country. At first probably just across the I CTZ, but eventually to the highlands to chase the Viet Cong. The MACV desire for a U. S. Division in the Delta

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can be expected as an argument to justify a piece meal fracturing of III MAF.

General Krulak has indicated that he will use all his persuasiveness with CINCPAC to prevent approval of recommendations for a FFC at that level.

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UNIT ROTATION

General Krulak briefed every staff we visited, in addition to the HQMC Liaison Team, concerning his viewpoints on unit rotation. He emphatically stated that never again would he ever have anything to do with unit rotation. That we were organized for peace and had to reorganize in the face of the enemy on the battlefield. In doing so, we fractured units by interchanging squads, platoons, and companies - none of the Commanders ever felt that they were getting as good as they had to give away. Overall unit readiness and morale suffered in the so-called "Mixmaster Program", but that the mixing was an inescapable requirement.

He was then reminded that aviation squadrons with new type aircraft would continue to be phased in-country for some time to come. He replied that he recognized this as unit commitment, and agreed that it was necessary, but that he would immediately start a "mixmaster program" with the arrival of the second squadron of the same type aircraft. In the soft skills, he would start it even sooner.

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Enclosure (6)

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MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

1. Air Component/2nd AIR DIV

By default, the 2d Air Div staff handles numerous actions that should be actioned by the MACV staff. General Moore uses the term Air Component Commander in every other breath and is dedicated to the task of taking over all air. He never quits even when given specific directions.

Colonel Harper (III MAF liaison at 2d Air Div) states that General Moore and his staff are completely dishonest in their actions. As an example: Debriefing reports by pilots on RVN strikes are supposed to go directly to CINCPAC, but CG, 2d Air Div stops them at his Headquarters and if he doesn't like the report, edits it to provide what he wants.

General Moore constantly complains that the III MAF has by far the highest sortie rate per battalion in-country and the RVN in I Corps have the lowest, and tries to blame III MAF for this, but it is actually his fault because the 2d Air Div frags all the RVN support. It was recently pointed out to him by the Wing that during the 4 weeks subsequent to 28 October that of the total Air Force RVN effort only 3% (148 sorties) were in I Corps while at the same time 7% (660 sorties) of the Marine Corps effort was in the II Corps area. Since we now provide about 75% of the general aviation support to RVN in I Corps, we should be given responsibility to provide all air in I Corps and the problems would then be resolved. This, of course, was rejected by General Moore.

General Krulak stated that on a recent visit to Saigon by General McCutcheon, he was cornered by General Moore who wanted him to get him off the hook in regards to providing an answer to a Krulak personal - that for some reason General Krulak was out to get him. Naturally General McCutcheon would not help him, but the letter had not been answered as of 13 December.

General Krulak stated further that the antidote for the 2d Air Div problem is overall restraint imposed at CINCPAC level, and that he (General Krulak) worked at this constantly.

2. B-52 Worth

The worth of the B-52 effort is a subject of disagreement among the Marines - the split is about 50 - 50. General Krulak is for the strikes, and believes that as time goes by and the intelligence improves they will

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MAINTAIN CODES EYES ONLY **Enclosure (7)**

AT-5-jrf

be much more effective. Since the B-52's constantly hit their assigned targets, the fault lies with the intelligence.

3. III MAF Name Change

It was suggested that III MAF be changed to I MAF to simplify the relationship to I Corps. General Krulak said "No". That while he would have agreed in the beginning, that each change caused too much confusion and many administrative problems, the end results were ^{not} worth the cost.

4. Three Star III MAF

General Krulak has a discussion prepared which he will provide privately to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

5. General Krulak will propose a 15-20% increase in the in-country CB battalions, and ask for 4 additional battalions at the same strength.

6. General Krulak states that his requirements for in-country VMF/VMA stands at 10 squadrons regardless of a compromise reached elsewhere - that he stated his requirements, felt he could justify them and would continue to do so.

7. Viet Cong 50 calibre

There is a real fear throughout III MAF and FMFPAC that the appearance of the 50 caliber machine guns will cause serious problems to our helicopter operations - will require A4 support.

8. Armed Huey

General Krulak believes that our employment of the Armed Huey is wrong - that we are using Army tactics which Marines don't need. The F-4's and A4's are the attack aircraft and the Armed Huey should not be employed in this role. Landing zone should be prepared by attack aircraft then followed by the Armed Huey escorting the troop lift.

9. Army/Marine Tactics

General Krulak wanted his views made known on the maturity and effectiveness of our individual Marines. That it was very difficult to expect an 18 - 20 year old to be a tiger one minute and an ambassador

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the next. Unit Commanders down to Platoon level are preceptive of this which must be instinctive. We, the Marines, are only ones with a balanced approach. The Army has not yet faced to this or their civic action responsibilities. They have not yet faced the guerilla in the populated area, but would have to do so in the not far distant future. In the Army areas of battle anyone you saw you could shoot and be reasonably sure that you were shooting VC. General Krulak told General Westmoreland that if he were a VC commander that he would present MACV with a situation in the Delta which would lick the Army unless they began to prepare for it.

General Krulak believes that General Westmoreland and General DePuy are scared - that the recent battles where the VC stayed and fought caught them by complete surprise - that they never expected the VC to attack a well equipped U. S. unit and this coupled with the recent poor performance of reasonably good RVN troops had scared them. Their desires for the troop build-up is caused more from these facts than from any other cause.

10. CAS Definition

For their own purposes, the 2d Air Division does not use the JCS approved definition for CAS. Their approach consists of two parts: First, the use of FAC or FAC(A), and second, instantaneous fuzing of the ordnance. There is not a requirement for troops to be supported or even in the area.

11. HMM 363

Two Army Aviation Companies have been in-country for 2-3 months and are not yet operational. Two more are due in during December and are not expected to be operational. FFV requested HMM 363 until April 1966 - tentative agreement now 31 January 1966 with the Marines providing in-country briefing and check out for the Army. Currently HMM 363 provides all ROK and RVN support at Qui Nhon.

The Air Cav aviation companies are untouchable on the basis that the companies are organic units while the Marines were not.

12. F4 Loss in NVN

Recently when the F4 escorting the EF-10B in NVN was lost, General Moore's first reaction was, "What was he doing up there, who fraged him". At first his staff denied that the 2d Air Div fraged the mission, but were trapped by evidence, so the issue was then dropped.

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13. Visitors and VIP's

While the problem of visitors and VIP's are known here at this Headquarters, a real awareness of the problem is impossible until it is actually witnessed - it is unbelievable. This not only pertains in SVN, but on Okinawa and at Iwakuni as well.

14. The III MAF Plans Officer, Colonel Glidden, requested that a note be dropped to him whenever the CMC or JCS changed first positions on Marine forces - this would assist him in his dealings with MACV. As an example: change the Civil Affairs Company from Marine to Army troops in the Phase I Add-Ons.

15. OV-10A LARA

General Krulak is still opposed to the OV-10A. He feels it duplicates the mission of attack aircraft and VMO type helicopters and that eventually it may cost us attack aircraft. In this regard, our real Air/Ground Team is unique because of our VMF/VMA aircraft and not because of HMM's and VMO's. He feels we would be better off with O1s or piper cubs than with the OV-10A. That eventually OSD will look at the OV-10A performing limited CAS missions, then decide we can do with fewer attack aircraft.

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HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 10-11Serial No. 061603
10 November 1965
(MACJ5)ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR USMACV(U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. The purpose of this directive is to set forth command relationships within the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV) and the Terms of Reference for commanders and senior USMACV advisors in the Republic of Vietnam.

2. (U) GENERAL. These Terms of Reference govern the organization and operation of USMACV. They define the relationship of USMACV to higher Headquarters, the US Mission, Component and Subordinate Commanders, Senior USMACV Advisors, Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF), and the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).

3. (U) MISSION. The primary mission of USMACV is to assist and support the government of the Republic of Vietnam in its efforts to provide for its internal security, defeat communist insurgency and resist overt aggression.

4. (U) PRINCIPLES. The principles and definitions set forth in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications numbers 1, 2 and 3 apply.

5. (S) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.a. Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV).

(1) COMUSMACV is a subordinate unified commander under the operational command of Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC). He exercises operational control of all forces assigned or attached through his component commanders or commanders of subordinate commands, and is responsible for the conduct of US military activities and operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and in such other areas as may be directed by CINCPAC.

(2) COMUSMACV is the representative of the Secretary of Defense and CINCPAC to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam with respect to the United States Military Assistance Program (MAP). The Chief of the US Mission supervises MAP matters to the extent provided by law and in accordance with Executive Orders and such other instructions as the President may promulgate. COMUSMACV, as the military member of the US Mission, coordinates MAP activities with other US governmental agencies represented in the US Mission which are concerned with the execution of Foreign Assistance legislation. Actions and recommendations relating to budgeting, funding and manpower will be routed as provided in the Military Assistance Manual.

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b. Component Commanders.

(1) Army Component Commander: Commanding General, US Army, Vietnam (CG, USARV).

(2) Naval Component Commander: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (CG, III MAF).

(3) Air Force Component Commander: Commander, Second Air Division (Com, 2AD).

(4) With respect to administrative, technical, and other non-policy matters of uniservice interest, component commanders may receive instructions from and are authorized to communicate through unilateral service channels with their respective Military Departments and agencies thereof. COMUSMACV will be kept informed as appropriate.

c. Subordinate Commands and Advisory Elements.

(1) United States Army, Vietnam (USARV).

(2) United States III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF).

(3) United States Air Force, Second Air Division (2AD).

(4) Field Force, Vietnam (FFORCEV).

(5) United States Army 1st Infantry Division (1st INF DIV).

(6) United States Army 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (5SFG).

(7) Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon (HSAS).

(8) Studies and Observations Group (SOG).

(9) United States Army Advisory Group, I Corps Tactical Zone (USAAG, I CTZ).

(10) United States Army Advisory Group, II Corps Tactical Zone (USAAG, II CTZ).

(11) United States Army Advisory Group, III Corps Tactical Zone (USAAG, III CTZ).

(12) United States Army Advisory Group, IV Corps Tactical Zone (USAAG, IV CTZ).

(13) United States Naval Advisory Group (NAG).

(14) United States Coastal Surveillance Force (TF 115).

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(7) Work directly with the Military Departments and appropriate military area commands in arranging for receipt and transfer of military assistance materiel, disposal of MAP excess property, training and services in the RVN.

(8) Advise the RVN with respect to weapons production and off-shore procurement matters.

(9) Conduct a program of review and observation to serve as a basis for rendering an appropriate report to the Chief of the US Mission on RVN implementation of that portion of its military program financed by other US agencies with US-owned local currency.

(10) Provide such services as may be required in connection with the mutual weapons development program.

(11) Provide the US point of contact to RVNAF for the exchange of information on forces, budgets, weapons and capabilities.

(12) Make recommendations to CINCPAC concerning off-shore procurement of military assistance materiel or services.

(13) Advise the RVN with respect to any other military assistance requirements or logistics matters of the DOD and perform such other functions as may be required under Foreign Assistance legislation.

(14) Support FWMAF activities in RVN through the MAP in accordance with established US commitments.

7. (S) UNITED STATES MISSION COUNCIL. The US Mission, consisting of the US Embassy, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, US Operations Mission (USOM), Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), and Office of the Special Assistant to the US Ambassador (OSA), has been established to implement US objectives in the Republic of Vietnam. While these US agencies respond to the direction of US agencies at the national level, local guidance is provided by a mission council which has been established to assure an integrated US effort in the RVN. The council is composed of the US Ambassador (Chief); the Deputy US Ambassador; Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Director, US Operations Mission; Director, Joint US Public Affairs Office; and the director of the US intelligence community. The relationship between USMACV and the other elements of the mission team is one of coordination and cooperation. In case of differences of view between the Chief, US Mission and COMUSMACV, each is free to communicate such differences to national authorities. COMUSMACV communications will be forwarded through CINCPAC.

8. (S) RESPONSIBILITIES AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, SUBORDINATE COMMANDS AND ADVISORY ELEMENTS.

a. United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) with assigned and attached units is assigned to Headquarters, US Army Pacific (USARPAC), with station in

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the RVN. CINCUSARPAC exercises command, less operational control of USARV. COMUSMACV exercises operational control. CG, USARV will:

- (1) Advised COMUSMACV on US Army combat, combat support and combat service support matters.
- (2) Provide COMUSMACV with US Army forces for the conduct of combat, combat support and combat service support operations in Vietnam.
- (3) Command US Army units assigned or attached by CINCUSARPAC and bases and facilities in RVN as directed by COMUSMACV.
- (4) Discharge Army Component Command Functions for uni-SERVICE Army matters in Vietnam.
- (5) Keep CINCUSARPAC informed of all Army Component functions performed in support of COMUSMACV.
- (6) Provide combat support and combat service support to US Army units in Vietnam.
- (7) Provide common supply and common service support to all US Forces in Vietnam except to those forces located in the I Corps (ARVN) Tactical Zone and provide service peculiar support to US Army units in all areas.
- (8) Support other activities as directed by COMUSMACV.
- (9) Perform US Army Base Development Planning to support COMUSMACV's operational requirements as directed by CINCUSARPAC to include facilities for common item support.
- (10) Conduct Army component planning to support COMUSMACV's operational plans for current operations and contingency or unilateral CHIAMS.
- (11) Perform manpower authorization and other personnel functions for US Army units in Vietnam.
- (12) Provide logistical support to Free World Military Assistance Forces in accordance with established military working arrangements.
- (13) Provide intelligence and counterintelligence support to COMUSMACV.
- (14) Coordinate real estate functions and activities of all US and FWMA Forces within area assigned for base development.
- (15) Perform specific administrative and logistic support functions within areas designated by COMUSMACV.

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(16) Prepare to execute contingency plans as directed by COMUSMACV.

b. United States III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) with assigned units is assigned to Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC), with station in the RVN. CG, FMFPAC exercises command of III MAF less operational control. COMUSMACV exercises operational control. CG, III MAF will:

(1) Serve as Naval Component Commander for COMUSMACV and discharge the Naval Component Command functions for uniservice Naval matters in RVN except those functions which are performed by Chief, Naval Advisory Group.

(2) Conduct Naval component planning to support COMUSMACV's operational plans for current operations and contingency US unilateral and SEATO OPLANS except that planning performed by Chief, Naval Advisory Group.

(3) Keep CINCPACFLT informed of all Naval Component functions performed in support of COMUSMACV.

(4) Conduct, in coordination with CG, I Corps (ARVN), unilateral US, combined US/FWMAF and/or combined US/RVNAF combat operations.

(5) Provide security for designated critical US and CVN installations in the ARVN I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ).

(6) Exercise operational control of the US Army Advisory Group in the I CTZ and serve as the Senior US Advisor to CG, I Corps (ARVN).

(7) Perform the functions of US Area Coordinator in the I CTZ, coordinating specific administrative activities involving two or more services or two or more elements of the same service.

(8) Provide logistical support (less service peculiar items to other services) to all US Forces located in the I CTZ.

(9) Perform US base development functions in I CTZ in accordance with USMACV Directive 405-2.

(10) Coordinate real estate functions and activities of all US and Free World Military Assistance Forces within areas assigned for base development.

(11) Provide close air support for ground operations in accordance with USMACV Directive 95-4.

(12) Designate to Com, 2AD, those forces to participate in and conduct air defense tasks as agreed by Com, 2AD and CG, First Marine Aircraft Wing (FMAW).

(13) Prepare to execute contingency plans as directed by COMUSMACV.

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(14) Perform manpower authorization and personnel functions for assigned units as directed by FMFPAC.

(15) Provide intelligence and counterintelligence support to COMUSMACV.

(16) Perform other missions and tasks as required and/or as directed by COMUSMACV.

c. United States Air Force, 2nd Air Division (2AD) with assigned and attached units stationed in the RVN is assigned to Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). CINCPACAF exercises command, less operational control of 2nd Air Division forces stationed in the RVN. COMUSMACV exercises operational control of 2d Air Division. Logistic support is provided by USARV except for service peculiar items which are provided from own service resources. Commander, 2AD will:

(1) Exercise command and direction of all tactical, tactical support, base support, and training units assigned or attached to 2d Air Division in RVN.

(2) Serve as Air Force Component Commander for COMUSMACV and discharge Air Force Component Command functions for uniservice Air Force matters in RVN.

(3) Serve as Deputy Commander USMACV for Air Operations.

(4) Conduct and coordinate offensive and defensive air operations, tactical airlift, air traffic control, search and rescue operations, close air support and reconnaissance operations, and provide communications and navigational facilities as required.

(5) Provide USAF close air support for operations conducted in Vietnam in accordance with USMACV Directive 95-4.

(6) Exercise operational control of the US Air Force Advisory Group.

(7) Coordinate all air operations in the COMUSMACV area by United States and VNAF units which are not assigned or attached to 2d Air Division.

(8) Function as air defense commander and exercise overall air defense responsibility within the Republic of Vietnam. Authority exercised over III MAF air defense resources will be as agreed by Com, 2AD and CG, First Marine Aircraft Wing (FMAW).

(9) Conduct USAF component planning to support COMUSMACV's operational plans for current operations and contingency US unilateral OPLANS.

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- (10) Provide Postal, Weather, and Aerial Port services for COMUSMACV through attached units.
- (11) Coordinate service real estate requirements in accordance with USMACV Directive Number 405-1.
- (12) Perform base development functions in accordance with USMACV Directive Number 405-2.
- (13) Perform manpower authorization and personnel functions for assigned USAF units in Vietnam.
- (14) Keep CINCPACAF informed of all USAF component functions performed in support of COMUSMACV.
- (15) Provide intelligence and counterintelligence support to COMUSMACV.
- (16) Perform other missions and tasks as required and/or directed by COMUSMACV.
- (17) Prepare to execute contingency plans as directed by COMUSMACV.

d. Field Force, Vietnam (FFORCEV) with assigned and attached units is assigned to USARV. USARV exercises command, less operational control of FFORCEV. Operational control is exercised by COMUSMACV. Logistic support is provided by USARV. CG, FFORCEV will:

- (1) Exercise operational control of US and FWMAF units designated by COMUSMACV.
- (2) Conduct, in coordination with CG, II Corps (ARVN), US unilateral, combined US and FWMAF and/or combined US/FWMAF/RVNAF combat operations.
- (3) Provide security for designated critical US and RVN installations in the II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ).
- (4) Exercise operational control of the US Army Advisory Group in II CTZ and serve as the Senior US Advisor to CG, II Corps (ARVN).
- (5) Perform the function of US Area Coordinator in the II CTZ, coordinating specific administrative activities involving two or more services or two or more elements of the same service.
- (6) Coordinate real estate functions and activities of all US and FWMA Forces within the II CTZ in accordance with USMACV Directive Number 405-1.

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(7) Prepare to execute US contingency plans as directed by COMUSMACV.

e. United States Army 1st Infantry Division, Reinforced (1st Inf Div) with assigned units is assigned to USARV. USARV exercises command less operational control of the 1st Inf Div. Operational control is exercised by COMUSMACV. Logistic support is provided by USARV. CG, 1st Inf Div will:

(1) Exercise operational control of US and FWMAF units designated by COMUSMACV.

(2) Conduct, in coordination with CG, III Corps (ARVN), US unilateral, combined US and FWMAF and/or combined US/FWMAF/RVN combat operations.

(3) Provide security for designated critical US and GVN installations.

(4) Exercise operational control of the US Army Advisory Group in III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) and serve as the Senior US Advisor to CG, III Corps (ARVN).

(5) Perform the function of US Area Coordinator in the III CTZ, coordinating specific administrative activities involving two or more elements of the same service.

(6) Coordinate real estate functions and activities of all US and FWMA Forces within the III CTZ in accordance with USMACV Directive Number 405-1.

(7) Prepare to execute contingency plans as directed by COMUSMACV.

(8) Provide intelligence and counterintelligence support to COMUSMACV.

f. 5th United States Army Special Forces Group (Airborne) (5th SFG) is assigned to USARV. USARV exercises command, less operational control. COMUSMACV exercises operational control. Logistic support is provided by USARV except for mission peculiar items which are provided through own resources. CO, 5th SF Group will:

(1) Exercise command of subordinate detachments.

(2) Provide advisory assistance to the Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) by training and assisting indigenous forces for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.

(3) Assist the VNSF in the establishment of bases for the conduct of border surveillance operations.

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under existing assumptions or agreements pertinent to such contingency or general emergency operations.

(5) Act as Commander (Designate), Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF), for Southeast Asia; develop for implementation upon order, plans for unconventional warfare in Southeast Asia.

(6) Provide intelligence support to COMUSMACV.

i. United States Army Advisory Group, I Corps Tactical Zone (USAAG, I CTZ) is assigned to Headquarters, USMACV. COMUSMACV exercises command less operational control. CG, III MAF exercises operational control and serves as the Senior US Advisor to CG, I Corps (ARVN). The Naval Component Commander provides logistic support less service peculiar items which are provided by USARV. The Senior US Advisor, I Corps Tactical Zone will:

(1) Provide assistance to the GVN in developing and maintaining an effective military capability by advising and supporting RVNAF military and paramilitary commanders and staffs at all levels in operations, training, intelligence, personnel management, combat support and combat service support activities.

(2) Provide advice, assistance and support to the RVNAF at corps, province and district level in planning and executing coordinated rural construction operations.

(3) Exercise command of subordinate advisory teams and operational control over designated units through the Deputy Senior US Advisor.

(4) Assist in the coordination of military operations and civil affairs/civic action functions by performing liaison among US/RVNAF military and civil officials and GVN authorities.

(5) Develop, in coordination with I Corps, MAP materiel, personnel and organizational requirements and submit to COMUSMACV.

(6) Observe and report on the utilization of materiel furnished by and personnel trained by the US through the MAP.

j. United States Army Advisory Group, II Corps Tactical Zone (USAAG, II CTZ) is assigned to Headquarters, USMACV. COMUSMACV exercises command less operational control. CG, Field Forces, Vietnam exercises operational control and serves as the Senior US Advisor to CG, II Corps (ARVN). USARV provides logistic support. The Senior US Advisor, II Corps Tactical Zone will:

(1) Provide assistance to the GVN in developing and maintaining an effective military capability by advising and supporting RVNAF military and paramilitary commanders and staffs at all levels in operations, training, intelligence, personnel management, combat support and combat service support activities.

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(2) Provide advice, assistance and support to RVNAF at corps, province and district level in planning and executing coordinated rural construction operations.

(3) Exercise command of subordinate advisory teams and operational control over designated units through the Deputy Senior US Advisor.

(4) Assist in the coordination of military operations and civil affairs/civic action functions by performing liaison among US/FWMAF military and civil officials and GVN authorities.

(5) Develop, in coordination with II Corps, MAP materiel, personnel and organizational requirements and submit to COMUSMACV.

(6) Observe and report on the utilization of materiel furnished by and personnel trained by the US through MAP.

k. United States Army Advisory Group, III Corps Tactical Zone (USAAG, III CTZ) is assigned to Headquarters USMACV. COMUSMACV exercises command less operational control. CG, 1st Infantry Division (Reinf) exercises operational control and serves as Senior US Advisor to CG, III Corps (ARVN). USARV provides logistic support. The Senior US Advisor, III Corps Tactical Zone will:

(1) Provide assistance to the GVN in developing and maintaining an effective military capability by advising and supporting RVNAF military and paramilitary commanders and staffs at all levels in operations, training, intelligence, personnel management, combat support and combat service support activities.

(2) Provide advice, assistance and support to the RVNAF at corps, province and district level in planning and executing coordinated rural construction operations.

(3) Exercise command of subordinate advisory teams and operational control over designated units through the Deputy Senior US Advisor.

(4) Assist in the coordination of military operations and civil affairs/civic action functions by performing liaison among US/FWMAF military and civil officials and GVN authorities.

(5) Develop, in coordination with III Corps, MAP materiel, personnel and organizational requirements and submit to COMUSMACV.

(6) Observe and report on the utilization of materiel furnished by and personnel trained by the US through the MAP.

l. United States Army Advisory Group, IV Corps Tactical Zone (USAAG, IV CTZ) is assigned to Headquarters, USMACV. COMUSMACV exercises command of the USAAG, IV CTZ. USARV provides logistical support. Senior US Army Advisor, IV CTZ will:

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(1) Provide assistance to the RVN in developing and maintaining an effective military capability by advising and supporting RVNAF military and paramilitary commanders and staffs at all levels in operations, training, intelligence, personnel management, combat support, and combat service support activities.

(2) Provide advice, assistance and support to the RVNAF at corps, province and district level in planning and executing coordinated rural construction operations.

(3) Exercise command of subordinate advisory teams and operational control of designated units.

(4) Assist in the coordination of military operations and civil affairs/civic action functions by performing liaison among US/FWMAF military and civil officials and RVN authorities.

(5) Perform the functions of Area Coordinator within the IV CTZ, coordinating specific administrative activities involving two or more services or two or more elements of the same service.

(6) Develop, in coordination with IV Corps, MAP materiel, personnel and organizational requirements and submit to COMUSMACV.

(7) Observe and report on the utilization of materiel furnished by and personnel trained by the US through the MAP.

(8) Provide intelligence support to COMUSMACV.

m. United States Naval Advisory Group (NAG) is assigned to Headquarters, USMACV. COMUSMACV exercises command of the NAV. Logistical support is provided by the Naval Component Commander in the I CTZ and by USNAW in the II, III and IV CTZ's except for service peculiar items which are provided by HSAS. Chief, Naval Advisory Group will:

(1) Advise COMUSMACV on Naval matters.

(2) Serve as commander of the US Coastal Surveillance Force (Task Force 115).

(3) Serve as Senior Advisor to the Commander of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN), and the Commander of the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC). In discharging these responsibilities, he will:

(a) Exercise command of subordinate advisory teams.

(b) Advise and assist the VNN and VNMC commanders and staffs at all echelons in achieving and maintaining a high state of combat readiness so as to fulfill their responsibilities for internal security, defeat of the communist insurgency, and resistance to aggression.

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(c) Develop, in coordination with the VNN and VNMC, MAP materiel, personnel and organizational requirements and submit to COMUSMACV.

(d) Observe and report on the utilization of materiel furnished by and personnel trained by the United States through the MAP.

(e) Assist in the coordination of the rural construction programs by cooperation with and assistance to RVN, USCM, JUSPAO, and other US and FWMAF agencies.

(f) Advise and assist the VNN and VNMC in psychological warfare and civic action programs.

(g) Advise, assist and support the VNN by the conduct of air and surface surveillance in designated major rivers/estuaries of RVN.

(h) Establish and operate, in coordination with the VNN, coastal surveillance information centers to assist VNN in coastal surveillance operations and to provide an interchange of information between VNN and US coastal surveillance forces.

(4) Provide intelligence and counterintelligence support to COMUSMACV.

n. United States Coastal Surveillance Force (TF115). Headquarters, Coastal Surveillance Force (TF115) is assigned to Headquarters, USMACV. Various US Navy and US Coast Guard ships, US Navy aircraft and other units are assigned to the operational control of COMUSMACV. Chief, Naval Advisory Group, as Commander, Task Force 115, exercises operational control of these forces for COMUSMACV. Logistic support is provided by in-country logistic agencies, by PACFLT and by the US Coast Guard. CTF 115 will:

(1) Conduct air and surface surveillance, naval gunfire support, visit and search, psywar, combat support (such as support of commando raids, UDT and Search and Rescue) of US and RVN forces and other operations as directed, along the coast and in the major rivers of RVN in order to assist the RVNAF in the detection and prevention of communist waterborne movement and infiltration from the sea.

(2) Improve the VNN's counterinsurgency capability and assist the GVN and US Forces to secure the coastal regions, major rivers, and Rung Sat Special Zone as part of the overall effort to defeat the communist insurgency in Vietnam.

(3) Collect and report information on location of friendly surface units, suspected infiltration and transients in or approaching assigned patrol areas and other information of an intelligence nature. Coordinate such information with other agencies including COMSEVNTHFLT.

(4) Provide intelligence support to COMUSMACV.

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o. United States Air Force Advisory Group (AFAG) is assigned to Headquarters, USMACV. COMUSMACV exercises command less operational control. Commander, 2AD exercises operational control of the AFAG. Logistic support is provided by USARV except for service peculiar items which are provided by the Air Force Component Commander. Chief, US Air Force Advisory Group will:

- (1) Exercise command of subordinate advisory teams and operational control of designated units/detachments.
- (2) Advise and assist the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) in achieving a state of combat readiness through application of proper techniques, procedures and training.
- (3) Advise and assist the VNAF in the conduct of combat operations.
- (4) Develop, in coordination with the VNAF, MAP materiel, personnel and organizational requirements and submit through command channels to COMUSMACV.
- (5) Observe and report on the utilization of materiel furnished by and personnel trained by the US through the MAP.

p. United States Army Advisory Detachment, Capital Military Region (USAAD, CMR) is assigned to Headquarters, USMACV. COMUSMACV exercises command of the USAAD, CMR. Logistic support is provided by USARV. The Senior US Army Advisor, CMR, will:

- (1) Provide assistance to the GVN in developing and maintaining an effective military capability by advising and supporting RVNAF military and paramilitary commanders and staffs at all levels in operations, training, intelligence, personnel management, combat support and combat service support activities.
- (2) Provide advice, assistance and support to the RVNAF province and district levels in planning and executing coordinated rural construction operations.
- (3) Exercise command of subordinate advisory teams and operational control over designated units.
- (4) Assist in the coordination of military operations and civil affairs/civic action functions by performing liaison among US/RVNAF military and civil officials and GVN authorities.
- (5) Develop, in coordination with the CMR, MAP materiel, personnel and organizational requirements and submit to COMUSMACV.
- (6) Observe and report on the utilization of materiel furnished by and personnel trained by the US through the MAP.

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(7) Provide intelligence support to COMUSMACV.

q. United States Army Advisory Detachment, Regional Force/Popular Force (USAAD, RF/PF) is assigned to Headquarters, USMACV. COMUSMACV exercises command of USAAD, RF/PF. USARV provides logistic support. Senior Advisor, USAAD, RF/PF will:

(1) Provide assistance to the GVN in developing and maintaining an effective counterinsurgency capability in RVNAF by assisting and advising the Regional Force and Popular Force commander and staff in matters pertaining to command, administration, intelligence, training, organization, field operations and logistics.

(2) Develop, in coordination with the RF/PF Command, MAP materiel, personnel and organizational requirements and submit to COMUSMACV.

(3) Monitor the administration and support of the RF/PF.

(4) Observe and report on the utilization of materiel assistance furnished by the US through the MAP.

(5) Provide intelligence support to COMUSMACV.

r. United States Army Advisory Detachment, Airborne Brigade (USAAD, AB) is assigned to Headquarters, USMACV. COMUSMACV exercises command of the USAAD, AB. USARV provides logistic support. Senior Advisor, USAAD, AB will:

(1) Assist the GVN in developing and maintaining an effective military capability by advising and supporting Airborne Brigade commanders and staffs at all echelons in operations, training, personnel management, intelligence, combat support and combat service support activities.

(2) Exercise command of subordinate advisory teams.

(3) Assist in the coordination of military operations and civil affairs/civic action functions by performing liaison among US/RVNAF military and civil officials and GVN authorities.

(4) Develop, in coordination with the Airborne Brigade, MAP materiel, personnel and organizational requirements and submit to COMUSMACV.

(5) Observe and report on the utilization of materiel furnished by and personnel trained by the US through the MAP.

(6) Provide intelligence support to COMUSMACV.

s. United States Army Advisory Detachment, Railway Security (USAAD, RS) is assigned to Headquarters, USMACV. COMUSMACV exercises command of the USAAD, RS. USARV provides logistic support. Senior Advisor, USAAD, RS will:

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- (1) Advise and assist the Chief, Military Rail Service on security of the Vietnamese railroad.
- (2) Advise the Commanding Officer, Military Rail Security Group on all matters pertaining to operations, training, intelligence, personnel management, logistics and rail security.
- (3) Maintain liaison with the Senior Advisor in each CTZ to ensure coordination of effort in support of rail security.
- (4) Observe and report on the utilization of materiel furnished by the US through the MAP.
- (5) Provide intelligence support to COMUSMACV.

9. (S) RELATIONSHIP OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM AND REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES.

a. National Level. The relationship between COMUSMACV and Chief, Joint General Staff, RVNAF is one of coordination and cooperation. Each commander retains operational control of his respective national forces. Under this arrangement, RVNAF retains all territorial responsibilities.

b. Subordinate Level.

(1) The basic concept underlying command relationships between US/FWMAF and RVNAF is one of combat support through coordination and cooperation in the mutual self-interest of each command.

(2) As a matter of policy, US Forces will not be placed under the command or operational control of allied commanders. However, this restriction does not preclude the temporary tactical direction of US Forces by RVNAF or FWMAF commanders under exceptional circumstances and by mutual agreement, or temporary direction of RVNAF forces by US commanders. Matters of this nature which cannot be resolved by subordinate US commanders will be referred to COMUSMACV.

(3) National unit integrity will be maintained at all levels.

(4) In the event a US unit is employed as a reaction force to support ARVN forces already committed against the Viet Cong (VC), the procedures contained in USMACV Directive 525-4 (reference 10j) apply.

(5) USMACV advisory teams at all echelons perform the combat liaison function between the US/FWMA Force and RVNAF in addition to their primary mission of advice, assistance and operational support of RVNAF.

10. (U) REFERENCES.

- a. DOD Directive 5132.3, 8 July 1963, subject: "DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Military Assistance."

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b. JCS Publication Number 1, "Dictionary of US Military Terms for Joint Usage (JD)," 1 December 1964.

c. JCS Publication Number 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," 23 November 1959, with 8 changes.

d. JCS Publication Number 3, "Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy Guidance."

e. CINCPACINST 003020.2D, 19 April 1963, Subject: "Command Relationships in the Pacific Command (PACOM)," and Change 1, 7 July 1964.

f. CINCPACINST 4900.11, 16 August 1963, Subject: "US Policy Relative to Commitments to Foreign Governments Under MAF."

g. CINCPACINST 03960.1, 13 March 1964, Subject: "RDT&E and CD Activities in RVN."

h. USMACV Directive Number 10-10, 23 March 1965, Subject: "Organization and Functions; Statement of Mission, Tasks and Objectives."

i. USMACV Directive Number 95-4, 13 July 1965, Subject: "Aviation; Air Operations in RVN."

j. USMACV Directive Number 525-4(C), 17 September 1965, Subject: "Tactics and Techniques for Employment of US Forces in RVN."

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. B. ROSSON
 Major General, USA
 Chief of Staff

L. M. HARRIS
 Colonel, AGC
 Adjutant General

Annex
 Command Relationship Schematic

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Directive Number 10-11, HQ MACV (Cont)

10 November 1965

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
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LEGEND:

— OPERATIONAL CONTROL
- - - - - COMMAND, LESS OPCON

NOTES:

- 1 - Army Component Comdr
- 2 - Naval Component Comdr
- 3 - Air Force Component Comdr
- 4 - Also DEPCOMUSMACV for Air
- 5 - Under command, less OPCON, of COM, AAFV
- 6 - Under command, less OPCON, of COM, ROKMAC-V
- 7 - Under command, less OPCON, of COMNAVPHL

SECRET

To Subordinate Commanders only.

DTG 070002 Dec

42887

Subj: January - February Operations (U)

1. We must go on the offensive against VC and PAVN main force units now rapidly building up in south Vietnam. Our operations must be oriented toward the destruction of these forces and we must undertake an effective war of attrition against them. We have not yet adequately exploited our great advantages in mobility and fire power. We have not yet succeeded in bringing the enemy to combat with sufficient frequency to achieve the results which we must attain in order to perform successfully our mission in South Vietnam. Major commands are expected to undertake operations which will find, fix and destroy major VC forces by sustained and aggressive action.

2. Operations during January and February will be designed to implement the concept described above within the limits of available forces in each CTZ. As additional forces become available the implementation of this concept will be expanded in size and scope to embrace the entire South Vietnam theater and to include the employment of sizeable theater reserves. The principle of economy of force will be employed in securing critical bases and installations, and the attendant principle of mass will be employed in attacking and destroying enemy forces.

3. In order to locate major enemy formations, and subsequently to encircle and destroy them, an concentrated intelligence effort is required at all levels. Maximum advantage will

be taken of all intelligence sources and available intelligence ~~is~~ information will be passed both up and down the chain of command as a matter of the highest priority. In connection with this intelligence effort, available reconnaissance capabilities will be exploited to the maximum, in order to locate accurately the enemy force involved and to permit the optimum employment of critical airlift resources in bringing maneuver forces into contact.

4. During January and February, and in consonance with the foregoing, major subordinate commanders will accomplish the following missions:

a. Continue to insure the security of critical installations, base areas and national priority areas for rural construction and to advance the civic action program. In this connection provisions must be made to meet PACN/VC capabilities to mass considerable forces for concentrated attacks.

b. Implement an aggressive intelligence program. Close coordination will be effected with Province Chiefs and sector and sub sector advisors to locate enemy forces, bases and infiltration/supply routes.

c. Develop and implement tactical plans which exploit the intelligence gained and take advantage of superior mobility and firepower to mass against and destroy enemy forces wherever and whenever they can be ~~found~~ found.

5. As a minimum, and based on the size of enemy forces involved, major subordinate commanders will conduct the following operations in thier respective CTZ's. These operations will be fully coordinated with the ARVN Corps Commander concerned,

and will include ARVN participation to the maximum extent possible.

a. CG, III MAF:

(1) An operation in Quang Nam Province in January/February to locate and destroy major VC units in that province and disrupt local infiltration/resupply routes. Code name MALLARD.

(2) An operation in Quang Ngai Province in January/February to locate and destroy enemy forces, possibly the 18th PAVN Regiment, which have been operating in that province.

b. CG, FFORCDEV:

(1) An operation in upper Kontum Province in January/February to locate and destroy enemy units in that province including, possibly the B9 PAVN Regiment. Code name MAULER.

(2) An operation in Pleiku and lower Kontum Province in January/February, to destroy enemy forces operating in that province including possibly the 32d, 66th and Song Lam Regiments. Code name MATADOR.

(3) An operation in Binh Dinh Province in January/February to locate and destroy the 2d VC MF Regiment, possibly elements of the 18th PAVN Regiment and the base from which these units have been operating. Code name MASHER.

c. CG, 1st INF DIV

(1) Operations in Binh Duong - Binh Long - Tay Ninh Provinces in January and February to locate and destroy the major enemy units which have been operating in and around the Michelin plantation. Code name MASTIFF.

(2) An operation in Hau Nghia - Long An Provinces in January, along the Oriental River, to locate and destroy the 506th LF Bn, interrupt the major infiltration routes passing thru

the area and enhance the security of the anticipated deployment of a US brigade in this area. Code name MARAUDER.

(3) Possibly an operation in Phuoc Tuy Province in February to locate and destroy the 5th and/or 94th VC MF Regiments, open Route 15 and disrupt infiltration Corridor 321. Code name MALLET.

6. The foregoing is not intended to restrict operations to those described above. Addressess will conduct such other operations as they deem appropriate within the context of existing missions.

7. In order to permit coordination of the employment of available reserves and combat service support, to include air and sea lift, and the integration of such employment with other theater requirements, it is requested that addressess forward to this HQ, for approval, a schedule of Battalion and larger operations planned for January and February. These schedules will include the following, and will be submitted by 22 December for January operations and 22 January for February operations.

- a. Location and Objective of operation.
- b. Planned duration of operation.
- c. Forces to be employed to include reserves available for reinforcement.

- d. Combat and service support required over and above organic capabilities. It is recognized that these requirements are subject to modification in the event of unforeseen circumstances or opportunities. However, extreme care should be

exercised in developing these requirements in order to enable this HQ to allocate maximum support without unnecessary interference with other operations, or without impeding the essential theater logistic effort.

e. Code name of operation.

8. Following approval and integration into overall plans of the operations schedules described above, this HQ will publish a combat and logistic support plan which will allocate available resources to include air lift, sea lift, Army Aviation assets and other essential combat and service support.

9. JGS has agreed with schedule subject to coordination with ~~XXXXXX~~ ARVN corps commanders. J-3 JGS will inform all corps commanders

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Operations in I CTZ) to Appendix 3 (Phase I Operations) to
Annex D (Operations)

1. Concept:

a. III MAF will continue to develop and protect the secure base areas at Hue Phu Bai, Danang and Chu Lai, and concomitantly, in coordination with CG, I Corps, and local RVNAF commanders, the III MAF will conduct offensive operations against Viet Cong bases and forces.

b. The presently established TAOR's will remain in effect, modified as required to meet changes in the situation.

c. III MAF ground operations will be either unilateral operations with RVNAF liaison participation; coordinated U.S./RVNAF operations; or combined U.S./RVNAF operations.

d. III MAF ground operations will include search and destroy, clearing, attack on Viet Cong bases or concentrations, day and night combat patrols, and reconnaissance patrols, and day and night ambushes.

e. III MAF ground operations will range in scale from platoon size to battalion size and will include provisions for the use of artillery, naval gunfire and air support as appropriate.

f. Provisions will continue to be made for the rapid exploitation of any advantage occurring during III MAF operations. Accordingly, reserves of troops and firepower will continue to be provided as a means to exploit advantages and successes.

g. A cardinal objective of the III MAF and the RVNAF will continue to be a vigorous rural reconstruction program. This includes the destruction of the Viet Cong and the persuasion of the general populace towards acceptance of RVN control and rejection of the Viet Cong. In the conduct of clearing and securing operations, the destruction of Viet Cong and the protection of the general populace are of transcending importance. Terrain will be important only so far as it provides the means or advantages which can be exploited in the accomplishment of the primary objectives. Manifestly, control of the general populace and all of its resources has been a principal Viet Cong objective. Accordingly, for the most part, the sparsely populated piedmont and mountain regions in I CTZ will be entered only in connection with deep patrolling and attack of known or highly suspected Viet Cong forces or bases. The impetus or the main thrust of III MAF operations will be directed at the heavily populated, rich coastal region contiguous to the secure base areas. III MAF ground operations will be directed at selectively clearing villages and hamlets in the coastal region with the primary objective of bringing a maximum measure of security and stability to liberated areas.

h. In the conduct of III MAF operations in the heavily populated coastal regions, the Viet Cong will be opposed by an amplification of his own tactics which are offensive actions carried out in a mobile, discriminatory, and flexible fashion. Where appropriate for use, supporting ground fires, Naval gunfire support and air support will be closely coordinated and controlled to minimize destruction of potentially friendly life and property. In the execution of these operations, maximum use will be made of RVNAF, particularly

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Regional Forces and Popular Forces. These forces will contribute to the initial operations to secure a village and after III MAF forces have departed a secure village, the Regional Forces and Popular Forces will remain as the key elements to assure the people that the RVN government can and will take steps to meet their just aspirations. Although the III MAF will bear no responsibility for the rural reconstruction of such areas, per se, it will make a major contribution to the program through civic action, psychological warfare activities, intelligence activities, and most significantly, by providing overall security of areas undergoing rural reconstruction. Security in this respect, will be a continuation of vigorous action against the Viet Cong, not static security of the type which would serve to dissipate the combat power of III MAF forces.

1. As a collateral action to operations designed to secure populated coastal areas, III MAF and RVNAF operations will be undertaken to secure and improve those land lines of communication essential to the successful conduct of operations in the coastal region.

j. III MAF aviation units will operate from the Danang, Danang East, Chu Lai and Hue Phu Bai airfield complexes, providing air support of all descriptions for III MAF ground forces operations. III MAF forces will have first priority on air support provided by III MAF aviation units; available sorties in excess of III MAF requirements will continue to be identified to the 2nd Air Division to be used for support of other forces engaged in operations against the Viet Cong.

k. As a temporary measure, operations involving forces of the III MAF and RVNAF will continue to be undertaken on the basis of close and mutual coordination and cooperation. However, to facilitate success and to provide for maximum flexibility and rapid response, utility of command for specific operations will be essential. Therefore, as early as practicable, arrangements will be sought that will provide for combined III MAF/RVNAF operations involving the operational control of RVNAF elements by U.S. commanders for the duration of specific operations.

2. Tasks: In the conduct of Phase I operations, III MAF will undertake the following major operational tasks:

a. Continue to maintain a strong area defense in Chu Lai, Danang and Hue Phu Bai enclaves/secure base areas to prevent Viet Cong attack against the airfields, supporting facilities and logistical installations.

b. Conduct a vigorous program of aerial, ground, photographic and electronic reconnaissance to include deep/long range ground reconnaissance/surveillance.

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c. Conduct day and night combat patrols and ambushes to provide active security of base areas and to harass, destroy or capture Viet Cong personnel, equipment and supplies.

d. Conduct search and destroy operations to find and eliminate Viet Cong forces, installations or resources.

e. Conduct clearing operations in the coastal region directed at destroying or driving off Viet Cong forces and reducing the effectiveness of the Viet Cong political - military apparatus.

f. Conduct well planned attacks against known Viet Cong forces employing, where practicable, air, artillery and naval gunfire support.

g. Conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations to include close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, air superiority, air transport, search and rescue and other supplemental air support as required to assist in the over-all effort to defeat the Viet Cong.

3. Forces: The III MAF (total strength approximately 36,000) will consist of the following major forces:

a. Ground.

(1) The reinforced infantry elements of the 3rd Marine Division (Rein) consisting, in part, of 12 infantry battalions will be located as follows:

(a) Chu Lai - 3 Infantry Regiments (Rein) consisting of six infantry battalions and reinforced with appropriate forces.

(b) Danang - 2 Infantry Regiments (Rein) consisting of five infantry battalions and reinforced with appropriate forces.

(c) Hue Phu Bai - 1 Infantry Battalion (Rein).

(2) Major elements of the 3rd Marine Division (Rein) will consist of the following:

TYPE UNIT	NUMBER
Infantry Battalion	12
Artillery Battalion (105mm How or 107 mm Mort)	4
Artillery Battalion (155mm How)	1 1/3
175 Gun Btry (SP)	1
8" How Btry (SP)	1 1/3
AT Battalion	1 1/3
Recon Battalion	1 1/6
Tank Battalion	1 1/3
Arm Tractor Battalion	1 1/2
MT Battalion	2 1/2
Medical Battalion	1 1/3

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b. Air.

(1) The First Marine Aircraft Wing will be located at Danang, Danang East, Chu Lai and Hu Phu Bai.

(2) Fixed wing and rotary wing squadrons and LAAM battalions of the First Marine Aircraft Wing will consist of:

TYPE UNIT	NUMBER
VMA	4
VMF/A	3
VMCJ	6
HMM	2
VMO	1
LAAM Battalion	

c. Logistics. The Force Logistics Support Group will be located at Danang, Chu Lai and Hu Phu Bai and will consist of major detachments of 2 Force Service Regiments, 1 1/3 Service Battalions and 1 1/3 Short Range Battalions.

d. Other Support. The 30th Naval Construction Regiment will be located at Danang and Chu Lai and will consist of 3 Mobile Construction Battalions.

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Feb 1968 Operations in II CTZ) to Appendix B (Phase I Operations (Feb 1968 - Jun 1968 Operations))

1. Concept: Establish and secure operational logistics bases and, in coordination with RVNAF, conduct operations to destroy Viet Cong forces and prevent the loss of important population and political centers. Major and minor bases will be secured by locating troops in defensive positions along avenues of approach at a sufficient distance to minimize the possibility of damage from 82mm mortar fire. Patrols will be conducted to prevent infiltration and to provide early warning of enemy approach. Reserves for local reaction to VC attack must be provided at each base. Offensive operations will be conducted either from Brigade home bases or from forward operational bases (e.g. Binh Khe, Kontum, Cheo Reu, Gia Bon) or Ban Me Thauot. Units for this purpose will be those at Dong Ba Thin and An Khe. When operations are conducted from forward bases, airlift from home base will be required. Frequency of operations will vary, but it is anticipated that two Brigades from An Khe will be on operations at all times and the brigade from Dong Ba Thin will be on operations about 50% of the time.

2. Tasks:

- a. Defend major bases at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh.
- b. Defend the minor bases at An Khe.
- c. Conduct offensive operations against VC bases and forces.
- d. Conduct reaction operations to assist RVNAF in the defense of Provincial Capitals, selected district towns, and in the opening and securing of land LOC's.

3. U. S./3rd Country forces required:

- a. Ground combat forces:
 - (1) Defense of bases:
 - (a) Qui Nhon - 3 battalions.
 - (b) An Khe - 2 battalions.
 - (c) Cam Ranh - 3 battalions.
 - (2) Assist RVNAF in opening and securing of Route 19:
 - (a) Binh Khe - 3 battalions.
 - (3) Reserve/reactive and offensive combat forces:
 - (a) Dong Ba Thin - three battalions.
 - (b) An Khe - six battalions.

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HEADQUARTERS

III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
 c/o FPO, San Francisco,
 California 96601

PP:EOG:jpr
 5200
 5 December 1965

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MEMORANDUM

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6
 To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
 Subj: Trip report, Colonel CHURCH, MACV Phase II Conference

1. COMUSMACV convened a Phase II Force Development Planning Conference to meet during the period 29 Nov - 4 Dec 1965. All Component Commanders and principal commands were requested to provide representation. In addition, CINCPAC participated. The purpose of the conference, ~~was~~ to reconstruct a new set of requirements to include Phase I forces not yet in country, Phase II requirements developed at the CINCPAC Conference, 27-30 Sep 1965, and any Phase II add-on requirements generated since the CINCPAC conference.
2. The conference was established prior to the visit of Mr. McNAMARA, however, planning action received impetus from guidance provided by Secretary of Defense to COMUSMACV.
3. Component Commanders and principal commands were required to submit their requirements not later than 3 December 1965. III MAF requirements were so submitted, and are now being included in a COMUSMACV capitulation of Phase II requirements which ~~will~~ be hand-carried to CINCPAC by 10 December 1965.
4. COMUSMACV plans a briefing of the new Phase II requirements for 8 December if possible, if not, for 9 December 1965. Indications are that attendance by component commanders and the principal commanders ~~will~~ be requested. Four spaces in the briefing room were requested for III MAF anticipating that General WOLF and/or Gen MCCUTCHEON, and two representatives (1 wing, 1 III MAF) would be needed at the briefing.
5. III MAF requirements have been established as follows: (a) Phase I approved forces not yet in country, (b) Phase II forces previously established and (c) Phase II add-on forces.
 - a. The following Phase I forces are not yet in country -

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5200

III MAF Headquarters Augmentation

Comm Bn (-)

SF Bn

Interpreter/Translator Teams (2)

Interpreter Teams (2)

VMA (1)

b. Phase II forces remain as previously stated and consist essentially of the remainder of the 1st Marine Division, Supporting forces, one VFA, one HMM and 750 additional navy personnel for NSA.

c. Phase II Add-on forces established at the latest conference are as follows:

475 Additional Navy personnel for NSA

6 NACB (2 Feb; 2 Mar; 2, Apr)

1 VFA (would give a total of 9 jet squadrons)

1 HMM

Air support elements 961 personnel (463 HMMs, 498 HNS)

6. In addition to the USMC force requirements listed above, a requirement has been established for a ROK Marine Brigade (3 Battalions) to chop op-con III MAF in June 1966.

7. The addition of the ROK Brigade in June and the deployment of the 1st Marine Division and remaining Battalions will provide III MAF with 21 Battalions in I CTZ. The 6 Division Battalions and 3 ROK Marine Battalions are programmed for introduction into I CTZ as follows:

1	Chu Lai	Jan
1	Danang	Feb
1	Chu Lai	Mar
1	Chu Lai	Apr
1	Chu Lai	May
1	Danang	Jun
3	Danang (ROK)	Jun
9	Total	

8. A recapitulation of the I CTZ USMC and ROK Battalions strength is as follows:

ENCLOSURE	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	MONTHS	
									(1)	(1)
Danang	6	6	7	7	7	7	9	9		
Chu Lai	5	6	6	(1)7	(1)7	(1)3	9	9		
Hue Phu Bai	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3		
TOTAL	12	13	14	15	16	17	21	21		

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52009. An overall recapitulation of COMUSMACV force requirements for
AVN identified as Phase II and Phase II add-ons is as follows:

<u>NO OF BNS</u>	<u>MONTH REQUIRED</u>	<u>PHASE II</u>	<u>ADD-ONS</u>
(4)	JAN	Bde (25th)MarDiv (-)	
(2)	FEB	BLT, Abn Inf Bn	
(1)	MAR	BLT	
(7)	APR	25thDiv (-) RLT (-)	ROK RCT
(7)	MAY	BLT, Bde (25th)	ROK Div(-)
(7)	JUN	BLT, 4thDiv (-)	ROK RCT
(12)	JUL	2nd Cav Regt, 2 Bdes (4th)	ROK RCT Inf Bn AC Sqdn
(0)	AUG		
(0)	SEP		
(9)	OCT		2 Div
(3)	NOV		Bde, AC Sqdn
(0)	DEC		

* ROK Mar RCT to I Corps

Total 53PHI 44

Total 97 Bns ent phase II

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HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243DIRECTIVE 13 July 1965
NUMBER 95-4* (MACJ3)

Effective until 12 January 1967 unless sooner rescinded or superseded

AVIATION

AIR OPERATIONS IN RVN (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. To establish operating procedures and assign responsibilities for command, control and coordination of US air operations in the Republic of Vietnam.

2. (C) CONCEPT.

a. The general mission of US military forces in the Republic of Vietnam is to provide advice, training and assistance to the RVNAF in their counterinsurgency effort.

b. All US services possess aircraft as a part of their organic equipment and each has the inherent capability to command, control and coordinate its respective air-ground effort and to participate in tactical air support operations in the Republic of Vietnam.

c. It is not the intent of this directive to alter or modify current service concepts for allocation and control of air resources. All services, however, operate through portions of the same airspace and are frequently employed on joint and combined operations. Each possesses, to some degree, the capability to accomplish missions normally assigned to another service. Close cooperation and coordination is therefore required to assure that efforts are complementary, integrated and achieve the most effective results.

3. (C) GENERAL.

a. US Air Force air resources will be employed under the USAF concept of centralized control and decentralized operations. A Tactical Air Control System (TACS) has been established in RVN for use as both an operational and a training vehicle. Allocation and control of USAF/VNAF air resources and coordination of USMC/USN aircraft will be exercised through the elements of this system. Aircraft and units operating under the TACS will be allocated through the Air Operations Center (AOC) to Air Support Operations Centers (ASOC's) as appropriate, for operations in support of Corps Tactical Zones. In the case of USMC strike aircraft, those aircraft available after USMC ground operations requirements have been met will be reported to and allocated by AOC.

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

*This directive supersedes Directive Number 95-4, 7 September 1964; MACJ3 10682, 040509Z April 1965.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS

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APO San Francisco 96243DIRECTIVE 13 July 1965
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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10*This directive supersedes Directive Number 95-4, 7 September 1964; MACJ3
10682, 040509Z April 1965

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Directive Number 95-4, HQ MACV (Cont)

13 July 1965

b. US Army Aviation resources will be allocated to Corps and/or separate Division Senior US Advisors for employment in support of ARVN/US/Third Country operations. Aviation resources so allocated will be assigned, insofar as practicable, missions of direct support of Divisions and Zones. Allocations may be made on the basis of operational control, direct support or general support in accordance with US Army concepts. Senior Advisors will establish an Army Aviation Element (AAE), co-located with each Corps ASOC and each Division TOC, to insure coordination of US/VNAF air activities supporting ARVN/US or Third Country operations.

c. US Army resources allocated in accordance with Annex A are subject to reallocation, recall or diversion on order of the Army Aviation Operations Section (AAOS), JOC Branch, J-3, in accordance with priorities established by this headquarters and RVNAF High Command. US/VNAF resources allocated to ASOC's are subject to reallocation, recall or diversion on order of the Air Operations Center.

d. US Army Aviation resources assigned in general support and not allocated to support a specific Corps or Division will remain under operational control of COMUSMACV. Resources in this category will be controlled and allocated, on behalf of COMUSMACV, by AAOS, JOC Branch, J-3 MACV in accordance with priorities established by this headquarters and the RVNAF High Command. When committed to operations, such resources will be under operational control or in support of, as appropriate, the commander of the US unit or the Senior US Advisor of the ARVN unit concerned until release by the US Commander or Advisor or recalled by MACV through the AAOS.

e. US/Third Country units will request US Army aviation support through the CTOC of the CTZ which they are supporting.

f. USMC aircraft will be allocated thru Marine Command Channels for the support of USMC operations. Aircraft in excess of current USMC requirements may be utilized to support US/RVN/Third Country operations as appropriate.

g. US military aircraft in the Republic of Vietnam will operate under a single coordinated Air Traffic Control System. Air Traffic Control is a service which provides for identification and regulation of aircraft when they are performing tactical air support tasks. It does not exercise mission control or mission denial over aircraft operating in its area of jurisdiction. The Air Traffic Control System established in the Republic of Vietnam will make coordinated maximum use of the communications facilities, personnel and equipment organic to each of the services. The provisions of the reference cited in paragraph 6c apply.

h. For planning purposes, the employment of available air support in RVN will normally be committed in the following order of priority:

- (1) Troops engaged with the enemy in combat.
- (2) Units on major ground operations. (Pre-strike and air cover)

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Directive Number 95-4, HQ MACV (Cont)

13 July 1965

(a) Provides optimum freedom of movement for all aircraft consistent with the priority of their mission and the degree of risk considered to be operationally acceptable.

(b) Provides the capability to warn airborne aircraft of conflicting usage of the airspace.

(c) Is compatible with air defense requirements to include identification and air defense warning.

(d) Incorporates provisions for accepting flight planning information from other services operating in the Republic of Vietnam.

(7) Provide meteorological support for air operations.

(8) Be responsible for and coordinate all search and rescue (SAR) activities in RVN.

(9) Prepare, in conjunction with the Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Vietnam, the CG, 1st MAW, as the Tactical Air Commander for the CG, III MAF, and in coordination with the Commander, 7th Fleet, such joint operating instructions as are needed to insure an integrated and coordinated joint force effort.

b. Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Vietnam, will:

(1) Provide, as directed, US Army Aviation resources to support offensive and defensive ground operations through the conduct, as appropriate and in accordance with established rules of engagement, of airmobile operations, aerial battlefield surveillance, aerial fire support, search and rescue, air transport, and other supplement air support missions as required.

(2) Exercise command, less operational control, of those US Army Aviation resources allocated to Corps and separate Divisions and those under operational control of COMUSMACV.

(3) Provide qualified aviation personnel to operate Army Aviation Elements at Corps and Division TOC's.

(4) Provide US Army Aviation support for headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

(5) Establish and operate an Army Air Traffic Regulation and Identification System, coordinated with and responsive to the Air Traffic Control System operated in conjunction with RVN agencies by the Commander, 2d Air Division.

(6) As the Deputy Army Component Commander, prepare, in conjunction with the Commander, 2d Air Division, such joint operating instructions as needed to insure an integrated and coordinated joint effort.

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Directive Number 95-4, HQ MACV (Cont)

13 July 1965

(3) Air cover for trains, convoys, ships, and aircraft.

(4) Other targets: (a) Targets which are critical to continuation of MACV operations (b) Targets which are important to economic

(a) Targets directly affecting current operations.

(b) Lucrative perishable targets.

(c) Lucrative targets expected to exist for a period of time.

1. In the event of a major emergency or disaster in the area of responsibility which necessitates immediate use of any or all US air resources for accomplishment of a single emergency task, COMUSMACV may direct the Commander, 2d Air Division, to assume operational control of all US air resources. The responsibility for determining the existence of such an emergency rests with COMUSMACV and will not be delegated.

j. Allocation of US Army aircraft and units and support priority for one USMC helicopter squadron to Senior US Advisors and other users is established in Annex A. Allocation of USAF/VNAF and of available USMC/USN strike aircraft and/or units to ASOC's will be established by the Air Operations Center.

4. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Commander, 2d Air Division will:

(1) In his capacity as MACV Air Force Component Commander, act as coordinating authority for all US air operations and VNAF activities (insofar as practicable) in the MACV area from an air defense standpoint.

(2) Establish and operate, in conjunction with the RVNAF, a Tactical Air Control System for command and control of USAF/VNAF and for the coordination of USMC/USN strike aircraft.

(3) Provide essential training for VNAF in offensive and defensive tactical air operations.

(4) Conduct, as appropriate and in accordance with established rules of engagement, offensive and defensive tactical air operations, to include air superiority, interdiction, close air support, reconnaissance, search and rescue, air transport and other supplemental air support as required, within the capabilities of assigned and attached resources.

(5) Be prepared to conduct active air defense throughout the area of responsibility as required.

(6) Establish, in conjunction with other US and RVN agencies, an Air Traffic Control System which will coordinate and direct traffic within the MACV area of responsibility as required.

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c. CG, III MAF, thru his Tactical Air Commander, the CG 1st MAW, will:

(1) Exercise operational control over all USMC Aviation resources except as provided for in paragraph 31, above.

(2) Conduct offensive and defensive Tactical Air Operations to include close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, air superiority, air transport, search and rescue and other supplemental air support, as required and within the capability of assigned and attached resources.

(3) Identify to the Commander, 2d Air Division, through the TACS, those air resources not currently required for support of III MAF operations in order that such resources may be used to support other forces.

(4) Provide aircraft to support US Seventh Fleet operations as directed by COMUSMACV or higher authority.

(5) Establish and operate an organic Tactical Air Control System to include a Tactical Air Direction Center. Coordinate and integrate this system with the TACS operated by VNAF/USAF.

(6) Prepare, in conjunction with the Commander, 2d Air Division, such joint operating instructions as are needed to insure an integrated and coordinated joint effort.

d. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet: Provides strike aircraft as directed by CINCPAC to operate in coordination with the USAF/VNAF TACS.

e. Corps Senior Advisors will:

(1) Exercise operational control over allocated US Army aviation resources.

(2) Establish, within allocated personnel resources, an Army Aviation Element, collocated with the ASOC in zone of responsibility.

(3) Establish, within allocated personnel resources, an Army Aviation Element at each ARVN Division TOC.

(4) Within allocated resources, provide essential aviation support for ARVN military and paramilitary forces in zone of responsibility, including units of the General Reserve and Special Forces when committed.

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5. (C) OPERATIONAL PLANNING.

- a. Joint preplanning of US/VNAF aviation support will be conducted on a daily or more frequent basis at Corps and Divisions. Air Liaison Officer, representatives of ASOC's and Army Aviation Elements will participate in tactical ground operations planning to insure that air support requirements are fully considered and to insure a coordinated air ground effort. USMC officials and Seventh Fleet Liaison Officers will also participate on appropriate occasions.
- b. Senior Advisors and US Commanders will ensure that pre-planning considers the use of air support for all ground operations. Plans for movement of convoys and trains, ground reconnaissance patrols, security forces and quick reaction units will include provisions for using air support as appropriate to the requirement. In regard to airmobile operations, pre-strikes or, where surprise is the principal consideration, air cover by strike aircraft will be used against all landing zones where there is a possibility of VC opposition.

c. Planning of Air Operations in support of III MAF ground operations will be conducted within III MAF Channels, but coordinated with AOC, ASOC's and CTOC's by USMC Liaison Officers as appropriate.

d. Air request channels. Annexes B, C, and D.

6. (U) REFERENCES.

a. JCS Publication 1, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage (JD).

b. JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

c. Letter of Agreement between DCA, VNAF and MACV, Subject: Special Procedures for Tactical Operations Flights, MACJ311, Serial 395, dated 5 February 1965.

d. MACV Directive 95-2, Operational Restrictions on US Military Aircraft in RVN.

e. MACV Directive 95-3, USA/USMC Aviation Support.


f. MACV LOI governing operations of III MAF in RVN, dated 6 May 1965.

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13 July 1965



W. B. ROSSON
 Major General, USA
 Chief of Staff

L. M. HARRIS
 Colonel, AGC
 Adjutant General

4 Incl

1. Annex A - USA/USMC Aircraft Allocation
2. Annex B - Emergency Air Request Channels
3. Annex C - VNAF/USAF Immediate Air Request Channels
4. Annex D - VNAF/USAF Preplanned Air Request Channels

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 30 - MACJ3
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 25 - Sr Adv, II Corps
 25 - Sr Adv, III Corps
 25 - Sr Adv, IV Corps
 2 - Sr Adv, Rung Sat SZ
 25 - COMSEVENTHFLT

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ANNEX A

USA/USMC AIRCRAFT ALLOCATIONSSenior Advisor, I Corps

USMC HMM Squadron (Priority to MAF combat operations) 24 UH-34

I Corps Avn Det (Prov)

6th Airlift Platoon	10	UH-1
7th Airlift Platoon	10	UH-1
220th Avn Co (Obsn Lt)*	24	O-1F
Detachment, 18th Avn Co (Otter)	4	U-1A
Detachment, 92nd Avn Co (Caribou)	2	CV-2B
Detachment, USASCV	1	U-6A

*Effective o/a 25 July 1965

Senior Advisor, II Corps

52nd Avn Bn	25	UH-1
117th Avn Co (AML)	3	O-1F
119th Avn Co (AML)	25	UH-1
Co A (AML), 1st Avn Bn	25	UH-1
219th Avn Co (Obsn Lt)*	48	O-1F
52nd Airlift Platoon	9	UH-1
145th Airlift Platoon	10	UH-1
Detachment, 18th Avn Co (Otter)	6	U-1A
Detachment, 92nd Avn Co (Caribou)	2	CV-2B

*Effective o/a 20 July 1965

Senior Advisor, III Corps

145th Avn Bn	25	UH-1
118th Avn Co (AML)	3	O-1F
197th Avn Co (AML)	25	UH-1
120th Avn Co (AML)	3	O-1F
Co A (AML), 501st Avn Bn	25	UH-1
Co A (AML), 82nd Avn Bn	3	O-1F
57th Med Det (Hel Amb) (Plus DS 7th DTA)	25	UH-1
	5	UH-1

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74th Avn Co (Oboe Lt)* (Priority 2 A/C to Rung Sat SZ)	24	O-1F
Detachment, 18th Avn Co (Otter)**	4	U-1A
Detachment, 54th Avn Co (Otter)**		
Detachment, 61st Avn Co (Caribou)	1	CV-2B

*Effective 0/a 15 Aug 1965
**54th Avn Co relieves 18th Avn Co when operational

Senior Advisor, IV Corps

13th Avn Bn				
11th Avn Co (AML)	*(31 med C) 60 AVA 38F	25	UH-1	
121st Avn Co (AML)	(med C) 60 AVA 38F	3	O-1F	
Ad 121st Avn Co (AML)	60 AVA 38F	25	UH-1	
		3	O-1F	
Co A (AML), 502nd Avn Bn	60 AVA 38F	25	UH-1	
		3	O-1F	
Co A (AML), 101st Avn Bn	60 AVA 38F	25	UH-1	
82nd Med Det (Hel Amb) (Less 7th DTA)	60 AVA 38F	5	UH-1	
221st Avn Co (Obsn Lt)*	60 AVA 38F	32	O-1F	
Detachment, 18th Avn Co (Otter)**	60 AVA 38F	6	U-1A	
Detachment, 54th Avn Co (Otter)**	60 AVA 38F	6	U-1A	
Detachment, 61st Avn Co (Caribou)	60 AVA 38F	3	CV-2B	
L-HU				
*Effective c/s 15 Aug 1965				

**Effective o/a 15 Aug 1965
**54th Avn Co relieves 18th Avn Co when operational

*Effective when 54th Avn Co becomes operational

USASF(V)

Detachment, 52nd Airlift Platoon	(AMA) 01 00 00 1-1 UH-1
Detachment, 18th Avn Co (Otter)	2 U-1A
Detachment, 92nd Avn Co (Caribou)	(AMA) 00 00 00 3-1 CV-2B
II-0	(AMA) 00 00 00 00
II-0	00 00 00 00
Detachment, 61st Avn Co (Caribou)	2 CV-2B
II-0	(AMA) 00 00 00 00

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ANNEX A

USA/USMC AIRCRAFT ALLOCATIONS

(Notional) (MAF combat operations) (JMA) (MAF combat operations) (JMA) (MAF combat operations) (JMA)

Senior Advisor, I Corps

USMC HMM Squadron (Priority to MAF combat operations) 24 UH-34

I Corps Avn Det (Prov)

6th Airlift Platoon	10	UH-1
7th Airlift Platoon	10	UH-1
220th Avn Co (Obsn Lt)*	24	O-1F
Detachment, 18th Avn Co (Otter)	4	U-1A
Detachment, 92nd Avn Co (Caribou)	2	CV-2B
Detachment, USASCV	1	U-6A

*Effective o/a 25 July 1965

Senior Advisor, II Corps

52nd Avn Bn	(ATD MAF 25) (MAF combat operations) (JMA) (MAF combat operations) (JMA) (MAF combat operations) (JMA)	
117th Avn Co (AML)	25	UH-1
119th Avn Co (AML)	3	O-1F
Co A (AML), 1st Avn Bn	25	UH-1
219th Avn Co (Obsn Lt)*	48	O-1F
52nd Airlift Platoon	9	UH-1
145th Airlift Platoon	10	UH-1
Detachment, 18th Avn Co (Otter)	6	U-1A
Detachment, 92nd Avn Co (Caribou)	2	CV-2B

*Effective o/a 20 July 1965

Senior Advisor, III Corps

145th Avn Bn

118th Avn Co (AML)	25	UH-1
197th Avn Co (AML)	3	O-1F
120th Avn Co (AML)	25	UH-1
Co A (AML), 501st Avn Bn	3	O-1F
Co A (AML), 82nd Avn Bn	25	UH-1
57th Med Det (Hel Amb) (Plus DS 7th DTA)	5	UH-1

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Detachment, 18th Avn Co (Otter)	1	U-1A
Detachment, 54th Avn Co (Otter)*		
Detachment, 61st Avn Co (Caribou)	1	CV-2B

*54th Avn Co relieves 18th Avn Co when operational

(MACV GENERAL SUPPORT)

(Allocations and priorities, except as noted, established by the Army Aviations Operations Section (AAOS), JOC Branch, MACV J3)
 73rd Aerial Surveillance Co (Mohawk)
 (Priorities established by MACV J2 thru AAOS)

12	OV-1
----	------

20th ASTA Platoon (Mohawk) (Priorities established by MACV J2 thru AAOS)	6	OV-1
120th Avn Co (AML)	25	UH-1
Detachment, 61st Avn Co (Caribou)	2	CV-2B
Detachment, 92nd Avn Co (Caribou)	2	CV-2B
MACV Flight Detachment	9	U8
	6	U6

NOTES:


1. CV-2B and U-1A allocations are flyable aircraft and are based on 62.5 percent and 81 percent in commission rates respectively. CV-2B and U-1A aircraft allocated herein are programmed to provide 96 and 98 flying hours respectively per aircraft per month to users.
2. U-1A aircraft allocated from the 18th Aviation Company (Otter) are total airframes out of which must be deducted maintenance downtime until the 54th Aviation Company becomes operational. At that time, note 1 applies to aircraft of both units.
3. Phase in of O-1F aircraft to be accomplished in accordance with instructions previously issued to the field.
4. This Annex supersedes all previous instructions regarding the permanent allocation of US Army aircraft.

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ANNEX B

EMERGENCY AIR REQUEST CHANNELS



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
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ANNEX C

VNAF/USAF IMMEDIATE AIR REQUEST CHANNELS



NOTE: Abn Bde or Marine Bde may submit air support requests directly to AOC through the VNAF ARN if operating as an independent force. Otherwise requests will be submitted to ASOC of CTZ being supported.

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
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ANNEX D

VNAF/USAF PREPLANNED AIR REQUEST CHANNELS



* Special task forces such as the Abn Bde and Marine Bde units may submit preplanned air support requests to their TOC or another TOC depending on the concept of operations for the assigned task and area of operation.

LEGEND:

ARVN Air Ground System —

Ground to Ground Comm —X—(Request) —X—()

Order

Requirement

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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

BETWEEN

COMMANDER 2D AIR DIVISION

COMMANDING GENERAL, FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

SUBJECT: AGREEMENT FOR PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF 1ST MAW FORCES

IN SUPPORT OF US AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS IN RVN

1. PURPOSE: TO LIST ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND TO DISSEMINATE BASIC POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF US AIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS IN RVN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.

2. WHEN EFFECTIVE: THIS AGREEMENT BECOMES EFFECTIVE WHEN SIGNED/AUTHENTICATED BY THE COMMANDER, 2D AIR DIVISION AND COMMANDING GENERAL, 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING.

3. TERMS OF REFERENCE:

A. COMUSMACV IS A SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDER UNDER CINCPAC. COMMANDER, 2D AIR DIVISION IS THE DESIGNATED AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER TO COMUSMACV. IN THIS CAPACITY, COMMANDER 2D AIR DIVISION WILL CONDUCT AND COORDINATE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS, TACTICAL AIR-LIFT, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, SEARCH AND RESCUE, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND RECONNAISSANCE, PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS AND NAVIGATIONAL FACILITIES AS REQUIRED.

C. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR US AIR DEFENSE IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA WILL BE DISCHARGED BY CINCPACAF THROUGH HIS MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA AIR DEFENSE REGION COMMANDER (COM2AD). THE COMMANDER MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA AIR DEFENSE REGION WILL EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER ALL AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH ARE ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO HIM.

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D. CG, III MAF IS THE NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER OF COMUSMACV. CG 1ST MAW IS THE TACTICAL AIR COMMANDER UNDER III MAF AND HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED DIRECT LIAISON WITH COMMANDER, 2D AIR DIVISION.

E. III MAF FORCES ARE ASSIGNED TO THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF COMUSMACV. COMUSMACV EXERCISES OPERATIONAL CONTROL THROUGH CG, III MAF.

4. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS:

A. TERMS DEFINED IN JCS PUB 1 ARE ACCEPTED AS PUBLISHED.

B. MARINE CORPS DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS:

(1) TADC - TACTICAL AIR DIRECTION CENTER. THE CONTROL CENTER FROM WHICH CG 1ST MAW CONTROLS AND DIRECTS HIS OVERALL AIR EFFORT.

(2) CAOC - COUNTER AIR OPERATIONS CENTER. A 1ST MAW AIR CONTROL FACILITY WHICH PROVIDES FOR SURVEILLANCE, DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT AND CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF FIGHTER TYPE AIRCRAFT. (ORGANIC

A MACS DESCRIBED IN (5) BELOW.)

(3) DASC - DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER. THE 1ST MAW AIR CONTROL FACILITY WHICH CONTROLS AIRCRAFT IN DIRECT AND CLOSE SUPPORT OF III MAF FORCES.

(4) AAOC - ANTI-AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS CENTER. A 1ST MAW CONTROL FACILITY WHICH PROVIDES FOR CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES (HAWKS).

(5) MACS - MARINE AIR CONTROL SQUADRON. A 1ST MAW UNIT WHICH PROVIDES SEARCH, EARLY WARNING, HEIGHT FINDING, AND GAP FILLER RADAR COVERAGE AND GROUND CONTROL INTERCEPT FOR FIGHTER TYPE AIRCRAFT. (A CAOC IS ORGANIC TO A MACS.)

(6) MASS - MARINE AIR SUPPORT SQUADRON HAS FACILITIES FOR PROVIDING

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DIRECT AIR SUPPORT TO MARINE GROUND FORCES. A DASC (DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER) AND 3 ASRT (AIR SUPPORT RADAR TEAMS) COMPRIZE A MASS.

(7) MATCU - MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNIT. A 1ST MAW FACILITY WHICH PROVIDES TERMINAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AT AN AIR BASE.

(8) LAAM BN - LIGHT ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE BATTALION. A 1ST MAW UNIT WHICH PROVIDES SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE FIRES FOR AIR DEFENSE.

C. AIR FORCE DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS:

(1) TACS - TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. A USAF AIR CONTROL SYSTEM ESTABLISHED IN RVN FOR CONTROL OF AIR RESOURCES MADE AVAILABLE TO INCLUDE COORDINATION OF USN/USMC AIR RESOURCES. IT IS A COMBINED SYSTEM MANNED BY USAF AND VNAF PERSONNEL.

(2) TACC - TACTICAL AIR CONTROL CENTER. THE 2D AIR DIVISION/VNAF INSTALLATION FROM WHICH THE TACTICAL AIR EFFORT AND AIR CONTROL FUNCTIONS ARE PLANNED, COORDINATED AND DIRECTED, LOCATED AT TAN SON NHUT AIR BASE.

(3) CRC - CONTROL AND REPORTING CENTER.

(4) CRP - CONTROL AND REPORTING POST.

(5) RP - REPORTING POST.

(6) DASC - DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER. A SUBORDINATE OPERATIONAL COMPONENT OF THE TACS RESPONSIBLE TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE TACC FOR CONDUCT OF PREPLANNED AND IMMEDIATE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND ATTENDANT TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS.

(7) AEW&C - AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL. THE RADAR FACILITY PROVIDED FOR CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS BY EC-121 AIRCRAFT.

(8) SEAADR - MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA AIR DEFENSE REGION.

(9) SEE - SOUTHEAST ASIA EAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR.

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5. CONCEPT OF AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS DA NANG SUB-SECTOR:

A. THE COMMANDER SEAADR DESIGNATES THE AREA IN RVN NORTH OF 14 DEGREES 30 MINUTES NORTH LATITUDE AS THE DA NANG SUB-SECTOR UTILIZING THE CONTROL FACILITIES OF THE MONKEY MOUNTAIN (DA NANG) CRC.

B. THE MONKEY MOUNTAIN (DA NANG) CRC HAS OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES. FOR AIR DEFENSE, IT WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SURVEILLANCE, IDENTIFICATION, COMMITMENT, INTERCEPTION AND ENGAGEMENT OF ALL AIRCRAFT PRESENTING A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE DANANG SUB-SECTOR. THE CRC IS ALSO DELEGATED, IN ITS SUB-SECTOR, THE TASK OF MANAGEMENT OF ASSIGNED AIR DEFENSE FORCES: LIAISON AND COORDINATION WITH AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AGENCIES AND THE ARMY, NAVY, MARINE AND ALLIED ELEMENTS: AND PROVIDING EVALUATION OF THE AIR SITUATION. THE CRC WILL ADDITIONALLY INTERCHANGE LATERAL AND THREAT TELL WITH THE TAN SON NHUT SUB-SECTOR, THE SOUTHEAST ASIA WEST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR (SEW), AND TASK FORCE 77.

C. TO REDUCE SPAN OF CONTROL AND TO REDUCE THE REACTION TIME NECESSARY TO COPE WITH A RAPIDLY DEVELOPING AIR THREAT, THE COMMANDER SEAADR HAS DESIGNATED A USAF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE 2D AIR DIVISION TACC AS AIR DEFENSE BATTLE COMMANDER IN DA NANG SUB-SECTOR TO BE CO-LOCATED AT THE MONKEY MOUNTAIN CRC AND AVAILABLE 24 HOURS DAILY. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE COMMANDER SEAADR, THE AIR DEFENSE BATTLE COMMANDER WILL BE DELEGATED AUTHORITY IN DA NANG SUB-SECTOR TO DECLARE AIRCRAFT HOSTILE, ENGAGE ENEMY FORCES, ORDER MANDATORY SCRAMBLE, AND IMPLEMENT SURFACE TO AIR (SAM) WEAPONS FREE AREAS, ZONES AND CORRIDORS.

6. RESPONSIBILITIES:

A. COMMANDER 2D AIR DIVISION WILL:

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- (1) HAVE OVERALL AIR DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN THE MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA AND FUNCTION AS AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER.
- (2) ESTABLISH, MAINTAIN, AND OPERATE AN AIR DEFENSE BRANCH IN THE TACC.
- (3) OPERATE CRC'S AT TAN SON NHUT AND MONKEY MOUNTAIN.
- (4) ESTABLISH TWO AIR DEFENSE SUB-SECTORS WITHIN THE SEE SECTOR.
- (5) PUBLISH SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING PROCEDURES TO BE USED.
- (6) PUBLISH RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.
- (7) ASSIGN AN AIR DEFENSE BATTLE COMMANDER TO BE ON DUTY AT ALL TIMES AT CRC MONKEY MOUNTAIN WHO WILL ACT AS THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COMMANDER, SEAADR IN THE DA NANG SUB-SECTOR.
- (8) PROVIDE COMMUNICATION EXTERNAL TO 1ST MAW TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM REQUIRED TO INTEGRATE 1ST MAW SYSTEM WITH TACS.

B. COMMANDING GENERAL, 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING WILL:

- (1) ESTABLISH ORGANIC TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM.
- (2) INTEGRATE SUCH ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST MAW ORGANIC TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AS MAY BE APPROVED BY THE COMMANDER SEAADR INTO THE SEA TACS WITH COMMUNICATIONS PROVIDED BY 2AD/GOMUSMACV FOR PURPOSES OF COORDINATING AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, AIR DEFENSE AND SUCH OTHER TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS AS MAY BE REQUIRED.
- (3) DESIGNATE A CAOC TO SERVE AS BACK-UP AIR DEFENSE CONTROL CENTER FOR CRC MONKEY MOUNTAIN.
- (4) ESTABLISH IN DA NANG TAOR A LAAM BATTALION.
- (5) ASSUME HOT PAD ALERT AT DA NANG AND PROVIDE ALERT AIRCRAFT WITHIN HIS CAPABILITIES.

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(6) PROVIDE LIAISON OFFICERS TO TACC AND CRC MONKEY MOUNTAIN.

7. POLICY:

A. PARTICIPATION OF 1ST MAW FORCES IN AIR DEFENSE WITHIN RVN CAN BE A VALUABLE AND POSSIBLY CRITICAL CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY AND POSTURE WITHIN RVN.

B. WITHIN RVN THE 2D AIR DIVISION IS ASSIGNED AIR DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITY AND HAS ESTABLISHED THE NECESSARY COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTEGRATION AND CONTROL OF U.S. RESOURCES IN AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS WITH FORCES OF THE HOST NATION, THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION OF 1ST MAW FORCES REQUIRES THEY BE EMPLOYED IN ACCORDANCE WITH US/RVN ARRANGEMENTS, PROCEDURES, AND/OR AGREEMENTS.

C. CG 1ST MAW WILL DESIGNATE THOSE FORCES UNDER HIS COMMAND TO PARTICIPATE IN AND CONDUCT AIR DEFENSE TASKS. COMMANDER 2D AIR DIVISION WILL EXERCISE THE FOLLOWING AUTHORITY OVER 1ST MAW FORCES DESIGNATED FOR PARTICIPATION IN AIR DEFENSE:

(1) FOR FIGHTER TYPE AIRCRAFT:

(A) AUTHORITY TO ADJUST ALERT POSTURE AS APPROPRIATE TO THE AIR DEFENSE SITUATION BUT WITHIN LIMITS AGREED TO FROM TIME TO TIME BY COMMANDER, 2D AIR DIVISION AND COMMANDING GENERAL, 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING.

(B) SCRAMBLE AUTHORITY FOR ALERT AIRCRAFT.

(C) DESIGNATION OF GROUND CONTROL STATIONS.

(D) DESIGNATION OF AIRBORNE TARGET(S).

(E) DIRECTING THEIR DIVERSION AND RECOVERY.

(2) FOR MACS:

(A) THOSE PORTIONS OF A MACS ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE OPERATIONAL AND FUNCTIONING AS AN ELEMENT OF THE GROUND ENVIRONMENT OF THE DA NANG SUB-SECTOR.

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1. MACS UNITS AC&W FACILITIES WILL BE INTEGRATED AS CONTROL AND REPORTING POSTS (CRP) OR REPORTING POSTS (RP) WITHIN THE DA NANG SUB-SECTOR REPORTING TO THE MONKEY MOUNTAIN CRC FOR AIR DEFENSE, WEAPONS CONTROL, AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH PERTINENT PLANS AND DIRECTIVES.

2. THE CAOC OF THE MACS UNIT PROPOSED FOR DA NANG SUB-SECTOR MOST SUITABLY POSITIONED WILL BE ADDITIONALLY DESIGNATED A BACKUP CRC. THE BACKUP CRC WILL PROVIDE FACILITIES FOR USAF AND VNAF LIAISON OFFICERS AS THE SITUATION REQUIRES. (COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES COMMENSURATE WITH BACKUP CRC RESPONSIBILITIES WILL BE PROVIDED BY 2D AIR DIVISION BETWEEN DA NANG TROPO AND THE BACKUP CRC.)

(3) LAAM BATTALION:

(A) AUTHORITY TO DESIGNATE, ASSIGN AND ORDER ENGAGEMENT OF HOSTILE AIRCRAFT.

(B) AUTHORITY TO DECLARE WEAPONS CONTROL STATUS, I.E. DISCREET FIRE, WEAPONS TIGHT, WEAPONS FREE, AND HOLD FIRE.

D. DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN 2D AIR DIVISION AND 1ST MAW IS AUTHORIZED AND ENCOURAGED FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT.

E. TO DEVELOP TEAM WORK REQUIRED FOR EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION OF 1ST MAW FORCES INTO AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM, TRAINING EXERCISES WILL BE CONDUCTED WHENEVER PRACTICABLE ON NON-INTERFERENCE BASIS WITH OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

F. 2D AIR DIVISION WILL PROVIDE 1ST MAW SUFFICIENT COPIES OF BRIEFINGS, PLANS, REGULATIONS, MANUALS, AND OTHER INSTRUCTIONAL INFORMATION AS MAY BE REQUIRED FOR 1ST MAW FORCES TO PARTICIPATE EFFECTIVELY IN AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS IN RVN.

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G. WHEN PROVIDING AIRCRAFT ON ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE ALERT AND WEATHER OR AIRFIELD CONDITIONS BECOME SUCH AS TO MAKE OPERATIONS OF THESE AIRCRAFT HAZARDOUS, 1ST MAW AIRCRAFT WILL BE REPORTED TO THE CRC AS ON "MANDATORY SCRAMBLE" STATUS, THEY MAY BE SCRAMBLED ONLY ON AUTHORITY OF DESIGNATED U.S. AIR DEFENSE BATTLE COMMANDER AT THE SECTOR CRC AFTER AN APPROPRIATE EVALUATION OF THE THREAT VERSUS HAZARD INVOLVED. ANY SCRAMBLE ORDERED FOR ALERT ON "MANDATORY SCRAMBLE" STATUS WILL INCLUDE THE TERM "MANDATORY SCRAMBLE".

8. COMMUNICATIONS RESPONSIBILITIES: COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES TO SUPPORT THE AIR DEFENSE STRUCTURE WILL BE OBTAINED AND SUPPORTED BY A COMBINATION OF ORGANIZATIONS AND SYSTEMS. FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT THE FOLLOWING BASIC RESPONSIBILITIES ARE RECOGNIZED.

A. COMMANDER 2D AIR DIVISION WILL:

- (1) BE RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERALL PLANNING TO ESTABLISH AND IMPROVE BASIC COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS WHICH INTERCONNECT ELEMENTS OF THE AIR DEFENSE STRUCTURE.
- (2) PROVIDE AND MAINTAIN ALL AIR-GROUND AND INTERNAL SITE COMMUNICATIONS AT USAF AND JOINT USAF/VNAF SITES.
- (3) TAKE ACTION TO OBTAIN VALIDATED CIRCUIT ALLOCATIONS IN SUPPORT OF AIR DEFENSE STRUCTURE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.
- (4) ARRANGE FOR TERMINATION OF ALL VALIDATED CIRCUITS AT USAF OR JOINT USAF/VNAF SITES AND 1ST MAW AIR DEFENSE SITES WHERE CIRCUITS ARE EXTERNAL TO 1ST MAW REQUIREMENTS.
- (5) FURNISH CURRENT SIE/IFF MODES/CODES TO MONKEY MOUNTAIN CRC FOR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF 1ST MAW AIRCRAFT.

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B. COMMANDING GENERAL, 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING WILL:

- (1) PROVIDE AND MAINTAIN AIR-GROUND AND INTERNAL SITE COMMUNICATIONS AT 1ST MAW AIR DEFENSE SITES.
- (2) ARRANGE FOR TERMINATION OF THOSE VALIDATED CIRCUITS AT 1ST MAW AIR DEFENSE SITES WHERE CIRCUITY ARE IN SUPPORT OF INTERNAL 1ST MAW AIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS.
- (3) TAKE ACTION TO OBTAIN CIRCUITS IN SUPPORT OF INTERNAL 1ST MAW AIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS.

9. REVISIONS: THIS AGREEMENT MAY BE REVISED FROM TIME TO TIME AS AGREED TO BY THE UNDERSIGNED.

J. H. MOORE
LT GENERAL, USAF
COMMANDER, 2D AIRDIV

K. B. MCCUTCHEON
BRIG GENERAL, USMC
CG, 1ST MAW