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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Memorandum

A03E-fws

DATE : 8Nov67

FROM : Head, Civic Action Branch

TO : Head, Historical Reference Section, Historical Branch

SUBJECT : Warrenton Meeting on Vietnam, Jan8-11, 1966

Encl : (1) Report of the Warrenton Meeting (Reproduced copy)

1. The enclosure is provided as an item of historical significance. The Warrenton Report was a product of a top level meeting in Jan66 to establish national policies and objectives in Vietnam.


D.P. WYCKOFF

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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D.P.WYCKOFF

WARRENTON

8-11 Jan 66

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REPORT

January 13, 1966

To Principals:

Secretary of State

Administrator AID

Secretary of Defense

Director USIA

Director CIA

Special Assistant to
the President for
National Security Affairs

To Ambassador Lodge

From: Co-Chairmen: Ambassadors William Porter and
Leonard Under

Subject: Warrenton Meeting on Viet-Nam, January 8-11, 1966

1. The Warrenton meeting was originally called for mid-December, 1965 in order to bring together senior representatives of the U.S. Mission, Saigon, the Viet-Nam Coordinating Committee, Washington, and several other individuals (see Annex A) to a) review the joint GVN-US pacification/rural construction program and seek to promote its more effective operation and b) address the problem of the increasingly serious shortages and bottlenecks in manpower, materials and transport in Viet-Nam and to designate priorities and machinery for resources control and allocation.

2. Before the meeting convened on its postponed date (January 8) it had also been agreed to take advantage of the presence here of the Saigon representatives to hold an

SECRET

REPORT OF WARRENTON MEETING
8-11 JAN 66

SECRET

-2-

additional day of meeting in Warrenton to discuss the problems, inter alia, of Montagnards, Chieu Hoi, land tenure and urban questions such as Labor and Youth and to meet 2 days more in Washington on, inter alia, Prisoners of War, Economic Warfare, Free World Assistance, and Elections and Political Parties. This latter set of Washington meetings is still underway as this report is being written. Meanwhile, Messrs. Bell, Poats and Chester Cooper and Mr. Richard Cooper's group have visited Saigon to develop emergency programs to meet the grave inflationary threat, the problem of port congestion and to review the organization of the U.S. Mission to handle economic problems. For this reason the Warrenton Meeting did not address the first two problems at any length.

3. On the basis of the several days' discussion, considerably assisted by numerous reports from the Saigon representatives, the general conclusions were reached that a) the military situation although not critical nevertheless continues grave in Viet-Nam with a prospect ^{at least} under the present strategy of several years' more fighting on the current scale before the GVN will be in a position to exercise effective control over substantially all of South Viet-Nam except over Viet Cong base areas; b) there have been some instances of weakening Viet Cong morale, but the Viet Cong, buttressed by continuing infiltration from the North, continue to be a dangerous and effective fighting force; c) the Ky Government continues in relative stability with its collegial division of responsibility, is willing and in a limited degree able to take certain measures long considered necessary to improve its domestic and international position but remains fragile and is failing to live up to its "revolutionary" billing as originally presented by Prime Minister Ky or to produce a fighting force appreciably larger or more aggressive than earlier.

4. In view of this evaluation in general and, in particular, the inter-dependence of military operations and rural construction, it is recommended that a SNIE be promptly produced on the likely development of the politico-military situation over the next two years, based upon

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

present estimates of enemy capabilities and Vietnamese and allied deployment plans, with particular attention to certain outside factors which could produce unanticipated shortfalls in the execution of present plans (identified at Annex B).

5. The sense of the participants also was that it would be advisable to review the current political-military strategy in Viet-Nam and related areas. Such a study (also see Annex B) should include: a) scope and phasing of force deployment (U.S., Free World and GVN), b) alternative concepts for the employment of forces in South Viet-Nam; against infiltration through Laos and by sea; and related actions against North Viet-Nam. (The projected Honolulu meeting at the end of this January might serve this purpose among others.)

6. In its deliberations on rural construction/pacification ("the reconstitution of the social and governmental fabric") the Warrenton meeting noted some encouraging actions by the GVN: a) to develop, in frequent consultation with the U.S. Mission, promising concepts to provide an agreed basis for this effort (see Annex C), b) to issue detailed instructions about the operation of the rural construction program including provision for continuous coordination between the civilian and military branches at national, corps, division and province levels and c) to organize cadre teams and groups designed to see the effort through from the conclusion of large-scale military action to the point where reconstituted governmental and social institutions can ^{with} resume their functions in cooperation/a receptive population.

7. On this same subject conclusions and recommendations were adopted (see Annex D) on the following aspects:

a. concentration of effort and resources on the four already designated rural construction priority areas for 1966, with lower priorities in turn for the extensive remaining areas where that program is also underway and for other kinds of U.S. programs in rural areas (a report will be submitted to the VNCC by the Mission by March 31 on the prospects for successful execution of the plans for the four priority areas in 1966),

SECRET

SECRET

-4-

b. continued direct U.S. funding to support the most crucial aspects of the rural construction program (i.e. cadre for the teams in the Rural Construction 80-man Groups),

c. the importance of encouraging the development of representative bodies at the hamlet or village level, as well as the development of non-governmental institutions such as cooperatives and labor unions,

d. the optimum organization of the U.S. Mission for its support of the rural construction/pacification program - a senior official with a supporting staff with full-time responsibility in this field was considered necessary. (Coordination is also required with Ambassador Lodge and Mr. Bell's conclusions on this point.) It would also be desirable for such an official to have in Washington a high-level point of liaison to assure the expeditious discharge here of urgent Viet-Nam business in this field. (See also items 10 and 14 below.),

e. the proper relation of the respective roles and missions of rural construction teams, police and regional and popular forces, and with the missions of the regular forces, and the requirement for a police force of adequate size and charged with an appropriate mission,

f. the collation both in Washington and Saigon of available material on the primary needs and requirements of the rural population (e.g. as reflected in findings of the Census Grievance Teams) - (See Annex D.).

8. The need to be prepared for an expanded role of the police in a situation of ceasefire (and eventual peace) was also noted and Mission Saigon will prepare a contingency plan for the immediate incorporation of some element of the various paramilitary forces into the police in anticipation of such circumstances.

9. On the matter of resource allocation the meeting took note of the grave danger to essential GVN and U.S. programs

SECRET

SECRET

-5-

of insufficiently controlled construction and free bidding for scarce manpower and the contribution of these activities to the inflation problem. In this connection, the Saigon Mission representatives described the setting up of the Deputy Ambassador's committee on construction priorities and the joint GVN-US committees on manpower, construction, logistics, construction material and wages. Measures recently taken to relieve port congestion were also noted.

10. It was the sense of the participants that Ambassador Lodge be invited to consider the appointment as his own direct adviser or assistant of a high-level resource allocation official to devote full time to the anticipation and elimination of resource stringencies; such an official might chair the U.S. side of the joint GVN-US committees mentioned above and serve as principal adviser to the Deputy Ambassador on the construction priorities committee. He should also have a Washington counterpart to follow up such business here (see also paragraphs 7d above and 14 below). For guidance in this field, it was proposed that the Mission regard combat operations, the rural construction program and the logistical support for both of these, and measures for economic stability as having top priority; other GVN-US activities will take second place. Pending the preparation of the strategy paper mentioned in paragraph 13, the meeting did not attempt to agree on any further refinement of priorities for resource allocation.

11. On the other subjects treated at Warrenton the following conclusions, which are elaborated in Annex E, have been drawn:

a. The U.S. should take advantage of General Co's recent invitation (see Embtel 2451) to submit suggestions on a GVN program for the Montagnards as an opening to press hard for concrete improvements in GVN-Montagnard relations in the economic, social and, as soon as possible, political fields.

b. At present the Chieu Hoi program most requires effective reception and resettlement of returnees. The Mission will seek to stimulate this through the provincial authorities, perhaps through the occasional direct application of funds; it will also continue to press the GVN for recognition of

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SECRET

-6-

the importance of the program at national level and continue to urge the designation of an effective head.

c. Studies of land tenure, credit and related programs will be expedited to enhance their use as support of the rural construction program.

d. While rural construction takes priority over urban programs in general, the U.S. Mission will examine how the U.S. might expand its educational and cultural activities directed at youth in urban as well as rural areas.

12. On a number of occasions during the meeting there was discussion of the intensity of pressure the US should seek to exert on the GVN to adopt or vigorously pursue policies or programs which we favor. In principle the US, by paying attention to forms, should take care to maintain the full appearance of GVN independence, but in view of the US involvement and commitment in South Viet-Nam, it may be necessary to exert considerable pressure. Ambassador Lodge and the Saigon Mission will have to be the judges of how pressure, persuasion and manipulation are managed in any specific case. (Some of the participants believe that unless this basic issue -- the U.S. ability to influence the GVN -- is resolved satisfactorily, our already questionable chances of success in South Viet-Nam will be significantly reduced.)

13. Finally, with regard to policies and programs in Viet-Nam, the absence of any recent strategy paper was noted and the Saigon Mission will undertake the preparation of a first draft to cover the coming 3-5 year period. This should correlate political, military, economic and propaganda policies and future activities, assure that they are in harmony with each other and best serve US objectives. Such a paper will have to be related to several alternative assumptions provided by Washington.

14. Note was taken also of the inadequacy of present U.S. Government machinery in Washington to handle Viet-Nam problems quickly and decisively. The need for referral of too large a number of problems to the Secretarial level was

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ANNEX A

PARTICIPANTS1. Saigon Principals:

William J. Porter - Embassy
 Charles A. Mann - USOM
 Barry Zorthian - USIA
 Edward G. Lansdale - Embassy
 Brig.Gen. James L. Collins - MACV
 Gordon Jorgensen - CIA

2. VNCC Principals (from Washington):

Leonard Unger - State
 Rutherford Poats - AID
 Maj.Gen. William R. Peers - JCS
 Alvin Friedman - OSD/ISA
 William Colby - CIA
 Peer deSilva - CIA
 Chester Cooper - White House
 Sanford Marlowe - USIA

3. Others:

Maj.Gen. Clair Hutchins - CINCPAC
 Norman Hannah - CINCPAC-POLAD
 Rufus Phillips - Lansdale group*
 Charles Zwick - Bureau of the Budget*
 Henry S. Rowen - Bureau of the Budget*
 George C. Lodge - Consultant*
 Desmond Fitzgerald - CIA*
 Dr. Leon Goure - Rand*

* not present at all sessions

4. Other Saigon:

Philip L. Habib - Embassy
 Sam Wilson - USOM
 Capt. Stanley Konorowski - MACV

5. Other VNCC:

Daniel Moore - USIA
 Walter Stoneman - AID
 Col. John Arthur - JCS
 Lt.Col. Kurtz Miller - OSD/ISA
 Donald Ropa - White House
 Col. Otis Hays - USIA

Robert Miller - State
 John Helble - State
 WA. K. Lake - State
 W. Robert Warne - State
 Joseph Z. Taylor - AID

SECRET

-7-

one of the problems mentioned. While the meeting did not have time to come to any firm conclusions, there was a view that the VNCC because of its coordinating rather than decision-cum-enforcement powers could not perform this task except in part. If endowing the VNCC or its Chairman with larger powers, and with a staff associated with no one agency, is not a feasible solution, it was considered that the required directing position might have to be set up at a higher level, perhaps related to the National Security Council. (See also paragraphs 7d and 10 above.)

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Review of Politico-Military Strategy -- Other Possible
Courses of Action (Paragraph 5 of Report)

Although this is not an all-inclusive list, some of the courses of action which should be investigated include the following:

- a. In allocation of available forces, what priority should be given to fulfillment of missions designated in national, corps and provincial rural construction plans.
- b. Roles and missions of allied forces to include possibility for integration with elements of RVNAF units, allied leadership for Vietnamese troops, and methods of operation.
- c. Comparative effectiveness of defensive, securing or offensive employment of allied forces against the peculiar nature of the VC enemy;
- d. Possible reallocation of forces to include those devoted to protection of population in pacification areas, reduction of infiltration and denial of base areas to the enemy, selecting priorities among these in specific areas and assigning appropriate proportions of available assets;
- e. Potential of developing irregular "resistance movements among special groups in SVN or selected areas thereof, with or without GVN collaboration.

SECRET

11

ANNEX B

ATSECRET

f. Responsibilities for Rural reconstruction:

- (1) Lowest administrative official who actually and directly involves in the rural reconstruction work during the security restoration period is the District Chief. Besides the actual administrative & military facilities at District level, a number of Civilian Cadre Groups called "Rural reconstruction Cadre groups" are placed under the employment of the District Chief to perform the rural reconstruction.
- (2) These cadre groups are recruited by the Districts and Provinces, and trained by the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and other Ministries. Each group consists of the following four elements: Armed propaganda Section, civil affairs team, People's pre-propaganda Team and New Life development team. This group can be reinforced with the Communal Pacification Committee, local hamlet and technical cadres (Paywar, Public Health, Education..)

(a) Missions of Armed Propaganda Section:

- 1 Conduct propaganda under every form to:
 - a. Explain the rural reconstruction policies of the Government, working procedures of the Cadre Groups, missions of the cadres and missions of the people.
 - b. Appeal to the people to coordinate with the Cadre Groups and not to cooperate with the Viet Cong.
- 2 Study the areas to which the Groups plan to restore security.
- 3 Organize and train People's self-defense forces.
- 4 Provide close in security for the Groups.
- 5 Destroy VC infra-structures.

(b) Missions of Civil Affairs Team:

- 1 Make a census and classify the people living in the areas.
- 2 Interrogate the people to:
 - a. Discover VC infra-structures and to continually follow up VC infra-structures and our infra-structures.
 - b. Compile the aspirations and complaints of the people.

ATSECRET

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(c) Missions of People's propaganda Team:

1. Replace Hamlet and Communal authorities during the transient period or reinforce the present Hamlet and Communal authorities.
2. Motivate the people to rise up and organize themselves into Groups and maintain regular activities.
3. Motivate the people and assist the District Chief in the election of Hamlet Chiefs, Assistant Hamlet Chiefs and Communal People's Councils.

(d) Missions of the New Life Development Team are to temporarily satisfy the immediate requirements of the people on public health, education, social affairs, agriculture...and concurrently to lay foundation for future new life development work. The missions of the Team are to:

1. Direct and help the people enjoy the social and economic facilities which the Government can provide:
 - a. In the framework of the self-help project in which the Government furnishes materials and the people contribute work.
 - b. In the framework of the economic development project such as repair of roads, markets ...
2. Convey the direct assistance of the Government to the people such as technical instructions, supply of seeds, fertilizers...
3. Assist in social work such as education, public health...

(3) Armed Propaganda Section is usually employed during the military mop-up period as an advance element of the Group.

The entire Group will be employed during the actual pacification period. The Group will leave the areas as soon as the New Life development period starts. One civil affairs cadre and one People's Propaganda cadre will be left in the localities to permanently follow up VC infra structures and to maintain and control our infra-structures. All or part of the New Life Development Team will coordinate with the technical cadres during the beginning period.

In addition, the Group can be concentrated in a Hamlet or split into several Hamlets. The composition in each Hamlet varies according to local requirements and situation. Example: For hamlets which require the standards concerning the people's organization, District Chiefs can assign the People's Propaganda Teams to these Hamlets only.

MẬT SECRET

ATSECRET

- (4) The new life development period will be assumed by the Communal Councils, Communal Committees and Hamlet Committees under the direct supervision of the District Chiefs and with the active participation of the cadres of the Development Team and technical cadres (Psywar, Public Health, Education, Agriculture...)

g- Rural reconstruction system:

- (1) A Rural Reconstruction Committee combining military, civilian and administrative efforts is activated at Districts, Provinces, Division Tactical Areas, Corps Tactical Zones as well as at the Central level.
- (2) The Chiefs of Rural reconstruction groups are members of the District Rural Reconstruction Committees, which are presided over by the District Chiefs.

District Chiefs are members of the Provincial Rural Reconstruction Committees.

Provincial Chiefs are members of the DTA Rural Reconstruction Committees.

DTA Commanders are members of the CTZ Rural Reconstruction Committees.

CTZ Commanders are members of the Central Rural Reconstruction Committee.

- (3) The main missions of Division Tactical Areas, concerning the Rural reconstruction, are to supervise and provide military support for the Provinces to execute the Rural reconstruction plans prepared by the Provinces. These must be considered and approved by Division Tactical Areas, Corps Tactical Zones and the Central Agency. In addition, Division Tactical Areas also have to conduct regular mop-up operations in secret zones, on communication roads and adjacent infiltration roads in order to make the Viet Cong unable to assemble and undermine the rural reconstruction of the Provinces.
- (4) The administrative and logistical support will be executed directly from the Central Rural Reconstruction Committee to the Provincial Rural Reconstruction Committees. CTZ and DTA Rural Reconstruction Committees must be notified and consulted in unusual cases.
- (5) If a military unit is employed to support a District or Province in the rural reconstruction, the Division Tactical Area must clearly define and explain the genuine military support missions of the Unit Commander and the rural reconstruction missions of the District Chief or the Provincial Chief.

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CONFIDENTIAL**A CONCEPT OF PACIFICATION****THE PROBLEM**

1. The totality of Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam consists of two distinct but interrelated problems:

a) The Viet Cong military apparatus, which now constitutes a well-equipped, growing, and experienced army, and is no longer a collection of partisans. These so-called main force units now augmented by at least seven PAVN regiments are supported by an extensive and much more numerous paramilitary structure. The fighters in this structure are, from time to time, gathered as military units and committed to combat in concert with main force elements, or committed to military actions quite on their own. Let us call this entire military grouping the Viet Cong military arm.

b) The second part of the insurgency consists of those Viet Cong activists, terrorists, sympathizers, and collaborators who constitute the ever-widening and strangling web of subversion that moves out through the countryside, district by district, village

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by village, and household by household. The extent to which this subversive permeation of the population is successful constitutes the extent to which and the rate at which the population is being lost to the enemy. In this grouping one must include the part-time VC paramilitary fighter, when he is not gathered for an operation but is at rest and pursuing an apparently harmless and normal life in the body of the non-VC population.

2. These two arms of the Viet Cong movement, described above, constitute our enemy. It is their destruction or neutralization which comprise our immediate purpose in being in this country, in support of the South Vietnamese themselves. These two problems are sufficiently different as to require radically different methods and styles of attack. They have, however, been viewed and approached as a military challenge which would be met by a military response, with minor and peripheral support by civilian authorities and agencies. Certainly, we on the American side have not distinguished between these two problems, and have concentrated our efforts on dealing with it militarily by the constant enlargement of the RVNAF as an establishment directed from the national level. At the same time, much less attention has been devoted to the significance of the civil effort at the provincial and district level, where the popular pacification war is being fought.

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT C TO ANNEX C

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household unit upwards, classically is to "arm" those households and villages, by means of civic action and reasonable protection at the family level, and thus to equip them to resist or deflect VC blandishment and encroachment, to the limit of their ability to resist. In speaking of "the people" in this way, one must visualize them as existing in rural groupings ranging from a few score to several hundred. One must also envisage the goal as being the creation and sustaining, among these small groupings, of a collective attitude which is hostile to the VC - or if it is responsive, it is so only under VC duress. In brief the target here is the involvement of the population itself, beginning with its smallest components, in the overall commitment against the Viet Cong. This favorable environment, friendly to the GVN and poisonous to the VC, can be achieved by the proper mixture of low level civic action, basic armed security, and gradually strengthening mutual confidence between GVN action teams and the families amongst whom they circulate and live. This is one of the lessons we have learned from the development of the People's Action Team program.

4. There are several points that should be noted with regard to the four efforts mentioned in the preceding paragraph:

a) Sub-paras a. and d. above have been given the least attention to date. Given further inattention, additional effort on sub-paras b. and c. may become irrelevant.

50

CONFIDENTIAL

ATTACHMENT C TO ANNEX C

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b) It should be noted that sub-paras a. and d. are in themselves means to an end, with the end being b. and c.

5. The accomplishment of sub-paras a. and b. of para 3 are essentially military matters and clearly must be controlled and directed by the American and Vietnamese military leadership, each in its own sphere, and each subject to larger factors of a political nature. On the other hand, sub-paras c. and d. of para 3 have pretty much proved themselves to be the kind of problem with which a formal military establishment is ill-equipped to grapple. On the contrary, they constitute targets which are essentially civilian in composition and which are local in character, indigenous to the individual province, the individual district, or even at smaller sub-divisions of the population.

6. If one accepts this view of the insurgency as comprising two parts, and that these two parts produce four tasks or essential programs, then it becomes possible to think seriously and constructively about how to assign responsibilities, priorities, and resources available to the over-all task. It also becomes logical to view the first part of insurgency as one in which the GVN military component is dominant, with the civilian ministries in support. The VC main force units comprise an army in the field which must be brought down by an equivalent or greater force: the RVNAF and its allies. Equally, regarding the second part, it becomes logical to view the Ministries of Interior and Rural Construction as the dominant GVN agencies at the Saigon end, with the other echelons of the government being in support.

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ATTACHMENT C TO ANNEX C

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Practically, the role of these ministries is in itself less important than that which is even more essential: vastly to strengthen the authority and the capability of the province chief to work on sub-paras c. and d. of para 3.

7. The problem of the identification, harassment and ultimate neutralization of the VC political and covert apparatus is the subject of a separate paper which CIA will present to this meeting; the balance of this paper is devoted to the exposition of a conceptual framework within which activities aimed at engaging the peasants at the village and hamlet level in opposition to the VC should be pursued.

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ATTACHMENT C TO ANNEX C

CONFIDENTIAL**WHAT TO DO ABOUT PACIFICATION**

8. Briefly stated, we must agree that our pacification objective is the simply-stated goal of causing the small family units which make up the rural population, to become responsive to and receptive toward the lowest echelons of local authorities with whom they are frequently in contact.

9. We must recognize that the knitting together of the population and of the government must begin at this very lowest level; by the group of families and households that make up the villages, hamlets, and the countryside in general, to the local elders and the district officials and functionaries, who constitute local authority. Contact with such local authorities, certainly at the district level, may well be the only form of officialdom that the local residents will ever be aware of. As such, it is equatable to the GVN in Saigon, about which the ordinary rural dweller knows little and cares less.

10. National and provincial institutions of popular representation must indeed be brought into being, but these accomplishments will be enduring only to the degree that the linking of the rural population to his own visible local authorities has been brought about. In saying this, it is well understood that this objective has been voiced before. It has never been achieved, however, because the actions necessary to its accomplishment were never in fact performed.

11. One of the hard won lessons of 1964 and 1965, in the civic and political action field, has been that repeated and constantly-applied low level

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ATTACHMENT C TO ANNEX C

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civic action, of immediate and personal significance and value to the families concerned, rather quickly creates an atmosphere of friendliness and acceptance of the local authorities performing the actions, by the families being helped. This atmosphere established and maintained, information (intelligence) harmful to the Viet Cong and essential to GVN programs and efforts, is volunteered in an ever increasing amount. Then, as forceful action is taken against the Viet Cong locally on the basis of such intelligence, rural confidence in local authorities begins to develop, especially as the rural population continues to benefit from civic action of immediate value and impact. It is unfortunately necessary to emphasize that this civic action must in fact be done, and not simply planned and discussed in Saigon.

12. This cycle of good works leading to intelligence, thence to action beneficial to the rural households, is the cycle which, as continued, does indeed draw segments of the rural population closer to their local authorities. Our experience with People's Action Teams over the past year and a half seems to prove rather conclusively that this cycle of three elements is the only working device so far identified that indeed does accomplish this essential goal. The varying conditions in the different provinces and districts, and even within districts, require considerable latitude and flexibility in applying this doctrine. It is, however, exactly this requirement of flexibility that dictates an approach to the problem from the very lowest level upwards, rather than from the Saigon level downwards.

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ATTACHMENT C TO ANNEX C

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13. For a rural population, which has traditionally experienced callous indifference at best and more frequently thorough exploitation by its officialdom, to find this same echelon of local authorities itself taking the lead in civic action in its most basic and wanted forms--it is this experience that prepares the ground for the growth of rural response and friendliness toward their local authorities. Given this, the next phase is characterized by the volunteering of intelligence against the Viet Cong in their midst or passing through their locality. It must be recognized that if the people will give intelligence against the VC to local authorities, other forms of cooperation will come as well. Once this watershed of morale and spirit is crossed, the Viet Cong fish begins to swim in a hostile sea. This, of course, is the beginning of rural security. This also marks the beginning of the rural development which will make it possible for the bulk of the population of South Vietnam, once the major military actions have come to a close, to control and suppress the problems of subversion and terror which will without doubt continue for the next decade or longer.

14. This well-motivated performance by local authorities can be brought about by encouragement, example, and moral indoctrination. The techniques and devices used to train government cadre to this level of selflessness and helpfulness are known. They have been successfully employed over the last year and a half in the PAT program.

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15. Once this bond begins to show itself in a locality, and the local security situation (at least in terms of Viet Cong main force units) becomes tolerable, all of the other and more formal forms of government involvement and assistance can come into play--the more formal and complex forms of medical care, educational facilities, farmers' cooperatives, union activities, teachers' associations, and the like. The original form of low level civic action should not stop, however, but should be continued even during this build-up period, until it is well established that the more formalized institutions of rural help are indeed building the foot bridge as well as the highway bridge, and are indeed teaching remotely-located children how to count as well as those able to come to the school.

16. Given a growing bond of understanding and responsiveness by a rural population to its local authorities, one moves into a phase when meaningful choices of local representation to a higher local assembly can be made. Thus, the ascending spiral of some acceptable or reasonable form of representative government can begin. Possibly this spiral may reach the national level at about the time a constitution might be agreed upon and a national representative body needed--let us say in three to seven years.

17. It is felt that the doctrine set forth above is both appropriate and necessary to the present need. The general doctrine must be applied from the bottom up and in all provinces, or at least in as many provinces as

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can be staffed now, with high priority given to staffing all provinces as rapidly as proper training can be accomplished.

18. To apply this general doctrine to the rural areas of Vietnam will require immediate attention to two matters. One: the matter of manpower native to the province and district concerned. It would seem inevitable and that at an early date, provision be made for this kind of effort to get its essential and proper share of the manpower resources in the countryside. Two: the role and authority of the province chief (and his subordinate district chiefs) need clarification concerning and possibly even their separation from the military line of command. Regardless of the fact that the province chief is most often a military officer, he should be fully responsible for implementation of the doctrine presented above, given the manpower and other resources necessary to its accomplishment, and made responsible to the Prime Minister or his immediate delegee for this accomplishment. There are ample means of coordinating his activities with purely military activities going on in his province and district.

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONCLUSION**

19. In implementing the doctrine presented in this paper, we must always strive to advance the truly Vietnamese character of this effort. While doing what is essential in terms of initiating, supporting and monitoring, we should avoid any appearance of assuming the leadership of this pacification effort. The growth and spread of this activity will be effective and lasting only if it develops its own echelon of Vietnamese leadership, as opposed to American leadership.

20. We must bear in mind that the basic object here is to attach the rural population to its local authorities, and to inculcate the trait of their being mutually responsive, one to the other. Long after our joint military effort has dispersed or neutralized the Viet Cong military arm, Communist subversion, terror and coercion will continue. Only a population which is inclined to support its local authorities, and local authorities which work in the interest of serving and protecting the people--only this kind of rural environment will be able to contain or suppress such subversion. If this bond between people and local authority is not brought into being, the purely military effort, with all of its attendant losses, will have been a failure. Thus, the Vietnamese must be brought increasingly to take the lead and responsibility in this pacification effort, as rapidly as can be done without jeopardizing the effectiveness of this growing effort.

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21. For only too long have we played with widely differing concepts of pacification, both on the American and Vietnamese sides. The doctrine presented in this paper is simple, derived from the needs and problems of the rural population, and effective. Its successful implementation will make possible the development of a peaceful and orderly countryside. It does not conflict with military prerogatives or tasks; rather does it supplement them. We should accept it as the basis for rural construction, and urge the GVN to adopt it as well.

Attachment: The PAT Program: Theory and Practice

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CONFIDENTIAL**ATTACHMENT: The PAT Program: Theory and Practice**

1. Although differing local situations cause some variations in the specific content of People's Action Team actions, broadly speaking they all carry out three interrelated activities which experience has proved are essential to the success of the program. These activities may be described as:

a. Work. This means civic action at its lowest possible level and by this is meant basic and rudimentary medical help to an ill member of a family, help in repairing an enclosure for animals, repairing a path, cleaning a well, cutting a child's hair, teaching a child to count-- the list is endless.

b. Information (Intelligence). From the kind of work described above grows confidence and a gradual willingness to provide information, as well as to believe information coming from local authorities.

c. Action. It has been learned that from good work at the family level comes the confidence which brings with it intelligence about the Viet Cong in the area, and on the basis of this intelligence, armed action can be taken against Viet Cong so identified or compromised. It has been learned if those who perform the work, mentioned above, are in sufficient numbers and aggressively armed, that they themselves can in many cases

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carry out the action by themselves, thus further increasing the confidence of the local population in them, and further inspiring them to help. Where the intelligence so produced leads to a prospect of action beyond the capability of the workers themselves, referral to the district level can bring appropriate military units to bear upon the tactical opportunity.

2. Furthermore, it has been learned that there are four additional factors which must be constantly respected, if the above "Unity of Three" is to be successful. These factors are:

a. The work done for the small segment of rural population must be of immediate and continuing help and value to the families and households concerned, and be repetitive if necessary.

b. The work must be done essentially by the same group of activists, who must be native to the district in which they operate.

c. The work done by this repetitive group of activists must be, generally speaking, among the same segment of population, i.e., in the same district, or even in a certain portion of a district.

d. This work must be done by the same people among the same people, all the time and without end.

3. Where these factors are observed, and the "Unity of Three" employed, the activists indeed win the confidence, affection, and of even greater importance the protection of the people among whom they work

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ATTACHMENT C TO ANNEX C

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and live, and on whose behalf they on occasion fight. When these principles of conduct are observed and are in fact carried out, it has been found that these activists become as one with the population whom they serve and among whom they live. Where this condition has been created, objective evidence reveals that the Viet Cong find such areas dangerous to enter.

4. In addition to the "Unity of Three," and the four factors also listed above, there are certain other characteristics which have been found to have been greatly contributory, probably necessary, to the success of the program. These are:

a. The thoroughness and intimacy of the political and motivational training given to these activists must be maintained, and in no way diluted. Provision must be made for refresher courses of a political and motivational character every three to four months. While a good portion of this training can be given in a centralized location, for purposes of efficiency and uniformity, final indoctrination and training should be given on the ground in the district in which the team will work.

b. The activists must either be native to the district in which they will work, or long associated with it, at home in it, and generally speaking, accepted by the residents of the district.

c. In spite of the armament and fighting capability of these teams of activists, they are not to consider themselves as

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ATTACHMENT C TO ANNEX C

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military units, in the conventional sense, nor are they to be so viewed by the population amongst whom they work. They should view themselves, and in turn be viewed, as special civilian partisans whose work is to help the people amongst whom they live.

d. In keeping with previous sub-paragraph c., these partisan units should not have a barracks or compound which serves as their headquarters or base, nor any other such place to which a conventional military unit habitually returns. The base of these activists units is the district itself. They should sleep in places provided by the population they move among, and should purchase their meals from these same people.

e. These units, as they observe the "Unity of Three," must constantly move from point to point within their assigned district, depending on the work to be done, the intelligence received, and the action indicated.

5. The objective of the PAT program is of course to bring into being a local popular attitude which is hostile to the Viet Cong presence and which resists its encroachment. The attainment of this objective will be characterized by such examples as the following, which are each in themselves goals:

a. A willingness to provide to local authorities information concerning Viet Cong sympathizers, collaborators, or the movement of Viet Cong functionaries or armed units.

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ATTACHMENT C TO ANNEX C

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b. A willingness to protect (by hiding, dissimulation, or warning) local authorities or those working in their behalf from Viet Cong raiding parties, terrorist groups, or other forms of Viet Cong harassment.

c. To avoid where possible paying taxes, providing food, or otherwise assisting the Viet Cong, or where avoidance proves too dangerous to the family or the immediate community, to report such action promptly to local authorities.

d. To evade serving or supporting Viet Cong main force units by flight or hiding, and promptly reporting to local authorities.

e. Normal cooperation with local authorities in low level and local civic action or self-help activities of benefit to the immediate groups of households or the population of the immediate area.

6. The above enumeration is by no means all-inclusive. It must be borne in mind that the condition and the abilities of the local population to lend themselves to this objective may vary widely from province to province, and even within individual districts. This variance will be influenced by the following factors.

a. The presence and strength of Viet Cong main force units in or near the populated area in question.

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b. The degree of control or domination over the local population already exercised by the Viet Cong governing apparatus.

c. Purely local factors such as ethnic homogeneity, religious affiliation, local occupation, and availability of police at district level.

d. The degree to which there is a latent receptivity in favor of local authority, to the disadvantage of the Viet Cong.

7. It can be readily seen that once the villages begin to inform on the Viet Cong, once they begin to protect those working against the Viet Cong, and once they begin to resist Viet Cong demands, the first and critical round in the pacification struggle has been won, and the area in question is ready for "takeoff" with respect to the infusion of larger doses of economic aid in the form of schools, local developmental projects, etc. Until this essential first round is won, we believe that it is economically wasteful, politically undesirable, and administratively chaotic to deluge small peasant communities with the overly ambitious developmental projects which unhappily have in the past far too often constituted the primary ingredient of joint U.S./Vietnamese pacification efforts.

8. As it now functions, the PAT program is managed locally by the province chief, with staff assistance covering three types of support:

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a. Intelligence. It is this staff's responsibility to ensure that all reports provided to a district chief by teams within his district are funneled into the province intelligence center, for the benefit of all pacification operations within the province (with due respect to the protection of source identifications and agent names). In turn, this person has the obligation of providing to the district chief such additional intelligence as may be available and needed by a district chief in supervising or directing the "ACTION" aspects of the teams' activities within the district.

b. Civic action and government information. This staff has the responsibility of reviewing those civic actions found desirable by the partisan teams in the districts, but beyond their own capability to implement, and thereafter seeking ways and means, at the province level, of responding to the need so identified, or in otherwise giving evidence and concrete form of GVN interest in and concern for the welfare of the population at the lowest level. It is normally at this point that such civic action meshes into province civic action capabilities and plans, either on the part of the PATs themselves or in conjunction with USOM.

c. Team support. This staff has the responsibility of seeing to it that the PATs themselves receive, promptly and fully, all necessary support. This includes:

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(1) Maintenance at both district and province headquarters of adequate ammunition stocks, replacement weapons, replacement clothing and such accoutrements.

(2) Prompt and unvarying provision of cash to district chiefs for dependable salary payments to team members.

(3) Immediate payment to district chiefs of death and funeral benefits for immediate passing on to families of those killed in action.

(4) Maintenance of contact with the families of partisan team members, in order to be aware of personal problems, sicknesses, or other matters wherein the activist's family should receive some help or attention, so as to maintain the activist's morale and confidence that the local authorities are taking an active interest in himself and his family.

9. As the PAT program expands, it is very likely that the need will become apparent for similar support staffs to be established at the district level.

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SECRETRural Construction - Summary Record of Discussions and Actions

1. There was a consensus that the designation of priority rural construction areas for 1966 was important and that the modest goals set for these areas were realistic. However, it was emphasized that the contrast between the massive input of U.S. resources and the modest priority area goals made success in those areas imperative. Concern was expressed that even total achievement of the 1966 goals in the four priority areas could make those areas attractive Viet Cong targets and, at least, would not render the areas invulnerable to Viet Cong penetration or attack. It was agreed that the U. S. Mission would provide by March 31 an estimate of the likelihood that the 1966 goals for the four priority rural construction areas can be achieved by year's end.

2. In view of the prime importance to the U. S. of success in the four priority rural construction areas, there was discussion of the need for designating U. S. team chiefs to head the U. S. advisory effort in those areas. It was agreed that the U. S. Mission Council would consider this matter promptly and report its conclusions to the VNCC.

3. There was a consensus that, despite the prime importance of devoting all necessary GVN and U. S. resources and effort to the four priority areas, the U. S. and GVN had to devote sufficient effort and resources to rural construction programs in the remainder of the country in order to avoid any serious deterioration of security elsewhere, even if this should, in extremity, require the redirection or

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abandonment of the priority effort in one or more of the four priority areas.

4. There was discussion as to whether the application of resources was worthwhile in areas of South Viet-Nam in which the security situation made it impossible to conduct rural construction programs. There was a general consensus that emergency programs (e.g., refugee assistance and rice airlift) had to be continued, unless to do so would interfere seriously with priority programs, in order to give hope to the beleaguered population, and that phasing out such operations would undermine the GVN's political and psychological position. There was also a general consensus that for political and military reasons beleaguered district and province capitals should not be evacuated, unless militarily untenable; since such a move would destroy the GVN's position in the highlands area and in effect give the Viet Cong a well-defined geographic base.

5. It was agreed that the U.S. Mission would review the roles and missions of the Rural Construction Cadre, the National Police, the -- and the relation of the foregoing to each other and to the Regional and Popular Forces, and the CIDG/in the light of current regular forces -- budgetary and anticipated manpower limitations and of increasing support requirements for the GVN's new rural construction programs. Such a review should also take account of the possibility of negotiations and the restoration of peace; and the GVN's apparent intention to hold referenda or elections on constitutional or other political issues within the next two years.

6. The desirability of having policemen already present and familiar with the countryside and the rural population well in advance of either negotiations or peace or elections requires that USOM, with the

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assistance of the Mission Council, make every effort to achieve the previously approved strength levels and planned deployment of the police. In addition it should be noted that the contribution of the National Police to both the U.S. and GVN intelligence efforts against the VC; to the resources control program; and to the overall GVN endeavor to make its presence favorably and effectively known in the countryside make any reduction or slow-down in the police effort dangerous. This must be studied in conjunction with the review of roles and missions cited in the previous paragraph.

7. There was a general agreement that the GVN's Rural Construction cadre concept of the 80-man "Rural Construction Group", consisting of a collection of "Inter-Team Groups" was satisfactory as far as it went; but it was recognized that there was as yet no basis for judging its performance. The discussion of the rural construction concept revealed several aspects related to that concept which required further study -- relation of the "Rural Construction Group" to local military activity, to priorities among development projects and the emergence of a national development plan, to local non-governmental activities (labor unions, cooperatives, etc.) to local political development and to the possible dangers of bureaucratizing this effort.

It was also noted that the Minister for Rural Construction may have difficulties obtaining sufficient technical and social service cadre (e.g., teachers, health workers) to supplement the Rural Construction Group, and that the US may have to assist by training additional social service cadres.

8. It was agreed that the US should continue to provide support

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70

ANNEX D

SECRET

for the PAT's, including financial support, that such support should be extended as necessary to the whole Rural Construction Group, and that in connection with this support study would have to be given to existing inequities in pay scales. At the same time, it was agreed that such support could not be permanent and that the US would have to work out with the GVN how it could be shifted to the GVN over time; in working this out, the US should bear in mind the potential economic impact of the shifts and that US funding provided leverage to use on the GVN.

9. There was widespread recognition of the need to provide within the US Mission a single focus of operational control and management over the full range of the pertinent US efforts in order to gear all such US activities and resources effectively into implementation of the rural construction concept. However, some concern was expressed that too drastic organizational changes within the US Mission would create problems with the counterpart GVN organization and would not ensure success of rural construction programs. No agreement was reached on the precise form for organization changes in the US Mission but there was a general consensus that the focal point of control and management had to rest just below the Ambassador and that there must be a senior Mission official solely concerned with this subject. Disagreement was registered as to: (1) whether the Deputy Ambassador, assisted by a staff, should serve this function or whether another senior official (perhaps a second Deputy Ambassador) should be appointed; and (2) what extent individual agency personnel, funds and operations devoted to rural construction could and should be broken out of agency organizations and placed under the direction of the single focal point. Several separate proposals for organizational changes were submitted (Appendix A).

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
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10. There was discussion of the political element of the rural construction program. Although it was recognized that the GVN had made considerable progress in its thinking on political development at both the national and local level, there was general agreement that the US should emphasize to the GVN the need for taking into account in its political development plans at both levels the views of the rural population in secure hamlets and villages, e.g., increased consultation with already elected bodies (Provincial Councils) and arrangements to revive elected bodies at the hamlet and village levels.

11. It was agreed: 1) that, under the direction of the Viet-Nam Coordinating Committee, the Washington agencies concerned (Defense, CIA, AID) would survey studies and materials already available on all 43 provinces on the primary needs and requirements of the rural population throughout South Viet-Nam, 2) that the U.S. Mission would collate the similar findings of the Census/Grievance Teams; and 3) that both the VNOC and the U.S. Mission will prepare summaries of their findings and then consult on the preparation of a consolidated summary. It was recognized that the information on primary needs and requirements of the rural population culled from the Census/Grievance Teams would have immediate application, and that the larger purpose of the Washington and Saigon over-all summaries would be to obtain a more accurate estimate of nationwide rural needs and requirements in order to ensure that material and logistic planning would be adequate to meet them promptly.

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Proposed U.S. Organization - C. Cooper



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
APPENDIX A TO
ANNEX D

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(Prov. Rural Construction to be coordinated by a coordinator chosen for reasons of local situation and personal competence.)


Note: Resource Allocation Committee Chairman is Director of USOM, with deputy chiefs of Embassy, MACV, CAS, USIA and Econ counselor as members. Dep. Amb. resolves disputes.

Embassy group headed by Minister for Pol. Affairs, with provincial reporters material furnished to all agencies and Dep. Amb.

C/S for Rural Construction is new senior position either civilian or detached military, but independent.

Staff for C/S for Rural Const. is several task forces drawn from operating agencies but staying in their operational jobs in their agencies.

APPENDIX A TO
ANNEX D

ZORTHIAN PROPOSAL

75

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APPENDIX A TO
ANNEX D


1. Operating Agencies have command of province personnel.
2. Deputy Ambassador coordinates pacification through Agencies, Corps and Provincial coordinators.

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76


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SACSA PROPOSAL

*COMUSMACV




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APPENDIX A TO ANNEX D

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Proposed US Organization for Rural Construction - Saigon



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77

Rural Construction Council to be composed of 2nd or 3rd Echelon personnel charged with responsibility for Rural Construction activities of various agencies.

Task Groups to deal with specific problems organized on Ad Hoc basis from personnel provided by interested agencies.

Deputy Ambassador to be relieved of routine duties and to spend substantially all his time on Rural Construction duties.

He would be supported by a small permanent staff.


APPENDIX A TO
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78

APPENDIX A TO
ANNEX DR. H. MILLER PROPOSAL

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OTHER SUBJECTS - SUMMARY RECORD OF DISCUSSION
AND ACTIONS

Urban Programs. There was a general consensus that material programs in urban centers in South Viet-Nam could not be accorded as high a priority in GVN and U.S. efforts as that given Rural Construction programs because urban conditions of life were relatively more favorable both with respect to security and to material well-being. Nevertheless, it was recognized that urban groups (intellectuals, politicians, military, civil servants, labor and youth) are essential to both nation-building and political development and that therefore the GVN and U.S. needed to devote more attention to them. This attention should be addressed primarily to the development of responsible political and social institutions and organizations, considering physical improvement of the urban areas as an element of this purpose. Specifically, it was agreed that the U.S. Mission would examine how the U.S. might expand its educational and cultural activities directed particularly at youth in urban areas, e.g., English classes, programs involving expanded contacts between American students and professors and Saigon students. The Mission's study will also include a survey of specific projects which private American groups wishing to

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ANNEX E

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contribute to South Viet-Nam's welfare could undertake.

Montagnards. The conferees agreed with Ambassador Porter's view that the U.S. should take advantage of General Co's invitation for our suggestions on a GVN program for Montagnards as an opening to press the GVN hard for concrete and meaningful improvement in GVN-Montagnard relations. In particular, Ambassador Porter stressed that we should use Co's opening not only to press economic and social programs but also suggestions for political measures. It was agreed that Washington should endorse the U.S. Mission's recommended courses of action in Embtel 2451 and indicate that Ambassador Porter is bringing to Saigon additional ideas which, subject to the Mission's judgment, could be advanced later.

Chieu Hoi. There was a consensus that the U.S. Mission would have to intensify its efforts to overcome the GVN's lack of commitment to the Chieu Hoi program. It was generally agreed that, as a result of U.S. prodding, the GVN's psychological warfare efforts to attract Chieu Hoi returnees had been reasonably effective and that future efforts had to be devoted more to the reception and resettlement of returnees; accordingly, an effort should be made to persuade the GVN to transfer its Chieu Hoi Directorate from the Ministry for

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80

ANNEX E

SECRET

Psychological Warfare to another Ministry more directly concerned with resettlement or social welfare, such as the Ministry for Rural Construction or the Ministry for Social Welfare. Specifically, it was agreed that future Mission efforts would be two-pronged:

a) At the province level to work to persuade provincial authorities of the advantages of the Chieu Hoi program and the need to develop well-run Chieu Hoi reception centers and effective resettlement programs. In this connection, CIA will study the possibility of channeling aid funds for the Chieu Hoi program directly to the province level, bypassing GVN bureaucratic channels.

b) At the national level, to insist with the GVN on the worth of the Chieu Hoi program as an effective means both to undermine Viet Cong strength and as a source of manpower and intelligence. The Mission will also press on the GVN the importance of designating an effective head of the Chieu Hoi program with adequate authority. In addition, the Mission will actively pursue its recently developed action plan for the Chieu Hoi program.

Land Tenure, Agricultural Credit, Extension and Related Problems. There was a consensus that, although the degree to which land problems were a source of peasant grievance varied

SECRET

81

ANNEX E

SECRET

from area to area, the U.S. should nourish Gen. Ky's growing understanding of the political potential of land problems. In this connection, it was agreed that rural programs, including those related to land, should as far as possible be an instrument in the hands of the Rural Construction Groups. In this connection, it was agreed that the U.S. Mission would study further the potential in land measures as a Rural Construction tool, including such possibilities as turning over to village councils in secure villages the responsibility for carrying out satisfactory land distribution, tenure and related programs, and tying agricultural loans to security as an incentive to the villagers to commit themselves to their own security.

Cam Ranh Bay. There was a general consensus that U.S. and GVN efforts should give priority to the short-term development of Cam Ranh Bay and that long-term development plans would have to await improved security. It was pointed out that, in contrast to earlier estimates of the short-term need for housing for about 3,000 people at Cam Ranh, current estimates for housing ran to 6,000-7,000 people; thus, although the town would still be well laid out, if current plans for housing ^{were not} scaled down to more modest design, the project would cost \$20 million.

SECRET

82

ANNEX E

SECRET

Corruption. There was a general consensus that the U.S. Mission would have to judge on a case-by-case basis how hard and at what level to push the GVN for corrective action on corruption cases. Specifically, the U.S. Mission already has adopted a policy of trying to resolve reasonably well-documented cases of corruption quietly at a low level; but, if in the Mission's judgment the situation requires such action, it is prepared to present cases to the GVN with the comment that until the problem is rectified U.S. funds will have to be diverted to other provinces where they will be put to better use.

In connection with the discussion on corruption, U.S. Mission officials pointed out that for the most part senior GVN officials lived unostentatiously. There was a consensus that, to the extent this demonstrated that these officials were not profiting from corruption, efforts should be made to exploit this fact in the public media both in Viet-Nam and abroad.

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83

ANNEX E

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HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

Serial: 001128
22 Dec 1965

MACJ33

SUBJECT: RVNAF/JGS Directive AB 140

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Attached for your information and necessary action is RVNAF, Joint General Staff Directive AB 140, dated 151200H December 1965. This directive revises RVNAF High Command Directive AB 139, dated 25 December 1964. AB 140 is the basic GVN military plan to support the 1966 National Rural Construction Plan.

2. US unit commanders and advisors should become familiar with this document and encourage GVN field unit commanders to follow the instructions and guidance contained in the directive, particularly for roles and missions of forces.

3. The Campaign Plan for Military Operations in the RVN, Joint RVNAF/MACV Campaign Plan AB 141, will be published in the near future. This directive provides guidance and instructions for both RVNAF and FVMAF to support the 1966 National Rural Construction Plan. (AB 141 is attached as ANNEX G.)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

[Signature] CAPT
Wm. C. CARMICHAEL
Major, AGC
Asst AG

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84

ANNEX F

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MACJ33
SUBJECT: RVNAF/JGS Directive AB 140

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CG, USARV	10
CG, III MAF	10
CG, 1st Inf Div	6
Cdr, 2AD	2
Cdr, TF 115	2
Ch, USAF Adv Gp	2
Ch, US Nav Adv Gp	2
DSA, I Corps	12
DSA, II Corps	19
DSA, III Corps	20
SA, IV Corps	24
SA, CMR	2
SA, ABN BDE	2
SA, MAR BDE	2
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Cdr, 5th SF Gp (Adn)	2
MIL History Branch	1
MIG	2
Combined Studies	1
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85

ANNEX F

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Copy No. _____
 RVNAF JOINT GENERAL STAFF
 CAMP TRAN HUNG DAO, SAIGON
 151200H Dec 65 AB 140

DIRECTIVE AB 140 (U)

Ref: Maps of the World (East Asia), scale 1/1,000,000, types 1301 and 1301P, sheets NC 48-49, No 48-49, NF 48-49

1. SITUATION:

- a. Enemy forces. Annex A - Intelligence.
- b. Friendly forces.

US Forces Command, Pacific, with its naval and air forces, supports operations conducted in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), maintains ground reserve force ready for use in case of necessity and at the same time launches operations against North VN.

c. Assumptions.

(1) Communist China is not directly involved in the war, but continues to act as advisors and give VC (through Communist North VN) equipment and weapons.

(2) Communist North VN will not openly invade the RVN, but continues to direct VC in the South, and infiltrates its weapons, equipment, cadres and military units into the territory of the Republic of VN.

(3) VC activity in the RVN will not decrease, but the war may become more disastrous.

(4) Air raids over the North continue, and US-VN Air Forces maintain air supremacy in RVN.

(5) US Forces in RVN may be increased according to the situation.

2. DUTIES:

RVNAF, with the support of Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF), have the duties of defeating VC and enlarging government controlled areas throughout the territory of RVN.

3. OBJECTIVES OF THIS PLAN:

a. To restore security in densely populated areas around Saigon and a number of selected areas in the western provinces of southern VN as well as along the coast of central VN in order to support the pacification program of these areas (see map #1).

b. To protect province capitals, district towns, strategic bases and important economical as well as industrial installations.

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ANNEX F

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- c. To protect main land and water communication lines.
- d. To prevent or restrict to the minimum all infiltration of weapons, equipment, cadres and VC units into the RVN.
- e. To eliminate or harass VC secret zones, secret bases and in-country liaison routes.
- f. To destroy or weaken to the maximum all VC units that have been confirmed.

4. EXECUTION:

a. I CTZ.

- (1) To provide military support to the pacification program and concentrate efforts in areas where the pacification program is planned to be completed within the year of 1966 (see Map #2).
- (2) To protect and expand government-controlled areas around province capitals, district towns, strategic bases of PHU-BAI, DA NANG, LIEN CHIEU and industrial installations at AN SON.
- (3) To protect communication lines of vital importance: Highway 1, the national railroad, the road and railroad from DUY XUYEN to NONG SON. Priority will be reserved for sections of highways or railroads that are economically or militarily important, or running through areas where the pacification program is planned to be completed within the year of 1966.
- (4) To control and protect the rice-producing areas of QUANG NGAI, QUANG NAM, THUA THIEN Provinces and SA HUYNH area where salt is produced.
- (5) To eliminate or harass VC secret zones and in-country liaison routes, especially those that have direct effects on pacification areas, strategic bases and important land as well as water communication lines.
- (6) To conduct operations continuously to weaken and destroy VC units that have been confirmed.

b. II CTZ.

- (1) To provide military support to the pacification program and concentrate efforts in areas where the pacification program is planned to be completed within the year of 1966 (see Map #3).
- (2) To protect and expand government-controlled areas around province capitals, district towns, strategic bases of PLEIKU, QUI NHON, NHA TRANG and hydroelectric power plant of DANHIM and the DANHIM dam.
- (3) To protect communication lines of vital importance: Highways 1, 20, 11, 19, 21, 14 (the section from PLEIKU to KONTUM) and the national railroad. Priority will be reserved for sections of highways and railroads that are economically or militarily important, or running through areas where

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ANNEX F

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the pacification program is planned to be completed within the year of 1966.

(4) To control and protect rice producing areas of BINH DINH and PHU YEN Provinces, and salt producing areas of TUYET DIEM, HON KHOI, NINH CHU and CA NA.

(5) To eliminate or harass VC secret zones and in-country liaison routes, especially those that have direct effects on pacification areas, strategic bases and important land as well as water communications lines.

(6) To conduct operations continuously to weaken and destroy VC units that have been confirmed.

c. III CTZ.

(1) To provide military support to the pacification program and concentrate efforts in areas where the pacification program is planned to be completed within the year of 1966 (see Map #4).

(2) To protect and expand government-controlled areas around province capitals, district towns, cities, strategic bases of BIEN HOA, VUNG TAU and THANH TUY HA.

(3) To protect communication lines of vital importance: Highways 1, 4, 13, 15, 20, 22, national railroad, waterways of the rivers of VAM CO DONG, SAIGON and DONG NAI, and CHO GAO canal. Priority will be reserved for sections of highways, railroad and waterways that are economically or militarily important, or running through areas where the pacification program is planned to be completed within the year of 1966.

(4) To control and protect the rice producing areas of LONG AN, HAU NGHIA, TAY NINH, BINH TUY Provinces, and PHUOC TUY Province where salt is produced.

(5) To eliminate or harass VC secret zones and in-country liaison routes, especially those that have direct effects on pacification areas, strategic bases and important land as well as water communication lines.

(6) To conduct operations continuously to weaken and destroy VC units that have been confirmed.

d. IV CTZ.

(1) To provide military support to the pacification program and concentrate efforts in areas where the pacification program is planned to be completed within the year of 1966 (see Map #5).

(2) To protect and expand government-controlled areas around province capitals, district towns, strategic bases of BINH THUY airfields of TRA NOC, VINH LONG, CAN THO, SOC TRANG, LONG XUYEN; CAN THO gas depot; HA TIEN cement plant; and CHO GAO communications receiving tower.

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(3) To protect communication lines of vital importance: Highway 4, inter-provincial roads 7, 8, 27, provincial roads 24, 40, the road from SADEC to HONG NGU through CAO IANH; and HATIEU-SAIGON as well as BAC LIEU-SAIGON waterways. Priority will be reserved for sections of roads and waterways that are economically or militarily important, or running through areas where the pacification program is planned to be completed within the year of 1966.

(4) To control and protect rice producing areas.

(5) To eliminate or harass VC secret zones and in-country liaison routes, especially those that have direct effects on pacification areas, strategic bases and important land as well as water communication lines.

(6) To conduct operations continuously to weaken and destroy VC units that have been confirmed.

e. CMR.

(1) To provide military support for the pacification program in areas where it is planned to be completed within the year of 1966.

(2) To protect and expand government-controlled areas around province capitals, district towns, strategic bases of TAN SON NHUT, SAIGON Port, HANH THONG TAY ammo dump, NHA BE and CAT LAI gas depots, industrial installations along SAIGON auto route, PHU IAM communication center and QUAN TRE broadcasting center.

(3) To protect communication lines of vital importance, SAIGON-BIEN HOA auto route, Highway 1, 4, 13, inter-provincial road 5, national railroad, and SAIGON-NHABE waterway.

(4) To eliminate LY VAN MANH and LONG PHUOC THON secret zones, and cut off all VC infiltration corridors leading to the capital.

(5) To conduct operations continuously to weaken and destroy VC units that have been confirmed.

f. Air Force.

(1) To defend national airspace.

(2) To provide support for CTZ, CMR, Navy force and Special Forces on their request. To conduct air patrols and reconnaissance along the border and in territorial waters.

(3) To conduct unlimited airstrikes against VC secret zones and bases that have been confirmed.

(4) To satisfy the requirement of airlifted resupplies at its maximum.

(5) To conduct unilateral operations on orders from higher commands.

89

MIAT SECRET

ANNEX F

SECRET

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g. Navy.

- (1) To defend territorial waters.
- (2) To handle the coastal defense (with cooperation from CTZ and Air Force).
- (3) To defend sea ports.
- (4) To provide support for transportation and operations conducted by CTZ on their requests.
- (5) To take part in amphibious operations and to shell VC secret zones and bases along the coast.
- (6) To patrol and conduct operations along rivers and canals of III and IV CTZ, with cooperation from the CTZ concerned.
- (7) To conduct operations in order to destroy the enemy in RUNG SAT Special Zone, and to protect the VUNG TAU-SAIGON waterway.
- (8) To conduct unilateral operations when necessary.

h. General Reserve.

- (1) Airborne Brigade. Be prepared to conduct airborne and ground operations in the RVN (SOP para 2a(1) (m) 1 2 3).
- (2) Marine Corps. Be prepared to conduct ground operations in the RVN (SOP para 2a (1) (m) 2 3).

i. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) This principle will be strictly applied: "Concentration of strength for military support given to pacification areas of priority."
- (2) To expand government-controlled areas around cities and important bases on the following basis:
 - (a) Province capitals, DTA Command Posts and strategic bases: areas of at least 5 km-radius.
 - (b) District towns and important economical or industrial installations: areas at least 5 km-radius.
- (3) To increase the effectiveness of border defense and coastal defense to its maximum.
- (4) Regrouping of troops will be carried out in accordance with the deployment of FWMAF in order to increase the reserve forces, with at least one battalion at each DTA and two battalions at each CTZ.

MIAT

90

SECRET

ANNEX F

SECRET

(5) Joint Directive AB 141 will be strictly observed in coordination with FWMAF.

(6) Concrete objectives that must be obtained at each phase will be defined by CTZ (for DTA programs) and by DTA (for Provincial programs). Periodic meetings will be organized, especially at the end of each phase, to review results obtained, points of advantage and weaknesses for the benefit of the phase which follows.

(7) Pacification programs of each level must be considered and approved by its close and higher authority. Three copies of the pacification program of CTZ and CMR must be forwarded to J3/JCS prior to 31 December 1965 for approval.

Major General CAO VAN VIEN
Chief of JGS, RVNAF

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91

ANNEX F

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ANNEX B (Concept and Technique of Border Defense) to Directive AB 140 (U)

1. The Viet Nam border is extremely long and rough, thus the defense can not be perfectly established along the border. According to the assumptions on the enemy, the Viet Cong have not yet openly invaded the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) but continue to infiltrate their units, cadres, weapons and equipment through the border into the RVN territory.

2. Based on the above factors, Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) must review the border defensive plans in accordance with the following concept:

- a. Establish necessary bases along the border to block main infiltration corridors.
- b. Conduct reconnaissance patrols between the bases.
- c. Increase the depth of the border defensive plan.
- d. Air reconnaissance and armed reconnaissance patrols in the border areas.

3. To execute the above concept, Corps Tactical Zones must apply the following points:

- a. Confirm the VC infiltration corridors from the 17th parallel, Laos, Cambodia and inland communication axis between the infiltration corridors and important secret zones.
- b. Determine priority order for the infiltration corridors to be blocked.
- c. Establish border defense bases along the 17th parallel and the VN-Laos and Cambodian borders to block the above infiltration corridors. Each base will block one or more main infiltration corridors.

(1) Border defense bases must be linked with each other or with other bases of RVN Armed Forces.

(2) Each base must be assigned a clearly defined area of responsibility according to the terrain, enemy situation and capabilities of the base.

(3) The missions of the border defense bases are to harass and prevent every VC infiltration on the reported routes, and concurrently, to discover the new routes used by the Viet Cong.

(4) Most suitable forces for the border defense bases are the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) and the most effective operational method is combat patrol and mobile intelligence of section, squad and platoon level.

MIAT
109

ANNEX B TO AB 140
ANNEX F

SECRET

SECRET

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d. Conduct routine reconnaissance operations and combat patrols between the bases and in the areas not suitable to the establishment of bases in order to strengthen the operation of the border defense base network. These operations are aimed at preventing or at least timely discovering every VC infiltration for annihilation by our shock forces or air force. The most suitable forces for the reconnaissance operations and combat patrols are the Rangers.

e. Establish additional outposts or operational bases at the rear of the border defense bases to increase the depth of the border defensive network. These outposts and operational bases should be established at the following locations:

(1) On main land communication axes between the infiltration corridors and important secret zones.

(2) At infiltration corridors where the terrain is very rough and hampers the operational ability of the applicable border defense bases.

(3) On the routes which can be used by the enemy to sneak in or to move around the operational areas of the border defense bases in order to infiltrate into the mainland.

Each outpost or operational base should also: be assigned a clearly defined responsible area, coordinate the operation, and maintain close contact with the adjacent border defense bases.

The most suitable forces to occupy these outposts are the Regional Forces, and the most suitable to establish the operational bases are the Regular Forces or Regional Forces.

f. Increase air operations to provide support for the border defense.

(1) Prepare border air reconnaissance plans for each Corps Tactical Zone. Prescribe the number of weekly flight missions besides those unexpectedly required by the border defense bases.

(2) Prepare armed reconnaissance patrol plans to include periodic flight missions and those unexpectedly required.

(3) Determine controlled strike areas.

(4) Fill the requirements on fire support, air reconnaissance, aerial photo, transportation, supply and medical evacuation to a maximum extent for the Special Forces in Corps Tactical Zones.

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110

ANNEX B TO AB 140

ANNEX F

SECRET

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g. Organize a reserve heliborne force to exploit the engagements and coordinate with the border defense forces, when required.

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Chief of JGS, RVNAF

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111

ANNEX B TO AB 140
ANNEX F

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ANNEX C (Concept and Technique of Coastal Defense) to Directive AB 140(U)

1. The coast of Viet Nam is extremely long, making tight and continuous defense an impossibility. It is assumed that the enemy has not yet openly invaded the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN), but will continue to infiltrate cadres, weapons and materials by sea into the territory of the RVN. Thus, our concept of coastal defense is to positively block main infiltration corridors by sea, and at the same time, increase coastal and sea patrol operations.

2. In order to achieve the above concept the following measures must be applied:

- a. Confirm ocean and other waterway infiltration lanes and periods of time that would be favorable for infiltration.
- b. Determine sensitive areas on the sea where patrol efforts must be emphasized.
- c. Determine navigational corridors and waterways in and out of harbors.
- d. Determine "no fishing areas", "no navigation areas" and "restricted navigation areas".
- e. Determine free bomb and artillery areas on the coast and sea.
- f. Closely control fishermen, and concentrate them into villages and hamlets along seacoasts, if necessary.
- g. Clearly decide operational areas of units responsible for coast and sea patrols.
- h. Increase sea patrol operations and improve seacoast control centers to exploit sea patrols to the maximum.
- i. Improve the Junk Forces bases and operations.
- j. Coordinate with the US and VN Air Forces to prepare an aerial patrol and reconnaissance plan for along the seacoast and national territorial waters. (Clearly prescribe these areas of responsibility for the VN Air Force and the US Naval Air Forces).
- k. Exchange liaison officers with US Naval units in order to rapidly utilize information and closely coordinate operations.
- l. Coordinate with concerned CTZ's to exchange information, and organize amphibious operations into VC secret zones and bases along the coast.

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ANNEX C TO AB 140

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3. Coastal defense is assumed by the Navy in coordination with the CTZ's. The Navy assumes responsibility afloat, CTZ's ashore. Thus, the coastal defense plans that are prepared for each CTZ must be approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and CTZ commanders concerned.

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Chief of JGS, RVNAF

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113

ANNEX C TO AB 140
ANNEX F

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ANNEX D (Concept and Technique to Eliminate VC Secret Zones and their Main Local Communication Routes) to Directive AB 140 (U)

1. All CTZ's and DTA's must prepare plans to destroy VC secret zones and their main local communication routes. These plans are aimed at destroying or gradually destroying VC main force units, VC bases, logistical installations and training centers.

2. If we cannot attain the above objectives, we must at least create a permanent insecurity in their secret zones, upset their command channels, and create serious obstacles to the stationing of main force units in their secret zones and movement from one secret zone to another.

3. Upon plan preparation, CTZ's and DTA's must pay special attention to the following points:

a. Destruction of VC secret zones and bases which directly affect our pacification areas, strategic areas and vital communication arteries both by land and water.

b. Permanent destruction of VC secret zones of strategic value and main local communication routes linking one secret zone with another.

c. Cutting local VC communication routes which are starting points, or which lead through areas of rich manpower and resources.

d. Maximum use of US and Vietnamese Air Force and Navy support (especially strategic B-52 bombers) for the above plans.

4. Destruction of VC Secret Zones or local communication routes can be executed in three phases:

a. First phase (determination of objective) is to concentrate intelligence efforts on collecting and processing information in order to determine whether the objective is for subversion or destruction. The collection of information can be carried out by:

- The informant system.
- Collection detachment.
- Territorial Intelligence Agency (civilian and military).
- Technical Intelligence Agency.
- POW Interrogation Agency.
- Air reconnaissance and aerial photography.

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ANNEX D TO AB 140

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- Biet Kich and Biet Cach units of Special Forces.

b. Second phase (subversion). The subversion of VC bases and their local communication routes must be started in every form after a number of necessary objectives have been determined. Following are a number of methods which have proved effective by previous experiments.

(1) Successive raids should be made into determined and limited objectives. To obtain satisfactory results, the raids must be strong, and decisive, and at the same time, surprise should constitute a main factor through the use of helilifts and airlifts.

(2) Airstrikes by VN-US tactical aircraft should be launched in coordination with large scale artillery bombardment (including shelling attacks by the Vietnamese and US Navy against VC secret zones along the coastline) for numerous consecutive days. Concurrently, a ready reserve helilifted assault force must be prepared to exploit the objectives when opportunities arise.

(3) In addition, CTZ's should select a number of objectives as free strike areas for VN-US Air Force planes. Air Force Wings must be notified of these objectives, and should be changed periodically.

(4) Airstrikes are to be carried out by US Strategic Air Force bombers (B-52), and military operations should be conducted to search the objectives. Proper forces to be used for this purpose are helilifted Air Borne Special Forces units, CIDG or Ranger units.

(5) Large scale operations in which FVMAF participate are to be launched.

(6) The 2nd phase must last until VC secret zones and local communication routes are cleared or seriously undermined.

c. Third phase. After VC Secret Zones and local communication routes have been cleared or seriously undermined, the following actions should be taken to prevent the VC from reconsolidating their bases:

(1) Establish operational bases at important locations in VC secret zones or adjacent areas.

(2) Organize a special force CIDG system or intelligence network.

(3) Control the local population inside and outside VC secret zones, establish infrastructures and gather people into established hamlets, if necessary.

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ANNEX TO TO AB 140

115

ANNEX F

SECRET

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(4) Start psywar and civil affairs plans.

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Chief of JGS, RVNAF

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ANNEX D TO AB 140

ANNEX F

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ANNEX E (Concept and Technique of Defense of our Main Communication Axis and Strategic Bases) to Directive AB 140 (U)

1. DEFENSE OF COMMUNICATION AXES

a. During 1965, the security situation on the main communication axes deteriorated due to the increasing VC sabotage and pressure along these axes. The above facts have hampered the tactical operations as well as the supply of military units and to the people in the provinces.

b. Therefore, the defense of road axes and waterways must be a routine concern of Corps Tactical Zones during 1966. Corps Tactical Zones must review and prepare defensive plans for main roads axes and waterways through flexible application of the following measures:

(1) Defense of road axes.

(a) Classify and determine priority order for main road axes. Confirm the sections of critical road axes and important bridges requiring a priority defense.

(b) Clearly assign responsibility for road axes security defense to territorial commanders.

(c) Establish outposts to defend the important bridges.

(d) Construct by-passes at less important bridges for temporary use when bridges are destroyed.

(e) Apply appropriate measures to defend the bridges.

(f) Construct New Life Hamlets in heavy populated areas along the road axes, especially near bridges and culverts.

(g) Extensively promote the defoliation of road axes by 202 Projects, especially on bushy terrain where ambushes often occur.

(h) Organize a people's intelligence network along and on the sides of road axes.

(i) Establish fixed and mobile control stations.

(j) Prescribe curfew hours on the section of critical road axes.

(k) Coordinate artillery fire support along the road axes or at least on the sections of dangerous roads.

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ANNEX E TO AB 140

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(1) Establish operational bases on long, dangerous and hardly defended road axes with the reinforcement of Regional Forces mechanized rifle units or armored vehicles, if required.

(m) Conduct operations into VC secret zones and adjacent VC bases to insure distant security for road axes.

(n) Coordinate with the Public Works to resume the circulation on the presently interrupted road axes as soon as possible and immediately repair said axes after each VC sabotage.

(2) Defense of waterways.

(a) Classify and determine priority order for main waterways. Confirm the sections of vital waterways requiring priority defense.

(b) Construct New Life Hamlets in the heavily populated areas along the waterways.

(c) Defoliation.

(d) Occupy outposts and establish operational bases at vital areas.

(e) Establish fixed and mobile control stations.

(f) Organize intelligence networks along the waterways, especially people's intelligence. Confine special attention to the expeditious information transmittal system between the Territorial Intelligence Agencies and the River Patrol Units.

(g) Prescribe traffic regulations on the waterways (procedures for movement, control, off limit areas, curfew hours, etc.)

(h) Increase the activities of River Forces units operating along the main waterways.

(i) Make maximum use of Regional Forces shallow draft boat units in river patrol and escort missions.

(j) Conduct mop up operations in unsafe areas along the waterways.

(k) Conduct continual air raids, mortar shellings, land operations or amphibious operations into VC secret zones and bases which directly affect the security of the waterways.

(l) Closely coordinate shore and surface security operations.

(m) Make plans for expeditious support and rescue.

2. DEFENSE OF STRATEGIC BASES.

ANNEX E TO AB 140

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ANNEX F

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a. In addition to the defensive plan of main communication axes, Corps Tactical Zones must review and prepare defensive plans for the strategic bases in accordance with the following principles:

- (1) Review, classify and determine priority order for the strategic bases requiring defense. Corps Tactical Zones must defend the strategic bases having national importance.
- (2) Establish a sub-sector surrounding each strategic base. These sub-sectors, at least 4 kilometers wide, will become a close in security barrier for the strategic bases.
- (3) "Barrier Sub-Sectors" must conduct continuous reconnaissance patrols and ambushes, both day and night, in order to timely discover every VC attempt to launch attacks, raids or mortar bombardments.
- (4) Establish, if deemed necessary, in the "Barrier Sub-Sector" an operational base network, on high terrain or in the areas blocking the VC infiltration, to enable units to depart from these bases for outside operations.
- (5) Strategic bases and the "Barrier Sub-Sector" are two vital points which are organized into a critical area. The commander of the critical area, who is designated by Corps Tactical Zone, will be the representative of the CTZ Commander and has the mission to prepare and execute the general plans, and control and coordinate the defense of the subordinate sensitive points.
- (6) The people living in the critical areas must be closely checked. Critical areas must coordinate with the applicable sectors to conduct frequent police operations and searches of housing areas in order to completely destroy the underground infrastructure of the Viet Cong.
- (7) The villages and hamlets in the barrier sub-sectors must, on a priority basis, be formed into standard New Life Hamlets.
- (8) The applicable Division Tactical Areas must conduct frequent operations to harass the VC secret zones and communication roads adjacent to the critical areas.
- (9) Establish an effective territorial intelligence network.
- (10) Prepare detailed defensive plans for critical areas and critical points. CTZ Commanders must review, approve and endorse the defensive plans.

b. The defensive plans for the critical areas must be focused on the following principal points:

- (1) Forces organization.

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ANNEX E TO AB 140

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- (2) Command liaison organization.
- (3) Defoliation plan (manpower or 202 project).
- (4) Communication plan.
- (5) Counterattack and rescue plan.
- (6) Security for critical areas:

(a) Local security within the perimeter of the critical points.

(b) Close in security of the critical points: Reconnaissance patrol plan, and alert and ambush teams of the "Barrier Sub-Sector."

(c) Distant security of the critical points: Intelligence organization, and operational plans of the sectors and Division Tactical Areas for activities in adjacent VC secret zones and bases.

- (7) Fire support and counter battery plans.

(a) Artillery and air support plans must be closely coordinated.

(b) Establish observation towers operating on a 24-hour basis to observe and direct counter battery fire, when required.

(c) Prepare counter battery chart.

- (8) Security plan for personnel, installations and documents.

(a) Security clearance for personnel, especially for those personnel holding highly important positions.

(b) Strictly apply the secrecy preservation regulations.

(c) Prevent fifth column and sabotage activities.

(d) Control the ingress and egress.

(e) Determine off-limit areas or restricted areas for personnel.

- (9) Defensive plans for personnel, combat equipment and materials.

(a) Protect personnel and command posts.

(b) Disperse and conceal combat equipment and logistical installations within the bases.

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ANNEX E TO AB 140

(120

ANNEX F

SECRET MẬT

(c) Organize defensive works to preclude or to reduce damages to a minimum extent in cases of enemy mortar bombardment.

(d) Fire prevention and fire fighting plan.

(e) SOP for cases of alert.

c. Corps Tactical Zones must designate a representative party to inspect the defenses of the critical areas at least once a month, and notify the Joint General Staff of the date, time and location of inspection so it can detail representatives to join the inspection party, if required.

Maj Gen CAO VAN VIEN
Chief of JGS, RVNAF

Appendix 1: Overlay of the defense of strategic bases.

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ANNEX E TO AB 140

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 AB 140 F

ANNEX F (Concept on Use of Forces) to Directive AB 140 (U)

1. All military and paramilitary forces must actively participate in the pacification program. The roles of each force will change according to the phase and period of the pacification program. Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) also support the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) in the pacification program by direct and indirect military operations.

2. Regular Forces include armed services and service branches of the RVNAF. Regular Forces are essentially employed for annihilating regular VC forces.

3. Regional Forces (RF) are the organic military forces of sectors and subsectors, and include rifle companies, shallow draft boat companies, mechanized rifle platoons and support units. Regional Forces are responsible for pacification, defense, and security preservation in the sectors and subsectors to which assigned.

4. Popular Forces (PF) are the organic military forces of villages and hamlets, and include rifle platoons and squads. Popular Forces are responsible for pacification, defense and security preservation at the village and hamlet level.

5. The National Police is a police force at province, district and village levels and is used to maintain law and order, assure public security and control the people and resources.

6. In addition to the above responsibilities, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and National Police will assist directly or indirectly US and FWMAF forces in protecting their bases.

7. Following is the concept on the use of forces in pacification activities:

ANNEX F TO AB 140

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123

ANNEX F

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ANNEX G (Protecting and Controlling National Resources) to Directive AB 140 (U)

1. The work of protecting and controlling national resources is aimed at controlling the exploitation, production, movement and consumption of all resources in order to prevent the VC from utilizing national resources, including manpower and material. This work is aimed at controlling the 5 following main items:

- a. Food (rice, salt, dried fish, fish sauce, etc---).
- b. Manpower.
- c. Goods useful for military purposes.
- d. Money.
- e. Means of transportation.

2. The National Police is presently held responsible for controlling the population and resources. However, the National Police needs support from RVNAF because the former does not have the means to carry out the plan effectively, especially in insecure areas.

3. CTZ's are advised to use police forces in controlling resources in areas being developed, relatively secure areas and where mopping-up operations have been conducted. Military Police, RF and PF are used in less secure areas, and regular forces are used in insecure areas.

4. A Resources Control Committee is therefore necessary to be established with representative of military, civilian and government agencies at CTZ level to work out procedures of operations and control, as well as to define policies of action and make appropriate plans to be applied at each region.

5. Foodstuffs.

a. In order to feed their troops, every year during the harvest season the VC increase their military activities to collect rice paddy.

b. They also obstruct and threaten the farmers who desire to take their rice to the government areas to sell. Additionally, VC financial and economic cadres collaborate with headers to seize control of rice markets by illegally storing or clandestinely exporting large amounts of rice to foreign countries.

c. In order to timely stop their plot and to secure the rice supply for Saigon and the central provinces, and at the same time, stabilize the rice market, CTZ's are requested to set up plans to protect and control the rice.

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ANNEX G TO AB 140

135

ANNEX F

CONFIDENTIAL

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d. The rice protecting and controlling mission, particularly in IV, is a most important task. It requires special attention from the middle December 1965 to the end of 1966. The plan for protecting and controlling can be divided into two phases: Protection at harvest time and controlling the rice after harvest.

(1) Protection at harvest time.

(a) Determine the areas which produce large quantities of rice and establish priorities for protecting these areas.

(b) Conduct military and police operations to protect the rice and the people during harvesting.

(c) Protection must be provided while the rice is being transported from the harvest areas to agricultural cooperatives and farmers' associations.

(2) Controlling rice after harvesting.

(a) Civil affairs teams, in coordination with forces conducting operations, will initiate propaganda activities to urge the people to sell their rice to GVN authorities and legal rice traders only.

(b) Operations must be conducted to prevent the illegal collection of taxes on rice.

(c) Maximum effort should be made to insure that as much rice as possible is purchased by GVN authorities and authorized rice traders.

e. Economic measures against the Viet Cong:

(1) Conduct operations into VC secret bases and areas to seize or destroy VC rice storage areas.

(2) Step up intelligence activity to uncover VC rice warehouses and underground storage, particularly in the areas where a large quantity of rice has not been sold or sent to the local Agricultural Cooperative by farmers.

(3) Halt the transportation of VC rice into their secret bases, particularly from the Western Zone to the Eastern Zone of southern Vietnam, to Central Vietnam or to foreign countries (seaborne) by the following measures:

(a) Step up the coastal defense activity.

(b) Step up the river patrol activity, particularly on the MEKONG and BASSAC rivers.

(c) Conduct operations to harass VC secret bases and communication and liaison lines.

CONFIDENTIAL **K I N**

136

ANNEX G TO AB 140

ANNEX F

CONFIDENTIAL

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(d) Establish a static and mobile control system along communication and liaison lines (land and water) and around VC secret bases (control stations, operations, patrols, ambushes, etc.).

(e) Inform appropriate authorities when transportation of VC rice is reported so that appropriate measures will be taken against it.

f. Help administrative agencies in controlling and providing security for rice transportation.

(1) Move private rice mills from less secure areas to secure areas and keep an eye on the operation of these rice mills.

(2) Conduct police operations to control the storage of rice. The regulations to store, sell and buy rice are mentioned in decree No. 102/Kt dated 18 June 1965 (which is distributed by logistical command orders No. 3174/TTL/TCTV/KH dated 7 July 65).

(3) Prescribe the communication routes (land and water) which may be used to transport rice.

(4) Record daily production and decide the quantity of rice which may be sent out of each province each month.

(5) Establish belts of control around capital towns and rice producing areas.

(6) Establish "safe" warehouses to store rice at provinces.

(7) Provide security for the transportation of rice from Hau Giang to Saigon.

(a) Protect important waterways, particularly, from Ha Tien to Saigon and from Bac Lieu to Saigon.

(b) Provide security for boats and ships transporting rice.

g. Protection and control of salt.

(1) Salt is a resource that the VC exploit. Each VC soldier is given 15 grammes of salt daily. The amount of salt necessary for them totals 40 tons a year. Besides the quantity of salt distributed to VC troops, the enemy also tries to transport it to the highlands to exchange for rice.

(2) To prevent VC from seizing salt, the following measures are necessary to be applied:

(a) Classify and define the priority areas where there are salt fields to be protected.

K I N

CONFIDENTIAL

137

ANNEX G TO AB 140
ANNEX F

CONFIDENTIAL K I N

(b) Study the yield and production season of each region so operations can be conducted at the proper time to protect the local population collecting salt of that season.

(c) Provide protection while salt is being transported from producing areas to secure areas.

(d) Conduct operations aimed at seizing or destroying VC stores of salt.

(e) Prevent salt from being transported from producing areas to VC secret bases.

(f) Support local administrative agencies in the following matters.

1. Determine which agencies are authorized to and which are prohibited from transporting salt.

2. Organize convoys (truck, boats) to transport large quantities of salt with support given by military forces.

3. Set up static as well as mobile check-points around cities, towns and salt producing areas.

4. Require the people in salt areas to declare the quantity of salt produced in each region.

5. Set up stores in secure areas, and advise salt producers to sell salt to legal cooperatives and merchants only.

6. Set up regulations governing the storing of salt in producing areas, and conduct permanent police operations to control salt storing.

6. Manpower.

a. VC use manpower to increase the strength of their military and administrative units. The VC force men to join their armed forces, and force women as well as children to help them in supply, liaison, information, intelligence and propaganda.

b. Measure of protecting and controlling the people.

(1) Classify the people into 3 categories.

(a) Anti-communists.

(b) Neutralists.

(c) Communist sympathizers.

CONFIDENTIAL

K I N

(138

ANNEX G TO AB 140

ANNEX F

CONFIDENTIAL

K I N

(2) Enforce the control of people (statistics, ID cards, family records, inter-family organizations, family pictures, visitor books).

(3) Protect the youths at the new life hamlets and control movements in insecure area.

(4) Determine the curfew time, especially in the insecure areas.

(5) Determine the military areas where fishing and wood cutting are prohibited.

(6) Set up fixed and mobile check points.

(7) Conduct police operations in suspected areas to protect the people and to apprehend draft dodgers and deserters.

(8) Protect the people who are against terroristic actions and harassing propaganda of the enemy.

7. Goods needed by the VC.

a. The VC attempt to buy necessary goods from our town and cities to maintain their forces and increase their aggression.

b. Control measures.

(1) Classify and determine the goods which are of military necessity. Establish inventory controls on these kind of goods.

(2) Apply measures established by the Interior Department in trading, storage, use and transportation of goods (permits which show the means of transportation, itineraries, invoices, or legal papers which identify the kind of goods and their ownership).

(3) Prohibit the unauthorized collection of ammunition cases and other metal items. Restrict the trading of these items, particularly in areas near VC installations and arsenals.

8. Finances.

a. The VC try to finance their cadres, military and administrative units by increasing their activities of collecting taxes, forcing contributions, smuggling and establishing clandestine trading offices.

b. Measures to harass or destroy the VC economic and financial activities.

(1) Uncover and destroy VC economic and financial installations. Encourage denunciation of the VC by the local population.

(2) Halt smuggling activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

K I N

139

ANNEX G TO AB 140

ANNEX F

CONFIDENTIAL K I N

(3) Uncover illegal collecting organizations, clandestine trading offices, etc.

(4) Halt and prevent the VC from collecting taxes along communication lines.

(5) Provide additional security measures at rural areas, plantations, industrial firms and economic installations to prevent the VC from collecting taxes and forcing contributions from local inhabitants.

9. Transportation

a. The VC employ transportation means to infiltrate their cadres into our ranks in order to conduct sabotage, collect information and transport supplies and food.

b. Measures to control transportation.

(1) Control and inspect private and public transportation means (trucks, busses, cabs, three-wheeled scooters, ox-carts, boats, motorized boats, and ships, etc.).

(2) Require transporters to have transportation permits which indicate destination, type of transportation, type of goods, passengers, etc.

(3) Establish obligatory parking areas.

10. Coordination:

a. Coordination of resources control must be made with neighboring areas.

b. A meeting has to be held at least once a month by the committee for controlling resources to discuss the situation and to plan future actions.

c. Conduct training for members of resources controlling offices.

d. Explain to local population the mission of controlling resources and its advantages.

e. Strictly apply decrees, laws and decisions issued by the government concerning the control of national resources.

Maj Gen CAO VAN VIEN
Chief of JGS, RVNAF

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CONFIDENTIAL

140

ANNEX G TO AB 140
ANNEX F

SECRET

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ANNEX H (Disposition Plan for CIDG Bases) to Directive AB 140 (U)

1. The following additional CIDG bases will be established during the first half of 1966 according to priority order as follows:

a. Priority 1.

(1) I Corps Tactical Zone:

Establish 2 new bases: 1 at Minh Long (Quang Tin) and 1 at Thuong Duc (Quang Tin).

(2) II Corps Tactical Zone:

Establish 2 new bases: 1 at Poleikreng (Kontum) and 1 at Van Thai (Binh Dinh).

(3) III Corps Tactical Zone:

Establish 3 new bases: 1 at Xom Cat (Bien Hoa), 1 at Xom Kinh (Binh Duong) and 1 at Duc Phong (Phuoc Long).

b. Priority 2:

(1) I Corps Tactical Zone:

Establish 3 new bases: 1 at Dai Loc (Quang Ngai), 1 at Hau Duc (Quang Tin) and 1 at Hiep Duc (Quang Tin).

(2) II Corps Tactical Zone:

Establish 2 new bases: 1 at My Thanh (Pleiku) and 1 at Van An (Binh Dinh).

(3) III Corps Tactical Zone:

Establish 1 new base at Duc Hue (Hau Nghia).

c. In the event CTZ Commanders desire to change location of bases or priorities in para 1 a and 1 b, above, timely recommendations will be submitted to for consideration.

2. Five CIDG bases (Tan Dong, Giang Thanh, Nui Sam, Go Con, and Don Phuc) which were recommended by IV Corps Tactical Zone will be considered for deployment during the second half of 1966.

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ANNEX H TO AB 140

SECRET

141

ANNEX F

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3. Corps Tactical Zones must coordinate with the Special Forces Command to study the CIDG bases which need to be established during the second half of 1966 and to recommend to the Joint General Staff for consideration.

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Chief of JGS, RVNAF

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142

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX H TO AB 140
ANNEX F

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ANNEX I (Psywar/Civic Action) to Directive AB 140 (U)

1. Situation.

- a. Enemy (See Annex A, Intelligence).
- b. Friendly (See basic directive).
- c. Assumptions:

- (1) See basic directive.

- (2) Psywar and Civic Action branches of Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) that are helping the RVN are ready to support RVNAF psywar and civic action programs.

- (3) MACV provides RVNAF units with equipment to be used in propaganda and civic action programs. Civilian organizations such as CARE, USOM, RVN Social Welfare Department and Rural Construction agencies at CTZ and province level may help RVNAF civic action programs by providing additional equipment and gifts.

2. Duties.

- a. RVNAF, with support of Free World Military Assistance Forces, have the duties of defeating VC and expanding government controlled areas throughout the territory of RVN.

- b. All psywar and civic action agencies and units of RVNAF, with coordination of the joint Psywar Committee as well as rural construction teams, support local pacification programs by using all means available and with special attention given to pacification areas of national and CTZ importance.

3. Execution.

a. Concept:

- (1) Main psywar and civic action objectives through all phases to support the pacification program are listed below:

- (a) Propaganda aimed at friendly troops.

- 1. To keep up the fighting morale of troops.
- 2. To enhance the prestige of front line troops.
- 3. To raise the living standard of troops.

CONFIDENTIAL K I N

143

ANNEX I TO AB 140

ANNEX F

CONFIDENTIAL K I N

4. To teach troops, helping them understand thoroughly and observe RVNAF aims. All this has the purpose of forming good traditions for the Armed Forces.

5. Training:

a. Commanders of all levels are trained to understand RVN government pacification policies.

b. Troops are trained to have good conduct in treating the population and to know techniques of propaganda aimed at winning over the population.

c. To evoke and develop comradeship among the troops.

d. To make them believe in the final victory and disregard hardship.

e. To organize competition in making victories, developing spirit of union and enforcing good military conduct and military discipline.

(b) Propaganda and civic action aimed at winning over the population.

1. Propaganda aimed at the population.

a. To maintain the vital collaboration between troops and the population military-civilian solidarity.

b. To instigate population movements aiming at supporting the armed forces and the front line.

c. To make the population believe in the government policies and turn them into troop sympathizers.

2. Civic Action.

a. To separate the population from enemy influence by supporting military forces during operations launched in the clearing phase and the securing phase.

b. To make the population have self anti-Communist spirit (securing phase).

c. To assist local authorities and rural construction teams and to reorganize basic government structures as well as to develop the new life program (initial phase of the new life program).

(c) Propaganda aimed at the enemy.

1. To timely use information given by defectors and prisoners, and pictures of "destroy enemy" operations in order to cause a

144

ANNEX I TO AB 140

CONFIDENTIAL K I N

ANNEX F

CONFIDENTIAL

K I N

psychological shock among enemy ranks.

2. To sow dissension, cleavage and suspect among enemy ranks, destroying their belief in their leaders and the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam.

3. To call for enemy defections to the national cause by means of shaking their belief, promising and giving material benefits and convincing them through their families and relatives.

4. To harass the enemy's spirit in all occasions, not allowing them to relax, keeping them always in trouble so propaganda attacks can be launched against the enemy.

5. To universalize the Chieu Hoi (open arms) policy, utilizing defectors and prisoners to call for the enemy's defection; and to establish a 5th column personnel system within enemy ranks.

(2) Psywar and civic action activity during the security gaining phases:

(a) Military clearing phase.

1. To calm the wavering spirit and the fearfulness of the population. To show them secure areas where they can take shelter and avoid damages.

2. To make the population aware of curfew measures to prevent the regulations from being violated.

3. To sound out peoples rumors, collect and make use of psywar intelligence information and to make an inquiry about the civic action situation in the area concerned.

4. To handle first aid, evacuation, relief and gathering of local inhabitants in case there are large operations conducted with the participation of FWMAF.

5. To work out documents concerning war compensation for civilians.

6. To give lectures on the policies of the government.

7. To show VC crimes in order to evoke hatred from the population.

8. To call for the return of local VC and VC sympathizers who are secretly working in government controlled areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

K I N

ANNEX I TO AB 140

CONFIDENTIAL

K I N

(b) Securing Phase.

1. To continue lecturing government and armed forces policies among the population. To call for military-civilian solidarity.

2. To support rural construction teams in their explanation campaign and in works of constructing new life hamlets with the populations's participation.

3. To visit inhabitants, make inquiries, distribute gifts, medicine, give medical advice to win over the people.

4. To act as guides in organizing peoples groups and help them operate.

5. To assist in controlling the population and national resources.

6. To assist in setting up intelligence systems among the population, and make timely use of psywar intelligence information.

7. To motivate families that have relatives with local VC cadres in order to call for their return or their collaboration in providing information regarding VC activities.

8. To motivate the people in accusing VC crimes. To prove VC crimes by showing pictures.

9. To conduct propaganda campaigns along with air-strikes or counterattacks against VC secret zones or VC controlled areas.

10. To explain to the people living in VC secret bases and war zones that it is dangerous to live near VC units.

11. To appeal to the people to leave VC areas for government controlled areas in order to avoid dangers and regrettable incidents. To lead them to free zones.

12. To explain to the population that operations are launched to destroy VC, not to do any harm to the peoples' lives and property.

13. To show them the free and prosperous life of citizens living in free zones with the cadre of the government and the armed forces.

14. To distribute passes guaranteeing that VC who want to rally as well as people living in VC controlled areas may return safely to government controlled zones.

(3) Psywar and civic action activity during the beginning of the development phase (at the initial phase, if necessary):

CONFIDENTIAL

K I N

ANNEX I TO AB 140

146

ANNEX F

CONFIDENTIAL**K I N**

(a) To assist local authorities in organizing and strengthening government basic structure.

(b) To assist local authorities in carrying out the new life improvement program by helping in the construction, repair and maintenance of public facilities (Armed Forces Civic Action program for 1966 will be issued later).

4. Distribution.

a. 3d Psywar Bn and 1st Civic Action Co will provide direct support to I Corps. According to the plan designated by I Corps all efforts will be concentrated on the objectives of National and CTZ importance. I Corps will use the entire forces above.

b. 2d Psywar Bn and 4th Civic Action Co will provide direct support to II Corps. According to the plan designated by II Corps, all efforts will be concentrated on the objectives of National and CTZ importance. II Corps will use all units above.

c. 1st Psywar Bn and 2d Civic Action Co will provide direct support for III Corps. According to the pacification plan which was designated by III Corps, all efforts will be concentrated on the objectives of National and CTZ importance. III Corps can use the entire units above.

d. 4th Psywar Bn and 3rd Civic Action Co will provide direct support for IV Corps. According to the pacification plan which was designated by IV Corps, all efforts will be concentrated on the objectives of National and CTZ importance. IV Corps can use the entire units above.

5. Agencies.

a. Psywar Department and the Psywar Sections of the divisions (DTA) and the Psywar Teams of provinces will use all means available for civic action program for 1966 (to be published) to support the pacification plans on the following missions: information, education, gifts, building and repair of public construction, harm benefits.

b. Psywar agency, the combined Psywar Committee at the areas (CTZ, DTA, province) provide for the pacification plan, the broadcasting, leaflets, magazines, liberal arts and give to the people propaganda campaign and to have the movement of individuals or a group who have the idea to complete the objectives in paragraph 3a.

6. Coordinating instruction.

a. The subjects which need to be emphasized during the developing phase are noted in paragraph 3a.

b. The subjects to be avoided.

(1) Making fun of the poor life of the people in enemy areas and the enemy soldiers.

K I N

ANNEX I TO AB 140

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL K I N

- (2) Using bad words to criticize enemy.
- (3) Criticizing the custom or the superstition of the people or the religions.
- (4) To invent stories which are not true.
- (5) Criticizing the mistakes of the old regime.
- c. When using leaflets or broadcasts all information and photos of the battle area must be timely exploited. Local dialects must be used.
- d. Procedures for requesting broadcast and leaflet aircraft are as indicated in existing regulations.
- e. When requesting leaflet support, existing regulations will apply.
- f. The Psywar and Civic Action Operations Center of the Corps have the responsibility to closely coordinate between the appropriate psywar and civic action units and the psywar and civic action branch of Free World Military Assistance Forces operating or located in Corps area. They will also coordinate with joint psywar committees of CTZ as well as the rural construction teams at the CTZ to coordinate the mission of psywar and civic action in supporting the pacification plan of the Tactical area concerned.
- g. To avoid damage caused by air strikes; all units will request fire support or air strikes only when enemy positions are well identified.
- h. To make every effort to prevent damage to literary and religious structures, crops and property of the population.
- i. Each area pacification plan must have a psywar and civic action annex. All units must study this annex and the executing cadres must know well their mission before the operation begins.

7. Administrative and supply.

- a. Logistical support.
 - (1) Leaflet and printed matter.
 - (a) Tactical. Each area provide own support.
 - (b) Strategic. Supported by Psywar Department.
 - (2) Leaflet bombs and shells. The psywar units will send the requirement to J4/Corps through Joint Psywar and Civic Action Committee at the Corps concerned.
 - (3) Printing and broadcasting equipment will be distributed by Psywar Department as requested.

CONFIDENTIAL

K I N

ANNEX I TO AB 140

148

ANNEX F

CONFIDENTIAL

K I N

(4) Procedures for requesting emergency supplies are as prescribed in existing regulations published by the logistical department.

(5) Finance and maintenance.

(a) Budget. Supported by Psywar Department and according to designated budgets (to be published).

(b) Maintenance for Broadcasting Equipment. Supporting signal units in each corps area are responsible for maintenance.

8. Command and signal.

a. Command: All psywar battalions and civic action companies will be in direct support of the respective corps.

b. Signal: (See current signal plans).

Major General CAO VAN VIEN
Chief of JGS/RVNAF
Major General LINH QUANG VIEN
Chief of staff

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K I N

ANNEX I TO AB 140

CONFIDENTIAL

149

ANNEX F

SECRET

ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE) TO CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM - 1965 (U)

References: Map, Indochina and Thailand, Series L509, 1:250,000. Sheets
NE 4811, NE 4812, NE 4818, NE 4816, NE 4913, NE 484, NE 488,
ND 4816, ND 491, ND 495, ND 499, ND 4913, NC 483, NC 484,
NC 485, NC 486, NC 487, NC 488, NC 4810, NC 4815.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION: The overall goal of the DRV Lao Dong Party is the political and military conquest of the RVN. The struggle has been continuous since the Geneva Accords of 1954. During the period 1954-60, the Communists were attempting to gain control through political maneuver and small-scale guerrilla activity. Since 1960, the Communists have steadily developed their military forces in RVN, and have increased the magnitude of their military operations. The year 1965 began with the first serious VC attempt at mobile warfare in the Binh Gia Campaign. In February 1965, friendly airstrikes were initiated against LOCs in the DRV. The Communist response was a massive program to create an effective AA defense for the DRV, and a slowdown of VC military activity in March, April, and May. The VC "Summer Campaign" which followed reinstituted the emphasis on mobile warfare, although guerrilla activity increased also. VC casualties were heavy, primarily because of friendly airpower, and the "Summer Campaign" was indecisive. During the summer, U.S. and Third Country combat commitments expanded greatly. Regular PAVN units covertly invaded at an increased rate. After a short lull in September, the enemy intensified his war efforts. Large unit attacks and ambushes increased, and guerrilla activity expanded to a higher level than anytime previously in the war.

SECRET

166

ANNEX A TO AB 141
ANNEX G

SECRET2. ENEMY FORCES:a. Composition and Strength

(1) Viet Cong COSVN, Main and Local Forces opposing the Republic of Vietnam are estimated to consist of the following:

(a) Confirmed (COSVN, Main and Local Forces):

18 regimental headquarters
100 battalions
185 Separate companies
101 Separate platoons

with an aggregate strength of 68,000 men.

(b) Probable (COSVN, Main and Local Forces):

3 regimental headquarters
14 battalions
0 companies
0 platoons

with an aggregate strength of 4,900 men.

(c) Confirmed plus Probable total (COSVN, Main and

Local Forces):

21 regimental headquarters
114 battalions
185 Separate companies
101 Separate platoons

with an aggregate strength of 72,900 men (73,000)

157

ANNEX A TO AB 141

SECRET

ANNEX G

SECRET

(2) Militia forces opposing the Republic of Vietnam have a confirmed strength of 103,573 men, and an estimated strength of 120,000.

(3) The confirmed combat support strength is 16,911, (17,000)

(4) Confirmed political cadre strength is 39,175, (40,000)

(5) Total probable strength opposing the RVN is approximately 250,000.

b. Disposition: See Appendix 1. (Map)

c. Location: See Appendices 1 and 2.

d. Movement:

(1) The U/1 Regiment in Quang Tri Province infiltrated in June or July. Elements of the Regiment were engaged in mid-August during Operation Lam Son 190 in the Ba Long Valley.

(2) The 1st VC Regiment was badly mauled in Operation Starlight in mid-August. The Regiment withdrew from the battle site in Quang Ngai Province to Quang Tin Province. The Regiment was identified as the attacking force against Hiep Duc District Town, Quang Tin in mid-November.

(3) The 32nd PAVN Regiment left the DRV late in 1964. It overran Le Thanh District Headquarters, Kontum Province in early June, and battled friendly forces at Duc Co, Pleiku Province in early August. In mid-October, the 32nd conducted an ambush of ARVN relief forces for the Plei Me Special Forces Camp. The regiment used the Chu Pong Secret Base as a staging area.

168

SECRET

ANNEX A TO AB 141
ANNEX C

SECRET

Washington Cable Note 8 Jan 66
Warrington

Amb. Unger

Additional items for agenda

082030 for Laos
 092030 for MACV

Get AB 140
 141

Admin. Announcements

13 1300 Luncheon by Secy of State. All visitors; Unger will contact other individuals; also hopefully principals.

13 1830 Reception by Asst. Secy Bundy for all conf participants

Security at installation

Opening Remarks: Amb. Unger

Political Backdrop

Amb. Porter
 Expect initial political results by early 66
 Leadership, stable but limited

Directorate very fragile, and dependent on civilian ministers.
 Can't respond quickly enough to desires for civilian representation
 at core of government
 Too inflexible, is. influenced to remove undesirable
 Rapport between Directorate and population not good
 Some signs of growing uneasiness
 Military forces not imbued with fighting spirit from leadership

Popular support

Passive to extreme

Bright Spots

Ky improving, showing growing signs responsibility

Rural Construction

Minister has too unsatisfactory a scope; should be more
 of a manpower and econ exp than he is.

Tab E

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

(NB. Lack of a plan. Thang was to have solved this by 1 Jan.

Too little tie in of military un its w/ rural construction plans; Amb Porter considers that GVN hasn't grabbed bull by horns and given Thang power to move military to do what he needs to *synchronize efforts.*

Phil Habib

Govt Stability:

The fact is that directorate has maintained unity, *collegiality*, in face of problems is reason for Government retaining power. If any one individual should seek power, would kill GVN. Is therefore in our interests to promote variety to check and countercheck on Council of deliberations and decisions. US can influence the process; decisions are usually responsible. Ky will accept decision of directorate to step down *but* not a coup.

Ed Lansdale

The Congress of Armed Forces is coming up, the collegium is carrying the consensus down to NCO (Porter thought perhaps this might counter balance the NAC. Habib says no, is effort to explain their actions; they are wise enough not to rest their *life* on a military base. The military leadership through Admin and military base, as well as through political leadership, are attempting to develop and extend their influence.

(I detect here a note of difference of opinion between Porter and Habib.)

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

2. Milac

Compress of Armed Forces is effort of leadership to help morale. The morale as whole depends on leadership - it varies. Compared to year ago morale not much higher but certainly not much lower - is much higher than last March. Considering time and fight has been going on - morale is as good as could be expected.

(NB. This morale tied into lack of national effort insofar as military leadership concerned, both concept and coordinated effort.)

Habib

Please define morale. How measure. Until you can get ARVN to do security operations necessary, rural construction not possible. (Colby: Don't you need new overall strategy?)

(Note: This is chicken and egg concept again; need a strategy.)

Jorgensen:

Need more local PAT ~~time~~ action ~~again~~ to combat VC guerrilla.

Zorthian:

Many lost opportunities within last seven months belie optimism over stability. We need stimulate this government to establish a broader base than rural construction. Need to strike spark from people. *Colby ~~is~~ is in a class talking to themselves & U.S.*

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

Lansdale

Present leadership feeling way. They have discovered people, if late.

At some point US with understanding of this and our desire to spark, must find way to develop forgiveness for the out talent to come back and participate.

There are those with political *acumen not being used.*

Bill Colby

Ho Chi Minh didn't rehab. He drove out, shot and developed new leadership cadre, now strong. Diem on other hand used the old which was his achille heel. Perhaps we should look for new leadership, among lieutenants and captains. (Lansdale agrees. Habib: Directorate is leaning in direction of new ; see their objections in old political elements -- not in present political institutions -- such as labor, etc. Habib would also opt toward younger leadership.

Zorth:ian

More on lost opportunities. Corruption -- exists at high level e.g., Co's wife. --- hasn't been worked on at low levels. -- Privileges exist among Ky's brain trust -- Ky's original 27 points; people feel haven't moved aggressively enough on economic aspects and political evolution., not only at village levels but also in urban areas where civil servants and elite can observe.

SECRET

SECRET

-5-

Uncle

Why haven't they moved against corruption -- e.g., Ogie?

Zorthian

While will exists, their ability to act is limited.

DeSilva

Is this disappointment limited to ^{us?} Us? Zorthian: In urban areas, VN.

Habib: Major reason why competent VN don't want to participate.

Zorthian

What little spark this Government had for social revolution hasn't materialized. While they talked, little action. Thus the nebulous idea of social revolution which the intelligentsia, and I mean a relatively broad base group, hasn't been met. And this group could be moved. And it is this group support or lack of it on which governments have been lost. This isn't exclusive of rural effort but is essential to it.

(NB. What Zorthian is saying is need a national effort which the urban base can understand)

Habib

Believe the present military want to use this non-participatory group but don't want to (and shouldn't) give them leadership. We shouldn't work on this group. We can't. GVN will in their own Byzantine way. This isn't to say we ignore urban problems. 1/3 of people are urban, therefore, this is important -- Is provinces ^{and} ~~shilals~~ some district capitals, also.

SECRET

SECRET

-6-

Friedman

Would a Southern dominated NFLSVN, if possible, have more support than this Government. Porter: Difficult to say. Can only measure their present influence through current phenomena. This hasn't been evident.

Colby: points out that NFLSVN itself has little control or contact over people and says that this is their problem. Porter: This is their problem.

Friedman: Then why are we so concerned over their control as part of Government ?

Zorthian: Because they have an infrastructure, a shadow government, under their control which could *dominate any future efforts*.

Bill Colby: They now operate *civily* ^{*covertly*}, or through *terror* ^{*covertly*}, and could this control situation.

Friedman: But if we expose terror tactics. Barry Zorthian: People know of terror tactics. Answer to question is that any *group* ^{*can*} which ~~came~~ ^{*came*} out a program w/plans and policies would get support.

Peers

on Corruption. Corruption in VN similar to situation we saw in China which Chiang stopped once he got to Formosa. Is basic problem at local levels in RVN.

Habib

GVN hasn't really made anti-corruption an issue. Porter: I think so.

Habib: NO.

SECRET

SECRET

-7-

Friedman:

What is US program to deal with corruption in SVN today? Zorthian: Problems which US Government can't handle. Is cancer which is widespread, would destroy Government.

Friedman

Why can't we just get them to stop it; not moving against them. I think there is another question to answer: Can US be successful with it. Is different from NVN in that the totalitarian state which can control.

Unger

Believe we can't consider an absolute look at several examples.

Friedman:

Must look at cumulative aspects of corruption with other problems.

Zorthian

I agree. I don't think this Government without social revolution against corruption and other problems can survive. This must start moving and show more visibility. This government hasn't moved fast enough.

(Again need a US program)

Porter

Sees some rays of hope. Is not as pessimistic as Zorthian.

Zorthian

Believes in relative terms that US accepts.

SECRET

SECRET

-8-

Rowan

In time, US press will pick up VC ^{N.B.} (econ warfare feeds in this corruption.
When press gets it, look out.)

Habib

In Korea PAK made corruption ^{one} of his 6 points, which he used ~~often~~ after
punishing and reorganizing. Believes First, political evolution will develop
certain check on institutionalized corruption at high levels. Second,
something can be done to reduce it.

Unger

Recommends review of a table/paper on Korean experience.

Colby:

We still need to move against some flamboyant cases of corruption for
personnel gain. Have we enough information on it. (Peers: This is what
helped bring Nhu down.)

Zorthian

Press is influential but hasn't done it yet. Marlowe: Because too busy
covering war -- haven't treated corruption (In answer to Rowan's point --
that if it is as widespread as suggested, why not now -- coverage which was
given to Diem regime)

Lansdale

Ky has made announcements in leadership committee against corruption;

SECRET

SECRET

-10-

also said he hates to hit province level when exists ~~at~~ higher levels; he is reluctant to hit his colleagues without an air tight case. Interesting that among cadre responsibility is one of reporting on corruption.

Torgenson

Ky has acted.

Zorthian

While there may have been some actions, they haven't been visible.

Poats

A major admin. consequence is low morale among low level bureaucracy who assumes all others are corrupt, therefore, why shouldn't they be. Result is corruption. On other side, the result is establishment of rigid bureaucratic system which slows response and flexibility of government -- danger is more far reaching than stability. It also results in non-effectiveness more farreaching than public outcry. In terms of inflation and scarcity, one way is to release controls, as in Korea, which I can't see happening in SVN at this time.

Phillips

Only solution lies really in solution to political problem. That is getting Government going which people believe in. US pressures would be counter productive and would upset all over political efforts?

Friedman

Don't most people believe US doing this anyway?

SECRET

SECRET

-11

Zorthian

Can we have some discussion of Urban Programs?

Unger will ~~dox~~ add to this.

(NB. No presentation of military outlook ^{and strategy} as agreed to.

Habib

There is question of priorities that face our rural construction objectives. In this sense, the urban problem directly relates. This sense of priorities dictates pace of all activities. We shouldn't set it aside but should keep bringing it in as we discuss all.

POPULATION CONTROLMann

Regards 23% under ctl.

Collins sees MACV 53% as figure.

Porter

Gave Long An as example. Where province chief can't move into area to be pacified because he can't recruit PF to pacify areas for 66. He doesn't need cadre. While General ~~Long~~ ^{Tham} has promised to help him, they don't know how to do it because of wage differential between PF and RF. How to cope with this problem? What happens when regular military move on and VC move back in?

SECRET

SECRET

-12-

Rowan

I don't understand this.

General Collins

The province chief doesn't understand this concept. He should use Regional Forces until PF possible because people come back. The problem is that the province chief doesn't follow regulations. The 25th Division is poor.

Rowan

Two problems, command relationship and pay. This is susceptible to solution. How is US Mission organized.

Porter

Government of Vietnam must take initiative. Rowan: Why?

Porter

Explained GVN system of operation. (He didn't answer questions of what US should do.

Friedman

Why not start denying the 25th Division US support?

Collins

25th Div is better than nothing. VC would be at gate of Cholon.

Rowan

Who in US Mission who looks at province problem as whole?

Habib

Don't forget Hop Tac includes Lan An.

SECRET

SECRET

-13-

NS... But this was an US idea.

Zorthian

And that this was one of original priority areas ^{designated} several years ago!

Rowan

GVN not well coordinated.

Collins

Is not so much a matter of coordination. Is a force ~~major~~ problem.

Zorthian

Coordination was tried.

Habib

Was a US advisor plan

Lansdale

Plan described. was a US advisor plan -- agreed to Hop Tac is a force major one?"

Habib:

Plans are realistic. What we point out is the problems and complexity.

Porter:

We just don't know how Thang will accomplish the job. Our problem is ^{one the pacification is accomplished,} how to tackle job of maintaining security, i.e., keep VC out of areas.

SECRET

SECRET

-14-

Rowan

You're saying not much hope for local, i.e., province solutions?

Collins

Province chiefs are misusing Popular Forces.

Mann

You mean the military are not following orders

Collins

Fundamental problem is that there are not enough ARVN. The chain then is one of roles and mission w/RF and PF misused.

Rowan

Is the problem money? If not, how do we determine priorities?

Mann

Is a permissive situation. Wherein priorities set by wage -- role and mission, etc.

Friedman

I'd like to see ^{only} Len An taken as case example and see whether US can accomplish objectives w/present system whereby GVN runs the show. What are decisions which need be made in order to achieve pacification.

(NR Note done)

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II. Inventory of Activities in Rural Construction -- Pacification Field.

Mann

A. US Organization

B. GVN Effort:General Lansdale (See GVN Decree 0041, 11 Nov 65)

A. Doctrine is basically same in concept and thought as that since French days. To do this GVN need do several things:

(Top people pledge so far to)

Get
Act and maintain top interest and direction.

Get
Act broad enough, *put* indirect, consensus from other officials to

represent a stake from them too-- This is case to certain extent. Organ for this is described in his paper. Results

on a heap ahead. } to date have been more effective budgets and plans and
fund out to province chiefs for calendar year.

B. Ministry for Rural Construction

Thang recognizes his power lays in central concept working through Corps and Division Commanders to province chiefs. Atmosphere so far is good.

Top people as of *now support the efforts*

C. Plans3 Priority Areas:

1. S of Da Nang, a bite sized area, Population _____
2. Binh Dinh -- initially, of *N* *Qai* *Phon* city where most of refugees are and then inland along 19.

SECRET

SECRET

-16-

[Represents an additional area less than 1,000 square miles, a very modest program. 1,000,000 people are involved.]

3. Hop Tac and 7 provinces around Saigon

4. Let Hoa Hao extend into Long Xuyen Province, providing security themselves as they go along.

Cooper

Are people outside these priority areas claimants for resources; budget, cadre, US resources?

Lansdale

Yes, on a Province by Province basis as developed by each province.

e.g., Binh Dinh as 29% of total budget; Lang An 49.5 million.

Friedman

Cheaper to buy off VC than pacify X number people at blank \$ per head.

Wilson

Various province budgets do not reflect priority emphasis. Plans for cadre will put cadres in priority areas. Emphasis is regional rather than budgetary. Corps to have priority areas which should not be overlooked.

I. Strip N and S along coast from Da Nang.

II. Tuyen Duc, Phan Rang, Binh Thuan and Khanh Hoa

III. None

IV Go Cong, Dinh Tuong and Dien Giang

*(Get this Plan)

SECRET

SECRET

=17

Wilson

Certain amount of politics connected with budget in that Government gave money to areas where not much progress expected. There are 14 items in province budget.

Cooper

Does MACV have plan tied in to pacification plan?

Collins=

Answer is yes, since pacification chain of command is same as military.

Cooper

If we can't accomplish this modest program in 66, then we'd better go home. Unfortunate that though realistic this is modest. What is our chance for success?

Lansdale

In past they've tried larger efforts; the statistics led us down the garden path. Now we've urged GVN to be realistic and modest. This is not just ~~but~~ something we can build on. Hopefully it will snowball if successful. GVN are dead serious and apprehensive of a VC reaction. He feels the cadre construction under consideration are good. He doesn't think Thang has sufficient authority but he still has adequate capability to influence a lot of people and has moved to get job done personally, using US and GVN agencies on his own authority. Finally, when he got province chiefs to receipt for 66 funds, he got province chiefs to ^{agree to} do 75% of their plans.

SECRET

SECRET

-18-

Porter

Where will Thang's first great test come?

Lansdale

Probably on religious-political matters in Quang Nam Province where he has problems with VNQOD, since he's Catholic and Northern.

Friedman

Again, how were priority areas selected, going back to Cooper's question on budgets? How are resources to be allocated to these priority areas?

Habib

Da Nang— Hoi An as good an area to watch as any, since it has all ingredients of US presence, agreed plan, an ex hard core VC area, and other handicaps such as a war-ravaged society.

Cooper

What portion of USMC strength used in support of Da Nang - Hoa An area.
(9th Marine regiment is US screen.)

Unger

Where does USOM program fit into this picture?

Mann

USOM has been working with Minister Rural Construction.

Unger

But how do you know your effort is tied in?

Mann=

Through my ^{frontier} ~~reserve~~ and regional reps working with GVN on ground. Also this area has priority for goods. (Big question here is what is Saigon mechanism for determining competing priorities among

SECRET

SECRET

-19-

civil-military. This not yet examined here.)

Unger

How are we making sure that our various programs are going directly in support of priority areas and not in fact competing, and that programs are *coordinated?*

Habib

Trying to restructure political chain in village/hamlet and between these entities and province/GVN. First effort is to recreate local social fabric which has been redestroyed and relate this to government.

General Peers

Who is pulling together US effort in this area?

Unger

We assume reps get together.

Habib

A joint US committee, without charter, gets together.

Colby

Correction. At MACV's request, the US and GVN got together and General Thi bought it, that General McCulehen ^{chair} ~~share~~ a committee.

Cooper

Who decides -- Answer is no one.

Peers

But this is ^{not} example, in that it is a beachhead. How about An Quang?

Habib

No formal arrangement. We did try in several avenues and are continuing.

SECRET

SECRET

-20-

Peers

We need concentration of US effort.

Habib

It won't work. Mission Council thinks all depends on personality of people involved.

Mann

Depends entirely on individually assigned each province. I've been on 22 provinces and have yet to see *example of not working.*

Is activity and collaboration among US without team chief better than that of GVN integrated? Isn't GVN our problem?

Habib

Where GVN good, makes no difference. Effort is good there (How can this be, when most provinces not doing well?)

Zorthian

I believe in team chief in each province. You shouldn't depend on chance.

Unger

DALAT
How about Dalat instance?

Zorthian

A bad example.

Unger

What are defects?

SECRET

SECRET

-21-

Zorthian

Individual subject to agency pulls. You also need central section in Saigon.

Rowan

What is wrong with unity of effort?

Poster

I'm sure Mission Council would hear of problems.

Unger

What is Bible for all concerned. All There is no such document.

Moore

conducting
By ~~conducting~~ programs, we aren't working on main objective of political objectives. Wouldn't we loose individual expertise?

Habib

I asked political reporters to make their judgment on problems of coordination of US effort. Their answer was that there is no problem when in provinces, the problem is between provinces and Saigon. They work within concept of each province. However, there is no US plan of action that goes beyond resources; within US agencies there is some essence of requirement.

Unger

To what extent are resource plans really go to heart of recreating fabric of society as opposed to being a source of goodies?

Habib

For most part province chief is preoccupied with security and province chief ignores pacification. e.g., in 65 most province chiefs didn't spend pacification money.

SECRET

SECRET

-22-

Mann

Need much improvement in pacification plan. In addition to participation with ^{activity} PC's inclined to spread out money rather than allocate on priority basis.

Lansdale

What is in effect happening is that current program for 66 got off on slightly different basis. How it will go depends. Plans were developed by local people. (this we did in detail in 1962-63!) PC, MACV, and USOM signed plans against a concept to include social fabric, oil ^{spot} export, etc.

Cooper

I'm inclined to agree with Zorthian.

Collins

We have in two areas, Da Nang and Hop Tac. GVN is problem.

Cooper

We have no US boss. I would like to see at least US ^{boss} bases and hopefully a US/GVN boss.

Zorthian

We don't have.

Unger

We need a plan or concept.

Peers

Wasn't this spell out need for a boss in provinces and shouldn't these be someone in Saigon to coordinate overall US effort?

SECRET

SECRET

-23-

DeSilva

Illusory to think appointment of boss will better situation. Is no problem.

Zorthain

DeSilva's statement that team coordination doesn't pay out is not a valid one. Our experience indicates the value of a team captain.

Rowan

Since when is organ and unity of effort not better than none?

(NB. What about the Washington directive to establish a province committee?)

Poats

Aren't we missing our need for consolidated province effort by virtue of cadre effort emphasis?

Jorgenson

Joint control Group for Cadre

Cooper

Still think it better to have one guy represent US show.

Jorgenson

Explained PAT program

Have teams in 30 of 42 provinces. Thang may attempt more centralized control than CAS did, but he agrees province chiefs should control.

SECRET

SECRET

-24-

Unger

What is danger of expanding PAT teams too rapidly?

Jorgenson

No increase in bad indicators.

How about use by province chief of PAT teams in a military role; as in Quang Ngai?

Jorgenson

My decision was that PAT's must fight, if required.

Unger

Would you care to offer an opinion with respect to PAT as to susceptibility of area to VC attack once PAT has worked in area?

Jorgenson

Back to point of this morning about 110,000 guerrilla and 60-70,000 VC cadre operating against people, this spreads ARVN and Regional forces and prevents them taking initiative. PAT necessary to outflank this pressure on population. This then involves painful decision that once patient is reinvigorated, you have potential of training and ~~among~~ among people for local defense. This outflanking is only way I can see that we can get more manpower. Despite unpalatability of arming civilians to fight, we are coming to this.

Poats

Are you advocating hamlet militia as opposed to PF?

Jorgenson

I'm talking about villages not now defended; If we are to use weapons VC use, then we must create a hamlet militia in conjunction with the PAT's which are young women, old people, etc. Is a civilian defense concept which CAS has tried in two places and for which no approval has been requested.

SECRET

SECRET

-25-

Collins

MACV thinks this is not good and that except in rare cases, as good Catholic villages, these people should be part of a popular forces program, not an indiscriminate program where VC can get weapons.

Phillips

Need to be in position on a flexible and local basis to give weapons to people, otherwise we aren't meeting their commitment.

Friedman

What is difference between popular forces and PAT?

Collins=

Most of PAT are popular forces.

Jorgenson

This is not true (on basis of initial survey he made)

Collins

Now, this is the case. They are taking cream of popular and regional force personnel. You are weakening fabric of entire armed forces by creating a small elite force by offering more pay and US support.

Cooper

Couldn't you do same thing for popular forces by more pay? I'll bet I've listened to discussion of PF for 4 years and heard they take more casualties, kill more VC, are under paid, etc. Why can't we cure this?

SECRET

SECRET

-26-

Collins

If others didn't raise ante, they couldn't be underpaid.

Mann

They are at end of hierarchy, hence undersupplied. Also more US control.

Habib

US Mission Council has decided and Washington has approved PAT.

If we didn't have PAT's in place, etc., we wouldn't have bases for 66, 67 program. *(Collins. I don't know of a MC approval)*

Peers

Two Questions: (1) What is the difference between basic mission of PAT's and PF, and (2) if we have similar objectives, why not allocate effort on area basis with PATs in one area, popular forces in another.?

Jorgenson

Explained on performance basis.

Peers

Couldn't we create some capability among popular forces.

Jorgenson

Yes. Is matter of training.

Peers.

Why not do this for PF?

Jorgenson

No real answer.

Porter

Mission Council should look into this; this hasn't been considered.

SECRET

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-27-Collins

Explained mission of Popular Forces

Zorthian

Seems to me there is legitimate need to re-examine popular force role. Question in my mind ~~is~~ to need for PF's at same time we are creating PAT and police field forces. Havent we changed situation with introduction regular forces. Perhaps we should do away with PF's, letting Regional forces and PATs assume role.

Cooper

Maybe thing to do is break ^{them} out of ARVN, scale down their manpower objectives, and put them into PF.

Colby

Follow pp to PAT is PF. If you review roles and missions, what should PF do?

Zorthian

Need to determine where they fit into overall mission concept, what should control structure be?

Cooper

What of PATs coming out now are going into priority areas.

Jorgenson

None scheduled now; these areas have a lot now. We can't pull out of non-priority areas where we are.

Poats

How do you plan to relate to MACV military plan, or political plans?

(Or ~~is~~ no coord with MACV?)

Jorgenson

Is related to what province chief thinks. Can't plan in advance.

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-28

Poats-----

How about operation of team. Who is in Charge? What is concept?

Lansdale

Roughly 16,000 PATs plus 4000 cadre from other Pacification efforts. Chou, with US, is screening other cadre residue. Ministry hopes to train 16,000 more PAT type in 66 -- believe h2 this is a little ambitious. PAT now called armed propaganda team, team, Command team, etc., of 80 members called inter group teams, components of a inter group are civil affairs team; development team. Is doubtful what entire concept for 80 men will be because the various components of this team will operate in various ways, according to situation. A GVN decree of late December spells out Pacification Cadre roles and missions. We are now screening cadre to determine what more schooling is needed. They are assigned to a village but will probably stick together.

Zorthian

USIA has 3400 who would help; they could be attached at group level.

Poats

Again said something about agr cadre; they would stand by while inter group operate. Key point is that we should get people from technical areas into cadre program, not try to train up the present uneducated lot.

Porter

This is a weakness in program.

SECRET

SECRET

-29-

Zorthian

Concept calls for technical people to phase in.

Porter

Lot still to be worked out. Than^y not trying to get control over technical cadres. Altogether there are 54,000 cadres, with technical cadres. Thang still has to get health, and agr cadre out of ministries. This is a problem.

Cooper

Can't we make sure he gets them?

Habib

Something has happened since we last saw cadre proposal. Development team and attachment of technical cadre is new. Why?

Lansdale

Vann and Chou ^{working}unhung together for last several weeks have come up with the new effort.

Cooper

If Thang doesn't have his hand on type cadre he needs, then we need provide perhaps through special training for some PAT types -- instead of six weeks combat training.

Lansdale Peers

Agrees we need do something in a hurry but has trepidation about crash expert program unless at same time we open up institutional ^{try} for experts.

SECRET

SECRET

30

Ponts: Pay scale per health worker not competitive. This will be continuingly true for ministerial workers. In four priority areas, perhaps we should give them PAT pay scale. This would be difficult country wide because of financial burden.

Cooper: Since big employer is US, why doesn't US establish uniform scale, country wide?

Porter: If problem of holding personnel there are ways to control it.

Phillips:

Okou says cadre entry into village and districts will be problem because of relatively low pay of village chiefs.

MACV Role in Rural - EGen Collins

AB 140 Just Published
AB 141

Mission:

Advisor organization and mission - regional and popular forces.

Duty in areas of pacification

16 refugee relief teams

US civic action projects by US forces

Psywar effort

Support

Get most ?
1

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SECRET

31

Al Friedman: How many US personnel in provinces?

MACV 12-15 (42) Province (all Prov)
6-24 per Districts *unannounced*

USOM 1-2

CAS 1-3

USIA 1

USIA Role - Zorthian: *30-50 advisors*

US National Level

Info media

Chug Hoi and MIE

Field (Corps, Prov & US Divs)

24 JUSPAO now, 10 on way -- stay at that level next 4-5 months. Works as advisor to province chief and in operational role w/VIS.

MACV has 640 in psyOps, 1/3 in 5th Air Commando Sqd.

Roughly 400 are in PsyOps dets in direct support of US tactical units.

U.S.
Ms 5-5 at province operates 30% of *total* teams on PsyOps. We trying to double this.

GVM - National Level

PolWar Directorate

4 Psywar Bns.

Ministry of PsyWar part of Defense Ministry . Has 3400 men on pay roll to include VIS in provinces - not well trained, too many of them.

SECRET

SECRET

32

Also have 3000 volunteers. Also has ^CChieu Hoi which is ~~not~~ and we don't agree; lot of effort in support ~~of~~ Chieu Hoi effort.

Motivational training program involving working at province with CAS and MACV now so far along that USIA now to phase out. Have one pilot project going with village level.

Other than some technical plants, etc., nothing else.

Porter: How do you get planes for PsyOps mission? JUSPAO and JS usually put in request together. Exploit immediate but also in process of developing a 200 tape library. Air Requirement goes to EACC. No problems so far. Is surveying to correlate number of runs with returnee numbers. Doesn't rely on chopper because they are in such demand otherwise.

Cooper: Who makes psywar policy?

Northian: Command line in MACV but JUSPAO provides substantive input and provides guidance which obtains. Doesn't try to call shots within tactical units.

Friedman: Have you had shortage of resources, why?

Northian: Yes, lack of interest and request. Also lead time for personnel. However, people and equipment now coming in. Much more improvement needed, particularly in training.

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SECRET

33

Mann: US and GVN do work closely together; US does know what is going on at Cadre program.

Posts: Would like to hear from Wilson prospects for US support of Cadre system.

Wilson: One issue to be resolved in salary area. GVN costs included in budget family allowances. US wants restrict ^{to} pay only.

Jorgenson: We think that once it gets out that cadre is getting large fat money ^{ANALYST} it would destroy credibility with population of cadre motivation. Thang in agreement with US that the cadre should be temporary augmentation not a civil service.

Posts: Looks like matter of ethics. US paying through CAS or GVN accepting as part of their budgetary program.

Jorgenson: Thang wants US to continue to provide because the straight line to province is more dependable. If GVN takes over, corruption ^{NE} will influence as concerns family allowance and total pay assessment. _{corruption comment.} It hasn't been thought out. (This comment is my own, we haven't discussed in Saigon.)

Posts: His point is the whole nationwide cadre program is to be paid by the US. In addition to budgetary question, there is the political question of US taking over the substantial portion of system. We'd also need to adjust technical cadre pays.

Jorgenson: Are salaries that far apart? (Yes. Teachers 1500; health workers 1200. ^{PAF = 500})

SECRET

SECRET

34

Colby: We got CIO started this way. US should be willing to do this.

Portch: Yes, but there is a difference between small elite *glorification*

Mann: Explains that USOM operates through GVN entirely. They must *find large capital flows* operate with *high* echelon of government who say that this is a direct infringement on government sovereignty. Thus they oppose current USOM efforts to get piasters. In provinces on other hand, the chief doesn't care where he gets the money. It's a fact of life that the National Government is against currs. *this. I don't ?*

Friedman: Why can military do as they please but AID, CAS must go through bureaucracy.

Peers: Explained development of 50,000 *piaster* sector and subjects' advisory fund (which is now on trial run).

Porter: Mission authorized to purchase piasters for province reps to use funds generated by CIA program. We tried to get GVN to release to our unilateral control and GVN has refused to release so we are going ahead with purchase.

Friedman: Why don't we bulldoze GVN/

Porter: We are against pressuring GVN at this time.

Cooper: Questions our ability to get GVN to do or not do something.

To do this we need some creditable leverage. Issues such as security, our forces, pacification *pay plan and areas of*

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(2)

2nd Pad

35.

Technical competence in which GVN has only opinion.

Poats: Cadre system provides this leverage.

*(Note. But why not go to GVN at top and agree to it!)

Jorgensen: We have not discussed this openly in mission council.

Habib: Hasn't caused trouble yet because not widespread. Even so now,

Buddhists, ^{Mr} Tu Quang came to me and has advised us of this on small basis.

We must be concerned with with on a larger scale in this respect.

Friedman: I say an inconsistency in buying plasters to use leverage and in GVN not allowing us to get from CIP sources. I say GVN is concerned with image. CAS slips in back door, not asking; USOM asks and is refused. USOM is weak sister and we need ~~face~~ face up. . MA CV openly does what it wants; CAS covertly.

Poats: This would be an experiment to see if politically acceptable.

Amb. Porter: is politically necessary. We should do.

Poats: next area we will have it on will be police, then medical teams.

Friedman: Yes. GVN may make compromise between self-respect and what US wants, letting US support cadres and GVN expend their funds as they want.

Poats: Then is problem of *inflation* and budget management.

Friedman: Aren't you discussing that US should control GVN budget to extent we do in Korea?

Poats: Yes. We have not in past had control over GVN budget which we have had in Korea.

SECRET

SECRET

36

- 2 -

Friedman: We need arrive at consensus that US should control GVN budget.

Mann: This year for first time we did exert some control, in view of inflationary situation. US/GVN ~~unilaterally~~ arbitrarily set somewhat inadequate budget level of 55 billion piasters. Two ~~more~~ *Eligibility in world police force*

- ① level of budget too low. We did this because all recognize inflation dangerous at this point: that might need supplemental later. (2) Implementation of budget, in general terms, moves slowly. Also province chief inhibited by administrative procedures. We still need concern ourselves over implementation of these activities we are interested in such as public health. We may need take over ~~these~~ funds.

Poats: Recognized last week that USOM must sit down with GVN and agreed to expand police ~~within~~ *within* certain limits, depending on a budget supplemental.

While Thang wants PF, ~~police~~ *police* and USOM ~~are~~ *see* this as role of police field forces.

Mann: ~~As~~ concerns policy, GVN will do anything we pay for.

Cooper: If we should find ourselves in a negotiating process, one of things we must have in Viet-Nam is a very solid police as opposed to a military operation. In this reason ~~the~~ other things being equal, if there is a manpower shortage, I would put people in police now, as opposed to ~~the~~ popular forces.

Also PATS in same category.

Mann: No manpower ~~the~~ problem with police.

SECRET

SECRET

37

- 3 -

Peers: As I see it we need spell out roles and missions of these various forces competing for manpower resources to include some like CIDG not yet mentioned. Important to discuss where we are going. We need plan based on where we are going. Pay scales not adjusted to this.

Habib: We've had elaborate discussion. Nothing in manpower picture in 66 seems to preclude projections. In 68, 69 the lines seem to cross.

Porter: Mission Council has considered manpower situation in detail.

Poats: Thang quoted as saying that he does not favor ~~policy~~ ^{policy} in his pacification scheme. We must get agreement. Another item which impacts on manpower is competition.

Colby: Do we agree with GVN system of pacification? Are we putting enough ~~force~~ on pacification? Do we agree with roles and missions of division commander? I still don't see any indication that all assets coordinated in required national plan. We shouldn't say we accept GVN pacification concept. In fact to have good PATs, PF and enough military we need US/GVN plan.

Lansdale: Have enough resources. Thang indicates he will talk with National Police ~~and have~~. As concerns a national effort, GVN so far doesn't have a red book procedure similar to Malaya, though they are talking about it. I suspect that to keep the top three people interested with ministers involved, we may want to set up a pattern. On military side we have set up.

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SECRET

38

Hutchinson: Sounds like a two-pronged effort: (a) one, the cadre effort, (b) two, the provincial councils. Nor should we forget the US military effort.

Habib: Big gap at present time is that there is no civil-military operations at province-district level in which the local officials have any impact.

Landsale: They are talking this way.

Habib: Doubt that province and district ~~may~~^{chiefs} really interested at this time in giving up power to village council system.

Poats: We need a systematic political strategy.

Habib: Great disparity, from province to province now as concerns province councils which however do represent some political influence and expression.

Poats: US needs push function of councils and get clear explanation from GVN of political function of proposed cadre. Is particularly important in view of April election.

Hutchinson: US forces - i.e. sector and subsector advisors pushing this very line.

Unger: *and* with respect to village and hamlet?

Habib: GVN now consider ~~helping~~^{organize} the village. They are determined to move to develop the village, not only in pacification sense but also as base for their political plan. One of tasks now up to NAC is party politics (along with constitution, etc.). What they are saying sounds all right. We haven't seen anything yet. I believe we have had considerable influence.

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SECRET

39

Friedman: Back to police. Does CVN budget reflect increases in RVNAF and if so whose views are reflected.

Mann: Money ceiling set; how it affects manpower ceiling is fix contained in amount. This arrived at by MACV. We aren't sure the proposed FY 66

RVNAF manpower increases *will be met (be a flexible possibility)*

Friedman: If exclusion of police from FY 66 budget and inclusion of MACV is implicit, this is wrong. Mission should have decided where we wanted manpower to go and then budgeted accordingly. (Note: What is really involved is that the overall manpower situation wasn't the basis for budget allocation, particularly with respect to who got what money for manpower). I think this goes to heart of mission council coordination.

SECRET

SECRET

3

Porter: We haven't accepted decision that police are out.

We are trying to get them back in. Friedman: I'm trying

to hold on to one point. We've got to make it clear that

all military strength increases are *pending* also. Habib:

Believe we will keep to manpower increases for ^{military} manpower, since

they were approved. Cooper: Supports Friedman's point.

Mann: 20 B for civilian, 35 B for military ^(PLANNING of 55B Budget). Friedman: I

don't think force increase proposals were reduced. I think

MACV's procedures with Mission too loose. Habib: This is not

so, we considered thoroughly MACV's manpower situation and costs

(within Mission Council). Friedman: I'm groping for how

decisions on manpower made. I was shocked to see police reduced.

I'd like a briefing on it. Mann: I don't think police

justified. Boats: I think jeopardized. Marlowe: I don't

see how we solved problem of coverage of villages on country-wide

basis in various concepts discussed so far. Peers:

relates to what I've said and Friedman said yesterday and lets

trace one province activities as concerns roles and missions.

Unger: With respect to Cooper's idea, wouldn't it be good

idea to have plans ready for shift of popular forces to

constabulary role. All agreed. Boats: Need to get GVN

on record in establishment of a plan for police field forces.

Constabulary for the day of peace. For diplomatic purposes

change record on limit of 22,500 now. Habib: You can't

start talking this until you've established position with

government on a much greater scale. Boats: I think we could.

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Hamdani: If we could do this we might get a better Minister of Interior. Hann: Agus Habib: Minister of Interior is what he is because of reputation. Unger: Out come of this meeting will be agenda to reflect issues; it will reflect consensus as well as issues; will be live document for review by VNCC, and issues.

Unger: ISSUES as far as agreed to be:

1. Rural Construction and Pacification.
2. Designation of priority areas. What it means. Who is doing it. What happens to rest of country. Is worthwhile as central base for oilstain and locals.

(This relates to strategy, militarist!)

3. Team leaders for province: Saigon to examine.
 4. Relations of roles and missions of PAT, PF and police.
- No agreement w/GVN on roles & mission. Review. No budget.
U.S. concept and agreement among U.S. for future use of forces:

5. Cadres.

- a. Rural Construction Group. Consensus is we generally concept indorse/as far as it goes, worked out in dealings w/GVN.

We have reservations about a number of identified related aspects outside this: coordination with military activity priorities. Eventual development of not to plan non-govt activities. Political development.

- b. Cadres outside group.

- c. Our support of Rural Construction Teams

Salary levels, who pays: US continue extend to all the PAT process w/GVN agreement to eventually accept requirements to pay/ Leverage. How maintain control over econ programs Control over Cadre.

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Peers: You are alluding to instrumentality discussed yesterday.

Solby: Presidential Letter to Ambassador, Provides, I believe. Porter: Also should include authority to deal w/GVN

Gen. Collins: This is agenda item, number 5. Habib: Mission Council is only mechanism within mission to do this. ~~HOWEVER~~ How it's done now doesn't require a special staff.

Non-military side is thin. I mean that this goal is not geared up to cope w/pacification as an institution. Therefore the management aspects are thin. What we need is not more coordination but someone who can decide and make decisions ~~the~~ stick. Within civil and between civil and military.

(2) Ushering visitors. Managing programs. There is guy who

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spends 12 hours a day managing pacification? I don't see him. I think you need staff. I don't think Mission Council is geared to this. It meets and discusses problems but can't deal w/ problems in forceful and definitive way. Colby: We need leadership. Zorthian: I think pieces are there, you don't need more manpower or layers. There are enough senior people in Saigon. Cooper: Question. As Deputy Ambassador, Porter spends some time on pacification. Friedman: I agree with Chet Cooper. Boats: I can cite numerous examples that Saigon Mission Council not set up to ^{run} pacification effort. We should not leave this conference without deciding to establish a control operation in Saigon, with a full time manager - the 2nd ranking officer in the mission.

Boats: There is under consideration within U.S. Govt an executive "Vice President" for civil affairs. A civilian business manager type, framing attention on civil problems. This ignores need for civil military coordination. Habib: I don't agree that Amb. Porter is so tied up in other duties. We need only decide to give him more responsibility.

Amb. Porter: I am tied up w/other duties.

Cooper: Sketched chart (attached)

1. Plan & LN; adv to GVN
2. Adjudicate, allocate priorities
3. General. Point of decision is Ambassador. This represents major portion of civil effort.

Habib: We all agree pacification effort needs integration.

I believe it can be done within present framework. With your

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concept you followed the whole program. I think change of personnel is reason for confusion you've seen. Peers: A year ago psyops effort in Vietnam wasn't worth a damn. Because we have a HEK JUSPAO this now going concern. As concerns Cooper's suggestion for rural construction, ^{it} is representative ^{of present} COLBY: We haven't had a planning function. HABIB: O.K.

put in a planner. S we haven't done this in the past.

FRIEDMAN: There must be one man with necessary authority who does nothing but rural construction. COOPER: Look Phil, we've been playing around with this problem for years. There are identifiable units more related to CI program than others which can be grouped together. LANSDALE: How about what

Washington agencies think about how you are spending their resources. (This is an interesting revelation on a fundamental aspect of problem. Why should Washington be concerned over manner of programs implemented once agreed except as overall objectives concerned?) FRIEDMAN: We have same problem in Washington. Unger cannot run foreign policy and pacification.

COOPER: It may be too late to reorganize Saigon. But we need recognize future requirements for elsewhere ^{at} any extent. I don't see how Ambassador could function in his many roles as now set up. ZORTHIAN: I found out job of mission coordinator, formerly held by Sullivan ^{at} present, just not used.

UNGER: I see problem of piecing up parts of agencies and placing under one guy. What you need is leadership.

COLBY: This is why I asked if he has command authority or

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SECRET

operational direction and staff supervision which I would buy.

UNGER: Present system adequate. LANSDALE: Don't think will

work. FORTHIAN: MACV's command line is to CINCPAC. FRIEDMAN:

Don't let that cloud issue. COOPER: If this doesn't work then

we must create an operational agency in Saigon. PEERS: We have

a military Agency exists; we need one for Rural/Construction

UNGER: We need define pacification elements. COOPER: We know

enough about what is and isn't to get the show on the way.

JORGENSEN: Let's follow existing command lines. HUTCHINS:

Believe we need include in our report the need for a

management apparatus, a special reorgn to get on with pacification
job.

POATS PROPOSAL: (Reorganization Chart - see attached) SECTION V.

PHILLIPS: Harked back to his experience when direct contrast

been committee in Saigon and field possible, (Truehart Committee).

POATS: Rufe, Truehart Comm. an unfortunate experience in

many ways. All not represented, etc.

SECRET

SECRET

7

Gen. Collins: COMUSMACV feels that we have at present time a mechanism for coordinating, but that council doesn't have time to coordinate. If something like Poats set up where items coordinated, could be Ad Hoc basis with probably a senior man represented.

Kann: Mr. Bell discussed this problem with Westmoreland.

Cooper: If you have any quarrel with this concept, you'll need discuss them with Dave Bell.

Zorthian's Proposal (See attached) *Section III*

Cooper: I find no inconsistencies between this chart *mine*

Fritz: CIA - This concept would not be acceptable to agency in that there are heavy intelligence overlays in all our province activities which is our responsibility to President.

Cooper: We must quit running this part of war by committee. With so much at stake we can't

Fritz: (CIA) Why not let two experienced people in agency run pacification through existing organization.

Geo. Lodge: I hesitate to enter into discussion piecemeal. As I see problem within Mission with respect to handling pacification. I think there is a need for more staff assistance, a concentration of control necessary for the integration of program for three things basically:

1. Identification of priorities
2. Identification of criteria necessary for success
3. Enforcement machinery

I felt lack of this

SECRET

SECRET

88

Accomplishment of above depends on existence of people responsive to Ambassador not associated with a particular program who can bring to Ambassador necessary requirements to apply criteria, in accordance with policy. We need one success to determine how to evaluate new ideas.
It's a mistake to do more than test it in several areas.

If you want flexible and responsive policy implementation you need determine how to do it.

NOTE: In this respect, the current situation is such that the modest program for 1966 provides the basis for test.

To succeed we must really designate priorities areas which will receive priority. Having in mind four essential steps:

1. Agitation so feeling of need is higher than feeling of fear, which it now isn't.
2. Motivation with accompanying capacity to develop what they want.
3. Commitment comes with ⁴participation.

CAT, PAT, MCL Civic Action, and hopefully some kind of elective process.

If pacification to work need most intimate association within steps so that material aid is only a tool. This will require drastic ^{note also CAS black box} enforcing of AID process. Now we inject AID into local government ^{off balance} which really isn't inflation which isn't there, overburdening delicate tentacles in areas where there is no ideological return. I suggest we withdraw AID except in a few areas where above four steps are possible.

In summary, It would seem to me a mistake to change mission structure until we try the above.

SECRET

SECRET

9

Cooper: I think above would have been fine three years ago. Now in 1966, I don't think we have time enough to learn from mistakes. We've had programs before. The problem has been we haven't implemented programs.

Lodge: I agree its late. But, ^{I think} suggest way to demoralize everyone is have another failure.

Friedman: I believe CIA has best idea of what they want to do. I'd agree to give it to CIA. In two years I've been with role, I feel that military don't understand pacification. I'd like to give all human assets from military to one agency. I would look to one agency which has best ideas to run show; we'd give assets to agency.

Colby: We succeed because we have good field officers and flexibility to operate. However we can't take over rest of US ~~the~~ Government.

Friedman: We've got to give MACV and USOM some flexibility CIA enjoys. We can't go on with each agency running separate programs.

Unger: I believe we have such a program outlined (within current organization).

Cooper: No. While Ambassador has capability for policy direction, I don't think under current arrangement we have needed operational direction.

Lodge: I agree with Cooper on operational control. One simple idea. I heard in Saigon is possibility of Deputy to Charlie Mann with role of responsibility for pacification. If right sort of man, might be ok, i.e., Dave Bell ~~man~~ who could pound table with enough "clout" to resolve how things are to be done, without necessarily taking things in all instances to Ambassador.

SECRET

SECRET

10

Colby: I agree with Chet. However, if a short time force to accomplish I suggest we ~~from~~ free up ambassador rather than go into a bureaucratic reorganization success. Don't bother current operation momentum.

Unger: I agree.

(NB. Let's face it. There's little going on right now, so this is the time to reorganize. In this respect Colby's comments an operational momentum *are not valid.*)

Mann: Seems to me from all conversation that representatives or heads of various agencies are being narrow with little appreciation for overall US Government policy. We have developed system for condensation, beginning of pacification and PAT's. If Ambassador doesn't like agency heads, he gives them ticket home. As concerns Saigon, I've yet to see any basic difference among agencies in Saigon. The Ambassador has made necessary decisions. You have senior Government officials who fully understand US policy, objectives and requirements. Give them a chance. Gen. Collins, to what extent does VC potential for conventional warfare influence our capabilities to accomplish pacification?

(Note: Why is this question asked by Mr. Mann. Does n't he know? Seems to me question ^{on} Barry's proposal is whether Ambassador can delegate authority. We do need *clarification*.)

Lansdale: Major difficulties since Nhu has been lack of follow through and putting war on a political footing. We need use pacification to establish on a vertical ^{line} government-level-from top to bottom of political institutions at all levels. So we have two avenues to go. But if we

SECRET

SECRET

11

don't keep our leadership as excited as possible over political as over warlike requirements, we won't succeed. We finally have a GVN leadership long enough in power who agree with this. Gen Thang has stressed people are most decisive elements and they intend involving them.

Given GVN capability to implement pacification and determination to build institutions, I believe we have an entry point into the circle which doesn't necessarily require security. The Hoa Hao have chosen to align themselves with something. We need define it. A US mechanical input is necessary but we need to spark GVN effort.

(This is far as it goes. But I believe that)
 This ignores actual facts of situation which have
 been lack of US/GVN plans and condensation of effort.
condensation (unity) as basis for spark

Gen Peers: We need a czar over rural construction. Need someone to put thing together on a continuing basis. Job is big enough to require man of stature at right hand of Ambassador who can talk with GVN and COMUSMACV, USOM Director, etc.

deSilva: I would submit that this group should come together on an agreement on a concept which binds structure of family to local authority.

Reiser: This is basis for beginning. Determine what US can do for, through and with GVN to help them. Avoid doing something not related to this -- *and as* which is this business of Mission organization. Arrive at what US objectives are, such as establish fabric of society. Therefore, I suggest we try for first time to define objective in countryside.

Zorthian: I suggest there's little difference on concept of pacification and objectives.

deSilva: I submit that not all programs I've heard discussed *here* relate to objectives.

SECRET

SECRET

12

Zorthian: Little disagreement over objectives. Big problem is how to go about achieving objectives.

Fritz: (CIA) I've noticed a fundamental disagreement on method which deals with when you can enter areas to begin pacification. On one hand, Lodge mentioned agitation as initial step. On other, I believe you can begin with military action.

Lodge: If you use USOM criteria for pacification, you have set of needs and methods to fulfill them and present premises. Here is the flaw, since it is said this is done through local government to increase effectiveness of that government and response of people to it. This is flaw, because large areas of people don't have government. As explained before you must add that this material comes under VC. If you accept that AID goes only to elements can use it as basis for ideological base, then we must refocus AID effort.

Unger: I think we have done this.

Lodge: Then there's few places where AID appropriate.

Unger: I think this is what we will do in future.

Mann: Lodge makes telling point, certain activities must be run outside framework of regular Government, e.g., CVT or a village (Catholic) particularly organized.

Unger: I thought Lodge addressing much larger picture in which CVT is in fact the agent, not the black bag.

Lodge: There are four existing or potential receptacles under criteria I've set forth.

SECRET

SECRET

13

- ① Communities organized by PAI or successor and agitated or motivated
- ② Villages in Phu Bai district have in this instance with US Marines with a FF counterpart platoon (There's an individual here who represents Government). As soon as Marine or PAI finish, village elects functionaires who receive aid according to need and as requested from province chief.
- ③ CVT: Use as a test for four purposes. Do something which could be duplicated fairly rapidly.

Develop model for training.

Use ^{CVT} VCE for other purposes.

- ④ Village which has had chance to select leadership.

And Porter: three of 4 getting now.

Lodge: Is question of priorities. Are they receiving fast enough.

Can we supply small quantities required on flexible enough basis? Why build school house in areas not in response to an agitated oppressed community need. I have feeling much AID we do is in latter category.

Wilson: Is wrong to neglect totally areas not defined as one of 4 receptacles. Denies us possibility of gaining possible converts, otherwise lost.

An area of concept to be decided.

Note that while was decided to examine in more detail, longer included in report as a recommendation.

Cooper: Would have someone at end of phone in Washington otherwise modified his original proposal to meet.

Friedman: What's wrong with this?

Rowan: Does anyone prefer existing situation to this one (by Cooper)?

SECRET

SECRET

14

Colby: Don't think you always need security screen. Why can't we turn around and in some areas tie our aid to it. One of things we need look into is relationship between military and civilian requirements.

Collins: Div Co has interest in pacification for first time.

(US ^{+ original Chen Sheng} or, Back to 1963, ^{AB} which 139 and ABL40&141 have said all along)

Habib: Let's look at what GVN geared to do. GVN is going to proceed with his concept and we are going to follow on. While possible will

be in GVN plan and we'll recognize what can follow-on as it occurs.

The PAT ^{team} time is arm of rural construction group and Government, not something which ^{government (GND)} must follow up on.

Friedman: Back to the organization. What's wrong with Cooper's proposal?

Unger: This lumps responsibilities under one Deputy which belong to another. I prefer Pudd Poats.

Cooper: You can't have cake and eat it too. Start reorganizing Government; you must accept compromise.

Friedman: who else feels as CIA does about operational control, i.e. want ~~now~~ no one else with operational control over their field elements: i.e. province reps -- USOM and MACV.

Unger: Back to assessment of conference so far.

What we do in areas not presently a part of present rural construction program. Need clear expression of priorities. I see three areas:

1. Four priority areas
2. Areas PAT teams going into.
3. Other areas -- hand holding.
4. Refugees, also, *white neck area*

SECRET

SECRET

15

Wilson wants continue so long as doesn't detract from other areas with respect to 3.

(N.B. However, we need look at this from economic warfare angles.)

Boats: At point will be begin making more contact with isolated sector towns., using helicopters. I argue that as generality, I would be chary of pressing hand holding requirement in view of limited US capabilities.

Lansdale: I agree GVN won't give up territory if it can help it.

Allocation of material for school comes many times from US emotion, not requirement.

Friedman: Gave up country-side.

Collins: Impractical politically. We considered in instance of Kontum.

Friedman: I would like to see areas where everyone enemy in some areas.

Habib: This is indeed situation in large areas.

Zorthian: I disassociate myself from this discussion. Given present precarious nature of government, even implication of such a decision would collapse government. In all areas we do have some GVN who opt. GVN.

Friedman: I'd like to see quantified the amount of support which goes to isolated areas. How many people in such areas?

Lansdale: We've stopped short of something here. Enemy skillful.

Whatever cost for limited pacification relief effort pegged to isolated areas, if we move people in those areas, go after enemy, cost to use

SECRET

SECRET

16

military *hardware* against enemy will be prohibitive.

Friedman: Again, I'd like to see if the minimum effort you say is going into these areas pays for GVN.

Habib: Maintain a definite writ which would otherwise be denied.

Zorthian: Denies to VC a clear final leave for area they can claim.

Mann: Fundamentally, you can't give up province or district town.

I'd like to see cost of B52 *raids* related to number of people involved.

Rowan: On one hand, you maintain minimum effort must be required in the remote areas. OK. Describe what requirements are in terms of money, personnel, aircraft, etc. Turn to priority areas and describe them. Also describe in other areas. You could then determine what you could do. Maybe overcommitted, maybe not.

Habib: We can do this.

(This would be against the areas for priority, hand holding, and others.)

Mann: You mean a total resource evaluation US/GVN civil-military? *(any, one?)*

Friedman: This is what I wanted yesterday. I think mission needs go through this kind of program quantification and analysis. I don't get feeling mission has yet done this. Thus, my concern for lack of a boss. *(These sentiments are being for Friedman's continued return to Hanoi's influence over situation)*

Wilson: As I said yesterday, I feel GVN in 66 programming failed to in terms dramatize difference in funds for priority areas. *priority activities*

MANN: I feel what Friedman asking is correct. Mission does have in *which he* mind quantifying what you put in any areas to include funds, personnel *and* and materials, etc., *and*

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*agrees attempt to give
institution efforts to emphasize
civil approach to rural
construction i.e. more PRTs and
rebuild US troops to ARVN.*

SECRET

17

Cooper: I would hope before we close discussion, that we would get assessment of probability, that we will achieve objectives and description of what factors stand in way - if there are obstacles, what can Washington do?

Porter: There are GVN components to this we can give you better answer later on, maybe 3 months.

Mann: What is MACV's assessment of security in priority areas.

Habib: Charlie, we have had two briefings from MACV on what they can do with resources available. Both for 66 program and add-ons to include deployment and intentions to use them. You'll recall that we were horrified to extent that we would be limited by security in what we could do.

Back to Unger:

Saigon to provide estimate of possibilities of success in 4 priority areas.

Amb. Porter: by Mar 31, OK? Cooper: Yes

NB *

deSilva: Still haven't defined pacification objectives. What will happen to rest of province and country in meantime?

Habib: Agree with deSilva.

Rowan: Take all plans and supply a suitable deflater area by area and then develop US plan for compensating for serious deficiencies. This would identify specific American actions required.

Unger: Isn't this what we are doing now?

Friedman: We don't want to go through paper exercises.

Rowan: I wouldn't know how else to go about figuring out what I could do.

SECRET

SECRET

18

Colby: We should recognize that present priority areas may turn out bad, as in past. Mission should have prerogative of changing areas as situation dictates. Washington in general and President in particular won't hold Mission Council's seat to fire over priority areas. If GVN accomplishes GVN objectives, modest as they are, we will be happy. With dough we'll spend and casualties we'll suffer, you ^{aren't} my mother, etc., will ^{wonder} what you've done. All I'm asking is that let's not kid ourselves; what are chances of doing this, if not good what are (1) alternatives or (2) possibilities for sharing up soft spots?

Friedman: MACV is real spender.

(Again, US mission must coordinate & integrate progressively)
Colby: People will say what the hell with little or no progress. *the point,*

Habib: What war are you fighting. If Jan, 67 NVN still not successful, ^{not to} reflect ^{unfavorably} on ^{MACV} ^{was also} ^{part of} ^{the staff} ^{message} ¹²²⁻⁴ we're OK; with what we know now, we may be in same stalemate.

Porter: Can we really hack it in face of infiltration, rising terror and things they'll do in spite of what we do?

Unger: Don't advertise in advance what we intend to do. *(or, don't plan)*

Zorthian: Stated in Chet's terms will be the same unless startling development. As concerns 65, the VC have not accomplished their objectives. I see a need for preparation of public opinion on US. We need more realism in what they are led to expect. We have a GVN now 7 months old with programs.

Cooper: With resources we and GVN will put in this effort in 66, if we can't accomplish objectives, we need re-examine marbles.

SECRET

SECRET

19

Hutchins: Our resources input have greatly increased DRV problems with respect to their objectives. One day it will all start going for us.

Cooper: Only reason we can get out of bed in AM.

Lansdale: Our horseback estimate of all agencies concerned indicated that we would be able to accomplish our objectives in priority areas.

Unger: With respect to estimate shouldn't we inject into our instructions to province refs greater use of province councils, etc.?

(*ask* Why wouldn't this be part of US plan to
share phase up GVN effort?)

Lansdale: Need town hall meetings by leaders to give people some sense of participation VC provide.

Habib: This is part of plan.

Zorthian: They intend to do this.

Unger: Should we look for this as something to push them on if they don't do?

Habib: There are many other items.

(*Habib has touched on these previously.*)

The leadership council not sleeping on political evolution, in spite of security requirements.

Moore: Shouldn't our people be watching knitting of fabric at local level? Monitor this?

Porter: We monitor everything.

SECRET

SECRET

20

Colby: We need strengthen non-governmental institutions , if necessary outside governmental institutions and as an American effort independent of GVN effort. We should include this in mission charter.

Habib: It has been included.

Colby: We don't want to see everything stopped out with fall of this government.

Marlowe: Danger in this is that we siphon off manpower.

Phillips: Danger is that you do too much yourself, however, you also educate them.

Colby: FULRO is far out example of type organization independent of present GVN which we could support (though we wouldn't support FULRO).

Habib: GVN also considering non-government institutions. Example was a veterans organization, though they now backing off from it. Again and again, we are not dealing in a vacuum. This is fertile bunch and they know their people.

Unger: Need a statement of concept. Draw up first draft.

Friedman: I think we should adopt now.

Phillips: I think it overlooks national political effort without which effort cannot succeed.

Unger: We need a one page statement which would consider many papers available.

Lansdale: We need consider Nov GVN concept paper.

SECRET

SECRET

21

Collins: Also, use rural construction decree of 11 Dec.

(Get this. - *have*)

Peers: Another item should be correlation of rural construction with urban construction. Hasn't Ky's 27 points lost steam and currency?

Lansdale: They are not going to ^{well} remind on 27 points.

Friedman: Do we know what GVN will say? Have we recommended speeches to them?

Porter: In this context, no.

Collins: I will present military briefing at 2030 tonight.

Friedman: Colby and Poats question this because feel there are gaps in strategy.

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(4)

Pad 4

10 January AM

Mann: Never has been analysis in Saigon of overall civil-military construction for 66-67, GVN/US.

Friedman: MACV has military inventory.

Porter: No meaningful inventory of all planned and underway. We may wish to stop some.

Friedman: I don't understand how MACV could have proposed through military channels a program which had not been *aired* and reviewed by mission.

Cap. Friedman's point here is not critical of MACV but of lack of Mission Coordination & etc.)
Mann: We recognize problem. MACV did brief thoroughly on all programs.

We are forming committees.

Porter: If later we think some of planned military construction not in phase by Mission Council determination, we may pull brake. ! *

Friedman: Were there *any* construction projects you objected to or MACV did not *coordinate* on?

Porter: No. We had some doubts on MACV hqs but did not choke off this project. We want to analyze situation first. We believe we have it in hand.

Friedman: Supplemental gets appropriated quickly. In view of DOD budget process you are behind power curve. When will MACV construction program be reviewed?

Porter: We will review this on return to Saigon, within next several weeks, along with other required actions. This requirement has developed recently and we haven't the organization yet to cope with it.

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- 2 -

Friedman: When MACV comes in with proposals, I consider it Ambassadorial responsibility to consider alternative, i.e. use Thai bases instead of build in Viet-Nam and require more security forces. The military should not ~~form~~ terminate the situation or pay lip service to integration. Facts are military decision making process is ^{de}terminating process.

Porter: If a cable comes in that you believe requires Mission coordination and analysis, send message back to that effect. Something may be germinating that Amb. or I don't know about.

Cooper: What is possibility of MACV moving in to new embassy?

Porter: Certainly this should be examined and put on paper.

Poats: Brief review of what Saigon is doing to analyze military impact *(i.e. ports, radio trips)*

Hutchinsons: Would like to ^{say} ~~see~~ that with respect to examination of alternative for an airfield at Tuy Hoa, ~~there~~ there was much deliberation given to the requirement. Also was given to another airfield at Thailand. JCS presently considering a field program of entire area, to include Thailand, not just VN. Unfortunately a carrier not available.

Friedman: I'm in embarrassing position but I intend to push this point. A lot of what is bad in SVN is ~~just~~ because of DOD machine-roller on decision making process. If *you* allow people with security on mind to go to SVN and then come back and use all resources at DOD disposal *to bolster VN*,

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- 3 -

If the other agencies don't face discussions on a world-wide basis, ie build airfield in Europe to ^{over} ~~free~~ up corner, for SEA. If we don't get State, AID analysis on the issues on a world-wide basis, we are getting deeper and deeper into situation in SVN. Until the US Government makes this analysis on an inter-agency level, we will continue to escalate to

500,000-600,000 U.S.

Alternative to consider is MACV must recommend another airfield in VN
Porter: If you have suggestions submit them. Saigon will respond. We aren't in position for ivory tower thinking. Don't hesitate to give ^{us} word.

Unger: VNCC could examine these issues and recommend. But usually decided at higher level.

Friedman: Need executive committee in Washington strong enough to run VN war. The JCS, Bundy not looking at impact of VN militarily on rest of area on daily basis. For example, there's never been an agreement on how to relate ~~to~~ ^{to} VN. I think its a tragedy the way the US Govt. is organized.

Poats: In somewhat more temperate way, ~~those in US~~ those in US working on problem. Have been amazed to discover size of military program and its expansion. Also the size of the military buildup was kept within tight group and not disclosed to AID, though Washington knew more.

Mann: Got summary of military prospects just before coming to Washington.

None of our pacification planning has been influenced by the fundamental aspects of the military buildup. This is a symptom of the inadequacy of inter-agency participation of these problems. I believe NSC has seldom met on VN.

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- 4 -

Cooper: Last meeting was 28 M July.

Poats: VNCC has not looked at military aspects of situation. AID is just as guilty of not looking forward and are necessary to *catch up*

with logistics problems and inflationary measures. While ~~expensive~~ *expensive*

part of it, some of it reflects secrecy on plans not yet reaching

Presidential sign off.

(Note: This is because *Amber* Unger rewrote VNCC charter to exclude military aspects over our protests!)

Unger: We need force info to *go through* ~~them~~ of VNCC.

Cooper: I agree.

Poats: This meeting should develop some recommendations which will develop knowledge and procedures, a *regime* which will force high level noses to grindstone.

Porter: Two months ago Mann did get info.

(Note: All concerned did get nature of buildup to date, in detail, with

~~inaccurate~~ *both* accurate future propostications in July and November 65. *Also on*

4 Nov a Jt Staff meeting, a Surgeon (12.29?) urged full consideration all
Poats: I don't want my attacks to sound like MACV and Defense didn't

have info etc. I'm not as critical as some, but we need to know policy and costs in terms of impact on political economic situation.

Zorthian: All concerned did get briefings in detail in July and again in November 65.

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particular*

(Hoganah!)

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- 5 -

Unger: The number of operational proposals which come to State Department and manner they come is matter of distinct dissatisfaction to State

(I presume here ARV, etc, & not germane to issue at hand, Department and matter of disadvantage. State doesn't have opportunity

to coordinate with operators who propose. State just ^{doesn't} have enough time to check info.

(Note: This is not true nor is it germane to matter under discussion.

He refers to Arc & ITB type, here it is.)

BOB: VNCC by name not what we need.

Porter: We can get decision in hurry by getting Mission Council together and we are able to get quick decisions.

BOB: I had impression in February that Saigon emulating Washington quite well.

Peers: My impression is that Jorgenson doesn't have idea of what U.S.

strategy is for VN. 9/10s of our effort must depend on U.S. people in

SVN. Now we are concerned with rural construction. Now I don't think you

can ^{disavow} MACV from effort as you intend because there just must be ^{intimate} ~~intimate~~

^{coordination for} in construction planning decisions and control of overall effort.

Jorgenson: I was not aware of strategy.

Colby: With respect to the military presentation last night, I have

prepared a paper asking for a SWLE to present analysis of military

situation over next two years. Since so many of us are so disturbed over

what the military strategy appears to be, I think this group need re-

examine the entire strategy. I think it should be analyzed at the

Washington level, preferably the NSC, by interagency action.

(N.B. Should be overall strategy, per se seems to me)

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6

Arthur: We need plan for VM. We have a military plan, but it is not the overall strategic plan to include overall civil/military effort. We need a national plan. *(Referencing!)*

Golby: Too much VNCC attention to TV type items.

Unger: Because of white House pressure and press of daily operational business, we never get time.

Porter: What would happen to our plan in Washington?

Arthur: Each agency in Washington would review for own potential parts, then an interagency review. Then B52 operations, 7th fleet, Laos, etc.

Mann: In a sense I agree. But I believe in Saigon you could get into an exercise previously gone through ad Museum. Force build-up necessary; I believe as emergency action to keep VM from falling apart. I believe we are over this phase and can't get to substantive matters. However, planning would be fruitless unless directed against definite options.

Peers: Saigon has its objectives spelled out. Taylor had his; Lodge had his. Your requirement is to draw up concept, not in detail, to achieve these objectives. Then each agency prepares plan to achieve concept.

Unger: I would like to avoid thousands of man hours that would go into such a plan.

BOB: Reasons decisions made unilaterally is lack of confidence in bases for sound action below. People will not ignore good information, if available. Coordination and information is not available. We need a mechanism in Saigon and Washington to handle this, *with* while decisions quickly made, as Porter said, here in Washington, too, we need mechanism to implement a plan. While VNCC has role, it can't do this.

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7

Friedman: Zwick saying in broad terms that Saigon has no system analysis capability.

Cooper: Need be careful in imposing vast planning system on Saigon.

However, I wonder if national military strategy^{in fact} related to the pacification plan we discussed yesterday? I don't get sense that there is in fact a machinery in kind of detail necessary to make this succeed.

Peers: That you have to be right because of the way strategy developed.

Now we must revise for future.

Cooper: I didn't want to press this, but there may well be other gaps

- basically how it feed in major construction, etc.

Peers: One of reasons US organized in Saigon is so that J3 can accomplish this. Gen. Collins is part of Gen. DePuy's staff.

Cooper: OK for MACV but how about Jorgenson and Mann. Point 2, I couldn't agree more. I could suggest that high on list of our findings, in capital letters, that point be made that those of us in Washington and to some extent in Saigon, we are playing pin the tail on the donkey. This makes one whale of a difference in kind of game we play here. I have big interest in this. Viet Nam nastiest issue before President who has feeling he is walking on eggs. For that reason, way Viet Nam handled different from other areas. But it does mean those of us supposedly doing construction work find ourselves cleaning up garbage. I find a lack of consolidated approach to situation in Vietnam, as well as too consolidated approach to impact on US of VN situation; e.g., who coordinates medicare and USOM competition for nurses, one for US, other for VN. So I think we have organization problems in US. All well to talk of NSC, but that

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8

consists of Cooper and Rosp. To get these ideas off time, we need recommend to indicate little lateral coordination or interagency recommendation on issues in Washington.

Hannah: Relation mil strategy to pacification. What we need is willingness to think of big issues and their relationships. My impression is that there are certain issues we don't want to address, e.g., Jorgy's pacification concept is fine but microscopic. We need time phase, maybe over 10 years, to recognize all aspects. This is not matter for an instant time pill. How will you provide military security? What forces will be required over 10 years? What is relation of infiltration? I agree with role of Laos as Mr. Friedman said. I have never seen a study on relation of Laos/Vietnam and pacification to military strategy stated in time phase terms. Doesn't amount to tinkers damn about mechanisms for pacification if we don't know what problems are. I understand that CIA's paper assumed other aspects in explanation of their concept of pacification.

Friedman: I would like to hear what Ambassador Unger has to say about Laos. I consider nothing more important than to deny to Hanoi and VC the use of Laos. With 5000 PAFs for us to deny to VC the use of Laos as supply base and route. We have an outmoded concept when we consider Laos inviolable and neutral so long as VC walk out of rathole and attack. Laos now an extension of NVN.

Unger: We also offered NVN ^{pulling thunder} (PR) as panacea to assure SVN that they can win, etc.

Friedman: Restraints placed on RF program impossible. I want forces of Laos examined.

Unger: Not possible unless put in perspective. We need examine feasibility

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of what we can do, e.g., two years to set up logistics system to support route 9 block and I want that a military effort to block off route 9 is not feasible. However, if you do block off Route 9, it starts Laos war over which US military not prepared to fight.

Friedman: That was in 1961 not now.

Unger: So there is military problem but also a political one. Our role — would support no one.

Friedman: NO.

Unger: What Mr. Friedman proposes is way of military solutions was determined not feasible. I asked for more definitive military analysis which I have not seen.

Collins: ~~THE~~ MACV analysis indicated 4 Divs, 2 year buildup of logistics forces and many divisions: ^{was given} To Amb Taylor -

Friedman: I say US must recognize that 62 accords not binding. Try diplomatic initiative and then go in military way. Until we come to grips with rejection of 62 accords and with requirement to open corridor and use it as NVN, we will *be at loss in SVN.*

Unger: We are doing all possible.

Friedman: No, we are not.

Unger: ~~Shining~~ Brass, etc.

Friedman: ~~Shining~~ Brass is peanuts. We need reopen issue now.

Unger: Al, we need another military requirement statement.

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10

Colby: We don't need plans. We need organization. Planning will follow.

Poats: We do need statement of US National Strategy, to include analysis of time, impact, how we hold together.

Wick: You can graft together what Poats and Colby say.

Poats: We have no sense of where we are going or how we are going about it.

Unger: In planning field I would agree with Colby that there is surprising amount of apparatus, plan and US/CVN agreement and that we do have good picture of what is going on in Saigon.

Note: Above is shocking display of failure to appreciate what this meeting has demonstrated so far.

Lansdale: CVN knows where they are going. The US after long time of haphazard effort needs to get behind it. I think that the lack is on the US side. We need to organize.

Collins: There has never been a national plan until now. In spite of what Colby says. However, I haven't seen ministry of Interior Ministry of Health, etc.

Mann: But this begs issue of where we are in 1968.

Unger: We need ask Saigon what we expect of them. I'm willing to consider requirement.

Zwick: I'm pragmatic. Beginning with today's resources. Take present concepts, develop a mission capability to look at problems in decision way, evolving over next 6 months way to handle today's problems and at same time develop capability to look at tomorrow's issues. This is evolutionary and you need develop capability to eventually come up with a plan and to monitor.

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11

Jorgensen: How does US look at war? Long, slow one, or quick fast one? we don't have a feeling for this. What is US resolution?

Hutchins: You always look ahead because US military is carrying out political policy of US Government.

Jorgensen: What is US Government doing. Last year has seen major accomplishments in VN. If we can go into highlands eventually OK. in maybe 6-8 years. If we are trying to do next year for political.

Friedman: You must assume all we've been discussing, except Laos, fits into National Strategy. We are working at our level with established policies.

Cooper: We have had influence on where we are going but have not looked at implications of our decisions. Maybe after looking at where we are going now, we may wish to reassess.

Zwick: We need assume long situation and get on with it.

Friedman: Present US policy is to go on with Phase II and IIA behind US/GVN pacification effort and get on with our effort.

Colby: We must approach what we do on analysis of how effective is what we presently do.

Friedman: This is included part of coming out larger policy.

Unger: Agree with AI on Phas II and IIA approach with understanding we can't impact or handle political situation.

Colby: need recognize fragility of GVN situation and possibility of Soviet/DRV effort.

Friedman: Programs have not been coordinated.

Mann: We are now analyzing impact of military programs on USOM activities.

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SECRET

12

Unger: With respect to committees, what authority does it have? For example, manpower. No authority. Recommends decision by mission council for US agencies. As concerns ROK. ?

Mann: Shortage is principally in skills, not number of bodies. Negotiation to relieve skill is training and 3rd country nationals. GVN has ok'd input of ROK's and Phils.

Poats: ROK has been renegeing on promises to train GVN nationals as well as bring in 3rd country nationals. GVN will refuse permission to ROK for more input of FWA labor until they meet promises.

Unger: Resource control czar. Is this necessary or couldn't within US Mission the committees do the job. (These already established such as manpower, etc.)

Porter: I believe as head of various committees, I can fulfill various need for decisions on manpower, construction, etc. If any one in mission wants a Mission Council debate, I would arrange it.

Hutchins: There is give and take between Embassy and Military on this, e.g., Phan Rang where we delayed BOB until April, accepting crowding elsewhere on a temporary visit basis.

Porter: I suggest existing machinery adequate in this area of resources control and would like to go ahead with Washington.

Cooper: How about port congestion?

Porter: Would like proceed as we are.

Cooper: List of resource problems: construction materials; housing in country; manpower; I have feeling US agencies bidding against GVN and

SECRET

SECRET

13

one another and GVN bid one against the other.

Friedman: I think troop spending has impact.

Unger: Another problem but handled differently.

Cooper: Agree. Cited housing as area where competitive adding the rule.

Porter: There is bidding to degree but not excessive.

Collins: Normally good arrangement between agency housing agents.

Poats: ^{note} Frowall rentals not currently prohibited for military, though frowned upon. This is area of weakness. It is fairly considerable in Saigon.

Mann: FWA doing lot of this.

Friedman: Yesterday when discussing pacification we discussed Dep Amb do that. With respect to resource allocation now we discuss DepAmb doing this also.

Porter: I do not see DepAmb doing both in reorganization scheme. I see respective agency chiefs as head of various committees.

Cooper: Must be a directing head. This should be at ambassadorial level tied back to Washington. Projecting ahead, we are going to run into tight resources and guy concerned shouldn't have to decide.

Unger: I think Dep Amb responsible for other embassy functions. Could also handle resources.

Porter: I would think so, we all work well together and wouldn't need another body.

Poats: Resource allocation point of appeal will not be man responsible for pacification.

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Unger: I think DepAmb responsible for other Emb functions could also handle resources.

Porter: I would think so, we all work well together and wouldn't need another body.

Boats: Resource allocation point of appeal will not be man responsible for pacification.

Unger: No, one with responsibility for other Embassy function.

Mann: Mission coordinator should be resource control man.

Friedman: Two points:

1. Resource control man must have status of ambassador.

Mann: This is why you have USOM.

Porter: Chet didn't you have idea of this guy as coordinator?

Cooper: Yes,

Unger: Through committees you handle, with them doing examinations, day to day handling, and staff work. They report to Dep Ambassador and Ambassador for decision.

(Note: Misses point)

Cooper: I disagree with two deputy ambassadors but resource control should be a full-time job for someone. You need free up man to cope

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with operating problems. Mann has terrific responsibility with his responsibilities. In view of future, resource allocation will be a big problem requiring full-time consideration of options, considerations, alternations and size of full picture. You can't count on ambassador.

Poats: Two basic resource problems, GVN manpower and port and inland transport. I opt for a committee chaired by USOM which would offer problems to Mission Council for resolution. I don't see need for hierarchy or deputy ambassador.

Cooper: I see need for specialist with technical skills, not ambassador or hierarchy. He would be staff officer with abilities an FSO doesn't possess.

Poats: Need committee approach.

Cooper: How resolve airlift requirement in view of road and railroad, refugees, log requirements.

Collins: With respect to air movement (explained system).

Friedman: Who changes air priority?

Porter: I could.

Friedman: Who will in future?

Poats and Zorthian: Committees.

and as possible bureaucracy, to try to run by committee.

Time, ports, etc. In future

let's overpass.

Unger: Chet Cooper, what do you visualize?

Cooper: Another diagram and discussion along lines his previous explanation. In essence, central direction and control which frees up agency director, provides look ahead, ties in Vietnam effort to U.S. situation.

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Porter: I have no problem with it as concept.

Unger: Saigon will take up with ambassador and Washington will send a cable.

Friedman: Need also Washington organization which has authority to direct USC agencies.

Unger: Can we regard this as rough list of priorities we would recommend to mission (This is list considered previously by VNCC).

Peers: In answer to Colby's suggestion to reverse A & C, I suggest they go together. I don't see how you can separate consideration.

Porter: Must have troops free for sweeps for pacification when needed.

Friedman: Why not put U.S. troops where population is. You'd be amazed at present situation.

Porter: Strategy is to deny highlands to VC.

Peers: This highland screen necessary to protect coast.

Hutchison: Biggest problem is VC.

Friedman: Don't see why we put 3,000 troops in one area, to stay, such as highlands.

Collins: Explained rationale of operations against VC basis.

Poats: You can't generalize on priorities to be assigned.

Colby: Rural construction is only concept, supported by military operations.

Friedman: 21 of 34 battalions are devoted to security. Why?

MILLER ~~(Comment:~~ The MACV strategy assumes that as in past VC buildup will prevent meaningful rural construction without military forces which perform simultaneously pacification, security and reach-on and S & D missions. Present situation is one of about 1/2 of U.S. forces recommended in July on basis estimate of VC capabilities to do job as Phase I -

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hold line. Meanwhile VC buildup continues. Phase II may not be enough.

Unger: Suggest priority list to Saigon lumping first three, also organization we've discussed Colby's concept proper related to strategy analysis requirements.

Cooper: We need look at what ideal operation would be in way of Province analysis.

Poats: To come back to resource allocation, there is question of Military Province Hospital teams, since Defense has said could, couldn't etc. within last few days. This raises problems of priorities. Couldn't it be put back in DOD plan to provide at least some doctors from DOD, if not the 30 originally discussed we can consider lesser amount. Airlift AID needs commodities for local province requirements. We would like three C-123's and Caribou and a few helicopters which we can't get immediately.

Friedman: 1. With respect to airplanes is Saigon problem.
2. As to doctors, VNCC will look at; also maybe Saigon can ask MACV for more.

Zorthian: Does Ambassador Lodge have authority to direct MACV? *AID requested to discuss requirements. 300/100 approved. Related to establishment.*

Mann: Believes there is reduction in authority as granted Taylor.

Friedman: Ambassador should at least recommend.

Poats: We need responsive airlift, perhaps could be MACV standby.

Friedman: Why not integrate within U.S. effort.

Hutchison: MACV will provide within priorities.

Zorthian: Mission Council has not considered it.

Porter: If put to Ambassador, we could act on it.

Unger: First handle on mission basis, then send to Washington.

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Hutchison: We need consider theater airlift capacity, with guaranteed lift, not separate air lines.

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A CONCEPT FOR PACIFICATION

Discussion by Lansdale, Zorthian, Mann agreed that this okay as guidelines within GVN directive of 11 December.

General Collins: MACV agrees heartily with 9 January paper (Rufe Phillips)

As concerns DeSilva's this is first time I've seen it (3 January paper).

As long as we are considering papers, I recommend we include the Mission Council agreed paper which defines pacification as well.

Zorthian: Believe the mission paper is overtaken by events.

Collins: Don't think so. May be some changes in language. AB 140 also applies.

Jorgenson: Then we need ^{revise} reserve AB 140 and mission concept statements.

I haven't read them for a long time.

Collins: They are not inconsistent.

Unger: This is mission business to get items of doctrine tied together and revised as necessary.

Collins: What are we stating. I want to revise in Saigon along with other papers in mission. I agree with Tab A and B, they are official papers. *(as presented at meeting & now part of approved)* As concerns the 9 January DeSilva paper, it is not approved policy. *(back to tab B, report)* I would like to see it revised in Saigon.

S. Wilson: I want to go on to AB 140 and AB 141 before I agree with them.

Friedman: Who is running pacification within mission. Where did this

Directive 1535 come from. *(GVN pacification Directive)*

Lansdale: GVN produced, we provided influence.

Colby: Reference recommendation for a SNIE on likely development of military situation over next two years, I believe we need new, healthy look.

Peers: I don't think anyone would object to a look.

Colby: In view of terrible shortfall over our previous analysis of

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(five months) ago need new look.

Cooper: We haven't had a bad period last five months but I am concerned over next six months. What we are really talking about is strategy for use of U.S. forces in SEA theater and how would we get a new strategy?

Peers: I believe that the proposed paper on SNIE is wrongly worded. I think we need ask for SNIE but reword rest of proposal to state that once SNIE developed that strategy should be reassessed on basis of SNIE.

Arthur: Request SNIE and when agencies revise if indicated we request reassessment of strategy we may be going to far to request JCS to reassess strategy.

Colby: In view of time element discussed here I suggested analysis of strategy concurrently with development of SNIE.

Friedman: Believe this group could recommend that alternate strategies be assessed concurrently with SNIE. I believe we should have done this last fall. Reason we didn't was because Washington and Saigon were fragmented. MACV on his part...

Hutchison: Colby is right. We've had Rolling Thunder, Rural Construction and Military buildup as three pronged U.S. policy. Rolling Thunder now stood down, Rural Construction at standstill and only military buildup underway. We do need reassessment of situation and this is being examined SecDef and C,JCS have directed reassessment of alternatives. A very important conference is slated for January. I wouldn't be surprised if SNIE isn't already in preparation. I'd suggest it might be premature to recommend alternate strategies since the military are already looking at more alternatives than they can probably handle.

Unger: Recommend that we make the alternatives, refined, included in Colby's SNIE proposal be reconsidered as matter worth looking into.

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Porter: I assume Mission Council would have a look at it?

Poats: I hope with respect to synopsis of this meeting that co-chairman would submit in some form to President a prospectus of problems, time phasing and prospects of achievements would be submitted to President for the assessment of what it looks like we face. We would indicate that we are requesting a SNIE. I would expect President to pick up phone and say, is this best you can do. I could see him asking for review of strategy.

Cooper: Unless SecDef briefed President following SecDef's Saigon briefing, the President hasn't received the implications of last night's military briefing.

(Note: Essentially one given SecDef in Saigon in Nov.)

Hutchison: Congressional leadership indicated they were very much interested in U.S. strategy for ending war. What will be U.S. resource requirement; how long did it take?

Mann: I agree 100% that if this meeting has a purpose it should be a piece of paper for the President. I doubt that President has any idea how long this might last.

Unger: We intend a paper for secretary level and eventually to President. One of proposals would be a SNIE.

Colby: Would be appropriate for this group to request review of strategy points A, C and D of my SNIE proposal in that they relate so directly to military strategy I believe if we can't agree we need buck them for further consideration, as with matter of organization and pacification concept.

Unger: Reason why we come up with recommendation for President is as Poats says, relation to and impact on order programs.

Poats: I want President to know just how limited will be the Rural Construction progress in 1966.

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Zorthian: A number of congressional groups received orders of briefing on size buildup by 1966, etc., as did Vice President Humphrey.

Friedman: We should also include the ways in which the U.S. violates the facade of maintaining the GVN image.

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URBAN DEVELOPMENT (Mann)

Zorthian: Not enough be done for youth, intelligentsia or labor.

While number of Ky's 27 points were designed to do this, it hasn't been done. Recommend we get U.S. pressure on this through GAS, etc. Also enlist support of counterpart U.S. organizations to support U.S. country programs. We need a sharp increase in educational exchanges. We need an input into school system, secondary and higher now if in long run we want long range impact or eventual leadership of this country. Not that nothing is going on, just that there is too little. Need Fulbrights and students. There's been no dialogue between U.S. Missions and students (outside small program). We need more U.S. resources.

Colby: Do we have a document outlining concept for urban development? And then tie our hobbies to it instead of going out with individual programs such as youth.

Peers: It's not too early to begin thinking about a city manager as part of DeSamb's staff who should have advisors with city.

Zorthian: We lose government from cities, not rural areas. In this sense our urban programs are at low ebb. I want to see urban centers developed as source of strength to GVN.

Porter: Cities aren't our problem.

Friedman: All governments have been lost in the cities. How many times has GVN leadership met with GVN intellectuals?

Zorthian: Not very much except for Chieu. But it hasn't been enough that intellectuals feel inclined to support GVN.

Friedman: To what extent does mission encourage GVN leadership to do this and provide circumstances.

Zorthian: Really not.

Porter: Except at U.S. social functions.

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Lansdale: I don't get with really true intellectuals because they are fixed on one point: "Put me in and I can run government better."

Zorthian: I believe we are losing something here. What Lansdale says is true of older jaded group. We need work on younger element, which we are doing to certain extent. We need do more. We need look at youth in its broad sense along lines of paper on institution building presented here which I think is encouraging development. However we must adopt for urban areas the concept of social revolution expressed in pacification concept paper.

Marlowe: Need motivational programs in cities.

Kowan: When do we put PAT's in cities.

Colby: Suggest this group look at institution building program with idea of organizing population not building works.

Wilson: On September 64 and days following I had four students on demi-coup list for four weeks. Director of Police I contacted said good so long as I don't have to pick them up. We then worked through IVS to direct student energies profitably, finding they weren't organized or able to. As result we did much to temporarily busy students. However, this was bilateral between USOM and students and GVN was not happy. Since then (Oct. 65) we've tried to get students and GVN together and overcome antipathy among students, stemming from Diem regime. There still isn't too much dialogue between GVN and students. still and Minister Thinh and Police Director ^{new} ~~Law~~ to overcome. There's no progress yet, we need look at this to see what U.S. should do to get ^{them} off dead center; may need policy guidance.

Marlowe: How are cultural education programs going?

Zorthian: Not enough U.S. participation. Program is not moving.

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Lansdale: We have logistics jam from most U.S. public support. We need inventory of available U.S. assets other than physical.

Unger: We will do.

Lansdale: Couldn't VNCC do, that is motivate groups around country. As concerns what we need, I'm not certain of a list, however, what Barry just said sparked this. It's more than money and goods.

Mann: Why couldn't they make money available for an English professor? Or provide a scholarship for VN to come to the States.

Marlowe: It isn't quite this simple: 1. Requires lot of mission staff time; 2. While you want VN to come here to study English someone will want to come to States to do something else and when you turn down, 30 congressmen will holler.

Unger: Saigon will provide an inventory of what is useful. What could Washington do?

Zorthian: Recognize important role urban population can play.

Wilson: Vietnamese receptive to sports. We haven't done anything to get sports advisors.

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PROPOSED ADDITION TO SNIE PROPOSAL:

Meeting accepted addition of infiltration and DRV/CHICOM threat to Laos, Thailand, and Burma as areas for additional analysis.

(as recommended by OSO/PMR)

Unger: Propose a backgrounder by AmbPorter with press to get over to U.S. public idea of U.S. activities in peaceful field. Could be related to meeting here in that we are gathering to discuss non-combat aspects.

Friedman: Why not react to return to Saigon.

Zorthian: Valuable here because they get all the time in Saigon.

Ropa: McBundy pointed out to me in forceful terms how much President wanted emphasis on non-combat activity. However, since President's State of the Union message is Wednesday night, I recommend we do it Thursday, not Friday.

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SECRETUnger:

Our report will tentatively include:

1. Security situation and things which could go wrong with respect to rural construction and wider programs.
2. Request for SNIE.
3. What 1966 program will accomplish.
4. Factors to be considered as to other ways (employment of forces, etc) to meet problems. Strategy reassessment.
5. Various decisions made on pacification program.
6. Register on various resource problems.
7. Rove agreement on a concept for pacification.
8. Re-organization at Washington and Saigon level for management U.S. effort.
9. Report those factors which are encouraging.

Zorthian: Very soon to be available is a sampling of GVN opinion which will influence any assessment under way. This is first thing which purports to be a national survey therefore suspect that it will go to White House.

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11 January 1966

3
*Passing*Recap of Actions to DateUnger

Reconsideration of Action Agenda for Rural Construction (draft)

into (CIA will do):
Make Paragraph 6, 2 paragraphs and redraft other minor parts.

Isn't there a requirement to define-standardize the terms? Sam Wilson

will do before he leaves *(This is at pacification concept action; Saigon is in revision)*.Final Report, aside from possible condensed and brief report for President, will start and w/ an introduction *and* an assessment of situation *and include*

Snie →

Rural Construction Actions

Priorities and allocations and mission organization thereof

Washington organization on VN -- Can't do much beyond indicating present machinery; inadequate; will try move right along on this beginning 12 Jan 66.

Urban action program and other matters as developed 11 Jan.

Strategy paper to be drafted Saigon

Courses of action for cease fire *conditions*Zorthian: Shouldn't we assess what we would do should a de facto
cease fire occur. What is the US Program.Unger: A Washington Group will meet on this soon.**SECRET**

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Zorthian: I'm not discussing what our problem will be or how we get there.

I mean what will our action programs be and how will we carry them forward.

Unger: I think mission should do this.

De: I believe SNIE would be valuable here. For one, I could predict galloping infiltration, hoarding, uncertainty, etc.

(and corruption?)

Zorthian: What would VC tactics be to extend control, etc.?

DeSilva: SNIE generated in Washington. Couldn't appraise delicate interworkings. ^{However,} I believe this must be started in Washington.

Peers: Handle this on a close hold basis, initially in Washington.

Someone already thinking on this in Washington; they should outline several situations such as stand down, cease fire, etc., and then let small Saigon group assess compact and courses of action.

Unger: This could be one small planning group in Washington. We will begin with assumptions and send to Saigon to flesh out.

DeSilva: There are ^{NEL} WEASVN alternatives which would be attractive to US, but not GVN.

Additional Subjects

1. Montagnards: - Read Saigons 2451.

Porter: I would not hesitate to provide political suggestions to CO to include a semi autonomous area for montagnards, as I've seen work elsewhere. Co is man to work with. Let's do everything possible and not limit ourselves to social and economic affairs.

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Colby: While our draft telegram OBE on basis 2451, I suggest that this is so emotional a problem with GVN that it challenges not only the approach to the GVN with which I agree, but also our ability to lobby within the GVN. I suggest we put into Saigon's hands what we were to send out and let Saigon work out.

Peers: But not as a VNCC agreement with any position. I for one am leery of autonomy.

Under: Suggest Saigon operate on two step strategy: first get agreement on a limited basis and second, go into more controversial areas.

Collins: I've had many conversations at Col - Sub-Brigadier level and we've got to be careful. They are extremely emotional over any idea of montagnard sovereignty. COMUSMACV has asked ^{VNEN} ~~Koten~~ and Co to get rid of Vinh Loc.

Marlowe: However, in NVN the ^{Montagnard} ~~MOS~~ have some independence and we must match it in SVN.

Mann: Loc has asked me to come see him about Montagnard affairs as concerns reopening civil programs.

Lansdale: I know COMUSMACV has tempered his views on Vinh Loc in light of recent developments.

Mann: Discussions with Co about what US troops in Pleiku area reopened everyone's condctn.

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4

Unger: Is Vinh Loc himself a man whose removal could represent to the Montagnards a GVN indication of conciliation?

Mann: No.

2. Chief Hoi

Amb Porter: We've seen an increasingly stronger effort in field. However, provincial handling of program is indifferent, largely because they think Saigon is indifferent. We are trying to get GVN ^{comple} complex behind it, through Ky. The fact that Chief Hoi walking out in such numbers bears out program efficacy. Perhaps the TET effort will energize the GVN. The Mission generally thinks the program is very good.

DeSilva: Would motivational training for GVN help?

Zorthian: Let's be honest, until a few months ago, the US had only one person involved.

Mann: /described more successful efforts in III Corps. Difficulty has been lack of attention by Ky, however, US has also not put sufficient effort behind it.

Porter: I agree/ Returnees wants are simple. Requirements not complicated. Is case of getting something started.

Zorthian: GVN doesn't see why they should pay 20 piasters a day to returnees. GVN knows where ^{only of course 20,000} 1500 are. Ky has no more interest than

Quat, although he is showing more interest. First requirement is for a good director, which I believe we finally have.

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5

Marlowe: Need clout in program. Only by moving out of Psywar directorate, possibly into ministry of its own, can it have symbolic effect on provinces.

Mann: Need to get out of present out-house arrangement. It will not work under present organization. Also the Chieu Hoi money is not spent.

Zornhian: You ask what we can do? I say, we have a good report on Chieu Hoi. Implement it.

Jorgenson: ^{Opt sp?} Bik came to CAS with proposal. Seems to me this is place where another US money strand could be used. Why not use rural construction cadre.

Peairs: Rural construction may be answer as vehicle to activate Chieu Hoi. I see many parallels.

Mann: Minister for Rural Construction refused our recommendation.

Landale: I went along with Thang as he rejected these things with idea of doing first things first. I see this as evolutionary and predict that Thang may eventually do more. Let's wait until after TET, then visit out-house examples with Thieu. It won't be outhouse for long.

Colby: Problem is developed shows that this is a social welfare, not attraction problem. Let's transfer into proper ministry and then ourselves finance at local level.

Mann: Delicate for us to fiddle at local level because US would be accused of interfering and giving ex-VC more than locals.

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6

Zorthian: You could live with it in Psywar if it were treated as more than attraction and if it were given more support. The word has gotten out that the GVN doesn't want to support it.

Unger: Need to get with GVN.

Colby: Let's apply on a province to province basis using money as the attraction for resettlement.

Zorthian: Need a director.

Collins: Ky is understanding province chief. Case now is antipathy. Someone at GVN central level must emphasize.

Mann: We now have Ky behind TET.

Unger: CIA will study to see if they can work out with USOM a way to get cash into program. Otherwise we indorse continued implementation of Chien Hoi report recommendations.

Arthur: How about the bounty programs?

Collins: There are two programs which work spottily as best.

Zorthian: It's never gotten off the ground.

DeSilva: I feel that this effort should come far, far later on when we'll over the hump.

Lansdale: This was general experience in the Philippines.

Zorthian: We can't identify anyone now.

Unger: As appeal side, worth of material Goure turns up. On material side, a great manpower source, if we could get large-scale defection going.

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7

Land Reform, Agricultural Credit and Related Items

Mr. Mann described general status of land reform implementation, agricultural credit. See attached discussion outline. *Tolson, Lickin*

Lansdale: In addition to what Goure said last night, if we become successful, people will pay attention to things other than sleep and security and we will have real problems on land reform. There is fear that returning landlords will claim land parceled out by VC. We need to face up to future requirement to straighten this out. Ky cottoned to my idea of taking pictures and giving people title by photo and at same time establishing land courts. This is a big job which we may eventually get GVN to face up to. (Note: Goure Stated VC at this time have given up attempts at land reform because too difficult to organize.)

Zandhian: Quayle survey will purport to get into all areas and we will be faced in next few months with pressure.

add. substance who is what was Quayle - ?
Lansdale: Let's put into our report that we will on nationwide basis conduct a study to determine prime needs of population which we could use as basis for programs for rural reconstruction. We could analyze current approaches, not pushing anything such as land reform, but duly noting response.

Two aspects: (1) what tools can we provide to help investigative processes to determine what programs we should push and (2) how should we determine what and where we should apply resources.

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8

Zarthian: There's a lot still pertinent from surveys of past several years. Can't a social scientist in Washington pull this together while we could predict we need a professional assessment, to lend substance.

Galby: Agree.

Mann: We could do in Saigon.

Peers: I suggest we look into this in Washington; let me do it.

Unzer: We will take on as a VNCC action. Gen Peers get what information available in OSD. Stoneman, AID; Saigon meanwhile will get census grievance team reports and other data. We'll go at it from both ends to collect information, exchanging news and determining where we'll go from there on with respect to an end product. This will be purely a US exercise for information and will not be intended to stimulate the SVN.

Lansdale: Couldn't we sex this subject up with an indication of the extent of our census coverage, to include province reports, etc.?

Stoneman: What is Quayle report?

Marlowe: Explained.

Gen Paul Ray: See discussion paper attached.

Mann: As practical matter, oil refinery can't be built today. You can't get 70 to 80,000 ton tankers in. What is needed is housing for labor and various military installations. While we have \$7 million for this, the increase from 3,000 to 7000 people has reduced housing standards. In conclusion, two things: (1) Port will remain, a good one

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9

and in and around Cam Ranh we will see a port city; and (2) development will proceed to work towards the Trang where there are established facilities. Industry will develop but no one knows when. I question that now is time to undertake any surveys because of security. Security also precludes consideration of industry now.

Mr. Collins: I know of no French surveys. The security situation should improve but we won't have forces to establish perimeter you would need for a survey.

Mr. Porter: Could do some by sea.

Munn: Recommend we look at later on in year when we know more about security situation (as concerns the economic development.) .

CORRUPTION

See dis points, attached. *Section III* We will largely depend on effective action of Rural Construction Cadre and census grievance.

Wilson: In operational sense, we do need some help. Lately we've had 19 reasonably documented cases of corruption against GVN officials. The GVN acts in such a manner as to develop inconclusive results. We sense what we must do but need some guidance with respect to how to enter the GVN to get prompt action locally, at higher level; how and where?

Porter: I would put report in hands of Bui Diem; we could also put US resources into provinces when they could be put to better use.

Lansdale: We discussed in Mission Council and agreed to do it as

Mr. Porter just explained with cases going to Mr. Porter.

*(NB. See also first day discussion on
Complaints. This discussion waiting, my
information!)*

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10

Porter: Cases haven't come to me.

Reagan: We've been talking about bottom up. I submit we need pressure from top down. (Note: This is what we decided)

Collins: Is important to Jr. officer morale who too often believe higher ranking officer get cars, etc., from top and just generally that there is corruption, at the top.

William: Can't overlook connection with VC economic warfare. The publicity DeSilva asked about with accompanying mass revulsion in US would happen if it developed that VC feeding on US programs through blackmail of corrupt GVN officials. If VC economic warfare as widespread as indicated, it is undoubtedly tied to corruption.

Utner: This is area we must use US clout if necessary

Note: US Mission does not appear really pushing this.

By 12AM tomorrow get comment on:

Proposed pacification definitions

SAIS proposal

I will get report in your hands early tomorrow with the idea that we can have a final paper by tomorrow night. We are shooting for a Thursday luncheon meeting.

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