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OFFICIAL PARTY

LGEN. JAMES M. MASTERS SR., USMC  
CMCS, QUANTICO, VA  
BGEN. EDWARD H. HURST, USMC  
COL. WILLIAM F. DOEHLER, USMC  
LTCOL. THEODORE E. METZGER, USMC  
CDR. J. J. O'CONNOR, USN, CHC  
MAJ. WARREN H. WIEDHAHN, JR.  
CAPT. WILLIAM M. KRULAK, USMC  
GYSGT. WILLIAMS, USMC, STEWARD

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BILLETING

LGEN. MASTERS - LOWER RIGHT VIP  
QTRS.  
BGEN. HURST - UPPER RIGHT VIP  
QTRS.  
COL. DOEHLER - ROOM #44, BOQ  
LTCOL. METZGER - ROOM #22, BOQ  
CDR. O'CONNOR - ROOM #77, BOQ  
MAJ. WIEDHAHN - ROOM #72, BOQ  
CAPT. KRULAK - ROOM #72, BOQ

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25,000 refugees

Pigs

Buddhists disorganized

Hoa Thanh (Hospital)

7 Hamlets

Phuoc Tho Tan  
Church

Phuoc Thanh

In the

Phuoc Thanh  
Village

Da Phuoc  
Vill torn down

VISIT BY LGEN. MASTERS

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
<u>29Sep67</u>	
1210	Arrive Danang AF Ops
1210-1220	Enroute III MAF by helo
1220-1310	Lunch w/CG, III MAF
1310-1420	III MAF Special Brief. Brief by III MAF G-2, G-3, Dir CAP & Dep CORDS in III MAF COC Briefing Room
1420-1430	Enroute I Corps by helo
1430-1450	Call on CG, I Corps
1450-1500	Enroute III MAF by helo
1500-1730	Discussions w/DepCdr III MAF & Staff
1730-1830	Free Time in III MAF VIP Qtrs.
1830-1840	Enroute DepCdr, III MAF Qtrs. by sedan

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(at General)

Trinity 8-0406  
Tom Whooten

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DATE/TIME EVENT

29Sep67

1840-2030 Dinner w/DepCdr, III  
MAF

2030-2040 Enroute III MAF by  
sedan  
RON in III MAF VIP  
Qtrs.

30Sep67

0700-0730 Breakfast with ~~S/S~~ <sup>CC</sup>,  
III MAF in ~~III MAF~~  
~~CONF~~ in CC'S QTRs

0730-0750 Free Time in III MAF  
VIP Qtrs.

0750-0800 Enroute 1st MarDiv  
by helo. Land LZ 400.

0800-0805 Enroute Div. Conf.  
Rm. by vehicle.

0805-0855 1st MarDiv Special  
Brief

0855-0900 Enroute 1st Recon Bn  
by vehicle

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John Kelly - 1st Mar Div  
Vic Knecht - 1/1  
Glen - 1st Div  
Ken Adams - 2/5  
John - 2/11  
Rick Lyons - 1/1  
Pat Fennell - FHTW  
John H. White - CRR  
MAG 16  
George Johnson - 1st

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
<u>30 Sep 67</u>	
0900-1000	Visit 1st Recon Bn
1000-1010	Enroute 1st Bn, 7th Mar by helo. From LZ 401. Land AT 912694
1010-1110	Visit 1st Bn, 7th Mar
1110-1115	Enroute CAP B-31 by helo. Land AT 946695.
1115-1130	Visit CAP B-31
1130-1150	Enroute An Hoa by helo. Land Bn Aid Station.
1150-1340	Visit/Lunch 2d Bn, 5th Mar to include a visit to Btry E, 2/11.
1340-1400	Enroute 1st Bn, 1st Mar by helo. Land LZ 411
1400-1445	Visit 1st Bn, 1st Mar
1445-1500	Enroute FMAW by helo. Land LZ 11.

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60% of people in one country  
had no idea to their name

Supply system totally  
unresponsive  
It just is maintenance  
A supply discipline (American  
culture)

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
<u>30Sep67</u>	
1500-1505	Enroute FMAW Parade Field by sedan
1505-1520	Presentation of awards (1-JSC, 2 DFC's)
1520-1525	Enroute FMAW Conf. Rm.
1525-1625	FMAW Brief by FMAW G-3 & G-4.
1625-1630	Enroute LZ #11 by sedan
1630-1640	Enroute MAG-16 by helo. Land MAG-16 VIP Pad.
1640-1720	Visit MAG-16
1720-1730	Enroute III MAF by helo
1730-1820	Free Time in III MAF VIP Qtrs.
1820-1830	Enroute 1st MarDiv by helo

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16 in the field +  
3 Bw - not very heavy  
a few more eggs

APRIL 1  
1961  
Top -

McClary - (all) 10  
Stouky - (all) 10

Hand - 3.6  
St. John - 3.6  
Live - 10.0  
Capt. 10.0

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
<u>30Sep67</u>	
1830-2000	Social/Dinner w/ CG, 1st MarDiv
2000-2010	Enroute III MAF by helo RON in III MAF VIP Qtrs.
<u>10Oct67</u>	
0700-0730	Breakfast with C/S, III MAF in III MAF COM
0730-0745	Free Time in III MAF VIP Qtrs.
0745-0815	Enroute 3d MarDiv by helo. Land Div CP.
0815-0915	Visit w/ADC, 3d Mar Div/Briefing
0915-0930	Enroute CAP H-2 by vehicle
0930-1000	Visit CAP H-2
1000-1015	Enroute Div. CP by vehicle

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Let's do just count for the  
 because we don't want  
 House killed to prove  
 something to the press  
 Let's do just count for the

to help + destroy out.  
 worse than WWII + Korea  
 American between 9 + 16 %  
 = terrible

When they without effect on  
 surface  
 Committee destroyed

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
<u>10 Oct 67</u>	
1015-1030	Enroute Camp EVANS by helo
1030-1115	Visit Camp EVANS
1115-1140	Enroute Dong Ha. Overfly Cua Viet
1140-1245	Briefing
1245-1330	Lunch at Dong Ha
1330-1415	Enroute Camp Carroll by helo, Overfly Rockpile & Razorback
1415-1500	Visit Camp Carroll
1500-1520	Enroute Khe Sanh by helo, Overfly Ca Lu
1520-1630	Visit Khe Sanh
1630-1730	Enroute III MAF by helo
1730-1830	Free Time
1830-2000	Social/Dinner w/CG, III MAF RON in III MAF VIP Otrs.

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Old set talk - young LT -  
 forget that crap, this is war +  
 the little way we do it.  
 Don't know - these kids are  
 going to be dead soon  
 We are taking from care of  
 EMB then in any other way

Hunting in North -  
 19/20 the commanding people  
 - PWs are Agent like copiers  
 No complaints, women, even  
 from wounded

REC  
 Burn  
 10/2

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
<u>20 Oct 67</u>	<i>Dep CDR</i>
0700-0730	Breakfast with G/S, III MAF in <del>III MAF</del> <del>Gen</del> Dep CDR's Qtrs
0730-0750	Free Time in III MAF VIP Qtrs.
0750-0800	Enroute FLC by helo. Land LZ #23.
0805-0830	Briefing LOC
0830-0840	Visit Children's Hosp
0840-0915	Visit CCP & walk thru of Rations, Bakery, S&R & PP&P Warehouse
0915-0920	Enroute ASP #1. Depart LZ #23. Arrive Helopad #2254
0920-0940	Tour ASP #1 & EOD
0940-0945	Enroute Maint. Bn. Arrive H&MS-17 Flight Line
0945-1015	Walk Thru of Maint Bn

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100 Reg. - May 30 1961  
100 Reg. - May 30 1961  
100 Reg. - May 30 1961  
100 Reg. - May 30 1961  
100 Reg. - May 30 1961

DECLASSIFIED



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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
<u>20 Oct 67</u>	
1015-1025	Enroute III MAF by helo
1025-1030	Enroute CORDS by barge & sedan
1035-1150	Visit CORDS
1150-1200	Enroute III MAF by sedan & barge w/Dep CO
1200-1300	Lunch in <del>III MAF COC</del> <sup>to Dep CO</sup>
1300-1730	Trng Symposium w/ Major Commands Rep concurrently with conference involving Landing Force Develop- ment Center and FMF representatives. In III MAF COC Briefing Room.
1730-1820	Free Time in III MAF VIP Ctrs.
1820-1830	Enroute FMAW by helo
1830-2000	Dinner w/CG, FMAW

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Man on in combat 365 days

Many field also men  
in combat before

LTJ must be taught to  
believe that what they're  
being taught is right

(partly without comparison)

Archie, Brown, comparison

There are 9 EMBs that -

Identify with in text -

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DATE/TIME EVENT

20 Oct 67

2000-2010 Enroute III MAF by  
helo.  
RON in III MAF VIP  
Qtrs.

30 Oct 67

0700-0730 Breakfast w/CG, III  
MAF in CG's Qtrs.

0730-0750 Free Time in III MAF  
VIP Qtrs.

0750-0800 Enroute Danang AF Ops  
by helo

0800 Depart

*Lowell Jennings*

*Tel: 729 6269*

*Carlsbad, Calif.*

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idea of the  
people of the central  
and peripheral to them.

CAQO - very effective  
Siberian down to the  
CAF portion of New York  
0122 + 05 and roughly  
disputes toward the - survey  
PAP materials in the area  
Understanding American

P.P.P.

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012434

U. S. MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS EFFORT  
IN VIETNAM

APRIL 1966 TO APRIL 1967

by

Captain William D. PARKER, USMCR

Historical Division

Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps

1970

CORDS

S/81/70

**SJSH-S-00** 0.750-70

12DOO 1328/70

SC12434

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It had long been charged that the political/military division of the country lent itself to the development of "war-lord" tactics on the part of those exercising control over each region or corps area. Lieutenant General Nguyen Chanh Thi was the man in power in I Corps, the northernmost region of South Vietnam, having control of all ARVN forces in the area. It was generally conceded throughout South Vietnam that Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, who administered the government from Saigon, and General Thi, the Military Commander in I Corps, represented the two strongest leaders throughout the country. It was also conceded that if a military coup ever deposed General Ky, that General Thi was his most likely successor. With these two powerful figures exercising their influence in Saigon and Hue, approximately 400 miles apart, to maintain their positions of power, the stage was set for the events that transpired on 10 March 1966.

On that date, the 10-man Directory headed by Prime Minister Ky and chief of state Nguyen Van Thieu stripped the I Corps commander, General Thi of his command. Thi was relieved "on the grounds of insubordination and attempting to rule with virtual autonomy in his area." N. Y. Times, 11 Mar '66, p. 1. 7

The general was considered to have resisted consistently the exercise of the authority of the Central (Saigon) Government in his corps area, even going so far as to permit students and political groups to conduct an anti-government campaign there.

Declassified by the Director of Marine Corps  
History and Museums in accordance with the  
provisions of CMO ltr Op-2423523 Joy, Ser:  
10770 P342 of 12 October 1971.

*P. B. Rafferty*  
Signature/date

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It was known that Marshal Ky and his friends in the National Leadership Committee had objected to Thi's refusal to prevent anti-government activity in his corps area and had clashed over his refusal to execute, or occasionally to accept, orders from the Central Government on matters ranging from refugee administration to rural pacification. [ N. Y. Times, 11 Mar 66, p. 1. ] Ky was credited with persuading the other junta members that Thi had to go. [ Newsweek, 28 Mar 66, p. 40. ] Thi had long courted the Buddhist leaders for their support, and there was speculation that his removal might bring about political pressure on his behalf. Informed sources stated, however, that Marshal Ky and other officers had checked on this possibility and had reached the conclusion that Thi's political strength had been overrated.

An informed source stated that American officials felt that the ouster was a favorable move against "warlordism." The move, if it could be made to stick, was considered as enhancing the prestige of the Saigon or Central Government, as well as the personal prestige of Premier Ky. [ N. Y. Times, 11 Mar 66, p. 1. ] The ouster took the form of General Thi applying for a "vacation." His successor, Brigadier General Nguyen Van Chuan, had commanded the South Vietnamese 1st Division and was highly regarded by the American military authorities.

Upon Thi's dismissal, he was not arrested, but was permitted to go to his house in Saigon. The next day, in a somewhat surprising move, Thi was allowed to return to his former

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I Corps area to preside over a celebration commemorating a recent victory over the enemy by U. S. Marine and ARVN troops.

[ N. Y. Times, 11 Mar 66, p. 1 ]

When the news of Thi's ouster reached I Corps, there was an immediate relation in Da Nang, South Vietnam's second largest city. Most of the city's shops closed down for a half day in protest, and the long-shoreman in the harbor failed to report for work. U. S. Marines stationed at the large Da Nang base were kept on base by a command decision made on Friday evening, 11 March, that the city was "off limits." Vietnamese Air Force men (Ky's personal command) were similarly confined to the Da Nang Air Base.

From 1,000 to 3,000 people attended street demonstrations where speakers denounced the parts played by Marshall Ky and General Thieu in the dismissal of General Thi. The agitators in Da Nang were apparently representatives of a group calling itself the Military and Civilian Struggle Committee. [ N. Y. Times, 14 Mar 66, p. 1. ] There was no government reaction, however, since Thi's successor, General Ghuan, said there had been no violence and no infiltration by Communists. [ AP, 15 Mar 66 ] This opinion was reinforced by press beliefs that the demonstrations were probably fomented by public officials who owed their jobs to General Thi. [ Corres. Neil Sheehan, N. Y. Times, 14 Mar 66. ]

In the city of Hue, to the north of Da Nang, high school students vowed to boycott classes until Thi was reinstated.

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N. Y. Times, 14 Mar 66, p. 1. [ ]/ Opposition continued, and on Tuesday, 15 March, an estimated 7,000 persons, including many students, put on a two-hour demonstration in Hue in favor of the demands made by Buddhist leaders for a civilian government. These demands followed similar ones made in Saigon on Saturday, 12 March, by the Buddhist leadership. [ ]-Corres, Neil Sheehan, N. Y. Times, 15 Mar 66, p. 1. [ ]/

In an effort to calm the situation, it was reported that General Thi had been persuaded to fly to Da Nang on the 16th to meet with officials there. Guarded conversations with Government officials disclosed that while the demonstrations had been expected, the main point of worry was that the agitation appeared to have a lot of official sponsorship. More important than the fate of Thi himself was the fear expressed by one source that, "If the Buddhists move and the Catholics react, we could have blood in the streets. None of us is prepared to say this Government is strong enough to withstand the tensions that could generate." [ ]- R. W. Apple, Jr. in N. Y. Times, 16 Mar 66, p. 1. [ ]/

Thi himself told a gathering of about 50 former staff officers in Saigon before flying to Da Nang, "Think about the country, not about me." [ ]- Charles Mohr in N. Y. Times, 17 Mar 66, p. 1. [ ]/ On his arrival in Da Nang on the 16th, Thi told a gathering of 5,000 to stop demonstrating for his return and urged them to support the Government and concentrate in their opposition to the Communist enemy." [ ]- Edwin Newman, NBC-TV. [ ]/

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

The next day, General Thi received a hero's welcome on his return to his "home" city of Hue where he addressed a crowd estimated at 10,000 persons. While presumably apologizing for charges that he had run I Corps like a "war lord," he allowed verbal attacks on the military junta that had fired him. [Wash. Post, 18 Mar 66, p. 18; N. Y. Times, 18 Mar 66, p. 1.]

At the same time, in Saigon, it was reported that the Buddhist leader, Tich Tri Quang, who had helped maneuver the downfall of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in 1963, had warned Premier Ky in a secret meeting that the only way to save the country from political chaos was to return the government to civilian rule. Ky's immediate reaction was not known. [Wash. Post, 18 Mar 66, p. 18.]

The meeting apparently led to an accord between Premier Ky and the Saigon Buddhists as a rally held the next day (the 19th) in Saigon indicated that the Buddhists were calling off their incipient campaign to bring down the military government of Premier Ky. Informed sources stated that part of the agreement was to move up the date of a national election to early 1967 rather than late in the year. A spokesman, Thich Tam Chau," denied that the monks were trying to force Ky from and explained that the calls of the Buddhists for a civilian government had been 'observations' rather than 'demands.'" [N. Y. Times, 21 Mar 66, p. 1]

On the 19th, Premier Ky made a speech at the mountain resort of Dalat and was quoted as having said that disturbances,

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street demonstrations, strikes, and walkouts would have no influence on the Government. His speech was interpreted as a warning to those who because of personal resentment and dissent were scheming to betray and sell out the nation. This story was not printed in Saigon until the morning of the 21st of March. The Buddhists expressed surprise at Ky's "hasty and unconstructive statements," particularly on the day they had issued a conciliatory statement, but no reprisals were threatened. Their response seemed "more in sorrow than in anger" according to some political observers. [N. Y. Times, 22 Mar 66, p. 4.]

While conciliation was being talked in Saigon, the opposition to Ky's government continued unabated in I Corps with the unrest centered in Hue and Da Nang. A new protest now came to the fore. Previously alluded to, anti-Americanism became more and more open and explicit. In Da Nang, one banner carried by the crowd of protesters read, in English:

Down With the American Conspiracy of  
Hindering the Summoning of a Constitutional  
Parliament is to Intervene in the Vietnam's  
Own Affairs.

Another banner read:

Isn't American Hindering of the Summoning  
of a Vietnamese Parliament a Conspiracy to  
sell Vietnam to the Communists?

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The protesters apparently interpreted the United States' support for Premier Ky as a part of a plan to block a return of civilian government within a reasonable time. The fact that the opposite was true, that the United States had been urging Ky to restore civilian government, was either not known or overlooked. In both Hue and Da Nang, radio stations were meekly handed over to students on demand and were used to broadcast anti-Government statement.

Meanwhile, in Saigon, Premier Ky indicated that a national election to replace his military government might take place sooner than expected. [N. Y. Times, 24 Mar 66, p. 1.] Several days later, on 27 March, some 20,000 Buddhists marched in silence for two hours through the city of Hue in a massive demonstration against the military regime of South Vietnam. The procession was almost two miles long and included about 1,000 uniformed South Vietnamese soldiers carrying banners with anti-American slogans.

Accompanying the demonstration were radio broadcasts by students in which Premier Ky was given two days in which to set a date for the elections, but the alternative was not announced. That same day some 1,000 Buddhist students gathered at their headquarters to denounce the military government and to protect the presence of American troops in South Vietnam. [Wash. Post, 28 Mar 66, p. 1.]

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~~SECRET~~ The continuing agitation which had been largely ignored by the Saigon Government finally brought forth a statement to some foreign newsmen by Premier Ky that it might be necessary to use "very strong measures" against the Buddhist-led demonstrators. He remarked that Governmental action would be "not for the survival of the government but for the survival of Vietnam." The news in Saigon was that Ky had met the previous night with five Buddhist leaders to try to calm the political unrest, but the actual discussion remained a secret. [AP News, 29 Mar 66.]

A new element entered the confused picture on 29 March when spokesmen for the Roman Catholics called for faster action by the Government in returning the country to a civilian government. [Wash. Post, 30 Mar 66, p. 14.]

The American military had been cautious since the beginning of political trouble on 10 March, but a small event triggered an anti-American demonstration on 30 March. A United States Marine truck collided with a Vietnamese bus, and although no one was hurt, a street hassle quickly developed. Students charged that the accident had been deliberately staged to help break up a demonstration against Premier Ky's government. The bus had been a part of the protest cavalcade. It was also charged that some Marines had attacked civilians during the hassle, hitting one with their rifle butts.

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More than 2,000 demonstrators then gathered outside a Marine billet, shouting anti-American slogans. An American official attempted to mollify the crowd by apologizing for the accident and denying that the Marine driver had acted deliberately. [Mike Wallace, CBS Morning News, CBS-TV.]

Conditions had reached a stage where action had become necessary. On 30 March, the ruling military junta voted to proceed to form a council to draft a national constitution. The council would include 96 members. Of these, 48 would represent city and provincial councils and the other 48 would be from the bar, the other professions, and religious groups. While the action was probably designed to placate the agitating Buddhists, it ignored what the Buddhists had considered a crucial issue -- how the council was to be chosen.

Accompanying the acquiescence to the agitators was a decision to "take all appropriate measures against military personnel and civil servants of all levels who have taken part in any activities that are harmful to the nation's security." Here, for the first time, was an indication that the Government's policy of doing nothing to interfere with the demonstrators was to change. This policy had been a difficult one for the United States officials to comprehend. [N. Y. Times, 31 Mar 1966, p. 1.]

The month of March ended with the National Government still showing restraint in allowing the anti-government

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demonstrators to operate unmolested in the wake of the growing political crisis. General Thi was still in Hue, anti-government and anti-American demonstrators were on the rise, and there was growing indication that no quick settlement would be made between the Ky government and the "Struggle Forces." As the month of April arrived, the National Government was faced with a precarious situation, being torn between the rising political crisis and the continuing fight against the Viet Cong.

#### U. S. MARINE CIVIL AFFAIRS CONTINUES IN

#### I-CORPS IN THE FACE OF POLITICAL CRISIS

The political crisis in I-Corps during the month of

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## U. S. MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITY

DURING THE 2ND QUARTER OF 1966

April-May-June

## Political Crisis Continues Into April 1966

The political crisis had begun in March and reached a new peak of intensity during April 1966. Throughout April there were anti-government demonstrations in all major cities within the five provinces of I Corps. The "Struggle Forces," in attempting to bring about a capitulation of the Ky regime staged their demonstrations in Da Nang, Hoi An, Tam Ky, Quang Ngai, and Hue. These demonstrations and the general political unrest throughout I Corps, while not completely stopping the pacification efforts on the part of III MAF, did have a stultifying effect upon civil affairs projects being carried out in the ICTZ.

III MAF Command Chronology, April 1966. (S)

After the dismissal of General Thi on 10 March, peaceful pro-Thi demonstrations took place in Da Nang, Hue, and Hoi An.

1966 Facts on File 82E2

From a pro-Thi stand, the objectors moved swiftly to an anti-Ky and anti-Thieu basis and charged that the real reason for this ouster was his fight against corruption and dictatorship. 1966 Facts on File 82B3 Not the least of the factors was the religious overtone. Thi was a Buddhist, and the South Vietnamese Buddhists rallied around his ouster to create anti-government agitation.

1966 Facts on File 89A1)



  
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On 18 March, at Da Nang, Buddhist speakers demanded the restoration of Thi, the abolition of the military junta, and the restoration of civilian rule. 1966 Facts on File 89G1 The rally at which these demands were made was held in defiance of General Chuan's proclamation earlier that day urging an end to public protests, school boycotts, and work stoppages.

The first week of April 1966, continued to produce strong anti-government demonstrations with anti-American overtones in I Corps, and on the 3d, Prime Minister Ky began to make his move against the "Struggle Forces" in Central Vietnam. In a press conference in Saigon on that day, he announced that he considered the city of Da Nang to be in Communist hands, and that the Mayor of the city of Da Nang, Dr. Nguyen Van Man, was himself, a Communist and had been using government funds to support

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Between the 6th and 9th, it became necessary to begin evacuating U. S. civilian personnel from the northern provinces in I Corps. In the city of Hue, Thua Thien Province, 72 U. S. civilians were evacuated to Marine bases at Phu Bai and Da Nang.

1966 Facts on File - 213F

On 9 April, U. S. civilians and non-essential military personnel were transferred from Da Nang city to the American airbase outside the city to avoid the possibility of violence.

1966 Facts on File - 121D3

Around the time evacuation of U. S. civilians were taking place, pro-American demonstrators appeared in Da Nang proclaiming that the United States is Vietnam's "great friend and ally." The anti-government forces also began to address the Americans through Da Nang Radio and loud speaker trucks proclaiming that the "Struggle Forces" appreciated American assistance and would insure that the Americans would not be harmed.

FMPAC Operations of U. S. Marines in Vietnam, April 1966, (S)  
p. 31.

The apex of tension was reached during the political crisis, when on 9 April, III MAF received reports that ARVN troops along with an armed personnel carrier and howitzer were moving from Hoi An to Da Nang, with the intension of joining the "Struggle Forces." This movement was countered

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had resettled, at their own request, inside the Marine secure area at Chu Lai, a youth from one of the families offered to lead a patrol to a concealed cave in his former hamlet, where he said seven VC had hidden during the move. When that cave was located and destroyed, entrances to two others were revealed. The armed VC inside the caves were killed and one was captured, along with seven weapons and a quantity of clothing and ammunition." There were numerous other reports during the month which provided the Marines with good intelligence information and directly contributed to the saving of many Marine lives.

FMFPac Operations of U. S. Marines, Vietnam. May, 1966, pp. 3-8. (S)

In a surprise move on 15 May against the city of Da Nang, Prime Minister Ky sent 1,000 RVN Marines to Da Nang from Saigon by C-47 transport planes and reinforced them with 500 paratroopers and rangers. Resistance was offered by an estimated 300-500 rebel troops of the ARVN 1st Division, but this opposition collapsed within two hours. It was soon learned that a number of ARVN units in I Corps had stated their opposition in this move on the part of Prime Minister Ky and were en route to Da Nang to support the opposition forces. With this information,

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P. 53

To replace 2d ¶, p. 52 and 1st ¶ p. 53

After the dismissal of General Park on 10 March, peaceful pro-Thi demonstrations took place in Danang, Hue, and Hoian (1966 FOT 82 E 2)

From a pro-Thi stand, the objectors moved swiftly to an anti-Ky and anti-Thieu basis and charged that the real reason for Thi's ouster was his fight against (82 B 3) corruption and dictatorship. Not the least of the factors was the religious overtone. Thi was a Buddhist, and the South Vietnamese Buddhists rallied around his ouster to create anti-government agitation. (89 A 1)

On 18 March, at Danang, Buddhist speakers demanded the restoration of Thi, the abolition of the military junta, and the restoration of civilian rule. (89 G 1)

The rally at which these demands were made was held in defiance of General Chuau's proclamation of earlier that day urging an end to public protests, school boycotts, and work stoppages.

p. 56

Between the 6<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup>, it became necessary to begin evacuating U.S. civilian personnel from the northern provinces in I Corps. In the city of Hue, Thua Thien Province, 72 U.S. civilians were evacuated to Marine bases at Phua and Danang.

66FOF-121F3

On 9 April, U.S. civilians and non-essential military personnel were transferred from Danang city to the American airbase outside the city to avoid the possibility of violence.

66FOF121D3

To replace 1st ¶ on p. 56

on 15 May

In a surprise move against the city of Danang, Prime Minister Ky sent 1,000 RVN Marines to Danang from Saigon by C-47 transport planes and reinforced them with 500 paratroopers and Rangers. Resistance was offered by an estimated 300-500 rebel troops of the RVN 1st ~~Army~~ Division, but this opposition collapsed within two hours. It was soon learned...

To replace 1st part of  
#2, p. 78

It had long been charged that the political/military division of the country lent itself to the development of "war-lord" tactics on the part of those exercising control over each region or corps area. Lieutenant General Nguyen Chanh Thi was the man in power in I Corps, the northernmost region of South Vietnam, having control of all ARVN forces in the area. It was generally conceded throughout South Vietnam that Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, who administered the government from Saigon, and General Thi, the Military Commander in I Corps, represented the two strongest leaders throughout the country. It was also conceded that if a military coup ever deposed General Ky, that General Thi was his most likely successor. With these two powerful figures exercising their influence in Saigon and Hue, approximately 400 miles apart, to maintain their positions of power, the stage was set for the events that transpired on 10 March 1966.

On that date, the 10-man Directory headed by Prime Minister Ky and chief of state Nguyen Van Thieu stripped <sup>the</sup> I Corps ~~Commander~~, General ~~Nguyen Chanh Thi~~ of his command. ~~[State Dept, 11 Mar '66, p. 1.]~~ Thi was relieved "on the grounds of insubordination and attempting to rule with virtual autonomy in his area." [N. Y. Times, 11 Mar '66, p. 1.] <sup>the</sup> General ~~Thi~~ was considered to have consistently resisted the exercise of the authority of the Central (Saigon) Government in his corps area, even going so far as to permit students and political groups to conduct an anti-government campaign there.

It was known that Marshal Ky and his friends in the National Leadership Committee had objected to Thi's refusal to prevent anti-government activity in his corps area and had clashed over his refusal to execute, or occasionally to accept, orders from the Central Government on matters ranging from refugee administration to rural pacification. [N. Y. Times, 11 Mar '66, p. 1.] Ky was credited with persuading the other junta members that Thi had to go.

b

[Newsweek, 28 Mar '66, p. 40.] Thi had long courted the Buddhist leaders for their support, and there was speculation that his removal might bring about political pressure on his behalf. Informed sources stated, however, that Marshal Ky and other officers had checked on this possibility and had reached the conclusion that Thi's political strength had been overrated.

An informed source stated that American officials felt that the ouster was a favorable move against "warlordism." The move, if it could be made to stick, was considered as enhancing the prestige of the Saigon or Central Government, as well as the personal prestige of Premier Ky. [N. Y. Times, 11 Mar '66, p. 1.] )

The ouster took the form of General Thi applying for a "vacation." His successor, Brigadier General Nguyen Van Chuan, had commanded the South Vietnamese 1st Division and was highly regarded by the American military authorities.

Upon Thi's dismissal, he was not arrested, but was permitted to go to his house in Saigon. The next day, in a somewhat surprising move, Thi was allowed to return to his former I Corps area to preside over a celebration commemorating a recent victory over the enemy by U. S. Marine and ARVN troops. [N. Y. Times, 11 Mar '66, p. 1.]

When the news of Thi's ouster reached I Corps, there was an immediate reaction in ~~the port town of~~ Da Nang, South Vietnam's second largest city. Most of the city's shops closed down for a half day in protest, and the long-shoremen in the harbor failed to report for work. U. S. Marines stationed at the large Da Nang base <sup>were</sup> ~~had been~~ kept on base by a command decision made on Friday evening, 11 March, that the city was "off limits." Vietnamese Air Force men (Ky's personal command) were similarly confined to the Da Nang Air Base.

28 38



From 1,000 to 3,000 <sup>people</sup> attended street demonstrations where speakers denounced the parts played by ~~Air Marshal Ky~~ <sup>Vice</sup> ~~South Vietnam's Premier~~, and Lieutenant General ~~Nguyen Van Thieu~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the chief of state~~, in the dismissal of General Thi. The agitators in Da Nang were apparently representatives of a group calling itself the Military and Civilian Struggle Committee. [N. Y. Times, 14 Mar '66, p. 1.] There was no ~~Government~~ reaction, however, since Thi's successor, General Chuan, said there had been no violence and no infiltration by Communists. [AP, 15 Mar '66.]

→ This opinion was reinforced by press beliefs that the demonstrations were probably fomented by public officials who owed their jobs to General Thi. [Corres. Charles Mohr, N. Y. Times, 14 Mar '66.]

In the city of Hue, to the north of Da Nang, high school students vowed to boycott classes until Thi was reinstated. [N.Y. TIMES, 14 Mar '66, p. 1.] Opposition continued, and on Tuesday, 15 March, an estimated 7,000 persons, including many students, put on a two-hour demonstration in Hue in favor of the demands made by Buddhist leaders for a civilian government. These demands followed similar ones made in Saigon on Saturday, 12 March, by the Buddhist leadership. [Corres. Neil Sheehan, N. Y. Times, 15 Mar '66, p. 1.]

In an effort to calm the situation, it was reported that General Thi had been persuaded to fly to Da Nang on the 16th to meet with officials there. Guarded conversations with Government officials disclosed that while the demonstrations had been expected, the main point of worry was that the agitation appeared to have a lot of official sponsorship. More important than the fate of Thi himself was the fear expressed by one source that, "If the Buddhists move and the Catholics react, we could have blood in the streets. None of us is prepared to say this Government is strong enough to withstand the tensions that could generate." [Corres. R. W. Apple, jr., <sup>in</sup> N. Y. Times, 16 Mar '66, p. 1.]

Thi himself told a gathering of about 50 former staff officers in Saigon before flying to Da Nang, "Think about the country, not about me." [~~Comm.~~ Charles Mohr <sup>in</sup> N. Y. Times, 17 Mar '66, p. 1.] On his arrival in Da Nang on the 16th, Thi told a gathering of 5,000 to stop demonstrating for his return and urged them to support the Government and concentrate in their opposition to the Communist enemy." [Edwin Newman, NBC-TV.]

The next day, General Thi received a hero's welcome on his return to his "home" city of Hue where he addressed a crowd estimated at 10,000 persons. While presumably apologizing for charges that he had run I Corps like a "war lord," he allowed verbal attacks on the military junta that had fired him. [Wash. Post, 18 Mar '66, p. 18; N. Y. Times, 18 Mar '66, p. 1.]

At the same time, in Saigon, it was reported that the Buddhist leader, Tich Tri Quang, who had helped maneuver the downfall of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in 1963, had warned Premier Ky in a secret meeting that the only way to save the country from political chaos was to return the government to civilian rule. Ky's immediate reaction was not known. [Wash. Post, 18 Mar '66, p. 18.]

The meeting apparently led to an accord between Premier Ky and the Saigon Buddhists as a rally held the next day (the 19th) in Saigon indicated that the Buddhists were calling off their incipient campaign to bring down the military government of Premier Ky. Informed sources stated that part of the agreement was to move up the date of a national election to early 1967 rather than late in the year. A spokesman, Thich Tam Chau, <sup>denied</sup> denied that the monks were trying to force Ky from power and explained that the calls of the Buddhists for a civilian government had been 'observations' rather than 'demands.'" [N. Y. Times, 21 Mar 1966, p. 1.]

On the 19th, Premier Ky made a speech at the mountain resort of Dalat and was quoted as having said that disturbances, street demonstrations, strikes,

and walkouts would have no influence on the Government. His speech was interpreted ~~as intended~~ as a warning to those who because of personal resentment and dissent were scheming to betray and sell out the nation. This story was not printed in Saigon until the morning of the 21st of March. The Buddhists expressed surprise at Ky's "hasty and unconstructive statements," particularly on the day they had issued a conciliatory statement, but no reprisals were threatened. Their response seemed "more in sorrow than in anger" according to some political observers. [N.Y. Times 22 Mar '66, p. 4.]

While conciliation was being talked in Saigon, the opposition to Ky's government continued unabated in ~~the~~ I Corps with the unrest centered in Hue and Da Nang. A new protest now came to the fore. Previously alluded to, anti-Americanism became more and more open and explicit. In Da Nang, one banner carried by the crowd of protestors read, in English:

Down With the American Conspiracy of Hindering the Summoning  
of a Constitutional Parliament. To Hinder the Summoning of  
Parliament is to Intervene in the Vietnam's Own Affairs.

Another banner read,

Isn't American Hindering of the Summoning of a Vietnamese  
Parliament a Conspiracy to sell Vietnam to the Communists?

The protestors apparently interpreted the United States' support for Premier Ky as a part of a plan to block a return of civilian government within a reasonable time. The fact that the opposite was true, that the United States had been urging Ky to restore civilian government, was either not known or overlooked.

In both Hue and Da Nang, radio stations were meekly handed over to

students on demand and were used to broadcast anti-Government statements.

Meanwhile, in Saigon, Premier Ky indicated that a national election to replace his military government might take place sooner than expected.

[N. Y. Times, 24 Mar '66, p. 1.]

Several days later, on 27 March, some 20,000 Buddhists marched in silence for two hours through the city of Hue in a massive demonstration against the military regime of South Vietnam. The procession was almost two miles long and included about 1,000 uniformed South Vietnamese soldiers carrying banners with anti-American slogans.

Accompanying the demonstration were radio broadcasts by students in which Premier Ky was given two days in which to set a date for the elections, but the alternative was not announced.

That same day some 1,000 Buddhist students gathered at their headquarters to denounce the military government and to protest the presence of American troops in South Vietnam. [Wash. Post, 28 Mar '66, p. 1.]

The continuing agitation which had been largely ignored by the Saigon Government finally brought forth a statement to some foreign newsmen by Premier Ky that it might be necessary to use "very strong measures" against the Buddhist-led demonstrators. He remarked that Governmental action would be "not for the survival of the government but for the survival of Viet Nam." The news in Saigon was that Ky had met the previous night with five Buddhist leaders to try to calm the political unrest, but the actual discussion remained a secret. [AP News, 29 Mar '66.]

A new element entered the confused picture on 29 March when spokesmen for the Roman Catholics called for faster action by the Government in returning the country to a civilian government. [Wash. Post, 30 Mar '66, p. 14.]

The American military had been cautious since the beginning of political

trouble on 10 March, but a small event triggered an anti-American demonstration on 30 March. A United States Marine truck collided with a Vietnamese bus, and although no one was hurt, a street hassle quickly developed. Students charged that the accident had been deliberately staged to help break up a demonstration against Premier Ky's government. The bus had been a part of the protest cavalcade. It was also charged that some Marines had attacked civilians during the hassle, hitting one with their rifle butts.

Here More than 2,000 demonstrators then gathered outside a Marine billet, shouting anti-American slogans. An American official attempted to mollify the crowd by apologizing for the accident and denying that the Marine driver had acted deliberately. [Mike Wallace, CBS Morning News, CBS-TV.]

Conditions had reached a stage where action had become necessary. On 30 March, the ruling military junta voted to proceed to form a council to draft a national constitution. The council would include 96 members. Of these, 48 would represent city and provincial councils and the other 48 would be from the bar, the other professions, and religious groups. While the action was probably designed to placate the agitating Buddhists, it ignored what the Buddhists had considered a crucial issue -- how the council was to be chosen.

Accompanying the acquiescence to the agitators was a decision to "take all appropriate measures against military personnel and civil servants of all levels who have taken part in any activities that are harmful to the nation's security." Here, for the first time, was an indication that the Government's policy of doing nothing to interfere with the demonstrators was to change. This policy had been a difficult one for the United States officials to comprehend. [N. Y. Times, 31 Mar 1966, p. 1.]

NOTES ON THE PREPARATION OF "U. S. MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS  
EFFORTS IN VIETNAM, APRIL 1966 - APRIL 1967"

1. The author, Captain Bill D. PARKER, a reserve officer who had served in Vietnam during 1965-66 and who had been involved with civic action efforts there as a member of 3/4, came on active duty on 1 June 1968 to write a historical reference pamphlet which would continue the story of civic action/civil affairs begun by the publication of a similar pamphlet, U. S. Marine Corps Civic Action Effort in Vietnam, March 1965 - March 1966. This first pamphlet, which was also written by a reserve officer on temporary active duty during the Spring and Summer of 1967, was published early in 1968. It had been authorized by the Commandant in a letter to the officer involved, Captain Russel H. STOLFI, USMCR.

2. Captain PARKER, like Captain STOLFI, worked very closely with the Civil Affairs Branch of the G-3 Division in developing the sources and arranging the interviews that document the pamphlet. Colonel Don P. WYCOFF, who had been the G-5 of III MAF, and Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. EVANS, Jr., who had been the Recorder of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, the successive heads of the Civil Affairs Branch, were in regular contact with Captain PARKER. Lieutenant Colonel EVANS made the notes of the meetings of the I Corps JCC available to Captain PARKER and recommended the attached list of interviewees to cover the 1966-67 period.

3. Captain PARKER went off active duty on 30 August 1968 to return to graduate school at the University of Maryland where he was a teaching assistant. The pamphlet was approximately 80% completed at this time. Captain PARKER, utilizing weekends and other time that he could spare from his studies, continued the interviews, research, and writing of the pamphlet. When a first draft was completed towards the end of 1968, it was submitted for comment and criticism to the Civic Action Branch and to the Vietnam Unit of the Writing Section of the Historical Branch. The comments and corrections received were incorporated by Captain PARKER in a revised draft manuscript, again working on his own time.

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INTERVIEWS

The following is an alphabetical listing of those personally interviewed concerning Civil Affairs Activity in I Corps, South Vietnam from April 1966 - April 1967:

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PARKER

It had long been charged that the political/military division of the country lent itself to the development of "war-lord" tactics on the part of those exercising control over each region or corps area. Lieutenant General Nguyen Chanh Thi was the man in power in I Corps, the northernmost region in South Vietnam, having control of all ARVN forces in the area. It was generally conceded throughout South Vietnam that Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, who administered the government from Saigon, and General Thi, the Military Commander in I Corps, represented the two strongest leaders throughout the country. It was also conceded that if a military coup ever deposed General Ky, that General Thi was his most likely successor. With these two powerful figures exercising their influence in Saigon and Hue, approximately 400 miles apart, to maintain their positions of power, the stage was set for the events that transpired on 10 March 1966.

*that date,*  
On ~~10 March 1966~~, Prime Minister Ky moved against General Thi, Commander of I Corps, and relieved him of his command. It was reported in the Defense Intelligence Bulletin, ~~10 March 1966~~, "Prime Minister Ky is reportedly moving against 1st Corps Commander, General Nguyen Chanh Thi. According to a generally reliable Vietnamese source, Ky has called a special meeting of all regular members of the Directorate for 10 March, during which he will accuse Thi of insubordination and ask for a vote approving his removal from command. Ky apparently confirmed by personal invest-



*substantive*

igation that Thi's "war-lord" behavior has alienated many people in Central Vietnam, particularly in the historically dissension-ridden Hue area, although there appeared to be general popular support there for the Ky government. Charges against Thi reportedly will be based on unrest and obstruction of the government's Revolutionary Development Program in the 1st Corps area. Thi apparently will not be charged with political moves against the government." With conflicting Defense Intelligence Bulletin 47-66, 10 March 1966. (S)

reports about General Thi's willingness to support the Vietnamese Pacification effort in I-Corps and his "war-lord" tactics that were alienating the people against the National Government, Thi's fate was decided by a special meeting called by Prime Minister Ky in Saigon, ~~on 10 March 1966~~ of the Vietnamese National Military Council (Directorate). With all <sup>10</sup> ~~ten~~ members of the Council meeting, including General Thi, a secret ballot was taken by <sup>9</sup> ~~nine~~ of the members, Prime Minister Ky abstaining, with the vote going against Thi. With this vote of confidence by the Military Council in favor of Prime Minister Ky, General Thi was relieved of his command. <sup>Upon</sup> ~~After~~ General Thi's dismissal as I-Corps Commander, General Nguyen Van Chuan, <sup>1st</sup> ~~ARVN~~ ARVN Division Commander in I-Corps, succeeded General Thi as I-Corps Commander.

Defense Intelligence Bulletin 48-66, 11 March 1966. (S)

With the Military Council's vote ~~of confidence~~ in favor of Prime Minister Ky, it was the immediate consensus that the National Government had taken a strong step toward unity and stability; however, the opposite proved to be true. While General Thi was <sup>losing</sup> Command of I-Corps at the Council meeting in Saigon, a pro-Thi group was forming in DaNang to protest his removal and ~~denounce~~ the government's actions. On 12 March 1966, the "Civil and Military Struggle Committee" met ~~and~~ and called for a general strike by the workers in protest of Thi's removal as Commander of I-Corps. In the city of DaNang on the 13th of March, the first strike was held. During the day stores were closed, no police were on duty in the streets, and between 85 and 90 percent of the civilian workers failed to show up for work. With the strike going on, ~~other~~ other groups were forming in I-Corps to carry the protest into the other four provinces. In Saigon, Prime Minister Ky was reportedly stating that the strike ~~presented~~ presented little cause for alarm, but he would <sup>go to</sup> ~~DaNang and~~ <sup>DaNang and</sup> visit throughout I-Corps if the situation became worse. Buddhist leaders had assured Ky that they would not cause any trouble during this period of unrest and would do what they could to help stabilize the situation in I-Corps.

Defense Intelligence Bulletin 49-66, 14 March 1966. (S)

From the 13th of March, the day of the first protest

strike in DaNang, to the end of the month, the situation in I<sup>st</sup> Corps continued to deteriorate. A committee was formed in the city of Hue, Thua Thien Province, called the "Popular Forces to Struggle for the Revolution" and received <sup>its</sup> ~~their~~ support from Buddhist and pro-Thi forces, who were against Prime Minister Ky. It was apparent that the growing unrest

III MAF Command Chronology, March 1966. (S)

was becoming a vehicle for advancing the vested interest of many different groups against the National Government, irrespective of their attitudes toward the dismissal of General Thi. Even though the Buddhist leader, Thich Thien Minh, had promised not to get involved in the demonstrations against the government, for other Buddhist leaders the opportunity was too fruitful to let slip by and not advance their own brand of nationalism: Down with Ky and Thieu-- long live the revolutionary principles of November 1963!\*

Defense Intelligence Bulletin 52-66, 17 March 1966. (S)

Strikes and demonstrations continued in DaNang and Hue and were having a paralyzing effect on the areas. Shops, schools, and port facilities were closed, and long mass meetings were drawing crowds of 5,000 or more. In DaNang,

\* In 1963 the Buddhists had played a principal role in the fall of the Diem regime.

the mass meetings were being attended by large numbers of ARVN personnel who were speaking out in protest against the National Government. Vietnamese Military Officers in I~~A~~Corps were speaking out on such topics as support for General Thi, demands for civilian government, and opposition to Chief of State Thieu. Further to the south

Defense Intelligence Bulletin 51-66, 16 March 1966. (S)

in Saigon, Buddhist factions were preparing to launch their demonstrations against Prime Minister Ky and make similar demands for abolishing the military junta and establishing a ~~c~~ivilian National Assembly to draw up a constitution and carry out an organized election. It was believed by the Buddhists that if a National Assembly could be formed and carry out general elections, they would be able to gain a seat of power within the government. In an attempt to force Prime Minister Ky into a position of supporting their demands, the Buddhists were attempting to secure the help ~~of~~ Catholic groups in forming a coalition against the Ky Regime.

Defense Intelligence Bulletin 53-66, 18 March 1966. (S) (NEP)

In I~~A~~Corps area the situation remained tense. General Thi, who had reportedly accepted the decision of the Military Council gracefully, in allowing Prime Minister Ky to dismiss

him as I~~IV~~Corps Commander, had returned to Hue and was failing to fulfill the agreement that had been reached during the Council's meeting on (March 10). It was reported that at the Defense Intelligence Bulletin, 55-66, 22 March 1966. (S)

~~General Thi's~~ meeting ~~on 10 March~~, General Thi was not only dismissed as I~~IV~~Corps Commander but also asked to leave the country. General Thi was reluctant to accept the fact that he would have to leave his native land permanently, so the Council agreed that if Thi would leave the country to help prevent any disunity that might occur as a result of his dismissal, he would be allowed to return within four months. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

General Thi was expected to submit a letter requesting relief from his ~~Command~~ in I~~IV~~Corps, for medical reasons. In order to ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ clear up his affairs in I~~IV~~Corps before leaving the country, General Thi, ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Co, was to proceed to DaNang on 11 March, return to Saigon around the 15th of March, and leave the country shortly thereafter. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ On the Defense Intelligence Bulletin 48-66, 11 March 1966. (S)

22<sup>nd</sup> of March, General Thi was still in Hue, but reportedly had been ordered back to Saigon immediately. Deputy Prime Minister Co, who had ordered General Thi's return to Saigon,

suspected that the Buddhist leader, the Venerable Tri Quang, who had returned to Central Vietnam around the 20th of March, had gone there to whip up anti-government sentiment in support of General Thi. ~~He~~ <sup>He</sup> was also worried because General Thi had not submitted a request for sick leave as he had promised. Although the National Government had been able to maintain a certain amount of stability throughout South Vietnam in the wake of the political upheaval, it was believed that renewed agitation in the central part of the country by a coalition of Tri Quang and pro-Thi supporters could develop into a major threat against the government.

~~Defense Intelligence Bulletin 55-66, 22 March 1966.~~ (S)

As the month ~~came~~ came to a close, Prime Minister Ky and members of the National Government ~~continued~~ continued to labor at solving the political upheaval that was raking the country of South Vietnam. Hopefully, the problem could be solved with a minimum of violence while maintaining a maximum of unity within the country. ~~The~~ The situation in the city of Hue took a turn for the worse on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of March, when the "Students Council Struggling for Revolution" seized the Hue radio station and began to use it to air their opinions. The justification for seizing the ~~Hue radio~~ station advanced by the "Students Council" was that the Ky government had ignored "the people's legitimate aspirations" and that "the generals" were determined

to suppress the populace. Significantly, the only attack made directly against a political figure in the National Government was the attack made against Prime Minister Ky. There was no reference made concerning the recent dismissal of General Thi. On the same day, [REDACTED] demonstrations occurred in the city of Hue, which not only carried a theme of anti-government, but for the first time, a strong anti-American theme ~~began to appear~~. With the Defense Intelligence Bulletins 56-66, 57-66, 23-24 March 1966. (9)

appearance of anti-American <sup>agitation</sup> ~~the appearance~~ in I-Corps area the tenseness of the situation increased. Headquarters, III MAF was doing all it could to prevent any incident from developing between ~~the~~ Marine personnel and ~~the~~ anti-government demonstrators that would add fuel to the growing political crisis. ~~[REDACTED]~~ Before the month of March ended, two ~~[REDACTED]~~ isolated incidents had occurred, one in Hue, the other in DaNang, between Marines ~~personnel~~ and ~~anti-government~~ ~~most~~ demonstrators. In Hue on the 28th of March, a Marine was involved in the destruction of an anti-American banner, which brought recriminations from the "Struggle Forces" over the Hue radio, which they still controlled. Threats were made against U. S. installations, particularly the United States Information Service (USIS) Library. The tension was somewhat reduced when the chairman of the "Struggle Forces" in Hue agreed to accept the apology of the Senior U. S. Military Advisor in the area.

Defense Intelligence Bulletin 59-66, 28 March 1966. (S)

In DaNang on the 30th of March, anti-government demonstrators using about 400 vehicles to carry signs denouncing the National Government and accusing the United States of preventing the election of a National Assembly, paraded through the streets. When a U. S. Marine Corps vehicle, attempting to pass between two trucks, scraped the bumper of one of the vehicles, demonstrators proclaimed over loudspeakers that two Vietnamese demonstrators had been killed. As a result of this incident, approximately 2,000 demonstrators gathered in front of the U. S. Marine Corps Command Headquarters in DaNang and demanded to see the U. S. Consul and the III MAF Commander. Again, the situation was handled in a diplomatic manner in an effort to ameliorate the situation. On the same day in the city of Hue, the Police Chief led a parade of approximately 400 uniformed National Policemen past the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Compound and Sector Headquarters. The police were carrying signs that read, "Down with American intervention in Vietnamese affairs" and "Down with Ky and Thieu".

Defense Intelligence Bulletin 62-66, 31 March 1966. (S)

Although the political crisis had initially developed around the dismissal of General Thi as I<sup>st</sup> Corps Commander, resulting in many groups getting on the bandwagon in an effort to support their own political or religious cause, it was now evident that the Vietnamese Communists were going to take every opportunity to exploit the situation



in their favor. COMUSMACV had reason to believe that the "Struggle Forces" both student and non-student, were Communist penetrated but not necessarily Communist dominated. It was also disclosed by an official Vietnamese report that a clandestine student organization had been established in the Hue Faculty of Law, with the possibility that one of their leaders, Hoang Phu Ngoc Phan, had been Communist trained in propaganda techniques.

Defense Intelligence Bulletin 58-66, 59-66, 25-28 March. (S)

The month of March ended with the National Government still showing restraint in allowing the anti-government demonstrators to operate unmolested in the wake of the growing political crisis. General Thi was still in Hue, anti-government and anti-American demonstrators were on the rise, and there was growing indication that no quick settlement would be made between the Ky government and the "Struggle Forces". As the month of April arrived, the National Government was faced with a precarious situation, being torn between the rising political crisis and the continuing fight against the Viet Cong.

#### U. S. MARINE CIVIL AFFAIRS CONTINUES IN I-CORPS IN THE FACE OF POLITICAL CRISIS

The political crisis in I-Corps during the month of

demanding the return of the National Government to civilian control, Prime Minister Ky moved against the dissident forces in I Corps in an attempt to break the revolt. ~~On 1 April~~ On 1 April, Prime Minister Ky discussed with his Cabinet the growing political crisis and the demands that were being made by the anti-government Buddhist leaders and pro-Thi forces. There was general agreement within the Cabinet that no more concessions would be made to anti-government groups who were intensifying their efforts in order to create more disunity throughout South Vietnam. Prime Minister Ky informed his Cabinet that he planned to deal firmly with the disturbances in Central Vietnam and that any further disorders in Da Nang and Hue by demonstrators trying to enlarge the anti-government campaign, would be met by military force.

Defense Intelligence Bulletin 63-66, 1 April 1966 (C-NFD)

The first week of April 1966, continued to produce strong anti-government demonstrations with anti-American overtones in I Corps, and on the 3rd ~~April~~, Prime Minister Ky began to make his move against the "Struggle Forces" in Central Vietnam. In a press conference in Saigon on ~~that day~~ <sup>that day</sup>, ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> announced ~~to the press~~ that he considered the city of Da Nang to be in Communist hands, and that the Mayor of the city of Da Nang, Dr. Nguyen Van Man, was himself, a Communist and had been using government funds to support

## U. S. MARINE CORPS CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITY

DURING THE 2nd QUARTER OF 1966

April-May-June

## Political Crisis Continues Into April 1966

The political crisis had begun in March and reached a new peak of intensity during April 1966. Throughout April there were anti-government demonstrations in all major cities within the five provinces of I#Corps. The "Struggle Forces" in attempting to bring about a capitulation of the Ky regime staged their demonstrations in DaNang, Hoi An, Tam Ky, Quang Ngai, and Hue. These demonstrations and the general political unrest throughout I#Corps, while not completely stopping the Pacification efforts on the part of III MAF, did have a stultifying effect upon civil affairs projects being carried out in the ICTZ.

III MAF Command Chronology, April 1966. (S)

Since the beginning of the demonstrations in March, the National Government had shown restraint in moving against the demonstrators with any overt act of force and the "Struggle Forces" in I#Corps had been operating almost unopposed. However, as the demonstrations moved from a protest surrounding the dismissal of General Thi as I#Corps Commander to attacking Prime Minister Ky and Chief of State Thieu and

*Park*

Between the 6th and 9th ~~April~~, it became necessary to begin evacuating U. S. civilian personnel from the two most northern provinces in I Corps. In the city of Hue, <sup>in</sup> Thua Thien Province, 85 U. S. civilians were evacuated and in Quang Tri city, Quang Tri Province, 8 civilians were evacuated. On Defense Intelligence Bulletin 66-66, 6 April 1966. (S)

the 9th of April, U. S. civilians in Da Nang, along with those from Hue and Quang Tri were evacuated to safe areas outside <sup>of</sup> ~~the~~ I Corps, ~~area~~

Around the time evacuation of U. S. civilians was taking place, pro-American demonstrations <sup>ors</sup> appeared in Da Nang proclaiming that the United States is Vietnam's "great friend and ally". The anti-government forces also began to address the Americans through Da Nang Radio and loud speaker trucks proclaiming that the "Struggle Forces" appreciated American assistance and would insure that the Americans would not be harmed.

FMFPAC Operations of U. S. Marines in Vietnam, April 1966, (S)  
p. 31.

The apex of tension was reached during the political crisis, when on 9 April, III MAF received reports that ARVN troops along with an ~~Armed Personnel Carrier~~ and howitzers were moving from Hoi An to Da Nang, with the intension of joining the "Struggle Forces". This movement was countered

*Carter*

*Indirect  
Quota*

had resettled, at their own request, inside the Marine-secure area at Chu Lai, a youth from one of the families offered to lead a patrol to a concealed cave in his former hamlet, where he said seven VC had hidden during the move. When that cave was located and destroyed, entrances to two others were revealed. Two armed VC inside the caves were killed and one was wounded and captured, along with seven weapons and a quantity of clothing and ammunition." [There were numerous other reports during the month which provided the Marines with good intelligence information and directly contributed to the saving of many Marine lives.

FMFPac Operations of U. S. Marines, Vietnam. May, 1966, pp. 3-8. (S)

While the pacification efforts were continuing, ~~tampa~~ ~~crashed out~~, the 15th of May brought a resurgence of political upheaval to the ICTZ. In a swift and sudden move against the city of DaNang, Prime Minister Ky sent four Battalions of pro-government troops into the area for the expressed purpose of preventing the anti-government forces from taking over the city. While the two Vietnamese Marine battalions and two ARVN Airborne battalions received <sup>little</sup> ~~some~~ opposition upon their arrival in DaNang, it was soon learned that a number of ARVN units in I Corps had stated their opposition to this move on the part of Prime Minister Ky, and were ~~enroute~~ <sup>enroute</sup> to DaNang to support the opposition forces. With this information,

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

MEMORANDUM

From: Assistant Commandant

To:

*Capt Parker -*

*My compliments on  
a job well done -*

*W*

L. W. WALT

**SECRET**

## INTERVIEWS

The following is an alphabetical listing of those personally interviewed concerning Civil Affairs Activity in I-Corps, South Vietnam from April 1966-to April 1967:

Brown, Calvin D., SSgt., USMC, 2 July 1968, Washington, D. C.  
Burgess, Roger E., USAID, 23 July 1968, Washington, D. C.  
Evans, D. L., Jr., LtCol., USMC, 2 July 1968, Washington, D. C.  
Gordon, Mark, USAID, 25 July 1968, Washington, D. C.  
McGonigal, Richard A., LtCdr., USN, Chaplain, 1 August 1968, Washington, D. C.  
Mattingly, Robert E., Capt., USMC, 22 July 1968, Washington, D. C.  
Nickerson, Herman Jr., LtGen., USMC, 2 August 1968, Washington, D. C.  
Platt, Jonas M., MajGen., USMC, 24 September 1968, Washington, D. C.  
Robertshaw, Louis B., MajGen., USMC, 31 July 1968, Washington, D. C.  
Walt, Lewis W., LtGen., USMC, 6 August 1968, Washington, D. C.  
Weschler, Thomas, RAdm., USN, 5 August 1968, Washington, D. C.  
\*Young, Earl, USAID, 23 July 1968, Washington, D. C.

Note to typist

Please spell out full military titles when re-typing this page.

**SECRET**A03D1-jeb  
4 NOV 1969

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Proposed Historical Reference Pamphlet, "U. S. Marine Corps  
Civil Affairs in I Corps, Republic of Vietnam, April 1966 -  
April 1967REF : (a) CMC Memo A02A-VBR-thb to Dir, DIA of 16 Jun 1969  
(b) DIA Memo S-2195/CI-1 to CMC of 17 Jul 1969ENCL: (1) Pages 36-46 and 53-56 of original manuscript (S)  
(2) Subject pamphlet as amended (S)

1. In accordance with reference (a), DIA conducted a review for clearance of the subject pamphlet and submitted its comments in reference (b).
2. In accordance with reference (b), all mention of DIA Bulletins included in enclosure (1) have been deleted and the text is now footnoted from U. S. news media (enclosure (2)).
3. It is requested that enclosure (2) be declassified.
4. This Division interposes no objection to this manuscript as an official publication of the Marine Corps on the grounds of military security or policy.
5. This memorandum is unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1) and (2).

C. C. CROSSFIELD  
By direction

RETURN TO A03D

**SECRET**



**SECRET**Sent  
1453 21001 69

A03D1-jeb

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Proposed Historical Reference Pamphlet, "U. S. Marine Corps  
Civil Affairs in I Corps, Republic of Vietnam, April 1966 -  
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**SECRET**

HISTORICAL BRANCH  
G-3 DIVISION

31 October 1969  
(DATE)

G-3 DIVISION ROUTING	DATE	INIT
AC/S, G-3 (A03)		
DAC/S, G-3		
1 ASST G-3	10/31	✓
ADMIN & FISCAL (A03A)		
PLANS & PROGRAMS (A03B)		
TRAINING (A03C)		
CIVIL AFFAIRS (A03E)		
COMD, CONT & COMM (A03F)		
OPERATIONS (A03H)		
COMBAT PICTORIAL (A03P)		

RECOMMENDED EXTERNAL  
ROUTING AS FOLLOWS:

REMARKS:

Subj: Proposed Historical Reference Pamphlet, "U. S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs in I Corps, Republic of Vietnam, April 1966 - April 1967"

1. The attached proposed memorandum is submitted for approval, signature, and forwarding to AC/S, G-2 for action.

*F. C. Caldwell*  
F. C. CALDWELL

11/6/69 *JW*

To- AC/S, G-2

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

A03D1-jeb  
28 APR 1969

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Director of Information

Security and Policy Review of Historical Manuscript

REF : (a) HQO P5000.3A  
(b) DOD Directive 5230.9

ENCL : (1) Manuscript entitled "U. S. Marine Corps Civil  
Affairs in I Corps, Republic of South Vietnam,  
April 1966 to April 1967" (S) (5 copies)

1. Enclosure (1) is transmitted in accordance with references (a) and (b) for further transmittal to the Department of Defense for security and policy review required by reference (b).
2. In general, the material in this manuscript has been taken from unclassified sources. Where classified material has been used the indicated portion is marked in the left hand margin of the manuscript. This manuscript has been reviewed and approved by the Civil Affairs Branch of this Division for suitability for unclassified publication; the comments of this Branch have been incorporated.
3. It is the present intention of this Division to publish enclosure (1) as an unclassified Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet which will be distributed to numerous libraries throughout the United States, within the Marine Corps and other services, and to the general public upon request.
4. This Division interposes no objection to this manuscript as an official publication of the U. S. Marine Corps on the grounds of military security.
5. This memorandum is unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

WEBB D. SAWYER  
By direction

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

RETURN TO A03D

**SECRET**

**DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

S-2195/CI-1

17 JUL 1969

**SUBJECT:** Proposed Historical Reference Pamphlet: U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs in I Corps, Republic of South Vietnam, April 1966 to April 1967.

**TO:** Commandant  
U.S. Marine Corps  
Washington, D.C. 20380

1. Reference is made to Department of the Navy letter, file S908 846, dated 16 June 1969, subject as above.

2. The DIA information was contained in 16 identified Defense Intelligence Bulletins of March and April 1966 and security classifications of "Confidential/No Foreign Dissem" through "Secret/No Foreign Dissem." Original sources were COMUSMACV, CIA and U.S. Embassy Saigon reports; however, the age and "current-intelligence" nature of the information make it virtually impossible for DIA to identify specific statements with specific sources.

3. In view of the date of the information, the concurrent reporting of much of the data in U.S. news media and the fact that different Allied political issues now apply in Vietnam, continued classification of the material in question is no longer considered warranted. DIA will therefore concur in declassification, providing:

a. The authority of the originators of the source reports (COMUSMACV, CIA and State Department) is obtained.

b. No attribution to the Defense Intelligence Bulletin (footnotes, and textual reference on page 37) is made. This is especially important for the citation from Bulletins 47-66 (pages 37, 38) and 63-66 (page 53) where association of direct and non-public statements by the present Vice President of Vietnam with the Bulletin may cause serious embarrassment to the U.S. Government.

4. The draft Marine Corps report is returned.

SIGNED

D. E. BERGIN  
REAR ADMIRAL, USN  
ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF

1 Enclosure  
U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs  
in I Corps, (S) 1 cy

Regraded Unclassified  
when separated from  
Classified enclosure

**SECRET**

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**SECRET**

HDM-ck

JAN 22 1970

S 0 1 0 5 4 4

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps  
To: Commanding General, United States Military Assistance  
Command, Vietnam

Subj: Declassification of certain pages of "U. S. Marine Corps  
Civil Affairs Effort in Vietnam, April 1966 to April 1967"

Encl: (1) Subject monograph  
(2) U. S. Marine Corps Civic Action Effort in Vietnam,  
March 1965 - March 1966

1. It is the intention of the Historical Division of this Headquarters to publish enclosure (1) as an unclassified historical reference pamphlet similar to enclosure (2).

2. Enclosure (1) has been reviewed by various cognizant agencies of this Headquarters and the Defense Intelligence Agency and various changes in the text and citations have been made to comply with security regulations. As the draft now stands, only material cited on pages 89-94 and 174-175, originated by your command and supporting agencies, cannot be declassified by this Headquarters.

3. Your review of the material on pages 89-94 and 174-175 is requested with the intention that this information be declassified for publication. Once your concurrence in this matter is received, it is the intention of this Headquarters to submit the draft manuscript as an unclassified document to the Department of Defense for security/policy review and approval prior to unclassified publication.

4. Expeditious handling of this matter would be appreciated.

5. This letter is unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

F. C. CALDWELL  
By direction

**RETURN TO HD****UNCLASSIFIED**  
**SECRET**

*To S+C  
on 23 Jan*

HDM-ck

JAN 24 1966

**SECRET**

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To: Commanding General, United States Military Assistance  
Command, Vietnam

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5. This letter is unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

F. C. CALDWELL  
By direction

**SECRET**

EDH-ck

**SECRET**

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5. This letter is unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

F. C. CALDWELL  
By direction

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

**DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

0-2395/CI-1

**SUBJECT:** Proposed Historical Reference Pamphlet: U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs in I Corps, Republic of South Vietnam, April 1966 to April 1967.

**TO:** Commandant  
U.S. Marine Corps  
Washington, D.C. 20380

1. Reference is made to Department of the Navy letter, file 8908 846, dated 16 June 1969, subject as above.

2. The DIA information was contained in 16 identified Defense Intelligence Bulletins of March and April 1966 and security classifications of "Confidential/No Foreign Dissem" through "Secret/No Foreign Dissem." Original sources were COMUSMACV, CIA and U.S. Embassy Saigon reports; however, the age and "current-intelligence" nature of the information make it virtually impossible for DIA to identify specific statements with specific sources.

3. In view of the date of the information, the concurrent reporting of much of the data in U.S. news media and the fact that different Allied political issues now apply in Vietnam, continued classification of the material in question is no longer considered warranted. DIA will therefore concur in declassification, providing:

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4. The draft Marine Corps report is returned.

**SIGNED**

D. E. BROWN  
BRIG ADJUTANT, USN  
ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF

1 Enclosure  
U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs  
in I Corps, (S) 1 cy

Classified and controlled  
information  
is separated from  
unclassified information

**SECRET**



port  
UNCLASS

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
ENCLOSURE(1)

A02A-VER-4bb

1001 1 1960

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps  
To: Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

1000-100-1

Subject: Prepared Historical Reference Pamphlet: U. S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs in I Corps, Republic of South Vietnam, April 1966 to April 1967

Re: (1) Subject manuscript

1. The Marine Corps desires to disseminate enclosure (1) as an unclassified historical reference. With this goal in mind it is requested that enclosure (1) be reviewed and the Headquarters be apprised of those portions which can not be declassified. Particular attention is invited to those sections listed below which contain extracts from DIA or COMUSMACV publications:

a. Pages 36-46 - Extracts from Defense Intelligence Collection.

b. Pages 53-56 - Extracts from Defense Intelligence Collection.

c. Pages 89-94 - Extracts from COMUSMACV Command history.

d. Pages 174-175 - Extracts from COMUSMACV Command history.

2. It is further requested that this matter be handled as expeditiously as possible.

E. W. DZIALO  
By [Signature]

Copy [Signature] of [Signature] [Signature]

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
ENCLOSURE(1)

UNCLASS  
~~SECRET~~

## HISTORICAL DIVISION


(DATE) \_\_\_\_\_

HISTORICAL DIVISION ROUTING	ACT	INFO	IN	OUT	INIT
Dir, MarCor Hist (HD)		X	1/13	1/13	fw
AdminBr (HDA)					
HistoriesBr (HDH)				1/8	HIS
Current HistSect					
Oral HistSect					
General HistSect					
ReferenceBr (HDR)					
AdminSect					
RefSect					
Unit HistSect					
LibrarySect					
DocumentationSect					

REMARKS:

Recommend that we send this to ComUSMACV, asking that it declassify information on pp. 89-94, ~~indicated~~ ~~that the remainder~~ and pp. 174-175, stating that what our intentions are in regard to the ~~see~~ monograph and sending along a copy of Spolti's study as an example

VR

DEADLINE TO HD \_\_\_\_\_

## MAPS FOR PARTS I AND II

## PART I

Map Title	Page No.
Location of SHUFLY, 1962-1965	3-24A
Da Nang	4-17 <b>A</b>

## PART II

Chu Lai	5-12A
Chu Lai Short Air <sup>F</sup> ield	5-19
Provinces in I Corps	6-17A
Phu Bai TAOR*-Aug 1965	6-30A
STARLITE- <del>The</del> Landings on 18 August 1965	7-5A
STARLITE- Push to the Sea on 19 August 1965	7-23A
Operation HARVEST MOON, December 1965	7-29A
Da Nang TAOR and NGU HANH SON Pacification Area, December 1965	8-25A

**SECRET**

012434

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- Chapter III: U. S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs in I-Corps, South Vietnam, during July-August-September 1966.
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APPENDIX                List of Interviews.

List of Abbreviations.

Selected Bibliography concerning Indo-China/Vietnam.

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
MARINE CORPS COMMAND CENTER  
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps  
Washington, D. C. 20380

AC-RJC-rjc  
007B7065  
11 Mar 1965

MEMORANDUM

From: Director, Marine Corps Command Center  
To: Distribution List  
Subj: Current FMF Ground Unit Status Reports (U)  
Encl: (1) FMF Ground Unit Status Reports


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2. This memorandum is unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

  
F. R. DOWSETT

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## HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

CG: LtGen V. H. KRULAK

DATA AS OF: 15 February 1965

DEP CMDR: MGen S. S. WADE

REF: FMFPAC 200502Z Feb 65

SECRET	ACTUAL STRENGTH (MANNING LEVEL)				LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
	U S M C		U S N				
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
<u>H&amp;S BN (REIN) (TOTAL)</u> Col McClanahan	161	795	13	28			M/L does not include 3d & 4th SSC Teams with 1st & 3d MAW; 6th & 7th CIT with 1st & 3d MAW. See Last Page for Commanders Statement
H&S Bn (Rein)	155	757	13	28	Camp Smith		
Det	6	32	0	0	Camp Fuchu, Japan		
Det	0	6	0	0	Hilo, Hawaii		
<u>H&amp;S BN (TOTAL)</u>	155 (139)	757 (666)	13	28	Camp Smith		
<u>RepWestPac</u> Col Brackett	6	32	0	0	Camp Fuchu, Japan		
<u>SU#1 ServCo</u>	0	6	0	0	Hilo, Hawaii		
<u>1st IT Team</u> Capt Biel	4 (4)	22 (7)	0	0	Camp Smith		
<u>FSAO</u> CWO Meek	1	2	0	0	Camp Smith		
<u>1ST ANGLICO</u> LtCol Valente	33 (32)	280 (302)	10	0	Camp Smith		
<u>1ST RADIO BN (TOTAL)</u> Maj Smith	17 (18)	282 (214)	0	1	MCAS Kaneohe		

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PERSONNEL SHORTAGES

1. Headquarters, FMF, Pacific

a. Critical shortage of Enlisted Personnel exists in OF 28 in the First RADBn.

<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ACK</u>	<u>SHORT</u>
2043	2	0	2
2861	5	1	4
2862	1	0	1

b. There are no basic Marines on the rolls of the 1st RADBn. No Enlisted Personnel possess an additional MOS in the shortages reported above.

SECRET

## FORCE TROOPS, FMF PACIFIC

CG: BGen W. K. JONES

DATA AS OF: 15 February 1965

REF: CG ForTpsPac 190145ZFeb65

SECRET	ACTUAL STRENGTH (MANNING LEVEL)				LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
	U S M C		U S N				
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
<u>FORCE TROOPS</u> <u>(Less AirFMFPac)</u>	134 (146)	2024 (1925)	20	53	MCB 29 Palms		See last page for Commander's Statement
HQ CO Capt D. J. Viera	40	199	7	5	MCB 29 Palms		
5th DENTAL CO Capt E.J.Lofgreen,USN			6	10	MCB 29 Palms		
<u>CO"D",7TH ENGR BN</u> <u>Capt J.C. Thorp</u>	6	153			MCB 29 Palms		
<u>1ST FAG</u> LtCol R.G. Fritch	43	646	2	5	MCB 29 Palms		
HQ BTRY 1stLt R.J.Johnson	17	138	2	5	MCB 29 Palms		
<u>1ST 155MM GUN BTRY</u> <u>(SP)</u> Maj J.R. McEnaney	7	128			MCB 29 Palms	6-155mmGuns (SP)	
<u>3D 155MM GUN BTRY</u> <u>(SP)</u> Maj R. L. Etter	6	114			MCB 29 Palms	6-155mmGuns (SP)	
<u>3D 8" HOW BTRY (SP)</u> <u>(REIN)</u> Maj L. T. Drennan	13	266			MCB 29 Palms	8-8" How (SP)	



SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>4TH BN, 11TH MAR</u> LtCol A.M. Roebuck	26	479	1	5	MCB 29 Palms	18-155mm How	
<u>SUPPORT BN</u> Maj D. W. Saaron	20	503			MCB 29 Palms		
<u>5TH NOP</u> 1stLT "W" S. Miller	2	32			MCB 29 Palms		
<u>1ST HOSP CO</u> Lt R. E. Greene, USN		25	4	28	MCB 29 Palms		
<u>AIRFMFPAC UNITS</u>	32 (66)	664 (1074)	1	6			
<u>2D LAAM BN</u> LtCol N.E. Dayvault	28	567	1	6	MCB 29 Palms	3-Btry Sets, Hawk Wpn System	Cmbt Readiness 90% as of 1 Mar 65
<u>4TH LAAM BN (CADRE)</u> Capt D. E. Keller	4	97			MCB 29 Palms		

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## FORCE TROOPS, FMT PACIFIC

## COMMANDER'S STATEMENT

1. A shortage of two 5907's in the 2nd LAAM Bn may have an adverse affect on the combat readiness of the LAAM Bn equipment if this shortage is not rectified. The shortage has existed since November 1964.

- a. Resources available in OFF MOS'S reported as critical:

<u>OFF ABOARD WITH</u>		<u>OFF ABOARD WITH</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>SHORT</u>
MOS	PRIMARY MOS	ADD MOS			
5907	3	0	3	5	2

- b. There is no known projected input in MOS 5907.

## 1ST MARINE DIVISION

CG: MGen W. T. FAIRBOURN

DATA AS OF: 15 February 1965

ADC: BGen E. H. HURST

REF: CG 1stMarDiv 192147Z Feb65

SECRET	ACTUAL STRENGTH (MANNING LEVEL)				LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
	U S M C		U S N				
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
<u>1STMARDIV (REIN)</u>	1163 (1238)	22099 (22277)	97	586	CamPen		See last page for Commander's statement. PACFLEX 1-65 "SILVER LANCE" 23Feb-12Mar65 CamPen
<u>HQ BN</u> LtCol P.M. Moriarty	183	1668	8	36	CamPen		
<u>1ST MAR</u> Col C. W. Hoffman	141	3333	7	81	CamPen		
<u>HQ CO</u> 1stLt C. R. Loyd	17	182	2	2	CamPen		
<u>1ST BN</u> LtCol D.V.MCCLOSKEY	41	1094	2	26	CamPen	905 M-14; 8 Mort; 36 M-79; 8 RR; 35 MG; 32 3.5"RL; 8 Flame Thrower	
<u>2D BN</u> LtCol R. C. Wood	40	963	1	27	CamPen	-do-	
<u>3D BN</u> LtCol V.E.Ludwig	43	1094	2	26	CamPen	-do-	To WESTPAC Mar65
<u>5TH MAR</u> Col V. J. Croizat	127	2960	6	73	CamPen		
<u>HQ CO</u> Capt C. H. Ram	17	163	1	2	CamPen		
<u>1ST BN</u> LtCol G.R.Scharnberg	29	1014	2	23	CamPen	-do-	
SECRET							

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SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>2D BN</u> LtCol J.M.Cummings	38	870	2	25	CamPen	905 M-14; 8 Mort; 36 M-79; 8 RR; 35 MG; 32 3.5"RL; 8 Flame Thrower	
<u>3D BN</u> LtCol L.E.Fribourg	43	913	1	23	CamPen	-do-	
<u>7TH MAR</u> Col O.F. Peatross	143	3227	7	75	CamPen		
<u>HQ CO</u> 1stLt R.C. Keeler	18	177	3	2	CamPen		
<u>1ST BN</u> LtCol A.J.Warshawer	42	987	2	24	CamPen	-do-	
<u>2D BN</u> LtCol J.K.McCreight	41	1038	1	25	CamPen	-do-	
<u>3D BN</u> LtCol C.H. Bodley	42	1025	1	24	CamPen	-do-	
<u>11TH MAR</u> LtCol P. J. Mulroney	136	2023	15	38	CamPen		
<u>HQ BTRY</u> 1stLt M.W.Smithson	23	216	6	16	CamPen		
<u>1ST BN</u> LtCol R.W.Stephens, JR.	37	602	3	7	CamPen	18 - 105mm How 6 - M98(HOWTAR)	
<u>2D BN</u> LtCol J.B.Stribling	37	301	6	7	CamPen	-do-	
<u>3D BN</u> Maj J.C. Alexander	39	604	3	8	CamPen	-do-	
							SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>1ST FSR</u> Col H.G. Lawrence Jr.	93	2318	5	15	CamPen		
<u>H&amp;S BN</u> LtCol M.F. Wojcik	36	671	5	15	CamPen		
<u>SUP BN</u> LtCol R.L. Johnson	30	788	0	0	CamPen		
<u>MAINT BN</u> LtCol W.L. Nelson	27	859	0	0	CamPen		
<u>1ST AT BN</u> LtCol C. R. Roberts	27	406	1	8	CamPen	45 - M50 Ontos	
<u>1ST MED BN</u> Lt W.H. Sothronon Jr.	3 USN	135	9	118	CamPen		
<u>1ST ENGR BN</u> LtCol H. Heinemann	33	646	2	10	CamPen		
<u>1ST MT BN</u> Maj R. L. Doering	15	307	0	5	CamPen	96 - 2½ ton M-35	
<u>1ST SERV BN</u> Col E. G. Atkin, Jr.	45	916	3	18	CamPen		
<u>1ST SHORE PARTY BN</u> LtCol R.T. Taylor, Jr.	23	418	2	13	CamPen		
<u>1ST RECON BN</u> LtCol J. N. Pieti	24	377	1	9	CamPen		
<u>1ST TANK BN</u> LtCol D.E. Esslinger	35	705	1	9	CamPen	17 - 120mm Tks 36 - 90mm Tks 9 - Flame	
<u>3D AMTRAC BN</u> LtCol J. T. Fox	26	654	2	8	CamPen	100 - LVTP-5 9 - LVTC-1 4 - LVTR-1	
							SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>7TH ENGR BN</u> LtCol E.L.Meeker	30	667	2	16	CamPen		
<u>7TH COMM BN</u> Maj T.W. Hopkins	45	719	2	8	CamPen		
<u>7TH MT BN</u> Maj F. J. Ballek	14	369	0	6	CamPen	126 - 5 ton 6x6	
<u>1ST BRIDGE CO</u> Capt E. A. Studer	5	112	0	0	CamPen	3-Float;3-Fixed; 6-Foot Bridge	
<u>1ST DENTAL CO</u> Capt A.T.Smith, USN	0	0	24	40	CamPen		
<u>1ST FORCE RECON CO</u> Maj H.A.MacDonald,Jr.	10	123	0	0	CamPen		
<u>1ST CIT</u> 1stLt R. M. Varn	4	10	0	0	CamPen		
<u>2DSPEC SEC COMM TM</u> 1stLt U. L. Giff	1	6	0	0	CamPen		
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PERSONNEL SHORTAGES1. 1stMarDiva. Officers

(1) Division is currently at 96 percent of overall officer manning level. Availability of Majors and Captains continues low with percentages of 71 percent and 66 percent respectively. This is particularly significant in OCCFLD 30 where the availability of Captains is only 32 percent (9 for 28).

b. Enlisted

(1) Critical shortages exist in following MOS's

<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ACT</u>	<u>SHORT</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
0239	30	23	7	77	Note 1
0842	27	15	12	56	
0844	232	125	107	54	
0847	17	10	17	59	
1141	104	73	31	70	
1341	204	133	71	65	
2151	29	18	11	62	
2311	166	84	82	51	
OCCFLD 30					Note 2
3311	69	35	34	51	
3516	780	491	289	63	

NOTE 1: This shortage is compounded by the lack of supervisory personnel in OCCFLD 02. For Example:

	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
Sgts/Above	74	56	75

NOTE 2: Specific critical MOS shortages in OCCFLD 30 are not reported this month due to the recent reclassification actions directed by Ch 17 to MCO

P1200.7 couple with non-receipt of revised manning levels.

(2) Following resources available to assist through on-the-job training and formal schooling to improve personnel situation in above MOS's:

- (a) 424 Basics OCCFLD 08. OCCFLD 08 104 Percent.
- (b) 12 Basics OCCFLD 11. OCCFLD 11 91 Percent.
- (c) 349 Basics OCCFLD 13. OCCFLD 13 93 Percent.
- (d) 23 Basics OCCFLD 21. OCCFLD 21 108 Percent.
- (e) 2 Basics OCCFLD 23. OCCFLD 23 58 Percent.
- (f) 126 Basics OCCFLD 33. OCCFLD 33 96 Percent.
- (g) 502 Basics OCCFLD 25. OCCFLD 35 92 Percent.

(3) Estimated numbers of Basics to be assigned appropriate Primary MOS within 30 to 90 day period are as follows:

<u>MOS</u>	<u>30 DAYS</u>	<u>60 DAYS</u>	<u>90 DAYS</u>
0842	0	3	3
0844	28	39	21
0847	1	0	0
2311	0	0	1
3311	11	0	0
3516	13	16	44

(4) Additional Formal Schools Quotas in Basic Electricians Course (MOS 1141), Engineer Equipment Mechanics Course (MOS 1341) and Turret Repair (MOS 2151) have been requested by separate correspondence.

(5) This report has considered personnel situation in FSR.



## 1ST MARINE BRIGADE

CG: BGen M. E. CARL

Personnel 15Feb MAG-13

DATA AS OF: Readiness 1Feb

REF: 1stMarBrig 200235Z Feb65

SECRET	ACTUAL STRENGTH (MANNING LEVEL)				LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
	U S M C		U S N				
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
<u>1ST MAR BRIG</u>	494 (485)	6778 (7129)	31	170	MCAS Kaneohe		See last page for Commander's Statement.
<u>GROUND UNIT TOTAL</u>	301 (264)	5231 (5288)	27	156			
<u>HQ CO, 1ST MARBRIG</u> Maj B.B. Smith, Jr.	33	150	4	7	MCAS Kaneohe		
<u>4TH MAR (REIN)</u> Col E. P. Dupras	157	2982	6	86	MCAS Kaneohe		
<u>HQ CO (REIN)</u> Capt J.L. Compton	25	198	0	2	MCAS Kaneohe		
<u>1ST BN</u> LtCol H. D. Fredericks	39	875	2	28	MCAS Kaneohe	905 M-14; 8 Mort; 36 M-79; 8 RR; 35 MG; 32 3.5" RL 8 FlameThrower	
<u>2D BN</u> LtCol J.R. Fisher	40	852	2	25	MCAS Kaneohe	-do-	
<u>3D BN</u> Maj D.R. Jones	43	859	2	26	MCAS Kaneohe	-do-	
<u>CO "B", 3D RECONBN</u> Capt R.H. Philon	5	90	0	3	MCAS Kaneohe		
<u>CO "B", 3D AT BN</u> Capt H.L. Mills	5	109	0	2	MCAS Kaneohe	15-M50 Ontos	
							SECRET

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SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>3D BN, 12TH MAR</u> <u>LtCol A.B. Slack, Jr.</u>	52	590	3	8	MCAS Kaneohe	18-105mm How 6-M98 (HOWTAR)	
<u>SERVICE BN</u> <u>LtCol J.S. Heitzler</u>	30	880	14	55	MCAS Kaneohe		
<u>HQ CO</u> <u>1stLt W.F. Spence</u>	11	197	1	0	MCAS Kaneohe		
<u>SERV CO</u> <u>Capt G.H. Taylor, III</u>	3	95	0	1	Pearl City		
<u>CO "A", 1ST AMTRAC</u> <u>BN (-)</u> <u>Maj P. M. Helsher</u>	5	229	0	0	MCAS Kaneohe	44-LVTP-5 3-LVTC-1 1-LVTR-1	
<u>CO "B", 3D ENGR BN</u> <u>(REIN)</u> <u>Capt D. R. Comer</u>	5	123	0	0	MCAS Kaneohe		
<u>CO "B", 3D MED BN</u> <u>Lt D.C. Tharp</u>	0	24	4	37	MCAS Kaneohe		
<u>CO "C", 3D MT BN</u> <u>Capt R. A. Fugate</u>	2	72	0	0	MCAS Kaneohe	31-2½ ton trk 6x6 M-35	
<u>CO "B", 3D SP BN</u> <u>Maj J. O. Elder</u>	4	140	0	3	MCAS Kaneohe		
<u>DET, 3D DENT CO</u> <u>Capt A.L. Tietel, USN</u>	0	0	9	14	MCAS Kaneohe		

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<b>SECRET</b>	U S M C			U S N		LOCATION	AIRCRAFT		% READI- NESS	EXERCISES/ DEPLOYMENTS/REMARKS
	NA	AG	ENL	OFF	ENL		OP ALLOW	ON HAND		
<u>MAG-13</u> Col R. H. Spanjer	141 (156)	52 (75)	1547 (1841)	4	14	Kaneohe				Pers as of 15Feb65 Readiness as of 1 Feb 1965
<u>H&amp;MS-13</u> Maj L. F. Blass	25	13	309			Kaneohe	2-C54 3-TF9J	2-C54Q 4-TF9J	95%	
<u>MABS-13</u> Maj George Pechar	5	10	425	4	13	Kaneohe			85%	
<u>MATCU-62</u> 1stLt J. N. Bacon	1	2	37			Kaneohe			85%	
<u>MACS-2</u> LtCol C. E. Tucker	3	16	141			Kaneohe			92%	
<u>VMF(AW)-212</u> LtCol C. H. Ludden	16	5	162			USS ORISKANY	16-F8D	1-F8D 12-F8E	83%	W/CAW-16, USS ORISKANY - To WESTPAC 20Apr-30Dec
<u>VMA-214</u> LtCol K. OKeefe	29	2	161			Kaneohe	20-A4C	26-A4C	78%	5-A4C Classified Project "SHADY GROVE" 1Mar-5Apr65
<u>VMF-232</u> LtCol H. K. Jobe	21	3	160			Kaneohe	16-F8B	16-F8B 16-F8D	70%	redesignated VMF(AW) 1Mar
<u>HMM-161</u> Maj B. R. Wilkinson	41	1	152			Kaneohe	24-UH34D	24-UH34D	88%	2 A/C 4Jan-31Mar "SHADY GROVE"
<u>SU#1</u> LtCol W.H. Macklin	0	29	629			Kaneohe				

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1ST MARINE BRIGADE  
COMMANDERS STATEMENT

1. COMMANDER'S STATEMENT CONCERNING ANY EXISTING OR ANTICIPATED CRITICAL PERSONNEL SHORTAGE:

A. THE BUPERS ALLOWANCE FOR HOSPITAL CORPSMEN IS TWO ZERO FOUR, PRESENT ON BOARD STRENGTH IS ONE SEVEN ZERO. ANTICIPATED GAINS DURING THE NEXT SIX MONTHS ARE TWENTY ONE AS COMPARED WITH EXPECTED AND KNOWN LOSSES OF THIRTY TWO. THE HOSPITAL CORPSMEN SITUATION IS SERIOUS AND COULD AFFECT THE COMBAT READINESS OF THE BRIGADE.

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DECLASSIFIED

## 3D MARINE DIVISION (-) (Rein)

CG: MGen W. R. COLLINS

DATA AS OF: 15 February 1965

ADC: BGen F. J. KARCH

CG3DMarDiv 190530ZFeb65 & Sailing  
REF: Reports for BLT 1/9 and 3/9&9thMEB

SECRET	ACTUAL STRENGTH (MANNING LEVEL)				LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
	U S M C		U S N				
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
3DMARDIV (-) (REIN) (TOTAL)	913 (953)	14173 (16363)	106	520			
3dMarDiv	777	11258	95	425	Okinawa		
Hq Staff	18	34	0	0	9thMEB Hq		
Elements	93	2285	9	84	w/BLT 1/9 BLT 3/9		
Co"C", 3dReconBn	4	64	0	3	9th MEB		
Co"D" 1/3 (Rein) Security Augmentation	8	248	0	4	DANANG		
Co"C" 7thEngrBn	5	145	0	0	DANANG		
Det, Comm Support Co	0	12	0	0	9th MEB Hq		
Elements	8	127	2	4	Camp Fuji		
HQ BN (-) (REIN) (TOTAL) LtCol W.E. Melby	210	1369	13	25			
HqBn	151	1028	9	23	Camp Courtney		
SU#1	0	147	2	0	Camp Butler		
SU#5	18	119	0	0	Camp Hansen		
LtCol JK. Keith, Jr.							
Det	18	34	0	0	HqStaff 9thMEB		
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SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
Det	1	4	1	1	w/BLT 1/9		
Det	1	10	1	1	w/BLT 3/9		
Hq CTF 79 MGen W.R. Collins	20	26	0	0	Camp Hauge		
9th MEB	1	0	0	0	Camp Hauge		
3d MARINES (TOTAL)	150	3232	10	102			
Col E.B. Wheeler							
3d Marines	142	2984	10	98	Camp Schwab		
Co"D" 1/3	8	248	0	4	DANANG, RVN		
HQ CO	16	134	2	2	Camp Schwab		
Capt D.L. Nichols							
1ST BN (TOTAL)	47	1041	3	34			
LtCol H. J. Bain							
Bn	39	793	3	30	Camp Schwab	905-M-14;8 Mort; 36-M79;8 RR; 35 MG; 32 3.5" RL; 8 Flame Thrower	
Co"D"	8	248	0	4	DANANG		
TU 79.4.2							
2D BN (TOTAL)	44	1014	3	34	Camp Schwab	-do-	"JUNGLE DRUM III"
LtCol D.A. Clement							THAILAND 3Mar-8Apr65
3D BN (TOTAL)	43	1043	2	32	Camp Schwab	-do-	
LtCol W.D. Hall							
9TH MARINES (TOTAL)	140	3151	11	111			
Col F. E. Garretson							
9th Mar	64	1272	5	47	Camp Hansen		
Bn	39	980	3	39	BLT 1/9		
Bn	37	899	3	25	BLT 3/9		

SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
HQ CO (TOTAL)	23	162	2	2			
Hq Co	23	158	2	2	Camp Hansen		
Det	0	4	0	0	BLT 1/9		
<u>1ST BN (TOTAL)</u> <u>LtCol T. Owens</u>	40	1019	3	46		905-M-14; 8 Mort; 36 M79; 8 RR; 35 MG; 32 3.5" RL; 8 Flame Thrower	
Bn	39	976	3	39	BLT 1/9		ETA Okinawa 13Mar65
<u>SU#1</u> <u>1stLt R.A. Irvin</u>	1	43	0	7	Camp Hansen		
<u>2D BN (TOTAL)</u> <u>LtCol E.G. Derring</u>	37	987	3	35	Camp Hansen	905-M-14; 8 Mort; 36 M79; 8 RR; 35 MG; 32 3.5" RL; 8 Flame Thrower	To Relieve 1/9 Mar65
<u>3D BN (TOTAL)</u> <u>LtCol C.E. McPartlin</u>	40	983	3	28		-do-	
Bn(-)	37	899	3	25	BLT 3/9		
<u>SU#1</u> <u>1stLt E.W. Ruffin</u>	3	84	0	3	Camp Hansen		
<u>12TH MARINES (TOTAL)</u> <u>Col W. P. Pala</u>	108	1365	11	28			
12th Mar	99	1171	10	26	Camp Sukiran	24-105mm How; 18 155mm How; 12 M98 HOWTAR	
Btry	5	112	1	1	BLT 1/9	6-105mm How	
Btry	4	85	0	1	BLT 3/9	6-105mmHow	

SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>HQ BTRY (TOTAL)</u> Capt W.B. Clark	13	130	5	6	Camp Sukiran		
<u>1ST BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol G.H. Nilsen	39	460	2	6	Camp Sukiran	18-105mmHow 6-M98 (HOWTAR)	
<u>2D BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol J.K. Knocke	35	458	4	10		18-105mmHow 6-M98 (HOWTAR)	
2dBn	26	261	3	8	Camp Sukiran	6-105mmHow 6-M98 (HOWTAR)	
Btry "D"	5	112	1	1	BLT 1/9	6-105mmHow	
Btry "F"	4	85	0	1	BLT 3/9	6-105mmHow	
<u>4th Bn (TOTAL)</u> LtCol P.N. Austen	21	320	0	6	Camp Sukiran	18-155mmHow	
<u>3D ENGR BN (-) (REIN)</u> <u>(TOTAL)</u> LtCol C.M. Wann, Jr.	26	27	1	7			
3dEngrBn	24	378	1	5	Camp Hansen		
Plat Co "K"	1	26	0	1	BLT 1/9		
Plat Co "C"	1	23	0	1	BLT 3/9		
<u>3D MT BN (-) (TOTAL)</u> LtCol A.C. Beverly	12	163	0	5	Camp Schwab	62-2½ ton 6x6	
<u>3D SERV BN (-) (REIN)</u> <u>(TOTAL)</u> Col R. J. Oddy	32	607	7	31			
3d ServBn	24	417	5	27	Camp McTureous		
Det	0	30	0	0	BLT 1/9		
Det	0	33	0	0	BLT 3/9		

SECRET



SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
SU#1 Col B.M. Boress	8	127	2	4	Camp Fuji		
<u>3D RECON BN (-) (TOTAL)</u> LtCol D.H. Blanchard	23	308	0	12			
3dReconBn	17	208	0	8	Camp Schwab		
Plat	1	19	0	0	BLT 1/9		
Plat	1	17	0	1	BLT 3/9		
Co "C"	4	64	0	3	w/9TH MEB		ABD APD COOK
<u>3D AT BN (-) (TOTAL)</u> LtCol T. Summers	17	209	0	5		30-M50 ONTOS	
3dATBn	15	172	0	5	Camp Hansen	20-M50 ONTOS	
Plat	1	17	0	0	BLT 1/9	5-M50 ONTOS	
Plat	1	20	0	0	BLT 3/9	5-M50 ONTOS	
<u>3D MED BN (TOTAL)</u> Lcdr J.W. Davis, USN	3	72	20	98			
3dMedBn	3	62	20	85	Camp Hansen		
Det	0	5	0	0	BLT 1/9		
Det	0	5	0	13	BLT 3/9		
<u>3D FSR (-) (TOTAL)</u> Col H.F. Stevenson	93	1654	5	29			
3dFSR	91	1641	5	29	Camp Sukiran		
Det, EOD Plat	2	13	0	0	Camp Hauge		
<u>H&amp;S BN (-) (TOTAL)</u> LtCol H.T. Dawes	34	435	4	23	Camp Sukiran		

SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>SUP BN (-) (TOTAL)</u> LtCol D.E. Morin	36	634	1	6	Camp Sukiran		
<u>EOD Plat, AMMO Co</u> Capt R.H. Martin	2	13	0	0	Camp Hauge		
<u>MAINT Bn (REIN) (TOTAL)</u> LtCol H.W. Evans	23	585	0	0	Camp Sukiran		
<u>3D TANK BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol S.R. Jones, Jr.	31	486	0	5		53-90mm GunTks 9-Flame Tanks 4-Tank Recovery	
3dTkBn	29	435	0	4	Camp Hansen	43-90mmGunTks 9-Flame Tanks 3-Tank Recovery	
Plat Co "C"	1	27	0	1	BLT 1/9	5-90mmGunTks 1-M51TkRecovery	
Plat Co "B"	1	24	0	0	BLT 3/9	5-90mmGunTks	
<u>9TH MT BN (TOTAL)</u> Maj H.F. Finney	18	329	0	8		126-5 ton 6x6 trk	
9thMTBn	16	281	0	8	Camp Hansen	97-5 ton 6x6 trk	
Plat	1	24	0	0	BLT 1/9	13-5 ton 6x6 trk	
Plat	1	24	0	0	BLT 3/9	16-5 ton 6x6 trk	
<u>1STAMTRACBN (-) (TOTAL)</u> LtCol J. GLENN	23	327	0	8			
1stAmTracBn	21	245	0	7	Camp Schwab	34-LVTP-5 6-LVTC-1 3-LVTR-1	
Plat	1	41	0	1	BLT 1/9	11-LVTP-5	
Plat	1	41	0	0	BLT 3/9	11-LVTP-5	

SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>1ST 8" HOWBTRY (SP) (TOT)</u> Maj E.H. Stansel	7	135	0	2	Camp Sukiran	6-8" How (SP)	
<u>1ST PLAT 1ST BRIDGE CO (TOTAL)</u> 1st Lt A.K. Kuhn	1	21	0	0	Camp Hansen		
<u>CO "C" (REIN) (7th ENGR BN) (TOTAL)</u> Capt J.E. Anderson	5	153	0	0			
Det	0	8	0	0	Camp Hansen		
Co "E"	5	145	0	0	DANANG		
<u>COMM SUP CO (FMF) (TOT)</u> Maj E.B. Hart	9	184	0	0			
Elements	9	172	0	0	Camp Hauge		
Det	0	12	0	0	9th MEB HQ		
<u>3D DENTAL CO (TOTAL)</u> Capt A.B. Noble, USN	0	0	26	38	Camp Courtney		
<u>SU#1, 1ST FORRECON CO</u> Capt D.N. Whittingham	1	15	0	0	MCAF Futema		
<u>3D SP BN (TOTAL)</u> Maj J.C. Gray III	11	200	2	10			
3d SPBn	9	133	2	8	Camp Hauge		
Plat	1	41	0	1	BLT 1/9		
Plat	1	26	0	1	BLT 3/9		
<u>3D CIT</u> WO J.E. Stephensen	1	12	0	0	Camp Courtney		

SECRET

REF: CG 9TH MEB 271638Z Jan65

**DECLASSIFIED**

BLT 3/9(-)

CO: LtCol C. E. McPARTLIN

REF: Sailing Reports 111030Z, 121000Z

and 120220Z Jan65

SECRET	STRENGTH				CURRENT LOCATION	ASSIGNED SHIPPING	MAJOR ARM/ EQUIP	REMARKS
	USMC		USN					
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL				
<u>BLT 3/9</u> LtCol C.E. McPartlin	49	1207	4	43		PHIBRON 1		
<u>3D BN, 9TH MAR</u>	37	899	3	25		LPD VANCOUVER APA HENRICO		
H&S CO, 3/9 (Rein)	14	196	3	14		LPD VANCOUVER		
Co"I", 3/9 (Rein)	5	156	0	0		LPD VANCOUVER		
Co"K", 3/9 (Rein)	6	169	0	3		APA HENRICO		
Co"L", 3/9 (Rein)	8	248	0	4		APA HENRICO		
Co"M", 3/9 (Rein)	4	130	0	4		APA HENRICO		
Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv	1	10	1	1		LPD VANCOUVER		
Btry "F", 2/12	4	85	0	1		LPD VANCOUVER	6-105mmHow	
Plat, Co"B", 3dTkBn	1	24	0	0		LPD VANCOUVER	5-90mmGunTks	
Plat, Co"B", 1stAmTracBn	1	41	0	0		LPD VANCOUVER	11-LVTP-5	
Plat, Co"C", 3dATBn	1	20	0	0		LPD VANCOUVER	5-50A1 ONTOS	
Plat, Co"C", 9thMTBn	1	24	0	0		LPD VANCOUVER		
Plat, Co"C", 3dEngrBn	1	23	0	1		AKA UNION		
								SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

[illegible]

**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

BLT 3/9 (-)

WEAPONS & VEHICLE RECAP

WEAPONS

731 M14 Rifle  
251 Pistol, cal .45  
10 Sub-machine Gun, Cal .45  
37 M60 Machine Gun  
37 3.5" Rocket Launcher  
2 81mm Mortar  
4 Flame Thrower  
26 M79 Grenade Launcher  
8 106mm RR  
6 105mm How (Abd LPD)  
5 90mm Gun Tanks (Abd LPD)  
5 M50 Ontos (Abd LPD)  
38 Machine Gun, cal.50  
21 Machine Gun, Cal.30

VEHICLES

31 M274 (MULE)  
2 M170 (¼ ton ambulance)  
7 Radio Jeep  
29 M422 (Mighty-Mite)  
5 M37 (Pers Carrier)  
15 M35 (2½ ton truck)  
3 M38A1 Jeep  
1 M49 (2½ ton tanker)  
1 M51 (5 ton dump truck)  
1 M51 (Mat-Laver)  
11 LVTP-5 (Abd LPD)  
2 M43 (3/4 ton ambulance)  
16 M54 (5 ton truck)  
1 M62 (5 ton wrecker)  
1 DUKW (Abd LPD)

SECRET

## MARINE UNITS VIETNAM (MUV)

CO: Col John H. KING

REF: 1stMAW 190142ZFeb; AdminOFMFPac

CTG 79.4

DATE: 2March1965

110244ZDec64; COMUSMACV 200925ZFeb65

SECRET

USMC

USN

OFF

ENL

OFF

ENL

CURRENT LOCATION

ASSIGNED SHIPPING

MAJOR ARM/EQUIP

REMARKS

<u>SU#2, MABS-16</u> LtCol T. E. Vernon TU 79.4.1	21	172	3	7	DANANG, RVN			
Co "D" (REIN) 1/3, 3dMar Div <u>SECURITY AUGMENTATION</u> TU 79.4.2	6	252	0	0	DANANG, RVN			
<u>HMM-163</u> LtCol N. G. Ewers TU 79.4.3	57	171	2	0	DANANG, RVN		27-UH34D 3-01B 1-C117D	
<u>1stLAAM Bn (-)</u> LtCol B. E. Cook TU 79.4.4	24	421	0	0	DANANG, RVN		13-XM78 Launchers 108 Missiles	1-CIV Techrep attached.
<u>CTG 79.4 (TOTAL)</u>	108	1016	5	7				
<u>Co "C" 7thEngrBn</u> Capt J. E. Anderson	4	146	0	0	DANANG, RVN			
<u>MUV TOTAL</u>	112	1162	5	7				

SECRET

SECRET

USMC

USN

OFF

ENL

OFF

ENL

CURRENT LOCATION

ASSIGNED SHIPPING

MAJOR ARM/EQUIP

REMARKS

<u>SU#2, MABS-16</u> LtCol T. E. Vernon TU 79.4.1	21	172	3	7	DANANG, RVN			
Co "D" (REIN) 1/3, 3dMar Div <u>SECURITY AUGMENTATION</u> TU 79.4.2	6	252	0	0	DANANG, RVN			
<u>HMM-163</u> LtCol N. G. Ewers TU 79.4.3	57	171	2	0	DANANG, RVN		27-UH34D 3-01B 1-C117D	
<u>1stLAAM Bn (-)</u> LtCol B. E. Cook TU 79.4.4	24	421	0	0	DANANG, RVN		13-XM78 Launchers 108 Missiles	1-CIV Techrep attached.
<u>CTG 79.4 (TOTAL)</u>	108	1016	5	7				
<u>Co "C" 7thEngrBn</u> Capt J. E. Anderson	4	146	0	0	DANANG, RVN			
<u>MUV TOTAL</u>	112	1162	5	7				

SECRET



## HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, ATLANTIC

CG: LtGen J. P. BERKELEY

DATA AS OF: 20 February 1965

DEP CMDR: MGen R. K. ROTTET

CG FMFLant SpdLtr 107/871 efh of  
REF: 24Feb65

SECRET	ACTUAL STRENGTH (MANNING LEVEL)				LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
	U S M C		U S N				
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
<u>H&amp;S BN</u> Col J. B. Bristow	152 (154)	686 (642)	8	10	Norfolk		
<u>HEDRON</u> Maj J. F. A. Jones	9 (8)	68 (62)			NAS Norfolk	1 - C131F 3 - T1A 2 - UC45J 1 - C54T	
					</		

FORCE TROOPS, FMF, ATLANTIC

CG: BGen D. J. ROBERTSON

DATA AS OF: 20 February 1965

ForTpsLant ltr ser 01A55-65 of 24  
REF: Feb65 & Sailing Rpts LANFORMED 3-64

SECRET	ACTUAL STRENGTH (MANNING LEVEL)				LOCATION	CARIB 1-65 & LANFORMED 1-65 MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
	U S M C		U S N				
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
<u>FORTPS, FMFLANT (TOTAL)</u>	447 (463)	7889 (7427)	36	147			See last page for Commander's Statement
Elements	403	6953	31	136	CamLej		
Elements	4	126	0	1	CARIB 1-65		
Elements	3	124	0	1	LANFORMED 1-65		
Elements	4	153	0	2	LANFORMED 3-64		
Elements	10	148	2	1	GTMO		
Elements	0	5	0	0	LittleCreek, Va		
Elements	6	174	0	1	VIEQUES		
Elements	1	0	0	0	Ft Knox, Ky.		
Elements	0	2	0	0	PHIBULEX 1-65		
Elements	2	20	0	1	NATAL, BRAZIL		
Elements	11	177	2	2	Camp Garcia		
Elements	3	5	0	0	Morocco		
Elements	0	2	0	0	Surefoot		
Elements	0	0	1	2	Camp Elmore, Va.		
<u>HQ CO (TOTAL)</u>	45	280	3	11			
Capt D.E. Sudduth							SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
HqCo	43	271	3	10	CamLej		
Detachment	2	7	0	1	Camp Garcia		
Detachment	0	2	0	0	GTMO		
<u>2D FAG (TOTAL)</u> <u>LtCol W.E. Magon</u>	39	495	0	6			
2d FAG	38	454	0	5	CamLej	4-155mmGun (SP) 6-8" How (SP)	
Detachment	0	3	0	0	Camp Garcia		
Det, 155mm GunBtry	1	38	0	1	GTMO	2-155mmGun (SP)	
<u>8TH MT BN (TOTAL)</u> <u>LtCol E. S. Baker, Jr.</u>	22	375	0	6			
8th MT Bn	21	338	0	5	CamLej	95-5 ton 6x6trks	
Detachment	0	6	0	0	Camp Garcia		
Platoon	1	31	0	1	LANFORMED 3-64	15-5 ton 6x6trks	I Co COMEX (VIEQUES) 14-28Mar65
<u>8TH COMM BN (TOTAL)</u> <u>LtCol B.E. Horner</u>	42	774	1	7			
8th Comm Bn	41	764	1	7	CamLej		
Detachment	1	10	0	0	Camp Garcia		
<u>2D AMTRAC BN (TOTAL)</u> <u>Maj W.C. Barrett</u>	30	707	2	10			
2d AmTracBn	26	581	1	8	CamLej	68-LVTP-5 8-LVTC-1 4-LVTR-1	
Detachment	1	0	0	0	Ft Knox, Ky.		

SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
Detachment	0	1	1	0	Cam Garcia		
Platoon	1	38	0	1	IANFORMED 3-64	10-LVTP-5 1-LVTC-1	
Platoon	1	44	0	1	IANFORMED 1-65	11-LVTP-5	
Platoon	1	43	0	0	CARIB 1-65	11-LVTP-5	
<u>2D ANGLICO (TOTAL)</u> LtCol J. W. Tuma	27	293	9	1			
2d Anglico	21	253	7	1	CamLej		
Platoon	6	40	2	0	GTMO		
<u>2D RADIO BN (TOTAL)</u> Maj J.R. O'Mara	15	344	0	1	CamLej		RADEX (CARIB) Mar65
<u>2D TOPO CO (TOTAL)</u> Maj O.G. Candler, Jr.	7	90	0	2			
2d Topo	5	70	0	1	CamLej		
SU# 1 Capt M.E. Schwarz	2	20	0	1	NATAL, BRAZIL		Coastal Survey 26Jan65-1967
<u>8TH ENGR BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol G.A. Merrill	47	1046	1	11			
8thEngrBn	39	844	1	10	CamLej		
Detachment	2	28	0	0	Camp Garcia		
Company "D"	6	174	0	1	VIEQUES		Co "D" VIEQUES Feb-Aug 65
<u>2D FORRECON CO (TOTAL)</u> Maj J.H. Carothers, Jr.	8	126	0	2			
2d ForRecon	7	112	0	2	CamLej		
Detachment	1	14	0	0	CARIB 1-65		

SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>2D BRIDGE CO (TOTAL)</u> Capt T.J. Dalzell	6	157	0	1			
2d Bridge Co	6	151	0	1	CamLej		
Detachment	0	6	0	0	Camp Garcia		
<u>2D FSR (TOTAL)</u> Col H. Wallace	111	2433	3	27			
2d FSR	101	2121	3	27	CamLej		
Elements	5	113	0	0	Camp Garcia		
Elements	1	59	0	0	LANFORMED 3-64		
Elements	1	45	0	0	CARIB 1-65		
Elements	2	29	0	0	GTMO		
Elements	0	2	0	0	PHIBULEX 1-65		
Elements	0	2	0	0	Surefoot		
Elements	1	50	0	0	LANFORMED 1-65		
<u>H&amp;S Bn (TOTAL)</u> LtCol C. J. Peabody	47	712	2	21			
H&S Bn	44	645	2	21	CamLej		
Detachment	0	15	0	0	LANFORMED 3-64		
Detachment	1	5	0	0	LANFORMED 1-65		
Detachment	0	2	0	0	PHIBULEX 1-65		
Detachment	1	9	0	0	CARIB 1-65		
Detachment	1	35	0	0	Camp Garcia		
Detachment	0	1	0	0	GTMO		

SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>SUPPLY BN (TOTAL)</u> <u>LtCol O. J. Morel</u>	30	717	1	6			
SupBn	25	595	1	6	CamLej		
Detachment	3	43	0	0	Camp Garcia		
Detachment	1	23	0	0	LANFORMED 3-64		
Detachment	0	23	0	0	LANFORMED 1-65		
Detachment	0	22	0	0	CARIB 1-65		
Detachment	0	2	0	0	SUREFOOT		
Detachment	1	9	0	0	GTMO		
<u>MAINT BN (TOTAL)</u> <u>LtCol J.A. Wachter</u>	34	1004	0	0			
MaintBn	32	893	0	0	CamLej		
Detachment	1	35	0	0	Camp Garcia		
Detachment	0	14	0	0	CARIB 1-65		
Detachment	0	21	0	0	LANFORMED 3-64		
Detachment	1	19	0	0	GTMO		
Detachment	0	22	0	0	LANFORMED 1-65		
<u>4TH DENTAL CO (TOTAL)</u> <u>Capt C.G. Veno, USN</u>	0	0	13	26			
4TH Dental Co	0	0	11	23	CamLej		
Detachment	0	0	1	2	Camp Elmore, Va.		
Detachment	0	0	1	1	Camp Garcia		

SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>2D HOSPITAL CO (TOTAL)</u> Capt J.K. Cunningham, USN	0	26	3	20	CamLej		
<u>2D SEP SURG CO (TOTAL)</u> Lt J.R. Renard, USN	0	7	1	3	CamLej		
<u>2D TANK BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol T.M. Horne	36	690	0	13			
2d Tank Bn	32	572	0	12	CamLej	12-120mm Gun 21-90mm Gun 7-Flame Tanks	
Detachment	0	2	0	0	Camp Garcia		
Platoon	1	23	0	0	LANFORMED 3-64	5-90mm GunTks	
Platoon	1	25	0	0	LANFORMED 1-65		
Platoon	1	24	0	1	CARIB 1-65	5-90mm Gun Tks	
Platoon	1	39	0	0	GTMO	5-120mm GunTks 2-Flame Tanks	
Detachment	0	5	0	0	Little Creek Va.		
<u>2D CIT (TOTAL)</u> Capt W. R. Gentry	4	9	0	0			
2d CIT	4	8	0	0	CamLej		
Detachment	0	1	0	0	Camp Garcia		
<u>2D IT TEAM (TOTAL)</u> Capt R. T. Waters	1	11	0	0			
2d IT Team	0	7	0	0	CamLej		
Detachment	1	4	0	0	Morocco		LANG TRNG (MOROCCO) 29Jan-9Mar65

SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>4TH IT TEAM (TOTAL)</u> 1stLt D. G. Eirich	5	12	0	0			
4th IT Team	3	9	0	0	CamLej		
Detachment	0	2	0	0	LANFORMED 3-64		
Detachment	2	1	0	0	MOROCCO		
<u>6TH IT TEAM (TOTAL)</u> 1stLt O. Saenz	2	14	0	0	CamLej		
							SECRET



**COMMANDER'S STATEMENT:**

1. Critical Personnel Shortages. A critical shortage of one Marine exists in the 2d Counter-Intelligence Team in the MOS 0211. The records at this Headquarters indicate that this shortage will not be alleviated until June 1965.

## 2D MARINE DIVISION (REIN)

CG: MGen W. J. VAN RYZIN

DATA AS OF: 20 February 1965

ADC: BGen J. G. BOUKER

2dMarDiv 260148ZFeb65 and Sailing  
REF: Reports LANFORMED 3-64; & CARIB 1-65  
and LANFORMED 1-65

SECRET	ACTUAL STRENGTH (MANNING LEVEL)				LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
	U S M C		U S N				
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
<u>2D MARDIV (REIN) (TOTAL)</u>	1033 (951)	17925 (16984)	98	658			
2dMarDiv	853	14017	81	505	CamLej		
Elements	60	1286	4	49	LANFORMED 3-64		
Elements	52	991	7	40	CARIB 1-65		
Elements	57	1315	6	56	LANFORMED 1-65		
Elements	11	316	0	8	GTMO		
<u>HQ BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol H.T. Pittman	194	1459	17	33			
HqBn	190	1415	17	33	CamLej		
Det	3	24	0	0	LANFORMED 3-64		
Det	0	12	0	0	LANFORMED 1-65		
Det	1	8	0	0	CARIB 1-65		
<u>2D MARINES (TOTAL)</u> Col C. H. BRUSH, Jr.	143	3491	10	113			
2dMar	101	2556	7	83	CamLej		
Bn	42	935	3	30	LANFORMED 3-64		
<u>HQ CO (TOTAL)</u> 1stLt D.M. Beinner	17	212	2	17	CamLej		

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>1ST BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol A.V. Marusak	42	935	3	30	LANFORMED 3-64	905 M-14; 8 Mort. 36 M79; 8 RR; 35 MG; 32 3.5RI 8 FlameThrower	ETA MHC, NC 12Mar65 AIR ALERT 2-9APR65
<u>2D BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol J.W. Donnell	43	1140	2	36	CamLej	-do-	LANFORMED 2-65 Apr65
<u>3D BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol J.A. Weizenegger	41	1204	3	30	CamLej	-do-	AIR ALERT 5-12Mar65
<u>6TH MARINES (TOTAL)</u> Col G.W.E. Daughtry	160	3570	7	122	CamLej		Ex "QUICK KICK VII" 22Mar-15Apr
<u>HQ CO (TOTAL)</u> Capt B.G. Ourcash	27	210	1	14	CamLej		
<u>1ST BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol W.F. Doehler	43	1095	2	34	CamLej	-do-	AIR ALERT 16-22Mar65
<u>2D BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol R.D. Bohn	44	1242	2	33	CamLej	-do-	AIR ALERT 22Mar-2Apr65
<u>3D BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol P.F. Pedersen	46	1023	2	41	CamLej	-do-	AIR ALERT 26Feb-5Mar65 Ex "QUICK KICK VII" 22Mar-15Apr
<u>8TH MARINES (TOTAL)</u> Col B.S. Johnson	149	3189	10	106			
8th Mar	63	1321	2	37	CamLej		
Bn	36	698	3	29	CARIB 1-65		
Bn	43	968	3	34	LANFORMED 1-65		
Co (Rein)	7	202	0	6	GTMO		
<u>HQ CO (TOTAL)</u> Maj V.A. Salvo, Jr.	20	401	2	14	CamLej		
Det	0	9	0	0	CARIB 1-65		
Det	0	2	0	0	LANFORMED 1-65		

SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>1ST BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol E.F. Danowitz	41	848	2	23	CamLej	905 M-14; 8 Mort; 36 M79; 8 RR; 35 MG; 32 3.5RL 8 FlameThrower	Co "C" (Rein) Ex "COLD WINTER-65" 20-26Mar65
<u>2D BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol J.B. Ord, Jr.	43	968	3	34	LANFORMED 1-65	-do-	
<u>3D BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol R.F. Vancantfort	45	972	3	35		-do-	
Sub Unit	2	72	0	0	CamLej		
3d Bn	36	698	3	29	CARIB 1-65		Participate Ex "QUICK KICK VII" 22Mar-15Apr
Co "M" (Rein)	7	202	0	6	GTMO		
<u>10TH MARINES (TOTAL)</u> Col J.R. Chaisson	182	2622	11	31			
10th Mar	152	2134	7	21	CamLej		
Btry	10	144	1	2	LANFORMED 3-64	6-105mm How	
Btry "A"	7	124	1	1	LANFORMED 1-65	6-105mm How	
Btry	9	106	2	5	CARIB 1-65	-do-	
Btry	4	114	0	2	GTMO	6-155mm How	
<u>HQ BTRY (TOTAL)</u> Capt L.C. Gapenski	47	595	5	9			
Elements	46	595	5	9	CamLej		
Det	1	0	0	0	CARIB 1-65		
<u>1ST BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol A. Novak	44	622	3	6			
1st Bn	29	392	0	0	CamLej	12-105mm How	
Btry	8	106	2	5	CARIB 1-65	6-M98 (HOWTAR)	SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
Btry "A"	7	124	1	1	LANFORMED 1-65	6-105mm How	Btry "L" to GTMO 30Mar
<u>2D BN (TOTAL)</u> Maj K.C. Williams	34	458	2	6	CamLej	18-105mm How 6-M98 (HOWTAR)	
<u>3D BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol E.A. Bailey	32	485	1	6		-do-	
3d Bn	22	341	0	4	CamLej	12-105mm How 6-M98 (HOWTAR)	
Btry	10	144	1	2	LANFORMED 3-64	6-105mm How	
<u>4TH BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol R. E. Young	25	462	0	4		18-105mm How	
4th Bn	21	348	0	2	CamLej	12-155mm How	
Btry "K"	4	114	0	2	GTMO	6-155mm How	
<u>2D SERV BN (TOTAL)</u> Col R.R. Weir	48	1014	3	14			
2dSerBn	44	886	3	14	CamLej		
Det	1	42	0	0	LANFORMED 3-64		
Det	2	47	0	0	LANFORMED 1-65		
Det	1	39	0	0	CARIB 1-65		
<u>2D AT BN (TOTAL)</u> LtCol R.O. Dillow	31	465	0	5		45-M50 ONTOS	
2dATBn	28	400	0	5	CamLej	29-M50 ONTOS	
Plat	1	21	0	0	LANFORMED 3-64	5-M50 ONTOS	
Plat	1	22	0	0	LANFORMED 1-65	6-M50 ONTOS	
Plat	1	22	0	0	CARIB 1-65	5-M50 ONTOS	

SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>2D MT BN (TOTAL)</u> <u>LtCol E.K. Vickers, Jr.</u>	25	280	0	4		96-2½ ton 6x6 trk	
2dMTBn	23	230	0	4	CamLej	81-2½ ton 6x6 trk	
Plat	1	31	0	0	LANFORMED 1-65		
Plat	1	19	0	0	CARIB 1-65	15-2½ ton 6x6 trk	
<u>2D RECON BN (TOTAL)</u> <u>LtCol J. Westerman, Jr.</u>	30	422	1	12			
2dReconBn	27	336	1	11	CamLej		
Det	1	19	0	0	LANFORMED 3-64		
Det	1	20	0	0	LANFORMED 1-65		
Det	1	19	0	1	CARIB 1-65		
<u>2D ENGR BN (TOTAL)</u> <u>LtCol F.R. Denormandie</u>	40	806	0	7			
2dEngrBn	37	680	0	7	CamLej		
Plat	1	39	0	0	LANFORMED 3-64		
Plat	1	43	0	0	LANFORMED 1-65		
Plat	1	44	0	0	CARIB 1-65		
<u>2D SP BN (TOTAL)</u> <u>LtCol W.R. Gould</u>	28	464	0	23			
2dSPBn	25	341	0	20	CamLej		
Det	1	52	0	0	LANFORMED 3-64		
Det	1	36	0	2	LANFORMED 1-65		
Det	1	35	0	1	CARIB 1-65		

SECRET

SECRET	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	LOCATION	MAJOR ARM/EQUIP	REMARKS
<u>2D MED BN (TOTAL)</u> LCDR N.W. Wenger, USN	3	143	12	141			
2dMedBn	3	122	12	138	CamLej		
Det	0	10	0	17	LANFORMED 3-64		
Det	0	10	0	17	LANFORMED 1-65		
Det	0	1	1	3	CARIB 1-65		
<u>2D DENTAL CO (TOTAL)</u> Capt D.R. Shiffert, USN	0	0	27	47			
2dDentCo	0	0	24	44	CamLej		
Det	0	0	1	1	CARIB 1-65		
Det	0	0	2	2	LANFORMED 1-65		
							SECRET

LANFORMED 1-65

CO: LtCol J. B. ORD, JR.

REF: SAILING REPORTS: 131430Z; 112300Z;  
120143Z; 120350Z 101217Z;

TF 62

112100Z and 112056Z FEB 65

SECRET	STRENGTH				CURRENT LOCATION	ASSIGNED SHIPPING	MAJOR ARM/ EQUIP	REMARKS
	USMC		USN					
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL				
<u>LANFORMED TOTAL</u>	74	1509	7	95		PHIBRON-2		
2dBn, 8thMar TF 62.1	52	967	3	34				
H&S Co	17	264	2	30		APA FRANCIS MARION		
Co E	7	190	1	4		1ST TRAVERSE CTY		
Co F	6	169	0	0		APA MOUNTRAIL		
Co G	6	173	0	0		APA MOUNTRAIL		
Co H	16	171	0	0		APA FRANCIS MARION		
BTRY A, 1/10	7	124	1	1		APA MOUNTRAIL APA FRANCIS MARION	6-105mmHow	
SU#1, H&MS-26	5	63	0	1		LSD SAN MARCOS	3-UH34D	
Plat Co C, 2d ReconBn	1	20	0	0		APA FRANCIS MARION	(8 UH34D After Relieving LANFORMED 3-64)	
Plat Co A, 2d AmTracBn	1	44	0	1		1ST TRAVERSE CTY	11-LVTP-5	
Plat Co A, 2d ATBn	1	22	0	0		LSD SAN MARCOS LSD RUSHMORE	6-M50 Ontos	
Plat Co A, 2d TkBn	1	25	0	0		LSD SAN MARCOS LSD RUSHMORE	5-90mmGunTks	
Plat Co C, 2d EngrBn	1	43	0	0		APA FRANCIS MARION		
								SECRET



DECLASSIFIED

SECRET	USMC		USN		CURRENT LOCATION	ASSIGNED SHIPPING	MAJOR ARM/ EQUIP	REMARKS
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL				
Det, 2d MTBn	1	31	0	0		AKA THUBAN		
Det, 2d SerBn	2	47	0	0		AKA THUBAN APA MOUNTRAIL		
Det, 2d SPBn	1	36	0	2		APA MOUNTRAIL LSD RUSHMORE		
Det, 2d FSR	1	60	0	0		AKA THUBAN		
Det, MED Bn	0	10	0	17		APA FRANCIS MARION		
Det, HqBn, 2dMarDiv	0	12	0	0		APA FRANCIS MARION		
Det, H&S Bn, MCB	0	2	0	0		APA MOUNTRAIL		
Det, HqCo, 8thMar	0	2	0	0		APA FRANCIS MARION		
Det, HqCo, ForTrpsLant	0	1	0	0		APA FRANCIS MARION		
Det, 2d DentCo, FMF	0	0	2	2		APA FRANCIS MARION		
Det, ACB-2	0	0	1	29		LSD SAN MARCOS		
Det, BMU	0	0	0	8		LST TRAVERSE CTY		

SECRET

**SECRET**

44

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

WEAPONS, VEHICLE AND AIRCRAFT RECAP LANFORMED 1-65

WEAPONS

5 Tanks (M-48, 90mm) (abd LSD SAN MARCOS)  
(abd LSD RUSHMORE)

6 M-50, Ontos (abd LSD SAN MARCOS)  
(abd LSD RUSHMORE)

6 105mm Howitzer (abd APA MOUNTRAIL)

45 M60, Machine Gun

8 106mm Recoilless Rifle

9 .50 Cal. Machine Gun

28 3.5" Rocket Launcher

11 Flame Thrower

35 M-79, Grenade Launcher

8 81mm Mortar

VEHICLES

11 LVTP-5 (LST TRAVERSE CTY)

1 DUKW (LST TRAVERSE CTY)

36 M35, 2½ ton truck

2 M-54, 5 ton truck

7 M37, 3/4 ton Pers Carrier

1 M51, 2½ ton dump

1 M51, Mat Laying

1 M52, 5 ton trk trac

3 M43 3/4 ton ambulance

2 M170, ¼ ton ambulance

24 M422, Mighty-Mite

31 M274, Mule

2 M63, Refueler

1 M49, 2½ ton tanker

3 M38A1, Jeep

9 Radio Jeep

1 M62, 5 ton wrecker

AIRCRAFT

3 UH34D (abd  
LSD SAN MARCOS)

SECRET

SECRET

LANFORMED 1-65

1. SUPPLIES	DAYS OF SUPPLY
CLASS I	70
CLASS II, II(A) (NON VEH)	75
CLASS III (BULK)	8
CLASS III (DRUM & PKG)	8
CLASS III(A) (BULK)	34
CLASS III(A) (DRUM & PKG)	0
CLASS IV, IV(A) (NON VEH)	30
CLASS V	16
CLASS V (A)	16

SECRET

## CARIB READY FORCE

CO: LtCol R. F. VANCANTFORT

SAILING REPORTS: 202339Z;221725Z;  
REF:220240Z;212045Z;201822Z Jan65

CTG 45.9

SECRET	STRENGTH				CURRENT LOCATION	ASSIGNED SHIPPING	MAJOR ARM/ EQUIP	REMARKS
	USMC		USN					
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL				
BLT 3/8 (Minus Co "M" at GTMO)	111	1309	15	128	(GTMO)	Phibron 12		TOTALS DO NOT INCLUDE CO "M"
3D BN, 8TH MAR(-)	35	688	4	29		LPH GUADALCANAL LST LORAIN CTY		
CO "M"	(7)	(202)	(0)	(6)				
HowtarBtry(Rein),1/10	8	106	2	5		LPH GUADALCANAL	6-M98 107mm HOWTAR	
Plat(Rein)Co"B",2D SP BN	1	35	0	1		LSD PLYMOUTHROCK		
Plat(Rein)Co"B",2D MT BN	1	19	0	0		AKA VERMILION		
Plat,Co"A",2dReconBn	1	19	0	1		LSD PLYMOUTHROCK		
Plat,2dForReconCo	1	14	0	0		LPH GUADALCANAL		
Plat,(Rein),Co"A", 2D AT BN	1	22	0	0		LST LORAIN CTY	5-ONTOS	
Plat,(Rein),Co"C", 2d ENG BN	1	44	0	0		LST LORAIN CTY		
Plat,(Rein),Co"B" 2dAmTracBn(FMF)	1	44	0	0		LST LORAIN CTY	11-LVTP-5	
Plat,(Rein),Co"A", 2d TK BN	1	25	0	0	LSD PLYMOUTHROCK	5-90mmGunTks		
Det,HqCo,8thMar	0	9	0	0	LPH GUADALCANAL			
								SECRET

SECRET	USMC		USN		CURRENT LOCATION	ASSIGNED SHIPPING	MAJOR ARM/ EQUIP	REMARKS
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL				
Det, HqBn, 2dMarDiv	1	8	0	0		LPH GUADALCANAL		
Det, 2dDentCo, FMF	0	0	1	1		LPH GUADALCANAL		
Det, 2d MED Bn	0	1	1	3		LPH GUADALCANAL		
Det, 2d ServBn	1	39	0	0		AKA VERMILION		
Det, 2d FSR	1	21	0	0		AKA VERMILION		
Det, HqBtry, 10Mar	1	0	0	0		LPH GUADALCANAL		
Det, ACU	0	0	1	28		LSD PLYMOUTHROCK		
Det, UDT-21	0	0	3	18		LSD PLYMOUTHROCK		
Det, BMU-2	0	0	2	34		LSD PLYMOUTHROCK		
Det, ACB-2	0	0	0	6		LSD PLYMOUTHROCK		
HMM-262 (Rein)	56	215	1	2		LPH GUADALCANAL		
LtCol E.K. Kirby								
HMM-262	48	154	0	0		LPH GUADALCANAL	20-UH34D	
Det, H&HS-27	0	2	0	0		LPH GUADALCANAL		
Det, MABS-26	0	23	1	2		LPH GUADALCANAL		
Det, H&MS-26	0	3	0	0		LPH GUADALCANAL		
Det, VMO-1	3	14	0	0		LPH GUADALCANAL	2-UH1E	
Det, HMH-461	5	19	0	0		LPH GUADALCANAL	2-CH37C	
								SECRET

**SECRET**CARIB READY FORCERECAP WEAPONS, VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFTWEAPONS

6 - M98 HOWTAR (abd LPH)  
 5 - M50 ONTOS (abd LST)  
 5 - M48A3 Gun Tanks (abd LSD)  
 8 - 106mm Recoiless Rifle  
 8 - 81mm Mortar  
 73 - M60 Machine Gun  
 34 - 3.5 Rocket Launcher  
 8 - Flame Thrower  
 11 - .50 cal Machine Gun  
 16 - .30 cal Machine Gun

VEHICLES

38 - M422 (Mighty Mite)  
 1 - DUKW (abd LSD)  
 29 - M274 (Mule)  
 13 - M37 (Pers Carrier)  
 8 - Radio Jeep  
 7 - M38A1 Jeep  
 11 - LVTP-5 (abd LST)  
 2 - M51 (5 ton Dump Truck)  
 2 - M51 w/Mat Layer  
 4 - M54 (5 ton Cargo)  
 1 - M52 Truck Tractor  
 1 - M170  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton Ambulance  
 1 - M43  $\frac{3}{4}$  ton Ambulance  
 26 - M35  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton Truck  
 1 - M62 5 ton Wrecker  
 2 - M49  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton Gasoline Tanker

AIRCRAFT  
(abd LPH)

20 - UH34D  
 2 - CH37C  
 2 - UH1E

**SECRET**

SECRET

SUPPLIES EMBARKED WITH CARIB READY FORCE

Ref: BLT 3/8 msg 202339Z Jan

SUPPLIES

DAYS OF SUPPLY

CLASS I

16

CLASS II (non veh)

30 (Operating Level)

30 (Mount Out)

CLASS II (A) (non veh)

30 (Operating Level)

30 (Mount Out)

CLASS III (Bulk)

13

CLASS III (Drum & Pkg)

15

CLASS III (A) (Bulk)

17

CLASS III (A) (Drum & Pkg)

NONE

CLASS IV (non veh)

21

CLASS IV (A) (non veh)

NONE

CLASS V

BA PLUS 23

CLASS V (A)

NONE

SECRET

GTMO DEFENSE FORCE

CO: Col A. WALKER

FORTPSLANT ltr ser 01A55-65 of  
REF: 24Feb65

As of Date: 20 February 1965

SECRET	STRENGTH				CURRENT LOCATION	ASSIGNED SHIPPING	MAJOR ARM/ EQUIP	REMARKS
	USMC		USN					
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL				
MarBks (T/O)	10	230			GTMO		8-106mm RR 16-81mm Mortar	
FMF Aug	3	4						
Total MarBks (Rein)	13	234						
Det, HqCo, FortPsLant	0	2						
Co "M", 3/8	7	202		6				
Plat, Co "C", 2dTkBn	1	39					5-120mm GunTks 2-Flame Tks	
Btry "K", 4/10	4	114		2			6-155mm How 4-105mm How	
Det, 2d 155mm GunBtry	1	38		1			2-155mmGun (SP)	
Plat, 2d ANGLICO	6	40	2	0				
Det, 2d FSR	2	29						
Det, MABS-31		17	1	2				
Det# 7 H&MS-26	4	8					2-UH34D	
TOTAL	38	723	3	11				
								SECRET

SECRET



## 1ST MARINE BRIGADE DEPLOYMENT TO WESTPAC

CG: BGen M. E. CARL

REF: AdminoFMFPAC 230618Z Mar65

SECRET	STRENGTH				CURRENT LOCATION	ASSIGNED SHIPPING	MAJOR ARM/ EQUIP	REMARKS
	USMC		USN					
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL				
<u>1ST MARINE BRIGADE</u>	413	6109	22	179				
<u>SU #1, HqCo</u> Capt P. W. Gage	31	68	0	0				
<u>SERV BN (-)</u> LtCol J.S. Heitzler	30	890	7	53				
<u>DET, 3dServBn</u>	8	182	0	0				
<u>DET, 3d FSR</u>	2	74	0	0				
<u>Co"A"(-)(Rein),1st</u> <u>AmTracBn</u> Maj P.M.Heisher	7	225	1	1			44-LVTP-5 3-LVTC-1 1-LVTR-1	
<u>Co"B" (Rein),3dMedBn</u> Lt P.A.Fleming USN	0	26	6	49				
<u>Co"B"(-)(Rein)</u> <u>3d Engr Bn</u> Capt D.R.Comer	4	130	0	0				
<u>Co"C"(-)(Rein)3dMTBn</u> Capt R. A. Fugate	4	80	0	0			31- M35 2½ ton 6x6 trk	
<u>Co"B", 3d SP Bn</u> Maj J. O. Elder	5	173	0	2				
<u>4th MARINES (REIN)</u> Col E. P. Dupras,Jr.	196	3861	12	115				
								SECRET

SECRET	USMC		USN		CURRENT LOCATION	ASSIGNED SHIPPING	MAJOR ARM/ EQUIP	REMARKS
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL				
<u>HqCo</u> Capt D.L.Compton	20	213	0	1				
3 Infantry Bns	118	2845	9	104				
<u>Co"B"(Rein)3dATBn</u> Capt H. L. Mills	5	114	0	2			15 M50 Ontos	
<u>Co"B"(Rein)3dReconBn</u> Capt R. H. Philon	5	101	0	2				
<u>3dBn(Rein), 12thMar</u> LtCol A.B. Slack, Jr.	48	588	3	6			18- 105mm How 6- M98(HOWTAR)	
<u>MAG-13 (-)</u> Col R. H. Spanjer	156	1290	3	11				
<u>H&amp;MS-13 (-)</u> Maj L. J. Blass	25	309	1	0				
<u>MABS-13 (-)</u> Maj G. Pechar	17	399	1	10				
<u>VMA-214</u> LtCol K. O'Keefe	22	139	1	0			15-A4C	5-A4C assigned special proj 1Mar-5Apr
<u>VMFA-542</u> LtCol R.A. Savage	50	270	0	0			15-F4B	
<u>HMM-161</u> Maj B.R. Wilkinson	39	173	0	1			22-UH34D	2-UH34D assgd spec project 4Jan-31Mar65
<u>Det, 3d MAWTU</u>	3	0	0	0				
SECRET								

MCC: Current FME Ground Unit Steps

11/11/65

~~1. The Bureau, 503 1st St. N. W., Washington, D. C. 20540~~

~~SECRET~~

Property of  
MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL ARCHIVES  
Please Return to Room 3127

~~SECRET~~