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					DC/S (AIR)		REMARKS (Entries to be dated and signed)		
					SECY OF GEN STAFF		ACTION: 16 FEB 1967		
					G-1		1. Attached is trip report of LtCol C. J. Keever. LtCol Keever accompanied the Chief of Staff on WestPac visit 5-16 Dec 1966, both as a G-3 representative and special representative of the Marine Corps and remained in Vietnam after return of Chief of Staff in accordance with his assigned task.		
					G-2		2. Additional back-up information is available for review or loan from G-3 Division (Civic Action Branch, A03E).		
					G-3				
					G-4		E. L. ROWSE By direction		
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MEMORANDUM

From: Lieutenant ^{Celest} Charles J. KEEVER, USMC
 To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Trip Report on RVN Visit

- Encl: (1) Organization
 (2) 29th Civil Affairs Company
 (3) Psychological Operations
 (4) Chieu Hoi Program
 (5) Combined Action Companies
 (6) City of Danang
 (7) Revolutionary Development
 (8) Reporting of Revolutionary Development
 (9) Health Program
 (10) Press and Photo Coverage
 (11) Reactions to Observations Cited in Memo from Maj Charles J. KEEVER to CMC dtd 1 Nov 66
 (12) Bibliography on RVN

1. Background: The undersigned was assigned the mission of visiting RVN for the purpose of reviewing civic action/psychological operations matters currently under study at HQMC. In accordance with said assignment the undersigned has visited III MAF, 1st MarDiv, 3rd MarDiv, 1st MAW, NAVSUPACT, and with various representatives of USAID, JUSPAO & OSA in the I CTZ; Office of Civil Operations officials & representatives of the MACV Revolutionary Development Support Directorate in Saigon; and I Force, Vietnam in II CTZ & II Force, Vietnam in III CTZ.

2. Organization of Memorandum: Enclosures (1) through (12) hereto contain the bulk of the detailed information which the undersigned collected on specific matters together with observations where appropriate. The undersigned has collected in the following paragraphs the recommendations which he submits for consideration as a result of this assignment together with the principal reasons for each.

3. Need for Continuity

a. One of the more pressing problems facing III MAF in its efforts to proceed with an effective program in the fields of civic action/psy-ops/revolutionary development is the lack of continuity of units within a given area. Practical military considerations necessitate frequent rotation of battalions between geographical areas, but this is very disruptive to progress in the three cited areas. It is submitted that factors to be considered in connection with this problem are the following:

- (1) Civic action, psy-ops and revolutionary development support programs must remain a command function if the basic Marine Corps position

W. Keen -

I think this goes along w/ my recommendation to you

Thru the Battle

Commander should have OPLON/ALCON or the CAs. (Dun)

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that every Marine is a civic action officer is to be sustained. This requires, in the undersigned's opinion, that the ~~Battalion Commander must be responsible for the fitness report of the staff officer(s) responsible for these programs within his TAOR.~~

(2) Advantages accruing from having one officer constantly working in these fields in the same geographic area are, of course, manifold: growth of confidence between that officer and the villages; development of a store of knowledge as to what civic action and psy-ops programs have been executed in the past so that consistent programs can be pursued; development of sufficient measurement of progress can be accomplished and attention focused on underlying problems hindering this progress.

(3) Subsector Advisors cannot be used effectively to accomplish the required continuity for numerous reasons, some of which include the vast scope of his other responsibilities, the fact that he is not under the operational control of the battalion commanders, and as a practical matter he cannot become as intimately familiar with Marine Corps operations as would be required.

(4) The generalist teams of the civic affairs teams are presently located in static positions for the most part, but there are practical problems which prevent their total effectiveness: there are not enough teams for each battalion, they necessarily are not under the operational control of Battalion Commanders, they have no psy-ops responsibilities, and they, by the very nature of their organization and mission, cannot serve as an integral part of the Marine battalion.

(5) There are fairly constant Battalion TAOR's within which the Battalions are rotated.

b. One possible solution to this problem is the establishment of battalion civic action/psy-ops sections which operate within Battalion TAOR's. When a battalion rotates into a new TAOR, it picks up, as an integral part of its organization, the section for that TAOR - and when it rotates out of the TAOR, the section remains to be joined to the next battalion. This suggested solution has met with enthusiastic reception on the part of each unit commander with whom the undersigned has discussed it - except for the problem of personnel. The establishment of these sections would cause a significant drain on the manpower of battalions and it has not heretofore been practicable.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That sufficient additional officers, men & equipment be authorized and provided to enable the establishment of these special civic action/psy-ops sections for each rifle battalion in RVN. It is anticipated that it would require one Capt/Lt, 1 E-7/E-8; 2 E-4/E-5's, 1 E-3/E-4 clerk-typist and 1 E-3/E-4 driver for each battalion.

*I agree! Additional duty come out of TMS on the goal.
If the MARINA Corps really believes in C/A
as we want to push the people then I think
Battalion Commander should know 4 just 2 in C/A TRO*

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SECRET**4. Revision of T/O's and T/E's**

a. CG, III MAF has made the point that it is perhaps premature to attempt to revise formally all Marine Corps T/O's and T/E's on the basis of our limited experience in the Dominican Republic and in RVN. He suggested that it would be preferable to wait until we have more experience, and can give very careful consideration to other situations in which the Marine Corps may find itself in the future before effecting fundamental changes. It is apparent that his observation is very valid when one considers the evolving staff structure within the various III MAF units - ie, where psy-ops officers properly fit, where civic action officers properly fit, the necessity for CAC staffs, etc..

What is this?
 b. RECOMMENDATION: That no final decisions be made in connection with T/O's and T/E's in connection with the Human Sciences Research, Inc. study at this time. Information should constantly be fed to subordinate units throughout the Marine Corps on the general subject but final decisions which would be difficult to change should be deferred.

5. Debriefing of Civic Action Officers & Psy-Ops Officers

a. It is apparent from talking to the various civic action & psy-ops officers that many of them have very sound ideas and concepts that should be considered by HQMC and other commands. The undersigned is not convinced that at this time all of these officers are being adequately debriefed or if they are, the results thereof are receiving adequate distribution.

b. RECOMMENDATIONS: A directive be issued providing for HQMC (Code AOJL) be notified of the name of any officer debriefed under the present debriefing program who has served as a civic action/psy-ops officer in order that appropriate follow-up may be taken. Significant observations of these persons should then be distributed to the field, including III MAF and its subordinate units.

6. Briefings Prior to Arrival in RVN

a. In the field of Psy-Ops, it would appear that one of the more significant matters is a lack of awareness of psy-ops on the part of Marines arriving in RVN. It has been suggested that the 7th Psy-Ops Group on Okinawa could give an appropriate two hour briefing to all personnel in the grade of E-5 and up, and an additional two hour briefing for all officers. (Please note the enclosure hereto on psy-ops for further details).

b. RECOMMENDATION: That liaison be made with FMFPac(Fwd) and the 7th Psy-Ops Group to arrange for such briefings. If the 7th Psy-Ops Group is unable to give the briefings perhaps that organization could provide the material and Marines could give the briefings.

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c. There is reportedly practically no written material on RVN available for reading by officers or men either on Okinawa or in RVN, and in both places personnel tend to have time when they could, and probably would, read this material if it were available. Enclosure (12) hereto is a list of materials available procured by the AC/S, G-5, 1st MarDiv. There is doubtless additional material available.

d. RECOMMENDATION: That HQMC procure a library of reference sources on RVN and provide a supply to FMFPac(Fwd) and to the various units of III MAF. These should be made available through command channels and their availability should be made known periodically on a broad base.

7. Psy-Ops and Civil Affairs Schooling

a. It appears to be the general consensus that while school training in psy-ops and in civil affairs is helpful, it is not a necessary prerequisite for the successful performance of duty in either billet, especially in the light of the availability of specialists from the 244th Psy-Ops Company and the 29th Civil Affairs Company. It further appears to be the general consensus, however, that a sprinkling of school trained officers is always desirable.

Conclude b. RECOMMENDATION: That HQMC undertake to keep enough officers going through these two schools so that there can be a minimum of five school trained officers in each division and three each in the Wing and the FLC at all times.

8. Support by U.S. Army Psy-Ops & Civil Affairs Companies

a. It is apparent that the present arrangement whereby the Marine Force is being supported by an Army Psy-Ops Company and an Army Civil Affairs Company is proving to be outstandingly successful. For further details, please see the enclosures hereto on the 29th Civil Affairs Company and on Psychological Operations.

b. RECOMMENDATION NO. ONE: That arrangements be made for a formal debriefing by USMC personnel of each of the principal officers of these companies as they complete their tours of duty in RVN. Almost without exception these officers identify very intimately with the Marine Corps and their experience should be recorded along with those being recorded on the part of Marine officers serving in RVN.

Deferred
31 Jan
Camp Parley c. RECOMMENDATION NO. TWO: That the proposed organization of the USMC Civil Affairs Group in the 5th MarDiv be postponed indefinitely. There would not appear to be any requirement for the establishment of such a group of specialists by the Marine Corps, at least at this time.

9. Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund

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a. It is apparent that the Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund plays a major role in the III MAF civic action/psy-ops program and that it is vital that the Division of Reserve continue to support same aggressively. CG, III MAF is fully aware of the need for information to be submitted on the application of this fund and appropriate action is being taken to ensure a continuing flow of such information.

b. RECOMMENDATION: That a formal coordinating relationship be established between A03P, A03E, Division of Information and Division of Reserve to guarantee full utilization of all information presently being channeled to HQMC through the various channels. Indications from the field are that there is already a wealth of information going into HQMC which is not being fully utilized.

10. Reporting of Civic Action to HQMC

a. It is apparent that many reports, position papers and other documentation originate in the field but do not find their way to HQMC, Code A03E, at least on a timely basis. It is suggested that this raw material, together with appropriate evaluations by intermediate commanders, would be of assistance to Head, Civic Action Branch, in his endeavors of constantly advising the AC/S, G-3 and CMC on the formulation of basic Marine Corps-wide policies on psy-ops and civic action.

b. RECOMMENDATION: That a request be made of CG, FMFPac for the forwarding of all raw reports from III MAF on a periodic basis.

11. Attitude Toward Respective Missions of FMMAF and ARVN

a. The undersigned has noted, in his official calls on MACV, I Force and II Force, a rather distressing tendency on the part of U.S. personnel to take the general position that ARVN has proved to be a complete failure in fighting VC Main Force and NVA units, so they are now being relegated to the task of supporting the revolutionary development program and that they had better succeed in this mission or else. The undersigned has also received reports from U.S. and GVN sources that many ARVN personnel are rather resentful of this attitude on the part of so many Americans and that such an approach seems to give to the U.S. military forces the "glory" of fighting and relegates to the ARVN the less "glorious" task of working in the rear areas." There is also a tendency on the part of many U.S. personnel, both military and civilian, to look at the U.S. role as being exclusively in missions against the Main Force & NVA units - apparently on the grounds that revolutionary development has to be accomplished by the GVN. It is submitted that this position grossly ignores the success of our CAC units and the fact that policies leaving revolutionary development exclusively to the GVN has failed to produce any significant results to date.

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b. RECOMMENDATION: That GIC attempt to propagate the idea that it is imperative that all U.S. personnel respect the sensitivities of ARVN personnel and cast their discussion of the "new role" for ARVN in terms that they are best suited for the job - not that they have failed in the "Real-fighting" role. And that he continue to propagate the idea that combined security units can be effective in providing the local security requisite for the successful completion of revolutionary development programs by Vietnamese officials.

12. GVN Health Program

a. It appears to the undersigned, perhaps on the basis of inadequate information, that there is not enough stress on the establishment of a viable rural health system on the part of both U.S. & Vietnamese senior officials. (Please see the enclosure hereto on public health for details).

b. RECOMMENDATION: That through continuing liaison with the USAID offices in Washington, D.C., HQMC personnel attempt to encourage additional interest in establishing a viable rural health system which will tend to put many of our MEDCAP teams out of business.

13. CAC Program

a. It is apparent that the III MAF CAC program is meeting with increasing success and receptivity in RVN. (Please see the enclosure hereto on CAC for details).

b. RECOMMENDATION NO. ONE: That HQMC continue to support this program by providing additional men and equipment as required.

c. RECOMMENDATION NO. TWO: That a 15-18 minute film be prepared explaining the CAC program and its effectiveness which could then be used to inform the public and to gain support for the USMCR Civic Action Fund. One of the principal things which the U.S. public needs to know is how aggressive and effective the Vietnamese individual can be when given a proper opportunity and appropriate leadership and assistance.

Respectfully submitted

CHARLES J. KEEVER
LtCol USMC

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CONFIDENTIALENCLOSURE (/): ORGANIZATION1. Attachments

- a. Number 1: Organization of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO)
- b. Number 2: Memo from Deputy Ambassador to USAID, OSA, JUSPAO dated 1Dec66: U.S. Mission's Office of Civil Operations - Terms of Reference
- c. Number 3: Outline Organization, USAID Regional Office, I Corps
- d. Number 4: Description of Functions of USAID Officers, Regional Office, I Corps
- e. Number 5: Letter of Instructions

2. Civilian

a. Attachment (1) hereto is a schematic drawing indicating the proposed organization of the Office of Civil Operations. It should be stressed that attachment (1) is subject to change.

b. Attachment (2) hereto is the first "terms of reference" for the new OCO. This also is subject to change.

c. Attachment (3) is a schematic drawing indicating the present (pre-OCO) organization of USAID in the 1st Region & Attachment (4) is a description of the functions of the various USAID officials.

3. Military

a. MACV: The Revolutionary Development Support Directorate (RDSD) is the MACV agency responsible for revolutionary development. This Directorate is headed by an Army Brigadier General and is co-located in the same compound with the GVN Minister of Revolutionary Development. It is organized into 4 divisions:

(1) Plans & Policies: Responsible for concept, plans & supervising execution.

(2) Special Activities: Responsible for Chieu Hoi, Revolutionary Development Cadre, Refugees, Civic Action, MACV Advisors.

(3) Reports, Inspections, Liaison: Responsible for compiling reports from the field & checking on responses to directives.

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ENCLOSURE 11

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(4) Review & Analysis: Responsible for developing raw data for the Reports, Inspection & Liaison Division, measurement of progress of revolutionary development & constant review of the 19 programs included within the 1967 Revolutionary Development Plan.

b. I Force, Vietnam: The Revolutionary Development Support Division (12 officers and 7 enlisted) located within the G-3 section is responsible for civic action/psy-ops/revolutionary development within this command. It is organized as follows:

(1) Civic Action Branch: (1 LtCol, 1 Major, 1 E-7, 1 E-4)

(2) Plans Branch: (1 LtCol)

(3) Operations Branch: (1 LtCol, 1 Opns Sgt E7, 1 Ass't Opns Sgt E-5, 4 Field Representatives, LtCols) (See Attachment (5) hereto for letter of Instructions for the Field Representatives.)

(4) Reports & Special Studies Branch: (1 Major, 1 Captain)

(5) Administrative Branch: (1 Capt, 3 Clerk Typists)

c. II Force, Vietnam: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 is responsible for civic action (psy-ops) revolutionary development within this command. The section is organized as follows:

(1) AC/S, G-5: Colonel

(2) Dep G-5: LtCol

(3) Administrative Division: 1 E-9, 1 E-6, 1 E-4

(4) Plans Division: 1 LtCol, 1 Maj, 1 Capt, 1 E-8

(5) Civil Affairs Division: 1 LtCol, 1 Maj, 1 Capt, 1 E-8

(6) Psy-Ops Division: 1 LtCol, 1 Maj, 1 Capt, 1 E-8, 1 E-4

4. Coordination

a. There has not yet been any formal decision as to just how coordination will be effected at the national level between the office of Civil Operations, the MACV Revolutionary Development Support Directorate, and the GVN Ministry of Revolutionary Development.

b. In III CTZ there is no formal coordinating agency.

c. In II CTZ the U. S. agencies are coordinated by means of a "County Team" organization consisting of the following persons:

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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CG, I Force, Vietnam
Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps
Regional Director, USAID
Regional Senior Representative, JUSPAO
Senior Advisor, OSA
Chief of Staff, I Force, Vietnam
AC/S, G-3, I Force, Vietnam
Director, Revolutionary Development Support Division, I Force,
Vietnam
All Sector Senior Advisors
All Division Senior Advisors

This "County Team", which has no GVN representation, is scheduled to meet weekly, but it had not met for about three weeks in the last week of December and its fate was unknown in view of the establishment of the Office of Civil Operations.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

ENCLOSURE (2): 29th Civil Affairs Company1. Attachments

- a. Number 1: Schematic Drawing of Organization of 29th Civil Affairs Company
- b. Number 2: Public Education Team Periodic Report No. 3, 1-30 November 1966
- c. Number 3: Tables of Statistics on Education in ICTZ
- d. Number 4: Memo to G-5, III MAF dated 19 Dec 1966: Deployment of Displaced Persons Teams
- e. Number 5: Study on Problems Affecting Resettlement of Refugees dated 1 Oct 1966
- f. Number 6: Memorandum No. 195-1 dated 13 Nov 1966: Public Safety SCG's Operations
- g. Number 7: Study of the An Hoa - Hong Son Industrial Complex dated 10 Oct 1966
- h. Number 8: Agriculture Situation in I Corps, RVN
- i. Number 9: Proposed reorganization of Civil Affairs Companies

2. General

a. Attachment (1) hereto is a schematic presentation of the organization of the 29th Civil Affairs Company. The general concept of employment of this company is as follows:

(1) The company headquarters and the functional teams have been retained at the III MAF level under the direct operational control of the CG, III MAF (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5).

(2) The generalist teams have been assigned to the Division and operate under the operational control of the Division CG's (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5).

(3) As a matter of practice, every effort has been made to assign a generalist team to a given geographic area and to leave that team in the area regardless of which tactical unit may be located there.

(4) The Displaced Person Teams (Refugee Relief Teams) operate under the operational control of CG, III MAF (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5) and operate out of the respective provincial headquarters.

ENCLOSURE (-2)

b. In both I Force and II Force, the civil affairs companies have been organized into generalist teams, regardless of any special talents the individual members may have, and function with the various brigades.

c. Attachment (2) hereto presents a proposed reallocation of civil affairs personnel between the 3 companies now in RVN. It will be noticed that this attachment indicates no Displaced Persons Teams now in the 29th Civil Affairs Company. 4 of these teams from the 41st Civil Affairs Company have been attached to, and are serving with, the 29th Company.

3. Scope of Operations

a. Attachments (2) through (8) hereto are representative of the type work being done by the functional teams of the 29th Civil Affairs Company. The undersigned has heard a great deal of praise for the calibre of this work from both military and civilian sources.

b. It will be noted that the functional teams duplicate services which are within the USAID field of expertise. Inquiry of the various USAID staff members in Danang resulted in nothing but praise for the civil affairs personnel except in the case of the Public Safety Advisor. The other staff members indicated that the company officers were obvious very competent in their respective fields, were very cooperative in every possible manner and that there was very close coordination between the company and USAID. It appears that the functional teams are complementing the USAID effort very effectively.

c. The Public Safety representative indicated that the Public Safety Division could not accept any assistance from the military without the approval of Saigon and that this approval had not been forthcoming. The undersigned was unable to contact the Saigon authorities, but he intends to persevere and will submit a supplemental report as soon as he determines the reasons for this reluctance on the part of USAID.

4. Observation

It would appear that the concept of an Army civil affairs company supporting a Marine force is proving to be very effective. The company personnel seem to be very well qualified and well motivated, and constantly tend to use the term "we" in describing their collective missions with Marine forces.

(5) In paragraph VI, sub-paragraph 3f, incorporate a proviso that the III MAF Surgeon should at all times coordinate with the Regional CCO Health Representative.

(6) In paragraph 1, appendix I, incorporate instructions that the civil affairs problems should be studied in conjunction with the Subsector Advisor and the CCO Health Representative.

(7) In paragraph 3, appendix I, incorporate a reference to liaison with the Province Medicine Chief.

6. Recommendations:

a. That the Marine Corps continue its efforts to support the establishment of a viable and effective rural health system.

(1) At the III MAF level this can be done by continuing efforts through the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council.

(2) At the NTMC level this can be done by liaison with the USAID health personnel, stressing always the importance of this program from a psy-ops impact point of view. One cannot help but get the feeling that perhaps the senior officials responsible for the health program fail to remember that in its infancy the U. S. health structure rested on "Country Doctors" - not on all the fine specialists we have today.

b. That consideration be given to revising the "MILCAP Guide" in accordance with the comments contained in paragraph 5(b) above.

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ENCLOSURE (3): PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS1. Attachments

- a. Number 1: III MAF Psychological Operations Organization
- b. Number 2: Mission and Organization of 244th Psy-Ops Company
- c. Number 3: Force Order 3410.2 dated 18 Sep 66: Employment of the 244th Psy-Ops Co (Tactical) U. S. Army
- d. Number 4: Psy-Ops Newsletter 2-66
- e. Number 5: Psy-Ops Newsletter 3-66
- f. Number 6: Monthly Psy-Ops Report dated 4 Dec 66
- g. Number 7: Weekly Activities Report, 1-7 Dec 66, 244th Psy-Ops Co
- h. Number 8: Psy-Ops Scheduling and Coordination Conference, 30 Nov 66
- i. Number 9: Representative Leaflets used by III MAF
- j. Number 10: Leaflet Catalog of 244th Psy-Ops Co

2. Organization

a. III MAF Headquarters. Attachment (1) hereto is a schematic drawing showing the psy-ops organization in III MAF Headquarters. It may be noted that the Force Psy-Ops Officer is a special staff officer reporting directly to the Chief of Staff.

b. Marine Divisions. The Psy-Ops Officer in the 1st Marine Division is an Assistant G-5 and in the 3rd Marine Division he is an Assistant G-3. In both divisions one officer has been assigned fulltime to psy-ops. There are psy-ops officers assigned in each regiment and battalion, these officers having the assignments on an additional duty basis.

c. Marine Aircraft Wing. The Wing Psy-Ops Officer is located in the Civil Affairs Section. Each Group in the Wing also has a psy-ops officer appointed on an additional duty basis.

d. 244th Psy-Ops Co. Attachment (2) hereto is a statement of the mission and a schematic portrayal of the organization of this company. Attachment (3) hereto is a Force Order setting forth the employment of this company. It might be noted that this company is under the direct operational control of CG, III MAF, whereas when the company just began operating in ICTZ it was under the operational control of the Senior Advisor and operated under the ICTZ G-5 Advisor. The G-5 Advisor is of the opinion that the original arrangement was far more satisfactory. The undersigned sees no situation to exist in the III Corps and III Corps areas, ie,

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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the psy-ops companies in each area have been placed under the operational control of the Force Commanding General to the chagrin of the Advisory personnel. The psy-ops company personnel, without exception, indicated that the present arrangement is by far more satisfactory than the original arrangement. It should be noted that everyone with whom the undersigned spoke regarding this company had the very highest praise for its support and, likewise, the company personnel with whom the undersigned spoke had very high praise for III MAF's understanding and utilization of the company's talents.

c. 10th AFVN Political Warfare Bn: This is the opposite number of the 244th Psy-Ops Co and has the mission of supporting ARVN just as the 244th has the mission of supporting III MAF. The two units are co-located and as a practical matter work very closely together.

f. Observations

(1) It is apparent that field commanders are still attempting to develop appropriate staffing for psy-ops. The three CG's of the major land commands have selected three solutions: independent special staff officer with direct access to the Chief of Staff, assistant G-3 and assistant G-5. Conversations with each of the three psy-ops officers disclosed pro's and con's for each arrangement, but none of the three indicated a preference for a change of status. The undersigned is still inclined to favor an arrangement whereby the AC/S, G-5 (Colonel) has two assistants, a Civic Action Officer (LtCol) and a Psy-Ops Officer (LtCol). The principal reason for this is that there must be close coordination between the civic action & psy-ops programs, and nothing of any magnitude should be done in civic action without a conscious review of the psy-ops potential of the action.

(2) There appears to be fairly unanimous agreement that at regiment and battalion the ideal arrangement is to have one officer hold both the civic action and psy-ops responsibilities. This has not proved to be possible in all cases because of a shortage of personnel - ie, the civic action job is often an additional duty for one officer and psy-ops an additional duty for another.

(3) It appears that having the 244th Psy-Ops Co under the direct operational control of the III MAF staff is far superior to the original arrangements.

3. Dissemination of Information

a. Attachments (4) and (5) hereto are examples of newsletters being promulgated throughout III MAF in an effort to indoctrinate all commanders and their staffs on the use of psy-ops.

b. Attachments (6) and (7) hereto are examples of the periodic reports submitted in the field of psy-ops.

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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c. Each month III MAF sponsors a conference to which are invited the Psy-Ops Adviser for I CTZ, the Deputy C/S for Political Warfare (ARVN), the JUSPAO representative for 1st Region, the Naval Advisory Group Psy-Ops Adviser, the Commanding Officer, 244th Psy-Ops Co, and all psy-ops officers in the divisions and wing down to squadron/group level. Attached hereto as Attachment (8) is a representative schedule for one of these conferences.

d. The Psy-Ops Committee of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council is not functioning as such, but there are regular monthly meetings between the Commanding Officer, 5th Air Commando Squadron (which provides aerial support), the Psy-Ops Adviser, I CTZ, the Commanding Officer, 244th Psy-Ops Company, the III MAF Psy-Ops Officer, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Political Warfare (ARVN) and the Regional Representative of 1st Region. There is also very close cooperation between these officials at other times and it is the opinion of the III MAF Psy-Ops Officer that no other coordination is required.

e. The III MAF Psy-Ops Officer is currently preparing an SOP to be used in connection with "County Fair" operations.

4. Psy-Ops Programs

a. Leaflet Drops. The principal effort continues to be massive leaflet drops. Attachments (9) & (10) are samples of leaflets presently in use.

b. Psy-Ops Exploitation Teams (POET). These teams come from the 244th Psy-Ops Company and consist of a team leader, an interpreter, an intelligence specialist and a technician. Whenever an incident occurs in an area which can be exploited from a psy-ops point of view, these teams can be called immediately to the scene (eg, an act of terrorism, booby-trap wounding or killing a civilian, etc.) to prepare appropriate propaganda material. Within 16-36 hours these teams have produced leaflets and/or posters and have delivered same for dissemination. The teams were used 22 times during the month of November, 1966 and have been received very well by the field units.

c. Chieu Hoi Program. The 244th Psy-Ops Company provides "tactical" support for this program whereas JUSPAO provides "strategic" support. This program receives a great deal of attention from everyone in the psy-ops field. (See also the enclosure to this report concerning the Chieu Hoi Program.)

5. Areas for Improvement

a. Vietnamese Information Service (VIS). It was noted by several persons that one of the principal weaknesses in the psy-ops program centered in the VIS. This is, of course, a JUSPAO responsibility and the undersigned was unable to make contact with the JUSPAO representative. A supplemental report will be submitted on this matter.

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b. Closer Coordination with Civic Action Program. The Force Psy-Ops Officer noted that he was undertaking to establish closer liaison with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 in an effort to incorporate more psy-ops material with the civic action programs. This is a matter which is presently receiving staff attention within III MAF.

c. Trained Personnel. It appears to be the general consensus that any competent officer with good common sense can effectively serve as a psy-ops staff officer so long as the technical back-up of a unit such as the 244th Psy-Ops Co is available. There is a recognition, however, that a few school-trained officers sprinkled throughout the various field units would be of assistance. Insofar as is known, there are currently no school-trained Marine Officers serving in psy-ops officer billets. The C.G., 244th Psy-Ops Company, has offered to provide a short, 3-4 day on-the-job training course for newly appointed psy-ops officers but very few trainees have been able to take advantage of this offer.

d. Indoctrination of Personnel. The C.G., 244th Psy-Ops Co indicated that when his personnel approach a newly-arrived battalion, their first job is to explain what they can do to assist the unit - after a short period of "getting acquainted" they find that the units enthusiastically request support and cooperate in every possible way. It was suggested that arrangements could be made for the 7th Psy-Ops Group on Okinawa could brief all incoming personnel on psy-ops along the following lines:

(1) For enlisted men from the grade of E-5 and up, a two-hour block on why psy-ops is important, what psy-ops is achieving in RVN, and what it can do for the individual (eg, mines, booby traps, ralliers).

(2) For all officers, the same two-hour block (in substance) plus 2 more hours on equipment available and the capabilities of the Psy-Ops Co (ie, air, audio-visual, PCBT's).

e. Continuity of Efforts. The constant movement of battalions between TAGOs makes it very difficult to achieve continuity in psy-ops programs. The difficulty comes in recording how many of what type leaflets have been used in a given hamlet, or in determining which posters have been used in order to achieve a continuing and consistent flow of information. Efforts are being made to maintain accurate records, but this problem probably requires a continuity of personnel in the same area which is not now possible.

f. Determination of Efficacy of Psy-Ops Programs. One of the principal problems in the psy-ops field is to determine the efficacy of the various programs being pursued. Personnel in the field are striving to accomplish this through interviews with villagers and extensive questioning

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of ralliers and prisoners of war. The scope of the job is such, however, that it really requires the assistance of highly-trained, well coordinated experts working on a broad base over an extended period of time.

6. Recommendations

a. That an additional quota for Marine Corps Officer at the U. S. Army psy-ops school be procured for officers enroute to RVN for duty. It is recommended that for planning purposes there should be at least five school-trained psy-ops officers in each division at all times.

b. That instruction on psy-ops be included in the formal curriculum of all officers' schools at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico and in NCO leadership courses throughout the Marine Corps. It is suggested that the content of this instruction should be determined after careful interviewing of personnel with experience in psy-ops in RVN and the Dominican Republic.

c. That the suggestion of briefings for Marines on Okinawa by the 7th Psy-Ops Group contained in paragraph 5d above be pursued and arrangements therefor be completed.

d. That every effort be made at the highest levels to launch a study on the effectiveness of the various psy-ops programs and that periodic reports on the progress of studies be made available to the field forces.

e. That arrangements be made for officers of the 244th Psy-Ops Company to be debriefed fully at HQ MC or by qualified personnel at a Marine Corps installation when they complete their tours in RVN. This company is providing outstanding support for the Marine Forces in RVN and many of them are developing techniques and methods which should be recorded as a part of the Marine Corps "body of experience" in RVN.

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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ENCLOSURE (4): Chieu Hoi Program1. Attachment

Number 1: Region I Chieu Hoi Advisor's Conference, 10 Dec 1966

2. General

No effort is made herein to discuss the JUSPAO portion of the Chieu Hoi Program - i.e., the preparation and distribution of leaflets. This enclosure has to do with the USAID portion of the program - i.e., the Chieu Hoi centers and the handling of ralliers after they have come in.

3. Organization

a. Until 2 months ago, the U. S. Chieu Hoi staff consisted of only 1 U. S. A.I.D. representative. In November, however, this staff was increased to include a MACV J-2 Liaison Officer (Major) who serves as an intelligence coordinator and a Philippine assistant advisor. In December, a Philippine advisor was located in each province. All of the Philippines involved have had experience with the Huk and in community development. Attachment (1) hereto is the agenda for a recent meeting of all Chieu Hoi Advisors.

b. On the Vietnamese side the Chieu Hoi program is presently under the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi at the national level. At the region level there is an Inspector with a small staff. In each province there is a Chieu Hoi Service Chief and a Chieu Hoi Center Chief and a few cadre working for each chief. The Service Chief is the senior of these two positions.

c. Reports received by the undersigned indicate that the 1st Region Chieu Hoi Inspector is practically useless and the Province Service Chiefs are very bad. Steps are currently being taken to prepare job descriptions for the various Vietnamese positions and it is anticipated that new personnel will be appointed practically all of the billets. The one exception to the derogatory reports about Vietnamese personnel is the Danang Chieu Hoi Service Chief who is reportedly outstanding.

4. Chieu Hoi Centers

The Chieu Hoi centers in all provinces are now very adequate except in Quang Nam Province where the facilities are totally inadequate (no cooking facilities and very poor sleeping facilities). Quang Nam has plans for a new center but construction has not yet been commenced. The Quang Nam Province Chief (Dr. Chi) is reportedly completely disinterested in the program and gives it no support.

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5. Chieu Moi Hamlet in Thua Thien Province

There are presently over 91 families residing in a "model" Chieu Moi hamlet located just north of the Phu Bai TACR which the Marines in that area assisted in establishing. The establishment of these resettlement hamlets is a test project funded by the GVN ministry and has not yet been accepted in principle. This particular hamlet has proved to be very successful and is a most interesting place to visit.

6. Armed Propaganda Teams

a. Every province has been authorized Armed Propaganda Teams since September, 1966. Each team consists of 36 ralliers organized into two 17 man squads each of which is organized into three 5 man teams.

b. There is presently no documentation or written guidance for the utilization of these teams and this has hampered their effectiveness. The 244th Psy-Ops Company is presently studying the matter with a view to developing specific guidelines for their use. The basic goal of these teams is to urge other ralliers to come in by working in the field with tactical units and by talking to families of VC personnel.

7. Kit Carson Scouts

1st Marine Division has pioneered a very successful program whereby ralliers from specific areas have been hired on a full time basis to patrol with Marine tactical units in their home areas. These scouts have proved extremely successful and the program is being expanded several fold. 1st Marine Division is preparing additional information on this program which will shortly be disseminated.

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Enclosure (5): Combined Action Companies (CAC)

1. Attachments

- a. Number 1: Proposed S.O.P. for CAC Program
- b. Number 2: Training Syllabus for 3rd MarDiv CAC Personnel
- c. Number 3: CAC Program, 1st Mar Div

2. General

a. Attachment (1) hereto is the proposed S.O.P. for the CAC program in III MAF. It is self explanatory i.e. organization & equipment of these units.

b. Attachment (2) hereto is a copy of the training syllabus for personnel joining the CAC program in the 3rd MarDiv area. The 1st MarDiv does not yet have such a formal training program but it is planning one.

c. Attachment (3) hereto is the 1st Mar Div SOP

3. Staff organization

a. These are special staff officers in the G-3 Section of III MAF and in each Marine Division whose sole job is the supervision of the CAC program. These officers are extremely enthusiastic about their jobs, obviously believe in the validity of the program, and spend a great deal of time in the field. Also, the CO, 1st MAFBn. (LtCol. George Stavridos) who has 12 platoons (2 companies) under his control, is intimately familiar with the program and supports it very enthusiastically.

b. All members of CAC units now belong administratively to sub-units within the division and appropriate provision has been made for promotions and other house-keeping chores. This is a vast improvement over previous procedures whereby the CAC units belonged to battalions or regiments administratively.

c. In the Phu Bai area, the CAC units are organized into 2 companies, 1 located in Huong Thuy Province and 1 located in Phu Loc Province. Each of these companies is commanded by a Captain who has been formally school-trained in civil affairs and who lives, with his Marine staff, right in the respective District Chief's compound. This has met with the greatest approval by the Marines involved, the District Chiefs involved and the Sub-sector Advisors involved.

4. Observations

a. The undersigned has visited approximately thirteen CAC Platoons and inevitably finds very high morale on the part of the Marines involved and an aggressive spirit on the part of the Marines and from their reports it is obvious that the PF involved share their high morale and aggressiveness.

b. Insofar as the undersigned has been able to determine, there have been no incidents involving serious offenses by members of CAC units against the local villagers. The high regard in which the individual CAC member holds the

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Vietnamese individuals is truly a remarkable thing.

c. The consistent report from all sources has been that patrolling by CAC units is far more effective than patrolling by Marines only.

d. Arrangements are now being made through GIB for the publication of a special CAC newsletter. This should serve to increase the effectiveness of these units even more because it will be a bi-lingual publication and distributed to all U.S. and Vietnamese members of these units.

e. CAC units are extremely active in civic action projects throughout the III MAF TACR's. As has previously been pointed out, the CAC Company Commanders in 3rd MarDiv are civil affairs trained officers and are distinctly oriented toward civic action. The C.O., 1st MP Battalion advised that approximately 90% of his unit's civic action is done through his CAC units. And the same is true throughout the entire area.

f. There has been no opposition to the CAC program on the part of Vietnamese District Chiefs insofar as the undersigned has been able to determine. Rumors to this effect within the III MAF Advisory Group proved to be groundless after a check in the field. On the contrary, District Chiefs have accepted the program with enthusiasm and the undersigned could find no instance where the effectiveness of a unit has been impaired through unilateral action by Vietnamese officials.

g. Training programs for both the Marines and the P.F. involved are being developed and it appears that this development will improve the effectiveness of these units even more.

h. I Force, Vietnam has sent an officer to III MAF to study the CAC program and has now instituted a similar program calling for the integration of Army battalions and Regional Force Companies (called "Units of Mutual Association").

i. There is one site in the Phu Bai area where a CAC unit is operating in the same village with a Revolutionary Development Cadre Group. The results of this joint venture have been most promising and CG, III MAF has advised the undersigned that additional "joint ventures" are planned.

5. Recommendations

a. That HQ MC continue to support the III MAF CAC Program by providing additional men and equipment as required.

b. That every effort be made to demonstrate to the senior officials in Washington, D.C. the effectiveness of these combined units with a view to encouraging similar developments throughout RVN.

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c. That a 15-minute film be prepared explaining the CAC program and its effectiveness which could then be used to inform the public and to support the USMCR Civic Action Fund. One of the principal things which the public needs to know is how aggressive and effective the Vietnamese individual can be when given a proper opportunity and appropriate leadership and assistance.

Enclosure (6) : City of Danang

1. Attachment:

a. Number 1: Patch worn by members of Village Action Teams (VAT's)

2. Organization: NavSupAct, Danang is responsible for civic action within the City of Danang. That command's organization for accomplishing this mission is as follows:

a. Civil Affairs Officer: Lt. Sr. Grade

b. Ass't Civil Affairs Officer: Lt. Jr. Grade (Works with village chiefs (30 of them) coordinates the Village Action Teams, checks each project periodically, coordinates MEDCAP program).

c. Technical Training Officer: Lt. Jr. Grade. This officer has a staff of 9 full time instructors.

(1) Builder Chief

(2) 1 2d Class Builder

(3) 1 1st Class Shipfitter

(4) 1 2d Class Steelworker

(5) 1 1st Class Utility Man

(6) 4 Equipment Operators

d. Foreign Claims Officer: Chief Petty Officer in charge of section with 6 claims investigators who work throughout the I CTZ.

e. 5 Village Action Teams: 4 construction men each

3. Village Action Teams

a. These teams consist of 4 volunteers each who volunteer for the job and who live on a full time basis out in the various areas where they are working. The modus operandi of these teams is that a village chief will ask for assistance in a building project - usually a school, meeting hall or houses. A VAT will be made available if the chief will provide a Vietnamese labor force and quarters for the team. These specialists will then move physically into the area until the mission is accomplished, serving as technical advisors and assisting in getting the job done. Attachment (1) hereto is a special insignia worn by members of these teams.

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b. One corpsman visits each VAT each day to provide medical assistance to the villages.

c. The VAT's have assisted in the construction of some 70 homes plus a number of schools and other facilities.

4. Technical Training

a. Courses are offered at the vocational high school in the following fields:

- (1) Auto mechanics
- (2) Carpentry
- (3) Driving
- (4) Electricity
- (5) Sewing and tailoring
- (6) Typing
- (7) Sheet metal
- (8) Welding
- (9) English
- (10) Masonry

b. There have been approximately 200 students graduated from these courses, all of whom have been located in jobs in the private economy, and there are approximately 200 persons now under going training.

c. Classes are conducted daily, Monday through Saturday, from 0800 to 2100 with the assistance of Vietnamese instructors.

d. Students are recruited primarily from the refugee camps and from the various Industrial Relations Departments of the commands in the Banang area. NAVSUPACT provides transportation from the various camps to and from the school. All students must be 16 and have some ability to read Vietnamese. Final selection of students is made by the principal of the vocational high school.

e. Upon graduation each student is given a tool kit for his particular trade in addition to being located in a job.

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5. Danang Hospital: NAVSUPACT has had from 3-8 men working in each of the two civilian hospitals in Danang since July, 1966 on a continuing campaign to scrub the buildings, repaint them and replace screens. The program is a self-help type project with the U. S. personnel attempting to indoctrinate the Vietnamese in the importance of cleanliness. Much improvement in both these hospitals can be seen since April, 1966.

6. Refugees: NAVSUPACT works constantly in the 5 refugee camps in Danang, principally with MEDCAP assistance.

7. Sanitation

a. NAVSUPACT has assisted in spraying the entire city with insecticide and has a continuing program of cooperation with the Mayor on this project.

b. NAVSUPACT has provided 150-50 gallon drums to the city for deposit of garbage and has 60 more en route. Each day that command provided the city with two trucks which are used in collecting and disposing of garbage.

8. Fire Protection: NAVSUPACT has a continuing program of assisting in the maintenance of fire fighting facilities and has assisted just recently in the distribution of 5000 fliers printed in Vietnamese explaining how to call fire fighting equipment.

9. Band Concerts: Band concerts have proved to be extremely appealing to the citizens of Danang. Concerts are regularly held with the 7th Fleet, CINCPACFLT and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing bands participating.

10. Lumber yard: NAVSUPACT has established a lumber yard where dunnage from ships is sawed into lumber and then distributed for use in self-help projects. This lumber is distributed throughout the I CTZ in coordination with the III MAF A C/S, G-5 and the MACV G-5 Advisor.

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ENCLOSURE (7): REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT1. Attachments

- a. Number 1: Revolutionary Development Concept
- b. Number 2: Revolutionary Development Planning
- c. Number 3: MACV Directive 10-12 dated 20Oct66: Organization & Functions Organization for Revolutionary Development
- d. Number 4: MACRDS Fact Sheet dated 26Nov66: GVN Organization for Revolutionary Development
- e. Number 5: Revolutionary Development Guidelines for 1967
- f. Number 6: Revolutionary Development Support Newsletter No. 1 dated 21Dec66

2. General

a. There is a very deep awareness on the part of all G-5 type officers whom the undersigned interviewed concerning the 1967 Revolutionary Development Program and a very thorough knowledge of that program. It was apparent that all three Force Staffs (I Force, II Force and III MAF) had carefully studied the program and understood the goals very well. It was also very apparent that the G-5 officers of the First Marine Division and the Third Marine Division had worked very closely with their respective provincial officials in developing detailed plans for the various provinces and were intimately familiar with some.

b. Attachment (1) hereto is the so-called "party-line" on Revolutionary Development and most every officer with whom the undersigned talked, both Army and Marine Corps, evidenced a good understanding of the contents of this document.

c. Attachment (2) hereto is a good summary outlining the derivation of the 1967 plan.

d. Attachments (3) and (4) hereto cover the organization of the U. S. military and GVN for revolutionary development.

e. Attachment (5) hereto sets forth the 1967 guidelines in detail.

f. Attachment (6) hereto is the first of a series of newsletters which MACV is putting out in an attempt to disseminate information concerning the revolutionary development program.

3. Observation

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a. There seems to be an underlying conviction on the part of the U.S. planners (and perhaps also on the part of the GVN planners) that revolutionary development programs must be executed in areas where there is no U.S. military presence. It can be noted that for the most part, principal revolutionary development programs in I CTZ are planned for areas outside those with a U.S. military physical presence and in Quant Nam Province where the National Priority Area lies within the III MAF TAOR, there is a tendency to pull Marine forces out of the specific area of operations.

b. It is suggested that the following experience tends to indicate that this is an unfortunate development:

(1) The principal reason why revolutionary development (and previously, rural construction) programs have been unsuccessful is a lack of security.

(2) Experience has indicated that a USMC presence without intensive GVN follow-on does not tend to produce lasting results. (For example, Hoa Lac, Yen Bao, An Track).

(3) One of the most successful security devices has proved to be the Combined Action Company which unites Marines and Vietnamese Popular Forces. In one instance in Thien Thien Province a combined action unit and a Revolutionary Development Cadre Group are operating very successfully in the same village.

c. It is suggested that the continued separation of U. S. Military presence and principal revolutionary development projects should be reconsidered with a view to making progress in areas where military security is necessarily present due to U.S. installations and with a view to locating Combined Action units with principal Revolutionary Development Cadre projects. It is recognized that more ARVN units are to be assigned the job of protecting the Revolutionary Development Cadre - but it is submitted that this should not necessarily preclude utilization of U.S. military forces necessarily located in populated areas and Combined Action units.

4. Recommendation: That HQMC personnel attempt to convince the governing authorities in Washington, D.C. that revolutionary development programs and U.S. military presence are not necessarily mutually exclusive and if U.S. forces are ever to be diminished in those areas where they must necessarily remain for station security purposes, there must be a concentrated Vietnamese effort to dig out the VC infrastructure and to establish a viable government which the villagers will respect and support.

At the Tanh Ba, An Thuan, 2nd MT WARR MORTAR CO from this Hamlet - 3d ATs built 2 schools, donated 2000 engines plus water pumps for irrigation in order that Hamlet could get 2 rice crops² each year, medical facilities, donated cloths, food, dug wells, pig projects, planted okra, sweet potatoes, etc.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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ENCLOSURE (8): Reporting of Revolutionary Development

1. Attachments:

- a. Number 1: MACRDS Fact Sheet on SECDEF Hamlet Evaluation System dated 15 Dec 1966
- b. Number 2: Joint SCC/MACV Directive 1-67 dated 2 Jan 1967: Revolutionary Development Hamlet Evaluation Report
- c. Number 3: Annex E - Guidance for Determining Status of Revolutionary Development Factors & Specific Indicators
- d. Number 4: Hamlet Evaluation Worksheet
- e. Number 5: Hamlet Evaluation Summary Form
- f. Number 6: Annex D - Subsector Advisor's Remarks Section
- g. Number 7: GVN Hamlet Classification Form
- h. Number 8: General Instructions Concerning the SJN Statistical Appendix
- i. Number 9: Glossary & Numerical Index of Statistical Annex
- j. Number 10: Monthly Revolutionary Development Provincial Statistical Report UX 1967

2. General: The matter of revolutionary development progress reporting is receiving a great deal of attention in RVN, largely as a result of the Secretary of Defense's memo to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency in October, 1966 requesting the development of a new method of measuring this progress. The new reporting systems go into effect as of 1 January 1967. Basically, two new reporting procedures are being established:

- a. Hamlet Evaluation Report
- b. Monthly Revolutionary Development Provincial Statistical Report

The impact of these new reporting systems upon existing systems has not yet been fully determined although it has been announced that they will, in large part, supplant the existing reports.

3. Hamlet Evaluation Report:

- a. Background. The Commandant is generally familiar with the origins of this report. (JFC & AO3E both monitored early developments in Washing-

ENCLOSURE (3)

ton, D. C. on this report.) Attachment (1) hereto sets forth generally developments in RVN subsequent to 19 Nov 1966 giving rise to the present report format.

b. Executive Agent. It is apparent that COMUSMACV, through his advisory organization, will be the executive agent for the processing of this report although provision has been made for concurrence of the senior OCO representatives at District (where applicable) and at Province.

c. Preparation & Processing.

(1) Attachments (2) & (3) hereto contain the basic instructions for the preparation & processing of this report.

(2) In essence, the Subsector Advisor will, each month, complete the "Hamlet Evaluation Worksheet" (Attachment (4) hereto). It is recommended that this worksheet be completed in pencil so that erasures can be made, thus enabling the Advisor to use the same worksheet from month to month. The underlying premise of the new system is that after the first month only changes will be reported since the worksheet never leaves the Subsector Advisor's Headquarters, it will cut down on his paper work if he doesn't have to complete a new worksheet each month. After the worksheet has been completed, the Advisor will transpose the information to the "Hamlet Evaluation Summary Form" (a sample of which is Attachment (5) hereto). These forms are printed out for each subsector & the information in the first six columns will always be constant after appropriate corrections have been made the first month (i.e., the village, the QVN hamlet serial number, the hamlet, the grid coordinator, the U. S. hamlet identification number & the population) The U. S. identification number, incidentally, is made up as follows:

1st	digits:	Region/Corps
2d & 3d	digits:	Province
4th & 5th	digits:	District
6th & 7th	digits:	Village
8th & 9th	digits:	Hamlet

The information as to whether the hamlet is or is not within a national priority area will always remain constant also once this is established. The next 6 columns represent the 6 factors or categories which are to be judged & the 3 lines in each column opposite each hamlet represent the indicators under each factor. Line D opposite each hamlet is for the confidence factor. For the first month, the Advisor will place the appropriate letter rating opposite each indicator. In subsequent months the identifying letters "a", "b", "c", "d" will not be shown - only the letter rating for the indicator & the confidence rating will appear. The last four columns represent the "problem areas" shown on the worksheet. After the Advisor has completed transposing the information for all of his hamlets to the summary form, he will complete the "Subsector Advisor's Remarks Section" (Attachment (6) hereto) & will forward these two documents to Province. The Sector Advisor & Provincial OCO representative will complete the remarks section & then forward one copy directly to the RDSB, MACV

Hamlet forms & forward another copy to the same office via the chain of command. By the third week of each month a new & revised data sheet will be returned to the Subsector Advisor - who will then indicate only the changes at the end of the month by lining out the previous ratings & substituting the new.

(3) The "GVN Hamlet Classification Form" (Attachment (7) hereto) is prepared by the Sector Advisor & is designed to report GVN data. The first six columns are self-explanatory & will not change (i.e., Village, GVN Serial, Hamlet, Grid Coordinates, U. S. Hamlet Identification Number & Population). The 7th column is designed to enter into the data bank the status of the hamlet at the end of 1966 & will not be repeated each month. The 8th column ("1967 Hamlet Type") is to reflect what the GVN has planned for the hamlet, & the last column ("GVN Control") is to reflect the GVN opinion about status.

4. Monthly Revolutionary Development Provincial Statistical Report CY 1967:

a. Background. The purpose of this report is to make it possible to determine with more exactitude where USAID commodities are being utilized, the effect of that utilization, & to measure the extent of progress in each province in each of the activities areas where assistance is being given.

b. Executive Agency. This report will be the responsibility of OCU personnel.

c. Preparation & Processing. Attachments (8) and (9) hereto contain self-explanatory instructions concerning the preparation & processing of this report. Attachment (10) hereto is a draft copy of the report itself. It should be noted that there may be minor changes in the final format to be issued to the field.

5. Observations on Reporting Systems:

a. The new reporting systems are to be executed by U.S. personnel operating independently of the GVN, although the latter government is to be kept fully informed at all times. The impact of this rendering of an independent judgment by a U. S. advisor on his counterparts area of operations has not been fully analyzed & has been the subject of some concern, at least at the lower echelons of the advisory machinery.

b. The Hamlet Evaluation Report would appear to be far superior to prior progress reports, although in the undersigned's opinion it is still too subjective & makes use of too many general terms ("most of village apparatus leaders eliminated", "considerable useful info from the public", "some welfare activity", "increased numbers of ralliers", etc.) to be truly reliable. The report presupposes a rather intimate knowledge over a continuing period of time of each hamlet on the part of the reporter, plus a mature & consistent sense of judgment which will be compared to

all reporters. It is suggested that a better approach would have been to have required the reporter to record physical manifestation of activities (such as evidence of intrusion of armed hostile groups or propaganda teams, explosions of ordnance, etc.) and then let one set of experts either at Saigon or in Washington, D. C. render conclusions based upon these facts.

c. It would appear that the new reporting systems described above render the present Marine Corps reporting system unnecessary.

6. Recommendations.

a. That the present Marine Corps progress reporting system be terminated.

The Marine Corps measuring system has served a very useful purpose very successfully - i.e., demonstrating to the governing powers that such a system is required. Now that it has served this purpose it is no longer necessary.

b. That instructions be issued requiring liaison between Subsector Advisors and appropriate tactical unit commanders in the preparation of the Hamlet Evaluation Report.

(1) This report calls for a U. S. judgment and that judgment should be the best possible attainable. This necessarily require close consultation between the reporting advisor and the tactical units operating in the area.

(2) The present Marine Corps reporting system serves to focus the attention of unit commanders on those things which are necessary in order to achieve an ultimate victory. If that reporting system is abandoned as recommended, the substitution of the new, uniform system for periodic consideration will achieve the same end.

(3) Integration of effort on the part of all personnel in RVN, be they tactical advisor or civilian, is an admitted necessity if victory is to be achieved. Mutual work on this report will necessarily tend to bring the advisor and the tactical unit commander more closely together in approaching the problems in each area.

c. That copies of both the Hamlet Evaluation report and the Monthly Revolutionary Development Provincial Statistic Report be made available to tactical commanders concerned, CG, III MAF, CG, FMFPac and CMC.

(1) This will not create an administrative burden because all reports will be machines run and extra copies can be made available with a minimum of cost and effort.

(2) The reports need to get into the hands of operators if they are to serve as a truly useful purpose, and not just into the hands of analysts.

(3) It is important that all U. S. personnel be looking at the same reports in order to ensure the development of internally consistent approaches to problems.

d. That the Marine Corps continue to study the present reporting systems with a view to recommending improvements therein.

Recommendations should be encouraged from the field as to indicators that would tend to disclose the basic information being sought in the reports but would require a minimum of subjective evaluation on the part of the reporter.

MEMORANDUM (9): Health Program1. Attachments:

- a. Number 1: Current Positions Filled, Public Health Service, I Corps - 1966
- b. Number 2: Revised Copy of the Direct Translation of the Interministerial Agreement of Construction & Health - RVN
- c. Number 3: Syllabus: III MAF, MACV Rural Health Worker Education Curriculum
- d. Number 4: MEDCAP Guidance

2. Background: The Commandant is generally familiar with the origins of the Marine MEDCAP program, its purposes, development and status. Attachments (1) and (2) hereto depict generally the status of the health structure in ICFZ and the written program.

3. Rural (Village & Hamlet) Health Workers:

a. Since MEDCAP has been so effective in assisting the Marines in establishing a rapport with the villagers, it has long been the undersigned's conviction that a vital health program on the part of the GVN would be just as effective in gaining the villagers' support for that institution. The undersigned was, therefore somewhat disappointed to discover that in practically no instance has a MEDCAP facility or service been discontinued and turned over to an effective and continuing Hamlet or Village Health Worker. Considerable progress has been made in constructing District infirmaries and dispensaries, but the functioning of these institutions still depends largely on USMC presence.

b. Attachment (3) hereto is a syllabus which has been approved by the GVN for the training of rural health workers. The GVN has failed, however, to support the training program by failing to pay students or to hire graduates (all of which has been duly reported to HQMC and is a matter of record in AQ3E). Last October the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council directed a letter to the Ministry of Health concerning this problem but there has been no response and, insofar as known, no further follow-up.

c. In conversations with various U. S. and GVN personnel, both in Danang and in Saigon, it would appear that the primary emphasis on the part of both the U.S. and GVN senior health people is on hospitals, research, mass immunization programs - not on developing a viable, rural health program with its attendant psychological impact on the villagers. Several people experienced in this field indicated that one of the principal problems, aside from an apparent lack of emphasis on the part of the senior officials, is a lack of compassion on the part of the health worker himself, indicating the necessity of some "Wung-tao" type training for these people in addition to technical training.

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d. One encouraging development has been the very recent announcement that commencing in 1967, rural health workers are to receive ^{per} month. It is represented that there are sufficient health workers already trained but that the pay has been too low (and so often even that low pay has not been delivered) to keep people working in the field.

4. Danang Hospital:

NAVSTACT, which has civic action responsibility for the city of Danang, is constantly working to improve the physical structures of the Danang civilian hospitals and much improvement can be noted during the past six months. This is, of course, a continuing problem and requires the constant attention which it is getting.

5. III MAF MEDCAP Program:

a. The III MAF MEDCAP program continues to be very effective. The undersigned's only concern is that perhaps it is too effective - perhaps it has lulled responsible U.S. & GVN officials into a feeling that the rural health problems are being solved whereas they are not in a long range point of view. It is submitted that the MEDCAP ideal for units which have been operating in a given area for a substantial period of time should be to ensure the local worker has sufficient supplies, assist in transporting ill persons to appropriate installations, and assist in furthering the training and efficiency of the local workers.

b. Attachment (4) hereto is the current III MAF "MEDCAP Guide". The undersigned thinks that this is a very useful and instructive document, but would suggest the following possible additions:

(1) Add a training objective in Paragraph II, Page 1.

(2) In paragraph VI, sub-paragraph 2 incorporate instructions as to what the unit surgeon should do with the information he collects. For example, he should review this information with the Sub-Sector Advisor and the Provincial CCO Representatives with a view to exchanging ideas and formulating a joint program.

(3) In paragraph VI, sub-paragraphs 3a and 3b, include the Province Medicine Chief in the various discussions and planning. Experience in RVN has indicated that without the support of Provincial authorities, programs will not be effective.

(4) In paragraph VI, sub-paragraph 3c, incorporate a reference to the use of training aids and coordination with Psy-Ops personnel

ENCLOSURE (10): Press and Photo Coverage1. Attachments:

- a. Number 1: Monthly "Wrap-Ups"
- b. Number 2: III MAF CIB Factsheet on CAC Units
- c. Number 3: III MAF CIB Release 2087 on Role of Marines in RVN
- d. Number 4: Background on An Hoa
- e. Number 5: CIB Release on Booby Trap School
- f. Number 6: Biography of LtGen WALT
- g. Number 7: I Corps Joint Coordinating Council
- h. Number 8: III MAF Tactical Areas of Responsibility: Economic Activity in I Corps
- i. Number 9: III MAF CIB Background for Press
- j. Number 10: III MAF November Wrap-Up
- k. Number 11: III MAF CIB Release on Monsoons

2. General:

a. Attachments (1) through (11) hereto were contained in the folder which was handed to each member of the press who visited CIB during December, 1966. It will be noted that 6 of the 11 documents have reference to civic action.

b. There is in continuing practice whereby the III MAF AC/S, G-5 goes to the Press Center to brief reporters on request, and it was noted that there are staff officers constantly on duty at the Center who are intimately familiar with all phases of the civic action programs of III MAF.

3. Observation

In conversations with the staff at the CIB, it became apparent to the undersigned that there is a great deal of coverage - both printed and photographic being sent to HQMC about which little is known. This material goes to the Division of Information and to AO3 .

4. Recommendation

That representatives of the Division of Reserve responsible for the Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund and of AO3E establish a regular procedure for screening the material submitted to HQMC on a regular basis.

ENCLOSURE (10)

This would serve to reduce the problems concerning lack of current information and photo coverage which is currently a problem for these branches.