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TOP SECRETATA12-jds
10 July 1965MEMORANDUM

From: Director, Joint Planning Group
To: Distribution List

Subj: Special Folder - JCS Meeting, 13 July 1965

Encl: (1) INDEX/STAFF RESPONSIBILITY
(2) SECTION TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. This office has been directed to assemble and submit to the Chief of Staff by 1800, 11 July 1965 a special folder of informative data. Content of the folder has been divulged to addressees in a special briefing by CMC on 10 July 1965.

2. It is requested that addressees submit the required information as indicated in enclosure (1) to Director, Joint Planning Group, Room 2108 by 1500, 11 July 1965 for compilation and delivery to CMC by 1800, 11 July 1965.

3. Submissions will be placed in a glassine 10X12 folder by JPG. The following information applies:

- a. Classification-TOP SECRET (SENSITIVE).
- b. Paper - 8"X11".
- c. Typing - single-spaced. Sections - see enclosure (2) for example.
- d. Numbering of pages - I-1, I-2, I-3, etc.
- e. Copies - original only - Opaque and/or tape corrections permissible.

4. In addition, it is requested that a summary of recommendations be submitted in any format by 1500, 11 July to Joint Planning Group, Room 2108.

5. This memo is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosures.

g
C. I. QUINN
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
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ATA12-jds
10 July 1965

DISTRIBUTION:

AC/S (G-1)
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QMG
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TOP SECRETINDEX/STAFF RESPONSIBILITY*Harry Painter*
*4/4/20*STAFF
RESPONSIBILITYINDEX

JPG

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AC/S (G-3)

SECTION II - DEPLOYMENTS *AND DIVISIONS*AC/S (G-3)
DC/SAir/DivResSECTION III - MOBILIZATION FOURTH
DIV/WG TEAM/ACTIVATIONAC/S (G-3)
DC/S (Air)SECTION IV - ACTIVATION ^{OF} REPLACEMENT
BRIGADES, ^a

AC/S (G-1)

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SECTION VIII - SUMMARY ACTIONS
RECOMMENDED

ENCLOSURE (1)

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(THIS IS AN EXAMPLE ONLY)

(NOT INTENDED TO PREEMPT RESPONSIBILITY OF COGNIZANT STAFF SECTION)

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SECTION II
DEPLOYMENTS

- Part 1 - MOVEMENT OF WESPAC UNITS TO SOUTH VIETNAM.
- Part 2 - MOVEMENT OF REMAINDER IMEF TO OKINAWA/JAPAN.
- Part 3 - PHASING OF ADDITIONAL MARCOR AVIATION UNITS TO WESTPAC.
- Part 4 - MOVEMENT OF IMAF(-) TO SOUTH VIETNAM.
- Part 5 - MOVEMENT OF IV MEF TO OKINAWA/JAPAN.
- Part 6 - MOVEMENT OF IV MAF TO SOUTH VIETNAM.
- Part 7 - MOVEMENT OF SPECIAL BRIGADE AIR/GROUND TEAMS TO SOUTH VIETNAM.

ENCLOSURE (2)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

See now desired by 1700

COMPTROLLER

22 JUL 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Secretary McNamara has requested the following information by 7:00 p.m., Thursday, July 22, 1965:

A. Navy

1. A firm list of force augmentations, particularly ships and aircraft units (if applicable) showing the units, military and civilian personnel required, a short statement of the reason for the augmentation (i.e., increased flying hours, improved manning of present force, manning for new units, port support, etc.) and the time when action is to be completed (i.e., readiness dates for major units). Increases in ships should be shown by source (i.e., retained above the budget plan, new activations, from new procurement).
2. A breakdown of the military personnel increases by source:
 - a. Callup of reserves
 - (1) In units (drill pay)
 - (2) Individuals
 - (a) On drill pay
 - (b) Non-drill pay
 - b. Retainees
 - c. Recruitment (or draft if applicable)
3. Schedule for deployment of carriers and other major ships to the Pacific and WestPac to show present forces, and forces under the new Vietnam plan. The Secretary particularly wants to see how we get to the ten carriers in the Pacific, including five in WestPac. It might be useful to show present and planned world-wide deployment of the 16 carriers and how the 16 level is planned to be maintained.

SECRET

5010-107-100

AOSB-ajk
22 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Rm. 30894

1. Mr. Ben Schemmer, OSD Systems Analysis (OX 7-6056, OX 7-6079) called 1500, 22 July 1965 with a request for information to be used as back up to the supplemental. He indicated he required the information tonight. Information required is as follows:

a. For forces in-country

- (1) Where they were located in May - in July. What was their posture for those months. What was their strength.
- (2) For the same periods, what was their activity rate in terms of consumption (Class V), how frequently in combat, attrition by major items. Where there any constraints which affected consumption rates.

b. Time phased deployment and mobilization schedule monthly through June 1966 by Battalions, Squadrons. Where in the theater are the units to be deployed to. Task organization of units by locality in the theater.

c. Projection or extrapolation of engagement rate, consumption rate and attrition rates through June 1966.

d. What are the consumption rates we used?
Are they different from the PACOM normals?
Why.

2. G-3 input to paragraph 1. a. and 1. b. are attached.

D. E. HABERLIE

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DISPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENTS
MARINE INFANTRY BATTALIONS
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

DATE	1/ WESTPAC	1/2/ ORI/JAPAN	2/ RVN	Strength at deployment from CONUS
1May65	9	5	4	95% T/O
1Jul65	6	5	7	
1Aug65	6	3	9	
1Sep65	0 ^{4/}	0	12 ^{2/}	94% T/O
1Oct65	9	6	12	
1Nov65	9	6	12	
1Dec65	9	6	12	
1Jan66	9	6	12	
1Feb66	9	6	12	T/O
1Mar66	9	6	12	
1Apr66	9	6	12	
1May66	9	6	12	
1Jun66	9	6	12	
1Jul66	9	6	12	

1/ Normal training activity.

2/ Normal combat activity.

3/ Includes Special Landing Force, 7th Fleet.

4/ 6 Battalions in transit to Westpac.

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22 July 1965

**LOGISTIC INFORMATION REQUESTED BY Mr. Ben Schemmer, OSD
Systems Analysis (to be used as back up to the supplemental)**

Q. What was the activity rate in terms of consumption of Class V of Marine units in RVN in May? In July?

A. Ammunition expenditures for Marine units deployed in RVN from the initial landing through 30 June 1965 have been received in Headquarters Marine Corps. This expenditure report is predicated on a limited employment of forces, varying from the landing of several battalions to approximately division strength during this period of time (approximately three months). Also the types of action in which Marine forces have been engaged have graduated from basic security and defensive build-up to limited patrol activity to more extensive and aggressive patrolling. This type of action is not representative of the offensive combat operations now contemplated.

As of 15 July 1965, the Commanding General, FMF Pacific has reported that high usage trends are developing for certain items of ammunition and has projected increased usage/expenditure rates which exceed current combat rates by factors of from 1.05 to 16.5. Twenty-seven separate ammunition types were reported as developing these high usage trends. Examples are:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>COMBAT RATE*</u>	<u>PROJECTED RATE*</u>	<u>FACTOR</u>
40mm HE Ctg	2.0	6	3.00
105mm Illum	0.8	3	3.75
155mm Illum	2.5	6	2.40
Signal, Illum	0.03	0.5	16.50

***Per one Day of Ammunition**

Q. What, if any, were the constraints which affected consumption rates?

A. The gradual introduction of Marine Corps forces as well as the assigned mission to support initially defensive operations and, subsequently, increasing patrol activity in expanding tactical areas of responsibility had a direct effect on ammunition consumption. As these constraints have been removed, increased usage trends have developed, the full impact of which can only be determined on the basis of experience gained from future actions.

Q. What is the projection or extrapolation of engagement rate, consumption rate and attrition rates through June 1966?

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SECTION IV

ACTIVATION OF REPLACEMENT BRIGADES

1. Assumption: That the Marine Corps will be authorized to activate 3 air/ground brigades, in addition to those regular Marine Corps forces currently authorized in the active structure. This will provide a force with the following capabilities:
 - a. Support committed forces by provision of replacement units and/or drafts.
 - b. Replace equivalent elements of IV MEF at any time those reserve forces revert to inactive status.
 - c. Perform such other tasks as the situation then may require.
2. Structure: In order to provide unit replacement of WESTPAC forces and to supplant component parts of the IV MEF when scheduled, the replacement brigades must include both air and ground combat and support organizations. The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) framework meets this criteria when tailored to represent one third of the personnel assets of the IV MEF. See TAB A.
3. Time of Formation: Formation of the replacement brigades will be contingent upon the availability of adequate numbers of personnel completing basic training. These organizations should be activated incrementally; the first on 1 January 1966; the second, 1 February 1966 and the third, 1 March 1966. This will permit orderly organization and training of new units and a systematic replacement of reserve forces when ordered.
4. Deployment Schedule: The deployment of replacement brigades from an operational viewpoint must be based on activation dates and completion of the training necessary to achieve a combat ready status prior to movement. In consideration of such factors and in accordance with paragraph 3 above, the three Marine Expeditionary Brigades will be ready for deployment 1 July 1966, 1 August 1966, and 1 September 1966, respectively. Organization and training of air elements of the brigades will require a 12-18 month period to provide for training of pilots and procurement of equipment. Initial air elements of the

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brigades must come from existing CONUS forces. A reduction in readiness of CONUS air units will result until aircraft and trained pilots are available to bring CONUS units to full strength.

5. Locales for Formation: The selection of locales for the formation of replacement brigades must necessarily be predicated upon troop capacity, training facilities and accessibility to ports of embarkation, all framed in the essence of time. Application of these criteria indicates that Camp Pendleton, El Toro and Twentynine Palms, California are the best locations for forming and training these replacement brigades.

6. Source: The replacement brigades should be formed initially around cadre elements and should receive their personnel from three separate sources; namely: (1) the Infantry Combat Training Regiments, (2) specialists schools and, (3) lateral input of enlisted and officer personnel from posts and stations, East Coast Fleet Marine Force units and personnel eligible for another WESTPAC tour.

7. Equipping the 3 MEB's: The training equipment and aircraft necessary for these brigades will be provided, in limited amounts, from assets now held and the remainder from new procurement.

8. Individual Training Implications: The general ~~individual~~ training implications applicable to the entire Marine Corps, air and ground, are as follows:

6a-
~~6a-~~ Officer. The relatively heavy and abrupt input to basic officer training will reflect in increased use of the present orientation type courses and formal schooling to replace the on-the-job training concept. This ~~will~~ require that training facilities - air and ground- ~~be placed in a mobilization state.~~ *to meet the resultant increased*

Temp
(3) Enlisted. Recruit training will require rapid expansion initially. In addition, requirements for trained combat ready replacements will dictate the use of Basic Specialist Training to replace the present on-the-job training concept. Also abrupt increases of input to the formal technical schools of the Marine Corps and other services, especially the Naval Air Technical Training Command, will be necessary.

TAB A: MEB Organization (Regular)

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 TAB A to SECTION IV: MEB Organization (Regular)

UNIT	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
HqCo MEB	50	346	6	6
InfRegt	152	3429	10	161
ArtyBn (Rein)	68	830	5	14
ReconCo (Rein)	11	136	1	5
ATCo (Rein)	9	122	0	2
EngrCo (Rein)	11	240	0	4
DetSvcBn	17	325	1	9
MTCO (Rein)	6	90	1	2
C&C Co (Rein)	1	43	16	90
SPCo (Rein)	9	143	1	14
SUB TOTAL	334	5704	41	307

FORCE TROOPS

TkCo (Rein)	16	244	1	6
AMTracCo (-)(Rein)	10	221	0	4
155mm Gun Btry(SP)(-) <u>1/</u>	5	95	0	2
8" HowPlt(SP)(Rein)	4	68		1
CommCo (Rein)	14	236	0	4
EngrCo (Rein)	16	350	1	6
Det, Force ReconCo	4	49	0	1
MTCO (Rein)	8	119	0	2
Det, HqBtry, FAG	8	40	1	1
Det, Hospital Co	0	11	3	20
Dental Co (-) <u>2/</u>	0	2	17	28
Det, FSR (FS)	58	1325	4	30
SpSecCommTms	3	6		
CI Team <u>2/</u>	4	8		
Interp Team <u>2/</u>	1	4		
IT Team <u>2/</u>	4	7		
MP Co (Rein)	11	174		2
Det, Bulk Fuel Co	4	127		
BridgePlt (Rein)	3	56		1
Det, MilGov'tGrp	8	25	2	4
SUB TOTAL	181	3167	29	112

IV-A-1

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TAS A to SECTION II: Deployments, Activations and Personnel Involved (FMFPAC)

Month	Day	West Coast & Hawaii and Afloat	Okinawa/Japan	South Vietnam (RVN)	Aggreg. in Vietnam	Remarks
July (1965)	15	I MEF (30,100)	Remainder III MAF (8300) & RLT-7 (-1 BLT) (5700)	III MAF (26,000)	26,000	BLT 3/7
Aug	1		Deploy remainder III MAF (less air support elements, FSR(-) & MAG-13) & RLT-7 (-1 BLT) to RVN (9900)			BLT 3/7
	5	Deploy MAG-36 to RVN (1600)		Join remainder III MAF (less air support elements, FSR(-) & MAG-13) (4200) & RLT-7 (-1 BLT) (5700)		
	10					
	15	Deploy 1st MARDIV (-) (Rein) to OKI/JAPAN (19,800)				
	25			Join MAG-36 (1600)	37,500	2000
Sep	5	Deploy MAG-33 to OKI/JAPAN (1900) Deploy 2d LAAM to RVN (600)	Join 1st MARDIV (-) (Rein) (19,800)			BLT
	15		Deploy MAG-13 for RVN (1600)			
	20			Join MAG-13 (1600)		
	25		Join MAG-33 (1900)	Join 2d LAAM (600)		
	30		Deploy SLF from I MEF (2000) III MAF support elements (2500) remain.		39,700	2000
Oct	1			Join SLF from afloat (2000)		BLT
	15	Deploy MAG-31 as part of I MEF to OKI/JAPAN (1700)			41,700	2000
Nov	5		Join MAG-31 (1700)			BLT
	20	Deploy remainder of 3d MAW (less 1 MAG) to OKI/JAPAN (4600) Elements 3d MAW (1600) remain			41,700	2000
Dec	10		Join 3d MAW elements (4600)			BLT
	15		Deploy MAG-33 to RVN as part of III MAF (1900)			
	20			Join MAG-33 (1900)	43,600	2000
Jan (1966)	10	Deploy I MEF and III MAF augmentation to OKI/JAP/RVN (10,800) Deploy remaining 3d MAW MAG to OKI/JAPAN (1600)			43,600	2000
Feb	1		Join I MEF augmentation (3300) Join remainder 3d MAW (1600)	Join III MAF augmentation (7500)		BLT
					51,100	2000

* SLF from III MAF until 1 Oct 1965, thereafter from I MEF.

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II - A - 1

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1 July 67

TAB B to SECTION II: ~~(Alternate Concept Modified to Delete Reserves and Brigades)~~ DEPLOYMENTS,
ACTIVATIONS AND PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR 12 BATTALION SLICES IN RVN

ACTIVATIONS AND PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR 12 BATTALION SITES IN RVN																				
	1965						1966										1968			
	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	JAN	FEB	
RVN	(9																			
	Bn	← III MAF / I MAC →																		
	Slices	(12 Bn Slices)																		
		*	*																	
OKI/JAP	RLT-7			← I MEF *																
	(3 Bn Slices)			(6 Bn Slices)																
EAST PAC	I MEF																			
	(6 Bn	→																		
	Slices)																			
	* Includes SLF																			
																			TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE	

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SECTION II

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT AND DEPLOYMENT

1. Control of population and resources, not terrain, is the sine qua non of the military aspects of counterinsurgency. From a counterinsurgency viewpoint, Vietnam can be divided into the following areas: Mountainous jungle region, intermediate piedmont, the coastal delta and the populated zones. The latter three are of military significance. This is because it is in these areas that the population and wealth of RVN are concentrated. The basic purpose of US/RVN strategy must be to gain the loyalties of the people and control the resources in these areas. Destruction and/or elimination of the Viet Cong from these areas largely by conducting operations in the intermediate piedmont is a prerequisite to achieving this basic purpose. Accomplishing this, we can then expand our military influence, compressing the Viet Cong, into the unproductive mountain areas or rendering them militarily ineffective.

Tactical requirements generated under this concept are best met by the maintenance of a series of secure base areas at key localities on the sea coast, from which sustained operations can be supported. Control of coastal locales constitutes the beginning steps in regulating population and resources vital to U.S. and RVN prosecution of the war and will deny the most important areas of South Vietnam to the Viet Cong. This can be effected by pacification to include the routing of guerrillas, the reestablishment of RVN authority in the villages and towns and through the provision of security to the native populace in those areas which are either remote, or considered desirable by the Viet Cong.

2. Implementation of this concept within I Corps area dictates the establishment of a secure base at the centrally located Da Nang coastal enclave with:

Forces projected north to Hue/Phu Bai and Quang Tri, to control the juncture of vital routes of communications in the vicinity of the 17th Parallel and the population concentrations in those areas.

Forces projected to the south to Chu Lai and Quang Ngai to initially control Viet Cong egress from the northern portion of the central highlands and entry into the population concentrations in those areas, in order to:

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a. Insure destruction and/or expulsion of the Viet Cong from the coastal areas.

b. Insure sanctity of principal populated areas.

c. Isolate the Viet Cong from indigenous support.

d. Preclude the Viet Cong from massing significant forces for attacks on key locations.

e. Inhibit reinforcement of the Viet Cong forces.

f. Permit RVN political agencies to operate effectively.

g. Deter overt aggression from north of the 17th Parallel.

3. The magnitude of the area to be covered and the population to be controlled precludes complete accomplishment of the entire task within I Corps as set forth in paragraph 2. above by Fleet Marine Forces limited to elements of 1-1/3 Division/Wing Teams (12 battalion slices). That size force, however, can effectively accomplish the following:

a. Insure destruction and/or expulsion of the Viet Cong from the Da Nang and Chu Lai coastal areas.

b. Insure sanctity of the immediate Da Nang, Chu Lai and Hue/Phu Bai areas.

c. Isolate the Viet Cong from indigenous support in those areas within and adjacent to TAOR's.

d. Inhibit reinforcement of Viet Cong and preclude their massing significant forces for attacks on key locations, within the limitations of intelligence and available forces.

e. Permit RVN political agencies to operate effectively within TAOR's.

f. Deter overt aggression from north of the 17th Parallel only to the extent that the presence of a significant force in the Da Nang - Chu Lai - Hue/Phu Bai coastal area permits. Additionally, elements

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of the force at Da Nang, Chu Lai and Hue/Phu Bai would be mutually supporting and can operate in conjunction with RVNAF.

g. Provide 7th Fleet Special Landing Force until such time as I MEF forces are deployed to Japan/Okinawa.

4. To implement this concept, initial steps must be taken to expeditiously provide and maintain the following actions:

a. Extend enlistments of Marine Corps personnel, for the convenience of the government, for a period of one year.

b. Bring existing units, within the active Fleet Marine Forces, assigned or programmed for the Far East, up to authorized strength in terms of personnel and equipment.

c. Augmentation of the Marine Corps Supporting Establishment in CONUS with additional personnel required to accomplish the processing, equipping and training of new personnel and units.

d. Recruit and train personnel as are necessary to implement this overall concept and to provide overseas replacements based upon a 13 month tour in the Far East and two years in CONUS.

5. A buildup and sustaining of Fleet Marine Forces in the Western Pacific to a strength comprising the elements of 1-1/3 Division/Wing Team (12 battalion slices), within the I Corps area of RVN, and 2/3 of a Division/Wing Team (6 battalion slices) on Okinawa/Japan, can be accomplished in three steps, with timing dependent primarily upon:

a. Availability of in-country logistic support, particularly port facilities.

b. Availability of amphibious shipping for introduction and maintenance of a Marine Amphibious Force (12 battalion slices) in the I Corps area of RVN.

c. Availability of amphibious and other type shipping for movement overseas of additional forces required.

d. Availability of air facilities in the I Corps area of RVN.

e. Availability of replacement and augmentation personnel and equipment for existing forces.

AO3D21-01g
26 Jul 1965

	TOTAL MARCORPS	CONUS	KOREA/JAPAN	DEPLOYED	
				Inflice	Sqdn
JUN 1950	74,279 ⁽¹⁾	73,463	-	1	0
JUL 1950	82,916	76,597	6,319 ⁽²⁾	4	4
SEP 1950	126,688	96,304	30,384 ⁽³⁾	9	6
APR 1953	247,618	210,925	36,693 ⁽⁴⁾	10	7
SEP 1953	261,343	208,267	53,076 ⁽⁵⁾	19	13

NOTE: CONUS figures reflect total Marine Corps strength less personnel deployed and include RIF and non-RIF organizations. RIF figures include organic Navy.

KOREA/JAPAN figures include organic Navy.

SOURCES:

- (1) Unless otherwise noted, all strength figures are derived from pertinent issues of Military Personnel Statistics, Navy and Marine Corps published monthly by HQMC.
- (2) U. S. Marine Operations in Korea, v. 1, p. 51.
- (3) U. S. Marine Operations in Korea, v. 2, p. 303; "Status of Fleet Marine Force (Ground) and (Air)" as of 30 Sep 1950.
- (4) CINCPAC Interim Evaluation Report No. 6, pp. 9-54 and 10-220.
- (5) PersDept memo DGR-1672-jb of 27 Nov 1953.

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AO3821-
26 Jul 1965

Marine Corps Strength Comparison COMUS-Base and Operational
Forces Forward, Korea - Current and Proposed R&M Deployments

At the onset of the Korean conflict in the latter part of June 1950, the strength of the Marine Corps was 74,279, including 2,369 reservists on continuous active duty. R&M components stood at 27,945 (18,536 Ground and 9,412 Air). One BDE of the R&M was deployed as the MHI Battalion.

When the 1st Provincial Marine Brigade, consisting of three battalions (4,769 Ground and three squadrons (1,550 Air), was committed in Korea in the first days of August 1950, the Corps strength had risen to 82,826, including 10,235 reservists on active duty reflecting the first input in response to the mobilization order of 20 July 1950. R&M strength was 29,460 Ground and 9522 Air. In addition to the force deployed to Korea, a BDE remained afloat in the Mediterranean and one squadron was carrier-deployed enroute to the Far East. Because of the pressure for men and shipping, the MHI commitment was cancelled on 18 August 1950.

At the time of the Inchon landing the strength of the Marine Corps was 126,668, including 48,049 reservists. R&M strength consisted of 35,189 Ground and 17,050 Air.

April 1953 marked the peak strength of Marine forces in the Korea/Japan area during the period of hostilities--nine battalions supported by seven squadrons. An additional BDE was afloat in the Mediterranean.

Peak overseas deployment was reached in September 1953--19 battalions including one in the Mediterranean, and 13 squadrons, one of which was in the Atlantic.

The above figures do not reflect support rendered Marines as follows:

September 1950: 13 ships for naval gunfire for Inchon-Seoul.

April 1953: Approximately 8,000 Koreans supporting division and wing operations; three battalions and two batteries of U. S. I Corps Artillery supporting 1st Marine Division operations.

It should also be pointed out that in Korea the U. S. Army provided the bulk of logistical support Marines required. The U. S. Navy and, to a lesser extent, the U. S. Air Force provided limited logistical support.

MARINE CORPS STRENGTH COMPARISON,
KOREAN AND CURRENT AND PROPOSED RVN DEPLOYMENTS

At the onset of the Korean conflict in the latter part of June 1950, the strength of the Marine Corps was 74,279, including 2,389 volunteer reservists on continuous active duty. One BLT of the FMF was deployed as the NELM Battalion.

When the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, consisting of the 5th Marines (Rein) and three carrier-based squadrons, was committed in Korea in the first days of August 1950, the Corps strength had risen to 82,916, including 10,238 reservists on active duty, which figure reflected the first input in response to the mobilization order of 20 July 1950. In addition to the force deployed to Korea, a BLT remained afloat in the Mediterranean and one squadron was carrier-deployed en route to the Far East. Because of the pressure for men and shipping, the NELM commitment was cancelled on 18 August 1950.

At the time of the Inchon landing, the strength of the Marine Corps was 126,688, including 48,043 reservists.

When the reserve peak was reached in April 1951, the total strength of the Corps stood at 191,699. In addition to the troops deployed to WESTPAC, one BLT and a squadron were deployed in the Mediterranean.

April 1953 marked the peak strength of Marine forces in the WESTPAC area during the period of hostilities---nine battalions supported by nine squadrons. An additional BLT and squadron were afloat in the Mediterranean.

Peak overseas deployment during the Korean crisis was reached in September 1953 upon the formation and movement of the Third Marine Division to Japan and the introduction of additional 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units into that country. Nineteen battalions, including one in the Mediterranean, and seventeen squadrons, including one in the Atlantic, were in a deployed status that month.

During the hostilities, Marines received support from several sources. Naval gunfire played an important part in the Inchon-Seoul operation. In their western Korea operations since March 1952, Marines were supported by units of U. S. I Corps field artillery. That amounted to three battalions and two batteries in April 1953. That same month, air and ground Marine operations were supported by approximately 7,000 Korean Service Corps members and civilians.

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KOREA JUN 1950-SEP 1953

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EVENT AND DATE	TOTAL		DEPLOYED		DEPLOYED		DEPLOYED		BASES		ACTIVE		DATE	TOTAL		Deployed		DEPLOYED		BASES					
	MarCor	Bns Sqdns	FMF	Bns Sqdns	Korea	Other	Bns Sqdns	Support	Training	RESERVES	Selectees	MARCOR		Bns Sqdns	Bns Sqdns	Bn Sqdns	RVN	Other ⁽¹⁾	Support	Training					
Outbreak of Hostilities Jun 1950	74,279	8	22	800	0	0	1	0	24,552			2,389	1,091	1 JAN 1965	189326	27	53	0	1	8	12	780	26314	17032	33973
Pusan Aug 1950	82,916	8	23	6,966	3	4	1	0	27,701			10,238	117	1 APR 1965	189522	27	53	1	3	7	10	4652	28194	17938	36012
Inchon/Seoul Sep 1950	126,688	18	24	30,200	9	7	0	0	16,997	25,451		48,043	19	1 JUL 1965	191096	27	53	9	1	6	10	24517	19935	18041	39500
Reserve Peak Apr 1951	191,699	18	29	32,071	9	7	1	1	24,005	48,980		85,538	6	1 OCT 1965	202669	27	53	12	18	6	8	38914	13980	20445	42500
Peak Strength in Korea during Hostilities Apr 1953	247,618	27	45	36,966	9	9	1	1	29,819	46,729		20,093	70,479	1 JAN 1966	221096	27	53	12	18	6	8	38914	13980	23301	54287
Peak Strength Korean Crisis Sep 1953	261,343	27	45	58,378	9	9	10 ⁽¹⁾	8	30,568	59,902		22,215	58,802	1 FEB 1966	225237	27	53	15	19	5	10	51987	17073	24000	69127
														1 APR 1966	235995	27	54	18	23	2	8	65623	6250	24000	64135
(1) Nine battalions and 7 squadrons in Japan.														1 JUL 1966	248190	27	54	18	23	2	8	65623	6250	24000	64054
														(1) OTHER: NELM BN., CARIB BN, HAWAII, OKI, & JAPAN											

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AO3D21-dnw

MARINE CORPS STRENGTH COMPARISON,

KOREAN AND CURRENT AND PROPOSED RVN DEPLOYMENTS

1. KOREA: At the onset of the Korean conflict in the latter part of June 1950, the strength of the Marine Corps was 74,279 (See TAB A), including 2,389 volunteer reservists on continuous active duty. One battalion of the FMF was deployed in the Mediterranean.

When the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, consisting of the 5th Marines (Rein) and three carrier-based squadrons, was deployed into Korea in the first days of August 1950, the Corps strength had risen to 82,916, including 10,238 reservists on active duty. This latter figure reflected the first response to the mobilization order of 20 July 1950. In addition to the force in Korea, one squadron was redeployed aboard a carrier to the Far East. The Mediterranean battalion remained there until mid-August, when the requirement for it was cancelled.

At the time of the Inchon landing, the strength of the Marine Corps was 126,688, including 48,043 reservists. The reserve peak was reached in April 1951 when of a Marine total of 191,699, there were 85,538 reservists on active duty. At this time there were nine battalions and seven squadrons deployed in Korea.

Enclosure (1)

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April 1953 marked the peak strength of Marine forces in WESTPAC during the active fighting -- ⁹ nine battalions and ¹¹ nine squadrons. Peak overseas deployment was not reached until two months after hostilities ceased. The formation and movement to Japan of the 3d Marine Division and the deployment of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units to Japan brought the deployed strength there and in Korea to 18 battalions and ¹³ 17 squadrons. At this time, there were 261,343 Marines on active duty.

During hostilities, Marines received support from several sources. Naval gunfire played an important part in the Inchon-Seoul operation. On their western Korea operations, which began in March 1952, Marines received support from ~~units~~ units of U.S. I Corps field artillery. That amounted to three battalions and two batteries in April 1953. That same month, air and ground Marine operations were supported by approximately 7,000 Korean Service Corps members and civilians.

2. RVN: For a comparison of RVN deployments, current and proposed, with those of Korea, a starting date of 1 January 1965 was selected. In March 1965, the 9th MEB was deployed to RVN. By 1 July 1965, a total of nine battalions had been deployed to RVN. In order to meet commitments, the 1st Marine Brigade and RLT-7 along with supporting squadrons were deployed. The build up to 12 battalions by 1 October 1965 (See TAB A) is based on the concept of a 30,000 man increase in total Marine Corps strength.

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29 Jul AM

RVN 1 JAN 1965 - 1 JUL 1966

KOREA JUN 1950 - SEP 1953

KOREA JUN 1950 - SEP 1953																			
Event and Date	TOTAL		DEPLOYED				Bases	Active	Reserves	Selectees	DATES	TOTAL		DEPLOYED				Bases	
	MarCorps	Bns Sgds	Korea Bns Sgds	Other Bns Sgds	FMP	Support						Training	RVN	Bns Sgds	Other (1)	RVN	Other (1)	Support	Training
Outbreak of hostilities Jun 1950	74,279	8 22	0 0	1 0	800	24,552	2,389	1,091		1 Jan 1965	189,326	27 53	0 1	8 12	780	26,314	17,032	33,973	
Busan Aug 1950	82,916	8 22	3 4	1 0	6,966	27,701	10,238	117		1 Apr 1965	189,522	27 53	1 3	7 13	4,652	28,194	17,938	36,012	
Inchon-Seoul Sep 1950	126,688	18 24	9 7	0 0	30,200	16,997	25,451	48,043	19	1 Jul 1965	191,096	27 53	9 10	6 9	24,517	19,935	18,041	39,500	
Reserve Peak Apr 1951	191,699	18 32	9 7	1 1	32,071	24,005	48,980	85,538	6	1 Oct 1965	202,699	27 53	12 18	6 10	39,164	16,247			
Peak strength in Korea during hostilities Apr 1953	247,618	27 51	9 11	1 1	36,966	29,819	46,729	20,093	70,479	1 Jan 1966	221,096	27 53	12 19	6 10	39,414	16,247			
Peak strengths during Korean crisis Sep 1953	261,343	27 51	9 10	10 (1) 8	58,378	30,568	59,902	22,215	58,802	1 Feb 1966	225,237	27 53	15 22	5 12	54,754	20,229			
(1) Nine battalions and seven squadrons in Japan										1 Apr 1966	235,995	27 54	18 23	2 9	68,390	10,230			
										1 Jul 1966	248,290	27 54	18 23	2 9	68,390	10,230			
										(1) OTHER: NEIM Bn, CARIB Bn, Hawaii (one battalion subsequent 1 Jun 65)									

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Phase II of the build up calls for 18 battalions to be in RVN by 1 April 1966. To meet this requirement, it has been assumed that a further increase of 25,000 personnel will be authorized in time to begin receiving draftees in January 1966.

3. COMPARISON: As can be seen from TAB A, the peak strength of the Marine Corps during the Korean conflict, 261,343 Marines, supported a maximum deployment of 19 battalions and ¹³~~17~~ squadrons. Of these units, only ~~nine~~⁹ battalions and ~~nine~~¹⁰ squadrons were in Korea. The currently projected strength, based on a 55,000 man increase by 1 June 1966, is 248,190 to support an overseas force of 20 battalions and 31 squadrons. Of these units, 18 battalions and 23 squadrons will be in RVN.

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HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

ADD-24W

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Secretary of the Navy

Subj: Marine Corps Capabilities to Support Deployments to
WESTPAC

Encl: (1) Analysis of Marine Corps Capabilities to Support
Deployments to WESTPAC

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in response to requirements stemming from our conference of 23 July.

2. Requirements established by COMUSMACV for deployment of balanced Marine Corps combat, combat support, and combat service support forces in terms of basic units consist of:

PHASE I (In RVN prior to 1 January 1966)

- 12 - Battalions (1 1/3 Reinforced Divisions)
- 7 - Tactical Squadrons
- 9 - Helicopter Squadrons
- 2 - LAAM Battalions

PHASE II (In RVN subsequent to 1 January 1966)

- 18 - Battalions (2 Reinforced Divisions)
- 7 - Tactical Squadrons
- 12 - HMM Squadrons
- 3 - LAAM Battalions

3. Based on an end strength increase of the Marine Corps of 30,000 Marines and COG of 4 months, we can meet Phase I requirements, assuming MAG-36 is deployed, except for one HMM.

The Marine Corps can meet Phase II requirements with

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Subj: Marine Corps Capabilities to Support Deployments to
WESTPAC

the following exceptions:

- 3 - Battalions (1/3 Reinforced Division)
- 3 - HMM Squadrons
- 1 - LAAM

and the remainder of combat, combat support, and combat service support elements for the 1st MEF.

4. In order for the Marine Corps to meet COMUSMACV requirements, in lieu of a 30,000 end FY66 increase, a total increase of 55,000 is required.

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AO1C-rll-2

Subj: Marine Corps Capabilities to Support Deployments to WESTPAC

1. If the FY66 end year strength is increased by 30,000 personnel, the Marine Corps' capability to support deployments to WESTPAC will be as follows:

a. Of the 30,000 a total of 13,739 will be required to support the additional units already deployed or scheduled for early deployment. These units include:

1st Marine Brigade
RLT-7 with air units
Helicopter MAG (MAG-36)
Force Service Regiment augmentation
Command and Control elements (MAF Hqs)

b. Detailed justification for the 13,739 additional personnel was included in a "CMC memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, AO1C-kb Ser 0001A18165 of 1 July 1965" (TAB A). This memorandum was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense under "SecNav Memo of 16 July 1965 TS-371". Slight adjustments in the total of the 14,726 requested in the above memorandum have been made. Modifications include:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
(1) Reduction in theater casualty pipeline by 50%	86	738
(2) Addition of hospitalized casualty man years lost	88	1,208
(3) Deletion of personnel to reconstitute MAG-36	265	1,692
(4) Reduction in Rotation Base personnel from 3,028 to 2,081 to remain within 30,000 increase.		

c. Present units in WESTPAC (assuming that MAG-36 deploys) will satisfy COMUSMACV Phase I requirements in country except for 1 HMM squadron and 1 LAAM Battalion.

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2. As described in paragraph 1. above, of the total increase in authorized strength of 30,000 Marines, 13,739 will be required to support units already deployed to WESTPAC. The balance of 16,261 will permit the following units to be deployed at T/O strength and maintained in WESTPAC on a continuous basis:

RLT/MAG

<u>RLT - ALL RVN</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
— Inf Regt	140	3285
— Arty Bn (Rein)	63	796
— Recon Co (Rein)	10	129
— AT Co (Rein)	9	117
— Engr Co (Rein)	11	231
— Det Svc Bn	17	311
— MT Co (Rein)	6	86
— G&C Co (Rein)	1	41
— SP Co (Rein)	8	138
— AmTrac Co (Rein) ^{BC}	12	283
— Comm Co (Rein)	13	226
— Force Engr Co (Rein)	15	325
— Det Force Recon Co	4	47
— Tk Co (Rein)	15	234
— Det 1st FSR	53	1269
— Force MT Co (Rein)	8	114
— 155MM Gun Btry (SP)	6	133
— 8" How Plt (SP) (Rein)	4	65
	<u>395</u>	<u>7837</u>

8232MAG

<u>RVN</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>AG</u>	<u>ENL</u>
— HMM	53	424	186
— MASS	9	182	143
— LAAM W/3 Btry		31	518
	<u>62</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>846</u>

	81	82	83
MASS	10	10 = 32	404
MASS	6	6 = 19	304
MASS	2	2 = 7	51
YMA	28	28 = 32	187
YMA	28	28 = 32	187
YMA	21	21 = 48	276
YMA (A)	21	21 = 35	175
MASS	6	6 = 22	276
	<u>120</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>1330</u>
TOTAL MAG	200	200	2000
		<u>200</u>	

AUGMENTATION UNITS
(TO BE ACTIVATED)

CORPS UNITS - RVN	81	82
MASS	32	404
Comm Bn (-)	40	646
Log Bn	12	145
Recce Co	23	610
MP Bn	24	76
1st Gov't Grp	8	14
2 - Interp/Trans Teams	2	10

III MAP AUGMENTATION - RVN

MP Bn	22	919
-------	----	-----

I MAP AUGMENTATION - CONUS

1st FOR (T/O Storage)	30	1001
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TOTAL AUGMENTATION UNITS	210	4115
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400

* Personnel to support this requirement are included in paragraph 1.

1. The Marine Corps will be able to provide the following forces:

2. The Marine Corps will be able to provide the following forces:

- 12 - Battalions (with combat support and combat service support (1 1/3 Reinforced Division)
- 7 - Tactical Squadrons
- 3 - Helicopter Squadrons
- 1 - Marine Battalion (1 Reinforced Division)

The Marine Corps can provide these forces with the assistance of one Helicopter Squadron.

3. The Marine Corps desires, subsequent to 1 January 1966 the following additional forces:

- 1 - Remainder of the 1st Marine Division (Main)
- 2 - Helicopter Squadrons
- 1 - Marine Battalion
- 1 - Marine Air wing (-)

4. Under the limitations imposed by the 30,000 man increase, the Marine Corps will be unable to deploy and sustain the forces required to meet the Phase II requirements to the extent of 1 1/3 of a reinforced division (3 Battalion slices) and elements of a Marine Aircraft Wing and combat support and combat service support units.

5. The detailed breakdown of utilization of the 30,000 man increase is presented in paragraph 8 to follow.

6. The total personnel above 30,000 required to deploy and sustain an additional Battalion - 2 Battalion (-) force in country, as requested by the Joint Chiefs, are estimated at 25,000 Marines for the FY66. The additional requirements expected in FY67 as personnel requirements generally will be different is based upon the details covered in the report submitted and presented to the Joint Chiefs on July 1, 1965. The report is a part of an additional Battalion force in country, and the total is 25,000.

3. Force Augmentation Requirements and 2756.

UNIT REQUIRMENTS

to 1/1/70

III MAF and 101st AF, including

3d FBR to 101st AF

I MAC HQS

RLH/MAG

340 (25) 305 2181 (1501) 6800
48 87
156 386

AUGMENTATION

Corps Augmentation

151 2092

I MEF

35 1001

III MEF

83 512

Base Support

100 2301

TRAINING

Training Overhead

451 3022

Recruit Training

836

ICL, Staging and Basic Specialist

72 2375

Tech and Other Training

582 1336

Professional Training

27

PIPELINE

Hospitalized Casualties

124 1680

Casualty Pipeline

105 1000

Rotation Pipeline

291 6058

Rotation Base

2081

TOTAL REQUIREMENT

3526 27474

30,000

Total Civilians: 1240 (includes 420 foreign hire)

4. Attached at IAB E is a spread sheet indicating personnel build-up by month for fiscal year 1966.

5. Additional civilian personnel strength required to provide augmentation to CONUS support and supply bases and recruit depots plus bases in WESTPAC is 1,240.

6. An increase of Marine Corps personnel by 10,000, an increase of 30,000 is as follows:

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>
Involuntary Extensions (4 months)	1,000	1,000
Enlistment and/or draft	1,000	1,000
TOTAL	2,000	2,000

30,000

Enclosure (1)

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SECTION IICONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT AND DEPLOYMENT

1. Control of population and resources, not terrain, is the sine qua non of the military aspects of counterinsurgency. From a counterinsurgency viewpoint, Vietnam can be divided into the following areas: Mountainous jungle region, intermediate piedmont, the coastal delta and the populated zones. The latter three are of military significance. This is because it is in these areas that the population and wealth of RVN are concentrated. The basic purpose of US/RVN strategy must be to gain the loyalties of the people and control the resources in these areas. Destruction and/or elimination of the Viet Cong from these areas largely by conducting operations in the intermediate piedmont is a prerequisite to achieving this basic purpose. Accomplishing this, we can then expand our military influence, compressing the Viet Cong, into the unproductive mountain areas or rendering them militarily ineffective.

Tactical requirements generated under this concept are best met by the maintenance of a series of secure base areas at key localities on the sea coast, from which sustained operations can be supported. Control of coastal locales constitutes the beginning steps in regulating population and resources vital to U.S. and RVN prosecution of the war and will deny the most important areas of South Vietnam to the Viet Cong. This can be effected by pacification to include the routing of guerrillas, the reestablishment of RVN authority in the villages and towns and through the provision of security to the native populace in those areas which are either remote, or considered desirable by the Viet Cong.

2. Implementation of this concept within I Corps area dictates the establishment of a secure base at the centrally located Da Nang coastal enclave with:

Forces projected north to Hue/Phu Bai and Quang Tri, to control the juncture of vital routes of communications in the vicinity of the 17th Parallel and the population concentrations in those areas.

Forces projected to the south to Chu Lai and Quang Ngai to initially control Viet Cong egress from the northern portion of the central highlands and entry into the population concentrations in those areas, in order to:

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- a. Insure destruction and/or expulsion of the Viet Cong from the coastal areas.
- b. Insure sanctity of principal populated areas.
- c. Isolate the Viet Cong from indigenous support.
- d. Preclude the Viet Cong from massing significant forces for attacks on key locations.
- e. Inhibit reinforcement of the Viet Cong forces.
- f. Permit RVN political agencies to operate effectively.
- g. Deter overt aggression from north of the 17th Parallel.

3. The magnitude of the area to be covered and the population to be controlled precludes complete accomplishment of the entire task within I Corps as set forth in paragraph 2. above by Fleet Marine Forces
may be changed → limited to elements of 1-1/3 Division/Wing Teams (12 battalion slices). That size force, however, can effectively accomplish the following:

- a. Insure destruction and/or expulsion of the Viet Cong from the Da Nang and Chu Lai coastal areas.
- b. Insure sanctity of the immediate Da Nang, Chu Lai and Hue/Phu Bai areas.
- c. Isolate the Viet Cong from indigenous support in those areas within and adjacent to TAOR's.
- d. Inhibit reinforcement of Viet Cong and preclude their massing significant forces for attacks on key locations, within the limitations of intelligence and available forces.
- e. Permit RVN political agencies to operate effectively within TAOR's.
- f. Deter overt aggression from north of the 17th Parallel only to the extent that the presence of a significant force in the Da Nang - Chu Lai - Hue/Phu Bai coastal area permits. Additionally, elements

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of the force at Da Nang, Chu Lai and Hue/Phu Bai would be mutually supporting and can operate in conjunction with RVNAF.

g. Provide 7th Fleet Special Landing Force until such time as I MEF forces are deployed to Japan/Okinawa.

4. To implement this concept, initial steps must be taken to expeditiously provide and maintain the following actions:

a. Extend enlistments of Marine Corps personnel, for the convenience of the government, for a period of one year.

b. Bring existing units, within the active Fleet Marine Forces, assigned or programmed for the Far East, up to authorized strength in terms of personnel and equipment.

c. Augmentation of the Marine Corps Supporting Establishment in CONUS with additional personnel required to accomplish the processing, equipping and training of new personnel and units.

d. Recruit and train personnel as are necessary to implement this overall concept and to provide overseas replacements based upon a 13 month tour in the Far East and two years in CONUS.

5. A buildup and ^{Sustaining} maintenance of Fleet Marine Forces in the Western Pacific to a strength comprising the elements of 1-1/3 Division/Wing Team (12 battalion slices), within the I Corps area of RVN, and 2/3 of a Division/Wing Team (6 battalion slices) on Okinawa/Japan, can be accomplished in ~~four~~ ^{three} steps, with timing dependent primarily upon:

a. Availability of in-country logistic support, particularly port facilities.

b. Availability of amphibious shipping for introduction and maintenance of a Marine Amphibious Force (12 battalion slices) in the I Corps area of RVN.

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c. Availability of amphibious and other type shipping for movement overseas of additional forces required.

d. Availability of air facilities in the I Corps area of RVN.

e. Availability of replacement and augmentation personnel and equipment for existing forces.

6. Air facility availability in the I Corps area of RVN is the determining factor in the rate of introduction of additional Marine Air Groups. ~~The aircraft groups of 1-1/3 Division/Wing Teams consist of four (VF/VA) MAGs and two helicopter MAGs.~~ At the present time, one helicopter MAG and two squadrons of a three squadron (VF/VA) MAG are operating from Da Nang. The construction of a parallel runway at Da Nang and the need for space to accommodate the remaining squadron of the (VF/VA) MAG require the movement of the helicopter MAG from its present site at Da Nang, to a field at Da Nang East - currently under construction. One (VA) MAG is now operating from the field at Chu Lai. The in-country air groups now saturate existing secure airfields. Consequently, there is a requirement for ~~three~~ ^{two} expeditionary airfields to accommodate ~~two~~ ^{one} (VF/VA) MAGs and one helicopter MAG, in addition to those facilities at Da Nang, Chu Lai and Da Nang East (under construction).

Map 11
12
13 E
16
36

Sufficient AM-2 matting is on hand to construct one operational runway approximating the Chu Lai runway by 15 September 1965. Sufficient matting is allocated to the Marine Corps ^{FROM} for production and repayment from the Air Force to permit construction of one more Chu Lai type runway by 15 December 1965. ~~Programmed and~~ ^{There} ~~currently allocated~~ resources would permit the basing of one more helicopter MAG in the I Corps area, either by expansion at existing sites, or the construction of an additional expeditionary site roughly comparable to Da Nang East. Timing is dependent upon introduction of the additional helicopter group into the I Corps area. This concept envisions the replacement of the expeditionary airfields with semi-permanent MILCON facilities. Each MILCON facility should be completed within 12 months after the completion of the expeditionary airfield.

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left.

7. "Training and provision of replacement personnel" - AO3C in coordination with DC/S(AIR). *new*

Chow

8. TAB A presents a more detailed description of forces, and chronologically summarizes unit deployments, activations and numbers of personnel involved; TAB B presents this information in graphic form.

gle

9. Step I. RLT-7 (less the SLF), currently on Okinawa, can commence movement to the I Corps area of RVN as soon as directed and amphibious shipping is available. The SLF will continue to be provided from RLT-7. MAG-13, currently in Japan, can move to I Corps area of RVN as soon as air facilities are available (estimated date - 15 September 1965). Remaining on Okinawa/Japan will be III MAF support elements.

10. Step II

100%

a. I MEF ground elements, from the West Coast and Kaneohe, can be moved to the Far East beginning 15 August 1965, subject to the availability of amphibious and other shipping. The most probable pattern of deployment would find I MEF ground elements moving directly to Okinawa/Japan during September, 1965. The SLF will continue to be provided from RLT-7.

b. Air elements of I MEF can be moved from CONUS to the Far East beginning 1 August 1965, subject to the availability of shipping. The probable pattern of deployment is as follows:

(1) MAG-36 moves to RVN during August, 1965.

(2) MAG-33 moves to Japan and 2d LAAM Battalion moves to RVN during September, 1965.

(3) MAG-31 moves to Japan during October. *check - may be not*

(4) The remaining MAG (VF/VA) of I MEF will move to Japan in January, 1966, to complete the aviation complement of I MEF. *questionable - may have to be reviewed*

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c. With the contemplated introduction of the additional Fleet Marine Force air/ground task organization into RVN, the integrity of organic aviation support becomes critical. Previous decisions to deploy Marine Corps aviation elements to other than I Corps, in general support of RVNAF, i. e., Marine Aircraft Group-36 and 2d LAAM Battalion, should be reevaluated with a view toward restoring the tactical integrity of the total force. All available Marine helicopter transport and anti-air warfare capabilities currently in and/or scheduled for RVN will be required when III MAF reaches the 12 battalion level.

d. In order to deploy I MEF units in an acceptable combat readiness category, it will be necessary to exchange two battalions with the 2d Marine Division and provide one MAG from the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. These forces will deploy as part of I MEF. *not under E*

11. Step III

Copy E
a. All ground elements of I MEF, in the Far East, less some support elements, become available as rotational units to provide relief for FMF units in the I Corps area and afloat. The relief of the SLF can be effected by I MEF on 1 October 1965. This rotational employment of I MEF units is highly desirable in light of the debilitating effect upon the efficiency of troops in RVN caused by long periods of exposure to heat and humidity and in consideration of the high tempo of sustained combat operations. Such a rotation program will assist in maintaining the combat capability, efficiency and morale of III MAF.

b. During December, 1965, it is planned that MAG-33 will move from Japan to an expeditionary airfield in I Corps area, RVN. Remaining air units, I MEF, will move to Okinawa/Japan during the period October 1965 - January 1966, to be in place 1 February 1966, available for rotational relief of air units in RVN. Support, command and control elements of 3d MAF move to Okinawa/Japan during November, 1965.

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White 12. Step IV. Replacement personnel necessary for the maintenance of this increased force level in the Far East, on a 13 month/24 month rotational basis, can be available on 1 January 1966.

Clark TAB A: Deployments, Activations and Personnel Involved (FMFPAC).

TAB B: Deployments, Activations and Personnel Requirements for 12 Battalion Slices in RVN.

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SECTION IICONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT AND DEPLOYMENT

1. Control of population and resources, not terrain, is the sine qua non of the military aspects of counterinsurgency. From a counterinsurgency viewpoint, Vietnam can be divided into the following areas: Mountainous jungle region, intermediate piedmont, the coastal delta and the populated zones. The latter three are of military significance. This is because it is in these areas that the population and wealth of RVN are concentrated. The basic purpose of US/RVN strategy must be to gain the loyalties of the people and control the resources in these areas. Destruction and/or elimination of the Viet Cong from these areas largely by conducting operations in the intermediate piedmont is a prerequisite to achieving this basic purpose. Accomplishing this, we can then expand our military influence, compressing the Viet Cong, into the unproductive mountain areas or rendering them militarily ineffective.

Tactical requirements generated under this concept are best met by the maintenance of a series of secure base areas at key localities on the sea coast, from which sustained operations can be supported. Control of coastal locales constitutes the beginning steps in regulating population and resources vital to U.S. and RVN prosecution of the war and will deny the most important areas of South Vietnam to the Viet Cong. This can be effected by pacification to include the routing of guerrillas, the reestablishment of RVN authority in the villages and towns and through the provision of security to the native populace in those areas which are either remote, or considered desirable by the Viet Cong.

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Forces projected to the south to Chu Lai and Quang Ngai to initially control Viet Cong egress from the northern portion of the central highlands and entry into the population concentrations in those areas, in order to:

*Has much of this
go to
3 a-g
eliminated*

*! ? can be
done w/ 1/3
Divs
if not
should
this be
whittled
down?*

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- ??
- a. Insure destruction and/or expulsion of the Viet Cong from the coastal areas.
 - b. Insure sanctity of principal populated areas.
 - c. Isolate the Viet Cong from indigenous support.
 - d. Preclude the Viet Cong from massing significant forces for attacks on key locations.
 - e. Inhibit reinforcement of the Viet Cong forces.
 - f. Permit RVN political agencies to operate effectively.
 - g. Deter overt aggression from north of the 17th Parallel.

3. The magnitude of the area to be covered and the population to be controlled precludes complete accomplishment of the entire task within I Corps as set forth in paragraph 2. above by Fleet Marine Forces limited to elements of 1-1/3 Division/Wing Teams (12 battalion slices). That size force, however, can effectively accomplish the following:

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- a. Insure destruction and/or expulsion of the Viet Cong from the Da Nang and Chu Lai coastal areas.
- b. Insure sanctity of the immediate Da Nang, Chu Lai and Hue/Phu Bai areas.
- c. Isolate the Viet Cong from indigenous support in those areas within and adjacent to TAOR's.
- d. Inhibit reinforcement of Viet Cong and preclude their massing significant forces for attacks on key locations, within the limitations of intelligence and available forces.
- e. Permit RVN political agencies to operate effectively within TAOR's.
- f. Deter overt aggression from north of the 17th Parallel only to the extent that the presence of a significant force in the Da Nang - Chu Lai - Hue/Phu Bai coastal area permits. Additionally, elements

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of the force at Da Nang, Chu Lai and Hue/Phu Bai would be mutually supporting and can operate in conjunction with RVNAF.

g. Provide 7th Fleet Special Landing Force until such time as I MEF forces are deployed to Japan/Okinawa. ??

4. To implement this concept, initial steps must be taken to expeditiously provide and maintain the following actions:

a. ~~The addition of one Division/Wing Team to the active Fleet Marine Forces of the Marine Corps~~

b. ~~Augmentation of the Marine Corps Supporting Establishment in CONUS with additional personnel required to accomplish the processing, equipping and training of new personnel and units.~~

c. ~~Bring existing units within the active Fleet Marine Forces up to authorized strength in terms in personnel and equipment.~~

d. ~~Replacement forces to supplant such U. S. Marine Corps Reserve Units as are necessary to implement this overall concept, upon the completion of a tour of active duty.~~

5. A buildup and maintenance of Fleet Marine Forces in the Western Pacific to a strength comprising the elements of 1 1/3 Division/Wing Team (12 battalion slices), within the I Corps area of RVN, and 2/3 of a Division/Wing Team (6 battalion slices) on Okinawa/Japan, can be accomplished in five steps, with timing dependent primarily upon:

a. Activation of the 4th Division/Wing Team and such other reserve units as may be required.

b. Availability of in-country logistic support, particularly port facilities.

c. Availability of amphibious shipping for introduction and maintenance of a Marine Amphibious Force (12 battalion slices) in the I Corps area of RVN.

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ca. Availability of amphibious and other type shipping for movement overseas of additional forces required.

de. Availability of air facilities in the I Corps area of RVN.

hang f. Activation of replacement brigades.

de. 6. Air facility availability in the I Corps area of RVN is the determining factor in the rate of introduction of additional Marine Air Groups. ^{??} The Aircraft groups of 1-1/3 Division/Wing Teams consist of four (VF/VA) MAGs and two Helicopter MAGs. At the present time, one Helicopter MAG and two squadrons of a three squadron (VF/VA) MAG are operating from Da Nang. The construction of a parallel runway at Da Nang and the need for space to accommodate the remaining squadron of the (VF/VA) MAG require the movement of the Helicopter MAG from its present site at Da Nang, to a field at Da Nang East - currently under construction. One (VA) MAG is now operating from the field at Chu Lai. The in-country air groups now saturate existing secure airfields. Consequently, there is a requirement for three expeditionary airfields to accommodate two (VF/VA) MAGs and one Helicopter MAG, in addition to those facilities at Da Nang, Chu Lai and Da Nang East (under construction).

Sufficient AM-2 matting is on hand to construct one operational runway approximating the Chu Lai runway by 15 September 1965. Sufficient matting is allocated to the Marine Corps for production and repayment from the Air Force to permit construction of one more Chu Lai type runway by 15 December 1965. Programmed and currently allocated resources would permit the basing of one more Helicopter MAG in the I Corps area, either by expansion at existing sites, or the construction of an additional expeditionary site roughly comparable to Da Nang East. Timing is dependent upon introduction of the additional Helicopter Group into the I Corps area. This concept envisions the replacement of the expeditionary airfields with semi-permanent MILCON facilities. Each MILCON facility should be completed within 12 months after the completion of the expeditionary airfield.

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7. For planning purposes, mobilization of necessary reserve forces is assumed to begin on 15 September. Based on this assumption, IV MEF can be ready for deployment anytime after 15 December. The first of the three replacement brigades can be ready for deployment beginning 1 July 1966 with the second and third brigades ready 1 August and 1 September, respectively.

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8. TAB A presents a more detailed description of forces, and chronologically summarizes unit deployments, activations and numbers of personnel involved; TAB B presents this information in graphic form.

9. Step I. RLT-7 (less the SLF), currently on Okinawa, can commence movement to the I Corps area of RVN as soon as directed and amphibious shipping is available. The SLF will continue to be provided from RLT-7. MAG-13, currently in Japan, can move to I Corps area of RVN as soon as air facilities are available (estimated date - 15 September 1965). Remaining on Okinawa/Japan will be III MAF support elements.

10. Step II.

a. I MEF ground elements, from the West Coast and Kaneohe, can be moved to the Far East beginning 15 August 1965, subject to the availability of amphibious and other shipping. The most probable pattern of deployment would find I MEF ground elements moving directly to Okinawa/Japan during September, 1965. The SLF will continue to be provided from RLT-7.

b. Air elements of I MEF can be moved from CONUS to the Far East beginning 1 August 1965 subject to the availability of shipping. The probable pattern of deployment is as follows:

(1) MAG-36 moves to RVN during August, 1965.

(2) MAG-33 moves to Japan and 2nd LAAM Battalion moves to RVN during September, 1965.

(3) MAG-42 activated with IV MEF joins I MEF and moves to Japan during October.

(4) An additional MAG(VF/VA) of IV MEF will move to Japan in January, 1966 to complete the aviation complement of I MEF. MAG-15 will remain CONUS as a training and support base for the activation of the aviation component of IV MEF.

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c. With the contemplated introduction of the additional Fleet Marine Force air/ground task organization into RVN, the integrity of organic aviation support becomes critical. Previous decisions to deploy Marine Corps aviation elements to other than I Corps, in general support of RVNAF, i.e., Marine Aircraft Group-36 and 2d LAAM Battalion, should be re-evaluated with a view toward restoring the tactical integrity of the total force. All available Marine helicopter transport and anti-air warfare capabilities currently in and/or scheduled for RVN will be required when III MAF reaches the 12 battalion level.

d. In order to deploy I MEF units in an acceptable combat readiness category, it will be necessary, upon the return of two battalions of the 5th Marines from WESTPAC, to exchange those battalions with two battalions from the 2d Marine Division. The battalions from the 2d Marine Division will deploy as part of I MEF.

11. Step III.

a. All ground elements of I MEF, in the Far East, less some support elements, become available as rotational units to provide relief for FMF units in the I Corps area and afloat. The relief of the SLF can be effected by I MEF on 1 October 1965. This rotational employment of I MEF units is highly desirable in light of the debilitating effect upon the efficiency of troops in RVN caused by long periods of exposure to heat and humidity and in consideration of the high tempo of sustained combat operations. Such a rotation program will assist in maintaining the combat capability, efficiency and morale of III MAF.

b. During December 1965 it is planned that MAG-33 will move from Japan to an expeditionary airfield in I Corps area, RVN. Remaining air units, I MEF, will move to Okinawa/Japan during the period October 1965-January 1966, to be in place 1 February 1966, available for rotational relief of air units in RVN. During this period (1 October 1965 through 1 February 1966), scheduled replacement of III MAF air units in the Far East will continue from air elements of the II MEF in CONUS. Support, command and control elements of 3d MAW move to Okinawa/Japan during November, 1965.

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12. Step IV. Ground units of IV MEF can be ready for deployment to combat subsequent to 15 December 1965. It is anticipated that this MEF can arrive in the Far East 35 days after shipping is made available and replace comparable I MEF and III MAF elements. At this point of time, the dispositions of Far East Fleet Marine Forces scheduled to rotate to CONUS will be such that an RLT of IV MEF will replace an equivalent force in RVN. The remainder of IV MEF ground units will replace comparable forces on Okinawa. Selected air units of IV MEF can be ready for deployment commencing 15 October 1965. Two MAG (VF/VA) will deploy to I MEF, in Okinawa/Japan, in October, 1965 and January, 1966. Remaining air elements would be deployed in November, 1965, through March, 1966, to RVN, Okinawa/Japan to replace like III MAF elements. Some ground and air support elements would divert and remain on Okinawa/Japan, as part of the logistic support base.

13. Step V. A replacement Brigade can be ready for deployment on 30 June 1966. Its most probable pattern of deployment would be to replace RLT-7 and its supporting air.

14. As described in SECTION IV, the three air/ground brigades authorized for activation subsequent to mobilization of IV MEF would be utilized to:

- a. Provide replacement units and/or drafts in support of committed forces.
- b. Replace equivalent elements of IV MEF at any time those reserve forces revert to inactive status.
- c. Such other tasks as the situation may require.

TAB A: Deployments, Activations and Personnel Involved (FMFPAC).
TAB B: Deployments, Activations and Personnel Requirements for
12 Battalion Slices in RVN.

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