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CMC MR

SPREAD SHEET - ISSUES

COMPARISON - FINAL CLASS/UNCLAS STATEMENTS

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These Tabs  
all relate  
to the  
classified  
version

These Tabs  
all relate  
to the  
unclassified  
version



## HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

25 August 1967

SECRET

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Statements (one classified, one unclassified) by General Wallace M. Greene, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee on the Air War Against North Vietnam scheduled for Tuesday, 29 August at 1400; clearance of

Ref: (a) A SecDef Memo for the Service Secretaries of 6 Jan 1967, subj: Security Review of Executive Session Congressional Testimony (U)

(b) DepSecDef Memo for the Service Secretaries on 11 Jan 1965, subj: Congressional Appearances by Department of Defense Witnesses (U) (FOUO)

Encl: (1) Statement by General Wallace M. Greene, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Air War Against North Vietnam, on

Tuesday, 29 August at 1400 of 21 Aug 1967 (S)

(2) Statement by General Wallace M. Greene, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee on the Air War Against North Vietnam, on Tuesday, 29 August at 1400 (U); prepared for press release by the Committee if it so desires

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) and (2) were submitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Directorate for Security Review) for clearance on 23 Aug 67.

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25 August 1967

2. On Thursday evening, 24 August, at 1825, I received a telephone call from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Baird, who was calling me at my quarters from Mr. Baird's office in regard to the clearance of enclosures (1) and (2). Mr. Baird said that he was calling in connection with enclosures (1) and (2) which had been submitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for clearance. He said that Mr. Frickland ( ) was with him - Baird - in Baird's office, and Frickland was concerned with two aspects of my statement. The first aspect was my comment regarding the requirement for an additional division and helicopter support in I Corps. The second aspect concerned my statement regarding the closure of the port of Haiphong. Mr. Baird stated that Mr. Frickland felt that it would be better if the Commandant did not volunteer information regarding these two subjects in his proposed statement, although Mr. Baird and Mr. Frickland realized that what the Commandant said about these two subjects represented his already known position regarding the two matters. "In any event," said Mr. Baird, "the Committee is certain to ask you for your views, whether they are expressed in your opening statement or not, and you can state your views when so asked."

3. I replied to Mr. Baird that these statements represented my personal views which were well known to the Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs, and that while I was willing to modify my statements to insure that they were in accordance with references (a) and (b) that I nevertheless felt that this was an unwise thing to do because the Committee was certain to ask me whether the statement which I presented to them at the hearing was the same statement which I had submitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs for clearance. And if this were done, I would have to truthfully reply that it was not and would be compelled to explain why the changes were made. After a conversation with Mr. Frickland which I could not hear over the telephone, Mr. Baird repeated his previous views; or those of Mr. Frickland. I asked Mr. Baird to return the two statements to me as soon as possible so that I could re-examine the statements and make any changes which I considered might be necessary in the light of references (a) and (b). A messenger delivered the sealed envelope to my quarters at . The envelope contained only one statement, the classified Secret version; the unclassified statement was not in the envelope, and I do not know what happened to it. I immediately re-examined the classified version and made changes as indicated in the filed copy attached hereto.

WALLACE M. GREENE, JR.

SECRET

OFFICE OF  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

24 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL  
WALLACE M. GREENE, JR.,  
USMC

Dear General,

Attached are the papers  
which you discussed over the phone  
with Mr. Baird at 6:30 this evening.

Very respectfully,

*Michael Spark*  
Michael Spark  
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC  
Marine Corps Aide

Attachment

*Rec'd 2420 15 Aug 66 by  
mengen @*

**SECRET**classified  
originalATA12-dak  
21 Aug 1967

Statement by  
General Wallace M. GREENE, USMC  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee  
of the Senate Armed Services Committee  
On the Air War Against North Vietnam on \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee

It is an honor and a distinct personal pleasure to meet with you again. I know you have questions and I hope to answer them.

Since I have recently returned from a most rewarding trip to South Vietnam, perhaps I can set the stage for some of your questions. I found - as usual - a refreshing desire on the part of all hands to contribute to the war and, even more encouraging, a complete reversal of the pessimistic outlook - the doubts and fears - which plague us so here in Washington.

The Marines are more deeply committed than ever in all facets of the war. For example, out of our entire active structure, [58%] of the Marine infantry battalions, [37%] of the Jet Tactical Squadrons and [54%] of the Helicopter Squadrons are fighting in Vietnam. This adds up to very nearly 1/3 of all the Marines on our rolls being committed to the Vietnam War. This proportion of commitment is higher than that of any other Service.

DSR 67-T- 914

**SECRET**

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[Although the Marine Corps is stretched thin world-wide as a result,] I would like to give you an idea of what return the nation is getting from this commitment. In I CTZ, during the first 6 months of this year, we had [44%] of all enemy incidents and [32%] of all enemy forces opposed by only 21% of the friendly forces, but we produced 45% of the total enemy killed. While, of course, US Army and Free World forces have contributed to operations in the I Corps area, the heaviest actions have involved Marine Corps forces in the DMZ area. I believe the results show clearly that the Marine operational and organizational concepts are sound.

The enemy, by directly committing large segments of North Vietnamese Regular Army from the DMZ sanctuary, has opened a second front. This clearly amounts to open aggression against South Vietnam, giving the lie to communist propaganda for all to see. His overall strategy, as expounded by Pham Van Dong the NVN Prime Minister, is:

"...through a program of all-out attacks, to cause many US casualties, and so to erode the US will that the anti-war influences will gain decisive strength."

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Insofar as the DMZ area is concerned, Nguyen Van Mai of the NFL Press office in Phnom Penh said:

"The National Liberation Front will entice the Americans close to the North Vietnamese border and will bleed them without mercy. In southern South Vietnam the pacification campaign will be destroyed."

In essence, our enemy is counting on his patience, our lack of it, plus an attrition of our forces, as his formula to win. Further, he wants to divert our forces from the critical regions where the people and resources are.

He has succeeded to a degree in drawing forces away from the critical, populated lowland areas, but he has paid heavily. He has lost over 30,000 troops in I CTZ just in the first six months of 1967. That is the price he was willing to pay in an effort to slow down our pacification program. But despite his efforts, it is still grinding, slowly, ahead. The rate of progress is slow and as long as we must counter the threat of [37] enemy battalions in the general DMZ area, progress will continue to be slow.

[ ] It is for those reasons that we need more forces in SVN, [ ] and I applaud the President's recent decision to provide some additional forces [ ] as a step in the right direction.

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[I am firmly convinced we need [another division] with its associated helicopter and fixed wing support, to accomplish our assigned objectives in the I CTZ ---] which are ~~essential~~ and ~~assigned~~ these objectives in a reasonable period of time.]

With respect to the air war, I recognize that while the Marines are not a major participant in the activity over North Vietnam, we have been involved, from the very beginning and are getting deeper into it all the time.

In addition to our continuing effort in [Route Package 1] in Southern North Vietnam, our A6 and EA6 assets are being used in the far north and our Marine Tactical Data System provides a vital link in the entire chain of air coordination. That we have been able to make these needed contributions to the air campaign in the North in addition to conducting operations in I Corps is testimony, I believe, to the soundness of Marine Corps concepts that its forces must be balanced in air/ground structure and equipment to meet readily any combatant task that US commitments around the world may require.

As you well know, I have long been an advocate of a stronger air campaign against NVN, and I remain convinced that such must be a necessary part of our strategy. Since Admiral Sharp and General Wheeler have covered that

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ATA12-dak

strategy and the relationship of the air campaign to it, I won't go over it again. I would emphasize, however, that we must make it as difficult and costly as we can for Hanoi to support the war. Of prime importance in accomplishing this task is reducing to the minimum their importation of war supporting material. [This requires the closure of Haiphong to deny the sea lines of communication while concurrently cutting the enemy land supply lines to China. I have consistently recommended mining the harbor of Haiphong since November of 1964. Further, I am not a believer in sanctuary or buffer areas. [I do not hold with those who feel that actions against these would trigger major reaction by the Soviets or the Communist Chinese.] They are supporting an aggressor - who is our enemy. That support results in the loss of American lives. This does not seem to me to warrant extraordinary measures for their safety while they accomplish this support.] In short, my position has consistently been that we must do all we can to reduce infiltration of men and material, regardless of its source, whether from NVN, through Laos, Cambodia, or by sea. We should do everything possible -- indeed we have the responsibility -- to provide our forces with the support they require.

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ATA12-dak

Of course we have our problems. You gentlemen are aware of them as you should be. My duty is to answer your questions about them. But there are bright sides as well, and they also merit your consideration.

The war is progressing. The continuing attempts of NVN to invade the South in force, designed to reverse the successes we have made in our vital pacification task, have not succeeded; and every invasion has met with dismal failure - and overwhelming enemy losses. But they have slowed down the planned progress we had for pacification. To that extent, we must concede a measure of enemy success. Short of that, however, all they have left to hold to is their hope that, because of the slowness of our progress, and our casualties, and our domestic dissent, we will become discouraged. I, for one, gentlemen, am not discouraged. It will take time, and money, and determination; not just by the military, but by all Americans. The amount of time the actual fighting will last is a function of the effectiveness of the air campaign, the number of combat forces we have on the ground for both the pacification and major engagement tasks, the supporting naval effort, and the soundness of our strategy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**SECRET**

Unclassified Version

ATA12-jfc

Statement by  
General Wallace M. GREENE, USMC  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee  
of the Senate Armed Services Committee  
On the Air War Against North Vietnam on \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee

It is an honor and a distinct personal pleasure to  
meet with you again. I know you have questions and I  
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Since I have recently returned from a most rewarding  
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war and, even more encouraging, a complete reversal of  
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The Marines are more deeply committed than ever in  
all facets of the war. Very nearly 1/3 of all the  
Marines on our rolls are committed to the Vietnam War.  
This proposition of commitment is higher than that of  
any other Service.

I would like to give you an idea of what return the  
nation is getting from this commitment. In I Corps,

ATA12-jfc

during the first 6 months of this year with over 40% of all enemy incidents and over 30% of all enemy forces opposed by only 21% of the friendly forces, we produced 45% of the total enemy killed. While, of course, US Army and Free World forces have contributed to operations in the I Corps Area, the heaviest actions have involved Marine forces in the DMZ Area. I believe the results show clearly that the Marine operational and organizational concepts are sound.

The enemy, by directly committing large segments of North Vietnamese Regular Army from the DMZ sanctuary, has opened a second front. This clearly amounts to open aggression against South Vietnam, giving the lie to communist propaganda for all to see. His overall strategy, as expounded by Pham Van Dong the NVN Prime Minister, is:

"...through a program of all-out attacks, to cause many US casualties, and so to erode the US will that the anti-war influences will gain decisive strength".

Insofar as the DMZ area is concerned, Nguyen Van Mai, a high VC official said:

"The National Liberation Front will entice the Americans close to the North Vietnamese border and will

ATA12-jfc

bleed them without mercy. In southern South Vietnam the pacification campaign will be destroyed."

In essence, our enemy is counting on his patience, our lack of it, plus an attrition of our forces, as his formula to win. Further, he wants to divert our forces from the critical regions where the people and resources are.

He has succeeded to a degree in drawing forces away from the critical, populated lowland areas, but he has paid heavily. He has lost over 30,000 troops in I CTZ just in the first six months of 1967. That is the price he was willing to pay in an effort to slow down our pacification program. But despite his efforts, it is still grinding slowly ahead. The rate of progress is slow and as long as we must counter the threat of invasion in the DMZ area, it will continue to be slow.

It is for those reasons that we need more forces in SVN, and I applaud the President's recent decision to provide ~~some~~ additional forces, as a step in the right direction. I am firmly convinced we need another division, with its associated helicopter and fixed wing support, to

ATA12-jfc

accomplish our assigned objectives in the I CTZ --- if we are to accomplish those objectives in a reasonable period of time.

With respect to the air war, the Marines have been involved from the very beginning and are getting deeper into it all the time. In addition to our continuing effort in Southern North Vietnam, our aircraft are being used in the far north. That we have been able to make these needed contributions to the air campaign in the North in addition to conducting operations in I Corps is testimony, I believe, to the soundness of Marine Corps concepts that its forces must be balanced in air/ground structure and equipment to meet readily any combatant task that U.S. commitments around the world may require.

As you will know, I have long been an advocate of a strong air campaign against NVN. I would emphasize, that in my view, we must make it as difficult and costly as we can for Hanoi to support the war. Of prime importance in accomplishing this task is reducing to the minimum their importation of war supporting material. This requires the closure of Haiphong to deny the sea lines

ATA12-jfc

~~of communication while concurrently cutting the enemy land supply lines to China. I have consistently recommended mining the harbor of Haiphong since November of 1964. Further, I am not a believer in sanctuary or buffer areas. The people using these areas are supporting an aggressor who is our enemy. That support results in the loss of American lives. This does not seem to me to warrant extraordinary measures for their safety while they accomplish this support. In short, my position has consistently been that we must do all we can to reduce infiltration of men and materiel, regardless of its source, whether from NVN, through Laos, through Cambodia, or by sea. We should do everything possible -- indeed we have the responsibility -- to provide our forces with the support they require.~~


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ATA12-jfc

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PLEASE RETURN  
CODE ARASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

January 6, 1967

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY ~~SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE~~  
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(COMPTROLLER)  
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY  
(LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Security Review of Executive Session Congressional  
Testimony

References: (a) DoD Directive 5122.5, "Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)," July 10, 1961  
(b) DoD Directive 5400.4, "Provision of Information to  
the Congress," December 24, 1966

References (a) and (b) assign to this office authority for security review  
of testimony by Defense witnesses before Congressional Committees  
in executive session.

It is essential to the efficient discharge of this responsibility that my  
Directorate for Security Review:

Be provided consistent, authoritative, and defensible security  
positions on transcripts of executive session testimony which clearly  
identify for deletion that information the unauthorized disclosure of  
which could result in damage to the United States within the meaning  
of Executive Order 10501.

Be afforded adequate time to permit thorough final security  
review action.

It is imperative that security review action be supported with  
defensible security positions. Inconsistencies cannot be justified  
and inevitably result in severe criticism from Chairmen and

2 132

Members of Congressional Committees. Security guidances are frequently so broad that interpretations and judgments vary widely within a single department. I therefore urge addressees to review procedures for the establishment of consistent, authoritative, and defensible security positions.

Time to be allowed for transcript review by the Directorate for Security Review is established as a minimum of forty-eight hours or one-half of the time available between official receipt of a transcript from a Congressional Committee and the deadline for its return to the Committee.

In the interest of effecting thorough security review of testimony within the shortest time practicable, I am herein restating pertinent policies and procedures and establishing additional requirements:

A. Prepared Statements

1. Congressional Committees normally desire that prepared statements be delivered to the Committee staffs at least twenty-four hours in advance of the hearing. It is incumbent upon the responsible monitoring agencies to keep prospective witnesses apprised of upcoming appearances and insure that their statements are prepared sufficiently early to allow for proper processing and review.
2. Prepared statements will be submitted in quadruplicate to the Directorate for Security Review, OASD(PA), at least five working days prior to the day of delivery to the Committee. While there may be cases in which the prescribed time limit cannot be met, monitoring agencies must insure compliance with these requirements in all cases except true emergencies.

B. Transcripts

1. Following testimony by DoD witnesses before a Congressional Committee in closed session, the Committee will normally provide the Department

of Defense a stenographic transcript of testimony in order that: (1) necessary editorial corrections may be made, (2) additional information requested may be provided, and (3) security information may be deleted if publication is contemplated.

2. Expedited handling and editing is essential. Time limits for the return of transcripts are normally imposed by the Congressional Committees. Monitoring agencies must exercise tight control over each step in the review process to insure there is no unjustifiable delay.
3. Information presented in hearings may not be released to the public until released by the Committee or by permission of the Committee. The importance of maintaining the confidence of Congress in this regard cannot be overemphasized.
4. Editing by witnesses should be limited to punctuation and changes of language designed to clarify the intent of the witnesses and to correction of mistakes in facts or figures. Extensive substantive revision or the addition of new information is not permitted unless expressly authorized by Congressional Committees. Material to be deleted for editorial reasons will be lined out rather than bracketed. Brackets are reserved for security deletions. Editing will be done in ordinary black lead pencil and printed where possible.
5. Information which warrants the protection of a security classification will be marked for deletion by brackets / / with ordinary black lead pencil and the symbol of the office or organization taking the action entered in the margin. Security deletions must be as specific as possible - for example, classified figures will normally be deleted rather than the sentence or paragraph in which they appear. If an entire passage or page is considered to require deletion, the brackets

DECLASSIFIED

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Addressees are requested to provide this office with information concerning responsibilities assigned and procedures adopted to meet the requirements established in this memorandum. This information, including the names of the offices which will be responsible for monitoring the action on prepared statements, transcripts, and inserts, is desired by January 15, 1967.

*Arthur Sylvester*

Arthur Sylvester

Attachment  
DD Form 1587

will clearly indicate the extent of the deletion recommended. When more than one page is marked for deletion, brackets should be used at the beginning and end of each page. Recommendations for deletion of information from executive session transcripts must reflect a defensible security position that can be consistently maintained from day to day, from witness to witness, and from committee to committee.

6. After necessary editing and preliminary security review have been accomplished, monitoring agencies will submit transcripts for final security review by the Directorate for Security Review, Office Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). It is essential that monitoring agencies arrange to meet the time requirement for this review by the Directorate for Security Review, which is stated earlier in this memorandum as a minimum of forty-eight hours or one-half of the time available before the deadline established by the Committee. Final security determinations will be made by that Directorate, utilizing red pencil markings.
7. It is the policy of the Directorate for Security Review, during peak work load periods, to review transcripts on a first in-first out basic. Monitoring agencies which desire, in special cases, to change assigned priorities will be responsible for making the necessary arrangements with other interested monitoring agencies and with the Congressional Committees involved.
8. Attached to this memorandum is DD Form 1587, Congressional Transcript Review. Effective immediately a copy of this form will be attached as a cover sheet on each executive session transcript of Congressional testimony which is reviewed for security within the Department of Defense.

This form is divided into three parts as follows:

- a. Heading - this portion of the form is designed for use by monitoring agencies to forward transcripts to appropriate offices for review and to establish deadlines for the return of transcripts to the monitoring agencies after that preliminary review.
- b. Guidelines - this statement of instructions for proper marking of transcripts is self-explanatory. It is important that these instructions be followed by all persons who review transcripts.
- c. Log and certificate - this portion of the form must be filled in by all review officials.

Copies of this form may be obtained from the Directorate for Security Review, Room 1E764.

C. Inserts for the Record

It is essential that all information prepared at Committee request for insertion as a part of the official record be submitted to the Directorate for Security Review for review before delivery to the Congressional Committee. Appropriate procedures should be established to preclude the possibility that insert material is forwarded to Congressional Committees without this required review action.

It is emphasized that the Directorate for Security Review has no responsibility for monitoring the action on prepared statements, transcripts or inserts for the record before their delivery to that office for final security review.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JAN 11 1965



MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments  
The Director of Defense Research and  
Engineering  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense  
The General Counsel  
The Assistants to the Secretary of Defense  
The Directors, Defense Agencies

SUBJECT: Congressional Appearances by Department of Defense  
Witnesses

I have been asked by prospective witnesses to provide guidance for the benefit of personnel of the Department who, in the course of congressional hearings, are required to give their personal opinions on matters concerning which a Department of Defense position has been established by the Secretary of Defense with the approval of the President. If pressed for his personal opinion, the witness should make clear:

1. that his personal views were expressed (if such be the fact) to appropriate authorities within the Defense Department before the departmental position was established;
2. where his views are not in accord with the departmental decision, that, notwithstanding his personal views, he has accepted and will abide by the departmental position; and
3. the considerations or factors which support the decision; in other words, the pros and cons on the issue involved.

A handwritten signature in cursive ink that appears to read "Cyrus Vance".

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

2 255

STATEMENT APPROVED BY CMC  
23 AUG 67

TAB A

It is for those reasons that we need more forces in SVN, and I applaud the President's recent decision to provide some additional forces as a step in the right direction. I am firmly convinced we need another division, with its associated helicopter and fixed wing support, to accomplish our assigned objectives in the I CTZ --- if we are to accomplish those objectives in a reasonable period of time.

Of prime importance in accomplishing this task is reducing to the minimum their importation of war supporting material. This requires the closure of Haiphong to deny the sea lines of communication while concurrently cutting the enemy land supply lines to China. I have consistently recommended mining the harbor of Haiphong since November of 1964. Further, I am not a believer in sanctuary or buffer areas. I do not hold with those who feel that actions against these would trigger major reaction by the Soviets or the Communist Chinese. They are supporting an aggressor - who is our enemy. That support results in the loss of American lives. This does not seem to me to warrant extraordinary measures for their safety while they accomplish this support. In short, my position has consistently been that we must do all we can to reduce infiltration of men and material, regardless of its source, whether from NVN, through Laos, Cambodia, or by sea. We should do everything possible -- indeed we have the responsibility -- to provide our forces with the support they require.

DOD RECOMMENDED DELETIONS/CHANGES  
24 Aug 67

TAB B

CHANGE TO READ:

It is for those reasons that we need more forces in SVN, and I applaud the President's recent decision to provide some additional forces, which are essential if we are to accomplish our assigned objectives in a reasonable period of time.

DELETE: This requires the closure of Haiphong to deny the sea lines of communication while concurrently cutting the enemy land supply lines to China. I have consistently recommended mining the harbor of Haiphong since November of 1964. Further, I am not a believer in sanctuary or buffer areas. I do not hold with those who feel that actions against these would trigger major reaction by the Soviets or the Communist Chinese. They are supporting an aggressor - who is our enemy. That support results in the loss of American lives. This does not seem to me to warrant extraordinary measures for their safety while they accomplish this support.

DELETE:

Whether from NVN, through Laos, Cambodia, or by sea.

CMC SUBMISSION TO DOD  
24 AUG 67

TAB D

It is for those reasons that we need more forces in VN, and I applaud the President's recent decision to provide additional forces.

I am firmly convinced we need another division, with its associated helicopter and fixed wing support, to accomplish our assigned objectives in the I CTZ --- if we are to accomplish those objectives in a reasonable period of time.

Of prime importance in accomplishing this task is reducing to the minimum their importation of war supporting material.

We must do all we can to reduce infiltration of men and material, regardless of its source,

We should do everything possible -- indeed we have the responsibility -- to provide our forces with the support they require.

DOD RECOMMENDED DELETION  
25 Aug 67

TAB E

DELETE:

I am firmly convinced we need another division, with its associated helicopter and fixed wing support, to accomplish our assigned objectives in the I CTZ --- if we are to accomplish those objectives in a reasonable period of time.

DECLASSIFIED

FINAL CMC SUBMISSION  
25 AUG 67

TAB F

It is for those reasons that we need more forces in SVN, and I applaud the President's recent decision to provide additional forces.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED STATEMENT ON RIGHT PAGE

UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT PASTED ON LEFT PAGE

DECLASSIFIED

Cleared  
for open publication

24 AUG 1967 8

AS AMENDED

Statement by  
General Wallace M. GREENE, USMC  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee  
of the Senate Armed Services Committee  
On the Air War Against North Vietnam on 1400, Monday, 28Aug67

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee

It is an honor and a distinct personal pleasure to  
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Since I have recently returned from a most rewarding  
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some of your questions. I found - as usual - a refresh-  
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war and, even more encouraging, a complete reversal of  
the pessimistic outlook - the doubts and fears - which  
plague us so here in Washington.

The Marines are more deeply committed than ever in  
all facets of the war. Very nearly 1/3 of all the  
Marines on our rolls are committed to the Vietnam War.  
This proportion of commitment is higher than that of  
any other Service.

**SECRET**

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**"DOWNGRADING AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED  
DOD DIR 5200.10"**

**SECRET**

26 Aug  
Addition

Although the Marine Corps is stretched thin world-wide as a result, I would like to give you an idea of what return the nation is getting from this commitment. In I Corps, during the first 6 months of this year with over 40% of all enemy incidents and over 30% of all enemy forces opposed by only 21% of the friendly forces, we produced 45% of the total enemy killed. While, of course, US Army and Free World forces have contributed to operations in the I Corps Area, the heaviest actions have involved Marine forces in the DMZ Area. I believe the results show clearly that the Marine operational and organizational concepts are sound.

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Insofar as the DMZ area is concerned, Nguyen Van Mai, a high VC official said:

"The National Liberation Front will entice the Americans close to the North Vietnamese border and will bleed them without mercy. In southern South Vietnam the pacification campaign will be destroyed."

In essence, our enemy is counting on his patience, our lack of it, plus an attrition of our forces, as his formula to win. Further, he wants to divert our forces from the critical regions where the people and resources are.

He has succeeded to a degree in drawing forces away from the critical, populated lowland areas, but he has paid heavily. He has lost over 30,000 troops in I CTZ just in the first six months of 1967. That is the price he was willing to pay in an effort to slow down our pacification program. But despite his efforts, it is still grinding slowly ahead. The rate of progress is slow and as long as we must counter the threat of invasion in the DMZ area, it will continue to be slow.

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Of course we have our problems. You gentlemen are  
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**SECRET**ATA12-dak  
21 Aug 1967

Statement by  
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Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee  
of the Senate Armed Services Committee  
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LATEST 251030 version  
final draft

Statement by  
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Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee  
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On the Air War Against North Vietnam on 1400, Monday, 28Aug67

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"The National Liberation Front will entice the Americans close to the North Vietnamese border and will bleed them without mercy. In southern South Vietnam the pacification campaign will be destroyed."

In essence, our enemy is counting on his patience, our lack of it, plus an attrition of our forces, as his formula to win. Further, he wants to divert our forces from the critical regions where the people and resources are.

He has succeeded to a degree in drawing forces away from the critical, populated lowland areas, but he has paid heavily. He has lost over 30,000 troops in I CTZ just in the first six months of 1967. That is the price he was willing to pay in an effort to slow down our pacification program. But despite his efforts, it is still grinding, slowly, ahead. The rate of progress is slow and as long as we must counter the threat of 37 enemy battalions in the general DMZ area, progress will continue to be slow.

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In addition to our continuing effort in Route Package 1 in Southern North Vietnam, our A6 and EA6 assets are being used in the far north and our Marine Tactical Data System provides a vital link in the entire chain of air coordination. That we have been able to make these needed contributions to the air campaign in the North in addition to conducting operations in I Corps is testimony, I believe, to the soundness of Marine Corps concepts that its forces must be balanced in air/ground structure and equipment to meet readily any combatant task that US commitments around the world may require.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman

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ATA12-dak  
25 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. At approximately 1330, in the presence of LtCol CHADWICK of the HQMC Legislative Liaison Office, I discussed the clearance of CMC's CLASSIFIED statement with Captain William KELLY in DOD. The Security Review office recommended deletion of the sentence at page 5 of the latest submission (Tab D) which stated:

"I am firmly convinced we need another division, with its associated helicopter and fixed wing support, to accomplish our assigned objectives in the I CTZ --- if we are to accomplish those objectives in a reasonable period of time."

2. Reason cited was that a policy decision had been made at the Presidential level concerning additional forces. CMC would be free to respond to questions on his views, but should not volunteer them in the statement (Reference (b) to CMC MR applies).
3. Following receipt of CMC's approval at 1355, DOD was authorized to rewrite page 4 of the statement, deleting the above sentence.



H. F. PAINTER  
Colonel USMC

TAB E

DECLASSIFIED

OPNAV FORM 5216-96 (Rev. 1-59)

8-31000



**CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ATTACHED**

SAFEGUARD -

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS CLASSIFICATION SET FORTH  
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY SECURITY MANUAL FOR  
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET



## OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

August 25, 1967

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Ref: 67-T-914

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER R. E. LASHLEY, Jr., USN  
Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of the Navy

SUBJECT: Statement of General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. before the  
Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, regarding  
the Air War in North Vietnam.

There is no objection to the presentation of the subject statement  
in classified form.

*Richard D. Lazenby*  
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Captain, USN  
Chief, Navy Division  
Directorate for Security Review

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On the Air War Against North Vietnam on 1400, Monday, 28Aug67

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It is an honor and a distinct personal pleasure to meet with you again. I know you have questions and I hope to answer them.

Since I have recently returned from a most rewarding trip to South Vietnam, perhaps I can set the stage for some of your questions. I found - as usual - a refreshing desire on the part of all hands to contribute to the war and, even more encouraging, a complete reversal of the pessimistic outlook - the doubts and fears - which plague us so here in Washington.

The Marines are more deeply committed than ever in all facets of the war. For example, out of our entire active structure, 58% of the Marine infantry battalions, 37% of the Jet Tactical Squadrons and 54% of the Helicopter Squadrons are fighting in Vietnam. This adds up to very nearly 1/3 of all the Marines on our rolls being committed to the Vietnam War. This proportion of commitment is higher than that of any other Service.

**"DOWNGRADING AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED  
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FINAL DRAFT  
242215 Aug 67  
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ATA12-jfc

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*LATEST 251030 VERSION*  
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He has succeeded to a degree in drawing forces away from the critical, populated lowland areas, but he has paid heavily. He has lost over 30,000 troops in I CTZ just in the first six months of 1967. That is the price he was willing to pay in an effort to slow down our pacification program. But despite his efforts, it is still grinding slowly ahead. The rate of progress is slow and as long as we must counter the threat of invasion in the DMZ area, it will continue to be slow.

It is for those reasons that we need more forces in SVN, and I applaud the President's recent decision to provide additional forces.

With respect to the air war, the Marines have been involved from the very beginning and are getting deeper into it all the time. In addition to our continuing effort in southern North Vietnam, our aircraft are being used in the far north. That we have been able to make these needed contributions to the air campaign in the North in addition to conducting operations in I Corps is testimony, I believe, to the soundness of Marine Corps concepts that its forces must be balanced in air/ground structure and equipment to meet readily any combatant task that U.S. commitments around the world may require.

As you well know, I have long been an advocate of a strong air campaign against NVN. I would emphasize, that in my view, we must make it as difficult and costly as we can for Hanoi to support the war. Of prime importance in accomplishing this task is reducing to the minimum their importation of war supporting material. We must do all we can to reduce infiltration of men and supplies, regardless of its source. We should do everything

possible -- indeed we have the responsibility -- to provide our forces with the support they require.

Of course we have our problems. You gentlemen are aware of them as you should be. My duty is to answer your questions about them. But there are bright sides as well, and they also merit your consideration.

The war is progressing. The continuing attempts of NVN to invade the South in force, designed to reverse the successes we have made in our vital pacification task, have not succeeded; and every invasion has met with dismal failure and overwhelming enemy losses. But they have slowed down the planned progress we had for pacification. To that extent, we must concede a measure of enemy success. Short of that, however, all they have left to hold to is their hope that, because of the slowness of our progress, and our casualties, and our domestic dissent, we will become discouraged. I, for one, gentlemen, am not discouraged. It will take time, and money, and determination; not just by the military, but by all Americans. We can, and we must, persevere.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CLEARED  
FOR OPEN PUBLICATION

24 AUG 1967 8

AS AMENDED

Statement by  
General Wallace M. GREENE, USMC      DIRECTORATE FOR SECURITY REVIEW (OASD-PA)  
Commandant of the Marine Corps      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
Before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee  
of the Senate Armed Services Committee  
On the Air War Against North Vietnam on 1400, Monday, 28Aug67

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee

It is an honor and a distinct personal pleasure to meet with you again. I know you have questions and I hope to answer them.

Since I have recently returned from a most rewarding trip to South Vietnam, perhaps I can set the stage for some of your questions. I found - as usual - a refreshing desire on the part of all hands to contribute to the war and, even more encouraging, a complete reversal of the pessimistic outlook - the doubts and fears - which plague us so here in Washington.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ATA12-dak  
261200 AUG67

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Revision of UNCLASSIFIED Stennis Committee Statement

1. This morning BGen Wilson and Colonel Painter conferred by telephone with Mr. Kendall, Counsel for the Stennis Committee, on his objections to the UNCLASSIFIED version of CMC's statement. Mr. Kendall indicated:

a. The UNCLASSIFIED statement did not accurately reflect the SECRET version and he could not recommend its release. He hinted that if it weren't changed, he would recommend that the Chairman take up the differences on the Floor of the Senate.

b. Specifically he objected to deletion of the following-SECRET version (Tab F):

(1) Page 2.

"Although the Marine Corps is stretched thin world-wide as a result,..."

(2) Page 4. Reference to "Route Package 1", "A6 and EA6 assets" and mentioned the phase referring to the MTDS, acknowledging that he didn't know if it was classified or not.

(3) Page 5.

"...and I remain convinced that such must be a necessary part of our strategy. Since Admiral Sharp and General Wheeler have covered that strategy and the relationship of the air campaign to it, I won't go over it again."

(4) Page 6.

The last sentence beginning with "the amount of time..." and ending with "...soundness of our strategy."

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2. The above objections were discussed with the Chief of Staff who was informed that the deletions had been made here in this Headquarters and not by DOD and that DOD had, in fact, recommended the inclusion of the one at subparagraph (4) above in the UNCLASSIFIED statement. The Chief of Staff directed that DOD (Security Review) be contacted with reference to the mechanics of approval of a change and that CMC's approval be obtained for inclusion of the material referred to in subparagraphs (1), (3) and (4).

3. At 1100, this date, Mr. Roger Delaney, Deputy Director of the Directorate of Security Review, ASD (Public Affairs), in a telephone conversation with Colonel Painter, authorized changing the UNCLASSIFIED statement by including the phrases referred to in subparagraphs (1), (3) and (4). He further stated that this verbal authorization would not be changed and we could wait until Monday morning to get a formal clearance stamp on the revised statement.

4. At 1200, CMC's approval of the changes was received and the statement was accordingly revised.



Cleared  
for open publication

28 AUG 1967 8

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the number of combat forces we have on the ground for both the pacification and major engagement tasks, the supporting naval effort, and the soundness of our strategy. We can, and we must, persevere.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.