

Washington Star 11⁷ Jan 72

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

Dispute Over Khe Sanh Lingers On

By ORR KELLY

The battle of Khe Sanh was fought nearly four years ago in the rugged northwest corner of South Vietnam. But the details of one of the bitterest inter-service disputes of the Vietnam war still are shrouded in clouds of secrecy even more impenetrable than the clouds that hung over Khe Sanh during much of the battle.

A new, official Marine Corps history of the Marine war in Vietnam has now lifted the veil just enough to reopen the controversy — without providing the information an outsider would need to judge the merits of the dispute.

★

At the height of the battle, which went on from late January 1968 to the first of April, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander of American forces in Vietnam and now chief of staff of the Army, took control of tactical aircraft operations in the Khe Sanh area away from the Marines and gave it to the Air Force.

The Marines, always jealous of their control over aircraft operating with their ground forces, were furious. But they went along with Westmoreland's orders, air power played major role in the battle (the Air Force, in fact, has described it as the first ground conflict won by air power) and the battered enemy forces withdrew without having overrun the badly outnumbered Marine force.

But the overview-and-index volume of the official historical series, "Operations of U.S. Marine Forces in Vietnam," published by the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, makes a serious charge about the results of Westmoreland's order.

"Nineteen sixty-eight," it says, "brought a radical disruption to III Marine Amphibious Force's organization for combat when on 10 March, its fixed wing strike and reconnaissance aircraft and associated air control assets were assigned to the mission direction of 7th Air Force. By the time 7th Air Force control actually got underway (1 April) the Tet offensive was over, the battle for Hue was fought and won, and the siege of Khe Sanh was broken."

In other words, according to the Marines, Westmoreland's order caused "radical disruption" in the midst of a battle, but the Marines went on and won it anyway, before the Air Force could get itself organized.

Unfortunately, the one volume of the Marine history in which that paragraph appears is the only one of a 67-volume, month-by-month history of the war that is available to the public. The rest are classified.

Similarly, almost everything in the Air Force files that might shed light on what happened during that critical period also is still classified, according to the Air Force historian's office at the Pentagon.

★

In his report on the war in Vietnam, issued after his departure from Vietnam, Westmoreland devoted a single paragraph to the shift of air control from the Marines to the Air Force.

"My objective," he said, "was to develop procedures that would combine into a single system the best features of both the Air Force and Marine tactical air support systems, and thereby provide more flexible, effective, and

responsive aerial firepower support for our ground forces."

In the case of Khe Sanh, Westmoreland himself was exercising personal control over at least a portion of the air operations. He slept in his headquarters next to the combat operations center and personally decided where the B52 bombers would strike.

★

Certainly, Westmoreland had some good precedent on his side in giving control of the air assets to a single air commander. In 1947, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, then fresh from leading allied troops to victory in Europe, was asked by the Defense secretary whether control over tactical air power should be given to the fledgling Air Force or to the Army. He came down solidly on the side of the Air Force and declared:

"Basically, the Army doesn't belong in the air; it belongs on the ground."

The Army has since gotten back into the air in a big way with 23,500 aviators and 11,500 aircraft of its own, and the Marines have never agreed that someone else should be controlling the planes that are dropping bombs and firing rockets and machine guns near their men on the ground.

The ground war may be nearly over for Americans in Vietnam, but the basic conflict over control of close air support is far from over.

It would help those in the public and Congress who have a financial stake—if nothing else—in the argument, if the veil of secrecy were lifted from what really happened at Khe Sanh between March 10 and April 1, 1968.

Mrs. Calhoun Shorts
12021 Main Street
Bellevue, Washington 98004

Dear Mrs. Shorts:

The Secretary of the Navy has asked that I reply to your letter of 19 March 1968 addressed to the Secretary of Defense concerning the Marine combat base at Khe Sanh.

Khe Sanh, as you know, is a part of a system of patrol bases astride the infiltration routes into South Vietnam. This defensive system was organized at the direction of the operational commander in Vietnam in 1966 to thwart a major enemy invasion across the Demilitarized Zone. Since that time, Marine units in the DMZ area have defeated seven such attempted invasions by large scale forces. Additionally, our continued presence denies the enemy relatively easy access routes to the major population centers of the northern provinces including possible use of Route 9, the only east-west route in the northern portion of South Vietnam.

Khe Sanh is the western anchor of our mutually supporting positions in the DMZ. A withdrawal from Khe Sanh would require a fall back to another position equally susceptible to attack, or the withdrawal of forces occupying other positions along the DMZ as well. A withdrawal of this type would result in larger scale confrontations with the enemy in the more populated areas and urban centers, plus subjecting our military logistics installations and lines of communications to more frequent attack by major forces.

Substantial Marine forces are deployed at Khe Sanh and occupy an extensive complex of mutually supporting, fortified positions. In addition to the artillery units at Khe Sanh, 175mm guns are in positions from which to provide support, as required. Hundreds of Marine, Navy and Air Force planes, ranging from attack aircraft to heavy bombers, are available to bombard the enemy positions on an around-the-clock basis. As a result of this combat power, our

Malcolm
8 APR 1968

forces have inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, and recently it appears he has effected at least a partial withdrawal. Furthermore, sizable numbers of additional troop units are available in I Corps Tactical Zone for reinforcement should the situation warrant.

In addition to our tactical aviation effort, both fixed wing transports and helicopters provided daily logistic and medical evacuation support to our forces in the Khe Sanh area. There has never been any shortage of combat equipment which could preclude Marines at Khe Sanh from performing their mission. Although the amount of ammunition, food and supplies delivered each day is classified information, it is interesting to note that during the month of February, 90,613 pounds of mail were delivered to our forces at both the main position and the outposts. Even more revealing is the 79,980 pounds of mail delivered during the first seventeen days of March. When it is taken into consideration that food, equipment and ammunition receive higher transportation priorities than mail, it is apparent that the Marines at Khe Sanh are receiving the necessary logistic support.

The quality of medical treatment received by our personnel at Khe Sanh is unprecedented in military history. The first aid facilities at the base are adequate to support a higher casualty rate for a longer period than is currently necessary. However, our medical evacuation policy at Khe Sanh, as well as throughout I Corps Tactical Zone, is based on immediate helicopter evacuation of the seriously wounded to large medical facilities in more secure areas. At no time have seriously wounded personnel been unduly exposed to enemy fire or required to wait inordinately long periods of time for evacuation.

While Marine presence along the DMZ is a heavy and challenging commitment, it is this presence which impedes more direct North Vietnamese invasion.

I trust that this information will allay somewhat your concern for our forces at Khe Sanh.

Sincerely,

12021 Main St.
Bellevue, Wash., 98004
March 19, 1968

Mr. Clark Clifford
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Clifford:

In recent weeks I have become so concerned with the situation of the Marines at Khe San that I feel I MUST take advantage of the American right to voice one's opinion and tell you my feelings.

I grant that I do not know what military plans there may be for protecting the young men there or of what value their presence now is to the military picture but I do know that the negative impression Americans get of the prospects for the survival of these young men is one of the several factors that has so drastically changed the support for our Commander in Chief.

Newspaper, radio, and T-V coverage constantly compare the situation to Dien Bien Phu. This is not a cheering comparison. The men themselves must be aware of it. To them and to their relatives and friends it must seem that America has left them to accept the same death and defeat that the French took. That our generals would, to all intents and purposes, turn their back on these men, particularly those on the lonely outposts of Hills 881, 861, etc. where they can neither be replaced, re-supplied or evacuated, seems an incredible situation. If the officers in charge learned nothing from the French defeat, they should be replaced.

The response of our Military to the outcry is that we have "fire power and mobility," as the French did not. But the facts don't show this. The facts show that in spite of the fire power, the men of Khe San face an ever-increasing number of Viet Cong or North Vietnamese. Planes which provide that "mobility" can't even land to remove the wounded or re-supply the base; they have to drop the supplies. So----we start an action down near Saigon! An action every move of which seems to be known to the enemy which conveniently melts away. If we have all that manpower, why don't we show the world that we don't just abandon our soldiers, and instigate some kind of action that would bring them before the VC tunnel right up under our own trenches and erupt like atomic moles.

Khe San could be like Dien Bien Phu because if our country is willing to sacrifice these Marines as the French garrison was sacrificed, it will completely break the will of the American people to continue. It did it to France and Giep is smart enough to know it will do the same to America. That we did not learn the lesson is incredible!!

At first I felt our action in Viet Nam was a sad but necessary one but I feel we made a mistake. Why can't a country, like a person, admit a mistake? The people don't rally to protect their own country nor apparently do they trust their new regime. Why should we continue such wholesale destruction to "save" it?

But don't simply shrug off the entrapped men in Khe San!

Yours very truly,

Henry M. Kissinger

29 FEB 1968

Mr. Everett Jordan
 United States Senate
 Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Jordan:

This letter is in reply to your inquiry of 21 February 1968 on behalf of the Reverend Robert E. Seymour relative to the combat base at Khe Sanh.

Khe Sanh, as you know, is a part of a system of patrol bases astride the infiltration routes into South Vietnam. This defensive system was organized in 1966 to thwart a major enemy invasion across the Demilitarized Zone. Since that time, Marine units in the DMZ area have defeated several attempted invasions by large scale forces. Additionally, our continued presence denies the enemy relatively easy access routes to the major population centers of the Northern provinces including possible use of Route 9, the only east-west route in the northern portion of South Vietnam.

Khe Sanh is the western anchor of our mutually supporting positions in the DMZ. A withdrawal from Khe Sanh would require a fall back to another position equally susceptible to attack, or the withdrawal of forces occupying other positions along the DMZ as well. A withdrawal of this type would result in larger scale confrontations with the enemy in more populated areas and urban centers, plus the loss of our military logistics installations and lines of communication to attack by major forces.

Thus, while Marine presence in the DMZ is a heavy and challenging commitment, it is considered a very necessary one. It is this presence which provides a shield against direct North Vietnamese invasion and without which vital military tasks to the south could not proceed.

Additional Marine forces are deployed at the base and occupy an extensive complex of mutually supporting, fortified positions. In addition to the artillery units at the base, 175mm guns are in positions from which they can provide support, as required. Marine and air force planes, ranging from jet attack aircraft to light bombers, are available to bombard the enemy positions on an around-the-clock basis. Furthermore, sizable numbers of additional troop units are available in I Corps Tactical Zone for reinforcement should the situation warrant.

I trust that the information provided will suffice to answer the questions posed by your constituent.

Sincerely,

R. G. ()
Brigadier General, Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Encl:

- (1) Ltr to Rev. Robert E. Seymour
from Senator Jordan dtd 21 Feb
1968 with telegram to Senator
Jordan from Rev. Seymour
dated 26 Feb 1968.

Copy to: SAC, 21-561
SAC 54262

FRANK BLAIR: American war planes for the first time attacked the Hanoi radio station, but when the planes withdrew, the station was still on the air.

The enemy has just approved new Japanese film of this key communications center.

JOHN RICH (FILM CLIP): From time to time, NVN permits a leftist Japanese news organization to photograph film of its military establishments. This film, released in Tokyo, shows what's described as a newly organized communications center in the vicinity of Hanoi.

The unit operates underground and numbers many women on its staff. It's called the Fifth Communications Unit of the Peoples Army. Some of the women have become very proficient; others carry on their study and practice while they work.

Ping pong seems to be the main daytime amusement, and evenings, according to the captions, they hold songfests and put on skits and plays.

NEW ROCKET USED AGAINST US IN VN

BLAIR: In Saigon, American sources said a powerful new rocket, designed and manufactured by the communist Chinese, is now being used against American fighting men.

With fighting on the outskirts growing more and more bloody, and the enemy had launching sites set up openly in the market places of villages hard by the big Tansonnhut airbase on the city's outskirts.

WILSON HALL (FILM CLIP): The problem with Tansonnhut is that it is always and will continue to be vulnerable to enemy rocket attacks. There are villages all around Tansonnhut. Some are backed right up to the perimeter. Rocket sites have been discovered in some of these villages.

Enemy 122mm rockets, the types that are hitting Tansonnhut, have a range of about seven miles. There could never be enough ground troops to continually sweep seven miles in all directions from Tansonnhut.

VNese civilians who live in the area do not report enemy movements or enemy rockets, either because they're afraid or are VC sympathizers, or because they just don't care. So, the rockets come in.

MCNAMARA FAILS TO CONVINCE FULBRIGHT

BLAIR: Sen J. W. FULBRIGHT said that two days of testimony by Def Sec MCNAMARA had failed to convince him that the US was justified

in starting the bombing of NVN 3-1/2 years ago because of a Gulf of Tonkin incident.

REPORTER (FILM CLIP): Senator, Sec MCNAMARA testified that there's unimpeachable evidence that there was a second attack on two destroyers. Do you accept his version?

FULBRIGHT: No, I do not believe they're unimpeachable. I think they're very questionable, if not inaccurate.

What we were interested in, and still are, of course, is what's significant. It's what was the situation at the time of the decision to mount very substantial attacks on NVN, that is, some 64 sorties, which, as I would call it, a very drastic reaction, especially in view of the fact that no damage whatever was done to any of our ships or personnel.

BLAIR: The Def Dept, last night, issued a statement saying that any suggestion that MCNAMARA had suppressed information on the Tonkin incident was, quote "Totally without foundation."

GEN CUSHMAN ASSESSES HUE FIGHTING

2-22-68

7:05 AM: CBS Morning News, CBS TV

DOUGLAS EDWARDS: At a news conference Gen Robert CUSHMAN was asked for an assessment of that fight.

Q: Has, in fact, the general's offensive operations in the Citadel been restricted recently due to high American casualties?

A: I think the troops have gotten tired and the casualties are bound to have an effect; the steam goes up. And that's why I'm trying to get, in my case, fresh US Marines in, and in the ARVN case, they've got some people on the move too.

Q: Have offensive operations virtually come to a standstill for the time being?

A: No, we killed 21 yesterday.

Q: Would you say that possibly the latest situation could be cleaned up in another month?

A: Well, I don't like to say. If the clouds went away for one day, you'd see a big difference. It's really impossible to say.

MARIJUANA AT THE NAVAL ACADEMY

JOHN HART (FILM CLIP): The Naval Academy was forced to make an unusual announcement when a tipster called The Washington Post to report Midshipmen were observed in a dormitory burning incense, playing on a ouija board

STANDARD KHE SANH LETTER.

REPLY COORDINATE WITH SPECIAL
ASSISTANT TO SEC DEF.

27 February 1968

Dear Miss Russell:

President Johnson has asked that I reply to your recent telegram concerning the U. S. Marine Corps units along the Demilitarized Zone at Khe Sanh.

In Vietnam, as in any war, the tactical situation is ever changing. Recently, the combat activity and infiltration attempts of the North Vietnamese have significantly increased near the Demilitarized Zone. To counter these operations, the Marines were assigned the very important mission of establishing defensive positions south of the DMZ. Their efforts have repeatedly repulsed the North Vietnamese, thereby preventing the northern provinces of South Vietnam from being overrun. During these past months, the Marines at the DMZ have received the finest combat, logistic and fire support in the history of modern warfare.

It is realized that another major engagement is probable at the Marine positions near Khe Sanh. Nevertheless, I can assure you that our field commanders in that area have reported that they have sufficient troops to ensure the accomplishment of their vital assignment. Troop level requirements are constantly reassessed by our military leaders who have the responsibility of ensuring that no unit is placed in any situation unless there are sufficient men and supplies to complete the assigned mission successfully. It is our firm belief that Khe Sanh should be, and can be, successfully defended.

There is no equivocation in our determination to support our valiant Marines. President Johnson stated it best when he said, "....We will strive to limit the conflict, for we wish neither increased destruction nor increased danger. But we will give our fighting men what they must have: every gun, every dollar and every decision--whatever the cost and whatever the challenge."

It is our sincere prayer that the time will soon come when it will no longer be necessary to send our finest young men to foreign shores to protect our precious heritage of freedom.

Sincerely,

R. S. Driver
Deputy Under Secretary

Miss Jane D. Russell
648 Dunwoody Drive
Pensacola, Florida 32503

Prep by: GARY GRIER, USMC, White House Cor. Sec. x50191
Typed by: R. David, 27 Feb 68
Copy to: SECDEF Files / 1-2-68

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Subj: Subsistence Matters Pertaining to Vietnam

1. For general background information, the following types of field rations and other essential items are provided Marines deployed in combat areas:

a. Meal, Combat, Individual (MCI's)

The Meal, Combat, Individual, which replaced the Ration, Combat, Individual ("C" Ration) and the "K" Ration used so extensively in World War II, was designed to supply individually-packaged nutritional meals. It is issued, as the tactical situation dictates, either in individual units as a meal or in multiples of three as a complete daily ration. Its characteristics emphasize utility, flexibility of use, and more variety of food components than were included in the "C" and "K" Rations. Twelve different menus are provided, two of which are attached. Each menu consists of canned meat, canned fruit, bread or dessert item, and an accessory packet containing cigarettes, matches, gum, toilet paper, coffee, cream, sugar, and salt. Each meal furnishes approximately 1200 calories. Although the meat item can be eaten cold, it is more palatable when heated. Trioxane fuel bars are issued with these meals in sufficient quantities to heat the meat item and to make coffee or cocoa.

b. Operational Ration "B"

The Standard "B" Ration is used for mass feeding in areas where kitchen facilities, with the exception of refrigeration, are available. This ration consists of approximately 103 nonperishable items, mainly canned and dehydrated, and is served in bulk. Hot meals furnishing approximately 4000 calories per man per day are prepared, using a 15-day cycle of menus. Calorie content may be varied to meet requirements of varying climatic conditions or degree of physical activity of the troops. This ration is supplemented with fresh or frozen foods whenever feasible. (Two sample menus attached).

c. Operational Ration "A"

The "A" Ration is used when refrigeration facilities are available. It consists of perishable items, such as fresh meats, fruits, vegetables, and nonperishable items such as canned fruits, vegetables, and juices. The meals served in this ration to Marines in Vietnam are similar to those served to Marines in the United States except that they do not have the versatility and selection because of food preparation equipment limitations.

d. Packet, Subsistence, Long Range Patrol

The Packet, Subsistence, Long Range Patrol, is used by Marines on patrol and reconnaissance duty. It is designed to be eaten for periods of one to ten days under tactical situations which require men to eat as individuals but which allow them time to prepare and heat hot food items. The packet is packaged in a scrim cloth bag, and weighs approximately ten ounces. Eight different menus are provided; each contains a dehydrated meat item, such as chili con carne, chicken stew, etc., plus a box of sweets, instant beverage, cream, and sugar. The dehydrated components are easily prepared with water. Each packet (menu) contains approximately 1000 calories.

The major difference in the Food Packet and the Meal, Combat, Individual (MCI) is in caloric content and weight. The Packet is lower in calories, weighs approximately 10 ounces, and can be easily carried in combat packs or on person. Its use is restricted to periods not to exceed 10 days. The MCI's are complete meals (each meal furnishes 1200 calories) and can be eaten for indefinite periods of time. Each meal weighs approximately 1.63 pounds.

e. Ration Supplement, Sundries Pack

Under varying combat conditions, it is difficult to establish exchange facilities for advance units. Recognizing this, when warranted by the situation, Marines are provided, in addition to the regular operational rations, a Ration Supplement, Sundries Pack. This pack consists of tobacco, shaving cream, cigarettes, matches, candy bars, gum, life savers, razor blades, tooth brushes and tooth paste, writing paper, pens, and envelopes. In general, all the health and comfort items that the exchange would normally provide Marines are included and furnished without charge to Marines in forward areas. Each sundries pack contains health and comfort items in sufficient quantities for 100 men for one day.

f. Water

Water is always a serious problem during combat. Water purification equipment is used to purify all water used for drinking and cooking purposes in stable areas. Water purification tablets are issued to Marines on patrol missions to ensure that the water they may have to obtain from land sources (rivers, streams, etc) is safe and pure. To make this water more palatable, individual packets of an artificially sweetened beverage powder (Kool-Ade type) are provided.

g. Dairy Products

Fresh butter and varieties of fresh cheese are supplied to the majority of Marines in Vietnam. Since there is no in-country source of supply of dairy fresh milk in Vietnam, action was taken to construct two milk plants in Vietnam for the production of filled milk (a liquid whole milk made from nonfat dry milk solids and vegetable fat) ice cream and cottage cheese. These plants are in operation, and Marines are presently being supplied over a pint of liquid whole milk per day. In addition, a number of servings of ice cream are supplied every Marine each week.

2. During combat operations, the character of the particular tactical situation will indicate the type of food that will be provided the participating Marines. The Meal, Combat, Individual, is the subsistence item designed to feed Marines under usual conditions of combat, and extended consumption may be necessary depending on actual conditions encountered.

3. With specific reference to Marine Corps operations in South Vietnam, analysis of subsistence reports received indicates that 75 percent of the meals served there are Operational Rations A or B. Further these reports reflect that fresh beef is generally available, canned fruits and fruit juices are being issued as components of the A and B Rations, and moderate amounts of ice are available for use in making iced tea and fruit-ades with artificially sweetened beverage powders. Fresh fruits and vegetables are not as plentiful as desired, but considerable effort is being concentrated toward increasing the availability of these desirable items. Refrigeration facilities are limited, but are adequate to meet the day-to-day operations of the individual messes. As a matter of information, the food served in Vietnam is reported to be the best that has ever been served to Marines during combat operations.

"B" RATION MENU
FIRST DAY

BREAKFAST

Grapefruit and Orange Juice
Hot Oatmeal
Scrambled Eggs
Bacon
Bread
Margarine
Jelly
Coffee

DINNER

Beef and Gravy
Mashed Potatoes
Stewed Tomatoes
Dill Pickles
Hot Biscuits
Margarine
Pineapple Slices
Cocoa
Coffee

SUPPER

Pea Soup W/Crackers
Grilled Hamburgers W/Fried Onions
O'Brien Potatoes
Buttered Whole Grain Corn
Bread
Margarine
Jam
Brownies
Coffee

"B" RATION MENU
NINTH DAY

BREAKFAST

Tomato Juice
Hot Oatmeal
French Toast W/Hot Maple Syrup
Bacon
Margarine
Jelly
Coffee

DINNER

Candied Luncheon Meat
W/Sweet Potatoes
Buttered Lima Beans
Dill Pickles
Bread
Margarine
Apple Crisp
Coffee

SUPPER

Chicken Pot Pie
Cranberry Sauce
Mashed Potatoes
Sautéed Corn
Four and Cheese Salad
Bread
Margarine
Devil's Food Cake W/Chocolate
Cream Icing
Coffee

MEAL, COMBAT, INDIVIDUAL

Menu No. 1

Beefsteak
Pears
B-1 Unit

Candy, coconut disk (1)
Chocolate fudge disk (1)
Enriched sweet chocolate disk (2)
Vanilla cream disk (1)
Crackers (5)
Peanut butter (1)

Accessory Pack

Coffee, dry cream, sugar, salt, gum
cigarettes, matches, toilet paper

Plastic Spoon
Can Opener

Menu No. 10

Chicken, boned
Fruit cocktail
B-3 Unit

Bread
Cocoa beverage powder
Cookie, sandwiches (3)
Jam (preserves)

Accessory Pack

Coffee, dry cream, sugar, salt, gum
cigarettes, matches, toilet paper

Plastic Spoon
Can Opener

CONTENTS OF RATION SUPPLEMENT, SUNDRIES PACK

<u>PRODUCT</u>	<u>UNIT OF ISSUE</u>
Tobacco Pack (Cigarettes, Assorted Brands)	100 packages(10 cartons)
Cigars	2 packages (4-5 in each)
Tobacco (Chewing, Plug)	2 packages (1 1/2-2 1/4 oz.)
Tobacco (Pipe, Smoking)	6 packages (1 1/4-1 3/4 oz.)
Matches (Safety, Book, Humidity-Resistant)	100 books (2 cartons)
Flints (Lighter)	2 packs (4-5each)
Cleaners (Pipe)	1 package (24-36 each)
Toilet Articles(Cream, Shaving, Pressurized Can)	2 cans (5 1/2-6 1/2 oz.)
Razor (Safety, Double-Edge Blade)	1 package
Blade (Razor, Safety, Double-Edge)	10 packets (4 blades)
Toothpaste	3 tubes (1.3-1 3/4 oz.)
Tooth-powder	2 cans (1 1/2-2 1/2 oz.)
Tooth Brush with Container	2
Soap (Toilet, Soft, Hard, or Sea-Water)	30 bars (2-2 1/2 oz.)
Confection and Stationery Pack(Chocolate, Sweet Bar or Chocolate Sweet Bar with Almonds or Nuts- Summer Type)	168 (7 cartons)
Starch (Jelly Bar) or Starch (Jelly, Bar with Fruit)	24 (1 carton)
Fudge Bar (Uncoated)or Coconut Bar(Chocolate- Coated) or Caramel Nougat Bar (Chocolate-Coated) or Fudge or Caramel Bar (Chocolate-Coated)	96 (4 cartons)
Candy (Hard, Fruit Tablets)	20 packages (1 carton)
Gum (Chewing, Assorted Flavors, Candy-Coated)	100 packets (1 carton)
Stationery (Ready, Airmail)	45 envelopes, 45 sheets (3 packages)
Pens (Ballpoint)	3 each

NEWSWEEK, 30 Sep 1968 (27) Race Riot at Long Binh

Late last month, U.S. military spokesmen dutifully revealed to the press that there had been what they called "a fight among inmates" at the Army stockade at Long Binh, 10 miles north of Saigon. At the time, the incident seemed easily enough understood. Unofficially known as "the 110" (for "Long Binh Jail," Army officers carefully explain), the stockade was built to accommodate a maximum of 400 prisoners—and last month it was bulging with some 700 GI's who have been convicted of everything from AWOL to murder. But overcrowding, as it turned out, had little to do, at least directly, with the trouble at Long Binh. Instead, cabled Newsweek's Robert Stokes last week, it has gradually emerged that the worst prison riot in the modern history of the U.S. Army had profoundly racial overtones. Stokes's report:

"The Aug. 20 riot at Long Binh began with a clash between a relatively small number of blacks and whites in the low-security section of the prison. Bored MPs armed with nightsticks immediately rushed in to separate the combatants, only to be overpowered and stripped of their keys. Moments later, the troublemakers, emboldened by this initial success, unlocked the gates of the medium-security area and streamed into the stockade's central courtyard. There, led by a group of blacks, they first disposed of the 25 guards on duty, leaving many of them beaten and bloody on the ground. Then the black rebels proceeded to unlock the maximum-security cell-block and to set fire to a number of buildings, several of which (including the administration building) rapidly burned to the ground.

About an hour after the riot started, a wave of MP reinforcements arrived at the stockade. Thus bolstered, the watchtower guards trained their machine guns on the prisoners and ordered them to "cease and desist." Many obeyed. But some 250 hard-core insurgents, the majority of them black, defiantly held their ground, shouting obscenities at the guards. And when a platoon of MP's advanced with fixed bayonets, lobbing tear-gas canisters as they came, the angry blacks fought back with sticks, coals and metal rods. In the melee, seventeen MP's, including the stockade commander, were wounded. So were 70 of the black rebels. And one white inmate lay dead, reportedly clubbed to death by black prisoners.

Darkness: When order was restored, the MP's sorted the prisoners into "cooperatives" and "uncooperatives." The 250 uncooperatives, all black save for seven Puerto Ricans, were locked into an isolated part of the stockade—and, with that, prison officials assumed the rebellion was over. But this, as it turned out, was a highly premature conclusion. So sure in the knowledge that their records had been destroyed with the administration building, the black militants gave fake names and serial numbers. Even more provocatively, many of them proceeded to shed their uniforms and to don white kerchiefs and African-style robes which they made out of Army blankets. "Some of them were running around naked or wearing bits of clothing as loin-cloths," reported one shaken Army official. "Others were beating out jungle drums and chanting."

Only some of the sensitivity of the

KHESANH

eral Cushman proposed. An official statement cited an increase in the enemy's forces in I Corps, which consists of the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, from six divisions to eight since January. "This," the statement noted, "gives him the capability of mounting several sizable attacks concurrently." Such attacks, of course, were precisely what had happened at the end of January in the Tet offensive. At any rate, the statement went on to say that the United States forces were adopting a "mobile posture," which would mean continued operations around Khesanh without a need for a large fixed base.

Before this statement came out, I made my visit into Khesanh aboard a slow, throbbing, deafeningly noisy Marine helicopter. (The Marines seem to revel in old equipment; "We do with men what the Army claims it does with all its gadgets," a Marine sergeant boasted at the Danang press center bar.) The word had been out in Saigon, and again in Danang, Phubai, and Dongha, that Khesanh was being abandoned, but I had no idea how far along the withdrawal had gotten until we approached the base itself.

Portions of the base that had been crowded with sandbagged bunkers and antennae were now broad fields of raw, red earth. Marines were tearing down bunkers, and bulldozers were filling the remaining holes with rubble and dirt. Big tandem-rotor helicopters were shuttling in and out, carrying slings full of cargo east to Landing Zone Stud and returning empty. The unloading tarmac of the metal runway was being peeled up and stacked in strips, ready to be hauled out.

In talking to the Marines on the ground, I learned that the North Vietnamese Army had seen everything I had. Patrols had encountered enemy troops on the hills overlooking the base, and there had

Continued

been sniper fire within only a few hundred yards of the perimeter. It was clear that the news of the withdrawal was being held up for political, not military, reasons. The North Vietnamese Army knew about the withdrawal; the American public did not.

Writing the story would mean trouble from the command, for stories about troop movements and future plans are embargoed until released by the Saigon headquarters. For the command, releasing the story at this time would have meant headache after headache. Correspondents would flock to the base to file eyewitness accounts of the last days of Khesanh. Instead of disposing of the issue in a single day after the completion of the move, the command would have to answer questions every day for nearly two weeks. Television watchers and newspaper readers would want answers. What would happen when our forces no longer sat astride those infiltration routes? What would become of the defensive line of bases along the demilitarized zone if the western anchor was hauled in? Above all, why was Khesanh worth all that effort a few months ago and not now?

As things worked out, the command ultimately faced the questioners with its lame answer, and I lost my press card. At first the suspension was indefinite, then it was set at six months. At that point the whole issue was hashed over publicly, and after some protests, the command agreed to reduce the suspension to sixty days, leaving neither of us entirely satisfied. My own hassle was one of the less significant unresolved questions about the military's role in political and propaganda aspects of the war which remain as the Khesanh episode passes into history, and the trenches and crumbled bunkers become overgrown with the lush foliage of South-east Asia.

— John S. Carroll

civil-rights issue back home, the men in command at Long Binh decided not to crack down on the militants but rather to "wait them out." Each day, cases of C-rations were tossed over the fence into the area in which the uncooperatives were confined. And scores of Army psychologists and stockade officials were sent in to question the insurgents about their grievances. "Most of them," said one psychologist, "just wanted out of the Army and out of Vietnam." But besides expressing the usual stockade grievances about bad food and not enough mail, many of the blacks complained that white guards had often abused them verbally and had given white prisoners far better treatment.

Import: By military standards, the Army's handling of the holdouts was incredibly permissive and, to a degree, the policy of restraint did work out. Last week, 21 days after the riot, only the

teen rebels were still defying prison discipline. Nonetheless, the riot at LBV would seem to have ominous import both for the Army and for U.S. society as a whole. Since Harry Truman integrated the armed forces in 1948, the Army has been justly proud of the commitment it offers black soldiers. But for the most part, relations between white and black troops in Vietnam have been good, especially in combat zones where they share common needs and common dangers. But in the Long Binh stockade, with these bonds dissolved, black soldiers, rightly or wrongly, felt they faced the same kind of prejudice that they had in the ghettos of the U.S. and quickly rediscovered their built-in resentment of authority. All of which seemed to suggest that the vaunted egalitarianism of the Army cannot, by itself, even in the most tense situations, automatically erase between white and black Americans.

ATLANTIC, OCTOBER 1968 (27S)

Khesanh

Some months and many disasters ago, when North Vietnam and the United States were more peaceful than they are now, the first American troops entered the green plateau that was known as the Khesanh Marine combat base. In those days there was little fighting in the north-west region of North Vietnam, so the Marines and their troops spent their spare hours fishing, the leading mountaineers, or hunting, from the boats.

All this changed, of course. First, the Special Forces were displaced by the Marines. Then, last year, there was a series of vicious battles on the jungled slopes near the base. Finally came this year's big victory—or defeat, depending on whom you ask—at the base itself.

As a correspondent for the *Baltimore Sun*, I visited Khesanh several times between the first of this year and June 24. On that day I wrote that the base was being abandoned, and subsequently I had my military press accreditation suspended for breaking the embargo on the story. One could say I asked for it; in fact, that is exactly what the military command did say. I will save a defense for another occasion. What is important is the nature of the battle of Khesanh—how we got into it and how, once we were there, we found ourselves entangled in a double web of military and public relations considerations.

Military-press relations were different in World War II, when the press was very much part of the team. The reporting of that war focused on how the combat was going and what the individual soldier was enduring.

In the Vietnam War the press has addressed itself to issues like the feasibility of our aims. Vietnam has no Ernie Pyle, and none seems likely to emerge. The military has come to realize that while fighting well against the Viet Cong is important, looking good to the press, and through the press, to the world, is equally critical.

By the time the shells were pouring down on Khesanh, the military had learned its lesson. This time the psychological war, waged through the press, would not be neglected. There would be a victory—or

the climactic Tet offensive against South Vietnam's previously un-molested—and largely ungarrisoned—cities, the battle of Khesanh marked the end of the American military's delight at finding the enemy willing to stand and fight in the remotest corners of the country. While the cities were ravaged, the resources tied up in the Khesanh venture were considerable: a six-thousand-man garrison, supported by thousands more troops and

bombardment heavier than the United States's total bombing effort in Europe during 1942 and 1943. And throughout the 77 days of repeated ground probes and heavy shelling at the base, there was always the fear that the North Vietnamese in the hills, estimated variously from ten thousand to forty thousand, would mass and swarm over Khesanh, inflicting a military blow and perhaps a crippling psychological defeat on the United States.

My first visit to Khesanh was on January 23, the fourth day of what came to be called the "siege." I was as green a war correspondent as had ever wandered into Vietnam, and my imagination was working double time as the four-engine C-130 transport whined along the runway at Danang and lumbered into the gray monsoon clouds. There were several other correspondents along, all of whom had been under fire before, and I resolved to do as they did. If they ducked, I would duck. If they ran for a bunker, I would run for a bunker. If they flattened themselves in a ditch, I would flatten myself in a ditch.

As it turned out, there was no cause for panic. January 23 was a relatively quiet day at Khesanh. We came tumbling out of the plane onto the metal tarmac with flak vests zipped up tight and helmets low over our eyes, but it was immediately apparent that the shelling was in a lull.

Sore

The Khesanh of January, 1968, was no longer a place for fishing or tiger-hunting. The green plateau had become a red-brown sore on the face of the earth, and everything—the sandbagged bunkers, the jeeps, the stubble-bearded Marines—was tinted the reddish color of the dirt. Around us were the lush, sinister hills. Above were the oppressive layers of dark clouds that gradually

We were walking on the dirt road that was Khesanh's main street, skirting the edge of the base as we approached the command post. Everything that was not sandbagged—the jeeps, the antennas, the makeshift runway, and the bunch of wooden "thin trees" (shacks) all lined in the same direction. Thus, we were to learn, was because no enemy reconnaissance had detected the main command on camp a few days before.

In the dim yellow light inside the sandbagged command-post bunker, a plain-spoken man told us about the situation at Khesanh. In contrast to the Marines outside, this man managed to keep unstained by the dirt and the billowing clouds of dust, and his neatness all came to focus in his marvelous mustache, impeccably waxed to two sharp points. He was Colonel David Lownds, the Khesanh commander. "Our reconnaissance team and patrols have made contact in every direction," Lownds said. "I have no doubt that we will be attacked." A twenty-three-year-old corporal took a break from sandbagging to tell me: "The hills are full of gooks. They'll probably start a barrage of artillery and then run right through the base."

It was in January that public concern about Khesanh began to build. The military command knew it had problems. Some high-ranking officers had opposed holding Khesanh at all. Militarily, the base was simply not worth it, they believed. But there were problems in pulling out. One was the fact that many of the guns would have to be destroyed if the Marines fought their way out on the ground. The guns had been flown in, and the pump-movers—the machines that tow the guns and carry the ammunition and crews—had been left behind.

Another problem, the decisive one, was that a withdrawal under pressure would have all the earmarks of a defeat. By the last ten days of January the world was watching Khesanh, and the first grim parallels with Dienbienphu had been drawn. So to withdraw at this time would be to take a terrific drubbing before a huge audience.

"Western anchor"

What was needed, then, was a good, solid, militarily sound explanation of why we were holding Khesanh. The American public could be counted upon to take a dim view of it all if the military were to announce frankly: "Our sons are

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS ROUTING SHEET
NAVMC HQ 335-CMC (REV. 9-64)

DATE 25 JUL 65

7-1108

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE		INITIAL	ADDRESSEES	FROM
		IN	OUT			
					COMMANDANT	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT	TO
					MILITARY SECY, TO CMC	Chief of Staff
					CHIEF OF STAFF	SUBJECT
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)	CMC ltr to LtGen Eaker USAF(Retired)
					DC/S (RD&S)	re: Newspaper article
					DC/S (AIR)	"Why Khe Sanh was Evacuated."
3		7/29	7/30	R	SECY OF GEN STAFF	REMARKS (Entries to be dated and signed)
					G-1	1. Request CMC signature at
					G-2	(TAB A).
					G-3	
					G-4	
					ADMINISTRATIVE	
					DATA PROCESSING	
					MCCC	
					FISCAL	
					INFORMATION	
					INSPECTION	
					PERSONNEL	
					POLICY ANALYSIS	
					RESERVE	
					SUPPLY	
					WOMEN MARINES	
					LEGISLATIVE	
					COUNSEL	
					STAFF DENTAL	
					STAFF MEDICAL	
					STAFF CHAPLAIN	
					OP-09M	

G-3 DIVISION

					AC/S, G-3 (A03)
					DAC/S, G-3
2		7/29	7/29	47	Asst G-3
					Admin&FiscBr (A03A)
					Plans&ProgBr (A03B)
					AdminSect
					PlansSect
					ProgSect
					TrngBr (A03C)
					GenTrngSect
					SchoolsTrngSect
					Plan&ProgSect
					EducAdv&EvalSect
					TrngReqSect
1					OpnsBr (A03H)
	X				Opns/CombEvalSect
					CombReqSect
					ReadinessCent
					Cmd, Cont&CommBr (A03F)
					CivAffBr (A03E)
					HistBr (A03D)
					AdminSect
					WritingSect
					HistRefSect
					CombPictBr (A03P)
					I ² S (OpnsWkgGrp)

(For additional remarks attach plain paper)

ROUTING - Use numbers to show order of routing

OPERATION CODE

- X - ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET
 A - FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION
 B - FOR COMPLIANCE
 C - PREPARE-REPLY FOR SIGNATURE
 D - FOR COMMENT
 E - FOR RECOMMENDATION
- F - FOR CONCURRENCE
 G - FOR INFORMATION
 H - RETURN TO
 I -
- OF _____
- INITIAL FOR FILE

D-33719

DECLASSIFIED

A03H13-dnw

29 JUL 1968

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, USAF (Retired)
1612 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear General Eaker:

Our mutual friend, Al Pefley, has sent me a copy of your recent article, "Why Khe Sanh Was Evacuated" which appeared in your syndicated column last week.

Your analysis of the Khe Sanh situation is without doubt the most perceptive account of the recent decisions affecting Khe Sanh to appear in the press. Your ability to portray the changing nature of the conflict in northern I Corps and to place Khe Sanh in historic perspective has set your article apart from similar current efforts.

Please accept my thanks for providing such a meaningful analysis of the Khe Sanh situation. I have followed your past efforts in this area with interest and wish you continued success in your future endeavors.

Sincerely,

W. A. WATKINS, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commanding General, I Corps
Fort Belvoir, Colorado

Return to A03H13 RM 2134
Maj. H. H. H.
26 JUL 1968

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

22 JUL 1968

[Signature]
From: Chief of Staff

To: ACoS, G-3

XX Appropriate action

See Attached CMC note

 Comment and/or recommendation

 Retention

XX Prepare reply for CMC signature

 Information and return to CoS

XX COORDINATE WITH Director of Information

 Concurrence

Remarks: Reply due ASAP NLT, 1500, 26 JUL 68

Copy to Director of Information

[Signature]
W. J. VAN RYZIN R

DECLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

11 JUL 1968

FROM: COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

TO: ☒ ACMC

☒ C/S

☐ MILSEC

☐ AIDES

☐ SPEC ASS'T (PAO)

1. Action:

☒ Prepare reply + ltr. to Gen Eaker
if desirable -

☐ Coordinate and staff

☐ Comment and/or recommendation

☐ Information

Remarks:

[Handwritten signature] *[Circular stamp with 'h']*

L. F. CHAPMAN, JR.

DECLASSIFIED

July 12, 1968

Dear Chaffin,

The enclosed letter is an advance copy of Gen. Carter's military column which will appear in some 100 newspapers the week of July 21. He is one of our great military writers as well as one of our great leaders. Each week I feel highly honored in getting an advance copy of his column. This week's is of special significance and that is why I'm passing it on to you.

It was a fine occasion on Thursday night and we appreciated being there.

No acknowledgment of this necessary, but if you see fit and considerate it appropriate a note to Gen. Carter would be nice for him. He is well in the 70's now but very active and besides his column does many other things and continues to strike a blow for liberty.

During the PKC period of the mid thirties I knew the Marine Corps would be in good hands during 60-70 decade. Best to Emily. - Al Pefley

WHY KHE SANH WAS EVACUATED
by
Ira C. Eaker

When recent dispatches from Vietnam revealed that the U.S. garrison had evacuated Khe Sanh many of our citizens were surprised and concerned.

"Why," came the normal query, "was Khe Sanh so vital to our interests in Winter and Spring but now no longer considered important?"

Since Khe Sanh was abandoned at about the time General Abrams succeeded General Westmoreland, there has been some speculation that it represented a change of tactics or policy coincident with the change in command.

Investigation reveals that the main reasons for the evacuation of Khe Sanh were these:

When the Marines originally occupied and fortified Khe Sanh it was astride a main road net over which weapons and men infiltrated from North Vietnam into I Corps, the Northern section of South Vietnam. These invasion forces threatened the security of Quang Tri, Hue, Da Nang and other populous areas.

The first reaction of the Vietcong was to attack the Marines at Khe Sanh in order to remove this road block to infiltration. When these attacks failed with heavy losses, General Giap announced and Hanoi boasted that Khe Sanh would now be given the Dien Bien Phu treatment. Giap, heralded by Reds world wide, as the guerrilla Napoleon, surrounded Khe Sanh with two of his crack regular divisions, began the construction of approach trenches and the constant shelling of the defenses in a tactical pattern which

has been classic since Dien Bien Phu.

Khe Sanh proved, however, to be a trap for the Red besiegers. General Giap having had little air opposition at Dien Bien Phu, did not realize what tactical airpower could do to his trenches, troop, supply and artillery concentrations.

The lowest estimate of Red casualties I have seen for the battle of Khe Sanh is 15,000 dead. Less than 300 of our Marine defenders were killed there. In early June Giap realized that Khe Sanh could not be taken at any price he could afford to pay. He then withdrew his battered, decimated divisions and the siege was lifted. It was again demonstrated that the shifting scenes and sites of warfare change with the fortunes of war. Meade's Union Army did not remain long on the battlefield at Gettysburg after Lee withdrew into Virginia.

At the time the Marines took station in Khe Sanh the Russians had not delivered 120 millimeter rockets to the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. A few months later with these rockets now available in large numbers, Khe Sanh could be shelled from the sanctuary of Laos. By removing the Marines from Khe Sanh to temporary, mobile bases a few miles to the East they are now free from the harassment of rockets from the Laotian hills.

When the rail lines of North Vietnam were being bombed by our Air Force and Navy, the Reds had 300,000 workers fully engaged in repair of bomb damage and 200,000 soldiers manning anti-aircraft defenses. When President Johnson announced on March 31st that our bombing would cease north of the 19th parallel, these forces were freed for other tasks. With this manpower the Reds built new roads and trails by-passing Khe Sanh and to the West through Laos and

Cambodia and Khe Sanh was no longer vital for its original purpose.

General Westmoreland's earlier search and destroy strategy was a combination of strong points supported by mobile reserves. His request for the troop strength needed fully to implement this policy was denied in Washington. It appears now that there will be fewer fortified strong points and a larger mobile striking force.


New enemy dispositions and available resources, not a change in command, caused the evacuation of Khe Sanh. But when the reputable historians of the future evaluate Khe Sanh dispassionately it will be recorded as a great victory for its gallant defenders and their magnificent air support. Khe Sanh will now be the name of a new battle streamer on the Marine Corps flag like Tripoli, Belleau Wood, Midway, Tarawa and all the rest.

DECLASSIFIED

1612
IRA C. EAKER - USAF Ret.
1612 K STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

one of the greats
of the Air force

Brig. Gen. A. R. Pefley
6428 Ichabod Place
Falls Church, Virginia
22042



DECLASSIFIED

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS - 24 JULY 1968 (25) GIRL GUERRILLAS PLUG VIET CONG GAPS

By Keyes Beech
Daily News Foreign Service

SAIGON—The Viet Cong have launched a massive campaign to recruit women to fill out their ranks after their exhausting winter-spring offensive.

Reports of all-female combat units have cropped up all over the country, according to allied intelligence sources.

Captured documents and prisoner interrogations indicate that in some areas women account for one-third to one-half of the enemy's guerrilla strength.

American and Vietnamese sources greeted these reports with mixed feelings. Despite their deceptively fragile appearance, Vietnamese women are tough. Besides, women warriors have a long and honored history in Vietnam.

TAKING A MORE serious view, intelligence analysts viewed the Viet Cong's increased dependence on womanpower as another sign of the Viet Cong's declining role in the war.

North Vietnamese troops account for 75 per cent of regular Communist military strength in South Vietnam. This is almost exactly the reverse of the situation three years ago when Viet Cong forces were predominant.

Enemy main force strength is estimated at 130,000, with guerrilla and militia units bringing the total to about 215,000.

There is nothing new about the Viet Cong's using women in such support roles as laborers, cooks, nurses, clerks, intelligence agents and ammunition bearers. What is new is the organization of all-female district defense units, sapper forces and reconnaissance platoons.

On March 8 the South Vietnam Women's Liberation Assn., an affiliate of the National Liberation Front,

marked its seventh anniversary with a militant call for women to "foster hatred" in cities and towns and "use all types of weapons to kill the enemy" in rural areas.

SINCE THEN the women's role in the enemy's military effort has been increasingly aggressive. A crack all-women combat unit has been reported in Binh Dinh Province, although its duties were not specified.

In Kontum, in the Central Highlands, a captured girl guerrilla reported that the Viet Cong draft age for females had been lowered from 14 to 12.

But it is in the delta that the Viet Cong are making their maximum effort to recruit women as well as men. All-female sapper or demolition squads have been formed in Can Tho, Kien Hoa and Sa Dec.

The campaign to recruit women has been accompanied by a drive to bring more teenage boys into the Viet Cong fold.

In its scope the Communist recruiting campaign amounts to a giant body-snatching contest with the Saigon government, which recently launched a general mobilization.

But in their recruiting, the Viet Cong have run into many difficulties. Desertions are a major problem. Many boys quit at the first opportunity. Mothers were outraged when the Viet Cong lowered the draft age to 14.

High-level command directives are either being ignored or going unenforced for lack of leadership or personnel. A much ballyhooed campaign to set up "liberation committees" in the countryside has been an apparent failure.

There is an abundance of evidence that the Viet Cong lost many of their most valued and experienced leaders in the winter-spring offensive.

NEWPORT NEWS DAILY PRESS - 21 JULY 1968 (25)

Why U.S. Garrison Evacuated Khe Sanh

By LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER

Many of us were surprised and concerned when recent dispatches from Vietnam revealed that the U.S. garrison had evacuated Khe Sanh.

"Why," came the normal query, "was Khe Sanh so vital to our interests in winter and spring but now no longer considered important?"

Since Khe Sanh was abandoned at about the time Gen. Creighton Abrams succeeded Gen. William Westmoreland, there has been some speculation that it represented a change of tactics or policy coincident with the change in command.

Investigation reveals several main reasons for the evacuation of Khe Sanh:

When the marines originally occupied and fortified Khe Sanh, it was astride a main road net over which weapons and men infiltrated from North Vietnam into I Corps, the northern section of South Vietnam. These invasion forces threatened the security of Quan Tri, Hue, Da Nang and other populous areas.

The first reaction of the Viet Cong was to attack the marines at Khe Sanh to remove this roadblock to infiltration. When these attacks failed with heavy losses, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap announced and Hanoi boasted that Khe Sanh would now be given the Dien Bien Phu treatment.

Giap, heralded by Reds worldwide as the guerrilla Napoleon, surrounded Khe Sanh with two of his crack regular divisions, began the construction of approach trenches and the constant shelling of the defenses in a tactical pattern which has been classic since Dien Bien Phu.

Khe Sanh proved, however, to be a trap for the Red besiegers. Giap, having had little air opposition at Dien Bien Phu, did not realize what tactical airpower could do to his trenches and troop, supply and artillery concentrations.

The lowest estimate of Red casualties I have seen for the battle of Khe Sanh is 15,000 dead. Less than 300 of our marine defenders were killed there. In early June, Giap realized that Khe Sanh could not be taken at any price he could afford to pay. He then withdrew his battered, decimated divisions and the siege

It was again demonstrated that the shifting scenes and sites of warfare change with the fortunes of war. Meade's Union Army did not remain long on the battlefield at Gettysburg after Lee withdrew into Virginia.

At the time the marines took station in Khe Sanh, the Russians had not delivered 120-millimeter rockets to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. A few months later, with these rockets now available in large numbers, Khe Sanh could be shelled from the sanctuary of Laos. By removing the marines from Khe Sanh to temporary, mobile bases a few miles to the east, they are now free from the harassment of rockets from the Laotian hills.

When the rail lines of North Vietnam were being bombed by our Air Force and Navy, the Reds had 300,000 workers fully engaged in repair of bomb damage and 200,000 soldiers manning antiaircraft defenses.

When President Johnson announced on March 31 that our bombing would cease north of the 19th parallel, these forces were freed for other tasks. With this manpower the Reds built new roads and trails, bypassing Khe Sanh and to the west through Laos and Cambodia, and Khe Sanh was no longer vital for its original purpose.

Gen. Westmoreland's earlier search and destroy strategy was a combination of strong points supported by mobile reserves. His request for the troop strength needed fully to implement this policy was denied in Washington. It appears now that there will be fewer fortified strong points and a larger mobile striking force.

New enemy dispositions and available resources, not a change in command, caused the evacuation of Khe Sanh. But when the reputable historians of the future evaluate Khe Sanh dispassionately, it will be recorded as a great victory for its gallant defenders and their magnificent air support.

Khe Sanh will now be the name of a new battle streamer on the Marine Corps flag, like Tripoli, Belleau Wood, Midway, Tarawa and all the rest.

NEWSWEEK - 29 JULY 1968 (25)

RECONNOITERING NORTH VIETNAM

The U.S. has three SR-71 photographic reconnaissance planes based at Kadena, Okinawa. The mission of the black-painted, 2,000-mph spy plane is surveillance of North Vietnam. (One of its predecessors, the U-2, is still based at Bien Hoa in South Vietnam.) Note: a Red Guard publication in Communist China recently charged that an SR-71 snapped pictures and gathered fall-

out samples during China's third nuclear bomb test in the Sinkiang desert in May 1966. The plane was supposedly 20 miles high; both U.S. Samos and Soviet Cosmos recon satellites orbited over the Chinese ground zero as well.

DALLAS MORNING NEWS - 19 JULY 1968 (25)

Intentions Good, But Not Results

By JIM WRIGHT
Editorial Staff Writer

IN VIETNAM, near the outpost at Gio Linh, stands all that there is and all that there is ever likely to be of the once-ballyhooed "McNamara Line."

A recent report by the Associated Press indicated that the line, once seen as the solution to the problem of infiltration, will not be completed. Thus, barring a complete change of thinking at the top, the 2,000 yards of "German tape" strung near Gio Linh will not be extended.

According to the AP's military sources, the abbreviated McNamara line was not very effective, for the enemy could walk around it or through it at several places. In addition, gaps had been necessary in the fence to allow Vietnamese farmers to reach their fields north of the wire.

The remains of the McNamara line are a monument to a wistful dream. The political leadership that has directed the Vietnam War in detail throughout tried to wall out invaders with material, with a physical barrier to keep North Vietnamese troops out of South Vietnam.

THE MILITARY professionals said it couldn't be done. Sure enough, it couldn't, as time and casualties have proved. The dream of a static, impenetrable defense barrier dies hard in the minds of political leaders. When attempts are made to put the idea into practice, usually men and sometimes nations die with it.

The theory of an impregnable line of fortifications, obstacles or barriers sounds good to civilian voters and for understandable reasons, chief of which is that the barrier seems to substitute stone or concrete or — in the case of the McNamara line — sophisticated new electronic devices and revolutionary hardware for a defense that depends on men. For a peace-loving people, it makes much more sense to spend money for materials than to depend on defenses that appear very likely to cost many human lives.

Unfortunately, as the military men tried to point out at the time, the use of walls



WRIGHT

and barriers is an aid to military effort, but not a substitute for it.

Long ago, when the Swedes were considered to be the best soldiers in the world, they had a saying which underlined this cruel truth, "Others try to defend their men with city walls. We have men to defend our walls."

THE SWEDES DID not mean that they valued stone more than life. The saying merely restated a lesson of history which has had to be learned over and over, most recently by us. From the Great Wall of China to the ill-fated Maginot Line of France, defensive walls have been advertised as the cheapest way to keep out invaders, to assure those within that they need not exert themselves for their own protection.

However, the fact is that what man has put together, other men can usually tear asunder. If the invader is determined enough, he will find a way to go through, over, under or around the obstacle. For this reason, every second lieutenant learns very early in his professional education that obstacles are nearly useless unless they are supported by fire.

The defenders have to be close enough, that is, to shoot at the people trying to get through the obstacle. The combination of obstacles and incoming fire tends to be much more distracting, it is said, than obstacles alone. The problem is that for the defenders to be close enough to shoot at the people on the other side of the wire, they must also be close enough for the people to shoot back at them. And, while the defenders must be emplaced to defend every foot of the obstacle, the attackers can move and concentrate at one spot to break it.

THE CASUALTIES were heavy at those outposts that lay along the proposed site of the McNamara line. To make matters worse, the garrisons could not move out against the North Vietnamese gun positions that were protected by the political limitations imposed from above. So they had to sit and take it.

The military professionals raised all these points when the scheme came up. But, as has so often been the case during the Vietnam War, their advice was overruled and the administration announced its decision to put up the wall. As *The News* noted editorially at the time, "if (the wall) is to be used as a magic panacea to our problems of defending South Vietnam . . . as a political pacifier for the restless critics of

the President, then it seems quite likely that we will repeat history."

That prediction has apparently come true. And the objections raised by the military have proved to be valid.

IN A WAY, THE abortive project is symbolic of the conduct of the entire war. Throughout the war, civilian officials have demonstrated their determination to tell the military professionals not only what to do, but exactly how to do it. Since 1960 civilian whiz kids have downgraded the opinions and experience of the military men who have spent a lifetime learning the profession. Over the objections of the pros, the civilian field marshals have vied to put their own theories into practice. The intentions were good, but the results haven't been.

This is not only poor military strategy, it is not common sense. You do not hire an expert professional, whether he is a pilot or a plumber, and then tell him exactly, step-by-step how he is to do his job, down to the last tool and technique. If he doesn't know and cannot learn how to do the job, he should be fired; but if he does — which presumably is the reason you hired him — he should be allowed to do it.

Recently Lt. Col. William Corson, in his book, "The Betrayal," tells of the early days of the Kennedy administration, when civilian officials from economists to cost accountants suddenly became "limited warriors," anxious to set the military straight on the miracles of revolutionary tactics.

Many of these late-blooming, limited warriors, after seeing their quick-fix solutions fail in practice, quietly slipped over to the side of the doves, deploring the war in general and joining in the calling for withdrawal.

While there is nothing illegal about changing one's views, this sudden pacifism seems rather unfair to the military men who have paid and are still paying the price for the civilians' experiments in generalship.

Civilian control of the military at the top is and always has been a fundamental part of the American system. But that concept does not extend down to the rifle squad level; the fighter pilot in combat should not have to get the permission from Washington to fire when fired upon.

It has been truly said that war is too important to leave it entirely to generals. It should be equally apparent by now that it is too complex to leave it entirely to amateurs, either.

U. S. 'Tells Off Spain'

By R. H. BOYCE
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

Spain has been told in polite diplomatic language that it won't get all it wants from the U.S. for permitting this country to continue using strategic Spanish submarine and air bases.

A new five-year Spanish bases agreement will be drawn up to replace the one expiring Sept. 26.

"It will sound better," said an Administration source, "but it won't mean much more to Spain."

Spain will get:

- Increased military assistance. Details are yet to be worked out, pending Congressional approval of the Administration's foreign aid legislation. Last year, Spain got \$8.3 million in military aid. Total economic and military aid to Spain since the U.S. first began using the bases in 1953 has exceeded \$2 billion.

- Wider jurisdiction over American GIs who commit crimes on Spanish soil outside the bases. The Status of Forces agreement drawn up in 1953 is outdated, say U.S. officials, when compared with agreements the U.S. has negotiated with other countries since then. Spain long has sought the right to try GI offenders in Spanish courts.

What Spain wanted but won't get for the bases agreement is some sort of formal U.S. assurance on Spain's military security, backing for Spain's ownership claim on British-held Gibraltar, and special exemption from U.S. restrictions on dollar investments abroad by Americans.

Spain long has sought admission into NATO. With France out of NATO, the Spanish felt the U.S. bases were more strategic, and sought greater U.S. assurance in the form of a mutual defense treaty. Washington turned down this

WASHINGTON NEWS
24 JULY 1968 (25)

proposal because the Vietnam war has made Congress wary of any new military commitments.

To a Spanish counter-proposal that the U.S. at least declare it recognizes Spain as part of America's "vital interest," officials reminded Spain that some congressmen oppose any further U.S. involvement with what the legislators regard as an outdated military dictatorship.

Spain's bid for backing on Gibraltar failed because the U.S. regards that dispute as a matter between Madrid and London. And relaxation of the investment restrictions probably would lead to similar demands from other countries.

U.S. servicemen and dependents in Spain spend \$40 million a year there, bolstering the uncertain Spanish economy. Ordering the U.S. off the bases would hurt Spain more than Madrid's desired goals would help the country, it was pointed out.

S&C NO.

NEW EYES ONLY

COPIES RECEIVED

COPIES PREPARED

COPIES NUMBERED

DATE **18 JUN 1968**

THRU

[illegible]

ADDRESSEES

✓ (If applicable, check one)

REQUEST FOR PERMANENT RETENTION (COPY) (BUCKTAG COPY)

RETAIN PERMANENTLY IN FILE (Record Material)

RETAIN MONTHS (Information material w/o historical value)

DESTROY AFTER ROUTING (No record or information value)

UNIT

SIGNATURE

✓	(If applicable, check)
---	------------------------

PLEASE ADVISE _____ SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL FILES
REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF EXTRA COPIES. (In the absence of
instructions extra copies will be destroyed after 30 days)

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

All Persons Who Handle the Attached Document,
Sign and Date in Numerical Order Below

DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME
6/18	1 B. W. Cheadle	11	
7/16	2 T. H. Stewart	12	
8/18	3 J. Z. Fisher	13	
9/19	4 [Signature]	14	
10/19	5 G. L. Moore	15	
	6 S. J. Kelly	16	
	7	17	
	8	18	
	9	19	
	10	20	

REMARKS (Entries to be dated and signed)

ACTION:

Attached talking paper
provided for information.

B. N. Piel

(For additional remarks attach plain paper)

ROUTING - Use numbers to show order of routing

OPERATION CODE

X - ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE
AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET

A - FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION

B - FOR COMPLIANCE

C - PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE
OF

D - FOR COMMENT

E - FOR RECOMMENDATION

F - FOR CONCURRENCE

G - FOR INFORMATION

H - RETURN TO

1 -

INITIAL FOR FILE

RETURN TO:


DO NOT DETACH - THIS FORM IS A PERMANENT PART
OF THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH IT IS ATTACHED

WHEN FILLED IN,
THIS FORM BECOMES

TOP SECRET

118
10
11

- P.R.



TOP SECRET

J-TP
17 June 1968

Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for a meeting with the JCS on 17 June 1968

Subject: Force Disposition in I CTZ (U)

1. PURPOSE: General Abrams has requested* the reaction of the Chairman, JCS, to a plan of General Cushman to adopt a mobile posture in western Quang Tri Province which will entail phasing down forces from the Khe Sanh area by 1 July or as soon thereafter as practicable.

2. RECOMMENDED POSITION:

a. That the Chairman, JCS, concur in General Cushman's proposal as supported by General Abrams.

b. That the attached (Eyes Only) message be dispatched.

3. POINTS SUPPORTING RECOMMENDED POSITION:

~~a. Defense Intelligence Agency concurs in the enemy threat and order of battle as stated by General Abrams.*~~

b. The fixed base at Khe Sanh has required a significant number of combat troops in a static defense role for the protection of the base. Higher priority military tasks exist elsewhere in I CTZ.

c. The base is at the end of a long and tenuous land LOC which requires that additional troops be tied to a security mission. When Route 9 is interdicted, an inordinate amount of available airlift resources is required to supply the base.

d. The base presents an inviting target for enemy offensive action.

e. The base presents a fixed target for cross-border artillery fires from positions that cannot be attacked by ground forces due to political constraints.

f. The planned posture provides flexibility to the force commander by affording him the capability to react to intelligence on enemy activity with only the size and composition of force necessary for the particular requirement. This will release maneuver elements for employment in other areas as required.

g. The good weather during the summer dry season favors offensive operations by friendly forces in northern I CTZ.

h. To provide the same priority for reinforcement of Khe Sanh as was available early in the year would be militarily unwise in view of the shift of the enemy threat in I CTZ. Renewed enemy offensive operations throughout I CTZ would further reduce the capability of friendly forces to reinforce Khe Sanh.

*MAC 8007 (Eyes Only)/170553Z Jun 68

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

i. The buildup of new road nets within key areas of South Vietnam such as the A Shau Valley, Quang Tin Province and the Tri-border area provide the enemy with a flexibility which makes Khe Sanh of lesser importance to the enemy's maneuver capability.

j. During the southwest monsoon, Khe Sanh assumes relatively less importance as the western anchor of the DMZ area defense because NVN is provided a better and more direct infiltration route directly through the DMZ to SVN.

4. OTHER VIEWS:

a. The enemy can and probably will claim a military victory in the area, and will indicate that the "withdrawal" of US/GVN forces is further indication that the two northernmost provinces of SVN are being "liberated" by NVN.

b. US political opponents to the military decisions and actions taken earlier this year concerning Khe Sanh may claim that the military has finally come around to their way of thinking. Conversely, other critics may contend that no part of SVN should be abandoned to the enemy without a fight.

APPROVED BY _____ Director, J-3
DJS _____ (CONCUR) (NONCONCUR)

Prepared by: Colonel D. M. Dexter, Jr., USA
Pacific Division, J-3
Extension 57008/78853

ATTACHMENT

Draft Reply to MAC 8007 (Eyes Only)/170553Z Jun 68

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

ATTACHMENT

BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE

FROM: GENERAL WHEELER, CJCS, WASHINGTON, D. C.
TO: GENERAL ABRAMS, HQ MACV, SAIGON
ADMIRAL SHARP, HQ PACOM, HONOLULU, HAWAII
SUBJ: Force Disposition in I CTZ (U)

1. (TS) Reference your MAC 8007/170553Z Jun 68. I concur in your assessment of the situation in SVN and in General Cushman's proposal to adopt a mobile posture in western Quang Tri Province. Adoption of this posture will be accompanied by a phasing down of forces from Khe Sanh by 1 July or as soon thereafter as practicable.

2. (TS) I do foresee some Public Affairs problems associated with adoption of the concept. Not only will NVN try to make psychological gain from the withdrawal of major forces from the Khe Sanh area, but some political voices may be raised in this country. Criticism may be expected from those who opposed the military decisions and actions taken earlier this year concerning Khe Sanh. There may also be some discomfiture from those who supported the holding of Khe Sanh during the debates last winter. I undoubtedly will be asked by higher authority how we will accommodate in the public and congressional arena our current views with those we previously held. I believe our best approach is to emphasize the dynamics of the situation and flexibility of tactical response. I would appreciate receiving your views on the elements of a Public Affairs plan to support your abandonment of Khe Sanh base.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~A03H13-dnw
11 Jul 1968ITEM: Reduction of the Khe Sanh Combat BaseBACKGROUND: (U)

The first occupation in force of Khe Sanh by Marine units was in September 1966 by 1st Bn, 3d Marines during Operation PRAIRIE.

During April and May 1967, Khe Sanh was the scene of heavy fighting when units of the 3d Marines surprised enemy forces in the Hill 861 - Hills 881 North and South complex.

Early in 1968, as a result of increased enemy activity, the 26th Marines was brought to full strength and reinforced by 1st Bn, 9th Marines. This unit, with its combat support and combat service support elements and an ARVN Ranger Battalion, held the Khe Sanh combat base against significant enemy forces for a period of more than 70 days at which time, late in March, the enemy units began to withdraw from the area.

Operation PEGASUS commenced on 1 April 1968. This operation completed the defeat of NVA forces in the Khe Sanh area and reopened Route 9.

Operation SCOTLAND II, which commenced on 15 April and is currently in progress, has continued to inflict heavy losses on the enemy.

STATUS:

(TS) On 17 June 1968, the Chairman, JCS concurred in CG, III MAF's proposal to adopt a mobile posture in western Quang Tri Province with the concomitant phase down of forces in the Khe Sanh area. The proposal was based on the following information:

a. The fixed base at Khe Sanh has required a significant number of combat troops in a static defense role for the protection of the base. Higher priority military tasks exist elsewhere in I Corps Tactical Zone.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRETA03H13-dnw
11 Jul 1968

b. The base is at the end of a long and tenuous land LOC which requires that additional troops be tied to a security mission. When Route 9 is interdicted, an inordinate amount of available airlift resources is required to supply the base.

c. The base presents an inviting target for enemy offensive action. Additionally, it presents a fixed target for cross border artillery fires from positions that cannot be attacked by ground forces due to political constraints.

d. This posture will provide flexibility to the force commander by affording him the capability to react to intelligence on enemy activity with only the size and composition of force necessary for the particular requirement. This will release maneuver elements for employment in other areas as required.

e. The good weather during the summer dry season favors offensive operations by friendly forces in northern I CTZ.

f. To provide the same priority for reinforcement of Khe Sanh as was available early in the year would be militarily unwise. In view of the shift of the enemy threat in I CTZ, renewed enemy offensive operations throughout I CTZ would further reduce the capability of friendly forces to reinforce Khe Sanh.

g. The building of new road nets within key areas of South Vietnam such as the Ashau Valley, Quang Tin Province and the Tri-border area provide the enemy with a flexibility which makes Khe Sanh of lesser importance to the enemy's maneuver capability.

h. During the southwest monsoon, Khe Sanh assumes relatively less importance as the western anchor of the DMZ area defense because the NVA is provided a better and more direct infiltration route directly through the DMZ to SVN.

(S) Based on the above, work commenced on the evacuation of equipment and material from the Khe Sanh

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

A03H13-dnw
11 Jul 1968

combat base and on the destruction of fortifications, structure and grade III ammunition. Evacuation of the combat base was completed on 5 July 1968.

RECOMMENDATION: (U)

For discussion with:

CINCPAC
COMUSMACV
CG, FMFPAC
CG, III MAF.

DISPOSITION:

TOP SECRET

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				DIST: CJCS-1 DJS-3 NMCC-4 S/DEF-7 ASD/PA-5 CSA-1 CMC-7 FILE-1{293}JEC	
UNCLASSIFIED					
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE		
		X	X		
PRECEDENCE					
ACTION				IMMED PRIORITY	
INFO				IMMED PRIORITY DTG 272057Z JUN 68	
FROM: SECDEF				SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
TO: COMUSMACV				DIST	
INFO: CINCPAC				CJCS	
UNCLASS DEF 3549				DJS	
SUBJ: N.Y. Times Story on Khe Sanh				CSA	
Following story, no by-line, appeared page 1, early edition N.Y. Times, 27 June 68:				CMC	
WASHINGTON, June 26---Khesanh, the United States				SECDEF	
Marine base in northwest South Vietnam that became the symbol				OASD/PA-5	
of a controversial military strategy, is being abandoned, accord-				AO-1	
ing to a dispatch in The Baltimore Sun.				DPP-1	
The report states that the withdrawal has been accompanied				DSR-1	
by a build-up of several United States combat bases a few miles				DDI-1	
to the east, just out of range of North Vietnamese guns. Among				SA/SEA-1	
the bases that are being strengthened, The Sun reports, are					
Landing Zone Stud and the hilltop camps named Hawk, Cates				DATE 27	
and Mike.				TIME	
				MONTH June	
				YEAR 1968	
				PAGE NO. 1	
				NO. OF PAGES 2	
D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE		PHONE 72973	SIGNATURE	
	L. Gordon Hill, Jr. Colonel, USA Special Assistant, SEA			<i>L. Gordon Hill</i>	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			RELEASER	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	
UNCLASSIFIED				L. Gordon Hill, Jr., USA, SA/SEA	
			REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS		

DD FORM 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 66 WHICH IS OBSOLETE

* GPO : 1966 O-223-007

DECLASSIFIED

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
		UNCLASSIFIED	
FROM:			
Col L. G. Hill, Jr. 72873			
<p>The Defense Department declined to comment on the dispatch, which was sent from Khesang on June 24 by a Sun correspondent, John S. Carroll, and published in the newspaper yesterday.</p> <p>In Saigon it was announced that Mr. Carroll's military accreditation had been suspended indefinitely because he had broken rules that forbid discussion of future plans, operations or strikes to insure the protection of troops.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">No Confirmation or Denial</p> <p>The military officials in Saigon said there would be no confirmation or denial of the Carroll dispatch. Brig. Gen. Winant Sidle, the American chief of information in Saigon, warned correspondents that they would loose their credentials if their dispatches described the situation at Khesan.</p> <p>The general also urged correspondents not to report on the decision to lift Mr. Carroll's credentials. Such reports might tend to confirm the dispatch in The Sun, he said, and thus help the enemy. But they would not be considered violations of security regulations, he said...</p> <p>(Rest of story quotes extensively from the Carroll story in the Sun.)</p>			
SYMBOL	PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
	2	2	UNCLASSIFIED 3549
			INITIALS

DECLASSIFIED

G-3 DIVISION
OPERATIONS BRANCH

DATE RECEIVED:

25 JUN 1968

ROUTING

ACT INFO DATE INIT

DEADLINE

AC/S. G-3	A03				
DAC/S. G-3					
Asst G-3					
Admin & Fisc Br	A03A				
Head, Operations Branch	A03H				
Asst Head	1	X	6/25		
Hd. Ops Cbt/Eval Sec	10	1	6/25		
Asst	11	2	6/26		
Tactical Dat/PubsO	12				
CounterinsurO	13	3			
FMF Trng/ReadinessO	14				
OperationsO	15				
PlansO	16				
Combat EvalO	17				
Head, Readiness Central	20				
Program Analyst	21				
Status of ForcesO	22				
Head, CombatReqSec	30				
Fire, SupportO	31				
Naval GunfireO	32				
NBC O	33				
Close CombatO	34				
TacMob/AsstCloseComO	35				
Tactical Comd/ContO	36				

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED

NIS

COPIES RECEIVED				COPIES PREPARED		COPIES NUMBERED		DATE	
						THRU		25 May 1968	
RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE		INITIAL	ADDRESSEES	✓	(If applicable, check one)		
		IN	OUT						
					COMMANDANT		REQUEST FOR PERMANENT RETENTION (COPY) (BUCKTAG COPY)		
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT		RETAIN PERMANENTLY IN FILE (Record Material)		
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC		RETAIN _____ MONTHS (Information material w/o historical value)		
					CHIEF OF STAFF		DESTROY AFTER ROUTING (No record or information value)		
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)		UNIT _____ SIGNATURE _____		
					DC/S (RD&S)		✓ (If applicable, check)		
					DC/S (AIR)		PLEASE ADVISE SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL FILES		
					SECY OF GEN STAFF		REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF EXTRA COPIES. (In the absence of instructions extra copies will be destroyed after 30 days)		
					G-1		REMARKS (Entries to be dated and signed)		
					G-2		ACTION: _____ A03-whs		
					G-3		Subj: Answers and comments provided for questions on Khe Sanh		
					G-4		1. Attached classified documents answers provided to the USMC representative at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in preparation for a CMC visit to the U. S. Army Command and Staff College on 2 May 1968.		
					ADMINISTRATIVE		2. The unclassified copies are in reply to congressional inquiries on Khe Sanh.		
					MCCC		(For additional remarks attach plain paper)		
					FISCAL		ROUTING - Use numbers to show order of routing		
					INFORMATION		OPERATION CODE		
					PERSONNEL		X - ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET F - FOR CONCURRENCE		
					POLICY ANALYSIS		A - FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION G - FOR INFORMATION		
					RESERVE		B - FOR COMPLIANCE H - RETURN TO _____		
					SUPPLY		C - PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE I - _____		
					S&C FILES		OF _____		
							D - FOR COMMENT		
							E - FOR RECOMMENDATION		
							INITIAL FOR FILE		

RETURN TO:

DO NOT DETACH - THIS FORM IS A PERMANENT PART
OF THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH IT IS ATTACHED

WHEN FILLED IN,
THIS FORM BECOMES

SECRET

SECRET

A03013-dnw

QUESTION #8:

Since March, 1965, the Marine Corps has been conducting essentially land warfare in I Corps area of South Vietnam. Has this derogated the amphibious capability of the Corps? Does it appear that the Marine Forces in Vietnam will continue to conduct this type of combat for the foreseeable future?

ANSWER:

While it is true that the Marine Corps has been conducting essentially a land war in I Corps, our amphibious capability has not been derogated. In addition to Marine combat forces ashore, two Special Landing Forces (SLF), one of which was activated in April, 1967, have been maintained afloat in Amphibious Ready Group shipping of the 7th Fleet. On over 40 occasions since March 1965, Marine units have conducted amphibious assaults from the delta to the DMZ. Amphibious raids and participation in larger operations ashore have demonstrated the versatility and effectiveness of the Navy-Marine Corps Teams in the Vietnam environment.

Since the battalion landing teams and their supporting helicopter squadrons of the SLF's are rotated periodically, we currently have more personnel experienced in amphibious operations in a combat environment than at any time since World War II. And while I see no change in our commitment in I Corps in the foreseeable future, the Marine Corps will continue to take maximum advantage of its ability to conduct amphibious operations in conjunction with our operations ashore.

SECRET

SECRET SECRET

A03H13-dnw

QUESTION #11:

The village of Khe Sanh in South Vietnam has been in and out of the news repeatedly since early 1966. Is Khe Sanh of truly strategic or tactical significance to Marine operations or does its ownership have more psychological significance?

ANSWER:

Our reasons are both military and psychological. Militarily, Khe Sanh is the western anchor of our positions along the DMZ; the next terrain suitable for a base complex is at the Camp Carroll - Rockpile area some fifteen miles to the east. To evacuate the Khe Sanh area would be to give up virtually half of the width of the country opposite NVN, and would provide the enemy virtually free access to the coastal regions behind our DMZ positions. In addition, the mountain chain in western SVN runs generally parallel to the coast, and evacuation of Khe Sanh would provide the enemy a fairly straight LOC from NVN into the southern end of the A Shau Valley. This would permit him the use of a dry LOC throughout the year either in SVN or in Laos, depending upon the monsoon season. (Laos is dry in the winter, I Corps is dry in the summer.) It would also solve many logistical problems for NVN in its avowed objective of seizing the northern two provinces of SVN.

Psychologically, we have the objective of preventing the enemy from accomplishing his stated goal of seizing Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The I Corps area contains nearly 20 percent of the country's population, about 800,000 of whom live in the northern two provinces. The geography of these two provinces provides the enemy many advantages: the distance from the Laos border is short (averaging about 30-40 miles), the enemy supply lines are short and over three-fourths of the land is jungle covered. Yet a significant portion of the country's population lives here, and they cannot be abandoned.

Evacuation of Khe Sanh would provide many advantages to the enemy - more than we can afford. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that our base at Khe Sanh should be retained and that it can and will be held.

SECRET

21 MAR 1968

Mrs. Bertha Minning
4371 Webster Avenue
Cincinnati, Ohio 45236

Dear Mrs. Minning:

The Secretary of the Navy has asked that I reply to your letter of 4 March 1968 addressed to the Secretary of Defense concerning the Marine combat base at Khe Sanh.

Khe Sanh, as you know, is a part of a system of patrol bases astride the infiltration routes into South Vietnam. This defensive system was organized at the direction of the operational commander in Vietnam in 1966 to thwart a major enemy invasion across the Demilitarized Zone. Since that time, Marine units in the DMZ area have defeated seven such attempted invasions by large scale forces. Additionally, our continued presence denies the enemy relatively easy access routes to the major population centers of the northern provinces including possible use of Route 9, the only east-west route in the northern portion of South Vietnam.

Khe Sanh is the western anchor of our mutually supporting positions in the DMZ. A withdrawal from Khe Sanh would require a fall back to another position equally susceptible to attack, or the withdrawal of forces occupying other positions along the DMZ as well. A withdrawal of this type would result in larger scale confrontations with the enemy in the more populated areas and urban centers, plus subjecting our military logistics installations and lines of communications to more frequent attack by major forces.

Substantial Marine forces are deployed at Khe Sanh and occupy an extensive complex of mutually supporting, fortified positions. In addition to the artillery units at Khe Sanh, 175mm guns are in positions from which to provide

Return to A03H, Rm 2126
after signature
14 MAR 1968

support, as required. Marine, Navy and Air Force planes, ranging from jet attack aircraft to B-52 bombers, are available to bombard the enemy positions on an around-the-clock basis. Furthermore, sizable numbers of additional troop units are available in I Corps Tactical Zone for reinforcement should the situation warrant.

With respect to enemy tunneling in the Khe Sanh area, our forces are employing various methods to detect this activity ranging from the use of simple stethoscopes to sophisticated seismic devices. Other detection devices which have been under study and analysis here in the United States will soon be available to our units in Vietnam. Additionally, the area surrounding Khe Sanh is under constant ground and aerial observation and all known trench works and potential tunnel areas are subjected to intense bombardment by artillery and air strikes.

Your suggestion regarding the use of water to flood tunnels is appreciated and you may be sure that all feasible methods will be utilized.

While Marine presence in the DMZ area is a heavy and challenging commitment, it is this presence which impedes more direct North Vietnamese invasion.

Again thanks for your suggestion and I trust that this information will allay somewhat your concern.

Sincerely,

R. G. OWENS, JR.
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

22 MAR 1968

Senator Hugh Scott
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Scott:

This letter is in reply to your inquiry of 14 March 1968 on behalf of Mrs. Jerralee Gay, whose husband, Staff Sergeant John B. Gay, died in Vietnam.

The commander of a unit conducting combat operations in a populated area such as the city of Hue is continually faced with decisions which affect not only his own forces but the lives of innocent civilians as well. He must make the judgment as to the course of action to be pursued which will assure the successful accomplishment of his mission with minimum loss of life to his personnel and civilians. The duration of operations in the city of Hue was extended in order to reduce the hazard to our Marines and to Vietnamese civilians. You may rest assured that no commander would endanger the life of a single one of his men when weighed against the preservation of "art treasures".

Our units at Hue had, and used, the requisite supporting arms to successfully accomplish their assigned tasks. Despite adverse weather conditions and a natural reluctance to destroy portions of the city that are of deep cultural significance to the Vietnamese people, artillery, naval gunfire and tactical air strikes were used extensively and played a significant part in bringing this operation to a successful conclusion.

Furthermore, up to eleven Vietnamese battalions participated in the combat operations in Hue. It was the Vietnamese units that recaptured the major portion of the Citadel. Roughly three times as many Vietnamese

Return to ADJ: RM 21
after signature

21 MAR 1968

22 MAR 1968

Honorable Alphonzo Bell
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Bell:

This letter is in reply to your inquiry of 14 March 1968 on behalf of Mr. Edgar F. Wright concerning Marine operations.

As Mr. Wright has correctly surmised, there are indications that the enemy has been tunneling in the Khe Sanh area. To counter this activity, our forces in addition to patrolling are employing various methods to detect digging, ranging from the use of simple stethoscopes to sophisticated seismic devices. Other detection devices which offer promise are being tested here in the United States and if practicable will be available to our units in Vietnam. Additionally, the area surrounding Khe Sanh is under constant ground or aerial observation and all known trench works and potential tunnel areas are subjected to intense bombardment by artillery and air strikes.

Substantial Marine forces are deployed at Khe Sanh and occupy an extensive complex of mutually supporting, fortified positions. In addition to the artillery units at Khe Sanh, 175mm guns are in positions from which they can provide support, as required. Hundreds of Marine, Navy and Air Force planes, ranging from attack aircraft to heavy bombers, are available to bombard the enemy positions on an around-the-clock basis. Furthermore, sizable numbers of additional troop units are available in I Corps Tactical Zone for reinforcement should the situation warrant.

Return to A03 H, Rm 2126
after signature
21 MAR 1968
May

Please convey my appreciation to Mr. Wright for his interest in improving the effectiveness of our combat operations in Vietnam.

Sincerely,

R. G. OWENS, JR.
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Encl:

(1) Ltr from Mr. Wright dated 9 March 1968.

Copy to: SECNAV #2-2684
OSD #6144

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNVV .FMF167XBWEZ
 PP RUEBHOA
 DE RUHHFMA 2547 1240649
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 133645Z APR 68
 CG FMFMA
 TO RUEBHOA/CIC
 R 120225Z APR 68 ZFF-6 ZEG
 FM COMUSMACV
 CG FMFMA
 CG III MAF DANANG
 INFO CG THIRD MAR DIV DANANG
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL 10311 WESTMORELAND SENDS.
 SUBJ: PUC RECOMMENDATION FOR THE 26TH MARINES (REIN) (U)
 REF: CG III MAF MSG DIG 090556Z APR 68 (U) - NH
 1. (U) CONCUR IN REFERENCE RECOMMENDING AWARD OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
 UNIT CITATION TO THE 26TH MAR (REIN).
 2. (C) THE STEADFAST DETERMINATION WITH WHICH THE OFFICERS AND
 MEN OF THE 26TH MAR (REIN) DEFENDED KHE SANH PERIMETER WHILE
 FACED BY AN EQUALLY DETERMINED AND NUMERICALLY SUPERIOR ENEMY
 FORCE IS WORTHY OF THE HIGHEST PRAISE. BY PERFORMING THEIR
 MISSION AT KHE SANH SO ADMIRABLY, THEY DENIED THE REGULAR NORTH
 VIETNAMESE ARMY A VITAL LINE OF COMMUNICATION INTO SOUTH VIETNAM.
 THUS PROVIDING A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE OVERALL FAILURE
 OF THE VC/PA TET OFFENSIVE. ACCORDINGLY, I CONSIDER THIS OUT-
 STANDING MARINE UNIT TO BE HIGHLY DESERVING OF THE RECOMMENDED

PAGE 2 RUMSAW 1903D CONFIDENTIAL
 AWARD.

3. (U) FOR CG III MAF. REFERENCE PARAGRAPH 8, REFERENCE MESSAGE
 REQUEST THIS HEADQUARTERS BE FURNISHED A COMPLETE TROOP LIST OF
 UNIT OF ALL SERVICES WHICH ARE INCLUDED IN BASIC RECOMMENDATION
 GP4
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

20411

PTTEZYUW RUHHFMA2546 1040631-EEEE --RUEBHQA.

ZNY EEEEE

P R 130631Z APR 68

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUEBHQA/CNC

INFO RUEBQFA/SECNAV (NDSBM)

RUEHAAA/CNO

RUHHHQA/CINCPAC

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUMMAA/CG III MAF

BT

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 1 OF 2

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION FOR TWENTY-SIXTH MARINES

(REINFORCED)

1. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE 26TH MAR (REIN) BE AWARDED THE PUC FOR EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM AND DISTINGUISHED PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IN COMBAT AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY FORCES AT KHE SANH IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, DURING THE PERIOD FROM 20 JANUARY 1968 TO 1 APRIL 1968. THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD THE 26TH MAR (REIN), AGGREGATING AT NO TIME MORE THAN 6,680 MEN, FACED TWO FIRST LINE

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA 2546 UNCLAS E F T O

NVA DIVISIONS (325-C AND 304) BOTH OF WHICH WERE STRONGLY REINFORCED WITH HEAVY AND MEDIUM ARTILLERY AND ROCKET SUPPORT. COMPLETELY SURROUNDED BY THE ENEMY, KHE SANH COMBAT BASE, COMPRISED OF THE PERIMETER DEFENSE AND VITAL HILL POSITIONS (881-SOUTH, 861-A, 558 AND 950), WAS SUBJECTED TO INTENSIVE ENEMY FIRE BOTH DAY AND NIGHT, AS WELL AS TO REPEATED ATTACKS BY ENEMY FORCES OF UP TO REGIMENTAL STRENGTH. ENEMY ARTILLERY, INCLUDING 130MM GUNS, 122MM GUNS, 152MM GUNS/HOWITZERS, 140MM ROCKETS, 122MM ROCKETS AND VARIOUS SMALLER PIECES, FIRED CONSTANTLY ON THE BASE. ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS THE BASE WAS HIT WITH AS MANY AS 650 TO 750 ROUNDS OF MIXED ARTILLERY AND ROCKETS WITHIN A MATTER OF ONLY A FEW HOURS. ON ONE DAY DURING THE PERIOD THE BASE WAS HIT WITH OVER 1,000 ROUNDS OF MIXED ARTILLERY AND ROCKET FIRE. IN ADDITION TO POWERFUL ATTACKS BY ARTILLERY AND ROCKETS, THE ENEMY DEVELOPED A SYSTEM OF TRENCHES WHICH HE UTILIZED TO APPROACH THE OUTER PERIMETER OF THE BASE DEFENSES. AGAIN AND AGAIN THE 26TH MARINES (REIN), LAUNCHED AGGRESSIVE FORCES OF

1/2 130631

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 2546 UNCLAS E F T O

UP TO COMPANY SIZE, ENTERED THESE TRENCHES, KILLED THE OCCUPANTS AND DESTROYED THE BUNKERS WHICH WERE A PART OF THE TRENCH COMPLEX.

2. DEPENDENT ENTIRELY ON AERIAL RESUPPLY FOR EVERYTHING REQUIRED TO SUBSIST AND FIGHT, THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE WAS SUSTAINED THROUGH THE LOGISTIC EFFORTS OF THE 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING AND THE 7TH AIR FORCE. WHILE FIXED WING AIRCRAFT WERE ABLE LARGELY TO SUPPLY THE BASE BY AIRLANDING AND AIR-DROPPING SUPPLIES, RESUPPLY OF THE VITAL HILL OUTPOST POSITIONS WAS A TASK WHICH COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED ONLY BY HELICOPTERS. WHEN IT BECAME HAZARDOUS FOR FIXED WING AIRCRAFT TO LAND AT THE BASE, THE BURDEN OF EVACUATING THE WOUNDED, WHICH PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN SHARED BETWEEN FIXED WING AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS, THEN BECAME THE PRIME RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HELICOPTERS FORCES. THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE DELIVERY OF SUPPLIES AND EVACUATION OF THE WOUNDED FROM THE EXPOSED HILL POSITIONS WAS ENTIRELY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HELICOPTER CREWS, ALL OF WHOM PERFORMED THEIR TASKS WITH GREAT GALLANTRY AND STEADFASTNESS.

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 2546 UNCLAS E F T O

WITHOUT REGARD TO THE COST TO THEMSELVES IN MEN AND MACHINES, AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ENEMY ENJOYED A NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OF GREATER THAN 3-1 IN MEN, AND WITH ARTILLERY/ROCKET SUPPORT OF GREAT MAGNITUDE, THE 26TH MARINES (REIN) RESOLUTELY AND COURAGEOUSLY HELD THEIR POSITIONS, ON BOTH THE MAIN PERIMETER AND ON THE ISOLATED HILLS, IN THE FACE OF EVERY EFFORT TO DISLodge THEM.

3. WHEN THE MONSOON WEATHER MADE AERIAL RESUPPLY IMPOSSIBLE AND GREATLY REDUCED AERIAL SUPPORT, THE 26TH MARINES (REIN) STILL STOOD FIRM. THEY HAD BEEN COMMANDED TO DEFEND KHE SANH AND THEY RESOLVED TO DO SO, TO THE LAST MAN AND TO THE LAST ROUND.

4. SUPPORTED BY THE GREATEST CONCENTRATION OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT EVER DEVOTED TO A SINGLE BATTLE, PROVIDED BY ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, 7TH AIR FORCE, AVIATION ELEMENTS OF THE 7TH FLEET, AND BY THE 91ST, 24TH AND 99TH BOMBARDMENT WINGS OF THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND AND SUSTAINED BY THEIR OWN PROFESSIONAL PRIDE AND HIGH SENSE OF DUTY, THE 26TH MARINES (REIN)

PAGE 5 RUHHFMA 2546 UNCLAS E F T O

STOOD STEADFAST AT KHE SANH AS A SHINING EXAMPLE OF COURAGE AND AGGRESSIVENESS IN THE FACE OF OVERWHELMING ODDS. THROUGH THE INDOMITABLE WILL OF THE MEN WHO DEFENDED KHE SANH, AND THROUGH THE GALLANT EFFORTS OF THE UNITS WHICH PROVIDED THE AIR SUPPORT SO VITAL TO THE DEFENSE OF THE BASE, KHE SANH WAS HELD, AND THE ENEMY WAS DECISIVELY DEFEATED.

5. THE FOLLOWING STATISTICAL DATA IS PROVIDED AS EVIDENCE OF THE DISTINGUISHED PERFORMANCE OF THE 26TH MARINES (REIN), AND THEIR SUPPORTING ARMS, DURING THE CITED PERIOD:

26TH MARINES (REIN)		ENEMY		DETAINÉES	WEAPONS CAPTURED INDIV/CREW SERVED
KIA	MIA	KIA	PW		
153	1,405	1,131	8	16	54/24

6. A LIST OF SUPPORTING UNITS OF ALL SERVICES IS CURRENTLY BEING COMPILED BY CG III MAF AND WILL BE FORWARDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

PAGE 6 RUHHFMA 2546 UNCLAS E F T O

7. THIS RECOMMENDATION IS FORWARDED ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS. CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT, CG III MAF AND THIS HEADQUARTERS ALL CONCUR.

8. PROPOSED CITATION FOLLOWS:

FOR EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM IN ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY FORCES DURING THE BATTLE FOR KHE SANH IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FROM 20 JANUARY TO 1 APRIL 1968. DURING THIS PERIOD, THE 26TH MAR (REIN) WAS ASSIGNED THE TASK OF DEFENDING THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE AND THE VITAL POSITIONS AT HILLS 881 SOUTH, 861-A, 558 AND 950, ALL OF WHICH OVERLOOKED CRITICAL AVENUES OF APPROACH FROM LAOS. ALTHOUGH CONFRONTED BY TWO FIRST LINE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY DIVISIONS, BOTH REINFORCED BY HEAVY AND MEDIUM ARTILLERY AND ROCKETS, AND CONSTANTLY SUBJECTED TO INTENSIVE ENEMY FIRE AND RELENTLESS ENEMY GROUND ATTACKS BY UNITS UP TO REGIMENTAL-SIZE, THE 26TH MAR (REIN) COURAGEOUSLY MAINTAINED THEIR POSITIONS AND SUCCESSFULLY THWARTED THE ENEMY'S ASSAULTS. ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, THE COMBAT BASE SUSTAINED HEAVY ENEMY ROCKET AND ARTILLERY ATTACKS.

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 2548 UNCLAS E F T O

RUPTED EVACUATION OPERATIONS OF THE WOUNDED BECAME THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE HELICOPTER UNITS OF THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING. IN LARGE MEASURE DUE TO THE SELFLESS AND HEROIC EFFORTS OF THE PILOTS AND THEIR CREWS, AND DESPITE SEEMINGLY INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLES, NUMEROUS MARINE LIVES WERE SAVED AND THE MATERIALS NECESSARY FOR SUSTAINED COMBAT WERE MADE CONTINUALLY AVAILABLE. DURING THE HEAVIEST MONSOON WEATHER PERIOD, WHEN AERIAL RESUPPLY AND AERIAL FIRE SUPPORT WERE DIMINISHED, THE 26TH MAR (REIN) REMAINED RESOLUTE AND DISPLAYED THE ULTIMATE IN FORTITUDE AND DETERMINATION, AS THEY GALLANTLY PROSECUTED THE DEFENSE OF THE BASE WHICH THEY HAD BEEN COMMANDED TO HOLD. THROUGH THE INDOMITABLE WILL, ENDURANCE AND STEADFAST COURAGE OF THE 26TH MAR (REIN) AND THE DISTINGUISHED EFFORTS OF THE MEN WHO PROVIDED THE AIR SUPPORT TO THE DEFENDERS, THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE WAS HELD AND THE ENEMY WAS DECISIVELY DEFEATED, RESULTING IN 1,131 KILLED IN ACTION, THE CAPTURE OF EIGHT SOLDIERS AND FIFTY-FOUR INDIVIDUAL AND TWENTY-FOUR CREW SERVED WEAPONS CONFIS-

PAGE 4 RUHHFMA 2548 UNCLAS E F T O

CATED. BY THEIR GALLANT FIGHTING SPIRIT AND THEIR INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF HEROISM AND DARING, THE MEN OF THE 26TH MAR (REIN) CREATED A RECORD OF ILLUSTRIOUS COURAGE AND DETERMINATION WHICH WAS IN KEEPING WITH THE HIGHEST TRADITIONS OF THE MARINE CORPS AND OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL SERVICE.

BT

NNNN#

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1000/500
10/0
30

Return to Major Hester

FILE 2

000 35 54268

VV FMF157
PP RUCIHOA
DE RUHHFMA 3883 0800327
ZNY CCCCC
P 200327Z MAR 68
FM CG FMFPAC
TO RUCIHOA/CNC
BT

CH
A03
A04
AR
AR
AG

CONFIDENTIAL
FOR CMC CODE CH

C. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR INQUIRY OF 5MARCH REGARDING ALLEGATIONS

MADE BY AN UNIDENTIFIED MARINE SERGEANT CONCERNING SHORTAGE OF
FORTIFICATION MATERIAL AT KHE SANH, THE FOLLOWING FACTS ARE SUB-
MITTED.

A. AS OF 7MARCH, A TOTAL OF 910 BUNKERS OF VARIOUS SIZES
WERE IN USE BY MARINE FORCES AT KHE SANH. THIS INCLUDES
THIRTEEN HEAVY TIMBER BUNKERS PRECUT AND ASSEMBLED ON-SITE.
SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF OTHER LUMBER, M8A1 MATTING AND CLASS
IV FORTIFICATION MATERIAL WAS AIRLIFTED AND MADE AVAILABLE FOR
THE CONSTRUCTION OF BUNKERS TO ACCOMMODATE THE INCREASE IN
TROOP STRENGTH. DURING JAN AND FEB 68, A TOTAL OF 784 SHORT TONS
OF THIS FORTIFICATION MATERIAL WAS AIRLIFTED TO KHE SANH. TWENTY
ADDITIONAL PRECUT BUNKERS ARE BEING

200327

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 2 RUHHFMA 883 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 DELIVERED TO KHE SANH ON A DAILY BASIS AS AIRLIFT IS AVAILABLE.
 EACH SMALL BUNKER (EIGHT BY EIGHT BY EIGHT FT) REQUIRES ONE C-130
 LIFT WITH MULTIPLE LIFTS REQUIRED FOR LARGER BUNKERS.

B. PRIOR TO 13DECS7, THE BUNKER REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ONE
 BATTALION LANDING TEAM FORCE AT KHE SANH WAS CONSIDERED ADEQUATE.
 BEGINNING 13DECS7, THE BASE WAS REINFORCED BY THREE ADDITIONAL
 BATTALIONS AND A CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN NUMBERS OF BUNKERS WAS
 REQUIRED. THESE ADDITIONAL FORCES ALSO REQUIRED AN INCREASE OF
 RESUPPLY AIR-LIFT FROM SIXTY SHORT TONS PER DAY TO 185 SHORT TONS
 PER DAY, AND SIXTEEN HUNDRED SHORT TONS OF SUPPLY WERE REQUIRED
 TO MEET MINIMUM STOCK LEVELS. THIS REQUIREMENT PLACED HEAVY DE-
 MANDS ON THE AVAILABLE AIRLIFT. INCREASED ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE
 AND INCOMING ROUNDS LANDING ON THE AIR FIELD, ALONG WITH DELAYS
 CAUSED BY POOR FLYING WEATHER, FURTHER HAMPERED THE DELIVERY OF
 BUNKERS AS WELL AS OTHER COMBAT ESSENTIAL MATERIAL.

C. PRE-CUT LUMBER AND OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT IS BEING DELIV-
 ERED BY THE LOW-ALTITUDE PARACHUTE EXTRACTION METHOD OF AIR DELIV-
 ERY, WITH FIVE SORTIES PER DAY SCHEDULED; HOWEVER, PRESENT AVAIL-
 ABILITY OF LOW-ALTITUDE PARACHUTE EXTRACTION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT HAS
 LIMITED OPERATIONS TO AN AVERAGE OF ONLY TWO SORTIES PER DAY.

PAGE 3 RUHHFMA 883 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 ADDITIONAL ASSETS ARE BEING OBTAINED.
 2. IN SUMMARY, ALL SUPPLIES, INCLUDING FORTIFICATION MATERIAL,
 ARE BEING DELIVERED AT KHE SANH AS RAPIDLY AS THE SITUATION WILL
 PERMIT.

GP-4
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 YVNA 4279 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SOLD A BOTTLE OF LIQUOR TO
 A MARINE FOR TWENTY-FIVE DOLLARS. IMMEDIATE
 STEPS WERE TAKEN WITH SENIOR AIR FORCE OFFICER
 PRESENT TO PRECLUDE FURTHER SIMILAR INCIDENTS.
 H. STATEMENT: "NO COMBAT GEAR OR PONCHOS TO
 SLEEP IN, NOT TO MENTION MAIL OR BEER."
 (1) THERE HAS NEVER BEEN ANY SHORTAGE OF COMBAT
 EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD AFFECT HIS UNIT'S COMBAT EF7
 FICIENCY.
 (2) THERE IS CURRENTLY A 15 DAY SUPPLY OF PETRO7
 LEUM PRODUCTS ON HAND AT HILL 881S AND A BASIC AL7
 LOWANCE PLUS 5 DAYS SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION.
 ORGANIZATIONAL/INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT AND FIELD
 FORTIFICATION SUPPLIES ARE AVAILABLE AS REQUIRED.
 (3) BEER HAS NEVER BEEN PROVIDED TO HILL 881S FOR
 THE REASON PREVIOUSLY STATED.
 4. CONCLUSION: LIEUTENANT AMMON HAS BEEN GUILTY OF
 MINOR EXAGGERATION. BEYOND THIS, HE APPEARS TO BE THE
 VICTIM OF POOR JUDGEMENT ON THE PART

PAGE 2 OF 2
 FILED OF 24 COR

PAGE 4 YVNA 4279 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 OF HIS PARENTS IN PUBLICIZING HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE.
 5. FOR CODE CHB-2. COMMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE CONCERNING
 MAIL AND FOOD DELIVERIES ARE EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO REFERENCE 8.
 GP74
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 5 YVNA 4277 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCD
 BUILT UP STOCKS. AS OF 17 MARCH, HILL 881S HAD 5.5
 DAYS SUPPLY OF INDIVIDUAL RATIONS ON HAND, PLUS
 SUPPLEMENTS CONSISTING OF 24 LOAVES OF FRESH
 BREAD, TWO CASES OF CANNED MILK, THREE CASES OF
 FRESH ORANGE AND REGULARLY SUPPLIED SUNDRIES
 PACKS (CIGARETTES, TOOTHPASTE, ETC). AS OF 190330W,
 THERE WERE 19.5 DAYS SUPPLY
 OF RATIONS ON HAND.

B. STATEMENT: "PUT PART OF PLATOON ON LINE AND
 SWEEP THROUGH GARBAGE DUMP. EVERYONE GOT
 PLENTY TO FILL STOMACHS LIKE HOBOES."

COMMENT:

(1) WHEN SUBSISTING ON "C" RATIONS
 TROOPS ARE LIKELY TO DISCARD THE LESS FAVORED ITEMS
 OF THE RATION; I.E., CANNED BREAD, PEANUT BUTTER,
 HAM AND LIMA BEANS, ETC. WHEN WEATHER PREVENTED RE
 SUPPLY, IT WAS TO BE EXPECTED THAT PREVIOUSLY DIS-
 CARDED, BUT STILL SEALED, CANS OF FOOD WOULD BE
 RECOVERED AND CONSUMED.

C. STATEMENT: "COMPANY HAS HAD ONLY ONE BAG OF
 MAIL WITHIN LAST FOUR OR FIVE WEEKS."

PAGE 6 YVNA 4277 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCD
 COMMENT:

(1) MAIL DELIVERY HAS BEEN POOR. DURING THE MONTH
 OF FEBRUARY, 90,613 POUNDS (43,365 SHORT TONS) OF
 MAIL WERE DELIVERED TO KHE SANH.

(2) UNTIL THE END OF FEBRUARY, ALL MAIL FOR KHE
 SANH WAS FORWARDED FROM DANANG/PHU BAI BY THE
 15TH AERIAL PORT COMPANY, USAF. III MAF HAS NOW
 ASSUMED THE TASK OF FORWARDING THE KHE SANH MAIL
 AND DISPATCHES IT FROM DONG HA.

(3) FOR THE PERIOD 1-17 MARCH, INCLUSIVE, 79,980
 POUNDS (34.99 SHORT TONS) OF MAIL WERE DELIVERED
 TO KHE SANH. III MAF IS PRESENTLY DEVISING A SYSTEM
 TO BREAK DOWN MAIL FOR HELICOPTER DELIVERY TO
 SPECIFIC TACTICAL LOCATIONS, INCLUDING HILL 881S.

(4) TWENTY-TWO BAGS OF MAIL ARE CURRENTLY AT
 KHE SANH AWAITING DELIVERY TO HILL 881S. ADDRESSING
 LIEUT AMMON'S CASE SPECIFICALLY, ELEVEN BAGS OF MAIL
 WERE DELIVERED ON 18 MARCH TO "M" COMPANY
 ON HILL 881S. THE LAST PREVIOUS DELIVERY
 TO "M" COMPANY OCCURRED ON 7 MARCH.

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 3 YNA 4277 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 (3) DURING THE FIRST 19 DAYS OF MARCH, THERE WERE
 13 CLOUDY, TWO PARTLY CLOUDY AND FOUR OVERCAST
 DAYS. MORNING HOURS HAVE BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY
 FOG, ALTHOUGH RAINFALL HAS BEEN SLIGHT. VISIBILITY
 IN THE GENERAL AREA AVERAGED ONLY 4.7 MILES;
 HOWEVER, LOW-HANGING CLOUDS AND FOG CONTINUED
 TO CURTAIL HELICOPTER OPERATIONS IN THE HIGHER
 ELEVATIONS. HUMIDITY AVERAGED 89 PERCENT DURING
 MARCH.

(4) 33 HELICOPTERS HAVE BEEN PERMANENTLY DIS-
 ABLED OR DESTROYED IN RESUPPLY OPERATIONS IN THE
 KHE SANH AREA SINCE 21 JANUARY 1968. THIS
 REDUCTION OF HELICOPTER ASSETS HAS, OF
 COURSE, FURTHER ERODED OUR ABILITY TO CONDUCT
 SUCH RESUPPLY OPERATIONS.

B. SECOND LIEUTENANT AMMON HAS A GOOD
 RECORD IN HIS BATTALION. HE SAYS THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE
 WAS THE RESULT OF A PRIVATE LETTER WRITTEN TO
 HIS PARENTS AND NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION. AL7
 THOUGH THE STATEMENTS IN HIS LETTER ARE, IN SOME

PAGE 4 YNA 4277 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEO
 SENSE, EXAGGERATED, THEY REFLECT SOME OF THE HARDSHIPS EX-
 PERIENCED ON HILL 881S AND THE OTHER KHE SANH
 COMBAT OUTPOSTS.

C. IN DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT, LIEUTENANT AMMON EX-
 PRESSED SURPRISE AND ALARM THAT ANY OF HIS
 STATEMENTS HAD BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, SINCE
 HE STATES THAT HIS WORDS WERE WRITTEN IN A HUMOROUS VEIN AND
 WERE NOT INTENDED AS COMPLAINTS. HE PROMISES
 ACTION TO PREVENT REPETITION OF SUCH AN INCIDENT.

D. LIEUTENANT AMMON HAS A STRONG DESIRE TO RE-
 MAIN WITH HIS COMPANY AND DENIES ANY WISH TO BE
 TRANSFERRED.

3. SPECIFIC COMMENTS

A. STATEMENT: "HASN'T HAD A WHOLE LOT OF CHOW
 AND WENT TWO DAYS WITH OUT SUPPLIES."

COMMENT:

(1) HILL 881S DID RUN OUT OF RATIONS ON 20 FEBRUARY
 AND WAS NOT RESUPPLIED UNTIL 22 FEBRUARY DUE
 TO BAD WEATHER.

(2) WITH IMPROVED WEATHER, RESUPPLY HAS STEADILY

2 3
 6 18

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAC 222

PP WWND
 DE YNA 4277 0820314
 ZNY CCCCC
 P 220314Z MAR 68
 FM CG FMFPAC
 TO WWND/CMC
 BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2
 SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN CHAPMAN FROM LTGEN KRULAK.
 MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
 NEWS ARTICLE FROM CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (U)
 A. CMC 160028Z/MAR 68 (U) -AC
 B. CMC 191447Z/MAR 68 (U) -CMA
 1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (A), THE FOLLOWING
 COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED CONCERNING SUBJECT
 ARTICLE.

2. GENERAL COMMENTS
 A. THE MAJORITY OF LIEUTENANT AMMON'S COMPLAINTS
 ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF
 PROVIDING RESUPPLY AT HILL 881'S SOLELY
 BY HELICOPTER. THESE DIFFICULTIES, IN TURN, ARE DIRECTLY RELATED TO
 WEATHER AND ENEMY INTERDICTION.
 THE SITUATION IS SUFFICIENTLY TENUOUS AS TO

PAGE 2 YNA 4277 C O N F I D E N T I A L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MCEC
 NECESSITATE COORDINATED FIXED WING
 STRIKES TO SUPPRESS ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE
 DURING HELICOPTER RESUPPLY OF HILL 881'S AND ADJ
 JACENT AREAS.

(1) THESE FACTORS HAVE FREQUENTLY RESTRICTED RE7
 SUPPLY TO PRIORITY ITEMS ONLY AND HAVE OFTEN
 RESULTED IN DEFERMENT OF OTHER CARGO.
 FOR EXAMPLE, BASED ON MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS,
 THERE WAS A DEFICIT OF 1037 SHORT TONS IN SCHEDULED
 DELIVERIES OF SUPPLIES TO THE SANH DURING FEBRUARY.

(2) EXCEPT FOR SEVEN DAYS, THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY
 WAS CHARACTERIZED BY MARGINAL FLYING WEATHER.
 DURING THE MONTH THERE WERE 24 CLOUDY AND FIVE
 OVERCAST DAYS. FOG AND RAIN WERE EX7
 PERIODIC THROUGHOUT THE MONTH. ALTHOUGH THE
 AVERAGE VISIBILITY FOR THE KHE SANH AREA
 DURING THE MONTH WAS 3 MILES, THE HIGHER ELEVA-
 TIONS SUCH AS HILL 881'S WERE FREQUENTLY SHROUDED
 IN CLOUDS OR FOG. HUMIDITY AVERAGED
 87 PERCENT DURING THE MONTH.

220314 1/2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Newsweek

MORE OF THE SAME WON'T DO

In the Wake of the Tet Offensive A New Policy Is Needed

After three years of gradual escalation, President Johnson's strategy for Vietnam has run into a dead end. Only the chronic optimist can now see "the light at the end of the tunnel" that used to illuminate the rhetoric of the military briefing officers. Only the deluded can console themselves with the comforting feeling that suddenly the war will turn a corner and the enemy will wither away. The Tet offensive—those three brutal weeks that may have been only the first part of the Communists' winter-spring campaign—has exposed the utter inadequacy of the Administration's war policy. A few months ago General Westmoreland suggested that he might be able to send some troops home "within two years or less." Today the enemy has the initiative throughout Vietnam.

As a consequence, the United States is seized by a crisis of confidence, and the lacerating debate about the whole Vietnam question has broken out again. Those who supported the war—for whatever reasons—have had to re-examine their assumptions. They have had to ask whether the political imperatives which seemed to justify the war are worth the savagery and terror, the wholesale destruction which mark the struggle. Those who opposed the war can now find new reasons to justify their criticism. But this is small consolation, for even the senators who attacked the President so fiercely last week feel frustrated and impotent to shape events. And those who just went along—as most people usually do—are beset by a nagging uncertainty, or at worst the feeling that they have been misled by their leaders.

Though the Johnson Administration may not have misled the nation, it has certainly miscalculated; and the extent of its miscalculation can be measured by the gap between what it hoped to achieve and the situation that now prevails. The limited bombing of North Vietnam—limited only in the most relative sense—was launched to punish the enemy, slow down Hanoi's infiltration of the South, bend the will of the Communists so that they would come to the negotiating table and bolster the government of the south.

Has the bombing succeeded? In 1965, when the U.S. bombing campaign over the North began, there were some 5,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in South Vietnam; now, 700,000 tons of TNT later, there may be as many as 112,000. As for the enemy's will, the Tet offensive, brilliantly planned and powerfully executed, is answer enough.

What of the escalation on the ground? By sending some half a million American troops to Vietnam the Administration hoped to crush the enemy's main forces, root out the guerrillas, seal the borders and secure the countryside. Today four NVA divisions are ranged near the tortured Marine garrison at Khe Sanh, security has broken down across the country, the Viet Cong are again recruiting feverishly and American casualties are sharply on the increase.

Somehow, the political support which the U.S. has given to the government of President Thieu and Vice President Ky has not had the intended effect either. The two generals in mufti have been unable to galvanize their troops or their people and few indeed would be so rash as to predict that

anything lasting can be built on their government. And what of the rest of the free world—which has contributed so pitifully little to carrying on this war? America's brave involvement was supposed to hearten and impress these free nations. But with a few exceptions, they look upon the U.S.'s plight with a sad compassion. Many of them, indeed, can barely conceal their moral revulsion at the sight of the world's most powerful nation locked in battle with a small and obscure state.

This is the dismal balance sheet at the moment. It can be argued that it is too pessimistic an accounting; but the reports of the Administration have always been too optimistic—a habit that still persists. Even now, no one will officially admit the one grim truth that recent events have underlined: the war cannot be won by military means without tearing apart the whole fabric of national life and international relations.

To accept this proposition might spark the Administration into turning its creative political energies to a new strategy. But the behavior of the U.S. Government these past few weeks has been curiously immobile—as if it were literally trapped in a series of dilemmas from which there is no escape. Even the most responsible critics of Mr. Johnson's strategy reflect this frustration. Speaking last week, Theodore Sorensen, once President Kennedy's most intimate adviser, said:

"Our worldwide military primacy cannot produce a victory and our worldwide political primacy cannot permit a withdrawal. We are unable to transfer our will to the South Vietnamese and unable to break the will of the North Vietnamese. Any serious escalation would risk Chinese or Soviet intervention, and any serious negotiation would risk a Communist South Vietnam."

But there are no truly insoluble dilemmas in political affairs. Choice, will, accident—all have a way of resolving the unresolvable. Even now, an intensive and private official re-examination of the American position is going on. Hopefully, the analysis concerns itself with something more than military questions. But even if those were the only ones—whether to send 50,000 more troops to Vietnam or 206,000, whether to pull back from the DMZ or try to mount an attack to the north of the DMZ—the decisions to be made are momentous enough. For whatever is decided is a step into the unknown. And in the past, the nation's leaders have not been the surest guides.

The Administration has occasionally argued that a public questioning of the conduct of the war plays into the hands of the enemy. This may be. But the editors of NEWSWEEK believe that the United States is strong enough and healthy enough to endure a public self-analysis, and that the stakes are so great that every voice should be heard.

In the pages that follow, NEWSWEEK tries to assess the present military and political situation—and offers some modest and tentative proposals for a new course in Vietnam. To say modest is not to be coy—nor ironic—but simply to suggest that there are other ways to end this war than the one the U.S. has been following. Indeed, simply to do more of the same might lead to more of the same kind of failure.



Westmoreland and Johnson

March 18, 1968

25

The Military Dilemma

The New Math of Escalation Adds Up to One-to-One

For a whole generation of Western military strategists, the steamy jungles of Asia have served as a classroom in the new math of unconventional warfare. It was there that they formulated a basic tenet of counterinsurgency—which is that the way to defeat an enemy who hits and runs is to smother him with vastly superior numbers. The British were quick to apply this lesson; in Malaya, they consistently fielded eight of their troops for every Communist insurgent—and still it took them twelve years to finish the job. In South Vietnam, the U.S., which rejoices in far more massive firepower than the British possessed, has been content with a more modest manpower ratio; U.S. commanders have sought to maintain four-to-one combat superiority. But in the aftermath of the Communist Tet offensive, that advantage has virtually vanished. Today, for the first time in the war, the U.S. and its allies face their enemy on a one-to-one basis.


The reason for this dramatic shift in the balance of forces is clear enough. Recently, intelligence officials discovered that there are now fourteen North Vietnamese Army divisions operating in South Vietnam—not nine as previously reported. And to make matters worse, the Viet Cong are recruiting at a furious pace. As a result, military men in Saigon have been forced to revise their estimate of the enemy's order of battle to include a total of 235 maneuver battalions—which is almost exactly the number of allied battalions currently available for combat.

Nowhere are the consequences of this increase in enemy strength more visible than at the beleaguered U.S. outpost of Khe Sanh. By concentrating 15,000 of his best troops in the razor-ridged mountains that dominate the northwest corner of South Vietnam, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnam's brilliant Defense Minister, has effectively isolated the 5,000 U.S. marines who defend Khe Sanh—and tied down close to 40,000 other U.S. troops who are being held in reserve. And the agony of Khe Sanh now stands as an eloquent symbol of the whole U.S. involvement in Vietnam. For from a small initial commitment, the U.S. investment at Khe Sanh has grown in both manpower and psychological significance to such enormous proportions that today the base can no longer be abandoned without severe repercussions.

'Accordion': No one, of course, planned it that way. Used as a U.S. Special Forces camp as early as 1962, Khe Sanh originally appealed to U.S. commanders because it provided an ideal launching site for secret long-range patrols against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But as infiltration from North Vietnam mounted, so did the pressure on the base. Concerned that

the outpost might be overrun, Gen. William C. Westmoreland and Lt. Gen. Lewis W. Walt, then the commander of the U.S. Marine forces in Vietnam, visited the area and together scratched the outlines of a forward Marine operational base in Khe Sanh's red laterite dust. From that time on, Marine units were phased in and out of Khe Sanh in varying numbers depending on the number of North Vietnamese troops in the area. "We played it like an accordion," one U.S. general recalled last week. So did the enemy.

Since late in January, when the North



The balance in I Corps

Vietnamese began their round-the-clock shelling, the initiative at Khe Sanh has slipped entirely into Giap's hands. On an average day, more than 100 rounds of enemy rockets and mortars come crashing into the base, taking a relentless toll in casualties and frayed nerves. At the appearance of an American aircraft—Khe Sanh's only lifeline to the outside world—North Vietnamese gunners in the surrounding hills hurl a blistering fusillade of fire into the airstrip and its approaches. Already, three U.S. fighter-bombers, two transport planes and several helicopters have been knocked out of the sky. Most ominous of all, enemy soldiers are slowly surrounding the base with a network of trenches that run all the way from their mountain redoubts down into the

narrow Khe Sanh plateau (page 28).

Inevitably, many observers see a direct parallel between Khe Sanh and Dienbienphu, the famed French fortress that Giap laid siege to fourteen years ago this week. There are differences, of course. While the base at Dienbienphu sprawled over 17 square miles of valley, Khe Sanh is squeezed into a tight perimeter barely 2 square miles in size. And while the French outpost was totally isolated from other friendly forces, Khe Sanh can depend on artillery support from nearby American bases. But the similarities are even more compelling. Like the French before them, the Americans at Khe Sanh are eager to lure the enemy into the open where they can destroy him with a massive hammer blow of artillery and air strikes. And once again, General Giap seems to be rising to the challenge. Repeating his tactics of fourteen years ago, Giap has assembled his forces with patient care. Indeed, U.S. military experts concede that, if and when the attack comes, Giap will be able to unleash such hitherto unused weapons as .37-mm. anti-aircraft guns, heat-seeking "Red-Eye" ground-to-air missiles, long-range artillery—and perhaps even Soviet-made Beagle bombers and MIG fighters stationed at bases in North Vietnam.

Confident: But if Giap can muster greater material resources than he did in 1954, allied firepower has increased even more dramatically. Since the beginning of the year, B-52s and tactical fighter-bombers have dumped 50,000 tons of bombs and napalm on suspected North Vietnamese positions around Khe Sanh. So confident are the marines of the ready availability of air and artillery support, in fact, that they have neglected to build adequate concrete bunkers and interlocking trenches at Khe Sanh. "It is not in the Marine Corps tradition to dig," Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., currently the top marine in Vietnam, once explained. And this attitude is shared by many less exalted Marine officers, some of whom have not even bothered to read up on the battle of Dienbienphu. (Not long ago, Col. David E. Lownds, the mustached commander of Khe Sanh, overheard a correspondent discussing Communist trenching tactics at Dienbienphu. "Oh," said Lownds, "is that how they launched their first attack?")

Though some well-informed U.S. officials—including U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker—privately question the wisdom of holding Khe Sanh, most military men argue that the base serves an important strategic function. "If you give up Khe Sanh," declares one general, "you are surrendering the western anchor of our defense line. The enemy could then turn our flank and two or three provinces would be in serious jeopardy." Perhaps an even more compelling reason for staying in Khe Sanh, however, is the fact that the marines there would be hard put to make an orderly withdrawal now. To the east, Route 9 has been cut by the

THE WAR IN VIETNAM

North Vietnamese who have prepared scores of ambush sites. And military planners estimate that a westward retreat into Laos would result in the destruction of at least one of the five Marine battalions based at Khe Sanh.

Microcosm: Though the U.S. dilemma at Khe Sanh is particularly acute, it is not unique. In one sense, in fact, it simply reflects in microcosm the entire U.S. military position in Vietnam. For after three years of fighting an aggressive, hard-hitting war, U.S. commanders have abruptly found themselves on the defensive everywhere. The extent to which this is true was inadvertently made plain last week by General Westmoreland when he informed the Pentagon that he had changed his mind and no longer believed that the North Vietnamese will seek to overrun Khe Sanh. Instead, said Westmoreland, he had concluded that the most probable target of the next big enemy assault would be the already-shattered city of Hue.

The truth, of course, is that neither Westmoreland nor anyone else can be certain about the enemy's intentions. In the five northern provinces of I Corps, for example, U.S. intelligence officials have predicted enemy attacks against such widely separated cities as Hue, Quang Tri and Da Nang. But with more than seven North Vietnamese divisions operating in the area, U.S. troops—wary from weeks of continuous fighting, sudden deployment and daily shellings—can do little more than protect their bases and keep their supply lines open.

For all his preoccupation with I Corps, moreover, Westmoreland cannot overlook the possibility that the enemy may choose to launch his next major strike not against some northern target but against Saigon itself. Currently, no fewer than 21 Viet Cong main-force battalions are poised in a ring around the capital and North Vietnam's Seventh Division is only two nights' march away. Says one seasoned observer: "If the enemy can force the government to flee the capital and make the United States do a Budapest in reverse to get them out, they will have won the war."

Reserve: The most chilling prospect of all is that the Communists may try to launch simultaneous attacks in both I Corps and Saigon. Officially, this is rejected as a serious possibility by most U.S. strategists. Said a senior spokesman for the U.S. command: "I don't believe the enemy has any great capability to resume offensive operations in the near future." Perhaps. But the fact remained that, in their Tet offensive, the Communists used no more than one-half of their available manpower and they are still credited with having more than 190,000 troops in reserve.

In view of all this, most observers were somewhat mystified last week when the U.S. command leaked word that it was considering going on the offensive. Obviously, no military man in a position to know was prepared to spell

out what Westmoreland had in mind. But the speculation was that the general might be tempted to try a relatively cautious thrust at the enemy in order to regain the psychological advantage. Such a move could take the form of reopening Route 9. "If we want to," said a high-ranking general, "it would take about 3,000 troops to open the road for truck convoys to Khe Sanh. There are enemy troops around there, but I know we could do it."

What remained unclear, however, was where Westmoreland would get the troops for any major offensive. Though he has committed the entire First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and most of the 101st Airborne Division to I Corps, both are assigned to stand by as a ready reaction force in the event the Communists attack Khe Sanh. And even the recent arrival of major portions of two more divisions has not been enough to free U.S. units for sustained operations.

No one is more painfully aware of how thinly stretched U.S. forces have become

war budget. The one option which will not be offered to Mr. Johnson is doing nothing. "The President," said one planner, "will have to do something just to prevent the situation from deteriorating."

Flaws: Clearly, the very fact that there is a need for such an exhaustive reappraisal at this late date indicates that U.S. strategy in Vietnam up to this point has been a failure. Indeed, in retrospect it now appears that American planning was flawed from the outset in several important respects. From the spring of 1965, when U.S. troops were ordered into combat for the first time, the war has been progressively "Americanized" to the point where today the Saigon government and its army sometimes seem almost like supernumeraries. Moreover, it is now clear that by concentrating on large-scale search-and-destroy missions in the sparsely inhabited interior of South Vietnam, the U.S. command rendered itself unable to provide adequate security along the populated coast.

Unquestionably, however, the major



Viet Cong soldiers transporting ammunition: No offensive capacity?

than Westmoreland himself. Reportedly, he would probably like to see the current 525,000 manpower ceiling in Vietnam raised by a staggering 206,000 troops. But he is unlikely to get any further reinforcements at all until President Johnson absorbs an exhaustive appraisal of the military situation prepared for him by Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Recently back from Vietnam, Wheeler has put together a half-inch-thick document outlining the various options now open to the Administration. Wheeler's minimum recommendation reportedly calls for a relatively modest increase in U.S. strength (about 50,000 troops) designed to blunt the enemy's current offensive. His maximum recommendation apparently will be a plan for a major "victory" campaign which would require 250,000 additional troops and a \$6 billion to \$10 billion increase in the Vietnam

cause of the present U.S. military dilemma in Vietnam has been the Administration's continuing faith in the efficacy of escalation. Time after time, Washington has increased the level of the U.S. commitment in Vietnam, each time in the belief that by so doing it could inflict an unacceptable degree of pain on the enemy and thus force Hanoi to come to terms. But each time Hanoi, which can draw on a well-trained army of 440,000 men as well as on the troops the Viet Cong constantly recruit in South Vietnam, has been able to match the increased U.S. effort. And it seems likely that this will continue to be true for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, unless it is prepared to indulge in the ultimate, horrifying escalation—the use of nuclear weapons—it now appears that the U.S. must accept the fact that it will never be able to achieve decisive military superiority in Vietnam.

March 18, 1968

THE WAR IN VIETNAM



FEARLESS: Hugging the floor of their trench during a Communist artillery barrage, the young marines on the opposite page dramatically exemplify the grim realities of life at Khe Sanh. Sadly, this photograph, and the pictures on the seven pages that follow it, seem likely to prove the final heritage of Robert Ellison, a 23-year-old free-lance photographer. Ellison was returning to Khe Sanh last week after a brief respite from the battle when his plane was hit by enemy ground fire and crashed in flames beyond the Marine lines; Ellison and

the other 48 men aboard it are missing and presumably dead.

Robert Ellison was surprisingly experienced for a man so young. His photographs of racial violence in Selma, Ala., appeared in national magazines even before he left the University of Florida in 1966. A NEWSWEEK correspondent reminisced last week: "Bob Ellison had the sixth sense of a great photographer for the most telling picture. He was absolutely fearless, but I never once heard him talk about his war experiences. Bob let his pictures speak for themselves."

The Dusty Agony of Khe Sanh

'What's There to Panic About? We're Here to Stay'

War as the strategist sees it and war as it appears to the foot soldier are vastly different things. Last week, after a visit to the U.S. Marine base at Khe Sanh, Newsweek's Merton Perry cabled the following report:

The North Vietnamese are busy all around Khe Sanh. Borrowing from their own military history, they have begun to dig trenches that zigzag up to within a hundred yards of the Marine lines. So far, there are only a few trenches—nothing like the intricate, spidery maze dug by the Viet Minh at Dien-bienphu—but the marines suspect that the Communists have also started to tunnel down toward the base from the back slopes of the ridges that surround the Khe Sanh plateau. "These people are moles," declared Capt. Jack Egger, 28, of Columbus, Ohio, commander of a Marine company on the camp's northern perimeter.

No one knows just how many "moles" are actually outside—or worse yet, under—Khe Sanh. Higher headquarters says there are two North Vietnamese Army divisions in the immediate vicinity, but few of the enemy troops have been seen from inside the camp. From beyond the perimeter, an occasional sniper plinks away at the marines, and there have been five or six battalion-size probes against the defenses. The greatest danger, however, comes from the daily barrage by NVA mortars, rockets and artillery pieces, some of them dug in under the jungle canopy miles away from the base. The constant shelling is not enough to destroy the camp, but it is enough to make the men who live there wonder constantly about what is coming next. And the wonder and the waiting inevitably tauten the nerves of the 5,000 marines who crouch inside Khe Sanh.

Even though Marine morale is high, Khe Sanh is physically and emotionally a miserable place, a noisy, dusty, dan-

gerous hell. The men who live there have a special gait known as the "Khe Sanh double step"—a crouching walk accompanied by a constant swiveling of the head. The point of the Khe Sanh double step is to make sure that there is always a hole within easy reach.

Red laterite dust clogs everything at Khe Sanh—your eyes, your ears, your throat. A jeep drives by and the red dust settles on you like talcum powder, making you gag and choke. The longer you stay in Khe Sanh, the redder you get. A Khe Sanh veteran has red hair, red hands and feet and red clothes; when he blows his nose, his handkerchief is stained red.

Rats infest the camp. One marine walked past me with an armload of huge traps. "If these don't work," he said, "we've got this"—he held up a bottle of rat poison—"and if that don't work I got a .45 pistol, and as a last resort we use hand grenades on them."

Napalm: Now that the weather is clearing, jet fighter-bombers roar overhead most of the day, plastering the ridges with napalm that burns off the scrub, trees and elephant grass where the NVA are dug in. But somehow the enemy troops seem to survive, and during the day they can be seen moving through their trenches. For weeks, one North Vietnamese, armed with a .50-caliber machine gun and known to the marines as "Luke the Cook," has been ripping off his deadly bursts at low-flying aircraft from a foxhole barely 100 yards outside the lines. No amount of napalm has been able to burn Luke out.

Several times a day, the ground trembles with B-52 strikes that hit within a mile or two of the camp. During the daylight hours, helicopters flutter in, kicking up massive new waves of the devil dust. Almost every one of them takes out wounded men. The attrition among the marines is not as high now as in weeks past, but there is still a steady trickle of

casualties. The men who remain behind live much like their enemies, the moles. Most hunker down in sandbagged bunkers connected by a trenchline that runs around the camp. Beyond the trench, concertina barbed wire lies in tangled coils, supplemented by a new type of German "razor" wire. The prickly strands are studded with explosive charges and Claymore mines—a deadly obstacle course through which the enemy will have to advance if he wants to get inside the camp.

Cold Nights: Along the perimeter, the men sleep in shifts, napping between watches. The nights are cold—when it is really chill, the men say "the hawk is out"—and no one has had a freshly cooked meal since the siege began on Jan. 21. The best meals available are C-rations: slimy chunks of franks and beans or turkey loaf cooked over heat pellets. They are not very good—and the coffee fortified with ascorbic acid (for Vitamin C) is even worse.

The 40 Seabees assigned to Khe Sanh are a little better off than the marines. Trained for engineering jobs, the Seabees have worked longer and more skillfully on their bunkers, and one of their dwellings, an elaborate fortification dubbed the Alamo Hilton, has timbers and sandbags 6 feet thick overhead. It is the safest place in Khe Sanh and not surprisingly has become the unofficial press headquarters. The grateful journalists import beer and whiskey for the Seabees, which does not sit at all well with the marines. "The Seabees have got more beer than we have water," gripes a leatherneck. The Seabees are not embarrassed, however. Says one sailor: "Before the siege began, marines sat on their tails when they should have been digging. They worked 9 to 4, knocked off and went to their beer hall. Charlie [the NVA] missed his golden opportunity—maybe many golden opportunities—by not attacking right away. Perhaps now the marines are dug in well enough." And perhaps they are not. Digging in is not the Marine way of war.

Most of the marines are pretty tough customers, and so far there have been only a few cases of men going around the bend. During my visit, an NVA shell

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED




Photographed for Newsweek by Robert J. Ellison (Empire News-Black Star)



DECLASSIFIED



DIRECT HIT: As an enemy shell roars into an ammunition dump, marines dodge exploding rounds, while others (below) frantically search for burning debris among ammunition cases.



DOWNED HELICOPTER: Hit by ground fire, a chopper (far left) crashes inside the camp. Medical corpsmen (left) try desperately to save a life.



DOOMED PATROL: After running into an enemy ambush, survivors of a 30-man unit scramble out of the jungle. The c





ically wounded are carried on stretchers or dragged back to camp (above). Others have to make it back on their own.





TENSE INTERLUDE: During a brief lull, faces of Khe Sanh's defenders reflect strains of the siege.



UNDER FIRE: With enemy shells whistling overhead, marines crouch in trenches. A corpsman (left) administers an injection to badly wounded South Vietnamese.




INCOMING AND OUTGOING: Marine shields a wounded comrade from enemy mortar barrage. The vast sea of shell casings (below) testifies to the volume of artillery fire hurled back at enemy.



LIFELINE: Parachutes drop critically needed food and weapons to sandbag-protected base.



MERCY MISSION: A South Vietnamese soldier carries wounded buddy back from patrol.



EVACUATION: Stretcher bearers rush a wounded marine toward a waiting helicopter.



The Political Morass

Missed Opportunities, Corruption, and a Lack of Will

"In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them ... but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam."

landed in a foxhole, killing five marines; the sole survivor was not even scratched, but after brooding all night, the young marine tried to make a desperate one-man assault out through the perimeter. He had to be knocked down and carried back. Another marine was killed when he opened a latrine door and set off a grenade that had been attached to it as a booby-trap. "It was either a crazy marine who did it," explained a marine noncom, "or the gooks have got a tunnel in here."

Barbecue: Despite their isolation the vast majority of the marines at Khe Sanh—from the lowliest, tiredst grunt on up to Col. David Lownds, the camp's 47-year-old commander—remain totally confident. A major factor behind this optimism is the awesome firepower of the U.S. forces. I saw this demonstrated in a sector of the perimeter defended by South Vietnamese rangers. The American adviser to the South Vietnamese, Capt. Walter Gunn, 31, of Columbus, Ga., ordered an air strike on the enemy trenches. His radioman, Pfc. John Burleson, 22, of Chicago, called higher headquarters and announced: "Captain Gunn wants a barbecue." A while later, when the napalm splashed in on the NVA positions, Captain Gunn remarked to no one in particular, "I don't care what they say back in the States, I say God bless Dow Chemical."

So confident is Khe Sanh's garrison, in fact, that many of its members would almost welcome an all-out enemy assault. "I wish they would come in now," says Pfc. Charles Hughes, 20, of Chattanooga. "We'll kick them around a little, no question about that." The marines feel sure that the U.S. air and artillery attacks have damaged the enemy. "You can still see them out there," says Gunnery Sgt. Freddie J. Morris, 36, of Thomaston, Ga. "But not like we used to. They've had the hurt put on them some."

Optimist: Colonel Lownds, a 20-year Marine veteran who has raised an up-swept British-style military mustache since taking over the Khe Sanh command, answers questions with firm, blunt optimism. Isn't it possible that the North Vietnamese could keep him pinned down with only a token force, diverting major units to a big attack on important northern cities, like Quang Tri, Hue or Da Nang? "I don't think so," he responds. "It's almost inconceivable to me that we won't get hit." Could the marines fight their way out of Khe Sanh on the ground if they had to? "I don't even think about that," replies Lownds. "My mission is to stay here, damn it, and we're going to stay here."

Lownds, in short, is certain that the North Vietnamese will try to overrun Khe Sanh sooner or later. "It's only a question of how much Ciap is willing to lose," he says. "I would hope it would cost him 40,000 or 50,000 men, maybe more. What's there to panic about? We're here to stay. That's our job, that's what we get paid for."

In the four and a half years since President Kennedy spoke those words, the crucial role of the people of South Vietnam in the battle for their country has been largely overshadowed by a gigantic American presence. But in a broad sense Kennedy's point is as valid today as it was in 1963. Even if the United States were to win a clear-cut military victory in South Vietnam—a prospect that now seems remote indeed—it would be a hollow and ephemeral triumph unless the people of South Vietnam demonstrated the will and ability to govern themselves effectively.

At the moment, there is scant cause for optimism on this score. From top to bottom, the government of South Vietnam is torn by bitter rivalries. Its titular chief, President Nguyen Van Thieu, a cautious, colorless man, presides over an administration that is not really his own. All the important officials—the only ones with authority—owe allegiance to Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky. For although Ky came out second best in last year's struggle for the Presidency, his forceful personality still enables him to look and act like a winner. One veteran observer of the South Vietnamese political scene likens Ky to whisky and Thieu to water: "Either you like whisky or you don't touch the stuff," he says, "but water is tasteless."

The antagonism between Thieu and Ky, moreover, is only one of the myriad feuds that tend to stifle any attempt at effective administration. Recently, in the wake of the Viet Cong's Tet offensive, neighborhood groups in Saigon and other

cities formed vigilante organizations to defend themselves against future raids. But this promising development has been thwarted by the deep-rooted antipathy between native South Vietnamese and immigrants from the north. Premier Nguyen Van Loc, a southerner, refuses to arm northern-born vigilantes, while the army, which is controlled by northerners, denies arms to southern groups.

The whole story of South Vietnam since the Tet offensive, in fact, has been one of missed opportunities. If ever the leaders of South Vietnamese society might have been expected to bury their differences and rally to the common cause, this was the time. Instead, South Vietnam's generals used the occasion to make a bid for something like a return to military rule. With martial law in force, more than 50 opposition politicians were taken into custody and held without formal charges.

Negative: Reasonably enough, the members of South Vietnam's Parliament have sought to combat this semi-coup. Last week, echoing a previous vote by the House of Representatives, the Saigon Senate refused to grant the Thieu regime emergency economic powers. And at the same time, a group of House members was circulating a petition which, in effect, called for a vote of no confidence in Premier Loc and his Cabinet. All this, however, was less a matter of deep-rooted concern for democratic procedures than politicking on the brink of disaster. Throughout the recent crisis, South Vietnam's legislators have played a purely negative role, offering neither a constructive alternative to the government nor a rallying point for the people.

Such internecine bickering results in staggering inefficiency in even the simplest governmental functions. A Filipino



Newsweek—Mauri Cnaan

Ky, Thieu and Bunker: Stuck with a sacred cow

technician who works for a U.S. construction firm recently had to wait two months for an extension of his residence visa; the buck had been passed all the way up to Interior Minister Linh Quang Vien. Similarly, Vietnamese industrialists whose factories were damaged in the Tet fighting are still awaiting word from the Economics Minister as to whether they should keep the plants closed or expect government help in reopening them. Given this lack of leadership, it is scarcely surprising that ordinary Vietnamese so often resort to a process known as *xoi-xo*—literally, “turn around and pick up what suits me.”

Back in Business: Even more debilitating than the government's ineptitude is its corruption. A report recently leaked to the press by a U.S. official in Saigon asserts that “corruption is permeating all echelons of government and society.” In fact, the report went on, most Vietnamese officials are so compromised that they are in no position even to attempt reforms. Nor has any of this changed in the aftermath of the Tet offensive; Saigon's black market reopened last week with business as usual for sellers of stolen or misappropriated U.S. goods.

Between them, in fact, inefficiency and corruption render most organs of state power in South Vietnam painfully ineffective. A striking case in point is the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). American officers maintain that the ARVN fought well during the New Year battles, and this apparently was true in many, if not all, cases. But that was a matter of self-defense. In the post-Tet effort to clear the Communists out of the cities, South Vietnam Army units have frequently displayed a distinct lack of aggressiveness.

If the Saigon government cannot maintain itself militarily, neither can it administer. Its most notorious failure has been in the care of war refugees. American officials were pleased that the refugee program did not collapse altogether under the pressure of the Tet offensive, but the fact is that the food and housing furnished to victims of the war were a scandal even before the attacks began and remain so today. And even lesser administrative challenges are not adequately met. In Saigon, municipal services such as garbage collection and electrical power were poor before the offensive began and now they are worse.

Rural Woes: Ill-run as the cities may be, the countryside fares even worse. Land reform, a vital element in any effort to win the loyalty of the peasantry, has not been tackled seriously. In fact, a report compiled for a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives charged that “virtually all land reform ceased in 1961, and the major new development in the law has been one prescribing in effect ‘negative land reform’ or the return of the landlords to their former positions in areas that have been resecured.”

More important yet, the immediate and overriding problem of assuring the



Black market: Business as usual

physical security of the rural population has not been met. Everywhere there is fear that if the Viet Cong strike again, the government will not be able to protect the farms, villages and towns. In the Mekong Delta, fear of fresh Communist attacks has created a bull market in empty sandbags for home fortification. Once the sandbags were free to anyone who wanted them, but now in the delta's largest city, Can Tho, they are selling for about 10 cents each.

Much of the present fear in the countryside, of course, stems from the Tet offensive. When the Communists struck, nearly half of the government's armed, 59-man pacification teams were pulled out of their hamlets to help defend the cities. Their withdrawal marked a psychological defeat of major proportion for Saigon, for the peasants had been promised that the government would not abandon them under any circumstances. And apparently it will be some time before the Saigon regime even attempts to



ARVN troops: How aggressive?

reassert its authority in many rural areas; last week U.S. officials admitted that 229 of the 550 pacification teams still had not returned to their posts.

The Tet offensive cannot be blamed for all of Saigon's failures in the rural areas, however; the pacification program was going badly even before the Communists launched their attacks. Last fall, for example, fewer than one South Vietnamese hamlet in six was officially considered secure, and that estimate was probably overoptimistic. Even in many villages where the pacification program had supposedly been completed, there were no indigenous self-defense teams—local militia which many observers consider vital to the permanent success of the program.

No Identity: Under such circumstances, it is not strange that relatively few South Vietnamese appear to feel strong loyalty to the Saigon government. In the absence of public-opinion polls and meaningful elections, it is impossible to be certain of course just where the sympathies of the people of South Vietnam do lie. But NEWSWEEK's Francois Sully, a twenty-year resident of Vietnam, offers an estimate shared by many other observers. “Perhaps 20 per cent of the people—the hard-core anti-Communists—strongly identify with Saigon,” says Sully. “A somewhat smaller percentage is devoted to Ho Chi Minh. But the great majority of South Vietnamese have no particular commitment to either side. Their attitude is summed up in a common Vietnamese saying: ‘I am merely trying to make a living.’”

That this is, in fact, the attitude of the majority of South Vietnamese was strongly suggested by their failure to alert U.S. or government officials to Communist preparations for the Tet offensive. “The people do not identify with the Saigon government,” said one American general then. “They don't want to become involved. Their attitude is: ‘Why bother to tell the government or the Americans about the Viet Cong; the government does nothing for our hamlet.’ This explains why so few bothered to warn the authorities about the Viet Cong moves.”

No Cause: The central problem plaguing the Saigon government, according to a U.S. psychological-warfare expert, is that it “has no cause it can express in terms that mean anything to its own peasantry.” But unfortunately, however alien it may be to the South Vietnamese themselves, the Saigon government has come to have immense political and psychological importance for the United States. In their commitment to constitutional democracy and their efforts to establish it in South Vietnam, American officials have, in effect, converted the Saigon government into a sacred cow. If it will not get off the road to allow the traffic through, all the Americans can do is plead and cajole. They cannot, by the rules they themselves have established, force the government of South Vietnam to do anything—even to govern well.

CHAIRMAN

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Gen Chapman

Commandant, US Marine Corps

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

12 Mar 68

From: Chief of Staff

To: (1) DirPolAnal
(2) AC/S, G-3
(2) DC/S (P&P)

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

11 MAR 1968

DM: COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

☐ AGM
☒ C/S
☐ MILSEC
☐ AIDES
☐ SPEC ASS'T (PAO)

Action:

☒ Prepare reply
☐ Coordinate and staff
☐ Comment and/or recommendation
☒ Information

Info:

L. F. CHAPMAN, JR.

☐ Appropriate action
☐ Comment and/or recommendation
☐ Retention
☐ Prepare reply for _____ signature
☒ Information and return to CoS
☐ Concurrence

Remarks:

H. W. BUSE, JR.

Chairman, JCS
 re: Khe Sanh

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

11 March 1968


Dear Mr. Saylor:

With reference to your 4 March 1968 letter concerning the current situation at Khe Sanh, there are several points which I would like to address.

The figure of 50,000 NVA which you attribute to the news media is incorrect. Until quite recently, we estimated that there were some 15,000 to 20,000 North Vietnamese troops at the most in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. Over the last several weeks, however, even this estimate has been reduced significantly. As a matter of interest, the 50,000 figure exceeds the total number of NVA troops which are estimated to be in the whole of the I Corps tactical zone (the five northern provinces of South Vietnam).

The increasing attention which has recently been focused on Khe Sanh has lead to many comparisons between Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu. While there admittedly are similarities between the situation at Khe Sanh and that which existed at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, there are also major differences between the two. These lie primarily in the vastly superior air and artillery support and air resupply capability which are available, and are being provided, to our forces at Khe Sanh; and in the large numbers of US operational combat forces in close proximity to Khe Sanh which can reinforce or relieve the base on very short notice. These key combat elements were not available in adequate amounts to the garrison at Dien Bien Phu.

There is no doubt that Khe Sanh is a dangerous place; however, many other areas of South Vietnam are equally dangerous. In fact, there are some areas which, in my judgment, offer greater risks than Khe Sanh. The casualties at Khe Sanh are of great concern to all of us, and I certainly do not in any way minimize the seriousness and the tragedy of these losses. However, equally




is the loss of every single US soldier, sailor, marine, and airman who dies in the Vietnam conflict, no matter where he is killed.

As I have told the press on several occasions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made a full review of the military situation at Khe Sanh. They support General Westmoreland's assessment that this base can and should be held. Furthermore, my colleagues and I review the activities at Khe Sanh on a daily basis, either individually or together, and you can be assured that we will continue to do so as long as a threat exists in that area.

May I use this opportunity to express my appreciation for the support which you have consistently given the Administration and the military leaders of this country in matters concerning Vietnam.

Sincerely,



EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Honorable
John P. Saylor
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

A03H10-000

ALLEGATION: United States Marines here (at Khe Sanh) are worried about their capacity to counter communist firepower and for maintaining their supplies in the mountain outpost.

COMMENT: The Marine Corps is fully confident of its ability to counter communist firepower and maintain an appropriate level of supply at Khe Sanh.

At the present time, the Marines at Khe Sanh enjoy an overwhelming superiority in firepower compared to the enemy forces arrayed against them. Marine and Army artillery battalions armed with weapons ranging from 6.2 inch mortars to 175mm guns are in position to provide fire support. These weapons have returned seven to eight shells for each enemy round received.

The artillery support available to Khe Sanh is complemented by U.S. Marine, Navy and Air Force air power, a portion of which is capable of providing close air support during all conditions of weather and visibility. During one eleven day period, the Marines at Khe Sanh were supported with 600 tactical air sorties and 288 heavy bomber strikes. Such support compares favorably with our experiences in past wars. For instance, since 22 January 1968, Marine, Navy and Air Force aircraft have delivered 80,000 tons of ordnance in support of Khe Sanh. This is more tonnage than was dropped in all of Europe during 1942 and 1943 combined, and more than the atomic tonnage dropped on Japan throughout World War II. The enemy is incapable of duplicating this tonnage.

In regard to our ability to maintain an adequate level of supply -- there has never been any shortage of combat equipment which could preclude the ability of the Marines at Khe Sanh to perform their mission. Although the amount of ammunition, food and supplies being delivered to Khe Sanh each day is classified information, it is interesting to note that during the month of February, 90,613 pounds of mail were delivered. Even more revealing is the 70,000 pounds of mail delivered during the first seventeen days of March. When it is taken into consideration that food and ammunition receive higher transportation priorities than does mail, and that the Marines are returning seven to eight artillery rounds for each enemy shell received, it is obvious that the supply situation at Khe Sanh is well in hand.

A23410-dnw

ALLEGATION: These concerns add to their (Marines at the Sanh) mistrust of command estimates of enemy strategy and the weight of applicable communist firepower.

COMMENT: The tactics employed by Marine commanders at all levels are influenced by the information contained in estimates which are based on a variety of intelligence information. Much of the information is procured through organic III MAF resources, such as reconnaissance and aerial photography, while additional information is collected by higher echelons of command by more sophisticated means. The information collected and produced into intelligence is then used by Marine commanders to analyze the capabilities of the enemy so that appropriate action may be taken. Although estimates are not always correct because of the judgment factors inherent in them, the fact that American units have never lost a major battle in Vietnam, would seem to indicate that most estimates have been sound.

ALLEGATION: The Marine trench lines, however, are generally in a straight line, so that a grenade could be rolled down one like a bowling ball. Moreover, significantly, the bunkering system of the Marines is considered inadequate to withstand sustained, pinpoint fire of the communists.

COMMENT: The trench lines at Khe Sanh are considered to provide adequate protection for personnel. They are not, as the author states, generally in a straight line. Marine doctrine dictates that the job of improving defensive positions is never completed as long as they are being occupied. Initially, temporary positions offering minimum cover and concealment are constructed to provide protection for all personnel in the shortest possible time. However, once minimal protection has been provided, the job of improving and strengthening the position begins. In the beginning, it is not inconceivable that a portion of the trench line at Khe Sanh was straighter than professional military men would desire, due to the situation confronting the Marines at that time. In accordance with our doctrine however, this situation is now largely corrected.

A93H10-1m

In regard to the bunkers at Khe Sanh, it should be noted that they are constructed of timbers covered with sandbags and earth. During January and February 1968, a total of 734 short tons of fortification material was airlifted to Khe Sanh. That these bunkers are adequate is best attested to by the fact that on 20-23 March 1968, the combat base received 177 rounds of enemy artillery rocket and mortar fire and yet sustained no Marines killed.

ALLEGATION: Reliable sources report that nowhere in the Pentagon's wide inventory of bunkering and defensive systems is anything bomb proof enough to withstand a direct hit by a communist 152 mm. artillery round with special fusing - which is thus far the communist's most powerful precision weapon evidenced in Khe Sanh.

COMMENT: Current III MAF directives contain information for the construction of bunkers that are capable of withstanding the ~~penetration~~ explosion from a 155mm artillery round and all lesser rockets and mortar rounds presently being used by the enemy. Directives of this nature are not new in the Marine Corps or in the other military services. The U.S. Army Field Manual 5-15 (Engineer's Reference and Logistical Data) contains the technical information required to construct fortifications that will withstand the impact of any known conventional munition. U.S. Army Field Manual 5-15 (Field Fortifications) furnishes additional information of this nature. The information contained in these documents is being used in the construction of bunkers at Khe Sanh as well as throughout the I Corps area.

ALLEGATION: Only three small bunkers have been made available to the Marine medical unit, two of which will hold a total of 40 seriously wounded. A third The American doctors are currently assuming that seriously wounded will be helicopter evacuated - but already serious problems are arising with getting the helicopters safely on the ground and loading the litter cases.


A03H10-dnw

COMMENT I: The quality of the medical treatment received by our personnel at Khe Sanh is unprecedented in military history. The first aid facilities at the base are adequate to support a higher casualty rate for a longer period than is currently necessary. However, our evacuation policy at the Sanh, as well as throughout I Corps, is based on immediate helicopter evacuation of the seriously wounded to large medical facilities in more secure areas. That we have been able to follow this policy in spite of the enemy's artillery capability is a fine testimonial to the tremendous fire superiority and air supremacy enjoyed by our forces. At no time have seriously wounded personnel been unduly exposed to enemy fire or required to wait inordinately long periods of time for evacuation. There is no reason why the present casualty evacuation policy can not be maintained.

ALLEGATION: The fourth area of concern relates to the uncoordinated manner in which Khe Sanh grew without systematic planning. A jodgepodge of units have been haphazardly thrust into the camp.

COMMENT I: The allied forces defending Khe Sanh are not a jodgepodge of units, but rather a fighting force which has been task organized to meet the contingencies of a particular enemy threat. This task organized force was established over a period of months from a small Special Forces camp to a well balanced, powerful, reinforced Marine regiment which is supported by personnel from the other services who have specific skills. This buildup was orderly and in consonance with the enemy threat.

It must be remembered that a reinforced Marine infantry regiment or equivalent U.S. Army force will not only consist of infantrymen, but also those combat support and combat service support units which are required to accomplish the mission. The infantry elements cannot do it alone. Artillery units, U.S. Navy Sea Bees and engineer units are examples of the support required. The ability to task organize units is inherent in the Marine Corps organizational structure and has been proven in countless battles since World War II.


TOP SECRETTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

THE JOINT STAFF


81 JAN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: Comparison of the Khe Sanh Campaign with
Dien Bien PhuI. General

1. Now that the battle of Khe Sanh seems about to enter the critical phase, it may be worthwhile to compare both the general and local situations with the battle of Dien Bien Phu. General Westmoreland has made a decision to defend Khe Sanh. By this decision he is accepting battle on terrain and at a time selected by the enemy. There are those who doubt the wisdom of his decision. It seems highly likely that the critics and doubters will increase in numbers as costs, casualties and battlefield equipment losses are revealed during the course of the battle. We always know about our own losses from the beginning stages of the battle. It will be many months, perhaps years, before the full extent of enemy losses will be known to us. Because of this, criticism and second guessing comes easily. For these reasons, it seems important to draw a comparison between Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu to provide background for a military judgment which has already been taken by the commander on the ground and endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. In the brief report which follows, there is a statistical comparison of the forces involved in terms of their strength, firepower, mobility and support and the physical environment in the area of the two battles. However, before we examine those comparisons it should be established that there is an overall similarity between Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu in the eyes of the enemy. The following subparagraphs

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

endeavor to outline the enemy view of the general situation in South Vietnam and the importance of Khe Sanh to his apparent strategy:

a. In 1953 General Navarre replaced General Salan as the French Commander. The forces available to him numbered about 522,000. Of these forces approximately forty seven percent or 245,000 were local auxiliaries including Vietnamese, Thai and Cambodians. The Government of Vietnam which had been thrown together as a political expedient under Bao Dai was weak politically and administratively. Corruption was rampant and subversion and penetration widespread. The Viet Minh had captured the patriotic theme of national independence.

b. Widespread guerrilla attacks from the Tonkin Delta to Cau Mau had tied down in defensive bases the bulk of the French Union Forces and their local auxiliaries. De Lattre had left behind a fortified line in the Tonkin Delta manned by auxiliaries and second line troops. It was the opinion of General Giap that the opponent was on the horns of a dilemma. 1/ If he concentrated his forces by withdrawing them from the defense of the populated areas, he contributed to the vulnerability of the rear, stopped pacification operations, and accelerated the possibility of an early takeover by the Communists leading to a "mass uprising". Alternatively, if he remained spread out in a defensive posture then the Viet Minh regiments and Divisions could concentrate at will and destroy his forces piecemeal.

c. In order to shake loose some mobile forces Navarre planned to turn over the "pacification" task to the Vietnamese troops. Giap calculated that these were neither inspired nor reliable and would pose no serious obstacle to the Viet Minh strategy.

d. As soon as Navarre assembled his mobile forces, Giap ordered an immediate offensive by guerrillas throughout the country. When French forces were committed at Dien Bien Phu, Giap ordered an offensive in Laos at Seno, Thakek and Luang Prabang and in Vietnam at Tuy Hoa, Pleiku and An Khe. In February, the Viet Minh seized forty-five strong points in the Tonkin Delta and most of these through defections.

e. The Viet Minh had long been convinced that they would not succeed unless and until they achieved a

1/ For compendium of NVN statements and analysis see, 7039 Annex A

TOP SECRET

significant military victory, which they believed would demoralize French forces, remove the last vestige of hope from the weak Government of Vietnam and finally persuade metropolitan France that the cost of the war was disproportionate to the objectives thereof. Therefore, while recognizing their deficiencies in military power and the formidable logistic problems involved they nonetheless decided upon a Herculean national effort including the use of 250,000 porters in order to achieve a major battlefield success at Dien Bien Phu.

3. It is interesting to note that after the encirclement of Dien Bien Phu by four reinforced divisions a period of almost three months passed before they initiated their major assault on the 13th of March. Presumably, as any military headquarters or staff would do, the Viet Minh deployed around Dien Bien Phu the largest force they could hope to supply and sustain in intensive combat. It is noteworthy that the enemy force at Khe Sanh and at Dien Bien Phu seem to be almost identical in strength and surprisingly similar in organization. It is rumored that Giau himself is in command at Khe Sanh as he was at Dien Bien Phu.

4. Although the strategic situation in South Vietnam today differs substantially from the situation in 1953 and 1954, there are enough similarities so that the North Vietnamese might well construct in their own minds, with some wishful thinking, a reasonable parallel.

5. One last general point, prior to Dien Bien Phu, the French Government had decided to negotiate an end to the war. The Viet Minh were aware of this, and in fact, contacts were under way and negotiations had started while Dien Bien Phu was under siege.

II. Comparison (For comprehensive statistical comparison see Annex B) (For Maps, See Appendix I)

6. Location - Setting

	<u>Dien Bien Phu</u>	<u>Khe Sanh</u>
a. Terrain	Open valley with jungle covered mountains on 2 sides	Open plateau with overlooking jungle covered mountains.
b. Access	No open roads	No open roads

TOP SECRET

Dien Bien PhuKhe Sanh

c. Distances.	288 KM to nearest air and log base (Hanoi)	64 KM to Quang Tri; 160 KM to Danang
d. Weather	NE monsoon rain- reduced visibi- lity	NE monsoon rain- reduced visibility

7. Opposing Forces (See Annex B)Dien Bien PhuKhe Sanha. Enemy

(1) Infantry	5 Divs (-) (43,000)	4 Divs (+) 38,590
(2) Artillery**	96 Tubes 48 120 mm mortar 16 122 mm rockets	48 HOW (+) (Est) 24 mortars (Est) 120mm 36 122mm rocket launchers (Est) 105 Recoilless (75. or 90mm) (EST)
(3) AAA**	36-37 mm 80 12.7 mm machine- gun	24-37 mm (EST) 84 12.7 mm machine- gun (Est)

b. Friendly

(1) Infantry	7,235 French and African 3,579 Auxiliaries (VN, Thai)	5,906 USMC 400 VN Rangers 500 Irregulars
Total	10,814	6,806
(2) Artillery		
On Position	28 Howitzers 24 120 mm mortars	24 Howitzers 6 4.2 mortars
(3) Armor	10 Lt tanks	None
(4) Other	None	12 - 175 mm guns
Artillery In Range		

** Estimated on basis OB and TO&E

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

3. Supporting Reinforcing Forces

	<u>Dien Bien Phu</u>	<u>Khe Sanh</u>
a. <u>Combat Air</u>		
(1) Fighters/ Fighter bombers	77	200+ 200 (+), on call
(2) Bombers	47 (B-26)	B-52 (30/day)
(3) Sorties (Maximum in one day)		
(a) Fighter	[Both 99 Types	500 (+)
(b) Bomber		40
(4) Ratio bomb tonnage delivered per day approx	1 to	20
b. <u>Log Air</u>		
(1) FW	43 C-119 29 C-47 (Maximum one day delivery 123 tons)	60 C-123 108 C-130 + necessary cargo helicopter augmentation (up to 1,000 tons)
(2) Helicopter	Utility only	500 + including CH-54 CH-56 Heavy lift as req.
c. <u>Mobile Reserves</u>	6 or 7 Infantry Bns (pcht delivery only)	17 USMC Bns 22 USA Bns All capable airmobile introduction

III. Campaign Scenario (To Date) (Annex C, Scenario)

9. The sequence of events and preparations are similar in many respects. In both cases the buildup of enemy forces over a period of about a month was followed by a slow encirclement. Prior to the main attack there was prolonged supply activity and just prior to the attack, a series of

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

coordinated attacks against population centers and support facilities, particularly airfields and LOCs. If the premise in this report is correct -- that is that Khe Sanh is a Dien Bien Phu in the eyes of the NVA, then the evaluation below is probably close to the mark as an extrapolation from the past.

IV. Evaluation

10. Probable enemy course of action:

- a. Attempt to strangle Khe Sanh by "axis" or feeder trenches ala Dien Bien Phu.
- b. Deny use of Khe Sanh airfield.
- c. Dig artillery into casemates with overhead cover.
- d. Ambush all nearby LZs and fortify all commanding terrain.
- e. Attack supporting artillery and airfields as far south as Cam Ranh Bay, Tuy Hoa, perhaps Phan Rang and Bien Hoa.
- f. Interdict route 1 north of Danang.
- g. Raise level guerrilla and sapper activity throughout country.
- h. Initiate negotiations.

W. E. DePUY
Major General, USA

TOP SECRET

MAPS


- I. INDOCHINA
- II. AIR DISTANCE FROM SUPPORT BASES
- III. GENERAL AREA - DIEN BIEN PHU
- IV. GENERAL AREA - KHE SANH
- V. BATTLE AREA - DIEN BIEN PHU
- VI. BATTLE AREA - KHE SANH & DMZ




5750 2-65

I

AIR DISTANCE FROM SUPPORT BASES




DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED


GENERAL AREA - KHE SANH




SOUTHERN LAOS LA35 905-T

8-67 Printed by Army Map Service

BATTLE AREA - DIEN BIEN PHU



BATTLE AREA - KH SANH - DMZ



Annex

The North Vietnamese View of the "Strategically
Decisive Battle of Dien Bien Phu

On May 7, 1964 the North Vietnamese celebrated the tenth anniversary of the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Minister of Defense Vo Nguyen Giap, Lt Gen Hoang Van Thai, Deputy Defense Minister and Maj Gen Vuong Thua Vu each published long articles in Nhan Dan which explained the strategy which had led to the decision, and the logic of the dialectic which made victory inevitable. Though replete with the usual Marxian doggerel, excerpts from these articles are probably descriptive of the current North Vietnamese thinking on the role of the "Strategically Decisive Battle," and are quoted and paraphrased below.

"Victory in the strategically decisive battles will go to the side whose leadership has seized the strategic initiative. It will go to the force which can force the enemy to fight according to his strategic desires and on an advantageous battlefield of his own choosing."

In order to carry out his plan of offensive Navarre planned to concentrate his force and turn the defense of cleared areas to newly created VN units. "He planned to use puppet troops for pacification and his European and African troops for the mobile attack...against our main forces in the North. The planned grand total of enemy forces would then have been about 500,000,"

CONFIDENTIAL

not attack. They became afraid that we would attack... so they determined not to pull out. They saw it as an ideal place for us to be defeated. If the enemy lost he would lose a decidedly important portion of his force. His strategic capability would be surely weakened and in a larger sense he would suffer an irretrievable political setback."

"Furthermore the struggle movement of the French people in opposition to the Indo China war would be encouraged and the internal contradiction within French ruling circles would grow apace.

"The battle of Dien Bien Phu had already been decided. This was a strategic determination that was carried to fruition by an iron will which did not flinch from difficulties. Our leadership had to dig hundreds of meters of communications trenches under heavy enemy fire. More than 260,000 people gathered together to carry thousands of tons of food supplies to the front. For seven years the French army wished to have a decisive and major combat so as to destroy General Giap's military force. For seven years (we) avoided such an encounter because we lacked the necessary capabilities."

"While not realizing the enemy's strong points, we had to make the most of his weak points. His greatest weakness lay in his supply. Our tactics were from the very

CONFIDENTIAL

beginning to use our artillery fire to destroy the air strips, and our anti aircraft guns to cope with his planes. Three months had passed from the occupation of Dien Bien Phu to the launching of our campaign. The historic campaign ended in our complete victory. Our troops had fought 55 days and 55 nights."

History seldom repeats itself in detail. At the same time the appraisal which the NVN strategists made of the French predicament is probably very close to their current appraisal of political conditions in South Vietnam, and the home front situation of the United States. So much so that one can predict, with a good deal of assurance, that the NVN will be deterred from an attempt to bill Khe Sanh as a "second Dien Bien Phu" only by being conclusively defeated in that area.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX B

STATISTICAL SUMMARYDBPKHE

1. Friendly Strength

a. Battle Area
(Personnel)

(1) (March 13)

(January 29)

French	1412
For Leg	2969
Africans	2854
VN Reg	2151
VN Aux	<u>1428</u>

10,814

USMC
4 Mar Bns
1 Rcn Co

Total 5906

ARVN (Khe-Sanh)	
1 Ranger Bn	400
RF/PF	97
USMC & Navy	60
Advisors	<u>557</u>

CIDG (Lang Vei)	333
USSF	<u>16</u>
	354

Laos-BV33	552
-----------	-----

Refugees	
Bru	5500
Laos	<u>2270</u>
	7770

(2) (Mar 13-May 6)

4291 Reinforce-
ments

French	1398
For Leg	962
VN & Afr	<u>1931</u>
	4291

TOP SECRET

1

GROUP - 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DBPKHE

- (3) Casualties
(Mar 13-May 6)

French	1403
For Log	2312
Africans	1676
VN	1585
VN Aux	178
	<u>7184</u>

- (4) (Apr 24-Effectives-
5300 Troops)

- (5) Total Casualties

DBP (Mar 13-May 9)

KIA	1980
WIA	5013
MIA	1795
POW (May 7-8)	6500

b. Battle Area
(Support)

- (1) Arty

24	105 How
4	155 How
24	120 Mort

18	105 How
6	155 How
6	4.2 Mort
2	175 guns (Rockpile)
10	175 Guns (Camp Carroll)
	Variable

- (2) Helicopters
& Light Air

5	S-55 Helo
17	Morane "Cricketts"
	(Based both at DBP & Muong Sai, Laos)

- (3) Armor

2 Platoons of
Light Tanks

FF NVN

3 MAF
(24 Jan 68)

c. Support Area
(Excluding Battle Area)

- (1) Ground Force

185,000
(Includes units
of all types,
similar to the
garrison of DBP)

(1)	17 USMC Bns
	22 USA Inf Bns
	18 Arty Bns (US)
	14 Combat Spt Bns (US)

FP VN

3 MAF
(24 Jan 68)(2) ROK Marines
4 Bns(3) ARVN
35 Bns(2) Helicopter Support 2 Squadrons
(24 January) Sikorsky
S-55

(1) USMC - 316 UE

(2) USA - 238 UE
(Considerably understated due to recent deployments to I Corps, particularly the 1st Air Cav)(3) Fighter Aircraft
(A total of 3700 support missions were flown during the 167 day siege. Daily sortie rate seldom exceeded fifty)
(The B-26 strength is the highest operational figure attained. Some losses were replaced by US transfers to attain this figure. The average number available was less than this figure.)32 Fighters
(Bear Cats)45 Fighter-Bombers
(Hell divers, Hellicats, Corsairs)

47 Bombers (B-26)

6 C-119 (equipped for napalm bombing.)

USMC *

142 Fighter-Bombers

USAF

58 Fighter-Bombers

Navy

Variable

* Note: The total of 200 Fighter-Bombers currently deployed in 1st Corps understates the sortie support available from other SVN locations.

43 Aircraft were shot down at DBP and 14 destroyed on the ground. An additional 167 suffered flak damage. The VC also claimed 78 planes destroyed in raids on Gia Lam (6 March 1954) and Cat Bi (7 March 1954). Their claim is an exaggeration, although this number was probably damaged by the raids.

REF 1

3 MAF
(27 Jan 68)

(4) Air Support
Total lift during
the 35 day period
(24 Jan - 19 May 68) was
5,410 tons, with a
maximum one day
delivery of 123
tons)

43 C-119
29 C-47
A few each of
miscellaneous
other types.

60 C-123
108 C-130
Many other of
mixed types,
capable of
lifting in from
any of the nine
major air bases
of SVN, including
the helicopter
support cited
above.

(5) Heavy Bombardment

5 Privateer
Bombers
(2-4 tons)
These were usually
used to interdict
major supply lines
into DBP.

B-52 as scheduled.

Sortie rate since
19 January as
follows:

19	6
20	27
21-22	45
23	24
24	33
25	33
26	33
27	33
28	33

Average - 27/Day

DBPKHE

2. Enemy Strength

a. Battle Area
(Personnel)

308 Div
316 Div
304 Div
312 Div
351 Div (H)

325C (5400)
324B (7800)
304 (10000)
320 (7500)

Separate
Regiments (7890)

Total 43,000

Total 38,590
(Not all of the above
have been positively
identified in the Khe
Sanh area. A total of
nine regiments are
currently carried as
an immediate threat
to Khe Sanh)

TOP SECRET
701 SECRET

109 8.12.53

DEKHEb. Battle Area
(Support)

(1) Army

48 75mm How
 48 105 mm How
 48 120 Mort
 36 37mm AA
 80 AAMG
 12-16 Katyusha Rocket
 Launchers

(Estimated)

5 152 How
 48 35, 105 or
 122mm How
 105 RR (75 or 90mm)
 24 120mm Mort
 36 122mm RL
 24 37mm AA
 84 12.7mm MG

3. Log & Support Rates
(Friendly)a. Arty (75 Cal or
larger)

93,000
 during the 55 day
 battle

(Viet Minh fired
 between 103,000
 French est/ and
 350,000 VM claim/
 The latter figure
 is probably correct
 for total shells of
 all types, i.e.,
 including organic
 mortars.)

Variable. Arty and
 mortars, at Khe Sanh
 are capable of a
 daily rate in excess
 of 5000 rounds.
 Reinforcement or
 replacement
 relatively easy.

b. Tac Air

Sortie rate of
 about 40/day.
 Normal load about
 one ton plus guns.

Sortie rate
 19 Jan - present

19 0
 20 4
 21-22 84
 23 102
 24 144
 25 125
 26 92
 27 74
 28 73

Average 70/day.
 Normal load of
 3,000 lbs with
 1 hour loiter time.

c. Heavy Air

None except
 occasional use of
 6 converted C-119
 for napalm and 5
 Privateers on route
 interdiction.

19-28 Jan sortie
 rate of 27/day.

Top Secret
 109 8.12.53

TOP SECRET

DRC

KHE

c. Air transport

(1) Holo

Negligible and for utility only.

In excess of 500 UE are in supporting range for both troop movement and resupply.

(2) FW

About 100 tons/day. Even if other airlift had been available this figure was close to the garrison's cargo handling ability for air-dropped loads.

At least 1000 tons per day. Rate subject to weather, enemy AA defense, and the cargo handling ability of the Khe Sanh garrison.

4. Description of Support Area and Battle Area

a. Terrain

Similar. Each is relatively lower than surrounding terrain which is hilly jungle. See maps for relative terrain.

b. Distance and Displacement

See maps for distances from support bases.

c. Weather

Dry Season, changing to Monsoon rain in April.

Monsoon, with heavy fog in morning and evening.

5. Scenario of major events, 1 January 1954 - 8 May 1954:January

Medium level action around Seno, Thakek, Tuy Hoa, Kontum, Pleiku, An Khe and Luang Prabang. All actions VM initiated and moderately successful, except at Tuy Hoa. French claim heavy Viet Minh casualties.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

February

First use of 75mm How by VM at DBP.

- 1 Action in Laos vicinity Luang Prabang drops off. Minor action in highlands continues.
- 8-10 French initiate heavy action in Red River Delta. Minor action in DBP primarily initiated by French patrols in force.
- 14 French report loss of 45 strong points in Tonkin Delta, mostly through defections.

March

- 6 VM attack Gia Lam. Damage 10 planes.
- 7 VM attack Cat Bi. Damage 63 planes. (VM claim. No detailed estimate of level of damage available.)
- 13 VM attack posts on Hanoi-Haiphong Highway. Capture or destroy 10 posts. Destroy 400 yards of Hanoi-Haiphong Railway. VM initiate final phase of siege on DBP. VM attack northern outpost of DBP. French claim 1500 KIA.
- 15 VM attack Lac-Dao on Hanoi-Haiphong Highway. VM lose 200 KIA.
- 20 French seek US military cooperation.
- 26 VM intensify small unit action in Delta.

April

- 3 Minor VM attacks on 2 towns and trains in Cambodia.
- 7 Small action in Tonkin Delta increases. French consider Hanoi threatened.
- 13 Military train ambushed in Cambodia.
- 20 Heavy action against Tonkin outposts continues.
- 26 GENEVA CONFERENCE BEGINS
- 30 Pressure in Tonkin Delta subsides.

May

- 5 VM renew activity in Tonkin Delta.
- 7-8 Dien Bien Phu falls.

RADIO-TV DEFENSE DIALOG

SUMMARIES ARE
NOT TO BE QUOTED

BROADCASTS OF MONDAY, JULY 1, 1968

RADIO-TV MONITORING SERVICE, INC.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SUMMARY OF BROADCASTS CONTAINED IN THIS DIALOG

Peter HACKES reported on the downing of a US military charter plane by the Soviets in the Kurile Islands. Frank BLAIR reported B-52 raids on VC bases ringing Saigon. Ken BERNSTEIN reported on the destruction of a fishing village by the VC. Frank BLAIR described the successful test of the first Lockheed C-5 Galaxy. Andrew GUTHRIE narrated a filmed demonstration of captured VC rockets by the 25th Inf Div, Arvin. Dan WEBSTER reported on the cutting of Highway 4 by the VC and the temporary spanning of the Ben Luc by SVN engineers. Tony SARGENT presented a filmed interview with Col Norman ALLEN, describing the job of searching out VC rockets and crews in the area south of Saigon.

US CHARTER PLANE HELD BY SOVIETS

7:00 AM: TODAY, NBC-TV

FRANK BLAIR: A big US military charter plane with 231 persons aboard was intercepted by Soviet planes and escorted to the island of Iturup in the Kurile chain north of Japan.

PETER HACKES: It was the very first commercial flight for this DC-8 jet, which was delivered to the Seaboard World Airlines, a charter company, just 10 days ago. It was ferrying a load of servicemen from Seattle, Wash, with a stop scheduled at Yokota, Japan, and then on to Viet Nam. As it neared Japan, the pilot reported his progress to another plane in the area, and last night, a Pentagon spokesman, Richard Fryklund, relayed this report.

FRYKLUND: The pilot of the flight which later landed on the Soviet island reported at about 7:20 PM, EDT, that his plane had been intercepted by Migs. Later he said he was being escorted by two fighters toward what appeared to be a Soviet fighter base. At 7:39 PM, he said that he was on the ground and that there was no

damage to the aircraft or injury to the passengers or crew. He said that the total number on board was 231, including 17 crew members. The last transmission was at 7:42 PM, when the pilot said that his engines were shut down.

HACKES: In Moscow this morning, US Amb Llewellyn Thompson discussed the incident with Russian officials, asking for immediate release of the plane and the 231 Americans aboard. Still no details on why the plane was intercepted; first word was, it had strayed off course. The Russians say they're investigating the incident.

B-52's BOMB VC BASES NEAR SAIGON

In Viet Nam, American B-52's dropped thousands of tons of bombs on VC bases ringing Saigon this morning; the objective, to wipe out enemy forces reportedly grouping for a new attack on the capital. In ground battles along Saigon's outer defense ring, American forces reported killing 56 enemy soldiers; only 2 Americans were reported killed.

VILLAGES RAVAGED BY VC

FRANK BLAIR: While the fighting raged, there was agony in a long list of SVNese villages that have been ravaged by the VC. Here is the story of another terrorist raid from Ken Bernstein, in VN:

(FILM CLIP)

KEN BERNSTEIN: The funeral of Nguyen Van Tung(?) took place on a sand dune overlooking the fishing village of Tang Tra(?). He was 34 years old, and he left a widow and three children. He was buried just beyond the barbed wire that was supposed to protect the village, but the barbed wire, a Civic Action platoon of US Marines, and a detachment of VN Popular Forces failed to protect Tang Tra, a refugee hamlet. The VC overran the village at midnight after pouring in mortar fire.

VC demolition men set off dynamite in the thatched huts, which burned to the ground. Along with Nguyen Van Tung, 70 other villagers were killed. The disaster had been forewarned. Two months ago, the VC threatened to destroy the village, unless the people stopped cooperating with the Americans; the VC kept its word.

SUCCESSFUL AF TEST OF GALAXY

BLAIR: The biggest plane ever built was flown for the first time yesterday over the green countryside of Georgia, the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy, weighing 248 tons, its tail the height of a 6-story building, lumbered into the air on a test flight from the Dobbins AFB at Marietta, Ga. The 4-jet military transport is 83 yds long, not quite the length of a football field, can carry 750 men or 62 automobiles. [FILM CLIP]

The big ship rose to 10,000 ft at 229 mph; it is capable of more than 500 mph. The AF has ordered 58 Galaxies. Lockheed Pres Tom May said he would now like to talk about a somewhat bigger commercial plane, one that could carry 1,000 passengers.

In yesterday's first flight, the pilot radioed back, "It handles beautifully, beautifully!" AF men noted that it had taken 300

planes to handle the Berlin airlift in 1948; if the C-5 Galaxy had been available then, it would have taken only 10 planes to do the job.

B-52's STRIKE AT NVN AGAIN

B-52 bombers today struck at NVN for the first time since May 16. There have been many US air raids since that date, but until today not by the big 8-engine bombers. In SVN, other B-52's heavily pounded secret VC bases in provinces around Saigon, bases where red troops are reportedly preparing for the expected big attack on Saigon.

UNCOVER VC ROCKET ARSENAL

Meantime, SVNese troops outside the capital uncovered a big new rocket arsenal. [FILM CLIP]

ANDREW GUTHRIE: The VC lost their chance with these rockets. These are some of the cache of 124 rockets found near Duc Hua, along with many other shells of various shapes and sizes. Troops of the SVNese 25th Inf Div found these rockets hidden in a paddy dike, covered with dirt. The SVNese were very pleased with their find and showed it off to the Saigon press corps. And then, to add emphasis to the display, two of the rockets were fired.

[DEMONSTRATION OF ROCKET FIRING.]

The first was set up the textbook way, with metal launching tube and mount. The second was set up by American military advisors just the way the VC have been firing them, very simply. The rocket is laid in the V of the poles; its course is set with an aiming device and a simple compass, and a battery-powered switch sets it off. These rockets carry about 15 pounds of TNT. The soldiers are always pleased to see them fired in the opposite direction.

VC BLOW BRIDGE SPAN

7:05 AM: MORNING NEWS, CBS-TV

US B-52 bombers raided targets in NVN today for the first time in almost 2 months; 25 of the big

A03813-eps

Honorable Bob Casey
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Casey:

This letter is in reply to your inquiry of 26 July 1968 on behalf of Mrs. Patricia L. Luyties concerning the Marine combat base at Khe Sanh.

A military force, in order to be successful, must be responsive to the vagaries of the enemy, terrain and the weather. During the past three years, the success of our forces in Vietnam has been based on our ability to anticipate and provide for the effect of these variables on our operations.

Early this year, the defense of the Khe Sanh combat base was necessary for several reasons. The base was located astride the major infiltration routes leading from North Vietnam, through Laos into the northern provinces of South Vietnam. These routes were among the most trafficable available to the enemy during the annual November through April monsoon season.

During mid-January 1968, a major confrontation between allied and North Vietnamese forces developed in the Khe Sanh area. We have reason to believe that the enemy intended to overrun Khe Sanh preparatory to the commencement of their Tet offensive. The necessity for the enemy to gain control of Khe Sanh and the infiltration routes in that area can now be fully appreciated in view of the events of the past six months.

By holding this base, a relatively small allied force prevented the enemy from gaining free access to the northern provinces and in so doing, successfully tied down an estimated 20,000 North Vietnamese soldiers.

*John
1 AUG 1968*

A03M13-eps

These enemy forces, while committed to the destruction of the Khe Sanh base, were severely attrited by the combined firepower of our ground and aviation units. By mid-March the enemy, having been thwarted with heavy losses in his attempt to destroy Khe Sanh, began to abandon the field and withdraw into North Vietnam and Laos.

Throughout the spring and early summer of this year, the enemy has made attempts to introduce major forces into I Corps Tactical Zone using other infiltration routes, notably through the Ashau Valley and down the coastal plain from North Vietnam. His efforts in the Khe Sanh area have been correspondingly reduced. The garrisoning of the Khe Sanh combat base was valid only when the base served to limit infiltration and inflict casualties on the enemy. The continued occupation of the combat base when major enemy forces were operating elsewhere served no useful purpose. Accordingly, the base was closed, thus freeing the forces that had occupied it to seek the enemy in other areas.

While we are no longer operating from a fixed base at Khe Sanh, I must emphasize that we have not abandoned the Khe Sanh area. We are continuing to actively engage enemy units in the Khe Sanh area, but only with the forces commensurate with the enemy threat. Our increased mobility has made it possible to conduct aggressive and far ranging operations throughout the western DMZ area of which Khe Sanh is a part.

In short, we realigned our forces at Khe Sanh because the enemy withdrew its major forces from the area; because it was uneconomical, in view of the enemy threat elsewhere, to retain a large garrison in that area; and finally, because our increased mobility and generally improved posture vis-a-vis the enemy throughout I Corps now allows us to make maximum use of our superior mobility to seek out and destroy the enemy forces encountered in the western DMZ area with a force commensurate with the enemy threat.

A03H13-eps

I trust that this information will suffice to answer the question posed by Mrs. Luyties.

Sincerely,

Encl. (1) Ltr from Mrs. Luyties dtd 9 July 1968

Copy to: SECNAV #2-7482
OSD #12513

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S.

JUL 29 1968
WASHINGTON, D.C.OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 1968Congressional Liaison Office
Defense Dept.
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

The attached communication is submitted for your consideration, and to ask that the request made therein be complied with, if possible.

If you will advise me of your action in this matter and have the letter returned to me with your reply, I will appreciate it.

PLEASE REPLY DIRECT TO ME AT
1035 LHOB.

Your reply to Item No. 5 would be appreciated.

Very truly yours,

2 7482

M.C.

District.

attachment

GW

12513

June 14, 1978

Representative Bob Dancy
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dancy:

(1.) A gun of any size or calibre is an inanimate object that cannot perform a single function itself. It is the man who kills with the gun. I vigorously support your stand for strong criminal punishment and strict law and enforcement as a means to curtail crime!

(2.) I support legislation to outlaw the Communist Party. The Communist aim is world domination. The Communist advocates the overthrow of our Government, by violent means whenever and wherever necessary. Treason used to be a crime - I believe it still should be.

(3.) What is being done to rescue the Pueblo crew?

(4.) With the critical need in our own country, and with the incredible rising cost of living, why are we giving \$65,000,000 to Central America?

(5.) Why, after all the lives lost to secure it, did we abandon Khe Sanh?

(6.) Why did we return Iwo Jima to the Japanese?

Very truly,

William F. Buckley

RL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

2 7482

New York Times

W
ton
Ter
61-5
61.

—NEW YORK, FRIDAY, JUNE 28, 1968—

M

JOHNSON SUBMITS PLAN FOR VOTING BY 18-YEAR-OLDS

Sends Congress Amendment
to Assure Nation's Youth
'That They're Trusted'

Text of President's message
appears on Page 27.

By DAVID R. JONES


Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 27—
President Johnson proposed to
a constitutional amendment
over the voting

permit us
the reality
ns are
by ex-
pub-
land
assume
age of
aid in

oposal,
26th
tution,
rise in
elec-
million
of 18
ie vot-

d not
ed by
ses of
he 50
st in-
ressed
would
ession



The New York

—NEW YORK, THURSDAY, JUNE 27, 1968—

The New York Times Company.

AMERICAN FORCES REPORTED LEAVING BASE AT KHESANH

They Are Said to Be Moving
to Camps Nearby—U.S.
Silent on News Dispatch

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 26—
Khesanh, the United States
Marine base in northwest South
Vietnam that became the sym-
bol of a controversial military
strategy, is being abandoned,
according to a dispatch in The
Baltimore Sun.

The report states that the
withdrawal has been accom-
panied by a build-up of several
United States combat bases a
few miles to the east, just out
of range of North Vietnamese
guns. Among the bases that
are being strengthened, The
Sun reports, are Landing Zone
Stud and the hilltop camps
named Hawk, Cates and Mike.

The Defense Department de-
clined to comment on the dis-
patch, which was sent from
Khesanh on June 24 by a Sun
correspondent, John S. Carroll,
and published in the newspaper
yesterday.

In Saigon it was announced
that Mr. Carroll's military ac-
creditation had been suspended
indefinitely because he had
broken rules that forbid dis-
cussion of future plans, opera-
tions or strikes to insure the
protection of troops.

No Confirmation or Denial

The military officials in Sai-
gon said there would be no
confirmation or denial of the
Carroll dispatch. Brig. Gen.
Winant Sidle, the American
chief of information in Saigon,
warned correspondents that
they would lose their creden-
tials if their dispatches de-
scribed the situation at Khesanh.

The general also urged cor-
respondents not to report on
the decision to lift Mr. Carroll's
credentials. Such reports might
tend to confirm the dispatch
in The Sun, he said, and thus
help the enemy. But they would
not be considered violations of
security regulations, he said.

Mr. Carroll wrote that "the
move is no secret among the
men at Khesanh, nor is it hid-
den from the North Vietnamese in

Continued on Page 4, Column 3 C

immediate delivery



open thursday night 'til 9

**Save on
hundreds of
wanted items**

U.S. Forces Reported Abandoning Khesanh Base

Continued From Page 1, Col. 3

the hills overlooking the once-besieged base."

He reported that the metal sheets that had formed the Khesanh airstrip were being removed, that helicopters were hauling out loads of equipment, that muddy, rat-infested bunkers were being dismantled and that bulldozers were pushing battered equipment into holes, reducing the camp that once teemed with 6,000 men to "broad fields of freshly overturned earth."

Interest 'Lively as Ever'

Mr. Carroll reported that Brig. Gen. Carl W. Hoffman, the commander of American forces in the Khesanh area, had said in an interview that "our interest in this area remains as lively as it has ever been."

"We have no intention of letting the enemy operate freely here," the general was reported to have said.

The Sun correspondent also quoted "some marines" at Khesanh as having said that the

Vietnam Casualties

WASHINGTON, June 26 (UPI)—The Defense Department today identified the following servicemen from the New York area as having been killed in Vietnam:

Army

STASIO, Richard P., Pfc., Brooklyn.

Marine Corps

ANSELL, John A. Jr., Pfc., Brooklyn.

BALL, Robert L., Pfc., Trenton.

concept of a "Western anchor" for the line of bases along the border zone between North and South Vietnam would survive, "if in slightly modified form."

The original decision to stand fast at Khesanh was made while Gen. William C. Westmoreland was the United States commander in South Vietnam. Two weeks ago he left Saigon for Washington he became Chief of Staff of the Army. His successor in Vietnam is Gen. Creighton W. Abrams.

The Khesanh base, one of a string of bases just south of the

demilitarized zone, was viewed by the Westmoreland command as an essential point from which to mount attacks on enemy forces seeking to infiltrate into the South.

In late January thousands of enemy troops began to mass about the base, and the American defenders were subjected to an intense barrage of rockets and shells. By early March the camp was fully surrounded by an estimated 20,000 enemy soldiers and supplies had to be dropped by planes.

And widespread concern that a military disaster similar to the French debacle at Dienbienphu in 1954 was in the making, Khesanh became a controversial symbol.

The Westmoreland command argued that the importance of the base had not been decreased by the siege because it was tying up thousands of enemy troops and still in use as a camp from which enemy infiltration routes could be threatened.

The critics of the Westmoreland strategy saw Khesanh as a worthless camp unsuitable for defense and not in the American tradition of offensive warfare. There was no reason, the critics argued, why American boys should be placed within the range of well-emplaced guns that could not be effectively silenced.

In early April, after two and a half months of encirclement, an American column advanced into the bases and the enemy drifted away. It was never determined whether the enemy withdrawal was the result of the intensive shelling and bombing attacks the Americans mounted, or strategic considerations, or a combination of the two.

About 100 Americans died during the siege and hundreds more were wounded. The toll in enemy dead and wounded probably will never be determined.

8961 72 ENIL AVUSMIL

URSDAY, JUNE 27, 1968

C

3

Iwo Jima

'SPY BOAT' SHOWN
BY NORTH KOREANSAides Display 12-Foot Craft
They Contend They Sank

PANMUNJOM, Korea, June 26—North Korea displayed a 12 foot speedboat during a meeting of the Korean Armistice Commission here today, and said it was the "U.S. imperialist spy boat" that it had reported having sunk Saturday off its west coast.

The craft is of Japanese make with two American-made outboard motors. A steel plate bear many bullet holes, mostly in the bow, indicating that the boat had been manufactured by the Yamaha motor Company of Japan. The 50-horsepower outboard motors were from the Kiekhaefer Corporation of Fond du Lac, Wisc.

"This is the joint product of U.S. and Japanese imperialists," said Maj. Gen. Pak Chung Kuk, the chief North Korean delegate at the meeting.

He charged that the boat had

Proceedings in the U.N.

YESTERDAY
(June 26, 1968)

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Special Committee on Colonialism—Adopted resolution on Portuguese territories.

Subcommittee on Pacific Ocean Territories—Completed work on Gilbert and Ellice, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands and New Hebrides.

SCHEDULED FOR TODAY
(June 27, 1968)

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Special Committee on

Peace-Keeping Operations—
3 P.M.

Special Committee on Colonialism, Subcommittee on Atlantic and Caribbean Territories—10:30 A.M.

Committee on Peaceful Uses of the Seabed, Legal Working Group—3 P.M.

Tickets may be obtained at the public desk, main lobby, United Nations headquarters. Tours: 9:15 A.M. to 4:45 P.M.



waters as part of an American scheme to "ignite another war of aggression in Korea." He had made the same charge about the United States intelligence ship Pueblo, captured in January off Wonsan.

The chief delegate of the United Nations Command, Maj. Gen. Gilbert H. Woodward of the United States Army, said that a preliminary investigation of the North Korean accusation, broadcast Saturday over the Pyongyang radio, "revealed an insufficient amount of evidence to substantiate it." He promised a full investigation, how-

can vessel had been sunk or otherwise involved with North Korean forces last Saturday, as the Koreans contend.

The State Department spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, said that the North Koreans had raised the alleged incident at a meeting in Panmunjom of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

The United States position remained as it was stated by the Defense Department Saturday. Mr. McCloskey said—a complete denial of any United States engagement with North Korea.

26th Marines Awarded PUC

WASHINGTON — The 26th Marine Regiment and its reinforcing units, which held the Khe Sanh combat complex in Vietnam against seemingly overwhelming odds during the seven-week attack by North Vietnamese forces, has been awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

President Johnson conferred the citation at White House ceremonies. Accepting the award was Col David E. Lownds, who earned

the Navy Cross for his leadership of the regiment during the action. Accompanying the colonel was Sergeant Major A. W. Smith, the senior enlisted Marine from the Khe Sanh combat base. Smith, the sergeant major of 1/9 which reinforced the 26th Marines, earned the Bronze Star for his role at Khe Sanh.

The regiment's mission was to hold the combat complex, consisting of the combat base and sur-

rounding hilltop positions which blocked enemy routes into the northern provinces of South Vietnam.

Opposing the regiment were two North Vietnamese Army divisions, reinforced with artillery, tank, anti-aircraft artillery and rocket units.

While occupying the position from January 20 to April 1, the Marines daily were subjected to hundreds of rounds of artillery and

rocket fire. On Feb. 23 more than 1,300 artillery and rocket rounds struck the combat base.

The bombardments were followed by repeated ground attacks on the Khe Sanh positions. Though outnumbered, the Marines hurled the enemy back, inflicting heavy casualties.

In citing the reinforced regiment, the President stated that "By their gallant fighting spirit

(Continued On Page 3)

June 7, 1968

SEA TIGER

Page 3

"For Extraordinary Heroism and Courage"

(Continued From Page 1)
and their countless individual acts of heroism, the men of the 26th Marines (Reinforced) established a record of illustrious courage and determination in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service." The complete citation follows:

"For extraordinary heroism in action against North Vietnamese Army forces during the battle for Khe Sanh in the Republic of Vietnam from 20 January to 1 April 1968. Throughout this period, the 26th Marines (Reinforced) was assigned the mission of holding the vital Khe Sanh Combat Base and positions on Hills 881, 861-A, 558 and 950, which dominated strategic enemy approach routes into Northern I Corps. The 26th Marines was opposed by numerically superior forces — two North Vietnamese Army divisions, strongly reinforced with artillery, tank, anti-aircraft artillery and rocket units.

"The enemy, deployed to take advantage of short lines of communications, rugged mountainous terrain, jungle, and adverse weather conditions, was determined to destroy the Khe Sanh Combat Base in conjunction with large scale offensive operations in the two northern provinces of the Republic of Vietnam. The 26th Marines, occupying a small but critical area, was daily subjected to hundreds of rounds of intensive artillery, mortar and rocket fire. In addition, fierce ground attacks were conducted by the enemy in an effort to penetrate the friendly positions. Despite overwhelming odds, the 26th Marines remained resolute and determined, maintaining the integrity of its positions and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. When monsoon weather greatly reduced air support and compounded the problems of aerial resupply, the men of the 26th Marines stood defiantly firm, sustained by their own professional esprit and high sense of duty. Through their indomitable will, staunch endurance, and resolute courage, the 26th Marines and supporting units held the Khe Sanh Combat Base. The actions of the 26th Marines contributed substantially to the failure of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army winter/spring offensive. The enemy forces were denied the military and psychological victory they so desperately sought. By their gallant fighting spirit and their countless individual acts of heroism, the men of the 26th Marines established a record of illustrious courage and determination in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service."

NAVY CROSS TO COL. LOWNDS

Col. David E. Lownds, who commanded the 26th Marines at the Khe Sanh combat base, was awarded the Navy Cross here at the Marine Barracks.



COLONEL DAVID E. LOWNDS

Presenting the Nation's second highest military decoration to the colonel was Secretary of the Navy Paul R. Ignatius.

Col. Lownds was cited for his leadership and command ability while serving as commander of the combat base from August 1967 to April 1968. Colonel Lownds, the son of Mr. & Mrs. Herbert J. Lownds of Adams, Mass., also is a veteran of World War II, the Korean War, and the Dominican Republic crisis. Part of his citation follows: "Colonel Lownds' superb knowledge of and appreciation for the terrain and his aggressive utilization of all supporting arms minimized the effectiveness of the enemy attack and resulted in a large number of enemy casualties. During daily enemy rocket and artillery attacks, his superior tactical judgment, calm leadership, brave demeanor, and resolute endurance were an inspiration to all around him and were a prime factor in maintaining a high level of morale among his men. Colonel Lownds upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service."

KHE SANH WRAP-UP

Khe Sanh was first occupied in force by Marine units in September 1966, when 1/3 arrived during Operation Prairie, and used the Khe Sanh airstrip as a base of operations until February 1967.

The area around the combat base became relatively quiet

during the early part of 1967, and, at the close of Operation Prairie I, 1/3 was replaced by a reinforced Company B, 1/9, which continued to provide security for the base and the airstrip. In addition, Khe Sanh became a base of operations for the Combined Action Platoons in the surrounding areas.

In April 1967, an enemy unit moving to assault Khe Sanh was surprised by Marine elements and the historic battles for Hills 881 North and South, and Hill 861 began. Fighting for these hills continued from April 24 until May 12. Marine units participating in the fighting were reinforced 2d and 3rd Battalions of the 3rd Marine Regiment, along with Regimental Headquarters.

During the summer and fall months of 1967, following the battles for 881 and 861, the western area of the DMZ was again relatively quiet. Marine units continued their patrol operations, and Marine reconnaissance elements continued their surveillance.

When increased enemy activity became apparent around the Khe Sanh area, Operation Scotland was initiated on November 1, 1967. The operation involved one Marine battalion (1/26), which had arrived from the United States in the fall and joined Operation Prairie.

Initial contact during Scotland was light, with scattered fighting reported in all areas around Khe Sanh, but evidence

continued to point to the fact that the enemy was increasing his forces in the area.

In December, reconnaissance showed a marked increase in enemy strength around the combat base, and indicated the enemy was massing his forces in the western Quang Tri area.

On December 13, LtGen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., commanding general of the III Marine Amphibious Force, ordered the Khe Sanh base to be reinforced by an additional Marine battalion . . . 2/26.

As fighting and enemy activity increased around the Khe Sanh area, so did the size of the Marine force there. On January 16, 1968, the 26th Marine Regiment was brought to full strength with the arrival of 3/26, and the Marine force was further strengthened by the addition of 1/9, on January 22. Five days later the ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion was airlifted to Khe Sanh and took up defensive positions on the perimeter.

By the end of January, the combined strength of the Khe Sanh combat base was four Marine infantry battalions, one Marine artillery battalion, and one ARVN Ranger battalion. This force included 105mm howitzers, 90mm gun tanks, and 106mm recoilless rifles, both tripod and Ontos-mounted. In addition a detachment of Air Force personnel and Seabees completed the makeup of allied forces.

The Khe Sanh combat base was commanded by Marine Col David E. Lownds. On January 20, an NVA battalion moving toward Hill 881 South made contact with elements of a Marine patrol. Marines from 3/26 killed more than 100 of the enemy in the ensuing fight, and forced the NVA battalion to retreat.

During the last 12 days of January, allied forces fired more than 13,000 artillery and mortar rounds in support of Khe Sanh. There were 3,990 fixed wing attack sorties flown by Marine, Navy and Air Force pilots in support of the base, and B-52 bombers flew a total of 288 sorties during this period.

Ground action during February at Khe Sanh was limited to enemy probing attacks, which resulted in only two major contacts, both early in the month.

On February 5, a battalion-sized enemy force, supported by rocket and mortar fire, attempted to overrun Marine positions on the west side of Hill 861. Company 1, 3/26 killed 109 of the attackers on the defensive wire.

In a related action on February 7, a large enemy force, using Russian PT-76 amphibious tanks, overran the Lang Vei Special Forces camp five miles southwest of Khe Sanh.

On February 9, again after a heavy rocket and mortar attack, an NVA battalion assaulted Company A, 1/9, two miles southwest of Khe Sanh airfield. After some penetration of their position, the Marine counter-attacked and killed 124 NVA and captured 50 weapons.

During the month of February, the enemy fired 4,404 artillery, mortar and rocket rounds at Khe Sanh brought additional posts. On February 23 alone, more than 1,300 rounds were received at Khe Sanh.

Ground action during March at Khe Sanh brought additional probing attacks by enemy units. In all, the enemy struck at the combat base five times throughout this period of some 70 days of concentrated action. Each time the enemy was thrown back in these ground attacks. Although the enemy kept up his intermittent shelling of the base, Marine outposts continued to screen Khe Sanh, patrols were conducted, the water point outside the base was never closed to vehicular access, and supply levels never became critical.

More than 103,000 tons of bombs dropped on the North Vietnamese units around Khe Sanh, who were also pounded by more than 104,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire from allied forces.

When Operation Scotland, which had commenced on Nov. 1, 1967, terminated on March 31, 1968, 1,551 enemy had been killed in the Khe Sanh area. After Marine units moved out of Khe Sanh and into the surrounding terrain, they discovered hundreds of North Vietnamese bodies in shallow graves. Also uncovered were numerous enemy supply caches containing quantities of weapons, ammunition, uniforms and equipment.

In the first few days of Operation Pegasus, Marine units uncovered an impressive list of enemy supplies and equipment that included 727 individual weapons, 173 crew-served weapons, more than 5,000 mortar rounds, 6,500 grenades, 77,000 small arms rounds, 125 mines and 650 rocket rounds.

Rough 31-Hour Mission

Recon Team In Narrow Escape

By Cpl. Tom Doulon

PHU BAI—A nine-man Marine reconnaissance team challenged a company of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars to "catch us if you can," during a 31-hour mission.

The NVA chased the Marines through the jungles south of Phu Bai, but all the enemy received for their troubles were 10 of their own dead.

It began when the Leatherneck recon team, eight Marines and one Navy corpsman from the 4th Plt., 1st Force Reconnaissance Co., 1st Reconnaissance Bn., were inserted into the eastern Ta Trach River Valley area. They were to make a surveillance of enemy operations in the valley.

The next morning, the leathernecks made contact with the enemy. Five enemy soldiers walked up a trail to within 30 meters of where a trio of the Marines were retrieving a Claymore mine.

Staff Sergeant Jack Mathis, (2407 Kaiser Dr., San Antonio, Tex.) the patrol leader; Corporal George Fell, (2120 W. Colorado Ave., Colorado Springs, Colo.) and Private First Class George Brice, (RD 4, Washington, Pa.) were retrieving the Claymore they had planted the night before.

"Five of them walked up to us," recalled Fell. "We dropped four of them right away and know we seriously wounded the fifth."

"I saw them scattering," said Cpl. Joseph Murphy, 21 (1809 Saint Clair Rd., New Cumberland, Pa.) "and one of them was a monster. He was huge. Must have been 6-foot-2!"

Mathis, Fell and Brice hurriedly finished their job of retrieving the mine.

Five more Communist troops were then seen moving up the trail. They were joined by others who poured a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire in on the Leathernecks.

The recon team answered with its own fire. The team's machine gunner, Pfc. James Hill, (207 S. Craig St., Pittsburgh, Pa.) cut loose with 300 rounds of M-60 machinegun fire.

"I burnt my wrist on the barrel and I didn't even know it," recalled Hill. "I didn't have time to think about it till we got back to Phu Bai. Then it hurt."

Two more enemy troops were killed in the heavy exchange between the Leathernecks and the communists. Still the enemy kept crowding the Marines.

"It was a running firefight from there on in. We had to get out of there," explained Fell. "We had a whole company on our tail and we had just nine guys."

"Now, if we'd have had ten we'd have been able to chase them out of the valley!" he smiled.

It was the enemy company,

however, that was planning to do the chasing.

The Leathernecks challenged the enemy to catch them.

"Our packs were a little on the heavy side," said Cpl. John Ploum, (231 Marengo Ave., Alhambra, Calif.). "We normally carry 75-pound packs so we had to lighten them to travel faster."

Two more communist soldiers were killed when Ploum saw them moving toward the Leatherneck position.

"They were only about 10 meters from me but I could hardly see them," he said. "The brush was that thick. I got two of them and there was a third. I don't know if I killed him but he was groaning and I could hear him trying to get away."

The Marines set off a harassing gas grenade.

"The grenade shut the door on the enemy," said Ploum. "Or at least it shut it long enough for us to get started pushing through the jungle to a landing zone (LZ) where we could be extracted."

With Fell and Brice taking turns clearing a path through the dense jungle with a K-bar knife, the recon team moved out.

"It took about two hours to get to the LZ," estimated Pfc. Charles Bickum (2002 Montour St., Philadelphia, Pa.).

"Behind us we could hear the enemy beating the bush for us trying to catch up," said Ploum. "They were there . . . 10 meters . . . 20 meters . . . 30 meters. They were there the whole time trying to catch us."

Thirty meters from the LZ two more enemy troops were spotted and killed.

A "Sea Knight" helicopter approached the LZ to pick up the recon team. Two gunships provided fire support.

The Leathernecks rushed on-board the "Sea Knight" with each member taking a window and opening up on the enemy troops that had been closing in on them. Mathis, the patrol leader, and Murphy, the team's primary radio man, were the last two men on.

"We got up in the air," said Hill, "and all those enemy troops were just standing up, trying to 'ding' us. We took off over a hillside and that whole hillside opened up on us! Then across the river, there was still more lead being poured in at us. Every enemy soldier in the area must have been trying to get us."

Except for minor shrapnel wounds received by Mathis and the burnt wrist suffered by Hill, the nine-man team was uninjured.

Mathis' T-shirt had been sprayed full of holes during the initial contact with the enemy. Mathis had left it on a branch at the patrol base to dry and had grabbed it when the team prepared to move out.

"If I'd been in it," noted Mathis, "I'd have been drilled full of holes."

Leathernecks Fight NVA Near Their CP

By Sgt. Robert M. Bayer

DA NANG—Leathernecks of the 1st Marine Division had to fight through their own command post recently to drive out North Vietnamese Army (NVA) sappers who breached the defensive lines of the 3rd Amphibious Tractor Bn., south of Da Nang.

Attacking the camp from the north and south under cover of mortar fire, the sappers crawled through the defensive barbed wire. The NVA attacking the northern perimeter were driven back by Marines before they could get inside the camp.

The communists assaulting from the south managed to destroy two Leatherneck bunkers and moved to the AmTrac parking area inside the command post. Some vehicles were damaged or destroyed with satchel charges and rocket propelled grenades before Marines could drive the NVA from the area.



COMBAT THIRST—Lance Corporal Daniel W. Wagner, (Lansing, Mich.), a grenadier with the 2nd Platoon of "E" Co., 2/7 pauses to take a long drink during Operation Allen Brook, southwest of Da Nang. (Photo by Cpl. A.V. Huffman)

Leathernecks Foil NVA Attempt at Bridge

By Sgt. Mike Stokoy

PHU BAI—Taking the bridge must have looked easy to a platoon of North Vietnamese Army soldiers when they saw only eight Marines manning the vital position, northwest of Hue.

The "A" Co., 27th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division Marines proved them wrong within minutes when the enemy launched their early morning attack.

At 3:30 a.m., the enemy point man set off a trail flare as he led half of the platoon toward the west side of the bridge. Meanwhile, the rest of the enemy force advanced toward the bridge from the east.

As the sky lit up, the enemy

pounded the bridge with B-40 rockets and mortar barrages. An eerie touch was added to the battle when the rest of the NVA assaulted. They all started laughing and screaming.

"It was crazy," recalled Pvt. Martin A. Alvarez, (114 Candle St., Highland Park, Mich.). "They just kept laughing and coming toward us. They didn't even seem to know what was happening. It was as if the entire (NVA) platoon was high on dope."

Alvarez killed one NVA as the enemy force began cutting the concertina wire around the perimeter.

The enemy attempts fared no better on the opposite side of the bridge.

LCpl. Anthony Licciardo, Jr., (4 Livingston St., Lowell, Mass.), killed two more NVA as they advanced to hurl grenades.

Pfc. Robert E. Dennis, (227 S. Washington Ave., Cedarburg, Wisc.), armed with a M79 grenade launcher, killed another enemy soldier who was about to fire a rocket.

Artillery was requested and 15mm howitzer rounds started bombarding the perimeter.

Suddenly, the NVA stopped their laughter and scrambled to gather their casualties. Shortly thereafter, the enemy began to retreat.



LOOK AT THE EYES—Queen of Peace orphans display a variety of emotions after receiving gift toys from Edmonds, Wash., grammar school second graders. The playthings were sent to a serviceman assigned to Vietnam Regional Exchange Headquarters in Cholon, and were taken to the children living at the Queen of Peace Orphanage, Saigon. (Regional Exchange Photo)

Life-Light Saves Marine Radioman at Dong Ha

By Sgt. T. E. Kingry

QUANG TRI—A young Marine radio operator was the subject of a daring night rescue by helicopters of Marine Aircraft Group-39 (MAG-39) in action north of the Cua Viet river near Dong Ha. The radioman, a member of the 4th Marine Regiment, had become cut off from his unit by enemy troops.

The ground Marine was able to contact an O-1C Bird Dog by radio. The plane, in turn, radioed MAG-39 at Quang Tri. Two Huey gunships of Marine Observation Squadron-5, led by Capt. Dennis W. Price, were soon enroute to the scene.

The radioman, meanwhile, was being pursued by the enemy and was having a difficult time trying to move to a suitable pickup point while avoiding detection.

As the gunships orbited overhead, the radioman could not move to a suitable pickup zone due to the position of the enemy troops.

Soon darkness came, providing the radioman more freedom of movement without being detected by the enemy. However, he encountered another severe problem: the helos were not able to see him without some night signaling device and the radioman did not have a flashlight or flare.

The problem was solved in short order, however, when the lead helo pilot turned on his landing lights and advised the lost radioman to guide the light to his position on the ground.

The radioman nervously talked the helicopter down through sporadic ground fire to his position. A weary Marine scrambled aboard as the helo lifted safely out of the zone and headed for Quang Tri.

jets crossed the DMZ to attack the red coast artillery sites in the southernmost part of NVN.

Also in SVN, the Saigon govt's frail network of railroads has been dealt another blow by the VC guerrillas who used a floating mine to blow up a railroad span over a river 10 mi from the big US base at Camranh Bay. The destruction of the bridge severed the rail link between Phan Rang and Nha Trang, the Hq of US Special Forces troops.

VC CUT VITAL ROUTE 4

Near Saigon, VC sappers recently succeeded in cutting another vital transportation link, this one with the rice-rich Mekong Delta. [FILM CLIP]

DON WEBSTER: Highway 4 is the most important road in SVN. The VC on several occasions in the past have been able to close it but never before have they done as complete a job as this. They've blown about 150 feet from the Ben Luc bridge, virtually severing the Mekong Delta from Saigon. The resulting traffic jam demonstrated how crucial Highway 4 is. About half the country's population lives in the Delta.

The Mekong Delta is by far the country's richest rice-producing area. Route 4 has been the only major route for much of that rice to get into Saigon, and rice, of course, is the staple of the VNese diet. In the past, the price of rice in Saigon has fluctuated according to whether Route 4 has been open or closed. SVNese troops were supposed to be guarding that bridge when the VC blew it up; 5 soldiers died in the explosion.

The US has shallow-draft boats in the Delta...As soon as the bridge was blown, they moved en masse down the Ben Luc river, but it was probably too late for them to do anything.

Within hours after the Ben Luc bridge was blown, SVNese engineers were hard at work building a temporary floating bridge to replace it. The speed with which they moved to start work in this traditionally slow-moving country is evidence of how important the road is.

Reconstruction of the original Ben Luc bridge will be handled by a big American construction company in SVN, but the quick construction of this temporary bridge is entirely a SVNese operation, although the materials being used, including the inflatable pontoons, are American made, and these engineers have had US instruction in bridge-building, but putting up a temporary bridge across a river the size of the Ben Luc is a formidable job. This is a simple contest of skills; the skill of the VC at blowing up a bridge, against the skill of the SVNese in replacing it.

NO ASSURANCE FROM SOVIET ON PLANE

6:00 PM: NEWS FOUR, WRC-TV

BILL LITTAUER: The State Dept reports that Soviet Premier Kosygin has given no assurances of a prompt return of the American airliner forced down in the Kuriles Islands. Kosygin told US Amb Llewellyn Thompson that the incident is under investigation. The plane carried 214 servicemen and 17 crewmen on a flight to Viet Nam via Japan.

Earlier today, a Defense Dept spokesman gave this report on the incident: [FILM CLIP OF RICHARD FRYKLUND REPORT].

US ASKS RETURN OF DC-8 TRANSPORT

6:00 PM: NEWSNIGHT, WTOP-TV

STEPHEN GEER: The US govt has asked the Soviet Union to return the Seaboard Airlines DC-8 transport that was forced to land in the Kuriles islands north of Japan last night. Bound for Japan with 231 aboard, the jet airliner was carrying 214 soldiers, sailors and AF men scheduled for VN duty. It apparently strayed off course and was in the vicinity of the Soviet-owned islands when it was intercepted by Mig fighters, who forced it down. The Soviet government said that it was investigating.

BATTLE POSITIONS IN DMZ POUNDED

In VN newly discovered NVNese

battle positions in the northern half of the DMZ were pounded today during five raids flown by B-52 bombers. It was the first time in two months that the giant planes had ranged outside the borders of SVN.

B-52'S POUND RED SHORE BATTERIES

6:30 PM: EVENING NEWS, CBS-TV

HARRY REASONER: US B-52's heavily bombed parts of both north and South Viet Nam today. The raids on the north were the first in almost two months and were part of attacks in and just north of the DMZ. The targets were primarily communist artillery batteries which had been shelling US vessels operating offshore. Other B-52 formations bombed enemy concentrations just east and northwest of Saigon, hoping to stop any major attack on the capital, rumored for later this month.

Evidence of increased enemy troop movement around Saigon came in a battle 30 mi NW of the city. US paratroopers intercepted at least 38 of them; 22 Americans were wounded. 15 Americans were awarded battle citations, including four Silver Stars on the spot.

1ST DIV ARMOR COMBS FOR VC

TONY SARGENT (NEAR SAIGON): The VC have been leaving Saigon pretty much alone lately, maybe because they are lying low, preparing for another big offensive. Or it may be that men like these of the 1st Div have been making them keep their heads down. Two tanks lead a column of armored personnel carriers out of the Bn command post. They move toward the area they are assigned to comb for enemy rockets and for the VC themselves.

A 50 cal MG is kept ready atop each vehicle as they roll and bounce through the ravines and undergrowth like a slow motion boat ride before a storm. The storm these men have to expect is a VC attempt to ambush them. The undergrowth is thick enough, and only this year, the VC in this area have become well enough armed to stop a tank.

A key man in planning the searches in this area of operations is Col Norman Allen. (FILM)

Q: Col Allen, what is the mission of your unit out here?

A: In simple terms, the mission is to find rockets in the southern portion of the operations, which is within rocket range of Saigon; to locate the crews which are dispersed in the area and to destroy them and to interdict the movement of major VC forces into the Saigon area, to make contact with them and to destroy them.

Q: Doesn't this result in a lot of casualties on your side as well?

A: I take about 80% of my casualties within the first two or three minutes of the engagement. Yes, unfortunately, statistics are grim, and we do take casualties.

Q: But the ratio is always favorable to your side?

A: Not always. Sometimes he is well dug in and we're moving across an open rice paddy, come up to a dike and he opens up on us with automatic weapons and he can hurt us pretty bad. In the long haul, though, he pays a terrible price for his efforts.

SARGENT: The most risky part of any patrol must be done on foot. The troops leave the armored column and sweep outward through an area where other elements of their unit battled the VC only the night before. Leaders of the foot patrol confer before returning to the armored column and turning to another area as skies darken before the daily monsoon rains. Sometimes these men get shot at and sometimes they only get rained on, but people in downtown Saigon are a lot safer because they are on patrol.

HARRY REASONER: While patrols and bombers sought out the enemy around Saigon, a VC demolition team cut a key supply route south of the city.

[REPEAT OF DON WEBSTER REPORT ON BEN LUC BRIDGE INCIDENT].

REASONER: Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin would give no assurances today of the prompt release of the jetliner forced by Soviet jet fighters to land in the Kuriles yesterday.



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

G-3

Y

NO. 608-68

OXford 50192 (Info.)
OXford 73189 (Copies)

FOR THE PRESS:

July 1, 1968

Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford today signed the following memorandum to all civilian employees of the Department of Defense:

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL EMPLOYEES

SUBJECT: Equal Employment Opportunity for Civilian Employees of the Department of Defense

I wish to reaffirm that the principle of equal employment opportunity without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin, must and will continue to command total support throughout the Department of Defense.

Under the Executive Orders of President Johnson and his predecessors, I am pleased to report that significant progress has been made toward achieving fairer and more effective utilization of the many skills and talents of minority group civilian employees. We recognize, however, that more remains to be done. The high priority requirement for further progress in equal employment opportunity will have my personal and earnest attention.

Progress toward full equality in employment opportunity requires more than policy statements. Continuous affirmative efforts are essential at all levels of command, supervision, and management. Our programs for equality in recruitment, career development, promotion, and in all other aspects of civilian employment must be characterized by positive, creative attitudes and actions. Such an approach will take into account the need to help overcome the effects of past prejudices and inequities.

The one million civilians in the Department of Defense work together ceaselessly to preserve America's freedom. In carrying out our mission, we must strive also to strengthen the individual freedom of opportunity which in our society and in this Department is the entitlement of every member. I shall spare no effort in the attainment of this vital goal. I expect every official, supervisor, and employee of this Department to do likewise.

/s/ Clark M. Clifford

END

1/che [signature]



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

July 1, 1968

NO. 601-68

OXford 50192 (Info.)

OXford 73189 (Copies)

DCA AWARDS WESTERN UNION CONTRACT FOR MODERNIZATION OF NINE CENTERS

The Defense Communications Agency (DCA) has awarded a contract to the Western Union Telegraph Company for the modernization of a portion of AUTODIN (Automatic Digital Network).

AUTODIN is a data transmission and switching network and is an essential part of the Defense Communications System.

DCA awarded the contract through its Defense Commercial Communications Office (DECCO), Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, which will service the contract. It calls for estimated monthly recurring use charges of \$595,000, which includes amortization and operating expenses.

The Western Union Telegraph Company will invest approximately \$20,000,000 in this project, with the RCA Corporation and Control Data Corporation participating as subcontractors.

The project will include replacement of some equipment at all nine of the AUTODIN centers which are presently being provided by Western Union. These centers are located at: Albany, Georgia; Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland; Fort Detrick, Maryland; Gentile Air Force Station, Ohio; Hancock Air Force Station, New York; McClellan Air Force Base, California; Norton Air Force Base, California; Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma; and Wahiawa, ii.

Equipment to be installed will consist mostly of communications data processes, memory units and tape stations.

Completion of this modernization project will improve the operational efficiency, improve the reliability of operations and will reduce power and air-conditioning requirements at each center.

The first site is scheduled for completion by September 30, 1969, with the last site completed by March 15, 1971.

END



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

July 1, 1968

NO. 599-68

OXford 7-5131 (Info.)

OXford 7-3189 (Copies)

SENTINEL LOGISTICS COMMAND TO BE LOCATED IN HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA

The recently established U.S. Army Sentinel Logistics Command (SENLOG) will be located in Huntsville, Alabama.

SENLOG, organized April 15, 1968, at a temporary location in Washington, D.C., is a major subordinate command of the U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC). Its mission is to provide logistical support to the Sentinel System, the Communist Chinese-oriented antiballistic missile system approved for deployment last September. SENLOG's responsibilities include all aspects of inventory management and maintenance engineering functions required to support the Sentinel System.

Huntsville is the location of the Sentinel System Command, the field agency of the Sentinel System organization charged with development, acquisition and installation of the antiballistic missile system.

Elements of other U.S. Army agencies involved with deployment of the Sentinel System are also located in the Huntsville area.

SENLOG, headed by Brigadier General Mahlon E. Gates, presently consisting of a small planning staff, is expected to move from Washington, D.C., to Huntsville later this summer. The command has an authorized strength of 109 personnel which is expected to increase substantially over the next few years.

END

TUESDAY MORNING, 2 JULY 1968

EARLY BIRD EDITION

CURRENT NEWS

NEW YORK TIMES, 2 July 1968 p.6

'Ground Rules' Keep Tight Rein on War Reporting

By GENE ROBERTS
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, July 1—This morning, as they do every morning, representatives of the United States command placed a hefty stack of mimeographed press statements on a table in a Government building in downtown Saigon.

One item told of a battle 46 miles north of Saigon in which two United States infantrymen were killed and four wounded. Although the battle took place at 9 A.M. yesterday, news correspondents—including any who might have witnessed it—were forbidden to say how many had been killed and wounded until the statement appeared on the table.

The battle was only a routine notice in a routine report, but it illustrated how the military's "ground rules" for press coverage apply. The ground rules set forth 15 categories of information—including United States casualties—that cannot be reported until a formal announcement is made in Saigon.

Last week the ground rules were dramatized when John Carroll, The Baltimore Sun's correspondent, wrote that the United States was in the process of abandoning its garrison at Khesanh after successfully defending it for three months earlier this year against the longest enemy siege of the war.

Press Card Was Lifted

Brig. Gen. Winant Sidle, chief of information for the military command, ruled that Mr. Carroll had violated a rule that forbids discussion of troop movements until they have been "cleared" by the military. He suspended Mr. Carroll's military accreditation card for an indefinite period, effectively preventing him from talking with military and embassy officials and barring him from military transportation.

How sweeping are the ground rules? Do they prevent the press from relaying facts a reader in the United States would need to reach a solid opinion on the conduct of the war? Do they prevent the enemy from getting information that would jeopardize the lives of allied troops?

In broad terms, the rules are designed to deny the enemy information about tactics, troop movements, air strikes, supply levels, future plans, and casualties and damage caused by enemy attack.

The commanders here reason, for example, that if the enemy forces knew that rocket attacks

CONTINUED PAGE 2

WASHINGTON POST, 2 July 1968 p.1

U.S., Russia Agree
On Missile TalksBy Carroll Kilpatrick
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Johnson announced yesterday that agreement had been reached with the Soviet Union to begin "in the nearest future" discussions on the limitation of both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.

The President's declaration followed by a few hours a statement in Moscow by Soviet Premier Kosygin that Russia would make proposals for a nine-point disarmament program when the 18-nation disarmament committee reconvenes in Geneva July 16.

Both leaders made their announcements at signing ceremonies for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. In all, 57 nations signed the treaty yesterday in Moscow, London or Washington.

Previous Statement

Once before, on March 2, 1967, President Johnson announced that the Soviet Union had agreed to discuss with the United States ways to limit the arms race in offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.

But not until last week, when Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said his government was ready to discuss the limitation of both kinds of weapons, was the way cleared for agreement on talks.

Even now, the precise time and place are in doubt. American officials were not certain whether the talks would be held in Geneva. They believed they may be held in Moscow, with only representatives of the two largest nuclear powers present.

Suggested in 1964

The first move toward negotiations for nuclear arms limitations came from President Johnson in January 1964 in a letter to then Soviet Premier Khrushchev, White House officials said.

When it became known nearly two years ago that Russia was building an anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow, new efforts were made to begin talks on limitation.

But the Soviets, while indi-

CONTINUED PAGE 2

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

2 July 1968 p.2

REPORT U. S.

HAS EDGE IN
SOVIET TALKS

BY FRED FARRAR

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

Washington, July 1—The United States will go into talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons with a clear edge over the Russians in the number of deliverable nuclear warheads.

It also has more intercontinental ballistic missiles, more submarine-based ballistic missiles, and more intercontinental bombers.

ABM System Not Started

But it does not have a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), which the Soviets are believed to be intensively testing.

Nor has the United States begun to deploy an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense as Russia has, although funds to start the deployment of such a system were approved last week by the Senate.

With President Johnson's announcement today of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to start talks "in the nearest future" this is how the two sides stand in numbers of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them:

According to figures quoted by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara early this year in his annual military posture statement, the United States had a total of 1,710 missiles capable of hitting the Soviet Union as of last October.

656 Aboard Polaris Subs

Of these, 1,054 are land-based and 656 are aboard nuclear powered Polaris submarines constantly prowling the seas within range of the heartlands

CONTINUED PAGE 3

NEW YORK TIMES

2 July 1968 p.1

U. S. BIDS MOSCOW
RETURN TROOP JET

Acts on Interception in the
Kuriles of Craft With 214
on Way to Vietnam

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 1—The United States asked the Soviet Union today for the immediate return of a DC-8 commercial aircraft, its crew and 214 United States servicemen forced to land yesterday in the Kurile Islands of the Soviet Union.

The State Department and the Defense Department have said that the plane had "apparently strayed off course" north of Japan before it was intercepted. Under charter to the Military Airlift Command, the airliner was carrying soldiers, sailors and airmen for duty in Vietnam.

From the United States point of view, as expressed by one White House aide, there is no reason why one "unfortunate incident" should interfere with progress being made with the Soviet Union on other issues, notably the agreement to open talks on limiting the two countries' stockpiles of offensive and defensive missiles.

Ignored by Johnson

President Johnson did not mention the plane incident today when he announced the imminent opening of missile talks.

Word that the plane, operated by Seaboard World Airlines, had been ordered to land on the island of Iturup reached Washington late yesterday.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk promptly telephoned the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, officials said, to explain the incident and ask for the safe and immediate return of the plane and personnel.

The Secretary was said to have discussed the situation with other Government officials during the night and drafted instructions to the United States Ambassador in Moscow, Llewellyn E. Thompson, to take

CONTINUED PAGE 2

TUESDAY MORNING, 2 JULY 1968

WAR REPORTING -Contd

on a base had seriously hurt the allies, they might order a ground attack in an effort to overrun the base while it was at its weakest. On the other hand, if they found out that the attack had done little damage, he might cancel a planned assault that would have pitted him against a superior force.

Before a newsmen can become accredited by the United States command, he has to sign a statement that he will abide by the rules. Few if any correspondents object to signing. For the most part they look upon the rules as a reasonable alternative to censorship, which has not been imposed in this war.

'Right to Protect Itself'

"An army has a right to protect itself," says a French reporter who is not in sympathy with the American position here. "I think the ground rules are fair. They may delay you a bit in telling the story to your readers, but you can tell it eventually. If there were censorship, the censors could edit out anything embarrassing to the United States."

Most of the more than 500 accredited correspondents here appear to share that assessment.

"The ground rules work pretty well," General Sidle says. "The press, as a whole, tries to abide by them."

"Ground rules are common sense," he adds. "All a reporter has to do is ask himself, 'will this help the enemy?'"

Although reporters have little quarrel with the rules, there are sporadic objections to the way they are applied. The loudest complaints came in April, when the Americans moved into the Ashau Valley in one of the war's major operations but refused to let newsmen say they were there until the operation was 11 days old. Normally, the military announce an operation after the second or third day.

Several newsmen suspected the command of having embargoed the operation to avoid "embarrassing" the United States while it was trying to get peace talks under way. Still others maintained that there was no valid military reason for not writing that the Americans were in Ashau in as much as the enemy was shooting at them.

Last week Mr. Carroll made much the same argument after reporting the Khesanh withdrawal. He went to Khesanh and saw marines disassembling the metal runway and dynamiting bunkers. He said he became convinced that enemy troops could see all this from nearby positions, so that there was no valid military reason for withholding the report.

Information officers counter that they are in a better position than newsmen to decide when information will benefit the enemy. One high-ranking information officer conceded that there was at least a 50 per cent chance that Mr. Carroll was right, but added that when there was even a slight chance that the enemy did not know, it was best not to tell

U.S., RUSSIA AGREE ON MISSILE TALKS**Continued**

cating interest in talks, delayed. When the United Nations General Assembly last month formally approved the draft of the nonproliferation treaty it called on the nuclear powers to seek further arms limitations.

"Discussion of this most complex subject will not be easy," the President said yesterday. "We have no illusions that it will be. I know the stubborn, patient persistence it has required to get this far."

But he said he believed the same "spirit of accommodation" that brought about agreement on the nonproliferation treaty "can bring us to a good and fruitful result."

The signing of the nonproliferation treaty, the President said, "keeps alive and active the impulse toward a safer world."

Declaring that recent years "have been fruitful times for the quiet works of diplomacy," he recalled the agreements reached on the limited test ban treaty, the treaty barring weapons from outer space and the treaty creating a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

"The march of mankind is toward the summit—not the chasm," Mr. Johnson said.

Most conspicuously absent from yesterday's signing ceremonies were France and Communist China. They have indicated they will not approve the treaty.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who signed for the United States, called the treaty "a major step" toward a rational world.

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, who signed for Russia in the White House ceremony, called the document

"an important international agreement" marking "significant progress."

The treaty is "one more practical step toward limiting the arms race," he said.

Sir Patrick Dean, the British Ambassador, hailed the treaty as "another measure for control of weapons of mass destruction."

Mr. Johnson said the treaty would commit the nations that do not have nuclear weapons not to produce or receive them in the future; assure that all nations benefit from the atom, and commit the nuclear powers to move forward "toward effective measures of arms control and disarmament."

The treaty "enhances the security of all nations by significantly reducing the danger of nuclear war among nations," the President said.

He promised that when the treaty is ratified the United States will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency "to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States—excluding only those with direct national security significance."

He said this demonstrates that the United States "is not asking any country to accept any safeguard we are not willing to accept ourselves."

Sen John J. Sparkman (D-Ala.), acting chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, announced that hearings on the nonproliferation treaty would begin next week. Chairman J. W. Fulbright is in Arkansas campaigning.

Sparkman said the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate members of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee would meet jointly to consider the treaty.

him.

The command contends that troops are especially vulnerable to attack when withdrawing. At the time of the Ashau operation, it maintained that the enemy had no way of knowing how many men the United States would ultimately commit.

The command's position was that the tone of press reports might indicate that more troops were on their way and that the operation was to become a major one. It ultimately involved two United States divisions, plus several South Vietnamese battalions.

The command agreed to publication on the 11th day of the operation only because Joseph Alsop, the columnist, announced it from Washington. A strong advocate of United States involvement in Vietnam, he was never disciplined for having broken the embargo.

Military men contend that for the most part they have tended to give reporters the benefit of the doubt in enforcing the ground rules. General Sidle says that accredita-

tion cards have been suspended only four times since 1966, when the rules were written, and that it is customary to re-accredit after 30 days.

"An awful lot of odds and ends get out that are helpful to the enemy," according to General Sidle, "but you can't have ground rules for everything."

Although he believes the enemy is assisted unwittingly by newspapers, he has not advocated censorship, saying:

"I don't see how it would work. How do you keep a guy from going to Hong Kong to file his story. And if the United States imposed censorship, this wouldn't affect foreign newsmen. How are you going to censor television films?"

For its part, the press corps is less concerned over not reporting all it knows at the earliest possible moment than it is over the possibility that it may not be getting all pertinent battle information. Reporters often guess wrong in trying to anticipate looming battles, so they depend on the daily military communiqué.

U.S. BIDS MOSCOW RETURN TROOP JET**Continued**

the case up with the Soviet Government at the highest level.

Mr. Thompson raised the matter briefly today with Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin at the Moscow ceremony for the signing of the treaty banning the spread of nuclear weapons. At that time, the Premier told him that the case was "under investigation."

It is thought here that by returning the plane with the soldiers, sailors and airmen bound for duty in Vietnam, the Soviet Union could be vulnerable to criticism from Communist China, North Vietnam and the Vietcong.

On the other hand, by holding the plane and the servicemen, the Soviet leaders would be committing a major provocation to the United States administration.

The most obvious counter-move available to the United States might be suspension of the civil air agreement for Moscow-New York direct flights that was expected to go into effect this month.

Responsible United States officials declined to speculate on these possibilities until some clearer impression of the Soviet attitude could be learned.

The four-engine jet was flying from McChord Air Force Base in Seattle to Cam Ranh Bay, South Vietnam, with a scheduled refueling in Japan.

The Defense department said the plane had apparently strayed 80 to 100 miles off course and flown into Soviet airspace. According to the pilot's radioed messages, reported by the Pentagon, Soviet MIG fighters intercepted the airliner and forced it to land at a Soviet air base on Iturup Island.

At 7:39 P.M. Eastern daylight time, 22 minutes after the first message of Soviet interference had come from the aircraft, the pilot, Joseph Tosolini, radioed that he had landed safely. Three minutes later, Mr. Tosolini said he had shut down his engines. That was the last word from the aircraft to reach the United States.

Soviet Silent So Far
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, July 1 — Llewellyn E. Thompson, the United States ambassador, urged Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin today to release the American plane. The Soviet Premier replied that the incident was under investigation. The Soviet press has not yet reported the incident.

The ambassador's representation was made at a ceremony for the signing of the treaty banning a spread of nuclear weapons.

Despite apprehension that the incident might cloud Soviet-United States relations at a crucial moment, the atmosphere at the ceremony was strikingly cordial.

Mr. Kosygin made no mention of the plane incident in remarks at the ceremony. The Premier, Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, the Defense Minister, were affable and smiling during conversation.

SDAY MORNING, 2 JULY 1968

WASHINGTON POST - 2 JULY 1968 P-7

Pentagon Is Set to Kill Project For a Deep-Diving Quiet Sub

By Ted Sell
Los Angeles Times

The Defense Department, over strenuous Navy objections, is about to kill a project to build a deep-diving quiet submarine which Navy officers say is necessary to guard against Soviet missile-launching submarines.

The cancellation is expected Wednesday, it was learned. It will come after \$50 million of \$125 million authorized by Congress last year for the project already had been obligated.

The Navy feels the upcoming cancellation shows duplicity on the part of John S. Foster, director of defense research and engineering. As recently as March, Foster was claiming partial credit for helping persuade the Defense Department to push ahead with development of the vessel.

Now, Foster reportedly is spearheading efforts to slash the remaining \$75-million expenditure as part of Pentagon efforts to cut \$3 billion in the overall defense budget. That is reportedly the Defense Department's share of a \$6-billion budget reduction forced on President Johnson by Congress as the price for his 10 per cent income tax surcharge.

Navy officers feel so strongly about the need to push development of the quiet submarine that they are willing to divert money allocated for surface ship construction and conversion in order to stay ahead of the Soviet Union in submarine technology.

The submarine, specifically designed for operation on surveillance missions, would have joined the fleet in early 1973, after construction by the Electric Boat Co. in Groton, Conn.

WASHINGTON POST 2 JULY 1968 P-10 Saigon Terms NLF Auxiliary of Hanoi

SAIGON, July 1—The South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry today told all ambassadors abroad to refer to the National Liberation Front (Vietcong) as a North Vietnamese auxiliary unit.

This should help clear up all misunderstanding of the role of the NLF and make clear that it is an agency of Hanoi, the Ministry said.

The NLF maintains that it is a political party supporting the Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam, and has no direct links with North Vietnam.

views with 13 U.S. pilots and airmen held prisoners of war by the North Vietnamese.

REPORT U.S. HAS EDGE IN SOVIET TALKS - Cont'd

of Russia and Red China.

The Russians, according to McNamara, possessed a total of 750 nuclear tipped missiles, with only 30 of them being submarine based.

McNamara said that the United States had 697 intercontinental bombers compared to 155 for the Soviet Union.

4,500 Deliverable Warheads

As far as deliverable nuclear warheads, McNamara said that the United States possessed approximately 4,500 while the Russians had about 1,000.

However, many or most of the Russian warheads are believed to be more powerful than ours, thereby possibly canceling some of our numerical superiority.

At the time, McNamara noted that the Russian fleet of intercontinental missiles had grown from 340 a year earlier and could be expected to keep growing in the next few years, altho at a slower rate.

So the number of Russian missiles probably has increased since last October.

Meanwhile, the number of American missiles had remained unchanged as late as Feb. 5, but this country is in the process of replacing its first generation Minuteman 1 land based missile with the more sophisticated Minuteman 3.

The Minuteman 3 will be able to carry multiple nuclear warheads, as will the Poseidon missile now being developed for Polaris subs.

WASHINGTON POST 2 JULY 1968 P-3 Ho's Thanks Transmitted

NEW YORK, July 1 (UPI) — President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam has asked an American newsman to "convey our thanks, our admiration" to American opponents on the Vietnam war, according to an interview to be published Tuesday in the new left-wing Daily World.

Ho is also quoted by Daily World correspondent James E. Jackson as describing American racial rioting as "remarkable exploits, and the fact that they (Negroes) relate their demands to the condemnation of the war against us greatly inspires and encourages our people."

The interview granted May 20, according to Jackson's article, appears in the "preview" issue of the Daily World. A spokesman described the daily as "a new left-wing paper" that succeeds the old leftist semi-weekly, "The Worker."

Jackson, employed by "The Worker" at the time of the interview, also further describes in the Tuesday edition inter-

BALTIMORE SUN - 2 JULY 1968 P-1

Senate Leaders Are Divided On Anti-Missile Fund Now

Washington, July 1 (AP)—Senate leaders disagreed today whether Congress should withhold funds for United States deployment of an anti-missile system in view of approaching nuclear talks with the Soviet Union.

The Senate Democratic leader, Senator Mansfield (Mont.), said he hoped the money would be cut from the budget.

But the Republican leader, Senator Dirksen (Ill.), said the funds should be provided.

Their comments followed President Johnson's announcement that this country and the Soviet Union would meet "in the nearest future" to discuss limits on offensive and defensive nuclear missile systems.

The Defense Department plans to begin deployment of the Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system as a thin line oriented toward Red China.

Senators who defeated a move to eliminate deployment funds from the new budget held that it would be used eventually as part of a more elaborate defense against Soviet missiles.

The \$227,000,000 deployment

appropriation has been authorized but Congress must vote again on providing the actual money.

Asked whether the President's announcement should bring about reconsideration of the Sentinel plan, Senator Mansfield said "I hope it would."

He said he hoped the issue of nuclear limitations "will be recognized as a two-way street by the Soviets as well as ourselves."

Spurred Talks

Senator Mansfield rejected the contention of several backers of the Sentinel plan that a vote favoring it had spurred the Soviet Union to agree to talks.

Senator Mansfield said the moves toward negotiations had been under way for some time before the Senate acted.

Senator Dirksen said that "for the moment," he thought the plans for the Sentinel system should proceed.

"Talks are talks," he commented, "the question is what do you do."

Russia is known to be pushing development of similar quiet vessels.

A major use of such nuclear submarines would be to shadow nuclear-missile carrying submarines and, undetected, destroy them if they showed signs of preparing to fire missiles.

Preparations to proceed with U.S. development of the

quiet submarine, while reported to Congressional committees, have been kept secret from the public.

As an indication of the importance attached to the scheme, however, complete control of the project was assigned to Vice Adm. Hyman G. Rickover, a Navy gadfly called the father of the nuclear submarine program.

WASHINGTON POST - 2 JULY 1968 P-8 Command Ship Is Sent To Caribbean Area

NORFOLK, Va., July 1 (AP) President.

—The command ship Northampton left Norfolk Sunday at 4 p.m. for what was described as "routine readiness exercises."

Her destination is the Caribbean area.

The Northampton, converted from a cruiser to a special purpose ship, carries some of the most sophisticated communications gear ashore or afloat. The ship is designed for top-echelon commands and staffs, including that of the

The Northampton's departure preceded by one day an announcement by the White House that President Johnson plans to leave Saturday for San Salvador to discuss the Central American common market.

The Navy would not comment on whether the Northampton was ordered out on short notice, but there was an indication that at least some of her crew missed the ship movement because of the quickness with which it put to sea.

WASHINGTON POST
2 JULY 1968 PAGE 16

TUESDAY MORNING, 2 JULY 1968

Quiet Kind of Anti-Americanism Grows in Thailand

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

TAKHLI, Thailand—It was a sure way for the prostitute to get your attention. She stood off in the shadows at the side of the road and tossed pebbles at the men walking by in the warm night. Their attention attracted, she proposed companionship for one dollar American.

Her more presentable sisters worked from the honkytonk strip the American Air Force base has put into business here. One-room bars line both sides of the road, their tubes of neon light a jarring imprint on the primitive Thai countryside.

Inside the cafes, the entertainment is the Thai concept of what the American GI wants: blaring rock and roll music, booze and Thai hostesses who hustle drinks and themselves in between dances. The airmen from the Takhlil base while away their free time wandering from bar to bar, with little enthusiasm. The sameness and tawdriness of it all seem as apparent to them as to the visitor from "the world," the GI term for the States.

THE ONLY REAL break in the uniformity of the bars stretching along Takhlil's main street like a stage set is a place called the Blue Sky. It is different in that Negro airmen have made it their own. Few, if any, whites enter there.

Similar strips blight Thai cities around other American air bases as well as the capital city of Bangkok, the leading rest and recreation center. This is one reason the American military presence in Thailand is not altogether welcome.

Anti-Americanism is bound to rise in proportion to the number of troops based in Thailand, unless their presence can be made less obtrusive. Defense Department figures show there are about 43,000 American servicemen in Thailand now—mostly Air Force. That number is 8000 above the total of a year ago.

THE AMERICAN servicemen in Thailand are under far fewer restrictions than their counterparts in South Vietnam. Unlike Vietnam, GIs based in Thailand can go into towns near their bases and spend as much money as they wish. GIs in Vietnam are kept out of many towns for fear of inflating the economy. U.S. and Thai policy makers evidently have decided the Thai economy can take it. And Thai businessmen are not complaining.

Anti-Americanism does not show up on their economic charts. But it does show up in other ways. A girl was brutally butchered here several months ago. Suspicions—some of which found their way into print in Thailand—were that an American GI did it. Several weeks ago an Air Force sergeant was found dead in a water-filled ditch a few miles from the Takhlil base. The talk among GIs along the strip right after the incident was that a Thai no doubt did it. Suspicions on both sides ran well ahead of any proof.

The economic impact of the Americans—despite the military line that the Thais never had it so good—has caused problems which contribute to a quiet kind of anti-Americanism, not the blatant "Yankee Go Home" campaigns in Europe after World War II. Miss Boonchan Wongrakinitr, dean of the Udon Teachers College, typifies this feeling.

Her college is in Udon, a city 350 miles north of Bangkok. The city has boomed from a population of 30,000 in 1963 to 70,000 today as the Air Force tripled its

WASHINGTON POST 2 JULY 1968 PAGE 18

Thai Official Urges U.S.-China Accord

By Jack Foisie
Los Angeles Times

BANGKOK — Thailand's nam is creating "a new form of isolation" in the United States.

Foreign Minister, Thanat Kho-man, although a staunch anti-Communist, believes the United States may have to make an accommodation with Communist China if there is to be enduring peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia.

He would prefer this type of Communist-Western accord to "disengagement" of the United States in Asian affairs, he indicated in an interview.

Thanat, whose nation is about to increase its own combat forces to a reported 12,000 men on the allied side in the Vietnam war, voiced his fear that U.S. difficulties in Viet-

nam in America today, he said, is the belief that "even if the United States solves the Vietnam war, it will become involved in another Vietnam"—namely, armed combat against Communist intrusion in Thailand.

His urging of an American effort to make diplomatic contact with Communist China came after my mention of a speech by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg before his resignation. Goldberg said the United States must "begin to seek a modus vivendi with mainland China . . . without abandoning old friends to bring about a relaxation of Chinese hostility" toward the United States and also other Asian nations.

Thanat agreed. "My humble suggestion is that you try to turn a bad situation (Vietnam) into a good situation. Follow a settlement in Vietnam with a general settlement in Asia, including Communist China. It is not an impossible task," he said.

Thanat also said the desire of some Americans to get out of Asia reflects a historic fact that the dominant U.S. interest has been Europe and, more recently, the Middle East.

The biggest bogeyman com-

BALTIMORE SUN 2 JULY 1968 PAGE 2

TALKS ON PUEBLO STILL FRUITLESS

Americans, North Koreans Meet For 18th Time

Washington, July 1 (AP)—State Department officials said today "there is no breakthrough" yet in the lengthening negotiations for return of the U.S.S. Pueblo and its crew.

The most recent meeting with North Korean negotiators at Pannunjom took place Thursday morning, and lasted about 1½ hours, they said.

It was the eighteenth United States-North Korean session at the Korean war truce site since the Communists seized the United States intelligence ship January 23.

82 Crewmen Held

The North Koreans are still holding the 82 surviving crewmen prisoner, at an unknown location. The vessel has been taken to another port north of

its original point of capture, off the North Korean port of Wonsan, United States officials said.

Officials do not see at this time any close parallel between the Pueblo seizure and the grounding of a troop-carrying United States airliner yesterday on a Soviet island in the Pacific Kurile Island chain.

North Korea asserts the Pueblo was engaged in hostile action—spying—in Korean waters. But Moscow has not said the plane's flying into Soviet air space was anything other than a navigational accident.

American military commanders in Thailand should take steps to make the presence of troops less obtrusive by imposing tighter curfews, ending off-base living and curbing the growth of honky-tonk bars by putting those outside a specified area off-limits. There have been suggestions in the Thai press that the recreation of American servicemen be confined to specific places.

Given the importance the Pentagon attaches to Air Force bases in Thailand, some American officials favor taking out more insurance against a rise in anti-Americanism. One such official, who has studied the problem closely for several years, said a change in style would help. He suggests, for example, putting Air Force community relations offices in towns near the base rather than expecting a Thai to risk the humiliation of being stopped at the military gate as he tries to get inside to see the community relations officer. Such measures might help soften the American presence, if not make it welcome to people like Miss Boonchan, who said: "If the U.S. military finishes their business, we would like them to leave as soon as possible."

personnel at the Udon base to a force of 6000 servicemen. About 1100 servicemen live off the base since the rapid expansion ran ahead of on-base housing. Miss Boonchan said the American presence has pushed the cost of housing in Udon to the point that her students cannot afford to live in the city any more. College construction costs have risen too, she said, as builders rush to serve the American-made market. And the city's prosperity has attracted robbers, she claimed.

ALL THESE complaints were couched in the most diplomatic terms as Miss Boonchan voiced her concern in an interview at the college. She stressed that "soldiers are soldiers" and that American airmen were not particularly ill-behaved. But she and two of her colleagues at the college said the American behavior is straining the Thai social fabric.

Signs of anti-Americanism are seen by American officials as warning of the danger, not evidence that anti-Americanism is running high. One such official, who has spent several years with the Thais and knows their language, said

WALL STREET JOURNAL
2 JULY 1968 PAGE 1

Jousting With Ivan

Russian Warships Dog The U.S. Sixth Fleet

By WILLIAM D. HARTLEY

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

ABOARD THE USS INDEPENDENCE—Cutting through the placid waters of the eastern Mediterranean on maneuvers, the aircraft carrier *Independence* suddenly finds its path blocked by a diminutive stranger.

The other vessel has come out of the rays of the setting sun, and it lies where the *Independence* is about to swing windward to catapult jet fighters into flight. Capt. Mark Hill, the carrier's commander, exclaims angrily. Maritime rules of the road give him the right of way, but this has happened before.

Sharply, he orders right rudder and jumps the speed from about 15 knots to 25 knots. Swinging into the wind, the ponderous carrier bears down on the stranger. Alarmed, the second skipper backs his vessel off, water churning at its stern.

The *Independence* straightens course and glides past the smaller vessels, Navy deckhands staring down from the carrier's lofty deck. The foreigner is close enough to make out his flag—the red star and hammer and sickle of the Soviet Union.

Ivan is back, the American sailors mutter. The encounter is no surprise; confrontations here with the Soviets are common these days. The strategically crucial "Med," once an American "lake" and the undisputed roving ground of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, has become a million-square-mile arena for a Russian-American war of nerves.

The Soviet ships are doggedly shadowing and frequently harassing the American fleet, and they are here in force. The size of the Russian fleet fluctuates, but it usually contains between 30 and 50 ships, half of them combat ships such as cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

"No longer is the Med ours to use as we see fit," acknowledges Adm. John S. McCain Jr., commander of U.S. Naval forces in Europe. American strategists discern solid political and military reasons for the new Soviet presence.

The Russians clearly want to emphasize their interest in the Arabian peninsula, where two-thirds of the world's oil reserves are located. The naval show of force reinforces the Russian influence—and its heavy arms investments—in the Arab nations. Soviet ships now stop at the Egyptian ports of Alexandria and Port Said and at Latakia in Syria, places no longer visited by American vessels.

By Land or Sea

Moreover, in the parlance of naval strategists, the Soviet presence has "turned the southern flank of NATO." North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliances prevent the Russians from menacing southern Europe by land. But, the strategists suggest, sending Soviet ships into waters off southern Europe produces a threat to NATO.

NATO planners are particularly concerned about Russian overtures to the Mediterranean island of Malta. Just south of Sicily, Malta is strategically located in the middle of the sea. The island is in economic trouble, and Soviet emissaries have been talking of giving aid in return for other favors. NATO admirals fear that Malta might become a regular port of call for Russian ships or even provide room for a Russian base.

Where the Soviet navy goes, the Soviet merchant fleet tends to follow, and Russian freighters are beginning to work the Mediterranean in force. The Soviet merchant presence is especially notable in shipping cotton and dried fruit from the Turkish ports of Izmir and Mersin.

But the Sixth Fleet obviously is the chief target of the Soviet venture into the Mediterranean. "The time has come to demand the complete withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean," Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev said recently.

TUESDAY MORNING, 2 JULY 1968

In the last few weeks, the *Independence* has had Russian company almost constantly as it has cruised through the eastern Mediterranean between Cyprus and Crete. Lately it has been either Soviet patrol boat 883—the vessel narrowly missed by the carrier—or a 492-foot guided missile destroyer numbered 532. Sometimes the Russian companion is a gray blur on the horizon; sometimes it darts in the way of the *Independence* and the destroyers accompanying her.

The *Independence* actually had its first encounter with the Russians before entering the Mediterranean in April. As the big carrier passed south of the Azores, a Soviet Tupolev-20 bomber flew over on two successive days. On both occasions, Phantom jets from the *Independence* rose to protect the carrier.

It was all terribly casual, according to the American pilots. "The Russian pilots were smiling, laughing and waving at our pilots," Capt. Hill recalls. The Soviets snapped photographs of the Americans and even motioned for the U.S. pilots to change position, for better camera angles.

One Soviet aviator held up pictures of Soviet pinup girls, and it looked at one point as though the Russians were drinking beer. "The pilot held up a can," says one American flyer. "He put up three fingers, then two. I figure that was three-point-two beer."

A Soviet ship first picked up the *Independence* as it was coming into the eastern Mediterranean through the strait of Messina between Sicily and the Italian mainland, and one or another has tailed the carrier ever since. The Soviet ships rotate the duty, presumably taking turns to refuel.

"Their attitude toward us changes from time to time," says Vice Adm. William I. Martin, commander of the Sixth Fleet, in his quarters on the guided missile cruiser *Little Rock*. "Sometimes they shadow, other times they are more arrogant. Their sea manners at times are atrocious, and at other times they obey the rules of the road."

Capt. Hill thinks the sea manners of the Soviet guided missile destroyer's skipper leave something to be desired. Not long ago, the destroyer, cruising off the beam of the *Independence*, suddenly shot forward and turned to port in front of the big ship.

A Good Sailor

Such a maneuver is roughly equivalent to a small automobile passing a truck on the right and then undertaking a left turn. It is perilous, but Capt. Hill doesn't allow himself to be intimidated. "A couple of times I've turned into him at high speed," he says. "He seems to have a good sense of not only how to turn to avoid, but how to turn back to get in the same relative position. He's a fairly expert seaman."

The day after making that statement, Capt. Hill found the Russian destroyer between the *Independence* and an old weather balloon the carrier had tossed into the water for target practice. *Independence* gunners had finished one salvo; the Soviet ship suddenly barged in. As the carrier swung around to maneuver the Russian ship out of the target range, a mustachioed sailor in one corner of the bridge muttered, "Hell, just shoot at it, skipper."

Most of the time, though, the Americans ignore their Russian companions. "We don't even report range and bearing to him anymore," jokingly says one young officer on the bridge. "Just 'on station.'" A lieutenant is more serious about the silent confrontation. "They've got their job to do, and we've got our job to do," he says sternly. "They're professionals doing what they're told, and we're professionals doing what we're told. It's a matter of mutual respect."

Unwittingly, the Russians serve to bolster morale on the *Independence*, where the average age of the crew is 19. "My men can look out and see a common threat," says Commander James Foxgrover, executive officer of the ship. "That's something you don't see in Norfolk, Virginia."

The Russian Sailors

Russia has tried off and on through the centuries to become a naval power, without much

success until the last few years. The Japanese demolished the Russian Navy in the 1905 war, destroying all but 4 ships of a 37-ship fleet.

Lenin, distrusting the navy, reduced it to a small element in the Communist military. Stalin reinstated the navy but concentrated on submarines. Nikita Khrushchev deemphasized the navy until the 1962 Cuban confrontation with the U.S., when the Soviet inability to protect its merchant ships proved humiliating.

The Russians then embarked on an extensive building program, and they now possess a modern and well-armed fleet. The average age of Soviet ships is about 10 years, Admiral Martin says, compared with 20 years for the Sixth Fleet ships of the U.S.

In terms of sheer power, the Sixth Fleet believes it far outstrips the Soviet fleet. The Russians lack the long-range striking power of aircraft carriers. But they now are building ships designed to deliver up to 2,000 troops for assault by helicopter.

And the Americans view Soviet guided missile destroyer 532 with respect. Cleanly and trimly designed, it has an impressive arsenal of missile launchers, antisubmarine rocket launchers and torpedo tubes. Four towers carry radar and missile control equipment. When the *Independence* bears down, powerful gas turbines put on a burst of speed to move the Soviet ship briskly out of the carrier's path.

How They Get There

The Russians send their ships into the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. A treaty requires eight days notice to Turkey before making the transits, but Russia gets around this by filing each eight days for the entire fleet; then individual ships are sent through at will.

Until the Soviets began using Arab ports, they used international anchorages such as Hammamet off Tunisia and Kithira south of Greece. Last year an American minesweeper sailed into an anchorage east of Crete and found a flotilla of Russian cruisers, destroyers and auxiliary ships. It dropped anchor in the middle of the fleet and some days later radioed a passing American carrier, "Don't worry about a thing. I've had them cornered for three days."

The Russians actually were more adventurous during their early days in the Mediterranean—about a year ago—than they are now. Last October a Soviet destroyer tried to unnerve the skipper of the U.S. destroyer *Dealey* by approaching from behind and passing close. The Russian skipper miscalculated and passed too close—within four feet. The alarmed Soviets tossed collision bumpers over the side, veered off and went away.

American officers think the Soviets want to learn from the U.S. fleet. Refueling at sea, for instance, has been of special interest to the Russians.

Despite observing the Americans, the Soviets still haven't mastered the knack of steaming along at 15 knots or so and refueling side by side. American pilots report seeing Russian oilers barely moving, their hoses trailing astern and destroyers trying to fish the hoses from the water, a cumbersome method. Moreover, the Soviet fleet still doesn't replenish food, stores and ammunition at sea as the Americans do. Those operations wait for stops in port.

Carrier operations also are of interest to the Russians. "I think they are recording as accurately as possible with minute detail everything we do," says Capt. Hill, "so if they do decide to build an attack carrier, they are that much ahead." The Russians apparently photograph flight deck activity and record radio transmissions between pilots and the carrier.

The eavesdropping is mutual, however. When a Russian ship moves close to the *Independence*, a voice on the carrier's loudspeaker blares out, "Now man all snooty stations," and a team of photographers dashes to its posts.

But there are long stretches of boredom, when the Russian ships remain distant and look idle. "When I've flown near them," says Lt. Bill Abernathy, a helicopter pilot, "there is usually a bunch of guys on the fantail in shorts sunbathing. They just look up and wave."

TUESDAY MORNING, 2 JULY 1968

(CASUALTIES)

(AP) U-S MARINES ARE LOSING MORE MEN IN PROPORTION TO OTHER U-S BRANCHES OF THE SERVICE IN THE VIETNAM WAR. THE ARMY HAS GREATER CASUALTIES BUT HAS MORE THAN FOUR TIMES AS MANY MEN INVOLVED. SO FAR, THE UNITED STATES HAS LOST ABOUT 25,400 MEN KILLED IN COMBAT.

-DASH-

(THE AIR FORCE AND NAVY HAVE BEEN HIT LIGHTLY COMPARED WITH THE MARINES AND THE ARMY WHICH CARRY THE BRUNT OF THE VIETNAM WAR.)

(PENTAGON OFFICIALS SAY ONE REASON MARINES LOSE MORE MEN IS BECAUSE THE LEATHER NECKS ARE MORE AVAILABLE FOR BATTLE THAN THE OTHER GROUPS.)

(AP) U-S MARINES, BACKED BY PLANES AND ARTILLERY, FOUGHT A DAYLONG BATTLE WITH A NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCE IN A BATTLE NEAR KHE SANH (KAY SANH) YESTERDAY, KILLING 157 NORTH VIETNAMESE. MARINE LOSSES WERE PUT AT TWO KILLED AND ELEVEN WOUNDED.

(VIET)

(AP) U-S B-52 BOMBERS CONTINUE TO HAMMER AWAY AT SOUTHERN NORTH VIETNAM, TRYING TO SMASH ENEMY SUPPLY LINES. SMALLER JETS FLEW NEARLY 3,700 MISSIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM'S SOUTHERN PANHANDLE DURING JUNE. BUT, DESPITE THE SHELLING, INTELLIGENCE SOURCES SAY THE ENEMY IS POURING MORE SUPPLIES AND TROOPS INTO SOUTH VIETNAM THAN EVER BEFORE.

-DASH-

(THE GIANT BOMBERS HIT ENEMY STORAGE AREAS IN AND ABOVE VIETNAM'S DE-MILITARIZED ZONE YESTERDAY. AND THEY ALSO ATTACKED NORTH VIETNAMESE ARTILLERY SITES THAT HAVE BEEN SHELLING ALLIED BASES ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER AND U-S WARSHIPS OFFSHORE.)

(AP) A SOUTH KOREAN COURT HAS SENTENCED U-S ARMY SPECIALIST-FOURTH CLASS H.K. SMALLWOOD OF KEITH, KENTUCKY TO 15 YEARS IN PRISON ON CHARGES OF MURDER AND ARSON. SMALLWOOD WAS ACCUSED OF CHOKING TO DEATH A 22-YEAR-OLD KOREAN WOMAN IN HER ROOM IN SEOUL AND SETTING FIRE TO THE VICTIM'S BED.

(AP) (MOSCOW) -- THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINS A PUBLIC SILENCE TODAY ON THE VIETNAM-BOUND AMERICAN TROOP PLANE DOWN IN THE KURIL (KOO-REL') ISLANDS. AND SOME EXPERIENCED OBSERVERS IN MOSCOW SAY THE SILENCE IS HOPEFUL.

THESE NON-COMMUNIST OBSERVERS CONTRAST THE SILENCE WITH NORTH KOREA'S IMMEDIATE AND TRIUMPHANT ANNOUNCEMENT LAST JANUARY OF THE CAPTURE OF THE U-S INTELLIGENCE SHIP "PUEBLO." THE PUEBLO WAS ACCUSED OF ILLEGAL SPYING AND ITS 82 SURVIVING CREWMEN STILL ARE PRISONERS.

BY AVOIDING ANY PUBLICITY FOR THE CAPTURE OF THE U-S PLANE WITH 229 PERSONS ABOARD, THE SOVIET UNION LEFT ITSELF MORE ROOM FOR MANEUVERING THAN A NORTH KOREAN-STYLE ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD HAVE GIVEN.

THE OBSERVERS REASONED THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES COULD DECIDE TO RELEASE THE PLANE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT HAD INNOCENTLY STRAYED INTO SOVIET AIR SPACE. THE POSSIBILITY WAS LEFT OPEN BY THE SOVIET FAILURE TO MAKE PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS OVER THE PLANE.

BUT THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THE SOVIETS WILL REMAIN SILENT OF WILL RELEASE THE PLANE AND PASSENGERS ANY TIME SOON.

WHEN U-S AMBASSADOR LLEWELYN THOMPSON SPOKE TO SOVIET PREMIER KOSYGIN (KAW-SEE'-GHIN) ABOUT IT YESTERDAY, KOSYGIN SAID ONLY THAT THE MATTER WAS UNDER INVESTIGATION. THE PREMIER DID NOT COMMIT HIMSELF FURTHER.

THERE IS NO INDICATION OF FURTHER U-S DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY IN MOSCOW. IT APPARENTLY IS BEING HANDLED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

A SOVIET GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN WHO WAS ASKED ABOUT THE PLANE YESTERDAY SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION BUT WOULD SEE WHAT HE COULD FIND OUT. ASKED AGAIN TODAY, HE SAID HE STILL HAD NO INFORMATION.

(AP) THE SWISS EMBASSY IN HAVANA SAYS A NORTHWEST AIRLINES PLANE WITH 94 PERSONS ABOARD, WHICH WAS HI-JACKED AND DIVERTED TO CUBA YESTERDAY, IS EXPECTED TO LEAVE CUBA "IN THE EARLY HOURS" OF TODAY. THE PLANE WAS EN ROUTE FROM MINNEAPOLIS TO MIAMI WHEN A PISTOL-WIELDING PASSENGER FORCED THE PILOT TO HEAD FOR CUBA.

CURRENT NEWS

WEEKEND EDITION

FRIDAY PM 28 JUNE THRU 30 JUNE 1968

WASHINGTON POST
29 June 1968 P1

Souvanna: Reds Must Leave Laos

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

PARIS, June 28—Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma today called for the withdrawal of 40,000 North Vietnamese troops from Laos as the price for halting American bombing of North Vietnam.

The leader of the embattled nation whose fate is intertwined with the war in Vietnam, told a group of newsmen during his visit to Paris:

"If you (the Americans) stop the bombing of North Vietnam without withdrawal of the North Vietnamese troops from Laos, how could the United States ever accept that? It would leave the western flank uncovered (in the Vietnamese war). I don't see how you could accept that."

Prince Souvanna arrived here six days ago on what he called a "private visit," which has included talks with U.S. officials about the American-North Vietnamese discussions under way here. These sessions have been dragging for six weeks with Hanoi insisting first on a total halt to U.S. bombing and the United States demanding a show of military restraint by Hanoi before the limited bombing ordered on March 31 is expanded to a complete halt.

On his arrival here, Souvanna described the continuing fighting in Laos—which borders Vietnam and is covertly used by North Vietnam to infiltrate troops into South Vietnam—as "the lost war of Laos." The conflict in Laos often tends to be forgotten, Souvanna complained. But in fact "the war has never ceased in Laos, in spite of the 1962 Geneva Agreement" to make Laos truly neutral by withdrawing all foreign troops from it.

What is actually involved in the once-a-week formal discussions under way in Paris between envoys of Washington and Hanoi, Souvanna said, are the terms of a "cease-fire." He used this terminology in its broadest sense, to extend it to his call for a withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from Laos. Hanoi's delegation here has rejected talk of a cease-fire at this stage, insisting the priority mission of the conference is to halt American

CONTINUED PAGE 2

WASHINGTON POST
30 June 1968 P1

Saigon Quiet, U.S. General There Says

By Peter Braestrup
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, June 29—Maj. Gen. John H. Hay, newly named commander of U.S. forces defending Saigon, said today that there were no signs of an imminent Communist ground offensive against the city.

"As a matter of fact," he told newsmen at the Capital Military District headquarters here, "it's so quiet it bothers me."

He warned that troops of the enemy 5th, 7th and 9th Divisions, apparently now dispersed to re-equip and rest, were capable of reaching Saigon within 48 hours from their rural base areas. However, he said, enemy troops were no longer "hanging in close" to the city.

Meanwhile, Saigon newspapers tonight again quoted South Vietnamese government sources as saying that the capital's defenses were on the alert for another enemy ground push. Such alarms, fostered both by local fears and by Vietcong propaganda leaflets, have been common ever since the last big enemy attack on Saigon May 5 to 13. But Gen. Hay said there was currently no special alert in the capital area.

There have been no major ground actions in the capital area, which embraces Saigon and Giadinh Province, since South Vietnamese Marines captured more than 140 surrounded enemy troops June 19 in Saigon's northern suburbs.

As of early today, there has been no rocket attack against the city or its suburbs since June 21, when the enemy put ten 122-mm. and 107-mm. rockets into Tan Son Nhut Airbase and nearby residential areas on Saigon's northern fringes.

However, Gen. Hay, like other allied military men, did not rule out either new infiltration or more rocket attacks. He noted that the rockets' seven-mile range, and the ease with which enemy rocket crews could move in close to Saigon through marshes, woodland and creeks, made perfect defense impossible.

Nevertheless, the General went on, added surveillance by electronic devices, helicopters

CONTINUED PAGE 2

BALTIMORE SUN
29 June 1968 P1

HANOI SAYS KHE SANH IS U.S. 'DEFEAT'

By THOMAS T. FENTON
(Paris Bureau of The Sun)

Paris, June 28—The Hanoi delegation at the Paris peace talks today heralded the evacuation of the Khe Sanh base by American forces as "a grave defeat for the United States."

The American forces were "forced to retreat," said Nguyen Thanh Le, spokesman for the delegation. He added that American explanations that the base was no longer essential were just "sour grapes."

Propaganda Boost

Mr. Le's statements were made at a press conference here which appeared to be part of a step-up in the heavy propaganda campaign which the North Vietnamese delegation has been conducting as the peace talks drag on without evident progress.

The press conference was called to publicize Hanoi's claim that the 3,000th American plane was shot down over North Vietnam this week.

According to the latest American figures published this week, less than 900 American planes have been lost over North Vietnam.

Mr. Le read a lengthy statement from what looked like the carbon copy of a cablegram, leading observers to speculate that the statement had been prepared in Hanoi and sent by Telex to the delegation here.

He quoted extensive figures designed to show that, despite the American bombing of North Vietnam, the country had increased its industrial and agricultural output, and quadrupled its road network.

Commenting on Khe Sanh, the American base near the border zone between North and South Vietnam at which 6,000 marines held out during a 77-day siege early this year by an estimated 40,000 North Vietnamese troops, Mr. Le said the withdrawal this week was both a tactical and strategic defeat.

Bad Faith Charged

"The United States military commanders once decided to defend the base at all costs," he said. "They are now forced to

CONTINUED PAGE 2

BALTIMORE SUN
30 June 1968 P2

EVACUATION OF KHE SANH GOES SLOWLY

Khe Sanh, Vietnam, June 29 (AP)—United States Marines are working night and day to clear out Khe Sanh within the next week. The warren of bunkers which soaked up so much American blood will soon be buried, and the rats will take over.

The going is slow. Bulldozers raise a haze of red dust in the daytime, and Air Force twin-engine C-47's orbit the base at night dropping flares.

A few enemy artillery rounds whistle over the workers every day, but no one pays much attention. The marines expect the North Vietnamese to step up the harassment shelling as Hanoi increases its propaganda drive about the withdrawal.

North Vietnam Claim

The North Vietnam news agency claimed Friday that the Viet Cong "wiped out" 122 American and South Vietnamese troops as they were withdrawing from Khe Sanh.

American spokesmen said convoys moving from here to Landing Zone Stud have not been hit since June 8 when the marines lost about twenty men in an enemy ambush.

One United States plane, dropping flares for the night workers, was shot at continuously by the enemy Thursday, but was not hit. Some sources identified the shell bursts as 37-mm. anti-aircraft fire, a rarity in South Vietnam.

Airstrip Salvage Effort

The marines, elements of a battalion from the 9th Regiment, are trying to salvage all the usable sections of the 3,000-foot aluminum airstrip. The sections are being flown out by huge cargo-carrying helicopters.

United States spokesmen said if this is not completed soon, the remainder of the airstrip may be blown up to expedite the pull-out.

Large holes are being dug to bury the skeletons of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft that supported the combat base while it was under siege for 77 days from January 20 to April 8.

The medical bunker is one of the few facilities still in operation, and demolition workers

CONTINUED PAGE 2

SOUVANNA...Cont'd

bombing.

At a press conference today, the North Vietnamese delegation "celebrated" the shooting down of that it said was the 3000th American plane to be brought down over the North. U.S. officials say their statistics show losses of less than one-third of that amount in fixed-wing aircraft, or 858 planes.

Hanoi's delegation used the occasion to label the American decision to evacuate the long-headlined U.S. military outpost at Khesanh in South Vietnam, "the gravest defeat for the United States."

Press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le said the U.S. explanation that holding Khesanh was no longer necessary because of a shift to more mobile strategy reminded him of the fable of the fox and the grapes, with the fox reluctantly abandoning the grapes out of his reach and saying, "They were sour anyway."

"This retreat" from Khesanh, said Le, shows that "as long as the United States insists on pursuing its war of aggression," it "will not avoid defeat, whatever strategy and tactics it uses."

Several members of the North Vietnamese delegation later today appeared at a sort of talk-in aimed at "American war crimes" committed in Vietnam.

American writer Mary McCarthy was among the group of mainly Frenchmen who described visits to North or South Vietnam, concentrating on damage caused by U.S. bombing. The meeting was the first production of the International Information Center on War Crimes in Vietnam. The group was described as an outgrowth of the Bertrand Russell international tribunal on American war crimes in Vietnam, and the new group also appeared to be solely concerned with American damage to civilian life and property.

Premier Souvanna Phouma's view is that the Paris talks are now "in the propaganda stage" but "might look different in a few weeks."

Once a cease-fire has been achieved here, he said, there should be a "general conference" of "all the interested parties" about the conflict in Southeast Asia. It is up to the "great powers," he said, to determine if it is possible to have such a conference with Communist China or, if necessary, without her.

As for Laos itself, said Souvanna, it should be provided with an expanded and effective International Control Commission which could enforce the neutrality that was pledged at Geneva in both 1954 and 1962. The present Indian-Polish-Canadian membership should be expanded to five nations, he suggested, with authority to operate by majority vote. The present procedure gives each member a

SAIGON QUIET, GENERAL SAYS...Continued

and fixed-wing aircraft, plus more aggressive patrolling and faster reaction by Saigon's defenders, should reduce the threat.

Hay was named "Commanding General, Capital Military Assistance Command" June 4 and given a staff. Prior to then, notably during the destructive February and May fighting in Saigon, no permanent special U.S. command existed to plan and direct the capital's defense; Both U.S. and South Vietnamese efforts to drive out enemy troops were handicapped by lack of organization and coordination.

Despite urgings of U.S. civilian authorities after the February fighting, Gen. William B. Westmoreland's staff and its South Vietnamese counterpart had not developed a detailed joint Saigon defense plan when Communists struck again May 5.

According to Gen. Hay, the new joint setup should vastly improve Saigon's defenses. He and his counterpart, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Minh, who heads all South Vietnamese police and military units in the Saigon area except the Strategic

EVACUATION OF KHE SANH SLOW...Cont'd

are expected to wait until the last day before they fill it in.

Wounded Brought In

Some marines wounded in a skirmish on one of the surrounding hills were brought there Friday for treatment.

Most of the salvaged material is being taken to Landing Zone Stud, 10 miles northeast of here, which is expected to be the new western anchor for allied bases along the demilitarized zone.

a veto and means, Souvanna said, that ICC members "live very well, but they don't do much work."

The result, he said, is that North Vietnam now has "40,000 troops in Laos permanently... not counting the troops passing through" to South Vietnam. "The presence of these 40,000 troops," said Souvanna, "has obliged us to maintain an army of 100,000 which is an enormous quantity for a country which has barely three million inhabitants."

The 1962 agreement was based on the premise that the three Laotian factions—rightist, neutralist (the group that Souvanna Phouma headed) and the pro-Communist Pathet Lao, could operate in a delicate balance. The balance long ago was upset, with Souvanna charging the Communists with destroying the neutrality premise and the Pathet Lao pulling out of the government. If the North Vietnamese withdraw from Laos, said Souvanna, "the Pathet Lao ministers can return to the seats which have been left vacant for them and we can then discuss the need to reaffirm the Geneva agreements."

Reserve, have combined their staffs to a degree rare in Vietnam.

The allied artillery operations intelligence and air liaison officers work side by side, Hay said. No U.S. infantry battalions are permanently assigned to Hay, but they move in and out of the capital area as Hay's immediate superior, Lt. Gen. William Weyand, commander of two field forces, decides. Hay currently controls several U.S. battalions operating in Saigon suburbs under this plan.

More than 30 projects for Saigon's defense are under way, Hay said, notably an "anti-infiltration belt" composed of roving South Vietnamese militia ambush patrols close in Twaujm city.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 June 1968 P2

135 U.S. COPTERS ORDERED BY BONN

Special to The New York Times

BONN, June 28 — West Germany's Defense Ministry has ordered 135 Sikorsky CH 53-A helicopters worth \$250-million from the United States.

The Defense Committee of Parliament approved the purchase from Sikorsky Aircraft, a division of the United Aircraft Corporation, at its last session before the summer recess yesterday.

The committee put off a decision on the purchase of 88 United States Phantom jet fighters, built by the McDonnell Aircraft Division of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation until after Parliament revenes in the fall.

The heavy assault helicopters were purchased, according to the Defense Ministry, to increase the mobility of West Germany's ground forces. The Defense Committee, before granting the request, obtained assurances from the army that enough trained personnel were available to fly and maintain the helicopters.

The committee said that payment for the helicopters would begin this year and end in 1974. It did not report on when the deliveries would begin.

In postponing the decision on the Phantom jet fighters, the Defense Committee turned down an urgent request by the Defense Ministry to equip two Luftwaffe reconnaissance squadrons with that plane.

The committee took the view that the American-designed F-104 Starfighters, which form the backbone of the West German Air Force, are as well suited for reconnaissance tasks. The Luftwaffe would like to see Phantoms replace Starfighters in the 1970's, but the Defense Committee holds that the air force should not be dependent on imports for its standard plane. The Starfighters are produced under license in West Germany.

HANOI SAYS KHE SANH U.S. 'DEFEAT'—Cont

retreat from the base."

"The high command pretends the retreat was ordered because the base is unessential now. That makes me think of the La Fontaine fable of the fox and the grapes."

Mr. Le repeated charges of "bad faith" on the part of American negotiators, and said North Vietnam wants peace, but "peace goes hand in hand with independence, and we reject a pax Americana."

At almost the same time the North Vietnamese were holding their press conference, another was being held by Prince Souvanna Phouma, pro-Western but officially neutralist Premier of Laos.

Eventual Settlement

Prince Souvanna, who is in Paris for private reasons, met with American reporters and outlined his views on how an eventual settlement of the war in Southeast Asia could be reached.

His views supported several key ideas already put forth by the American negotiators in early sessions of the talks which opened here May 13.

Although the peace talks are now in the "propaganda stage," he said, "they might look different in a few weeks."

40,000 In Laos

Prince Souvanna's main point was that the Americans should not stop the bombing of North Vietnam without first insisting on a withdrawal of the estimated 40,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos, which flanks North and South Vietnam. The main Communist supply line from North to South Vietnam passes through Laos.

The Prince predicted the talks could result in a cease-fire, with the evacuation of the troops from Laos and an end to the bombing. Without the Laos supply route, he said, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in the South could not continue to fight.

Once the fighting had stopped, Prince Souvanna conference foresaw an international conference of the United States, European and Asian countries concerned to work out a Southeast Asia settlement.

The International Control Commission would supervise the settlement and would be enforced by adding two Asian nations and instituting a majority vote to govern its actions.

The present control commission, established to police the 1954 Geneva settlement of the Southeast Asia conflict, has been largely ineffective. Each of its three present member countries—India, Canada and Poland—has a veto.

Prince Souvanna, who comes to France each year to take a spa cure, said the commission members "live very well, but they don't do much work."

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 30 June 1968 P3

Few 'New Troops' Infiltrate

By JOSEPH C. GOULDEN
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, June 29. — Although North Vietnamese infiltration is at its highest level of the war, U.S. intelligence concludes the bulk of the newcomers are replacements for casualties who do not increase the enemy troop level.

Of the 29,000 North Vietnamese regulars said to have crossed into the South during May, only 3000 are believed to be what the U.S. calls "new troops." The other 26,000 replaced North Vietnamese killed or wounded on the battlefield.

These figures are cited as one of the reasons the United States continues to be confident the Paris peace talks ultimately will bear fruit.

OPTIMISM GUARDED

The optimism is guarded — indeed, no one in the Administration will go beyond the words "bits and straws" which Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford used at a press conference on June 20 in referring to progress.

Two reasons are assigned for Hanoi's caution about increasing its force level in the South during the talks.

First, and foremost, is the fear of North Vietnam that any precipitate boost would quickly bring about a full resumption of the bombing which President Johnson partially suspended on March 31.

Mr. Johnson is under considerable pressure to lift the ban because of the continuing North Vietnamese terror attacks on Saigon and other cities. Indeed, at one point within the past two weeks, it appeared here that a resumption was imminent.

BELIEF IN SINCERITY

Second, the belief is now fairly unanimous within the Johnson Administration that the North Vietnamese are sincerely seeking a resolution of the war at the Paris talks.

Thus any military action that could cause the U.S. to resume bombing also risks breaking the negotiations. Further, the North Vietnamese fear that Mr. Johnson would not be subject to any military limitations if he decided an all-out resumption of the war.

Reading Ho Chi Minh's mind from a distance of 14,000 miles, even with the assistance of captured documents and prisoner interrogations, is an admittedly risky business.

MID-MARCH DATE

But Ho's change of heart on the conduct of the war is now dated here to around mid March — which, ironically, is about the same time that President Johnson decided to opt for a new strategy.

The "reconstruction" of the war that culminates in this conclusion goes roughly as follows: Through the late summer of

WASHINGTON POST 29 June 1968 P11

Ship Aids GIs In Viet Battle

From News Dispatches

SAIGON, June 29 (Saturday) — U.S. infantrymen, backed up by the guns of the cruiser Boston, Friday reported killing 105 North Vietnamese in a force of about 500 caught on beaches just below the Demilitarized Zone.

Heavy fighting raged into the night as North Vietnamese survivors defended deep bunkers in a village due east of Quangtri and 10 miles south of the DMZ.

American losses in the ranks of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) were described as "very light."

Vietcong guerrillas threw satchel charges into the houses of a sleeping coastal village Friday night, killing 45 civilians and wounding 80 to 100, the U.S. Command reported.

American spokesmen said more than 85 per cent of the village of Songtra, 345 miles northeast of Saigon, was destroyed in one of the costliest enemy terror raids in recent weeks.

U.S. infantrymen, meanwhile, battled an estimated 150-man enemy force 14 miles southwest of Saigon early Saturday in the campaign to block infiltrators believed readying a new attack on the capital. First reports said the Americans killed 24 Vietcong in the fighting that began Friday afternoon.

In Saigon, authorities Friday ordered rocket-raid siren drills for morning and evening

hours Saturday and Sunday and told all civilians to "keep calm and obey instructions" following any Vietcong invasion.

B-52 bombers and smaller tactical bombers Friday struck at Vietcong strongholds near the seven-mile-wide belt round Saigon used by the Communists to launch rocket attacks on the capital.

Vietnamese forces in Saigon were on full alert.

The heightened alert was attributed in part to information obtained from two high-ranking Vietcong officers captured within the past few days. One captive, a lieutenant colonel or colonel in the enemy command's capital military district, gave the South Vietnamese "important" tactical information about the planned new offensive, sources said.

Although 12,500 enemy troops are believed to be hiding in the jungled, marshy terrain around Saigon, South Vietnamese sources reported only small-scale enemy movements—presumably scouting parties—Friday night.

Intelligence sources said, however, that enemy infiltration into the capital military district had been stepped up within the past two days.

U.S. Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman will arrive Tuesday for a five-day tour of South Vietnam which will concentrate on the Mekong River Delta, the U.S. Embassy announced Friday. Freeman was last here two years ago.

1967 Ho Chi Minh was content to wage a war of attrition, with his guerilla units not risking direct confrontations with U.S. units if it meant heavy losses.

The increasing political viability of South Vietnam, however, began to worry Ho in September. The South Vietnamese elected a President and a constituent Assembly, and thrashed out a Constitution. These developments cast doubt on Ho's old policy.

DECIDED ON ATTACK

So in the late fall, U.S. intelligence has now established, the North Vietnamese leadership held a lengthy conference in Hanoi, and decided upon an all-out assault on a selected group

of South Vietnamese cities.

This offensive was launched during the Tet holiday period, and the Johnson Administration remains convinced it was a failure — despite the immediate psychological impact upon American and world opinion.

By mid-March, according to this reconstruction, Ho Chi Minh reached the same conclusion as had Washington. The U.S. thinks he looked at the war, and saw it this way:

Ho had hoped North Vietnam would become a major industrial power in Southeast Asia. Yet the war was destroying his cement and power plants, and his industrial installations.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
30 June 1968 P3

REPORT U.S., N. KOREA NEAR PACT ON CREW

SEOUL, Korea, June 29 — [UPI] — A Seoul newspaper, in a report quickly denied by the state department, said today American officials are ready to receive the 82 crewmen of the navy intelligence ship Pueblo from North Korea captors.

The newspaper, Kyunghyang Shinmun, said negotiations between American and North Korean generals on the release of the vessel's crew were at "a breakthrough stage."

The state department's Washington reaction denied that any agreement was near. United States officials said there had been no breakthrough and deplored what was described as false reports which raise false hopes among relatives of the captured Pueblo crew.

Spokesmen Won't Comment

A spokesman at United States 8th army headquarters in Seoul said "it is not our release" when asked about the newspaper report.

Kyunghyang Shinmun attributed its frontpage story to "informed American military sources in Korea." It said United States authorities in Korea "have secretly worked out a plan to prepare for the return of the Pueblo crew."

North Korean gunboats seized the Pueblo on Jan. 23. The Communists said the vessel was in North Korean waters on a spy mission. North Korean sailors boarded the Pueblo and took it to the Port of Wonsan.

U.S. Issues Denial

The United States denied the Pueblo was in North Korean waters when it was seized, but the state department and the Pentagon have left open the possibility the ship might have strayed from international waters during its mission.

The Seoul newspaper report today came two days after the latest talks on the Pueblo incident between American and North Korean generals at Panmunjom. Eighteen such meetings have been held since Feb. 2.

The newspaper said its informants believed North Korea has exhausted any propaganda they hoped to obtain from the seizure of the Pueblo and that the United States is hoping to settle the matter before the Presidential elections.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE June 1968 P3

General's Tact Ends Hostility

CLARK AIR FORCE BASE, P. I., June 29 (UPI)—When Lt. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis Jr. came to the Philippines a year ago to command the 55,000 men of the 13th United States Air Force, he found that unpleasant relations existed between American service men and Filipinos.

Philippine labor leaders and politicians were upset because Filipinos received lower pay than Americans doing the same job for the air force.

American service men were being mugged and cheated regularly in Angeles City just outside the main gate of the base, 60 miles north of Manila.

Philippines Are Suspicious
The Philippine government believed that United States officials were doing little to stop the flow of American goods from the military post exchanges into the Philippine black market.

Into this environment came Gen. Davis, the highest ranking Negro in the United States military, and—he now admits—he was “alarmed at some of the things I heard.”

Davis, 55, will not talk about it. But fellow officers say he received the silent treatment during his four years in the United States Military Academy at West Point.

Pioneering Negro General
His father was the first Negro brigadier general (one star) in the United States but American military forces were segregated into black and white units in those days, including the time when young Davis was a cadet and later a lieutenant.

In World War II, when he was a combat pilot, the young Negro officer often found himself assigned to segregated quarters, living apart from white officers.

From this racial background, this fellow officers say, Davis brought to the Philippines an understanding and sense of direction which have improved relations between the American military and the Filipinos.

Transfer to MacDill

The tall, slender general granted an interview before his transfer in July to MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, where he will serve as deputy commander of the United States strike command.

He said he first heard of the troubles in the Philippines when a group of Filipino journalists spoke to him in Korea in 1966. He was then winding up an assignment as chief of staff of the United Nations command. Confirmation was not long in coming after he arrived here.

Davis and Col. Philip C. Rawlins, 51, a friendly, talkative man from Oklahoma, arrived at Clark field last July. A few weeks later, thousands of demonstrators converged on

the main gate to protest the firing of more than 350 Filipino house boys and mess attendants who had lost their jobs because of a change in financial procedures.

“I attacked the Philippine-American relations problem because I am fully convinced that United States military men are much more effective if they have happy relations with the host country,” Davis said.

The task was a sizable one. Clark air base employs 31,000 Filipinos and is the biggest single business in Pampanga province, a farming region noted for its resurgent Huk communist movement.

Clark is the largest American air base outside the United States. It has a population of 60,000 people. It is so vast that security police ride horses and motorbikes and use helicopters to patrol the 26 miles of perimeter fence that surrounds the main base area.

For example, the general said, Philippine squatters have occupied part of the base's outlying regions for the last 10 years.

“Some say you should push

them off one day and tell them they can't come back,” he said. “But we have to accept reality and, after all, this is their country.”

Now, the air force seeks to live with the squatters, gently trying to prevent further encroachment, particularly on the base's jungle survival school.

A major problem confronting Davis during his first months was the harassment Americans were undergoing at Mactan air field, a base shared by the Philippine and United States air forces. It is located 400 miles south of Manila.

Daily incidents were reported, most of them involving prolonged searches of United States service men by Filipino guards. In one episode, the United States air force put up an annex to the noncommissioned officers' club and Philippine authorities tore it down.

“A single day didn't pass without trouble,” Davis said. The general got his staff together with Philippine air force leaders and asked them to map out an agreement covering all relationships. The agreement came into effect earlier this year and put an end to the incidents.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 30 June 1968 P3

Traces of Nerve Gas Remain in Utah Valley

LOGAN, Utah, June 29 (AP).—Dr. D. A. Osguthorpe, Salt Lake City, says nerve chemicals continue to linger in Skull Valley, Utah.

About 6400 sheep died in March at Skull Valley after the army conducted an aerial spray of nerve gas at nearby Dugway proving ground.

Osguthorpe, a veterinarian, was hired by the Utah Department of Agriculture and Gov. Calvin L. Rampton as a consultant in the incident.

LINGER IN SOIL

He said Saturday the nerve agents “are stable and lingering in the vegetation and soil.”

“Reports that the Skull Valley area is clear of dangerous compounds are false. Animals

taken into the area suffer toxic effects,” he said.

Osguthorpe said it is possible the compounds will become more toxic as their molecules combine with vegetation and organic materials in the soil.

CARRIED BY RAIN

He said the nerve agents were carried to the ground by rain. “The only reason people weren't injured is that they were out of the rain,” he said.

Osguthorpe spoke to a Utah State University symposium on chemical and biological warfare. The symposium was sponsored by the 49th annual meeting of the Pacific division of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

WASHINGTON POST 29 June 1968 P11

Hanoi Broadcasts Pilot's Gratitude

HONG KONG, June 28 (AP)—A man identified as a U.S. Air Force colonel shot down and wounded near Hanoi last October today thanked his captors for their “humane treatment” in a North Vietnamese broadcast.

The speaker, identified by Radio Hanoi only as Col. John P. Flynn, said: “Despite the fact that I

was a pilot who had participated in raids against North Vietnam . . . I received massive doses of penicillin and all other medical treatment I needed.

“I wish the bombing could stop and the war could end so that the people of Vietnam could get on with the job of building their nation.”

Radio Hanoi later broadcast the names of five U.S. pilots it said had been captured. Identified were:

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

30 June 1968 P22D

LT. GEN. BOWEN IS NAMED NEW 5TH ARMY HEAD

BY MICHAEL McGUIRE

(Reprinted from yesterday's late editions)
Lt. Gen. John W. Bowen, 57, has been named commandant of the 5th army, with headquarters at Fort Sheridan, Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford announced Friday.

Bowen will replace Lt. Gen. John H. Michaelis, 55, who will become deputy commanding general of the Continental Army command at Fort Monroe, Va. Michaelis, who won fame as a regimental commander in the early days of the Korean war, has been 5th army commander since April, 1966.

Bowen, a former commander of the 82d airborne division, is now chief of staff of the United States European command.

During World War II, Bowen served as commander of the 1st division's 26th infantry in the Tunisian and Sicilian campaigns. He was deputy chief of staff of the 8th army in Korea in 1953 and 1954, and commanded the 82d in 1956 and 1957.

Born in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, Bowen was graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1932. He studied at the National War college in 1948 and 1949.

Among the awards and decorations he wears are the distinguished service medal with cluster, the silver star medal with cluster, the Legion of Merit medal, and the French croix de guerre.

Michaelis has been a soldier for 37 years. He was twice wounded in combat and has been awarded the distinguished service cross, the nation's second highest military honor.

Michaelis, as did Bowen, came up in the army the hard way, enlisting as a private before winning the chance to go to West Point in 1932. His subsequent career took him to the Philippines before World War II, and then thru the Normandy invasion and to Holland with the airborne forces.

He won his first general's star in the Korean war and later went back to West Point as commandant. He also had the job of liaison between the Italian, Turkish, and Greek armies.

Lt. Alfred Alvarez of California, Lt. Charles D. Stickhouse of Wisconsin, Lt. Col. Jeff Lindberg of Iowa, Wesley Lewis Bumble of California and Maj. Roger D. Anderson of Minnesota.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
1 JULY 1968 (30 JUNE)

EDITORIALS

NEW YORK TIMES
30 JUNE 1968

Added Burden on Vietnamese Refugees

We hope the report of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, headed by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.), wins the attention it deserves, not only in the Senate but in both United States and South Vietnam administrations. The extra "tax" being placed on Vietnamese refugees by inexcusable corruption and outright stealing could easily be the last straw that loses the war for the Allied forces.

The subcommittee said flatly that refugees have received less than half the \$100 million in relief supplies this country has contributed (and a paltry contribution it has been, too, in view of the need). It also stated that fewer than 25 percent of those driven from their homes ever get the meager \$43 allowance they are supposed to get.

As if this weren't bad enough—in addition to the pilferage that has long been a scandal on Saigon docks

—the subcommittee also found that in the refugee camps there are perpetual shortages of food, school and sanitation facilities and any kind of useful work.

Those who can see beyond the end of their noses, and there must be some in that category in Vietnam as well as Washington, must be aware that this kind of neglect and privation is doing the Communists' work for them. What kind of loyalty or help can or should be expected from persons driven into such a situation?

Senator Kennedy's group urges a special Presidential investigatory team under President Thieu's personal control, and it might help. But it must seem to the layman that enough is known right now to clamp down hard on this heartless victimization of people already victimized by the circumstances of war. And we should put on the pressure.

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS
28 JUNE 1968 (30)

Remember Khe Sanh?

"Hold Khe Sanh at all costs," the Marines were told, and they did. Three hundred died, and another 2,000 were wounded, but they held Khe Sanh for 77 days—in the face of overwhelming enemy forces: under hour-by-hour threat of annihilation; under incessant, punishing artillery fire—until they were finally relieved.

Now Khe Sanh is abandoned as a "new concept of mobile warfare" goes into effect—a concept that does not require an outpost at that precise point in the northwest corner of South Vietnam. And the parents of 300 dead Marines and 2,000 other Marines who stopped bullets or were torn by shell fragments in those 77 interminable days may well ask: Why?

There is no adequate answer: there never is. The "logic" of war requires its premises to be taken on faith, and the premises dissolve as the action surges to and fro.

Khe Sanh will now move into the

history books, to take its place among other spits of land and hills with numbers for names, and island specks known only for their cost in blood.

Iwo Jima was one of these. It was a nothing of a far Pacific island, home for a few hundred Japanese fishermen and sulphur miners and sugar workers. Suddenly in 1945 it became important enough that 5,000 young Americans' lives were deemed a fair price for its possession, and the transaction was made. On Wednesday of this week, in an amiable ceremony between two friendly nations, the island was handed back to its former owner.

The sacrifices at Khe Sanh and Iwo Jima cannot be called futile without calling civilization itself a lost cause. Each life was spent in the hope that it would form a part of a bridge that mankind would cross into an era of peace and brotherhood. As long as the hope remains, the sacrifices retain validity.

WASHINGTON STAR
29 JUNE 1968

Khe Sanh Abandoned

Khe Sanh's abandonment may come as a shock to many people. Indeed, in some quarters it is viewed as a significant propaganda setback for our country. But this judgment seems shallow; the explanation offered by the United States Command makes much more sense to us.

Military pragmatism, not propaganda considerations, is what counts most in a matter of this sort. The controlling fact is that changes in the nature of the Vietnam war—including changes in the enemy's tactics—have rendered the continued operation of Khe Sanh unnecessary. Now, instead of remaining there in a static position, American and allied

forces will use their superior firepower and mobility to counter North Vietnam's capability to launch "several sizable attacks concurrently" in the five provinces making up the I Corps area. These forces will also be able to take over the base's role as a monitor of the Communist infiltration routes.

It may be, as critics have argued, that the military made a mistake in moving into Khe Sanh. Once there, however, the 6,000 U. S. Marine and South Vietnamese defenders performed magnificently. And their commanders—despite the Cassandras crying that the troops were "trapped" and the base

Priorities After Vietnam

Efforts to achieve peace in Vietnam are barely off the ground, but it is not too soon for Americans to make a clear commitment to a reordering of national priorities as soon as that costly and futile war can be honorably liquidated.

That a commitment to transfer billions released from Vietnam to urgent domestic needs has not yet been made—and, indeed, is very much in doubt—was made clear this week by Under Secretary of the Treasury Joseph W. Barr. Mr. Barr, who ought to be in a position to know, says there will be little opportunity for cutting the military or diplomatic budget after the Vietnam war if the Pentagon and the State Department hold to their current goals.

This disturbing prophecy is reinforced by Defense Department pressures for substantial fresh spending, including a costly new antiballistic missile system, and by the continuing disposition of Congress to protect military items in the budget at the expense of social and economic development programs, both domestic and foreign.

After the agonizing experiences of recent years in Southeast Asia and in the ghettos of America's cities, it is hard to believe that responsible national leaders have not at least begun to discern the dangers in overcommitment abroad and undercommitment at home.

The new national mood is reflected in Vice President Humphrey's recent declaration: "I think it would be a very wise thing that as, when and if we see that we can reduce our commitments in Vietnam, which are costly, that we ask, that the Congress and the American people pledge those resources to the great social needs at home."

No one expects the estimated \$28 billion in annual Vietnam spending to disappear overnight, even if a settlement should be reached fairly soon. Few would dispute the need for a strong American defense posture in a world that will continue to pose many perils.

But there is a growing recognition that American security interests are not best served when scarce resources are wasted on extravagant military adventures at the expense of fundamental domestic requirements. Neither overseas wars nor domestic missile defenses can save American cities that are rotting from within or an American society that is torn by internal strife.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 JUNE 1968

Supersaving

One of the few wise economies Congress has made up to now was the vote of the House Appropriations Committee to withhold new funds for development of a supersonic airliner. It was the easy way to save: The funds weren't needed this year anyway because of design delays.

Even without such holdbacks, the superplane project is a splendid candidate for deferment. There are more urgent national needs, including down-to-earth transportation for choked metropolitan areas. And no one is yet sure that it will ever be practical to fly the new plane at superspeeds because of the shattering effects of its sonic boom on people and property below.

doomed to be another Dienbienphu—remained supremely confident. Possibly just possibly, the surrounding enemy, numbering up to 20,000, could take the place against our awesome firepower, but only if he were prepared to suffer prohibitive casualties. Hanoi apparently came to agree with this view after 77 days of siege operations that ended in April. The Dienbienphu bogey has not been heard of since.

To be sure, Khe Sanh will be a subject of controversy for a long time, but this much about it is indisputable: It has won a large place in the history of the Vietnam war as an inspiring example of American and allied valor. One day, in fact, the victory over the siege there may be judged a decisive turning point that finally convinced the enemy he could not win.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
1 JULY 1968 (30 JUNE)
**ACADEMIC BUGLERS
SOUNDING RETREAT**

The University of Chicago recently held a conference on "Viet Nam: Lessons and Mislessons."

A reporter who had examined the list of some 30 participants and read some of the "papers" asked a spokesman for the conference whether there would be any representation for the official United States position on Viet Nam or any intimation that there is another view of the war besides Hanoi's. The spokesman seemed hurt by the question. Yes, he said, there would be rebuttals by several participants.

Despite this pretense of objectivity, the conference was loaded with notorious Viet Nam defeatists, anti-anti-communists, and sellers of birthrights, mainly from Harvard and other universities, but with a sprinkling of journalists.

Stanley Hoffman, professor of government at Harvard, ascribed the guerrilla war in South Viet Nam to the policies of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem and said it bore little resemblance to invasion from the north. He completely ignored the fact that as early as June, 1962, the legal committee of the International Control commission reported that "armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies" had been sent from the north with the object of carrying out "armed attacks" against the government and forces of South Viet Nam.

Altho conceding that the communist Viet Cong "constitutes only a minority" in South Viet Nam, Prof. Hoffman called it "the only national movement that cuts across religious and social lines." He regretted that by pressing for military victory in Viet Nam "we left ourselves no room for maneuver or for the sort of retreat that does not look like an admission of failure."

Samuel P. Huntington, also of Harvard, described Ho Chi Minh's government as "probably the most stable" one in south-east Asia. He attributed this to "the fact that in the north the organization of the Communist party reaches out into the rural areas and provides a channel of communication of rural grievances to the center and for the control of the countryside by the government." Contrast this idyllic vision with what Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap said (Nhan Dan, Oct. 31, 1953): "We . . . executed too many honest people. . . . Terror became far too widespread. . . . Worse still, torture came to be regarded as a normal practice during party organization."

Still another Harvard prodigy, Adam Yarmolinsky, said "the first major obstacle to negotiations in Viet Nam was the strategic bombing of North Vietnamese territory." Yarmolinsky was a chief lieutenant of Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara when [according to Gen. Curtis E. LeMay] we "permitted our general war capability to rust."

Prof. Roger Hilsman of Columbia was another participant in the conference. As assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs in the Kennedy administration, Hilsman was the principal author of a directive to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon, stating in effect that Diem must go. When the president and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were assassinated in a coup d'etat, the late Marguerite Higgins, a redoubtable journalist, roused Hilsman at 2 a. m. and said: "Congratulations, Roger. How does it feel to have blood on your hands?"

This is a representative sample of participants chosen for a conference on Viet Nam when, as its sponsors conceded, "the Paris peace negotiations" are under way. It was a shabby enterprise.

2-E

PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN
28 JUNE 1968 (30)
Gromyko Opens a Door

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's announcement to the Supreme Soviet that Russia is ready to talk about limiting costly antiballistic missile systems opens at least a crack in a door on which the United States has been knocking without prior response.

"Persistent efforts to get a mutual agreement not to engage in an ABM race had been met with a puzzling lack of interest in Moscow, since the value of such a defense system is admittedly dubious."

"Demands that the United States build an ABM system against Russian missiles began almost as soon as it became evident that the Soviets were constructing an ABM system around Moscow and in the Leningrad area. Former Secretary of Defense McNamara fought it off as long as he could, but finally agreed to a so-called light defense system aimed at protection against a possible threat from China in the 1970s."

"But this Sentinel system, to cost over \$5 billion, was openly acknowledged to be but the start of a \$40-billion network defense against Russian missiles."

Mr. Gromyko's offer came just two days after the Senate overwhelmingly voted to spend \$227 million to get the Sentinel system started. This may or may not have influenced the Kremlin, but Senator Jackson, who was in charge of the bill, argued that rather than adding fuel to the arms race, the Sentinel system would give the United States a powerful bargaining tool.

Clearly enough, in spite of budgetary cutbacks, the Senate showed itself prepared to go ahead with ABM systems.

That Mr. Gromyko made the offer as part of a broader limitation and eventual reduction of nuclear weapons, both offensive and defensive, as envisaged in the U. S.-Soviet-British treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, should not detract from its importance. Agreement to stop an ABM race before it gets fully underway ought to be relatively easy and thus a good starting point for the much more complicated questions of limitation and especially reduction.

As President Johnson said in his speech to the UN General Assembly when it endorsed the non-proliferation treaty, there is no time to lose.

WASHINGTON NEWS
28 JUNE 1968 (30)

Russia 'Is Prepared'

ANY diplomat worthy of his striped trousers would greet with "cautious optimism" any hopeful yet murky international development. And that strikes us as exactly the right phrase in response to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's statement yesterday that the Soviet government "is prepared" to discuss mutual limits on nuclear missiles, including anti-missile missiles.

Of course, the Soviets have said this before. In February, 1967, in commenting on President Johnson's plea for such an agreement, Pravda newspaper said the Kremlin "is ready" to discuss the problem. Yet nothing more happened, at least publicly.

What is new, and hopeful, about Gromyko's declaration is its context and timing.

He said his government "is prepared to exchange opinions" on "the search for agreement on the mutual restriction and subsequent reduction of strategic delivery systems of nuclear weapons, offensive and defensive, including anti-rocket weapons." In the diplomatic world, that is precise, thought-out "working" language.

Moreover, Mr. Gromyko made his statement before the Supreme Soviet (parliament) in Moscow, as part of a formal, comprehensive report on Soviet foreign affairs. It is the farthest any Soviet official has gone on the subject.

The Soviet "readiness" to talk about a missile pare-down came just two weeks after the United Nations passed a treaty barring the further proliferation

of nuclear weapons. The treaty, drafted by Washington and Moscow, obliges nuclear powers to negotiate "in good faith" and "at any early date" a halt to the arms race.

Mr. Gromyko's announcement also comes in the same week the U. S. Senate voted a multi-million dollar authorization to start the Pentagon deploying a "light" Sentinel ABM system. That news must have been read with interest inside the Kremlin.

Whether one concludes sweetly, "See, the Russians want peace," or argues sourly "Something must be going wrong with the ABMs they are putting in around Moscow," the point is this may be a fresh opportunity to strike a bargain. The logic of nuclear armaments is that the more missiles Russia and America have the less security. The ultimate security in the nuclear age will come thru the reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons — but it has to be done on a mutual basis.

America and Russia are the key nations involved, but Britain, France — and China — are nuclear nations too. Properly, UN Secretary General Thant has invited Peking to the UN-sponsored nuclear conference at Geneva from Aug. 29-Sept. 28. Our ABM system is dubbed by the Pentagon as an "anti-Chinese" defense, so by definition talking with Moscow is not enough. Sooner or later China has to be brought into nuclear disarmament agreements, if they are to have full meaning. The sooner the better.

NATIONAL OBSERVER 1 JULY 1968 (30 JUNE)

Albuquerque: Junior-Sized Jets

To test some new tracking telescopes, scientists at the Sandia Corp. are using model airplanes instead of real Air Force jets. The seven-pound models are controlled by radio equipment on the ground and can perform any maneuver that a full-sized plane can make. Only four feet long, the models duplicate the optical images of real jets simply by flying close

to the telescopes. In contrast to Air Force planes that take a lot of space and time in taking off, turning around and landing, the model planes can provide 18 test runs an hour. They are also easily painted different colors to test varied visual conditions. A final economy note: The little planes operate on thimblefuls of alcohol, castor oil, and nitromethane fuels.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 JUNE 1968
Missile System Backed
To the Editor:

There are several points made in his June 23 letter ("Missile System Termed Wasteful") by Jerome Wiesner with which I agree. For example, the rationale advanced by former Secretary McNamara and his spokesmen in support of the Sentinel deployment decision last fall seemed conspicuously defective on several grounds. And I agree with Dr. Wiesner that Secretary McNamara's previous position of seeking joint Soviet-United States abstention from missile defenses made the declared anti-Chinese orientation of the Sentinel program something of a lapse in logic.

But I do not agree with much of Dr. Wiesner's apparent position concerning possibilities of defending against Soviet missile attacks. For example, he speaks of "...the generally admitted virtual impossibility of ever achieving a really effective anti-missile defense against the Russians." If "really effective" means that all but a very few Soviet missiles could reliably be excluded, it would indeed be widely judged impossible to achieve. But it is by no means "generally admitted" that it is impossible to achieve a defense that might well save the lives of some tens of millions in a war. A great many Americans, myself included, would certainly be willing to describe such a defense as "effective."

Dr. Wiesner said that "Sentinel itself is already technically obsolete." It is true of any technical system that a deployment will be based on a technology that will not be as advanced as that available immediately after the design is set; Dr. Wiesner might equally have said that our most advanced offensive weapons now being procured, Poseidon and Minuteman III, are "already technically obsolete." The question is one of degree.

Until quite recent years, I was myself skeptical of missile defenses. But the dramatic advance in defense effectiveness that has taken place has changed the nature of the problem completely. For example, it appears that one could do a great deal with a defense system much less expensive than the astronomical estimates mentioned in your June 23 editorial "Postponing Sentinel"—indeed, one much less expensive than our present system of air defense.

It is reasonable to take precautions concerning arms races. But the obvious way of reconciling the diverse Soviet and United States requirements of the present era for strategic forces is to seek a ceiling on offensive forces, not on defenses. I cannot understand why the Administration is not pursuing this possibility. Still less can I understand why Dr. Wiesner is not.

D. G. BRENNAN
 Hudson Institute
 Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y.
 June 25, 1968

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
1 JULY 1968 (30 JUNE)

Bonn to buy 135 U.S. copters

By the Associated Press

Bonn

The West German parliamentary defense committee has given a go-ahead for purchase from the United States of 135 Sikorsky CH-53A helicopters valued at \$350 million for use by the Army Air branch.

NEW YORK POST
29 JUNE 1968
'Defense' and Disarmament

It is too early, despite the heartening Soviet response to Washington's long-standing proposals for a mutual cutback in ballistic missile defense, to suggest that the two thermonuclear adversaries have actually begun comprehensive planning for peace. But they do seem ready now to limit planning for war; in the grim circumstances, that is an appreciable achievement.

The Johnson Administration has been waiting nearly a year and a half for the Soviet reply on missile defense and Washington has reacted swiftly. It is prepared to open talks almost immediately; if Moscow is in earnest, profitable progress could be made in a matter of months.

By ironic coincidence, the Soviets' expression of interest in an "exchange of

opinion" came only three days after the U. S. Senate overrode liberals' objections to start on deployment of a missile defense system.

That form of missilemania, shared by defense contractors and the fantasists of thermonuclear war who theorize about Armageddon in the abstract, presents a continuing challenge to sane statesmen in both Washington and Moscow. They have negotiated a test-ban treaty. They have, most recently, worked persistently side by side on the new agreement to limit the spread of atomic armaments in the world. They will have the grateful support of most of mankind in their efforts to reduce both the conflicts and the costs which missile defense inevitably entails.

WASHINGTON STAR
28 JUNE 1968 (30)

Russian Overture

Yesterday only snatches of the text were available. But they were enough. President Johnson "welcomed" the Russian offer to open talks on mutual cutbacks of offensive and defensive missiles. The State Department found it "vastly encouraging." So do we.

It is the first unhedged public response to the President's seventeen-month campaign to bring the Soviet Union to the conference table. It came as part of a ninety-minute survey of foreign policy to 1,500 Supreme Soviet delegates. The language reads like a lawyer's brief. Granted that arrangements have yet to be worked out, and that talks with the Russians often have floundered. Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement has the ring of the real thing.

Whatever the outcome, however, there is a valuable lesson here. This country should deal with the Soviet Union from a position of strength and appeal to its national interest.

The Sentinel anti-ballistic missile saga appears to bear this out. When the Russians began ringing Moscow with a "thin" ABM system, President Johnson launched appeal after appeal for arms control talks—all to no avail. Then last fall, Sentinel development was approved, in large part to give this country a means of appealing to the Russian self interest.

Now the Russians apparently are ready to talk—and a significant, though indeterminate part of their reason would appear to be our decision to go ahead with Sentinel. This should be carefully noted by those doves among us who have contended that approval of Sentinel would push the Soviet Union the next step up the escalation ladder. It also suggests a second look at the thesis that arms control talks cannot begin until the Vietnam war is over.

Make no mistake about it, the Soviet Union will act in its own interest on matters of national security—Vietnam War or no Vietnam War. The Russians, too, are bothered by the increasing costs of new weapons systems. They, too, would like to reduce the danger and terror level. They, too, recognize the absurdity of building a "thick" missile system.

The administration should not stand on ceremony but instead seek a place, a time, and an agenda. Sentinel development should proceed on schedule so as not to deprive the United States of an important chip at the conference table. And, if this point is reached, the broadest area of mutual accommodation should be sought. The Russians, too, have traffic jams, air pollution, and poor people—and they, too, want to do something about it.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 1 JULY 1968 (30 JUNE)

Better Maps for the Undersea Fleet

The critical importance of pushing the work of undersea exploration and research is underscored again by testimony before a naval court of inquiry that the submarine Scorpion may have been lost because it was operating in an inaccurately charted area of mountainous ocean bottom.

The submarine service has requested new, accurate mapping of the Atlantic undersea mountains for more than two years without getting action. Some undersea mountains reach to within less than 100 feet of the surface while U. S. submarines cruise as deep as 1000 feet and must soon be designed to go much deeper if they are to match Soviet underwater vessels reported already to be cruising at 2000 feet.

It is as important for the United States to map the ocean floors with pinpoint accuracy as it is to have

accurate maps of the surface and shallow coastal waters. The needs of the U. S. undersea fleet are as critical as those of the surface fleet—more so, in this instance, because of the inadequacy of existing charts which were pieced together over the years from random sources, with surface shipping in mind or at the most the shallow-diving submarines of pre-nuclear times.

The powerful undersea vessels now at sea represent a new kind of Navy, operating in a new hostile environment.

They need a whole new support system tailored to deal with problems the surface ships have never had to face. The Navy should give greater weight to the voices of its undersea officers. Congress should make certain that the undersea fleet is supported in proportion to its importance and special needs.

MINNEAPOLIS STAR
24 JUNE 1968 (30)

Our Troop Strength in Europe

MORE THAN a year ago, Sen. Mike Mansfield, D-Mont., the majority leader, introduced a Senate resolution calling on the President to bring home a large portion of the 260,000 U.S. troops in Western Europe.

The resolution, although never acted upon, bore some fruit. The United States is now returning about 35,000 men from West Germany to this country. But to Mansfield, this is not enough. The six U.S. divisions that will remain are too many, he believes, and he is again criticizing the administration for failing to adjust to "fundamental and far-reaching changes" in Europe.

Happily for this view, the NATO ministers now meeting in Iceland have in mind the same sort of reduction of forces.

The military and political situation in Europe is far different than it was in 1951, when the Senate approved a substantial military contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. West Europeans are no longer living in fear of an imminent invasion from the East. Although the Communists can exert pressure, as they are now doing on West Berlin, the Russians have for long been preoccupied with other matters—"invasions" of the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean areas, for example.

There is, in addition, the stubborn U.S. balance of payments deficit, which is not helped by the drain of dollars to maintain U.S. troops in Europe. Attempts have been made to hold down that drain by getting our allies to bear some of the U.S. costs, but these have been met with more bitterness than success.

With modern airlift technology, several more divisions of American troops could be brought home and still be committed to Western Europe's defense. In an emergency, they could be flown into position alongside other NATO troops in a short time.

WASHINGTON NEWS
28 JUNE 1968 (30)

Gifts, Rules and Protests

UNCLE SAM has been donating increasing sums to education and much of it has been doled out with little restriction.

But the rash of senseless and often riotous disturbances on college campuses has aroused Congress which lately has been busy writing some conditions into the laws which govern this use of taxpayer money.

For instance, the Senate recently voted without dissent to withhold funds from any university which barred Armed Forces recruiters from the campus. The Defense Department reported six colleges bar Navy recruiters and 18 have a ban on Marine recruiters.

On most of these campuses there has been some type of disturbance.

Seven of these institutions have had grants from the National Aeronautics and Space Agency. The pending bill authorizes up to \$10 million in such grants for research and student aid.

The House has voted to cut off Federal loans to individual students or faculty members involved in riots.

There has been some squawk about this from professors and even Government officials.

But this money comes from all the taxpayers, including some of those fighting in Vietnam which has been the pretext for some of the campus outbreaks. Why should they be asked to subsidize students or professors who are more interested in "protesting" than in finishing the jobs for which the

NEW YORK TIMES
1 JULY 1968 (30 JUNE)

Gaullist Landslide

For the first time in French parliamentary history, a single party has captured an absolute majority in the National Assembly. President de Gaulle has accomplished one of the most dramatic political reversals of modern times.

The Gaullist landslide yesterday, which confirms the first round victory of a week before, was a vote for stability and order in the streets after weeks of turmoil, student revolt and worker sit-ins that bordered on general strike. France looked in the mirror, felt it saw anarchy in its face and turned away.

Some voters undoubtedly were confused by Gaullist charges of Communist subversion and that was the supreme irony. For the Communists, along with the Socialist and Catholic unions, were taken by surprise by the spontaneous nationwide wave of strikes.

Trade union leaders rushed to negotiate a settlement with the badly shaken Government and obtained extraordinary concessions. But they were immediately repudiated by the men on strike, who refused to return to work, thus demonstrating that the Gaullist opposition leaders could not control their troops.

The Government undoubtedly appeared impotent, especially when the national referendum announced by General de Gaulle achieved nothing and had to be abandoned. But what seemed worse was the alternative. A popular front government in which the Communists were the strongest element would have been bad enough. But there was not even the certainty that the Gaullist opposition could unite. The Communists ran against the moderate Left Federation in every election district in the first round. The Center party, which did the same, made deals with the Gaullists in the second round yesterday.

President de Gaulle and his followers now hold more complete power than at any time during their decade in office. For the first time, they can rule alone, without allies, if they wish.

Complete power means complete responsibility, as Premier Pompidou recognized in his post-election statement, which predicted a "difficult future." The economic difficulties the country faces will not be easy to resolve. Inflation, already underway, could wipe out the recent wage increases by winter and bring a renewal of major strikes. Resumption of the student rebellion is expected in the fall. Flight of capital has already reduced monetary reserves by well over \$1 billion, and the outlook for the franc is perilous.

But the upheaval in May was not set off by economic pressures. It essentially was a revolt against the Gaullist regime, its authoritarianism and its concern with prestige abroad instead of problems at home. President de Gaulle's promise of basic reforms may point toward some solutions. But it is certain, in any event, to change the character of the regime. A turn inward by Gaullist France appears unavoidable.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
1 JULY 1968 (30 JUNE)

A-aid for Japan backed

By the Associated Press

Washington

A proposed agreement under which the United States would provide additional uranium for an expansion of Japan's nuclear-power program would benefit both nations, an Atomic Energy Commission official says.

Gerald F. Tape of the AEC told Congress's Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that the arrangement would assure Japan a long-term supply of the nuclear fuel and add \$620 million to the U.S. export trade.

subsidies are granted?

Reasonable restraints from Congress are quite in order; they are not likely to be initiated by the bureaucrats who hand out the money.

FEATURES COLUMNISTS

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 30 June 1968

SECOND HO CHI MINH TRAIL IS PROLONGING THE WAR

By Robert S. Elegant

SAIGON.

THE Communist supply network for South Vietnam has doubled in the past year with construction of a whole new trail system in western Laos and an increased flow through Cambodia.

As a result, Red forces often are better armed than South Vietnamese troops. The Communists, violating a basic rule of guerilla warfare, no longer bother to pick up weapons left on the battlefield by their foes, and often ignore weapons dropped by fallen comrades.

They don't need these abandoned weapons, for they are equipped by an efficient "underground" supply system running through South Vietnam's "neutral" neighbors, Cambodia and Laos.

Reinforcements—more than 100,000 men so far this year—as well as weapons, ammunition, food and fuel flow along the Ho Chi Minh Trails in Laos and the Sihanouk Trail in Cambodia.

Without these reinforcements and supplies, the war in South Vietnam might have ended a year ago when the Allies routed the local Vietcong.

Because of these routes, the war is no longer a guerilla conflict, but a wholly new engagement best described as a "semi-conventional war."

Double Capacity

North Vietnam's switch in mid-1967 from a traditional guerilla war to a strategy of seeking major victories brought into heavy use the latest major addition to the supply system — Ho Chi Minh Trail II.

The old Ho Chi Minh Trail goes through Mu Gia Pass in the Annamite mountain range just below the 18th Parallel, then turns southward through the difficult terrain of eastern Laos.

The new route, Ho Chi Minh Trail II, starts halfway between the 18th and 19th Parallels where Keo Neua Pass pierces the Annamite range dividing North Vietnam from Laos, and runs about 340 miles, first westward and then south to the Bolivens Plateau, the rice bowl of southern Laos.

Doubling the capacity of the routes through Laos, the new Ho Chi Minh Trail II provides a road over which some North Vietnamese replacements have ridden in trucks all the way

from Hanoi to Kontum in central South Vietnam — about 800 miles — in 11 days.

Troops going farther south toward Saigon and the Mekong Delta use the continuation in Cambodia of Ho Chi Minh Trail I and II, called the Sihanouk Trail.

Flow Increases

Moving northward on the Sihanouk Trail are many of the supplies which fuel the insurrection in the southern part of South Vietnam. The flow of weapons, gasoline and food through Cambodia, often in trucks of the royal army, has increased sharply during the past year.

Ho Chi Minh Trail II, by being farther west than the original Ho Chi Minh Trail, is out of the usual range of native patrols led by U. S. Special Forces and Central Intelligence Agency officers.

Two trails from the north, instead of one, mean dispersed targets for U. S. bombers. In addition, the Communists evidently believe that air strikes on the new trail will be deterred by a population denser than in southeastern Laos, where the old Ho Chi Minh Trail runs.

The North Vietnamese have stationed 65 regular combat battalions along the new trails in Laos, as well as almost that many service troops who operate and maintain the routes and major fixed installations.

Fine Networks

The Bolivens Plateau at the southern end of Ho Chi Minh Trail II is a virtual "liberated area" rich in rice, cattle and other food. The area around the cities of Saravane and Attapeu, Red-dominated until 1962, is now wholly under Communist sway, although the cities themselves remain non-Communist islands.

The two Ho Chi Minh Trails are not direct highways, but complex, interwoven networks which include well-camouflaged all-weather roads on some stretches. Lateral east-west routes link them at several points along their length. Not only trucks, but half-tracks and even tanks move along the trails.

The Communist training camps, hospitals and rest and recreation centers are gener-

ally on Laotian and Cambodian territory, while the major supply centers are on both sides of the Vietnamese border.

The five chief points of entry into South Vietnam from the Ho Chi Minh Trails are determined mainly by the terrain. Some of the bloodiest battles of the war have been fought at these points. They include Khe Sanh, the A Shau Valley, Dak To, and Los Minh.

The east-west branch routes from Laos are supplemented by complex north-south secondary roads, roughly paralleling the Vietnamese border on either side. The Communists use these north-south routes to transfer troops from one area of South Vietnam to another, as the 324C Division was recently shifted from the Khe Sanh area to Kontum, about 200 miles to the south.

Cambodia's road and river routes handle about one-fourth to one-third of the logistical traffic into South Vietnam. Weapons and ammunition come in primarily through the port of Sihanoukville, Cambodia, then move northward over the Sihanouk Trail.

Hidden in Coal

Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia has acknowledged that the Vietcong receive rice and medicine from Cambodia. He denies, however, the almost equally obvious flow of weapons.

These arms enter Sihanoukville consigned to the royal Cambodian army or concealed in coal shipments from Hanoi. The arms are transported openly to points near the Vietnamese border, where they are transferred to porters or to sampans which ply the web of canals and rivers that crisscross the southern part of South Vietnam.

"The big Vietcong supply base at Batu is just 15 minutes from here by helicopter, just on the other side of the Cambodian border," said Brig. Gen. Nguyen Xuan Thinn, commander of the South Vietnamese 25th Division, with headquarters at Duchoa, about 20 miles from the Cambodian border.

"Even from our side, you can see 10 to 15 Cambodian army trucks unloading every day. The helicopter regularly draws fire from Batu even though it's over Vietnam," he added.

Gen. Thinn lit a cigaret and continued.

"All the Vietcong do is give the province chief a million piasters a month, and they can move anything — even

SAM missiles if they wanted to."

Key to problem

Captured North Vietnamese soldiers and local porters confirm the intelligence on the supply routes provided by air reconnaissance and electronic sensors.

These trails in Laos and Cambodia have been the key to the problem in South Vietnam since the insurgency was renewed in 1959.

The guerillas knew that they could neither maintain an insurrection nor raise their strength to the level necessary to overthrow the Saigon Government unless they had secure supply lines from their base in North Vietnam. All previous guerilla insurrections in Southeast Asia which lacked such supply lines had failed.

The supply routes run through Laos and Cambodia because the Demilitarized Zone — 50 miles long and six miles wide dividing North from South Vietnam since the Geneva accords of 1954 — is too susceptible to observation and partial control to allow massive infiltration. At the end of September, 1967, Communist "main force" units consisted of 53,000 soldiers of the regular North Vietnamese army and 62,000 Vietcong.

Today, there are 85,000 North Vietnamese in regular units and 40,000 in the Vietcong. About half of the "Vietcong" are actually individual replacements sent from the North along the trails.

Lavish Weapons

The trails enabled the Communists to launch the Tet offensive at the end of January, and to reinforce and resupply the badly battered Vietcong with an entire new generation of Chinese and Soviet-bloc weapons after Tet. Without the supply lines, Tet could have been the end of the road for the Communists.

Communist forces now are lavishly equipped with AK-47 automatic rifles, recoilless rifles, mortars, rockets, rocket

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS - 28 JUNE 1968

Thieu won't accept a weak cease-fire

By Carl T. Rowan
Daily News Columnist

SAIGON—South Vietnam will not accept an unconditional cease-fire as a step toward ending the war, President Nguyen Van Thieu said Friday.

A cease-fire without specific safeguards would work "90 per cent to the advantage of the Communist aggressors," he said in an exclusive interview. He made it clear that South Vietnamese officials were disturbed by Vice President Hubert Humphrey's recent statement that the United States was eager to have a cease-fire.

In a wide-ranging interview, Thieu emphasized that "no one wants this war to end more than we do," but he said Vietnam will guard against concessions that would open the door to a Communist takeover.

IN THIS CONNECTION, the young chief of state said that:

- Hanoi is stalling in Paris peace talks while trying to amass enough strength to score a major military-political victory in South Vietnam. He said he expects a new Communist military onslaught soon.

- He has raised with the United States and other allies the question of how long they can afford to show restraint while the Communists escalate the war. He argues that if the Communists launch more rocket attacks on Saigon, or begin another military offensive against this or other cities in the South, the allies should consider stern retaliation, including possible resumption of wide-scale bombing of North Vietnam.



Nguyen Van Thieu

- His government remains adamantly opposed to a coalition government that would embrace the National Liberation Front (NLF), but he invites any NLF or Viet Cong member to cease warring against South Vietnam and become "a first-class citizen with full political and other rights."

THIEU PRAISED the United States for "complete consultation and co-operation" with regard to the Paris talks, but it was clear throughout the interview that he thinks the Communists are making suckers of the allies. He said Hanoi's only reason for going to Paris was to gain a respite during which it could plan a military campaign that Hanoi hopes will improve its bargaining position.

THIEU SAID some people tried to dismiss Humphrey's

call for a cease-fire as "just the remarks of a political candidate," but that the South Vietnamese government could not dismiss them so lightly.

He said a cease-fire is acceptable to Saigon only if it brings an immediate end to hostilities, forbids the Communists from seizing more territory or people and prevents them from using the cease-fire period to build up their military forces and supplies in South Vietnam.

Thieu indicated he views the Paris talks as nothing more than exploratory and concerned with little more than the conditions under which the United States might completely stop bombing North Vietnam. When talks begin on political and other arrangements of ending the war, he said, South Vietnam must play the key role.

FOR THE United States to try to speak for Saigon would be to fall into Hanoi's trap, Thieu said, because it would give the Communists support for their propaganda that the United States has become an imperialist colonial power in Saigon and that Thieu and his colleagues are mere "puppets."

Explaining his rejection of a coalition government, Thieu said he rests on a point stated many times by the U.S. government: that the NLF is the creation of Hanoi and the tool through which Hanoi conducts the war. Thus, he said, "We can never consider the NLF as the equal, or parallel, of the government of South Vietnam."

15,000 American and South Vietnamese soldiers were killed and injured while trying to hold the strategic marine outpost, south of the demilitarized zone.

He said 11,700 of the casualties were Americans. U.S. marines reported suffering 2,000 casualties—including wounded—at Khe Sanh.

Nguyen Thanh le, chief spokesman for the Hanoi delegation, described the withdrawal from Khe Sanh as an American attempt to avoid full defeat.

The news conference was another Communist propaganda attempt to claim victory and demand an immediate cessation to U.S. bombing of the North. North Vietnamese spokesman said the 3,000th U.S. plane was shot down over Dong Hoi in

North Vietnam's southern panhandle.

According to U.S. military spokesmen, 859 American planes were downed over North Vietnam in the course of the war.

Reds Sure of Strategy

Intensified pressure on the battlefield and propaganda efforts in Paris are major elements of the strategy of North Vietnam, Communist sources said.

The sources said Hanoi was confident this strategy would bring about a weakening of America's resolve to fight the war.

At the same time, Hanoi diplomats attempted to demonstrate they were ready to talk peace "with anyone except the devil"

PROLONGING THE WAR ... CONTINUED

grenades, light, heavy and anti-aircraft machine guns, and communications gear. Some of the equipment, captured by Allied forces bears dates of manufacture in China only two or three months earlier.

Troops have been moving down the trails at the rate of well over 20,000 a month since the beginning of April. Truck traffic since the March 31 bombing restriction has exceeded 15,000 vehicles a month, despite losses of more than 15 percent inflicted by Allied air action in Laos.

These supply routes through neighboring "neutral" countries present a major problem to American strategists.

"How can the Allies possibly expect to win with their flanks wide open?" asked one European senior officer. "It's the most elementary rule of warfare to cut the enemy's supply lines. Why don't the Americans do it?"

"It is almost impossible to understand," he added, "how a major power could allow itself to be so frustrated and to endure enormous humiliation at home and abroad for want of decisive action to choke off the enemy's supplies and reinforcements."

The best available answer to his comments are complex and ultimately unsatisfactory.

Fear of further inflaming world public opinion and of extending the war has prevented the United States from cutting the supply routes with ground action instead of relying on partially effective air attacks and harassment by native irregulars in Laos.

Effective action would be almost impossible in Cambodia, where Prince Sihanouk plays a subtle game he believes is in Cambodia's best interests. Sihanouk will not permit American action, and the border is practically impossible to seal.

But major staff studies conducted by both American and foreign officers conclude that two divisions of Allied troops used as "strategic guerrillas" could choke off most of the supplies and reinforcements. Since the Communists' enormous buildup of men and supplies has made their fixed installations vulnerable to ambushes and to hit-and-run raids, the troops would not attempt to hold ground, but only to shatter the trails.

Many officials argue that effective action in Laos would demonstrate to Sihanouk that his belief in an inevitable Communist victory in Vietnam is erroneous. He then might move with confidence and vigor against the supply lines through Cambodia which help sustain the Vietcong.

by expressing willingness to meet with all U.S. presidential candidates. Diplomatic observers called this a propaganda effort to improve Hanoi's image in the United States.

WASHINGTON STAR - 28 JUNE 1968

Hanoi Delegate Calls Khe Sanh A U.S. Defeat

PARIS (UPI) — North Vietnam's negotiators at the deadlocked peace talks today claimed the American pullout from Khe Sanh is "One of the most serious strategic defeats" suffered by the United States in the Vietnam war.

A Hanoi spokesman told a news conference called to claim downing of the 3,000th American plane over North Vietnam that

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR - 29 JUNE 1968

How U.S. intelligence weighed Khe Sanh opposition

Even as United States bulldozers and explosives demolish Khe Sanh as the marine base is being abandoned, the mystery as to whether the earlier siege of Khe Sanh was an end in itself or just a ploy remains. The following story describes how intelligence information was obtained and how it was evaluated.

By Beverly Deepe
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Khe Sanh, Vietnam

Was the siege of Khe Sanh a North Vietnamese diversionary strategy to divert United States attention from the Tet offensive? United States military men in Vietnam disagree. Both the pro and con views are based upon military intelligence. But there is no general agreement on the interpretation of the mass of information that accrued.

The intelligence-gathering means were sophisticated and varied:

Clothbound, granulated land mines, were seeded amid electronic sensors around Khe Sanh, as they have been for sometime along the seaboard side of the "McNamara Line."

Portable radar sets, four feet high, were staked out around Khe Sanh and monitored by ground surveillance teams; they are now being funneled out to other units in Vietnam.

"People-sniffers" which detect chemicals emitted by human bodies were employed and the results electronically magnified onto measuring dials.

Starlight -scopes, resembling elongated, old-fashioned binoculars, were issued to low-flying forward air controllers in mid-March. The instruments magnify moonlight so the navigators see potential targets in the darkness.

Scores of reconnaissance aircraft flew over Khe Sanh. Some carried metal-detecting infra-red cameras, some carried black-and-white film, and some employed color photography — which distinguished between natural jungle and day-old camouflage. From these "Recce" returns, a miniature Khe Sanh was built in a sandbox in Saigon, where American generals deduced where the North Vietnamese were most likely to concentrate their supplies, troops and equipment.

All tested devices

None of these exotic detection devices were innovations in the siege of Khe Sanh; all had been employed in Vietnam, but in less concentrated doses. Mass deployment of them reflected the thinking of American commanders that North Vietnamese units detecting was more significant than simply dropping overwhelming tonnages of bombs onto the jungle wilderness.

The mechanics of the sophisticated devices are veiled behind top-secret military classification. Their accuracy seems masked not only behind military security, but also behind the difficulties in assessing their contribution to lifting the Khe Sanh siege. Clearly, though, the confidence of senior American commanders did not rest on these "secret weapons" to pivot the battle of Khe Sanh.

"We remained confident simply because we knew marines were marines," one informed source explained. "We knew that what had to be done, the marines were going to do."

In general, assessments of the value of these devices were mixed. Some, such as the portable radar sets, gave "good results" in detecting North Viet movements within limited distances, one source reported. But other sources, including some American generals, believe the gadgetry is generally overrated. One source explained:

"Frankly, we can't get overenthused with these gadgets. They're all aids, but they're no substitute for eyewitnesses — either American patrols or Communist prisoners. We need all these means of gathering intelligence, but you can't just sit back and look at electronic devices."

Some discount 'gadgets'

Another said: "I know, some think the 'people-sniffer' is a big thing. I got a briefing on it in the United States—the briefer said we'd fly out with this gadget and it would sniff out the enemy and then we'd fire artillery in there and the sniffer would end the war for us. But, actually, on the battlefield, it isn't even the beginning of an answer."

Another opinion: "Don't tell me about those electronic sensors forming the McNamara line. An NVA regiment came across the DMZ, straight through the McNamara line and stopped us cold during the Tet offensive."

"Frankly," said another, "no one knew how many NVA were around Khe Sanh most of the time. We kept getting these 'wave of the hand' intelligence briefings. The briefer would wave his hand over a big chunk of the map around Khe Sanh and tell us that's where the enemy was. But, to be really effective, the intelligence has to locate the enemy within a couple of grid squares — down to several thousand meters."

Road network pushed

Critics of these electronic devices—and of the overall, publicized view that the North Vietnamese were "bombed out of the hills"—expressed the belief that the Communists used Khe Sanh as a strategic diversion while the actual objective was their Tet military offensive against the Vietnamese cities.

This school of thought is also based on evidence — although not conclusive — and from this, deductions were made piecing together the Communist strategy. These sources maintain that—based on captured documents—as early as June last year the Hanoi high command had already mapped out its grand strategy for the Communist drive into the cities. Hanoi then persuaded the Moscow-bloc countries to support their master plan with sophisticated weaponry. Evidence: material captured in the Ashau Valley — ranging from canned Hungarian goulash to Soviet trucks, tracked vehicles, field artillery pieces, and Bulgarian medicines.

By the fall of 1967, the Communists were building elaborate road networks throughout Laos and into the Ashau Valley, leading to Hue, designed to transport their growing number of heavy weapons and to create a high-speed system for logistics and troop movements. Evidence: the increased Communist emphasis on road networks, including fragments of an asphalt road 40 miles north of Saigon.

"Everything the Communists did from mid-1967 had to fit into their plan to hit the cities, I figure," one source explained. "And Khe Sanh had to fit into that strategy too. Unless Khe Sanh was an extremely easy target to take, it was diversionary for the Communists. But, to be a credible diversion, they had to create a real and serious threat around Khe Sanh—and there's no question but what it was a real threat there."

"But, the enemy created that threat to draw friendly forces away from the coast. Their main objective was Hue and their secondary one was Quang Tri city. If one accepts this view, then the Marines assessed the situation well and were very wise in deciding to hold Khe Sanh with only 6,000 men, without major reinforcements. The NVA put heavy pressure on Khe Sanh—and then started pulling them [troops] out, transporting them down their high-speed

highway in January in time to reach Hue for Tet."

These sources then look at what intelligence officers call the "enemy order of battle"—what North Viet units were "confirmed" or "believed probable" at a given location at a given time. Confirmation is based on at least two items of separate, firsthand evidence — such as two prisoners, or a prisoner and a captured document.

Field commanders differed

There is still considerable disagreement within the military on what North Viet units had surrounded Khe Sanh at a given time. Marine officers at the base during the siege, and other commanders now, consistently maintain that two North Viet divisions—the 304th and 325C—had surrounded it until mid-March.

However, the United States Army field commanders operating in the northern provinces hold a different view. The Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division in early February was rushed towards Hue to reinforce the Marines battling at least a Communist division there.

The 1st Cavalry was stopped cold several miles from the Hue imperial citadel in the village of La Chau, one of the showplace pacification projects in Vietnam.

For two weeks, from Feb. 3 to 15, the sky troopers battled Communists in the village, while intelligence officers were perplexed as to which North Viet units they were fighting. Finally, on Feb. 21, the intelligence officers had "confirmed" through prisoners and documents the units: The 29th Regiment of the 325C Division and 24th Regiment (sometimes also numbered 57) or the 304th Division—two regiments which were presumed to be attacking Khe Sanh.

The 1st Cavalry was stopped cold several to its division headquarters. The division replied it "completely discounted" the information because the two regiments were around Khe Sanh. One staff officer retorted, "But I'm eyeballing the prisoner now and I interrogated him while rocket rounds were coming in. I've got prisoners to show those regiments are in La Chau—what's your evidence they're in Khe Sanh?"

By late February, however, General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., then representing General Westmoreland in the northern provinces, accepted the "proof" that the two regiments were outside of Hue, instead of around Khe Sanh. Other prisoners captured later around Khe Sanh when the siege was broken also said part of their divisions had deployed for Hue in early January.

Movements confusing

(Maj. Gen. R. M. Tompkins, commanding general of the Third Marine Division during the Khe Sanh siege and later promoted to commanding general of the senior Marine command headquarters, said at a press conference in Da Nang on May 24 it was "absolutely incorrect" that elements of the two divisions were actually fighting near Hue. "Until mid-March, both divisions were around Khe Sanh").

By late February, only four of the six North Viet infantry regiments were believed still poised around Khe Sanh. Sources tend to agree that by mid-March—no specific date is available from any source—the remaining two regiments of 325C Division deployed southwards. Prisoners from this division were captured in the Ashau Valley operation and later near Kontum and Dak To. Intelligence sources said they have yet to seize a prisoner of high enough rank to explain why the two regiments moved south.

This left, then, two regiments of the 304th Division around Khe Sanh—and there is still disagreement whether they actually ever withdrew from the greater Khe Sanh area, although they did evade the 1st Air Cavalry and Marine units in early April. Some of these units fled their hill positions in something close to a rout, leaving behind weap-

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR - 29 JUNE 1968

Hanoi asks East bloc for more aid

By John Hughes
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Hong Kong

Though Hanoi's spokesmen are trying to project an image of sweet reasonableness at the Paris talks, the North Vietnamese regime is pressing the war with undiminished militancy.

At the latest session of the peace talks, chief North Vietnamese delegate Xuan Thuy appeared to accept the concept of South Vietnam's "neutrality" in foreign affairs after any settlement of the war. And Australian Communist journalist Wilfred Burdett says in an interview that National Liberation Front leaders (the political arm of the Viet Cong) "have stopped stating that they are the only authentic representatives of the south."

Yet even as these "concessions" are being unveiled, a North Vietnamese delegation was in Moscow pressing the Soviets for greater military and economic aid.

Visits completed

The delegation is headed by North Vietnam's Vice-Premier Le Thang Nghi. It already has completed visits on similar business to East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Hanoi's official newspaper, Nhan Dan, says the East Germans are providing "valuable material assistance" and that this is encouraging the Vietnamese people "to dash forward and defeat the United States aggressors completely."

In Czechoslovakia, where the North Vietnamese also sought military and economic aid, the delegation expressed gratitude for aid from the Czechs and also for the dispatch to Vietnam of Czech "volunteers."

This quest for aid is being pressed against a background of massive continuing North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam.

President Johnson says infiltration is up

20 percent since the Paris talks began. At the latest session of the Paris talks, American delegate Cyrus R. Vance charged infiltration had reached a record high of 29,000 men last month.

Information reaching this correspondent is that American intelligence estimates of infiltration now are remarkably accurate following activation of an American electronic monitoring screen which stretches the breadth of South Vietnam and Laos to the American base at Nakhon Phanom in eastern Thailand.

The North Vietnamese themselves no longer appear so reticent about admitting the extent of their involvement in South Vietnam. In a recent issue of the party theoretical journal Hoc Tap, for instance, a North Vietnamese colonel discusses this involvement openly.

Goals restated

One of the objectives of the American air war, writes Col. Dang Tinh, was "to prevent the flow of assistance from the North to the South and cow our people into negotiating on their [American] terms."

But, he goes on, the Americans have missed their objectives. American bombs and shells have "failed to cow our people. Instead our 31 million compatriots, single-mindedly, are resolved to defend socialist North Vietnam, liberate the South, and achieve eventual national reunification."

In a rare admission of North Vietnamese involvement he adds, "The higher the Americans escalate their war of destruction in the North, the more substantial the assistance of the North Vietnamese people for the revolution in South Vietnam becomes."

Meanwhile, in a new editorial the North Vietnamese Army newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, openly admits that Communist forces have launched a new offensive, aimed particularly at the cities and towns of South Vietnam, even as the Paris talks proceed.

The paper discusses the "new drive of attacks beginning in May," says the "revolutionary war is standing deep in the towns," and avers the United States is on the "strategic defensive."

Westmoreland assailed

The editorial was written to mark the departure from Vietnam of Gen. William C. Westmoreland. The North Vietnamese Army

KHE SANH OPPOSITION

... CONTINUED

ons and supplies over large areas as they evaded the 1st Air Cavalry.

But by Mid-March, four or five days of extensive treetop helicopter reconnaissance identified the presence of not more than nine Communist infantry battalions around Khe Sanh (three battalions form a regiment). In actual contact during Operation Pegasus, American units identified only seven battalions—three from the 66th Regiment and three from the 9th Regiment, plus one sapper battalion.

Intelligence discrepancies continue. The Marines still list all three regiments of the 304th Division around Khe Sanh, as well as the 68th Artillery Regiment and "possibly" a regiment of the 308th Division. But Army headquarters in the northern provinces lists the 24th Regiment—which the 1st Cavalry fought at La Chau—as "location unknown. Certainly no one has annihilated it," one source explained.

End of a series

paper faults General Westmoreland for his offensive search-and-destroy operations, likening him to Napoleon at Austerlitz. It says his frontal attacks failed and "exploded all the myths about American military power."

The paper says the general "lacked one thing fundamental, and very important to every military man — knowing oneself and one's enemy."

Quan Doi Nhan Dan pays a backhanded kind of compliment to General Westmoreland's successor, General Creighton W. Abrams Jr. For he, says the Hanoi journal, "has indeed acted with certain promptness. He took various moves toward mobile defense such as reinforcing the garrison in the Quangtri-Thua Thien region, strengthening the defenses around Saigon, sending air mobile forces to Khe Sanh and then to the Ashau Valley, etc."

But the new Communist attacks have "put a damper on Abrams enthusiasm," says the North Vietnamese Army paper. "The United States is losing heavily right at its strongest positions: Highway 9, the military, political, and psychological dam defended by about two-thirds of the American forces in South Vietnam, is constantly under fire. . . .

"The towns, the innermost defense and hub of American neo-colonialism, are quaking under the onslaughts of the liberation [Communist] forces.

WASHINGTON NEWS - 29 JUNE 1968

'No Good Reason to Stay'

Why U. S. Has Quit Khe Sanh

By JIM G. LUCAS
Script-Howard Staff Writer

The U.S. decided to move troops out of its big base at Khe Sanh because "there was no longer any good reason to stay" and because "we can deny it to the enemy," Lt. Gen. Lewis Walt, Assistant Marine Commandant, said today.

Gen. Walt formerly commanded Marines in 1st Corps, which includes Khe Sanh, and established the base which later became the scene of the bitterest fighting of the war.

In Saigon, Brig. Gen. Winani Sidle, U.S. Chief of Information, said Khe Sanh "will be leveled, bulldozed and the bunkers closed up." He said the razing operation was "now under way."

Gen. Walt said he concurred in the 1968 decision of Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then U.S. Commander in Vietnam, to

establish a major patrol base at Khe Sanh and thinks it was "a wise decision." But he said conditions have changed and it is now best to shift to mobile tactics.

He said the American investment at Khe Sanh, where 5000 Marines recently broke a siege by two-and-a-half North Vietnamese divisions, was a sound one.

"They lost 15,000 men and we lost 199 dead Marines," he said. "Five thousand Marines tied down 35,000 North Vietnamese. If those troops had been available to the enemy during his Tet offensive he might have won. Can you imagine what would have happened if he could have thrown them into the battle for Hue?"

But Gen. Walt said the North Vietnamese now "really have nothing left up there" for men

inside Khe Sanh to oppose. He said they "may have two regiments in the whole area" but that Khe Sanh is no longer needed.

"We are confident we can deny use of the area to the enemy," he said. "If they go in, we've got every inch of that ground registered (for artillery fire)."

Abandonment of Khe Sanh was considered a foregone conclusion after Lt. Gen. Henry Buse, new Fleet Marine Force Commander in the Pacific, told the press at Da Nang three weeks ago, his men "may or may not" give it up. Gen. Buse added there was "much less reason to hold onto it" now that North Vietnamese troops once surrounding it had been soundly defeated.

'NEW TACTICS'

Gen. Buse said he planned

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

1 JULY 1968 (30 JUNE)

U. S. Will Realign Air

Units in South Korea

TOKYO, June 30 (UPI) — The United States 5th Air Force today announced a realignment of American air force tactical fighter and interceptor units in South Korea.

"new tactics" for the Marines, apparently a reference to "Sting Ray" patrols favored by Gen. Walt, when he was in command. Gen. Buse and Gen. Creighton Abrams, Gen. Westmoreland's successor, apparently have agreed to give "Sting Ray" a full field test. Gen. Westmoreland is to be sworn in as Army Chief of Staff next week.

Under the "Sting Ray" concept, troops are held in centers of population along the coastal plains, while small patrols of highly trained scouts go out to spot the enemy. Once they locate his encampments, they call in artillery and planes.

WASHINGTON STAR - 30 JUNE 1968

A Look at War After Six Years

By PETER ARNETT

Associated Press Staff Writer

SAIGON — Vietnam's Communist leadership continues relentlessly to unroll its biggest military offensive right into the jaws of allied strength.

Vast allied firepower is chewing up enemy troops by the thousands in the battles that began with the Tet offensive five months ago. The bloodletting across the country is more than double that of last year.

Yet as rapidly as the Communist-led troops die, as many again beat their way right up to the doors of the capital itself.

"By God, there are 51 enemy battalions maneuvering just one day's march from Saigon," commented a U.S. general.

"They arrived in February, they have hit us twice, and they are still there pressuring the city, regardless of casualties."

Impossible Objectives

Much of the killing in recent months the enemy has brought upon himself. He attacked objectives he had no real possibility of seizing.

The easy, extensive kills have led some observers to believe North Vietnam's Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap is making his great mistake of the war. By disregarding his own rules of guerrilla warfare and engaging in conventional battles, they suggest, he has committed his armies to certain defeat.

The most knowledgeable Americans and Vietnamese read the current situation much differently.

They see the enemy fighting a short-term high intensity war to impact with maximum effectiveness on the South Vietnamese and the American public this year—particularly by inflicting American casualties. These have doubled to more than 9,000 dead for the first six months.

Enemy forces have shelved the low-intensity, long, protracted "war into the future" they were fighting up to late last year. They try to reap quick political gains now, hoping that the Vietnamese government will fragment, that the people will get tired, and that the issue of peace on their terms can be forced here and in the United States.

Many Options Open

Should these gains not be made, then the North Vietnamese could use any of many options. Based on allied studies of North Vietnam's population growth, they can sustain the current huge casualty rate indefinitely and fight on with troops of increasingly poorer quality.

Or if the allied pressure became too great they could make "one little concession in Paris and we'll have to back off," commented a U.S. general.

Alternatively, the North Vietnamese could cut their losses and fade back into jungle, continuing the war as before while

building back their guerrilla units. They could start a new offensive when ready.

There are two factors short of full scale unlimited war that could frustrate the North Vietnamese.

One would be a miraculous improvement in the Vietnamese army, permitting American troops to go home. The other is

Where does the Vietnam war stand?

What is the outlook? Here is an assessment by a Pulitzer-prize correspondent of The Associated Press who has covered the war for six years. To get information for this dispatch he traveled up and down Vietnam from the Mekong Delta to the demilitarized zone, interviewing senior Americans and Vietnamese.

getting the Saigon government the support of the population.

Both prospects are remote. Knowledgeable Americans see the Vietnamese army becoming at best the cutting edge for the other allies, a role hitherto held by the Americans.

Frequent Crises in Saigon

There is no sign the Vietnamese population has wormed toward a Saigon government that is staggering through one crisis after another. "The people just do not accept their government," one senior American commented.

Dissension within the Vietnamese military high command adds to political instability.

"I could launch a coup d'etat any time I liked, any time I wanted to, and the Americans could not stop me," Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky told this reporter a few days ago. Ky was lolling in swimming trunks under a yellow parachute canopy shielding off the sun on a Nha Trang beach. He had just vented rage against President Nguyen Van Thieu, long a rival, who is now attempting to grasp complete political and military power.

"President Ngo Dinh Diem craved too much power. Look what happened to him," Ky commented.

Here is a grassroots look at the war and politics in Vietnam at midpoint in 1968:

Allied War Strategy: After he took over the American troop command recently, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams told a staff conference how he would handle the enemy menace on Saigon:

"We are going to drop so many B52s on them that all we'll need to do is to send in an unarmed LURP (long-range patrol) team with notebooks to keep score. . . ."

Firepower remains the key to allied strategy, and the high-flying B-52 bombers Abrams favors are pounding the countryside from the Mekong Delta to the DMZ.

The allies are fighting a holding action. When the reporter asked the former Vietnamese commander in the delta, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Duc Thanh, if he

would get victory, he said, "We hold on tight now, win later."

That pretty well sums up allied strategy.

Pressure Is on Saigon

The main enemy pressure is directed against Saigon, and allied forces are in continuous contact with 51 enemy battalions within 25 miles of the city. Continuous helicopter operations are launched along the canals, the sugarcane fields and swamps.

Ten American infantry battalions operate near the Saigon perimeter, but a senior American commander said as much as 20 percent of an attacking force could penetrate the city in a big push.

A major enemy challenge remains at the DMZ. American commanders have sought to relieve pressure by pulling out of the combat base of Khe Sanh.

Much work is going into the only portion of the "McNamara Line" ever built along the DMZ, that section stretching across the eastern coastal plain.

U.S. Forces at Triborder

American forces are also bunched in Kontum province on the Laos-Cambodian-Vietnamese triborder where half a dozen enemy regiments are deployed.

Abrams seems to favor increasing mobile operations. It is unlikely he can do anything, however, about cutting down American casualties. Each American regiment is locked onto an enemy one, and it is up to the enemy to fight or run away. This year he is generally fighting.

Enemy War Strategy: The enemy of 1967 did not attack until he was reasonably sure of victory and outnumbered his opponents.

These days the North Vietnamese troops blunder blindly into allied units, and seem to lack the guerrilla's ability to disperse.

"They are much easier to deal with than the old Viet Cong," an American officer commented. "So often they stick together as we zero in, and they die together."

Prisoner interrogations indicate that high-ranking enemy commanders are staying back from the fighting, a departure from the early Tet offensive. Allied officers see this as particularly disadvantageous to them, because of the numerous decisions needed.

American intelligence has estimated that the enemy infrastructure is being destroyed at three times last year's rate, but thousands of these clandestine political operatives remain.

The Communist leadership is pouring troop replacements down the Ho Chi Minh trail. An estimated 25,000 troops were infiltrated into the 3rd Corps area in the first five months of this year, compared with 14,000 in all 1967.

By estimate 40,000 enemy

have been killed in the 3rd Corps, but as in all other areas of the country the infiltrators and local recruiting are refilling decimated ranks.

PACIFICATION: The fury of the enemy offensive seems to have stunned much of the population. A study by the U.S. high command on a village southwest of Saigon indicates that the population is more passive than ever to the war.

"Lack of help for the Viet Cong is about all we can expect," a senior U.S. military man said.

High-ranking Americans say pacification cadres now concentrate on achieving fewer things, such as security and developing the local militia.

Enemy battalions apparently stay pretty much to themselves, moving into hamlets some nights but generally leaving the population alone. "He could take over the countryside, but he hasn't bothered. He has a more important target — Saigon," a pacification officer commented.

POLITICS: Resentment over President Thieu's open bid for complete power had led half a dozen important Vietnamese generals to resign. The president is taking his time deciding whether to accept them, conscious that a wrong decision could upset the delicate balance of the country's real power—in the military high command.

Vice President Ky told this reporter: "The president has enough power, hasn't he? He is the boss because of his rank. Must he have it all, though?"

Some Americans see both Ky and Thieu as attempting to force senior generals to join one side or the other.

PARIS TALKS: A catalyst for an attempted coup d'etat could come from Paris, where any hint of American concessions sends rage through the Vietnamese hawks.

A compromise of any sort with the Communists would mean the destruction of free Vietnam," Ky says. "The U.S. cannot force a compromise of any sort on us. I and my friends are patriots. We will fight to the end."

Ky's views are shared by many in the U.S. high command. Lt. Gen. William Peers, commander of Field Forces 1, which covers the 2nd Corps area, told this reporter: "I would hate to think that what we have done over here has been in vain."

High-ranking American officials acknowledge there is obviously an underlying feeling of apprehension among some Vietnamese over the Paris talks, and the possibility that the American commitment might somehow alter its form, if the war is ever to end.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER - 30 JUNE 1968

Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall

Is Hanoi Deluded by Its Own Propaganda —or Is It Desperate?

SAIGON.

WE HAVE seen it happen in our time that at the very top of government it is possible for dictators of policy to become deluded by their own propaganda.

So one cannot ponder the question, whether at this juncture the clique running the war from Hanoi are very clever realists running a monstrous bluff or mere dupes victimized by the party line, without remembering Berlin.

Hitler in the Reichschancellory bunker still believed he could pull it off and talked that way to all about him, though the city was in flames and his armies were in collapse. Until the hour of his suicide, the mythology of invincibility voided any possibility of confrontation by fact.

Either there is a similar condition in Hanoi, or Uncle Ho Chi Minh and his henchmen are a die-hard crowd of realists, making a final and supreme gamble on the chance that the United States can be enchained out of the stakes on the table, by big talk and a reckless use of weapons and military manpower. Adding one thing with another, it is self-evident that they are risking far more than they can afford on the thin hope that they can win the war this summer.

THEIR boastful claiming reveals the hollowness, rather than the strength, of the position. Only a few days ago came the threat to lay one hundred 122-mm rockets on Saigon and keep it up 100 days. Tactically, it was no more possible for the Com-

munists to stage any such attack than it was for friendly patrolling to eliminate the rocket menace altogether, and someone should have said so instead of letting them create the impression that they could do so.

Ever since the Tet battle of the cities, Hanoi has been outdoing Baron Munchausen. At the conclusion of that long-drawn effort to win a decision, these words came from the Hanoi mill: "In 45 days of attack, we have wiped out more than 40 percent of American and Allied strength in South Vietnam."

In cold fact, the enemy had not killed or wounded even 4 percent, though the statistics again leaves unanswered the vital question: Do Ho and the others really believe such rot?

When they tell the juvenile replacements, sent southward, that all resistance to the Communist front has subsided in the delta, either they have themselves embraced that wishful thought, or they are perpetrating a monstrous deception of their own people.

AT THIS writing, Hanoi is sending more soldiers into South Vietnam than ever before. The troop flow is between 14,000 and 16,000 monthly, compared to 7000 monthly one year ago. Most of this input is composed of young replacements sent forward in packets through the DMZ via the coastal plain to join units fighting in I Corps zone.

There, and not around Saigon, is where the struggle has intensified so immoder-

ately. Forty-seven percent of enemy strength is now deployed in the few northern provinces, and 42 percent of our own field force is engaged there.

These fresh troops come forward adequately armed. Thanks to Soviet and Red Chinese help, Hanoi has no problem there. The array of heavy weapons supporting them out of the DMZ and from the high ground was never as formidable as now. Due to the construction of the road through Laos that will serve motor traffic, they can now get the heavy stuff forward in large numbers.

Otherwise, the big push is noteworthy only because of its marks of weakness seemingly energized out of sheer desperation. The troops are badly trained. When cornered, they surrender now in big bunches. Under interrogation, they talk freely. Few of the replacements are aware of the unit to which they had been assigned. Some have not fired a rifle before being sent over the trail.

THREE main characteristics were identified with the North Vietnam regulars and Vietcong discipline in former years. They strove at all times, and largely succeeded, in extracting their dead from the battlefield. They cleared the battlefield of all weapons they could. When surrounded, they were inordinately clever at finding the one small escape hole, converging to it, and getting

away.

Most of that is now in the past. They flee the scene and don't bother to burden themselves with their dead. They leave the combat field littered with their ordnance, rifles, rockets, grenades and all else. And the cunning they once acquired in training that enabled them to break contact at will and slip away, leaving no trail behind, is now less evident than the lack of craftiness and care in operations.

The heavy antiaircraft weapons and rocket caches that our patrols have lately come across in the I Corps piedmont and highlands are often found totally unguarded and inexpertly camouflaged, if at all. Fancy the delight a squad of young GIs entering upon a jungle clearing to discover there an enemy battery of 57-mm guns well-emplaced and not an enemy soldier in sight. It has happened several times.

MORE significant still is the abandonment of caution and self-advantage in the enemy attack. Today, North Vietnamese formations are repeatedly committed to battle under conditions where bloody repulse, for no gain, becomes inevitable.

These, and other signs, such as their coldly deliberate slaughter of Vietnamese civilians, all point to an enemy racing against time. Either Hanoi is deluded that it has the war won and is now applying the crusher, or it is moved by the false courage of desperation. There can be no middle ground.

WASHINGTON NEWS - 29 JUNE 1968

Protection Against Chinese Missile, But . . .

ABM No Defense Against Cuba

By MIKE MILLER

Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

As currently designed, the Sentinel Anti-Ballistic Missile system could protect the U.S. against missiles fired from Red China 6000 miles away — but not from any missiles that might be fired from Cuba 90 miles away.

That's what Army officials have told the House Defense Appropriations Sub-committee, according to testimony the Sub-committee made public today.

Lt. Gen. A. D. Starbird said Sentinel would not defend against potential missile threats from Cuba because "it would not have the over-all country-wide coverage that you can get by looking out (by radar) and catching the missile coming in from a long distance."

Nor are there any other U.S. defensive systems to stop a missile attack from Cuba. In response to Sub-committee inquiries, they Army supplied

this statement for the record of the hearings:

"The Army has no active defense today against a missile aimed at the United States from Cuba once the missile is launched."

The Army added that an additional Spartan missile site with accompanying radar installations at an undisclosed location "would be required to protect Florida against Cuban-based ballistic missiles."

But no plans were disclosed to provide that additional site.

The Spartan will be the long-range missile of the Sentinel system. A shorter-range defensive missile will be known as the Sprint.

There have been no confirmed reports of strategic offensive missiles in Cuba since 1962 when the late President John F. Kennedy successfully demanded removal from the island of imported Soviet missiles. But Rep. Robert L. F. Sikes (D., Fla.) raised the possibility during the recent

hearings of a recurrence of the 1961 crisis.

Scientists estimated in 1962 that the missiles in Cuba could hit the U.S. mainland less than five minutes after launching.

Gen. Starbird also said Sentinel would have only limited effect against the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System Russia is reported to be developing. FOBS would approach the U.S. on a low trajectory designed to cut down radar warning time.

Gen. Starbird said it would be possible to design Sentinel to defend against both FOBS and missiles fired from Russian submarines off the U.S. coast. But this would require more ABMs than currently planned, the Army said.

The Defense Department has said there will be 15 to 20 missile batteries in the \$5.5 billion Sentinel system. Thirteen potential sites are being surveyed, the closest to Cuba being the Albany, Ga., area. Sentinel is scheduled to become fully operational in five or six years.

WASHINGTON POST - 29 JUNE 1968



Joshua Lederberg

The Real Missile Gap Is In Knowledge of Psychology

THE SEASON for the missile-gap game has rolled around again. This time the Republicans promise to lambaste the Democrats for letting the Russians creep up on our "nuclear superiority."

A large backward step is the premise that nuclear supremacy is an end in itself. If this is a valid aim for the United States, it should be also for every other independent power. These familiar arguments about mutually aggravated escalation are too often attributed to a world view that is supposed to be soft-minded about communism and what the Reds would do to us if we gave them half a chance.

To the contrary, I must give great credit to the world Communist conspiracy for inciting the United States to unrealistic goals that drain our resources. With good reason, they are as afraid of American irrationality as we are of theirs. It would be a cosmic crime to tempt them by our own weakness into the ultimate gamble that might, once and for all, pacify the world. But it is so easy to exploit our adolescent temperament, our historic insistence on being the prima donna, if we accept any part at all on the world stage. So they feint in Berlin, or with ballistic-missile defenses or just by holding back in Vietnam and we promptly overreact in push-button fashion.

THE MISSILE-GAP game should stimulate us to hard thinking about the truths of national security. The achievable purposes of strategic nuclear weapons are to forestall nuclear blackmail and to deter a mortal attack. These are essentially psychological aims, intended to influence our own behavior and that of the adversary. If strategic nuclear weapons ever again have to be used, they will have been dismal failures—and we, as a species, along with them.

In this light, a striving for nuclear superiority may temporarily further some national psychological aims; but do we need to bolster self-confidence that can resist blackmail? Perhaps yes. The ultimate step in any scenario of nuclear deterrence is exquisitely irrational. An unsophisticated public may demand the comfort of large irrational numbers in order for nuclear stalemate

to be emotionally acceptable. We might also wonder about the public on the other side: will they also understand that there is no difference between being killed or overkilled?

There is unfortunately more to deterrence than the calculated physical capacity to retaliate after a first strike. We might make that capacity more credible and thus more effective, especially if the adversary is ill-informed, by expanding our own advertised reserve force. But deterrence also demands that he feel secure enough not to have to gamble on a desperate strike. Parity is the most stable equilibrium for mutual security, for each side may then feel that both will be unacceptably damaged no matter who takes the initiative. The most unstable is that disparity is approached.

THE CASE for escalating nuclear armaments as a valid investment in world

stability (rather than a step toward pre-emptive war) would be far more reasonable if the psychological objectives of nuclear policy were more clearly perceived and used as a basis of research and action. How our friends and adversaries per-

ceive this country's policies and motives are at the root of our foreign and military policy. Do we spend 1 per cent of our arms outlay on social and psychological research and action? If so, Congress is not aware of it, for it would surely be squelched, by the same illogic that led to the halving of the already puny research budget of the Disarmament Agency. Perhaps the brunt of such research ought to be directed at the perplexing psychology of our own Congress.

© 1968, The Washington Post Co.

WASHINGTON NEWS - 29 JUNE 1968

Red China the Danger

U.S.-Russian talks on disarmament may have to do only with reinforcing defense systems against one another. This would leave both countries free to build anti-ballistic missile systems for defense against Red China or other small-scale nuclear powers.

This would let U.S. go ahead with \$5.5 billion Sentinel system just approved by Senate; would do away with need for \$40 billion ABM system to protect against Russian attack.

Position of Russian ABMs already installed indicates to U.S. Intelligence analysts they are intended to stop U.S. missiles, but scale is not great enough to blunt any all-out U.S. attack, they say. Conclusion is that Russians may be willing to hold down ABMs to a level that would protect USSR from Red Chinese attack only.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR - 1 JULY 1968 (30 JUNE)

Missile curbing talk buoys UN

By Mario Rossi

Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

United Nations, N.Y.

Moscow's apparent readiness to start talks on missile curbs has elicited a positive response in United Nations diplomatic circles.

The main reason is seen in the hope that an eventual agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States will contribute to maintaining the balance of power.

Most nations recognize that the peace of the world is today in large measure dependent upon the capacity of both superpowers to deter one another.

It is assumed that establishment of an effective antimissile system would upset the balance and invite countermeasures.

Diplomats here do not doubt that the superpower which considered itself at a disadvantage would also feel threatened with all the dangers that this implies.

That is why it is felt that since the balance would have to be reestablished in the shortest possible period, the antimissile system now under construction would imply a very considerable expenditure without altering

the balance in any substantial manner.

It is also believed here at the United Nations that the Soviet offer goes some way toward meeting the insistent demand of the nonnuclear powers that nonproliferation of nuclear weapons should represent the first step toward limiting the arms race.

Pulled in opposite directions

The United States is given full credit for having taken the initiative in suggesting conversations to the Soviets.

The general feeling is that the two superpowers have acted in a most responsible manner.

As so often happens when considering the mutual relationship between superpowers, the smaller nations find themselves pulled in opposite directions.

They consider the equilibrium of mutual deterrence to be indispensable to the preservation of peace. But any understanding between the superpowers for the realization of this aim also raises the "threat" that the Washington-Moscow "axis" will run the world as it pleases without taking into much account the wishes of the smaller nations.

This "threat" in turn strengthens the conviction so widely felt at the United Nations that most other countries have hardly any role to play in world affairs.

Quite a number of diplomats are emotionally at least inclined to accept Peking's views on "nuclear colonialism" by the superpowers.

Frustration, however, is often the mask behind which the third world's deep divisions hide.

The Afro-Asian majority at the UN is presently unable to assume greater responsibilities and in the circumstances an understanding among the superpowers becomes all the more necessary, it is felt here.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE - 30 JUNE 1968

Military Bases Strain U.S.-Japanese Relations

BY SAMEUL JAMESON

[Chief of Tokyo Bureau]

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

TOKYO, June 29—A five-month campaign against American military bases here has unearthed a series of deep-rooted problems in American-Japanese relations.

The anti-base furor, which United States military officials say has thus far caused "no serious impediments" to operations, has been spurred by a series of specific incidents—but in each case the wave of protest has overwhelmed the facts at hand.

Altho military officers dismiss the trouble as the work of a handful of agitators, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and his ruling Liberal Democrats have either affirmed or refrained from countering countless charges which originated in local governing bodies, in the press, or in leftist demonstrations. And the ideological coloring of anti-base flareups has been replaced by a new theme of alleged American disregard for the health and safety of the Japanese people.

Express Deep Concern

American embassy officials, unlike the military, express deep concern. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson returned to Washington last month for what were described as routine consultations—only six months after his last visit home. Altho the embassy has refrained from public comment, one highly placed American diplomat told a group of Japanese scholars in an off-the-record meeting that "a basic re-evaluation of United States-Japan relations probably would be a good thing for both countries." countries."

The present trouble does not represent anti-American sentiment, but rather anti-base feelings, embassy officials confide privately.

It started with the visit in January of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, Enterprise, gained momentum with street riots against an American army hospital for Viet Nam casualties in February and March, picked up emotionalism when above-normal radioactivity was detected during a visit of a nuclear-powered submarine in May, and exploded when a F-4 Phantom jet crashed on the campus of Kyushu university June 2.

Won't Unload Ammo

Workers have refused to unload ammunition, students have stopped an ammunition train, and Kyushu university has refused to permit recovery of the jet wreckage. A series of

protests has been directed at noise irritants around air bases, a practice bombing range, two ground maneuvering areas, transportation of jet fuel on Japanese highways, and use of civilian airports by military chartered planes. More than 50 of the 147 American military installations have been troubled with protests in one form or another.

Causes of the trouble include rising Japanese nationalism, which finds expression in lashing out at what former Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer called undue Japanese consciousness of "the overwhelm-

ing presence of the United States" in Japan's affairs.

Concentration of population around urban areas has crowded many United States bases, which once sat in the middle of rice paddies, and made accidents and crimes committed by American military personnel felt more noticeably. As a result, the foreign ministry has announced an over-all re-evaluation of the base locations.

Move Poses Difficulties

Moving them elsewhere in crowded Japan, however, poses difficulties. Last year the United States agreed to move a

bombing range to a Japanese-proposed substitute location, only to run into heavy opposition at the proposed site.

The underlying causes of the present base furor, however, appear to be less sophisticated. In October, 1965, Lt. Gen. Maurice Preston, commander of American forces in Japan at that time, told a group of American correspondents:

"The thing that has always bothered me is that when these base problems arise, nobody stands up to speak for us. The Liberal Democrats always hide behind us—and it is disturbing to me that they should think this attitude is politically sound."

Words Still Applicable

Preston's words are as applicable as ever.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

WASHINGTON POST - 1 JULY 1968 (30 JUNE)

U.S. Takes Tougher Line With Japan, Where Nationalism Is on the Increase

By Richard Halloran

Washington Post Foreign Service

TOKYO, June 30—The manner in which the Japanese government accepted the return of Iwo Jima and other Bonin Islands last Wednesday is not a happy omen for relations between the two nations in the next couple of critical years.

Premier Eisaku Sato's short address during ceremonies in Tokyo had a tone of pique and impatience.

"With respect to the return of administrative right over the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands, the government of Japan, as in the case of Okinawa, has long been requesting the United States Government for its early realization," Sato said. This "has finally been realized," he added.

Return of Ryukyus

The English-language Japan Times, generally considered an outlet for foreign ministry views, echoed Sato. The newspaper editorialized that "this propitious occasion may be regarded as an assurance of the eventual reversion of the more important Ryukyu Islands," of which Okinawa is the main island.

An incident on Iwo Jima just before the reversion ceremony there gave another clue to Japanese sentiment. Three Japanese naval officers raised a Rising Sun flag atop Mt. Suribachi in the same pose as the U.S. Marines when they raised the American flag during the 1945 battle.

A European observer here may have overstated it when he called Wednesday "a day

of revenge," but discernible undercurrents of vindication seemed to flow through the day and were particularly apparent in the increasingly nationalistic Japanese press the next day.

Anti-American Outbursts

This, on top of a rising wave of Japanese nationalism that expresses itself mainly in anti-American outbursts, is causing considerable concern in Washington, informed sources here said. Further, it has led to a quiet but distinct hardening in U.S. attitudes toward Japan.

When American officials look askance at Japan, they focus on three interlocking questions: the Mutual Security Treaty that is open for revision in 1970, the continued presence of U.S. military power in Japan, and the reversion of Okinawa, site of major U.S. bases.

Informed sources here said the U.S. is beginning to remind the Japanese that the treaty puts the obligation for security on the U.S., that it is committed to the defense of Japan while Japan has no defense commitments toward the United States.

These sources said the United States has also changed its attitude on the base issue. Where it previously spoke in terms of the Japanese doing it a favor by permitting bases in Japan, now it is telling Japan that the bases provide for Japanese security but that the U.S. is not willing to maintain forces here unless the Japanese genuinely desire their presence.

Informed sources said Jap-

anese officials are being faced with the direct questions—what kind of American presence do they want, what are they willing to do to make this possible, what political support will they give it?

The United States, disturbed by growing agitation around its bases in Japan, is also beginning to tell the Japanese that the United States can't be expected to return political control over Okinawa if the United States bases there are to be subjected to the same pressures as in Japan itself.

So far, the Japanese haven't come up with any clear answers. Observers here said it is possible that eventually they will conclude that Japan doesn't want U.S. bases to remain but wants to retain the treaty protection, especially the nuclear umbrella.

This, however, appears increasingly unacceptable to the United States, as the treaty without the bases in Japan does little for U.S. security. If the treaty were renegotiated to exclude the bases, political observers said, the Senate would not ratify it. Rather, they said, the Senate would insist on a genuinely mutual security commitment from the Japanese.

This would leave the Japanese the choice of reinforcing the alliance with the United States, or undertaking the effort and expense of full rearmament, including nuclear rearmament, or turning to unarmed neutrality, which the major opposition party here advocates.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR - 29 JUNE 1966

U.S. steps may undo Vietnam war snarl

By Richard L. Strout
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The Vietnam war is being patiently and gradually unraveled.

That is the interpretation of one school of thought here that has been watching with bated breath the adventure that has now involved 534,000 American troops in South-east Asia.

There have been 25,000 Americans killed and the cost to the United States is \$30 billions a year.

First step in the untangling, according to this thesis, was the request of Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander of the American forces, for big new reinforcement after the Tet offensive. According to reports the request was for 206,000 troops.

President Johnson had promised General Westmoreland at Hawaii, "I will give you anything you want, because you want what I want in Vietnam. But I may have to give it to you a little slower than you want."

An upper limit of around 525,000 troops was reportedly imposed.

The Tet offensive came early in 1968, and Gen. Earle E. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited General Westmoreland, Feb. 23-25.

The report of the request for 206,000 more troops followed the Wheeler visit. It has never been confirmed, but Washington observers put together pieces of the jigsaw puzzle, with several still missing.

It is believed that President Johnson decided that escalation of this sort was impractical both from his own view and that of the mood of the country.

Mr. Johnson's decision coincided with the two-day appearance of Secretary of State Dean Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D) of Arkansas, a critic of the war.

Mr. Rusk had resisted such an appearance for two years. It became evident that three-quarters of the committee were critical of the administration policy. They demanded that the Senate be consulted if any large number of new troops were sent. Mr. Rusk guardedly said this would be done with "appropriate members of Congress . . . as we have done in the past."

It was on or about this time that President Johnson was coming to a conclusion that he had toyed with for a year, not to run again. Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy had won a victory in New Hampshire, Robert F. Kennedy had thrown his hat in the ring, the President's poll rating was at a low point, and he understood the profound significance of General Westmoreland's request for massive reinforcements.

Victory "in the historic sense," as General Westmoreland was to say a little later, could not be won; that is, without more troops.

On Friday, March 22, Mr. Johnson announced that General Westmoreland would come home before July to become Army chief of staff. There had been reports that this would happen, but Mr. Johnson denied them.

The general was personally identified with the so-called search-and-destroy strategy. Under him the controversial decision had been made to hold Khe Sanh, where in early March 6,000 Americans were surrounded by 20,000 enemy. General Westmoreland had been promoted out of Vietnam command. There were signs of a change of strategy.

On Sunday, March 31, President Johnson told a nationwide television audience that he would not seek reelection.

In retrospect the retirement of Mr. Johnson, following the return of General Westmoreland, seemed inevitable to some.

However gracefully and tactfully explained, the facts indicated the need of a major change in Vietnam. Mr. Johnson announced the ending of most of the bombing of North Vietnam.

On April 3, 60 hours after Mr. Johnson's announcement, Hanoi agreed to establish contact to see what could be done in the way of negotiations.

Paris was ultimately picked as the site, and the preliminary talks are under way. Hanoi repeatedly professes to be willing to undertake genuine talks if bombing stops.

The bombing policy is associated with Mr. Johnson's adviser, Walt W. Rostow, a special assistant. Air Force leaders originally hoped that bombing would interdict supplies and end the war quickly with a minimum American loss.

Students of Asiatic thinking charged that it would only deepen resistance to an enemy seen as "a white, capitalist, superpower."

Before retiring, former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara acknowledged that bombing could reduce but not stop infiltration.

The latest episode in the story follows the pattern of past oblique disclosures. War correspondent John S. Carroll of the Baltimore Sun, in that paper June 25, declared that marines are leaving the Khe Sanh base, so long associated with General Westmoreland's strategy.

Then on June 27, the White House announced that abandonment of the marine combat base at Khe Sanh was a military decision which was not made by President Johnson.

Following the story Mr. Carroll's military accreditation has been suspended indefinitely, according to other dispatches.

According to the New York Times, June 27, from Washington, Brig. Gen. Winant Sidle, chief of information in Saigon, warned correspondents that they would lose their accreditation if their dispatches described the situation in Khe Sanh.

The general also urged correspondents not to report on the decision to lift Mr. Carroll's credentials, according to the New York Times.

The jigsaw puzzle seems to be taking shape. It looks like a patient but momentous shift in strategy.

General Westmoreland has been withdrawn from the scene, Mr. Johnson is withdrawing from the scene, the tentative request for 200,000 or more troops has apparently been shelved, U. S. bombing has been reduced in the north, and direct discussions at Paris are under way. While hotly disputed officially, this could be interpreted as a fall back in American positions.

On the other hand fighting around Saigon has intensified, apparently with an eye on Paris peace talks.

Simultaneously there seems to be growing restlessness in the House of Representatives of the South Vietnamese at Saigon, a city which has been under rocket attack. The United States is criticized for not doing more to defend South Vietnam or consulting more closely in the Paris talks. One Representative urged the United States to use atomic bombs

MILITARY BASES ... CONTINUED

plicable this year as they were then.

In the case of the army hospital for Viet Nam casualties, for example, Japanese defense officials approved location of the hospital in the Oji section of Tokyo in November, 1965. Construction began in March, 1967, and no protests occurred until radical students took to the street with stones and staves last February.

Not long afterward, Sato's right-hand man, the chief cabinet secretary, called the location in a populous area "undesirable" and the welfare minister complained about the danger of contagious diseases spreading thru the neighborhood. No mention was made of the earlier Japanese role in approving the site.

Stuck by Their Claim

Concerning the radioactivity detected in Sasebo harbor during a visit by the nuclear submarine, Swordfish, the Japanese assumed the American submarine was responsible and stuck by their claim despite an admission that conclusive proof was not available. A panel of three American nuclear experts, flown here from Washington, said the submarine could not possibly have caused radioactivity.

But Japanese officials announced that no more nuclear ships would be permitted until a new system of radiation monitoring was established.

The crash of the F-4 Phantom led to the cabinet decision to seek new land for the American base at Itazuke in Fukuoka city.

The reason the furor still hasn't affected operations of the bases is that despite its public pronouncements, the Japanese government has not issued official requests that the United States curtail military activity.

Play Down Trouble

Some American officials play down the trouble, citing Sato's worries over the forthcoming July 7 election for the lower house of the diet [parliament].

Altho Sato has linked Japan's postwar prosperity with its defense pact with the United States, no Japanese official has yet explained the necessity of having American bases here. To the contrary, Cabinet Secretary Toshio Kimura told foreign correspondents that Japan would welcome an American initiative in removing them if technological advances in weaponry should make such a move feasible.

WASHINGTON POST, 30 JUNE 1968

General to Switch From Talk to War

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

PARIS—The dragging talks here on Vietnam contain a personal negotiate-or-fight deadline for the United States delegation's distinguished military adviser.

In early July, Lieut. Gen. Andrew Jackson Goodpaster, No. 3 man on the negotiating team, is scheduled to shift to the battlefield. He has been designated deputy commander to Gen. Creighton Abrams, who replaced Gen. William C. Westmoreland as chief of U.S. forces in Vietnam.

It does not strike the methodically-minded General as odd that he is to move from an ornate conference room with his adversaries to a wartime command post against the same enemy.

Goodpaster's career as an "army intellectual" has mixed soldiering and statecraft. It brought him a Distinguished Service Cross and other combat decorations in World War II, midwife work in organizing the postwar military structure of the North Atlantic Alliance.

6½ years' service in the White House under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, and a continuing liaison role between President Johnson and Gen. Eisenhower from 1964 to 1968.

The Goodpaster affinity for anonymity has left unrevealed until now the fact that for the past year, while serving as Commandant of the National War College at Fort McNair, in Washington, he was also deeply immersed in studying the military-political-psychological problems of Vietnam.

Goodpaster's service in Vietnam until now has been limited to a few official visits. But the first came at a critical point: He was on the mission headed by Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy that was in South Vietnam in February, 1965, when the American barracks at Pleiku were attacked and the United States retaliated by initiating the air war against North Vietnam.

Goodpaster, lean, bespectacled, scholarly-looking, with white hair that appears to escalate his age of 53, is noted, as was his long-time, taciturn

White House colleague under Mr. Eisenhower, Sherman Adams, for saying little that is publicly audible. Was it true, he was asked here in a rare interview, that he used to tell President Eisenhower on occasion: "No, you can't do that, Mr. President."

With a grin, Goodpaster softly replied: "Yes—but you don't do that too often."

When Goodpaster was selected to join the U.S. negotiating team here, the appointment drew much behind-the-scenes approval. President Johnson, in 1964, had nominated him for promotion to three-star general, and Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman, who heads the U.S. negotiators here, was welcoming back an old friend.

Goodpaster had been one of the first three officers on the scene to organize the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, for Gen. Eisenhower's Command. He worked with Harriman in 1961 and early 1962 in formulating what became known as the "Three Wise Men" report, in which Harriman, Jean Monnet of France and Britain's Edwin Plowden projected the military and political objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The then Col. Goodpaster was broadly qualified for ex-tramilitary duty. Second in his

graduating class academically at West Point, and a member of the Strategic Planning Group in the War Department for Gen. George C. Marshall at war's end, he then spent three years at Princeton, gaining a master's degree in engineering plus a master's and a doctor's degree in the philosophy of international relations.

At the White House through the Eisenhower Administration, Goodpaster was the President's immediate assistant on all day-to-day matters in the security field, including liaison with the State and Defense Departments, Central Intelligence Agency and Atomic Energy Commission. That job involved him in the Taiwan and Lebanon crises, the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference, the Suez crisis and the U-2 spy plane affair and the aborted 1960 Paris Summit.

President Kennedy asked Goodpaster to stay at the White House through March, 1961, until the Eisenhower structure was remodeled to Mr. Kennedy's taste. Goodpaster then became assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, another military "egghead." In 1966 his post was broadly extended to director of the joint staff of the Joint Chiefs, heading 400 officers on that staff, plus 400 other military specialists.

WASHINGTON POST, 30 JUNE 1968

French Crisis Tests Bonn Ties

By Dan Morgan
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN—The long French-German special relationship, the pillar of Bonn's European policy, is facing new tests in the shadow of France's domestic troubles.

The Germans are not yet very worried about the future of the relationship, but the spectacular events of the last two months have forced politicians here to start thinking seriously in terms of Germany without de Gaulle.

President de Gaulle, wrapped up with other problems, has postponed his annual visit from July until at least September. It may never be quite the same again between the General and the collective leadership in charge in West Germany.

On May 30, Foreign Minister Willy Brandt voiced the general uneasiness in Parliament when he said: "France will, perhaps, hopefully—'hopefully' broadly underlined—find its way and at the same time become in German-French cooperation and in European integration what it must become."

Nobody in West Germany is ready to challenge de Gaulle, or suggest that the center of European power has begun to move from Paris to Bonn. But last Sunday's first election vic-

tory for the Gaullists has failed to dispel deep German skepticism about the future of Gaullism in France. On Tuesday the West German press rendered an almost unanimous verdict that the real tests lay ahead.

Many West Germans, particularly members of the conservative Christian Democratic Party, took de Gaulle's Red scare to heart. Since it is now apparent that France is not to be ruled by a Communist-dominated regime ready to recognize East Germany and dissolve ties with NATO and the Common Market, more immediate points of friction are being examined.

These include:

• The Common Market.

France's proposal for special exceptions to the July 1 removal of internal tariffs so far has received grudging acceptance from the Bonn Foreign Office and industrial leaders. West Germany had counted on a 7 to 8 per cent export increase in 1968 to its biggest trading partner, to whom it sold \$12.5 billion in goods last year. This hope is now being scaled down in light of the French special measures, and German officials insist that these measures be subject to a strict time limit.

• British entry in the Market. Chancellor Kiesinger has hinted that French leaders have welched on the agreed-upon phased plan for British

membership. But Foreign Office officials said this week the French predicament probably cannot be used to promote the British cause, since the British economy has shown little improvement. Non-German diplomatic sources here contend Bonn is more interested in using the opportunity to get French concessions on Common Market agricultural payments.

• East European policy. Despite West German hopes, the French have been of no visible help in promoting Bonn in Eastern Europe. Officials believe they will be less so after de Gaulle's pre-election campaign against the French Communists.

• French troops. Rumors in May that de Gaulle was recalling some of the 60,000 troops in West Germany to put down rioting proved unfounded. But some officials fear this could happen if more trouble occurs. French observers doubt this, but point out in the light of recent drains on French monetary reserves that the troops are the only foreign ones here not covered by a foreign exchange offset arrangement.

• Joint projects. Concessions to French workers is seen here as inevitably pushing up the costs of such joint endeavors as the European Airbus, about which the German airline Lufthansa already has expressed reservations.

The immediate problem of

rescuing the French economy, through acceptance of limited import quotas and export subsidies, poses fewer problems in Bonn than might be expected.

Bonn economists have little desire to see West Germany's already heavy export surplus, aided by French demand, create new pressures for an upward revaluation of the German Mark.

However, concern is being voiced in certain industries principally automobiles and textiles, that the French measures could throw off production plans.

The net affect of the French upheavals is caution and watchfulness in Bonn. For the past 20 months Bonn's foreign policy has been that de Gaulle cannot be pressured—or challenged. This is still so. Even within the Social Democratic Party, which deeply resents de Gaulle's imperious rejection of Britain, French-German cooperation remains the basis for European integration.

In both parties, there are those who share his vision of a United Europe, though lately it has been the Germans themselves, and not de Gaulle, who have been picking their way toward that goal.

De Gaulle showed the Germans how national power can be used. Whether there is a German strong enough to pick up the torch after his departure remains to be seen.

CURRENT NEWS

MONDAY, JULY 1, 1968

NEW YORK TIMES
1 July 1968 P54

MILITARY CARGOES TIED UP, U.S. SAYS

By EDWARD A. MORROW

The nation's largest shipper, the Military Sea Transportation Service, reported yesterday that 24 vessels carrying military supplies exclusively have been tied up by the two-day strike of the National Maritime Union.

A spokesman for the agency in Washington said that the walkout, which began at 12:01 A.M. Saturday, had immobilized 13 freighters chartered by the agency under long-term contract or operated for it by steamship companies under general agency agreements. The remaining vessels were tankers.

In past strikes maritime unions have either made arrangements before a strike for the clearance of military cargoes or swiftly instituted such arrangements as soon as a strike was under way.

Apparently M.S.T.S. believed such arrangements may be made today at a meeting scheduled with the union, for the spokesman said it was "not diverting" any vessels from normal operations.

To Spend \$170-Million

The scope of the agency's operations can be gathered from the fact it expects to spend \$170-million for shipping charges during the fiscal year that begins today.

Twelve other ships were immobilized yesterday as they arrived from foreign voyages. The union estimated that 116 had been tied up on Saturday.

According to an Associated Press dispatch from San Juan, P. R., Joseph Curran, president of the 55,000-member union, believes the strike "will be a short one." Since Mr. Curran is expected to stay in San Juan until tomorrow, he will miss the arbitration meeting scheduled by arbitrator Theodore W. Kheel for this morning at the request of the Maritime Service Committee and the Tanker Service Committee.

The two groups act as bargaining agents for 73 companies that operate 576 vessels.

The union is seeking an increase in basic wages and overtime amounting to approximately 5 per cent and the addition of 15 days to the annual vacation of 60 they now have. These gains are being sought under a clause in the four-year contract expiring next year that permits the union to reopen the contract twice.

Management negotiators contend that the union has exhausted its reopeners. They fear that should they accede to the demands other maritime

CONTINUED PAGE 2

NEW YORK TIMES
30 June 1968 P9 (1J)

SOVIET BID LINKED TO MISSILE COSTS

By RAYMOND H. ANDERSON

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, June 29.—The Soviet Union's long-awaited announcement this week that it was ready to respond to President Johnson's appeal for talks on limiting costly antimissile systems appeared to stem from two painfully reached decisions.

The burden of diverting billions of rubles of inadequate investment funds would severely strain the economy for the next decade, compelling the leadership to shelve or sharply curtail urgent projects to modernize industry and agriculture and to raise living standards.

The Soviet authorities seem to have reluctantly realized that the sacrifices and exertions in attempting to build an impregnable shield against enemy missiles almost certainly would be futile.

The realization of futility is thought to have overridden concern over economic sacrifices. In the view of analysts here, the Soviet Union, as the United States, would pay virtually any price for a defense system that would assure it against destruction by missiles armed with nuclear warheads.

Soviet willingness to forgo material comforts for the sake of national defense was demonstrated in the years after World War II. The country endured low living standards to finance a rapid program to develop nuclear bombs and other modern weapons intended to achieve a balance with the United States.

Futility Is Stressed

The announcement Thursday by Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko that Moscow favored efforts to curb antimissile defenses was seen in effect as a confession that attempts to build such defenses would be folly.

The conclusion represents a reversal of Soviet strategic thinking. Early in the nineteen sixties, the Soviet Union made an effort to deploy antimissile systems and Nikita S. Khrushchev, then the nation's leader, said that Soviet antimissiles could "hit a fly in the sky."

The boast now appears to have been premature. The primitive antimissile installations were scrapped and a new program was undertaken to develop defenses capable of intercepting and destroying the more advanced attack missiles developed by the United States.

CONTINUED PAGE 2

BALTIMORE SUN
1 July 1968 P1

C-5 TEST FLIGHT CALLED SUCCESS

Marietta, Ga., June 30 (AP)—The biggest airplane in the world, the C-5 Galaxy, made its first test flight today after failing to get off the ground yesterday. The Air Force and the plane's builder, Lockheed-Georgia Company, called the flight highly successful.

Leo J. Sullivan, the test pilot, said, "We had minimum, minimum problems," as the 248-ton aircraft flew over north Georgia for slightly more than an hour and a half.

"Handles Beautifully"

"She handles beautifully, beautifully," Mr. Sullivan radioed to the control tower time and again.

Tom May, president of Lockheed-Georgia, said numerous tests made during the flight prove that there are practically no engineering limitations to building bigger planes. However, he said he doubts the world is ready for them now.

"We have preliminary plans for airplanes weighing over a million pounds," he said. And he added he was certain jet engines could be built with enough thrust to fly them.

Asked About Vietnam

Among the few invited observers was R. H. Charles, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, who noted it will be at least a year and a half before the plane's military value can be realized to any extent.

Mr. Charles was asked what effect the C-5 might have on the war in Vietnam.

He replied: "I hope the war in Vietnam will be over. If (the C-5) will carry practically all the Army's equipment. We will take what we need, when we need it, anywhere in the world."

There were some minor problems today, including trouble with the mammoth landing gear, which would not retract completely.

One Bad "Bogie"

In the main landing gear, there are 24 wheels fitted into 4 separate "bogies." Each "bogie" is supposed to retract, but one of them would not, so Mr. Sullivan left all of them down.

Spokesmen said the plane could easily have landed on any three sets of wheels. There are four other wheels in the nose

CONTINUED PAGE 2

NEW YORK TIMES
30 June 1968 P1 (1J)

JOHNSON IN PLEA FOR CURB ON ARMS BY U.S. AND SOVIET

By FRED P. GRAHAM

Special to The New York Times

NASHVILLE, Tenn., June 29.—President Johnson called today for the United States and the Soviet Union to act to bring under control the expensive antiballistic-missile race and the competition in offensive atomic arms.

This can be done, the President said, "in ways which do not endanger the security of the United States, our allies, or others."

The arms-control statement was made in a brief comment inserted in a speech on conservation delivered by Mr. Johnson at the dedication of a new dam here.

Mr. Johnson said he would have more to say on the subject on Monday. There was speculation that he might announce details of arrangements for a meeting between United States and Soviet representatives to discuss an agreement for limiting antiballistic-missile development and deployment.

The President's statement was his first on the subject since Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, announced in Moscow on Thursday that the Soviet Union was ready to open discussions on limiting the antiballistic defense system.

Senate Backs Program

Mr. Johnson again hailed the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, worked out by the United States and Soviet delegations to the Geneva disarmament negotiations and steered by the two nations to approval by the United Nations General Assembly. The treaty is to be signed Monday at the White House, then sent to the Senate for ratification.

After praising the treaty, Mr. Johnson declared:

"We must now turn to a task at least equally complex and difficult: to bring under control the nuclear arms race—in offensive and defensive weapons—in ways which do not endanger the security of the United States, our allies, or others."

"It would be easy for the

CONTINUED PAGE 2

C-5 TEST CALLED**SUCCESS...Continued**

gear.

Two of the aluminum dust guards on the wheel mounts were blown off, but a spokesman said this was comparable to losing hub caps off an automobile.

Fifty-eight C-5s are scheduled for delivery to the Air Force by 1971 at a cost of \$1,800,000,000. This will make United States airlift capability 10 times what it was in 1961.

Can Carry 350 Soldiers

The C-5 can carry 350 troops and all of their equipment.

The various control systems aboard the big plane, which are computer operated, received special attention during the test flight.

Through use of the wheel, Mr. Sullivan passed his intentions along to the computers, which actually manipulated the controls.

The C-5's top speed during the maiden flight was 230 miles an hour. It flew at an altitude of 10,000 feet.

Besides Mr. Sullivan, a native of Pomona, Cal., others in the crew were the co-pilot, Walter E. Hensleigh, 47, a native of Centerville, Miss.; Lt. Col. Joe Schiele, the Air Force's chief test pilot, who took the controls for about five minutes; E. Mitendorf, a Lockheed flight-test engineer, and Jerome H. Edwards, flight engineer.

JOHNSON IN FLEA FOR ARMS CURB...Cont'd

United States and the Soviet Union to continue on the present course of piling weapons system on weapons-system, diverting billions upon billions of dollars, while adding nothing to the security of either country," the President said.

"But the time is now at hand to find security in a more rational way, he concluded.

The Soviet announcement came three days after the United States Senate voted approval of a \$5.5-billion missile-defense program, the Sentinel antiballistic missile system.

The Soviet move was linked to the Senate action by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, an Administration leader. "This was one of our objections—to improve the chance that Moscow would start talking," he said.

The Soviet Union is believed to be well advanced already in construction of an antiballistic missile network around Moscow. The Defense Department estimates that the Soviet Union will have more than 1,000 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles by the middle of next year.

Mr. Johnson flew to Tennessee today to honor old political friendships and to promote a "new conservation" campaign to preserve natural playgrounds near population centers.

SOVIET BID LINKED**TO MISSILE COSTS-Cont**

A few years ago, the Russians began deployment of a new system around Moscow and were feared to be planning to extend it through the nation. This attempt to gain a strategic advantage over the United States likewise was quickly nullified. The Pentagon responded with a build-up of ballistic missiles with strengthened protection and improved evasive techniques against anti-missile defense.

Projecting this pattern of action and reaction into the future, the Soviet leadership seems to have concluded that antimissile defenses against the United States are a pipedream.

Foreign Minister Gromyko appeared to hit in his speech to the Supreme Soviet that this decision and a related appeal for worldwide disarmament had aroused hostility among Soviet military leaders and others in the leadership.

In a remark that struck diplomats as aimed at disarmament foes within the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko declared:

"We say to the pseudo-theoreticians, who try to reproach us and all supporters of disarmament that disarmament is an illusion—you are marching in step with the most diabolic forces of Imperialist reaction and thereby are weakening the front of struggle against it."

Although considerations of economic strain are secondary in Soviet decision-making on deployment of antimissile defenses, they are nonetheless formidable.

The Soviet people, after decades of deprivation, are finally beginning to obtain some of the comforts of modern life and are demanding more.

Ten years ago a Soviet family was overjoyed to receive any kind of apartment, no matter how shabbily constructed. Now it insists on an apartment of good quality. The same pressure for quality applies to consumer goods.

A diversion of funds ranging from \$20-billion to \$40-billion for an antimissile system would be borne mainly by the consumers.

Foreign Minister Gromyko's gloomy report this week on Communist China's deepening hostility toward the Soviet Union suggested that Moscow must continue to consider the possibility of a nuclear attack from that direction.

Any limitation of antimissile systems worked out with the United States may therefore provide a thin shield, as planned by the United States, for protection against China's elementary nuclear arsenal.

MILITARY CARGOES TIED UP...Continued

unions would again approach them under the "me too" clause.

This clause, inserted into maritime contracts in 1965, permits one union to claim benefits equal to those achieved by another union.

The clause involved a theoretical parity among the unions that was never established. Consequently, Government statistics indicate, labor costs have risen 30 per cent in the maritime field since 1965 in-

NEW YORK NEWS 1 July 1968 P6

Red Plot Would Label Shells 'U.S. Nerve Gas'

Saigon, June 30 (Special)—Authorities here have seized a Communist directive outlining the production of chemical mortar shells to be labeled with phony United States markings designating them as deadly nerve gas.

The document, captured recently by U.S. forces here, appeared to be part of a future Communist attempt to smear American forces. It contains instructions on how to produce 80-mm chemical mortar shells and grenades.

U.S. forces have used the gas and tear gas on occasion, but not the deadly nerve gas.

It was believed that the Reds intend to fire the rounds, then exhibit them as "evidence" that America has introduced nerve gas into the Vietnam war.

—Joseph Fried

BALTIMORE SUN

1 July 1968 P4

TALKS HINTED ON ARMS RACE**Johnson Message Expected Today At Pact Signing**

Washington, June 30 (P)—Signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the White House tomorrow is expected to bring a statement from president Johnson that talks are being arranged between the United States and the Soviet Union on the nuclear arms race.

The President hinted at this yesterday in a speech at Nashville, saying he would have an announcement at the multi-nation ceremony in the East Room. Qualified observers today said this will be a confirmation of an early start on talks dealing with both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.

Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey gave further weight to this speculation today when he said "a very substantial breakthrough has been made" on the question of de-escalation of the costly arms race.

Mr. Humphrey declined to give details in advance of Mr. Johnson's disclosure but said

stead of the planned 3.2 per cent per year.

The strike has caught management almost completely unaware. It was not until last Tuesday that the N.M.U. used the word "stoppage" in a telegram to management stipulating the demands, a management spokesman said.

The two management groups that charge the union has violated the "no-strike" provisions of its contract were expected to ask Mr. Kheel for a "back to work order" or to seek a court injunction prohibiting the strike.

the announcement "will have great significance in terms of arms control and control over weaponry."

The Vice President gave this information while being interviewed on the CBS television-radio program "Face the Nation."

ABC radio reported today that Mr. Johnson will say he is seeking a face-to-face meeting with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin on the subject of arms control. It added that the President regards the speech as the most important of his career.

Direct Talks

CBS reported Mr. Johnson will announce the beginning of direct talks but without saying when or where they will be or who will conduct them.

The ceremony, starting at 11:30 A.M. is being given live coverage by the principal television and radio networks.

The new treaty is expected to be signed here by 50 or more nations. Notices of intention to sign were still being received today at the State Department and the close-off time was set for 10 A.M. tomorrow. Signings will take place tomorrow in London and Moscow, also.

Pact To Stay Open

After these opening-day ceremonies, the pact will remain open for further signatures, and Administration officials expect 100 or so nations ultimately will subscribe to the treaty, which they describe as the most important disarmament agreement of the nuclear age.

The treaty would bar its nuclear power signatories from supplying atomic weapons to non-nuclear states, while the latter would pledge not to acquire such arms.

It is to become effective after ratification by the 3 major nuclear powers and by a minimum of 40 other states.

Rusk Expected To Sign

Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, is expected to sign for the United States, and Mr. Johnson hopes for Senate ratification later this month.

BALTIMORE SUN

1 July 1968 P1

SENATE MAY CUT BILLION FROM AID

By JOSEPH R. L. STERNE
(Washington Bureau of The Sun)

Washington, June 30—Foreign aid will be on the butcher's block once again as Congress drives for an adjournment before the Republican National Convention in early August.

House and Senate experts are worried that the final appropriation might be a billion dollars below the \$2,961,475,000 requested by President Johnson.

One factor that could prevent an even greater cut is a desire on the part of Republican lawmakers to avoid embarrassment for the GOP President they hope to see inaugurated next January.

Drafting Delayed

They would hate to have him cast in the position of having to rescue the foreign aid program—perhaps with an emergency funding request.

Ominously signaling what lies ahead for the perennially embattled program was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's quiet decision last Thursday to delay final drafting of its bill until the House acts.

Senators hostile to foreign aid wanted to wait and see how much the House as a whole restricts and cuts the \$3,364,725,000 bill approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Then, quite obviously, they will get in their licks.

Seven Republicans on the House committee have publicly announced they will fight for another \$400,000,000 reduction, including two who have said they will try to kill the entire measure—a bid that failed by only eight votes a year ago.

If the latter tactic succeeds this year, Administration Democrats would be forced to go back to committee and draw up a drastically reduced measure, to prevent actual dismantling of the Agency for International Development.

House action is tentatively set for July 9 and 10 provided the House Rules Committee clears the way, as expected, in a meeting Tuesday.

During last Thursday's closed-door meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, three conflicting viewpoints were evident. One group favored acceptance of the House committee figure as the best the Administration could hope for. Another wanted the bill chopped to \$2,000,000,000 and still another group favored an authorization of only \$1,800,000,000. One senator said he would not vote for anything over \$1,000,000,000.

Senator Mansfield (D,

WASHINGTON POST 1 July 1968 P16

Escalated War Games End in Czechoslovakia

NEW YORK TIMES
1 July 1968 P39

AN ICBM IS REPORTED DEVELOPED IN CHINA

MOSCOW, June 30 (AP) — Communist sources said today that Communist China had developed its first Intercontinental Ballistics Missile, broadening a nuclear capability that Peking says includes a hydrogen bomb.

The sources reported it was their understanding that the missile has not been tested, but that its construction had been completed in the last few days. The missile was described as ready for trial use.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 30 — Military sources here said the information available to them indicated that the Chinese missile program had not progressed so far as the Moscow report stated.

Mont.), the majority leader, finally agreed the best way to handle the situation was to wait until after the House acted. Then the Senate committee will hastily draft its bill and send it to the floor for action in the week beginning Monday, July 15.

However small the authorization bill may be, the foreign aid program will face further cuts when Congress takes late-session action on appropriations bills providing funds within the limits set in the authorization measure.

Particularly at this stage, there will be great pressure for cuts because of the new tax-increase law which called for a \$6,000,000,000 reduction in actual spending by the Government.

If Congress does the expected by chopping the foreign aid program close to the \$2,000,000,000 level, the chief reduction would be made in the development loan fund providing long-term credits to nations outside the Western Hemisphere.

Smaller slices also would be likely for the Alliance for Progress, supporting assistance for nations on the Communist periphery and perhaps military assistance.

Uncertain at this stage is the fate of a separate request of \$120,000,000 to finance arms credit sales to friendly countries.

Resistance to the arms sales is fierce in the Senate committee, which long has been the key base in Congress for resistance to the Vietnam War.

By Kenneth Ames

Special to The Washington Post

PRAGUE, June 30 — The Warsaw Pact war games, advertised as a small command-staff exercise and carried out as a full-dress operation involving more than 9000 Communist troops, ended on schedule today in Czechoslovakia.

The weeks-long military exercise brought troops from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary and East Germany to join those of Czechoslovakia. Official observers from Rumania were present and there were unconfirmed reports that Bulgarian units participated.

The maneuvers took place amid pressure on the new Prague leadership from her Communist neighbors to keep the liberalization drive from getting out of control.

A statement released by Maj. Gen. Josef Pocepický, spokesman for the exercise, reported that participating staffs "are now engaged in evaluating the exercise and holding discussions on the experiences gained."

The statement further said that results of the exercise, for some reason not explained, will be placed before the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party "whose participation at the analysis is being counted on."

"The units which acted as marker troops and signal and logistics units are preparing for departure to their locations and the public will be informed to the greatest possible extent on the results of the exercise at a press conference to be held on July 2 or 3," Gen. Pocepický's statement ended.

This was the case of the military exercise which escalated, or, more properly, the deal forced on Czechoslovakia by the Soviets which leaked out only gradually. There have been repeated denials over the past few weeks that there was anything unusual about the maneuvers, described as "purely routine liaison operations."

As one example of duplicity, it was originally denied that East German troops would be participating, since Czechoslovak relations with that neighboring country were so tense. Saturday, however, was the first official admission that East German forces had been directly involved.

Kulturny Zivot, a Czechoslovak literary weekly newspaper, said, "The play has developed according to the strict rules of drama. In the spring it was said there would be no exercise and no exercise was contemplated. In the second stage, it was tentatively admit-

ted that a tiny and ordinary exercise of staffs was being prepared. People not well acquainted with military matters visualized staff officers over maps shifting small tanks in a sand table game."

The paper continued with heavy irony, "The true play started when the press secretary of the Ministry of Defense reminded us that staff exercises need signal troops, estimated at about one battalion. Then in rapid succession so-called security units and marking units were added, then tanks and aircraft and the whole glittering cast was on stage."

Kulturny Zivot then cites the case of the innocent man of Trutnov "who did not grasp the director's intentions and in some alarm telephoned Prague Radio to report that Soviet columns and tanks had been marching through his town for four hours."

The newspaper draws the inference, first, that the "director of the play" was not a Czechoslovak, and, second, that the failure to provide complete and truthful accounts of intentions has created a crisis of confidence between the government and nation.

Some expert observers believe this may have been precisely the main object of the exercise. From the outset, it has been clear that the intent was more political than military: a crude attempt at saber-rattling to let the conservative Czechoslovak political elements know the Russians are still there to back them if needed.

The presence at one stage or another of nearly all the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers suggested something more than a routine "coordination and control of armed forces under modern operational conditions" (the way it was advertised), and Marshal Ivan Jakubovský himself, the Warsaw Pact commander-in-chief, saw fit to take time out and address a purely domestic political rally in Bohemia. Other foreign military leaders conducted "friendly and useful exchanges of views" with Czechoslovak political leaders and squeezed in their ration of preaching in factories and down on the farms.

It is regarded as highly probable that the driving force behind the maneuvers was the Soviet High Command itself, rather than Kremlin political leaders.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER July 1968 P2

3 Arab States Hold Secret War Games In Northern Jordan

From Our Wire Services.

BEIRUT, Lebanon, June 30.—Reliable sources reported Sunday that Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi infantry and artillery units held three days of secret joint war games in northern Jordan last week.

The reports from travelers arriving in Lebanon from Jordan came amid indications of a possible showdown between Israeli hawks and doves in Jerusalem.

GUERRILLA ACTION

Premier Levi Eshkol summoned his cabinet to discuss a proposed reshuffling of portfolios and ironing out of differences over the Arab Israeli crisis.

Explosives ripped up the railway line through the Israeli-held Gaza Strip in three places early Sunday, military sources at Gaza reported.

The sources said the sabotage was believed to have been the work of a new guerilla group which began operating last week and which has sabotaged the railway line and nearby roads three times in the Beit Hanun area south of Gaza city.

Israeli military officials reported two Arab El Fatah guerillas were killed in a clash with an Israeli patrol near Damiah Bridge across the Jordan River Saturday night. No Israeli casualties were reported.

The officials said two Russian-made Klachnikov rifles were found on the guerillas.

EGYPT TALKS PEACE

In Helsinki, Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Riad said the Arabs must not lose hope that a peaceful settlement can be reached even though diplomatic efforts have failed thus far to achieve any progress.

Riad, who is on tour of the Scandinavian nations to explain Egypt's position in the crisis, praised Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jarring, the U.N. special envoy to the Middle East, who has been trying for months to work out a peace formula acceptable to both sides.

Jarring was in Moscow for talks with Soviet officials. He met Friday with Premier Alexei Kosygin and Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii Kuznetsov and with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on Saturday. No details were disclosed.

An official announcement in Moscow Sunday said, Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko will visit Algeria July 5 at the invitation of President Houari Boumedienne, one of the toughest of the Arab anti-Israel hardliners.

Since the Arab-Israeli war last June, Grechko has visited Arab capitals to discuss Soviet military aid.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 July 1968 P7

SENATOR SUGGESTS A NEW PEACE MOVE

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, June 30 — Senator Claiborne Pell said today that the time had come for a third party, preferably France or the Soviet Union, to try to help break the deadlock in the Vietnam talks here.

The Rhode Island Democrat, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a critic of Administration policy on Vietnam, said that a third power could provide the United States with the assurances of reciprocal action it seeks as a prelude to a total halt of the bombing of North Vietnam.

The American delegation to the talks left open the possibility for indirect assurances of military restraint by Hanoi in the last negotiating session here.

The advantage of such an indirect assurance, some diplomats have suggested, is that it would help Hanoi save face. It would spare North Vietnam, they suggest, from having to backtrack on its persistent refusal to reciprocate for a total halt in American bombing.

Senator Pell, in an interview at the Hotel Crillon, said:

"If there was ever a time for a third party, this is it. The Russians or the French could assure us what would happen if we stopped the bombing. That would be a way to get the North Vietnamese off the hook of having to say it themselves."

The talks have been deadlocked for seven weeks over North Vietnam's demand for a total halt in American bombing and "other acts of war" against North Vietnam. The United States has asked for some matching restraint from Hanoi, preferably some indication or assurance that North Vietnamese soldiers will not take advantage of a bombing cessation to launch new attacks against allied positions just south of the demilitarized zone.

In the last negotiating session, Cyrus R. Vance, who was leading the United States delegation while Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman was home for a wedding, said that the United States hoped to see "some response" from Hanoi "in the direction of de-escalation of the violence."

"This could be done de facto," he said. "It would be

BALTIMORE SUN 1 July 1968 P1

Huge Enemy Arsenal Taken In Battle Near Cambodia

Saigon, Monday, July 1 (AP). United States Green Beret troopers and South Vietnamese irregulars dislodged a Viet Cong defense unit after two days of fighting and seized one of the biggest weapons caches of the war, military spokesmen said yesterday. The weapons, including some American rifles, were apparently for use in a new assault on Saigon.

United States B-52 bombers, keeping up the Air Force side of the air-ground campaign against enemy units threatening the capital, flew eight more raids today on enemy positions 25 to 57 miles above the city. Four of the raids were in Tay Ninh province, a long-time Viet Cong stronghold along the Cambodian border.

Heavy, but unspecified casualties were reported in the fight for the arsenal, located about 5 miles from the Cambodian border in a key supply corridor to Saigon, some 45 miles to the west.

Allied spokesmen said the cache, seized late Saturday, included 172 carbines; 39 Browning automatic rifles of the type used by American forces in World War II; 95 machine guns; 20 pistols; 75 Soviet-designed AK47 assault rifles; 20 tons of TNT; 3 mortars; 3 recoilless rifles; 3 tons of mines; 300,000 rounds of AK47 ammunition; more than 2,000 mortars; bazooka-type rockets and recoilless rifle shells, and more than 8,000 grenades.

This coincided with a South

done by some indication, either directly or indirectly, that such a step is being taken."

Mr. Harriman is due back in Paris in time for a formal negotiating meeting on Wednesday.

Senator Pell, who arrived here today to check on political developments in France and Czechoslovakia as well as the state of the Vietnam talks, said he would meet tomorrow with the American negotiating team and with French Foreign Ministry officials.

He said he would make no attempt to meet with the North Vietnamese delegation. He also criticized Senator Eugene J. McCarthy for his announcement that he would come to Paris in late July for talks with the North Vietnamese delegation.

Kosygin Meets With Tho
MOSCOW, June 30 (AP) — Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin and two other leaders who have played a key role in the Soviet aid program to Hanoi met today with North Vietnam's special adviser to the Paris talks, Le Duc Tho.

The official announcement said only that their conversation had been "marked by fraternal friendship and mutual understanding."

Vietnamese report that Government patrols uncovered two large arms caches 18 miles north of the capital, and confiscated about 200 mortar rounds and nearly 100 rounds of bazooka-type rockets.

200 Enemy Intercepted

In another engagement, United States paratroopers, screening the outer northwestern flanks of the capital, intercepted 200 enemy moving under the cover of darkness and killed 38 of them in a 3-hour battle 29 miles northwest of Saigon today. They also seized several heavy machine guns. United States losses were 22 wounded.

South Vietnamese troops, United States paratroopers and infantrymen, are among thousands sweeping around Saigon in an attempt to defuse an attack allied intelligence sources say is likely to come early this month.

In line with this, North Vietnam threatened intensification of its attacks in South Vietnam in retaliation for what it said was continuing American escalation of the war.

Nhan Dan, North Vietnam's Communist party newspaper, said yesterday: "As a reply to the war intensification by the enemy, the people in both parts of Vietnam are resolved to push ahead their struggle against United States aggression and for national salvation. For the South Vietnamese revolutionary armed forces and people this means that they will step up their general offensive and widespread uprising until complete victory."

In the air campaign United States Air Force B-52 bombers mounted 9 new missions over enemy troop concentrations, base camps and supply and storage areas. Forty-five of the eight-jet bombers dropped 2,500,000 pounds of explosives on enemy targets within a 75-mile arc of Saigon.

Supply Routes Attacked

Over North Vietnam, United States pilots flew 142 missions Saturday against enemy supply routes below the nineteenth Parallel. The pilots reported destroying or damaging 12 trucks, 10 supply boats and 4 railroad cars.

In a political development, the Government yesterday freed the militant Buddhist leader Thich Tri Quang and several other Buddhists held without charges for more than four months.

Thich Tri Quang and five monks were arrested February 21 and held without specific charges. The Government had feared the Viet Cong would seek their participation in a coalition government which the present Saigon regime rejects.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
1 JULY 1968

New Chance for Nuclear Disarmament

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's offer to begin talks with this country on limiting nuclear missile arsenals and antimissile systems was indeed welcome. Perhaps it had more force because it was not a solicited response but in the text of a speech to the Supreme Soviet—not that President Johnson has not been trying to get some action on the subject over the past couple of years.

We would be "vastly encouraged"—as a State Department spokesman promptly put it—if this offer had not come immediately after the United States Senate had at last voted to get started on a "thin" antimissile system dedicated to the possibility that Red China will be able to deliver nuclear rockets on target in the 1970s. Possibly this approval of the first \$227 million of what could be an expense of \$40 billion had nothing to do with the sudden Soviet interest in forestalling it, but the timing was poor.

This country would be glad to be spared that expense, and probably the Soviet Union could do without being challenged, however obliquely, to make a similar outlay.

Further, as Carl Kayser, director of the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study, points out in the current issue of Foreign Affairs Quarterly, "With not too widely disparate levels of offensive forces, and some deployment of defensive forces on both sides, the possibility of an agreed 'freeze' in further deployments of strategic weapons looks more favorable than it has for some time. . . . Wider deployment of ABMs (antiballistic missiles) compounds the difficulty by adding to the uncertainties of both sides as to the effectiveness of their own and their rivals' forces. . . . All signs point to the coming of a time when the stability of mutual deterrence can no longer rest reliably on mutual watchfulness and forbearance, without explicit arms control agreements over strategic weapon deployments. We should do nothing to hasten its arrival, and everything to take advantage of whatever respite we have to move forward to such agreements."

In short, whatever motivated the Soviets to make their offer at this particular time, the time remaining for both of the world's superpowers to grow up to their responsibilities to mankind may be short.

PHILA INQ 1 JULY 68
Biggest Hurdle

(Manchester Guardian)
For progress to begin in Paris, the Americans must stop bombing the North and Hanoi must find an acceptable way of reciprocating. But when that hurdle is overcome, if there is to be any progress towards peace, Saigon will have to find a regime sufficiently representative of nationalist feeling to be able to talk to the Communists. This is likely to be the biggest obstacle of all. But it will have to be overcome if the death and destruction are to be stopped.

EDITORIALS

CHINESE SCIENCE MONITOR

1 JULY 1968

What's happening in Vietnam?

The scenario has changed in many ways. United States and North Vietnamese delegations are now meeting at least once a week in Paris. President Johnson has announced he will bow out next January. Clark Clifford has taken over from Robert McNamara at the Pentagon, and Gen. Creighton Abrams from Gen. William Westmoreland in Vietnam. But the contest of wills is very much the same.

Both sides have, in fact, kept up the military pressures in Vietnam since the tedious meetings began in Paris. Each is apparently determined: (1) to enhance its bargaining position at the table with a well-timed military punch half a world away; and (2) to prevent the other from assuming that what is being sought is face-saving surrender.

Against this background must be seen both the United States command's decision to withdraw from Khe Sanh and indications that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong are about to have another go at Saigon.

No definitive reason for the Khe Sanh withdrawal has been given. Once a decision had been made at the turn of the year to hold the outpost, to have faltered or buckled during the dark days of the Tet offensive would have been calamitous. But many questions have been asked about the wisdom of the kind of static strategy of which Khe Sanh was a symbol. It is interesting that the outpost should be dismantled so soon after General Abrams has taken over. Perhaps it is a move in the direction of the "greater willingness to patrol, ambush and to fight at night"—listed as one of requirements by Herman Kahn, director of the Hudson Institute, in the July number of Foreign Affairs.

One of the factors to emerge forcefully from the Tet offensive was the reduced importance today of such positions as Khe Sanh and the vital importance in the struggle now of South Vietnam's cities. To a certain extent, some of the priority has gone out of the Vietnamese countryside as more and more people have fled from the villages to the cities. The Tet offensive showed that the Communists had woken up to this and were throwing most of their energies now against the cities. In none did they have lasting success, despite what happened at Hue. And this explains why they may be about to have a second major go at Saigon.

So much for the fighting. But what about those Paris talks in which Secretary Clifford said the United States team had "got some bits and straws that indicate that there is some movement now"? Dean Rusk wisely followed this up with what amounted to a cautionary word against reading too much into what his Cabinet colleague had said. Nevertheless, some pieces could be falling into place.

It is not that the North Vietnamese are about to be conciliatory or to get down to genuine business. Rather is it that there are signs that they are preparing a fall-back position from which to negotiate effectively if their Saigon push (or any other offensive) is not a success. Most significant of these signs perhaps was the carefully worded near-admission by North Vietnamese Army Commander General Giap three weeks ago that there were North Vietnamese fighting in South Vietnam after all. This at least indirectly concedes there is something to negotiate about—which has not hitherto been a point on which the North Vietnamese agreed. They had blandly asserted hitherto that they had nobody in the South.

NEW YORK TIMES

1 JULY 1968

Giant Plane, Giant Problems

Yesterday's historic first flight of the giant C-5 Galaxy is a milestone in aviation development. The largest plane in the world, the C-5 has been called at times the "flying football field" and the "flying Holland Tunnel." Designed originally to move troops and battle equipment, this huge plane promises to revolutionize military logistics in the years ahead. Similarly, these transports will render obsolete all present notions of civilian air travel when they appear as liners carrying almost 1,000 persons a trip, at fares probably well below present levels.

Of the many technological advances required for yesterday's aviation breakthrough, the most important was the quantum leap in jet propulsion capabilities represented by the C-5's motors. The enormous size of the new plane forced extraordinary use of light metals and other materials to keep down weight. It also posed unprecedented manufacturing problems whose brilliantly successful solution was proved by yesterday's pathbreaking flight.

But will the airports of this country—and the world, for that matter—be capable of meeting the challenges they will face within the next decade when civilian passenger and cargo versions of the C-5 appear in the sky? Anyone who flies more than occasionally now knows that present facilities for airplane control in flight and for handling airliners, their passengers and their cargoes on the ground are already frequently strained to or beyond their limits. Moreover, many observers have already expressed serious concern about the adequacy of presently planned expanded facilities to handle the burdens in the years immediately ahead when the Airbus and other planes carrying 300 to 500 passengers each come into service. But the giant C-5, its descendants and its competitors will pose needs far beyond even those presented by tomorrow's planes.

By 1978 it may be commonplace for a few enormous planes landing minutes apart to deposit 5,000 or 10,000 passengers on the ground almost simultaneously at a major airport at peak arrival times. Now is none too soon to begin planning for handling such masses of people and their needs in orderly fashion. Responsibility for this planning—and then for implementation of the plans—must be met jointly by the Department of Transportation, the airline companies, and the numerous local governmental and other units responsible for American aviation's ground facilities. The vast size of the giant new planes ahead is dwarfed only by the enormity of the unprecedented problems they pose.

WALL STREET JOURNAL 1 JULY 68

The largest plane ever built, the C5 Galaxy, made its first test flight, which the Air Force and the builder termed highly successful. The 248-ton, four-jet transport, built by Lockheed Aircraft's Lockheed-Georgia division, flew over north Georgia for slightly more than 1½ hours. Its test pilot said he had "minimum, minimum problems." Fifty-eight of the planes, designed to carry 350 troops and their equipment, are scheduled for delivery to the Air Force by 1971.

Red China has developed its first intercontinental ballistic missile, Communist sources in Moscow said. They told the Associated Press they understood that the missile hasn't been tested but that its construction was completed in the past few days. The development, if true, would make China the third nation, after the U.S. and Russia, with an ICBM and would broaden a nuclear capability that Peking says includes a hydrogen bomb.

The Pentagon, in its annual splash to spend all its budgeted funds, poured out more than \$685 million for 136 separate defense contracts as the Government's fiscal year ended. The biggest award, four Army contracts totaling \$97.4 million, went to Kaiser Jeep Corp.

PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN
29 JUNE 1968 (1 JULY)

Stopping an ABM Race

The Kremlin rather obviously has been having an internal tug of war over nuclear weapons policy and how far to go in collaborating with the United States.

Foreign Minister Gromyko's inclusion in his foreign policy review to the Supreme Soviet of an offer to discuss the limiting of antiballistic missile systems with Washington, is an indication that the influence of the "restrainers" in the Kremlin is at the moment uppermost.

What caused the Soviet leaders to respond favorably to a proposal President Johnson has been repeating for a year and a half, can only be a matter of conjecture. As seen from Washington, the Soviets have had as much interest in preventing a disastrous ABM defense race as this country did, yet the President has been brushed off with the stock explanation that the Vietnam war prevented improvement of relations between Russia and the United States.

Former UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg thought that the signing of the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear

weapons might lead to a Soviet willingness to discuss ABMs. His hunch may have been right for the Soviets claim the treaty as their own and take great pride in it as a Soviet achievement.

The change of view on ABMs, of course, must be explored to the fullest to find out what the Soviets have in mind. They cannot be expected to stop building their ABM defenses around Moscow without getting something in return. As far as ABMs are concerned, the United States has only the threat to build a system as a bargaining point.

The prospect would be brighter if Mr. Gromyko had not surrounded his offer to exchange "opinions" with the kind of unrealism that has marked Soviet disarmament talk ever since World War II. He was still advocating "general and complete" disarmament which has been a propagandistic slogan. And he proposed an international conference to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons. Manifestly, an ABM agreement cannot wait on Utopia.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 JUNE 1968 (1 JULY)

Now rockets

The movement toward greater world security has picked up momentum. Moscow's announcement that it is "ready to exchange opinions on the curtailment of rocket systems—both offensive and defensive" is of immense hope and encouragement for mankind.

In thus responding positively to year-and-a-half-long American efforts to get such talks started, the Soviet Union has again indicated its recognition of the need for a limitation on today's terrible armaments. For this Kremlin response follows hard on the heels of the United Nations General Assembly's endorsement of the joint American-British-Russian treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

President Johnson, in his surprise address to the General Assembly on June 12, asked that the nuclear treaty be followed by other disarmament negotiations. Through its positive response on rockets, the Soviet Union seems clearly anxious to maintain the present momentum toward a relaxation of the threat which today's gigantic and monstrously destructive weaponry poses to peace and security.

True, a vast amount of hard negotiating lies ahead. True, Moscow is today talking primarily of rockets and not of an overall cutback in armaments.

But neither of these facts need discourage men and nations of goodwill in their determination to find a means of

lightening the burden and threat of armaments. No one familiar with the complexities of the problem (whether technical, political, ideological or economic) has ever supposed that armament agreements could be reached other than after long and hard bargaining.

As for beginning with rockets, this is clearly a most sensible place to take off. After nuclear weapons (with which they are so closely associated) rockets are the greatest international weapon menace. A limitation on them would be a gigantic step forward.

Moscow's willingness to open talks on rockets strengthens the argument that the Kremlin, basically, believes that its best interest lies in at least limited cooperation with the United States in the preservation of world peace. It is interesting to note that this "yes" from Moscow came only a couple of days after the United States Senate decided to go ahead with the Sentinel antimissile missile system. Were America to press forward vigorously with this system, Moscow in turn would almost certainly have felt forced to step up its own antimissile missile system at a probable cost of tens of billions of dollars.

Thus economically, as well as practically and morally, America and Russia must turn their attention to the curtailment of rockets, not to their expansion.

NEW YORK NEWS
29 JUNE 1968 (1 JULY)

GROMYKO ON MISSILES

Soviet Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told the Soviet Parliament Thursday that his country just might be willing to accept the U.S. proposal for talks about calling off the expensive antiballistic missiles race.

Before we jump for joy, as some of the stupider among us already are doing, the U.S. government should demand of the Soviet Russian tyrants a one-word answer

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 JUNE 1968 (1 JULY)

Bring the boys home?

How many troops on guard in Europe constitute security?

This basic question is raised anew whenever the NATO ministers meet, as this week in Reykjavik, Iceland. But this year it has assumed a new twist, to wit: Should the United States and the West thin out their forces anyway, in West Germany and at Berlin, even if the Soviet Union is not disposed to thin out its forces on the other side of the East-West line? And even if Moscow's East German satellite is making trouble for West Germans along the travel routes to Berlin?

Two Democratic Senators, Stuart Symington and Mike Mansfield, have called for a prompt reduction of American troop strength in Europe, from the present 220,000 force to a mere 50,000. They say 50,000 men are sufficient as a trip wire and a warning to the Soviets to make no forward lunge. They argue that the Russians are having altogether too much trouble with their Eastern European allies to be willing presently to contemplate a thin-out of their own garrisons in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary—but why wait on the Russians?

An argument can surely be made for taking the initiative. It can be contended that, eventually, as the American reduction allayed tensions, the Soviets in turn would pull back their forces. And that an American initiative could save the Pentagon many millions of dollars.

But the administration strongly opposes a cutback at this time. Again, arguments can be made for this viewpoint. For instance: Why weaken Western strength at the precise moment when East bloc countries are in partial rebellion against Moscow? Why talk thinouts when the East German Government is making itself particularly obnoxious? Why act when there is political instability in France and West Germany?

We can see great value in approaching Moscow on the troop-reduction issue—as one more prospect for détente, along with the nonproliferation treaty, the talks on missile limitation and suchlike. In fact the NATO council at Reykjavik has just now appealed for a mutual East-West reduction of forces in Europe.

But a unilateral withdrawal is another matter. Would it persuade Moscow to do likewise—or to plot new aggressions against the West? We realize the pressures on Congress to cut forces, save money. But, before any such action, we would like to see closest consultation with NATO allies, and further soundings in Moscow regarding the prospects for mutuality. This would give better perspective, as to whether unilateral action was forehanded, or foolhardy.

to the question: In event of such an agreement, will the Kremlin permit periodic inspections inside Russia, by U.S., Nato or other teams, to make sure that Russia is not cheating?

If the Kremlin's answer is Yes, let's proceed with the talks—though very cautiously. If the Kremlin's answer adds up to No, let's proceed full-speed with an antiballistic missiles program aimed at protecting us against both Red China and Red Russia.

FEATURES COLUMNISTS

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS - 28 JUNE 1968 (1 JULY 1968)

Do U.S. generals understand war? Reversal on defense of Khe Sanh leads to questioning of U.S. military leadership in Washington and Saigon

By Raymond R. Coffey

The generals in Vietnam changed their minds again this week.

Less than six months ago—when a lot of other people were questioning the value of Khe Sanh—the generals insisted the besieged base was a vital stake in the war that must be held as the western anchor of the northern defense line.

Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then top commander in Saigon, went so far as to suggest publicly that the Viet Cong's countrywide, weeks-long Tet offensive, the strongest and most sustained campaign of the war, was just a "diversion" to cover the enemy's real goal of capturing Khe Sanh.

And Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Khe Sanh was "psychologically important because if lost it would permit North Vietnamese troops to advance deep into South Vietnam territory, come very close to the heavily populated coastal regions and thereby exacerbate the fears of the South Vietnamese that the North Vietnamese will be able to take over the two northern provinces of South Vietnam—a longtime objective of theirs."

Now suddenly—and thousands of U.S. casualties later—property values around Khe Sanh have nosedived. The U.S. command in Saigon disclosed Thursday that the base once counted so vital is being leveled and abandoned. The U.S. garrison there, the generals say, will be used in a "new concept of mobile warfare."

THIS SWITCH ON KHE SANH is typical of the sort of thing that generates criticism and questioning of the U.S. military leadership in Washington and Saigon.

Until the Tet offensive last winter the generals had been largely, and curiously, immune from the sort of controversy that dogged almost everyone else concerned with the war. From President Johnson to Dr. Spock.

Since Tet, however, the generals too have been getting their lumps.

A feeling is conspicuously growing among people in Vietnam and among the constant flow of official experts from Washington that the generals should have accomplished a lot more than they have.

Even South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu has criticized the emphasis placed on Khe Sanh by Westmoreland and the U.S. "war of attrition" strategy.

And Westmoreland's litany of assurances that progress is being made has become the funniest joke in Saigon.

THESE ARE SOME of the points generally included in the indictments of the American military leadership:

From a professional military point of view, **one** of the most important mistakes is the policy of requiring officers to spend only **one**-year tours of duty in Vietnam.

That is the judgment of many of the officers themselves, as well as of people like Herman Kahn, a professional civilian strategist and thinker about war.

An officer barely gets to know his way around before his tour is up, the critics say, and efficiency suffers.

Compounding the one-year tour mistake is the policy, followed rigidly by Westmore-

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR - 29 JUNE 1968 (1 JULY)

No more Khe Sanhs for U.S.?

By George W. Ashworth
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The abandonment of Khe Sanh sharply delineates a shift in United States military strategy in Vietnam.

During the past several months, the U.S. command in Saigon has struggled to enhance the mobility and flexibility of allied fighting forces.

In the face of steadily more intensive Communist efforts, it was determined that the regaining of the tactical offensive whenever and wherever possible was essential.

And, as the character of the allied and enemy efforts has changed, Khe Sanh has become, simply, superfluous.

High cost of battle

Many would argue that Khe Sanh was unnecessary all along. Some military and civilian officials in the Pentagon view Khe Sanh as an effort that could have been a tragedy and became through intensive efforts merely a blunder.

Others argue fervently that the enemy was smashing defeated around Khe Sanh. The Air Force considers Khe Sanh a signal victory. A film pressing that point of view is being shown widely.

Now bulldozers have pushed debris in gaping holes where bunkers stood. And valuable equipment has been taken out. Almost all that remains is a vast, barren piece of earth, surrounded by pocked and ugly hills and slopes.

The battle for Khe Sanh was an expensive affair. From Jan. 19 until March 31, when the siege had been broken, 199 marines in and around Khe Sanh were killed, and an additional 1,600 marines were wounded. Heavy casualties also were suffered by Vietnamese troops and Army Special Forces men.

Bombs worth about \$250 million were dropped in support of the operation, and millions more worth of artillery and mortar rounds were fired. Equipment and maintenance costs added tens of millions more to that figure.

A valid question now is what Khe Sanh accomplished.

• If the enemy goal was to overrun the base at heavy cost to the allied military in the field and to cause heavy psychological damage to the allied war effort throughout the world and in the United States in particular, the effort was at least a partial failure.

Sources agree that Khe Sanh brought on much dismay throughout this nation, but they point out that the effect would have been infinitely worse had the base been lost at heavy cost in life. It would have been particularly grim had numerous captives been taken.

• If the effort was to create a diversion, it was doubtless a success, for the defense

of Khe Sanh required far more than the 6,000 marines manning it. Thousands of troops had to be made available for use in the event of a massed attack on the base. And thousands more were steadily involved in the air support and supply efforts.

The damaging Tet offensive began after the siege of Khe Sanh was under way. But there is some doubt whether allied forces would have been any more prepared to cope with the offensive had Khe Sanh not been a problem. And the Tet effort was largely crushed before Khe Sanh became such an overweening concern.

Throughout the period of the siege, marines claim, outposts continued to screen Khe Sanh, and patrols were conducted.

Khe Sanh was supposed, however, to be the western anchor of a line of allied concentrations in the area south of the demilitarized zone.

Marines operating out of Khe Sanh were expected to keep tabs on enemy infiltration from Laos and disrupt it as much as possible. However, as the siege worsened, the marines found themselves able to do little about infiltration past their base.

It has been argued that Khe Sanh provided the opportunity for about 6,500 allied troops to hold about two enemy divisions in place while the enemy forces were mauled. However, some argue that the thousands of allied servicemen kept tied up backstopping Khe Sanh makes that numerical comparison somewhat illusory.

Struggle for land ending?

But enemy losses were very high. Some units were decimated in the operation. Between Nov. 1 and March 31, 1,561 enemy troops were killed in the Khe Sanh area, according to allied estimates, which some believe are somewhat underestimated. Thousands of North Vietnamese troops were wounded, and tons of enemy equipment fell into allied hands during the mopping-up operation.

Khe Sanh was in a sense the last vestige of a different sort of war—a kind which may well be largely avoided in the period ahead. It was a battle for land between two determined forces.

Its abandonment reminds observers here of other battles of the past two years—battles in which heavy losses were sustained to gain ground that was later given up.

During periods of shorter supplies of troops, the eventual abandonment of hard-won territory was largely dictated by the shortage of manpower. Troops became needed for other tasks, and they would leave.

Now the troops that were at Khe Sanh are not needed in that sense. But it has been decided that they could be more successfully occupied in more mobile forces.

According to the U.S. Saigon headquarters, enemy forces of the First Corps area now include the equivalent of eight divisions, as opposed to six in January when the Khe Sanh battle started.

The forces, the command believes, give the North Vietnamese the capability to mount several sizable attacks at once.

Landing Zone Stud held

The key to the altered allied strategy is in the official comment: "To meet this significantly increased threat, friendly forces must make maximum advantage of their superior

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

DO U. S. GENERALS UNDERSTAND WAR? ... CONTINUED

land, of not keeping an officer in a command job for more than six months.

Command assignments are essential for career officers hoping to move up the promotion ladder. And there is a lot of competition for them. The six-months idea is supposed to give more men a crack at command and broaden the experience base of the Army.

But again it's questionable if either a battalion commander or a battalion, for example, can operate most effectively in this sort of swinging-door situation.

Giving more men experience in command assignments is no doubt a good thing for the Army, but Vietnam is not a training maneuver at Fort Benning.

ANOTHER CONSPICUOUS failing of the U.S. military leadership, the critics say, is that it has consistently underestimated the enemy capability. The evidence abounds.

Westmoreland, for example, talked continually of reaching "the crossover point"—that is the point at which the enemy was supposedly losing troops faster than he could recruit or infiltrate replacements.

This point, according to the Saigon command, had been reached, re-reached and reached again during the last year or so. And yet it can hardly be argued that the enemy is showing any signs of folding.

In this same connection, Westmoreland was once asked, when talking about the "crossover point," if he was referring to what the enemy planned or was capable of in the way of replacements.

His response was that the whole "crossover" discussion was based on what the enemy was doing—not at all on what he might do or be able to do. It sounded incredible, but that was the answer.

SIMILARLY, when the big new \$40,000,000 U.S. military headquarters was built at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airbase, the assumption was that the enemy had now been pushed back from the metropolitan area and the headquarters was secure from any major attack.

Suddenly the enemy turned up with the long-range rockets that have been hitting Saigon for weeks now, and a U.S. construction company was called in for a rush job on a steel-and-concrete bunker addition to the headquarters.

S. Viet army sad

Perhaps the most readily visible failure of the U.S. military establishment in Vietnam is the South Vietnamese army.

Americans have been advising and equipping the Vietnamese for well over ten years now, and the U.S. military prides itself on its technological superiority.

Yet today the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese are better armed than the government army. Enemy guerrillas who as recently as three years ago were using pop-bottle grenades, homemade rifles and sharpened sticks now are armed with Red Chinese AK-47 rifles much superior to the old carbines and M-1s the government soldiers have.

Recently—belatedly—the United States has begun issuing our modern M-16s to the Vietnamese, and Westmoreland's staff says he asked for the new rifles as long ago as 1965.

However, I was there then and I clearly recall Westmoreland's staff people saying they didn't want to give the Vietnamese better weapons because they were losing and leaving so many of them on the battlefield.

THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE army is, of course, a pretty sorry outfit.

Its weaknesses, however, cannot be blamed entirely on the Vietnamese. If they are confused, it is a made-in-America confusion.

A couple of years ago, after the Manila conference, for example, Westmoreland and the Americans decided that the U.S. troops would bear the brunt of the war and handle the major combat. The South Vietnamese army, it was then said, was better able to work on "pacification," securing areas for government cadre teams that would go in

and win the hearts and minds of the people.

There was a special pacification training program for the Vietnamese, and battalions were dispersed about the country in their new role.

Now, of course, despite official denials to the contrary, the pacification program has been all but forgotten. And, since Tet, things have changed once again, and now the Vietnamese are being asked to bear more of the major combat burden.

Conventional warfare

U.S. military leaders also have talked a lot about having to fight the enemy on his own terms, about having to learn guerrilla warfare, the need to operate at night and so on.

In fact, however, the U.S. effort has appeared to be directed at making the war as conventional as possible, the kind the generals fought before and know how to fight.

For all the talking, U.S. and Vietnamese troops do very little operating at night—which is when the Viet Cong do most of theirs.

It is still most common for U.S. units out on operations to start digging in for the night at around 4 p.m. Then, before dark a wave of highly visible helicopters arrives with a hot dinner. That makes life more comfortable, but the enemy doesn't require much genius to adjust his mortars for a night bombardment of the U.S. position.

AS THE HELICOPTER-DELIVERED hot meals (often eaten picnic-style off paper plates and with plastic knives and forks) suggest, troops in Vietnam have more creature comforts than in any previous war. And that's fine.

However, it does appear sometimes that the U.S. military leadership has become overinvolved with logistics and technology.

Until Tet, for example, Westmoreland in reciting the progress he said was being made talked always about how many airfields had been built, how many deepwater ports dug, how many roads built (not to mention PXs, bowling alleys and swimming pools).

He sounded more like a construction company president than a general with a war on his hands.

Headquarters staff people often sounded as though all that was needed to win the war was a few more helicopters or airplanes or tanks or some other kind of machine.

The most ridiculous example of this approach—cited by command staff people themselves—was the Navy decision to take a battleship out of mothballs and send it to Vietnam at an astronomical cost.

Navy people, when asked about it, talk about how the ship's 16-inch guns can hurl shells weighing several hundred pounds or so 20 miles or whatever. That leaves unanswered the question of what the shell can do that a bomb can't, or what there is in North Vietnam to throw such a big shell at.

"The whole thing is, the Navy wants to get on the cover of Life magazine," is the verdict of an Army general.

On the other hand, things that might be useful sometimes don't get built or don't get to Vietnam.

Recently, for example, Gen. Wheeler disclosed to a congressional committee that \$300,000,000 or \$400,000,000 worth of airplanes had been lost on the ground as the result of enemy rocket and mortar attacks in Vietnam.

He made the disclosure in appealing for funds to build revetments with roofs on them to protect our planes—in Europe, where there is no war, not in Vietnam, where there is one.

THE MOST SERIOUS charge made against the U.S. military leadership—and those who make it include some of the top civilian members of the U.S. mission in Vietnam—is that the generals still don't really understand the war and what it's all

about.

A lot of lip service is paid to the fact that this is, as they keep saying, "a political war" and a war in which standard military measurements just don't apply.

Thus within the last few weeks Westmoreland has said again that the attacks on Saigon are of "no military significance."

That's right. The attackers are not inflicting great casualties, they're not about to run the Americans out of town, the fighting is pretty small-scale.

BUT WHAT ABOUT the significance in a political war? The enemy attacks do weaken the government and multiply its refugee and other welfare problems. They also make the people even wearier of the war than they already are. And they have led to a lot of grumbling among the people about the inability of the government and the Americans to protect them.

This sort of effect can make Westmoreland's line about "no military significance" irrelevant.

In their own defense, top military people in Vietnam complain privately about being forced to fight the war "on the cheap," not getting all the troops they need, having restrictions on bombing targets in North Vietnam.

Some also argue that, in order to win, the war must be expanded to Laos, where the enemy has much of his infiltration and supply system.

The United States and its allies, however, have well over 1,200,000 men under arms now—an edge of almost six-to-one over the enemy. They also have an enormous edge in equipment and technology—helicopters, aircraft carriers and destroyer fleets, bombers, artillery, tanks and all the rest of it.

It's questionable whether there's room for much more, and the question being asked more and more lately is how well and how wisely the commitment already made is being used.

Former Defense Sec. Robert S. McNamara angered Westmoreland last year when McNamara seemed to suggest that better use might be made of the troops already in Vietnam.

The generals never did like McNamara. Perhaps they're lucky they never had to work for Abraham Lincoln.

When things were going badly in 1862, the Civil War President—who hired and fired practically a platoon of generals until he found one who could win—cracked that if the Union commander, Gen. George McClellan, did "not want to use the army," he (Lincoln) "would like to borrow it."

ASHWORTH ... CONTINUED

firepower and mobility. Mobile forces tied to no specific terrain must be used to the utmost to attack, intercept, reinforce, or take whatever action is most appropriate to meet the enemy threats."

Some of the marines are moving several miles east of Khe Sanh to Landing Zone Stud and to three nearby hilltop firing bases. This was disclosed in a dispatch to the Baltimore Sun, which also announced the departure from Khe Sanh. Some plans may now be changed because of the disclosures.

But many of the marines who were at Khe Sanh can be expected to become available for use in free-wheeling attack operations.

The war now is in something of a lull. Allied officials are uncertain where enemy forces might strike in force next, but they have little doubt that there will be strikes.

As sources see it, the main hope now is to smash enemy forces wherever possible, to frustrate organization for attack, and to keep up the heavy and damaging attrition of enemy forces.

And static confrontations on countryside battlefields will be avoided. Allied forces will try to find enemy units, destroy them with great force of arms, and move on.

Through these means and better defenses of populated areas and bases, the allies will try to keep the enemy from making any gains—and themselves from any losses—that could have an effect upon the Paris talks.

WASHINGTON STAR - 30 JUNE 1968 (JULY)

PHILA. INQUIRER
30 June 1968 (1JUL)HANOI SACRIFICING
TROOPS TO GAIN ON
POLITICAL FRONT

By PETER ARNETT

SAIGON, June 29 (AP). — Vietnam's Communist leadership continues relentlessly to unroll its biggest military offensive right into the jaws of allied strength.

Vast allied firepower is chewing up enemy troops by the thousands in the battles that began with the Tet offensive five months ago. The bloodletting across the country is awesome, more than double that of last year.

Yet to the consternation of senior American officers, as rapidly as the Communist-led troops die, as many again beat their way down through the bomb-blackened jungles, across the shell-pocked paddyfields and right up to the doors of the capital itself.

"By God, there are 51 enemy battalions maneuvering just one day's march from Saigon," commented a U. S. general, stabbing his finger at a tactical map covered with brown patches showing where enemy units encircled the city.

"They arrived in February, they have hit us twice, and they are still there pressuring the city, regardless of casualties."

Much of the killing in recent months the enemy has brought upon himself. He attacked objectives he had no real possibility of seizing. Many times he fought seemingly only for the sake of fighting.

The easy, extensive kills have led some observers to believe that North Vietnam's military chieftain, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, is making his great mistake of the war. By disregarding his own rules of guerrilla warfare and engaging the Allies in conventional battles, they suggest, he has committed his armies to certain defeat in South Vietnam.

The most knowledgeable Americans and Vietnamese read the current situation much differently.

They do not see North Vietnam as on a do-or-die course that will lead either to victory or destruction.

They see the enemy fighting a short-term high intensity war to impact with maximum effectiveness on the South Vietnamese and the American public this year—particularly by inflicting American casualties. These have doubled to more than 9000 dead for the first six months.

Enemy forces have shelved tracted "war into the future" they were fighting up to late last year. They try and reap quick political gains now, hoping that the Vietnamese Government will fragment, that the people will get tired, and that the issue of peace on their terms can be forced here and in the United States.

Should these gains not be made, then the North Vietnamese could use any of many

A Vietnam Dilemma:
When to Use Restraint

By ORR KELLY

Star Staff Writer

FORT BRAGG, N. C. — Col. Samuel V. Wilson was talking about the loss of life and the damage to property that has accompanied the use of overwhelming American firepower in South Vietnam.

He paused for a moment, thinking, and then said:

"You know, we haven't awarded any medals for military restraint. But perhaps we ought to."

"This is the great dilemma of every military commander in Vietnam."

"Military action without political followup is useless. Political action without military security is futile. We have to seek a balance. A military commander can make a series of military victories add up to political defeat."

Wilson, who wrote the original description of the role of the Army's Special Forces and subsequently became one of the legendary figures of the U. S. involvement in Vietnam, has been back here for about a year and now heads the 6th Special Forces Group.

Well Informed

Because of the time that has elapsed since he was in Vietnam, he is careful to note that he is not an expert on what is going on there now. But frequent exchanges of letters with friends who are still there, combined with his own three years in the country, have kept him well informed about the situation in Vietnam even though his attention is now focused on the Middle East, South Asia and Africa south of the

options they still retain. Based on Allied studies of North Vietnam's population growth, they can sustain the current huge casualty rate indefinitely and fight on, admittedly with troops of increasingly poorer quality.

Or if the Allied pressure became too great they could make "one little concession in Paris and we'll have to back off," commented a U. S. general.

Alternatively, the North Vietnamese could cut their losses and fade back into jungle sanctuaries, continuing the war as before while building back the guerrilla units that have been badly mauled. They could start a new offensive any time they were ready.

There are two factors short of full-scale unlimited war that could frustrate the North Vietnamese.

One would be a miraculous improvement in the Vietnamese Army, permitting American troops to go home. The other is getting the Saigon Government the support of the population.

Both prospects are remote. Knowledgeable Americans see the Vietnamese Army, for all its new automatic weapons, be-

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

3-F

Sahara.

In February of 1967, Wilson recalled, he was working with the South Vietnamese army in Long An province, south of Saigon. He learned that a Viet Cong group was meeting in a village—information that was later confirmed—and called in an airstrike.

From an observation plane circling overhead, he saw a dozen children run from the burning huts, one with his clothing afire.

"I call off the Skyraiders and I am sick to my stomach," Wilson noted in his diary that night.

Because of experiences like this, Wilson is painfully aware that firepower may not only kill Viet Cong—but create them as well.

"The roughest question," he said, "is whether we are using enough restraint to avoid creating VC. There are times when we haven't done it sufficiently well. But we are learning. We are doing a little better than we were a year or two ago."

Many Losses

On the other hand, he is convinced the VC and the North Vietnamese have suffered terrible losses.

"North Vietnam wouldn't be in Paris if they weren't in bad shape. I can say that flatly," he said. "They would not be at the conference table if all were going well militarily. Coming to Paris was out of necessity on their part."

"There is no doubt in my mind," he added, "that the Tet offensive was a stunning defeat for them. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the regional and popular forces, the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, the national police all fought valiantly. When the Vietnamese teach history to their children years in the future, this will be one of the bright pages in their military history."

But the Paris meetings do not necessarily mean the U. S. is certain to achieve its objectives in Southeast Asia, in Wilson's view.

"Even if we settle things in South Vietnam, we will still have a monumental problem, but it won't be nearly as severe as it would be if we don't solve things in Vietnam."

"I think we can restore enough stability to the area so the people will have a fighting chance to determine their own destiny."

Wilson, interviewed in his office in a World War II barracks building at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center here, is convinced that the Special Forces still have a vital role to play in the Army and as an instrument of U. S. foreign policy, even though the nature of that role has shifted somewhat since it was first formulated in the late 1950s.

The original concept was that the Special Forces would be used in a major war to aid guerrilla units operating behind enemy lines such as those that fought in German-occupied territory in World War II.

But in Vietnam, where the Fifth Special Forces Group is operating, the emphasis has shifted 180 de-

grees, from guerrilla warfare to counter-guerrilla warfare.

The Special Forces still train for operations consistent with their original role—partly because they still may be called upon for that kind of work, partly because many of the techniques are interchangeable.

Wilson and his group, for example, have just concluded an exercise called Orbit Wings II in the area south of Salt Lake City, Utah.

Rivals Take Sides

It was assumed that the Irbian army had invaded the area from the east and that the U. S. Special forces were sent to aid the Astro- vians who had been overrun. Half of the group acted as Irbians—the other half as the "good guys."

In addition to the 600 Special Forces soldiers, 3,000 civilians were drawn into the five-week war game.

At one ranch, a Special Forces man who had parachuted into the nearby mountains pitched hay to earn a meal and, before the rancher realized what was happening, he had agreed to help set up an operations center in his cellar.

In the towns, rival auto dealers found themselves taking sides, furnishing trucks and gasoline to the soldiers.

"We got ourselves involved in the society," Wilson said. "People had to make choices."

"It was interesting to watch and also a little frightening. We came in with political and propaganda lines and latched onto the needs and aspirations of the people. It was a demonstration of how a disciplined minority can come in and shape an element of society to its own purposes. One hopes those purposes would be in the interests of the whole society."

Flexible Role

As Wilson now sees it, the role of the Special Forces can be extremely flexible. It can be as little as the one man who recently went to Iran to help train paratroops or a method of keeping U. S. options open as the Special Forces did in Laos in the early 1960s when they provided a choice between major military involvement and total withdrawal.

But, whatever the role, Wilson has little patience with those who worry that the decision to send a small number of Special Forces units into a country will inevitably drag the U. S. into future Vietnam-sized engagements.

"In Vietnam," he said, "I don't think the Special Forces were the reason we had to go up the next staircase."

"Their numbers were pitifully small. Their activities were essentially defensive in character. If one can say we waved the red flag, he would have to say that of almost anything we did that might have some effect. One would have to say that putting in civilian advisers in health and education was also provocative."

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER - 1 JULY 1968

Vietnam Pacification

NEW YORK, June 30 (AP)—A retiring U. S. Marine Corps combat officer in Vietnam says in a book published Monday that the American pacification effort in South Vietnam is a dead issue—"dead, finished, kaput."

The charge about the "other war" is included in a sweeping indictment of U. S. policy and action in Vietnam, and of corruption and ineptitude on the part of the South Vietnamese military and civilians.

The book, "The Betrayal," published by W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., is by Lt. Col. William R. Corson, 42, who retired Sunday after 25 years in the Marine Corps. He is joining the economics department of Howard University.

The veteran of combat in the Second World War, Korea and Vietnam was reprimanded by the Marine Corps for publication of the book, on a charge that he failed to submit the

manuscript for review.

Corson's request for retirement, after being approved, was delayed until a study of the case was finished. The corps said the content of the book was not in question.

Corson says the pacification program, called Revolutionary Development in the latest phase was shown by the Vietcong Tet offensive to be "just one more swindle in a long line of short-lived pacification programs."

"No matter what the reason or combination of reasons for not facing the facts openly and leveling with the American public," he says, "the blunt and inescapable conclusion is that Revolutionary Development or pacification is dead, finished, kaput."

Corson advocates cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, arguing that it does no good. He suggests several steps to avoid corruption and to reach

the peasant. He says there should be a reduction in troop strength to 250,000 from the current 535,000.

"If we are to remain in Vietnam," he says, "we can no longer tolerate the ineptness, corruption and rot of the GVN (Government of South Vietnam) or the nonperformance of the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam)."

"The GVN," he says, "is a rotten, corrupt institution with little or no real popular support even with the false front of free elections."

Corson also suggests withdrawal of all American military advisers from the South Vietnamese army and allowing a coalition government, among other moves.

The author has some of his harshest criticism for Robert W. Komer, head of the pacification effort, and Gen. William C. Westmoreland, who has left as

head of the military forces in Vietnam.

Komer's evaluation of safe hamlets, Corson says, "must be unmasked for the fraud it really is."

"By giving a false picture of progress," Corson says, "it grossly deceives the American people concerning actual conditions in Vietnam."

Corson argues that the evaluation is based on the "grossest of measurements" and is used to "trumpet hosanna paper progress for political reasons." Komer's claim that two-thirds of the population is secure, he said, is a "glaring untruth."

Corson says Westmoreland's belief that the central aim of American military strategy must be to defeat the enemy offensive is a "grievous and fundamental error."

Both Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak and Lt. Gen. Lewis W. Walt of the Marine Corps were aware, Corson says, that "Search and destroy was the gospel according to Westmoreland even though it was clearly inadequate."

WASHINGTON POST - 1 JULY 1968

Unity Still a Dream in Saigon

By Lee Lescaze

Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, June 30—Greater unity in the anti-Communist cause has for years been one of the goals of American Vietnam policy and has been a hoped-for result of recent events.

The Sept. 3 election was to bring a popular government to South Vietnam; the replacement of Premier Nguyen Van Loc by Premier Tran Van Huong was to broaden to government's popular base; in the eyes of many officials, the Vietcong Tet offensive would have a positive affect because it would generate support for the government among people who previously had been loath to take sides.

On Saturday, President Thieu told a meeting of political and religious leaders that one of the major reasons the war against the Communists has not been won is because "there was no unity and cooperation among our political organizations."

Cooperation Lacking

It has become increasingly apparent, however, that South Vietnam's disparate political organizations are not willing to cooperate unless the government provides a tempting reason for them to come into the fold, at least temporarily.

Thieu said that he considers "political parties as the country's infrastructure while the government, including both executive and legislature, is only its superstructure."

This is an amazing state-

ment for a politician operating in a nation without effective political parties. It is an invitation to form parties, particularly parties which support the President—a man elected without a political base to the leadership of a nation he is charged with changing into a constitutional democracy.

Overtures by Sects

Leaders of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai religious groups have recently made overtures to the Saigon government. They would like more arms in exchange for more energetic loyalty to the anti-Communist cause.

A senior American official said last week that he had no knowledge of such gestures by the religious groups. Vietnamese aides to the President make no men-

tion of any new arrangement with the sects.

There was a time when American and government officials paid greater heed to the requests of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai minorities.

A characteristic of the Vietnamese political scene since Tet has been the formation of political organizations designed to present a unified front in opposition to the Vietcong. It was largely to these groups that Thieu spoke Saturday.

Buddhist Released

The release from detainment of Thich Tri Quang is certain to please many of the old political groups in Saigon opposed to Thieu's government.

But, the last six months have demonstrated that South Vietnam's govern-

ment is not going to be built into a popular, widely supported political regime no matter what political dealings are made with the traditional power blocs in the capital.

None of these blocs has been able to produce significant political support for its leaders since the election. No political organization has been strong enough to command a major voice in Thieu's government or in the opposition.

The weakness of the old-line groups was recognized when Thieu asked that there be one opposition bloc in the legislature to represent all the dissident elements. On past form, the divisions within such a bloc would be stronger than any common opposition to the President's programs.

HANOI SACRIFICING TROOPS TO GAIN ON POLITICAL FRONT ... CONT'D

coming at best the cutting edge for the other Allies, a role hitherto held by the Americans. This would lower American casualties but not permit any U. S. combat units to go home, these Americans believe.

There is no sign the Vietnamese population has warmed toward a Saigon Government that is staggering through one crisis after another, anxiously nursed by the American Embassy.

VIET DISSENSION

"The people just do not accept their Government," one senior American commented. "What a pity this is, because we can never capitalize on the other side's mistakes."

Dissension within the Vietnamese military high command adds to political instability.

"I could launch a coup d'etat

any time I liked, any time I wanted too, and the Americans could not stop me," Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky said a few days ago.

TOO MUCH POWER

Ky was lolling in swimming trunks under a yellow parachute canopy shielding off the sun on a Nha Trang beach. He had just vented rage against President Nguyen Van Thieu, long a rival, who is now attempting to grasp complete political and military power at the expense of Ky and his associates. "President Ngo Dinh Diem craved too much power. Look what happened to him," Ky commented, blinking under his blue baseball cap.

After he took over the American troop command in Vietnam recently, Gen. Creighton W.

Abrams told a staff conference how he would handle the enemy menace on Saigon:

"We are going to drop so many B-52s on them that all we'll need to do is to send in an unarmed LURP long-range patrol team with notebooks to keep score . . ."

HOLDING ACTION

Firepower remains the key to Allied strategy, and the high-flying B-52 bombers Abrams favors are pounding the countryside from the heavily populated Mekong Delta to the starkly gaunt DMZ.

The Allies are fighting a holding action. When the reporter asked the former Vietnamese commander in the delta, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Duc Thang, if he would get victory, he said, "We hold on tight now, win later."

LOS ANGELES TIMES - 23 JUNE 1968 (1 JULY)

South Vietnamese Forces Still Inadequate to Defend Nation

Causes Include Weapon Shortages, Inappropriate Military Tactics and Morale-Sapping Political Maneuvers in Saigon

BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT

Times Staff Writer

SAIGON—South Vietnam's military forces still are inadequate to defend the nation.

Much of the blame rests with the United States, for South Vietnam's 815,000-man military and paramilitary forces are largely creations of the Americans who planned, trained, equipped and guided them in battle.

The shortcomings are rooted in a wide range of causes, both military and nonmilitary.

They can be found in the Eisenhower-Kennedy-Johnson Administrations' policies of piecemeal escalation, and in the morale-sapping political maneuverings in Saigon and overseas.

They can be found in inappropriate military strategy and ineffectual battlefield tactics. And they can be found in shortages, both in quality and quantity, of weapons and other military hardware.

Being Ally Can Be Hard

As a result, experience has taught the Vietnamese that it can be very difficult being an ally of the United States.

A deeply concerned bystander, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand, recently described the problem in words the South Vietnamese are both too polite and too prudent to utter in public.

"A major problem of the non-Communists is that we are not geared to unconventional warfare," said Thanat. "Americans are not efficient in training the South Vietnamese to carry on the war, but the other side has shown its ability to train the North Vietnamese. Our side seems very stingy with weapons and equipment. We give our friends too little and too late."

Thanat continued: "The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong have a profusion of new weapons. Even in Laos, while the government troops have the old-style rifle, the Pathet Lao use the AK-47 and rocket-launchers. But every time the non-Communist forces ask for modern weapons, the United States finds cause to delay or refuse. Can you, for example, find a reason why the North Vietnamese can fly MIG-21s while the South Vietnamese cannot fly F-105s?"

The foreign minister added: "Perhaps it is lack of trust, perhaps it is that Americans think they are the best, some kind of supermen, the only ones who can do the job. So we can't complain now that we haven't trained

the South Vietnamese to fight the way by proxy."

Thanat's facts are indisputable, though the reasons for American parsimony are complex.

More than two-and-a-half years after the recommendation was first made by U.S. officers in Saigon, all regular South Vietnamese infantry are at last in the final stages of being equipped with the automatic, light weight M-16 rifle. Supply of other weapons to the regulars still lags, while the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces, the first line of defense against Viet Cong attacks, are spectacularly outgunned by the enemy.

The human material with which American advisors work is, of course, critical to success. The Vietnamese have demonstrated that they can fight well given the proper arms and leadership.

Persistent Fear

Political instability here—partially an American responsibility—further inhibits military quality. Nor does the persistent fear of a Hanoi-Washington deal, presumably deleterious to South Vietnamese adherents, inspire either leaders or troops.

A substantial share of the responsibility for the indifferent performance of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) before the Communists' Tet offensive galvanized South Vietnamese troops must, therefore, be laid at America's door.

The United States, which began building the South Vietnamese armed forces in 1954, created an American-style army. But America failed to provide arms, helicopters and vehicles adequate either in quality or quantity.

Americans trained the South Vietnamese in the U.S. doctrine of pulling back and calling for massive artillery and air support when contact is made with the enemy. Now critics complain of ARVN's lack of aggressiveness and failure to fight at close

quarters. American reluctance to engage guerrillas by night, transferred to the ARVN, is only now slowly being overcome by both Americans and Vietnamese.

Many South Vietnamese commanders are intensely aware of the psychological and political problems inherent in American practices.

Personal View

Brig. Gen. Nguyen Xuan Thinh, commander of the South Vietnamese 25th Division, offered a personal appraisal: "My men don't care about casualties. They must capture their objective even if they take many casualties. If Viet Cong resistance is too great and we withdraw for artillery and air support, it's bad for morale. I am cultivating aggressiveness."

The words may, perhaps, exceed the reality. Nonetheless, American appraisals of the 25th—once known as the worst division in the ARVN—since Thinh took over last January testify that he is, indeed, cultivating aggressiveness—even if his tactics sometimes run counter to American doctrine.

Although ARVN units are roughly 80% lower in effective combat manpower, an American division has about twice the number of howitzers and mortars of a ARVN division.

The disproportion is most acute in helicopters, the war's most prominent piece of military equipment. The Vietnamese air force has 120 obsolescent H-34 troop-carrying helicopters. The American 1st Cavalry Division (Airmob/1c) has 200 modern helicopters of various types.

The difference in fixed-wing aircraft also is striking. The Vietnamese air force has only one squadron of jets—designed as trainers.

Fully Armed

The disproportion in basic arms is now being remedied, while certain crack ARVN units, like

the 5th Ranger Group, have been fully armed for some time. Nonetheless, the essential disproportion will persist in artillery and transport, as well as in technically sophisticated, but easily operated, sensing devices like the night-seeing Starlight.

If ARVN had been conceived and developed as a swift-striking, anti-guerrilla force, the imbalance in arms would still be painful. It would still be hard to explain to the ally of the world's greatest industrial power that political reluctance and commercial snarls prevent its being provided adequately with what is, after all, one of the cheapest and most abundant commodities available to the United States—metal machined into different forms.

But since 1955, it has been distressing to watch ARVN's diversion from its logical course of development by a succession of American chief advisers who appeared mesmerized by the Korean war.

The chiefs of the American Military Advisory and Assistance Group acted as if the danger were a frontal attack by the North Vietnamese army across the demilitarized zone rather than guerrilla and semiconventional assaults throughout the country. The heavy, road-bound army thus created was, nonetheless, never adequately equipped for its presumed mission.

Moreover, American administrations consistently rejected then-President Ngo Dinh Diem's pleas that the irregular units, the Regional Forces and Popular Forces which now make up almost half the formal component of South Vietnam's armed forces, be expanded and properly armed, paid and equipped. Those ragged-uniformed forces that are today heavily outgunned by the Viet Cong will still be outgunned, even by local guerrilla units, when their present melange of obsolete weapons is eventually replaced.

The fundamental American strategy might almost have been contrived to place ARVN at disadvantage.

First advisers and then specialized American units trickled into the country under the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. Even when the Johnson Administra-

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

CHICAGO TRIBUNE - 1 JULY 1968

REPORT FROM WASHINGTON

By Walter Trohan

New Russian
Missile Stand
Is Significant

CHIEF OF CHICAGO TRIBUNE'S
WASHINGTON BUREAU

WASHINGTON, June 30—The surprising and unexpected suggestion that the Russians are ready to discuss limitation of missiles is a most interesting international development.



Trohan

President Johnson has long proposed that the United States and Russia discuss limitation of the missile race. The first favorable reaction came during a 90 minute report by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko to the semi-annual session of the Supreme Soviet in which he declared Russia "is ready to enter an exchange of opinions" on "the mutual limitation and later the reduction of strategic weapons, both offensive and defensive, including anti-missile missiles."

If the Russians are sincere, and that is always a paramount question in any dealing with the masters of the Kremlin, this could be a most significant move for both nations and for the world.

Both Russia and the United States have their financial problems, both face unrest at home, and it would seem that neither can afford to finance war, such as the conflict in Viet Nam, to say nothing of a war between the world's two most important powers.

One of the world's most powerful bankers recently discussed the situation of the two countries in an off-the-record interview. He said the United States has erred in trying to run the world by buying friendship and the Russians erred in trying to rule by terror. Neither method, he added, has been successful.

Russia never expected to keep the iron curtain countries. The Russians thought they would be forced out so they stripped what became the captive nations of their forests, resources and possessions. This is the reason for unrest in Romania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Twenty years has not been enough to re-

SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES ... CONTINUED

tion decided to commit American combat troops in significant numbers, those units arrived piecemeal.

Washington embraced the theory of progressive escalation. Military pressure would mount by clearly marked increments until the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese were forced to give up their attempt to conquer the south.

Powerful Enemy

The strategy actually worked in reverse. We forced the North Vietnamese themselves to counterescalation. But we were prepared neither to cope with that escalation in the south nor to prevent it by blocking the channels of resupply and reinforcement through Laos.

ARVN and its auxiliary units consequently face a powerful enemy—largely North Vietnamese in composition and entirely equipped from the north—which they cannot possibly defeat by themselves. We forced the enemy to escalate, but failed to counterescalate our allies' power.

Other fundamental problems haunt the ARVN. For one, American and South Vietnamese operations are coordinated by goodwill, rather than directed by a single authority, such as during the Korean war. Also, American officers are associated with ARVN units as advisers. Relations range from cool to good, depending largely on personalities.

Since American officers normally serve only one year, ARVN officers, many veterans of more than a decade of combat, are often unimpressed by neophyte advisers. Sometimes, the Americans, counting their remaining tours day by day, actually inhibit the aggressiveness of ARVN commanders.

ARVN in 1968 is a more effective and better equipped force than were the armies of the Republic of Korea in 1953, when the war ended there. But it is wholly unrealistic to expect those undergunned and hard-trying forces to assume the major burden of the war, the panacea many American politicians offer.

store the ravages of war and post war plunder.

Both U. S., Russia Seek to Cut Spending

RUSSIA hasn't won friendship of the captive nations. Now Russia has been moving into the Mediterranean, long eyed by the czars, and this may prove expensive without winning friendship.

Russia has given 3 billions to Nasser in Egypt and is preparing to give another three billions. Russia has been spending billions to support North Viet Nam in the war in Southeast Asia. Russia has been selling gold to meet the drain. American gold has been sent abroad because of the drain here.

Both countries may be searching for ways to slow down the drain. One of the best ways would be reduction of armaments, if we could be sure the Russians were honest and not interested in weakening us by trickery.

In his penetrating study, "The Case Against Missile Defense," which now becomes pertinent in view of the Russian move toward talks, Dr. Jeremy I. Stone, an experienced analyst of national security issues, has written:

"Faced with rising unrest at home, an expensive war abroad, inflation, and a balance of payments deficit, the United States is finding it ever harder to persuade European bankers and European institutions to hold United States dollars rather than gold."

Important Question the West Must Answer

DR. Stone warns that under these conditions "a decision to spend resources on missile defense is likely to be the worst possible step." He adds that this is especially true when the majority of the American intelligence community no longer believes that the Soviets' "Tallinn" system has any significant anti-ballistic missile capability.

"In my view, the important question for the west is whether the national interest of the United States demands that she try to protect against the low-probability threat of nuclear war, even if the chance of effective protection is itself small over the long run," Dr. Stone said.

"Perhaps any amount of money and any encouragement to the arms race are worth a small chance of protecting American society, and perhaps nothing in the resultant arms race can make the United States much more vulnerable than she is now . . . The United States must learn, just as people must learn, to distinguish between a legitimate interest in insurance and an obsessive, neurotic concern for an unachievable nuclear security."

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER - 1 JULY 1968

William S. White

Red Missile Bid Could Bring Big Johnson Finale

WASHINGTON.

BELOW the somber and ceaseless drumbeats of the Vietnam dilemma and the shrill clamors of a domestic political campaign, there runs now within the Johnson Administration an undertone of genuine feeling that in these last months of his service the President may yet score a major diplomatic breakthrough with the Soviet Union.

Of course, once bitten is twice shy; and many times bitten is many times more shy when the White House approaches any Russian gesture that may appear to promise abatement in the cold war. All the same, and making allowance for past disappointment and disillusion, the fact remains that the Administration is inclined to believe that the Russians' sudden affirmative response to the President's long-standing offer for

discussion of a limitation of missiles may in truth have substantial meaning and may raise authentic hope.

If this should turn out to be the case it would be ironic, indeed. It would mean that only after renouncing his office had the President been able to convince the Russians of a vast point which in the full powers of that office he had never been able to make them accept. This point was that this country was honestly prepared to make accommodations with Moscow, so long as they were realistic and enforceable accommodations, to reduce a possibility of nuclear holocaust that still hangs over the world and will so hang whatever may or may not happen in the Vietnams.

However beset by Vietnam and all the rest of it, in short, the President from the day he took his oath has identified the real and the big objective as a thaw in the cold war with the one nation that still holds the ultimate Communist power and menace, the Soviet Union.

Accordingly, to this matter, and specifically to missile limitation, he has given an absolute

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

RED MISSILE BID

... CONTINUED

ute and a continuous priority. For 18 months now, for example, he has had direct and personal charge of this diplomatic missile probe, assisted at some intermediate points by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and others but still holding the ball at every critical juncture wholly in his own hands.

To be sure, nobody here is prepared to assume for a fact that this time the Russians mean business. The only way to put it is to say that this time all the information available to this Government does suggest that for whatever reason and however improbably, they really do. Why now a Soviet act of conciliation that has for so long been so stonily withheld by Moscow?

There are several provisional answers; one can take his pick. It may be that Moscow is willing to deal with a lame duck Administration precisely because that is what it is. It may be that Moscow fears the election of Richard Nixon, whose general foreign policy line is harder than Mr. Johnson's.

At all events, the atmosphere in the highest places in this Government is less gray than it has been in a long time. A certain cheerfulness insists upon breaking through among the President's associates at the possibility that he might yet leave his task with a diplomatic victory that could hardly be denied.

If they are wrong, then they are wrong. They can scarcely be blamed, however, if they now discern a little light somewhere.

SAN DIEGO UNION
20 JUNE 1968 (1 JULY)

U.S., India Eye Defense Of Asia

By JAMES CARY

Cobley News Service

WASHINGTON — High-level delegations from India and the United States will meet in New Delhi June 28-30 to explore global issues, including the defense of Asia.

Undersecretary of State Nicholas D. Katzenbach will head the U.S. team, and Minister of State Shi B. R. Bhagat the Indian participants.

The talks, first of their type for the two nations, could evolve into the same type of annual Cabinet-level meetings the United States conducts with Japan.

Officials said both sides have been trying to arrange such talks for some time as a means of gaining better understanding

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR - 28 JUNE 1968 (1 JULY)

Soviet missile-curb talk

By Takashi Oka

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

The Soviet Union has taken an important step forward toward talks with the United States on mutual restriction of antimissile defense systems.

If successful, the talks will save both countries billions of defense dollars which might otherwise be spent building antimissiles, the effectiveness of which is still far from fully proved.

In a major foreign policy address to the Supreme Soviet, Thursday, Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko declared his government's readiness for "an exchange of views" on the "search for an agreement on mutual restriction and later reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, offensive and defensive, including that of antimissiles."

The curly haired, durable Soviet Foreign Minister, speaking crisply to the thousand Soviet legislators assembled in the gleaming air-conditioned Kremlin Palace of Congresses, did not mention the United States in this context. But his meaning was clear.

'Brick by brick'

Only the United States and the Soviet Union have begun to build costly antimissile missiles, and President Johnson has wanted talks on the subject for well over a year. The Americans say they began their program reluctantly, after it was clear the Soviet side had already started to surround Moscow with a new antimissile system.

Mr. Gromyko's speech thus represents a real breakthrough for President Johnson's effort to widen areas of agreement with the Soviet Union, to build peace "brick by brick." But the Foreign Minister carefully dissociated his offer to talk from the American President's Glassboro, N.J., speech and other conciliatory gestures.

Mr. Gromyko's references to the United States, though sharp, were not as barbed as some of the commentaries recently carried in Soviet newspapers. He affirmed the "increasing isolation" of the United States in the international arena and urged it to reach a political settlement with North Vietnam. The Vietnamese people, he said, "have no friends more loyal than the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries."

He accused Washington of "connivance" with Israel in floating United Nations resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from seized Arab territories.

"The curve of munitions production in the United States is rising," the Foreign Minister said, "While the influence of the United States is declining. The military might of imperialism is contained by the might created by the Soviet people."

of the policies and positions involved in each other's foreign and internal policies.

DISCUSSION POINTS

The officials said the United States wants to discuss China, the other powers on the Indian subcontinent, the relationship of Indian development to Asian defense and the problems expected in the 1970s.

"We have no intention of negotiating agreements on specific subjects," an official said.

He also said he did not expect

Soviet relations with the United States, Mr. Gromyko said, were "still burdened by the aggressiveness of the United States foreign policy and primarily by the war unleashed by the United States in Vietnam."

The Foreign Minister's reference to the possibility of antimissile talks came only in the context of general disarmament discussions.

He said the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, approved by the United Nations General Assembly, was the culmination of many years of long work by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and of the Soviet Government. He suggested that this agreement could be followed by an international convention banning all use of nuclear weapons. "Our country is ready to affix its signature to such an international document immediately," he said.

Mr. Gromyko then said the Soviet Union was ready to "discuss a whole complex of other proposals on nuclear disarmament, jointly or separately, at one conference or at several, bearing in mind that it is necessary to exclude idle words from the vocabulary of those who discuss such important problems."

"One of the untried fields of disarmament," he continued, "is the search for an agreement on mutual restriction and later reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, offensive and defensive, including that of antimissiles. The Soviet Government is ready for an exchange of views on this question as well."

Mr. Gromyko reiterated the Kremlin's tough line against West Germany, accusing Bonn of reviving the Nazi demand for "living space." He placed on West Germany "the entire responsibility for the aggravation of the situation around West Berlin."

As for the Bonn proposal to exchange statements on the renunciation of force, Mr. Gromyko said that what was needed was a "clearcut and precise recognition of the fact of the existence of the German Democratic Republic."

Referring obliquely to Czechoslovakia, Mr. Gromyko said, "Shortsighted and in vain are the calculations of those who would like to wrest at least one link out of the socialist community. The socialist community will not allow this to happen."

On Communist China, the Soviet Foreign Minister said his country was doing its utmost to keep up state relations with specific proposals on trade and on the joint use of the Amur and other frontier rivers. "But Peking remains deaf to any initiative prompted by solicitude for the present and future of Soviet-Chinese relations," Mr. Gromyko said.

He disclosed trade had fallen to 5 percent of the 1959 figure. "Cultural relations have practically stopped."

derlined by the recent visit of a Russian fleet to Indian ports.

There is also some concern here over the continued purchase of Soviet planes and other arms by India. The United States has spent \$7.1 billion dollars since 1946 to prop up the Indian economy.

In 1966 U.S. economic aid — including massive wheat shipments to alleviate a famine — soared to \$913 million.

U.S. military aid to India has been virtually nil since the Indo-Pakistani war.

NAVAL VACUUM

It has been feared Soviet naval power might move into the vacuum. This concern was un-

AVIATION WEEK - 24 JUNE 1968 (1 JULY)

DOD Details New Satcom System

Strategic program would boost traffic capacity greatly; funding for synchronous satellites, terminals would start in Fiscal 1969

By Katherine Johnsen

Washington—Defense Dept. has made a firm decision to move forward with a new strategic satellite communications system that would multiply by hundreds of times the traffic capacity of the 25-satellite Initial Defense Satellite Communications System (IDCSP). The cost range of the new system would be \$100-200 million.

At an initial presentation last week before the House government military operations subcommittee, Dr. Gardiner L. Tucker, deputy director, Defense research and engineering, said the Defense Dept. was ready to issue requests for proposals after consultations with other interested congressional committees.

Funding of the new system—Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)—would start in Fiscal 1969, which begins July 1.

It will comprise more than three synchronous satellites and more than six ground terminals.

Key Feature

The key feature will be the use of very narrow-beam, steerable antennas in the satellites, illuminating an area of the earth's surface 1,000-2,000 mi. in diameter. The satellite would also have earth coverage antennas illuminating one-third of the earth's surface.

Each satellite will be capable of providing hundreds of channels over the portion of the earth that is visible to it. Additional hundreds of channels will be available within the much smaller area illuminated by the narrow beams.

The present Philco/Ford IDCSP satellites provide five and 12 channels. The determining factor is the power of the ground stations with which the satellite operates.

The narrow beam antennas could be focused on any desired areas—for example, Hawaii and Southeast Asia—and used with very small and quickly deployable ground terminals.

The DSCS satellites would be comparable to the Intelsat 4 series now under consideration for commercial service by the 61-nation International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (Intelsat). Intelsat is evaluating four Intelsat 4 proposals—two by Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. and one each by Hughes Aircraft Co. and TRW Systems (AW&ST June 10, p. 15).

The Intelsat 4 would have two steerable, narrow-beam antennas and two earth coverage antennas. For commercial service, the narrow beams would be used with major permanent ground stations equipped with 85-ft. antennas to provide service between big traffic centers such as the eastern U.S. and Europe. The Intelsat 4 would have more than 5,000 channels. Six transponders functioning with the earth coverage antennas would provide more than 1,800 channels, and six transponders functioning with the narrow beam antennas would provide more than 4,200 channels.

The new system, planned by Defense Dept., represents a technological leap over the advanced DSCS under consideration a year ago, but is less ambitious in cost and size. The cost of the former program was estimated at

\$500 million and would have included nine synchronous satellites and 250 ground terminals (AW&ST Sept. 4, 1967, p. 18).

"Last summer the evidence was in hand to support the judgment that satellites which kept stationary positions above the earth and provided antenna beams which concentrated most of their power in the direction of the earth could be confidently designed for operational use," Tucker said.

Mechanical Platforms

He continued:

"The accumulation of engineering experience with satellite-borne sensors, motors, bearings, electronics and controls has led, in the past several months, to the confidence that mechanical platforms can be provided and controlled on satellites which are stable in their orientation to within less than a degree in angle, and that mechanisms for steering and pointing antennas can be provided on these platforms and controlled to comparable accuracy, and that such systems can attain mean-times-to-failure measured in years. The combined effects of progress in many areas of technology has made prudent the use of narrow beam antennas for operational systems."

In addition, Tucker said, an evaluation of experience during the Vietnam war has given the Defense Dept. "a very clear appreciation" of the role which the planned new system could play in the future.

"In Southeast Asia we have spent hundreds of millions of dollars providing long-range communications to and within the theater," he noted.

"Since much construction was required for these conventional fixed plant facilities, the full communications capacity has often lagged many months behind the buildup of forces," he added.

"The realistic possibility of narrow-beam, steerable antennas and smaller highly transportable terminals," he continued, "together with the clear requirement for a capability for rapid buildup of command communications in contingency situations has led to a qualitative shift in our thinking and planning for the DSCS system."

Tucker pointed out that the addition of the narrow-beam feature will substantially increase the satellite cost, delay initial launch and reduce satellite reliability.

"If the main purpose of the satellite system is to provide tough trunking links . . . for unique and vital traffic, then the narrow beams are a poor buy," he said. "In the Pacific theater, for example, we have to interconnect Alaska, the continental U.S., Hawaii, Guam, Japan, Southeast Asia and Australia, so the value of a narrow beam is small."

Addition Supported

"However, since the main purpose includes a requirement to provide rapidly communications into and within contingency areas, then the addition of the narrow beam is well worth the cost, delay and difficulty."

The 25 IDCSP satellites now in use are designed with a switch to turn the satellites off after six years in orbit to prevent frequency interference when they are replaced. This means that even without any satellite failures, these satellites will start becoming inoperable in June, 1972—six years after the initial launch of seven satellites.

Lifetime of the IDCSPs has far exceeded the Defense Dept.'s original estimate of a maximum of three years. All 25 of the satellites that achieved orbit are performing within specifications, although there have been some component failures and the resort to backup components. The Defense Dept. now estimates that the average lifetime of the IDCSPs could be well over 10 years.

Because of technological advances it will be possible to include ground-controlled switchoff features in the new DSCS satellites.

The Defense Dept. plans to launch the DSCSs starting in late 1970 or early 1971. It is estimated that at least 20 IDCSPs still will be operational until the end of 1971.

Following is the status report Tucker gave the subcommittee on the programs for the U.S. IDCSP, the U.S.-U.K. IDCSP, the NATO IDCSP and the tactical satellite communications program (TacSatCom):

■ **U.S. IDCSP.** There are now 22 land-based antennas operating with the 25 satellites in near-circular orbits of about 18,200 mi.: two fixed U.S. terminals with 60-ft. antennas, 13 Hughes transportable 40-ft. antennas and seven readily transportable Radiation, Inc., 18-ft. antennas.

Six of the 40-ft. antennas and the seven smaller antennas were deployed over the past year.

A year ago, the Defense Dept. started a program of improving the two-channel capacity of the 40-ft. terminals. So far, nine have been upgraded to 12-channel capacity. The remaining four have been upgraded to five-channel capacity, and will be improved to 12-channel capacity after the required equipment to do this is delivered this fall.

Tucker estimated the reliability of the 40-ft. terminals at about 90% and

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

NATIONAL OBSERVER - 1 JULY 1968

NATO Signals the Kremlin It's Time to Talk Over Troop Cutbacks

At the June 1968 meeting of foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a Danish proposal for an East-West conference on European security was rejected with but a modicum of polite debate. But in the two years since then, NATO officials have had a change of outlook. They have turned their thoughts from the strictly military issue of defending Western Europe against Communist attack to the political one of eventually ending the Cold War in Europe.

At their spring meeting last week in Reykjavik, Iceland, the NATO foreign ministers declared that, despite new Communist pressure on West Berlin and a Russian naval build-up in the Mediterranean, the time had come for East and West to begin considering ways of reducing their military forces in Europe.

The NATO officials made no specific proposals in their call for "mutual and balanced force reductions" in Europe, nor did they suggest any timetable for discussing the idea. The foreign ministers held scant hope that Russia would respond immediately to the offer. But they did want to signal the Kremlin that the West was ready—whenever the Russians were—to take advantage of the present mood of *detente* on both sides of the Iron Curtain and try to reduce tension in Europe.

Though the Russians officially ignored the NATO call, Moscow apparently sent out a signal of its own that could lead to a relaxation of strains between East and West. In a speech in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said Russia was ready to discuss limitations on offensive and defensive missile systems.

However, mutual troop reductions would be politically unpalatable for Russia now. The Russians would leave themselves open to the accusation that they were enabling the United States to divert troops to Vietnam. Too, with Czechoslovakia loosening its ties to Moscow and Romania pursuing policies inimical to the Kremlin, the Russians undoubtedly would be reluctant to thin out their troops in other Eastern European countries. Viktor Matveyev, an authoritative but unofficial Russian commentator, described the NATO idea as hypocritical and accused the West of "building up armed forces on the borders of Socialist countries."

Political Pressure May Help

Despite this anticipated Soviet reaction, NATO officials believe that political pressure from East Europeans and the high cost of maintaining 240,000 Russian troops in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany sooner or later will force the Russians to consider cutting back their military contingents in Eastern Europe.

This ferment in the Soviet bloc contrasts sharply with the solidarity the NATO nations showed at Reykjavik. There was no talk about NATO "disarray." Nobody castigated France, which has dropped out of NATO's integrated military structure but remains a member of the political arm of the 15-member alliance. The French, in turn, made no effort to obstruct the meeting. The French did refuse to subscribe to that part of the communique calling for military reductions, but nevertheless said they supported the idea.

Indeed, the French pull-out from NATO's military command gave birth to a NATO self-appraisal in 1967 that subsequently led to the decision to seek East-West military reductions in Europe. After the French withdrawal, NATO set up several commissions to search for ways of modernizing the 19-year-old alliance in a time when the organization's *raison d'être*—defense against Russian attack—seemed to be growing less compelling. The commissions focused on a long-range program of improving relations between the West and the Soviet bloc. Even before the commissions were set up, President Johnson told U.S. officials to switch their emphasis in NATO affairs from the military to the political in hope of finding ways to strengthen the alliance after France's military withdrawal.

The troop-cutback proposals gained impetus from debate in the U.S. Senate over the size of American forces in Europe. In a 1966 resolution, 44 senators called for a "substantial reduction" in the number of GIs based in Europe, regardless of whether the Russians took a similar move. The Administration argued that it too, wanted to bring home some of the 220,000 American soldiers in Europe, but only if Russia matched any Western troop cuts. "Detente and security are complementary," Secretary of State Dean Rusk told the foreign ministers last week.

The NATO studies on measures to slim down the military forces in Europe are still under way. "This work involves extremely delicate and complex problems of force comparison," explained Manlio Brosio, the NATO secretary general.

Among the broader suggestions are creation of a disarmament zone in central Europe to serve as a pilot plan for later extension to other European areas, and establishment of a nuclear-free zone covering Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the two Germanies. The commissions also have studied less-ambitious proposals for reducing ground forces, air forces, or a mixture of both, while maintaining present bases. Other proposals before the commissions involve troop pull-backs from the front lines without any immediate reduction in the size of the contending forces.

Rusk Flies to Bonn

NATO's conciliatory attitude was apparent in the final communique of the two-day foreign-ministers' meeting. The NATO officials asserted that East German restrictions on West German travel to and from West Berlin constituted a "deliberate attempt to jeopardize detente" in Europe, but proposed no retaliatory measures. After the Reykjavik meeting, Secretary Rusk flew to Bonn to confer with West German officials on the East German moves.

East German restrictions imposed on June 11 require passports and visas for West Germans traveling through East German territory on trips to West Berlin. Another set of restrictions takes effect July 1. These include new taxes and tolls on trucks, buses, and barges crossing East German territory to West Berlin. The East Germans indicated that all the talk about detente and military cutbacks would not distract them from following through on travel restrictions. For the moment, at least, the movement toward military disengagement in Europe clearly was one-sided.

—RICHARD EGAN

NEW SATCOM SYSTEM

... CONTINUED

said the performance of the recently installed 18-ft. terminals so far has been good.

The terminal points are in the Washington, D.C., area, New Jersey, Colorado, California, Hawaii, Guam, Australia, Korea, Okinawa, Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, Ethiopia and West Germany.

Over the past year, six Hughes ship-based 6-ft. antennas were introduced and demonstrated the communications capacity for which they were designed, but reliability was not satisfactory. After modifications are incorporated they will be used on major naval command ships.

■ **U.S.-U.K. IDCSP.** There has been some slippage, but this program is now progressing satisfactorily and launch of a synchronous Philco/Ford Skynet satellite is scheduled for mid-1969.

USAF is procuring two Skynets for U.K., one for backup. After launch by USAF, the satellite, as well as the ground station complex, will be controlled by U.K.

Joint efforts are under way to insure the interoperability of the U.S. and U.K. satellites and terminals.

■ **NATO IDCSP.** USAF shortly will procure two Skynet-type satellites for NATO, and first launch is planned for late 1969 (AW&ST Dec. 25, 1967, p. 22).

Other NATO nations will provide the ground stations, but U.S. will control the satellite.

■ **TacSatCom.** Launch of Hughes TacSatCom is now scheduled for early next year. By this time, experimental ground, sea and airborne terminals will be deployed for testing with the satellite (AW&ST Jan. 15, p. 66).

A joint test plan will be completed within a year, providing for extensive evaluation with TacSatCom of a variety of networks and configurations, including terminals installed in tactical vehicles, such as jeeps, submarines, small and large ships, and operational aircraft of the three military services.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

1 JULY 1968

SAIGON ATTACK ISN'T NEAR, U.S. GENERAL SAYS

SAIGON, Viet Nam, June 30 (UPI)—Maj. Gen. John H. Hay yesterday belittled speculation that a Viet Cong assault on Saigon is near.

"It is a possibility, but there is no indication of it at this time," the United States commander of the newly formed capital military district said. He denied press reports that special security measures have been taken in the Saigon area because of a threatened enemy attack this week-end.

"There has been no increase in alertness because there is no need for it," he told reporters. "As matter of fact, it is so quiet it worries me." The general's command was created June 4 to counteract the growing communist pressure against the capital city.

AEROSPACE DAILY, 1 JULY 1968

JACKSON 'DELIGHTED' AT PROSPECT OF U.S.-SOVIET TALKS ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS

Russia's bid to swap opinions with the U.S. on the possible limitations of strategic weapons drew a delighted reaction from Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), who marshalled advocates of national security last week to defeat an attempt to delay deployment of the Sentinel system for a year.

In response to an announcement by Soviet foreign minister Andre Gromyko, Jackson said, "I am delighted at the news that the Soviets are now ready to exchange views with us on the limitations of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive weapon systems, including the ABM. This was one of our objectives. This was one of the compelling reasons for urging the Senate to vote for deployment of the Sentinel ABM system--to strengthen the President's diplomatic hand vis-a-vis the Soviets and to improve the chances that Moscow would start talking to us on this range of issues."

The possible Russian reaction to the Sentinel was one of the arguments that Jackson used to defeat the Hart-Cooper amendment to deployment. He stressed that the basic purpose of the system was to strengthen the U.S. diplomatic position.

Jackson said, "For more than eighteen months the President has been trying to persuade the Russians to talk about this critical subject. At last, we appear to be seeing some hopeful results."

* * *

AEROSPACE DAILY, 1 JULY 1968

NAVY SEES POLARIS, POSEIDON AS POSSIBLE ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS

Polaris or Poseidon missiles could be developed into anti-satellite weapons, some Navy sources believe. This could make a lot of sense, it is reported, because it would provide the U.S. with mobile launch platforms for anti-satellite defense--a posture which would permit launching from the greatest portion of the Earth's surface to intercept satellites placed in any type orbit.

Navy spokesmen believe a water-launched anti-satellite system would be more advantageous than a strictly land-based system, AEROSPACE DAILY learned. Reason for this is that enemy satellites could be directed so that they would make only a minimum number of passes over U.S. land areas, making it more difficult for land-based anti-satellite weapons. A further advantage would be lessening the possibility of damage on land resulting from destruction of nuclear-armed satellites.

It is pointed out that with development of military reconnaissance satellites, the ability of ships to roam the seas at will and submarines to hide is threatened.

* * *

AEROSPACE DAILY, 1 JULY 1968

GAO URGES MORE COMPETITION IN PROCUREMENT OF AERONAUTICAL SPARES

Uncoordinated management within the military services is obscuring the possible benefits of greater use of competition in procurement of aeronautical spare parts, the General Accounting Office said in a recent report to Congress.

In response to requests from the Joint Economic Subcommittee on Economy in Government, the GAO surveyed procurement within each service and reported, "Our current as well as earlier work showed that technical data problems remained the predominant reason why procurements were made without competition."

GAO said Defense Department officials promised to provide for earlier reviews of items to determine whether they could be procured competitively. DOD plans to document reasons for non-competitive purchases. DOD is studying means of coordinating interservice procurements of spares, GAO said.

GAO said that it reviewed records for fiscal 1966 and found that four procurement activities spent \$2 billion on aeronautical spares. About \$1.5 billion, or 78.5%, were noncompetitive buys. Of these, GAO sifted procurements totaling \$174 million and found that \$103 million, or 59% were not awarded competitively due to inadequate technical data. Other reasons included critical manufacturing techniques, urgency of requirements, and administrative expediency related to awards for \$2500 and under.

GAO complained that, although justification was given for noncompetitive buys, this information was not uniform in nature and the specific reasons were not summarized and reported to higher management levels in the services and the Defense Department.

* * *

AEROSPACE DAILY, 1 JULY 1968

AUSTRALIAN F-111s: First F-111 for Royal Australian Air Force is slated to be delivered in October, some three months behind the original schedule. Delivery of all 24 aircraft to RAAF should be completed by March or April, 1969. The delay will allow incorporation in the U.S. of engineering changes required to correct faults in the plane's control system.