

UNCLASSIFIED

ATA-jpe-15  
30 December 1969

1. CINCPAC Operation Plan 5060 (Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan) provides general guidance to military commanders under CINCPAC for the execution of assigned responsibilities for the emergency care, protection and/or evacuation of US noncombatants and certain designated aliens abroad.

2. This plan assigns responsibilities to appropriate subordinate commanders to assist the US chiefs of diplomatic missions, upon request, to prepare country or area noncombatant emergency and evacuation plans. CINCPAC component commanders and subordinate unified commanders are directed to plan to assist in the execution of the various country or area plans should military assistance be required.

3. No specific forces are identified for use in the execution of this plan.

4. COORDINATION. DC/S (Air); AC/S G-2; AC/S G-4.

5. This plan is considered acceptable to the Marine Corps. It is recommended that the attached memorandum of acceptability be signed.

*J. A. Weizenecker*  
J. A. WEIZENECKER

BUCKTAG COMMENT ON: S&C C 918114 (CINCPAC OPLAN 5060)

Declassified by the Director of  
Marine Corps History and Museums  
in accordance with the provisions  
of CNO ltr Ser 003D323/232095 of  
21 Feb 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

*In compliance with the instructions of the Bureau of the command (through the memorandum of acceptability), I believe that the instructions for review (see the table in plan) provide sufficient guidance to CINCPAC's component.*  
*J. A. Weizenecker*



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

IN REPLY REFER TO

ATA-jpe-15  
31 DEC 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: CINCPAC Operation Plan No. 5060

Ref: (a) JCS 2054/805  
(b) JCS MOP 144

1. The subject plan, referred to the Services by reference (a), has been reviewed in accordance with the provisions of reference (b).
2. The plan is considered acceptable to the Marine Corps.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "F. C. Dodson", is positioned above the typed name.

F. C. DODSON  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Director, Joint Planning Group  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Plans and Programs)

**TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE**  
**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

ATA-dnc-15

POINT PAPER

Subj: RESIDUAL FORCE

1. The Chief of Staff has requested views on:

a. The merits of a Systems Analysis draft paper (enclosure 1) on the residual force for RVN.

b. The advisability of the Marine Corps' modifying its current position and seeking to include a Marine brigade in the residual force.

2. Enclosure (2) is an evaluation of the Systems Analysis draft. The evaluation concludes that the force levels proposed in the draft are based on invalid assumptions and should not be supported.

3. The HQMC staff is split on the desirability of including a MEB in the residual force. Enclosure (3) summarizes the arguments for and against including a MEB.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Approve the submission of enclosure (2) to the Chief of Staff.

b. Discuss the desirability of including a MEB in the residual force with the P&P Committee and provide guidance for preparation of a recommendation to the Chief of Staff.

	<u>APPROVED</u>	<u>DISAPPROVED</u>
4. . .		
4. . .		
4. a.	_____	_____
4. b.	_____	_____

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PROS AND CONS OF MARINE COMBAT FORCES IN THE RESIDUAL FORCEPROS

1. If US forces anywhere are exposed to combat, Marines should be participating.
2. Marine Corps forces are properly suited for employment in conflict of any intensity.
3. In contrast to the situation envisaged in T-Day and NSSM-36 planning, the residual force may become engaged heavily in RVN.
4. Vietnam will continue to offer the opportunity for US forces to gain combat experience, test new equipment, develop new tactics, etc.
5. The Services with forces committed in RVN will have a leg up in the competition for the Defense dollar.
6. Marines in the residual force would facilitate any reentry into RVN by III MAF.
7. Basing Marine Corps units in RVN would ease base loading in Okinawa and Japan.

CONS

1. The residual force mission basically is more appropriate for the Army and Air Force, i.e., augmenting the ARVN and VNAF as required by the threat.
2. CINCPAC's forward-deployed amphibious reserve would be reduced.
3. It could prove difficult to extricate the Marine units from the residual force. A Marine division and a MAW stayed in Korea over 1½ years after a truce was signed, and a 2-division Army residual force still is there.
4. As US combat activity subsides, the residual force will become a garrison force, and combat readiness would decline.
5. By the time US forces are drawn down to residual force levels, the public opposition to the war will have increased to even higher levels. A disapproving press will be critical of every engagement involving

(ENCLOSURE 3)

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8. Amphibious shipping could provide logistics support for a MEB and complete basing for a portion of a MEB committed in the residual force, thereby reducing the size of the support establishment in RVN.

US forces and US commanders will be under even more pressure to avoid casualties. The opportunity to promote the image of the Marine Corps in Vietnam largely will have disappeared.

6. Integrity of a MEB as an air-ground team in the residual force would be most difficult to maintain. Single Management almost surely would evolve toward increased Army/Air Force control of the MEB's aviation assets.

7. Dedication of available amphibious shipping to support of the residual force would seriously derogate the mobility of the remaining PACOM amphibious reserve.

8. The cost, in money, materiel, and personnel, of maintaining a MEB in Vietnam could be expected to exceed any added resources provided to support that mission, thus continuing the draw-downs on the rest of the Marine Corps that have been experienced throughout the war.

(ENCLOSURE 3)

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12 November 1969POINT PAPERSubj: III MAF PLAN FOR AMALGAMATION OF III MAF AND XXIV CORPS  
HEADQUARTERS1. The subject plan (Tab A) calls for the formation of a  
joint headquarters in I CTZ, to be designated I Corps Field  
Force Vietnam or Joint Field Force Vietnam.a. Composition of the joint headquarters

337	USMC
274	USA
<u>15</u>	USN
626	
330	Hq Co (approximately 250 USMC and 80 USA; T/O in preparation)
<u>956</u>	TOTAL

b. Service distribution of key billets

<u>USMC</u>	-	CG
		Deputy CG
		Deputy CofS
		Deputy G-1
		Deputy G-2
		ACofS G-3
		Deputy G-3 (Gnd Ops)
		Deputy G-3 (Air Ops)
		ACofS G-4
		Deputy G-5
		ACofS G-6
<u>USA</u>	-	CofS
		ACofS G-1
		ACofS G-2
		Deputy G-3
		Deputy G-3 (Plans)
		Deputy G-4
		ACofS G-5
		Deputy G-6

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c. Phasing

(1) From date of approval to 15 December 1969

- (a) Alert component headquarters involved.
- (b) Transfer approximately 30 personnel into key Army billets in the new joint headquarters.
- (c) Prepare to deactivate XXIV Corps headquarters.

(2) 15 December 1969

- (a) Deactivate Hq, III MAF and Hq, XXIV Corps.
- (b) Activate new joint headquarters.
- (c) Reassign CG and Deputy CG, XXIV Corps. Assign Army brigadier general to new joint headquarters as Chief of Staff.

(3) 15 December 1969 - 15 March 1970 - Complete the amalgamation.

2. The plan has been briefed to LtGen ZAIS, CG, XXIV Corps, who agrees with the general concept. LtGen ZAIS believes, however, that command should pass to an Army lieutenant general on 15 December 1969 for the following reasons:

a. At that date, the Army in I CTZ will number 82,606 vs. 54,500 Marines. Army maneuver battalions will outnumber Marine maneuver battalions by 27 to 14.

b. Appointing an Army commander at the inception of the joint headquarters would allow transition to the residual force posture (all Army) with the least amount of turbulence.

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3. Additionally, LtGen ZAIS believes the CG and Deputy CG should be from different Services.

4. LtGen ZAIS's opinions are provided to COMUSMACV in the plan. An alternative organization for the command section of the joint headquarters, showing an Army commander, also is provided.

5. Evaluation

a. Two points are vital to the Marine Corps position relative to the consolidation of headquarters in I CTZ:

(1) The Marine division/wing team must remain an integral unit under a MAF headquarters which exercises operational control over all Marine combat forces in RVN.

(2) The status of III MAF as a uni-Service command must be preserved in order that the CG, III MAF retain direct access to COMUSMACV on matters of importance to the Marine Corps.

b. The III MAF plan is incomplete in its consideration of both the above points. Unless a separate replacement headquarters for III MAF is being formed (and this is not suggested by the plan) the Marine division/wing team will be joined only by both elements being under operational control of the commander of the new joint headquarters in I CTZ who possibly will not be a Marine. The status of the Force Logistics Command under the new headquarters also is not clear.

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c. LtGen BUSE indicated in his letter of 15 September 1969 (Tab B) that he thought it prudent that LtGen NICKERSON commence planning for a small headquarters to be generated out of III MAF assets, under command of a senior major general, to assume operational control of and preserve the integrity of the division/wing team. Additionally, LtGen BUSE has suggested (Tab C) to LtGen NICKERSON that he develop a reclama position for use in the event Gen ABRAMS agrees with LtGen ZAIS's position that the Army should take command on 15 December 1969. LtGen BUSE also pointed out that the final MACV plan must ensure that Marine Corps forces in RVN, as a uni-Service force, retain direct access to Gen ABRAMS. The status of these planning actions is unknown.

d. III MAF is a uni-Service command, approved as such by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Tab D). It cannot be disestablished, as recommended in the plan, without approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

## 6. Conclusions

a. The plan is defective in that it does not reflect the retention of a MAF headquarters with operational control of the division/wing team and with direct access to COMUSMACV. CMC's previously expressions of concern remain valid.

b. The precise modalities of correcting the plan are not critical, but the Commandant of the Marine Corps should be kept informed of actions underway to alleviate his expressed concerns.

c. The enclosed draft message should elicit information required to ensure a uniformity of approach at all echelons involved.

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7. Recommendation. Authorize release of the enclosed draft message to CG, FMFPac.

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FM: CMC

TO: CG FMFPAC

INFO: CG III MAF

TOP SECRET. PERSONAL FOR LTGEN BUSE, INFO LTGEN NICKERSON,  
FROM GEN CHAPMAN. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

RIF-AMALGAMATION PLAN

A. CG FMFPAC 040211Z NOV 1969

B. JCS MSG 3964 DTG 142250Z FEB 1966

1. AFTER REVIEW OF SUBJECT PLAN, MY CONCERN OVER THE FUTURE INTEGRITY OF OUR AIR-GROUND TEAM CONCEPT AND THE LOSS OF DIRECT MARINE CORPS ACCESS TO COMUSMACV, AS REPORTED IN REF A, REMAIN.
2. BY REF B, THE JCS APPROVED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF III MAF AS A UNI-SERVICE FORCE REPORTING DIRECTLY TO COMUSMACV. DEACTIVATION OF HQ III MAF, AS RECOMMENDED IN THE PLAN, WOULD REQUIRE JCS APPROVAL AND WOULD RUN COUNTER TO OUR DESIRE TO KEEP A VIABLE AIR-GROUND TEAM FUNCTIONING IN RVN UNTIL PHASE SIX REDEPLOYMENTS.
3. I KNOW FROM REF A THAT AN APPROACH TO SOLVING THIS PROBLEM IS BEING DEVELOPED. DOUBLE-HATTING THE MARINES IN THE NEW JOINT HQ TO PROVIDE A CG AND STAFF FOR III MAF MAY BE AN ACCEPTABLE

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SOLUTION, AS MAY BE THE CREATION OF A SEPARATE SMALL III MAF  
HQ OF THE SORT YOU DESCRIBED IN YOUR 15 SEP LETTER. IN ANY  
EVENT, I THINK IT ESSENTIAL THAT A III MAF HQ BE RETAINED IN  
SOME WORKABLE FORM.

4. PLEASE KEEP ME INFORMED OF THE APPROACH BEING TAKEN AND  
OF ACTIONS ON THIS MATTER AS THEY UNFOLD, IN ORDER THAT WE CAN  
BE CONSISTENT IN OUR DISCUSSIONS AND/OR ACTIONS HERE.

WARM REGARDS.

GP 3.

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ATA-jpe-15  
24 November 1969POINT PAPER

Subj: Employment of Marine Corps Teams in the Trust Territory

Ref: (a) Ltr from SecInt to SecDef of 24Oct69  
(b) CINCPAC msg 300930Z Oct69  
(c) JCS msg 281908Z Jul69  
(d) CMC msg 281635Z May69  
(e) CINCPAC msg 090101Z Nov69  
(f) Ltr from SecDef to SecInt of 12Nov69  
(g) CG FMFPAC msg 190215Z Nov69  
(h) CINCPAC msg 210313Z Nov69  
(i) JCS msg 211048Z Nov69

1. PURPOSE. To respond to the Commandant's query of 12 November:

"How about CMCM offering to send MarCor teams as training exercise at MarCor expense? (to Palau)"

which query was amplified on 15 November by an annotation by the Chief of Staff to the effect that:

"CMC recommends that we employ engineers on training."

2. BACKGROUND.

a. Commencing in June 1969, the Navy has deployed a total of five Seabee Civic Action Teams (1 officer and 12 enlisted men each) in the Trust Territory. Original plans envisioned the employment of one Civic Action Team in each of the six districts in the Trust Territory, but the Palau District did not extend an invitation for the services of a team.

b. On 24 October 1969, the Secretary of the Interior advised the Secretary of Defense that although the work of the Seabee Teams has been highly satisfactory, budgetary constraints have made it necessary for Interior to discontinue the program after the initial eight months; further, the Secretary of the Interior inquired as to whether or not Defense could fund the program as a defense project (Reference (a), Tab 1);

c. On 30 October 1969, CINCPAC submitted a plan (Reference (b), Tab 2) for a joint Service military Civic Action effort in the TTPI in response to a JCS request for such a plan (Reference (c), Tab 3). No Marine Corps participation was recommended.

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d. On 9 November 1969, CINCPAC expressed disappointment over Interior's decision to terminate the services of the Civic Action teams and recommended to the Chairman, JCS that Interior be urged to reconsider the termination decision (Reference (e), Tab 4);

e. On 12 November 1969, the Secretary of Defense expressed his regret to the Secretary of the Interior that Defense could not undertake the funding of the Civic Action project (Reference (f), Tab 5);

f. On 19 November 1969, CG FMFPAC reported (Reference (g), Tab 6) that it is feasible to organize a 14-man (or larger) engineer oriented Marine Corps Civic Action team (task organized in line with current Seabee 13-man teams) or a land survey team. He indicated that 30 days would be required to form the teams from personnel resources throughout the Marine Corps and that an additional 90-day period would be required for training. Based on this time projection, Marine Corps Civic Action Teams, configured generally along the accepted "standard" established by the Seabees, would not be ready until 1 April 1970. This timing synchronizes well with the rotation date of 1 May 1970 of the last Seabee team (in the Marianas) but it should be noted that CINCPAC had tentatively assigned the USAF as the relieving service for that Seabee team (Tab 2);

g. On 21 November 1969, the Chairman, JCS, informed CINCPAC of SecDef's decision not to replace the teams in the TTPI if Interior was unwilling to fund for them. CJCS also opined that departure of teams could help demonstrate that their presence was in conformance with Micronesian desires and hopefully create a clamor for their return (Reference (i), Tab 9).

### 3. DISCUSSION.

a. With respect to the practicability of deploying Marine teams in the Palaus, the continued absence of an invitation from Micronesian leaders in Palau would militate against any attempt to force the Palauans to accommodate "uninvited" guests. If the desired goal is visibility and acceptability by the Micronesians, it would seem that the initial entry by Marines should be directed at the Marianas, whose citizens have recently demonstrated an affinity for the United States, rather than the Palaus where hostility toward the US military has been evident;

b. On the question of Marines entering the Trust Territory on a training exercise, per se, it would appear to be feasible as long as such exercises are not relatable to on-going Civic Action projects with which the Secretary of Defense apparently

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wishes to disassociate himself. The Marine Corps effort could be built around a Force Engineer Company and could be deployed to the Trust Territory on a bona fide training mission. Civic Action type projects could be accomplished by such a Marine unit as a by-product of its training goals. A Marine Corps plan that would involve the insertion of an operational force on a training exercise could be worthwhile. Such a plan, however, would require careful analysis of funding, shipping and contingency implications.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS.

a. That in view of SecDef's embargo on the utilization of DOD funds for Civic Action projects coupled with the policy guidance for the restraint of activities which could result in misinterpretation or premature disclosure of military interest in the TTPI, it would not be desirable at this time to broach the question of Marines going into the Trust Territory;

b. That the Marine Corps does not have a Civic Action team, as such, in being which is prepared for immediate deployment;

c. That although the Palaus would be a very attractive target for the Marine Corps in light of the islands' potential for Marine Corps base and training requirements, the Marianas would lend themselves more readily to an initial Marine effort. Considering that the seat of the "Government of Micronesia" is located in the Marianas, a successful Marine Corps endeavor there would attract the immediate attention of Micronesian and American leaders;

d. That the Marine Corps should develop a plan for deployment of Marine units for training in the Trust Territory.

#### 5. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. That the Commandant not offer the services of Marine Corps teams in the Trust Territory at this time;

b. That the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 be tasked to examine the feasibility of organizing a task force (possibly with a Force Engineer Company as its nucleus) for deployment to the Trust Territory on a training exercise basis;

Paragraph 5a to Paragraph 5d:

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

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ATA-jnf-15

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)  
To: Secretary of the Navy (Navy Department Board of Decorations and Medals)  
Via: Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Subj: Meritorious Service Medal; recommendation for award of  
Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 1650.1C (Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual)  
Encl: (1) Proposed Citation

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), it is recommended that Colonel Robert H. TWISDALE 010961 USMC be awarded the Meritorious Service Medal for exceptional achievement.

2. From 1 September 1966 through 10 October 1969, Colonel TWISDALE served in the Joint Planning Group, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs), Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps. Initially assigned as Head of the Joint Policy Team, he demonstrated exceptional ability, foresight, and leadership in guiding his action officers' efforts in developing Marine Corps policy in joint matters ranging from arms control and disarmament to doctrinal issues fundamental to the roles and missions of the Marine Corps.

3. Reassigned on 9 January 1967, Colonel TWISDALE headed, until 28 February 1967, the Joint and Special Plans Team, where his responsibilities included directing Marine Corps participation in the preparation of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and for formulating Marine Corps positions with regard to the Single Integrated Operation Plan and the Draft Presidential Memorandums on General Purpose, Strategic Offensive and Strategic Defensive Forces.



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4. On 1 March 1967, Colonel TWISDALE became Assistant Director of the Joint Planning Group, a most demanding assignment in which he served for over 31 months. During this period, Colonel TWISDALE wisely and ably guided the participation of the entire Joint Planning Group in the development of Marine Corps positions on and inputs to all matters of interest to the Commandant of the Marine Corps in his capacity as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. Colonel TWISDALE's sound military judgment, thorough knowledge of world political and military affairs, extraordinary analytic ability, and uncompromising devotion to excellence contributed immeasurably to the consistently high quality support provided to three Directors of the Joint Planning Group, three Marine Corps Operations Deputies, and two Commandants of the Marine Corps during this period. More than any other individual, Colonel TWISDALE during this period influenced the conduct of Marine Corps affairs within the joint arena, skillfully and surely guiding Marine Corps planners and action officers through the wide-ranging deliberations on the many complex issues of critical importance to the security of the United States and the Free World. Applying his superb understanding of the military planning processes, he not only fashioned and protected Marine Corps positions, but also assisted greatly in shaping and improving the positions adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters of utmost significance.

6. Throughout his tour, Colonel TWISDALE has demonstrated a dedication to duty, professional competence, and leadership capability seldom found even in an officer of his rank and length of service.

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7. The facts contained in the proposed citation are personally known to me.

8. Colonel TWISDALE previously has received the following awards:

Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V"

Navy Commendation Medal with Combat "V"

9. Colonel TWISDALE was detached from this office on 10 October 1969.

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Meritorious Service Medal to:

ROBERT H. TWISDALE  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

for services as set forth in the following:

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For exceptionally meritorious service while serving with the Joint Planning Group, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs), Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, during the period 1 September 1966 through 10 October 1969. Serving initially as Head of the Joint Policy Team, then as Head of the Joint and Special Plans Team, and, for the final 31 months of his tour, as the Assistant Director of the Joint Planning Group, Colonel TWISDALE was the individual officer who more than any other influenced the conduct of Marine Corps affairs with relation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Applying his superb understanding of the military planning processes, he not only fashioned and protected Marine Corps positions, but also assisted greatly in shaping and improving the positions adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters of utmost significance to national security. His sound military judgment, thorough knowledge of world political and military affairs, extraordinary analytic ability, and uncompromising devotion to excellence contributed immeasurably to the consistently rational, well-reasoned positions taken by the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Throughout this period, Colonel TWISDALE clearly demonstrated exceptional intellectual

brilliance, professional competence, devotion to duty, and leadership. In doing so he reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

FOR THE PRESIDENT,

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AN EVALUATION OF THE OASD(SA) RESIDUAL SUPPORT FORCE PAPER

1. The paper suffers from a degree of misunderstanding of how the military functions and what can be expected in the way of results from a given organization and a given set of resources. This failure to completely comprehend the problem manifests itself in the postulation of an inadequate command and control organization and in the use of simplistic models for determining combat support and combat service support force levels.
2. More specifically, this paper assumes that the post-phase-down effort in Vietnam will proceed with a tidiness and predictability that contrasts starkly with the events of the past. This assumed predictability permits planning to proceed with little or no allowance for safety margin. The elements of surprise, lack of adequate information as to enemy intentions, and human error are dismissed, and replaced by an assumed efficiency for the future that has been precluded in the past and present by the very factors OASD(SA) has dismissed.
3. Fundamental to the concept of a residual force is the capability of the force to prevent any serious defeat being inflicted on the RVNAF. The JCS recommended force levels, including 2 2/3 divisions, provides the depth of staff support and flexibility of command arrangements to allow the force a reasonable chance to foresee requirements and react in a timely manner, in adequate strength, and with necessary command and staff support. The OASD(SA) paper emphasizes instead the concept of using separate brigades operating essentially independently of each other as light, self-sufficient, mobile strike forces actively seeking out and engaging the enemy themselves. This concept appears to be more a return to the Vietnam of 1965 than a plan to support the Vietnamization of the War.

(ENCLOSURE 2)

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the time. This invalidates the scaling process used by OASD(SA).

e. Transport aircraft function in much the same manner as helicopters, having one component of their force level requirement being based on total cargo/passengers hauled and another component being based on the requirement to visit a certain number of different places on courier runs and to deliver high priority cargo, both these tasks being at only a fraction of full load factor. As before, the feature of having a relatively fixed commitment, based on geography rather than number of troop units in-country, renders scaling based on troop units alone invalid.

f. Finally, there is an apparent assumption that the volume and complexity of administrative, logistic and communications is related closely to troop strength. There is no recognition given to the fact that the number and complexity of these staff actions and combat service support functions are fixed cost type functions, being related more to the existence of certain type tasks rather than the number of personnel or units being supported. Thus, here again scaling is inappropriate.

5. In summary, OSD(SA) has assumed, incorrectly, that a revised aggregation of battalions will make everything simpler and more efficient, enabling them to ignore fixed cost commitments and to scale combat support/combat service support forces almost exclusively on maneuver battalion strengths. The proposal should not be supported.

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tasked to provide support over a geographic area, so the 50% reduction of this force component seems unjustified).

b. OASD(SA) also sized helicopter forces primarily on the total maneuver battalions supported. Helicopters perform at least two general types of mission. Transport or resupply of troops for tactical operations is one type, and is properly related to the total maneuver battalions supported. However, helicopters also make courier runs, provide liaison transport, transport VIPs, etc. Such operations are based on geography or the number of places supported. As with the artillery, unless the area of operations is reduced, the geographically-oriented helicopter support requirement will remain relatively constant. Thus, a strict scaling based on maneuver battalions is invalid, and prior to determining scale factors, assets devoted to relatively constant tasks should be deducted from present forces.

c. Tactical air reductions, both Air Force and Navy, are scaled partially on a basis of maneuver battalion reductions and partially on a presumed reduction in the necessity for bombing targets (geographic locations) associated with enemy logistics effort. This assumes that the reduction in geographic targeting will involve primarily unremunerative targets, reflecting an assumption of improved intelligence information, for which no basis is offered. Further, it seems to assume that the enemy supply system will be located in fewer locations. As long as the enemy is spread geographically over the same area as now, it will remain necessary to cover the same number of locations as at present.

d. The reduction in gunfire ships is based on the reduced number of maneuver battalions. It ignores the fact that the ships function in an area coverage role, much as the heavy (8"/175mm) artillery does, a great proportion of

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4. The scaling down of virtually all forces is ostensibly based on providing the same level of support per maneuver battalion as at present. In almost all cases, it ignores a dual nature or dual function for the force component being scaled. With most combat support and combat service support forces/functions, there is a part of the force that does function in direct support of the combat units and which can properly be sized approximately according to the number of combat units supported. Since the actual level of support provided to a given unit will vary according to the situation and the terrain, this scaling must be approximate. In addition, there is a portion of current support/service support that is based on geography, fixed function, or variety of tasks to be accomplished and which essentially constitutes a fixed cost. Determining scale factors while ignoring the fixed cost results in attributing more support per maneuver force unit than is actually used. The result is that when forces are scaled down, the fixed cost support is cut without reason. Specific examples, with brief explanations of the invalidity of scaling, follow:

a. OASD(SA) assumes that all light and medium artillery is provided to support maneuver battalions. In fact, some of this artillery is emplaced to provide support in specified geographic areas and will stay in place regardless of the number of maneuver battalions within the capabilities fan. To determine a proper scaling factor, those light/medium artillery battalions dedicated to area support should be deleted from the force before the support per maneuver battalion is determined. In view of the low probability of obtaining an agreement from the VC/NVA which will reduce their geographic operating areas, it seems reasonable that the force level of artillery dedicated to area support should be maintained at a constant level and only the maneuver battalion support varied. (It should be noted that the majority of 8"/175mm battalions would ordinarily be

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ATA-plb-15  
25 November 1969

POINT PAPER

Subj: Employment of Marine Corps Teams in the Trust Territory

Ref: (a) Ltr from SecInt to SecDef of 24Oct69  
(b) CINCPAC msg 300930Z Oct69  
(c) JCS msg 281908Z Jul69  
(d) CMC msg 281635Z May69  
(e) CINCPAC msg 090101Z Nov69  
(f) Ltr from SecDef to SecInt of 12Nov69  
(g) CG FMFPAC msg 190215Z Nov69  
(h) CINCPAC msg 210313Z Nov69  
(i) JCS msg 211048Z Nov69  
(j) CINCPAC 222211Z Nov69

1. PURPOSE. To respond to the Commandant's query of 12 November:

"How about CMCM offering to send MarCor teams as training exercise at MarCor expense? (to Palaus)"

which query was amplified on 15 November by an annotation by the Chief of Staff to the effect that:

"CMC recommends that we employ engineers on training."

2. BACKGROUND.

a. In June 1969 the Navy deployed a total of five Seabee Civic Action Teams (1 officer and 12 enlisted men each) in the Trust Territory. Original plans envisioned the employment of one Civic Action Team in each of the six districts in the Trust Territory, but the Palau District did not invite a team.

b. On 24 October 1969, the Secretary of the Interior advised the Secretary of Defense that budgetary constraints made it necessary for Interior to discontinue the program after the initial eight months. He suggested that possibly DOD could fund the program as a defense project (Reference (a), Tab 1);

c. On 30 October 1969, CINCPAC submitted a plan (Reference (b), Tab 2) for a joint Service military Civic Action effort in the TTPI in response to a JCS request for such a plan (Reference (c), Tab 3). No Marine Corps participation was recommended. Earlier, in May 1969, certain Marine Corps units were offered by the CMC to JCS for use in the Civic Action program (Reference (d), Tab 4).

d. On 9 November 1969, CINCPAC expressed disappointment over Interior's decision to terminate the services of the Civic Action teams and recommended to the Chairman, JCS that Interior be urged to reconsider its decision (Reference (e), Tab 5)

e. On 12 November 1969, the Secretary of Defense informed the Secretary of the Interior that DOD could not fund the Civic Action project (Reference (f), Tab 6);

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25 November 1969

f. On 19 November 1969, CG FMFPAC reported (Reference (g), Tab 7) that it is feasible to organize a 14-man (or larger) engineer oriented Marine Corps Civic Action team (task organized in line with current Seabee 13-man teams) or a land survey team. He indicated that 30 days would be required to form the teams from personnel resources throughout the Marine Corps and that an additional 90-day period would be required for training. Based on this time projection, Marine Corps Civic Action Teams, configured generally along the accepted "standard" established by the Seabees, would not be ready until 1 April 1970. This timing synchronizes well with the rotation date of 1 May 1970 of the last Seabee team (in the Marianas), but it should be noted that CINCPAC had tentatively assigned the USAF as the relieving service for that Seabee team (Tab 2);

g. On 21 November 1969, CINCPAC outlined the JCS policy guidance to his component commanders based on SecDef guidance which directed that every indication of military interest or planning in the Trust Territory be cautious and low key (Reference (h), Tab 8).

h. On 21 November 1969, the Chairman, JCS, informed CINCPAC of SecDef's decision not to replace the teams in the TTPI if Interior was unwilling to fund for them. CJCS also opined that departure of teams could help demonstrate that their presence was in conformance with Micronesian desires and hopefully create a clamor for their return (Reference (i), Tab 9).

i. On 22 November 1969, CINCPAC expressed to DEPSECDEF (Reference (j), Tab 10) his disappointment that the Civic Action program would be discontinued. He recommended that "in the interest of continuing the program, funding of the teams be considered as an agenda item for the 26 November Secretaries meeting".

### 3. DISCUSSION.

a. With respect to the practicability of deploying Marine teams in the Palaus, the continued absence of an invitation from Micronesian leaders in Palau would militate against any attempt to force the Palauans to accommodate "uninvited" guests. If the desired goal is visibility and acceptability by the Micronesians, the initial entry by Marines should be directed at the Marianas, whose citizens have recently demonstrated an affinity for the United States, rather than the Palaus where hostility toward the US military has been evident;

b. Placing Marines in the Trust Territory on a training exercise seems feasible as long as such exercises are not relatable to on-going Civic Action projects with which the Secretary of Defense apparently wishes to disassociate himself. The Marine Corps effort could be built around a Force Engineer Company and could be deployed to the Trust Territory on a bona fide training mission. Civic Action type projects

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could be accomplished by such a Marine unit as a by-product of its training goals. A Marine Corps plan that would involve the insertion of an operational force on a training exercise could be worthwhile. Such a plan, however, would require careful analysis of funding, shipping and contingency implications.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS.

a. That in view of SecDef's embargo on the utilization of DOD funds for Civic Action projects coupled with the policy guidance for the restraint of activities which could result in misinterpretation or premature disclosure of military interest in the TTPI, it would not be desirable at this time to broach the question of Marines going into the Trust Territory;

b. That the Marine Corps does not have a Civic Action team, as such, in being which is prepared for immediate deployment;

c. That although the Palaus would be a very attractive target for the Marine Corps in light of the islands' potential for Marine Corps base and training requirements, the Marianas would lend themselves more readily to an initial Marine effort. Considering that the seat of the "Government of Micronesia" is located in the Marianas, a successful Marine Corps endeavor there would attract the immediate attention of Micronesian and American leaders;

d. That the Marine Corps should develop a plan for deployment of Marine units for training in the Trust Territory.

#### 5. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. That the Commandant not offer the services of Marine Corps teams in the Trust Territory at this time;

b. That the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 be tasked to examine the feasibility of organizing a task force (possibly with a Force Engineer Company as its nucleus) for deployment to the Trust Territory on a training exercise basis.

Paragraph 5a

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Paragraph 5b

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(Yellow Tabs)

## B. POINT PAPER

EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE CORPS TEAMS  
IN THE TRUST TERRITORY

## (Pink Tabs)

1. Ltr from SecInt to SecDef of 24Oct69 Financial Support for Seabee Teams in TTPI
2. CINCPAC Msg 300930Z Oct69 Joint Participation in Military Civic Action TTPI (U)
3. JCS Msg 281908Z Jul69 Military Civic Action Program for the TTPI
4. CMC Msg 281635Z May69 TTPI Civic Action Team (U)
5. CINCPAC Msg 090101Z Nov69 HICOMTERPACIS Visit (U)
6. Ltr from SecDef to SecInt of 12Nov69 Denial of DOD Funding Civic Action Project
7. CG FMFPAC Msg 190215Z Nov69 MARCORPS Civic Action Program for TTPI (U)
8. CINCPAC Msg 210313Z Nov69 TTPI Policy Guidance (U)
9. JCS Msg 211048Z Nov69 TTPI Matters
10. CINCPAC 222211 Nov69 Civic Action Teams in TTPI (U)

**TOP SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

ATA-jpe-15

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)  
To: Deputy Chief of Staff (Air)  
Assistant Chief of Staff, (G-1  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4  
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs)

Subj: Residual Force

Encl: (1) C/S memo AD-mgy of 80Oct69, same subject, w/attachment

1. Enclosure (1) provided a greatly expanded version of a Systems Analysis paper dealing with the Vietnam residual force, with the request that the paper be examined in detail to determine its possible impact on our forces, roles, and missions in future years.

2. In view of the significance of this matter to the future of the Marine Corps, it is imperative that a comprehensive coordinated Marine Corps position be prepared. To this end, it is requested that each addressee provide an action officer to participate in the preparation of a response to the Chief of Staff. Please have the names and telephone numbers of action officers provided to the primary action officer, Lieutenant Colonel D'Wayne GRAY, at extension 43169, by 1600 Tuesday, 14 October 1969. It is anticipated that a preliminary meeting of the action officers will be held on 15 or 16 October 1969.

3. The comments provided on the earlier version of the Systems Analysis paper are appreciated. They will prove most useful in the preparation of the final recommendation for the Chief of Staff.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY  
**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

**TOP SECRET****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

ATA-jnf-15

**8 OCT 1969**MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)  
To: Lieutenant General ROBERTSHAW  
Major General McCUTCHEON  
Major General PLATT  
Major General DRAKE  
Major General CHAISSON  
Brigadier General HILL  
Brigadier General MILLER

Subj: Command Structure in I CTZ and Withdrawal of III MAF

Encl: (1) Draft DC/S (P&P) memo for CMC, same subj

1. Enclosed is a redraft of the memorandum for CMC relative to the impact of Phase II and subsequent redeployments on command arrangements in I CTZ which was discussed at our meeting last week.

2. You are requested to meet in Room 2018 at 1600 today to discuss this new draft and to assist in the formulation of a recommendation to the Commandant in this matter.

*Foster C. Lahue*  
FOSTER C. LAHUE  
By direction

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**TOP SECRET**  
**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

**SECRET**I-K-5  
ATA-jpe-15REFERENCE NOTEBOOK ITEM

Subj: Program 8

QUESTION

Does the current OSD SEA deployment program provide adequate US forces for the war in Vietnam?

POSITION

The Marine Corps believes that the current program provides adequate forces for conduct of the war under present circumstances. Should the intensity of combat increase, or should new requirements develop, as for example, large-scale amphibious operations, a relaxation of the ceiling would be required.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Upon the completion of Phase II redeployments (by 15 December 1969), US forces in Vietnam will be limited to a strength of 484.0K, divided as follows:

Marine Corps	55.5K
Army	338.4K
Navy and Coast Guard	30.8K
Air Force	59.3K

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10 October 1969

Record of Review	
<u>Date</u>	<u>Initial</u>

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15 October 1969POINT PAPER

Subj: COMUSMACV Request for Force Level Increase for CY 68

1. General WESTMORELAND indicates (Green Tab 1) that published allegations that he asked, in February 1968, for 206,000 additional troops have been misleading.
2. Examination of documents of the period in question reveals the following:
  - a. On 27 February 1968, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a report of his trip to Vietnam of 23-25 February 1968, stated that General WESTMORELAND asked for a 3 division-15 tactical fighter squadron force (White Tab 1) totalling 206,756 additional spaces (over the then-authorized 525,000) (White Tab 2).
  - b. On 29 February 1968, General WHEELER informed (Green Tab 3) General WESTMORELAND of the discussion touched off in Washington by his (General WESTMORELAND's) "force requirements." The precise size of the requirement was not stated, but the order of magnitude is evident from the statement that a 400,000 space end strength increase would be required.
  - c. On 2 March 1968, General WESTMORELAND responded (Green Tab 4) to General WHEELER's 29 February message. Again, the precise size of the forces requested is not stated, but the requirement for additional forces of multi-division size is defended.
  - d. MACV and CINCPAC command histories for the period (Green Tabs 5 and 6) verify the request.

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(Yellow Tabs)

B. POINT PAPER

COMUSMACV REQUEST FOR FORCE  
LEVEL INCREASE FOR CY 68

(Green Tabs)

1. Memo from General WESTMORELAND to CMC -do-
2. JCS 2472/237 #14 Report by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the Situation in South Vietnam and MACV Force Requirements (U)
3. CJCS msg 292339Z  
Feb68 #1A General WHEELER's Info to General WESTMORELAND of the Discussion Touched off in Washington by his (General WESTMORELAND's) "Force Requirements"
4. COMUSMACV msg 020947Z  
Mar68 #1B General WESTMORELAND's Response to General WHEELER's 29 February message
5. Extract From MACV Command History 1968, Volume I
6. Extract From CINCPAC Command History - 1968

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

- NOTE 1. Although this alternative would provide the greatest immediate reduction of Marines in RVN, it is not considered to enhance the total redeployment capability of Marine Corps forces in RVN. A MAF hq is required both to coordinate any directed redeployment and to insure proper presentation of a single Marine Corps position to COMUSMACV during a redeployment planning.
- NOTE 2. In all alternatives which remove III MAF from the position of senior hq in I CTZ, a derogation of the uni-Service command status could result. UNAAF prescribes that commanders of uni-Service commands operate directly under the commander who established the uni-Service command (in this case, COMUSMACV). Placing III MAF under operational control of any headquarters except MACV would violate UNAAF if CG, III MAF did not also retain direct access to COMUSMACV. A possibly acceptable solution, along the lines of Alternative G, would be for operational control to flow directly from MACV to both III MAF and the senior Army headquarters in I CTZ, with the Army commander (assumed to be senior) being given coordinating authority for the entire CTZ. In any case, the working arrangements for allocation and fragging of Marine Corps air assets, within the MACV Single Management System, may be adversely affected.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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ALTERNATIVE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN I CTZ

ALTERNATIVES	REDUCES PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS	MAINTAINS UNITY OF COMMAND IN I CTZ	ARMY TAKES COMMAND	ENHANCES III MAF REDEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY	MAINTAINS MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM	MAINTAINS III MAF AS A UNIT-SERVICE COMMAND
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A. Disestablish III MAF hq. Augment XXIV Corps hq with additional Army and Marine Corps personnel as required to allow that hq to function as senior US hq in ICTZ.	Yes.	Yes.	Yes.	No. See Note 1	No.	No.
B. Disestablish XXIV Corps hq. Augment III MAF hq with additional Army personnel as required.	Yes.	Yes.	No.	No.	Yes.	Yes.
C. Disestablish both III MAF and XXIV Corps hq. Establish a JTF hq as senior hq in ICTZ	Yes.	Yes.	Probably.	No.	No.	No.
D. Establish a JTF with III MAF and XXIV Corps as subordinate elements.	No.	Yes.	Probably.	Yes.	Yes.	Possibly. See Note 2.
E. Establish a JTF with III MAF and the various Army divisions in ICTZ as subordinate elements. Disestablish XXIV Corps hq.	Probably.	Yes.	Probably.	Yes.	Yes.	Possibly. See Note 2.
F. Upgrade XXIV hq to a Field Force hq, with III MAF and the various Army divisions in ICTZ as subordinate elements.	Probably.	Yes.	Yes.	Yes.	Yes.	Possibly. See Note 2.
G. Place all Army forces in ICTZ under CG, XXIV Corps. Reduce III MAF hq to size required to control div/wing team only, and assign CG XXIV Corps as Coordinating Authority throughout I CTZ.	Yes.	No. See Note 2.	Yes.	Yes.	Yes.	Yes.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA-jnf-15

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Command Structure in I CTZ

Ref: (a) DC/S (P&P) memo ATA-jnf-14 of 30Aug69 to C/S, Subj:  
Feasibility of Combining Headquarters III MAF and  
Headquarters XXIV Corps during the Phasing Out of  
US Forces in Vietnam  
(b) CG FMFPAC 260405Z Aug69.

Encl: (1) Alternative Command Arrangements in I CTZ  
(2) Draft Interim Response to LtGen Buse

1. In commenting on reference (a), CMC asked, "Shouldn't we offer to give up I Corps command but retain III MAF as Marine Corps command when General Nickerson is detached?"

2. In consideration of the pressures to reduce the size, number, and visibility of major US force headquarters and of future redeployments in connection with Vietnamization programs, COMUSMACV has developed a concept to eliminate headquarters as the situation in Vietnam permits. As reported in reference (b), it is planned that USARV and 1st Logistics Command be combined, probably in Phase IV. III MAF will be phased out in Phase VI. Combining Headquarters, III MAF, and Headquarters, XXIV Corps is being planned for execution in the near future. As the situation develops, consideration will be given to the merger of field force headquarters with major unit headquarters in each geographical area. COMUSMACV's established objectives with regards to headquarters are as follows:

a. Eliminate some major headquarters.

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- b. Cut headquarters strengths.
- c. Reduce the visibility of US presence.
- d. Continue to provide adequate command and control for residual forces.
- e. Retain the capability to perform all assigned missions.
- f. Be consistent with posture for transition to T-Day.

3. General Nickerson, on 14 August 1969, provided to General Abrams a concept for the combining of the III MAF and XXIV Corps headquarters. The concept would make III MAF a joint Marine Corps-Army headquarters (529 Marines and 350 Army personnel) and XXIV Corps headquarters would be deactivated. A total personnel savings of 518 would be realized. (Tab A).

4. General Abrams, on 25 August 1969, approved the concept for planning purposes and directed General Nickerson to prepare by 25 September 1969, a plan for execution, with the additional guidance that:

"a. The combined headquarters will eventually become an augmentation to the 101st Airborne Division. \*

b. In order to reduce visibility of US personnel the combined headquarters should not be located in a large population center such as Da Nang. \*\*

\* It is assumed that this refers to the residual force posture after III MAF departs during Phase VI redeployments. Army elements of III MAF headquarters would augment the division headquarters which will become senior US headquarters in I CTZ.

\*\* No attempt has been made to analyze the implications of moving the proposed combined headquarters from Da Nang, since MACV's intent cannot be ascertained from a study of available data.

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c. Funds for construction of new facilities will be most difficult to obtain."

The date of 25 September 1969 for having a plan for execution has slipped considerably. According to a telephone call on 14 October 1969 from G-3, FMFPAC, III MAF's plan will be ready "in a month or two."

5. In view of COMUSMACV's inherent responsibility to determine, within the limits of UNAAF, the command arrangements within his command, it would appear inappropriate that the Marine Corps formally propose a change in such arrangements. However, in view of the strong possibility that a change is impending, it appears prudent that a Marine Corps position be developed, consistent with COMUSMACV's objectives concerning headquarters while simultaneously providing for protection of Marine Corps interests.

6. Two points are vital to the Marine Corps position relative to command in I CTZ:

a. The Marine division/wing team must remain an integral unit under a MAF headquarters which exercises operational control over all Marine combat forces in RVN.

b. The status of III MAF as a uni-Service command must be preserved in order that the CG, III MAF retain direct access to COMUSMACV on matters of importance to the Marine Corps.

7. Two basic alternatives exist:

a. Try to retain overall command in I CTZ so long as a division/wing team remains committed.

b. Express a willingness to turn over command in I CTZ to the Army upon General Nickerson's detachment, as long as vital Marine Corps interests are protected.

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8. Relative to Alternative A above, the following advantages and disadvantages are seen:

a. Advantages:

- (1) Preserves vital Marine Corps interests.
- (2) Is consistent with immediate course of action approved by COMUSMACV.
- (3) Provides continuity of current, well-established lines of coordination and cooperation with Vietnamese and Korean forces in I CTZ.
- (4) Provides greater visibility to Marine Corps contributions in Vietnam than would be likely otherwise.
- (5) Recognizes that the Marine Corps contribution in I CTZ cannot be measured purely by comparing gross personnel figures or ground maneuver elements vis-a-vis the Army.
- (6) Obviates the need for a separate MAF headquarters which would be required by the other alternative.

b. Disadvantages:

- (1) May be challenged in consideration of relative Army-Marine Corps strengths in I CTZ. After Phase II redeployments, there will be 25 Army and 12 Marine battalions in I CTZ. Personnel strengths will be 72.0K Army and 53.8K Marines.
- (2) Would leave a Marine officer to preside over the dissolution of American efforts in I CTZ under possibly undesirable circumstances vis-a-vis the American public and the Vietnamese, a situation which would not promote the Marine Corps image.

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(3) Leaves a Marine officer responsible for an extensive area of operations with a sizeable force, the preponderance of which will be other than Marine.

(4) Would require a change of overall command at the same time the division/wing team is redeployed and the residual force is being redisposed, adding to the burden on both the departing Marine commander and the remaining Army commander at that time.

(5) Delays ultimate transfer of responsibility to the Service which will be responsible for I CTZ after US forces reduce to residual levels.

(6) Maintains a larger drain on Marine resources than necessary for the size of the Marine combat force remaining committed.

(7) Reduces the readiness of III MAF to redeploy in response to other contingencies in the Pacific which might require large amphibious forces.

9. Relative to Alternative B above, the following advantages and disadvantages are seen:

a. Advantages:

(1) Recognizes the preponderance of Army forces which will exist in I CTZ after Phase II redeployments.

(2) Creates a low Marine Corps profile during the possibly turbulent final phases of redeployment.

(3) Extricates the Marine Corps from extraneous problems during the withdrawal of III MAF.

(4) Lessens drain on Marine Corps resources.

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(5) Enhances III MAF capability for rapid redeployment to meet other contingencies.

(6) Transfers responsibility immediately to the Service which will provide the residual force in I CTZ:

(7) Provides a quid pro quo for solidifying current or even improved Marine Corps position relative to control of its own assets.

(8) Provides a means of acceding gracefully to what may prove inevitable, meanwhile protecting vital Marine Corps interests.

b. Disadvantages:

(1) Complicates the problem of protecting vital Marine Corps interests. Enclosure (1) provides a detailed analysis of feasible alternative command arrangements in I CTZ.

(2) Disrupts continuity of current lines of coordination and cooperation between US, Vietnamese, and Korean forces in I CTZ.

(3) Lessens Marine Corps visibility in Vietnam.

(4) Requires the maintenance of two major headquarters in I CTZ -- an overall headquarters and a smaller III MAF headquarters to control Marine forces.

10. From the foregoing it is concluded that:

a. The Marine Corps should not offer at this time to give up command in I CTZ.

b. A final position reached at this time on the merits of retaining or giving up command necessarily would be based on assumptions concerning a number of unknown factors.

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c. In view of the delay in submitting a detailed plan for the combining of headquarters in I CTZ, no immediate decision on a final Marine Corps position is required.

d. The forthcoming visit of ACMC to WestPac offers the opportunity to learn more about the factors involved in the determination of a proper Marine Corps position.

11. It is recommended, therefore, that:

a. The Marine Corps at this time not offer to relinquish command in I CTZ.

b. No decision be made at this time on a final position relative to relinquishing command in I CTZ.

c. ACMC discuss the I CTZ command structure with CG, FMFPAC; CG, III MAF; and COMUSMACV on his forthcoming WestPac trip. If this recommendation is approved, this office will prepare a trip book item for use by ACMC.

d. If the recommendation in paragraph 11.c above is approved, enclosure (2) be approved as an interim response to LtGen Buse's letter of 15 September 1969.

APPROVED

DISAPPROVED

11. a. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

b. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

c. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

d. \_\_\_\_\_

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

## ALTERNATIVE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN I CTZ

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ALTERNATIVES	REDUCES PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS	MAINTAINS UNITY OF COMMAND IN I CTZ	ARMY TAKES COMMAND	ENHANCES III MAF REDEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY	MAINTAINS MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM	MAINTAINS III MAF AS A UNI- SERVICE COMMAND
A. Disestablish III MAF hq. Augment XXIV Corps hq with additional Army and Marine Corps personnel as required to allow that hq to function as senior US hq in ICTZ.	Yes.	Yes.	Yes.	No. See Note 1	No.	No.
B. Disestablish XXIV Corps hq. Augment III MAF hq with additional Army personnel as required.	Yes.	Yes.	No.	No.	Yes.	Yes.
C. Disestablish both III MAF and XXIV Corps hq. Establish a JTF hq as senior hq in ICTZ	Yes.	Yes.	Probably.	No.	No.	No.
D. Establish a JTF with III MAF and XXIV Corps as subordinate elements.	No.	Yes.	Probably.	Yes.	Yes.	Possibly. See Note 2.
E. Establish a JTF with III MAF and the various Army divisions in ICTZ as subordinate elements. Disestablish XXIV Corps hq.	Probably.	Yes.	Probably.	Yes.	Yes.	Possibly. See Note 2.
F. Upgrade XXIV hq to a Field Force hq, with III MAF and the various Army divisions in ICTZ as subordinate elements.	Probably.	Yes.	Yes.	Yes.	Yes.	Possibly. See Note 2.
G. Place all Army forces in ICTZ under CG, XXIV Corps. Reduce III MAF hq to size required to control div/wing team only, and assign CG XXIV Corps as Coordinating Authority throughout I CTZ.	Yes.	No. See Note 2.	Yes.	Yes.	Yes.	Yes.

Enclosure (1) TOP SECRET  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

NOTE 1. Although this alternative would provide the greatest immediate reduction of Marines in RVN, it is not considered to enhance the total redeployment capability of Marine Corps forces in RVN. A MAF hq is required both to coordinate any directed redeployment and to insure proper presentation of a single Marine Corps position to COMUSMACV during redeployment planning.

NOTE 2. In all alternatives which remove III MAF from the position of senior hq in I CTZ, a derogation of the uni-Service command status could result. UNAAF prescribes that commanders of uni-Service commands operate directly under the commander who established the uni-Service command (in this case, COMUSMACV). Placing III MAF under operational control of any headquarters except MACV would violate UNAAF if CG, III MAF did not also retain direct access to COMUSMACV. A possibly acceptable solution, along the lines of Alternative G, would be for operational control to flow directly from MACV to both III MAF and the senior Army headquarters in I CTZ, with the Army commander (assumed to be senior) being given coordinating authority for the entire CTZ. In any case, the working arrangements for allocation and fragging of Marine Corps air assets, within the MACV Single Management System, may be adversely affected.

ENCLOSURE (1)

TOP SECRET  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

ATA-jnf-12

Dear Bill,

In early September, I had directed the staff to examine the pros and cons of offering to give up, at the time of Nick's detachment, overall command in I CTZ under some arrangement which would protect Marine Corps interests. Your letter of 15 September, enclosing Nick's concept plan, provided some interesting input for this effort.

On the basis of rather fragmentary information available here, a persuasive case can be made for either retaining or relinquishing the command. In either case, I believe we must protect the status of III MAF as a uni-Service command, exercising operational control of the division/wing team, and with direct access to COMUSMACV on matters of importance to the Marine Corps. Possibly such an arrangement can be devised with an Army commander exercising overall command in I CTZ.

I understand that submission of Nick's detailed plan for implementation of the combined headquarters has slipped a month or two. In view of that delay, it appears that we have some additional time to study this problem.

Since Lew will be coming out in less than a month, I am going to ask him to discuss the question with you, Nick and perhaps with Abe. On Lew's return, I will decide which course to follow and will be in touch with you.

With warm regards,

**TOP SECRET**  
**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

ATA-jnf-15

15 OCT 1969

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)  
To: Deputy Chief of Staff (Air)  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4  
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs)


Subj: Residual Force

Encl: (1) C/S memo AD-mgv of 8Oct69, same subject, w/attachment

1. Enclosure (1) provided a greatly expanded version of a Systems Analysis paper dealing with the Vietnam residual force, with the request that the paper be examined in detail to determine its possible impact on our forces, roles, and missions in future years.

2. In view of the significance of this matter to the future of the Marine Corps, it is essential that a comprehensive coordinated Marine Corps position be prepared. Request each addressee provide an action officer to participate in the preparation of a response to the Chief of Staff. Please have the names and telephone numbers of action officers provided to the primary action officer, Lieutenant Colonel D'Wayne GRAY, at extension 43169, by 1600 Wednesday, 15 October 1969. It is anticipated that a preliminary meeting of the action officers will be held on 16 or 17 October 1969.

3. The comments provided on the earlier version of the Systems Analysis paper are appreciated. They will prove most useful in the preparation of the final recommendation for the Chief of Staff.



FOSTER C. LAHUE

By direction

**TOP SECRET**

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**



**TOP SECRET**ATA-jpe-15  
S&C T9511  
13 October 1969

1. CINCPAC Oplan 5064 is a revision of CINCPAC's plan for the establishment of an expanded military advisory and assistance role in Laos by the United States.
2. The plan provides for the deployment of DEPJUSMAGTHAI and appropriate elements of his staff into Laos to form a U. S. Supply and Training Mission, Laos, and for the provision of augmentation personnel to provide advisory assistance to FAR/FAN headquarters, selected FAR/FAN units, and the RLAF, as necessary.
3. No Marine Corps forces are tasked in the plan.
4. COORDINATION. DC/S (Air); AC/S, G-2; AC/S, G-3; AC/S, G-4.
5. It is recommended that the attached Marine Corps Memorandum of Acceptability for the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, be signed.

  
J. A. WEIZENEGER

BUCKTAG COMMENT ON: S&amp;C T 9511, CINCPAC OPLAN 5064

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

IN REPLY REFER TO

ATA-jpe-15

13 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: CINCPAC Operation Plan No. 5064

Ref: (a) JCS 2054/799  
(b) JCS MOP 144

1. The subject plan, referred to the Services by reference (a), has been reviewed in accordance with reference (b).
2. The plan is considered acceptable to the Marine Corps.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "F. C. Dodson", is positioned above the typed name.

F. C. DODSON  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Director, Joint Planning Group  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Plans and Programs)

TOP SECRET

ATA-jnf-15  
1 October 1969POINT PAPER

Subj: COMMAND STRUCTURE IN I CTZ AFTER PHASE II REDEPLOYMENTS

1. In view of the Phase II redeployments, it is likely that some change will be made in the overall command structure in I CTZ.

a. There is pressure from OSD to reduce the numbers of spaces in major headquarters.

b. The preponderance of ground forces in I CTZ after these redeployments will be Army.

2. General NICKERSON has provided to General ABRAMS a concept for the combining of the III MAF and XXIV Corps headquarters. The concept would make III MAF a joint Marine Corps-Army headquarters (529 Marines and 350 Army personnel) and XXIV Corps headquarters would cease to exist. A total personnel savings of 518 would be realized.

3. General ABRAMS has approved this concept for planning purposes and has directed General NICKERSON to prepare a plan of execution, with the additional guidance that:

a. The combined headquarters will eventually become an augmentation to the 101st Airborne Division after Phase VI.

b. In order to reduce visibility of US personnel the combined headquarters should not be located in a large population center such as Da Nang.

c. Funds for construction of new facilities will be most difficult to obtain.

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ATA-jnf-15  
1 October 1969

4. Points of major concern to the Marine Corps are that:

a. III MAF be retained as a Marine air-ground team headquarters (albeit at a reduced strength) with operational control over the Marine division and the MAW.

b. The status of III MAF as a uni-Service command be preserved.

c. NSA Da Nang continue to provide primary logistical support to III MAF forces.

5. The planning to date does not appear to jeopardize the Marine Corps' position. It is presumed that General ZAIS (CG, XXIV Corps) will be reassigned and that General NICKERSON will remain the senior US commander in I CTZ.

6. At a later date, COMUSMACV may move towards placing an Army officer in command in I CTZ, possibly when General NICKERSON's tour ends in April 1970. Although certain benefits accrue to the Marine Corps by having a Marine in overall command in I CTZ, chiefly in the management of aviation resources, it is believed that acceptable arrangements can be worked out to satisfy the critical requirements listed in paragraph 4 above.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

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**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

IN REPLY REFER TO

ATA-jpe-15

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Command Structure in I CTZ and Withdrawal of III MAF

Ref: (a) DC/S memo ATA-jnf-14 of 30Aug69 to C/S, Subj:  
Feasibility of Combining Headquarters III MAF and  
Headquarters XXIV Corps during the Phasing Out of  
US Forces in Vietnam

Encl: (1) Alternative Command Arrangements in I CTZ

1. In commenting on reference (a), CMC asked, "Shouldn't we offer to give up I Corps command but retain III MAF as Marine Corps command when General Nickerson is detached?" Additionally he commented that, "We should be prepared to withdraw III MAF at the earliest opportunity."

2. In view of COMUSMACV's inherent responsibility to determine, within the limits of UNAAF, the command arrangements within his command, it would appear inappropriate that the Marine Corps formally propose a change in I CTZ. It might be desirable, however, that the Marine Corps' views be expressed to General Abrams, as it is known that he is considering the combining of III MAF and XXIV Corps Headquarters. APMC's forthcoming visit to WestPac would afford an opportunity for discussion of the matter with COMUSMACV, should CMC elect to follow this course.

3. The basic considerations involved in any decision to change the command arrangements in I CTZ appear to be:

- a. Reductions in numbers of personnel.
- b. Maintenance of unity of command in I CTZ to parallel Vietnamese command structure.
- c. Shift of senior command to the Army, as the Army will have the preponderance of troops in I CTZ.

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**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY ATA-jpe-15

d. Enhancement of III MAF's capability for rapid redeployment.

e. Maintenance of III MAF as an integral air-ground team, preferably in its current status as a uni-Service command.

4. Enclosure (1) displays several feasible alternatives COMUSMACV may consider.

a. Alternatives A and C would disestablish III MAF Headquarters and so are unacceptable to the Marine Corps.

b. Alternative B is likely to be unacceptable to COMUSMACV, as it would perpetuate Marine command over a preponderantly Army force. It also would impose inordinately heavy personnel requirements on the Marine Corps for the size of the committed Marine Corps combat forces. Further, it would hamper any rapid redeployment of III MAF either before or during the final drawdown of US forces in RVN to the residual force levels.

c. Alternative D would be unacceptable because it would require larger numbers of personnel in RVN at a time when reductions are being sought.

d. Alternatives E and F could be made to work, but they would jeopardize the status of III MAF as a uni-Service command.

e. Alternative G has the disadvantage of dividing operational control of the US forces in I CTZ, but through assigning coordinating authority to the senior Army commander, uniform policies and procedures vis-a-vis the Vietnamese should be possible.

5. Relative to withdrawal of III MAF, on 22 August CMC concurred in the final report of NSSM 36 which provided for the Marine division/wing team to redeploy from RVN during Phase VI, the final phase of the withdrawal. In developing all T-Day, Force Planning, and Vietnamization plans, this office has operated under the general philosophy that the Marine Corps should strive to retain a significant force (division/wing team) in RVN so long as the United States is

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ATA-jpe-15

actively engaged in a hot war, but that the Marine Corps should strive just as actively to avoid commitment of combat forces in any residual force. Current JCS/CINCPAC/COMUSMACV plans reflect this position.

6. It is recommended that:

- a. The ACMC discuss command arrangements in I CTZ with COMUSMACV during his forthcoming visit to WestPac.
- b. The policy outlined in paragraph 5, above, be approved.

Recommendation 6a: \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED

DISAPPROVED

Recommendation 6b: \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED

DISAPPROVED

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

ALTERNATIVES	REDUCES PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS	MAINTAINS UNITY OF COMMAND	ARMY TAKES COMMAND	ENHANCES III MAF REDEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY	MAINTAINS MARINE AIR-GROUND TEAM	MAINTAINS III MAF AS A UNI- SERVICE COMMAND
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A. Disestablish III MAF hq. Augment XXIV Corps hq with additional Army and Marine Corps personnel as required to allow that hq to function as senior US hq in ICTZ.	Yes.	Yes.	Yes.	No. See Note 1	No.	No.
B. Disestablish XXIV Corps hq. Augment III MAF hq with additional Army personnel as required.	Yes.	Yes.	No.	No.	Yes.	Yes.
C. Disestablish both III MAF and XXIV Corps hq. Establish a JTF hq as senior hq in ICTZ	Yes.	Yes.	Probably.	No.	No.	No.
D. Establish a JTF with III MAF and XXIV Corps as subordinate elements.	No.	Yes.	Probably.	Yes.	Yes.	Possibly. See Note 2.
E. Establish a JTF with III MAF and the various Army divisions in ICTZ as subordinate elements. Disestablish XXIV Corps hq.	Probably Not.	Yes.	Probably.	Yes.	Yes.	Possibly. See Note 2.
F. Upgrade XXIV hq to a Field Force hq, with III MAF and the various Army divisions in ICTZ as subordinate elements.	Probably Not.	Yes.	Yes.	Yes.	Yes.	Possibly. See Note 2.
G. Place all Army forces in ICTZ under CG, XXIV Corps. Reduce III MAF hq to size required to control div/wing team only, and assign CG XXIV Corps as Coordinating Authority throughout I CTZ.	Yes.	No. See Note 2.	Probably.	Yes.	Yes.	Yes.



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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

NOTE 1. Although this alternative would provide the greatest immediate reduction of Marines in RVN, it is not considered to enhance the total redeployment capability of Marine Corps forces in RVN. A MAF hq is required both to coordinate any directed redeployment and to insure proper presentation of a single Marine Corps position to COMUSMACV during redeployment planning.

NOTE 2. In all alternatives which remove III MAF from the position of senior hq in I CTZ, a derogation of the uni-Service command status could result. UNAAF prescribes that commanders of uni-Service commands operate directly under the commander who established the uni-Service command (in this case, COMUSMACV). Placing III MAF under operational control of any headquarters except MACV would violate UNAAF if CG, III MAF did not also retain direct access to COMUSMACV. A possibly acceptable solution, along the lines of Alternative G, would be for operational control to flow directly from MACV to both III MAF and the senior Army headquarters in I CTZ, with the Army commander (assumed to be senior) being given coordinating authority for the entire CTZ. In any case, the working arrangements for allocation and fragging of Marine Corps air assets, within the MACV Single Management System, may be adversely affected.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

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IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA-jnf-15

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Command Structure in I CTZ and Withdrawal of III MAF

Ref: (a) DC/S (P&P) memo ATA-jnf-14 of 30Aug69 to C/S, Subj:  
Feasibility of Combining Headquarters III MAF and  
Headquarters XXIV Corps during the Phasing Out of  
US Forces in Vietnam

1. In commenting on reference (a), CMC asked, "Shouldn't we offer to give up I Corps command but retain III MAF as Marine Corps command when General Hickerson is detached?" Additionally he commented that, "We should be prepared to withdraw III MAF at the earliest opportunity."
2. In view of COMUSMACV's inherent responsibility to determine, within the limits of UNAAF, the command arrangements within his command, it would appear inappropriate that the Marine Corps formally propose a change in I CTZ. It would appear desirable, however, for ACMC to discuss this matter with COMUSMACV during his forthcoming WestPac trip. If approved, this office will prepare an item for ACMC trip book.
3. Relative to withdrawal of III MAF, on 22 August CMC concurred in the final report on NSSM 36 which provided for the Marine division/wing team to redeploy from RVN during Phase VI, the final phase of the withdrawal. In developing all T-Day, Force Planning, and Vietnamization plans, this office has operated under the general philosophy that the Marine Corps should strive to retain a significant force (division/wing team) in RVN so long as the United States is actively engaged in a hot war, but

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that the Marine Corps should strive just as actively to avoid commitment of combat forces in any residual force. Current JCS/CINCPAC/COMUSMACV plans reflect this position.

Paragraph 2: \_\_\_\_\_  
APPROVED

\_\_\_\_\_  
DISAPPROVED

Paragraph 3: \_\_\_\_\_  
APPROVED

\_\_\_\_\_  
DISAPPROVED

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ATA-jpe-15

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)  
To: Chief of Staff

Subj: Residual Force

Ref: (a) C/S memo AD:mgv dtd 12Sep69, same subject

1. By reference (a), the Chief of Staff provided a copy of an unofficial paper entitled "Residual Support Force - Separate Brigades with Forward Support Area Bases" and stated that the rationale presented in the paper may make it advisable for the Marine Corps to modify its position relative to Marines in the residual force. The views of DC/S (P&P) on the matter and suggestions as to how such a proposal could be surfaced were requested.

2. In NSSM 36, Dr. Kissinger required the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draw up timetables "for the transfer of the combat role to the GVN and restriction of the US role to combat support and advisory missions only." As stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their final report on NSSM 36, the "US units composing a Residual Support Force will furnish combat support and combat service support to RVNAF, relieve RVNAF units on pacification and security missions when necessary, and be prepared to reinforce in emergencies." The proposal provided by reference (a), however, as indicated in its first sentence, puts forth a concept for a residual force geared more "to conduct the war" than to assist the RVNAF. The concept of light, hard-hitting, flexible, separate brigades would have served well in the earlier days of the war, but, in view of Dr. Kissinger's directive, it seems now to be somewhat out of date.

3. The arguments seen for including a Marine brigade in the residual force are:

a. If US forces are fighting anywhere, Marines, America's military exemplars, should be participating.

b. Vietnam will continue to offer the opportunity for US forces to gain combat experience, test new equipment, develop

TOP SECRET-MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

ATA-jpe-15

new tactics, etc.

c. The committed forces, and the Services that furnish them, will have a leg up in the competition for the Defense dollar.

d. It would facilitate any reentry into Vietnam by III MAF.

4. Arguments against including Marine combat forces in the residual force are:

a. The mission of the residual force basically is one for the Army and Air Force, i.e., augmenting the RVN Army and Air Force as required by the threat. No amphibious role is envisaged for the residual force.

b. Basing a MEB permanently ashore in Vietnam would derogate CINCPAC's WestPac amphibious reserve by 50% unless Marine Corps forces in Okinawa and Japan were augmented by an equivalent force.

c. Once established ashore in the residual force, the MEB would be most difficult to extricate. A Marine division and a MAW stayed in Korea over 1½ years after the truce was signed, and a two-division Army residual force still is there.

d. In spite of the best efforts of its commanders, a MEB fulfilling the JCS-approved mission for the residual force would become more a garrison force and less an operationally-committed combat force as the RVNAF capabilities improve. Consequently the state of readiness of the MEB would decline to an unacceptable state.

e. By the time US forces are drawn down to residual force levels, the public probably will have become even less interested in the war than today. A disapproving press will be critical of every engagement involving US forces. The opportunity to promote the image of the Marine Corps in Vietnam largely will have disappeared.

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ATA-jpe-15

f. Integrity of the MEB as an air-ground team would be difficult to maintain. In the proposal provided by reference (a), two brigades would be located in I CTZ. Some common headquarters certainly would be established. Also, with the Air Force providing the preponderance of the fixed-wing support in the residual force, it would be difficult to save the aviation elements of the MEB from some extreme form of Single Management.

5. On balance, it appears that the Marine Corps' interests in the post-Vietnam period would best be served by exploiting the flexibility provided only by amphibious forces rather than by usurping a part of what is essentially an Army/Air Force job. In the era of austerity in defense expenditures which is sure to follow the Vietnam war, it appears that the maintenance of a MEB in Vietnam (which certainly would have first call on Marine Corps resources) would cost the Marine Corps more in money, material, and personnel, than should be spent in support of a force of that size. The rest of the Marine Corps -- that portion involved in the amphibious role so vital to our mission -- would suffer accordingly.

6. Should CMC desire to propose the inclusion of additional Marines in the residual force, the best opportunity would be at the time the originator of the proposal provided by reference (a) submits it for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Composition of the residual force is primarily of concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but Secretarial support could be solicited once the matter is addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is recommended, however, that the current policy remain unchanged and that no effort be made to include a MEB in the residual force.

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET-MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)

To: Chief of Staff

Subj: Residual Force

Ref: (a) C/S memo AD:mgv dtd 12Sep69, same subject

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2. NSSM 36 required the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draw up timetables "for the transfer of the combat role to the GVN and restriction of the US role to combat support and advisory missions only." As stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their final report on NSSM 36, the "US units composing a Residual Support Force will furnish combat support and combat service support to RVNAF, relieve RVNAF units on pacification and security missions when necessary, and be prepared to reinforce in emergencies." The proposal provided by reference (a), however, as indicated in its first sentence, puts forth a concept for a residual force geared more "to conduct the war" than to assist the RVNAF. The concept of light, hard-hitting, flexible, separate brigades would have served well in the earlier days of the war, but, in view of the mission envisaged for residual forces, it seems now to be somewhat out of date.

3. The arguments seen for including a Marine brigade in the residual force are:

a. If US forces are fighting anywhere, Marines, America's military exemplars, should be participating.

b. Vietnam will continue to offer the opportunity for US forces to gain combat experience, test new equipment, develop

TOP SECRET-MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

ATA-jpe-15

new tactics, etc.

c. The committed forces, and the Services that furnish them, will have a leg up in the competition for the Defense dollar.

d. It would facilitate any reentry into Vietnam by III MAF.

e. Basing Marine Corps units in RVN would ease base loading in Okinawa and Japan.

f. Volunteers will be attracted to the Service having the action. Recruiting for an uncommitted Marine Corps would suffer.

4. Arguments against including Marine combat forces in the residual force are:

a. The mission of the residual force basically is one for the ~~Army~~ and Air Force, i.e., augmenting the RVN Army and Air Force as required by the threat.

b. Basing a MEB permanently ashore in Vietnam would derogate CINCPAC's WestPac amphibious reserve by 50% unless total Marine Corps deployments are increased and necessary end strength increases are obtained to support the additional deployments.

c. Once established ashore in the residual force, the MEB would be most difficult to extricate. A Marine division and a MAW stayed in Korea over 1½ years after the truce was signed, and a two-division Army residual force still is there.

d. In spite of the best efforts of its commanders, a MEB fulfilling the JCS-approved mission for the residual force would become more a garrison force and less an operationally-committed combat force as the RVNAF capabilities improve. Consequently the state of readiness of the MEB would decline.

e. By the time US forces are drawn down to residual force levels, the public probably will have become even less interested in the war than today. A disapproving press will be critical of every engagement involving US forces. The opportunity to promote the image of the Marine Corps in Vietnam largely will

TOP SECRET-MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY



ATA-jpe-15

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f. Integrity of the MEB as an air-ground team would be difficult to maintain. In the proposal provided by reference (a), two brigades would be located in I CTZ. Some common headquarters certainly would be established. Also, with the Air Force providing the preponderance of the fixed-wing support in the residual force, it would be difficult to prevent the evolution of the of the present Single Management System toward increased Army/Air Force control of the MEB's aviation assets.

5. On balance, it appears that the Marine Corps' interests in the post-Vietnam period would best be served by exploiting the flexibility provided only by amphibious forces rather than by usurping a part of what is essentially an Army/Air Force job. In the era of austerity in defense expenditures which is sure to follow the Vietnam war, it appears that the maintenance of a MEB ashore in Vietnam (which certainly would have first call on Marine Corps resources) would cost the Marine Corps more in money, materiel, and personnel, than should be spent in support of a force of that size. The rest of the Marine Corps -- that portion involved in the amphibious role so vital to our mission -- would suffer accordingly.

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APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET-MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

**TOP SECRET MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA-jpe-15

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Command Structure in I CTZ and Withdrawal of III MAF

Ref: (a) DC/S (P&P) memo ATA-jnf-14 of 30Aug69 to C/S, Subj:  
Feasibility of Combining Headquarters III MAF and  
Headquarters XXIV Corps during the Phasing Out of  
US Forces in Vietnam  
(b) CG FMFPAC 260405Z Aug69

1. In commenting on reference (a), CMC asked, "Shouldn't we offer to give up I Corps command but retain III MAF as Marine Corps command when General Nickerson is detached?"

2. Following Phase II redeployments, some change will be made in the overall command structure in I CTZ.

a. There is pressure from OSD to reduce the size, number, and visibility of major headquarters.

b. The preponderance of ground forces in I CTZ will become preponderantly Army (25 Army battalions vs. 12 Marine battalions).

3. COMUSMACV's basic concept is to eliminate headquarters as the situation permits. To this end it is planned that USARV and 1st Logistics Command be combined, probably in Phase IV. III MAF will be phased out in Phase VI. Combining Headquarters, III MAF, and Headquarters, XXIV Corps is being planned for execution in the near future. As the situation develops, consideration will be given to the merger of field force headquarters with major unit headquarters in consonance with the situation extant in each geographical area. COMUSMACV's established objectives with regards to headquarters are as follows:

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**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

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**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

ATA-jpe-15

- a. Eliminate some major headquarters.
  - b. Cut headquarters strengths.
  - c. Reduce the visibility of US presence.
  - d. Continue to provide adequate command and control for residual forces.
  - e. Retain the capability to perform all assumed missions.
  - f. Be consistent with posture for transition to T-Day.
4. General Nickerson, on 14 August 1969, provided to General Abrams a concept for the combining of the III MAF and XXIV Corps headquarters. The concept would make III MAF a joint Marine Corps-Army headquarters (529 Marines and 350 Army personnel) and XXIV Corps Headquarters would be deactivated. A total personnel savings of 518 would be realized.
5. General Abrams, on 25 August 1969, approved this concept for planning purposes and has directed General Nickerson to prepare a plan of execution, with the additional guidance that:
- "a. The combined headquarters will eventually become an augmentation to the 101st Airborne Division.
  - b. In order to reduce visibility of US personnel the combined headquarters should not be located in a large population center such as Da Nang.
  - c. Funds for construction of new facilities will be most difficult to obtain."
6. It is considered that the following elements comprise the essential points of an appropriate Marine Corps position relative to command arrangements in I CTZ following completion of Phase II redeployments and continuing through Phase VI when III MAF will redeploy. The position also is consistent with COMUSMACV's objectives.
- a. Retain III MAF headquarters as a Marine air-ground team

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**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

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ATA-jpe-15

headquarters (albeit at a reduced strength) with operational control over the Marine division and wing.

b. Preserve the status of III MAF as a uni-Service command.

c. NSA Da Nang continue to provide primary logistical support to III MAF forces.

7. In the planning to date, the matter of transferring command of US forces in I CTZ to an Army officer before the execution of Phase VI redeployments has not been addressed in joint channels. General Buse presumes that when III MAF and XXIV Corps headquarters combine, General Zais (now CG, XXIV Corps) will be reassigned outside I CTZ and General Nickerson will remain the senior US commander in I CTZ. It is understood that General Zais agrees.

8. The following considerations support the retention by the Marine Corps of overall command in I CTZ:

a. The true combat power of a Marine Corps division/wing team cannot be measured in terms of gross personnel figures or ground maneuver elements. Therefore, a statistical comparison of Marine Corps versus Army strength in I CTZ, based on these factors, does not provide a valid basis for determining which Service should exercise overall command.

b. The experience gained by the III MAF headquarters in the control and coordination of operations in I CTZ involving all US Services, the ARVN, and ROK forces since 1965 should be retained.

c. The size and significance of the Marine Corps commitment remaining after Phase II justifies the public recognition to the Marine Corps that accrues from a Marine officer being in command in I CTZ.

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**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY****TOP SECRET**  
**MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

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9. In view of the above, it is recommended that the Marine Corps endeavor to retain overall command in I CTZ so long as a division/wing team remains committed.

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

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**TOP SECRET****MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY**

UNCLASSIFIED

ATA-jnf-15

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (PLANS & PROGRAMS) COMMENT:

1. Recommend deletion of reference in paragraph 2 to major items of equipment, as the Program does not consider these items for all geographic areas covered.
2. Recommend redrafting the last portion of paragraph 2 to preclude the possible inference that reference (b) is the source document for determining space authorizations for all the geographic areas. Reference (b) addresses only RVN and Thailand, whereas the Marine Corps troop list addresses all the areas.
3. Recommend reviewing MJCS 268-69, which is the JCS SOP for handling day-to-day changes in the OSD Deployments Program. It provides detailed definitions and information on the joint aspects of the Program, some of which may be useful to include in the draft letter.

UNCLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

TOP SECRET  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA-jnf-15

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Command Structure in I CTZ and Withdrawal of III MAF

Ref: (a) DC/S (P&P) memo ATA-jnf-14 of 30Aug69 to C/S, Subj:  
Feasibility of Combining Headquarters III MAF and  
Headquarters XXIV Corps during the Phasing Out of  
US Forces in Vietnam  
(b) CG FMFPAC 260405Z Aug69

1. In commenting on reference (a), CMC asked, "Shouldn't we offer to give up I Corps command but retain III MAF as Marine Corps command when General Nickerson is detached?"

2. Following Phase II redeployments, some change will be made in the overall command structure in I CTZ.

a. There is pressure from OSD to reduce the size, number, and visibility of major headquarters.

b. The preponderance of ground forces in I CTZ will become preponderantly Army (25 Army battalions vs. 12 Marine battalions).

3. COMUSMACV's basic concept is to eliminate headquarters as the situation permits. To this end it is planned that USARV and 1st Logistics Command be combined, probably in Phase IV. III MAF will be phased out in Phase VI. Combining Headquarters, III MAF, and Headquarters, XXIV Corps is being planned for execution in the near future. As the situation develops, consideration will be given to the merger of field force

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headquarters with major unit headquarters in consonance with the situation extant in each geographical area. COMUSMACV's established objectives with regards to headquarters are as follows:

- a. Eliminate some major headquarters.
- b. Cut headquarters strengths.
- c. Reduce the visibility of US presence.
- d. Continue to provide adequate command and control for residual forces.
- e. Retain the capability to perform all assumed missions.
- f. Be consistent with posture for transition to T-Day.

4. General Nickerson, on 14 August 1969, provided to General Abrams a concept for the combining of the III MAF and XXIV Corps headquarters. The concept would make III MAF a joint Marine Corps-Army headquarters (529 Marines and 350 Army personnel) and XXIV Corps headquarters would be deactivated. A total personnel savings of 518 would be realized.

5. General Abrams, on 25 August 1969, approved this concept for planning purposes and has directed General Nickerson to prepare a plan for execution, with the additional guidance that:

"a. The combined headquarters will eventually become an augmentation to the 101st Airborne Division. \*

\* It is assumed that this refers to the residual force posture after III MAF departs during Phase VI redeployments. Army elements of III MAF headquarters would augment the division headquarters which will become the senior US headquarters in I CTZ.

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ATA-jnf-15

b. In order to reduce visibility of US personnel the combined headquarters should not be located in a large population center such as Da Nang.

c. Funds for construction of new facilities will be most difficult to obtain."

6. It is considered that the following elements comprise the essential points of an appropriate Marine Corps position relative to command arrangements in I CTZ following completion of Phase II redeployments and continuing through Phase VI when III MAF will redeploy. The position also is consistent with COMUSMACV's objectives.

a. Retain III MAF headquarters as a Marine air-ground team headquarters (albeit at a reduced strength) with operational control over the Marine division and wing.

b. Preserve the status of III MAF as a uni-Service command.

c. NSA Da Nang continue to provide primary logistical support to III MAF forces.

7. In the planning to date, the matter of transferring command of US forces in I CTZ to an Army officer before the execution of Phase VI redeployments has not been addressed in joint channels. General Buse presumes that when III MAF and XXIV Corps headquarters combine, General Zais (now CG, XXIV Corps) will be reassigned outside I CTZ and General Nickerson will remain the senior US commander in I CTZ. It is understood that General Zais agrees.

8. The following considerations support the retention by the Marine Corps of overall command in I CTZ:

a. The true combat power of a Marine Corps division/wing team cannot be measured in terms of gross personnel figures or ground maneuver elements. Therefore, a statistical comparison

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ATA-jnf-15

of Marine Corps versus Army strength in I CTZ, based on these factors, does not provide a valid basis for determining which Service should exercise overall command.

b. The experience gained by the III MAF headquarters in the control and coordination of operations in I CTZ involving all US Services, the ARVN, and ROK forces since 1965 should be retained.

c. The size and significance of the Marine Corps commitment remaining after Phase II justifies the public recognition to the Marine Corps that accrues from a Marine officer being in command in I CTZ.

d. Retention of overall command is the best means available for retention of the existing integrity of the Marine division and wing as an air-ground team.

9. In view of the above, it is recommended that the Marine Corps endeavor to retain overall command in I CTZ so long as a division/wing team remains committed.

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

TOP SECRET  
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA-jnf-15

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Command Structure in I CTZ and Withdrawal of III MAF

Ref: (a) DC/S (P&P) memo ATA-jnf-14 of 30Aug69 to C/S, Subj:  
Feasibility of Combining Headquarters III MAF and  
Headquarters XXIV Corps during the Phasing Out of  
US Forces in Vietnam

(b) CG FMFPAC 260405Z Aug69

1. In commenting on reference (a), CMC asked, "Shouldn't we offer to give up I Corps command but retain III MAF as Marine Corps command when General Nickerson is detached?"

2. In view of the Phase II redeployments, it is likely that some change will be made in the overall command structure in I CTZ.

a. There is pressure from OSD to reduce the numbers of spaces in major headquarters.

b. The preponderance of ground forces in I CTZ after these redeployments will be Army.

3. General Nickerson has provided to General Abrams a concept for the combining of the III MAF and XXIV Corps headquarters. The concept would make III MAF a joint Marine Corps-Army headquarters (529 Marines and 350 Army personnel) and XXIV Corps headquarters would cease to exist. A total personnel savings of 518 would be realized.

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4. General Abrams has approved this concept for planning purposes and has directed General Nickerson to prepare a plan of execution, with the additional guidance that:

a. The combined headquarters will eventually become an augmentation to the 101st Airborne Division after Phase VI.

b. In order to reduce visibility of US personnel the combined headquarters should not be located in a large population center such as Da Nang.

c. Funds for construction of new facilities will be most difficult to obtain.

5. COMUSMACV's established objectives concerning headquarters, as set forth in reference (b), are as follows:

a. Eliminate some major headquarters.

b. Cut headquarters strengths.

c. Reduce the visibility of US presence.

d. Continue to provide adequate command and control for residual forces.

e. Retain the capability to perform all assumed missions.

f. Be consistent with posture for transition to T-Day.

6. It is considered that the following elements comprise an appropriate Marine Corps position relative to command arrangements in I CTZ following completion of Phase II redeployments, and that the position is consistent with the COMUSMACV objectives:

a. Retain III MAF headquarters as a Marine air-ground team headquarters (albeit at a reduced strength) with operational control over the Marine division and the MAW.

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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

ATA-jnf-15

b. Preserve the status of III MAF as a uni-Service command.

c. NSA Da Nang continue to provide primary logistical support to III MAF forces.

7. The planning to date does not appear to jeopardize the proposed Marine Corps position. General Buse presumes that when III MAF and XXIV Corps headquarters combine, General Zais (now CG, XXIV Corps) will be reassigned and General Nickerson will remain the senior US commander (and become at that time the only American lieutenant general) in I CTZ.

8. At a later date, COMUSMACV may move towards placing an Army officer in command in I CTZ, possibly when General Nickerson's tour ends in April 1970. The logic of such a change, based on the composition of forces in I CTZ and on the planned redeployment of III MAF in Phase VI, would be difficult to fault. Although certain advantages accrue to the Marine Corps from having a Marine in overall command, chiefly in the control of III MAF air assets under the Single Management System, it should be possible to develop an arrangement, under an Army commander, that would satisfy the critical requirements listed in paragraph 5 above. If it develops that Vietnamization is a raging success and redeployments through Phase VI appear imminent, turnover of command in I CTZ to the Army at an early date may prove desirable. At the time of redeployment of III MAF, it would be better that CG, III MAF not be burdened also with the many problems of a change of command, coordination with the Vietnamese, redistribution of the residual force, etc. General Buse has indicated that planning has commenced for the generation of a small headquarters out of III MAF assets to assume operational control of the division/wing team.

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9. In view of the current state of planning for combining the III MAF and XXIV Corps headquarters, the time remaining before General Nickerson's rotation, and the uncertainty of the timing of future redeployments, it is recommended that no action be taken at this time to give up command in I CTZ.

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**TOP SECRET**ATA-jpe-15  
S&C T9453  
2 October 1969

1. Change 2 to MPO Plan 5/69 provides the following annexes to MPO Plan 5/69, the SEATO plan to assist the Royal Laotian Government to counter Communist insurgency:

A-Intelligence  
D-Logistics and Administration  
E-Command and Organization  
F-Communications-Electronics  
H-Psychological Warfare  
J-Civil Affairs  
K-Public Information  
L-Warning Notices and Readiness Stages

2. COORDINATION: DC/S (Air); AC/S, G-2; AC/S, G-3; AC/S, G-4.

3. It is recommended that the attached Marine Corps Memorandum of Acceptability for the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, be signed.

*Ralph Thuesen*  
RALPH THUESEN

BUCKTAG COMMENT ON: S&C T9453, MA31C-CHANGE 2 to  
MPO PLAN 5/69, ANNEXES A, D, E,  
F, H, J, K, AND L

**TOP SECRET**



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

IN REPLY REFER TO

ATA-jpe-15  
2 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: Draft Change to MPO Plan 5/69

Ref: (a) JCS 2339/309  
(b) JCS MOP 144  
(c) CINCPAC 300448Z Aug69 (JCS IN 12154)

1. The subject draft change, referred to the Services by reference (a), has been reviewed in accordance with the provisions of reference (b).
2. The US Military Advisor position proposed in reference (c) is considered acceptable to the Marine Corps.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "R. H. Twisdale", is positioned above the typed name.

R. H. TWISDALE


Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Director, Joint Planning Group  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Plans and Programs)



SECRET

ATA-jnf-15  
8 September 1969JOINT PLANNING GROUP COMMENT:

1. MJCS-388-69, as modified by DAN JS-69-639, shows the Marine Corps authorized ceiling in SVN as 73,974. The "DOD Auth Spaces" columns in the troop list should be changed to reflect this authorization.
2. MJCS-388-69 and the troop list differ by one space in the Marine Corps authorization for Thailand. A DAN should be submitted if MJCS-388-69 is incorrect.
3. The troop list should be carefully proofread to insure that columns 4, 7, and 15 agree with similar data in MJCS-388-69. Where discrepancies are found, a DAR or DAN should be submitted and be completely processed before the troop list is distributed. (Line # VS 04 248 on page VS-016, for example, now shows a non-existent DOD FRN.)



R. H. TWISDALE  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Director, Joint Planning Group  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Plans & Programs)

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ATA-jnf-15

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)  
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

Subj: Inactivations Resulting from Redeployments (U)

1. The redeployment of Marine Corps forces from RVN resulting from the Vietnamization of the war should reduce personnel requirements within the Marine Corps to some extent and permit a reduction in Marine Corps end strength.
2. To date, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have formally considered redeployment packages in Phases I and II. The Marine Corps portion of these packages totals 26,783. As the JCS reports to the Secretary of Defense addressed inactivation only of units/spaces within the redeployment packages actually being removed from RVN, the Marine Corps input to the reports for both Phase I and Phase II redeployments showed zero inactivations.
3. It is essential, however, to determine the personnel savings accruing as a result of the redeployments and the inactivations made possible by these savings. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 is requested to make these determinations, in coordination with other appropriate staff actions, for both the Phase I and the Phase II redeployment packages. This information is requested by the close of business Wednesday, 27 August 1969.

Copy to:

Chief of Staff  
DC/S (Manpower)  
AC/S (Air)  
AC/S (G-3)  
AC/S (G-4)

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ATA-jnf-15

JOINT PLANNING GROUP COMMENT:

1. MJCS-388-69, as modified by DAN JS-69-639, shows the Marine Corps authorized ceiling in SVN as 73,974. The "DOD Auth Spaces" columns in the troop list should be changed to reflect this authorization.
2. MJCS-388-69 and the troop list differ by one space in the Marine Corps authorization for Thailand. A DAN should be submitted if MJCS-388-69 is incorrect.
3. The troop list should be carefully proofread to insure that columns 4, 7, and 15 agree with similar data in MJCS-388-69. Where discrepancies are found, a DAR or DAN should be submitted and be completely processed before the troop list is distributed. (Line # VS 04 248 on page VS-016, for example, now shows a non-existent DOD FRN.)

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**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**ATA-jpe-15  
19 August 1969POINT PAPER

Subj: THE SITUATION IN LAOS

1. North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces have the capability of taking over the remainder of Laos at any time they choose. For reasons of their own, they have chosen to conduct limited offensive actions during the dry season, generally October through March, and to give ground slowly during the wet season.

2. This cycle has been interrupted this year by the enemy's continuing his offensive into the wet season. Most significantly, in late June, enemy forces captured the main neutralist base at Muong Soui.

3. In response to a Presidential request, an analysis of the following list of actions which might be undertaken in support of Laos has been developed in an interagency report submitted via Dr. Kissinger on 19 August 1969.

a. Initiate B-52 reconnaissance and strike operations in the northern and heretofore restricted areas of Laos.

b. Deploy two Thai infantry battalions into Laos.

c. Provide additional Thai air support to Laos.

d. Provide Thai artillery support.

e. Provide additional equipment to Laotian forces.

f. Increase Lao salaries and food allowances.

4. The report concludes that:

a. Each of the measures listed above would tend to bolster the Laotian government and would marginally improve its ability to resist the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese. They would all be costly to the United States, however, and even if taken collectively would not prevent the overrunning of Laos should the Communists make the political decision to employ their present capability to that end.

b. The Laos problem can best be kept manageable by a mixture of diplomatic, political, economic, and military means. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed the view that it would not be militarily sound to commit US ground forces in Laos unless the decision were also made to destroy the capability or the will of North Vietnam to persist in its aggression. Unless air and naval operations against North Vietnam are conducted without militarily confining restraints, the campaign in Laos would be costly and uncertain of success.

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11 August 1969POINT PAPER

Subj: Phase 2 Redeployments

1. On 20 June 1969, in anticipation of a possible Presidential decision to redeploy additional forces from Vietnam during 1969, the JCS requested CINCPAC to provide an assessment of the military situation in Vietnam together with his recommendations concerning Phase 2 redeployments.
2. On 6 August 1969, COMUSMACV provided an assessment of the military situation, together with the effects of the Phase I redeployment, and recommendations for a Phase 2 package. CINCPAC provided the JCS with his comments and recommendations concerning the Phase 2 redeployment on 9 August.
3. COMUSMACV's assessment concludes that unless conditions change significantly before the end of September, the Phase 2 redeployment of about 25,000 U.S. personnel could commence at that time. The major combat element will be the remainder of the 3d MarDiv with supporting units of the 1st MAW (Rear). The total Marine force to be redeployed is 18,395.
4. The disposition of Marine Corps forces will be as follows: Okinawa, 11,403; Japan, 373; CONUS/Hawaii, 6,619 (Tab A). It should be noted that with the 3d MarDiv being responsible for the 2 SLE's afloat, approximately 3,916 personnel required for the 2 SLF's will not be physically present on Okinawa. Therefore the increase in actual Marine Corps strength on Okinawa would be about 7,487 rather than 11,403.
5. The JCS are discussing at their meeting today a report to the Secretary of Defense recommending that if a further redeployment is directed in CY 1969, the Phase 2 force redeployment consist of about 25,000 personnel to be redeployed commencing approximately 30 September 1969 and ending about 30 November 1969, with dispositions as indicated in Tab A.

**TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE**



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

(Unclassified upon removal  
of enclosure)

IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA-tib-15

8 AUG 1969

CONFIDENTIAL - UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM

From: Director, Joint Planning Group  
To: Director, J-3, Joint Staff

Subj: Revision to Program 7

Encl: (1) DAN MC-69-504

1. It is requested that the enclosed DAN be forwarded to the OSD(SA) and incorporated into the Program 7 data base.

R. H. TWISDALE

By direction

CONFIDENTIAL

(Unclassified upon removal  
of enclosure)

CONFIDENTIAL - UNCLASSIFIED  
UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

SEA DEPLOYMENT PLAN AND ADJUSTMENT REQUEST  
AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM

SERVICE ADJUSTMENT NOTIFICATION NUMBER		DATE
MC-69-504		8 Aug 1969
UNIT DESIGNATION		
1st LAAM Bn and SCRLT Btry		
COUNTRY	ORIGINATOR OF REQUEST	SUBMITTING AGENCY
okinawa	HQMC; CINCPAC 310344Z JUL69	J-3, Joint staff
UNIT STRENGTH	JCS DOCUMENT IDENTITY	
777	Program 7	

## PROPOSED CHANGE

1. Destination of two Marine Corps units in the phase I redeployment package has been changed from okinawa to CONUS. (DAN JS-69-633 should be amended accordingly).

FRN	UNIT	STR	Destination	
			From	To
99LO62	1st LAAM Bn	661	okinawa	CONUS
99LO60	SCRLT Btry	116	okinawa	CONUS

2. As a result of above change, the Marine Corps authorized spaces in Okinawa should be reduced by 777 spaces; i.e. from 15.0K to 14.2K.

## BASIS FOR CHANGE

conforms with preferred Marine Corps force posture in the Pacific under the current situation.

## IMPACT ON OTHER UNIT DEPLOYMENTS

None

## STATUS OF DEBIT/CREDIT ACCOUNT

No change

JCS RECOMMENDATION ☒ Approve ☐ Disapprove ☐ No comment

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ACTION ☒ Approve ☐ Disapprove ☐ See Attached  
memo

DATE	SIGNATURE

ENCLOSURE (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE**

ATA-gwe-15

7 August 1969

POINT PAPER

Subj: Strategic Implications of Alternative Marine Corps  
Force Postures in WestPac

1. This ~~point paper~~ addresses the strategic implications inherent in a force posture providing for a MEF (less one brigade in CONUS/Hawaii) in Okinawa/Japan as contrasted with a posture providing for a single brigade on Okinawa with the remainder of the MEF based in CONUS/Hawaii.

2. The requirement for forward deployed Marine Corps forces in PACOM derives from the US policy of maintaining a position of influence in Asia. Forward deployed forces are needed to provide continual visibility to PACOM forces and thus give clear evidence of US intent to fulfill its many mutual defense commitments in the area. Such commitments exist to Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand, and will continue in effect for some time regardless of the terms under which the Vietnam war concludes. These commitments have been confirmed by enunciations of the President during his recent trip. Okinawa's strategic location is nearly ideal for the basing of amphibious forces to meet contingency requirements in all these areas. Equally advantageous is the use of Okinawa as a logistics base to support deployed forces in one of these contingency areas. The capability that has been developed in WestPac, and which can be maintained only if adequate forces are retained there, would add significantly to the staying power of any Marine Corps force committed in WestPac.

3. Further, forward deployments are necessary to enable rapid and adequate initial responses to military contingencies, thereby enhancing the probability of successful military action and reducing the total amount of force that would be required for a contingency. The theory of a gradual response to contingencies has been disproved by our Vietnam experience. Immediate responsiveness, adequacy of forces, and determination to quickly terminate hostilities in a manner favorable to US interests is essential in the initial commitment to a contingency or crisis control situation. The major contingencies for which Marine Corps forces are likely to be used in WestPac are in Korea and Southeast Asia. In both, timeliness is critical.

a. CINCPAC's plan for defending Korea requires a full MEF in Korea by D+30. With the preferred posture of 2/3 MEF forward deployed, this requirement could be met. With 1/3 MEF forward deployed, a full MEF could not be deployed to Korea within that time frame.

b. In any future reentry into Vietnam the requirement may well be for forcible entry rather than administrative movement. Only amphibious forces have the capability to forcibly enter enemy territory from the sea with the strength and staying power to carry out extended operations ashore. From the preferred initial posture, a full MEF with this capability could rapidly deploy to Vietnam. An additional 12 days would be required if only one RLT is forward-deployed on Okinawa.

**TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE**



**TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE**ATA-gwe-15  
7 August 1969

4. The time differential for the deployment of a MEF to Korea or to Vietnam with only one brigade forward deployed would allow significant deterioration in the contingency situation requiring the deployment, resulting in increased casualties, time, and expense in the successful conclusion of the military operations required. Early commitment of a superior force is necessary to effectively influence an unfavorable tactical situation.

5. Adequate amphibious forces strategically located in the Western Pacific:

a. Provide visible evidence of and enhance credibility of U.S. adherence to our commitments.

b. Restrict the enemy initiatives, deter aggression, and help prevent Asian nations with uncertain futures from being cajoled into the communist orbit.

c. Provide forces immediately available in crisis situations to quickly demonstrate US concern, deter intervention by third parties, and thus increase the chances for accelerated political solution.

d. Provide forces immediately available to move to the scene of crisis, without regard for the existence of overflight rights, terminal ports, airfields, or approval of other nations, and to remain in the area pending decision on commitment.

6. An additional important factor accruing from the forward deployment of the MEF (-), is the exceptionally high state of readiness that it is possible to achieve in such a deployed force. Serving a relatively short overseas tour, unaccompanied, and hence immediately responsive to movement requirements, continuously available for concentrated training and exercises, co-located with combat supplies and transportation, the Marines of the forward deployed force maintain a combat readiness which cannot be equalled by a CONUS based unit.

7. In conclusion, it should be noted that both CINCPAC and COMUSMACV have strongly urged the retention of the entire 3d Marine Division, with normal support, in Okinawa and Japan at least until the completion of redeployment of US forces from Southeast Asia, and CINCPAC has indicated that such a posture could be maintained without additional construction. From a purely strategic viewpoint, the stationing of a fully structured MEF in WestPac offers the optimum posture. However, under the impending constraints, a posture providing for a MEF (less one brigade) based on Okinawa/Japan is the maximum supportable; most nearly satisfies the near-term requirement established by CINCPAC; and is fully consistent with T-Day planning and the recommended Post-Vietnam PACOM posture for Marine Corps forces. Finally, this force level does not exceed the level of Marine forces stationed in Japan/Okinawa during the pre-Vietnam era.

**TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE**

**TOP SECRET**ATA15-tib  
4 August 1969POINT PAPER

Subj: LAOS SITUATION

1. The Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will discuss the situation in Laos at their meeting today. The Secretary of Defense has indicated his desire to discuss the following points:

- a. History of situation before 1962  
History of Situation post 1962  
(also, what Geneva Accords provided for)
- b. Communist objectives in Laos today  
NVN objectives in Laos today (if different from general Communist objectives)
- c. Enemy order of battle today
- d. Assessment of what enemy capability amounts to
- e. Friendly order of battle today
- f. Assessment of what friendly capability amounts to
- g. What added increment of force needed to stabilize situation and/or provide adequate security to Royal Lao government?
- h. Possible sources for added increment?
- i. What role might Geneva Accords (1962) signatories play?
- j. What role might other Southeast Asian nations play?

2. A background paper (Green Tab 1) has been prepared for the use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the meeting. This paper includes the major points of interest concerning the current situation and recent developments in Laos. Additionally, immediately preceding the discussions, a briefing (Green Tab 7) will be presented covering the earlier background of the Laos situation and introduces the options open at this time.

3. The main topic of the discussions is expected to be the possible use of B-52's in northern Laos. The chief questions as yet unanswered are:

- a. Can suitable targets be identified?
- b. How vulnerable will the B-52's be to the MIG threat in the area?

**TOP SECRET**

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**TOP SECRET**ATA15-tib  
4 August 1969

4. Planning is underway for the B-52 radar reconnaissance mission needed preparatory to strikes, but the Secretary of Defense has informed (Green Tab 6) the President that in view of the MIG threat he considers that suitable targets should have been identified and a decision to employ B-52's on strike missions in northern Laos should have been made before the radar reconnaissance mission is flown.

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

I-N-D-E-X  
(Yellow Tabs)

**TOP SECRET**

B. POINT PAPER

THE SITUATION IN LAOS (U)

(Green Tabs)

1. J-5 BP 63-69 -do-
  - Pink Tab A Employment of Thai Forces in Laos (S)
  - Pink Tab B Call on SecDef by U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Leonard Unger
  - Pink Tab C Mission Assessment of Dry Season
  - Pink Tab D ARC LIGHT in Northern Laos (S)
  - Pink Tab E Conduct of Hostilities in Laos (U)
  - Pink Tab F Contingency Planning for Enemy Action in Laos (S)
  - Pink Tab G Friendly Ground Order of Battle, Laos
  - Pink Tab H Enemy Ground Order of Battle, Laos
2. MAP Showing Approximate Dividing Line Between Communist and Non-Communist Areas of Laos in 1962
3. JCS 2344/151-1 #10 Conduct of Hostilities in Laos (U)
4. CJCS 09447 DTG #1B 311316 JUL69 ARC LIGHT in Northern Laos (S)
5. CJCS 09478 DTG 312209 JUL69 -do-
6. SecDef Msg 011800 #1A AUG69 B-52 Missions in Northern Laos
7. Draft Text of Briefing for SecDef, 4 August 1969

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(Unclassified upon removal  
of enclosure)

**TOP SECRET**

ATA15-ear

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel TWISDALE

To: Brigadier General CHIP

Subj: Marine Corps Forces in Okinawa/Japan

Encl: (1) Spread sheet

1. Enclosed is a pread sheet prepared by G-3 reflecting pre-Vietnam, current, and projected levels of Marine Corps forces in Okinawa and Japan. It is provided as possibly being of use to you in the upcoming MCON hearings.

(Unclassified upon removal  
of enclosure)

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ATA15-tib

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)  
To: Chief of Staff

Subj: US Force Declarations for MPO Plan 8/66 (U)

Ref: (a) C/S note dtd 28 July 1969  
(b) CINCPAC 230515Z April 1969  
(c) CMPO 1tr MS/605/1/69 dtd 18 June 1969  
(d) JCS 261642Z July 1969  
(e) CINCPAC 300229Z July 1969

1. In reference (a), the Chief of Staff asked if the Marine Corps had supported CINCPAC on the issue of the substitution of a MEB for one of the Army brigades in the U. S. force declarations for MPO Plan 8/66.

2. A Joint Staff paper was drafted approving the CINCPAC recommendation, reference (b), and was supported by the Marine Corps. In view of reference (c), however, in which doubt is cast on the validity of MPO Plan 8/66 in its entirety, all the Services concurred in the dispatch of reference (d) suggesting that the substitution of forces in the U. S. force declaration should not be addressed at this time.

3. CINCPAC in reference (e), has concurred.

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ATA15-gwe

S&amp;C S 909 558

30 July 1969

1. CINCPAC OPlan 5065 (Security of Selected Personnel and Equipment)(U) provides guidance for and assigns tasks to CINCPAC subordinate commanders to insure the security of selected personnel and equipment employed in the national cryptologic effort.
2. The basic tasking directs the PACOM subordinate commanders in Japan, Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines to maintain evacuation and security plans for selected personnel and equipment. PACOM Component commanders are to be prepared to recommend relocation areas for the evacuated personnel and equipment, and CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF are tasked to provide required sea and air lift, respectively.
3. No specific Marine Corps forces are tasked in the plan.
4. COORDINATION. AC/S, G-2.
5. It is recommended that the attached Marine Corps Memorandum of Acceptability for the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, be signed.

  
J. A. WEIZENEGGER

BUCKTAG COMMENT ON: S&C S 909558, CINCPAC OPLAN 5065 (Security of Selected Personnel and Equipment)(U)

**SECRET**

**SECRET**ATA15-dnc  
25 July 1969

## MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Strength Authorizations for SVN (U)

Encl: (1) SecDef memo dtd 15 July 1969, same subj  
(S&C 910785)

1. The effect of enclosure (1) is to establish two ceilings for US troop strength in Vietnam: 524,500 for budget and program planning, and 515,000 for actual strengths in-country. Fluctuation on the order of 1% of the 515,000 figure is allowed. This means that actual in-country strengths can vary between 510,000 and 520,000.

2. It appears that OSD has analyzed previous actual in-country strengths as opposed to authorized ceiling and noted that the total actual strengths for all services in SVN averaged some 9,500 below the authorized ceiling. Therefore by applying the current 25,000 reduction to the actual strength figure at the time the decision for redeployments was made, an actual strength ceiling of 515,000 was produced.

3. The J-1, Joint Staff, is preparing a report for the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending a means for controlling the rotation of personnel to and from Vietnam to comply with the SecDef decision. It is not known what approach the Joint Staff will take. The tentative Marine Corps position is that each Service should continue to man its elements in Vietnam with the deficit it had at the time of the decision to redeploy the 25,000 troops. For the Marine Corps this would require manning at about 1.1K below our 73.9K slice of the 524,500 ceiling.

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of enclosure)

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ATA15-plb  
25 July 1969


MEMORANDUM

For: Brigadier General CHIP  
From: Colonel TWISDALE

Subj: Marine Corps Forces in Okinawa/Japan

Encl: (1) Spread sheet

1. Enclosed is a spread sheet prepared by the G-3 reflecting pre-Vietnam, current, and projected levels of Marine Corps forces in Okinawa and Japan. It is provided as possibly being of use to you in the upcoming MCON hearings.



R. H. TWISDALE  
By direction

(Unclassified upon removal  
of enclosure)

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## MARINE FORCES IN OKINAWA/JAPAN

TIME FRAME	OKINAWA FORCES	JAPAN FORCES
Pre-Vietnam	<p>a. Marine Div (-) 2 RLTs w/combat support and combat service support; Special Landing Force; Marine Air Group; non-FMF base support.</p> <p>b. Total T/O Strength 23052</p>	<p>a. Marine Air Wing (-) Marine Wing Service Group; 2 Marine Air Groups; non-FMF base support.</p> <p>b. Total T/O Strength 7450</p>
Current	<p>a. 9th Marine Amphibious Bde (-) RLT Headquarters; elms combat support and combat service support; non-FMF base support.</p> <p>b. Total T/O Strength 7368</p>	<p>a. Marine Fighter Squadron plus supporting Aviation detachments; Fleet activities non-FMF base support.</p> <p>b. Total T/O Strength 2398</p>
Projected (T-DAY)	<p>a. MEF (-) MarDiv (-) 2 RLT's w/combat Support and Combat Service Support; 2 SLF's.  Mar Air Wing (Minus) 3 HMM Okinawa/ SLF Helicopter and Light Observation aircraft maintenance support.</p> <p>b. Total T/O Strength 27684 1/ 3/</p>	<p>a. Det Marine Air Wing 2 Marine Air Groups (VF/VA) Marine Wing Service Group Non-FMF base support</p> <p>b. Total T/O Strength 5909 2/</p>

- 1/ The precise numbers of Marines home based in Okinawa/Japan concern to the Japanese and Okinawans than the fact the Mar be no larger than during pre-Vietnam. T/O changes, plans f to Okinawa and similar evolutionary changes will result in numerical strength of Marine Corps Forces.
- 2/ Excludes 317 Navy spaces now needed at MCAS Iwakuni.
- 3/ Okinawa will be manned at approximate strength of 23.1K.

*File*  
**SECRET**  
ATA15-gwe

## DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (PLANS &amp; PROGRAMS) COMMENT

1. Recommend use of the following expanded statement of the Marine Corps' position on the retention of forces on Okinawa:

The Marine Corps desires to maintain forces on Okinawa, for the foreseeable future, in strengths necessary to meet its immediate strategic obligations in the Western Pacific. These include requirements for support of forces in Vietnam and for forces to meet CINCPAC's requirements, as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for forward-deployed forces to meet other likely contingencies now and in the post-Vietnam period. For the post-Vietnam period, these forces should total two-thirds of a fully-structured Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa and Japan.

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<u>PLAN</u>	<u>FORCES/SOURCE</u>	<u>TIME FRAME</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
(With Marine Forces)			
CINCPAC 1-69 PACIFIC COMMAND GENERAL WAR PLAN (U)	2 DWT + 1 DIV (PAC)	Not Specified.	The general war plan for the Pacific Command
CINCPAC 21-69 SINGAPORE (C)	1 MEB (PAC)	Not specified	Provides for employment of US military forces in the Singapore-Malaysia area to assist in deterring the formation of a communist government in Singapore and to keep the Strait of Malacca open.
CINCPAC 22-67 SUPPORT OF INTERNAL UPRISINGS AND REVOLUTIONS (S)	As authorized in other operation plans for Korea, China, and Vietnam	Not Specified	Provides for the support of internal uprisings and revolutions in North Korea, Communist China and North Vietnam.
CINCPAC 23-69 HONG KONG (C)	1 MEB (PAC)	Not Specified	Provides for US military operations to evacuate or to assist in the evacuation of US citizens and designated aliens from Hong Kong with or without the direct assistance of the British.

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CINCPAC

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<u>PLAN</u>	<u>FORCES/SOURCE</u>	<u>TIME FRAME</u> (Without Marine Forces)	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
CINCPAC 26-66 CONTROL OF MARITIME TRAFFIC (C)			A unilateral capabilities plan for the control of maritime traffic in those portions of the Pacific Ocean and its tributaries contiguous to the Asian mainland during periods of tension & conditions of conflict.
CINCPAC 28-69 ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND CONTROL AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING (U)			Provides for ASW.
CINCPAC 31-69 PACIFIC MINING PLAN (U)			Provides for offensive and defensive mining operations in the Pacific Ocean, the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean and waters contiguous thereto.
CINCPAC 60-69 NONCOMBATANT EMERGENCY AND EVACUATION (U)			Furnish planning assistance and be prepared to provide forces, transportation, and facilities in order to assist the State Department in the emergency care, protection, and evacuation of US non-combatants and certain designated aliens from countries in the PACOM area.

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(CINCPAC CONT'D)

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<u>PLAN</u>	<u>FORCES/SOURCE</u>	<u>TIME FRAME</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
CINCPAC 62-69 EMERGENCY RELIEF TO INSULAR AREAS (U)			Provides for the movement and handling of essential supplies, and if required, the emergency issue of supplies from military stocks for health, safety, and welfare, to the people of the affected insular area(s) in the event that movement of required supplies is interrupted as a result of labor strikes affecting commercial shipping.
CINCPAC 64-69 ESTABLISHMENT OF US SUPPLY AND TRAINING MISSION-LAOS (S)			Provides for the reintroduction into Laos of a US military advisory and assistance organization to provide support to the Royal Lao Government in the maintenance of internal security and in the attainment of the maximum feasible capability to resist initially, external aggression.
CINCPAC 65-69 SECURITY OF SELECTED PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT (U)			Provides for security of selected personnel and equipment in PACOM in the national cryptologic effort.

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(CINCPAC CONT'D)

TOP SECRET

<u>PLAN</u>	<u>FORCES/SOURCE</u>	<u>TIME FRAME</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
CINCPAC 66-69 SUPPLEMENTARY COLLECTION OPERATIONS AGAINST FOREIGN NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS (C)			Provides for diagnostic collection efforts against nuclear weapons tests in CINCPAC'S area of responsibility. When directed, data collection operations with PACFLT and PACAF forces are conducted.
CINCPAC 76-69 SUPPLEMENTARY COLLECTION OPERATIONS AGAINST FOREIGN MISSILE AND SPACE ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES (C)			Provides for collection efforts against Soviet missile and Earth Satellite vehicles.
CINCPAC 85-69 PRECLUDE COMMUNIST COUP- KOREA (S)			Provides for US military operations in concert with ROK armed forces in order to prevent seizure of the ROK government apparatus by dissident factions dominated by identified communists.
CINCPAC 90-A through 90-F-69 PROGRAM OF PLANS - BERLIN (U)			Purpose is to interfere at selected levels of severity with communist bloc aircraft, to aid in regaining allied access to Berlin. 90-A. Seizure or destruction of aircraft intruding US airspace. 90-B. Destroy bloc aircraft within 50 miles of US territory or territorial waters.

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(CINCPAC CONT'D)

PLAN	FORCES/SOURCE	TIME FRAME	DESCRIPTION
CINCPAC 91-A and 91-B-61 PROGRAM OF PLANS-BERLIN (DESTROY NAVAL STRENGTH WHICH OPPOSES OUR MARITIME FORCES). (C)			90-C. Deny entry of specified air- craft into airspace of allied nations. 90-D. Air harassment by air defense measures. 90-E. Air harassment by admin- istrative measures. 90-F. Air harassment by overt tactical aerial reconnaissance.
CINCPAC 92-68 PROGRAM OF PLANS-BERLIN (U)			91-A. PACOM conducts military operations to destroy naval strength opposing our maritime forces, to apply pressure on the USSR/GDR in a Berlin crisis. 91-B. Seize and/or destroy all bloc ships within specific geographic areas of PACOM closed to the Soviet Bloc.
CINCPAC 95-67 QUADRIPARTITE NAVAL COUNTERMEASURES (S)			CINCPAC conducts overt tactical reconnaissance operations against the Sino-Soviet Bloc for intelli- gence or harassment during a Berlin crisis.  Provides for various countermeasures against USSR/GDR/Soviet Bloc ships in the Pacific in support of agreed quadripartite (US, UK, FR, FRG) policy.

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**SECRET**

ATA15-gwe

22 July 1969

MEMORANDUM

From: Director, Joint Planning Group  
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3


Subj: Force Planning

Ref: (a) AC/S, G-3, memo A03B11-rep of 17Jul69, same subj

1. In reference (a) the proposal was made to redeploy the 1st Searchlight Battery to CONUS vice Okinawa, and a draft message to CG, FMFPac, directing this action was circulated for comments, recommendations, or concurrence.

2. The proposal is concurred in. It is pointed out, however, that the redeployment of this battery to Okinawa was agreed upon at the CINCPAC Force Planning Conference in June 1969 and that CINCPAC's concurrence in the changed destination should be obtained by CG, FMFPac. It is recommended, therefore, that the second paragraph of the draft message to CG, FMFPac, be changed to read:

"2. IN ORDER TO EASE BASE LOADING PROBLEMS AND MAKE ROOM FOR MORE ESSENTIAL UNITS ON OKINAWA, IT IS DESIRED THAT THE FIRST SEARCHLIGHT BATTERY, 116 PERSONNEL AND RELATED EQUIPMENT, REDEPLOY TO CAMP PENDLETON VICE OKINAWA. REQUEST YOU OBTAIN CINCPAC CONCURRENCE AND EFFECT CHANGE IN DESTINATION."



R. H. TWISDALE  
By direction

**SECRET**

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ATA15-jnf  
2 July 1969

File

1. Annex U to CINCPAC Operation Plan No. 1-70 prescribes the procedures and emergency action messages to be used by CINCPAC under the following conditions:

a. When an increase in the readiness condition of a CINCPAC subordinate command is either requested or declared by the commander or directed by CINCPAC or higher authority.

b. When a requirement exists to engage a non-US orbiting satellite.

c. Upon the imminence or outbreak of hostilities.

d. When the release of nuclear weapons is authorized by the President.

e. When the execution or termination of the SIOP and General War Plans, to include the use of nuclear weapons, is directed by the President.

f. During exercises where simulation of emergency action procedures of CINCPAC or the JCS is required.

2. No specific Marine Corps forces are tasked in the annex.

3. COORDINATION. None.

4. It is recommended that the attached Marine Corps Memorandum of Acceptability for the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, be signed.



J. A. WEIZENEGGER

BUCKETAG COMMENT ON: S&C T9331, Annex U to CINCPAC Oplan 1-70

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TOP SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA15-jnf

2 JUL 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: CINCPAC Operation Plan No. 1-70 - Annex U

Ref: (a) JCS 2054/789  
(b) JCS MOP 144

1. The subject annex, referred to the Services by reference (a), has been reviewed in accordance with the provisions of reference (b).
2. The annex is considered acceptable to the Marine Corps.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "R. H. Twisdale", is positioned above the typed name.

R. H. TWISDALE  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Director, Joint Planning Group  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Plans & Programs)

**SECRET**ATA15-jmh  
27 June 1969POINT PAPER

Subj: Transfer of OOCNE Spaces to Okinawa

1. Included in the Marine Corps forces to be redeployed from SVN to Okinawa are 360 of the 3500 OOCNE spaces currently in the Marine Corps SVN Program 6 ceiling.
2. The Joint Staff has prepared a DAN to effect the changes to Program 6 required by the 25,000-man redeployment. The DAN, as presently drafted, shows the 360 OOCNE spaces being transferred to Okinawa.
3. Brigadier General Glick has been informed by OSD(SA) that a DAN adding 360 OOCNE spaces in Okinawa would be unacceptable. Systems Analysis did not specify the form the disapproval would take but indicated that it might be:
  - a. Specific disapproval of the addition of the 360 spaces on Okinawa.
  - b. Rejection of the entire DAN and imposition of a requirement that the package be submitted as a DAR.
  - c. Acceptance of the DAN excepting the 360 OOCNE spaces on Okinawa and directing that a DAR for those spaces be submitted. (It was implied that such a DAR would be disapproved.)
4. General Glick offered to do what the Marine Corps thinks best in this matter. Our alternatives appear to be:
  - a. Send the DAN as is and await OSD action.
  - b. Send the DAN as is except for the addition of the 360 spaces on Okinawa, thereby accepting the apparent OSD position.
  - c. Send the DAN as is except for the addition of the 360 spaces on Okinawa. Follow with a DAR for the 360 spaces. (The DAR would require approval of the other Services.)
  - d. Modify the DAN by applying the 360 OOCNE spaces on Okinawa to one or more of the cadred units being moved to Okinawa.
5. RECOMMENDATION: Approve alternative 4.b. above. This would reflect optimal application of the total Marine Corps Program 6 ceiling at this time and should present the most difficult target for Systems Analysis to attack.

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

**SECRET**

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ATA15-jnf  
27 June 1969POINT PAPER

Subj: TRANSFER OF OCCNE SPACES TO OKINAWA

1. Included in the Marine Corps forces to be redeployed from SVN to Okinawa are 360 of the 3500 OCCNE spaces currently in the Marine Corps SVN Program 6 ceiling.
2. The Joint Staff has prepared a DAN to effect the changes to Program 6 required by the 25,000-man redeployment. The DAN, as presently drafted, shows the 360 OOCNE spaces being transferred to Okinawa (Tab A).
3. Brigadier General Glick has been informed by OSD(SA) that a DAN adding 360 OOCNE spaces in Okinawa would be unacceptable. Systems Analysis did not specify the form the disapproval would take but indicated that it might be:
  - a. Specific disapproval of the addition of the 360 spaces on Okinawa;
  - b. Rejection of the entire DAN and imposition of a requirement that the package be submitted as a DAR; or
  - c. Acceptance of the DAN excepting the 360 OOCNE spaces on Okinawa and directing that a DAR for those spaces be submitted if desired. (It was implied that such a DAR would be disapproved.)
4. General Glick has offered to do whatever the Marine Corps thinks best in this matter. Our alternatives appear to be:
  - a. Send the DAN as is and await possible OSD action. If there is no OSD action, our purpose is accomplished. If a disapproval is received, its form would determine our options for future action.
  - b. Change the DAN to bring the 360 spaces to CONUS, vice Okinawa, thereby accepting the OSD position. This would result in a 360-space decrease in our overall Program 6 ceiling. It could result in an end strength loss of 360 spaces as manpower spaces have been given to the Marine Corps for a 3500-man OOCNE package. The G-1 is proposing, however, that OSD be requested to leave any such spaces in our end strength to go into the training line.

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**SECRET**ATA15-jnf  
27 June 1969

c. Change the DAN to eliminate reference to the 360 spaces being added to Okinawa, but follow up immediately with a DAR requesting approval of their movement to Okinawa. This would protect the remainder of the package but probably would result in an OSD disapproval of the DAR and a directive to bring the 360 to CONCUS with the same effect as alternative 4.b. above. At any rate, approval of the other Services would be necessary for submission of the DAR.

d. Change the DAN by applying the 360 spaces to one or more of the cadred units being redeployed to Okinawa. For example, in part I of the DAN the OOCNE line would be eliminated and the strength of the 1st AmTrac Bn be increased to 495. This would, if accepted by OSD, protect our overall Program 6 ceiling, reflect the optimal use of the spaces in that ceiling at this time, and should be the most difficult approach for Systems Analysis to attack. The loss of end strength would still be a possibility as the 360 OOCNE manpower spaces would have been diverted from the purpose for which the Marine Corps acquired them.

5. RECOMMENDATION: Approve alternative 4.d.

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

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CONFIDENTIAL~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATA15-apc

13 JUN 1969


MEMORANDUM

From: Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans)  
To: Deputy Chief of Staff (Air)  
Deputy Chief of Staff (R,D&S)  
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs)  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4  
Director, Policy Analysis Division

Subj: Proposal for the Development of A Special Low Intensity Conflict Force; Request for Comments

Ref: (a) JCS 2472/487

1. Reference (a) circulated a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense requesting comments on a proposal for the development of a Special Low Intensity Combat (SLIC) force.
2. Your comments on the proposal and recommended input for inclusion in the responses to be made by the Secretary of the Navy and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested. Comments and recommendations should be delivered to Room 2108 by the close of business Monday, 16 June 1969.
3. LtCol D'Wayne GRAY (extension 44221) is the JPG action officer for this matter.



R. H. TWISDALE

By direction

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRETSECRETATA15-apc  
13 June 1969POINT PAPER

Subj: Guidance for NSSM 51 Study Effort

1. NSSM 51 directs (Tab A) a study of the U.S. interests and objectives in Thailand. To assist the interdepartmental ad hoc group charged with making the study, the Secretary of Defense has been directed to provide an analysis of possible Southeast Asia contingencies, including the defense of Thailand, and their implications for required U.S. forces and bases.
2. ISA has overall responsibility for the DOD input to NSSM 51, but Mr. Nutter has requested (Tab B) the Joint Staff to prepare the analysis of possible Southeast Asia contingencies.
3. Representatives of State, ISA, the Joint Staff, and the NSC staff developed specific guidance as to the assumed outcomes of the Vietnam war (White Tab 1) and the contingencies to be analyzed. These were furnished, in draft form, to C/S, CINCPAC, by a back-channel message from the J-5, Joint Staff (Tab C).
4. The guidance has been put in final form and forwarded officially to the Joint Staff (Tab D). The assumed outcomes (White Tab 2) are essentially the same as in the initial draft.
5. CINCPAC, in response to the J-5 back-channel message, has questioned (Tab E) the propriety of assumed outcome 3, stating that plans should not be written postulated on defeat and that if this should be the outcome of the war for RVN, it would appear highly improbable that the United States would again commit troops for the defense of RVN.
6. CINCPAC's objections to the assumed outcome appear insupportable for the following reasons:
  - a. The assumed outcome, i.e., political disintegration and collapse of the South Vietnamese government, remains a possibility, even though the present government is more stable than any since Diem's.
  - b. The assumed outcome does not postulate a military defeat but a political failure.
  - c. None of the contingencies addressed considers the possibility of the United States reentering RVN in the event of assumed outcome 3.

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**SECRET**ATA15-apc  
13 June 1969

7. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, has responded (Tab F) to CINCPAC essentially along the lines of paragraph 6 above, and CINCPAC has been formally tasked (Tab G) by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide input to the study.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

I-N-D-E-X  
(Yellow Tabs)

## B. POINT PAPER

GUIDANCE FOR NSSM 51  
STUDY EFFORT

## (Pink Tabs)

- |                                 |   |
|---------------------------------|---|
| A. JCS 2353/171 #30             | NSSM 51 - Program Analysis<br>of Thailand (U)           |
| B. JCS 2353/171-1 #30           | Program Analysis of Thailand<br>(Reference NSSM 51) (U) |
| C. JCS Msg 031628 Jun69 #1A     | NSSM 51 Study Effort                                    |
| White Tab 1                     | Assumed Outcomes -<br>Draft Guidance                    |
| D. JCS 2353/171-2 #29           | Program Analysis of Thailand -<br>NSSM 51 (U)           |
| White Tab 2                     | Assumed Outcomes -<br>Final Guidance                    |
| E. CINCPAC msg 070048 Jun69 #1A | NSSM 51 Study Effort (U)                                |
| F. CJCS Msg 102101 JUN69        | -do-  |
| G. JCS Msg 102120Z JUN69        | Program Analysis of Thailand (U)                        |

**SECRET**



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

**SECRET**

IN REPLY REFER TO

ATA15-apc  
11 June 1969

From: Director, Joint Planning Group  
To: Director for Operations, Joint Staff

Subj: Program 6

Encl: (1) DAN MC-69-503

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted with the request that it be forwarded to OSD. In view of the CINCPAC conference beginning 12 June 1969, it is requested that this DAN be forwarded on an urgent basis.
2. Copies of the attachment to enclosure (1) were furnished to the J-3 and HQMC representatives for use at the CINCPAC conference beginning 12 June 1969.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "R. H. Twisdale".

R. H. TWISDALE  
By direction

**SECRET**

**TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE**

ATA15-dnc

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy, Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs)  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Vietnamizing the War (C)

Encl: (1) Point Paper ATA12-jnf dtd 21 May 1969, subj:  
Vietnamizing the War (C), with attachment

Ref: (a) C/S note dtd 9 June 1969

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1),  
previously submitted on 21 May 1969, is resubmitted.


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FROM ENCLOSURE

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FILE

ATA15-jmh  
2 June 1969

1. CINCPAC Operation Plan 95-70 (Quadripartite Naval Countermeasures) (S) is a unilateral capabilities plan for the conduct of various types of naval countermeasures against USSR/GDR/East European Communist ships in the PACOM area in support of agreed quadripartite (United States, United Kingdom, France, West Germany) policy.
2. It is envisaged that world-wide naval countermeasures may be used to exert leverage against the Communist powers in the event of an increase in USSR restrictions on the Allied rights in Berlin, including the rights to ground and air access to Berlin. The plan contemplates twelve categories of actions ranging from in-port harassment of Communist shipping to seizure of or inflicting minor damage to designated Communist shipping.
3. No Marine Corps forces are expected to be used in the execution of the plan.
4. COORDINATION. DC/S (Air); AC/S, G-2; AC/S, G-4.
5. It is recommended that the attached Marine Corps Memorandum of Acceptability for the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, be signed.



J. A. WEIZENEGER

BUCKTAG COMMENT ON: S&C S906 675, CINCPAC OPLAN 95-70  
(Quadripartite Naval Countermeasures) (S)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA15-jnf  
2 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: CINCPAC Operation Plan No. 95-70

Ref: (a) JCS 2054/787  
(b) JCS MOP 144

1. The subject plan, referred to the Services by reference (a), has been reviewed in accordance with the provisions of reference (b).
2. The plan is considered acceptable to the Marine Corps.

*R. H. Twisdale*  
R. H. TWISDALE

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Director, Joint Planning Group  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Plans & Programs)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

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*File*

IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA15-ear  
10 MAY 1969

MEMORANDUM

From: Director, Joint Planning Group  
To: Director for Operations, Joint Staff

Subj: Program 6 Deployments

Encl: (1) DAR MC-69-502

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded with the request that it be forwarded to OSD for approval.

*R. H. Twisdale*

R. H. TWISDALE  
By direction

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SEA DEPLOYMENT PLAN AND ADJUSTMENT REQUEST  
AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM

SERVICE ADJUSTMENT REQUEST NUMBER		DATE
MC-69-502		9 May 1969
UNIT DESIGNATION		
Field Supply Analysis Team		
COUNTRY	ORIGINATOR OF REQUEST	SUBMITTING AGENCY
Japan	HQMC	HQMC
UNIT STRENGTH	JCS DOCUMENT IDENTITY & FORCE REQUEST NO.	
4	Program 6 Data Base	

## PROPOSED CHANGE

1. Add:

FRN	Unit Description	Strength	Location	Projected Close Date
	Fld Sup Anal Tm	4	Yokosuka	Jun69

## 2. Increase Marine Corps authorization for Japan by 4 spaces.

## BASIS FOR CHANGE

Effective supervision of Marine Corps property accounts in WestPac requires addition of one additional four-man field supply analysis team to the 13-man field supply analysis office permanently deployed in WestPac. See attached for details.

## IMPACT ON OTHER UNIT DEPLOYMENTS

None

## STATUS OF DEBIT/CREDIT ACCOUNT

Not Applicable

JCS RECOMMENDATION ☐ Approve ☐ Disapprove ☐ No CommentSECRETARY OF DEFENSE ACTION ☐ Approve ☐ Disapprove ☐ See Attached Memo

DATE

SIGNATURE

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Basis for Change

(1) Effective property supervision procedures require that teams from the FSAO visit each organic account in its area of responsibility annually and each stock account semiannually. The FSAO's area of responsibility encompasses the following:

- (a) Two Stock Accounts (FLC and 3d FSR)
- (b) Two Remote Storage Activities (FLSG "A" and "B")
- (c) One Base-type Activity (Camp Butler)
- (d) Seven Marine Barracks
- (e) 130 FMF Organic Accounts (III MAF and Okinawa)

(2) Optimum scheduling for FY69, based on current manpower authorizations, will leave 40 per cent of organic FMF units not visited and will allow only one visit to each of the two major fleet stock accounts.

(3) To accomplish its mission the FSAO should be capable of fielding three four-man teams. This would allow visits to each WestPac organic account annually and each mechanized account semiannually (six RVN/Okinawa trips per team per year, seven accounts per trip; plus trips to Marine Barracks and miscellaneous organic accounts).

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

SECRET

IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA15-jnf  
8 May 1969

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs)  
To: Chief of Staff

Subj: Status of DAR MC-69-501

Encl: (1) Analysis of Okinawa Ceiling Change Based on  
Approval of DAR MC-69-501 Insofar as Consistent  
With T-Day Planning

1. According to the Joint Staff action officer, the current draft of the response to our DAR includes four alternatives for the relocation of the forces recommended for withdrawal:

- a. Return all to CONUS.
- b. Relocate all to Japan and Okinawa as recommended by the DAR. (ISA is reported to support this alternative.)
- c. Relocate air elements to Japan as requested. Return ground elements to CONUS. (Systems Analysis is reported to support this alternative.)
- d. Relocate air elements to Japan as requested. Increase the Okinawa ceiling by 1233 to accommodate portions of the ground elements. Return remainder of ground elements to CONUS.

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ATA15-jnf  
8 May 1969

2. The exact method Systems Analysis used to compute the 1233 spaces mentioned in the last alternative is not known. As shown in enclosure (1), it may be based on approval of redeployments to Okinawa within the levels shown in T-Day plans for the type units recommended for redeployment.
3. The four alternatives are expected to be submitted to DepSecDef for decision within the next few days.

F. C. THARIN

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ANALYSIS OF OKINAWA CEILING CHANGE  
BASED ON APPROVAL OF DAR MC-69-501  
INSOFAR AS CONSISTENT WITH T-DAY PLANNING

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A	B	C	D	E	F
<u>TYPE UNIT</u>	<u>SPACES CURRENTLY</u> <u>AUTHORIZED ON OKI-</u> <u>NAWA FOR THIS TYPE</u> <u>UNIT</u> *	<u>DAR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>CURRENTLY</u> <u>RECOMMENDED</u>	<u>POSTHOSTILITIES</u> <u>PLAN 2/3 MEF IN</u> <u>WESTPAC</u> **	<u>CHANGE IN OKINAWA</u> <u>CEILING CAUSED BY</u> <u>APPROVAL OF THIS</u> <u>PROPOSAL</u>
Anti-tank	30	546	576	278	+ 248
Tank	44	254	298	755	+ 254
Amtrac	51	713	764	730	+ 679
Armd Amphib	0	203	203	42	+ 42
TOTALS	125	1716	1841	1805	+1223

\* Figures are from current G-3 troop list.

\*\* Figures are from Marine Corps T-Day Plan.

Enclosure (1)

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ATA15-jnf  
6 May 1969

POINT PAPER

Subj: RIVERINE OPERATIONS

1. On 7 April 1969, CINCPAC, in a Program 6 change request, recommended a change in the organization of one brigade of the 9th Infantry Division. In his justification for the change, CINCPAC stated, "The VC have progressively adapted tactics to counteract riverine operations. In recent months success in pure riverine operations is almost non-existent." (Tab A)
2. These critical judgments concerning riverine operations have disturbed the Navy, as evidenced by a personal message from VAdm Baumberger at CINCPACFLT headquarters to VAdm Zumwalt, COMNAVFORV, in which, among other things, VAdm Baumberger suggested that VAdm Zumwalt approach CG, III MAF, on the feasibility of providing two Marine battalions for the Mobile Riverine Force in the Delta, (Tab B).
3. A message for VAdm Baumberger was drafted in OpNav concurring with the introduction of Marines into the Mobile Riverine Force, (Tab C). LtGen Tharin discussed the draft message with VAdm Blouin. It was redrafted and released stating that the introduction of Marine battalions into the Mobile Riverine Force "arouses...interest as it would help develop a joint Navy/Marine capability" and suggesting that VAdm Baumberger discuss the matter with LtGen Buse, (Tab D).
4. LtGen Buse has been informed of the Navy's interest in getting Marine battalions into the Mobile Riverine Force (Tab E), but no guidance has been provided to date. It is considered that LtGen Buse should be provided an indication of the situation as seen from this Headquarters. At Tab F is a draft message to accomplish this.
5. RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that approval be given for the release of the draft message at Tab F.

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

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I-N-D-E-X  
(Yellow Tabs)

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B. POINT PAPER

RIVERINE OPERATIONS

(Pink Tabs)

- A. CINCPAC Msg 071938Z Apr68 Change Request 119A to MJCS 312-68 (U)
- B. CINCPACFLT Msg 272107Z Riverine Operations  
Apr69
- C. Draft msg from CNO to CINCPACFLT -do-
- D. CNO msg 011656Z May69 -do-
- E. CMC msg 301709Z Apr69 -do-
- F. Proposed CMC Msg to -do-  
CG FMFPAC

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ATA15-dnc

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

1. Subject: DAR MC-69-501
2. Date and Time: 1400, 25 April 1969
3. Participants: RAdm Tazewell T. SHEPARD Jr., OASD (ISA)  
BrigGen J. E. GLICK, J-3  
Col R. MORIARTY, J-3  
LtCol D. GRAY, JPG
4. Background: OASD (SA) has prepared a draft decision on DAR MC-69-501. OASD (ISA) has been requested to chop the draft. Adm SHEPARD requested the meeting with J-3 and HQMC representatives to clear up several points in his mind before recommending an ISA position.
5. Substance of conversation: Adm SHEPARD stated that there seemed to be no issue concerning the air elements in the DAR. Relative to the movement of the ground units to Okinawa, however, he had three questions:

Q: Are all the units requested for relocation on Okinawa appropriate for assignment to the projected post-Vietnam posture of 2/3 MEF in WestPac?

A: Yes. There may be minor give and take on individual units, but the elements recommended for movement to Okinawa are consistent with T-Day planning to date.

Q: Why should these units go to Okinawa rather than to CONUS at this time? After the war, the balanced force on Okinawa can be reconstituted from Vietnam.

A: The units being removed are not really "excess" in Vietnam; they are merely the lowest priority units there and must be moved to allow satisfaction of higher requirements. A requirement may arise for the immediate return of

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ATA15-dnc

these units to Vietnam to restore the full amphibious capability of III MAF. Additionally, these units could be joined by other units from Vietnam or from CONUS to reconstitute a PACOM reserve on short notice. There is no forward-deployed PACOM reserve at this time.

Q: As there is insufficient amphibious shipping in WestPac to lift a Marine division, couldn't these units be based in CONUS near the shipping they would use?

A: A more immediate response to a contingency is possible with a balanced force deployed to WestPac. With the lift available in WestPac, a force can move to a trouble spot, unload, and the ships can return to SVN and Okinawa, pick up, and deliver a second load - all in the time required for ships from CONUS to cross the Pacific.

6. Additional Comment: After the substantive conversation, Adm SHEPARD asked that we give him "non-parochial" opinions on the requirement that all changes in deployed forces be requested from/reported to OASD (SA). He was told that we believed the program was over-managed, but that Systems Analysis would present a strong case for the system. Some of the more ridiculous examples of how the system functions were discussed.

7. Conclusion: Adm SHEPARD gave no indication as to what his recommendation would be. He commented that the point relative to a PACOM reserve was good and made a note to that effect.

D'WAYNE GRAY

Copy to:

AC/S, G-3

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ATA15-gwe

24 April 1969

1. Change 1 to CINCPAC OPLAN 21-69 (Singapore) (C) provided revised intelligence and communications-electronics annexes and made other minor changes (chiefly editorial) in the plan.
2. COORDINATION. AC/S, G-2; AC/S, G-4.
3. It is recommended that the attached Marine Corps Memorandum of Acceptability for the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, be signed.



J. A. WEIZENEGGER

BUCKTAG COMMENT ON: S&C T8124, CINCPAC OPLAN 21-69  
(SINGAPORE) (C)

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16 April 1969POINT PAPER

Subj: DAR MC-69-501

1. DAR MC-69-501 (Tab A) was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 March 1969.
2. Informal inquiry as to when a decision would be made and what the decision might be has been made through the Joint Staff.
3. Initial responses to the inquiry indicated that it is likely that the recommended redeployments to Japan will be approved.
4. OASD(SA) has revealed, however, a predisposition to recommend that the Secretary of Defense disapprove the redeployment of the ground elements to Okinawa. First, OASD(SA) indicated to the Joint Staff that the response might hold these movements in abeyance pending the identification of tradeoff spaces from other units (of any Service) on Okinawa to preclude any overall increase of the military population on Okinawa. On 15 April 1969, further information from the Joint Staff indicated that OASD(SA) is considering the proposed redeployments as related to ongoing posthostilities planning. OASD(SA) also asked the Joint Staff for a troop list of Marine Corps forces on Okinawa.
5. No firm forecast can be made as to when a decision will be made. It is obvious, however, that the DAR is under active consideration in OASD(SA).

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ATA15-glw  
16 April 1969

POINT PAPER

Subj: DAR MC-69-501

1. DAR MC-69-501 (Tab A) was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 March 1969.
2. Informal inquiry as to when a decision would be made and what the decision might be has been made through the Joint Staff.
3. Initial responses to the inquiry indicated that it is likely that the recommended redeployments to Japan will be approved.
4. OASD(SA) has revealed, however, a predisposition to disapprove the redeployment of the ground elements to Okinawa. OASD(SA) has indicated to the Joint Staff that the decision might be to hold these movements in abeyance pending the identification of tradeoff spaces from other units (of any Service) on Okinawa to preclude an overall increase of the military population on Okinawa. It is unlikely that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could agree on tradeoffs approaching the size required (2390 spaces).
5. On 15 April 1969, OASD(SA) queried the Joint Staff regarding the pre-Vietnam location of the WERS, the current structure of Marine Corps forces on Okinawa, and the size of the end strength increase the Marine Corps would require to support the additional deployments.
6. No firm forecast can be made as to when a decision will be made. It is obvious, however, that the DAR is receiving active consideration.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA15-jnf  
15 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: MA30C, "Proposed Agenda Item C, Approval of Draft  
Change 1 to MPO Plan 9/67" (U)

Ref: (a) CINCPAC 292244Z Mar69 (JCS IN 88835)  
(b) JCS 2339/292  
(c) JCS MOP 144

1. (TS) Reference (a), referred to the Services by reference (b), has been reviewed in accordance with reference (c). The following changes are recommended:

MC-1. CINCPAC message, paragraph 4.A; change to read:

"A. (TS) PAGE 2, PARA 7, 2ND SENTENCE, CHANGE LAST  
PART OF SENTENCE TO READ: '...CAN BEST BE OFFSET BY ADEQUATE  
GROUND AND AIR FORCES SUPERIOR...'

REASON: THE NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OF THE ASIAN COMMUNIST  
NATIONS IN MANPOWER MAKES IT NECESSARY THAT SEATO NATIONS FULLY  
UTILIZE ALL FORCES FOR THE EARLY DETECTION OF A COMMUNIST  
OFFENSIVE IN ORDER THAT IT MAY BE DEALT WITH PRIOR TO DEPLOY-  
MENT IN THE VICINITY OF ITS OBJECTIVE."

REASON: Editorial.

MC-2. CINCPAC message, paragraph 4.B; delete.

REASON: Unnecessary. The term firepower includes air  
strikes.

GROUP 3: Downgraded at 12 year  
intervals; not automatically  
declassified

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ATA15-jnf  
15 April 1969

MC-3. CINCPAC message, paragraph 4.C; change to read:

"C. (S) PAGE 4, PARA 9C, 2ND SENTENCE,  
CHANGE TO READ: 'THE GUNSHIP TYPE OF HELICOPTER HAS  
PROVED TO HAVE UNIQUE CAPABILITIES IN PROVIDING CLOSE  
PROTECTION FOR HELICOPTER OPERATIONS.'

REASON: GUNSHIPS PROVIDE A UNIQUE CAPABILITY IN  
HELICOPTER OPERATIONS, BUT THEY ARE NOT THE ONLY SUITABLE  
MEANS OF PROVIDING CLOSE PROTECTION FOR HELICOPTER OPERATIONS."

REASON: Accuracy. Fixed-wing tactical aircraft can  
assist in the provision of close protection for helicopter  
operations, but the gunship does provide a necessary, unique  
capability.

MC-4. Appendix C4; In listing force declarations,  
recommend descriptive headings "Air Forces" be replaced  
with "Air Force Forces."


REASON: Complements the change recommended in  
paragraph 8 of the CINCPAC message. Precludes any  
implication that all aviation units are included under the  
one heading.

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ATA15-jnf  
15 April 1969

2. Subject to the above, the position recommended by CINCPAC in reference (a) is acceptable to the Marine Corps.



G. A. GIBSON

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Acting Assistant Director, Joint Planning Group  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Plans & Programs)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

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IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA15-gwe

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs)  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Amphibious Operation at Vinh (S)

Ref: (a) CINCPAC ltr 3010 Ser: 000197 of 12 May 1969,  
subj: Plan for Lodgement of U.S. Forces in  
the Vinh Area, North Vietnam (S)  
(b) Hq, FMFPac Estimate of the Situation to Establish  
a Lodgement in Vinh Area of North Vietnam, dtd 23  
October 1964

Encl: (1) Outline Plan for Lodgement of U.S. Forces in the  
Vinh Area, NVN

1. As requested by the Commandant, an examination has been made into the feasibility of establishing, through an amphibious operation, a lodgement in the Vinh area of NVN in order to sever the lines of communication leading into Laos and SVN through the Nape, Mu Gia, and Ban Karai passes and through the DMZ.
2. Reference (a) is an outline plan prepared in 1966 by CINCPAC in response to a request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CINCPAC plan appears to have been based to a great extent on reference (b), an estimate prepared at FMFPac in 1964. These plans form the basis of the outline plan submitted herewith as enclosure (1).
3. It is considered that the CINCPAC concept and rationale, which are reflected in enclosure (1), are sound. The reasoning behind the selection of the Vinh area for the lodgement remains valid. The confluence of the major north-south lines of communication and the availability of suitable beaches and reasonably defendable terrain in the area promise acceptable chances of success for the lodgement to reduce the movement of men and materiel into Laos and South Vietnam.

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ATA15-gwe

4. Substantial changes have occurred, however, both in the actual enemy situation and in our knowledge of the enemy situation which render invalid the threat evaluation in the CINCPAC plan. A current evaluation of certain aspects of the intelligence annex is included in Annex A to enclosure (1). Most significant is the estimated capability of the enemy to develop in the Vinh area a force of 11 1/3 divisions by D+15.

5. In view of this capability, a larger landing force than that proposed by CINCPAC is required. Extrapolating from the indices of combat effectiveness used by CINCPAC, a requirement exists for one additional division and one additional airborne brigade for this operation. Annex C to enclosure (1) presents the rationale employed.

6. With the enlargement of the landing force, amphibious lift becomes even more significant. Through the activating of amphibious ships from the reserve fleet, drawdown on Atlantic Fleet amphibious shipping, and augmenting with MSTS shipping, sufficient lift could be generated to lift simultaneously the required two Marine divisions, one MAW (-), and one Army division. The second Army division could be brought in on turnaround shipping from Okinawa by D+15, thereby providing necessary force levels at appropriate times.

7. It is concluded, therefore, that enclosure (1) provides a feasible alternative to the current course of action in Vietnam. The following considerations are added to highlight important relevant factors:

a. To conduct the operation outlined in enclosure (1) under constraints approaching those currently in effect relative to bombardment of NVN would be impractical. As a minimum, freedom must be obtained to conduct air and naval gunfire attacks against those military targets which must be destroyed or neutralized to ensure the protection of the landing force and/or the accomplishment of the overall mission.

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ATA15-gwe

b. Weather is critical to the timing of such an operation. April through September provides the best weather for amphibious operations in the area.

c. Although it is not estimated that the CHICOMs would confront the lodgement forces directly, it would be imprudent to launch this operation prior to mobilization and deployment, as appropriate, of forces adequate to contain a full-scale CHICOM intervention. This would require, for example, activation of all the Marine Corps and Army reserve units and would require at least six months to have all these units combat ready.

d. Assuming full stoppage of the flow of supplies south through the Vinh area, estimated enemy stockpiles in Laos and southern NVN could support the enemy activities at current levels over 1½ years.

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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

**TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE**

ATA15-gwe

ANNEX CCOMPUTATION OF FORCES REQUIRED

1. The number of friendly and enemy maneuver battalions in or at the objective area on each day during the buildup was considered by CINCPAC to be an acceptable basis for a comparison of force capabilities. The index of combat effectiveness (ICE) was used for force comparison. The ICEs were taken from the Theater Battle Model developed by the Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group (STAG), Department of the Army. CINCPAC developed additional ICEs, when required, using professional judgment and by relating to known values.

2. The ICE computed by CINCPAC for 31 NVA battalions (the highest level of NVN forces considered in his plan) was 1.37. This paper considers NVN capable of employing 103 NVA battalions. By extrapolation, the 103 battalion force would be assigned an ICE of 4.55, as shown below.

$$\begin{aligned} 103 \div 31 &= 3.32 \\ 3.32 \times 1.37 &= 4.55 \end{aligned}$$

3. CINCPAC computed the ICE of his lodgement force (2 Marine divisions, 1 infantry division, 1 airborne brigade) to be 3.79. Adding one infantry division and one airborne brigade (with ICEs, as assigned by CINCPAC, of 1.10 and .14, respectively) would provide a friendly force with a total ICE of 5.03. This is estimated to represent minimal force requirements against the NVN threat. Additional forces would be required if the CHICOMS intervened directly.

**TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE**

**SECRET**ATA15-ear  
14 April 1969POINT PAPER

Subj: AIR ARRANGEMENTS IN CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69 (U)

1. CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69 is CINCPAC's contingency plan for the defense of South Korea in the event of North Korean or combined North Korean/Communist Chinese aggression. The plan was given conditional approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 4 April 1969.

2. As originally submitted by CINCPAC, the plan would have had COMUSKOREA exercise operational control of all tactical air operations in South Korea through his Deputy for Air (Commander, 5th Air Force). Additionally, Deputy COMUSKOREA for Air would have been responsible for allocations and control of target assignments and air strikes in-country. "Single management", in its worst form, would have been introduced into a contingency plan for the first time.

3. While the plan was under review in Washington, CINCPACFLT made strong representation to CINCPAC that the air control arrangements were unsatisfactory. CINCPAC acquiesced and published a change to the plan, deleting the offensive section on the control of air. In doing so, however, he left a void in the plan, as control of in-country tactical air operations is not addressed.

4. The Marine Corps attempted at the Service Planner level to have the Joint Chiefs of Staff fill this void using words previously agreed to for use in certain MEAFSA contingency plans. No support could be gained from the other Services, however, and the report finally approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff compromises by requiring CINCPAC to address the matter in his next change to the plan. The next change should be published within 30 days of CINCPAC's receipt of the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. The Air Force has long been tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draft a joint doctrine for air control. It obviously has been dragging its feet on this project. Until such doctrine is produced and agreed upon, however, each contingency plan must contain guidance in lieu thereof.

6. If CINCPAC's next submission is not in accord with the Navy-Marine Corps position, the review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff necessarily will reopen the whole issue of "single management" and the requirement for agreed joint doctrine.

7. A talking paper on the subject of single management of air assets in South Vietnam is appended.

**SECRET**

ATA19-jnf  
14 April 1969

### TALKING PAPER

For use by ADC/S (Plans) in discussion with CG, FMFPac

Subj: Single Management of Air Assets in SVN

### BACKGROUND

a. In March 1968, COMUSMACV instituted a single management system for air assets in RVN which in effect placed all Marine fixed wing reconnaissance/attack aircraft under control of CG, 7th AF.

b. In late March 1968, CMCM 21-68, addressed to the JCS, pointed out that establishment of the single management system was a contravention to provisions of UNAAF as well as previous positions of the JCS. It proposed a JCS message to CINCPAC directing that he withhold changes to the then current air support procedures. The CSA and CNO supported the Marine Corps position. The Chairman, JCS and the CSAF nonconcurred. The matter was referred to the SecDef. The DepSecDef responded on 15 May 1968 stating: that the commander on the scene should be presumed to be the best judge of how combat forces assigned to him are to be organized, commanded, and deployed; that the single management system should not constitute a precedent for centralized control of air operations under other combat conditions; and that COMUSMACV should revert to normal command arrangements for III MAF when the tactical situation permits.

c. With respect to recent events, on 1 October 1968 CMC forwarded a memorandum to the Chairman, JCS commenting on CM 3651-68 of 16 September 1968 which reported the current status of the single management arrangement for air support in South Vietnam to DepSecDef and recommended that COMUSMACV be permitted to continue the single management system until he considers its discontinuance appropriate. CMC nonconcurred with the Chairman's evaluation and recommendation and requested that his views be conveyed to DepSecDef for his consideration in relation to the Chairman's memorandum. The Chairman forwarded CMC's memorandum to the DepSecDef on 22 Nov 68. Mr. Nitze took no action on this memorandum.

d. On 30 Dec 68 CMC forwarded a memorandum to SecNav noting the Chairman's delay in forwarding CMC's memorandum of 1 October and reiterating the point that the Chairman's recommendation to retain the single management arrangement is tantamount to a recommendation that it be continued as an end in itself, and is not consistent with the guidance of DepSecDef.

### DISCUSSION

a. The purpose of this portion of the talking paper is not to review in detail what has transpired in the single management experience, but to indicate what the current situation is, and what are the implications for the Marine Corps related to single management. To summarize, Marine Corps objections to this arrangement were, and are, based on two considerations.

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(1) The implementation of single management was not required. The command arrangements and responsibilities established in SVN prior to its implementation had adequate provision for COMUSMACV to utilize Marine air assets in the execution of the overall mission in both emergency and routine situations. Single management contravenes all established statutory and departmental authorities governing organization and functioning of joint forces.

(2) The Marine air-ground team has been trained, equipped and organized to fight together, in accordance with responsibilities assigned to SecNav and CMC. The application of the single management system has been divisive to the Marine air-ground team and has resulted in the establishment of a precedent inimical to Marine Corps organizational precepts and combatant efficiency.

b. Notwithstanding Mr. Nitze's guidance concerning the existence of the single management system because of a temporary and "specific combat situation," a draft revision to MACV Directive 95-4 (US Air Operations in RVN) dated 25 December 1968 was sent to CG, III MAF for comment or concurrence. This draft incorporated the provisions of the single management system, thereby formalizing mission direction of III MAF resources by Deputy COMUSMACV for Air on a permanent basis. CG III MAF forwarded his comments to COMUSMACV nonconcurring with the revised directive. The draft revision was subsequently withdrawn.

c. In addition to single management being perpetuated in RVN, the Air Force is attempting to inject similar arrangements into contingency plans world-wide. Thus far these attempts have not been successful due to Marine Corps efforts during the JCS review process. However, the final action on the CINCPAC 27 Plan may well bring the whole single management issue back into the JCS arena.

d. The ability of Marine Corps forces to operate as an air-ground team in combat is in jeopardy. Although Marine Corps forces may continue to be organized and trained as an air-ground entity, decisions which uniformly subject Marine air assets to operational control or mission direction by another Service, when committed to combat in joint operations, fragments the team and degrades the capability of the Marine force. The long range result could be the loss of Marine air, since its reason for existence is to support Marine ground elements in combat.

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ANNEX AINTELLIGENCE1: TRANSPORTATION

The damages caused by the bombing of North Vietnam forced the North Vietnamese to exert great efforts toward the repair and maintenance of their LOCs. The overall result of this effort has been that since the cessation of bombing, the North Vietnamese have improved their land LOCs to a point which exceeds the pre-bombing capacity. Presently all major roads from China to the DMZ are serviceable and operating. The Hanoi - Dong Dang rail line is dual-gauged and permits the through rail shipment of materiel to south of Hanoi without transshipment at the Chinese border. The railroad from Hanoi to Vinh has been repaired and is currently in full use.

With the expanded use of the waterborne logistics made after the bombing cessation, North Vietnam has accordingly repaired and expanded the port facilities and transshipment points throughout the southern panhandle.

2. RELATIVE COMBAT POWER - North Vietnamese Armed Forces - (In NVN).a. Strength

(1) Army	344,000
(2) Navy	2,600
(3) Air Force	10,000
(4) Organized Security Forces	30,500
Total	387,100

b. Composition

(1) Army	-	9 Infantry Divisions
		2 Training Divisions
		1 Artillery Command/Division
		1 AAA Division
		1 Airborne Brigade
		4 Independent Infantry Regiments
		1 Armor Command (2 Regiments)
		62 Individual AAA Regiments
		35-40 SA-2 Missile Battalions
		8 Individual Engineer Regiments
		7 Radar Guard Battalions
(2) Navy	-	38 Patrol Craft
		50 Service Craft
(3) Air Force	-	See Tab "B" - North Vietnamese Air Situation.

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c. Composition and Disposition.

- (1) Ground Forces - See Tab "A" - North Vietnamese Ground Forces.
- (2) Naval Forces - Principally located at Haiphong and Hon Gai.
- (3) Air Forces - See Tab "B" North Vietnamese Air Situation.

3. THE THREAT

a. The strength of enemy military forces within the lodgement areas is not clear. The headquarters/logistic nature of the Vinh complex suggests a preponderance of rear services and support type personnel. It should be noted, however, that the 324th Division and 341st Division are presently carried as unlocated in Military Region IV. Major elements of these forces could well be in the near vicinity. For lack of better information we must assume these units to be in the lodgement area. Thus, a constructive estimate of enemy forces in the area would be as follows:

324th Division	12,500
341st Division	12,500
Other Military (Rear Services, AAA, Militia)	<u>10,000</u>
Total	35,000

b. By repositioning the forces of his standing army the enemy can reinforce in the lodgement with up to 117,000 by D+15. Units and cumulative strengths are shown below:

	<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>Cumulative Strengths</u>
Available forces in AO on D-Day (324th and 341st Div)		35,000
305th Airborne Brigade	+02	40,000
320th Division	+04	52,500
308th Division	+10	65,000
304th Division	+10	77,500
325th Division	+11	90,000
330th Division	+12	102,500
350th Division	+13	115,000
312th Division	+14	127,500
316th Division	+14	140,000
250th Division	+15	152,500

c. Augmenting the ground forces in the lodgement area, the North Vietnamese Air Force could play a significant role from the standpoint of defensive actions and retaliatory raids in South Vietnam. Tab "C" depicts the capabilities of North Vietnamese aircraft.

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d. Such a redeployment of NVA forces would occur only in the event of overt CHICOM intervention. While CHICOM intervention could take the form of attack against the lodgement area, it is more probable that CHICOM forces would enter NVN, initially, to relieve forces of the North Vietnamese standing army to permit their deployment to the lodgement area.

#### 4. LOGISTICS

a. The materiel support provided NVN by the communist world has been steadily increasing in both volume and quality. The major problem has been the redistribution of these supplies. This problem was substantially alleviated by the cessation of bombing. Consequently since November 1968 NVN has moved vast quantities of materiel into Southern NVN and Laos. These quantities far exceed the current consumption rates in RVN. These stores could be diverted to support the defense of the lodgement area, or, more likely, they could be utilized to sustain forces in RVN.

b. The total volume of supplies being shipped into Laos and towards the DMZ is not known. Movement toward the DMZ has reached as high as 150 tons per day and into Laos over 350 tons per day. Based on photographic analysis only, it has been estimated that during the period of 1 November 1968 to 31 March 1969, approximately 225,000 tons of materiel were transported into the southern panhandle of North Vietnam. Of that approximately 50,000 tons have been transhipped into Laos. (Analysis of sensor/road-watch reports suggests this figure may be higher). During the same time frame 9,800 tons were consumed in RVN, 10,300 tons consumed in Laos and 8,400 tons destroyed in transit. Based on this consumption/destruction rate, the amount of material transported could satisfy the enemy requirements in SVN for over 30 months.

#### TABS

- A - NVN Ground Forces
- B - NVN Air Situation
- C - Capabilities of NVN Aircraft

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10 April 1969

An index of combat effectiveness (ICE) is a numerical value establishing the relative capability in combat of one unit or group of units when compared with other units analyzed using the same criteria. Basic to an ICE-producing analysis is the consideration of the strength of the unit and the numbers and types of weapons the unit employs. Other factors may be added ad infinitum.

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ANNEX CCOMPUTATION OF FORCES REQUIRED

1. The number of friendly and enemy maneuver battalions in or at the objective area on each day during the buildup was considered by CINCPAC to be an acceptable basis for a comparison of force capabilities. The index of combat effectiveness (ICE)\* was used for force comparison. The ICEs were taken from the Theater Battle Model developed by the Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group (STAG), Department of the Army. CINCPAC developed additional ICEs, when required, using professional judgment and by relating to known values.

2. The ICE computed by CINCPAC for 31 NVA battalions (the highest level of NVN forces considered in his plan) was 1.37. This paper considers NVN capable of employing 103 NVA battalions. By extrapolation, the 103 battalion force would be assigned an ICE of 4.55, as shown below.

$$\begin{aligned} 103 \div 31 &= 3.32 \\ 3.32 \times 1.37 &= 4.55 \end{aligned}$$

3. CINCPAC computed the ICE of his lodgement force (2 Marine divisions, 1 infantry division, 1 airborne brigade) to be 3.79. Adding one infantry division and one airborne brigade (with ICEs, as assigned by CINCPAC, of 1.10 and .14, respectively) would provide a friendly force with a total ICE of 5.03. This is estimated to represent minimal force requirements against the NVN threat. Additional forces would be required if the CHICOMs intervened directly.

\*An index of combat effectiveness (ICE) is a numerical value establishing the relative capability in combat of one unit or group of units when compared with other units analyzed using the same criteria. Basic to an ICE-producing analysis is the consideration of the strength of the unit and the numbers and types of weapons the unit employs. Other factors may be added ad infinitum.

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OUTLINE PLAN FOR LODGEMENT OF US FORCES IN THE VINH AREA, NVN

1. Situation

a. Enemy Forces

(1) Although the nature of the installations and facilities near Vinh suggests a preponderance of rear services and support personnel in the area, major elements of two NVA divisions may be located there, bringing total enemy in the area to 35,000. The enemy can reinforce in the lodgement area with up to 117,000 troops by D+15.

(2) See Annex A (Intelligence)

b. Friendly Forces

(1) MACV forces will support these operations by mounting an attack across the DMZ with the limited objective of fixing in place the maximum numbers of NVN forces near the DMZ. Additionally present limited cross-border operations into Laos will be intensified.

(2) RLG forces will support operations in NVN by intensifying pressures on Pathet Lao/NVA forces in Laos.

(3) Air and naval forces will conduct supporting operations to restrict the flow of external assistance to NVN, to reduce major LOCs in the north, and to interdict coastal and inland waterways transport.

(4) SAC forces will be prepared to execute complementary combat operations as directed by the JJCS.

c. Assumptions

(1) The amphibious operations in this plan will be part of a coordinated military/political program to cause NVN to cease supporting and directing the war in SVN and Laos.

(2) Conditions short of general war will prevail.

(3) The USSR will not intervene directly.

(4) Communist China will not have intervened directly by D-Day.

(5) Prior to the implementation of this plan, forces outlined in CINCPAC Oplan 41-69 (Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia Against CHICOM Intervention in Current Combat Operations) will have been mobilized and deployed, as appropriate, to achieve a readiness posture in PACOM which will minimize the likelihood of CHICOM intervention. Forces to be employed in CINCPAC Oplan 41-69 include 16 Army divisions, 62 Air Force tactical fighter squadrons, 3 6/9 MEF plus 1 Marine division, and Navy forces including 12 CVA, 1BB, 27 cruisers, and 161 amphibious ships plus lift for 6/9 MEF from LANTCOM.

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(6) Military operations beyond NVN borders will be authorized when, and if, required to ensure the security of the landing force.

2. Mission. PACOM forces conduct amphibious and airborne operations to establish and operate from a lodgement in the Vinh area of NVN in order to sever LOCs leading toward SVN, to pose a threat of further offensive actions in NVN, and to provide ready access to other areas of NVN in the event of expanded military actions.

3. Operations

a. Concept

(1) Scheme of maneuver. The landing force will land by surface, helicopter, and parachute means and seize key terrain in the objective area bounded generally by the Song Ca on the north, Route 15 on the west, and a line extending from the Cua Sot through Hill 288 on the south. After the landing force is securely established ashore, operations will be conducted to destroy enemy forces and lines of communications in the area.

(2) Phases of operations

Phase I: Alerts and Deployments D-60 to D-30 days.

Phase II: Embarkation and Movement to the Objective Area. D-30 to D-Day.

Phase III: Pre-assault Operations. D-1 to D-Day.

Phase IV: Assault. D-Day to D+4.

Phase V: Operations Ashore. D+4 to Termination.

b. Phase I - Alerts and Deployments

(1) CINCPAC, upon receipt of a warning directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will:

(a) Alert forces to be committed to the operation.

(b) Deploy forces to attain the specific posture required for these operations.

c. Phase II - Embarkation and Movement to the Objective Area

(1) Assault shipping of the Pacific Fleet and augmentation MSTs shipping will assemble at Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippines; forces to be committed to these operations will embark with their equipment and supplies in a sequence designed to meet the landing force scheme of maneuver.

(2) Transport aircraft of the Pacific Air Forces will assemble at Clark Air Force Base, Philippines; assault elements

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of the airborne brigades will embark with equipment and supplies in a sequence designed to meet the scheme of maneuver.

(3) Rehearsals will be conducted as required.

(4) Assault shipping will depart from loading points in movement groups (advance force group, D-Day groups, post-D-Day groups, and follow-on shipping) which will proceed on prescribed routes to the Gulf of Tonkin.

(5) Assault elements of the airborne brigades will depart Clark Air Force Base in assigned airlift, flying prescribed routes to the Vinh area.

d. Phase III - Pre-assault Operations

(1) Ships and aircraft of the Pacific Command will conduct operations to:

(a) Isolate the objective area and attain and maintain local air superiority.

(b) Gain information of the enemy.

(c) Prepare the objective area for assault.

e. Phase IV - Assault

(1) After landing beaches, landing zones, drop zones, and objectives are prepared by air and naval bombardment, assault echelons of two Marine divisions and two airborne brigades will be landed and air-dropped, respectively, in a rapid D-Day buildup in the objective area seizing high ground inland and key terrain along the Song Ca and in the vicinity of Route 15 south of Vinh Khanh. Route 1A, Route 15, and the railroad will be severed. Elements of the Marine divisions will link up with the airborne brigades as early as practicable. Tactical reserves and support units will be landed as the situation ashore permits and as required to support the seizure of the beachhead and the continuation of the attack. Supporting air operations will be conducted from carriers and helicopter transports and from bases outside the objective area.

(2) Follow-on echelons of the assault forces, including one infantry division, and essential landing force supplies will be phased into the objective area as soon as practicable. One Army infantry division will land from turnaround shipping on D+15 prepared upon landing to conduct joint operations to expand the beachhead and place forces astride the main north-south lines of communication.

f. Phase V - Operations Ashore

(1) By D+15 the buildup of forces and equipment ashore will permit further operations. These operations will involve expansion and further consolidation of the lodgement; additional offensive operations to deny enemy use of LOCs and military facilities, and to harass and destroy enemy military forces; and continued preparation for defensive and

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counter-offensive operations against infiltration and large scale attacks by NVN/CHICOM forces. Lodgement forces will conduct operations against military targets in Vinh, enemy movement on Routes 1A, 8, 7, 72, 74 and 15, the Song Ca and the Song La Giang, and roads and trails leading to the Bartholemey Pass, Nape Pass, Mu Gia Pass, Dong Hoi and to infiltration routes in Laos. Concurrently with the above, raids, demonstrations and other operations will be conducted from the sea to divert, harass and destroy enemy forces, interdict LOCs, destroy selected targets and collect intelligence.

(2) The objective area is about 20 miles wide in an east-west direction and approximately 20 miles in north-south length. Artillery emplaced in this area will increase the size of the overall area in which U.S. firepower will be brought to bear to about 28 by 38 miles. Naval gunfire will extend this coverage further to the north and to the south. Selective helicopter operations conducted from the lodgement area, or from the sea, will extend coverage further. Enemy motorized vehicle and rail traffic will cease within the objective area and be denied intermittently beyond the fringes of it. Enemy foot traffic will be denied within the area and be interrupted beyond it. The net effect will be a cessation of all but intermittent foot traffic by small enemy groups throughout the area, severance of all major enemy LOCs leading from Vinh southward toward South Vietnam and disruption of LOCs leading from west of Vinh into Laos.

#### 4. Logistics

a. Supply and Resupply. Forces, except the airborne brigades, will land with a minimum of 15 days supply. Air delivery will be utilized to resupply the airborne brigade until a linkup with the landing force is effected. A buildup level to 30 days supply within a 90 day time-frame will be utilized for ashore requirements. Follow-up shipping will be utilized for resupply; and aerial delivery for emergency resupply.

b. Evacuation and Hospitalization. Hospital facilities will be established ashore. Initial evacuation from the lodgement area will be to hospital ships and to hospitals in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines.

c. Maintenance. Limited maintenance will be performed in the lodgement area. Rear echelon maintenance will be performed in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines.

#### 5. Command Relationships

a. CINCPAC will exercise operational command of forces assigned to, and operating in support of, these operations through his Component Commanders in Chief and through the Commander, Joint Task Force (when designated).

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b. CINCPACFLT will designate the Commander of the Joint Amphibious Task Force and the Commander of the Landing Force. The Commander of the Landing Force will be designated as Commander, Joint Task Force, upon termination of amphibious operations.

ANNEXES:

- A - Intelligence
- B - Objective Area and Beach 34
- C - Computation of Forces Required



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA15-gwe  
8 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: MA30C, Proposed Agenda Item B, Approval of Draft  
MPO Plan 5/69

Ref: (a) CINCPAC 130240Z Mar69 (JCS IN 54039) .  
(b) JCS 2339/291  
(c) JCS MOP 144

1. Reference (a), referred to the Services by reference (b), has been reviewed in accordance with the provisions of reference (c).

2. The position proposed in reference (a) is considered acceptable to the Marine Corps.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "G. A. Gibson", is positioned above the typed name.

G. A. GIBSON

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Acting Assistant Director, Joint Planning Group  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Plans & Programs)



ATA15-jmh

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs)

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Amphibious Operation at Vinh (S)

Ref: (a) CINCPAC ltr 3010 Ser: 000197 of 12 May 1969,  
subj: Plan for Lodgement of U.S Forces in the  
Vinh Area, North Vietnam (S)  
(b) Hq, FMFPac Estimate of the Situation to Establish  
a Lodgement in Vinh Area of North Vietnam, dtd  
23 October 1964

Encl: (1) Outline Plan for Lodgement of U.S. Forces in the  
Vinh Area, NVN

1. As requested by the Commandant, an examination has been made into the feasibility of establishing, through an amphibious operation, a lodgement in the Vinh area of NVN in order to sever the lines of communication leading into Laos and SVN through the Nape, Mu Gia, and Ban Karai passes and through the DMZ.

2. Reference (a), is an outline plan prepared in 1966 by CINCPAC in response to a request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CINCPAC plan appears to have been based to a great extent on reference (b), an estimate prepared at FMFPac in 1964. These plans form the basis of the outline plan submitted herewith as enclosure (1).

3. It is considered that the CINCPAC concept and rationale, which are reflected in enclosure (1), are sound. The reasoning behind the selection of the Vinh area for the lodgement remains valid. The confluence of the major north-south lines of communication and the availability of suitable beaches and reasonably defensible terrain in the area promise acceptable chances of success for the lodgement to reduce the movement of men and materiel into Laos and South Vietnam.

4. Substantial changes have occurred, however, both in the actual enemy situation and apparently in our knowledge of the enemy situation which render invalid the threat evaluation in the CINCPAC plan. A current evaluation of certain aspects

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of the intelligence annex is included in Annex A to enclosure (1). Most significant is the estimated capability of the enemy to develop in the Vinh area a force of 11 1/3 divisions by D+15.

5. In view of this capability, it is imperative that a larger landing force than that proposed by CINCPAC be considered. Extrapolating from the indices of combat effectiveness used by CINCPAC, the requirement for one additional division and one additional airborne brigade in the lodgement was established. Annex C to enclosure (1) presents the rationale employed.

6. With the enlargement of the landing force, amphibious lift becomes even more significant. Through the activating of amphibious ships from the reserve fleet, drawdown on Atlantic Fleet amphibious shipping, and augmenting with MSTs shipping, sufficient lift could be generated to lift simultaneously the required two Marine divisions, one MAF (-), and one Army division. The second Army division could be brought in on turnaround shipping from Okinawa by D+15, thereby providing necessary force levels at appropriate times.

7. It is concluded, therefore, that enclosure (1) provides a feasible alternative to the current course of action in Vietnam. The following considerations are added to highlight important relevant factors:

a. To conduct the operation outlined in enclosure (1) under constraints approaching those currently in effect relative to bombardment of NVN would be impractical. As a minimum, freedom must be obtained to conduct air and naval gunfire attacks against those military targets which must be destroyed or neutralized to ensure the protection of the landing force and/or the accomplishment of the overall mission.

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b. Weather is critical to the timing of such an operation. April through September provides the best weather for amphibious operations in the area.

c. Although it is not estimated that the CHICOMs would confront the lodgement forces directly, it would be imprudent to launch this operation prior to mobilization and deployment, as appropriate, of forces adequate to contain a full-scale CHICOM intervention. This would require, for example, activation of all the Marine Corps and Army reserve units and would require at least six months to have all these units combat ready.

d. Assuming full stoppage of the flow of supplies south through the Vinh area, estimated enemy stockpiles in Laos and southern NVN could support the enemy activities at current levels over 1½ years.

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ANNEX C

COMPUTATION OF FORCES REQUIRED

CINCPAC computed the index of combat effectiveness (ICE) of 31 NVN battalions, the highest level of NVN forces he considered, to be 1.37. Enemy forces considered in this paper total 103 NVN battalions.

$$103 \div 31 = 3.32$$

$$3.32 \times 1.37 = 4.55 \text{ (ICE for 103 battalions)}$$

CINCPAC computed the ICE of his lodgement force (2 Marine Divisions, 1 infantry division, 1 airborne brigade) to be 3.79. Adding one infantry division, with an ICE of 1.10, and one airborne brigade, with an ICE of .14, would provide a force with an ICE of 5.03. This is estimated to represent minimal force requirements against the NVN threat. Additional forces would be required if the CHICOMs intervened directly.

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1 April 1969

POINT PAPER

Subj: CM 4010-69, VIETNAM DEMILITARIZED ZONE (DMZ) (U)

1. On 1 November 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided (Green Tab 1) supplementary rules of engagement in consonance with the President's decision to discontinue all offensive operations against NVN.

2. On 20 November 1968, authority was granted (Green Tab 2) to conduct squad-size patrols in the DMZ south of the PMDL. COMUSMACV is authorized to commit backup forces up to platoon size to assist in extrication of patrols in case of enemy actions against them. Initially this authority was granted for the period 23 November-3 December 1968 only, but later it was made permanent.

3. On 2 December 1968 the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended (Green Tab 3) to the Secretary of Defense that authority be granted for employment in the DMZ of ground reconnaissance forces of minimum essential size, as determined by COMUSMACV.

4. On 4 January 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed (Green Tab 4) the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion the continuation of the operational restrictions in the DMZ south of the PMDL would result in increasingly severe risks to friendly forces near the area and recommended that authority be granted to conduct operations in the DMZ south of the PMDL to counter enemy operations in the area.

5. On 18 January 1969 the Secretary of Defense stated (Green Tab 5) that we should continue to exercise maximum restraint in our incursions into the DMZ. Further, he stated that if any hard evidence that the enemy is preparing to carry out significant attacks from the southern part of the DMZ should appear, plans should be made for operations to counter the threat and authority should be requested 48 hours in advance.

6. On 29 January 1969, in response to a request by the President, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, summarized (Green Tab 6) the current authorities concerning operations in the DMZ and reiterated the request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that authority be granted to conduct ground operations in the DMZ south of the PMDL as necessary to counter enemy activity. He also recommended that COMUSMACV should be granted standby authority to counter attacking enemy forces with artillery, air, and naval gunfire against enemy forces and targets north, as well as south, of the PMDL, as necessary.

7. On 26 February 1969 the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported (Green Tab 7) to the Secretary of Defense on current enemy activities near the DMZ and again reiterated the request that restrictions on operations in the DMZ south of the PMDL be removed.

8. On 4 March 1969 the Secretary of Defense refused (Green Tab 8) the requested authorization out of concern that unlimited

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employment of allied forces in the DMZ could cause a further escalation of military activity there. Further, he requested that he be provided alternatives to unlimited operations in the DMZ south of the PMDL and judgments of the effectiveness and risks involved.

9. On 15 March 1969, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, responded (Green Tab 9) to the Secretary of Defense with:

a. An assessment of enemy operations concerning the DMZ.

b. Military alternatives to previously requested authorities concerning operations in the DMZ.

c. A recommendation that authority be granted for COMUSMACV to conduct ground operations of not greater than five days duration and not greater than brigade-size.

10. On 18 March 1969 the Commandant of the Marine Corps expressed (Green Tab 9) reservations on the recommendation and requested that the subject be placed on the agenda for the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 March 1969.

11. On 21 March 1969 the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked (Green Tab 10) CINCPAC and COMUSMACV for their views on the matter.

12. On 23 March 1969 CINCPAC responded (Green Tab 11), concurring with the recommendation previously made (Green Tab 8) by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 25 March 1969 COMUSMACV responded (Green Tab 12), concurring with CINCPAC. Both CINCPAC and COMUSMACV pointed out that they recognized the risks involved but considered that prior authority for a grand slam operation was not vital in view of the current rules of engagement which allow fire to be returned on the enemy north of the PMDL immediately. They also emphasized that massive support by friendly supporting arms would be preplanned and readily available to counter enemy fires.

13. The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the matter at their meeting of 28 March 1969. A draft message to CINCPAC (Green Tab 13) has been prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider at their meeting of 2 April 1969. The draft message advises CINCPAC that:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are recommending that authority be granted to conduct operations in the southern half of the DMZ up to brigade size and for periods of not more than five days. COMUSMACV would have to notify Washington and Paris 48 hours in advance of such operations, but battalion-size or smaller operations would require only 24 hours notification.

b. Authority for preparatory bombardment north of the PMDL is not being requested.

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c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be kept fully informed of enemy capabilities in the DMZ area, particularly as concerns artillery and mortar capabilities.

d. It might be appropriate that initial incursions into the DMZ be made by ARVN.

e. There is no indication that early approval of the requested additional authorities will be forthcoming.

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(Yellow Tabs)

## B. Point Paper

## VIETNAM DEMILITARIZED ZONE (DMZ) (U)

## (Green Tabs)

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1. JCS Msg 010108Z<br>Nov 68            | Supplementary Rules of Engagement  |
| 2. JCS Msg to CINCPAC<br>and COMUSMACV  | Patrols in Southern Half of DMZ  |
| 3. JCS 2472/392                         | Operations in the DMZ  |
| 4. JCS 2472/409                         | Vietnam Demilitarized Zone   |
| 5. JCS 2472/409-1                       | -do-   |
| 6. JCS 2472/417-1                       | Additional Authorities Recommended for<br>Operation in South Vietnam Border<br>Areas (S) |
| 7. JCS 2472/409-2                       | Vietnam Demilitarized Zone   |
| 8. JCS 2472/409-3                       | -do-   |
| 9. CM 4010-69                           | -do-   |
| 10. T90495                              | DMZ Authority  |
| 11. T90511                              | -do-   |
| 12. T90518                              | -do-   |
| 13. JCS msg to CINCPAC<br>and COMUSMACV | Vietnam Demilitarized Zone (U)   |

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ATA15-dnc

13. Why are the amphibious Marines in Vietnam's I Corps while the predominantly land-oriented Army is in the Delta?

ANSWER:

We are in I Corps simply because that is where the war is. It was in I Corps that help was most urgently needed back in 1965 when the President decided to commit major US forces to Vietnam. The Marine Corps force-in-readiness embarked in ships of the US Seventh Fleet in the waters off Vietnam, was the US force capable of quickest action, and it was committed in I Corps. Since that time the war in I Corps has continued at a consistently higher level of activity than anywhere else in Vietnam. We have stayed where the action required us.

We are interested, of course, in riverine war, and the Marine Corps is developing doctrine, tactics, techniques, and materiel for use in such an environment. We have advisors in the Delta with both the US Army and the Vietnamese Marines, and a Marine officer is serving on the staff of the Navy's River Flotilla One. But we have found full employment in I Corps for all the forces we can afford to deploy, and no mass movement of Marines to the Delta has been seriously considered.

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
ATA15-dnc  
S&C T 9079  
11 March 1969

1. CINCPAC OPlan 43-69 provides for PACOM actions in event of a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. It provides for a restructured PACOM force posture, for the redeployment of US forces to reinforce Europe, and for the conduct of operations to counter and contain communist aggression in the Pacific area.

2. No Marine Corps forces are specifically tasked in the plan. All FMFPac forces must be prepared to deploy to assist in the defense of Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, Korea, Southeast Asia, and other areas within PACOM as directed. Additionally, FMFPac must be prepared to furnish one MEF for redeployment to USEUCOM by M+2 months.

3. COORDINATION. DC/S (Air); AC/S, G-2; AC/S, G-3; AC/S, G-4.

4. It is recommended that the attached Marine Corps Memorandum of Acceptability for the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, be signed.

  
J. A. WEIZENEGGER

BUCKTAG COMMENT ON: S&C T 9079, CINCPAC 43-69

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

IN REPLY REFER TO

ATA15-da  
S&C T 9079  
11 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: CINCPAC Operation Plan 43-69

Ref: (a) JCS 2054/781  
(b) JCS MOP 144

1. The subject plan, referred to the Services by reference (a), has been reviewed in accordance with the provisions of reference (b).
2. The plan is considered acceptable to the Marine Corps.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "R. H. Twisdale", is positioned above the typed name.

R. H. TWISDALE  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Director, Joint Planning Group  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Plans & Programs)

ATA15-tib  
3 March 1969

MEMORANDUM

From: Head, Eastern Regional Team  
To: Assistant Director, Joint Planning Group

Subj: Amphibious Forces in a Major Conventional War

1. In response to your request that the Joint and Special Plans Team, the Western Regional Team, and the Eastern Regional Team search pertinent sources and furnish to you applicable quotations supporting the requirement for amphibious forces in a major conventional war, the attached are provided.
2. CINCPAC's comments on the Wood-McClintock study of US overseas basing arrangements would appear to be the most appropriate current vehicle for CG, FMFPac, to try to influence towards expressing the requirement for amphibious forces in a major conventional war.

J. A. WEIZENEGGER

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ATA15-tib

KEY ISSUE PAPER

Subj: BOMBING HALT OF 1 NOVEMBER 1968

QUESTION

What part did CMC play in the bombing halt of 1 November 1968?

CMC RESPONSE TO CONGRESS

In view of the encouraging reports that the negotiations in Paris has reached the stage where productive talks could begin and that NVN would not take military advantage of the situation, I concurred with the decisions by President Johnson that it was appropriate that the bombing be stopped on 1 November 1968.

MARINE CORPS POSITION

Same as above.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Applicable Reference Notebook Items

I-L-3-e Operations in NVN

I-L-7-b Concessions of Enemy to Bombing Halt

TAB:

TAB: Text of Presidents Johnson's speech of 31 October 1968

APR 15  
**TOP SECRET**COMMENTS ON ANNEX C, CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69

1. Page C-3, subparagraph 3.b. Delete and substitute 1  
therefor the following: 2
- "b. (U) Tactical Air: Component/uni-Service 3  
commanders having aircraft organic to their forces will 4  
retain operational control of such aircraft subject to 5  
the following: 6
- (1) (C) COMAFKOREA is designated as the 7  
coordinating authority for planning of air operations. 8
- (2) (C) COMUSKOREA, through COMAFKOREA, will 9  
provide, as needed, airspace control authority in certain 10  
sectors or for selected operations to other commanders 11  
dependent on the requirements of the situation. 12
- (3) (C) Operations of aircraft over fleet units, 13  
sea operating areas, and amphibious objective areas will be 14  
planned and controlled as directed by CINCPACFLT. When an 15  
amphibious operation has terminated and the air control 16  
capability is established ashore, COMUSKOREA will exercise 17  
his responsibility for airspace control through COMAFKOREA. 18
- (4) (C) COMAFKOREA will control all air opera- 19  
tions except as follows: 20
- (a) As noted in subparagraph 3.b(3) above. 21

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**TOP SECRET**

(b) For operations of Army aircraft in support 1  
of Army forces or Marine Corps air operations in support of 2  
Marine ground forces in sector(s) as designated by COMUSKOREA. 3

(5) Commanders will pass control of aircraft 4  
between their respective areas at a point designated by 5  
COMUSKOREA. For planning purposes, the actual points of 6  
assuming or releasing control will coincide generally with 7  
the boundaries of assigned areas or sectors of operations 8  
in the objective area or the amphibious objective area. 9

REASON: To provide guidance for coordination and 10  
conduct of air operations in accordance with the principles 11  
of UNAAF and with other arrangements previously approved 12  
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 13

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ATA15-dnc

ADC/S (PLANS) COMMENT:

1. If it is considered essential that both DARs be considered as being "one package", they should be combined into one DAR. Otherwise they will go to SecDef, after approval by the JCS, as two separate items, and OSD may or may not treat them as one package. It is not considered by this office that the "one package" approach to OSD is critical, as experience has shown that there is no hesitation in OSD to approve one part of a recommendation while disapproving or postponing action on other parts of the same recommendation.
2. It is recommended that the "Basis for Change" section in each DAR be expanded to provide added rationale for moving the units to Okinawa or Japan. The predisposition in OSD will be to approve the movement from SVN but to require that the units be brought back to CONUS in order to preclude raising the Okinawa and Japan ceilings and to preempt a Marine Corps request for an end strength increase. Every argument available should be set forth in the effort to counter this predisposition. The referenced JCSMs provide some rationale but are general in nature. Additional rationale could reflect among other things:
  - a. The consistency of the recommended relocation sites with JCS-approved T-Day planning.
  - b. The capability of the VMFA to provide immediate support in Korea from Iwakuni.
  - c. The requirement for the WERS functions to be performed in WestPac.
  - d. That the H&MS/MABS detachment is organic to the H&MS and MABS in Japan.

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ATA15-dnc

e. That 400 of the requested 674 additional spaces for Japan represent a restitution of the cut in the ceiling made in March 1968 to account for the deployment of the squadron and the H&MS/MABS detachment from Japan to SVN.

f. The capabilities represented by the ground units being withdrawn, in terms of support these units would furnish to amphibious operations in other WestPac contingencies.

g. The delay that would be required in mounting out an amphibious operation should these ground units be located in CONUS instead of Okinawa.

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ATA15-apc  
19 February 1969

MEMORANDUM

From: Head, Eastern Regional Team  
To: Assistant Director, Joint Planning Group

Subj: Briefings for LtGen WIESEMAN

1. Recommend ERT portion of briefings be concerned with:
  - a. Paris talks
  - b. Force deployments in PACOM
  - c. CINCPAC contingency plans
  - d. RVNAF improvement
  - e. Post-hostilities Asia strategy
2. Twenty minutes should be adequate for the briefings.

J. A. WEIZENEGGER

**SECRET**ATA15-ear  
11 February 1969POINT PAPER

Subj: SOUTHEAST ASIA MARINE CORPS FORCE STRUCTURE AND  
MANPOWER

1. The effect of the SecDef decision of 5 February 1969 (Tab S) is to:

a. Overturn Mr. Nitze's decision of 21 November 1968 that no Marine Corps units may be withdrawn from SVN except as a result of Paris negotiations.

b. Invite the submission of DARs to effect the relocation of Marine Corps units to Okinawa and Japan as desired.

2. The decision does not:

a. Promise approval of the proposed relocation of Marine Corps units.

b. Give any indication of approval or disapproval of the required increase in Program 6 ceilings in Japan and Okinawa should the relocation be approved.

3. The normal course of events would be for HQMC to forward to the J-3, Joint Staff, a DAR proposing the relocation of Marine Corps units. A new redeployment schedule must be developed as the schedule originally recommended has been OBE.

4. G-3 has a copy of the SecDef memorandum of 5 February and is aware of its implications. G-3 is coordinating with FMFPac on a new redeployment schedule and will prepare a DAR or DARs as appropriate for submission after a new schedule is agreed on.

5. A chronology of actions leading to the current situation is appended.

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**SECRET**ATA15-ear  
11 February 1969

CHRONOLOGY OF ACTIONS TO ADJUST THE  
MARINE CORPS FORCE STRUCTURE AND  
MANPOWER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. In response to requests from the Deputy Secretary of Defense dated 23 August, 6 September, and 18 September 1968 (Tabs A, B and C), the Secretary of the Navy provided, on 2 October, along with several alternatives, a plan for restructuring Marine Corps forces in the Program 6 countries within Program 6 authorized ceilings (Tab D).
2. In response to a subsequent request, dated 12 October 1968, by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Tab E) for clarification and amplification of the proposals, the Secretary of the Navy proposed on 1 November 1968 an additional alternative (Tab F).
3. On 12 October 1968 the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Tab G) concerning the recommendations of the Secretary of the Navy. After considering CINCPAC's recommendations (Tab H), the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved, on 2 November 1968, a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense forwarded on 4 November 1968 providing their recommendations (Tab I).
4. In order to prompt a decision by the Secretary of Defense, CMC, on 14 November 1968, directed that CG, III MAF, initiate a request to COMUSMACV to commence redeployment of certain units to Okinawa (Tab J). Substitution of a VMFA for the VMA on the list of recommended redeployments was approved by CMC on 15 November 1968 (Tab K). On 21 November 1968, CG, III MAF, initiated the request (Tab L).
5. On 22 November 1968, the Deputy Secretary of Defense provided to the Secretary of the Navy a record of decisions made at a meeting the previous day. Included was the decision that Program 6 manpower authorization schedules for the Marine Corps are to remain as currently approved (Tab M). The Chief of Staff's memorandum for the record of this meeting is enclosed (Tab N).
6. On 23 November 1968 CMC informed (Tab O) CG, FMFPac and CG, III MAF, of the decision but recommended that the request for redeployment (Tab L) be left effective in order to provide an audit trail.
7. On 4 December 1968, CINCPAC notified (Tab P) the JCS of his concurrence with the redeployment recommended by CG, III MAF (Tab L).
8. On 27 December 1968, CMC tabled a CMCM (Tab Q) reporting DepSecDef's decision and recommending that the JCS reiterate their earlier recommendations that certain Marine Corps units be redeployed from SVN to Okinawa and Japan to preclude

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**SECRET**ATA15-ear  
11 February 1969

the necessity for cadreing units in SVN and to maintain a balanced amphibious capability in WestPac.

9. On 16 January 1969, in response to the CMCM, the JCS requested (Tab R) of SecDef that the DepSecDef decision not preclude the withdrawal of the lower priority units to accommodate higher priority Marine Corps requirements and reaffirmed their views that the withdrawing units be relocated to Okinawa and Japan.

10. On 5 February 1969, SecDef responded (Tab S) stating that the Marine Corps structure in Southeast Asia is not "frozen" and that the JCS are encouraged to recommend whatever adjustments they believe necessary, such adjustments to be recommended through the usual Southeast Asia Deployment Program adjustment procedures.

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I-N-D-E-X  
(Blue Tabs)

POINT PAPER

SOUTHEAST ASIA MARINE CORPS FORCE  
STRUCTURE AND MANPOWER

CHRONOLOGY

CHRONOLOGY OF ACTIONS TO ADJUST  
THE MARINE CORPS FORCE STRUCTURE  
AND MANPOWER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Pink Tabs)

A. Memo for SecNav, CJCS, CMC	Marine Corps Manpower Requirements in SEA (U)
B. Memo for CMC	Marine Corps Strength and Structure in SEA (U)
C. Memo for SecNav & CMC	Marine Corps Strength and Structure (U)
D. JCS 2472/350-2 #59	Marine Corps Strength and Structure (U)
E. Memo for SecNav	Marine Corps Strength and Structure (U)
F. JCS 2472/350-5 #58	-do-
G. JCS 2472/350-3 #59	Southeast Asia Marine Corps Force Structure and Manpower (U)
H. CINCPAC msg 250414Z Oct68	SEA Marine Corps Force Structure (U)
I. JCS 2472/350-4 #59	SEA Marine Corps Force Structure and Manpower (U)
J. CMC msg 140216Z Nov68	Program 6 Realignment
K. CMC msg 151952Z Nov68	Relocation of Aviation Units (U)
L. CG, FMFPAC msg 212327Z Nov68	III MAF Prog Six Force Structure (U)
M. Memo for SecNav	Navy Major Force Level Issues
N. Memo for the Record	Major Force Oriented Issue (Navy Dept) Decision Meeting Between Under Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy on 21Nov68

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(PINK TABS CONTINUED)

O.	CMC msg 231831Z Nov68	Realignment of III MAF Force Structure (U)
P.	CINCPAC msg 040405Z Dec68	SEASIA Marine Force Structure (U)
Q.	JCS 2472/350-6 #65	SEASIA Marine Corps Force Structure and Manpower (U)
R.	JCS 2472/350-7 #66	SEASIA Marine Corps Force Structure and Manpower (U)
S.	JCS 2472/350-8 #66	-do-


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ATA15-gwe

10 February 1969

1. Commander-in-Chief, U.S./Thai Force Plan 2/68 (Short Title: CINCUSTAF Plan 2/68) is a bilateral capabilities plan providing for military operations in the defense of Thailand against communist forces in Laos by holding the Mekong River Valley and its principal cities and military facilities.
2. Marine Corps forces committed consist of one MEB.
3. Change 1 to the plan is essentially an updating of the plan for accuracy and clarity.
4. COORDINATION. DC/S (Air); AC/S, G-1; AC/S, G-2; AC/S, G-3; AC/S, G-4.
5. It is recommended that the attached Marine Corps Memorandum of Acceptability for the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, be signed.

  
J. A. WEIZENEGGER

BUCKTAG COMMENT ON: S&amp;C TS 4950, CINCUSTAF PLAN 2/68 (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

**TOP SECRET**  
IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA15-gwe  
T4950  
11 Feb 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: Change One to CINCUSTAF 2/68 (U)

Ref: (a) JCS 2353/159  
(b) JCS MOP 144

1. The subject change, referred to the Services by reference (a), has been reviewed in accordance with the provisions of reference (b). The following changes to the plan are recommended:

MC-1. Change where necessary throughout the plan the titles of the subordinate commands of the US/Thai Field Forces to read:

"Combined Ground Component

Combined Air Forces Component

Naval Component

Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force"

REASON: To provide more accurate and more descriptive titles for the forces involved.

MC-2. Page A-1, paragraph 2; change as follows:

"2. (TS) AIR FORCE FORCES."


REASON: Accuracy.

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T4950  
11 Feb 1969

MC-3. Page C-1, paragraph 1, penultimate sentence; 1  
change as follows: 2  
"Air,--ground-and-naval-participating-units Subordinate 3  
commanders will coordinate supporting plans with COMUSTAFF 4  
prior to publication." 5  
REASON: Accuracy. 6  
MC-4. Page C-2, paragraph 3.c; delete. 7  
REASON: Unnecessary and ambiguous. COMUSTAFF's subordi- 8  
nate commands are established in this plan and reflected in 9  
Appendix 1 to Annex C. 10  
2. Subject to the above, the change is considered acceptable  
to the Marine Corps.



R. H. TWISDALE

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Director, Joint Planning Group  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Plans & Programs)TOP SECRET~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYATA15-gwe  
30 January 1969BRIEF OF SERVICE OFSgt Robert J. HAMMOND 2046801/2571/2574/2533 USMC

3 May 63 - 19 Aug 63	Private, USMCR (inactive).
20 Aug 63	Enlisted USMC, for 4 years. Home of record, Claremont, N.H.
22 Aug 63 - 7 Nov 63	Recruit training, Parris Island, S.C.
8 Nov 63 - 16 Dec 63	1st ITR, Camp Lejeune, N.C.
6 Jan 64 - 11 Sep 64	Special Radio Operator Course, USN Communications Training Center, Pensacola, Fla.
1                      1 Feb 64	Promoted to Pfc.
16 Sep 64 - 25 Jun 65	Korean Language Course, Defense Language Institute, Monterey, Calif. Graduated 10th in a class of 13.
14 Aug 65 - 28 Dec 65	Radio Telegraph Operator, 1stMar Div, Camp Pendleton, Calif.
1 Oct 65	Promoted to LCpl.
29 Dec 65 - 23 Jul 66	Radio Telegraph Operator and Special Radio Operator, MCB, Camp Pendleton, Calif.
1 Apr 66	Promoted to Cpl.
19 Aug 66	Awarded Good Conduct Medal.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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30 January 1969

2 Sep 66 -

Special Radio Operator, Company  
"E", Marine Support Battalion,  
Naval Security Group, Kami  
Seya, Japan.3 Sep 66Received Code of Conduct  
instruction at Company "E",  
Marine Support Battalion,  
Kami, Seya, Japan. SRB entry  
is signed "F. J. REISINGER, CO."16 Dec 66 -  
12 Jun 67TAD, Subunit 1, 1st Radio  
Battalion, South Vietnam.

1 Jul 67

Promoted to Sgt.

20 Aug 67

Extended current enlistment  
for 2 years.

3 Jan 68

Assigned TAD, USS Pueblo.

23 Jan 68

Captured by North Koreans.

23 Dec 68

Released by North Koreans.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

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IN REPLY REFER TO

ATA15-apc

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: Change No. 2 to CINCPAC Operation Plan No. 27-69

Ref: (a) JCS 2054/778  
(b) JCS MOP 144

1. (TS) The subject change, referred to the Services by reference (a), has been reviewed in accordance with the provisions of reference (b). The following comments are submitted:

MC-1. Page A-I-A-1-2, REMARKS Column. Delete phrase, 1  
"Avail for Amphib. Opns." 2

REASON: Amphibious operations are a primary function of 3  
Marine Corps forces. All Marine Corps forces available for 4  
this plan are not tasked in the plan. If there is a need for 5  
amphibious landing forces in the PACOM reserve, Marine Corps 6  
forces should be so tasked. 7

MC-2. Page A-I-B-1-4. Change to reflect the availability 8  
of Marine Corps forces totalling 3 7/9 MEF plus 1 Marine divi- 9  
sion (2 MEF plus 1 Marine division assigned to PACOM; 7/9 MEF 10  
augmentation from LANTCOM; and 1 MEF available through mobili- 11  
zation). 12

REASON: To conform with JSCP. 13

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ATA15-apc

MC-3. Page A-I-C-2-1. Change to reflect deployment of 1  
7/9 MAW to Korea by D+75. 2

REASON: To conform with Ground Forces Profile Single 3  
Contingency on Page A-I-A-2-5 which shows 7/9 MEF being 4  
deployed to Korea by D+75. 5

MC-4. Page A-II-B-1-2. Same as MC-2. 6

REASON: Same as MC-2. 7

MC-5. Page B-3, paragraph 3.d(1)(b). Change to read: 8  
"(b) Providing Army, Navy, and Air Force, and 9  
Marine Corps forces..." 10

REASON: Accuracy. 11

MC-6. Page C-1, paragraph 2. Add the following new 12  
subparagraph between subparagraphs 2.d and 2.e, and renumber 13  
subsequent subparagraphs: 14

"e. (U) The Commanding General of U. S. Marine Corps 15  
forces deploying to Korea for other than amphibious operations 16  
will be designated a Uni-Service Force Commander under oper- 17  
ational control of COMUSKOREA." 18

REASON: Completeness, and to conform with note (2) on 19  
pages C-I-2 and C-II-3. 20

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ATA15-apc

MC-7. Page C-2, paragraph 2.k. change to read as follows: 1

"k. (TS) When directed by CINCPAC, operational control 2  
of designated U. S. forces in Korea will be assigned to 3  
COMUSKOREA. CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, ~~and~~ CINCPACAF, and CGFMFPAC 4  
will exercise command, less operational control, over those 5  
U.S. forces assigned to the operational control of COMUSKOREA. 6  
Other PACOM forces will continue to operate under the appropri- 7  
ate PACOM Service Component Commanders in support of this Oplan." 8

REASON: Accuracy. 9

MC-8. Page C-3, subparagraph 3.b. Delete and substitute 10  
therefor the following: 11

"b. (U) Tactical Air: Component/uni-Service commanders 12  
having aircraft organic to their forces will retain operational 13  
control of such aircraft subject to the following: 14

(1) (C) COMAFKOREA is designated as the coordinating 15  
authority for planning of air operations. 16

(2) (C) COMUSKOREA, through COMAFKOREA, will provide, 17  
as needed, airspace control authority in certain sectors or 18  
for selected operations to other commanders dependent on the 19  
requirements of the situation. 20

(3) (C) Operations of aircraft over fleet units, sea 21  
operating areas, and amphibious objective areas will be 22

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ATA15-apc

planned and controlled as directed by CINCPACFLT. When an  
amphibious operation has terminated and the air control  
capability is established ashore, COMUSKOREA will exercise  
his responsibility for airspace control through  
COMAFKOREA.

(4) (C) COMAFKOREA will control all air operations  
except as follows:

(a) As noted in subparagraph 3.b.(3) above.

(b) For operations of Army aircraft in support  
of Army forces or Marine Corps air operations in support of  
Marine ground forces in sector(s) as designated by COMUSKOREA.

(5) Commanders will pass control of aircraft between  
their respective areas at a point designated by COMUSKOREA.  
For planning purposes, the actual points of assuming or re-  
leasing control will coincide generally with the boundaries  
of assigned areas or sectors of operations in the objective  
area or the amphibious objective area.

REASON: To provide guidance for coordination and conduct  
of air operations in accordance with the principles of UNAAF  
and with other arrangements previously approved by the Joint  
Chiefs of Staff.

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ATA15-âpc

MC-9. Page C-I-1. Delete and substitute therefor the 1  
chart shown at enclosure (1). 2

REASON: Accuracy. 3

MC-10. Page C-II-1. Delete and substitute therefor the 4  
chart shown at enclosure (2). 5

REASON: Accuracy. 6

2. (U) Subject to the above comments, the change is considered acceptable to the Marine Corps.


R. H. TWISDALE  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Director, Joint Planning Group  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Plans & Programs)

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

**SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED**  
**Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals**

Operation Plan  
CINCPAC No. 27-69



Strategic Direction	Coordination & Support	GROUP-3
U.S. Operational Comd.	Command less OPCON	Downgraded at 12 year intervals
U.S. Operational Control	Command & OPCON	Not automatically declassified
UNC OPCON	C-I-1	

**Change 2**

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
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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX C

COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS (If UN Resolution is Terminated or Abrogated)

Operation Plan  
CINCPAC No. 27-69



Operational Command  
Operational Control  
Command less OPCON  
Command and OPCON

GROUP-3  
Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
Not automatically declassified

G-II-1

**TOP SECRET**  
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET (2)

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ATA15-dnc  
29 January 1969

## BRIEF OF SERVICE OF

Sgt. Robert J. CHICCA 2047622/2571/2574/2533 USMC

21 May 63 - 2 Sep 63	Private, USMCR (inactive).
3 Sep 63	Enlisted USMC for 4 years. Home of record, Chillum Heights, Md.
8 Sep 63 - 22 Nov 63	Recruit training, Parris Island, S. C.
16 Nov 63	Promoted to Pfc.
23 Nov 63 - 23 Dec 63	1st ITR, Camp Lejeune, N. C.
15 Jan 64 - 4 Nov 64	Special Radio Operator Course, USN Communications Training Center, Pensacola, Fla.
16 Oct 64	Promoted to LCpl.
8 Nov 64 - 10 Sep 65	Korean Language Course, Defense Language Institute, Monterey, Calif. Graduated 8th in a class of 18.
12 Sep 65 - 28 Dec 65	Radio Telegraph Operator, 1st MarDiv, Camp Pendleton, Calif.
29 Dec 65 - 19 Jul 66	Radio Telegraph Operator and Special Radio Operator, MCB, Camp Pendleton, Calif.
1 Jan 66	Promoted to Cpl.

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29 January 1969

2 Sep 66	Awarded Good Conduct Medal.
7 Sep 66 -	Special Radio Operator, Company "E", Marine Support Battalion, Naval Security Group, Kami Seya, Japan.
1 Dec 66	Promoted to Sgt.
5 Dec 66	Received Code of Conduct instruction at Company "E", Marine Support Battalion, Kami Seya, Japan. SRB entry is signed "A. R. JACOBSEN, Jr., by direction."
3 Sep 67	Extended current enlistment for 2 years.
22 Sep 67 - 7 Nov 67	TAD, 508th US Army Security Agency Group, Korea.
3 Jan 68	Assigned TAD, USS <u>Pueblo</u> .
23 Jan 68	Captured by North Koreans. Slightly wounded.
23 Dec 68	Released by North Koreans.

Sgt CHICCA has been selected for promotion to SSgt.

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File **TOP SECRET**ATA15-jnf  
22 January 1969

1. Annex U to CINCPAC Operation Plan No. 1-69 prescribes the procedures and emergency action messages to be used by CINCPAC under the following conditions:

a. When an increase in the readiness condition of a CINCPAC subordinate command is either requested or declared by the commander or directed by CINCPAC or higher authority.

b. When a requirement exists to engage a non-US orbiting satellite.


c. Upon the imminence or outbreak of hostilities.

d. During exercises where simulation of emergency action procedures of CINCPAC or the JCS actions is required.

2. No specific Marine Corps forces are tasked in the annex.

3. COORDINATION: None.

4. It is recommended that the attached Marine Corps Memorandum of Acceptability for the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, be signed.

  
J. A. WEIZENEGGER

BUCKTAG COMMENT ON: S&C T8397, Annex U to CINCPAC  
Oplan 1-69

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

IN REPLY REFER TO  
ATA15-jnf  
22 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: Annex U to CINCPAC Operation Plan No. 1-69

Ref: (a) JCS 2054/779  
(b) JCS MOP 144

1. The subject annex, referred to the Services by reference (a), has been reviewed in accordance with the provisions of reference (b).
2. The annex is considered acceptable to the Marine Corps.

*R. H. Twisdale*  
R. H. TWISDALE

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Assistant Director, Joint Planning Group  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Plans & Programs)

*File*  
 TOP SECRET  
 ATA15-gwe  
 227

MEMORANDUM

From: Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans)

To: Deputy Chief of Staff (Air)  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

Subj: Review of Change 1 to CINCUSTAF Plan 2/68

Encl: (1) Subject Plan

1. Change 1 to CINCUSTAF Plan 2/68 has been received for review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Marine Corps comments on the proposed change are due to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by 7 February 1969.
2. Enclosure (1) is the subject plan. The proposed change, originated by COMUSMACTHAI, and CINCPAC's recommendations concerning the change, are filed in front of the plan. Addressees are requested to review the change, as modified by CINCPAC, to determine its acceptability to the Marine Corps. Comments, to include specific changes recommended and reasons therefor, should be received in Room 2108 by 1600, 5 February 1969.
3. In order that the review may be completed on time, the following schedule is established:

<u>Staff Agency</u>	<u>Complete Review By</u>
DC/S (Air)	24 Jan 1969
AC/S, G-1	28 Jan 1969
AC/S, G-2	30 Jan 1969
AC/S, G-3	3 Feb 1969
AC/S, G-4	5 Feb 1969

R. H. TWISDALE  
 Director

TOP SECRET



ATA15-da

MEMORANDUM

From: Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans)  
To: Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs)  
Subj: Tentative Record of Decision DPM on Asia Strategy  
and Force Structure  
Ref: (a) ADC/S (Programs) memo ATB-6-1ph of 9 Jan 1969  
Encl: (1) Point Paper  
(2) Rough first draft of Navy Dept Working Group memo  
for SecNav

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is provided.
2. As shown by enclosure (1), the Tentative Record of Decision DPM is essentially the same as the two earlier versions of the DPM on Asia Strategy and Force Structure.
3. I recommend that no reclama be submitted, for the following reasons:
  - a. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have attacked this DPM vigorously twice during its preparation, all to no avail.
  - b. Force levels associated with Asia are decided in other DPMs, not this one.
  - c. A new administration is coming into office on 20 January.
4. For your information, the Navy Department Working Group on this DPM plans to recommend no reclama. Enclosure (2) is a copy of the rough first draft of the Working Group's memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

SECRET

LtCol GRAY-jmh  
13 January 1969

POINT PAPER

Subj: Tentative Record of Decision DPM on Asia Strategy and Force Structure

1. No new areas of decision are introduced in this version of the DPM.

2. Changes from the earlier version are:

a. Nuclear Strategy

(1) Earlier DPMs anticipate nuclear role to be as a deterrent and as a response if the enemy uses nuclear weapons first.

(2) SecNav position is that we must retain the option of using nuclear weapons and that the enemy must know of our capability and intent to employ nuclear weapons when necessary for the deterrent to remain effective.

(3) New DPM acknowledges that the enemy must be kept uncertain as to whether or not we would initiate the use of nuclear weapons but states that "in making force and budgetary decisions, we should plan on the basis that our use of nuclear weapons first is unlikely."

b. CHICOM Capabilities

(1) Earlier DPMs emphasize ammunition production capability as a limitation on CHICOM capability to wage a two-front war.

(2) SecNav position is that the uncertainties regarding CHICOM ammunition production and stockpiles and possible Soviet assistance are dismissed too readily in the DPM.

(3) New DPM acknowledges that CHICOMs might have stockpiles of ammunition available now, but no conclusions are changed.

SECRET

**SECRET**ATA15-gwe  
13 January 1969POINT PAPER

Subj: SOUTHEAST ASIA MARINE CORPS FORCE STRUCTURE  
AND MANPOWER

1. In response to requests from the Deputy Secretary of Defense dated 23 August, 6 September, and 18 September 1968 (Green Tabs 3, 4 and 5), the Secretary of the Navy provided, on 2 October, along with several alternatives, a plan for restructuring Marine Corps forces in the Program 6 countries within Program 6 authorized ceilings (Green Tab 6).
2. In response to a subsequent request, dated 12 October 1968, by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Green Tab 7) for clarification and amplification of the proposals, the Secretary of the Navy proposed on 1 November 1968 an additional alternative (Green Tab 8).
3. On 12 October 1968 the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Green Tab 9) concerning the recommendations of the Secretary of the Navy. After considering CINCPAC's recommendations (Green Tab 10), the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved, on 2 November 1968, a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense forwarded on 4 November 1968 providing their recommendations (Green Tab 11).
4. In order to prompt a decision by the Secretary of Defense, CMC, on 14 November 1968, directed that CG, III MAF, initiate a request to COMUSMACV to commence redeployment of certain units to Okinawa (Green Tab 12). Substitution of a VMFA for the VMA on the list of recommended redeployments was approved by CMC on 15 November 1968 (Green Tab 13). On 21 November 1968, CG, III MAF, initiated the request (Green Tab 14).
5. On 22 November 1968, the Deputy Secretary of Defense provided to the Secretary of the Navy a record of decisions made at a meeting the previous day. Included was the decision that Program 6 manpower authorization schedules for the Marine Corps are to remain as currently approved (Green Tab 15). The Chief of Staff's memorandum for the record of this meeting is enclosed (Green Tab 16).
6. On 23 November 1968 CMC informed (Green Tab 17) CG, FMFPac and CG, III MAF, of the decision but recommended that the request for redeployment (Green Tab 14) be left effective in order to provide an audit trial.
7. On 4 December 1968, CINCPAC notified (Green Tab 18) the JCS of his concurrence with the redeployment recommended by CG, III MAF (Green Tab 14).

**SECRET**

ATA15-jmh  
3 January 1969

ITEM: Japan's Role in Asian Regional Security

BACKGROUND:

The Japanese currently are enjoying what is in many ways the best of all possible worlds. Its economy, unfettered by large expenditures for defense, is one of the world's soundest, while its citizenry is protected by the umbrella of its security arrangements with the United States.

The basic cost to the Japanese for this security is in the postponement of the reversion of Okinawa and the granting of base rights in Japan to the United States.

STATUS:

It is in the best interest of the United States, and of Japan, that Japan take a more active role in Asian security affairs. Specific improvements in the following areas seem reasonable and desirable:

- a. Expanded air and naval surveillance capabilities.
- b. Improved ASW capability.
- c. Expanded harbor defense and minesweeping forces.
- d. Improved air defense capabilities, both aircraft and missiles.
- e. Modernized and improved ground and tactical air forces.

Additionally, Japan appears capable of expanding its assistance to the developing nations of Asia. Indonesia in particular would appear to be a nation in need of and susceptible to Japanese assistance and leadership.

RECOMMENDATION: The general subject of Japan's future in Asian security affairs is suitable for discussion with the US Ambassador to Japan and with Japanese defense officials.

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