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27 May 1969

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Colonel BRECKINRIDGE's After Tour
Report dated 18 April 1969

From: Senior Marine Advisor, Naval Advisory Group, Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam
To: Chief, Naval Advisory Group, Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam

Subj: After Tour Report

1. Forwarded. With one exception, the report will be discussed in its entirety rather than comment upon each specific recommendation.
2. During the period covered by this report, the Vietnamese Marine Corps has continued to wholeheartedly contribute to the overall efforts to insure Vietnamese self determination. Assigned a variety of general reserve missions through the Republic of Vietnam, the Vietnamese Marine Corps has responded most efficiently, operating in the field an average of 92.6% of the reporting period.
3. Within the above circumstances, it is entirely reasonable to expect any maturing military organization to reflect some imperfections such as are described in the basic report. These same imperfections are found in our oldest U.S. units in the Republic of Vietnam. The heartening fact is that the Vietnamese Marine Corps has functioned effectively despite certain shortcomings mentioned in this report. Colonel BRECKINRIDGE is a perfectionist and his standards are of the highest order. In pointing out imperfections, he does not compare performance with other units. He measures only against perfection. He has not mentioned that, in comparison with like units in similar roles and areas, the Vietnamese Marine Corps units have excelled, consistently. He merely points out areas in which improvement would reflect progress toward perfection.
4. The value of the comments are apparent. They serve as an excellent line of departure for future planning and programing. As practicable, attempts will be made by the Marine Advisory Unit to assist in improvement of command and staff action and coordination, training, and administrative and logistical proficiency. A copy of this report has been hand delivered to counterparts for study.

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5. The one aspect of the report which will be specifically addressed involves techniques employed during the conduct of the attack. Several observations are made in the report that once enemy contact had been established, the procedure of the friendly unit was to withdraw, request supporting fire on the enemy position, and finally to continue the assault upon completion of the fire mission. This procedure may be inconsistent with doctrine for conventional warfare under certain circumstances. It has however, become a common practice among Free World Military Forces in the Republic of Vietnam. Within existing practices then, such procedures are believed to be acceptable in this environment.

6. Colonel BRECKINRIDGE's report is considered to be a good tool for use in orienting new advisors and will be required reading for the foreseeable future.


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18 Apr 1969

From: Colonel James T. BRECKINRIDGE, 046940/9906, USMC
To: Chief Naval Advisory Group, Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam
Via: Senior Marine Advisor, Naval Advisory Group, MACV
Subj: After Tour Report

Ref: (a) CHNAVADVGRP MACV INST 5213.1B
(b) After Tour Report of Capt. R. V. COFFEL,
087242/0802, USMC of 16May68
(c) After Tour Report of Capt. D. B. FRYREAR,
091704/0302, USMC of 6Jun68
(d) After Tour Report of Capt. D. L. BONSPER,
091908/0302, USMC of 7Jun68
(e) After Tour Report of 1stLt. L. S. MACFARLANE,
097274/2502, USMC of 7Jun68
(f) After Tour Report of Maj. E. H. BOYCE,
077618/0302, USMC of 14Jun68
(g) After Tour Report of Capt. H. J. SHANE,
085116/0302, USMC of 3Jul68
(h) After Tour Report of Maj. P. E. GARDNER,
079532/0302, USMC of 1Jul68
(i) After Tour Report of Maj. P. L. CARLSON,
078772/0302, USMC of 9Jul68
(j) After Tour Report of Maj. T. C. BUDD, II,
057146/0302, USMC of 19Aug68
(k) After Tour Report of Maj. W. E. MCKINSTRY,
064664/0302, USMC of 30Aug68
(l) After Tour Report of LtCol. R. H. KANSIER,
057336/3002, USMC of 5Sep68
(m) After Tour Report of LCdr. K. F. HINES,
633746/2300, USN of 18Sep68
(n) After Tour Report of Capt. P. R. MCCARTHY,
080028/3002, USMC of 29Sep68
(o) After Tour Report of Maj. W. P. ESHELMAN,
077473/0302, USMC of 17Oct68
(p) After Tour Report of Maj. H. T. WARD, Jr.,
077961/0302, USMC of 17Oct68
(q) After Tour Report of Maj. J. A. WILLIAMS,
081802/0302, USMC of 28Dec68

- (r) After Tour Report of WO T. B. MARTIN,
099020/0803, USMC of 28Dec68
- (s) After Tour Report of Capt. J. T. FRISINA,
0947708/0302, USMCR of 13Feb69
- (t) After Tour Report of Capt. T. C. TAYLOR,
084362/0302, USMC of 14Feb69

- Encl:
- (1) Chronology of Tour
 - (2) Command and Staff Action
 - (3) Tactical Maneuver
 - (4) Use of Supporting Arms
 - (5) Employment of Artillery
 - (6) Training
 - (7) Logistics
 - (8) Medical and Sanitation Matters
 - (9) Consolidated List of Recommendations

1. Introduction.

a. This report is submitted in accordance with reference (a) and covers the period 29 April 1968 - 28 April 1969. During this period my assignment was that of Assistant Senior Marine Advisor, Marine Advisory Unit. For two periods of approximately 30 days each I was Acting Senior Marine Advisor.

b. My report consists, primarily, of a compilation of extracts from After Tour Reports submitted by U. S. Marine Corps advisors who were detached during my tour of duty. By necessity, there is an overlap into that period covered by my predecessor.

c. During my recent tour I have had occasion to read several After Tour Reports and speak to many past and present advisors, a good number of whom have registered a certain despondency at a seeming lack of improvement within the Vietnamese Marine Corps during their one year tours. I feel that, perhaps, I am in a slightly better position to judge improvement than most since I have the somewhat unique background of having been the first American advisor ever assigned to a Vietnamese Marine Infantry battalion. Specifically, I was advisor to the First Infantry Battalion during the period June 1955 - June 1957. The battalion was then based at NHA TRANG.

Therefore my comparisons span a period of nearly fourteen years. It is indeed quite difficult to measure improvement in just one year. For that matter, I too had difficulty in measuring any improvement during my first two year assignment. As one now detached advisor commented "The long term value (of the advisory effort) lies in the cumulative effect of advisor after advisor, year after year, exerting what influence each can do to the improvement of the Vietnamese Marine Corps". Over the long haul, that is from June 1955 to present, I have noted several marked contrasts. In some few, but important areas, I have also noted little appreciable progress.

2. Areas needing improvement.

a. Of the areas in which little improvement has been noted over the years, three stand out. These are:

(1) Staff Utilization. Most of the senior officers today have a solid educational background in proper staff functioning and this is, of itself, an improvement. However, there is a strong tendency on the part of most commanders (with some isolated exceptions) to ignore their staffs and personally do work of a staff officer. This problem is not necessarily unique to Vietnamese Commanders.

(2) Field sanitation. This subject is one which should be of general concern for all units, civilian as well as military, in the Republic of Vietnam. It is seldom practiced in a satisfactory manner. Several Vietnamese Marine Corps installations are excellent; for example, Headquarters Marine Corps and the Training Command. Although proper sanitation principles are taught to recruits and enforced at the Training Command, they appear ignored by certain other commanders.

(3) Rifle marksmanship. Although marksmanship proficiency remains below the most desirable standards, the new range currently under construction at the Marine Corps Training Command, THU DUC, coupled with the command interest registered, should produce a great improvement in this area.

n/b
range

3. Areas that Have Improved.

a. Since 1955, there have been distinct improvements within the Vietnamese Marine Corps. These include:

improvement
Care

(1) Proper care and maintenance of weapons is no problem today whereas it was one of major proportions in the early days of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

(2) General appearance and discipline has vastly improved. Over the past year I have witnessed formations that would please any U. S. Marine Corps drill instructor. Today, most Vietnamese Marines are in the same uniform; they salute; and the real indicator of improved discipline is their performance in combat. This performance could only be attained with disciplined troops.

Common
Schools

(3) There exists now a common platform of professional military education among Vietnamese Marine officers which did not exist fourteen years ago. Today, most Vietnamese Marine field grade officers and many company grade have received formal schooling at our Basic School. Several field grade officers have attended the Amphibious Warfare School. The foregoing also provides Vietnamese Marine officers and United States Marine advisors with a background for common understanding. This common professional education is further strengthened by a greater linguistic capability on the part of both. Now, many Vietnamese Marine officers speak English quite fluently and, through pre-tour schooling, most of our advisors speak some Vietnamese.

(4) Status of the noncommissioned officer although still a matter for concern, is improving. Over the past year, for the first time in its history, two separate noncommissioned officer messes were opened.

the
Duc

(5) Training facilities are markedly improved. In its early stages, the Vietnamese Marine Corps had no suitable facilities for conducting training. In the spring of 1968, the Marine Corps Training Command was activated at THU DUC. This Command is still expanding but, already, it is producing heartening results. It should be the answer to many of the problems discussed in the enclosures of this report.

MC
instructor

(a) The recruit training program produces a fine young basic Marine who is trained by instructors indoctrinated at U. S. Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego.

Mortar
classes

(b) A mortar training course was commenced in the summer of 1968. Although there are still many

problem areas in the use of crew-served weapons, performance of 60mm Mortar units has improved steadily and noticeably.

(c) As stated previously, the status of the Vietnamese Marine noncommissioned officer has been a matter of some concern. The opening of the two NCO messes was a positive step in the right direction. Even more important was the establishment of a NCO Course at the Training Command. Emphasizing the importance of the course, the first class of students was addressed by the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps. Appreciable results, however, cannot be expected in the immediate future. Progress will be gradual and based on increased education of the noncommissioned officer. Commensurate with the greater professional knowledge of the noncommissioned officer, hopefully, encouraged by his officers, will be a corresponding awareness of the role and usefulness of the former.

(d) A series of ranges have been constructed within the training command. With the completion of a modern rifle range (estimated by 1 May 1969), the Vietnamese Marine range complex will be unsurpassed within the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(6) Expansion of the Vietnamese Marine Corps from one ill supported infantry battalion in 1955 to the present modestly supported light division of six infantry battalions (approved 1 October 1968) is, in itself, a great improvement. An additional artillery battalion was authorized on 23 December 1968 thereby providing a greater combat support capability. The Vietnamese Marine Corps, however, has not yet achieved that balanced force structure of nine infantry battalions which, together with the Vietnamese Navy, would best enable it to perform its assigned missions.

4. Experiences and new Tactics.

a. All tactical discussions in this report are contained in enclosure (3).

b. Marine Advisory Unit. The initial strength of this unit was authorized at thirty three to include one U. S. Navy Medical Service Corps officer and his Chief Hospitalman assistant. This was entirely unsatisfactory and provided absolutely no flexibility. As an example,

LAAWS
M-79
Reference

during the fall of 1968, casualties and illness among advisors were so numerous that the entire Unit staff, less the Senior Marine Advisor, was committed to the field. One more requirement for field replacements would have snapped the rubber band. Since then, the Senior Marine Advisor has requested and had approved a new strength of forty-three. However, even this is presently and will continue to be insufficient for the following reasons: a new artillery battalion was authorized on 23 December 1968 and there is now a much greater requirement for liaison officers. This latter requirement is brought about by the changing deployment status of Vietnamese Marine infantry battalions. Battalions have been deploying as independent units remote from Saigon or other VNMC tactical headquarters and placed under operational control of United States or Vietnamese Army units necessitating a greater requirement for liaison officers. The present manner of filling this requirement is to draw upon staff advisors, an unsatisfactory arrangement since it breaks the continuity of the advisory effort at the Headquarters Marine Corps (Marine Division) level. As an example the Communications Advisor has been deployed as an infantry battalion advisor for most of his tour. The same applies to the Motor Transport Advisor. For a period of three months, the requirement for infantry advisors was so acute that the Operations Advisor was also deployed.

c. Advisor-Counterpart Relation. I have not observed a healthier relationship between the advisor and his counterpart as that existing today. This relationship appears to be based on complete professional and moral integrity in their association. This doesn't imply that differences do not exist - they do. However, no serious cleavages have developed in the past ten months. I suspect one of the reasons is that most of the new advisors are those with previous combat experience in the Republic of Vietnam. Although this is not necessary to being a good advisor, it does, in some cases, eliminate an initial reluctance on the part of a Vietnamese Marine Commander to accept an untested advisor. Perhaps, an even greater contributing factor in this bettering relationship is the understanding attitude of the Senior Marine Advisor who accepts the adage that "there are two sides to a coin". Continued reciprocal honesty is the answer to this thing called "rapport".

get tired. The U. S. Marine field advisor has been meticulously screened prior to assignment to duty with the Vietnamese Marine Corps. He is most competent professionally and my observations are that he is a professional perfectionist frustrated at times by an American advisory chain falling short of his standards of dedication and performance. The advisor assigned to a staff position, although not contending with the constant physical demands imposed by field duty, nonetheless has his share of frustrations. No staff advisor during my experience was able to commence a project and see it to a finish. It has been the experience of all to find themselves preemptorily ordered to the field, sometimes with as little warning as a few minutes. None complain, but it has not been a life conducive to continuity of effort. Under present conditions, a tour in excess of one year would be a mistake.

d. In no case can it be said that problems falling under "Areas Needing Improvement" are isolated to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. There is reason to believe they are common to all other branches of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. For that matter, they are areas with which any United States commander has been confronted at one point in time or another within his own experience with American units.



J. T. BRECKINRIDGE

c. Length of Tour for Advisors. One year; no longer! Several advisors, in both discussion and in their After Tour Reports have indicated that eighteen months was a more satisfactory tour. Ideally, this might be true. In recommending a longer tour, one advisor described a four stage evolution in his existence in Vietnam: (1) The acceptance phase, wherein as a newcomer to war, the advisor is in relative awe of the Vietnamese Marine and his commander; the latter having progressed from platoon to battalion commander in combat; (2) the awakening phase where the advisor becomes aware of the problems and errors committed and is simultaneously gaining confidence that the counterpart could learn from the advisor; (3) the discouragement phase where advice tendered is ignored or rejected out of hand; and (4) the more satisfactory final phase when the advisor finally sees some of his advice accepted and executed. I note that the advisor who penned the foregoing did not extend, nor did the several others who commented in a similar manner. My own personal observations of departing advisors is that, psychologically, they have spent themselves and one additional week would be too much. The life of the U. S. Marine infantry battalion advisor is the most difficult existence of any advisors assigned in Vietnam. This is true to a lesser degree in the case of the brigade and artillery advisors. Vietnamese Marine tactical units, along with those of the Vietnamese Airborne Division, comprise the National General Reserve Forces for the Republic of Vietnam. Therefore, they deploy as directed by the Joint General Staff of that country. In 1968 Vietnamese Marine units were committed to all four Corps Tactical Zones and it was not unusual for a battalion to be away from its base camp eight or ten months. The advisors accompany the battalions and, thus, it was not (and is not now) unusual for a Marine advisor to report aboard; undergo in-processing of two or three days; and join a deployed unit not to return to the Advisory Unit for months at a time. Therefore, his existence is nomadic and he leads a life of loneliness unlike his U. S. Army and Navy counterparts who are also assigned to tactical units but of a relatively static nature. The U. S. Marine field advisor eats Vietnamese food (three meals a day, and sometimes learns to enjoy) and sleeps with his unit (in a hammock or on the ground). He is not able to return to a luxuriously furnished "team house" as do the others. His relations with the Vietnamese Marines are generally good but, can, naturally, become frustrating. Both are human and both

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

CHRONOLOGY

<u>Period</u>	<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Operation/Location</u>
30Apr68	Reported	MAU/Saigon
1May-3May68	In-processing	MAU/Saigon
5May68	ASMA	Staff visit, 6thInfBn, GIA DINH; Opn TOAN THANG
7May68	ASMA	Staff visit, VNMC TrngComd, TUC DUC
10May68	ASMA	Staff visit, 1st, 5th, 6th InfBns; GIA DINH, Opn TOAN THANG
14May68	ASMA	Staff visit, 5thInfBn & VR Brigade "A" AO, GIA DINH
26May-29May68	ASMA	Liaison to Brigade "B", 3d & 4th InfBns, NINH THUY, IV CTZ
30May-31May68	ASMA	Staff visit, 2ndInfBn, CHO LON; & 1stInfBn, GIA DINH
6Jun-12Jul68	Acting SMA	MAU/Saigon
6Jun68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, CMD, SAIGON
7Jun68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "A", GIA DINH
9Jun68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, 2ndInfBn, CHO LON
11Jun68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, 5thInfBn, GIA DINH
15Jun68	Acting SMA	LtGen BUSE, USMC calls on LtGen KHANG, VNMC
18Jun68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "A", GIA DINH
21Jun68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, 6thInfBn, GIA DINH
26Jun68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, VNMC TrngComd, THU DUC
8Jul68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, 6thInfBn, GIA DINH
9Jul68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, 5thInfBn, GIA DINH

Enclosure (1)

<u>Period</u>	<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Operation/Location</u>
5Aug68	ASMA	Gen L.F. CHAPMAN, CMC visited MAU and called on LtGen KHANG, VNMC
12Aug-15Aug68	ASMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "A", KAI TAK, IV CTZ
16Aug68	ASMA	Liaison visit to SA 21stInfDiv, ARVN, BAC LIEU & C/S 9th US InfDiv DONG TAM
17Aug68	ASMA	Liaison visit, CTF 117 & CG 2d Brig, 9th US InfDiv, USS BENEWAH
18Aug68	ASMA	Liaison visit, Base Camp 4thInfBn, VUNG TAO
30Aug68	ASMA	Liaison visit, VNMC TrngComd, THU DUC
31Aug68	ASMA	Attended activation ceremony, Btry "D", VNMC ArtyBn, THU DUC; Liaison visit, VNMC TrngComd, THU DUC; attended change of command, 1stInfBn, VNMC
5Sep68	ASMA	Attended opening of VNMC NCO Scol, VNMC TrngComd, THU DUC
15Sep68	ASMA	Liaison visit, 4thInfBn, TAY NINH, III CTZ
17Sep-18Sep68	ASMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "B", vic TAY NINH, III CTZ
20Sep-11Oct68	Member, Board of Inquiry	CAM RANH BAY
10Oct68		VNMC Brigade redesignated as a Marine Division
13Oct68	ASMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "B", IV CTZ
14Oct-6Nov68	ASMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "B", US MRF (CTF 117 & CG 9th US InfDiv), DONG TAM; Liaison visit to 4th InfBn, CAN THO/RACH GIA opn SEA-LORDS

Enclosure (1)

<u>Period</u>	<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Operation/Location</u>
6Nov-6Dec68	Acting SMA	MAU/Saigon
10Nov68	Acting SMA	USMC Birthday Ceremony at HQ VNMC; LtGen KHANG was presented Silver Star Medal by Gen. ABRAMS, COMUSMACV
13Nov68	Acting SMA	Escorted LtGen KHANG to DONG TAM f/awards ceremony f/VN Marines by CG, 9th U.S. InfDiv
14Nov68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, HQ IV CTZ in connection planning f/Dry Season Campaign
17Nov68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "A", vic TAY NINH
18Nov68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, 5thInfBn, NW TAY NINH
21Nov68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "B" & 4thInfBn, RACH SOI, IV CTZ
22Nov68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, VNMC TrngComd, THU DUC
26Nov68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, SA 18thInfDiv, ARVN, III CTZ
28Nov68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, 7thInfDiv, ARVN, MY THO; & HQ 9th U.S. InfDiv, DONG TAM, IV CTZ
30Nov68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, 3dInfBn, MY THO; & HQ IV CTZ, CAN THO
1Dec68	Acting SMA	Liaison visit, 5thInfBn, NW TAY NINH, & Brigade "A" & 1st InfBn, SE TAY NINH, III CTZ
7Dec68	ASMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "A", SE TAY NINH, III CTZ
10Dec-12Dec68	ASMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "B", & 4thInfBn vic VI THANH, IV CTZ

Enclosure (1)

<u>Period</u>	<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Operation/Location</u>
13Dec-15Dec68	ASMA	Liaison visit, 5thInfBn, TAY NINH, III CTZ
19Dec68	ASMA	Liaison visit, 4thInfBn, VUNG TAO, III CTZ
24Dec68	ASMA	Liaison visit, 3dInfBn, CAN THO, IV CTZ
14Jan69	ASMA	Liaison visit to Base Camp 4thInfBn, VUNG TAO, III CTZ
20Jan-23Jan69	ASMA	Liaison visit, 2ndInfBn, 4thInfBn & Brigade "B", CAN THO, VI THANH & embarked TG 117.2 on LONG XUYEN-RACH GIA Canal, IV CTZ
25Jan69	ASMA	Liaison visit, 5thInfBn Base Camp, THU DUC
1Feb-5Feb69	ASMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "B", CAN THO, IV CTZ
16Feb69	ASMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "B" & HQ IV CTZ, CAN THO
18Feb69	ASMA son	Liaison visit, 3dInfBn, LOC NINH, III CTZ
21Feb69	ASMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "A" & 1stInfBn, III CTZ
24Feb-1Mar69	ASMA	On leave in Hong Kong
6Mar69	ASMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "B", CAN THO, IV CTZ
7Mar69	ASMA	Liaison visit, 2ndInfBn, vic BINH HUA, III CTZ
12Mar69	ASMA	Liaison visit, 3dInfBn, TAY NINH, III CTZ
14Mar69	ASMA	Liaison visit, HQ IV CTZ, CAN THO

Enclosure (1)

<u>Period</u>	<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Operation/Location</u>
20Mar69	ASMA	Liaison visit, 5thInfBn, CMD
23Mar-30Mar69	ASMA	Liaison visit, Brigade "B", 4thInfBn, & 6thInfBn, IV CTZ
4Apr-11Apr69	ASMA	On R&R, Sydney, Australia
24Apr69	ASMA	LtCol PARSONS - new ASMA Reports
2May69	ASMA	Detached

COMMAND AND STAFF ACTION

COMMAND & STAFF ACTION

1. This enclosure contains those areas concerning command and staff action within the Vietnamese Marine Corps both needing improvement (Tab A) and having shown improvement (Tab B). Tab (C) contains related recommendations.

2. General concepts. In the opinion of the U. S. Marine Advisory Unit, the greatest single weakness within the Vietnamese Marine Corps is the command and staff functioning within that Corps. It is also the opinion of the advisors that many Vietnamese Marine Officers, particularly those of field grade, have the professional education and background to understand and operate a staff as practiced by United States forces. This is not to say that the "American way" is the only way; certainly it is not. However, it represents a proven system which, if followed, lends itself to a smoothly functioning organization. It is recognized that many discrepancies noted in Tab A are a result of a lack of depth in the Vietnamese Marine officer corps, and to some extent are perhaps unavoidable. It is also felt that long standing cultural concepts may be responsible for other "failures" of the system. As noted by one recently detached advisor, however, there must be some bending of traditional cultural concepts if a modern military establishment is to be organized and maintained. On 13 November 1968 translated extracts of FMFM 3-1 "Command and Staff Action" were transmitted to VNMC Headquarters. The following are additional considerations from the aforementioned Fleet Marine Force Manual and should be considered when reviewing Tab A.

a. The relationship of a commander to his staff is one of a rather delicate balance. It is axiomatic within any military service that "the commander alone is responsible for everything that his unit does or fails to do". The commander must be given commensurate authority to exercise command. The commander, however, "cannot delegate his responsibility, or any part of it. The commander may delegate portions of his authority". However, it is customary and mandatory that a commander delegate authority to his staff in order that the members thereof may best assist him in exercising command in an

Enclosure (2)

effective and timely manner.

b. Staff officers assist their commanders by:

(1) Advising other staff officers and individuals subordinate to their commander of the commander's plans and policies.

(2) Interpreting (explaining) those plans and policies.

(3) Assisting subordinates in carrying out plans and policies.

(4) Determining the extent to which the plans and policies of the commander are being executed by the subordinates and advising the commander thereof.

(5) The commander and his staff should be considered as a single entity. However, no staff officer has any authority, in his capacity as a staff officer, over any subordinate unit of the command.

(6) The executive officer directs, coordinates, and supervises the activities of the executive and special staffs.

c. TAB A - Areas Needing Improvement.

(1) Delegation of Authority

(2) Depth of Command

(3) Rotation between Command and Staff

(4) Reporting of Problem Areas.

(5) Staff Liaison, Staff Visits, Inspections

(6) Use of Advisors.

d. TAB B - Areas That Have Improved.

(1) General

(2) Second Battalion

(3) Task Force (Brigade)

(4) Headquarters Marine Corps

2. Depth of command.

a. Situation. Officers are retained in command positions for excessively protracted periods of time.

b. Comments.

(1) Major H. T. WARD, USMC, recently of the Third Infantry Battalion, VNMC and Task Force BRAVO (reference (p)), pointed out that one of the most glaring discrepancies during his tour was the weak chain of command in the organization of battalion and task force (brigade). During his ten months with the Third Battalion, the Battalion Commander failed to take leave because Brigade (now Division) Headquarters would not authorize the Battalion Executive Officer to assume command. Major WARD's opinion is that this resulted in a reduction in the Battalion Commander's morale and efficiency.

(2) As it presently stands, few, if any, battalions could overcome the loss of a battalion commander in the heat of combat. Some Battalion Executive Officers do not seem to have concrete duties. They are not properly trained for command; are rarely allowed the confidence building opportunity of assuming command in the absence of the Commanding Officer.

(3) Major WARD stated that, as of his report (17 October 1968), the Second Infantry Battalion, VNMC, was without an officially designated executive officer even though the regular executive officer was away, attending a three month school.

(4) Citing the consequences of such a system, Major WARD was helilifted into a "hot contact" area the evening of 16 September 1968 to replace a wounded advisor. The VNMC unit, two companies from the Second Battalion, would normally have been commanded by the Battalion Executive Officer. Upon arriving in the area, then surrounded by a regiment of NVA, Major WARD quickly learned that there was no executive officer and the senior company commander would not assume command. Obviously this is an unsatisfactory situation. Major WARD describes the situation within Task Force BRAVO, at

TAB A
Enclosure (2)

AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT1. Delegation of Authority.

a. Situation. Commanders fail to delegate sufficient authority to their staff officers to enable them to accomplish their duties.

b. Comments.

(1) In reference (c), Captain BONSPER related that Vietnamese Marine commanders are "one-man shows". He appears afraid that if he delegates authority, he diminishes his power and, thus, would lose face. One man, no matter how efficient, cannot possibly provide all the services that can be accomplished by a well organized, functioning staff.

(2) Major MC KINSTY, in reference (k) commented that in his experience, commanders, with few exceptions, allow little opportunity for their subordinates or staff officers to exercise initiative. The major states that only rarely has he observed the assignment of a mission, the assignment of the means to accomplish the mission, and the delegation of authority to determine how the mission is to be accomplished.

(3) In reference (j), Major BUDD implied that the commander exercises an inflexible and unsophisticated concept of centralized authority. This concept dictates that official business is transacted on a direct "commander-to-commander" basis. This policy is altered only when special permission is obtained to deal with a specific problem.

(4) The former Supply Advisor, Captain MC CARTHY (reference (n)) observed that some staff officers are reluctant to make decisions within their areas of responsibility due to lack of authority delegated to them by their commanders. Staff initiative is suppressed because all decisions making is reserved for the commander, even such decisions as to rotation of advisor drivers and distribution of office (administrative) supplies. Captain MC CARTHY feels, properly, that the staff system will not function smoothly and efficiently unless a commander delegated authority to his subordinates.

TAB A
Enclosure (2)

2-A-1

officers, if they did anything, did it off their clipboards from their foxholes or hootches. With the arrival of a new Task Force Chief of Staff, fresh from Amphibious Warfare School, some order ensued, and individual staff sections functioned more effectively in a Tactical Operations Center. In spite of the foregoing, Major BUDD related that significant problems remained. There was a reluctance by Brigade Staff officers to coordinate with battalion staff counterparts. The rationale appeared to be that such coordination was an interference with the unit of a subordinate commander.

4. Reporting of problem areas to higher headquarters.

a. Situation. Some reluctance exists in reporting the existence of problems to higher authority.

b. Comments.

(1) In reference (j) Major BUDD indicated that a subordinate staff officer will hesitate or refuse to report problems and needs to a senior headquarters. The rationale of the subordinate appears to be that "they should know". This lack of communication between staff officers and commanders (or junior to senior) is detrimental to operations. Often, when pressed for an answer by an advisor, a staff officer will reply, "I don't know, its up to the commander". Thus, the commander makes the decision and the officers are conditioned to do only what they are told to do.

(2) Lieutenant Commander HINES, in reference (m), also noticed a lack of communications and stated that "officers often seem unable or unwilling to communicate up to someone above or to someone below--".

(3) Captain MC CARTHY (reference (n)) continued with the observation that staff officers consider problem areas within their purview as "their own", to be solved by themselves alone. Consequently, the "unsolvable" are usually brought to the battalion advisor for action, or the problem itself is put aside with the hope that it will be forgotten or, somehow, magically resolved (an illness not uncommon to the U. S. as well). An example is the battalion depot, e. g. ammunition, smoke grenades, barrier materials. In such cases, the

TAB A
Enclosure (2)

2-A-4

the time, as being no better - there being no one under the Task Force (Brigade) Commander either capable of or trained to assume command in the event of his loss.

(5) As a result of this lack of depth, battalion and higher commanders remain unrelieved for periods of two or more years (CO, Second Battalion).

3. Rotation between command and staff assignments.

a. Situation. There is little or no rotation of officers between command and staff duties. This results in a breach between these two groups of officers.

b. Comments.

(1) One advisor, Major E. H. BOYCE, USMC, (Reference (f)) felt that there are two distinct types of officers within the Armed Forces: the staff officer and the field (combat) officer. Once an officer is assigned to a battalion, he remains there until death, wounds, or other causes forces him to another billet. The same applies to the officer assigned to a staff. The result is a failure of the battalion line officer to appreciate the problems of the staff and a complete lack of familiarity of the line officer's problems on the part of the staff officer.

(2) Compounding the lack of understanding between the line and staff officer, it appears that staff visits are a rarity. Major BOYCE continued to relate that in his 12 months as an advisor, he did not see one member of a higher or supporting staff even though problem areas existed within the purview of the various staff officers of those headquarters. The results were a continuation of those problems, petty jealousies, and mutual lack of understanding.

(3) In reference (j), Major T. C. BUDD supported Major BOYCE's feelings that the distinction between staff and line officers is detrimental to the overall efficiency of the service. Referring specifically to Brigade (Task Force) ALFA, Major BUDD commented that during his first two months with that unit, there was no visible evidence of staff functioning. The Brigade Commander ran his brigade from his map sheet and, staff

TAB A
Enclosure (2)

2-A-3

expect explicit obedience from his juniors, the tendency exists to issue an order and then forget about it. In the rare instances in which an order of a general nature is issued, the practice of failing to supervise, or show interest in its execution, is carried over out of habit. The result is that seniors seldom know, until a situation becomes intolerable how their juniors are progressing.

6. Use of advisors in planning.

a. Situation. Battalion commanders do not request their advisors to participate in operational planning.

b. Comment. In reference (h), Major P. E. GARDNER, USMC, noted that battalion commanders planned all operations without allowing the advisors to participate in such planning. This omission fails to make full use of the advisors capabilities and the U. S. resources he controls. Further, it complicates the problems of offering advice since acceptance of same would mean that a commander might have to alter a decision he made during the planning phase. This same comment has been made by several other advisors.

TAB A
Enclosure (2)

2-A-6

AREAS THAT HAVE IMPROVED

1. General. In the field of command and staff action within the progress appears to be on an individual unit level rather than in terms of the Marine Corps as a whole. In those areas where progress has been observed, such has been based, primarily, on the initiative of a single individual. Improvements last as long as the individual remains in a position of influence. Such improvements as have been observed are noted in the following paragraphs.

2. Second Battalion. During his tour as Battalion Advisor, Captain BONSPER (reference (d)), noted that the assignment of a former company commander to the position of Battalion S-3 greatly improved the functions of that section. Captain BONSPER continued by stating that the aggressiveness and ability of this officer won the confidence of the battalion commander who, in turn allowed him greater latitude. During the period the Second Battalion was deployed with the U. S. Mobile Riverine Force in the Spring of 1968, the nature of the deployment required the S-4 to organize and maintain a battalion rear. The Battalion Commander was compelled to delegate sufficient authority to his S-4 to permit him to function in a manner to support the battalion. The results were described as most gratifying. Captain BONSPER felt that, although small, they were encouraging improvements.

3. Task Force (Brigade ALFA). The use and functioning of the new Task Force (Brigade) Chief of Staff described by Major BUDD in paragraph 3b(3) of Tab A is an excellent example of the effect a trained officer can have on a staff.

4. Headquarters Marine Corps. Although not necessarily documented in After Tour Reports, it is noted that the elements of delegation of authority are carried out within the staff of Headquarters Marine Corps. The most obvious example is the G-3 of the Marine Corps who appears to make staff visits to field activities in the name of the Commandant and Chief of Staff.

TAB B
Enclosure (2)

2-B-1

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the contents of Tabs A and B, the following recommendations concerning command and staff action are made:

1. That a concerted effort be made, through written and oral means, to educate all commanders and other officers to the realization that a modern armed service can function only with an equally modern concept of staff functioning.
2. That the recently translated extracts of FMFM 3-1 "Command and Staff Action" be reproduced and disseminated to all commanders and staff sections.
3. That the guidelines established by FMFM 3-1 as stressed in paragraph 2 of enclosure (2) (Page 2-1) be used to initiate recommendation 1, above.
4. That all commanders and other officers who have completed formal military courses of instruction be encouraged to put into practice the staff principles taught by those schools.
5. That staff officers at the various echelons be encouraged to "communicate" both in writing and through staff visits with their staff equivalents on all matters within their cognizance so as to ease the burden of the commander.
6. That commanders be encouraged to get out and visit subordinate units at every opportunity.
7. That an officer career pattern be established requiring periodic rotation of officers between command and staff duties.
8. That the Vietnamese Marine Corps continue to seek every opportunity to place officers in professional schools both within the Republic of Vietnam and the United States.
9. That commanders and staff officers include advisors in preoperational staff briefings and planning.

TAB C
Enclosure (2)

2-C-1

TACTICAL MANEUVER TACTICAL MANEUVER LINE CORPS UNITS

1. This enclosure contains those areas concerning tactical maneuver of Vietnamese Marine Corps Units both needing improvement (Tab A) and having shown improvement (Tab B). Tab C contains related recommendations.

a. TAB A - Areas Needing Improvement.

- (1) Maneuver of Battalions by Brigade Commanders.
- (2) Tactical Formations.
- (3) Infantry Maneuvers under Supporting Fire.
- (4) Operations at Night.
- (5) Deployment of Vietnamese Marines.
- (6) Tank/Infantry Operations
- (7) Riverine Operations

b. TAB B - Areas That Have Improved.

- (1) Mission Assignment
- (2) Combat Effectiveness
- (3) Better Liaison with United States Units.
- (4) Use of Tactical Control Measures.
- (5) Rotation of Battalions to Base Camp.
- (6) Defensive Operations.
- (7) Operations at Night.

Enclosure (3)

AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT1. Maneuver of Battalions by Brigade Commanders.

a. Situation. Brigade Commanders appear reluctant to maneuver one battalion while the other is in contact. When the remaining battalion is finally maneuvered to aid the one that is in contact, it is usually too late to influence the actions.

b. Comments.

(1) Reference (b) stated that on several occasions the Task Force Commander failed to move an idle battalion, enabling the enemy to break contact and escape at will. Operation PADDINGTON was cited as a specific example wherein the 3d Battalion was in light-to-heavy contact for a six hour period. At the same time, the 2d Battalion, located approximately two kilometers away, was not maneuvered to block the Viet Cong avenue of withdrawal.

(2) In reference (f), the advisor related his experiences in four operations under Task Force "B" and two under Task Force "A" when one battalion had been in heavy contact and the rest of the task force remained idle. Near the City of HUE, the 1st Battalion was in heavy contact for the better part of two days while two other battalions of the task force watched the fighting from a distance of about one kilometer. The 1st Battalion was opposed by an estimated 200 well entrenched enemy, supported by 60mm mortars. Total strength of the task force was approximately 2000, supported by all air and ground means. That only 31 of the enemy were killed in the two days (while suffering 39 Marine casualties), the advisor attributes directly to the Task Force Commander's failure to commit all or part of his watching, idle battalions. He failed to achieve mass and failed to maneuver. Commitment of even one additional company might have been enough to trap and destroy the entire enemy force. There was opportunity, time, and room to maneuver, yet over two thirds of the available force was unused.

TAB A
Enclosure (3)

3-A-1

2. Tactical Formations.

a. Situation. Infantry battalions operate on a dual axis concept regardless of terrain and enemy. Each column contains two infantry companies spaced, normally, not to exceed 1000 meters. (See also, Tab B, paragraph 4).

b. Comments.

(1) Reference (d), the report of Captain D. L. BONSPER, USMC, formerly advisor to 2d Battalion, commented that this situation is probably the result of earlier days of the present conflict. Since support was more a luxury than an asset, a unit was forced to provide its own support. Weapons were old and outdated. Understandably, battalion commanders preferred to group their battalions in compact units in order to consolidate firepower and provide mutual support to a minimum number of units under any situation. This situation, however, has altered. Today, Vietnamese Marines carry the best weapons available. In addition, a deployed battalion is provided combat support from external sources which enable battalions to operate on a broader front and still be supported. Reference (d), provides comments concerning the constant adherence to the dual axis concept. These are as follows:

(a) Restricts use of organic supporting arms.

Since the two columns operate in close proximity to each other, it is difficult to employ organic fire support. As a result, battalions become overly dependent on the "big supporting arms" to include fixed wing aircraft, helicopter gunships, and artillery. Consequently, much time is wasted waiting for these external assets, when a better deployment (tactical formation) would have allowed organic weapons to provide the necessary support.

(b) Combat is forced on a narrow front.

Reference (d) relates that on three notable occasions, the 2d Battalion was engaged and contained by an inferior force due to the dual axis concept. The battalion was forced to fight the enemy on a narrow front and was unable to employ envelopment or flanking maneuvers. The results were unnecessary casualties and a day-long stalemate.

TAB A
Enclosure (3)

3-A-2

(c) Maximum coverage of terrain is not possible

1. While 2d Battalion was operating with the MRF, some shortcomings were brought into focus. The battalion operated in coordination with two U. S. Army battalions, each having a strength of only 300-350 in the field. In comparison, the 2d Battalion had a strength of over 600. The dual column concept employed by the much larger Marine battalion prevented that unit from covering as much terrain as one of the U. S. Army battalions, half the size of the Marines.

2. Terrain in the delta is particularly suited to small unit action. Companies and platoons can be most effective in finding and fixing the enemy. The enemy is restricted to tree lines by day. When a battalion moves along one tree line, and ignores adjoining tree lines, it overlooks obvious areas for a weapons cache or even a troop concentration. A recent tactic has shown the Viet Cong avoiding contact unless fired upon. By failing to deploy into smaller units than a two company column, we are providing the enemy with a certain degree of safety and freedom.

(d) Discourages contact with small Viet Cong elements.

1. In most instances, small Viet Cong elements, aware of the futility of engaging much larger, better equipped VNMC units will avoid contact. Should battalions deploy in smaller elements, it is possible that the lesser enemy forces may be enticed into engaging. The VNMC commander would then bring the remainder of his force to bear. Organic and non-organic fire support is normally available to all elements of the battalion.

(e) Some arguments against deviating from the two column concept are:

1. Lack of qualified Vietnamese Marine Officers. Advisor comments - An invalid assumption. Vietnamese Company and Platoon Commanders, generally, are capable and should be given the opportunity to prove it.

2. Lack of advisors to accompany more than two columns. Advisor comment - An argument having no basis. Vietnamese Marine units, for the most part,

TAB A
Enclosure (3)

3-A-3

are tactically sound. The merit of the advisory effort once contact is made, is in field of coordinating supporting arms. Even then, the advisor requests and adjusts fires as delineated by the Vietnamese Marine officer concerned. Thus, the advisor can effectively support any one with whom his Vietnamese counterpart can communicate. An advisor is not needed with every maneuver element.

(2) At times, commanders adhere to a pre-planned scheme of maneuver so rigidly as to miss opportunities for a kill. On one occasion, after flushing 40 Viet Cong into a group of homes in a rice paddy, the battalion commander, correctly, requested a helicopter light fire team. After the gunship arrived and expended their ordnance, the battalion commander continued on his initial axis, ignoring the enemy.

3. Maneuver Under Supporting Fires.

a. Situation. Tactical commanders sometimes fail to maneuver their assault units so as to take advantage of the protection afforded by supporting fires.

b. Comments.

(1) Major BOYCE, in reference (f), reports that the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion is reluctant to close with the enemy while supporting fires are being delivered. The tendency is to hold assault elements in place in a covered position. When absolutely certain that supporting fires have ceased, the attack is commenced.

(a) When the enemy is well entrenched (as he often is), the fire support has done little more than force him to keep his head down. Waiting for supporting fires to lift prior to advancing, permits the enemy to recover and resume fire prematurely. This results in slowing the attack, causing unnecessary Marine casualties and enables large enemy units to break contact and escape.

(b) Within the 1st Battalion, recently, two helicopter gunships did an excellent job of neutralizing assault. Unfortunately, when the fires were lifted, the assault hadn't really been organized. By the time it commenced, the enemy had withdrawn to another position and finally infiltrated to an unknown area during the night.

TAB A
Enclosure (3)

3-A-4

(2). Captain COFFEL, in reference (b) comments "when supporting fires are employed, infantry battalions are reluctant to advance under cover of fire". He repeats the general comments made by Major BOYCE and states that battalion commanders (not just the 1st Battalion) seem reluctant to move their battalions closer than 500 meters to artillery and 200 meters to gunships. Thus, the protection afforded by these fires is wasted.

4. Operations at Night.

a. Situation. Some units appear reluctant to conduct night operations. (See also paragraph 7 Tab B).

b. Comments.

(1) Captain FRYREAR, formerly of Task Force "B", in his After Tour Report, comments that neither Task Force "A" or "B", nor the 5th Battalion conduct operations at night. His remarks include the following:

(a) Due to the numerous friendly aircraft and observation posts, hostile movement is conducted mainly at night. Further, a tendency exists to allow the Viet Cong virtual uncontested control of large areas during the hours of darkness. That the enemy controls the night is our fault. We could and should deny it to him.

(b) Within Captain FRYREAR's experience, the 5th Battalion has never executed a night operation, not even to the extent of moving an element to a more favorable attack position under cover of darkness. Movements to contact can be made at night with execution of the attack commencing at first light.

(c) Within the 5th Battalion, it is standard for each platoon to provide one outpost when establishing night positions. These normally, are no more than 300 meters away from the perimeter. This is proper since one purpose of an outpost is to provide early warning of an impending attack. Night ambushes, however, are not used. Having nothing forward of the platoon outposts means, in general, that the Viet Cong have absolute

TAB A
Enclosure (3)

3-A-5

freedom of movement forward of the 300 yard line of outposts. To provide depth to the night position and force the enemy to think defensively at night (as we do now), ambushes should be used. These should be placed no closer than 1000 meters to the night positions of the unit and reinforced by on-call supporting fires from within or beyond the night position. Although ideal, it is not fatal, should insufficient radios be available for ambush units. Use of pre-arranged signal by flares is an adequate substitute.

(2) In reference (s), Captain FRISINA related that the Sixth Battalion establishes ambushes after stopping for the night. These positions are described as squad sized listening posts. Captain TAYLOR, in reference (t) also commented that he had not observed night operations in the ten months he had been assigned to an infantry battalion. Each night, the battalions to which he was assigned established what were designated as squad or platoon ambushes. In reality, these were combat outposts. Captain TAYLOR's experience was that, once a platoon ambush site was selected, four or five men would remain on the alert and the remainder of the platoon secure for the night.

(3) It is realized, that certain factors must be considered when engaging in night operations. Mines, being difficult to detect by daylight, are impossible to detect at night. Thus, in heavily mined regions such as that in which Brigade B is presently operating, extensive operations at night might not be feasible.

5. Excessive Deployment of Vietnamese Marine Corps Units.

a. Situation. Vietnamese Marine Corps Battalions, without exception, were deployed on actual combat operations for 94 percent of the time during calendar year 1968.

b. Comments.

(1) Commitments of this nature can have no other effect than to create a general breakdown of morale and combat efficiency of the committed units. It makes no difference how fine a unit was at the beginning, six consecutive months in the line will have adverse effects on the most elite.

TAB A
Enclosure (3)

3-A-6

(a) U. S. Marine Corps advisors report that the reaction of Vietnamese Marine infantry battalions is not as responsive as it should be. Troops patrol all day and are expected to be alert throughout the night. They are beginning to show the wear.

(b) In addition to the individual fatigue factor, battalions are not available for training or retraining. As casualties occur and replacements filter into a unit, it becomes necessary to disengage periodically and reorient the unit.

(2) See paragraph 5, Tab B.

6. Tank - Infantry Operations.

a. Situation. The Vietnamese Marine is inexperienced in tank - infantry tactics.

b. Comment. Captain TAYLOR in reference (t) stated that the Vietnamese Marine does not receive training in tank-infantry tactics. As a consequence his first experience with friendly armor is on the battlefield. The Captain cites an experience which occurred on 15 May 1968 wherein a friendly tank, in support of the 5th Battalion, was lost due to the inexperience of Marines in providing close in protection. The infantry battalion commander and supporting tank commanders, together with their advisors, met and planned and coordinated a tank-infantry assault on a single axis. After the attack commenced, the armored vehicles and infantry became separated with the resultant destruction of one tank by hostile forces. Captain TAYLOR also witnessed the 6th Battalion lose a tank under similar circumstances in GIA DINH on 31 May 1968.

7. Riverine Operations.

a. Situation. All battalions, as of 1 April 1969, have not become experienced in riverine operations.

b. Comment. Four Vietnamese Marine infantry battalions have experience in conducting operations from either the Navy Assault Craft of the MRF or the Vietnamese Amphibious Task Force. In order to improve the Marine Corps position with respect to mission accomplishment,

TAB A
Enclosure (3)

3-H-7

all battalions should become thoroughly proficient in his type of warfare. At present, an additional battalion, the 6th is assigned to the delta, however, due to lack of assets it has not become as experienced as those which have preceded it.

TAB A
Enclosure (3)

3-A-8

AREAS THAT HAVE IMPROVED

1. Mission assignment. Heretofore, Vietnamese Marines, for the most part, have performed missions usually assigned to Army forces. Very little has been done in the form of riverine or amphibious operations. In late 1968 more battalions were rotated to the MEKONG DELTA for operations with the Mobile Riverine Force. It is hoped that the Commandant, Vietnamese Marine Corps will continue to press for more missions of this nature. Ideally, all Marine Battalions should be thoroughly experienced in this sort of warfare. Vietnamese Marines should be known as "the experts" in all matters related to riverine and amphibious warfare.
2. Combat effectiveness. Captain BONSPER, in reference (d), states that the 2d Battalion has proved itself capable of any combat movement. He considers that battalion as outstanding in airmobile assaults and has had a great deal of experience in that area. During February, 1968, 2d Battalion worked with the Vietnamese Navy on waterborne operations. It was initially described as totally unsatisfactory. It again performed in an unsatisfactory manner in April while making a riverine assault with the 21st Infantry Division, ARVN. Following this, the 2d Battalion executed seven operations with the Mobile Riverine Force during a three week period. Its previous experience, although unsatisfactory, reaped enormous dividends. The 2d Battalion now conducts riverine assaults in an outstanding manner with the professional competence expected of Marines.
3. Better Liaison with United States units. Major BOYCE reports that on several occasions within 1st Battalion, when no advisor was present, the battalion made excellent liaison with adjacent U. S. units on its own initiative.
4. Use of Tactical Control measures. Within 1st Battalion, the habit of controlling movement by "objectives" has been replaced by use of phase lines. The use of objectives tended to restrict movement and initiative to straight line marches from objective to objective. When no intelligence exists for an area, the use of phase lines gives company commanders more freedom of movement and more latitude to search. Instead of

TAB B
Enclosure (3)

3-B-1

moving to an objective in a column formation, company commanders are deploying and assigning intermediate objectives to their platoon leaders on a search mission.

5. Rotation of Battalions to Base Camp. As a result of efforts by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, since December 1968, Marine infantry battalions have been rotated to their base camps for significant periods of rest. Unfortunately, while in base camps, the unit remains on a 1 to 12 hour alert. It is still an improvement over the situation described in paragraph 5, Tab A when, in 1968, battalions remained deployed for six or more months before returning to their bases.

6. Defensive operations. My observations are that, within my tour, Vietnamese Marine infantry battalions perform in a thoroughly excellent manner when engaged in defensive operations. Examples within my cognizance are of Brigade "A" and 2d Infantry Battalion, during the protection of GIA DINH/CHOLON in the spring/summer of 1968. The defensive battles fought by the 1st Infantry Battalion on 20 September 1968 and the 5th Infantry Battalion on 26-27 February 1969 were superb.

7. Operations at Night. The defensive engagements of the 1st and 5th Battalions described in paragraph 6, above were fought at night and the results were a great credit to the units and commanders. Also most noteworthy was the night attack conducted by 1st Infantry Battalion on 3 February 1969. Both Vietnamese and United States units are sometimes criticized for failure to conduct night operations. The very successful action of the 1st Infantry Battalion, VNMC demonstrated the capabilities of Vietnamese Marines to perform in the night environment.

TAB B
Enclosure (3)

3-B-2

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the contents of Tabs A and B, the following recommendations concerning tactical maneuver of Vietnamese Marine Corps units are made:

1. That brigade commanders be encouraged to maneuver battalions so as to achieve mass rather than allow major elements to remain unengaged during contact.
2. That field commanders be encouraged to vary tactical formations according to the existing situation and terrain.
3. That all commanders invite their U. S. advisor to participate in, or at least be present during operational planning.
4. That commanders be encouraged to have assault units take advantage of the protection afforded by supporting fires. Lift fires only as assault troops are closing their objectives.
5. That, in coordination with the Operations and Training Advisors, Marine Advisory Unit, a supporting arms demonstration be planned and prepared for the purpose of demonstrating the capabilities and limitations of these arms. Execution of this demonstration be at such time as facilities and assets become available.
6. That training in night operations be incorporated at the Marine Corps Training Command. This is on the recruiting syllabus but is not done.
7. That the syllabus of 2 July 1968 proposed by Captain H. J. SHANE, USMC, be adopted in all respects with regard to night training.
8. That, within deployed infantry battalions, officers and troops be given special, unit-level training in night movement and tactics.
9. That at such time as Marine infantry battalions attend refresher training at the National Training Center, night operations and tank/infantry operations be stressed in the curriculum.

TAB C
Enclosure (3)

3-C-1

10. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps continue his efforts, with the Joint General Staff, to systematically rotate infantry battalions through the National Training Center VAN KIEP for retraining.

11. That whenever within the authority of a Vietnamese Marine Commander, and the situation permits, the practice of using phase lines rather than assigning numerous objectives be continued.

TAB C
Enclosure (3)

3-C-2

USE OF SUPPORTING ARMS

1. This enclosure contains those areas, concerning use of supporting arms, both needing improvement (Tab A) and having shown improvement (Tab B). Tab C contains related recommendations.

a. TAB A - Areas Needing Improvement.

- (1) Exploitation of Covering Fires.
- (2) Coordination of Requests for Assets.
- (3) Selectivity in Choice of Supporting Arms.
- (4) Use of Organic Mortars.

b. TAB B - Areas that have Improved.

- (1) General
- (2) Improved Use of Mortars.

SUPPORTING ARMS

Enclosure (4)

b. Comments.

(1) First Lieutenant MACFARLANE, in reference (e), felt that there was excessive reliance on helicopter gunships in preference to other supporting means. He stated that, inevitably, the first cry of the battalion commander when establishing enemy contact was for gunships. Very seldom, in his experience, was there an assessment of the target or tactical situation before calling for gunships.

(2) Major BOYCE, in reference (f), related that the First Battalion requested helicopter gunships for targets which should have been attacked by artillery. He stated that, nearly always, when a contact was made or the Viet Cong were sighted, the Battalion Commander asked for gunships. This request was made regardless of whether it was an area or point target, in the open or dug in. Major BOYCE stated that he has even been asked to get gunships to fire what were essentially H & I fires. He was unable to determine the reasons for an apparent reluctance to shoot artillery although he suspected it was a result of some previous bad experiences with inaccurate artillery fires.

(3) In reference (i), Major CARLSON made the statement that there is a general tendency not to employ supporting arms properly. He specifically referred to organic supporting means and commented that many battalions, including the Fifth, either do not use or fail to properly employ organic weapons. 60mm mortars, although carried, were never employed offensively. The 81mm mortars were seldom carried on offensive operations. When they were carried, they were used for illumination. In contrast, Major CARLSON felt it ironic that while we failed to use these weapons, the Viet Cong employ them quite successfully against us. Perhaps the primary reason for not utilizing these weapons is that Battalion Commanders know there is usually other support available. As a result, fire support is requested and expected in reverse order. Air, gunships, and artillery are requested, not to supplement organic fires, but as the only fire support means. Although it is recognized that conventional employment of supporting arms is not always applicable here, the fact that some units do not use organic weapons at all offensively is a serious weakness. The biggest

TAB A
Enclosure (4)

4-A-2

AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT

1. Exploitation of Covering Fires. See paragraph 3, Tab A to enclosure (3).

2. Coordinating Requests for Assets.

a. Situation. There has been a tendency to make unilateral, uncoordinated requests for supporting arms assets without prior consultation with advisors.

b. Comments.

(1) In reference (d) Captain BONSPER related that on one occasion, the Second Battalion requested a U. S. flareship to provide illumination. The request was not made known to the battalion advisor and was made solely through Vietnamese channels. Because of the urgency of this request, it was approved at a high level. When the flareship checked in on the Leatherneck net, the advisors were completely surprised. After a few moments conversation, the advisors released the flareship as unnecessary since, shortly thereafter, a Vietnamese flareship arrived on station.

(a) His experiences concerning use of fixed wing aircraft also indicate a lack of coordination. In this connection, Captain BONSPER stated that many times, at the urging of the Commanding Officer, he had requested and received U. S. Air Force fixed wing support only to find, to his surprise, A-1s from the Vietnamese Air Force arriving to attack the same target. Both strikes were not needed and there was a waste of assets.

(2) Captain BONSPER felt that the advisor presented the most obvious and facile means for a Vietnamese commander to obtain assets so this avenue was exploited first. However, simultaneously, equivalent Vietnamese assets were requested without informing the advisor.

3. Selectivity in Choice of Supporting Arms.

a. Situation. Sometimes there does not seem to be selectivity exercised in requesting the proper weapon for a given target.

TAB A
Enclosure (4)

4-A-1

(b) There are no forward observers in the mortar platoons. Hence, either the platoons or company commanders must request and direct the fires. This hampers the efficiency of these unit leaders who should be directing the actions of their troops.

(c) Small unit leaders are not proficient in calling for and adjusting indirect fires.

In summary, unit commanders won't ask for mortar fires because they don't know how and could not adjust the fires if they did get them. (See also para 2, enclosure (2)).

(3) Major BOYCE, in reference (f), stated that the First Battalion failed to use its organic 81mm mortars in any but a token manner.

(a) During his tour with that battalion, Major BOYCE observed that the battalion had fired its 81mm mortars only on two occasions; once in II Corps to expend excess HE rounds that could not be taken on board aircraft; once in IV Corps to test a new WP round.

(b) Other than the above, in spite of many opportunities, mortars were not fired. When firing is contemplated, the H & S Company Commander stands behind the tube with a map, compass, and firing table in hand. All firing is adjusted on the gun-target line by the H & S Company Commander. Mortars were never laid using procedures described in applicable field manuals.

(c) Further, according to Major BOYCE, the Vietnamese stated they must leave at least two 81mm mortars from the Battalion Mortar Platoon behind for base camp protection. In addition there are insufficient personnel to carry more than one tube and its ammunition on operations.

TAB A
Enclosure (4)

4-A-4

weakness in Vietnamese fire support concepts is the obsession with gunships (para 3b.1, above) as the panacea for all combat actions - troops in open, bunkers, fortifications, etc. Various reasons are given, but none valid. Artillery is often feared and not utilized close in. Targets that only 8" artillery can penetrate are assigned to gunships. This stems from a fear of artillery plus an overconfidence in the capabilities of the helicopter gunships. Another weakness of Vietnamese employment of fire support is the reluctance to move infantry forward under cover of the supporting fires. (See enclosure (3), Tactical Maneuvers of Vietnamese Infantry Units).

4. Use of Organic Mortars.

a. Situation. Some infantry commanders are hesitant to use 60mm and 81mm mortars organic to their units.

b. Comments.

(1) In reference (e), First Lieutenant MACFARLANE felt that infantry battalions were reluctant to use mortars. He stated that on numerous occasions, where mortars would have been the most appropriate supporting arm with the quickest reaction time, other means were employed. The most prevalent excuse for failure to use the mortars was "we must save ammunition in case of a Viet Cong attack".

(2) Speaking of the Fifth Battalion, Captain FRYREAR in reference (c), said that rarely were organic mortars employed in support of an assault. When queried, the Battalion Executive Officer stated that since the mortar squads can carry only a limited quantity of ammunition, he desired to save all of what could be carried to repel an enemy attack, particularly against night mass attack. The problem of not being able to carry sufficient ammunition is inherent in every mortar squad. Captain FRYREAR feels that reluctance to employ mortars, except in emergencies and for night defense, stems from three other facts:

(a) Mortar squads are not proficient in the use of their weapons. Consequently, officers are reluctant to request their fires for fear of a misplaced round. Conversely, Captain FRYREAR felt that the mortar squads were not proficient because they were never used. They do not practice or have gun drills.

TAB A
Enclosure (4)

4-A-3

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the contents of Tabs A and B, the following recommendations, concerning use of supporting arms are made:

1. That VNMC Commanders inform USMC Advisors of all requests for supporting fires regardless of source.
2. That, when available, Vietnamese supporting assets be requested in lieu of U. S. assets.
3. That advisors stress the capabilities and limitations of helicopter gunships to counterparts and emphasize the need for greater selectivity of supporting arms means.
4. That Infantry battalion commanders be encouraged to use organic mortars in an offensive role and that, whenever helicopters are available, ammunition resupply by this means be planned and employed.
5. That observer training be included and stressed in the syllabus of the NCO School and Officer's Refresher Course, Marine Corps Training Command, THU DUC.
6. That at every available opportunity, during stand downs and at base camp, 60mm mortar sections and 81mm mortar platoons be exercised in all aspects of their weapons.
7. That two additional 81mm mortars be assigned to each Infantry battalion to provide for both adequate base camp protection and adequate 81mm mortar support on field operations.
8. That sufficient base camp personnel be trained in the use of the 81mm mortar so as not to draw from those authorized to the Infantry Battalion 81mm Mortar Platoon.

TAB C
Enclosure (4)

4-C-1

EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY

1. This enclosure contains those areas concerning the employment of artillery within the Vietnamese Marine Corps both needing improvement (Tab A) and having shown improvement (Tab B). Tab C contains related recommendations.

a. TAB A - Areas Needing Improvement.

(1) Reconnaissance, Selection and Occupation of Positions.

(2) Survey of Battery Positions

(3) Artillery Reaction Time.

(4) Battery Organization.

(5) Forward Observers.

(6) Firing Planning

(7) Aerial Observers.

b. TAB B - Areas That Have Improved.

(1) Gunnery.

(2) Fire Support Coordination.

(3) Battery Positions.

(4) Schooling for New Artillerymen.

(5) Air Movement.

ARTILLERY

Enclosure (5)

AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT1. Reconnaissance, Selection and Occupation of Positions.

a. Situation. Battery Commanders are given little or no time to select a good battery position.

b. Comments.

(1) Captain R. "V" COFFEL, USMC, in reference (b) stated that when moving from one position to another battery commanders were rarely given the opportunity to select and to conduct a reconnaissance of their positions.

(2) While there has been much improvement in this area, more must be done. Too often the Brigade Commanders select the battery position without consulting with the battery commander. In some instances, this has resulted in unsatisfactory selection of position areas, wherein the battery had to occupy a position which was too small to adequately accommodate the entire battery.

(3) This discrepancy is most obvious in III Corps Tactical Zone. In the IV Corps Tactical Zone, good battery positions are few and far between and the battery must use what area is available; however, the battery commander should have the opportunity to reconnoiter the proposed battery position and make recommendations as to how many howitzers can adequately be employed within the position.

(4) The positioning of artillery units in combat is governed primarily by the mission, the terrain, the nature of the tactical operation and the fire support requirement. The artillery position area should be one that provides room for dispersion of battery elements. The artillery battery provides the enemy a lucrative target even when properly dispersed. The battery positioned with its howitzers within 10-15 meters of one another and its hundreds of rounds of high explosive ammunition invites disaster if subjected to an enemy mortar or rocket attack.

(5) CWO T. E. MARTIN, USMC, in reference (r) concurred with Captain COFFEL.

TAB A
Enclosure (5)

5-A-1

2. Survey of Battery Positions.

a. Situation. Battery positions are rarely surveyed.

b. Comments.

(1) Captain COFFEL stated that the failure to survey battery positions resulted in inaccurate chart data.

(2) One of the major reasons for lack of position area survey is that the batteries are normally operating at reduced strengths and the survey sections have an insufficient number of personnel to perform their task. In addition, those individuals assigned as survey personnel are insufficiently trained.

(3) The lack of available survey control points required survey parties to use assumed data for a starting point, based on map spotting. While this results in inaccurate chart data, it is in most cases, far more accurate than map spotting the battery center. An exception to this would be when the battery is located near or on prominent terrain features.

(4) Battery Commanders seldom request survey parties or control from ARVN Division Artillery and, in some instances, do not fully utilize that survey data received.

(5) Survey provides the artillery with control that will permit delivery of surprise observed fires, delivery of effective unobserved fires, transfer of target data between units, and facilitates massing of fires. It is the artillery commander's responsibility to ensure that every measure and technique available are utilized to improve the accuracy of artillery fire.

3. Artillery Reaction Time.

a. Situation. There is an excessive time lag for routine missions.

b. Comments.

(1) Artillery reaction time for contact or counter battery missions is extremely rapid. However, there is an excessive time lag for routine missions. This is due to a

TAB A
Enclosure (5)

5-A-2

talion commander's artillery expert, in addition to acting as the infantry battalion's fire support coordinator.

(3) The present battalion headquarter's table or organization should be increased by a liaison team, composed of the following personnel: 1 liaison officer, Captain; 1 liaison NCO, SSgt; 1 voice radio operator, LCpl; 1 driver, PFC.

5. Forward Observers.

a. Situation. Forward observers are not being utilized to their fullest extent.

b. Comments.

(1) Forward observers are presently being employed more as liaison officers while infantry company commanders adjust artillery fires. If the T/O were changed as proposed in paragraph 4 above the discrepancy would be corrected. While many of the forward observers are highly qualified, as a whole they do not adjust artillery often enough to maintain a high degree of proficiency. There is no refresher training available to the forward observer in "adjustment of fires" and "firing planning" at the battalion level.

(2) Both Captain COFFEL and CWO MARTIN commented on this situation.

6. Fire Planning.

a. Situation. The value of proper and detailed fire planning is not fully appreciated by infantry commanders at all command levels.

b. Comments.

(1) All areas of fire planning are neglected to the point that, with the exception of occasional night defensive concentrations and H&I fires, it can be said that there is no fire planning.

(2) A major discrepancy is in the use of preparation fires. There is no requirement to fire preparations on each objective unless there is good, up-to-date intelligence, in which case fire should be delivered immediately before and/or during the assault. Excessive use of prep fires during an operation serves only to inform the enemy of the routes of advance.

TAB A
Enclosure (5)

5-A-4

required lengthy process and the fact that personnel knowing the mission is routine see no reason to hurry.

(2) The present procedure for routine calls for fire is outlined below:

(a) Rifle company commanders pass their call for fire to the infantry battalion commander and request the fire.

(b) The battalion commander approves the request and gives it to the forward observer located with him.

(c) The forward observer sends the request to the battery fire direction center.

(d) The fire direction center then must contact the Brigade Artillery Liaison Officer, who, in turn, must request permission of the Brigade Commander to fire.

(3) Improvement in this area can be accomplished through limited reorganization. See paragraph 4 below.

4. Battery Organization.

a. Situation. Present organization of the VNMC artillery does not appear as effective as it might be.

b. Comments. The main thing here is that there be no changes for the sake of change; however, a few minor personnel changes would improve the time required to process fire missions and provide a more responsive means of fire support.

(1) Each firing battery should have four forward observer teams rather than the present six. Under the new artillery organization, two battalions, it can be expected that one firing battery will be in direct support of one infantry battalion. Four forward observer teams would provide one team per infantry company.

(2) The artillery liaison officer in the firing battery would be assigned to function as liaison with the infantry battalion rather than the brigade as is presently done. This liaison officer would be the infantry bat-

TAB A
Enclosure (5)

5-A-3

(3) Rather than prep fire on an objective, on call or prearranged fires would be ideal. Planning of prearranged fires shorten the time required to deliver fire on any target, does not telegraph route of advance, and facilitates coordination of fire with other arms. Within the Third Battalion, prearranged fire planning was always accomplished during the planning phase of the operation when operating with the Mobile Riverine Force. However while OPCON to Brigade A the battalion's fire plans were disapproved by Brigade. It was the expressed opinion of the brigade commander that fire support plans were unnecessary.

(4) Other types of fires that would be extremely valuable and readily available to commanders, but are not used, are:

- (a) Blocking fires
- (b) Flushing fires
- (c) Deception fires

7. Aerial Observers.

a. Situation. There are no qualified aerial observers within the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

b. Comments.

(1) There are many opportunities to employ Vietnamese aerial observers for preparation of landing zones, adjustment of artillery and general reconnaissance duties. There are numerous ways in which a trained aerial observer, at brigade level, would be able to assist the ground units.

(2) However, the availability of observer aircraft would present a major difficulty. This would necessitate a directive from JGS to the various Corps Commanders to provide observer aircraft to the Marine Brigade.

(3) Both Captain COFFEL and CWO MARTIN stated that during their tours there were numerous opportunities to employ Vietnamese Marine aerial observers had they been available.

TAB A
Enclosure (5)

5-A-5

AREAS THAT HAVE IMPROVED

1. Gunnery. Both Captain COFFEL and CWO MARTIN were highly laudatory of Vietnamese Marine artillery in general and specifically stated that artillery batteries have reached a high degree of proficiency in the mechanics of fire direction and gunnery.

2. Fire Support Coordination. Vietnamese Marine artillerymen have gained valuable knowledge as a result of close association with U. S. units in both III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. They have participated in numerous multi-battery fire missions and TOT's while integrated with U. S. artillery. Landing zone preparation, planned and controlled by Vietnamese Marine and involving close coordination of artillery, gunships and lift ships were successfully accomplished.

3. Battery Positions. Whereas batteries had a tendency to disregard normal procedures for digging in, this has improved considerably. When occupying a position for any length of time, gun positions are dug in and fortified with sandbags and barbed wire (when available). Every member of the battery is now required to dig his own fighting hole and battery defensive positions are also prepared.

4. Schooling for New Artillerymen. Heretofore, newly joined, prospective artillerymen from the Training Command went directly to the artillery batteries without prior artillery training. Now, however, the Commanding Officer, Artillery Battalion has organized a one week, battalion level school prior to further assignment of personnel.

5. Air Movement. Three 105mm Howitzer Batteries have become very proficient in air mobile operations. The battery commander coordinates with his advisor as to the order of movement and accepts related recommendations. The average time for the CH-47 helicopter to be on the ground has decreased from an average of approximately six minutes to four. Now that batteries have received slings and nets this time may be reduced still more.

TAB B
Enclosure (5)

5-B-1

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the contents of enclosures (1) and (2), the following recommendations concerning Vietnamese Marine Corps Artillery are made:

1. That battery commanders be allowed to make either a physical or aerial reconnaissance of new positions.
2. That battery commanders be encouraged to make recommendations to brigade commanders concerning new battery position areas and the number of howitzers employed.
3. That the strength of the battery survey section be brought up and kept at the Table of Organization (T/O) level.
4. That the artillery battalion commanders insure that all survey personnel are adequately trained and utilized by the respective battery commanders.
5. That, if necessary, the brigade commanders provide security for artillery survey parties.
6. That the Table of Organization changes listed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of TAB A, be incorporated as soon as possible.
7. That the procedure for routine calls of fire be changed as follows:
 - a. The infantry company commander informs the forward observer of the target and the desire to fire.
 - b. The forward observer submits the fire request direct to the battery/battalion fire direction center.
 - c. The artillery liaison officers at the infantry battalion and brigade headquarters monitor the request for fire. The fire request may be cancelled by either. Silence on the part of the liaison officers indicates consent.
 - d. The battery executes the fire request or the battalion fire direction center assign the mission to a battery for execution.

TAB C
Enclosure (5)

5-C-1

8. That the Division Artillery Headquarters organize a refresher program for forward observer teams.
9. That brigade commanders emphasize the need for correct and continuous fire planning and insure that it is accomplished.

TAB C
Enclosure (5)

5-C-2

TRAINING

1. This enclosure contains those areas concerning training both needing improvement (Tab A) and having shown improvement (Tab B). Tab C contains related recommendations.

a. TAB A - Areas Needing Improvement

- (1) Individual Training
- (2) Unit Refresher Training
- (3) Mobile Training Team
- (4) Noncommissioned Officer Training
- (5) Need for Off-Shore Training
- (6) Selection Criteria for Off-Shore Training
- (7) English Language Training for Vietnamese Marines.

b. TAB B - Areas That Have Improved

- (1) Increased Personnel for the Training Command
- (2) NCO Leadership
- (3) Basic Training of the Recruit.
- (4) M-79 Grenade Launcher and M-72 LAAW Ranges
- (5) Mortar Course
- (6) Unit Training

Enclosure (6)

and dry firing). However, once the recruit is exposed to the 25 meter and 300 meter live firing course, the efficiency of the live firing course falls to its lowest point. Captain SHANE's observations are as follows:

(a) The purpose of the 25 meter course is to achieve a 250 meter battle-sight zero on the shooter's weapon and to teach the shooter the fundamentals of shot group analysis. A conservative estimate of the number of recruits accomplishing the objectives of this course would be 65 percent. The remaining 35 percent are normally punished and then sent to the 300 meter course without ever having attained the essentials of live firing.

(b) Once on the 300 meter course, the recruits fire at ranges of 25 to 300 meters utilizing all firing positions. This course of fire uses a silhouette target fastened to a pole and raised and lowered on command by another recruit in a trench. As in the 25 meter course, 35 percent of the shooters show evidence of complete lack of understanding of marksmanship principles.

(c) Captain SHANE feels that the crux of the problem is a lack of qualified coaches. Further, there is no marking system for target hits therefore, neither the coach nor the shooter knows whether or not the target was hit.

(5) In support of Captain SHANE's comments concerning marksmanship training, Major WILLIAMS, in reference (q) also feels that the Vietnamese Marine method of conducting this instruction fails to adequately teach the Marine the principle of aimed, point fire. The problem, he feels lies at JGS as the current system is one developed by the Training Directorate thereof.

2. Unit Refresher Training.

a. Situation. Refresher training for Vietnamese Marine Corps tactical units has not been conducted since January 1967.

TAB A
Enclosure (6)

6-A-2

b. Comments.

(1) As indicated in paragraph 1b above, although the individual recruit is fundamentally prepared for combat, the effectiveness of his recruit training diminishes once he joins a battalion. In part, this is due to a lack of enforcement by unit commanders of those subjects and principles taught to the recruit at the Training Command. In other words, the newly graduated recruit learns bad habits from the "old timers". A large contributory factor, however, lies in the fact that Vietnamese Marine units are not given an opportunity to conduct unit training and/or retraining.

(2) Lieutenant Colonel KANSIER, in reference (1), stresses the need for infantry battalions to undergo a formal six week training course at the VAN KIEP National Training Center. Major CARLSON, in reference (i), states that most of the battalions have had no periodic retraining since their formation. He stresses that battalions must have designated periods for retraining if they are to maintain their technical and tactical proficiency. Lieutenant Colonel KANSIER reports that the last Vietnamese Marine Battalion to complete retraining was the Third Battalion in January 1967.

3. Mobile Training Team.

a. Situation. The use of mobile training teams would, in part, compensate for lack of unit training and retraining.

b. Comments.

(1) In reference (g), Captain SHANE remarks that the Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam does not seem willing to release a Marine battalion to undergo much needed retraining. Further, only a cursory effort is made at battalion level to conduct training while in a static position. As stated elsewhere in this report, any infantry unit, regardless of nationality, after sustained combat operations over an extended period, will lose its fighting edge due to accumulated

TAB A
Enclosure (6)

6-A-3

bad habits, casualties, new replacements etc.. Additionally, no progress in tactical proficiency can be realized without individual and unit exposure to new tactical trends, modern equipment and weapons, and a review of basic military skills. There can be no question that some form of training is essential. A logical solution - the mobile training team.

(2) The mobile training team requires only a couple of competent, energetic instructors. The mobility aspect is achieved readily by using a jeep and/or truck with trailer. If the unit is remote, a helicopter or fixed wing aircraft might be necessary.

4. Noncommissioned Officer Training.

a. Situation. NCO leadership, particularly at the squad level, remains poor.

b. Comments.

(1) Major GARDNER, in reference (h) describes the caliber of leadership of squad leaders and platoon sergeants as "very low". He relates that on one occasion in combat, a company commander was observed attempting to get a platoon to move against a house occupied by the Viet Cong. At no time did the squad leaders of this platoon attempt to move their squads. For that matter, the only person displaying any leadership was the company commander. Major GARDNER felt that squad leaders did not demonstrate responsibility for their men. When the battalion (Sixth) was engaged in a foot march, squad leaders failed to prevent straggling among their men.

(2) In reference (k), Major MCKINSTRY comments that Vietnamese Marine noncommissioned officers, though relatively experienced and knowledgeable, are not realizing their full potential as effective junior leaders. They are rarely granted authority to exercise their initiative or apply what experience they possess. Likewise, they are rarely given recognition for an admirable unit performance, nor are they held responsible for unit shortcomings.

TAB A
Enclosure (6)

6-A-4

(3) In reference (j), Major BUDD expressed the opinion that NCO training is non-existent and development of such training is hampered by the reportedly low educational level of NCOs and enlisted personnel. Properly, he continues that the grooming of a professional noncommissioned officer Corps is essential to a "quality" Marine Corps. The platoon commander can never do his own job well if he must continually perform the duties of his NCOs.

5. Need for Off-Shore Training.

a. Situation. Off-shore training is essential to the future progress/proficiency of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

b. Comments.

(1) As Major CARLSON indicated in reference (i), the continued expansion of the Vietnamese Marine Corps requires that as many key personnel as possible receive off-shore training. This is supported by Major WILLIAMS in reference (q) when he states that much of the success of the new Training Command is attributed to the number of company grade officers and NCOs who have been to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego and Marine Corps Education and Development Command, Quantico. Major WILLIAMS felt that the score attained at the U. S. training facility by a Vietnamese Marine is not an adequate measurement of the value of the training nor an indication of the potential he will bring back to his Corps. The real value, in Major WILLIAMS opinion is exposure to a modern Western military establishment. Thus, Major WILLIAMS concludes that the off-shore training program is one of the most important programs in the advisory effort. Lieutenant Colonel KANSIER (reference (1)) points out that the time to commence planning for this increased training is now. He further emphasized that this training include a variety of fields and suggests that the Commandant, Vietnamese Marine Corps consider:

(a) For Officers and NCOs: Specialist training in communications, intelligence, engineering,

TAB A
Enclosure (6)

6-A-5

ordnance, supply and logistics, artillery, medical, and motor transport.

(b) For Officers: Quotas should be obtained and increased for high level courses such as the U. S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the U. S. Naval War College.

(c) For NCOs: Quotas should be requested for specialist training in both the operational and maintenance aspects of communications, ordnance, engineering, and motor transport.

(2) It is realized that personnel losses due to combat operations have reduced the officer pipeline within the past year. However, the redesignation of the Marine Corps from a Brigade to a Division did result in a pipeline increase and should assist in meeting assigned quotas.

6. Selection Criteria for Off-Shore Training.

a. Situation. The selection system for Marines to attend off-shore training does not necessarily result in selection of the best candidate.

b. Comments.

(1) The broad objective of off-shore training is to improve the overall professional and technical knowledge of the Vietnamese Marine. It is, however, the opinion of Lieutenant Colonel KANSIER (reference (1)) that, within the Vietnamese Marine Corps, selection of personnel to attend off-shore training appears to be more as a "reward" or "bonus" for a job well done in the past - not on the actual requirements of the Marine Corps.

(2) Major BUDD, in reference (j), also believes that the selection of individuals for training in the United States seems to be based primarily on seniority and is a reward for faithful service. Using seniority as a prime consideration, officers and enlisted are frequently experienced beyond the level of the school for which selected; for example, the First Lieutenant with three/four years combat experience who attends

TAB A
Enclosure (6)

6-A-6

the Basic School. In this specific connection, once selected, the Vietnamese Marine officer logically feels that the level of instruction is below his experience.

7. English Language Training for Vietnamese Marines.

a. Situation. A prerequisite for off-shore training of Vietnamese Marines is an adequate background in the English language.

b. Comments.

(1) English language training for Vietnamese students selected for professional schooling in the United States will no longer be conducted at Lackland Air Force Base after Fiscal Year 1970. Therefore, it becomes imperative that concerted efforts be made to prepare students prior to departure from the Republic of Vietnam.

(2) Major CARLSON's After Tour Report (reference (i)) states that if we are to continue participation in the off-shore training program, we must insure that selectees are reasonably proficient in the English language. An individual who only barely passes the language proficiency test usually does not excel in the United States.

(3) Lieutenant Colonel KANSIER also felt the urgent requirement for in-country English language training, especially for noncommissioned officers. He stated that during Fiscal Year 1968, all off-shore training for enlisted Vietnamese Marines was cancelled in that no candidates could be found who could pass the mandatory language test. This situation is continuing into Fiscal Year 1969 and, of ten non-commissioned officers tested to meet a quota of three, only one achieved a passing score. These men were to have been trained at the U. S. Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego. So, it appears again this fiscal year, that all but one of the enlisted off-shore training quotas will have to be cancelled due to lack of eligible personnel.

TAB A
Enclosure (6)

6-A-7

(4) There are two in-country English Language Schools available to the Vietnamese Marine Corps in Saigon: The Armed Forces Language School and the Vietnamese Navy Language School. These have not been fully utilized in the past.

TAB A
Enclosure (6)

6-A-8

AREAS THAT HAVE IMPROVED

1. Increase of Personnel for the Training Command. Effective 1 October 1968 with the designation of the Marine Corps from a Brigade to a Division and commensurate force structure increase, the Vietnamese Marine Corps Training Command, THU DUC, expanded from 95 officers and men to 270. The latter is certainly a more realistic figure considering the courses that must be conducted and the quality of instruction desired.

2. NCO Leadership.

a. In spite of the comments contained in paragraph 4 to TAB A, enclosure (6), it appears that the Vietnamese Marine Corps is taking positive action to develop "the backbone of the Corps" - the noncommissioned officer. At all levels, it appears that steps are being taken to increase his status and the tendency is to no longer treat him as "just another" enlisted man. Particularly noteworthy are:

(1) The opening of the two fine NCO ^{messes} clubs during the latter part of 1968, one at Headquarters Marine Corps and the other at the Training Command, THU DUC.

(2) The establishment of the NCO Leadership School at the Marine Corps Training Command, THU DUC.

b. Drill Instructors. In reference (g), Captain SHANE states that the Vietnamese Marine Drill Instructor plays as important a role in the formation of a basic Marine as his U. S. Marine Corps counterpart at U. S. Marine Corps Recruit Depots, Parris Island/San Diego. A program was instituted, with the concurrence of the G-1, VNMC to reinforce the number of drill instructors with hand-picked NCOs. Further, these "Drill instructors" were issued all new uniforms, and two extra uniforms, above the authorized allowance. The Commanding Officer, Training Command took a personal interest in the program and, thereafter, inefficient instructors were removed. Daily inspections of classes and Drill Instructors by the Commanding Officer and his advisors further aided in raising the quality of the Drill Instructor. This

TAB B
Enclosure (6)

6-B-1

program, coupled with the increase in NCO prestige, has paid dividends.

3. Basic Training of the Recruit. The opening of the new Vietnamese Marine Corps Training Command, coupled with increased competence of Drill Instructors has raised the quality of the Marine recruit appreciably. Attesting to this fact was the determined, early morning defense (18 June 1968) of the 4th Company, 6th Battalion (composed of a substantial percentage of recently graduated recruits) against the aggressive infiltration efforts of over 200 heavily armed Viet Cong. That those young, well led, new Marines stood firm against fierce Viet Cong attempts to break out of GIA DINH under cover of darkness is a tribute to their training.

4. M-79 Grenade Launcher and M-72 LAAW Ranges. These ranges were completed in the fall of 1968. They are well planned and well constructed and should prove invaluable in training personnel to handle these weapons.

5. Mortar Course. The late spring of 1968 saw the establishment of a course of instruction for 60mm and 81mm mortarmen. If continued, the performance of mortar units should be very good indeed. One demonstration of the results of this training occurred during the same action described in paragraph 3 above, when organic mortars were employed in a most effective manner against the entrapped Viet Cong.

6. Unit Training. In spite of the fact that training conducted within units can stand considerable improvement, some sporadic effort has been made in this direction by individual unit commanders. Captain FRYREAR, in reference (c), commenting on the Fifth Battalion, states that in November 1967, a new executive officer joined that unit. It appears that this officer was receptive to ideas of concurrent training and, shortly after his arrival, a training program was instituted. This program included machine gun instructions to all troops and English instruction for the officers. This was a real fine start - but, only a start, and further, although not yet contained in

TAB B
Enclosure (6)

6-B-2

After Tour Reports, it is understood that the Commanding Officer, Sixth Battalion has also instituted unit training. Obviously constant training is an absolute necessity to maintain combat effectiveness. Further, on 20 March 1969, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor, while visiting the Fifth Infantry Battalion, operating within the Capital Military District under the Second Airborne Brigade, ARVN, observed excellent concurrent training being conducted by the Marines. This was particularly commendable since, at the time, the Fifth Battalion was committed to actual field operations.

TAB B
Enclosure (6)

6-B-3

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the contents of Tabs A and B, the following recommendations, concerning training within the Vietnamese Marine Corps, are made:

1. That emphasis on producing a disciplined, well trained recruit continue.
2. That Commanding Officers throughout the Vietnamese Marine Corps be regularly informed of the training syllabus for the recruit and asked to make recommendations.
3. That the proposed new rifle range at the Training Command be completed as soon as possible.
4. That the entire rifle marksmanship training program at the Training Command be revised to include more and better coaches and a marking system enabling coaches and shooters to determine hits. If necessary, initiate a letter to the Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam requesting reevaluation of current firing procedures.
5. That a coaches school be established.
6. That efforts be continued and intensified to rotate battalions through the VAN KIEP National Training Center. Obtain lesson plans from the VAN KIEP National Training Center and in coordination with the respective battalion commanders, establish a one week infantry battalion refresher course based on the individual needs of the battalion.
7. That the Commandant, Vietnamese Marine Corps insist that battalion commanders establish and conduct informal, battalion level schools whenever time permits in order that "bad habits" are corrected and military skills are sharpened and/or refreshed. English language training should be included for officers.
8. That a mobile training group be established at the Marine Corps Training Command. This group should contain two or more small special teams, each capable of competent instruction in given subjects. The

TAB C
Enclosure (6)

6-C-1

purpose of the teams would be to visit the various units and deliver instruction as directed by the Commandant and/or requested by a specific unit commander. Instructional capabilities should include, but not be limited to: new weapons (technique and employment), new tactical trends (friendly and enemy), capabilities and use of supporting arms (organic and otherwise).

9. That present efforts to increase the prestige of the NCO and caliber of his leadership be continued and emphasized at every level in every unit.

10. That the NCO School, Training Command be monitored by the Commander, Training Command and G-3 of the Marine Corps to ensure that only those subjects are taught that will enhance the NCO knowledge and leadership capabilities in the field. Leadership training and a fire and maneuver course should be included in the NCO School syllabus.

11. That all off-shore training quotas for officers as well as noncommissioned officers be filled.

12. That all in-country training quotas be filled.

13. That a study be made, in conjunction with the Operations Officer, Marine Advisory Unit, to determine those additional off-shore training quotas needed to meet future requirements of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

14. That only the best candidates for a given training course be sent, and that selection not be solely a "reward" for a job well done.

15. That every effort be made to send English language qualified, newly commissioned Lieutenants to the Basic School, Quantico, Va.

16. That every effort be made to prepare future off-shore trainees, primary and alternates, in English language well in advance through use of in-country English language schools.

TAB C
Enclosure (6)

6-C-2

17. That an Officer Course be established at the Training Command emphasizing use of supporting arms, fire planning, and fire support coordination. Course would also include a round table discussion on combat lessons learned, based on FMFPAC Tactical Trends.

TAB C
Enclosure (6)

6-C-3

LOGISTICS

1. This enclosure contains those areas concerning logistics both needing improvement (Tab A) and having shown improvement (Tab B). Tab C contains related recommendations.

a. TAB A - Areas Needing Improvement

- (1) Anticipation of Requirements
- (2) Maintenance of New and Improved Facilities.
- (3) The Supply System.
- (4) Employment of Engineers.
- (5) Deadline Reporting.

b. TAB B - Areas That Have Improved.

- (1) Deadline Reporting
- (2) Maintenance of Equipment.
- (3) Brigade Logistics Responsibilities.
- (4) Engineer Construction.

Enclosure (7)

AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT1. Anticipation of Requirements.

a. Situation. Advance planning for logistical support requirements is not as thorough as it might be.

b. Comments.

(1) In reference (i), Major CARLSON felt that commanders take too much for granted with respect to the ability of U. S. assets to support a troop movement with little or no advance notification of requirements. In combined operations, where U. S. forces are supporting Vietnamese units, the U. S. unit usually desires to have an idea of the support required in sufficient time to properly meet the need. This is particularly true for helicopter support. Major CARLSON felt that the Vietnamese must be reminded frequently to anticipate their needs and submit timely requests. Thus, proper planning and organization is required.

(2) Major BUDD, in reference (j), also commented with regard to inadequate information and coordination in air movements of units. Speaking at the level of the Marine Division/MAU, Major BUDD stated that it was his experience that initial lift requirements were submitted by Division (then Brigade) Headquarters to the Joint General Staff for transmittal to the U. S. Air Force. On two occasions within his experience when a Marine Unit was departing SAIGON via airlift, lift requirements were submitted without reference to the unit that was making the move. This resulted in having to correct the lift requirement information with U. S. Air Force personnel at the airfield. The planners had not coordinated the load requirements with the unit to be lifted and additional lift assets had to be requested. The decision as to what goes or does not go should be worked out between the Marine Division and the element to be lifted.

2. Maintenance of New and Improved Facilities.

a. Situation. Facilities are being constructed and improved within the Vietnamese Marine Corps without trained personnel to maintain them.

TAB A
Enclosure (7)

7-A-1

b. Comments. Major WILLIAMS, in reference (q), points out that the new Training Command is receiving sophisticated water and electrical distribution systems requiring qualified personnel to maintain them. Even though the Training Command Table of Organization includes a 30 man General Service Section, job titles are not assigned thereby designating what the section is to be responsible for in maintenance areas. Further, Major WILLIAMS indicated that trained Marine maintenance personnel are not available.

3. The Supply System.

a. Situation. The Vietnamese supply system is not as effective as it might be.

b. Comments.

(1) The causes for the relative ineffectiveness of the supply system within the Vietnamese Armed Forces probably can be traced to those factors mention in enclosure (1), Command and Staff Action. Another contributory factor is a tendency to use an advisor to "scrounge" rather than employ the established system. Certainly, use of an advisor, in some cases, is more expedient. However, it does not solve the ultimate purpose of giving the Vietnamese a self sustaining supply and resupply capability in anticipation of the day when advisors are no longer around.

(2) Lieutenant Colonel Glenn R. RODNEY's After Tour Report of 29 April 1968, (Page 45 of enclosure (1)) indicated that, in fact, too much scrounging was being done by advisors during the period covered by that report. It is doubted that such "scrounging" since Colonel RODNEY's report has amounted to much more than procurement of such items as dunnage and concrete with which to construct dependent's quarters and a rifle range. Captain TAYLOR in reference (t) appears to substantiate this.

(3) An example, however, of how the system should not work is found in reference (p) wherein Major WARD discussed the period of August 1968 when three Vietnamese Marine Battalions were responsible for the security of three critical bridges within CMD. On 8 August it was determined that the bunkers, lighting, and defensive

TAB A
Enclosure (7)

wire were inadequate. Immediate corrections were demanded by CMD at the request of the Senior Marine Advisor. That correction was needed cannot be questioned. The method used, however, is subject to some speculation. Pressure was immediately brought to bear on, not only the Vietnamese, but primarily the advisors. Daily inspections were made, not by the Vietnamese commanders, but by U. S. generals. Material was furnished, not through Vietnamese sources, but instead by the U. S.; delivered not to the Vietnamese, but to the U. S. advisor.

4. Employment of Engineers.

a. Situation. Engineer employment has, in reality, improved. However, certain parts of SMA Memorandum to Chief of Staff, VNMC memo of 5 July 1968; Subj: Employment of Engineer Company, are repeated for emphasis.

b. Comments.

(1) Major CARLSON, in reference (i) stated that infantry battalions did not possess a combat engineer capability. This omission has been largely corrected, however, continuous verbal comments of advisors indicate that the "destruction of enemy emplacements, ordnance and obstacles is severely limited by the small quantity of explosives the attached engineer squads have on hand. In many cases, facilities are left intact and may possibly be reoccupied by the enemy at a later date."

(2) When in a static or defensive situation, the battalions frequently rely on "outside" help for the construction of barriers and obstacles. The engineers are not consulted nor are they used in a supervisory capacity. Thus, they are denied the opportunity to use their special skills.

(3) Many field advisors report that mines and booby traps, set out by the VNMC, are neither properly marked nor removed when departing an area. Similarly, enemy mines and booby traps, when discovered by Marines, are left in place and poorly marked. This results in follow-on friendly units, possibly other Marines, suffering needless casualties.

TAB A
Enclosure (7)

7-A-3

5. Deadline Reporting.

a. Situation. The deadline reporting system employed by the Marine Corps (G-4) is relatively new and still in its initial stages of development.

b. Comments.

(1) Although the Marine Division has established a deadline reporting system and does require a monthly deadline report from all units, the system still has not achieved its full potential. At present, the system gives no indication as to the length of time an item of equipment has been on deadline. For example, a report submitted the first of the month showing status of equipment as of the last day of the previous month could contain items of equipment which have been on deadline since the first of the previous month.

(2) The purpose of a deadline reporting system, generally speaking, is to provide the quantity of equipment on deadline, indicating the parts required to remove those items from deadline. It is a management tool which provides the G-4 with information enabling him to monitor the progress of equipment maintenance and repair. If properly pursued, a commander always has available to him, a clear picture of the status of his critical material.

TAB A
Enclosure (7)

AREAS THAT HAVE IMPROVED

1. Deadline Reporting. According to Captain MC CARTHY (reference (n)), the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 has initiated a deadline reporting system for Vietnamese Marine Corps equipment. This should provide a valuable means for control, if equipment deadlines are monitored closely. Staff inspections by the Division Motor Transport and Signal Officers should also improve maintenance standards.
2. Maintenance of Equipment. Major CARLSON (reference (i)), related that he was quite favorably impressed with the maintenance of equipment within the Fifth Battalion. It was noteworthy that, at the time of the controversy over functioning of the M-16 rifle, there were very few problems within the Fifth Battalion due to the meticulous care given weapons. It can be stated that outstanding care of weapons appears to be a common trend throughout the Vietnamese Marine Corps.
3. Brigade Logistics Responsibilities. Major BUDD noted during his tour that although there was still some confusion regarding the logistics responsibilities of the brigade, there was a greater willingness to support subordinate battalions and coordinate the logistics effort at the brigade level. Problem areas were being anticipated to a greater extent and more planning was conducted. Major BUDD cited Operation LAM SON 198 in I Corps Tactical Zone where Brigade (Task Force) A where timely and comprehensive plans for resupply of three battalions were developed with a minimum of advisory effort - to include the use of helicopters. Plans included the procurement of rations, water, determining battalion requirements, staging, loading, delivery and unloading of supplies and recovery of containers for several consecutive days.
4. Engineer Construction. The construction units of the Engineer Company have demonstrated exceptional skill in masonry and building construction work. Their efforts over the past several months in erecting new buildings at Camp NGUYEN VAN NGO, LE THANG TON and the Training Command are noteworthy.

TAB B
Enclosure (7)

7-B-1

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the contents of Tabs A and B, the following recommendations concerning logistics within the Vietnamese Marine Corps, are made:

1. That the Marine Division, G-4, his advisor, and all commanders and advisors anticipate and make lift requirements sufficiently in advance (where possible) so as to enable the supporting (providing) unit to better meet those requirements.
2. That the G-4, VNMC, in coordination with the Logistics Advisor, prepare and promulgate a VNMC/MAU Air Movement SOP.
3. That the G-4, VNMC or his designated Engineer representative, in coordination with the Engineer Advisor and Commanding Officer, Training Command determine requirements for qualified maintenance personnel and submit same to the G-3 VNMC for action.
4. That all echelons in the chain of command within the Vietnamese Marine Corps continue to insist on making their own supply system work, resorting to advisors only in a combat emergency.
5. That the VNMC continue to attach one combat engineer squad to each deployed infantry battalion, regardless of the battalion's geographic locations.
6. That Brigade and Battalion Commanders be encouraged to make full use of their engineer capabilities. When attached, special attention should be given to use of an engineer officer in the planning stages of an operation.
7. That prior to the commencement of each operation, a determination be made at the level of the senior tactical headquarters, as to whether the overall mission will permit destruction of all enemy fortifications mines, and booby traps. When such is possible, attached engineer units should carry sufficient explosives and accessories to accomplish anticipated destruction missions. Included in operations plans should be provisions for resupply and destruction site security.
8. That, when discovered, enemy mines and booby traps be destroyed immediately.

TAB C
Enclosure (7)

7-C-1

9. That the deadline reporting system, currently in use by the G-4 be given command attention by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

TAB C
Enclosure (7)

7-C-2

Medical and Sanitation

1. This enclosure contains those areas concerning medical and sanitation matters both needing improvement (TAB A) and having shown improvement (TAB B). TAB C contains related recommendations.

a. TAB A - Areas Needing Improvement

- (1) Sanitation
- (2) Medical Facilities
- (3) Training of Medical Personnel
- (4) Company Corpsman

b. TAB B - Areas that have Improved

- (1) Buildings and Structures
- (2) Equipment
- (3) Utilities
- (4) Sanitation

MEDICAL

Enclosure (8)

8-1

revealed outstanding practices in the Battalion Command Post area.

(4) The lack of proper screening is a health hazard. Unscreened latrines, messhalls, and galleys permit flies to move freely from one area to another contaminating food as it is being prepared and served.

(5) Wells within base camps are generally unsanitary. Should a well be sufficiently deep to produce potable water, it is rendered unsanitary through the tossing of a variety of debris into it. In one case (Fourth Battalion) a newly constructed well had been filled to the water level with trash.

2. Medical Facilities.

a. Situation. Present Vietnamese Marine Medical facilities are inadequate.

b. Comments. The CUU LONG Dispensary provides in-patient and out-patient care for Marines and out-patient care for their dependents. This facility was authorized 20 beds until 1 December 1967 when the authorized bed capacity was increased to 50. The structures comprising the dispensary are old and in poor repair. Until April 1968, the sewage system had not functioned for several years. No running water was available until May 1968, despite the availability of a city water main within 20 meters of the facility. The dispensary is located in SAIGON while most of the base camps, dependents housing and the Training Command are located in the vicinity of THU DUC.

3. Training of Medical Personnel.

a. Situation. More extensive training of Vietnamese Marine medical personnel in U.S. facilities is essential to increase knowledge and capabilities.

b. Comments. Lieutenant Commander HINES stated that by the end of 1967 some plans had been formulated to send Vietnamese Marine Medical Personnel to U.S. facilities for training. These, however, were thwarted by the 1968 TET Offensive and subsequent combat commitments. Since the medical organization of the Vietnamese Marine Corps has been increased from a company to a battalion, new efforts to obtain training billets in U.S. medical facilities should be made.

8-A-2

TAB A
Enclosure (8)

AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT1. Sanitation.

a. Situation. General sanitation in base camps, tactical positions, and dependents housing needs considerable improvement.

b. Comments.

(1) Lieutenant Commander HINES, USN, in reference (m), related that sanitation in base camps and tactical positions is often poor. This applies to dependent housing areas as well. Field sanitation practices were described as unsatisfactory. General base sanitation is a command function and no amount of inspecting and reporting will improve a situation without command support.

(2) Major BUDD, in reference (j) felt that there was little awareness of the techniques of field sanitation by individuals, nor is there much concern expressed by commanders, although most Vietnamese are extremely sensitive to personal hygiene. Garbage, trash and human waste are invariably left in open areas or, otherwise, not properly disposed of. This, of course, is detrimental to the general health. Advisory effort to correct this situation on site has been ineffective or, at best, effective only with regard to a particular situation or a given time. The recruit is exposed to proper techniques at the Training Command, but lack of command interest in some field units diminishes the effects of his recruit training.

(3) Within the Fifth Battalion, Captain FRYREAR (reference (c)) commented that sanitation practices in the base camp were only slightly improved from those in the field. There are only two permanent heads within the confines of the base camp. These are inadequate and do not meet the demands of over 800 Marines and their dependents. There are a few urination tubes emplaced throughout the camp, but, due to improper construction, the soakage pits don't soak. Also there are no screens covering the openings of the tubes. In the field, rarely is any one spot designated for deposit of human waste. If such is designated, fecal matter is left exposed. With respect to sanitation in the field, a visit to the Fifth Battalion by the Assistance Senior Marine Advisor on 20 March 1969.

8-A-1

TAB A
Enclosure (8)

4. Company Corpsmen.

a. Situation. The number of corpsmen assigned to an infantry battalion appears inadequate.

b. Comments. Generally, only two corpsmen are assigned to each company within an infantry battalion and, on occasion, only one is assigned. It would seem that corpsmen should be assigned on the basis of at least one per infantry platoon, in addition to those located in company headquarters.

8-A-3

TAB A
Enclosure (8)

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the contents of TAB A and TAB B of enclosure (8), the following recommendations concerning medical and sanitation matters within the Vietnamese Marine Corps are made.

1. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps increase command emphasis on sanitary conditions in base camps, tactical positions, and dependents housing areas.
2. That the Marine Division surgeon provide commanders and battalion surgeons with sufficient technical guidance and assistance to improve field sanitation practices.
3. That all Marine unit medical officers increase efforts to educate their commanders in the importance of healthy sanitation practices.
4. That all wells located within base camps and dependents housing areas be provided with lids.
5. That the Marine Division Surgeon, accompanied by his medical advisor, conduct staff inspections of all base camps and dependents housing areas for the purpose of increasing sanitation standards.
6. That the results of the inspections mentioned in recommendation 5, above, be reported to the Chief of Staff, Vietnamese Marine Corps.
7. That the Marine Division Surgeon, accompanied by his advisor conduct periodic staff visits to deployed field units for the purpose of observing and reporting on field sanitation practices.
8. That commanders be directed to heed and enforce recommendations of their unit medical officers in overall sanitation matters.
9. That the newly planned Vietnamese Marine medical facility in the THU DUC area be completed on a priority basis.
10. That the Marine Division Surgeon, in coordination with his advisor, study and determine those additional student requirements for training in U.S. medical facilities. Further, that when determined, these requirements be submitted to the G-3 VNMC/Operations Advisor for action.

8-C-1

TAB C
Enclosure (8)

Requirements for both officers and enlisted men in medicine, dentistry, and allied sciences should be considered.

11. That sufficient corpsmen be obtained to provide a minimum of one per infantry platoon in each battalion.

8-C-2

TAB C
Enclosure (8)

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That a concerted effort be made through written and oral means, to educate all commanders and other officers to the realization that a modern armed service can function only with an equally modern concept of staff functioning.
2. That recently translated extracts of FMFM 3-1 "Command and Staff Action" be reproduced and disseminated to all commanders and staff sections.
3. That the guidelines established by FMFM 3-1, as stressed in paragraph 2 of enclosure (2) (Page 2-1), be used to initiate recommendation 1 above.
4. That all commanders and other officers who have completed formal military courses of instruction be encouraged to put into practice the staff principles taught by those schools.
5. That staff officers at the various echelons be encouraged to "communicate" both in writing and through staff visits with their staff equivalents on all matters within their cognizance so as to ease the burden of the commander.
6. That commanders be encouraged to get out and visit subordinate units at every opportunity.
7. That an officer career pattern be established requiring periodic rotation of officers between command and staff duties.
8. That the Vietnamese Marine Corps continue to seek every opportunity to place officers in professional schools both within the Republic of Vietnam and the United States.
9. That commanders and staff officers include advisors in pre-operational staff briefings and planning.
10. That brigade commanders be encouraged to maneuver battalions so as to achieve mass rather than allow major elements to remain unengaged during contact.
11. That field commanders be encouraged to vary tactical formations according to existing situation and terrain.

9-1

Enclosure (9)

12. That commanders be encouraged to have assault units take advantage of the protection afforded by supporting fires, - lift fires only as assault troops are closing their objective.

13. That, in coordination with the Operations and Training Advisor, Marine Advisory Unit, a supporting arms demonstration be planned and prepared for the purpose of demonstrating the capabilities and limitations of these arms. Execution of this demonstration to be at such time as facilities and assets become available.

14. That whenever within the authority of a Vietnamese Marine commander, and the situation permits, the practice of using phase lines rather than assigning numerous objectives be continued.

15. That Vietnamese Marine commanders inform USMC advisors of all requests for supporting fires regardless of source.

16. That, when available, Vietnamese supporting assets be requested in lieu of U.S. assets.

17. That advisors stress the capabilities and limitations of helicopter gunships to counterparts and emphasize the need for greater selectivity of supporting arms means.

18. That infantry battalion commanders be encouraged to use organic mortars in an offensive role and that, whenever helicopters are available, ammunition resupply by this means be planned and employed.

19. That observer training be included and stressed in the syllabus of the NCO School and Officer's Refresher Course, Marine Corps Training Command, THU DUC.

20. That at every available opportunity, including stand-down at base camp, 60mm mortar sections and 81mm mortar platoons be exercised in all aspects of their weapons.

21. That two additional 81mm mortars be assigned to each infantry battalion to provide for adequate base camp protection and adequate 81mm mortar support in field operations.

22. That sufficient base camp personnel be trained in the use of the 81mm mortar so as not to draw from those authorized to the infantry battalion 81mm mortar platoon.

23. That battery commanders be allowed to make either a physical or aerial reconnaissance of new positions.

24. That battery commanders be encouraged to make recommendations to brigade (battalion) commanders concerning new battery position areas and the number of howitzers employed therein.

25. That the strength of the battery survey section be brought to and maintained at its Table of Organization (T/O) level.

26. That the artillery battalion commander insure that all survey personnel are adequately trained and utilized by the respective battery commander.

27. That, if necessary, the brigade commanders provide security for artillery survey parties.

28. That the Table of Organization changes listed in paragraphs 4 and 5, TAB A to enclosure (5) be incorporated as soon as possible.

29. That the procedure for routine calls for fire be changed as follows:

a. The infantry company commander informs the forward observer of the target and the desire to fire.

b. The forward observer submits the fire request direct to the battery/battalion fire direction center.

c. The artillery liaison officers at the infantry battalion and brigade headquarters monitor the request for fire. The fire request may be cancelled by either. Silence on the part of the liaison officers indicates consent.

d. The battery executes the fire request or the battalion fire direction center assigns the mission to a battery for execution.

30. That the Division Artillery Headquarters organize a refresher program for forward observer teams.

31. That the brigade commanders emphasize the need for correct and continuous fire planning and insure that it is accomplished.

32. That the emphasis on producing a disciplined, well trained recruit continue.

33. That commanding officers, throughout the Vietnamese Marine Corps, be regularly informed of the recruit training syllabus and encouraged to make related recommendations.

34. That the new rifle range, now under construction at the Training Command, be completed as soon as possible.

35. That the entire rifle marksmanship training program at the Training Command be revised to include more and better coaches and a marking system enabling coaches and shooters to determine hits. If necessary, initiate a letter to the Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam requesting reevaluation of current firing procedures.

36. That a coaching school be established.

37. That efforts be continued and intensified to rotate battalions through the National Training Center, VAN KIEP.

38. That, at such time as Marine infantry battalions attend refresher training at the National Training Center, VAN KIEP, night operations and tank/infantry operations be stressed in the curriculum.

39. That training in night operations be conducted at the Marine Corps Training Command. This is on the recruit training syllabus but is not carried out.

40. That the syllabus of 2 July 1968 proposed by Captain H. J. SHANE, USMC be adopted in all respects with regard to night training.

41. That, within deployed infantry battalion, officers and men be given special, unit level training in night movement and tactics.

42. That the Commandant, Vietnamese Marine Corps insist that battalion commanders establish and conduct informal, battalion level school whenever time permits in order that "bad habits" are corrected and military skills are sharpened and/or refreshed. English language training should be included for officers.

43. That a mobile training group be established at the Marine Corps Training Command. This group should contain two or more small special teams, each capable of competent instruction in given subjects. The purpose of the teams would be to visit the various units and deliver instruction as directed by the Commandant and/or requested by a specific unit commander.

44. That present efforts to increase the prestige of the NCO and caliber of his leadership be continued and emphasized at every level in every unit.

45. That the NCO School, Training Command be monitored by the Commander, Training Command and G-3 of the Marine Corps to ensure that only those subjects are taught that will enhance the NCO knowledge and leadership capability in the field. Leadership training and a fire and maneuver course in the NCO School syllabus is needed.

46. That all off-shore training quotas for officers as well as noncommissioned officers be filled.

47. That all in-country training quotas be filled.

48. That a study be made in conjunction with the Operations Advisor, Marine Advisory Unit, to determine those additional off-shore training quotas needed to meet future requirements of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

49. That only the best candidates for a given training course be sent, and that selection not be solely a "reward" for a job well done.

50. That every effort be made to send english language qualified, newly commissioned lieutenants to the Basic School, Quantico, Virginia.

51. That every effort to prepare future off-shore trainees, primary and alternate, in the english language well in advance through use of in-country English language schools be made.

52. That an officer's course be established at the Training Command emphasizing use of supporting arms, fire planning and fire support coordination. Course would also include seminars on combat lessons learned based on FMFPAC "Tactical Trends".

53. That the Marine Division G-4, his advisor, and all commanders and advisors anticipate and make lift requirements sufficiently in advance (where possible) so as to enable the supporting (providing) unit to better meet those requirements.

54. That the G-4, VNMC, in coordination with the Logistics Advisor, prepare and promulgate a VNMC/MAU Air Movement SOP.

55. That the G-4, VNMC or his designated Engineer representative, in coordination with the Engineer Advisor and Commanding Officer, Training Command determine requirements for qualified maintenance personnel and submit same to the G-3, VNMC for action.

56. That all echelons in the chain of command within the VNMC continue to insist on making their own supply system work, resorting to advisors only in a combat emergency.

57. That the VNMC continue to attach one combat engineer squad to each deployed infantry battalion, regardless of the battalion's geographic location.

58. That brigade and battalion commanders be encouraged to make full use of their engineer capabilities when attached, Special attention should be given to the use of an engineer officer in the planning stages of an operation.

59. That prior to the commencement of each operation, a determination be made at the level of the senior tactical headquarters, as to whether the overall mission will permit destruction of all enemy fortifications, mines and booby traps. When such is possible, attached engineer units should carry sufficient explosives and accessories to accomplish anticipated destruction missions. Included in operations plans should be provisions for resupply and destruction site security.

60. That, when discovered, enemy mines and booby traps be destroyed immediately.

61. That the deadline reporting system, currently in use by the G-4, VNMC be given command attention by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

62. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps increase command emphasis on sanitary conditions in base camps, tactical positions, and dependents housing areas.

63. That the Marine Division Surgeon provide commanders and battalion surgeons with sufficient technical guidance and assistance to improve field sanitation practices.

64. That all wells located within base camps and dependents housing areas be provided with lids.

65. That the Marine Division Surgeon, accompanied by his Medical Advisor, conduct staff inspections of all base camps and dependents housing areas for the purpose of increasing sanitation standards.

66. That the results of the inspection mentioned in recommendation 65 above, be reported to the Chief of Staff, Vietnamese Marine Corps.

67. That the Marine Division Surgeon accompanied by his Medical Advisor, conduct periodic staff visits to deployed field units for the purpose of observing, correcting, and reporting field sanitation practices.

68. That commanders be directed to heed and enforce recommendations of their unit medical officers in overall sanitation matters.

69. That the planned, new Vietnamese Marine Corps medical facility, THU DUC be completed on a priority basis.

70. That the Marine Division Surgeon, in coordination with his advisor, study and determine those additional student requirements for training in U.S. medical facilities. Further, that when determined, these requirements be submitted to the G-3, VNMC/Operations Advisor for action. Requirements for both officers and enlisted men in medicine, dentistry and allied sciences should be considered.

71. That sufficient corpsmen be obtained to provide a minimum of one per infantry platoon in each battalion.