

NARRATIVE NOTES

1971

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INTRODUCTION

January 1971, when compared to the preceding month, can be best characterized as a period of mixed results, with a large number of indicators registering one month increases and a similarly sizable group of indicators posting decreases. However, when the entire set of indicators considered herein are compared to averages for the previous six months or one year, the January 1971 figures, almost without exception, represent gains (gains, in this context, meaning increases or decreases reflecting favorably on the progress of the Division).

The local (December to January) instability of these parameters may be attributed to the enemy's preparation for and execution of activities normally associated with the New Year, Tet and the early Spring, and to the efforts of the Division to disrupt his preparations and counteract his activities. A further, but less important cause of the local instability, especially in the areas of personnel administration, law and discipline, is the impending redeployment of a portion of the Division. When viewed in the larger context (comparison of January results to the averages for the previous six months or year), the reasons for the continuation of trends established during 1970 are reductions in both Division and enemy strength, and the enemy's reversion to guerrilla tactics.

The enemy, during the month of January 1971, was sighted a bit more often than in the previous month (1,394 sightings versus December's 1,331), although his estimated strength again decreased slightly (down 235 to 8,325). He again employed his "artillery" sparingly, expending only 46 mortar rounds and but a single rocket in attacks by fire on Division positions, the total figure of 47 representing a decrease of two from December's 49 rounds.

Although he killed 15 Division Marines or Navy corpsmen during January (up from 11 in December) and wounded 136 (up from 125), the enemy paid for this with the deaths of 211 of his soldiers (up from 162), and the loss of 80 individual weapons (down from 87) and 6 crew-served weapons (down from 9).

Friendly activity during the month included the continuation of Operations Imperial Lake (in the Que Son Mountains) and Upshur Stream (in the western Charlie Ridge area), and extensive patrol, ambush and reconnaissance activities. Especially active in January were the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) units, which claimed 63 of the enemy's 211 KIAs, captured two guerrillas and influenced ten to rally to the government cause, while suffering 25 wounded. This was the second consecutive month of heavy CUPP activity and, as was the case with the Division's results overall, produced (considering December to January) a mixed bag of results, both friendly and enemy casualties increasing and the number of prisoners/ralliers decreasing. Artillery and naval gunfire expenditures, fixed wing sorties, and all three parameters associated with helicopter support (flight time, passengers carried, and tons of cargo carried) increased during January 1971. Most of these support indices increased moderately, but artillery expenditure increased 30% (from just under 27,000 rounds to over 35,000), the rise fueled almost exclusively by an intense attack by fire on portions of Charlie Ridge which accounted for over 11,000 rounds during the latter third of the month. This attack on probable enemy staging areas and

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bases of operation was part of an active program to disrupt the enemy's preparations for his expected Spring campaign.

During the past thirteen months, the enemy has increasingly avoided direct confrontation with our troops and has even reduced sharply his standoff attacks by fire on our positions (e.g., monthly averages of 3,736 enemy sighted and 350 rounds in attacks by fire in the first half of 1970, decreasing to averages of 1,401 and 90 in the last half, and finally decreasing to 1,394 and 47 (totals) in January 1971). Nevertheless, he has managed to make his presence felt through the use of mines and booby traps. January 1971 saw a sharp increase in both the number of surprise firing devices detonated and the resultant number of casualties (37 devices detonated versus December's 28 and 72 casualties versus 53). The 30% increase in the number of detonations produced a January find/detonation ratio of 3.19:1, a decrease from December's record 4.00:1 and the first such setback since July 1970. One notable (although, thankfully, fairly uncommon) incident during the month served to add significantly to January's totals for both detonations and casualties. On operation Upshur Stream, a Marine detonated a surprise firing device which wounded four men. A second device was detonated as members of the unit rushed to the assistance of the first casualties, wounding an additional four men. Finally, the rotor blades of the medical evacuation helicopter triggered four more booby traps upon landing, wounding three more Marines. In addition, five more devices were found and destroyed, bringing the totals for this incident to six booby traps detonated, five found and eleven men WIA and illustrating the density with which the enemy emplaces these weapons. Further discussion of the topics above may be found in Tab G-3 and the other tabs in the G-3 and G-2 Sections.

Even as battle casualties increased, the non-hostile casualty rate decreased for the second consecutive month (from 94 casualties per million man-days in November to 75 in December and 51 in January). However, not all categories of non-hostile casualties decreased during January, Accidental Discharges rising from five to nine and Motor Vehicle Accidents soaring from four to twelve, but continued command emphasis on the reduction of such incidents and their resulting casualties should bring these two categories into line with the others. (See Section 1-6).

Just as with all other groups of indicators discussed thus far, mixed results obtained in the realm of personnel management, law and discipline. Much of the turbulence experienced is associated with the pending redeployments. Division strength crept higher in preparation for the unavoidable personnel realignments which will be occasioned by the redeployments, while the submission of award recommendations began to increase, as they did prior to both phases of redeployment in 1970. Certain indicators pertaining to law and discipline increased in January 1971 as Division units tried to clear court dockets and complete processing of recommendations for administrative discharges initiated in the latter part of 1970. However, it is gratifying to note that not a single "racial" or "ragging" incident occurred in January (See Tabs 1-5g and 1-5h) and the number of violent crimes committed by Division personnel fell from the seven recorded in December 1970 to two (one assault and one attempted homicide [See Tab 1-5i]).

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Another set of gratifying statistics contained herein are those treating readiness and maintenance management. The Division, in January 1971, continued to maintain a FORSTAT rating of C-1 (fully combat ready), while fully 95% of the Division's combat essential equipment was operationally ready, with three of the commodity groups (Communication-Electronics, Motor Transport and Ordnance) exceeding Marine Corps standards by a wide margin, and Engineer equipment registering its fourth consecutive month of increase and surpassing the standard by 3%.

The immediate future promises to be one of marked turbulence for the 1st Marine Division. As of the date of this introduction, one infantry battalion and three artillery batteries have commenced standdown. Eventually one full infantry regiment, six firing batteries and a wide variety of supporting units will depart country, requiring massive realignment of the remaining forces, including a sharp phasedown of such programs as the Combined Unit Pacification Program (already begun with the withdrawal of four CUPP units and the planned termination of another seven) and the medical and dental civic action programs. Consolidation of forces will require that a majority of friendly activity be conducted in the lowland areas, where the density of surprise firing devices is much greater than in the mountainous regions. Therefore, a certain increase in the detonation of such devices may be expected (already in February, 24 detonations have occurred, causing 44 casualties). Furthermore, some increase in enemy activity may be projected, as he attempts to harass to the maximum both remaining and redeploying forces. However, the combat efficiency of the Division has remained at a high level throughout its stay in the Republic of Vietnam, and there is no reason to believe that this record will not be at least maintained, if not improved.

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G-1 OVERVIEW

Personnel management, in January 1971 as well as in months past, has kept pace with the force structure reductions of the past 13 months, as evidenced by the Command being continuously in combat readiness category C-1. In other administrative areas involving such subjects as morale, discipline and personnel services, appropriate norms of effectiveness have been rather well maintained. Abstracts of these norms, as well as over and under achievements, are presented below:

a. The end-of-January 1971 strength of the Division was 12,623, an increase of 52 from December 1970 and 109 more than the RVN ceiling. The strength, which peaked at over 31,000 in November 1969 and dropped sharply during Phases III and IV of redeployment, will again drop with Phase VI, beginning in February 1971. (See Tab 1-1)

b. The January 1971 1st term reenlistment rate of 9% was a significant drop from December's 31% and the 1971 annual rate of 40%. Factors which may have affected the rate are the emphasis on reenlisting only Marines of the highest caliber and redeployments and subsequent reduction in overall Marine Corps strength. (See Tab 1-2)

c. Congressional and special interest correspondence received during January 1971 totalled 57 pieces compared to December's 71, representing 4.5 pieces per 1,000 strength compared to 5.7 and 1970's annual average of 5.3. Analysis reveals no statistical significance, but the increase during November 1970 may be attributed to correspondence generated as a result of the personnel redeployment criteria and, generally, can be grouped into the categories of welfare, confinement/discipline, and basic allowance/family separation. (See Tab 1-3)

d. During January 1971, Purple Heart Medals continued to be awarded at the rate of 10.0 per 1,000 personnel established in December 1970, while the rate for heroic/meritorious decorations increased from 27.4 to 33.1. While The Purple Heart rate was significantly less than 1970's annual rate (14.4/1,000) and less than one-third 1969's (31.3/1,000), it virtually equalled the average for the previous three months (9.7/1,000). The increase in the rate for all other awards may be attributed to the commencement of the program of early submission of award recommendations for deserving enlisted personnel of redeploying units and is a repeat of the pattern experienced during the two periods of redeployment in 1970. Additionally, an increase in combat activity during January fueled a rise in the submission of citations for heroism. (See Tab 1-4)

e. The rate for trials for crimes of violence involving Division personnel increased to 1.5 per 1,000 personnel during January 1971 and was a continuation of the rise in this rate that began in November 1970. The primary causes for the increase in the rate, the highest in 25 months and significantly higher than the averages for the past two years, are the increased effectiveness in the investigation of such crimes and the expedition of the case load concerning personnel redeploying with Keystone Robin (Charlie) units. (See Tab 1-5a)

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f. Although the 28 unauthorized absences reported in January 1971 does not represent the highest monthly total since this report was originated in July 1969, the corresponding rate of 2.2 absences per 1,000 personnel is the highest such rate in that same period. The absence rate, after remaining virtually steady during the period July through October 1970 (at about 1.0 per 1,000), increased to 1.3 in November, 1.7 in December, and 2.2 in January. If this trend continues, the rate for February 1971 will be 2.8 per 1,000 personnel. (See Tab 1-5b)

g. The number of Marines in confinement in January 1971 declined from December's 60 to January's 49. This seems to be a continuation of the downward trend established during 1970, wherein the year's monthly average was 90, that of the last half of the year 68, and that of the last three months of the year 52. However, because Division strength decreased apace, the confinement rate for 1970 was a relatively steady 4.5 per 1,000, from which January's 3.9 per 1,000 is not significantly different. Therefore, the rate in the future should remain in the range 4-5 per 1,000. (See Tab 1-5c)

h. During January 1971, eight punitive discharges were awarded, equalling the number awarded during December 1970, and, since Division strength during the two months was virtually unchanged, a steady discharge rate of 0.6 per 1,000 ensued. Both the number and rate were well above the figures for October and November because a greater number of general and special courts-martial were conducted during December and January than were conducted during the previous two months. However, January's rate equalled the annual rate for both 1969 and 1970, and rates in this vicinity should continue to occur in the near future. (See Tab 1-5d)

i. January 1971 saw the processing of 48 administrative discharges, up from 42 in November and 41 in December. The slight increase may be due to the fact that virtually all the recommendations for such discharges initiated during the latter part of 1970 were completed processing in January. Because the weeding-out process pursued during 1970 has been virtually completed, a distinct downturn in the rate of such discharges can be anticipated in the future. (See Tab 1-5e)

j. The number of judicial and investigatory actions concerning drug abuse increased only slightly during January 1971 (from 41 in December to 46), while the processing of administrative discharges increased by 250% (from 12 to 30). The rate of the former actions remained essentially the same as the three previous months (3.8 per 1,000 versus an average of 3.5 per 1,000), indicating relatively steady performance. The increase in the processing of drug-related administrative discharges may be attributed to the "clearing of the docket" (See Tab 1-5e) discussed in the paragraph above. (See Tab 1-5f)

k. There were no reported racial incidents during January 1971, a fact reinforcing the trend established during the last half of 1970, a period of time during which an average of just over one such incident occurred per month. Because of intense command interest, the reduced rate experienced in this recent period of time should carry over to the future. (See Tab 1-5g)

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1. As was the case with racial incidents above, there were no "fragging" incidents reported in January 1971, producing the second consecutive month during which no casualties resulted from such incidents. The trend in both cases and casualties is downward, although the evidence of a decreasing casualty trend is more convincing than that of incidents. (See Tab 1-5h)

m. Major offenses for January 1971 (encompassing those offenses criminal in nature) fell to 35 from December's 43, producing an offense rate of 2.8 per 1,000 compared to December's 3.4 and 1970's average of 3.3. It is significant to note that there were only two violent crimes (actual and attempted murder/homicide, simple and aggravated assault, rape, unlawful ordnance detonation, communicating a threat or armed robbery) compared to five in December and thirteen in November. (See Tab 1-5i)

n. The processing of vehicle/traffic offenses during January 1971 (a total of 122) increased more than three-fold over the average for the last three months of 1970 (36) and the monthly average for 1970 (102). These figures convert to offense rates of 9.7/1,000 (January 1971), 2.8/1,000 (October - December 1970), and 5.1/1,000 (1970). (See Tab 1-5j)

o. Miscellaneous offenses (encompassing those incidents not included in either the major or vehicle/traffic offense categories) increased to 95 from December's thirteen month low of 32, but decreased from the 1970 monthly average of 213, converting to offense rates of 7.5/1,000 personnel for January 1971, 2.5/1,000 for December 1970, and 10.8/1,000 for the year 1970. (See Tab 1-5k)

p. Ground safety is the general category embracing not only the subject of battle versus non-battle casualties, but also incidents involving friendly supporting arms, individual weapons (outside a cantonment), accidental discharges, explosive ordnance, motor vehicle accidents, and operational/occupational incidents.

(1) The battle casualty rate increased in January 1971 to 294 per million man-days from December's 212, temporarily arresting the gradual downward trend experienced over the previous nine months. The rate of non-battle casualties, on the other hand, decreased during January to 51 per million man-days from December's 75 and the average rate of 76 per million man-days during the last three months of 1970. (See Tab 1-6a)

(2) An analysis of the major categories of non-battle casualties reveals the following changes:

| <u>TYPE INCIDENT</u> | <u>JAN 71</u> <u>RATE*</u> | <u>DEC 70</u> <u>RATE*</u> | <u>CHANGE</u> | <u>1970</u> <u>RATE*</u> | <u>CHANGE</u> |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| Friendly Fire | 0.2 | 0.5 | -60% | 1.2 | -83% |
| Explosive Ordnance | 0.2 | 1.3 | -85% | 0.9 | -78% |
| Accidental Discharges | 0.6 | 0.4 | +50% | 0.5 | +20% |
| Motor Vehicle | 0.6 | 0.2 | +200% | 0.4 | +50% |

*Per 1,000 personnel

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q. Participation in the Savings Bond program during January 1971 decreased sharply from that achieved during the previous month (from 74.3% to 64.1%) and was well below the average for 1970 (69.8%). Participation in the Savings Deposit program, on the other hand, decreased negligibly from the 5.1% figure recorded in November and December 1970 (to 5.0%), while January's percentage surpassed 1970's average by a comfortable margin (5.0% versus 4.2%).

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G-2 OVERVIEW

During January 1971, enemy activity remained at a relatively low level of intensity. There were only 1,394 enemy sighted during the month (a slight increase over December 1970), and the enemy again chose not to present himself in strength, but instead conducted sporadic, harassing attacks directed toward disruption of the pacification effort and infrequent attacks by fire, during which he expended 46 mortar rounds and a single rocket. His major units spent most of the month in the mountainous base areas completing a lengthy phase of rehabilitation and resupply. During the latter days of the month, several Main Force and Local Force units left their base areas and returned to their traditional operating areas in the lowlands in preparation for the spring offensive. Major Main Force and NVA units remained in their rear areas concentrating on resupply, indoctrination, training and production. Division intelligence activity during the month included the implantation of nine new sensor strings using Phase III sensors and continuation of reconnaissance activity, which in turn included the daily inspection of all Q. L. 1 bridges in the Division AO by reconnaissance divers.

January reflected a continuation of the steady decline in enemy activity evidenced during 1970. The most striking evidence of this decline is reflected in a monthly comparison of enemy sighted/enemy attacks by fire during the past thirteen months. Total enemy sighted dropped from 4,425 (January 1970) to a low of 576 (November) with an increase to 1,331 (December) and 1,394 in January 1971 (locally significant, but in the long run relatively insignificant). In essence, more enemy were sighted during the first month of 1970 than were observed during the last four months of the year (4,159 observed from 1 September through 31 December 1970). Total enemy attacks by fire (rockets, mortar rounds, lob bombs) similarly declined; 658 rounds were received in January 1970 alone as compared to a cumulative figure of 638 rounds received during the last six months of 1970 (1 July through 31 December). In January 1971, 47 rounds were received, virtually equalling December.

This reduction in enemy activity can be attributed largely to the attritional losses sustained by units subordinate to Front 4 and to the resultant decision by the enemy to revert to guerrilla warfare techniques in order to conserve his depleted forces. Overall enemy strength in the province, once estimated as high as 16,800 (May 1969), diminished to an estimate of 8,325 (January 1971). Infiltration of replacements from North Vietnam has been minimal. The enemy's inability to recruit from the manpower base of indigenous South Vietnamese has resulted in the necessity to assign many NVA personnel to augment traditionally VC Main Force, Local Force, and Guerrilla Units. A further illustration of the enemy's declining combat effectiveness is evidenced by his need to realign his organizational structure. Throughout 1969 and during early 1970, Front 4 commanded four NVA Regiments, but at present it appears that only the 38th NVA Regiment remains active in the province. The disbanding of units, reduction of unit strengths, and realignment of operational control has resulted in an extensive reorganization of units as well as command and control relationships; the "Wing" concept of decentralized command and control is now apparently defunct. Unless an intense effort is made by the enemy to introduce sizable reinforcements into the province during 1971, it is antici-

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pated that his present force levels will continue to deteriorate. Confronted with FWMAF/ARVN preemptive operations, reduced manpower, and food shortages, enemy forces will be capable of conducting only the harassing activities, that have characterized their efforts in recent months. In the populated lowlands, main efforts will be channeled toward rebuilding the depleted VC military and political structure at the hamlet and village level; in the highlands, NVA forces will be preoccupied with logistic activities.

During January 1971 there were 24 Reconnaissance Teams available to the Division. Of these an average of 15 was available for field employment on any given day. An average of 8 teams was actually deployed, there being some curtailment of flight activities incident to reconnaissance activities due to the winter crachin. As a result of Phase IV reductions during September 1970, 1st Marine Division reconnaissance assets were reduced by two companies of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion as well as the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (less a platoon detachment). The availability of Reconnaissance Teams in January (1971) was the same as the last quarter of 1970. These figures are expected to remain relatively constant until Increment VI Redeployment is initiated. Although present weather conditions are restrictive to helicopter insertions/extractions of teams, the current use of Platoon/Company Patrol Bases will facilitate the employment and resupply of teams operating in the field.

A significant increase in ground sensor activity occurred in early January 1971. This is attributed to the arrival and employment of Phase III (Improved) Sensor Equipment. A total of 99 sensors was in use as of the 31st of January. This increased usage is expected to continue through Increment VI Redeployment.

1st Marine Division unattended ground sensor utilization has decreased significantly since July 1970 due to the removal of the DAISS (Danang Anti-Infiltration Surveillance System) as well as RF (Radio Frequency) Sensor Strings in southern and central Quang Nam Province. SCAMP personnel reductions, restrictions in the number of sensor channels, and monsoon conditions likewise contributed to the decline in the number of sensors that could be effectively employed.

the disbanding
of the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company

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ENEMY ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DIVISION TAOR, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

Overall enemy activity continued, when considering the long run, to decline in January 1971, although limited increases in certain statistics over figures for December 1970 occurred. The number of enemy sighted during the month rose slightly to 1,394 from the 1,331 sighted during the previous month. The January figure was just over half the monthly average (2,568) for 1970. The enemy fired 46 mortar rounds at friendly positions during the month and a single rocket, the 47 rounds representing a decrease of two from December. These decreases may be attributed to the enemy's forced reversion to the guerrilla warfare tactics which were prevalent prior to the large scale commitment of North Vietnamese Army forces in 1965. The enemy continued in January 1971 to reduce the number of his offensive actions using NVA units, concentrating instead on the disruption of the GVN pacification effort, terrorism and the employment of Local Forces. Therefore, his overt presence in the lowlands continued to decline significantly.

The number of enemy sighted by 1st Marine Division Units during 1970 steadily dropped throughout the year 1970 as illustrated by the high of 4,425 enemy observed in January in comparison to the 2,785 sighted during the latter quarter of the year (October, November, December). This reflects the enemy's overall strength decline in the province (See Tab 2-1) and also reveals his reluctance to jeopardize his remaining forces. While sightings have begun to increase (1,394 in January) slightly due to the passing of the monsoon season and pre-Tet activity, monthly totals almost certainly will not reach the levels observed in 1969 or early 1970. (See Tab 2-6b)

Enemy efficiency in the employment of mortars has deteriorated as evidenced by the inaccurate fire reported by units in the 1st Marine Division TAOR during recent months. His mortars have been used primarily as a harassing weapon since the enemy has not elected to commit sizable forces in an offensive role. As is true of rocket attacks, mortar attacks are timed to coincide with general offensive surges. With the expenditure of only 66 mortar rounds during November and December, this total represents approximately 2.7% of the number of rounds expended throughout 1970 and further illustrates a decrease in enemy activity. In January 1971, 46 mortar rounds were expended indicating no significant change in the enemy's employment of mortars. (See Tab 2-6a)

The use of lob bombs is almost entirely for purpose of harassment. The round, composed of a crudely fuzeed artillery round or aerial bomb lofted in the general direction of a target by a charge of explosive, may travel as far as 600 meters. It is a grossly inaccurate system, and the round is often a dud. (See Tab 2-6a).

In order for him to implement his strategy of guerrilla warfare, the enemy has continued to employ rockets against area targets, a tactic which serves as an excellent psychological weapon. Since he has neither the logistical system nor combat capability to employ rockets as a medium of close combat support, the enemy has utilized rockets as a medium to intimidate the civilian population and to a lesser degree, FWMAF. The pattern of rocket attacks conforms closely to surges and ebbs of the enemy's campaigns. (During the month of January 1970, the months of April and May, and the period August through October, the enemy attempted to increase his offensive activity. Consequently, of the 229 rockets that he launched during 1970, 185 were fired during these three periods). In January 1971 the enemy launched 1 rocket in the Division TAOR.

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There is no evidence that the effectiveness of enemy rocket units will improve in 1971. (See Tab 2-6a)

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ROCKETS, MORTAR ROUNDS, AND LOB BOMBS RECEIVED, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

The employment of rockets, mortars and lob bombs by the enemy in Quang Nam province remained at a low level during January 1971, during which month 46 mortar rounds were fired at friendly positions (an increase of five over the previous month), a single rocket was fired (down seven from December), and no lob bombs were employed (the second consecutive month). As can be easily seen, mortar rounds continue to be, by far, the largest medium of enemy firepower, but mortar attacks are primarily harassing in nature and are rarely followed by infantry or sapper exploitation.

Enemy employment of rockets during 1970 varied from a high during April, when 58 were expended, to two months (March and July) in which no rockets were fired in Quang Nam Province. Rocket attacks have been directed primarily against Danang and its environs, and while they frequently are planned for periods of low lunar illumination, the enemy's ability to launch such attacks is largely governed by his ability to avoid FWMAF/ARVN detection while attempting to establish launch sites. Preemptive small unit operations in the "Danang Rocket Belt" have contributed significantly toward denying the enemy sufficient opportunity to prepare multiple firing positions within range of lucrative targets. Rockets have also been employed recently against Hill 52 and Thuong Duc Ranger Border Defense Camp, both located in the Thuong Duc Corridor. By virtue of occupying dominant terrain, the enemy has a higher degree of selectivity in choosing firing sites within this area, however, the inherent inaccuracy of this weapon renders it relatively ineffective when fired in small quantities. When afforded the opportunity, the enemy will continue to fire rockets in small numbers, and employment in 1971 will probably reflect a low level of intensity similar to that observed in 1970. Tab 2-6 also discusses enemy rocket employment.

Enemy employment of mortars during 1970 commenced with a high of 621 rounds expended in January 1970 followed by a steady decline that resulted in a mere 25 and 41 rounds fired during November and December, respectively. From January through December the average monthly expenditure has been 85 rounds per month. This is in consonance with the evidence of declining enemy activity throughout the province; friendly small unit operations have denied the enemy opportunity to conduct sustained barrages without detection, consequently the mortar team must resort to short-duration employment and resultant ineffectiveness. Although local shortages of mortar rounds are apparent in some instances, this situation usually results from logistic interdiction by FWMAF/ARVN Forces and does not necessarily reflect a province-wide ordnance shortage. Mortar tubes, while sufficient in quantity, are considered too valuable to risk capture and therefore are employed sparingly. In the foreseeable future, the enemy can be expected to employ his mortars in a cautious fashion, choosing to jeopardize neither men nor weapons for the sake of limited results. Mortar attacks are predicted to remain harassing in nature. Additional comments on enemy mortar employment are contained in Tab 2-6.

Employment of lob bombs during the past thirteen months has varied from a high during June, when 27 were expended, to four months (February, April, and

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December 1970 and January 1971) in which no lob bombs were utilized in Quang Nam Province. As portrayed by the graph, the only pattern in evidence is a usage that appears to vary in inverse proportion to the expenditure of rockets or mortar rounds, thereby superficially indicating a "gap filler" weapon encountered during periods when conventional stand-off attacks by fire have declined. Despite such a pattern, there is no amplifying evidence to support this trend, and it is generally concluded that lob bombs are employed in random fashion by guerrilla forces. Although this crude weapon lends little to the enemy's supporting arms capability, it will probably continue to be employed infrequently by guerrillas as a harassing technique. Tab 2-6 also addresses lob bomb employment.

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G-3 OVERVIEW

January 1971 saw a minor upsurge in both friendly and enemy activity in the 1st Marine Division Area of Operations. Most indicators considered in this section showed an increase over those recorded in December 1970, yet when one compares January's figures with the monthly averages for 1969 or 1970 (or, for that matter, with monthly averages for the last three or six months), the downward trend in activity established over the past 25 months remains valid.

Both friendly and enemy casualties increased slightly in January, with USMC/USN KIA and WIA running 15 and 136 compared to 11 and 125 in December 1970. Enemy troops killed in action rose from 162 to 211, while enemy weapons losses (virtually the only statistics that experienced declines during the past month) dropped from 87 individual and 9 crew-served weapons captured to 80 and 6, respectively.

Mines and booby traps continued to take their toll of Division personnel in January. Such devices claimed 72 casualties in January compared to 53 the preceding month. The 72 casualties were caused by the detonation of 37 devices, while 116 mines or booby traps were found and rendered harmless by Division troops, resulting in a find/detonation ratio of 3.19:1. The figures for both finds and detonations represent increases over December, whereas the 3.19:1 ratio was the first downturn in that statistic since July 1970.

Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) units continued, in January 1971, to provide a measure of security to over 31,000 people located in some of the more remote hamlets of Quang Nam Province, even though one of the 22 units was disestablished during the month. A price was paid for this security, since 25 Marines and Corpsmen were wounded during the month, but CUPP members killed 63 of the enemy and were responsible for 12 prisoners or Hoi Chanh (ralliers). The 25 CUPP casualties were a marked increase over the one killed and nine wounded in December, while the enemy's 63 KIA represented an increase of nine over December's 54.

All statistics in the areas of supporting arms employment and helicopter usage (with the single exception of naval gunfire ship-days on station) experienced increases. Artillery and Naval gunfire expenditures were up from 26,999 artillery rounds and 217 rounds of naval ordnance in December 1970 to 35,400 and 295 in January 1971. Aircraft employment in support of the Division included 379 fighter/attack sorties (up from 333) and 5,431 hours of helicopter flight time (up from 4,941), during which 37,537 passengers and 2,259 tons of cargo were carried (up from 35,427 and 1,999, respectively).

As was mentioned above, comparison of January's statistics with those of past months continues to provide solid evidence of a downward trend in activity in the Division AO. In addition, similar comparisons can be made in the area of relative combat effectiveness. In Table I following January 1971 figures are compared to average statistics for the past six months, the six months previous to that (January - June 1970) and the twelve months of 1969.

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TABLE I. Comparison of January statistics to those of several previous periods.

| <u>TITLE</u> | <u>JAN 71</u> | <u>JUL - DEC 70</u> | <u>COMPAR TO JAN</u> | <u>JAN - JUN 70</u> | <u>COMPAR TO JAN</u> | <u>1969</u> | <u>COMPAR TO JAN</u> |
|---------------|---------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|
| Fr KIA | 15 | 20 | - 25% | 47 | - 68% | 88 | - 83% |
| En KIA | 211 | 213 | - 1% | 658 | - 68% | 804 | - 74% |
| Fr WIA | 136 | 181 | - 25% | 423 | - 68% | 774 | - 82% |
| En IWC | 80 | 76 | + 5% | 138 | - 42% | 189 | - 58% |
| En CSWC | 6 | 6 | 0% | 11 | - 45% | 20 | - 70% |
| CUPP KIA | 0 | 1 | -100% | 6 | -100% | 3 | -100% |
| CUPP WIA | 25 | 11 | +127% | 22 | + 14% | 13 | + 92% |
| KIA to CUPP | 63 | 21 | +200% | 25 | +152% | 20 | +215% |
| PW/HC to CUPP | 12 | 13 | - 8% | 16 | - 25% | 29 | - 59% |
| M/BT Found | 116 | 112 | + 3% | 206 | - 44% | 195 | - 41% |
| M/BT Deton | 37 | 52 | - 29% | 110 | - 66% | 107 | - 65% |
| Ratio F/D | 3.19 | 2.18 | + 46% | 1.86 | + 72% | 1.83 | + 74% |
| Arty Exp | 35400 | 73702 | - 52% | 148490 | - 76% | 168138 | - 79% |
| NGF Exp | 295 | 911 | - 68% | 3393 | - 91% | 5501 | - 95% |
| Ship-Days | 3 | 10 | - 70% | 25 | - 88% | 31 | - 90% |
| Sorties | 379 | 490 | - 23% | 937 | - 60% | 1743 | - 78% |
| Helo Hours | 5431 | 5895 | - 8% | 7182 | - 24% | 8074 | - 33% |
| Helo Pax | 37537 | 46295 | - 19% | 60823 | - 38% | 53335 | - 30% |
| Helo Cargo | 2259 | 3077 | - 27% | 4442 | - 49% | 6551 | - 65% |

Perusal of the table above lends credence to the conclusion that most activity in the Division AO, both friendly and enemy, is well below that of previous months and, additionally, because earlier periods of time have tended to produce higher statistics, such decreases have occurred gradually. Furthermore, because statistics reflecting favorably on Division performance tend to be decreasing

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less rapidly than adverse data (e.g. enemy KIA in January 1971 are down only 1% from the average for the previous six months and enemy individual weapons captured have actually increased 5%, while friendly KIA have decreased 25%), the excellent relative combat effectiveness of the Division appears to continue to improve.

Although the next few weeks will surely be marked by a turbulence rendering prediction a chancy undertaking, the Division should, in all circumstances, continue to maintain its excellent combat record.

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COMBINED UNIT PACIFICATION PROGRAM

During January 1971, combat action involving Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) units continued at the high level experienced during December 1970. In the 5th Marines Golf Cupp Area, aggressive patrol and alert ambush activities accounted for 63 NVA/VC killed in action (an increase of nine over the number recorded in December), two enemy captured and ten ralliers under the Chieu Hoi program. The majority of the sharp fighting again took place west of Baldy Combat Base in the Phu Huong (BT 1146) area. During the period 12 - 22 January, Golf CUPP 6, supported extensively by armed helicopters, killed 36 enemy without sustaining a single casualty. However, the CUPP units' success during the month was not without its price, as 25 CUPP members were wounded in January.

Since its inception in November 1969, CUPP has brought an increased measure of security to over 31,000 Vietnamese people, providing an atmosphere for growth of GVN strength in heretofore VC-dominated regions. Composed of Marine infantry squads integrated with Vietnamese Regional or Popular Force platoons, there are currently 21 CUPPs performing their mission in a like number of hamlets. Initially assigned to marginally secure or insecure hamlets (rated C or below on the Hamlet Evaluation System scale), these CUPP units form a viable screen behind which pacification and rural development can flourish at the grass roots level of Vietnamese society. There are over two Marine rifle companies assigned to the CUPP mission with a strength of 502 Marines and corpsmen. While there has been no reduction to date in the number of CUPP units because of redeployment, a schedule for the disestablishment of certain CUPP units has been approved and will be executed shortly. (See Tab 3-4b)

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SUPPORTING ARMS

The volume of ordnance delivered by supporting arms during the month of January 1971, including the number of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing fighter/attack sorties flown in support of the Division, increased over comparable statistics for December 1970. Artillery ammunition expended rose from 26,999 rounds in December to 35,400 in January, naval gunfire expenditures from 217 rounds to 295, and fixed wing sorties from 333 to 379. The lone statistic considered in this section that experienced a decline from December to January was the number of ship-days on station, which dropped from four to three. The local increases listed above are due, in large measure, to an upsurge in enemy manifestations (enemy sighted rose from 576 in November to 1,331 in December and 1,394 in January) and to a massive attack by fire conducted during the latter third of January (and, presently, continuing) designed to deny to the enemy probable bases of operation for his pre-Tet and post-Tet activities.

The local increases outlined above do not reverse the general downward trend in the employment of fire support established over the past several months. During 1969, artillery expenditures, although exhibiting sizable fluctuations from month to month, demonstrated a relatively level trend in monthly totals and averaged approximately 168,000 rounds per month. The average for 1970 was 111,000 rounds per month, but the monthly totals for the first half of the year were well above that average, while those for the latter half were, generally, well below that average, producing a definite downward trend. Increases in December 1970 to some 27,000 rounds (from November's two-year low of 21,500) and the aforementioned 35,400 in January affected only slightly the trend, which can be attributed to the general decrease in enemy activity (See Tab 2-1 and Sub-Section 2-6) and a more selective targetting policy adopted in the latter stages of 1970.

Naval gunfire expenditures in support of the Division, after averaging over 8,000 rounds per month in the Spring of 1969 (March - May), fell rather steadily and produced a 1969 average of 5,500 rounds per month and a 1970 average of 2,200. Monthly totals for the past six months (August 1970 through January 1971) have all been well under 1,000 rounds per month, a continuation of the downward trend. This continuing reduction can be attributed to a massive reduction in the monthly totals of ship-days on station for naval gunfire vessels (down by a factor of ten since the earlier months of 1969) which, in turn, has been accompanied by a lack of suitable observed targets in the Division AO (See Tab 3-5c).

The number of fixed wing fighter/attack sorties, after having dropped precipitously during the latter half of 1969, levelled off during the first five months of 1970, decreased gradually until September, and has since remained in the range 350 - 500 sorties per month. The large total decrease experienced during 1969 and 1970 is a result of reduced 1st Marine Aircraft Wing assets due to redeployment, the general decrease in enemy activity and, to a certain extent, the unfavorable flying weather occurring during the two rainy seasons covered on this report.

The employment of supporting arms will wax or wane in the near future in response to three factors: (1) the intensity of enemy activity, (2) the

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need for fire support by the Division and other allied units, and (3) redeployments as they occur.

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INTRODUCTION

Two over-riding factors influenced the bulk of 1st Marine Division activity during February 1971 -- the continuing Division effort toward defeat of the enemy (and the enemy's counter-effort to thwart the attainment of our objectives and begin his planned Spring campaign), and preparation for Increment VI redeployment. The enemy's activities were marked by a significant increase in standoff attacks by fire on friendly positions and his continued emphasis on the use of surprise firing devices, while the Division, through the continuation of Operations Imperial Valley and Upshur Stream and extensive repositioning of forces, exerted uninterrupted pressure on the enemy, despite the standdown of one infantry battalion and three firing batteries.

Although estimated enemy strength in Quang Nam Province continued to decline (from 8,325 in January to 7,710 in February 1971), and he was observed less often in the Division Area of Operations (enemy sightings falling from 1,394 to 1,146), he more than doubled his expenditure of ammunition in standoff attacks by fire during the month. The enemy increased his expenditure of mortar rounds from 46 in January to 69 in February (up 50%); the volume of his rockets fired from zero to 21 (and, incidentally, surpassing by 50% his total output for the previous three months), and his use of crude lob bombs from zero to four (February's four rounds exceeding the enemy's total expenditure of this makeshift weapon for the preceding four months). That the enemy was physically less in evidence may be fairly well established by noting that the number of enemy soldiers killed fell by 34% (from 211 in January to 139) and the number of his weapons captured dropped similarly (from 80 individual and 6 crew-served to 50 and 2, respectively). However, the decline in enemy sightings may not be a good indication of enemy activity during February, because a combination of factors tended to reduce the surveillance capacity of the Division. The Division AO was somewhat smaller during the month because of temporary AO extensions granted adjacent units, and the Division's means of observation decreased with the retrograding of the Integrated Observation Device from OP Roundup and the ship's binoculars from FSB Ryder and the standdown of the units mentioned above.

In addition to the continuation of the operations previously mentioned and extensive patrol, ambush and reconnaissance activity, supporting efforts kept pace with Division activities, although most indicators recorded small decreases. Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) units, after having engaged in two consecutive months of heavy contact, experienced a certain tapering-off in combat action. However, while members of CUPPs suffered less than 12% of the Division's casualties during February (one killed, fifteen wounded), they accounted for almost 27% of the enemy's deaths (37 enemy KIA of a total of 139). All but one of the indicators in the area of supporting arms and helicopter support fell during the month, the single exception being fixed wing aircraft support to the Division (up from 379 sorties in January to 413), but almost a third of the sorties flown were provided by non-1st Marine Aircraft Wing sources.

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Just as enemy losses decreased during February, so did Division casualties, although at a less rapid rate. This phenomenon may be attributed to the detonation of 33 booby traps which claimed 63 casualties, 46% of the Division total. Friendly casualties would have been noticeably lower but for the ill fortune of one company which suffered 24 men wounded in a three-day period because of the detonation of 11 surprise firing devices. The company was operating in the northern Arizona, a densely booby-trapped portion of the Division AO. The 33 detonations combined with a sizable drop in finds (from 116 in January to 74) and served to depress the find to detonation ratio to 2.24:1 (the lowest ratio since August 1970).

Non-battle casualties remained at the low level experienced in January (indeed, both the frequency of incidents [down from 33 to 31] and the casualties resulting [down from 30 to 24] decreased from January to February, but falling Division population rendered the rates virtually equal); but the vagaries of fate were such that the 24 casualties included four deaths, this figure exceeding the total number of non-hostile fatalities during the preceding two months. The Division continues to emphasize the reduction of non-hostile casualties, and the present low level should be, at worst, maintained, if not bettered.

The effects of redeployment were most noticeable in the area of personnel management, law and discipline during February 1971. The standdown of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines and Batteries D, F and K, 11th Marines contributed to a significant decrease in Division strength from 12,623 at the end of January to 10,440 at the end of February, and general anticipation of redeployment may have tended to lower the volume of Congressional and special interest correspondence received (down sharply from 57 pieces to 38). The 1st term reenlistment rate remained below 10% during February, while the early submission of recommendations for meritorious awards pushed the number of citations processed close to 600. Although violence has seemingly subsided, as evidenced by a number of indicators (e.g., the Division Military Police section processed only two major offenses involving violence during February), both the number of trials for violent crimes and the corresponding trial rate continued to increase, as the Staff Judge Advocate section labored to reduce its case backlog prior to redeployment.

The logistics picture within the Division remains bright, as the Division maintained its FORSTAT combat readiness rating of C-1 in both equipment readiness and supplies/equipment on hand. In addition, all categories of combat essential end-items of equipment continued to achieve operationally ready percentages well in excess of Marine Corps standards. However, the performance of numerous limited technical inspections (LTI) during the past month revealed that many items (especially in the motor transport commodity group), although fit for operations in the Republic of Vietnam, are unsuitable for retrograde due to age or condition. The Department of Defense sponsored program to transfer equipment to the Vietnamese armed forces commenced again during February, and the efforts of all concerned resulted in 100% acceptance of the 243 items offered thus far.

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The turbulence predicted in previous editions of this document is now being experienced. In addition to the units previously mentioned, a number of others have commenced standdown in early March, including the headquarters of both 5th and 11th Marines, the remaining batteries of 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Engineer Battalion (-), 1st Motor Transport Battalion (-), 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (-), Detachment, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company and Battery L, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines. The inevitable personnel and unit realignment concomitant with operations of this nature will continue in March as the remainder of the units involved in Phase VI of redeployment standdown. However, actual combat action thus far in March has been relatively light. For example, in the first fourteen days of the month, the Division has suffered only 37 casualties and has expended just over 5,000 rounds of artillery ammunition. If this trend continues, March may provide record low frequencies for most, if not all of the indicators considered in this book. However, redeployment notwithstanding, the 1st Marine Division will continue to carry the battle to the enemy.

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G-1 OVERVIEW

Personnel management, in February 1971 as well as in months past, has kept pace with the force structure reductions of the past 14 months, evidenced by the fact that the Command has been continuously in combat readiness category C-1. In other administrative areas involving such subjects as morale, discipline and personnel services, appropriate norms of effectiveness have been rather well maintained. Abstracts of these norms, as well as over and under achievements, are presented below:

a. The end-of-February strength of the Division was 10,440, a decrease of 2,183 from January 1971 and 468 less than the RVN ceiling. The strength, which peaked at over 31,000 in November 1969 and dropped sharply during Phases III and IV of redeployment (in 1970), will continue to fall during Phase VI (See Tabs 1-1 and 1-1-1).

b. The February 1971 1st term reenlistment rate of 10% was a significant drop from December's 31% and the 1970 annual rate of 40%. Factors which may have affected the rate are the emphasis on reenlisting only Marines of the highest calibre, redeployments, and the subsequent reduction in overall Division strength. (See Tab 1-2).

c. Congressional and special interest correspondence received during February 1971 totalled 38 pieces (registering 53 complaints) compared to January's 57 (registering 71 complaints), representing 3.6 pieces per 1,000 personnel for February compared to 4.5 in January and 1970's annual average of 5.3. Both the number of pieces received and the rate continue on a downward trend, February's figures being the lowest yet recorded in either category (See Tab 1-3).

d. During February 1971, Purple Heart Medals were awarded at the rate of 12.6 per thousand compared to January's 10.0 per thousand and the 1970 average of 14.4 per thousand per month. February's rate was significantly higher than the average rate for the previous four months (9.8/1,000) and reflected the increase in the enemy's post-Tet activities. Recommendations for heroic/meritorious/meritorious end of tour awards increased dramatically from the 33.1 per thousand in January to 56.0 per thousand in February 1971. The sharp increase may be attributed to the early submission of recommendations for deserving enlisted personnel of redeploying units and is a repeat of the pattern experienced prior to the end of the two periods of redeployment in 1970. Additionally, the increase in combat activity during the month fueled a rise in the submission of citations for heroism (See Tab 1-4).

e. The rate of trials for crimes of violence involving Division personnel (1.4/1,000) in February virtually equalled January's rate (1.5/1,000) and was a continuation of the trend toward higher rates established in late 1970. The primary causes for the rate increase are improved effectiveness in the investigation of such crimes and expedition of the case load involving personnel redeploying with Keystone Robin (Charlie) units (See Tab 1-5a).

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f. Although the 33 unauthorized absences reported in February do not represent the highest monthly total since the initiation of this report in July 1969, the corresponding absence rate of 3.1 per thousand is the highest on record. This rate has been increasing at an accelerating rate for the past four months and should reach 3.5/1,000 (and possibly 4.0/1,000) in March 1971 (See Tab 1-5b).

g. The number of Division Marines in confinement in February 1971 declined from January's 49 to February's 46. Computation of confinement rates, however, reveal that February's 4.4 prisoners per thousand personnel was a slight increase over January's 3.9 per thousand and virtually equalled 1970's annual average of 4.5 per thousand. Therefore, the rate in the immediate future should remain in the range 4.0 - 5.0 per thousand (See Tab 1-5c).

h. During February 1971, fourteen punitive discharges were awarded, well above the eight awarded in each of January and December, causing the rate to more than double that of the two previous months. The reason for this increase was the greater number of general and special courts-martial conducted in February than in the previous two months. March's rate should remain in the range 1.0 - 1.5 per thousand (See Tab 1-5d).

i. February 1971 saw the processing of 25 administrative discharges, down from 48 in January and 41 in December. The decrease is due to the fact that virtually all the recommendations for such discharges initiated during the latter part of 1970 were completed processing in January. Because the weeding-out process pursued during 1970 has been virtually completed, a distinct downturn in the rate of such discharges can be anticipated (See Tab 1-5e).

j. The number of judicial and investigatory actions concerning drug abuse increased only slightly during February 1971 (from 46 in January to 48), while the processing of administrative discharges decreased by 60% (from 30 to 12). The number of all such actions has fluctuated somewhat in the past, but should begin to decrease rather steadily as redeployments continue (See Tab 1-6f).

k. There were no reported racial incidents during February 1971, a fact reinforcing the trend established during the last half of 1970 and reflecting favorably on the racial climate in the 1st Marine Division. Because of intense command interest, the present low rate of such incidents should continue in the future (See Tab 1-5g).

l. Although one incident of felonious "fragging" occurred during February 1971 (the detonation of a CS grenade), February was the third consecutive month during which no casualties resulted. Both the number of incidents and the number of casualties appear to be maintained on a very low level which should continue in the future (See Tab 1-5g).

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m. Two of the three categories of offenses committed by Division personnel and processed by the Division Military Police Section showed sizable decreases from January to February 1971, while the third showed a definite increase. Major (felonious) offenses fell from 35 to 26 and vehicle/traffic offenses from 122 to 43, while miscellaneous offenses rose from 75 to 105. Violent crimes continued at the low level experienced in January, marijuana violations and larceny decreased 50%, but "hard" narcotics violations rose from 2 to 7. Speeding citations fell by two-thirds, accounting for most of the drop in vehicle/traffic offenses, while increases in off limits violations and drunk/disorderly citations accounted for the bulk of increase in miscellaneous offenses (See Tabs 1-5i, 1-5j and 1-5k).

n. Ground safety is the general category embracing not only the subject of battle versus non-battle casualties, but also treating individually incidents involving friendly supporting arms, individual weapons (outside a cantonment), accidental discharges, explosive ordnance, motor vehicle accidents and operational/occupational incidents.

(1) The battle casualty rate increased, in February 1971, to the highest level since September 1969 (459 casualties per million man-days). The non-battle rate, on the other hand, while increasing slightly over the record low recorded in January (82 versus 77), remained at less than half the average for the last three months of 1970 and approximately a third the average rate for any period prior to that (See Tab 1-6a).

(2) An analysis of the major categories of non-battle casualties reveal the following changes (See Tabs 1-6b through 1-6h):

| <u>TYPE INCIDENT</u> | <u>71 RATE</u> | <u>70 RATE</u> | <u>%CHANGE</u> | <u>69 RATE</u> | <u>%CHANGE</u> |
|----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Friendly Fire | 0.2 | 1.2 | -83% | 1.4 | -86% |
| Accid Discharge | 0.6 | 0.5 | +20% | 0.8 | -25% |
| Explosive Ord | 0.3 | 0.9 | -67% | 1.0 | -70% |
| Motor Vehicle | 0.3 | 0.4 | -25% | 0.4 | -25% |
| Operatnl/Occupatnl | 1.0 | 4.1 | -76% | 3.5 | -71% |

Rates above per 1,000 personnel.

o. Participation in the Savings Bond Program during February 1971 increased slightly over that experienced in January (66.3% of Division strength versus 64.1%), but participation in the Savings Deposit Program declined significantly (4.1% in February versus 5.0% in January). (See Tab 1-7).

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G-2. OVERVIEW

During February 1971, enemy activity remained at a relatively low level of intensity. There were only 1,146 enemy sighted during the month (a slight decrease from January 1971), and the enemy again chose not to present himself in strength, but instead conducted sporadic, harassing attacks primarily directed against GVN forces and functions, during which he expended 69 mortar rounds, 21 rockets and 4 lob bombs within the Division's AO. His major units spent most of the month in the mountainous base area continuing a lengthy phase of rehabilitation and resupply. Main Force and Local Force Units continued to operate in their traditional operating areas in the lowlands in execution of the initial periods of their spring offensive. The increase in the number of rounds received in attacks by indirect fire can be accredited to the enemy's high points in activity in connection with initial periods of Phase I and II of his K800 spring offensive.

February reflected a continuation of the steady decline in enemy activity evidenced during 1970. The most striking evidence of this decline is reflected in a monthly comparison of enemy sighted/enemy attacks by fire during the past fourteen months. Total enemy sighted dropped from 4,425 (January 1970) to a low of 576 (November) with an increase to 1,331 (December), 1,394 (January 1971) and a slight decrease to 1,146 in February 1971. In essence, more enemy were sighted during the first month of 1970 than were observed during the last four months of the year (4,159 observed from 1 September through 31 December 1970). Total enemy attacks by fire (rockets, mortar rounds, lob bombs) similarly declined; 658 rounds were received in January 1970 alone as compared to a cumulative figure of 637 rounds received during the last six months of 1970 (1 July through 31 December). In February 1971, 94 rounds were received, equalling the sum of enemy ammunition expended in both December (1970) and January (1971). The overall reduction in enemy activity can be attributed largely to the attritional losses sustained by units subordinate to Front 4 and to the resultant decision by the enemy to revert to guerrilla warfare techniques in order to conserve his depleted forces.

Overall enemy strength in the province, once estimated as high as 16,800 (May 1969), diminished to an estimated 7,710 (February 1971). Infiltration of replacements from North Vietnam has been minimal. The enemy's inability to recruit from the manpower base of indigenous South Vietnamese has resulted in the necessity to assign many NVA personnel to augment traditionally VC Main Force, Local Force, and Guerrilla Units. A further illustration of the enemy's declining combat effectiveness is evidenced by his need to realign his organizational structure. Throughout 1969 and during early 1970, Front 4 commanded four NVA Regiments, but at present it appears that only the 38th NVA Regiment remains active in the province. The disbanding of units, reduction of unit strengths, and realignment of operational control has resulted in an extensive reorganization of units as well as command and control relationships; the "Wing" concept of decentralized command and control is now apparently defunct. Unless an intense effort is made by the enemy to introduce sizable reinforcements into the province during 1971, it is anticipated that his present force levels will continue to deteriorate. Confronted with FWMAF/ARVN preemptive operations, reduced manpower, and food shortages, enemy forces will be capable of conducting only the harassing activities that have characterized

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their efforts in recent months. In the populated lowlands, main efforts will be channeled towards rebuilding the depleted VC military and political structure at the hamlet and village level; in the highlands, NVA forces will be preoccupied with logistic activities.

During February 1971, there were 24 Reconnaissance Teams available to the Division. Of these, an average of 14 was available for field employment on any given day. An average of 9 teams was actually deployed. As a result of Phase IV Reductions during September 1970, 1st Marine Division reconnaissance assets were reduced by two companies of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion as well as the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (less a platoon detachment). The availability of Reconnaissance Teams in January (1971) was the same as the last quarter of 1970. These figures are expected to remain relatively constant until Increment VI Redeployment is initiated. Although present weather conditions are restrictive to helicopter insertions/extractions of teams, the current use of Platoon Patrol Bases will facilitate the employment and resupply of teams operating in the field.

Unattended ground sensors were employed for the first time to monitor enemy activity on positions recently vacated by redeploying Division forces during February 1971. These new strings consisted of 20 radio frequency sensors, thus bringing the total number of sensors employed within the Division's area of operations to 117 in February.

The continued increase in sensor use each month is a result of two factors. As Marine units redeploy, sensors are used to cover areas infantry units once controlled. Also, there is an increased understanding of sensor capabilities by unit commanders of the Division, resulting in additional sensor requests.

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G-3 OVERVIEW

After a minor upsurge in both friendly and enemy activity in the 1st Marine Division Area of Operations during January 1971, a decline ensued in February 1971 below the low point established in December 1970. When comparing February's figures with the monthly averages for the past 25 months, one sees the downward trend in activity continuing.

Both friendly and enemy casualties decreased in February, with USMC/USN KIA and WIA running 9 and 128, respectively, compared to 15 and 136 in January 1971. Enemy troops killed in action fell from 211 to 139, while enemy weapons losses dropped from 80 individual and 6 crew-served weapons captured to 50 and 2, respectively.

Mines and booby traps continued to take their toll of Division personnel in February. Such devices claimed 63 casualties in February compared to 72 the preceding month. The 63 casualties were caused by the 33 devices, while 74 mines or booby traps were found and rendered harmless by Division troops, resulting in a find/detonation ratio of 2.24:1. The figures for both finds and detonations represent decreases from January; however, the 2.24:1 ratio is less favorable, after having improved throughout 1970 to a December ratio of 4.00:1.

Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) units continued, throughout February 1971, to provide a measure of security to over 31,000 people located in some of the more remote hamlets of Quang Nam Province. The disestablishment of four CUPPs during the month notwithstanding, there was no degradation in security of the hamlets involved, since these combined Marine and territorial force elements had succeeded in upgrading the hamlets to a level of B on the HES scale. The level of action diminished sharply in February; however, CUPP patrols and ambushes decreased Quang Nam's enemy population by 49 (37 killed and 12 captured), while sustaining one Marine killed and 15 wounded during the same period.

All statistics in the area of supporting arms employment and helicopter usage (with the single exception of fixed wing sorties) experienced decreases. Artillery and Naval gunfire expenditures were down from 35,400 artillery rounds and 295 rounds of naval ordnance in January 1971 to 31,362 and zero in February 1971, respectively. Aircraft employment in support of the Division included 413 fighter/attack sorties (up from 379) and 5,278 hours of helicopter flight time (down from 5,431), during which 31,935 passengers and 2,000 tons of cargo were carried (down from 37,537 and 2,259, respectively).

As was mentioned above, comparison of February's statistics with those of past months continues to provide solid evidence of a downward trend in activity in the Division AO. In addition, similar comparisons can be made in the area of relative combat effectiveness. In table I following average statistics for January and February 1971 are compared to average statistics for the last six months of 1970, the six months previous to that (January - June 1970) and the twelve months of 1969.

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TABLE II. Comparison of 1971 statistics to those of several periods in 1970 and 1969.

| <u>TITLE</u> | <u>AVG JAN -FEB 71</u> | <u>AVG JUL -DEC 70</u> | <u>COMPARE TO 1971</u> | <u>AVG JAN -JUN 70</u> | <u>COMPARE TO 1971</u> | <u>AVG OF 1969</u> | <u>COMPARE TO 1971</u> |
|------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| Frndly KIA | 12 | 20 | -40% | 47 | -74% | 88 | -86% |
| Enemy KIA | 175 | 213 | -18% | 658 | -66% | 804 | -78% |
| Frndly WIA | 132 | 181 | -27% | 423 | -69% | 774 | -83% |
| Enemy IWC | 65 | 76 | -14% | 138 | -53% | 189 | -66% |
| Enemy CSWC | 4 | 6 | -33% | 11 | -64% | 20 | -80% |
| CUPP KIA | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | -83% | 3 | -67% |
| CUPP WIA | 20 | 11 | +82% | 22 | - 9% | 13 | +54% |
| En KIA to CUPP | 50 | 21 | +138% | 25 | +100% | 20 | +150% |
| PW/HoiCh to CUPP | 12 | 13 | - 8% | 16 | -25% | 29 | -59% |
| M/BT Found | 95 | 112 | -15% | 206 | -54% | 195 | -51% |
| M/BT Detonated | 35 | 52 | -49% | 110 | -68% | 107 | -54% |
| Ratio F/D | 2.72 | 2.18 | +25% | 1.86 | +46% | 1.83 | +48% |
| Arty Ammo Exp | 33381 | 73702 | -55% | 148490 | -78% | 168138 | -80% |
| NGF Ammo Exp | 148 | 911 | -84% | 3393 | -96% | 5501 | -97% |
| Ship-Days NGF | 2 | 10 | -80% | 25 | -92% | 31 | -94% |
| Fx Wg Sorties | 396 | 490 | -19% | 937 | -58% | 1743 | -77% |
| Helo Hours | 5354 | 5895 | - 9% | 7182 | -25% | 8074 | -21% |
| Helo Pax | 34736 | 46295 | -25% | 60823 | -43% | 53335 | -35% |
| Helo Cargo | 2130 | 3077 | -31% | 4442 | -52% | 6551 | -67% |

Perusal of the table above lends credence to the conclusion that most activity in the Division AO, both friendly and enemy, is at a level well below that of previous months and, in addition, the trend in most statistics is gradually downward (e.g., friendly KIA have fallen from an average of 88 per month in 1969 to 47 per month for the first half of 1970 to 20 per month for the last half of 1970 to 12 per month for the first two months of 1971). Furthermore, because statistics reflecting favorably on Division performance tend to be decreasing less rapidly than adverse statistics (e.g., enemy KIA are decreasing less rapidly than friendly KIA), the excellent relative combat effectiveness of the Division continues to improve.

As the Division's operations in the Republic of Vietnam draw to a close during the next few weeks, turbulence associated with redeployment renders prediction difficult, if not impossible. However, the Division should continue to maintain its excellent combat record in all circumstances.

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COMBINED UNIT PACIFICATION PROGRAM

In sharp contrast to that experienced during December and January, the level of combat action involving Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) units declined substantially in February, as the enemy showed little inclination to engage these ubiquitous CUPP patrols and ambushes. Nevertheless, through comprehensive saturation operations and assiduous employment of supporting arms firepower, CUPP forces took 49 enemy out of action (37 killed and 12 captured), while also seizing eight weapons; one Marine was killed and 15 wounded during the month's fighting. Again, the bulk of the action was concentrated in the Golf CUPP (5th Marines) area, where the Marines and their territorial force counterparts have recorded marked success in upgrading the security of an area previously considered under enemy domination.

Since its inception in November 1969, CUPP has brought an increased measure of security to over 31,000 Vietnamese people, providing an atmosphere for growth of GVN strength in heretofore VC-dominated regions. Composed of Marine infantry squads integrated with Vietnamese Regional or Popular Force Platoons, there have been as many as 24 CUPPs performing their mission in a like number of hamlets. Initially assigned to marginally secure or insecure hamlets (rated C or below on the Hamlet Evaluation System scale), these CUPP units have formed a viable screen behind which pacification and rural development flourish at the grass roots level of Vietnamese society. February saw a reduction in the size of the program, as four CUPP units (those in Hoa Yen, Nghia Nam, Phu Thung, and Quan Nam hamlets) in the 1st Marines AO were disestablished, having accomplished their mission by elevating these hamlets to a B grade on the HES scale. Due to impending redeployment of Marines from RVN, no new CUPP units were established; for the same reason, all ten Golf CUPP units will be disestablished during 1 - 3 March, with the 1st Marines' Thuong Duc CUPPs likewise dissolving on the 15th.

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SUPPORTING ARMS

All indicators within the area of fire support to the Division changed from January to February 1971, although the changes were not all in the same sense. While the number of fixed wing fighter/attack sorties increased by 9% (from 379 to 413), artillery ammunition expenditures fell 11% (from 35,400 to 31,362) and no naval gunfire support was used by the Division during February, the first month in at least the last 26 during which such zero use has occurred.

The decreases above can be directly related to the decrease in enemy sightings (down from 1,394 in January to 1,146 in February), whereas the slight increase in fixed wing sorties may be attributed to the increased availability of such aircraft because of poor flying weather elsewhere in Military Region I. Almost a third of the sorties flown in February involved aircraft from sources other than the 1st MAW (U.S. Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force).

The gradually decreasing trend in the volume of ordnance delivered by supporting arms, which started in January 1970, is expected to continue in the coming months. The four factors influencing supporting arms employment are: (1) The scope of enemy activity, (2) The need for fire support by the Division, (3) The diminishing size of the Division Area of Operations, and (4), To a lesser extent, ongoing redeployments as they occur.

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G-4 OVERVIEW

Although the 1st Marine Division is fully prepared to accomplish its present mission in combat, as evidenced by the logistics figures contained herein, Increment VI redeployments, already begun with the standdown in February 1971 of an infantry battalion and three artillery batteries, will cause unavoidable degradation of combat readiness. The following paragraphs reflect the present situation regarding continuation of the Division's combat mission in the Republic of Vietnam, but losses of combat essential equipment during redeployment resulting from the factors below will have to be replaced for the Division to again achieve combat readiness. The four factors are:

1. Interservice transfer of equipment to RVN Armed Forces.
2. Disposal of obsolete or limited standard equipment in accordance with CMC SPD LTR AO 4G-pmh-2 of 11 Jan 71.
3. Equipment provided 3d Force Service Regiment to meet Mountout/Mountout Augmentation requirements.
4. Equipment coded as unrepairable or uneconomically repairable due to age or condition.

The status of operational readiness for combat essential items within the Division reflected in the unit FORSTAT ratings remains excellent. The Division overall, and all but one of its subordinate units are presently in a C-1 status. The 1st Medical Battalion is C-2 essentially due to deficiencies of a relatively small number of end items (See Tab 4-1).

The overall percentage of the Division's combat essential items of equipment maintained operationally ready continues at a 95% level compared to 87% at this time (the end of February) last year. Three of the four commodity groups used to determine overall readiness, Communication-Electronics, Motor Transport, and Ordnance, substantially exceed the minimum Marine Corps standard of 85% while the fourth, Engineer equipment (for which the standard is 83%), has significantly improved and now stands at 86%, exceeding the standard for the third month in a row (See Tabs 4-2 through 4-2d).

The Department of Defense program to transfer certain selected items to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces was reactivated during February. Transfers completed during the month numbered 243 items offered and accepted for an outstanding acceptance record of 100% (See Tab 4-3).

Embarkation planning and preparation has commenced for units redeploying during Increment VI. The first Division units to redeploy, detachment, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines and Battery K, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines are scheduled to embark on 3 March 1971 (See Tab 4-5).

The prevalence of malaria remained low in February 1971, with 25 cases being recorded for a case rate of 2.2/1000 men. February was the fifth consecutive month in which a reduction in the case rate was reported. On the other hand, the venereal disease case rate of 15.5/1000 men was the highest that has been recorded in the past 26 months (See Tab 4-4 through 4-4b).

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NEWS RELEASE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL DELIVERY OF ADDRESS
EXPECTED AT 12:15 P. M. (EST)
WEDNESDAY, 17 MARCH 1971

REMARKS BY
GENERAL LEONARD F. CHAPMAN, JR.
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
THE MARINE CORPS LUNCHEON OF THE
NAVY LEAGUE SYMPOSIUM
SHERATON-PARK HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

REMARKS BY
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WASHINGTON, D. C.
1215, WEDNESDAY, 17 MARCH 1971

Thank you Mr. Chairman, President Hannan, distinguished guests, members of the League, Ladies and Gentlemen, many fellow Marines.

I'm delighted to be with you today. I have just come from a session of the Senate Appropriations Committee which was also an important event with regard to our 1972 budget. I'm just as anxious to report to you on the present and future condition of the Marine Corps as I was to them. I am especially interested to make this report because I know how interested you are in the Navy-Marine Corps Team.

While I'm talking this afternoon I'm going to try to stick to the two cardinal rules of good reporting. I'm going to try to make the information clear and concise, and I'm going to match it to the specific interests of you, the recipients.

This is how we teach our young officers to frame their reports. And it works out pretty well, most of the time. Of course there are exceptions.

One of these exceptions occurred a few years ago in our Basic School at Quantico, Virginia, where we teach new Marine second lieutenants the techniques of their profession. "Don't make your reports stilted," an instructor warned one class of student officers. "Wipe out the bureaucratic jargon and extraneous words. Get to the heart of the matter. Make the senior officer you're reporting to feel personally involved. Make him know the importance of what you're saying."

To apply the instruction, the teacher had each lieutenant write a report covering the damage to a storeroom by fire. That night he read the efforts. He didn't like any of them. Too long winded, too aloof -- they made no impact at all.

The next day he took the class to task. "Now listen," he said. "You've got to make an immediate impact with the first sentence. Don't hide the seriousness of the situation behind a lot of bland words."

To help the students, the instructor expanded on the original scenario: The officer to

whom the report was addressed was the battalion commander, and he had inspected the storeroom the very morning of the fire. In fact, it was only fifteen minutes after the colonel had left that a gas pipe running through the storeroom had exploded starting the fire.

That evening the instructor settled down to read the results of his teachings. The first report he picked up began: "My God, Colonel, am I glad you left when you did."

Well, let me begin my report this afternoon by saying: I'm certainly glad you all came here when you did. This decade of the 1970's is a challenging period. And I want to tell you what Marines are doing to meet this challenge.

There are four things I want to stress this afternoon: purpose, readiness, quality, and progress. These are the principles guiding all efforts in the Marine Corps of 1971. We are well aware of the fact that we have a proud history and a solid present. We are not going to change anything just for the sake of change, because we know that change does not always mean progress, and progress is what we are seeking. That has always been true in the Marine Corps, and it's certainly true now.

NO CHANGE TO OUR PURPOSE

One thing we are absolutely sure won't change in our Corps is our purpose. Our purpose in 1971 remains exactly what it was in our beginning, nearly two centuries ago. Like the other armed forces of our nation, the purpose of the Marine Corps is the defense of the United States. And reality means facing the fact that the ultimate application of defense is the harsh environment of combat.

For Marines, combat still means facing an enemy on the personal levels of bayonet to bayonet, howitzer to howitzer, and aircraft to aircraft. No one wants this to happen, but we know that it can't be wished away -- and that it won't go away by ignoring it. We also know that the safest and best way to meet this possibility is to be ready for it. Every unit and individual Marine must be an element of readiness -- conditioned, trained, disciplined, lean, tough, and ready to fulfill our purpose.

To fulfill our purpose we are building a new Marine Corps. Now I want to be sure that you understand we are not abandoning the old Marine Corps. We are too tradition minded for that. And I mean exactly that. We are truly tradition minded. We understand the real and necessary strength derived from the proper application of tradition.

Marines know that tradition is not unthinking habit. Tradition is functional. It is a real and viable by-product of serving a purpose faithfully and successfully. It is the essence of past success carried forward to prime further success.

If all our training is traditionally tough, it's because the application of our purpose is tough, in combat and in being constantly ready for combat. If our discipline is traditionally exacting, it is because discipline is the key to winning and surviving in battle. If we traditionally demand pride in personal appearance and unit integrity, it is because pride gives strength, and we must be strong to serve our purpose.

We are not changing any of these things, these standards, nor any of our strict rules and regulations. On the contrary, we are looking for any way we can find to make it tougher, more demanding, with higher standards, for we know that this is the way to satisfaction, performance, pride, and above all, victory on the battlefield.

No, we are not abandoning the old Corps, we are only building a new Corps. And we are building our new Corps in the very best image of the old.

THE TRADITION OF READINESS

The first thing we are doing in building our new Corps, is making every effort to improve our traditional posture of readiness. One of the assets we have in our efforts is an advantage we had in the old Corps: size. We are not going to be big.

For more than a decade before our heavy commitment in Vietnam, our Corps kept its strength at something less than 200,000 Marines. The war, and the need to maintain almost three divisions and a multi-group reinforced aircraft wing in Vietnam, required the Marine Corps to expand to a top wartime strength of 317,000. Now we are down to about 230,000 and growing even slimmer. And slimmer is what we want to be.

We have approval for an eventual tough, lean strength of 206,000 Marines. With this strength we can fully man our three divisions, three aircraft wings, and all supporting units. The disposition of our Marine air-ground team will return primarily to the pre-Vietnam posture, too. One division-wing team will continue to be based on the East Coast at Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point in North Carolina. Another division-wing team will be on the West Coast at Camp Pendleton and El Toro in California, and we will keep one division-wing team in the Pacific.

In the Pacific we are returning to the balance of two-thirds of a division-wing team

forward, in the western Pacific; with the remaining one-third -- an infantry regiment, and air group, and supporting units -- brigaded together at Kaneohe Bay in Hawaii.

All of these organizations will be mobile. With the Navy, they will be totally ready to deploy anywhere at any time as needed. That's readiness.

And we will be able to maintain personal mobility and readiness, too.

With 206,000 Marines we can keep our Fleet Marine Force formations combat ready, and still freely rotate, train, and educate the individual Marines without pressure on professional quality. In fact, it will enhance our professional quality.

And with such readiness, we can meet the next emergency with confidence. And we know two things: First, whenever a crisis comes, anybody who's ready will get to go, and, second, it will likely be a surprise. So the Marines will be ready, every Marine, every piece of equipment, every unit, air and ground. Ready to mount out on short notice, go anywhere with the Navy, take on anybody, and win.

INDIVIDUAL MARINE QUALITY

The key to maintaining the professional quality of our overall character is the maintenance of the quality of the individual Marine -- officer, noncommissioned officer, and nonrated Marine.

Each member of our Corps must know his job and know it well. And each Marine must be able and ready to step up at least one rank to take on greater responsibilities in any emergency. We are going to ensure this quality by seeking only the very best to be Marines. We are going to enhance it by making certain they receive the best training in the profession of arms.

Because of the personnel demands of Vietnam we were forced to shorten enlisted recruit training, and initial officer training. Well, we have lengthened both programs now. And we have established higher standards for graduation from Boot Camp and Basic School. Every Marine, private and second lieutenant, who finally joins the Fleet Marine Force has passed a tough screening process. Each one is the kind of Marine we'd like to keep.

For more senior Marines -- commissioned and noncommissioned officers -- we have more schooling in mind: institutional and on-the-job.

Finally after long years of hoping and planning, we have established a Staff Noncommissioned Officers Academy at Quantico. We've always been able to maintain organizational

NCO schools to meet the particular needs of the units sponsoring them, but this academy is Marine Corps-wide. I'm very enthusiastic about it. It is, I think, an opportunity to reinforce our proven, experienced noncommissioned officer corps, into a breed of doctrine-trained professionals.

For officers, more will be going to our intermediate level Amphibious Warfare School, and the more advanced Command and Staff College, both at Quantico. And to reinforce these resident schools, our COPE program has been successfully underway for a year.

COPE is the acronym for Continuous Officer Professional Education. COPE is one of the best things that's ever happened to us, and it is a good example of progress.

COPE is not merely a correspondence school, nor is it a substitute for the resident schools. It is a professional effort to increase professional knowledge and keep our officers constantly prepared for higher responsibility.

At large posts and stations, officers are assigned by Headquarters Marine Corps, here in Washington, as participants in COPE. They meet in regular classes under the guidance of instructors, although the instructors are more monitors and counselors than teachers. Most of the study is self-study. But it's put together in class meetings to give it depth. Not only does this program fill the gap between officer training in Basic School, and more advanced training in Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Staff College; it prepares the participants for eventual entry into these schools.

Of course civilian education is still the base of professional training. This is especially true in this new and demanding time. To meet the technical demands of the 1970's, we are sending many of our officers, and even some of our staff noncommissioned officers to civilian institutions for advanced and undergraduate schooling. These Marine leaders are attending colleges and universities to study science, business management, and other useful educational programs.

And all of the programs have one common goal. We are using them to increase Marine Corps know-how. The disciplines studied, and the education gained must have a purpose, and that purpose is to better serve the United States as a force-in-readiness. We're going to hold the line on that. On-duty education in the Marine Corps will never become a recreational activity.

QUALITY EQUIPMENT FOR QUALITY MARINES

Our equipment situation, both air and ground, is good. We received much modern equipment the last few years. And we have more coming.

This year the Marine Corps will begin receiving a new family of tracked amphibian vehicles -- the LVTP7. These new vehicles, with only slight changes, will serve not only as amphibian personnel carriers, but as command and control vehicles, mine clearance and recovery tractors as well. Lighter, smaller, and more heavily armed than the current P5 series, the new LVTP7 operates better ashore, too.

For helicopters with a combat punch, we are already receiving the twin-engined Cobra, and Huey. We will soon be getting the A4M, the last word in this fine attack aircraft.

But the most dramatic progress in Marine aviation -- and in my opinion, in world aviation -- is undoubtedly the AV-8 HARRIER. We have the HARRIER now, and every day we find a new use for its versatility. The HARRIER is a fascinating airplane with a tremendous potential. Just as an example of what it can do, imagine an aircraft with the normal configuration of an attack jet, taking off and landing on a vacant lot in the middle of New York City. Well, it did just that several months ago, and it's been improved since. The vertical short-take-off and landing (V/STOL) is created by adjustable swivel jet nozzles. Once the aircraft is airborne, it merely flies on the horizontal plane. This saves deck space at sea, and runway construction ashore.

Finally, we have begun once again to deploy our jet squadrons aboard the Navy's carriers, thus returning to a commitment of benefit both to the Navy and the Marine Corps.

PROGRESS TOWARD MORALE AND SPIRIT

Keeping up with modern challenges requires modern training and modern equipment, but it also requires modern facilities for a new breed of Marines. Five years ago the Marine Corps carefully planned a program of ensuring that half of all new construction would be devoted to the comfort of Marines. New barracks, bachelor officers quarters, clubs and recreational facilities are the results. Never dreamed of in the Old Corps, these new accommodations add comfort and dignity to the demands of professionalism and readiness. But we aren't going to stop with what we have. More are being built, and more are being planned.

Dignity and comfort, and the right tools for the right jobs are clear needs of a solid,

professional Marine Corps. But there is more. If we expect each Marine to take pride in himself, to feel a part of the great tradition of his Corps, and to be proud of his mission; he must see himself as more than a well-taken-care-of technician. The outward sign of this is the Marine uniform. And who can think of a Marine without thinking of the Marine dress blue uniform.

Early this year we received authority to issue the dress blue uniform to all Marines graduating from boot camp, beginning in about two years.

And we're getting rid of a uniform, too. As blues come back, the old khaki -- or light tan -- uniform is on the way out. Beginning this summer the distinctive Marine green dress uniform will be optional for Marines the year round. Now this doesn't mean discomfort in hot weather. No, on the contrary, it means liberation.

The new summer-weight greens are actually lighter and cooler than the old tropical worsted khaki. They don't soil as fast either. And of course, there can be no question what service is represented when a Marine wears green, or blue, the whole year.

Another item, or I should say other items of dress that we have been testing are leather belts. Selected officers have been test-wearing the old over-the-shoulder around-the-waist leather -- or in this case Corfam -- Sam Browne Belt. And certain, selected enlisted Marines have been wearing the old fair leather belt -- this is also made of Corfam, a little narrower than the Sam Browne, and without the over-the-shoulder strap. This clearly indicates how reactionary the Corps can be. A decision as to their future will be made in the next few weeks.

All of this dressing up has a purpose: to enhance our professional image within ourselves. Professional service to the people of the United States is our goal in everything we do; from the way we think to the way we act; and from the way we know our profession to the way we look. This takes honest, loyal, dedicated service. Marines must continue to be proud of that service and the uniforms they wear.

And, as I constantly say to Marines, I believe the Corps has a national duty, not only to be ready to fight, but also to set an example, an example of the highest standards.

MARINES STILL FIGHT, WHILE THEY PREPARE FOR THE FUTURE

But past or future, right now the most important part of our service is **right** where it has been for the past six years -- in the Republic of Vietnam. As rapid and as sound as

progress toward Vietnamization has been, this war isn't over yet. From a high of nearly 85,000 Marines in Vietnam in 1968, to our present reduced strength of less than 25,000, the Marine air-ground team is still doing its duty in the harsh environment of combat.

On the ground Marine infantry units are still holding and patrolling vital terrain, while Marine artillery continues to provide support where needed.

In the air, Marines are still flying fixed-wing tactical air support for Allied Forces, and daily interdiction missions along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Marine helicopters still fly resupply missions, and the helicopter remains the fastest and best hope for medical evacuation.

And still, from Vietnamization to combat operations, our primary aim remains that of giving the South Vietnamese a chance to determine their own destiny. To become self-sustaining within the framework of their own society, and to be capable of withstanding efforts by outside and insurgent forces to control and intimidate.

We have almost accomplished what we set out to do. And only one person deserves the credit for it. The same person who is so much in the news the past few years. The young American.

UNITED STATES MARINES ARE AMERICANS

Since 1965, more than 700,000 young Americans have returned to civilian life from service in the Marine Corps. Their contributions to America during these trying times merit gratitude and recognition. We must consider their hopes for education, work, and homes not only as a privilege of citizens in a free country; but as a reward for valor in service to the United States.

But not all Marines are returning to civilian life. Many have found service to their country a proud and rewarding profession. And more young Americans will continue to join these veterans and accept the challenge of being Marines. It is to these Marines -- and their comrades of the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard, that the reality of the 1970's is a stark truth. We must know our purpose, we must be ready, we must maintain our quality, and we must meet challenge with progress. We must be prepared to meet any crisis, and we'd better be good if it happens. Yet, there is a confusion throughout America over this.

Service to country is not always treated kindly in our modern America. The same America to which this service is offered. And the young Americans who give that service

see it every day. They know that there is more to American defense than training, equipment, barracks, and uniforms. The real military and naval traditions of America have always been the good interaction that has existed between the served and the serving -- the American citizen and the American fighting man. We can no more stop war by despising the profession of arms, than we can prevent fires by berating the fire department.

War is still a real and present threat in the world of the 1970's. Sure strength is one of the means of prevention. And strength is sure only through solidarity of mutual pride and respect among all Americans. You, shipmates, have constantly proven yourselves in this duty of all citizens.

For this, for all Marines, everywhere, I thank you.

--END--

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22 April 1971

CG, 3D MAB

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G-2

PRIORITY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L // N03800 //

SUBJ: THE BATTLE FOR DUC DUC

1. WITH THE ENEMY IN THE FINAL PREPARATION AND STAGES FOR THE SECOND

SECOND PHASE OF HIS K850 CAMPAIGN, AND WITH THE UNIVERSAL CONCERN OV
OVER THE STATUS OF THE PACIFICATION AND VIETNAMIZATION EFFORTS,

THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

2. AS WE CONTINUE TO RECEIVE VARIOUS INDICATORS OF THE ENEMY'S
PPLANS FOR THE SECOND PHASE OF HIS K850 CAMPAIGN, TWO FEATURES
SEEM TO APPEAR THROUGHOUT THE REPORTS. FIRST, THE ENEMY WILLATTACK MANY OF THE SAME TARGETS HE ATTACKED DURING PHASE I, OR HE
WILL USE THE SAME BASIC TACTICS FOR NEW TARGETS AND, SECOND,THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSES OF HIS EFFORTS ARE THE DISRUPTION OF GVN
PACIFICATION EFFORTS AND THE ASSERTION OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE

OVER A WIDE SEGMENT OF THE POPULATION.

3. IN SEVERAL REPORTS THE ENEMY HAS TITLED HIS CAMPAIGN AS "THE

RETURN OF THE PEOPLE TO THEIR NATIVE HOMES." AND, IN THIS VEIN,
THE MOST LIKELY TARGETS ARE GVN FACILITIES, POPULATION CENTERS AND

RESETTLEMENT HAMLETS.

4. A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF HOW THE ENEMY SEEKS TO OBTAIN THESE

OBJECTIVES RESTS IN THE RECENT BATTLE FOR DUC DUC (D) WHICH FOR
ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, STILL CONTINUES.5. THE ENEMY'S ACTIVITIES IN THE DUC DUC/AMHOA AREAS DURING
PHASE I OF K850 WERE UNIQUE IN SEVERAL RESPECTS:A. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY MONTHS FRONT 4 EMPLOYED ITS SOLE
MAIN FORCE NORTH VIETNAMESE REGIMENT, THE 38TH REGIMENT.

PAGE 1 OF 1

SIGNIFICANTLY, THE REGIMENT WAS EMPLOYED IN A WELL COORDINATED, SUPPORTED MULTI-BATTALION EFFORT.

B. SECONDLY, THE 38TH REGIMENT DID NOT CONDUCT A HIT AND RUN STRIKE. RATHER, IT LEFT ITS BASE AREA TO DEVELOP A NEW OFFENSIVE

AREA OF OPERATIONS, AND IT WOULD APPEAR THAT AT LEAST TWO BATTALIONS REMAIN IN THE DUC DUC/WESTERN DUY XUYEN AREA, OPENLY

CHALLENGING THE 51ST ARVN REGIMENT.

C. WHILE THE INITIAL THRUSTS WERE AGAINST THE DISTRICT SEAT AND PROVINCIAL FORCES, A SIGNIFICANT EFFORT WAS DIRECTED TOWARD NON-MILITARY OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING THE INTIMIDATION OF THE POPULACE, DESTRUCTION OF HOMES AND KIDNAPPING.

6. THE PLANNING FOR THE ATTACK IN DUC DUC PROBABLY BEGAN WITH

RECONNAISSANCE BY ELEMENTS OF THE 42ND RECON BATTALION, POSSIBLY AS EARLY AS JANUARY. THE GROUND WORK FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE

38TH REGIMENT WAS LAID BY LOCAL FORCE VIET CONG ELEMENTS AND ELEMENTS OF THE Q81ST, DUY XUYEN UNIT, AND THE 91ST SAPPER BATTALION.

STARTING ABOUT 22 MARCH, THERE WAS A DECIDED INCREASE IN HARASSING ATTACKS AND PROBES TO THE NORTH OF DUC DUC, IN THE VICINITY OF THE

LIBERTY BRIDGE (AT925531) AND ALONG THE MAIN ROUTE FOR REINFORCING THE DISTRICT. THE LIBERTY BRIDGE WAS DAMAGED BY ENEMY ACTION ON THE NIGHT OF THE 26TH.

7. TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE PROVINCE-WIDE OPEN-FIRE OF PHASE I

OF K850, THE MAIN THRUST OF THE 38TH REGIMENT OCCURRED IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 29 MARCH. A BARRAGE OF MORTAR FIRE WAS

FOLLOWED BY A SERIES OF GROUND ATTACKS AND BY MID-MORNING, THE FLAG OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT WAS OBSERVED FLYING NEAR

THE DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS. IN A SERIES OF SHARP CLASHES AND TERRORIST ATTACKS MAJOR PORTIONS OF THE CIVILIAN AREAS SURROUNDING

THE DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS AND THE SHARPLETS FORTRESS (NAMES 865471) AND THE BONT (AT 580433) WERE HEAVILY DAMAGED.

8. INCOMPLETE REPORTS OF THE FIRST FOUR DAYS OF THE BATTLE REFLECTED 103 CIVILIANS KILLED AND 96 WOUNDED AND AN ADDITIONAL

37 KIDNAPPED. TWENTY PROVINCIAL TROOPS WERE KILLED AND 26 WOUNDED. AS MANY AS 1500 HOUSES WERE REPORTED DESTROYED. THE ENEMY LOST

59 KIA IN THE FIRST 3 DAYS.

9. ELEMENTS OF THE 51ST ARVN REGIMENT SENT TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT

FORCES HAVE SINCE MADE REPEATED CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY AND TODAY,

THREE WEEKS AFTER THE INITIAL SURGE, ORGANIZED ELEMENTS OF THE 38TH REGIMENT REMAIN IN DUC DUC AND WESTERN DUY XUYEN DISTRICT,

INDICATING NO INTENTION TO WITHDRAW; RATHER, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE CURRENT RELATIVE QUIESCENCE IS IN PREPARATION FOR

RENEWED OFFENSIVES. THE EXACT ROLE OF THE 38TH REGIMENT IN THE 2D PHASE OF K850 IS NOT CLEAR, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME IN-

DICATIONS THAT IT MAY ATTEMPT ACTIVITIES FURTHER TO THE EAST IN DUY XUYEN DISTRICT.

10. WHILE DUC DUC DISTRICT IS STILL VERY MUCH IN THE CONTROL OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT THE VIABILITY OF THIS CONTROL HAS,

MOST CERTAINLY, BEEN TESTED. MANY OF THE REFUGEES FROM DUC DUC HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO BE RESETTLING IN THE PREDOMINANTLY VIET

CONG CONTROLLED AREA OF ANTENNA VALLEY. (BT 900 320)

11. THE ENEMY HAS ENJOYED A CERTAIN DEGREE OF SUCCESS IN DUC DUC

AND HAS DEMONSTRATED HIS ABILITY TO DISRUPT GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE MORE REMOTE AREAS OF THE PROVINCE. IT IS REASONABLE TO

ASSUME THAT SOME OF HIS EFFORTS IN PHASE II OF K850 WILL FOLLOW THE PATTERN SET AT DUC DUC.

12. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT PHASE II K850 WILL COMMENCE ON TWENTY-SIX 25-26 APRIL 1971.

GP-4
BT

SECRET

III MAB Fact Sheet

Date: 30 Apr 1971

Subject: Operations Review - ACMC Visit

I. GENERAL:

A. The 3d MAB is in the final week of operations in Vietnam at this time.

B. Operationally, there is 1 infantry battalion (2/1), 1 Military Police Battalion, and 1 Combined Action Company in ground operations/security. There are 4 helicopter squadrons, 1 fixed wing squadron, and 3 fixed wing detachments in operation, however they will all standdown within the next three weeks.

II. CURRENT STATUS/FORECAST

A. The III MAF TAOI included Quang Nam Province, less the 2d ROKMC Brigade TAOI until 13 April 1971. Concurrent with the standdown of Marine combat units, on 13 April, the 23d Infantry Division TAOI was expanded to the north, generally following the ROKMC southern boundary and extending westward along the Song Thu Bon, Song Vu Gia and connecting river valleys (phase Line Blue on Supplemental Data Sheet A).

B. The 196th Infantry Brigade occupied the high ground on part of Charlie Ridge and the southern part of the BaNa Mountain area on 22 April 1971 and on 29 April 1971 took over all of the MAB terrain west of the 86 N-S grid line.

C. On 1 May 1971 the 23d Infantry Division TAOI was expanded again to a line following the trace of Hoa Vang District (phase Line White on Supplemental Data Sheet A).

D. Effective 7 May 1971, upon standdown of the 3d MAB, the 23d Infantry Division will complete the takeover of Quang Nam Province as it's TAOI.

E. The 23d Infantry Division will also assume responsibility as the single manager for security of the Danang Vital Area on 7 May 1971.

III. GROUND OPERATIONS & SECURITY

A. Ground Operations.

(1) The 3d MAB conducts one major operation - "Imperial Lake" which terminates 071200H May 71. This operation which commenced 31 August 1970 in the Que Son Mountains was a holdover from the tenure of the 1st Marine Division.

(2) The 1st Marines continue to conduct Rocket Belt Security Operations and protection of the Danang Vital Area until 071200H May 1971.

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SECRET**Subject: Operation Review - ACNC Visit**


(5) The remaining Combined Action Company operates as Combined Action Platoons in individually assigned AO's along QL 1 and Rt 538 running East to Hai An in the ROKMC AO.

B. Security Requirements.

On 7 May, the responsibility for coordinating security throughout the Danang Vital Area, inherited from III MAF, will be transferred to the 23d Infantry Division. Security responsibilities for the 3d MAB after 7 May are limited to internal security at those cantonments still retained by the Marine Corps. These include Marble Mountain (MAG-16), Camp Stokes (1st MP Bn), and Camp Boaks (PLC). These camps will be turned over as the redeployment reaches its final stages for Marines. Only Camp Boaks will have a small external security responsibility. Since no U. S. forces will operate within 3-4 kilometers to the north and west it has been deemed advisable to conduct limited patrolling within one to one and a half kilometers of the Camp. Personnel for this mission will come from the 1st MP Battalion which will be relieved of airfield security on 7 May.

Prepared by: Major R. L. BUB

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3d MAB Fact Sheet

Date: 1 May 1971

Subject: Keystone Redeployment Update

I. GENERAL:

A. On 20 April 1970, the President announced a 150,000 man reduction in U. S. authorized strength in RVN, to be effected by 1 May 1971. This reduction was code-named "Keystone Robin". Initial plans called for III MAF to redeploy 18,600 spaces by 15 October 1970; 10,600 additional by 1 January 1971, and 12,400 more Marines by 1 May 1971.

B. Subsequently, because available Army manpower could not support MACV-wide redeployment plans, adjustments to Marine redeployments were necessitated. In brief, the number of III MAF Marines redeployed in Increment 4 (1 July - 15 October) was reduced to 17,021 and Increment 5 redeployments numbering 11,207 (15 October 1970 - 1 January 1971) were slipped to Increment 6 (1 January - 30 April 1971). The remaining 13,600 Marines are scheduled for redeployment during May - June 1971.

II. CURRENT STATUS/FORECAST:

A. The current redeployment increment announced by the President on 7 April, "Keystone Oriole", involving the remaining 3d MAB forces, began on 1 May 1971 and will terminate 30 June. During the increment, 3d MAB spaces will be reduced by 13,588 - thus eliminating all Marines in RVN, less those spaces controlled by MACV. One additional non-3d MAB space will redeploy, raising the total Marine redeployment in the seventh increment to 13,589. A detailed summary of 3d MAB redeployment plans is contained in Supplemental Data Sheet A.

B. COMUSMACV-approved standdown dates and tentative embarkation/load dates for the seventh increment are shown in Supplemental Data Sheet B.

C. To date, the following units of Increment 7 have departed RVN: 1st Bn, 1st Marines; VMA(AW)-225; Det, 1st Bn, 11th Marines and approximately 200 spaces of the 2d CAG have been deactivated. The following units of Increment 7 have stood down: 3d Bn, 1st Marines; HqCo, 1st Marines; HMM-263; 3d 8" How Btry and Det, 1st Bn, 11th Marines.

D. To provide continued logistic support to the 2d ROKMC Brigade, a logistic liaison team, composed of thirteen Marine Corps personnel, will be retained in RVN. These spaces will be chargeable to MACV.

E. Twenty Marine Corps spaces will be retained in RVN subsequent to Increment 7 redeployments to provide interface between the U. S. Air Force and U. S. Navy Tactical Air Direction Control systems. These spaces will be chargeable to MACV.

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F. Upon completion of Increment 7, all U. S. Marine Corps spaces, except those chargeable to MACV, will be redeployed from RVN.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS:

None

Prepared by: Capt R. E. AFWLOWICH, USMC

Subject: Keystone Redeployment Update

Supplemental Data Sheets Attached.

A. Redeployment Plans

B. Standdown and Load Schedule Increment 7

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3D MAP SUPPLEMENTAL DATA SHEET A

1 May 1971

Subject: Keystone Robin/Oriole Redeployments

REDEPLOYMENT PLANS - KEYSTONE ROBIN/ORIOLE

| <u>Line</u> | <u>Unit</u> | <u>As of 1 Jul 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Incr 4 Jul-Oct 70</u> | <u>Spaces As of 15 Oct 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Fur Incr 6 Jan-Apr 71</u> | <u>Redeploy May-Jun 71</u> |
|-------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| 1 | III MAF/3dMAP | 726 | 307 | 419 | 45 | 369** |
| 2 | 5th Comm Bn | 525 | 375 | 150 | 116 | 34 |
| 3 | Comm Supt Co, 7th Comm Bn | 201 | | 201 | | 201 |
| 4 | CAF Hq | 45 | 45 | | | |
| 5 | Combined Action Plts | 1587 | 1111 | 476 | | 476 |
| 6 | Combined Action Co Hq | 114 | 66 | 48 | | 48 |
| 7 | Combined Action Gp Hq | 180 | 104 | 76 | | 76 |
| 8 | 11th ITT | 11 | | 11 | 11 | |
| 9 | 5th IT | 6 | | 6 | 6 | |
| 10 | 5th CIT | 16 | | 16 | | 16 |
| 11 | 7th Engr Bn | 1065 | 781 | 284 | | 284 |
| 12 | 9th Engr Bn (-) | 877 | 877 | | | |

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Subject: Keystone Robin/Oriole Redeployments

1 May 1971

| <u>Line</u> | <u>Unit</u> | <u>As of 1 Jul 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Incr 4 Jul-Oct 70</u> | <u>Spaces As of 15 Oct 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Dur Incr 6 Jan-Apr 71</u> | <u>Redeploy May-Jun 71</u> |
|-------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| 13 | 1st Bridge Co (-) | 135 | 135 | | | |
| 14 | 1st MP Bn | 585 | | 585 | | 585 |
| 15 | 3rd MP Bn (-) | 478 | 478 | | | |
| 16 | Trans Fac | 157 | 157 | | | |
| 17 | 1st Radio Bn (-) | 323 | | 323 | 238 | 85 |
| 18 | Total Hq Elements | (7031) | (4436) | (2595) | (416) | (2174)** |
| 19 | Hq Bn, 1st MarDiv(MP'S, SCAMP) | 1481 | 494 | 987 | 927 | 60 |
| 20 | 15 ITT | 11 | 11 | | | |
| 21 | 1st IT | 6 | | 6 | | 6 |
| 22 | 7th IT | 6 | | 6 | 6 | |
| 23 | 1st CIT | 16 | 16 | | | |
| 24 | 3rd CIT | 16 | | 16 | | 16 |
| 25 | 7th CIT | 16 | 16 | | | |
| 26 | nd SSCT | 10 | | 10 | 10 | |

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Subject: Keystone Robin/ Oriole Redeployments

| <u>Line</u> | <u>Unit</u> | <u>As of</u> <u>1 Jul 70</u> | <u>Redeploy</u> <u>Incr 4</u> <u>Jul-Oct 70</u> | <u>Spaces</u> <u>As of</u> <u>15 Oct 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Dur</u> <u>Incr 6</u> <u>Jan-Apr 71</u> | <u>Redeploy</u> <u>May-Jun 71</u> |
|-------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|---|---|---|--------------------------------------|
| 27 | Hq Co, 1st Mar | 220 | | 220 | | 220 |
| 28 | 3rd ITT | 11 | | 11 | | 11 |
| 29 | 1st Bn, 1st Mar | 1157 | | 1157 | | 1157 |
| 30 | 2nd Bn, 1st Mar | 1157 | | 1157 | | 1157 |
| 31 | 3rd Bn, 1st Mar | 1157 | | 1157 | | 1157 |
| 32 | Hq Co, 5th Mar | 220 | | 220 | 220 | |
| 33 | 13 ITT | 11 | | 11 | 11 | |
| 34 | 1st Bn, 5th Mar | 1157 | | 1157 | 1157 | |
| 35 | 2nd Bn, 5th Mar | 1157 | | 1157 | 1157 | |
| 36 | 3rd Bn, 5th Mar | 1157 | | 1157 | 1157 | |
| 37 | Hq Co, 7th Mar | 220 | 220 | | | |
| 38 | 9th ITT | 11 | 11 | | | |
| 39 | 1st Bn, 7th Mar | 1157 | 1157 | | | |
| 40 | 2nd Bn, 7th Mar | 1157 | 1157 | | | |

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Subject: Keystone Robin/Oriole Redeployments

| <u>Line</u> | <u>Unit</u> | <u>As of 1 Jul 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Incr 4 Jul-Oct 70</u> | <u>Spaces As of 15 Oct 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Dur Incr 6 Jan-Apr 71</u> | <u>Redeploy May-Jun 71</u> |
|-------------|--------------------|---------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| 41 | 3rd Bn, 7th Mar | 1157 | 1157 | | | |
| 42 | Hq Btry, 11th Mar | 230 | | 230 | 173 | 57 |
| 43 | 1st Bn, 11th Mar | 659 | | 659 | | 559 |
| 44 | 2nd Bn, 11th Mar | 659 | | 659 | 659 | |
| 45 | 3rd Bn, 11th Mar | 659 | 659 | | | |
| 46 | 4th Bn, 11th Mar | 512 | 272 | 240 | 241 * | |
| 47 | 1st 175mm Gun Btry | 158 | 158 | | | |
| 48 | 3rd 175mm Gun Btry | 158 | 158 | | | |
| 49 | 1st 8" How Btry | 222 | 222 | | | |
| 50 | 3rd 8" How Btry | 222 | | 222 | | 222 |
| 51 | 1st Recon Bn | 578 | 245 | 333 | 202 | 131 |
| 52 | 1st Force Recon Co | 154 | 124 | 30 | 30 | |
| 53 | 3rd Force Recon Co | 154 | 154 | | | |
| 54 | 1st Engr Bn | 763 | | 763 | 529 | 234 |
| 55 | ROK Aug | 8 | 8 | | | |

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Subject: Keystone Robin/ Oriole Redeployments

| <u>Line</u> | <u>Unit</u> | <u>As of 1 Jul 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Incr 4 Jul-Oct 70</u> | <u>Spaces As of 15 Oct 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Dur Incr 6 Jan-Apr 71</u> | <u>Redeploy May-Jun 71</u> |
|-------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| 56 | 1st Med Bn | 150 | 30 | 120 | 90 | 30 |
| 57 | 1st Dent Co | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | |
| 58 | Co C, 1st SP Bn | 76 | | 76 | | 76 |
| 59 | Co C, 1st Tk Bn | 120 | 120 | | | |
| 60 | 1st MT Bn | 285 | 66 | 219 | 137 | 32 |
| 61 | 11th MT Bn | 400 | | 400 | 400 | |
| 62 | | | | | | |
| 63 | Total Division Forces | (18839) | (6457) | (12382) | (7108) * | (5275) |
| 64 | MWFG-1 | | | | | |
| 65 | MAW Hq | 395 | | 395 | 371 * | |
| 66 | H&HS-1 | 180 | | 180 | 142 * | |
| 67 | MWCS-1 | 255 | | 255 | 259 * | |
| 68 | MWFS-1 | 141 | | 141 | 141 | |
| 69 | 11th Dent Co | 4 | | 4 | 2 | 2 |

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Subject: Keystone Robin/Oriole Redeployments

| <u>Line</u> | <u>Unit</u> | <u>As of 1 Jul 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Incr 4 Jul-Oct 70</u> | <u>Spaces As of 15 Oct 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Dur Incr 6 Jan-Apr 71</u> | <u>Redeploy May-Jun 71</u> |
|-------------|-------------|---------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| 70 | 3rd SSCT | 8 | | 8 | 8 | |
| 71 | MAG-11 | | | | | |
| 72 | H&MS-11 | 534A/ | 127 | 407 | 6 | 401 |
| 73 | MABS-11 | 390 | | 390 | | 390 |
| 74 | VMA(AW)-225 | 304 | | 304 | | 304 |
| 75 | IMS | (69) | | (69) | | (69) |
| 76 | VMA(AW)-242 | 304 | 304 | | | |
| 77 | IMS | (69) | (69) | | | |
| 78 | VMCJ-1 | 463 | 463 | | | |
| 79 | IMS | (58) | (58) | | | |
| 80 | VMO-2 | 293 | | 293 | 240 | 53 |
| 81 | IMS | (40) | | (40) | (40) | |
| 82 | MAG-13 | | | | | |
| 83 | H&MS-13 | 523A/ | 431 | 92 | 92 | |
| 84 | MA S-13 | 502 | 502 | | | |

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Subject: Keystone Robin/Oriole Redeployments

| <u>Line</u> | <u>Unit</u> | <u>As of</u> <u>1 Jul 70</u> | <u>Redeploy</u> <u>Incr 4</u> <u>Jul-Oct 70</u> | <u>Spaces</u> <u>As of</u> <u>15 Oct 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Dur</u> <u>Incr 6</u> <u>Jan-Apr 71</u> | <u>Redeploy</u> <u>May-Jun 71</u> |
|-------------|-------------|---------------------------------|---|---|---|--------------------------------------|
| 85 | VMA-311 | 216 | | 216 | | 216 |
| 86 | IMS | (34) | | (34) | | (34) |
| 87 | VMFA-115 | 324 | | 324 | 324 | |
| 88 | IMS | (58) | | (58) | (58) | |
| 89 | VMFA-122 | 317 | 317 | | | |
| 90 | IMS | (58) | (58) | | | |
| 91 | VMFA-314 | 324 | 324 | | | |
| 92 | IMS | (58) | (58) | | | |
| 93 | MATCU-67 | 68 | 68 | | | |
| 94 | MAG-16 | | | | | |
| 95 | H&MS-16 | 500A/ | 21 | 479 | 21 | 458 |
| 96 | MABS-16 | 571 | | 571 | | 571 |
| 97 | HML-167 | 229 | | 229 | | 229 |
| 98 | IMS | (24) | | (24) | | (24) |
| 99 | HML-367 | 228 | | 228 | | 228 |

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Subject: Keystone Robin/Oriole Redeployments

| <u>Line</u> | <u>Unit</u> | <u>As of 1 Jul 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Incr 4 Jul-Oct 70</u> | <u>Spaces As of 15 Oct 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Dur Incr 6 Jan-Apr 71</u> | <u>Redeploy May-Jun 71</u> |
|-------------|-------------|---------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| 100 | IMS | (29) | | (29) | | (29) |
| 101 | HMM-161 | 249 | 249 | | | |
| 102 | IMS | (21) | (21) | | | |
| 103 | HMM-262 | 249 | | 249 | Trans 2 Spaces To HMM-364 | 247 |
| 104 | IMS | (21) | | (21) | | (21) |
| 105 | HMM-263 | 248 | | 248 | | 248 |
| 106 | IMS | (21) | | (21) | | (21) |
| 107 | HMM-364 | 247 | | 247 | 249 Redeploy w/2 Spaces From HMM-262 | |
| 108 | IMS | (21) | | (21) | (21) | |
| 109 | HMM-463 | 237 | | 237 | | 236** |
| 110 | IMS | (24) | | (24) | | (24) |
| 111 | MATCU-68 | 68 | | 68 | | 68 |
| 112 | MACG-18 | | | | | |
| 113 | H&HS-18 | 217 | | 217 | 197 | 20 Trans 20 Spaces To MACV |

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Subject: Keystone Robin/Priole Redeployments

| <u>Line</u> | <u>Unit</u> | <u>As of</u> <u>1 Jul 70</u> | <u>Redeploy</u> <u>Incr 4</u> <u>Jul-Oct 70</u> | <u>Spaces</u> <u>As of</u> <u>15 Oct 70</u> | <u>Redeploy Dur</u> <u>Incr 6</u> <u>Jan-Apr 71</u> | <u>Redeploy</u> <u>May-Jun 71</u> |
|-------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|---|---|--------------------------------------|
| 114 | MACS-4 | 269 | | 269 | 269 | |
| 115 | MASS-3 (-) | 207 | | 207 | | 207 |
| 116 | MWSG-17 | | | | | |
| 117 | H&MS-17 | 615 | 382 | 233 | 293 * | |
| 118 | WERS-17 | 233 | 233 | | | |
| 119 | Det, VMGR-152 | 64 | | 64 | | 64 |
| 120 | Total Aviation Forces | (9976) | (3421) | (6555) | (2614) * | (3942)** |
| 121 | FLC | 4223 | 1197 | 3026 | 809 | 2217 |
| 122 | Auto Serv Cntr | 186 | 186 | | | |
| 123 | Brig Aug FLC | 67 | 67 | | | |
| 124 | Total Logistic Forces | (4476) | (1450) | (3026) | (809) | (2217) |
| 125 | OOONE | 1517 | 1257 | 260 | 260 | |
| 126 | Total III MAF/3d MAB Spaces | (41839)B/ | (17021) | (24818) | (11207)* | (13608)** |

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Subject: Keystone Robin/Oriole Redeployments

FOOTNOTES:

A/ Includes Intermediate Maintenance Support (IMS) for all squadrons in MAG. IMS apportionment in parenthesis shown under each squadron is non-additive.

B/ Does not include 197 ANGELICO and 574 MACV JTD non-III MAF Program 9 Spaces.

* Administrative adjustments made by DAN JS-71-601 of 17 February 71.

** Administrative adjustments made by DAN MC-71-505 of 12 April 71.

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3d MAB Supplemental Data Sheet B

Date: 1 May 1971

Subject: Increment 7 Redeployments

STANDDOWN AND LOAD SCHEDULE - INCREMENT 7

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>STANDDOWN DATE</u> | <u>LOAD DATE</u> |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| 3d MAB | 7 June | 15 June |
| HQ CO | 7 June | 15 June |
| COMM SPT CO(REIN) 7TH COMM BN | 7 June | 20 June 25 June |
| DET, 5TH COMM BN | 7 June | 25 June |
| 5TH CIT | 22 June | 25 June |
| DET, 1ST RADIO BN | 7 May | 12 May |
| DET, HQ BN, 1ST MARDIV | 7 May | 12 May |
| 1ST IT | 7 May | 12 May |
| 3D ITT | 7 May | 21 May |
| 3D CIT | 7 May | 21 May |
| CO A (REIN), 1ST RECON BN | 7 May | 12 May |
| 1ST BN (REIN), 11TH MAR | 7 May | 1 May 12 May 1 June |
| DET, HQ BTRY, 11TH MAR | 7 May | 12 May |
| 3D 8" HOW BTRY | 1 May | 24 May |
| HQ CO, 1ST MAR | 1 May | 12 May |
| 1ST BN, 1ST MAR | 13 April | 1 May |
| 2D BN, 1ST MAR | 7 May | 1 June |
| 3D BN, 1ST MAR | 1 May | 12 May |
| H&MS-11 | 19 May | 6 June |

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B-1

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Subject: Increment 7 Redeployments

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>STANDDOWN DATE</u> | <u>LOAD DATE</u> |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| MABS-11 | 19 May | 6 June |
| VMA(AW)-225 | 20 April | 1 May |
| DET, VMO-6 | 7 May | 26 May |
| VMA-311 | 8 May | 21 May |
| H&MS-16 | 26 May | 20 June 22 June |
| MABS-16 | 26 May | 20 June 22 June |
| HML-167 | 26 May | 26 May 6 June |
| HML-367 | 26 May | 15 June |
| HMM-262 | 7 May | 12 May 19 May |
| HMM-263 | 1 May | 12 May 19 May |
| DET, H&HS-18 | 7 June | 27 June * |
| HMH-463 | 18 May | 26 May 6 June |
| MASS-3 | 8 May ** | 1 June |
| MATCU-68 | 26 May | 15 June |
| DET, VMGR-152 | 17 June | 27 June |
| FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND | 10 May 10 June | 23 May 28 June |
| CO A (REIN), 7TH ENGR BN | 27 May | 25 June |
| CO A (REIN), 1ST MED BN | 7 June | 25 June |
| DET, 11TH DENT CO | 7 June | 27 June * |

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Subject: Increment 7 Redeployments

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>STANDDOWN DATE</u> | <u>LOAD DATE</u> |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|
| 1ST MP BN | 7 June | 28 June |
| CO A (REIN), 1ST ENGR BN | 27 May | 22 June |
| CO A (REIN), 1ST MT BN | 27 May | 22 June |
| CO C, 1ST SP BN | 27 May | 22 June |
| 2D CAG | 13 April | 1 May |
| | 1 May | 12 May |
| | 7 May | 1 June |

* TRANSFERRED TO MACV (TDCC)

\$ FLY-AWAY BY USMC AIRCRAFT

** LESS BIRMINGHAM ASRT

B-3

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INCREMENT VII STAND DOWN/DEPARTURE SCHEDULE

← APRIL → → MAY → → JUNE →

13 1 1ST BN, 1ST MAR
 13 1 DET, 2D CAG
 13 1 DET, 1ST BN, 11 MAR
 20 1 VMA (AW)-225

XX YY
 XX = Stand down date
 YY = Load date(s)

1 12 3D BN, 1ST MAR
 1 12 HQ CO, 1ST MAR
 1 12 DET, 2D CAG
 1 12 19 HMM-263
 1 24 3D 8" HOW BTRY
 1 12 1 DET, 1ST BN, 11 MAR
 7 12 1ST BN, (-) 11 MAR
 7 12 DET, 1ST RADIO BN
 7 12 DET, HQ BN, 1ST MAR DIV
 7 12 1ST IT
 7 12 DET, HQ BTRY, 11 MAR
 7 12 CO A (REIN), 1ST RECON
 7 12 19 HMM-262
 7 21 3D ITT
 7 21 3D CIT
 7 1 2D BN, 1ST MAR
 7 1 2D CAG (-)
 8 21 VMA-311
 8 26 DET, VMO-6
 8 1

Stand down dates
for ASRT's

Quang Tri — 7 May
 Danang — 7 May
 Birmingham — 30 May

MASS-3
 DET, FLC
 HMM-463
 H&MS-11
 MABS-11

10 23
 18 26 6
 19 6
 19 6
 26 6
 26 15
 26 15
 26 20
 26 20 22
 27 22
 27 22
 27 22
 27 25
 HQ, 3D MAB 7 15
 CO A (REIN), 1ST MED BN 7 25
 COMM SPT CO, 7TH COMM BN 7 20 25
 DET, 11TH DENT CO 7 27
 1ST MP BN 7 28
 FLC (-) 10 28
 DET, VMGR-152 17 27
 5TH CIT 22 25

LEGEND

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5D MAB Fact Sheet

30 April 1971

Subject: Cobra AH-1J Combat Evaluation

I. GENERAL.

On 16 February, AH-1J helicopter detachment personnel arrived in Danang and followed by four AH-1J aircraft aboard a C-133 on 17 February. A total of 250 maintenance man hours were required to ready four aircraft for flight testing. All flight tests were completed on 19 February and the first training was conducted on 20 February.

II. CURRENT STATUS/FORECAST:

After in-country orientation and training, the first combat mission in support of troops was carried out on the 2nd of March. Since then the AH-1J has been utilized in escort roles on combat logistic, medevacs, combat troop strike and reconnaissance missions. Mission performance in all roles were satisfactory. The primary combat evaluations objectives were:

- A. To evaluate the tactical effectiveness of the weapons system using all available conventional ordnance compatible with the AH-1J.
- B. To evaluate the maintainability and maintenance suitability of the weapons system.
- C. To evaluate the reliability of the weapons system.
- D. To evaluate the suitability of the special support equipment.
- E. To accumulate operational usage and maintenance man-hour data on the AH-1J.

All of the above objectives were completed in a satisfactory manner. Total flight hours included: 184 hours for testing and training; 300.5 combat support. Ordnance expenditures since beginning the evaluation are as follows: (a) 7.62 - 7,250 rounds; (b) 20MM - 53,515 rounds; (c) 2.75 rocket - 2,252 rockets; (d) GAU-55 Fuel Air Explosive - 36. The primary difficulties encountered during the combat evaluation have been: low frequency vertical vibrations, failures of the exhaust ejector assemblies and the XM197 being inoperative. The low frequency vertical vibration was caused by bonding separation in the main rotor blades. All main rotor blades on the four aircraft experience this bonding separation. Three of the AH-1J have been refitted with the main rotor blades dash-1 (AH-1G rotor blade) vice the dash-5 AH-1J blade. No further instances of low frequency have been experienced since the refitting with

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Subject: Cobra AH-1J Combat Evaluation

the dash-1 and reduction in maximum gross weight from 10,000 pounds to 9,500 pounds.

Six exhaust ejectors assembly have failed so far during the combat evaluation. The assemblies are repairable, however, the reliability is low and maintenance time to remove, repair and replace is high. The XM197 is mainly inoperative because of the availability of particular spares. A new loading procedure has made a substantial improvement in the fire out rate. The procedure starts with a double row at the bottom of each ammunition box compartment and alternates single and double rows thereafter. The AH-1J's are scheduled to be embarked for shipment to Okinawa on 4 May. They will become a part of VMD-6 on arrival in Okinawa and have the following advantages:

- A. Chipboard compatibility - (Rotor Brakes)
- B. Navy supported in spares, ground support equipment, AVCAL assets
- C. Navy compatibility Avionics Systems
- D. Twin engine reliability and more power
- E. Increased fire power

III. RECOMMENDATION:

Upon completion of the successful combat evaluation, it was recommended that the AH-1 Js remain in WestPac. The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps concurred with the recommendation and the AH-1Js will/did depart for Marine Aircraft Group 36 on 4 May 1971.

Prepared by: Maj R. J. SHEEHAN, USMC

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3D MAB Fact Sheet

2 May 1971

Subject: Air Support Radar Teams (ASRT)

I. GENERAL:

There are presently three (03) Marine TPQ-10 ASRT's deployed in RVN. Stand-down dates have been predicated on current operational requirements and have been influenced by Lam Son 720. The United States Air Force has a similar capability using the MSQ-77 equipment. One such unit is positioned in Hue Phu Bai. At present the Air Forces unit is utilized almost exclusively for ABE Light Control.

II. CURRENT STATUS/FORECAST:

The usage of the ASRTs has decreased with the redeployment of the First Marine Aircraft Wing from RVN. The stand-down dates for the ASRT located at the Fire Support Base Birmingham was readjusted to comply with a request from XXIV Corps to support Lam Son 720. It will now remain operational until 30 May 1971. This request reflects the importance of having this capability as was demonstrated by the high usage of the Khe Sanh ASRT during Lam Son 719. That unit controlled 954 sorties during February and March of this year in support of the ground forces.

The Danang and Quang Tri ASRTs remain on schedule and will stand-down on 8 May 1971 concurrently with the final unit of Marine attack aircraft.

III. RECOMMENDATION:

That the present plans for ASRT stand-down be executed.

Prepared by: Major G. W. BUNKLEY, USMC

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Third MAB Fact Sheet

2 May 1971

Subject: Status of Real Property

I. GENERAL:

On 1 November 1970, III MAF established a Real Estate/Base Development Office which is responsible for Marine real property. This function was formerly performed by the Navy. The Real Estate/Base Development Office is currently controlled by the 3d MAB, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. This office carries out the following tasks:

- a. Maintains and updates all 3d MAB property records, inventories, and site drawings,
- b. Plans for timely disposal of excess Marine real property,
- c. Submits excess base/cantonment C/E equipment listings to MACV,
- d. Submits property records (MACDC-13) to MACV,
- e. Submits property transfer plans (MACDC-14) to MACV,
- f. Prepares the transfer and acceptance of Marine real property forms (DD-1354),
- g. Submits the property transfer after action report (MACDC-15) to MACV and
- h. Prepares the required legal documents when property is transferred to ARVN forces.

Within ten (10) days of notification of troop withdrawals, 3d MAB identifies excess property. The 3d MAB Real Estate Office then begins the property transfer sequence by offering the property to other component commanders and ARVN.

II. CURRENT STATUS/FORECAST:

A. The following real estate/facility transfers were processed during Increment VI:

SECRET

Subject: Status of Real Property

| <u>CANTONMENT PROPERTY</u> | <u>PRESENT TENANT</u> | <u>COORD</u> | <u>SPACES</u> | <u>DATE OF TRANSFER</u> |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| MACS-4 | USN | BT088835 | 329 | 1 Feb 71 |
| CB Ross | ARVN | BT025343 | 800 | 15 Feb 71 |
| Freedom Hill Rec. | USA | AT982745 | 40 | 15 Feb 71 |
| FLC Bakery | USA | AT951795 | 0 | 15 Mar 71 |
| ASP #2 | USA | AT952775 | 170 | 15 Mar 71 |
| Camp Lauer/Stack Arms | ARVN | BT083706 | 600/ 300 | 23 Mar 71 |
| Camp Faulkner | USA | BT065725 | 800 | 27 Mar 71 |
| CB Baldy | ARVN | BT132453 | 3925 | 27 Mar 71 |
| MACG-18 Dng AB | USAF | BT001761 | 177 | 11 Apr 71 |
| Hill 65 | USA | AT880579 | 695 | 12 Apr 71 |
| Hill 37N | ARVN | AT915582 | 450 | 13 Apr 71 |
| MWHG-1 Dng AB | USAF | AT994757 | 1154 | 20 Apr 71 |
| 1st Med Bn | USA | AT973755 | 479 | 21 Apr 71 |
| 11th MT Bn CP | USA | AT942761 | 496 | 22 Apr 71 |
| 11th Mar CP | USA | AT958758 | 560 | 23 Apr 71 |
| Camp Reasoner | USA | AT958752 | 816 | 28 Apr 71 |
| Camp Perdue | USA | AT948751 | 812 | 30 Apr 71 |

B. The following real estate/facility transfers will be processed during Increment VII:

| | | | | |
|-------------------|--------|----------|------|--------------|
| Div CP | Hq 3d | AT956750 | 1970 | 6 May 71 |
| | MAB | | | |
| Camp Stokes | FLC | BT005748 | 300 | 7 May 71 |
| III MAF/Camp 14 | 3/1 | AT938783 | 650 | 10 May 71 |
| Northern Arty | 1/11 | AT922799 | 700 | 10 May 71 |
| ASP #1 | FLC | AT988734 | 0 | 15 May 71 |
| Ice Plant | FLC | AT999744 | 20 | 15 May 71 |
| MASS-3/Hill 327 | MASS-3 | AT972737 | 147 | 15 May 71 |
| MAG-11 | MAG-11 | AT999753 | 2293 | 21 May 71 |
| Hill 34 | 2/1 | AT988715 | 1600 | 26 May 71 |
| MAG-16/Marble Mtn | MAG-16 | BT065740 | 3191 | 24-31 May 71 |
| Retrograde Fac | FLC | AT958802 | 0 | 1 Jun 71 |
| Camp Books | FLC | AT935805 | 3876 | 1 Jun 71 |

C. OP's and forward combat outposts fall under 3d MAB's authority for disposal. Consequently they are not listed as scheduled transfers. To date eleven such forward positions have been leveled, policed, and vacated.

SECRET

Subject: Status of Real Property

III. RECOMMENDATION:

None

Prepared by: Major R. A. LARSEN, USMC

UNCLASSIFIED

Third MAB Fact Sheet

2 May 1971

Subject: Equipment Redistribution

I. GENERAL:

During the period April/May 1970 Headquarters, FMFPAC provided the initial logistic guidance for redeployment of Marine Forces from the Republic of Vietnam. This guidance included the requirement for an Equipment Redistribution Program.

II. CURRENT STATUS/FORECAST:

A. The Equipment Redistribution Program commenced in May 1970 and was officially suspended on 1 May 1971 with the termination of Keystone Robin Charlie, Increment VI. Redistribution instructions, however, have been issued for excesses reported that will become available during Increment VII. Excesses not reported will be retrograded by the holding units and turned in to the supporting service activity when the redeploying units arrive at their ultimate destination.

B. Priorities for redistribution have been adjusted throughout the program to reflect changing requirements. WESTPAC MO/MOA was recently advanced in the priority listing to rapidly reconstitute mount-out blocks. Deficiencies for MO/MOA were reported by 3d FSR. Excesses and T/E of redeploying and deactivating units were then matched against those reported deficiencies. The redistribution was and is being effected in two phases. One in Increment VI when excesses were turned in on 12 March and the other when excesses will be turned in on 15 May during Increment VII. Shipment will be made as space becomes available on assigned shipping.

C. The total redistribution effort through 23 April 1971 has processed 319,801 pieces of equipment at a value of \$44,590,804.66.

D. RVNAF transfer, referred to as Project 805, has been one of the most lucrative areas in the Redistribution Program. A "want list" is published and periodically updated by MACV for RVNAF. When a "match" with our excesses can be made, message reports are submitted through channels to Headquarters

UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: Equipment Redistribution

Marine Corps and Department of the Army level with the outcome resulting in a transfer of equipment to the Vietnamese with a "pay-back" made by the Army for like equipment in CONUS. This aspect of redistribution is considered to have enhanced the entire Vietnamization effort. Of the 10,274 pieces of equipment offered to the Vietnamese 9,534 have been accepted for a percentage rate of 93%. The value of the equipment transferred under Project 805 to date approximates 3.44 million dollars.

III. RECOMMENDATION:

None

Prepared by: Major J. E. FELKER, USMC

SECRET

Third MAB Fact Sheet

2 May 1971

Subj: Shipping Requirements/Assignments for Increment
VII Keystone Oriole (Alpha)

I. GENERAL:

Shipping schedules and embarkation planning for Increment VII are considered relatively firm. The results of the CINCPACFLT shipping conference concluded on 1 May 1971 have not been received to date. However, any changes to present plans should be minimal and easily accommodated.

II. CURRENT STATUS/FORECAST:

A. Increment VII is comprised of 14 embarkation units, a total of 21 amphibious ships loading during the period 1 May 1971 through 29 June 1971, a total of about 1,859 personnel, 387,562 square feet of vehicles and 554,883 cubic feet of general cargo (see attached supplemental sheets for detailed breakdown of embarkation units).

B. Opportune shipping available during the increment consists of two LPD's during May.

C. On 1 May 1971 the USS FREDERICK (LST 1184) arrived at Deep Water Pier, loaded approximately 13,000 square feet of vehicles and departed, completing the retrograde from Vietnam of the first portion of embarkation unit I, Increment VII.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS:

None

Prepared by Captain W. R. HALTERMAN, USMC

SECRET

EMBARKATION DATAKEYSTONE ORIOLE (ALFA)

| <u>LOAD DATES</u> | <u>UNITS</u> | <u>SHIPPING</u> | <u>DEST</u> |
|-----------------------------|--|--|----------------------|
| <u>EMBARKATION UNIT I</u> | | | |
| 1-3 MAY | 1stBn, 1stMar Det, 1stBn, 11thMar VMA(AW)-225 Det, FLC | USS FREDERICK (LST 1184) USS TULARE (LKA-112) | CONUS |
| <u>EMBARKATION UNIT II</u> | | | |
| 12 MAY | 3dBn, 1stMar HqCo, 1stMar 1stBn(-), 11thMar HMM-262(-) HMM-263(-) A Co, 1stReconBn Det, 1stRadioBn Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv 1st IT Det, HqBtry, 11thMar | USS OGDEN (LPD-5) | HAWAII/ CONUS |
| <u>EMBARKATION UNIT III</u> | | | |
| 19 MAY | Det, HMM-262 Det, HMM-263 Det, FLC | USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) | HAWAII/ CONUS |
| <u>EMBARKATION UNIT IV</u> | | | |
| 21 MAY | VMA-311 3d ITT 3d CIT | USS DUBUQUE (LPD-8) | OKINAWA/ IWAKUNI/ |

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| <u>LOAD DATES</u> | <u>UNITS</u> | <u>SHIPPING</u> | <u>DEST</u> |
|------------------------------|--|---|------------------|
| <u>EMBARKATION UNIT V</u> | | | |
| 23 MAY | Det, FLC | USS SUMTER (LST 1181) | HAWAII/ CONUS |
| <u>EMBARKATION UNIT VI</u> | | | |
| 24 MAY | 3d 8" HOW Btry Det, FLC | USS SCHENECTADY (LST 1185) | CONUS |
| <u>EMBARKATION UNIT VII</u> | | | |
| 26 MAY | Det, HMH-463 Det, HML-167 Det, VMO-6 Det, FLC | USS OKINAWA (LPH-3) | HAWAII/ CONUS |
| <u>EMBARKATION UNIT VIII</u> | | | |
| 1-3 JUN | 2ndBn, 1stMar Det, 1stBn, 11thMar MASS-3 Det, FLC | USS DENVER (LPD-9) | CONUS |
| <u>EMBARKATION UNIT IX</u> | | | |
| 6-9 JUN | H&MS-11 MABS-11 HML-167 (-) HMH-463 (-) | USS TUSCALOOSA (LST-1187) USS DURHAM (LKA-114) | HAWAII/ CONUS |
| <u>EMBARKATION UNIT X</u> | | | |
| 15 JUN | HML-367 MATCU-68 MAB. HQ | USS DUBUQUE (LPD-8) | OKINAWA |
| <u>EMBARKATION UNIT XI</u> | | | |
| 20 JUN | Det, CommSptCo Det, H&MS-16 Det, MABS-16 | USS MANITOWOC (LST-1180) USS PAUL REVERE (LPA-248) | HAWAII/ CONUS |

SECRET

SECRET

| <u>LOAD DATES</u> | <u>UNITS</u> | <u>SHIPPING</u> | <u>DEST</u> |
|------------------------------|--|--|------------------|
| <u>EMBARKATION UNIT XII</u> | | | |
| 22-23 JUN | A Co, 1st EngBn A Co, 1st MTBn C Co, 1st SPBn H&MS-16(-) MABS-16(=) | USS PEORIA (LST-1183) USS PT DEFIANCE (LSD-31) USS FREDERICK (LST-1184) | CONUS |
| <u>EMBARKATION UNIT XIII</u> | | | |
| 25-26 JUN | A Co, 1st MedBn A Co, 7th EngBn CommSptCo(-) Det, 5th Comm 5th CIT Det, FLC | USS ST LOUIS (LKA-116) USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35) | HAWAII/ CONUS |
| <u>EMBARKATION UNIT XIV</u> | | | |
| 28-29 JUN | 1st MPBn FLC(-) | USS JUNEAU (LPD-10) USS DULUTH (LPD-6) | CONUS |

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3d MAB Fact Sheet

Subject: Child Care Center

I. GENERAL

A. This project was begun in 1968 by the 3d Marine Division as the 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital and included the operation of a temporary pediatric facility by the 3d Medical battalion. Funds were obtained from voluntary contributions from the United States and the Republic of Vietnam. Construction work had progressed to a point where the shells of six buildings were nearly complete, but work was halted in June 1970 when the Vietnamese informed III MAF they would not have a capability to staff and operate the hospital for an indefinite period.

B. In September 1970 the Vietnamese proposed that the six buildings be utilized as shown on the drawing at Supplemental Data Sheet A. The Commandant approved the proposal, but stated no further funds would be solicited. The province officials informed III MAF that the Province Joint Usage Hospital would be expanded to include a new pediatric wing to provide care comparable to the scope of the temporary pediatric facilities.

C. With no additional money coming into this fund the project could not be entirely completed. Negotiations were begun to determine what work should be accomplished. In December 1970 a draft copy of a transfer agreement was produced. A copy of the agreement is at Supplemental Data Sheet B. This calls for the Marines to insure that exterior doors and windows are installed in all buildings and ceilings installed in the two buildings designated as the maternity/infirmary/dispensary. After turnover the Marines are to provide additional assistance within limited capabilities. The agreement was approved by the Vietnamese in February 1971.

D. An agreement was made to purchase the required lumber from the Army Support Command, Danang, but due to operational commitments and priorities

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Subject: Child Care Center

the lumber was not made available until 19 March. Additional delays coincident with Army operations and the redeployment of Marine engineer units led XXIV Corps to agree to provide Army engineer units to accomplish required carpentry work at the project.

II. CURRENT STATUS/FORECAST

A. Army engineers and hired Vietnamese workers are completing carpentry and habitability work and installing a perimeter fence. With guards now at the facility, donated equipment is being moved to the site and materials and equipment are being purchased for use in the project. Details of purchases are at Supplemental Data Sheet C.

B. A transfer ceremony passing the facility to the three Vietnamese agencies is scheduled for the second week of May 1971. Once the transfer is accomplished the Vietnamese can occupy the site and provide security as well as commence self-help work. The pediatric wing of the Province Joint Usage Hospital has not been completed. As a part of the transfer ceremony approximately \$10,000 will be donated to complete this project and link it to the Child Care Center and the 3d Marine Division. Additional information is at Supplemental Data Sheet D.

C. Information on the status of the 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital Fund is at Supplemental Data Sheet C.

III. RECOMMENDATION

Continue with plans and turn over project on or about 14 May 1971.

Prepared by: Major D. E. SUDDUTH, USMC

Supplemental Data Sheets Attached:

- A. Graphic of Child Care Center
- B. Transfer Agreement
- C. Funding
- D. Transfer Ceremony

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3d MAB Supplemental Data Sheet A

Subject: Child Care Center

GRAPHIC OF CHILD CARE CENTER

I. PURPOSE. To provide a graphic which will more clearly show the location of the buildings and their respective use.

II. EXPLANATION/DATA. The graphic at page A-2 shows the six buildings of the Child Care Center to be used as follows:


A. Two buildings marked A and B to the Province Health Service for use as a maternity/infirmary/dispensary (M/I/D).

B. One building marked C to the Quang Tri Red Cross for use as a dormitory for students in the secondary schools.

C. Three buildings marked C, E, and F to the Buddhist Social Services for use as an orphanage and/or schools.

Prepared by: Major D. E. SUDDUTH, USMC

CHILD CARE CENTER



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3d MAB Supplemental Data Sheet B

Subject: Child Care Center

TRANSFER AGREEMENT

I. PURPOSE. To provide copy of Transfer Agreement with attachments.

II EXPLANATION/DATA (Verbatim transcript)

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That by a certain document called a lease dated 3 March 1969 and signed by aged council and members of Ai-Tu Hamlet, Trieu-Ai Village, Trieu-Phong District, Quang Tri Province, certain land was leased to the Quang-Tri Provincial Health Service. A copy of this lease is attached to this agreement and is by reference made a part of this agreement as Attachment 1. This land is described in the previously mentioned lease, Attachment 1, as a piece of waste land called "Con-Co" located at Trieu-Phong District, Quang-Tri Province with boundaries as follows:

Eastern limit: Route 1
Western limit: Mr. Le-Ty's own land
Southern limit: Mr. Nguyen-Thien's own land
Northern limit: Mr. Nguyen-Phan's own land
against the Ai-Tu Hamlet path.

That the above described land is more particularly delineated on an aerial photograph which is incorporated and attached hereto as Attachment 2.

LET IT FURTHER BE KNOWN:

That the above described land was leased to the Quang-Tri Provincial Health Service for the purpose of constructing a Children's Hospital. Thereafter, the 3d Marine Division erected six buildings which were initially to be used as a children's hospital. These six buildings are depicted on a drawing labeled Attachment 3. However because of a lack of personnel to operate a Children's Hospital, it was recommended by the Quang-Tri Province Chief, in a letter dated 2 September 1970 signed by the Quang-Tri Province Chief, a copy of said letter being attached to and made a part of this agreement as Attachment 4, that the six buildings constructed by the United States Marine Corps

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Subject: Child Care Center

be distributed among various humanitarian organizations who maintain an active interest in the welfare of the Vietnamese children. Therefore, it is intended and mutually agreed by the undersigned that the United States Marine Corps is transferring all buildings, as shown on Attachment 3, and the possession thereto to be distributed and utilized only as follows:

a. Two buildings marked A and B to the Province Health Service for use as a maternity/infirmery/dispensary.

b. One building marked C to the Quang-Tri Red Cross for use as a dormitory for students in the secondary schools.

c. Three buildings marked D, E, and F to the Buddhist Social Services for use as an orphanage and/or school.

That it is further understood by the undersigned that the United States Marine Corps is transferring the above mentioned buildings agreeing to install exterior doors and windows in all buildings and ceilings in the two dispensary buildings and will provide interior furniture within the capabilities of the United States Marine Corps.

That all disputes and controversies of every kind and nature whatsoever which cannot be resolved by the recipients of the six buildings will be submitted to the Province Chief of Quang-Tri Province for arbitration.

Prepared by: Major D. E. SUDDUTH, USMC

QUẢNG-TRỊ PROVINCE
 TRIỆU-PHONG DISTRICT
 TRIỆU-ÁI VILLAGE

REPUBLIC VIETNAM

LEASE

The undersigned, aged council and members of Ái-Tử Hamlet, Triệu-Ái Village, Triệu-Phong District, Quảng-Trị Province.

We all agreed to give Quảng-Trị Provincial Health Service a waste land called "Côn-Cờ" for the construction of a Childrens Hospital. Its location described below:

- Eastern limit : Route I
- Western limit : Mr. LÊ-TÝ's own land.
- Southern limit: Mr. NGUYỄN-THIỆN's own land.
- Northern limit: Mr. NGUYỄN-PHẨM's own land,

against the hamlet path.

This lease is a proof by which we won't complain of anything. This lease was made into 4 copies, for file; one to Triệu-Phong District Hq. , 1 to Quảng-Trị Health Service, 1 to Triệu-Ái Village Office and 1 to the hamlet chief.

Ái-Tử, 03 March 1969.

Signed

Hoàng-Mậu /s/
 Nguyễn-Phẩm/s/
 Lê-Bảo /s/

Hoàng-Dư /s/
 Nguyễn-Phong/s/
 Hoàng-Vân /s/


Lê-Cung /s/
 Đặng-Niên/s/
 Cao-Thùy/s/
 Lê-Con /s/


Hamlet Board


Chief : ĐẶNG-PHÁC /s/
 Asst : NGUYỄN-RE/s/

Certified: Village Chief : ĐẶNG-TRƯỜNG /s/
 Deputy District Chief : HOÀNG-THỨC-DINH/s/
 Province Chief : Col. NGUYỄN-ẤM/s/

Authenticated as a true copy of the original


 Dr. M.B. AGE
 LT, MC, USNR


 R.C. MARKS
 LTJG MSC USN



 Bác-Sĩ Lê-Bá-TUNG
 Prov Med Chief

ATTACHMENT (1)

OMITTED

ATTACHMENT (2)

CHILD CARE CENTER



ATTACHMENT (3)

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
QUANG TRI PROVINCE

2 September 1970

From : Col. KHUEN, Province Chief, Quangtri Province.

To : Commanding General, III MAF

Subj : 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital.

1. On 20 August 1970, a meeting was held at Quang-tri Province Headquarters to discuss future possible use of the 3d MarDiv Memorial Children's Hospital.

Participants were :

- a. Col. KHUEN, Quang-tri Province Chief.
- b. Mr. LE-BA-TUNG, Chief of Quang-tri Province Health Service and Director of the Quang-tri Province Hospital.
- c. Ven. THICH CHANH TRUC, Chief Venerable for Quang-tri Province.
- d. Mr. TON-THAT HOAN, Chairman, Quang-tri Province Chapter, Red Cross.
- e. Col. G.J. PEABODY, AC/S, G-5, III MAF.
- f. Col. GREEN, AC/S, G-5, XXIV Corps.
- g. LtCol. E.H. BIRK, PCA, Quang-tri.
- h. LCDR G.B. COFFMAN, MC, USN, MCIC, MILPHAP Team 4.
- i. Maj. LUTIKSON, S-5, 1st Brigade, 5th Mech.
- j. Maj. B.E. LUDFUTH, DAC/S, G-5, III MAF.
- k. Lt. R.M. HELLER, MC, USN, MILPHAP Tm 4.
- l. LtJg. J.B. TYNDALL, MEC, USN, MILPHAP Tm 4.

2. Following the discussing, a tour around the construction site was made by recipients and after checking up, they would like to be given directly as indicated below :

- a. Buildings #6 and #7 : for Quang-tri Province Health Service to use as MDs.
- b. Building #5 : for Quang-tri Red Cross. It will be utilized as either a bearing facility for students attending schools in Quang-tri City, or a training center for Red Cross Scout.
- c. Buildings #1, #2, and #10 : for Quang-tri Buddhist Social Services to use as schools or orphanage.

3. The 3d Marine Division will give the chosen buildings directly to various recipients with the signature of approval by Quang-tri Province Chief.

The representative of Quang-tri Province Health Service is Dr. LE-BA-TUNG, Chief of Health Service and Director of the Province Hospital; of Red Cross is Pharmacist TON-THAT HOAN, Chairman of Red Cross Sub-Association ; of Buddhist Social Services is Venerable THICH CHANH-TRUC, Chief Ven. for Quang-tri Province.

4. In the meeting, the III MAF AC/S, G-5 stated that, it would not be appropriate to complete all buildings in accordance with the present plans, and that the

.....cont'd...

ATTACHMENT (4)

A-1-5

Subj : 3d NARDIV Memorial Children's Hospital.

(cont'd)


funds available to do additional work on the project are extremely limited. Therefore, it is requested that 1st priority be given to buildings #6 and #7 for completion. These two buildings will be utilized as public facility(MB)

5. An appropriate ceremony for the donation will be held as soon as all procedures get done.

DISTRIBUTION :

CG III MAF (Attn : AC/S, G-5)
CG XXIV Corps (Attn : AC/S, G-5)
CG 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, (Mech)
(Attn: AC/S, G-5)
FSA, Quang-tri.
Chief Public Health Division,
CORPS, XXIV Corps
File.

Sincerely yours,



Col. TON-THAT KHUEN
Province Chief
Quang-tri Province

ATTACHMENT (5)

UNCLASSIFIED

3D MAB Supplemental Data Sheet C

Subject: Child Care Center

FUNDING

I. PURPOSE. To provide information concerning the funds that can be utilized to support the subject project.

II. EXPLANATION/DATA

A. There are at present only two sources of funds available to support construction and the provision of materials and equipment to the project:

1. The 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital Fund.

2. The Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action (MCRCA) Fund. It is not presently anticipated that any monies will be expended from the MCRCA Fund in support of this project.

B. Status of the 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital Fund:

1. Available balance as of 25 February 1971, the date of the last statement was \$47,655.41. Expenditures to date are \$4,339.32 for lumber for the Child Care Center. Including petty cash the available balance is \$43,491.05 as of 27 April 1971.

2. Approximate amounts obligated through 14 May 1971 are as follows:

a. \$10,000 US to be spent in Hong Kong for equipment to be used in the Child Care Center. This equipment includes such items as:

- (1) material for 600 blankets;
- (2) six hot water heaters;
- (3) four stoves and three compressors
- (4) six television sets
- (5) two sewing machines

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Subject: Child Care Center

- (6) 100 stackchairs for use in the M/I/D
- (7) shower fixtures
- (8) medical supplies

b. Approximately \$6,000 US will be spent in the Republic of Vietnam to purchase materials and includes the purchase of:

- (1) flourescent lights;
- (2) ceiling fans and switches
- (3) sanitary facilities
- (4) water pipe
- (5) plumbing hardware
- (6) shower shoes
- (7) eating utensils

c. Checks will be presented to the three recipient agencies during the transfer ceremonies for the Child Care Center. It is proposed that checks be presented in the following manner:

(1) A check for \$10,000 to the Province Ministry of Health for use in completing the pediatric wing at the Province Joint Usage Hospital (One floor will receive a plaque showing sponsorship of the 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital Fund.);

(2) A check of about \$6,000 to the Province Ministry of Health for use in the M/I/D;

(3) A check of about \$3,000 to the Quang Tri Province Chapter of the Red Cross for use in the school dormitory.

3. The funds obligated in paragraph 2 above total \$38,000, leaving some \$5,000 for the payment of Vietnamese laborers and the completion of habitability

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Subject: Child Care Center

projects such as construction of the septic tank and digging a well. Completion of these plans should effectively zero out the 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital Fund by the middle of May 1971.

Prepared by: Major D. E. SUDDUTH, USMC

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C-3

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Supplemental Data Sheet D

Subject: Child Care Center

TRANSFER CEREMONY

I. PURPOSE. To provide information concerning the ceremony to transfer title to the buildings and grounds of the Child Care Center from the Marines to the Vietnamese agencies who will operate and maintain the facilities.

II. EXPLANATION/DATE

A. The transfer ceremony will be held at the Child Care Center, Quang Tri Province on 14 May 1971. The schedule of events will run as follows:

Music by the 3d MAB Band

History of the Project
(Vietnamese & English)

Remarks by Major General Armstrong

Signing Ceremony

Flag Raising

Remarks by Four Vietnamese Officials

Music by the 3d MAB Band

Light Refreshments

B. A program is being prepared to be distributed at the Transfer Ceremony. The program will be a bilingual booklet giving a brief sketch of the history of the project and showing pictures of Vietnamese children receiving care in the temporary pediatric facilities. The program booklet contains, in English only, a letter from the Commanding General, 3d MAB to all persons who contributed money or materials to the project, and a copy of the program will be mailed to all donors.

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Subject: Child Care Center

C. The cover of the program booklet will bear a reproduction of the dedication plaque which will be installed at the flagpole of the Child Care Center. The English rendition of the dedicatory plaque reads as follows:

DEDICATED MAY 1971

TO THE MEMORY OF VIETNAMESE AND AMERICANS
WHO HAVE DIED IN THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM

CHILD CARE CENTER

THIS PROJECT WAS INITIATED BY
THE 3d MARINE DIVISION
AND CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED THROUGH
THE JOINT EFFORTS OF CONCERNED CITIZENS
OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Prepared by: Major D. E. SUDDUTH

UNCLASSIFIED

D-2



NEWS RELEASE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL DELIVERY OF ADDRESS
EXPECTED AT 1930 (CDT)
1 MAY 1971

REMARKS BY
GENERAL LEONARD F. CHAPMAN, JR.
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
TO THE ANNUAL MILITARY CONFERENCE
OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE
OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION
SKIRVIN HOTEL
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA
1 MAY 1971

REMARKS BY
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 OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA
 1930, 1 MAY 1971

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. This is the fourth time I have had the pleasure of being with you in this capacity. But as much of a personal pleasure as it has been for me, I have been aware of my responsibility, too. Each year I have tried to do two things: Report to you on what Marines are doing; and listen carefully to what you have to say as Marines -- Marines who live and work in the civilian community. This, I think, has served our whole Corps well. I know that what I have learned from you has helped me. I hope that what I have been able to report to you has helped you understand the direction of march of our Corps.

Now, in this fourth year of our being together, our direction of march remains the same. We have attained some of our objectives, and others are closer -- or at least stand out with greater clarity.

VIETNAM: AN ERA IN MARINE CORPS HISTORY

One of the objectives we have reached very recently is the Marine Corps completed mission in the Republic of Vietnam. And the accomplishment of our mission in Vietnam, gentlemen, has been an era in itself in the history of our Corps.

In 1968, when I first reported to you from this platform, Marines were not only familiar with Vietnam, they had been serving in combat in that country for more than three years. Chu Lai was, by 1968, long since turned over to other Allied forces. Operations Starlight and Hastings were examples of Marine courage held up to recruits by veteran Drill Instructors who had been there. The enemy Tet aggression, though fresh, had been broken; Hue City was still smoking but secure, and already a part of Marine Corps History; the worst was over at Khe Sanh, and individual and collective Marine courage and know-how had won there, too.

But there were three more years of Marine Corps history yet to be acted out in the Republic of Vietnam. And at that time, in the summer of 1968, there were eight Marine infantry regiments; ten Marine artillery battalions, plus many additional batteries formed into three separate Field Artillery Groups; fourteen fixed-wing squadrons; ten helicopter squadrons; and a healthy depth of tank, amtrac, engineer, and communications battalions. All of these operating units were backed up by their own administrative and logistics supporting units, and the overall supporting organization of the Marine Force Logistic Command.

In that summer of 1968 the III Marine Amphibious Force in the Republic of Vietnam consisted of no less than 75% of all active Fleet Marine Force units, and 28% of the entire strength of the Corps. And when you extract those percentages from a Corps with a total strength of 307,000, that's an awful lot of Marines.

They were needed.

The three years since have not seen Marine battles as large as Khe Sanh, nor as well-covered in the news as Hue City; but the fight was tough, demanding, and complicated. It has been during these past three years that those earlier victories were consolidated. Pacification, Civic Action, Vietnamization, and an ever increasing stability. And it was hard, exacting work.

Today, three years since I first reported to you, and six and a half years since Marines first landed in the Republic of Vietnam; only a Marine Brigade -- consisting of a reinforced infantry regiment, Marine air and the Force Logistic Command -- remains in combat.

The 3d Marine Division is, and has been for some time, back to and operating out of Okinawa -- as tough and as ready as ever.

The 5th Marine Division, a reactivated wartime division flying its colors from Camp Pendleton, is once again retired. But even that division shared the demanding combat of Vietnam, through two of its regiments: the 26th and 27th Marines. And they did that division's record proud turns. The 26th Marines made the epic stand at Khe Sanh, and fought in the Phu Bai, Hai Van, and Danang areas. The 27th Marines distinguished itself in the plains and mountains of the Danang area. In both regiments a new generation of Marines won honors for the retired colors of the 5th Marine Division that match well those won at Iwo Jima.

The 1st Marine Brigade, reduced in size but still holding station on that gentle peninsula in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, is being rebuilt and will soon return to full strength.

Fixed-wing and helicopter squadrons of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing are already flying training and readiness missions from Japan and Okinawa.

And the Old Breed, the 1st Marine Division, is back home again at Camp Pendleton.

Of course "home" is a relative term for the Old First. A division which has spent twelve years of its thirty-year-life in combat overseas can't really feel out of place in any environment.

Yes, our Corps has nearly completed its mission in Vietnam. Scarlet flags and guidons heavy with new streamers and battle stars are once again out of the sound of enemy fire.

And what have we accomplished?

THE MEN WHO MADE HISTORY, AND THE MEN WHO WILL WRITE HISTORY

I don't know what historians will say about Vietnam, or how they will say it. Surely, in the polarized condition of our own time, no one is qualified to write an objective history of this war.

Our mission, when we landed there more than six years ago, was to give the people of the Republic of Vietnam the opportunity to determine their own destiny.

In 1965 the rivers of that rich country couldn't be fished, the paddies and the fields could not be farmed, the outlying communities couldn't be supplied, and the people had two choices -- give in or be terrorized.

The blood of thousands of hamlet, village, district, and province leaders ran in the fish-filled rivers. Land lay fallow, denied to the farmers through terror and destruction. Doctors, nurses, teachers, lawyers, and freely elected officials -- and their families -- were murdered by the Viet Cong if they showed any promise, or simply as examples in terror.

The armed forces of that country trying to fight a war of defense within its own boundaries, were at the tactical mercy of an enemy that moved freely from the battle zone to safe sanctuaries. But there were no sanctuaries for the people of the Republic of Vietnam.

Communities were cut off. Commerce had stopped moving over roads that were mined and ambushed, or simply destroyed.

Now, after more than six years of the toughest kind of war -- a war fought with strictly one-side rules -- most Marines have left their areas of responsibility in Vietnam's Military Region I. And in those areas fishermen ply the rivers, farmers harvest their work, commerce moves, populace speaks and votes, and their armed forces defend them. We have called it Vietnamization, I don't know what the historians will call it.

No, I'm not sure how the historians will describe all of this; but of the Marines who patrolled, and fought, and worked, and sacrificed through those six years and more -- they can only say: "They accomplished their mission. They did their duty."

And I'm sure the detractors will find proper recording, too.

A NEW ERA FOR MARINE PURPOSE, READINESS, QUALITY, AND PROGRESS

If Vietnam has been an era in the history of our Corps, it also is one of many past commitments. There is much more, and Marines are busy preparing.

These past six years have seen many changes in our country. Some count as progress, some do not. There have been changes in our Corps, too -- with more to come. But we want them to all count for progress, and this is what I want to complete my report with, what we are doing and what we plan to do.

Now there are four things I want to stress, here: PURPOSE, READINESS, QUALITY, and PROGRESS. These are the principles guiding all efforts in our Corps. We have made some changes, and we are making more changes, but we aren't going to change anything just for the sake of change.

NO CHANGE TO OUR PURPOSE

One thing we are absolutely sure won't change in our Corps, and that's our purpose. Our purpose in the 1970's remains exactly what it was in our beginning, nearly two centuries ago. Like the other armed services of our nation, the purpose of the Marine Corps is the defense of the United States. And reality means facing the fact that the ultimate application of defense is the harsh environment of combat.

For Marines, combat still means facing an enemy on the personal levels of bayonet to bayonet, howitzer to howitzer, and aircraft to aircraft. We know this as reality, and we know that it won't go away by ignoring it. We also know that the safest and best way to meet this possibility is to be ready for it. Every unit and individual Marine must be an element of readiness -- conditioned, trained, disciplined, lean, tough, and ready to fulfill our purpose.

To fulfill our purpose we are building a new Marine Corps.

Now, I want to be sure that you understand we are not abandoning the old Marine Corps. We are too tradition minded for that. And I mean exactly that. We are truly tradition minded.

We understand the real and necessary strength derived from the proper application of tradition.

Marines know that tradition is not unthinking habit. Tradition is functional. It is a real and viable by-product of serving a purpose faithfully and successfully. It is the essence of past success carried forward to prime further success.

If our training is traditionally tough, it's because the application of our purpose is tough. If our discipline is traditionally exacting, it is because discipline is the key to winning and surviving in battle. If we traditionally demand pride in personal appearance and unit integrity, it is because pride gives strength, and we must be strong to serve our purpose.

We are not changing any of our standards, our strict rules and regulations, or our traditions. On the contrary, we are tightening up. We are making it tougher and more demanding. We know that this is the way to performance, pride, satisfaction, and above all -- victory on the battlefield.

No, we are not abandoning the old Corps, we are only building a new Corps. And we are building our new Corps in the very best image of the old.

THE TRADITION OF READINESS

The first thing we are building in our new Corps is an even better posture of readiness. And one of the assets we have in our efforts is an advantage we had in the old Corps: size. We are not going to be big.

For more than a decade before our commitment in Vietnam, our Corps kept its strength at about 200,000 Marines. The war required that we grow, and grow we did -- to a top war-time strength of 317,000. Now we are down to just about 220,000 and growing even leaner. And leaner is what we want to be.

We have approval for an eventual tough, lean strength of 206,000 Marines. With this strength we can fully man our three divisions, three aircraft wings, and all supporting units. The disposition of our Marine air-ground team will be basically as it was before Vietnam. One division-wing team on the East Coast at Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point. Another division-wing team on the West Coast at Camp Pendleton and El Toro, and one division-wing team in the Pacific. Of the Pacific team, two-thirds will remain forward in the Western Pacific, and one-third will be brigaded together at Kaneohe Bay, in Hawaii.

With these three active air-ground teams, and the Marine Corps Reserve air-ground team of the 4th Marine Division and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, we can and will maintain our tradition of readiness. And with such readiness, we can meet any emergency with confidence, because we know two things: First, whenever a crisis comes, those who are ready will go. Second, such a crisis will more than likely be a surprise. So Marines will be ready. Every Marine, every piece of equipment, every unit -- regular and reserve, will be ready with the Navy to mount out on short notice and at the direction of our Commander-in-Chief go anywhere, take on anybody -- and win.

With 206,000 active Marines in the three regular Marine divisions and aircraft wings,

and 45,000 reserve Marines in the IV MAF, we can keep our Fleet Marine Force formations combat ready and still rotate, train, educate and prepare the individual Marines without sacrificing professional quality.

INDIVIDUAL MARINE QUALITY

The key to maintaining the professional quality of our Corps is the individual Marine -- officer, noncommissioned officer, and nonrated Marine.

We don't want a lot of Marines. We want quality, not quantity. We're looking for a few good men.

For almost two hundred years we've kept our standards high and our ranks small. If everybody could be a Marine, we wouldn't be "The Marines."

Today it's harder than ever before to be a Marine. We're a tough club to join, a tough team to make. And that's exactly the way we're going to keep it.

We want men who are proud of their Country, and who want to serve it in a proud Corps. We want men who aren't conformists, but who are disciplined individualists who believe in principles because they have made the decision themselves, not followed a fad.

We want men who seek a challenge and who aren't afraid of tough physical training. We want men who want to join us -- who want to become a part of an elite force steeped in the traditions of devotion to duty, discipline, and honor. We want extraordinary men.

We want men who believe that while nobody likes to fight -- somebody has to know how.

We want good men -- and then we'll make them better.

We're open, and we're looking -- for a few good men -- who have finished school but who haven't finished learning. Men who are ready for responsibility and leadership. If they've got it and they want to stand with Marines, they'll be welcome. But it must be clear: nobody's joining them, they'll be joining us.

We're continuing to train Marines the way we've always trained them. No compromises, no shortcuts, no promises except one -- they'll be Marines, and all that title bestows. Each one will be one of the few, one of the very finest.

To accomplish this we've lengthened both recruit training and initial officer training. And we've established higher standards for graduation from this training -- both boot camp and the Basic School. Every Marine, private and second lieutenant, who finally joins the Fleet Marine Force has not only been trained, he has passed a tough screening process. Each one is the kind of Marine we'd like to keep, active or reserve.

And, at this point, let me make it quite clear that the lean, tough character of the Corps which I see applies not only to the Corps of Marines on active service -- but equally so to those who comprise our wonderful Marine Corps Reserve.

QUALITY EQUIPMENT FOR QUALITY MARINES

Our equipment situation, both air and ground, is good, too. We have received a good issue of new, modern equipment over the past few years. And we have more coming.

This year the Corps will receive the first of a new family of tracked amphibian vehicles --

The LVTP7. These new vehicles, with only slight changes, will serve not only as armored amphibian personnel carriers, but as command and control vehicles, mine clearance and recovery tractors, and cargo carriers. Lighter, smaller, and more heavily armed than the current P5 series, the new LVTP7 operates better ashore, too.

But the most dramatic progress we've made in equipment is in Marine aviation -- and in my opinion, in world aviation. It is the AV-8 HARRIER.

We have HARRIERS now, five of them as of this month, and every day we find a new use for their versatility. The HARRIER is a fascinating airplane with a tremendous potential. Just as an example, imagine an aircraft with the normal configuration of an attack jet, taking off and landing on a vacant lot in the middle of New York City. Well, the HARRIER did just that several months ago, and it's improved since.

The vertical short-take-off and landing (V/STOL) of the HARRIER is created by adjustable jet nozzles that can swivel in any direction. For direct vertical take off, the jet blast straight down. Once the aircraft is up, it merely flies on the horizontal plane. This saves deck space at sea, and runway construction ashore.

PROGRESS TOWARD MORALE AND SPIRIT

We're making great progress in organization, training, and equipment. We're making progress toward meeting the individual Marine's other needs, too. Five years ago the Corps carefully planned a program of ensuring that half of all new construction would be devoted to the comfort of Marines. New barracks, bachelor officers' quarters, clubs and recreational facilities are the results. Never dreamed of in the Old Corps, these new accommodations add comfort and dignity to the demands of professionalism and readiness. And there's more.

If we expect each Marine to take pride in himself, to feel a part of the great tradition of our Corps; he must see himself as more than a well-taken-care of technician. The outward sign of this is the Marine uniform. And who can think of a Marine without thinking of dress blues.

Early this year we received authority to issue the dress blue uniform to all Marines graduating from boot camp. The funds are being allocated, the schedule is being set up, and we'll fully implement this program in about two years.

And we're getting rid of a uniform, too. As blues come back, khaki is on the way out. Beginning this summer Marine green will be optional the year 'round. Now this doesn't mean discomfort in hot weather. On the contrary, it means liberation.

The new summer-weight greens are actually lighter and cooler than the old tropical worsted khaki. They don't soil as fast, either. And of course, there can be no question what service is represented when a Marine wears green, or blue, the year 'round.

All this dressing up has a purpose; To enhance our professional image within ourselves. Professional service to the people of the United States is our goal in everything we do; from the way we think to the way we act; and from the way we apply our profession to the way we look. This takes honest, loyal service. Marines must continue to be proud of that service, and of the uniforms they wear.

UNITED STATES MARINES ARE AMERICANS

Since 1965, more than half a million young Americans have returned to civilian life from service in the Marine Corps. Their contributions to America during these trying times merit gratitude and recognition. We must consider their hopes and their pride. Those who leave our ranks, and those who stay on as Marines -- regular and reserve.

And not all Marines are returning to civilian life. Many have found service to their country a proud and rewarding profession. And more young Americans will continue to join these veterans and accept the challenge of being Marines. It is to these Marines -- and their comrades of the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard, that the reality of the 1970's is a stark truth. We must know our purpose, we must be ready, we must maintain quality and we must meet challenge with progress. We must be prepared to meet any crisis, and we'd better be good if it happens. Yet, there is a confusion throughout America over this.

Service to country is not always treated kindly in our modern America. The same America to which this service is offered. And the young Americans who give this service see it every day. They know there is more to American defense than training, equipment, barracks, and uniforms. The real military tradition of America has always been the good interaction that existed between the served and the serving -- the American citizen and the American fighting man. We here especially know that war is still a real and present threat in the world of the 1970's. And we know that sure and positive strength is one of the means of prevention. We also know that strength is sure only through the solidarity of mutual pride and respect among all Americans. You, as Marines who live and work among the people we serve, can tell this story better than anyone. That, too, is your tradition.

I believe it is particularly significant that this final evening meeting of the 1971 MCROA Military Conference coincides with national Loyalty Day -- proclaimed as such by President Nixon. And at the risk of repeating something you heard me say last year in Miami -- it bears repeating -- I would ask you to stand as I remind you of the Oath of Office you all once took:

I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter; so help me God.

Thank you again, ladies and gentlemen, for this fourth opportunity to be with you. They have all been great pleasures -- but then, being with Marines is always a pleasure.

--END--

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FOLLOW UP TO C/S~~

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DRA/G-3
REL/CG/GJW

B

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L // NO3100//
III MAF FOR G-3
MINE AND BOOBY TRAP LESSONS LEARNED (U)

A. MY 080130Z NOVEMBER 1970 (C)
B. MY 091243Z DECEMBER 1970
C. MY 110943Z JULY 1970 (C)
D. MY 200110Z AUGUST 1970 (C)
E. MY 271815Z NOVEMBER 1970 (U)
F. MY 040749Z DECEMBER 1970 (U)
G. MY 110551Z DECEMBER 1970 (C)
H. MY 042558Z JANUARY 1971 (C)
1. (C) THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE ENEMY'S EFFECTIVENESS IN EMPLOYING MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS. THE INCREASED EFFICIENCY OF COUNTER-MEASURES TAKEN BY THE DIVISION IS MANIFESTED IN THE 4.0 TO 1.0 RATIO OF FINDS TO DETONATED DURING DECEMBER 1970 AS COMPARED TO THE 1.2 TO 1.0 RATIO IN JULY. CONTINUED COMMAND EMPHASIS, REFINED DETECTION

PAGE TWO RUMULVA0306 C O N F I D E N T I A L
TECHNIQUES AND EXCELLENT INSTRUCTIONAL EFFORT BY INDIVIDUAL UNITS AS WELL AS THE FIRST ENGINEER BATTALION HAVE BEEN THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTORS FOR THIS VASTLY IMPROVED RATIO.

2. (C) IN SPITE OF THE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN COMBATING THESE INSIDIOUS WEAPONS, WE CONTINUE TO LOSE MEN. SPECIFICALLY, DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1970, THIS DIVISION HAD 127 MEN KILLED AND 1,135 MEN WOUNDED BY MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS. DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF 1970, 55 MEN LOST THEIR LIVES AND 551 WERE WOUNDED. DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF LAST YEAR, 44.5 PERCENT OF ALL CASUALTIES WERE CAUSED BY MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS, WHILE DURING THE LAST HALF OF 1970 THE PERCENTAGE WAS 48.1.

3. (C) THE FOLLOWING RECENT INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE THE ENEMY'S BOOBY TRAP TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES.

A. JUST BEFORE NOON ON 7 DECEMBER 1970, A SQUAD PATROL, WHILE OPERATING 2 1/2 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF HILL 52, FOUND A PUNJI PIT ALONG A TRAIL. A STAFF SERGEANT, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO LIFT THE COVER OF THE PUNJI PIT, USED A GRAPNEL HOOK FROM A DISTANCE OF 5 METERS AND DETONATED A 105MM BOOBY TRAP. THE STAFF SERGEANT WAS KILLED AND TWO MARINES WOUNDED. THE GRAPNEL IS AN EFFECTIVE TOOL WHEN USED PROPERLY, HOWEVER, THE SAFE PRACTICES OUTLINED IN REFERENCES A

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AND B MUST BE FOLLOWED. IN THIS CASE, FULL USE OF THE LONG LINE ATTACHED TO THE GRAPNEL, PROPER DISPERSION, AND ADEQUATE COVER FOR ALL THE MARINES IN THE VICINITY WOULD HAVE POSSIBLY ELIMINATED THE CASUALTIES RECEIVED WHEN THE BOOBY TRAP DETONATED.

B. ONCE THE ENEMY BECOMES AWARE OF ALLIED PRESENCE IN BASE CAMP OR LOGISTIC CACHE AREAS AND ALONG A LINE OF COMMUNICATION, HE WILL EMPLACE NUMEROUS MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS IN THE LIKELY AVENUES OF APPROACH INTO THE POSITIONS, IN THE ENTRANCES AND WITHIN THE CONFINES OF CAVES AND TUNNELS, IN ENTRANCES TO HUTS, ON GATES, AND IN OBVIOUS HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES. HE OFTEN INITIATES ACTION AGAINST OUR FRIENDLY PATROLS TO LURE THEM INTO PURSUIT THROUGH PREDETERMINED BOOBY TRAPPED AREAS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE FIND OF ONE BOOBY TRAP ALMOST INVARIABLY MEANS MORE IN THE AREA. ON 10 JANUARY 1971, MARINES CONDUCTING A SEARCH OPERATION 5 1/2 KILOMETERS NORTH WEST OF BALDY COMBAT BASE SUFFERED TWO WOUNDED AS THE RESULT OF A 60MM MORTAR ROUND BOOBY TRAP DETONATION. A BATTALION EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND A COMPANY COMMANDER LANDED TO OVERSEE THE ENSUING MEDEVAC. MOVING TOWARD THE TWO WOUNDED MARINES, THESE TWO OFFICERS WERE FATALLY WOUNDED BY A SECOND BOOBY TRAP. THIS EXAMPLE ILLUSTRATES THE ENEMY'S TACTIC OF EMPLACING NUMEROUS MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS ALONG

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ANTICIPATED EVACUATION ROUTES. ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THIS TACTIC WAS DEMONSTRATED ON 20 JANUARY 1971 ON WESTERN CHARLIE RIDGE WHEN THE POINT MAN OF A PLATOON PATROL DETONATED A CAN FILLED WITH C-4, RESULTING IN FOUR MARINES BEING WOUNDED. THE SUBSEQUENT MOVEMENT OF THE PLATOON TO SECURE A LANDING ZONE FOR THE MEDEVAC HELICOPTER RESULTED IN THE DETONATION OF ANOTHER BOOBY TRAP CAUSING FOUR MORE MEN TO BE WOUNDED. WHILE THE MEDEVAC WAS BEING COMPLETED, THE ROTOR WASH FROM THE HELICOPTER DETONATED FOUR MORE BOOBY TRAPS RESULTING IN THREE MARINES BEING WOUNDED. A FURTHER SEARCH OF THE AREA FOUND FOUR ADDITIONAL BOOBY TRAPS, ALL OF THE SAME TYPE AS ORIGINALLY DETONATED. IN THIS ONE LIMITED AREA, A TOTAL OF SIX BOOBY TRAPS WERE DETONATED RESULTING IN ELEVEN MARINES WOUNDED WHILE FOUR ADDITIONAL BOOBY TRAPS WERE FOUND AND DESTROYED IN PLACE.

C. ON 18 JANUARY 1971, A MARINE CUFP UNIT WAS PREPARING TO OCCUPY PREVIOUSLY PREPARED NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS 2 KILOMETERS SOUTH-WEST OF BALDY COMBAT BASE WHEN A MARINE DETONATED AN M-26 GRENADE BOOBY TRAP WITH TRIP WIRE EMPLACED IN A FIGHTING HOLE. FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT FOUR MORE FIGHTING HOLES IN THE SAME DEFENSIVE POSITION HAD BEEN SIMILARLY BOOBY TRAPPED. PRIOR TO REOCCUPYING OLD POSITIONS, A CAREFUL AND THOROUGH CHECK FOR MINES

PAGE FIVE RUMULVA0306 C O N F I D E N T I A L
AND BOOBY TRAPS MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED.

4. (C) REFERENCES A THROUGH H WERE ISSUED TO AID IN KEEPING ALL MARINES INFORMED OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF COUNTERING MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS. COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS WILL REVIEW THESE REFERENCES AND CONTINUE TO PLACE SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON MINE AND

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BOOBY TRAP INSTRUCTION AND DETECTION TECHNIQUES.
MAJOR GENERAL WIDDECKE SENDS.
GP-4
BT
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FM CG THIRD MAB

DRAREL/G-3/LWB

TO RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUMHMPA/CG XXIV CORPS

INFO RUEOFIA/CMC

COPY 15 OF 28 COPIES

RUMHMPA/CG FORLOGCOND

RUMHMPH/CG SECOND ROKMC BDE

RUMHGOEA/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT FOUR

RUMHMSA/CTU SEVEN EIGHT PT ONE PT ONE

RUMHODA/SA FIRST TASK FORCE

RUMHFGA/CCN DANANG RVN

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S E C R E T //NB3480//

THIRD MAB HISTORICAL SUMMARY NO. 0024 FOR PERIOD 070001H TO 072400H MAY 1971 (U) REPORT SYMBOL FMFPAC ZN 3390-09

A. FMFPAC 5750.10C

1. THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED IAW REF A

A) MAJOR UNIT OPERATIONS

1) IMPERIAL LAKE

(G) DTC TERMINATED: 071200H MAY 71

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(J) DAILY OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

(1) NONE

(2) NUMBER OF ARTY MENS 0/1; NUMBER OF ROUNDS 0/18;
WITH NO RPT BDA.

(K) CUMULATIVE HELO SUPPORT : 2 SORTIES

(L) CUMULATIVE FIXED WING SUPPORT : 7 ID SORTIES, 4 DAS
SORTIES, 39 CAS SORTIES.

(M) RESULTS: (DAILY/CUM) (INCLUDES 1ST MARDIV PLUS 3RD MAB)

FRIENDLY

ENEMY

0/24 USMC KIA

0/128 NVA KIA

0/170 USMC WIA(E)

0/170 VC KIA

0/58 USMC WIA(M)

0/183 DET

0/1 USMC KNHC

0/216 INC

0/128 USMC NHC(E)

0/18 CSWC

0/2 USMC NHC(M)

0/2 USN KIA

0/3 USN WIA(E)

0/6 USN NHC(E)

B) SPECIAL OPERATIONS: NONE

C) INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITIES:

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1) NORTHERN MILITARY REGION ONE: NONE
DANANG TAOR:

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SECRET

(A) AIR BASE DEFENSE: NO CONTACTS
 (B) 1ST MARINES
 (1) 1/1: CHOPPED EFFECTIVE 030000Z MAY 71
 (2) 2/1: STANDDOWN AT HILL 34
 (3) 3/1: STANDDOWN CAMP 14
 (C) 1/11: STANDDOWN AT NAC
 (1) 3RD BN HOW BTRY OPCON 1/11 STANDDOWN HILL 34
 (2) C BTRY STANDDOWN AT NAC
 (3) M BTRY STANDDOWN AT NAC
 (D) A CO (REIN) 1ST RECON BN: STANDDOWN CAMP REASONER
 (E) 2ND CAG: DEACTIVATED DTG 010001H MAY 71
 3) DAILY RECAP OF INDIVIDUAL USMC UNIT ACTIVITIES: NEGATIVE
 TODAY'S LOSSES: NONE
 0) AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS
 1) (A) 14 TOTAL ATTACK SORTIES WERE FLOWN; 14 IN SUPPORT OF
 THE 7TH AF.
 (B) OUT-OF-COUNTRY SUPPORT; 14 TOTAL ATTACK SORTIES WERE FLOWN
 BY THE A-4E WHICH EXPENDED 24.8 TONS OF ORD ACCOUNTING FOR

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1 TRUCK DAM; 10 BOX SUPPLIES DEST; 1 SEC EXPL AND 1 SEC FIRE.

2) FIXED WING OPERATIONS

(B) OV-10A: 4 VR WERE FLOWN FOR 7.7 HOURS.

(C) VMGR-152 (DET): 1 AIR REFUELING SORTIE WAS FLOWN FOR 1.7
 HOURS REFUELING 11 AIRCRAFT. 137 PASSENGERS AND 22.2 TONS

CARGO WERE LIFTED.

(D) MAG-11: 23 DAY AND 1 NIGHT SORTIES WERE FLOWN FOR 42.2
 HOURS, EXPENDING 25.8 TONS OF ORD ACCOUNTING FOR 1 TRUCK
 DAM; 10 BOX SUPPLIES DEST; 1 SEC EXPL AND 1 SEC FIRE.

3) HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

(A) MAG-16: 218 SORTIES WERE FLOWN FOR 61.8 HOURS PERFORMING
 58 TASKS. 631 PASSENGERS AND 72.2 TONS OF CARGO WERE
 LIFTED. 67 ARMED HELO SORTIES WERE FLOWN FOR 13.3 HOURS
 PERFORMING 5 TASKS WITH NO RPT BDA.

E) GENERAL INFORMATION

1) IMPACT OF WEATHER ON OPERATIONS

(A) GROUND OPERATIONS: NONE

(B) AIR OPERATIONS: NONE

2) FINAL WEEKLY MINE/BOOBY TRAP TOTALS FOR THE PERIOD 020001H TO
 071200H.

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(A) THERE WERE NO MINES/BOOBY TRAPS ENCOUNTERED DURING THE
 REPORTING PERIOD.

3) UNIT STAND DOWN THIS DATE:

(A) DET, VMO-6

(B) HMM-262

(C) DET, 1ST RADIO BN

(D) DET, HQBN, 1ST MARDIV

(E) 1ST LT

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(F) 3RD ITT
(G) 3RD CIT
(H) CO ACREIN, 1ST RECON BN
(I) 1ST BN (REIN), 11TH MAR
(J) DET, HQ BTRY, 11TH MAR
(K) 2ND BN, 1ST MAR

4) THE STAND DOWN ON 7 MAY OF THE 2ND BATTALION, 1ST MARINES
CONCLUDES USMC GROUND OPERATIONS IN RVN.
5) THIS DATE VMA-311 CONCLUDED USMC FIXED WING ATTACK OPERATIONS
IN RVN.

GP-4

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