



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting
the MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL to

CAPTAIN WILLIAM V. COWAN
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For outstanding meritorious service as Operations Officer, Refugee Affairs Section, and subsequently as Camp Commander, San Onofre Refugee Camp, Military Coordination Center, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California during Operation NEW ARRIVALS from 27 April 1975 to 5 November 1975. Captain Cowan exhibited exemplary leadership and organizational ability in forming a highly responsive and dedicated Refugee Affairs staff capable of effectively responding to hundreds of queries in connection with the arrival of thousands of refugees from Indo-China and of solving a myriad of unique problems associated with the arrival of the initial influx of refugees. As Camp Commander of the San Onofre Refugee Camp, the only camp housing both Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees and the only camp geographically separated from the Inter-Agency Task Force complex, he appointed English speaking refugees as coordinators between his staff and the more than 2,000 refugees billeted in the camp, as well as orchestrating a harmonious relationship between the peoples of the two disparate cultures. His camp was selected as the site for temporarily billeting a group of repatriates, a sensitive and potentially explosive situation. Though the possibility of disorder and confusion existed, Captain Cowan's organized manner, calm disposition, compassion, and sound judgment were prime factors in the success realized. Throughout his tenure, Captain Cowan directed his total efforts and energy toward the assignment; thereby reflecting great credit upon himself and upholding the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

45 Mar 76
For the President,

John M. McInerney
Secretary of the Navy

Bd Ser 144 of 2 Mar 76



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting
the MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL to

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DOMENICK MUFFI
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For outstanding meritorious service as Officer-in-Charge, Logistic Support Group, Military Coordination Center, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California during Operation NEW ARRIVALS from 2 May 1975 to 15 November 1975. An extremely competent and resourceful leader, Lieutenant Colonel Muffi continuously displayed superb managerial abilities in coordinating all aspects of the supply, motor transport, food service, engineer, medical, and baggage sections' efforts in support of the processing of more than 50,000 refugees from Indochina. He supervised a food service operation employing at its peak in excess of 900 Marine Corps and Navy personnel preparing and serving over 54,000 meals at a cost approximating \$31,000 daily. Further, Lieutenant Colonel Muffi directed and supervised procurement and emplacement of 1,049 general purpose tents, over 100 mobile homes, and the employment of more than 60 rental vehicles and thousands of other supply items, as well as refurbishment and construction of additional facilities required by the Inter-Agency Task Force. In preparation for the closing of operations, he established a massive and complex program for ensuring that all supplies and equipment were properly repaired, serviced, preserved, and packed prior to return to lending agencies. Lieutenant Colonel Muffi's exemplary performance and total devotion to duty reflected great credit upon himself and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

4 Mar 76
For the President,

James M. [Signature]
Secretary of the Navy

Base 142 of 3 Mar 76



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL to

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEPH H. OLIVER, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For outstanding meritorious service as Assistant Officer-in-Charge, Military Coordination Center, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California during Operation NEW ARRIVALS from 31 July 1975 to 15 November 1975. An extremely competent and resourceful leader, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver consistently displayed exceptional managerial and leadership abilities. In addition to routinely supervising and coordinating the functions of the Center's staff, he coordinated with officials of the Departments of State and Health, Education, and Welfare, as well as Immigration and Naturalization Service in controlling the flow of refugees to those federal and civil agencies of the Inter-Agency Task Force where all processing was accomplished. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver conducted frequent visits to each of the seven refugee camps, ensuring that accommodations were adequate, high sanitary standards maintained, security was responsive, and all supply and logistical requirements were satisfied. He supervised the processing and movement to point of departure of a large group of repatriates, a highly sensitive and potentially explosive situation with an intense news media interest. Though the possibility of disorder, confusion, and adverse media coverage existed, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver's organized manner and sound judgment ensured execution of the process with diplomacy and discretion. Further, he coordinated the drafting and publication of a comprehensive plan for the incremental phasedown of operations that contributed significantly to the orderly closure of the Coordination Center. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver's professionalism and selfless dedication under the most arduous conditions reflected great credit upon himself, the Marine Corps, and the United States Naval Service.

8 Mar 76
For the President,

William M. Miller
Secretary of the Navy

Bd Ser 1430 3 Mar 76



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting
the MERITORIOUS SERVICE MEDAL to

COLONEL JOHN F. ROCHE III
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For outstanding meritorious service as Officer-in-Charge, Military Coordination Center, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California during Operation NEW ARRIVALS from 10 July 1975 to 15 November 1975. During this period, Colonel Roche supervised all action attendant to the operation of six refugee camps which involved billeting, feeding, and providing for the health and general welfare of over 35,000 Indochina refugees. He coordinated the arrival, departure, and processing of those refugees with federal and civil officials of the Inter-Agency Task Force, a complex procedure made even more difficult by the variety of agencies involved and language problems of the refugees. Colonel Roche displayed exceptional tact and military acumen in a politically sensitive situation when, in conjunction with officials of the United Nations and the Department of State, he supervised the processing and movement of two large groups of repatriates to a designated departure point for a flight that was to ultimately return them to their homeland. Further, he developed and implemented, as the declining refugee population permitted, a plan for the incremental phasedown of operations that resulted in significant man-hour and dollar savings to the government. An imaginative and highly competent officer with extraordinary managerial and leadership abilities, Colonel Roche's performance was a paragon for all with whom he served and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

4 Mar 76
For the President,

William M. G. [Signature]
Secretary of the Navy

Be Ser 140 (A) 2 Mar 76

HDR:MKG
30 Sep 75

HDR COMMENT

Subj: Indochina Refugee-Authored Monograph Program


1. HDR would like to comment on only three of the questions proposed in the subject memorandum.

a. Question 1 should be amended to include discussion of the Combined Action Program.

b. Question 4 should be amended to include discussion of the Marine Division activities along with those of the Airborne Division.

c. Question 6 should include a discussion of informal advising after the withdrawal of all official U.S. advisors.

2. No other questions are recommended.



23 Sept 1975

From: Director of Marine Corps History
and Museums
To: Chief Historian *DIS*
Via: Deputy for History
Subj: CMH Indochina Refugee Oral History/
Monograph Program

1. In concert with Mr. Frank and Vietnam monograph writers, prepare response for my signature.
2. Topics and scope look good to me. We should also offer to cooperate in all appropriate ways.

V.R.

Mr. Shulimson;

Coordinate with all members of HistSec and LtCol Tiffany for comment. Prepare answer for Gen Simmons to CMC (HD Comment). Draft to me by 1 October. VR *VR*

9/23

Marty, would you get with Davron this for any input you all might want to make. Make it an HQR COMMENT to Jack by 27 Sep



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

IN REPLY REFER TO

DAMH-ZF-SG


16 SEP 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

SUBJECT: Indochina Refugee-Authored Monograph Program

1. The United States Army Center of Military History (CMH) is beginning a program of eliciting information from former Indochinese (primarily Vietnamese) military and civilian personnel, by means of comprehensive oral history techniques, and preparing a series of monographs concerning the history of the United States' military effort.
2. The eliciting of information and writing of monographs will be accomplished under the direction of a contracting firm, yet to be selected. Attached is a list of topics which have been identified by CMH as pertinent, however, they represent only the Army's need and may be expanded as necessary. In this regard we wish to consider USMC requirements as well, subject to fiscal limitations. It is requested, therefore, that if you have topics appropriate for consideration in this program that CMH be made aware of them at your earliest convenience. Every effort will be made to include them in the schedule and to provide you with the results as they become available. It is envisioned that this project will take a maximum of three years.

1 Incl
as


JAMES L. COLLINS, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History

TOPICS AND SCOPES OF INDOCHINA REFUGEE-AUTHORED MONOGRAPHS

1. RVNAF and US-Unit Cooperation and Coordination.

Scope: Successes and failures in RVNAF-US joint operations, and the reasons therefore. Large-unit as well as small-unit and local force operations. Cooperation and coordination in the use of firepower, mobility resources, planning, intelligence, communications and logistical support. Problems of boundaries, free-fire zones, civilian casualties and property damage. The assignment of objectives and the allocation of resources. Lessons learned.

2. Lam Son 719.

Scope: US-RVNAF Cooperation and Coordination. Planning from the RVNAF viewpoint. Collection and dissemination of intelligence, US and RVNAF, and the exchange thereof. The battles. Adequacy of US support. Evaluation. Lessons learned.

3. The Cambodian Incursion of 1970, its strategic background and its strategic implications for the period 1970-1975 from both the Khmer and US point of view.

Scope: Same as for Lam Son 719.

4. The Final Collapse.

Scope: Beginning with the loss of Phuoc Long Province, a description of the military and political events which culminated in capitulation. The impact of reduced US support and the absence of the credible threat of US military intervention on friendly and enemy plans, operations, morale and will to fight. Factors influencing the decision not to reinforce significantly in Phuoc Long; reasons for the failure to hold Ban Ma Thuot; the orders issued for the withdrawal from Pleiku-Kontum and the execution of those orders; the nexus between events in the II Corps Highlands, operations in Binh Dinh Province, the enemy buildup in III Corps, the decision to withdraw the Airborne from I Corps, and the loss of Hue and Da Nang. The final battles, including Xuan Loc and Long An.

5. Vietnamese views of the US evacuation of personnel, Vietnamese dependents, Vietnamese employees, and RVNAF personnel.

Scope: Appropriateness of timing, categories, and priorities. Problems of execution, security and control. Conduct of US officials.

6. The RVNAF, Vietnamization, and the Ceasefire.

Scope: Problems of transition. Adequacy of US training, equipment and supply support to make the program viable. Post-ceasefire enemy

Page 1

Sub-sector officials, and US agencies, officials and military units. Strengths and weaknesses. problems and solutions. achievements and failures. Adequacy and use of intelligence; sources and exchange of intelligence information. Evaluation of special equipment supplied by US. Training under US advisors, adequacy, strengths and weaknesses. Role and value of psychological operations, equipment and procedures.

Dr. Gordon -

Gen Simmons did not
see this before he left
for TAD. I am returning
it in case something comes
up on it.

Colvin

REFERENCE SERVICE LOG (5750)
 NAVMC HQ 29 (REV. 11-69)
 Previous editions will not be used.

HISTORICAL DIVISION
 HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS

RECEIVED BY	DATE <i>9/18</i>
OFFICE ORIGINATING REQUEST	NAME OF PERSON MAKING REQUEST <i>BEN SIMMONS</i>
NATURE OF REQUEST	

Col Roche Letter

*OK—
double-spaced
rough*

PRIORITY <i>A</i>	DEADLINE (If applicable) <i>10/3</i>	
<input type="checkbox"/> NO ACKNOWLEDGEMENT REQUIRED <input type="checkbox"/> CARD SENT <input type="checkbox"/> LETTER REPLY REQUIRED		
TO	DATE	ASSIGNED TO
HEAD, REFERENCE BRANCH		<i>30</i>
HEAD, HISTORIES BRANCH		
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER		
DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY		
TYPIST		
FOR SIGNATURE		
REMARKS		

*Rough to Director
9/23*

Col John F. Roche, III, USMC
Operation New Arrivals Interagency Task Force
Marine Corps Base
Camp Pendleton, California 92055
Dear Colonel Roche,

Thank you for your letter of 13 September with its useful enclosures. It was appreciated by our writers as it clarified some of the details of the operation. The messages which you enclosed were new to us; we might even plagiarize one of your field messages for the title of a chapter or section in our 1973-1975 Southeast Asia monograph. Your proposed award recommendations along with the anecdotal sketches in your letter will help in our efforts to include human interest material in our studies.

The tapes of your experiences which you recorded while in the Pacific have also been received.

If, in your present assignment, you come across any materials relating to the refugee program which might be of historical interest, please feel free to contact us about them.

UNCLASSIFIED

01 02

PP PP

UUUU

CMC WASHINGTON DC

CG MCB CAMP PENDLETON CA

INFO JCS WASHINGTON DC

CG MCAS EL TORO CA

UNCLAS //NO4000//

OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS AFTER ACTION REPORT. MARCOR MESSAGE

NO. 72 {CMC CODE LPP-2}

A. SECSTATE 042239Z SEP 75 {NOTAL}

1. REQUEST PROVIDE SUBJECT REPORT TO COVER SUPPORT DURING PERIOD
FROM 28 APRIL 1975 UNTIL 1 NOVEMBER 1975 CLOSEDOWN.

2. REPORT SHOULD FOCUS ON MILITARY SUPPORT ASPECTS AND INCLUDE
POE OPERATIONS AT MCAS EL TORO.

3. REF A TASKED THE SENIOR CIVIL COORDINATOR WITH A REPORT
OF OPERATIONS IN HIS AREA OF COGNIZANCE. SUGGEST COORDINATION
TO INSURE REPORTS ARE COMPLEMENTARY.

4. ALTHOUGH NO SPECIFIC FORMAT IS REQUIRED, A CHRONOLOGY OF
KEY EVENTS AND A SEPARATE SECTION ON LESSONS LEARNED IS DESIRED.
LESSONS LEARNED SHOULD INCLUDE APPLICATIONS TO SIMILAR TYPE



L,LP,LPP-2,LPP,LA-2,PA,P0,FD,HD,M,C/S, OLA

COL R W G JONES,LPP-2,56094

B.W. F. JONES, LtCol, EPPB, 56015

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

02 02

PP PP

UUUU

OPERATIONS, I.E., EVACUATION, CIVIL DISASTER, MOBILIZATION.

5. DUE DATE FOR REPORT IS 1 DECEMBER 1975. DISTRIBUTION
REQUIREMENTS WILL FOLLOW.



COL R W G JONES, LPP-2,56094

UNCLASSIFIED

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Special Report

No. 21
September 1975

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

Indochina Refugee Resettlement Program

Great credit is due to the 10 experienced volunteer organizations, to the generosity of many American citizens, and to state and local governments who have dedicated themselves to resettling 100,000 of the 130,000 refugees from Viet-Nam and Cambodia.

The phasing-out of the four refugee reception centers within the continental United States and the one in the Pacific is proceeding on schedule, and every state in the Union has accepted some refugees. The center at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida officially closed September 15, 1975. Camp Pendleton, California, is scheduled to close at the end of October. The center at Fort Indian-town Gap, Pennsylvania, will be phased out by the end of November. Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, anticipates a final closing during the month of December.

Most of the refugees at Guam have been transferred to the U.S. centers which are still operating or to third countries. At the present time there are approximately 1,500 refugees on Guam awaiting repatriation.

The following documentation, originally compiled by the Inter-Agency Task Force on Indochina Refugees, updates the information contained in Special Report No. 20 of August 1975.

Excerpts from Press Statement by
Mrs. Julia Vadala Taft, Director, Interagency
Task Force for Indochina Refugees,
September 18, 1975

I am pleased to be able to announce to you today that this week the one hundred thousandth refugee has been processed through our system to resettlement with an American sponsor. I thought I might use the occasion of this milestone to give a public accounting of our progress to date.

Five months ago, on April 18, the Task Force was created by the President to deal with a problem unique in the history of this country. Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees were beginning to arrive by the thousands at safe havens in the Pacific. We had to mount a humanitarian effort in which more people from different cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds were introduced into American society in a shorter period of time than ever before in our experience as a nation.

Over a much longer period we had absorbed more than 600,000 Cuban refugees and some 40,000 Hungarian refugees when circumstances in their countries forced them to leave. Our goal this time was to resettle, as rapidly and as humanely as possible, about 130,000 Indochinese refugees in this country and to accomplish this before the end

of this calendar year. The challenge was to develop, in remarkably short order, new structures for their reception and new approaches of social policy to cope with their unique problems.

The mandate of the Task Force created by the President last April 18 was to coordinate the activities of 12 U.S. Government agencies involved in the evacuation, reception, and resettlement of the refugees from Indochina. As you may recall, in less than 2 weeks the first refugees began to arrive in the continental United States. With a pipeline extending back to Guam, Wake Island, and Subic Bay [the Philippines] refugees continued to arrive around the clock.

It was necessary to quickly ready the installations in California, Arkansas, Florida, and Pennsylvania to receive the newcomers. At the peak of the program we had over 112,000 in the refugee system. Today I am pleased to announce that the center at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida processed out its last refugee 3 days ago and is now officially closed. The three remaining centers and the Guam repatriate camp now house only 34,992 refugees.

As of today more than 100,000 refugees have been "out-processed" through the sponsorship efforts of the voluntary agencies, which are going full speed ahead, with refugees having been resettled in all 50 states as well as Guam, American Samoa, and Puerto Rico. More than 6,000 refugees have been resettled in other countries, mostly in Canada and France.

In addition to those refugees who entered our system directly, a number of Cambodians and Vietnamese, having left their countries through their own efforts and resources, now find themselves stranded—primarily in the East Asian countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea. We have been accepting these refugees into our system in two categories: former employees of the U.S. Government and their dependents; and certain close relatives of persons already in the United States.

Depending on the willingness of the authorities in Viet-Nam and Cambodia to accept those desiring repatriation, and depending also on the number of our refugees who are accepted for resettlement by third countries, the United States will continue to grant parole to these stranded refugees until approximately 130,000 have been permanently resettled in our country. This was the

figure which was agreed upon in our consultations with the Congress.

Among the approximately 35,000 family units in the refugee population, there are about 70,000 persons 17 years of age or older. Of these we estimate that about 45,000 have entered, or will enter, the job market. This is certainly a small figure when we compare it with the Nation's work force of some 94,859,000.

A word about a current issue, which has received some publicity and will receive more—the problem of repatriates. There are still in our system about 1,800 refugees who wish to return to Viet-Nam or Cambodia. The bulk of them—1,500 plus—are located on Guam. When this issue first arose we asked the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to use his good offices on behalf of the refugees. We have made it clear that we do not wish to stand in the way of the refugees, but rather have done all within our power to see that their wish to return home is realized. In a few days' time the High Commissioner will be visiting Viet-Nam and he intends to take up this question with the authorities there. We hope that the results of his visit will be favorable and that arrangements can be successfully concluded shortly for the return of the repatriates.

As I mentioned earlier the one hundred thousandth refugee passed through our system this week on the way to resettlement with his American sponsors. The refugee is Mr. Pham Phu Quoc, a former Vietnamese major, or one or another member of his family of nine, since they have, of course, been resettled as a unit. Mr. Quoc, his wife, six daughters, and two sons are departing Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, today for Racine, Wisconsin, where the family is being sponsored by Lutheran congregations of that city.

I feel I should explain that Mr. Quoc's family was determined a week ago to be the group which would include the one hundred thousandth refugee to be processed out of our camps based on our projections at that time. As it turned out our centers have processed out more refugees than anticipated the past few days, so in actuality the hundred thousandth left the camps the day before yesterday with no fanfare. In any case, we are pleased to honor Mr. Quoc and his family as representative of all the refugees, Cambodian as well as Vietnamese, who passed through our camps since April.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- April 8-15 State Department officials consult with House and Senate Committees regarding use of Attorney General's "parole" authority for evacuees from Indochina.
- April 12 U.S. Embassy, Phnom Penh closes. Last Americans and approximately 1,200 Cambodians are evacuated in Operation Eagle Pull.
- April 12-17 U.S. Mission, Geneva, is asked to request assistance from UNHCR and ICEM [Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration] in locating third countries willing to accept refugees from Indochina.
- April 14 Parole is authorized for dependents of American citizens currently in Viet-Nam.
- April 18 The President asks 12 Federal agencies "to coordinate... all U.S. Government activities concerning evacuation of U.S. citizens, Vietnamese citizens, and third-country nationals from Viet-Nam and refugee and resettlement problems relating to the Viet-Nam conflict" and named Ambassador L. Dean Brown as his Special Representative and Director of the Special Interagency Task Force.
- April 19 Parole is extended to include categories of relatives of American citizens or permanent resident aliens who are petition holders.
- April 22 The Interagency Task Force asks civil and military authorities on Guam to prepare a safe haven estimated to be required for 90 days in order to provide care and maintenance for an estimated 50,000 refugees. The first to pass through the area arrive the following day.
- April 25 The Attorney General authorizes parole for additional categories of relatives, Cambodians in third countries, and up to 50,000 "high-risk" Vietnamese.
- April 27 The Task Force requests all American missions overseas to take up the possible resettlement of refugees as a matter of urgency.
- April 29 U.S. Embassy, Saigon, closes. Operation Frequent Wind removes last Americans and Vietnamese by helicopter from staging sites in Saigon. The sea-lift and self-evacuation continue. Camp Pendleton, California, opens as a refugee center prepared to care for 18,000 refugees.
- May 2 Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, opens as a refugee reception center prepared to care for 24,000 refugees.
- May 4 Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, opens as a refugee reception center prepared to accept 2,500 refugees (a figure later increased to 5,000).
- May 5 Ambassador Brown and senior Task Force officials testify before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.
- Ambassador Brown and senior Task Force officials testify before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations in connection with the Administration's request for \$507 million to run the refugee program.
- May 7 Ambassador Brown and senior Task Force officials testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
- Ambassador Brown and senior Task Force officials testify before the House International Relations Committee.
- May 8 Ambassador Brown and senior Task Force officials testify before the House Judiciary Committee.
- May 12 Ambassador Brown and senior Task

- Force officials testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- May 13 Ambassador Brown and senior Task Force officials testify before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees.
- May 14 Ambassador Brown and senior Task Force officials testify before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law.
- May 19 The White House announces the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees, with Chairman John Eisenhower heading a distinguished list of members.
- May 22 Ambassador Brown and senior Task Force officials testify before the House Judiciary Subcommittee.
- A House and Senate conference committee agrees on the language of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975, appropriating \$405 million for the Administration's refugee program.
- May 24 The Act becomes PL 94-23 as the President signs it into law.
- May 27 Ambassador Brown returns to his post at the Middle East Institute and the President asks Mrs. Julia Vadala Taft, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare for Human Development, to act as Director of the Interagency Task Force until arrangements are completed for organizing the Government's efforts for the longer term.
- May 28 A fourth stateside reception center is opened at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, and receives its first refugees.
- May 29 The UNHCR sends a representative to the reception center at Fort Chaffee to interview individuals who have indicated a desire to return to Viet-Nam
- and whose names had been furnished earlier. Representatives of the UNHCR have been working similarly on Guam for several weeks, will go to Pendleton and Indiantown Gap the following week and to Eglin thereafter.
- June 6 HEW reports the establishment of a special Task Force with representatives of the American Medical Association, the American Association of Medical Colleges, the Educational Commission on Foreign Medical Graduates, and of a number of programs within HEW that deal with the training and placement of physicians in the U.S.
- June 15 The President sends a report to the Congress as required by PL 94-23.
- June 16 General Accounting Office issues its initial report to Congress on the refugee program.
- June 23 State of Washington contracts with the Task Force to resettle more than 1,000 refugees.
- City of Indianapolis contracts with the Task Force to resettle 200 refugees.
- July 5 First of a series of regional meetings with local government officials and representatives of resettlement agencies held in New York City.
- July 6 Subic Bay, Philippines, refugee reception center closes.
- July 9 State of Maine contracts with the Task Force to resettle 300 refugees.
- July 14 Jackson County, Missouri, contracts with the Task Force to resettle 250 refugees.
- July 17 Task Force Director (*et al.*) testifies before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law.
- July 21 Principal operational responsibility for

the Task Force is transferred from the Department of State to HEW. Julia Vadala Taft is named Director of the Task Force.

Aug. 10 President Ford visits resettlement center at Fort Chaffee.

Aug. 15 Regional meeting in San Francisco.

Representatives of the voluntary resettlement agencies testify before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law.

Aug. 21 Regional meetings held in Chicago and Philadelphia.

Aug. 22 State of Oklahoma contracts with the Task Force to resettle 1,000 refugees including 414 students at Southeastern Oklahoma State and Connors College.

July 24 Task Force Director, representatives of the voluntary resettlement agencies, *et al.*, testify before the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees.

Sept. 3 State of Iowa contracts with the Task Force to resettle at least 500 refugees, most of whom will be Thai Dam or "Black Thai," former Vietnamese mountain tribesmen.

July 30 Second regional meeting held in Boston.

July 31 Tentative planning summary for phase-down of Task Force operations released.

Sept. 9 Chinese Benevolent Association of Los Angeles contracts with the Task Force to resettle more than 2,000 Indochina refugees of Chinese descent.

Aug. 1 Wake Island reception center closes.

Sept. 12 Regional meeting in Denver.

Attorney General extends parole authority to additional Indochina refugees stranded in third countries.

Sept. 15 Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, refugee reception center closes.

Number of Refugees Resettled by State, Including District of Columbia and U.S. Territories

Alabama	1,041	Massachusetts	816	South Dakota	314
Alaska	72	Michigan	1,194	Tennessee	551
Arkansas	1,247	Minnesota	3,037	Texas	6,085
Arizona	780	Mississippi	307	Utah	405
California	20,310	Missouri	1,753	Vermont	119
Colorado	2,018	Montana	149	Virginia	2,868
Connecticut	862	Nebraska	716	Washington	3,407
Delaware	91	Nevada	290	West Virginia	115
Florida	4,628	New Hampshire	119	Wisconsin	1,265
Georgia	1,072	New Jersey	1,246	Wyoming	61
Hawaii	1,876	New Mexico	139		
Idaho	270	New York	2,821	District of Columbia	1,105
Illinois	2,503	North Carolina	891	Guam	568
Indiana	1,155	North Dakota	362	American Samoa	1
Iowa	1,126	Ohio	1,924	Puerto Rico	1
Kansas	1,224	Oklahoma	2,645		
Kentucky	579	Oregon	1,530	Unknown	5,670
Louisiana	2,082	Pennsylvania	4,052	Deaths	65
Maine	315	Rhode Island	166		
Maryland	1,791	South Carolina	540	Total	*92,339

*Does not include 6,097 persons settled in third countries as of Sept. 14, 1975.

**Number of Refugees Resettled from U.S. System in
Third Countries (As of Sept. 15, 1975)**

<i>Country of Resettlement</i>	<i>Total</i>
Australia	158
Bahrain	2
Belgium	58
Bangladesh	2
Canada	3,880
Holland	4
Korea	4
France	1,534
Germany	16
Switzerland	1
Hong Kong	11
Iran	16
Italy	1
New Zealand	21
Philippines	115
Singapore	15
Spain	2
United Kingdom	30
Taiwan	82
Cambodia	*88
Laos	1
Thailand	17
New Caledonia	23
New Hebrides	2
Ivory Coast	10
Japan	1
Unknown	3
Total	6,097

*Crossed the Cambodian border on foot from Thailand on May 29, 1975.

**A CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY
ON REFUGEE REPATRIATION**

Background: The United States believes in freedom of movement for all people. Thus, it has been clear from the beginning that the United States would not stand in the way of any refugee who indicated that he would prefer to return to his country of origin. We turned to the traditional intermediary in instances where the countries involved do not maintain diplomatic relations, the UNHCR.

April 26 The UNHCR agreed to seek ways to assist voluntary repatriates and negotiations with the authorities in Viet-Nam and Cambodia. A first UNHCR representative was subsequently sent to Guam to conduct interviews with the earliest would-be repatriates.

May 3

The first requests for repatriation came from a group of Vietnamese Air Force personnel. Interagency Task Force representatives on Guam were instructed to lodge them separately and to inform them of the U.S. willingness to help to the extent possible in the circumstances and to explain the role of the UNHCR.

All refugee staging sites and reception centers were instructed to post notices and to run regular announcements in the camp newspapers informing the refugees of the option of repatriation.

May 8

All diplomatic and consular posts were advised by cable of U.S. policy regarding repatriation and instructed to turn over any such applicants to the UNHCR.

May 13

In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Ambassador L. Dean Brown, then Director of the Interagency Task Force, said in connection with U.S. policy, "If they want to go back, then through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, they will go back."

May 22

In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, Ambassador Brown reported "... We have made very conscious efforts, in light of the desires of some of the members of the Subcommittee here, to get the news across to every Vietnamese, either in the United States or at Guam and Wake, that they are not there under compulsion, that they can go back, that there is a mechanism by which they can go back. They can think it over again."

May 29

The first UNHCR representative arrived at a continental U.S. refugee center to conduct interviews with would-be repatriates to insure they had made their decisions voluntarily and to distribute the questionnaire which had been worked out in conjunction with the Vietnamese authorities and which is

required in Saigon before a decision will be made there.

June 3 The UNHCR New York representative announced that South Vietnamese authorities had requested its assistance in repatriation but that a solution would not emerge overnight.

June 20 Approximately 80 of the more than 200 would-be repatriates at Fort Chaffee demonstrated and threatened to turn violent if they were not moved to Camp Pendleton as quickly as they had expected. (Counter-demonstrations by refugees grateful for U.S. care followed.) The movement was to be part of a consolidation process, first at Pendleton, then on Guam, of all would-be repatriates already interviewed by UNHCR representatives.

July 8 In response to an appeal by the UNHCR for funding, the U.S. agreed to provide \$2 million to the UNHCR to pay its costs and the costs of the travel of repatriates from the U.S. refugee system to Viet-Nam if and when the authorities there accepted their return.

The United States also informed the UNHCR that it was prepared to assist in similar ways in the repatriation of Vietnamese already living in American communities who might decide that they, too, wished to return.

July 4-21 Applicants from the United States and continental refugee centers were moved to Guam.

July 19 The UNHCR was asked urgently to raise with the authorities in Viet-Nam the possibility of a meeting between representatives of the would-be repatriates and representatives from Saigon.

July 20 Slightly more than 2,000 Vietnamese and Cambodians have applied to the UNHCR for assistance in repatriation. The UNHCR has been unable to get an answer of any kind from Phnom Penh

and has learned from Saigon that the 600 questionnaires it has already forwarded there are being screened.

July 21 The UNHCR reported that it was instructing representatives in Southeast Asia to try to arrange the requested meeting between repatriates and Vietnamese authorities.

Vientiane advised that Hong Kong had agreed to act as a transit point for the Vietnamese repatriates coming from Guam.

July 22 U.S. Government concern for the continuing welfare of the would-be repatriates and over the slow progress toward their repatriation was once more conveyed to the UNHCR. Our Ambassador to the United Nations was also asked to raise the issue with Secretary General Waldheim.

July 23 State Department urged UNHCR representative in Vientiane to arrange a meeting between Vietnamese authorities and repatriates in a third country, perhaps Laos. U.S. Government would pay expenses for Guam repatriates delegation.

July 24 Demonstrations on Guam—sit down, refusal to board buses, and then refusal to disembark buses.

UNHCR representative in Guam, Mr. Gordon-Lennox, said that any unilateral action on part of the United States would be a breach of agreement and UNHCR would withdraw its good offices.

Aug. 15 UNHCR advised that Saigon authorities rejected request for meeting on repatriation in Laos or other country (see July 19).

Aug. 18 Representative Joshua Eilberg issued a press release stating that he would urge the Secretary of State immediately to request countries who have recognized

the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of Viet-Nam to assist in repatriating the Vietnamese refugees on Guam.

- Aug. 19 Petition presented on Guam to senior civil coordinator and representative of UNHCR during peaceful demonstrations by repatriates asking for the use of a ship to be manned by repatriates to sail to Saigon.
- Aug. 20 Congressman Charles H. Wilson, Mendel J. Davis, and Delegate Antonio B. Won Pat, visiting repatriates at camp in Guam, advised that they thought United States should let the repatriates set sail immediately for Viet-Nam on their own ship, rather than working through United Nations.
- Aug. 19-23 Repatriates on Guam previously housed in four contractor camps were consolidated in one camp, the Asan camp, for reasons of economy and security.
- Aug. 23 Letter from Acting Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll to Representative Charles H. Wilson in response to Congressman Wilson's telegram from Guam. Letter stated that using the ship was a difficult unilateral decision to be made and we would prefer continuing to try with the UNHCR.
- Aug. 29 A meeting was held to discuss options with regard to repatriates. This meeting resulted in September 1 cable.
- Aug. 31 Violent demonstrations break out at repatriates' camp in Guam. One barracks burned down. Four U.S. Marshals hospitalized.
- Sept. 1 Cable sent from Acting Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll to Francis Dale in Geneva strongly urging the UNHCR to reinforce the need for speedy action in acceptance by the

PRG; message also sent to USUN. In that cable, State Department also requested UNHCR to consider establishment of international camps for repatriates if demarche unsuccessful in South Viet-Nam. Stated that repatriates are an international issue with many potential repatriates in third countries around the world seeking return.

- Sept. 12 Invitation extended by Task Force Director to the UNHCR to meet her in Guam after his scheduled trip to Hanoi to discuss with repatriates the outcome of negotiations with PRG/DRV.
- Sept. 16 A meeting was held with State Department officials and Task Force Director with high level UNHCR personnel. U.S. Government again urged speedy action in negotiations between UNHCR and Viet-Nam authorities.
- Sept. 18-26 UNHCR, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, visited North Viet-Nam for discussions with the authorities on the return of refugees on Guam.
- Sept. 23 Repatriates on Guam were offered the opportunity to cable, phone, or personally visit the PRG/DRV observer delegations at the U.N. to present their plea for repatriation.
- Sept. 26 Repatriates submitted skills-profile for 60 experienced ship crewmen who had navigational and Navy experience. They also selected as their Captain, Master Tran Dinh Tru, former Commander in the South Vietnamese Navy with 12 years of seagoing experience.
- Sept. 29 Mr. Rizvi, a UNHCR official who accompanied the UNHCR to Hanoi, arrived on Guam representing the High Commissioner who did not accept the U.S. Government invitations to meet the repatriates personally.


MR BENIS M FRANK
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REFUGEE OPERATIONS TO CLOSE



WASHINGTON, Oct. 28 (MCNews)-- The Camp Pendleton refugee center will end operations Nov. 1. The Marine Corps role has been primarily in support of the President's Interagency Task Force, which coordinated the overall program and policies for the processing, sponsorship and assimilation of refugees into the U.S. society.

The close down will culminate six months of support during which approximately 50,000 refugees have been processed and released.

During this period, the Marine Corps provided the services and support necessary to sustain a general population of over 18,000 people. This population center was literally constructed by the Marine Corps overnight providing shelter, food, medical and personal services for men, women and children of all ages.

Within 24 hours following Camp Pendleton's official designation as a refugee center on April 29, 1975, the initial flow of refugees was received and provided for. The total support effort included the construction of nearly 1,500 shower units, 8,700 feet of underground water and sewage pipes, 12 miles of electrical wiring and 4 miles of primary and secondary power lines.

Laundry has been processed at the rate of 7,100 pieces daily. Playground and classrooms were constructed and food service involved the preparation of approximately 39,000 meals daily.


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HQMC
Washington,
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Telephone:
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Although this operations has not followed the traditional role normally assigned to an elite fighting force, the Marine Corps has gained valuable experience that can be applied when called upon to assist in future civil disasters or civilian evacuation operations.

HQMC officials believe the successful accomplishment of this mission points out, once again, the versatility, esprit and "can do" attitude which have been the hallmark of Marines throughout the years.

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VIETNAM HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND
EVACUATION ACT OF 1975



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94TH CONGRESS }
1st Session }

SENATE }

REPORT
No. 94-97

United States. Congress. Conference Committees, 1975.

VIETNAM HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND EVACUATION ACT OF 1975

APRIL 25 (legislative day, APRIL 21), 1975.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. SPARKMAN, from the committee of conference,
submitted the following

CONFERENCE REPORT

[To accompany H.R. 6096]

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 6096) to authorize funds for humanitarian assistance and evacuation programs in Vietnam and to clarify restrictions on the availability of funds for the use of United States Armed Forces in Indochina, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the text of the bill and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate amendment insert the following:
That this Act may be cited as the "Vietnam Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975".

SEC. 2. Funds hereafter made available under section 36 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 may be used on such terms and conditions as the President may deem appropriate for humanitarian assistance to and evacuation programs from South Vietnam without regard to the provisions of section 36(a)(1), section 36(a)(6), section 38(a)(1), or the third sentence of section 37(b) of such Act and notwithstanding any other provision of law.

SEC. 3. (a) It is traditional for the American people to be generous and compassionate in helping the victims of foreign conflicts and disasters. In keeping with that tradition it shall be the policy of the United States to provide humanitarian assistance to help relieve the suffering of refugees and other needy people who are victims of the conflict in South Vietnam.

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in addition to amounts made available under section 2 of this Act, and in addition to those amounts otherwise available for assistance to South Vietnam, there are authorized to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal

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year 1975, to remain available until expended, \$150,000,000, under such terms and conditions as he may determine, to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and other needy people who are victims of the conflict in South Vietnam.

(c) To insure that the humanitarian assistance provided under this section is provided to refugees and other needy people who are victims of the conflict in South Vietnam, such assistance shall be provided, to the extent feasible, under the direction and control of international organizations or under the auspices of voluntary relief agencies. To the extent that such assistance is so provided, it may be furnished only under the direct supervision and control of representatives of such organizations or agencies.

(d) Not less than ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act and not later than the end of each ninety-day period thereafter, the President shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report with respect to humanitarian assistance provided under this Act describing fully and completely—

- (1) the amount of each type of humanitarian assistance;
- (2) the expected recipients of such assistance;
- (3) the names of all organizations and agencies involved in the distribution of such assistance; and
- (4) the means with which such distribution is carried out.

Sec. 4. (a) If the President determines that the use of United States Armed Forces is necessary to evacuate citizens of the United States and their dependents from South Vietnam, the President may, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b), use such Armed Forces in a number and manner essential to and directly connected with the protection of such United States citizens and their dependents while they are being evacuated. In the event that such evacuation cannot be accomplished without involving such Armed Forces in hostilities or in situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, such evacuation shall, if feasible, be accomplished in a single operation. Other than the minimum number of personnel determined by the President to be essential to carry on critical functions of the United States mission or to carry out such evacuation, all such citizens who are employed by, or in the service of, the United States, and all such dependents, shall be evacuated as rapidly as possible after the date of enactment of this Act.

(b) If the President uses the United States Armed Forces for the purposes stated in subsection (a) of this section, he shall submit a report on the use of those forces as required by section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution (including the certification required under subsection (c) of this section) and shall comply with all other provisions of that resolution.

(c) In addition to the information required under section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution, the President shall also certify pursuant to subsection (b) of that section that—

- (1) there existed a direct and imminent threat to the lives of such citizens and their dependents; and
- (2) every effort was made to terminate the threat to such citizens and their dependents by the use of diplomatic and any other means available other than use of the Armed Forces; and

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(3) other than such essential personnel, such citizens and their dependents are being evacuated as rapidly as possible.

SEC. 5. In carrying out the withdrawal of such United States citizens and their dependents from South Vietnam pursuant to section 4 of this Act, the President is authorized to use the United States Armed Forces to assist in bringing out—

- (1) dependents of permanent residents of the United States;
- (2) Vietnamese nationals eligible for immigration to the United States by reason of their family relationship to citizens of the United States; and
- (3) other foreign nationals to whose lives a direct and imminent threat exists;

if he determines and certifies in writing to the Congress pursuant to section 4(b) of the War Powers Resolution that—

(A) every effort has been made to terminate the threat to such persons by the use of diplomatic and any other means available other than the use of the Armed Forces; and

(B) the number of such United States Armed Forces will not be required beyond those essential to and directly connected with the evacuation of citizens of the United States and their dependents; and

(C) the duration of the use of such United States Armed Forces to hostilities will not thereby be extended; and

(D) such evacuation will be confined to areas where United States forces are present for the purpose of protecting citizens of the United States and their dependents while they are being evacuated.

SEC. 6. The authority contained in this Act is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution but shall not be considered specific statutory authorization for purposes of sections 5 (b) and (c) of the War Powers Resolution.

SEC. 7. Nothing contained in section 839 of Public Law 93-437, section 30 of Public Law 93-189, section 806 of Public Law 93-155, section 13 of Public Law 93-126, section 108 of Public Law 93-52, or any other comparable provision of law shall be construed as limiting the availability of funds for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for the evacuation programs authorized by this Act.

SEC. 8. (a) The President shall transmit each day to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report setting forth fully and completely—

(1) the number of citizens of the United States and their dependents who left Vietnam the previous day, including the number of Embassy personnel and private contract personnel among such persons;

(2) the number of such persons remaining in South Vietnam; and

(3) the number of Vietnamese nationals who left South Vietnam the previous day with the assistance of the United States.

(b) Such reports shall be transmitted until such date as the Speaker of the House of Representatives and such committee may direct. The information may be submitted on a confidential basis if the President deems it advisable.

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SEC. 9. Not more than four days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Committees on Foreign Relations, Judiciary, and Armed Services of the Senate a report describing his general plan for the evacuation from Vietnam of the persons described in sections 4 and 5 of this Act.

SEC. 10. It is the sense of the Congress that as the humanitarian aid provided under this Act is made available in South Vietnam, the President is requested to use all appropriate diplomatic means at his disposal to obtain (1) an updated accounting of Americans listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia, and (2) the return of the remains of known American dead. The President is further requested to report to the Congress within 30 days after aid is made available in Southeast Asia, the diplomatic actions being taken.

SEC. 11. No funds authorized in this Act shall be used, directly or indirectly, to aid the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) or the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) nor shall any funds authorized under this Act be channeled through or administered by the DRV or the PRG.

And the Senate agree to the same.

JOHN SPARKMAN,
FRANK CHURCH,
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
CLIFFORD P. CASE,
J. JAVITS,
HUGH SCOTT,

Managers on the Part of the Senate.

THOMAS E. MORGAN,
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
WAYNE L. HAYS,
L. H. FOUNTAIN,
DANTE FASCELL,
WM. BROOMFIELD,
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI,

Managers on the Part of the House.

JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE

The managers on the part of the House and the Senate at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill H.R. 6096, the Vietnam Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975, submit the following joint statement to the House and the Senate in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the managers and recommended in the accompanying conference report:

The Committee of Conference recommends that the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the text of the bill with an amendment which is a substitute for both the text of the House bill and the Senate amendment thereto.

Except for clarifying, clerical, and necessary conforming changes, the differences between the two Houses and the adjustments made in the committee of conference are noted below.

SHORT TITLE

The House bill contained a short title which cited the Act as the "Vietnam Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975".

The Senate amendment contained a short title which cited the Act as the "Vietnam Contingency Act of 1975".

The Senate receded.

FUNDING AUTHORIZATION

The House bill authorized the appropriation of \$150 million for fiscal year 1975 for humanitarian assistance to and evacuation programs from South Vietnam. The House version also authorized the use of Indochina economic aid funds previously authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, for humanitarian purposes without regard to the restrictions of sections 36(a)(1), 36(a)(6), 37(b) (third sentence) and 38(a)(1).

The Senate amendment authorized the appropriation of \$100 million for fiscal year 1975 for humanitarian and withdrawal purposes and waived all the provisions of sections 36 and 38.

In addition the Senate version established a policy to provide humanitarian aid for war victims throughout all of South Vietnam and Cambodia, to be provided through channels acceptable to all parties; and authorized the appropriation of \$150 million for fiscal year 1975 for humanitarian assistance to refugees and other victims of the conflicts in South Vietnam and Cambodia, to be furnished under the direction and control of the UN or under the auspices of other international organizations, international agreements, or voluntary agencies, to be distributed only under the direct supervision and control of representatives of such organizations and agencies.

The Senate amendment also required the President to report to the Congress every 90 days (A) the amount of each type of economic assistance provided under the bill, (B) the expected recipients, (C) the distributing agencies, and (D) the means of distribution.

The committee of conference agreed to authorize the use of Indochina economic aid funds previously authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, but not yet appropriated, for humanitarian assistance to, and evacuation programs from, South Vietnam without regard to the funding limitations set in Section 36(a)(1), sections 36(a)(6), section 38(a)(1), or the third sentence of section 37(b) of such Act.

The committee of conference also agreed to a new authorization of appropriations of \$150 million for humanitarian assistance in South Vietnam. It is the intent of the committee of conference that funds made available under this section be available to administer these humanitarian programs for victims of the conflict, wherever they may be located.

It is the intention of the conference that such programs be carried out under the direction and control of international organizations and voluntary relief agencies, located in the United States and abroad, to the extent feasible. In order to insure that assistance so provided is actually delivered to refugees and others in need, the section requires that the assistance only be furnished under the direct supervision and control of representatives of the international organizations and voluntary agencies. The Conferees expect the Executive Branch to make every reasonable effort to involve these organizations and agencies in this humanitarian effort. Finally, the section requires quarterly reports to the Congress which would describe the amount and nature of the assistance provided by the Act, the expected recipients, the organizations and agencies involved in the distribution of the assistance, and the means by which the assistance is distributed. This reporting requirement should not be construed to require the imposition of additional U.S. Government inspections and audits on the distributing agencies and organizations, if such requirements would substantially impede or diminish the involvement of these agencies and organizations in the programs authorized by this section.

The Conferees have deleted the provisions in the Senate bill authorizing humanitarian assistance to refugees and war victims in Cambodia and a provision relative to Public Law 480 food assistance to Cambodia solely because the retention of these provisions of the Senate version would have subjected the Conference report to a point of order under the House rules. The managers of both the House and Senate are aware that under existing law food assistance for humanitarian purposes can be supplied to needy people in Cambodia and urge that Executive Branch officials give continuing consideration to requests for food and other assistance from international organizations and voluntary relief agencies to the extent such assistance may be provided under existing law. As to Cambodian refugees who have fled from Cambodia, the Conferees expect that the United States will provide appropriate assistance to those refugees through international organizations and voluntary agencies through whatever authority and funds that are available for such purposes, including the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act.

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There is no funding authorization in this Act for military assistance programs in South Vietnam.

AUTHORIZATION OF USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FOR EVACUATION PROGRAMS IN VIETNAM

The House bill had no express authorization for the use of United States Armed Forces but defined "evacuation" as one "without the use of military force, if possible, but should it become necessary and essential, with the minimum use of necessary force" to remove the categories described in the House bill.

The Senate amendment authorized the President to use United States Armed Forces to assist in withdrawing Americans and their dependents and endangered foreign nationals, and placed limitations on the use of those forces. If feasible, a single operation was required where imminent involvement in hostilities was indicated.

The House receded. It is the intention of the Committee of Conference that references in the conference report to the use of the United States Armed Forces are not intended to relate to the normal logistics and related services which may be performed by the Department of Defense, using military personnel in a non-combat situation, on a reimbursable basis under the Foreign Assistance Act and other laws.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS REGARDING USE OF ARMED FORCES IN CONNECTION WITH EVACUATION OF AMERICANS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS

The House bill did not refer to the provisions of section 4 of the War Powers Resolution which require that the President submit reports to the Congress in connection with the introduction of U.S. combat forces into a foreign country or the introduction of forces into a situation involving actual or imminent hostilities.

The Senate amendment required that if it is essential to employ the Armed Forces in withdrawal operations, a report be filed as required by Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution, and that that report certifies:

1. That a direct and imminent threat exists to the lives of U.S. citizens and their dependents;
 2. That every effort was made to terminate the threat by means other than the use of forces; and
 3. That, with the exception of essential personnel, such citizens and their dependents are being evacuated as rapidly as possible.
- The House receded.

EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS

The House bill authorized the use of minimum necessary force to evacuate, in addition to American citizens, their dependents, Vietnamese nationals eligible for immigration to the United States by reasons of their relationships to American citizens, and other foreign nationals "to whose lives a direct and imminent threat exists". Military force employed for this last purpose may not exceed that necessary to carry out the evacuation of the three categories of persons. The House bill also stipulated that the authority with respect to the last

category does not extend to any action or conduct not essential to effectuate and protect the evacuation of the persons referred to above.

The Senate Amendment authorized the President to use Armed Forces to assist in bringing out endangered foreign nationals if he certifies, pursuant to section 4(b) of the War Powers Resolution, that:

1. Every effort has been made to terminate the threat by other than military force;
2. A direct and imminent threat exists to the lives of such individuals;
3. The number of American forces used to evacuate foreign nationals will not be greater than those essential to and directly connected with a withdrawal of American citizens;
4. The duration of the use of such forces will not be extended; and
5. The withdrawal will be confined to areas where U.S. Forces are present for the purpose of protecting Americans while they are being withdrawn.

The conference report adopts the authorities and restrictions provided in the Senate version but adopts the definition of foreign nationals eligible for evacuation under the Act which was part of the House version.

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

The difference

The House bill stated that nothing in this Act is to be construed in derogation of the War Powers Resolution or to constitute a specific authorization for the use of Armed Forces within the meaning of sections 5 (b) and (c) of such Resolution.

The Senate amendment stated that the authority of this Act is intended to constitute specific authorization within the meaning of section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution and is not a specific authorization for the purpose of section 5(c) of such Resolution, and required the removal of such forces by concurrent resolution if Congress directs.

The conference report provides that the authority contained in the Act is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution but shall not be considered specific statutory authorization for the purposes of sections 5 (b) and (c) of the War Powers Resolution. This reference incorporates the time limitations and termination procedure of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution and requires that such forces be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution under section 5(c) of the Resolution.

WAIVER OF PROHIBITIONS ON THE USE OF FUNDS FOR THE USE OF U.S. FORCES IN EVACUATION

The House bill waived prohibitions on the use of funds for combat activities in Vietnam, in 5 public laws, section 839 of Public Law 93-437, section 30 of Public Law 93-189, section 806 of Public Law 93-155, section 13 of Public Law 93-126, section 108 of Public Law 93-52 and the precautionary phrase, "or any other comparable provision of law" to the extent necessary for the evacuation programs authorized in that bill.

The Senate amendment waived the same five prohibitions, plus section 741 of Public Law 93-238, and section 307 of Public Law 93-50, "only to the extent necessary" to use U.S. armed forces to withdraw U.S. citizens and their dependents from South Vietnam. The Senate amendment did not contain the precautionary phrase "or any other comparable provision of law."

The Senate receded.

DAILY WITHDRAWAL REPORT

The House bill contained no provision requiring a daily withdrawal report.

The Senate amendment required a daily report to the Speaker and to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, as long as the recipients desire such reports, on the numbers of Americans and dependents who left Vietnam the previous day, broken down by government and private contract personnel. The number remaining in South Vietnam, and the number of South Vietnamese who left South Vietnam the previous day with U.S. assistance.

The House receded.

WITHDRAWAL PLAN

The Senate amendment required the President to submit, within 48 hours of enactment, a report to the Speaker and to the Chairman and ranking minority members of Senate Foreign Relations, Judiciary and Armed Services Committees a report describing his general plan for withdrawal of U.S. citizens and their dependents and for withdrawal of endangered foreign nationals.

The House bill contained no provision requiring the submission to the Congress of a withdrawal plan.

The House receded, with an amendment extending the time period within which a report is required from 48 hours to 4 days.

MISSING IN ACTION REPORT

The House bill contained a sense of the Congress provision requesting that, as humanitarian assistance is being made available to South Vietnam, the President use all appropriate diplomatic means to obtain:

1. An updated accounting of Americans missing in action; and
2. The return of the remains of known American dead.

The House bill further requests that within 30 days after aid is made available in Southeast Asia, the President report to the Congress the diplomatic actions being taken.

The Senate amendment contained no comparable provision.

The Senate receded.

PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE

The House bill prohibited the use of funds authorized in this Act to aid, directly or indirectly, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) or the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) or the channeling or administration of funds by the DRV or the PRG.

The Senate amendment contained no comparable provision.

The Senate receded, with an understanding that the provision is not intended to prohibit assistance to refugees and other needy people who are victims of the conflict located in the territories controlled by these entities, if such assistance is channeled through and directly administered by international organizations or private voluntary agencies, and public facilities (for transportation, etc.) are only used in a manner that is similar to the common practice of these agencies and organizations in noncommunist territories.

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EVACUATION OF DESERTERS FROM THE U.S. MILITARY

The House bill contained no provision relating to the evacuation of deserters from the U.S. military.

The Senate amendment contained a provision which expressed the sense of Congress that the United States not abandon in Vietnam deserters from the U.S. military who remain in that country, but that upon their return to the United States they be turned over to proper authorities for prosecution in accordance with the law.

The Senate receded, with the understanding that the provision would have been subject to a point of order in the House.

RESCISSION OF PROVISIONS THROUGH CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

The House bill provided that any provisions of the bill may be rescinded by the Congress through concurrent resolution.

The Senate amendment contained no comparable provision.

The House receded, because the Committee of conference believed that the safeguards contained in section 5, concerning the War Powers Resolution, made the provision unnecessary.

DELIVERY OF PUBLIC LAW 480 SHIPMENTS TO CAMBODIA

The House bill did not contain a provision relating to delivery of Public Law 480 shipments to Cambodia.

The Senate amendment required Public Law 480 food shipments scheduled for delivery to Cambodia on or before the date of enactment of this bill to be delivered to Cambodia through international channels, provided that the assistance is requested by the Cambodian Government.

The Senate receded.

FINDING OF CONGRESS ON NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIETCONG VIOLATION OF PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT

The House bill stated the finding of the Congress that this bill is made necessary by North Vietnamese and Vietcong military aggression in flagrant violation of the Paris Peace Agreement.

The Senate amendment contained no comparable provision.

The House receded. The committee of conference believes that a formal assessment of blame could have undesirable consequences with respect to the overall objectives of the Act and, specifically, with respect

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to obtaining information about Americans listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia and the return of the remains of known American dead.

JOHN SPARKMAN,
FRANK CHURCH,
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
CLIFFORD P. CASE,
J. K. JAVITS,
HUGH SCOTT,

Manager on the Part of the Senate.

THOMAS E. MORGAN,
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
WAYNE L. HAYS,
L. H. FOUNTAIN,
DANTE FASCELL,
WM. BROOMFIELD,
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI,

Managers on the Part of the Senate.

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VIETNAM HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND
EVACUATION ACT OF 1975

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94TH CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { REPORT
1st Session } No. 94-155

VIETNAM HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND
EVACUATION ACT OF 1975

APRIL 18, 1975.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed

United States. Congress. House.
Mr. MORGAN, from the Committee on International Relations,
submitted the following

REPORT

together with

DISSENTING, MINORITY, AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

[To accompany H.R. 6096]

The Committee on International Relations, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 6096) to authorize funds for humanitarian assistance and evacuation programs in Vietnam and to clarify restrictions on the availability of funds for the use of United States Armed Forces in Indochina, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill do pass.

The amendments are as follows:

1. Page 2, line 12, after "possible," insert the following: "without the use of military force, if possible, but should it become necessary and essential,".
2. Page 2, immediately after line 24, add the following:
The authority granted by this section shall not permit or extend to any action or conduct not essential to effectuate and protect the evacuation referred to in this section.
3. Page 3, line 7, insert after "38(a) (1)" the following: "and in the third sentence of subsection 37(b)".

BACKGROUND

On March 4, 1975, the North Vietnamese and their allies in South Vietnam, the Vietcong, opened a major assault in the Central Highlands of Vietnam in flagrant violation of the Paris Peace Accords of 1973. In the ensuing days the Government of South Vietnam retreated

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from large portions of its territory while its forces were under attack by the other side. Uncounted numbers of South Vietnamese citizens fled before the Communist offensive and it is estimated that between 500,000 and 1 million new refugees are now present in areas controlled by the Government of South Vietnam.

At present a crisis situation prevails in South Vietnam. The government of that beleaguered country is attempting to stabilize the situation but it has been weakened and demoralized by the recent reverses. Its efforts are being complicated by the need to feed, clothe and shelter hundreds of thousands of displaced persons. The future of the country and its government are, at best, uncertain.

In the current emergency situation there are two clear priorities:

First, to permit plans to go forward for the evacuation of thousands of American citizens and their dependents who are now residing in South Vietnam;

Second, to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to the hundreds of thousands of men, women and children who have been uprooted and made destitute as a result of the fighting.

It is because of these harsh realities that this legislation has been formulated and reported by the Committee.

COMMITTEE ACTION

On April 14, 1975, the President sent to the Congress three bills relating to the current situation in Vietnam. Two of the bills were introduced by request the following day by Chairman Morgan and were referred to the Committee on International Relations.

One of the bills, H.R. 5960, dealt with the availability of funds for the use of U.S. Armed Forces to carry out evacuation from South Vietnam. The other bill, H.R. 5961, dealt with additional economic assistance for South Vietnam.

The bills were proposed by the President in order to carry out his proposals with respect to South Vietnam presented in his State of the World message to a joint session of Congress on April 10.

The Committee had previously begun a series of hearings and briefings on the situation in South Vietnam. On March 26, the Special Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by Mr. Hamilton, received a briefing in executive session on the political and military situation in South Vietnam from Maj. Charles Campbell, Chief, Vietnam Section, Southeast Asia Military Capabilities Branch, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Robert Wenzel, Director, Vietnam Task Force, Department of State.

On April 9, the full Committee received a briefing on the refugee situation in South Vietnam from Hon. Daniel Parker, Administrator of the Agency for International Development; Leonard F. Walenty-nowicz, Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State; and Frank L. Kellogg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Refugee and Migration Affairs. The same day, the full Committee was briefed in executive session on the political and military situation in South Vietnam by Hon. Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, United States Army, who

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had just returned from Vietnam where he was sent by the President to assess the military situation.

On April 14, the Special Subcommittee on Investigations met again on the Vietnam emergency. The witnesses were Assistant Secretary Habib and Arthur Z. Gardiner, Assistant Administrator for East Asia, Agency for International Development.

On April 15, AID Administrator Parker and Garnett A. Zimmerly, Deputy Assistant Administrator for East Asia, Agency for International Development, appeared before the full Committee on behalf of the President's proposal to authorize additional economic assistance for South Vietnam.

On April 16, the Special Subcommittee on Investigations had a briefing on the situation in Vietnam from William A. Christison, National Intelligence Officer, Southeast Asia, Central Intelligence Agency. In addition, the full Committee held a hearing on the President's proposal with respect to legal restrictions on use of United States forces for evacuation of personnel from Vietnam. The witnesses were the Honorable Les Aspin, Assistant Secretary Habib, and Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State. The hearing was followed by an examination of various evacuation contingencies in an executive session.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger also appeared before the Committee on the situation in Indochina on April 18 both in open and in executive sessions.

At a Committee markup session on April 17, a draft proposal combining the purposes of both H.R. 5960 and H.R. 5961—evacuation and humanitarian assistance—was put forward by the Chairman and was accepted as a working document by the Committee. The same day the Chairman introduced the proposal in the House as H.R. 6096.

The Committee considered both the President's requests and H.R. 6096 in morning and afternoon open markup sessions which lasted more than 6 hours. During the markup, the Committee debated and carefully considered 19 amendments which dealt with a wide range of alternatives for a U.S. response to the emergency in South Vietnam. Of these, three were adopted. Upon completion of the markup, the Committee ordered the bill, as amended, favorably reported by a vote of 18 to 7.

PRINCIPAL PURPOSES OF THE BILL

The principal purposes of the bill are several:

1. It authorizes an appropriation of not to exceed \$150 million to the President for humanitarian assistance in, and evacuation from, South Vietnam.

2. It modifies five specific provisions of law barring the use of funds for the reintroduction of U.S. Armed Forces into Indochina hostilities in order to permit the use of such forces, under clearly limited and specified conditions, to effect a humanitarian evacuation of American citizens, their dependents, and certain other limited categories of persons.

3. It lifts dollar ceilings and other restrictions in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 relating to South Vietnam. This will permit \$177 million in funds already authorized for Indochina post-

war reconstruction but not yet appropriated to be used for humanitarian purposes in Vietnam. It will also permit reprogramming for humanitarian purposes for South Vietnam of Indochina funds already appropriated but not spent in Cambodia and South Vietnam.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES

Of the \$150 million authorized to be appropriated in section 2, \$73 million is intended for humanitarian assistance for South Vietnamese refugees. When added to funds previously authorized but not appropriated for Indochina postwar reconstruction, this authorization would make available, subject to the appropriations process, the full \$250 million requested by the President for emergency humanitarian assistance to South Vietnam.

There are between 500,000 and one million new refugees in the territory of South Vietnam controlled by the Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The vast majority of them have come from the northern and central parts of South Vietnam which were recently taken over by North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces. Their needs are basic: they need food, shelter, medical care, and clothing.

Officials of the Agency for International Development, in testimony before the Committee, have indicated the priority programs which would be funded with the authorizations provided in this bill.

A first priority is the emergency transportation of refugees to temporary sites within South Vietnam. Estimated cost is \$10 million.

A second priority is the care of the refugees. That involves four broad categories of assistance:

1. Temporary refugee sites must be developed and constructed. AID sees the need for nine sites on the mainland, capable of accommodating 100,000 persons each, and one on the island of Phu Quoc. Costs of each site are estimated at \$10 million.

2. Refugee relief allowances and camp operation costs are estimated at roughly \$10 per person per month. This will enable the refugees to buy food to supplement their rice ration, charcoal with which to cook, and cloth for clothing. The total cost for this 6 months is set at \$60 million.

3. Work programs to keep some of the refugees productively engaged also are planned. This will permit at least one family member to have a small amount of additional income. AID estimates that some 200,000 people would be so employed at \$1 per day, or \$30 million for 6 months.

4. Relief and resettlement teams composed of voluntary agency personnel will be employed when the security situation stabilizes sufficiently to allow staff to operate with a degree of safety. Their contribution will be the provision of doctors, nurses, medical assistants and other persons in support and advisory roles. A total of \$12 million is planned for those teams.

The above outlined program is tentative. The objective of helping the refugees is clear. The ways of implementing that objective will be shaped by the changing conditions in South Vietnam.

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EVACUATION COSTS

The authorization contained in section 2 of the bill provides up to \$77 million for civilian evacuation from South Vietnam of United States citizens, their dependents, the dependents of permanent residents of the United States, and certain other persons specified in section 4.

The President had not requested this authorization. The Committee, in the course of the hearings and briefings on the situation in South Vietnam, became aware of the fact that no funds are currently available for certain costs connected with civilian evacuation from South Vietnam. For example, the cost of evacuating South Vietnamese orphans has already exceeded funds available for that purpose.

The Committee is strongly of the opinion that resources necessary to carry out prompt and safe evacuation of the categories of persons listed in section 4 should be made available to the executive branch. There is no way at present to estimate the exact amount of funds that will be required for this purpose. Those decisions can be made by the Congress through the appropriations process and by the Executive as the situation unfolds in South Vietnam. In the meantime, however, some type of a basic authorization is needed.

In recommending the authorization contained in this bill, the Committee thought it wise to take into account the many contingencies that could arise in a rapidly deteriorating situation. Too little and too late evacuation funding could result in hardship, even tragedy, for Americans, their dependents, and others.

COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS

The Committee adopted three amendments to the bill introduced by the Chairman, as follows:

Limitation on use of military force

Section 4 defined evacuation as the removal of certain persons to places of safety with the minimum use of necessary force. The Committee amendment adds language to emphasize that the evacuation should be carried out "without the use of military force, if possible" but if "it becomes necessary and essential" then it should be carried on "with the minimum use of necessary force." The evacuation is not, therefore, to be a cover for other military activities.

Limitation on authority

Section 4 provides and defines the authority for United States Armed Forces to carry out the evacuation of certain persons. The Committee amendment limits the authority further to action or conduct "essential to effectuate and protect the evacuation referred to in this section" only. This language emphasizes once again the limited scope of an evacuation and of any potential U.S. military involvement in it.

Availability of foreign assistance funds for adoptions

Section 6, which lifts some of the ceilings contained in sections 36 and 38 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, was amended to include

the third sentence of section 37(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. This will lift the funding restriction currently in the law which limited assistance, including transportation expenses, that can be furnished on behalf of South Vietnamese children adopted by United States citizens.

COMPARISON WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH REQUEST

While the Committee bill was occasioned by the urgent request made by the President in his April 10 speech to Congress, it contains significant improvements upon the legislative proposals which the executive branch submitted to the Congress.

1. *The bill provides funds for humanitarian assistance to refugees and for an evacuation in a single bill.*

The executive branch asked for separate legislation for humanitarian assistance for refugees and for a humanitarian evacuation of Americans and others from South Vietnam.

The Committee bill joins both objectives in a single fund, so that money not required for evacuation purposes may be used to feed, house and clothe war victims.

2. *It strictly limits the categories of individuals for whom an evacuation may be undertaken.*

The Executive Branch proposal would have removed the restrictions on the use of funds for the purpose of employing United States Armed Forces, under conditions involving hostilities, in the evacuation of personnel from South Vietnam without limiting the categories of persons eligible for such evacuation.

The Committee bill limits the categories of persons to be evacuated to four:

First and foremost, American citizens;

Second, dependents of American citizens and of permanent residents of the United States;

Third, Vietnamese nationals eligible for immigration to the United States by reason of their family relationships to American citizens; and

Fourth, third country nationals and Vietnamese whose lives are in imminent and direct danger, but only to the extent that they can be removed without the introduction of force additional to the requirements of an evacuation of persons in the first three categories.

3. *It makes clear that use of United States Armed Forces in an evacuation is to be a last resort.*

The executive branch proposals would have given the President wide leeway in the use of United States Armed Forces in an evacuation without qualification.

The Committee bill makes clear that the use of force in undertaking an evacuation is to be a last resort, and that if force is used, it should be kept to a minimum necessary to effect the withdrawal.

NO MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROVIDED

The funds authorized by this legislation are to be used for two purposes only—both essentially humanitarian in nature:

An evacuation of persons from the war zone in South Vietnam;
and

Care of refugees created by a war situation.

None of the funds authorized in the legislation may be used for military purposes either by the South Vietnamese or by our own U.S. Armed Forces.

The bill does, however, modify certain provisions of the law to permit funds available to the Government to be used for the single, narrow purpose of safeguarding an evacuation from South Vietnam—and for that purpose only.

In waiving the several provisions of law which prohibit the use of funds to support the use of U.S. Armed Forces in Indochina, the Committee intends that any funds will be used solely to finance the operations of such minimum forces as may be necessary and essential to effectuate the evacuation from South Vietnam of the limited categories of persons eligible for evacuation under this bill.

Therefore, the Committee urges the President to reduce the number of individuals to be evacuated as rapidly as possible so as to minimize the possibility that military force will be required to accomplish the evacuation.

LIMITATIONS ON USE OF U.S. ARMED FORCES IN AN EVACUATION

The bill does not provide any funds for military use in an evacuation from Vietnam. It does, however, free up certain other funds which might be used for that purpose. At the same time, the legislation contains specific limitations on how the use of force in an evacuation must be carried out. They include:

(1) A clear statement that any evacuation in Vietnam is to be carried out without the use of military force, so far as possible.

(2) If force ultimately is required, it should be the minimum necessary to accomplish the evacuation—and evacuation only.

(3) The legislation clearly states that no authority is given for any military action on conduct not essential to effectuate and protect the evacuation.

(4) The evacuation is limited to four carefully delineated groups of people. Three of them involve Americans, their dependents or their relatives.

(5) A fourth category of potential evacuees, Vietnamese in danger of their lives, has been sharply limited to those who can be removed *without additional use of force* needed to evacuate Americans, their dependents, and relatives.

(6) Any evacuation would be subject to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, including a requirement for prior con-

sultation with Congress, a detailed report, and an automatic cutoff of activities after 60 days. (The administration has assured the committee that any emergency evacuation would be completed within a few days.)

(7) The bill contains a provision which permits the Congress to rescind any or all of its provisions by the passage of a veto-proof concurrent resolution. The War Powers Resolution contains a similar concurrent resolution authority which could be used to cutoff U.S. participation in any hostilities which might result.

COSTS ESTIMATE

Pursuant to clause 7 of Rule XIII of the House Rules, the Committee has examined the requests submitted by the President to carry out the humanitarian and evacuation programs authorized by this bill. It has made adjustments in the requests and recommends \$150 million.

Since the funds authorized by this bill are for a one-time emergency the Committee does not expect any additional authorizations will be required.

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE XI(1)(3) OF HOUSE RULES

Pursuant to the requirements of Rule XI(1)(3) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the following statements are made:

(A) *Oversight findings and recommendations.*—Because this is emergency legislation no oversight findings and recommendations were made. However, the Special Subcommittee on Investigations currently is conducting an in-depth review of U.S. policies in Indochina.

(B) *Congressional Budget Act section 308(a) requirement.*—This measure provides for \$150 million in new budget authority.

(C) *Congressional Budget Office estimate and comparison.*—No estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 has been received by the Committee.

(D) *Committee on Government Operations summary.*—No oversight findings and recommendations have been received which relate to this measure from the Committee on Government Operations under clause 2(b)(2) of Rule X.

INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT

This legislation provides one-time emergency assistance to cope with a crisis situation which currently exists in South Vietnam. It has no specifically identifiable inflationary impact.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1.—Section 1 establishes title of bill as "Vietnam Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975".

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Section 2.—Section 2 authorizes the appropriation of \$150 million for humanitarian assistance programs in South Vietnam and for evacuation of certain categories of individuals from that country.

Of the funds provided in this section, \$73 million, together with the funds previously authorized but unappropriated and referred to in section 6 of this bill, is intended to cover costs in the humanitarian assistance program requested by the President. The remaining \$77 million is intended to be available for nonmilitary expenditures associated with the evacuation, including such costs as have been incurred in the transportation of South Vietnamese orphans to the United States.

Subject to the limitations contained in other provisions of the bill, it is the intent of the Committee to make available to the President the authorities of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and of other relevant Federal statutes in carrying out the humanitarian projects presented by the Administration and in making funds available to meet the costs of evacuation and the immediate needs of the evacuees. (These authorities include contracting, travel and administrative authorities, and the authority to carry out projects through the auspices of voluntary agencies and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.)

The Committee recognizes that the situation in South Vietnam is changing rapidly and believes that the President should have a reasonable degree of flexibility to meet such contingencies as may arise. The Committee is not adverse to changes in the tentative program presented to the Congress so long as the projects are of a humanitarian nature and consistent with the intent of this bill. It is the Committee's intent, however, that any funds used for evacuation purposes be used only for immediate, short-term requirements.

The Committee expects the executive branch to maintain a continuous dialogue with the Congress on uses and proposed uses of the funds made available by this section. The Committee notes that the Congress retains the power to rescind any of the provisions of this bill by concurrent resolution.

Section 3.—Section 3 assures that the provisions of law which restrict the use of funds for the use of United States Armed Forces in Indochina will not impede the specific evacuation authorized by this bill. Section 3 is not a blanket waiver for the use of American forces in Indochina. The use of such forces is carefully limited and circumscribed in sections 4 and 5 of this bill.

Section 3 waives the following five specific provisions of law which otherwise might limit the President's authority to use appropriated funds to effectuate and insure the safe evacuation of persons described in section 4 of this bill:

1. Section 839—Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1975 (Public Law 93-437) enacted October 8, 1974.

SEC. 839. None of the funds herein appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.

2. Section 30—Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 (Public Law 93-189) enacted December 17, 1973.

SEC. 30. No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended to finance military or paramilitary operations by the United States in or over Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.

3. Section 806—Military Procurement Authorization of 1974 (Public Law 93-155) enacted November 16, 1973.

SEC. 806. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon enactment of this Act, no funds heretofore or hereafter appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance the involvement of United States military forces in hostilities in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, unless specifically authorized hereafter by the Congress.

4. Section 13—Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act of 1973 (Public Law 93-126) enacted October 18, 1973.

SEC. 13. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds heretofore or hereafter appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance the involvement of United States military forces in hostilities in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, unless specifically authorized hereafter by the Congress.

5. Section 108—Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974 (Public Law 93-52) enacted July 1, 1973.

SEC. 108. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.

The phrase "any other comparable provision of law" is included to assure that the intent of this section will not be defeated by an inadvertent omission of a provision of law identical in impact to the specific sections cited. Under no circumstances is this phrase to be interpreted to authorize any activities other than those for the very clearly limited purposes specified in this bill.

The authority of this section cannot be used to authorize any activities other than those necessary and essential for the evacuation described in section 4.

Section 4.—Section 4 defines "evacuation" as:

"The removal to places of safety as expeditiously as possible, without the use of military force if possible, but should it become necessary and essential, with the minimum use of necessary force" of four categories of persons:

- First, United States citizens;
- Second, dependents of American citizens and of permanent residents of the United States;

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39) Third, Vietnamese nationals eligible for immigration to the United States by reason of their family relationships to American citizens; and

Fourth, such foreign nationals to whose lives a direct and imminent threat exists—*provided* that the military force necessary to carry out their evacuation does not exceed that force necessary to carry out the evacuation of the first three groups.

1b- While the Committee recognizes that the use of military personnel may be required to effectuate the evacuation of persons described in this section, the Committee expects the executive branch to make every effort to avoid the use of armed force to accomplish its evacuation programs. This section also makes clear that, if military force is required, it cannot be used for any purpose other than evacuation. The Committee understands that "relationships" which make Vietnamese nationals eligible for immigration to the United States includes Vietnamese fiancées of American citizens.

on *Section 5.*—Section 5 states that nothing in the bill in any way abrogates the provisions of the War Powers Resolution.

The President has been submitting reports to the Congress pursuant to the War Powers Resolution with respect to the use of armed forces in the recent emergency evacuations from South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The requirements of the War Powers Resolution, and the authority which it reserves to the Congress, remain unchanged by this bill. The power of the Congress to terminate the use of United States Armed Forces applies to the situation to which this legislation is addressed and is reinforced by the language specifically included in this bill.

74 *Section 6.*—This section would permit economic assistance funds appropriated for Indochina aid for fiscal year 1975 under section 36 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 to be used for humanitarian assistance purposes without regard to certain limitations now contained in that Act.

to Under section 36, \$617 million has been authorized for economic in- assistance for Indochina for this fiscal year. Of this amount, \$440 he million has been appropriated by the Foreign Assistance and Related be Programs Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1975. The remaining \$177 ary million of that authorization, together with such previously appropriated funds as may be or may become available, may be used for humanitarian programs under this bill.

The provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 from which the funds would be exempt are:

vi- Subsection 36(a)(1), which now limits to \$449.9 million the le- amount of economic assistance (other than Public Law 480 food aid) that may be provided for South Vietnam in fiscal year 1975;

h- Subsection 36(a)(6), which now limits to \$7 million the as- amount of economic assistance that may be provided for humanitarian ur aid for Indochina through international organizations in fiscal year 1975;

nt Subsection 38(a)(1), which now limits to \$90 million the amount of economic assistance for South Vietnam that may be used for humanitarian aid in fiscal year 1975; and

That portion of subsection 37(b) which now limits to 10 percent of the fiscal year 1975 funds provided for assistance to South Vietnamese children, the amount that may be used for adoption of South Vietnamese children by U.S. citizens.

It should be emphasized that these exemptions apply only to humanitarian assistance and in no way alter existing limitations on assistance for other purposes.

Section 7.—Section 7 permits the Congress to rescind the authorities contained in this bill by the adoption of a concurrent resolution.

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DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. LESTER L. WOLFF

I am prepared to support funds for humanitarian assistance and evacuation programs in Vietnam if we can sharply define the extent, nature and intent of this funding. I can support a funding authorization for specifically defined humanitarian and evacuation programs, but I cannot support the blanket authority that is given to the President by virtue of the catch-all phraseology and ambiguity of H.R. 6096. By failing to define the extent or limits to the President's authority and by waiving existing provisions of law which seek to place a necessary check on Presidential authority, H.R. 6096 fails to provide the vitally important safeguard against any type of renewed military commitment or involvement on the part of the United States in Vietnam.

The bill fails to define in any way what will be involved in our evacuation programs. It sets no limit on the number of troops that can be used in the evacuation effort. Will we send in 5,000 troops, 10,000, 20,000? Or, will we be caught up in a continuing spiral, sending 5,000 in to rescue the people, then 10,000 to protect the 5,000, then, perhaps, 20,000 to rescue them? The bill sets no time limit on the evacuation process, nor does it establish any restrictions on, nor even define, the kinds of activities in which our troops can engage under the cloak of an evacuation maneuver. In noting this lack of safeguard especially, I recall a statement that was made during the height of our involvement in Vietnam, "We had to destroy a town in order to save it."

The blanket authority which this bill gives to the Administration for implementing "evacuation programs" is reminiscent of the authority that was contained in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. H.R. 6096 explicitly waives the restrictions voted in several Congresses on the utilization of American Armed Forces and funds in Vietnam.

This waiver alone should make us wary; yet, the bill contains a waiver that is even more onerous. Section 3 of H.R. 6096 reads: "Nothing contained in section 839 of Public Law 93-437, section 30 of Public Law 93-189, section 806 of Public Law 93-155, section 13 of Public Law 93-126, section 108 of Public Law 93-52, or any other comparable provision of law shall be construed as limiting the availability of funds for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for the purposes of section 2 of this Act." Section 2 of the bill reads, "There is authorized to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal year 1975 not to exceed \$150,000,000 to be used, notwithstanding any other provision of law * * *".

A waiver has thus been granted not only to laws which have been spelled out, the ramifications of which we can determine, but a waiver has been granted as well to all other provisions of law which might apply. With this catch-all phraseology being added, we have, in effect, no idea of what laws the Administration will waive, and thus what authority it will use in implementing evacuation programs. After long

and considerable effort to restore to Congress its rightful Constitutional role in war-making decisions, we are now turning around and granting to the Executive the same type of unchecked authority which it enjoyed during the long years of our involvement in Vietnam.

This bill limits funding to \$150 million. However, by waiving existing provisions of law, it opens an avenue for the possible transfer of unlimited military equipment to the ARVN, who, I might note, have demonstrated an adeptness for transferring our equipment to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. It should also be pointed out that we have already authorized \$450 million for Vietnam in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1975. Of this, only \$282 million has been appropriated and allocated, leaving an additional \$168 million available for appropriation.

We can, I believe, legitimately question why Congress needs to give this blanket authority to the President if we are talking simply about evacuating Americans from Vietnam. I believe if we examined the Constitution, and the intent of the Constitution as determined by the Founding Fathers, we would see that the President has the authority, without this bill, to evacuate our people from Vietnam to insure their safety. To quote from James Buchanan, "(The Executive) cannot immediately resort to force without the direct authority of Congress, *except in resisting and repelling hostile attacks.*" I believe we would find that the President has the authority to act in an emergency if the safety of American citizens were threatened, and I thus seriously question the need for the all-encompassing waivers of law contained in H.R. 6096.

I do not wish to oppose humanitarian assistance for the beleaguered people of South Vietnam, but I cannot, in good conscience, vote for a bill which could be as disastrous to our country—and to Vietnam—as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. This bill asks us to once again step into the blackness of a tunnel, the end of which is not in sight; with the unknowns so powerful, we could too easily be re-drawn into this tragic conflict.

LESTER L. WOLFF.

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MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON

Passage of H.R. 6096 would be both dangerous and unnecessary, risking renewed American entanglement in the Vietnam conflict and setting a legislative precedent that could work mischief in the future.

The safe evacuation of U.S. citizens from South Vietnam must go forward immediately, but it does not require this or any other act of the Congress. The Administration carried out exactly the same kind of operation on a somewhat smaller scale in Cambodia just a few days ago. For the Congress to tamper now with the restraints of the law, explicitly approving the introduction of U.S. troops, would indicate either an amazing recklessness or a very short memory.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and its tragic aftermath should have taught us how a piece of legislation of this kind can not only serve as a foot in the door for an administration bent on broader involvement but can set in motion events in the field that develop their own logic and momentum.

The bill's provisions for humanitarian aid are equally ill-conceived. Mr. Thieu's long record of graft and corruption, including his recent effort to fly a load of gold bullion to Switzerland, should have convinced us by now that funneling this aid through international agencies is the only reasonable course for us to follow. No humanitarian assistance should be routed through government channels in Vietnam until a political settlement is achieved, and the Congress should do everything in its power to urge such a settlement.

I offer this minority view with the grim awareness that any legislative action may be rendered moot in a few days' time by unfolding events in Southeast Asia. I hope my colleagues will not be stampeded by the speed of these developments into enacting legislation whose long-term consequences have not been properly thought out. The responsibility and authority for evacuation already lies with the Administration, and we in the Congress should simply insist that the process go forward with dispatch.

MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON.

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DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR.

This legislation is another Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that poses the gravest dangers for the United States. If this legislation is passed, it would wipe away four years of carefully drafted legislative restrictions by the Congress which have brought our American military role in Southeast Asia to an end. I was astonished that the Committee would ever recommend the passage of such legislation.

If we grant the President the authority specified in this bill we give him a complete blank-check to plunge the U.S. into the war by reintroducing as many U.S. combat troops into Vietnam as he wishes, for as long as he wishes.

There are absolutely no limits in this bill on the amount of U.S. troops the President can send back into Vietnam, how long he can keep them there, or how much money he can spend in the process. This means, of course, there are absolutely no limits as to the number of American troops that might eventually be killed or captured.

Moreover this blanket grant of authority would also allow the President to resume the American bombing of North and South Vietnam—in contravention of legislative safeguards and limitations previously enacted but which are set aside by this legislation—if the President were to decide that such bombing was necessary to safely evacuate several hundred thousand South Vietnamese.

Furthermore there is no limit established as to the number of South Vietnamese that the President can commit the United States to evacuate. And again, the President is granted the authority for the unlimited use of American military combat resources to evacuate these South Vietnamese. While the Administration has tentatively spoken of withdrawing some 200,000 South Vietnamese, the President is free to announce that the target figure is 1,000,000 or more.

The Congress, in my judgment, would be foolish to the point of irresponsibility grant any President the sweeping powers outlined above.

There was general agreement in the Committee that the President already has sufficient power under existing law and legal precedent to use whatever U.S. military resources are necessary to carry out the safe evacuation of all Americans now in South Vietnam. As to the evacuation of South Vietnamese, it is my contention that we should commit ourselves to evacuate only as many as can be safely withdrawn without the use of American military combat forces. This would mean we should be evacuating as many as possible at the present time.

There are other serious deficiencies in this bill. One is that we persist in trying to channel humanitarian assistance through what is left of the government of South Vietnam. The current chaos and endemic corruption of that regime dooms any serious effort to properly administer and distribute humanitarian aid at the citizen level. A ranking Administration witness actually reassured us that U.S. AID personnel

in South Vietnam would insure any humanitarian assistance was properly administered—despite the fact that we are presently working against the clock to safely evacuate these same AID people.

It is my view that some humanitarian assistance should be made available to the citizens of South Vietnam and Cambodia but only through international relief organizations.

Finally, having listened to a number of top Administration officials testify over the past several days, it is my belief that the Administration has not been honest with the Congress on the matter of the evacuation of Americans from South Vietnam. It is my conviction that the Administration has moved much more slowly in evacuating Americans than seems to have been possible or prudent. Whether by accident or design, the remaining Americans have become hostage to a deteriorating set of events—which not only endanger their safety, but may later require a major U.S. military effort to secure their safe withdrawal. I don't know who is responsible for this failure in judgment—whether the American Ambassador in South Vietnam, the Secretary of State, U.S. military advisers, or the President himself—but a failure of this kind is inexcusable.

There are many former colleagues who now deeply regret their decision to vote for the original Tonkin Gulf Resolution. This legislation is Tonkin Gulf Resolution number 2—and I hope and pray that this 94th Congress will be wise enough to not make the same mistake again ten years later.

DON RIEGLE.

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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ

Throughout the past decade I have been unalterably opposed to this nation's ill-conceived military misadventures in Southeast Asia and to our prolonged involvement in the Vietnam war. While I was encouraged when the Paris Peace Accords were signed in 1973, I have been distressed that the United States has chosen to continue to support a corrupt and inept regime in Saigon, and that we have persisted in pouring millions of more dollars into an apparently bottomless pit.

At the same time I firmly believe that we have a very real duty to assist in the evacuation of those Vietnamese whose lives may be endangered when the Communists come to power. It seems to me that we have a particularly strong obligation to the South Vietnamese inasmuch as we encouraged them to continue to fight and resist—especially as they would never have been able to last as long as they did without massive American financial and military support. Certainly, those Vietnamese who worked closely with the American Government as well as those who were employed by private American firms under contract to the government are fearful they may lose their lives when the current regime falls. So are those who had no connection with the American presence but who supported the Saigon Government in one fashion or another. These men and women and their families simply cannot be abandoned and forgotten now that the war is about to end. I deeply believe that, within the framework of the practical and political limitations on what can be done for them, we have a very real obligation to facilitate their departure from Vietnam if they choose to leave.

On the other hand, I also share with many of our colleagues a very deep concern over the use of American troops to facilitate such an evacuation. It seems to me, as it does to them, that there is a potential possibility such a move could lead to a re-escalation of the war and a renewed U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. I think it important to point out in this connection that it may well be possible to evacuate those who wish to leave without using American military forces in the process.

Late last week I had an opportunity to discuss the question of the evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese from Vietnam with Mr. Pham Van Ba, the head of the permanent mission in France of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, in Paris. Mr. Ba indicated to me that the PRG would be willing to permit Americans and those Vietnamese who so wish to leave Vietnam without fear of military intervention. While I do not know to what extent Mr. Ba's assurances accurately reflect the real view of the PRG, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with which it is associated, it seems to me that it is incumbent upon the Administration to promptly pursue this possibility before sending in any American military personnel.

In the event, however, that American troops are ordered to Vietnam, it is essential that both the numbers that we send as well as the manner in which they are deployed be carefully controlled. In this regard, the Vietnam Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975 does contain several limitations on the use of American military personnel which make it extremely unlikely that they will be used for purposes other than those for which they were intended. Section 4 of the legislation clearly states that the evacuation "shall be defined as the removal to places of safety as expeditiously as possible, *without the use of military forces*, if possible, . . ." (emphasis added). It continues by declaring that if the use of military forces is required, it should be "with the minimum use of necessary force, . . ." Further, the number of military personnel that can be sent in is clearly limited to the amount necessary to evacuate American citizens, their dependents, and relations. Thus, we are talking about a substantially smaller number of troops than may have been originally anticipated or which some have estimated may be required to effectuate an evacuation. In addition, the bill specifically prohibits the deployment of troops, if sent, for activities not essential to the evacuation itself. It is also important to note that any provision of this act can be rescinded by concurrent resolution of the Congress and is thus not subject to a Presidential veto. For these reasons, I believe this legislation substantially restricts both the number of, and manner in which, American forces may be utilized in carrying out such an evacuation if it should prove necessary.

In view of the very legitimate concerns in both the Congress and the country over the possibility that a re-introduction of United States troops into Vietnam could lead to a renewed American involvement in Indochina, I believe it would be helpful if some additional protections against such an eventuality were adopted. In this regard, I think it would be useful to amend the bill to provide for a 30-day limit on the amount of time such forces may be used in effecting an evacuation. It seems to me that the number of persons we are talking about can be properly and safely removed from Vietnam—whether by air or sea—within this period of time. Also, it would make clear the Congress' determination to prevent this legislation from being turned into an open-ended invitation to a continuing American involvement in Vietnam.

In light of the statements recently made to me by the PRG representative that it would be willing to actively facilitate the evacuation of all Americans from the Republic of Vietnam and to permit those South Vietnamese who want to leave to do so as well, I believe that it may well be possible to remove those whom this legislation contemplates evacuating without the use of force.

If an arrangement were made with all interested parties whereby an evacuation could be conducted free of military harassment, there would clearly be no need to reintroduce American troops into Vietnam. I believe, therefore, that this legislation could be further strengthened by the adoption of an amendment which would require the President to make a good faith effort to work out an agreement with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolu-

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tionary Government of South Vietnam providing for a safe and orderly evacuation of Vietnamese nationals before sending American troops in for this purpose.

I supported this legislation because I believe we have a moral obligation to provide the people of Vietnam with essential humanitarian assistance and also because I feel we must aid those who fear their lives may be endangered following the collapse of the government of Saigon. With the restrictions already contained in the legislation, together with those I hope will be added on the floor, I believe the possibility that such an effort will lead to a re-escalation of the war is exceedingly remote.

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ.

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DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. HELEN S. MEYNER

It is with great reluctance that I oppose H.R. 6096. I have been deeply concerned with the issues of humanitarian assistance and the evacuation of Americans and certain Vietnamese nationals. I do not feel, however, that this bill addresses these problems in an adequate manner.

I object first to the combination of humanitarian assistance and evacuation in the same bill. The Administration did not request any additional funds for evacuation. Section 3 of this bill, however, permits the Administration to use as much of the \$150 million authorized in Section 2 as they please for evacuation efforts by American military forces in South Vietnam. Combining these two matters in a single bill also makes it more difficult for the House of Representatives to give these matters the singular attention they deserve.

I also object to the fact that the humanitarian assistance authorized in Section 2 and released by Section 6 continues to be channeled through AID and the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Saigon government. The record of these agencies in delivering humanitarian aid to those really in need is not a good one. Furthermore, human suffering in Indochina extends far beyond the remaining enclaves still controlled by the Saigon government.

The fact that some refugees may have fallen behind the lines of battle hasn't reduced their suffering, their innocence, or their need for assistance.

I would prefer to see this assistance provided under the auspices of international organizations and private relief agencies. Several organizations and agencies are in place now and have the confidence of all parties in that conflict.

Since 1973, the United Nations has had an Indochina Peninsula Liaison Group in operation, coordinating the efforts of UNICEF and the High Commissioner of Refugees in Indochina. UNICEF itself has been operating in Cambodia and South Vietnam since 1952. The Liaison Group is now under the able leadership of Sir Robert Jackson, who has directed nearly all of the UN's major emergency relief programs in recent years, including the billion-dollar relief effort in Bangladesh. Since the first of the month, the Liaison Group has received \$10 million worth of aid and pledges of aid from ten countries. An official of that group has said that what their organization needs now more than anything else is the infusion of a large grant from a concerned country. I believe that that grant should come from the United States.

In addition to the United Nations, several private relief agencies, including the International Red Cross, the Mennonites, and the American Friends Service Committee, are operating throughout South Vietnam and other areas of Indochina and have the trust of all par-

ties in the area. They too are willing and able to use massive amounts of new funds to help alleviate the suffering of innocent children and adults in Indochina.

I believe that internationalizing relief assistance will increase the likelihood that the aid will reach people in need. Furthermore, I believe that a sizeable American contribution to an international relief program will further encourage other countries to contribute to this effort.

My final objection to this bill has to do with its authorization of the use of military troops for the evacuation of Americans and even Vietnamese nationals from South Vietnam. Congress has been stung before on the issue of permitting the intrusion of American troops into Vietnam for "limited" actions. I devoutly hope that the American government will expedite the evacuation of Americans and friendly nationals, so that we can avoid the possibility of further scenes of panic and brutality or even American military actions in "self defense."

HELEN MEYNER.

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DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR.

Three objectives should guide American policy as we withdraw from South Vietnam.

First, all United States citizens and their dependents should be evacuated.

Second, our government should assist in the removal of those South Vietnam citizens whose lives may be endangered by the fall of the present government.

Third, these evacuations should be completed without the loss of American lives.

As approved by the Committee on International Relations, H.R. 6096 jeopardizes the attainment of the third goal. Specifically, Section 3 of this measure waives five statutes which prohibit the involvement of United States troops in combat action in Indochina. Repeal of these Congressional restrictions opens the door to exposure to hostile fire of an indeterminate number of American service personnel for an indeterminate period of time. This open-ended authority enabling the President to introduce troops in enemy-occupied areas presents a three-fold risk: first, possible delay in the implementation of evacuation plans until complete military collapse occurs; second, the resultant loss of American lives (both military and civilian); third, further assignment of United States forces in South Vietnam to salvage this deteriorating situation.

It was these fears which prompted me to vote against H.R. 6096 in Committee. During House consideration of this bill, I shall support efforts to delete Section 3. Two benefits will accrue from retention of the statutes prohibiting the use of United States combat personnel in South Vietnam.

First, the Administration will be required to accelerate its evacuation program so that United States citizens and Vietnamese nationals can be removed prior to the development of "combat" situations.

Second, the loss of American lives thereby will be eliminated or substantially minimized.

CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR.

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REFUGEE OPERATIONS TO CLOSE

WASHINGTON, Oct. 28 (MCNews)-- The Camp Pendleton refugee center will end operations Nov. 1. The Marine Corps role has been primarily in support of the President's Interagency Task Force, which coordinated the overall program and policies for the processing, sponsorship and assimilation of refugees into the U.S. society.


The close down will culminate six months of support during which approximately 50,000 refugees have been processed and released.

During this period, the Marine Corps provided the services and support necessary to sustain a general population of over 18,000 people. This population center was literally constructed by the Marine Corps overnight providing shelter, food, medical and personal services for men, women and children of all ages.

Within 24 hours following Camp Pendleton's official designation as a refugee center on April 29, 1975, the initial flow of refugees was received and provided for. The total support effort included the construction of nearly 1,500 shower units, 8,700 feet of underground water and sewage pipes, 12 miles of electrical wiring and 4 miles of primary and secondary power lines.

Laundry has been processed at the rate of 7,100 pieces daily. Playground and classrooms were constructed and food service involved the preparation of approximately 39,000 meals daily.

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Although this operations has not followed the traditional role normally assigned to an elite fighting force, the Marine Corps has gained valuable experience that can be applied when called upon to assist in future civil disasters or civilian evacuation operations.

HQMC officials believe the successful accomplishment of this mission points out, once again, the versatility, esprit and "can do" attitude which have been the hallmark of Marines throughout the years.

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DIVISION OF INFORMATION**DAILY PRESS CLIPS****OF**

JAN 23 1976

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Operation: NEW ARRIVAL

El Toro

by Major Sara Pritchett, USMC

Capt. James V. DiBernardo, who spent over five years as a North Vietnamese prisoner, met arriving refugees at El Toro.

The Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, became involved with the Vietnamese refugee program earlier than most other commands, which turned out to be fortunate. It began when we were chosen as an alternate landing site for Operation "BABY LIFT." The Naval Air Station, at Los Alamitos, was chosen as the primary site, due to its close proximity to Long Beach Naval Station, where the processing was being handled.

When we received the notification, the command sent several staff officers to observe a "BABY LIFT" arrival, and to plan for a similar operation. As the Public Affairs Officer (PAO), I was included in this group.

After observing the operation, we formulated

a plan which, later, was put into effect almost verbatim for use during Operation NEW ARRIVAL (ONA). Several important decisions were made with our facilities in mind. The passenger terminal would be used as the main operating area, rather than the old tower, which had traditionally been the site of Presidential arrivals; the basic Presidential security plan could be put into effect with slight modifications; the amount of personnel and logistic support was determined; and accommodations for the press were established. I would establish a Command Information Bureau (CIB) in the passenger terminal and, separate that function as best I could from the Public Affairs Office, so that the normal work could be accomplished unhindered.

The press area was delineated to give the media ample photographic opportunities, but not to interfere with the flow of required inprocessing. A public address system was established, apart from that used for paging in the terminal, for use in press briefings. Media representatives would be given passes by PAO personnel rather than Security, which would clear all others. One of the main advantages of the terminal was the bank of public telephones, about 20 of them, already installed, which proved to be a great convenience for media representatives. I made a request for a blackboard, which was questioned at first, but which later became the most-used item by all connected with refugee arrivals.


The word came to the command on Saturday, 26 April, to stand-by. Refugees could arrive as early as Monday, 28 April for further transport to Camp Pendleton. In addition, Pendleton would probably not be ready to handle the first group of 800, so El Toro might have to put them up for a night or two.

MAJOR SARA PRITCHETT, USMC, is the Public Information Officer, Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro. She holds a bachelors degree in radio and television from the University of Maryland.

MILITARY MEDIA REVIEW
JAN 76

MMR





Refugees get their first glimpse of American life during the bus ride to Camp Pendleton.

As with Pendleton, El Toro Marines started scrambling. Several old barracks near the terminal which were used mainly for Reservists in the summer were cleaned up and outfitted with bunks and linens. In addition, a tent camp capable of temporarily housing an additional 600 refugees was erected. Since we did not have some of the logistic support required for the larger commercial airliners, calls went out to Norton Air Force Base and gear started rolling in.

My office phone began ringing Monday morning with queries as to the possibility of refugee arrivals. My guidance was not to confirm or deny until given the go-ahead. Department of Defense (DoD) had stated that the local base PAO should not be the DoD spokesman, so a member of the Marine Public Affairs Office in Los Angeles, was ordered in. In the meantime, though, I was the gal on the spot.

As part of the planning, the Security people had contacted the Orange County Sheriff's office which turned around and made a press release on the refugee arrivals. When I discovered this, I called the Sheriff who confirmed and defended this action. There was a heated discussion over the propriety of this move, and we ended the conversation on less than friendly terms. He apologized a few days later, but that didn't help at the time.

His release stated that the refugees would

begin arriving that evening, which was incorrect, but it was late afternoon before I could release the anticipated arrival, which would now be the next morning. Though we were able to close up shop by about 9 p.m., my home phone rang most of the night.

By 7 a.m. the next morning, the PAO personnel were occupied full time answering the phones - press, curious civilians, complainers, offers of volunteer assistance, ad infinitum. The CIB was moved to the terminal, and by the arrival of the first aircraft at 9:30, we were attempting to answer the scores of questions from about 100 reporters, representing the wires, all three networks and the media throughout the west coast.

The film crews had set up on the portable press stand which had electrical outlets and was still around from the old Presidential arrival days. The remote units were parked in a predesignated area which would give them the best transmitting location and the still cameramen were swarming everywhere. Reporters were lined up to use the phones and to save them for immediate access after the first arrival. The CIB phones would not stop ringing with calls from all over the United States, and the whole scene was reminiscent of the proverbial fire drill.

We had split the terminal in half. One side where passengers normally check in and await transportation was used for press and others not

cleared for the other side, which was a large open area used for immigration and naturalization processing and customs checks. The two were totally isolated from each other. From the processing area, the refugees stepped right onto the busses. So, from the time they entered the terminal, there were no more photo opportunities, much to the media's dismay. But that was the way it was! To have allowed them in the processing area would only have created more chaos than already existed.

The blackboard, as I mentioned, became the best source of data we had. On it we listed the flight estimated time of arrival (ETA), type of aircraft, airline and expected number of passengers. The ETA's changed constantly and after a head count on each plane load, we would amend the numbers. We kept a running tally of numbers of aircraft and persons which was the most sought-out information from our operation.

More importantly, the phone at the PAO shop rang constantly with queries from interested civilians on how to help and sponsor. It became obvious that, for the time being, the idea of total separation from the normal PAO functions would not be possible.

My personnel shortage was nearly critical, but it was necessary to establish a 24-hour phone watch at the office as well as the terminal. We

had the capability of recording a message and having the operators direct all sponsor-type calls to that number, however, that wasn't enough, and a second line was installed.

In the morning of the third day, I entered the terminal to find 15 of the 20 phones sitting on the floor, and two phone company men working on 3 others. I am told that my look of utter disbelief should have been captured on film for posterity. It seems that several months prior, a work order was submitted to remove all but two, for lack of use. After a couple of hurried calls I left the terminal area. Later, when I returned, all 20 phones were reinstalled.

As the numbers of media reps decreased, we were able to give them more leeway. We let them inside the processing area and some were even allowed to board the busses for the trip to Pendleton, about a 40-minute drive.


The most harrowing experience I have ever had with the news media, and I thought I had seen the worst with Mr. Nixon's return after his resignation, was the arrival of former Premier Nguyen Cao Ky. The press stand proved incapable of providing sufficient electricity for lights, and film crews were frantic in their efforts to jerry-rig a workable system.

There was reluctance from higher up in allowing Mr. Ky to meet with the press. The compromise was that, if he agreed, he could meet them along the fence leading into the terminal. There would be absolutely no interference to the movement of the remaining refugees, and when the busses were ready to depart, he would be on one.

The DoD spokesman boarded the aircraft and asked Mr. Ky if our plan would be acceptable. He agreed. But, as they started walking along the fence, reporters, afraid they would miss something, stormed the area in the attempt to ask questions and have the answers recorded. Every couple of minutes, the DoD spokesman would move him down a few more feet. In their efforts to get the story, the reporters became downright vicious, and I was surprised that no one was hurt in the scramble.

A few weeks into the operation, my deputy and I visited Camp Pendleton to observe the operation with particular interest in the press center. It was obviously much different than ours, but then so were the circumstances. In one respect, though, we had approached the problem with the same philosophy: provide the most and best service available to the media and be as honest as possible. With minor exceptions, the theory worked and served to cement our already good relationship with the press. ☐

Former Premier Key was rushed by reporters in search of a story upon his arrival at El Toro.



Operation: NEW ARRIVAL

Pendleton

by GySgt. G.N. Dalessandri, USMC

On April 28, 1975, word was received from Washington that Camp Pendleton had been selected as one of four camps to receive Indochinese refugees. The real block-buster was, the refugees would start to arrive the next day. We were told to plan on housing about 18,000 refugees.

A short time later, local and national news media representatives came through the gates of Camp Pendleton to cover the preparations for the refugees arrival. The Joint Public Affairs Officer (JPAO) found himself on the phone or in front of TV cameras most of the day, with only a short break to hold a decision meeting with the base commanding general.

Provisions for handling the influx of reporters were established in this meeting. It was decided that the press would have an open door, however a few ground rules were devised for the benefit of all. All media representatives would receive a briefing from the Department of Defense PAO, each rep would have an escort and no refugees were to be interviewed or photographed without their permission.

At the time, the JPAO had a staff of three officers and 19 enlisted. And despite the problems that Operation New Arrivals (ONA) brought, the staff still had to produce the weekly newspaper, circulation 20,000, three external radio shows per day and the many regular daily news releases. They also had to maintain the Community Relations Program.

The staff was divided. The JPAO took charge of the Command Information Bureau (CIB) at the refugee center, while his deputy handled the responsibilities of the main portion of the base. The newspaper staff, three men, remained intact, the Radio-TV Chief assumed the role of the Media Support Officer, and half of the press section became media escorts. One man was left in

the Fleet Home Section, and two in the radio section.

The CIB was established in the Officers Club at Camp Christianitos, which, in time, would be the most centrally-located area of the refugee operation. The location worked out far better than planned. Within four days the CIB was surrounded by tents that made up tent camps No. 4 and No. 6.

Transforming an Officers Club into a working CIB takes a vast amount of equipment. We installed five extra phone lines, four typewriters, a public address system with multiple recording capabilities and three TV sets for monitoring news programs. A newspaper clipping service was contracted, and United Press International and Associated Press news wires were installed. A podium and extra chairs were set up for use during the press briefings, and press kits, with general material on Camp Pendleton, were set out. It took 30 hours to complete the job.

The news monitors and the clipping service

It was obvious that the children were less than shy when photographers were present.



GUNNERY SERGEANT G. N. DALESSANDRI, USMC, was a member of the Joint Public Affairs Office, Camp Pendleton, during Operation NEW ARRIVAL.



The understanding and compassion demonstrated by the Pendleton Marines helped to traverse the language barrier.

proved invaluable. As reporters were filing their stories, we knew in a matter of days what the media feeling for the operation was.

The wire services gave us instant access to stories about which we would be queried. It allowed us to get the jump on the queries and have the answers ready. Furthermore, it allowed the PAO to keep the commanding general and his staff informed, long before the stories appeared in local newspapers.

During the first week, 10 Marines of the JPAO staff handled the escort duties. However, the number of media reps coming into the refugee center far outnumbered the escorts (more than 100 a day). In answer to the request for more escorts, 30 additional men were selected. Much of the success of the press center operation can be attributed directly to the escorts. They worked many arduous hours helping the media cover the refugee story.

Unlike other visitors, the media were not issued passes. Instead, the press escorts had badges identifying them as members of the JPAO staff. Everybody knew that a person without a pass/badge would be more noticeable, and the media reps made it a point to keep their escort nearby. The ground rules immediately became clear to the media. If a rep was not escorted, he was challenged and referred to the press center, and this could result in a missed deadline.

When Mrs. Betty Ford visited the refugee center, the media pool concept was used. Mrs. Ford's press secretary provided a list of media reps who would accompany Mrs. Ford as she toured the center. Two reporters were selected to brief those reps who were only given photographic and observation opportunities. One bus took the pool reporters to the briefing room while a second bus took the others to a pre-arranged, roped-off press area. The briefing by the pool reporters worked so well that many of the other reporters said they could have filed their stories without leaving the press center.

When former Premier Nguyen Cao Ky arrived at tent camp No. 8, the press wanted interviews, and he cooperated fully. However, it soon got out of hand. So, it was decided that the press would meet Mr. Ky each day at 4 p.m., in his tent, to give them all an equal chance to talk with him.

On the second day the JPAO was appointed as the DOD spokesman, and the operation was revised. Due to the size of the processing center and the many refugees and staff it honored, space became a premium. If a journalist wanted to interview an agency chief (Red Cross, Immigration, etc.) or if a film crew wanted to cover the processing operation, it had to be requested through the Deputy Public Affairs Officer (DPAO). This reduced the number of persons

wandering through the center, interrupting the orderly flow of business.

The press was not enthusiastic about this new rule at first. However, when rules were made clear, no exceptions were made and, most important, when all were treated equally, the professionals acquiesced.

During Phase I of the operation, the press center produced hand-outs showing the number of daily arrivals, departures, and special events; weddings, baptisms and confirmations. The daily menu was published, as well as some figures on feeding 18,000 refugees. There was also a hand-out, updated weekly, listing improvements to the camp; i.e. power lines, water lines, phone trunks and recreational equipment for the refugees.

A file of all queries kept by the press center proved to be quite valuable when compiling information for press briefings. When it became evident many questions were being asked repeatedly, the file was used to prepare a hand-out containing the most frequently asked questions and their answers.


Despite the magnitude of the operation and the vast number of media representatives logging

into the press center, we never lost sight of our internal audience. The base newspaper, the **PENDLETON SCOUT**, carried many pages of photographs taken by the base and division photographers. While escorting members of the press, members of the PAO staff were also looking for stories to cover. Many of the human interest stories were produced by the escorts who were working 80 to 90 hours a week.

The base newspaper carried many articles explaining the refugees situation. It was also helpful in dispelling the many rumors that proliferate in an operation of this size. These efforts were further aided by the publication of an open letter from the base commander, in which he addresses himself to the need for stopping of rumors.

To date more than 3,000 newsmen have logged into the press center at Camp Pendleton, ranging from high school journalists to members of the international media. The open door policy proved to be very successful, and each journalist is treated with firmness, fairness and dignity at all times. This has resulted in a rapport with the media that, we feel, will last long after the last refugee has departed. ☐

Pendleton commander, BG Graham, shows Mrs. Ford a copy of the Vietnamese language paper printed by the refugees.



New York Times
22 1 Feb 76

SLAVERY REPORTED AMONG REFUGEES

Camp Pendleton Study Finds
Exploitation of Children

By EVERETT R. HOLLES

Special to The New York Times

CAMP PENDLETON, Calif., Jan. 31—A Marine Corps general has reported that "slave children," hidden weapons and unsanitary habits existed among the more than 50,000 Southeast Asian refugees cared for here last year before their American resettlement.

A sharp dispute has been touched off by the report, which was prepared for the commandant of the Marine Corps by Brig. Gen. Paul Graham, who recently retired as commander of this training base.

Details of the report, meant to be confidential, were disclosed last week and were quickly disputed by the Vietnamese Alliance Association and other refugee groups.

Officials of the Federal Immigration and Naturalization Service, who were accused in the report of negligently allowing "illegal aliens" to slip away, also challenged the findings.

The angriest reaction was to a statement that "slave children were discovered among the refugee families," either orphans of war or children separated from their parents in the confusion of the evacuations from Saigon last April.

Earlier Reports Unconfirmed

While the refugee center was in operation from last April 29 to Oct. 31, there were repeated but unconfirmed reports that wealthier refugee families were exploiting parentless children by compelling them to do menial work.

Mrs. Christine Minh, wife of a Vietnamese physician in San Diego and public relations director of the Vietnamese Alliance Association, denounced the findings as "grossly inaccurate."

"Slave children are not a part of the Vietnamese culture," she said.

"Ninety percent of the unaccompanied children at the camp were those whose families had them evacuated first, hoping to join them later. The remaining few had been live-in baby sitters for some of the families back in Vietnam. They were in no sense slave children."

Attention by Welfare Workers

In the San Diego area, where nearly 10,000 refugees have settled, county welfare officials said they have been alert to reports that some Vietnamese children had been forced to work for refugee families. The county officials said further that steps have been taken to protect the children.

General Graham defended his report, entitled "Operation New Arrival; After Action Report," as "wholly factual."

The report cited said that there had been not only confusion but also a lack of coordination among civilian and military officials assigned to the refugee project and singled out the immigration service for criticism.

"For reasons of convenience," the report said, the immigration service issued I-94 identity cards—used for aliens legally admitted to the United States—to refugees still undergoing security checks.

As a result, the report said, many refugees left the camp without authorization and were not subject to legal action for their absence.

Denial by Official

Donald Day, who headed the immigration processing detail at Camp Pendleton, denied that his agency had condoned unauthorized absences.

He said that contrary to General Graham's account, refugees who had left the camp improperly had been charged with being illegal aliens but that the charges had been dismissed by the United States Attorney's office.

The Marine Corps' account of weapons in the camp was contained in a section dealing with Cambodian refugees.

A search of the Cambodians and their belongings just prior to their transfer to Fort Chaffee, Ark., in October was said to have turned up 12 revolvers and 1,100 rounds of ammunition.

Much of General Graham's report dealt with what it called low standards personal hygiene among the refugees and their refusal to obey the camp's sanitation and housekeeping regulations, an accusation disputed by Mrs. Minh.

DECLASSIFIED

hidden weapons

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

*unsanitary conditions
slave children*

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

all refugee
+
in MKF files
material

DECLASSIFIED

INTERVIEWEE IDENTIFICATION: BGen Paul G, Graham, USMC (Ret)
Refugee Center
LOCATION AND DATE OF INTERVIEW: ~~MCB~~, Camp Pendleton, Calif 30Sep75
SUBJECT AND SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF INTERVIEW:
Debrief of Special Ass~~y~~ to CG, MCB, Camp Pendleton
for Refugee Matters
DATE OF EVENT(S): Apr-Sep75
TAPE CONTENT CODES:
DATE OF DUPLICATE TAPE:

6155

INTERVIEWEE IDENTIFICATION: LtCol Arthur Brill, USMC
LOCATION AND DATE OF INTERVIEW: Camp Pendleton, Calif 23Jul75
SUBJECT AND SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF INTERVIEW:
Speech of Joint Public Affairs Officer, Camp Pendleton
re/Press Relations and the Vietnamese Refugee
Camp
DATE OF EVENT(S): Apr-Jul75
TAPE CONTENT CODES:
DATE OF DUPLICATE TAPE:

FIRST DRAFT

Also in the 1973-1975 monograph will be a Part authored by Dr.

Gordon tentatively titled, "Refugee Operations - In the Cause of Humanity." Beginning with pre-evacuation planning, that part of the narrative will carry the Marine Corps' role in the recent Southeast Asia Refugee operations through to the termination of the Camp Pendleton refugee camp on 31 October 1975. Materials which the Historical Branch has gathered to support that portion of the writing program include After Action Reports from Camp Pendleton and Marine Barracks, Guam, as well as three cartons of operational records and supporting documents from Camp Pendleton's role in supporting Operation NEW ARRIVALS, as the refugee program was named. Letter Reports, oral history interviews, ~~and~~ selected message traffic, ~~and~~ and collected newspaper clippings have also been assembled within the Branch to assist the recording of the Marines' work in assisting these new Americans.

Ben,

*do you specifically want to mention
EHS' interview w/Ben Graham?*

16 Jan 76

From: Director of Marine Corps History
and Museums

To: Reference Section

Subj: Casualty figures, Vietnam

1. What are the "final" casualty
figures for Marines in the Vietnam
War?

see attached

2. How many refugees passed through
Camp Pendleton?

50,424

3. Did the camp close 31 October or
1 November 1975?

V.R.

S
No staff studies or equivocations; just
the facts, man.

Early Print 18 Nov 75
Weekend Edition--16 November 1975

WASHINGTON STAR 16 NOVEMBER 1975

Official Denies Vietnamese Are Being 'Pushed Out the Door' at Indiantown Gap

By Edwin Chen
Special to the Washington Star

ANNVILLE, Pa. — It is 0800 hours at Ft. Indiantown Gap. A wintry sun peeks over the blue ridge and drives away the morning frost.

The breakfast leftovers are being disposed of — overcooked scrambled eggs and toast are tossed into the dumpster, bacon is recycled to accompany the boiled string beans for lunch.

As the camp wakes up to another day, traffic is picking up on the World War II-vintage streets. A line of civilian cars is halted by a military policeman so the pack of children can cross the street safely to school. But a Volkswagen at the head of the line is in a hurry and begins to inch forward.

THE GUARD exchanges scowls with the VW's driver. The book-laden children ignore the exchange. They are discussing the No. 1 topic here: the closing of school next Saturday. They are speaking Vietnamese.

Behind the miles of thin, twisting strips of sagging white tape that encompass this "cantonment," more than 3,000 Vietnamese refugees are still cloistered in a quiet corner of the 18,000-acre military outpost, waiting for the Americans to do it for them. Just one more time.

But gone today is the initial air of fervent faddishness. Gone are the jeeps mounted with loud speakers broadcasting announcements and English-language pop songs. Gone is the friendly Good Humor man. The plastic footballs, Barbie dolls, jigsaw puzzles and frisbees have fallen by the wayside.

Gone are the welcoming committees: Now the big push is on to sponsor out the remaining refugees. It goes under a briskly military and brutally cold code name, "Closing the Gap."

"I DON'T LIKE this 'move 'em out' business. I prefer a more human interaction," said one worker for the U.S. Catholic Conference, the largest volunteer agency here, who said he is quitting the organization when the camp is shut down. Like other voluntary agency officials, he believes human factors are being ignored for the sake of expediency.

"This is not a great dumping-ground operation," counters Alan Carter, the camp's senior civilian coordinator. "But there is a need to close for human and political reasons."

"The refugees are still going to legitimate, fully verified sponsors," he added, noting that government officials and volunteers will still do follow-up checks to assure that everything goes all right.

"There's no way we're pushing them out the door," added Julia Vadala Taft, director of the president's Interagency Task Force for Indochina Refugees, who visited Indiantown Gap last week.

BUT THE IMPRESSION of haste and expediency remains. For example, Carter admits that some of the refugees will be farmed out to sponsors who will not be told of troubles they got into while at Indiantown Gap. Problem refugees, including those guilty of extortion at the camp, will mingle with the others who will be dispersed throughout the nation.

In the end, it's a matter of money. Unless a refugee can display \$4,000 in cash for himself and each member of his family, he must have a sponsor before he is "paroled."

A sponsor is an individual or a group that pledges — but is not held legally responsible — to provide for the refugee and his family until they can stand on their own feet. The parole status assigned to the refugees after they leave Indiantown Gap is the result of a quirk in immigration regulations, and it adds two years to the normal five-year waiting period before an immigrant is accorded full U.S. citizenship rights, according to Carter.

ONLY A FEW memories remain of the happy May days when they arrived in busloads to the tunes of marching high school bands, American flags and speeches. All that remains in this detention camp where no one works is a pervasive feeling of misery that has settled over the fort like the cold fog that each night shrouds the undulating hills here in Pennsylvania Dutch country.

Inside, older refugees sit with pensive stoicism day in, day out in makeshift libraries plastered with dog-eared travel posters, listening to cassette recordings of hauntingly sweet Vietnamese music, contemplating the vicissitudes of war and the price of peace.

Outside, there is only the cheery sounds of children at play as gangs of youngsters — some seem surprised by their own vitality — dash between the green-and-white clapboard barracks like a flock of hungry seagulls going after a ship's refuse.

THE RESTIVE middle-aged and young adult refugees, in their oversized military field jackets, do not want the past preserved, but the future explained. How far is Arlington? Can I get a job as an airplane mechanic? How much is an apartment?

In the haste to close the camp, the sheltered interlude that was supposed to allow a quiet transition between two cultures is about to end. The melting pot has become a pressure cooker.

Now has come the time for second-guessing or, in the words of one refugee, "what you Americans call 'Monday morning quarterbacking.'"

Said a 58-year-old man named Thuy: "Sometimes I feel it was wrong for me to leave. For the young people, it is a good thing. But me? I don't know anymore. Because I am very homesick for my family, for my friends, for my relatives and for my country. I feel half dead."

PHAN TRUNG QUAN, 49, Thuy's strolling companion on a pebble-strewn dirt path, said, "I left because I wanted liberty, freedom and democracy. The Communists would have killed me and my family. So with a sick heart I left. A sick heart. It is very sad. I will always remember the land where I was born. But I cannot live under the Communists," he said as a fitful wind sent dust swirling about. Quan was an employee of the Bank of Saigon.

A third man admitted, "I did not want to leave. But, because I worked for the Americans, the Communists would have killed me." He said he went to work for U.S. contractors nearly 10 years ago in the Central Highlands, where he was born. "You Americans always paid very well; there were many mouths to feed in my family."

However real those fears were last April, news dispatches from Saigon report few executions. The new government apparently has chosen to try to win over enemies and potential enemies through indoctrination.

Many who fled last April, including military personnel and employees of the U.S. government, have gone back.

But those developments cannot prevent the stories here, after a time, from becoming pathetically familiar: a hasty departure; families, friends and valued belongings left behind; a child spilled into the South China Sea, his head bobbing, then disappearing into the churning wake of overloaded fishing boats speeding out to sea; fear of Communist reprisals; longing for freedom.

THE VISION has waned for some. Of the 85 here who want to return home, 30 are refusing to be moved out to American homes for fear that the move will endanger their standing with their country's new rulers or that they will simply be lost in the bureaucracy.

"In the last six months, we have lived in extremely painful circumstances. Our young wives and children are still expecting our return," one refugee seeking repatriation told Mrs. Taft and Prince Suddrudin Aga Khan, the United Nations high commissioner on refugees, who came to meet with them last week.

"Even if we are given homes here, we would be dying slowly, mentally," pleaded another refugee. "Here we are like birds without a sky."

Asked at a press conference why the refugees could not remain here until their return to Indochina, Mrs. Taft conceded, "One has to look at it from the fiscal standpoint. . . . As long as there are sponsorships available they should accept them. I don't believe the federal government has the responsibility to keep

(SEE INDIANTOWN GAP...Pg.

Weekend Edition--16 November 1975

INDIANTOWN GAP

people in a camp for long periods of time when they have an opportunity to resettle."

"WE NEED to go home," another refugee told Taft and Khan. "That is where our hearts, our villages and our families are. We hope you will understand. No political factors enter here."

Khan, who has been negotiating with the new rulers of Saigon and Phnom Penh on the question of repatriation, advised the refugees, "the countries you have left have many problems, difficulties. So it takes time."

More than 140,000 refugees — including several hundred Cambodians and a handful of Chinese — have arrived in the U.S. since the Provisional Revolutionary Government marched into Saigon last spring. They were scattered at camps on Guam, in Camp Pendleton, Cal., Ft. Chaffee, Ark.; Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.; and here. All are closed now except Indiantown Gap and Chaffee, where 9,000 refugees still await sponsorship.

THE PROJECTED closing date for the Arkansas camp is mid-December. In all, more than 118,000 have been resettled throughout the country. Some 6,500 have moved to another country. Seventy-six have died, 1,546 have returned home to Southeast Asia.

About 15,000 refugees have been assigned to this camp, and about 3,000 of them are left, living out the remaining days before they are dispersed through the country behind endless white tape strung up between wooden sawhorses. The makeshift barriers are both real and symbolic: they demark both the camp and traditions of language, culture, history, ethics, tradition and ideology.

The symbolic barrier has not been bridged any more than the real one. An American public health nurse, for example, tells a visitor: "The refugees are used to having their babies die because life just isn't as important to them as it is to us. It doesn't mean as much to them."

The woman, a lieutenant colonel in the Army reserves from Texas, runs a family planning clinic and helps to inspect the living quarters and dining facilities.

"THEY TAKE the food out of the mess halls into their barracks, which they aren't supposed to do, and then they let the food just sit around attracting flies," she adds. "But, oh, they just love the food though. They eat like pigs."

A civilian contractor was hired to do the cooking, but the starchy, bland offerings are indistinguishable from Army cuisine, with an abundance of soggy rice and white bread.

They are fed en masse, military style, moving slowly down the chow line, plastic utensils in one hand and styrofoam cups in the other, thrusting out their paper plates to accept gobs of dishes sometimes they do not recognize. They eat in silence.

The cooks react to Vietnamese criticism of the fare with indignation. "I don't know what the hell they're complaining about. There's plenty to eat."

BUT THE CONTROVERSY about the food points to the larger problem: Little has been done to understand and respond to the tastes and sensibilities of the Vietnamese.

"The food is a minor problem, but we are starving psychologically," said one refugee.

"One morning I was crying because I was thinking about my brothers, my sisters, my father and my mother," said Nguyen Thi Cam. "An American got mad and said: 'You have no right to be upset! You have your husband and your children with you.' But what many Americans do not understand is I have lost my family."

Another problem here, says Victor Lawrence, a guidance counselor, is that "the refugees take siestas after lunch, instead of going back to school. Now we realize their culture is different, but nevertheless we don't condone this sort of activity."

With only weeks left, re-education and acculturation are now being attempted at full speed.

UNTIL the middle of September, attendance at all classes was voluntary. But with the knowledge of the camp's impending closing date, the Pennsylvania Department of Education hired 75 teachers at \$55 a day, set up a school system from kindergarten through high school and made attendance mandatory for those under 18, according to state law.

There are night classes, arts and crafts workshops, occupational training and an inter-scholastic sports program, in addition to the traditional subjects.

"Working here is so much better than in a school on the outside," said one teacher. "Here everybody is eager to learn."

The progress of the pupils is visible in the graffiti all around, many in bilingual juxtaposition. "Life is dream," said one. In a pamphlet above a map of the

United States, someone has printed in block letters that suggest the author is a child: "I love you."

"No, I don't think a lot of the refugees are happy about leaving. Some who were sponsored out have written us to say they want to come back to this school," said teacher Deap DeFino. "But now we are more concerned with trying to prepare them for people outside who may not all like them, unlike in here."

THE REFUGEES' morale "is sinking," said Gail Gromis, 22, another teacher. "They realize the end is coming. It's like the end of any school year. But here, nobody knows where they are going after school closes." Gromis said she and many other teachers have begun to devote more time to consciousness-raising rap sessions with the refugees than on grammar and diction. The result is sometimes-rambling discussions on all-American problems of job hunting, renting an apartment, commuting, balancing a budget, applying for credit and buying used cars.

"A panic has set in. I just try to keep their spirits up. A lot of them are bummed out," said Gromis.

Some do not want to leave if they could. They came seeking a new life and the freedoms and luxuries of a land they knew only as "The Big PX" and many have found it nearly impossible to let the old ways go.

"I'm willing to stay here until the camp closes," Anh Ngoc Pham, 40, an ex-major in the South Vietnamese army, says with a shrug.

What then?

"Maybe my sister and her sponsor in California can take me. It is warm there, go?"

PHAM SAID he was undergoing military training in the U.S. when Saigon fell. "My wife and seven children did not find the transportation out," he said.

Camp officials say Pham is an extreme exception. Every refugee wants out, they said.

Many more refugees, however, are difficult to locate sponsors for because they set "conditions" to be met before they will leave, said Larry Flood, a task force spokesman. For example, the fishermen want to be relocated as a group; the Catholics do not want to be sponsored by Lutherans; the larger families — some with 15 or more members — do not want to be separated; others insist on relocation in a warm climate.

"It's a herculean task,"

said one harried volunteer worker.

The trepidation and reluctance of some refugees to venture forth into a society they know is less than willing to receive them, is understandable to camp director Carter, who said:

"THEY ARE going to a sponsor whom most often they do not know, have not even seen, and into a culture they don't really, fully understand. . . . I suppose a few may get comfortable here, but they're going to have to leave."

Camp officials point to Dang Van Dung as the typical refugee here. The 38-year-old man was a foreign service officer stationed in Manila when the end came for the Republic of South Vietnam. He and his family of six were among 2,000 others who were stranded in, or fled to, a third country and who arrived here last month.

"A new life! A big challenge!" exclaimed Dung. "I think my wife and my children will encounter minimal difficulties here because we already speak some English."

But even Dung balked when a nearby charitable organization offered to take the Dungs with several other families in a "package" sponsorship deal because, Dung said, he wanted to be reunited with his family — his wife's brother, her sister and her mother in Takoma, Wash.

"YOU CANNOT buy affection with money," Dung said. "But to be here in the U.S. is great. It's great. For me. If you work hard here, you can make a decent living."

Meanwhile, the ground is getting harder and the days are growing shorter as the camp population dwindles toward zero. Indian summer has come and gone. So classes are let out at 3:30 to give the refugees some free daylight hours for more leisurely pursuits.

It is this time of day when the refugees reclaim their lives and their time. The narrow, grid-like streets suddenly become filled with couples out for a stroll, old women in baggy black pajamas and young girls in their *ao dais*.

And sitting lotus-style near the street is a wizened man with the pedantic awkwardness of a Confucian scholar, who nods sagely and says: "When I got on that boat, I thought we were the blessed. Now I know better; we are the damned."

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BALTIMORE SUN
1 November 1975 Pg. 7

Last of refugees leave Pendleton

Camp Pendleton, Calif. (NYT)—The Indochinese refugee center at this sprawling Southern California Marine base closed officially yesterday when Liang Sui Lang, his wife and nine children climbed aboard a van with their sponsors at 8.30 A.M. and headed for Los Angeles.

They were the last of the 50,426 persons processed through here in the six months and two days since April 29, when the refugees from South Vietnam began to arrive as their government collapsed.

Fort Chaffee, Ark., still has 11,384 refugees, including 244

who were shipped there in recent days from Camp Pendleton because they did not have sponsors. Indiantown Gap, Pa., has 4,065.

3

Early Bird Weekend Edition
4 Nov 75

NEW ARRIVALS MILITARY COORDINATION CENTER
Marine Corps Base
Camp Pendleton, California 92055

1/JLW/jwc
3000
14 Nov 1975

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Officer in Charge, Operation "NEW ARRIVALS"
To: Brigadier General SIMMONS, U. S. Marine Corps

Subj: Operation "NEW ARRIVALS", submission of after action data

Ref: (a) Fonecon between Brigadier General SIMMONS and Lieutenant Colonel
WATSON, of 12 Nov 1975

Encl: (1) Packing list, box 1
(2) Packing list, box 2
(3) Packing list, box 3

1. In accordance with reference (a), three boxes of reference data, photographs and individual NAMCC after action reports have been mailed under separate cover to Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps (HD)

2. The final After Action Report will be published in approximately two weeks.

3. Enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are inventories of the three-box shipment.

4. If I may be of any further assistance, I can be reached at the Third Marine Aircraft Wing, MCAS, El Toro (Santa Ana), California.

Respectfully submitted,



J. L. WATSON
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

INVENTORY
BOX #1

1. CAMP 1,2,3,	28 APR - 25 OCT
2. CAMP 4	28 APR - 25 OCT
3. CAMP 5	28 APR - 14 OCT
4. CAMP 6	2 MAY - 3 OCT
5. CAMP SAN ONOFRE	30 APR - 26 OCT
6. CAMP 8	3 MAY - 17 OCT
7. ADMIN SECTION	28 APR - 15 SEPT
8. SECURITY SECTION	28 APR - 31 OCT
9. OPERATIONS SECTION	29 APR - 31 AUG
10. REFUGEE AFFAIRS	29 APR - 31 OCT
11. (SPECIAL SERVICES)	29 APR - 31 AUG
12. COMMUNICATIONS	29 APR - 21 MAY
	1 JUNE - 31 OCT
13. PUBLIC AFFAIRS	29 APR - 31 OCT
14. LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP	29 APR - 31 OCT
15. MISCELLANEOUS NOTES	
16. SITREP REPORTS	10 JUNE - 31 OCT (INCOMPLETE)
17. SAMPLE OF CIVILIAN AGENCY REPORTS	
18. LSA PHASEDOWN REPORTS AUG-OCT	
19. SAMPLE NAMCC SOP	
20. OPERATION ORDER W/ANNEXES	
21. PHASEDOWN ORDER W/ANNEXES	
22. PROBLEM AREAS AND LESSONS LEARNED CAMP INPUTS	

Enclosure (1)

BOX #3


AERIAL MOSAIC OF CAMP PENDLETON REFUGEE CENTER
REPRESENTATIVE PHOTOS OF CAMP LIFE.

Enclosure (2)

BOX #2

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE TENT CAMPS

Enclosure (3)

Figure 1 *The Chain of Command at Camp Pendleton's Refugee Camp.*

The refugee camp, by its nature, presented some unique problems. The basic goal of the camp was for it to be dissolved as quickly as possible, thus eliminating many motivators or sanctions normally available. This one aspect alone made the refugee camp a challenging test of leadership and managerial skills. The ultimate gift—to allow a deserving refugee to leave the camp—was not in the power of the camp commander. The ultimate punishment—to send a recalcitrant back to South Vietnam—was unthinkable by definition. Even to give material rewards was impractical, both because of the general unavailability of anything for the camp commander to give and because of the possibility of negative publicity generated by those who did not receive gifts. Conventional punishments such as imprisonment or fines were assiduously avoided due to the uncertain legitimacy and, again, because of the counterproductive publicity that surely would have resulted. Even peculiarly military punishments such as confinement to quarters were too impractical to be implemented.

Another distinguishing feature of the refugee camp, alluded to above, was the press coverage. Because our overall goal was to disperse the refugees as quickly as possible, the program needed to be presented in a favorable light to a sometimes unenthusiastic American public. To aid in keeping the situation in the public eye, correspondents were given free access to the camp. This constituted additional pressure on the camp commanders to ensure that not only was every refugee treated fairly, but that every refugee perceived himself as being treated fairly. An unfavorable story might feed the anti-refugee feeling in the country and cause the loss of potential sponsors. As it turned out, the press coverage of the camps was a major contributing factor to their success.

In a utopian society, all members are equal, with the

leaders chosen from among the people and deriving their power from the people. At the refugee camp, this was obviously not the case. The American leaders were simply imposed, virtually at random, onto the majority of the society's population. Their power derived not from the people, but from outside. The leaders had no culture in common with the people, and they were obviously not equal, as was blatantly obvious every time a Marine got into his car and drove out of camp.

Within these unique and narrow confines, a motivational/punishment system to ensure orderly camp life and the accomplishment of the camp commanders' objectives depended on subtle shadings of available tools.

I will describe the relative effectiveness of the tools—and many experiences at the camp—in terms of the Maslow Need Hierarchy. This is a theoretical management principle, which states that every human has the same basic needs and will strive to fill these needs in a generally sequential manner. These needs are:

- ▷ Physiological
- ▷ Safety and security
- ▷ Belongingness, social, and love needs
- ▷ Autonomy and self-esteem
- ▷ Self-actualization

Satisfaction of the first level of need—physiological—was a "lose or break even" situation from the camp commander's viewpoint. The refugees had been promised implicitly and explicitly that they would receive food, clothing, and shelter. The options to use these factors as a carrot or a stick were not open. All refugees were to receive these necessities on as nearly an equal a basis as possible.

It should be realized that the refugees came to this country with a very fundamental understanding of the United States. One basic tenet, fiercely held to, was

that of equal rights. This created difficulties on at least one occasion. Dining facilities varied between camps. Camp 1-2-3 was fortunate in that there was a standard, permanent military mess hall. Other camp facilities consisted of hastily erected open tents. This was the cause of many complaints, and at one point it was proposed that the Camp 1-2-3 mess hall be closed and the residents of Camp 1-2-3 eat outside like everybody else. I argued that the other camp commanders should stress the fact that the disparity in facilities was unintentional, and that it was "the American way"—sometimes some folks are luckier than others. This was marginally acceptable to the other refugees, and the problem was ultimately solved by upgrading the facilities at the other camps.

The food served the refugees was nutritious, plentiful, and like all institutional food, bland. All attempts at Camp Pendleton to cater to cultural preferences were greatly appreciated, especially the "Mexican Nuc Mom" that resulted from using jalapeno peppers in trying to make the traditional Vietnamese fish sauce. An indication of the sensitivity of this factor took place


when the food services were assumed by a civilian contractor, replacing the Navy/Marine team. The immediate drop in quantity and quality inspired heated complaints and the closest thing to an organized demonstration seen at the camp. Pressure was immediately brought to bear to correct the problem.

Clothing was provided in two ways. One was through the establishment of sewing centers, and the other was through distribution of Salvation Army-provided clothing. Great care was taken to ensure that all received equal treatment. Two types of shelter were available in Camp 1-2-3. These were general purpose tents which were decided to have a capacity of 16, and quonset huts with a rated capacity of 40. These accommodations held the refugees themselves and all of their worldly possessions. Initial assignment to one type of housing or the other was a matter of chance, although most incoming refugees were assigned to the general purpose tents. The more highly prized quonset huts tended to stay at capacity with current residents moving in from tents as openings occurred. The quonset huts were warmer and had the additional luxury of concrete floors and, generally, better beds.

The State Department also recognized the primacy of physiological needs by its requirement that a sponsor guarantee a refugee sufficient food, clothing, and shelter.


For most of the refugees, the second level of need—

Each of the general purpose tents seen being hurriedly erected, below, had a capacity of 16 whereas the more desirable quonset huts could hold 40. At the outset, Camp 1, 2, 3 had a permanent mess hall; left: the other five camps at Pendleton did not.



U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1976

Mrs. Irene Dunham, right, was commended by the Marine Corps for starting the sewing centers which, together with the libraries, served as meeting places for young people. The meetings occasionally resulted in marriages such as this double wedding ceremony between two Catholic couples in Camp Five.



safety and security—provided the motivation for leaving their homeland and for choosing America as a destination. When asked why she had come, Tran Thi Nam, a 108-year-old lady spoke for many when she answered, "Because they [the Communists] would not have let me live." She had fled North Vietnam in 1954 and felt that the Communists would punish her for that earlier betrayal. All refugees assumed themselves to be free of physical danger in America. They were further convinced of the American interest in their physical well-being by the extensive medical treatment available, including routine examinations to rapidly identify any problems.

For those who had been practicing capitalists, the prospects of financial security under the incoming government had been intolerably low. Some lucky few brought economic security with them in the form of gold. For the vast majority, however, their capital assets were near zero. Only a handful of secretaries had the opportunity to earn money while living in the camp.

Attendance to the need of financial security centered on providing an index of skills acquired in Vietnam to prospective employers. While in camp, English classes, survival classes on how to visit a doctor, shop in a market, etc., and libraries were available. All were enthusiastically received. These improved the refugees' facility with the language, a major step, but did nothing to sharpen old skills or teach new ones which would improve their opportunities in the American job market.

Belongingness, love, and social needs—the third level of needs—were recognized and addressed in the welcome speech I gave to each planeload of new residents assigned to Camp 1-2-3. I stressed my personal pleasure that the refugees had chosen to come to America and ended my speech with, "... welcome to our country, for America is now *our* country."

Another occasion for speaking to large groups of the refugees came at the periodic meetings I held with spokesmen from each tent and quonset hut. While the elected spokesmen were specifically invited, an open invitation was proffered to all residents. After the routine announcements such as, "Please remind the children not to play with snakes," I would field any questions they might have. I realize now, in light of the sequential nature of the basic needs, why the questions

concerning food, clothing, and shelter steadily decreased and questions concerning the future increased. One poignant question encompassing level three and level four needs was, "Why would anyone want to sponsor one of us?"

The refugees' need to be loved was displayed on two levels—the need to be accepted by the Americans and the need for the personal love of close friends and relatives. Volunteers were especially helpful in demonstrating that Americans other than those assigned to the camp cared about the refugees' welfare. A great deal of my time was devoted to the coordination and orchestration of the efforts of these groups and individuals.

One special volunteer at Camp 1-2-3 was a U. S. Navy hospital corpsman. He took annual leave and drove to the camp on the day it opened because he thought that his knowledge of the Vietnamese language might be useful. He was a large man, complete with a red beard and a perpetually full bag of candy for the children. He was instantly and universally loved and trusted by the Vietnamese due to his obvious love for them and his knowledge of their language and customs. During the first weeks of the camp, he continually walked from tent to tent answering questions and locating people in need. I got his leave status changed to temporary duty and used him as an unofficial two-way communication link to the refugees. As the bond of mutual trust and respect between the refugees and

the official camp managers grew, the corpsman's utility declined. After two months, he returned to his home unit.

Another instance of individual effort was provided by a Marine's wife who constructed a series of displays on the various regions of the United States. By rotating these on the bulletin board near the mess hall, it was possible to give the refugees an idea of the vastness and variety of their new land.

While most entertainment was arranged through the Young Men's Christian Association, I set up the first major entertainment event at the camp. I invited a night club dance band to perform and also invited 30 American high school students. The American kids acted as catalysts for the dancing and soon had a couple of hundred refugees dancing on the parking lot black-top while 4,000 others watched and cheered.

Another area in which I was able to achieve good results was in assembling a library. By soliciting books from anyone who asked, "What can I do to help?" we soon had a library of over 1,000 books, supplemented by daily newspapers. The librarians were Vietnamese with previous experience. Combining the efforts of volunteers led to some symbiotic relationships. For instance, a Jewish youth organization came to work with a Southern Baptist group in running a day care center. The center enabled the mothers to take advantage of the language classes, sewing centers, and library.

As with many other projects, the library and the sewing center satisfied multiple needs. They served as meeting places for people with similar interests. They also contributed to self-esteem needs: the sewing center by providing the means for a higher standard of dress and appearance and the library by giving the refugees a chance to gainfully employ their time by adding to

their personal knowledge. The sewing centers came about through the efforts of a 72-year-old lady whose energy and ability to get results were astounding. She spent many nights on a folding cot in Camp 1-2-3's sewing center so she wouldn't have to "waste time" making the drive to and from her home. The chairman of Church Women United of San Diego County, she established sewing centers in five camps, coordinating donations of machines, material, and personnel. Additionally, she scrounged enough white gowns and tuxedos to set up a no-charge wedding boutique.


Nationally organized volunteer organizations also played a major part in camp life. The Salvation Army provided free clothing. The Red Cross, by actively seeking out those in need, was another manifestation of Americans caring about Vietnamese. These organizations also provided me with special materials on occasion. For instance, they provided a warm, pretty sleeping bag for the 108-year-old lady in Camp 1-2-3. They were reluctant at first, for fear of starting a run on sleeping bags, but I told them that everyone would be made aware of the rules. If your age went into three digits, then and only then would a sleeping bag be provided instead of the standard blankets.

Entertainment provided through the YMCA ranged from an accordion class playing polka music to Herb Alpert and the Tijuana Brass, from marching bands to church-sponsored choral groups, and from puppet shows to Barnum & Bailey. Because of the boredom that is inevitable at a refugee camp, all forms of volunteer entertainment were gratefully booked.

The need for familial love was constantly underscored by the refugees' efforts to locate relatives. The Red Cross devoted considerable assets to the "Family Re-Unification Program." All possible efforts were made to expeditiously unite families that had become separated during the exodus from South Vietnam.

Many romances, several leading to marriages, bloomed at the camp. On the other hand, several marriages were seriously endangered by the camp experience. I found myself functioning as a marriage counselor, a real trick since I don't speak Vietnamese. I had mixed success. One patch-up was beautifully successful, one common-law couple eventually made up, and the wife-beater husband-beater couple was still at odds when I left.

Self-esteem—the fourth need—of the majority of the refugees was at a low ebb when they arrived at the camp. Refugees are, by and large, tough mentally. They are survivors above all. Yet it is impossible to be indifferent to being forced out of your homeland, knowing you can never return. It is not possible in a refugee camp to offer each refugee an opportunity to demonstrate his worth to himself and others. Many had



This hospital corpsman quickly won the affection of the Vietnamese by his knowledge of their language and customs.



to regain some measure of self-esteem vicariously. If they saw other Vietnamese holding responsible positions, obviously being treated as important, knowledgeable people, they could say to themselves, "See, we Vietnamese people are capable. If there were more jobs open, I too would do as good a job."

It was partially with this in mind that the Vietnamese leadership structure was established. Each tent or quonset hut elected a leader, and then these spokesmen elected camp committee chairmen. Staff jobs were created as needed and filled with volunteers. The camp managers worked with and through these committees as much as possible.

An example of the use of the committees for both motivation and punishment concerned assignment to the quonset huts. The huts were the preferred quarters. Whenever a family from a quonset hut left the camp, there were always others waiting to move into the vacated beds. The refugees could not be allowed to change residence freely as it would completely negate any locator system. A form was devised for requesting to move into a quonset hut. The important signatures to obtain were those of the hut leader and the committee chairman. I made it clear that, "If they approve it, I will." This enhanced the position of the Vietnamese leaders, helped the self-esteem of all refugees, and gave an illusion of autonomy. Autonomy, of course, was not possible in any absolute sense. Given autonomy, the refugees would simply leave.

Organized games, such as ring-around-the-rosy, kept the children from stumbling upon Pendleton's many snakes and, in private unheralded moments, individual Marines taught children to write in English.

On the other hand, when some refugees decided not to follow the procedure and simply moved in, the camp executive officer and the Vietnamese leaders evicted them. This had to be done only once because the resulting loss of face was a powerful deterrent. The next day, the evicted family, submitting the standard form, was admitted, thereby reinforcing the position of the committee.

Losing face is the term used to describe the peculiarly Asian sensitivity to any degree of perceived public disgrace. It represents a violation of both social and self-esteem needs. Since the Vietnamese, like all Asians, have this as part of their psychological make-up, it afforded me my only real tool for punishment and one of my strongest tools for motivation. Gaining face by being paid special attention to or having his opinion and advice sought was important to all of the refugees. As with losing face, the more public the act, the more powerful.

When a refugee had broken a rule, I tried to let the situation be handled at a lower level, trying to conserve the usage of my only "weapon." If the Vietnamese themselves, or the camp executive officer could clear up a minor infraction, all the better. One type of trouble that I always handled myself was a fight.

Fights can be expected in any situation in which 3,500 people are packed in together with little to do. Everyone intuitively realized, and I stressed at the meetings, the necessity for mutual cooperation and harmony. Every so often, however, a fight would break out. The participants would be brought to me. I would meet them outside my office, thus insuring an audience. The first part of the proceedings consisted of me loudly demanding to know what the problem was and thoroughly reprimanding the culprits. The fact that this was done through an interpreter did not seem to diminish the effectiveness or the amount of face lost. At this point, I would "notice" the gathering crowd and disperse them. A long quiet talk with the participants would follow, hammering out a solution to the original problem and ending with personal promises to me that there would be no continuation of the fight. I never had a repeater.

An interesting indication of the sequential nature of the needs involved the issuing of coats. Camp Pendleton in late spring can be quite cold, especially when compared to Saigon. When the camp first opened, all incoming refugees were issued standard military field jackets. These jackets were uniformly unattractive and invariably oversized. Yet, they were happily accepted. Within two months, the Red Cross began issuing civilian jackets to new refugees and trading the new jackets for the field jackets. These new jackets came in several sizes and colors. There was considerable hag-

gling involved during the trade-in process. Refugees were quite choosy about size and color, an attitude which surprised and dismayed most of the American staff. This apparent change of attitude on the part of the refugees appears reasonable in light of Maslow's Need Hierarchy. When first arriving, the refugees were eager to fulfill their level one needs, including clothing. This was the attitude with which the field jackets were viewed. Several weeks later, confident of their ability to satisfy level one and two needs, the refugees viewed the offered jackets in light of level three and four needs. An attractive, well-fitting jacket filled social and self-esteem needs.

The fifth need, that of self-actualization, is the most difficult to fill in any society. Not surprisingly, it was even more difficult at the refugee camp. Those who approached it were a fortunate few, and can easily be enumerated. They were:

The artist who constructed a mammoth "Hand of Hope," a concrete sculpture, as a lasting memorial to the camp; the photographer who put together a portfolio to permanently record the camp life, using film provided by the Marines; the committee heads, including a number of women, who were probably more important than they had ever been before.

In all of this, I've only discussed one aspect of the assignment: the meeting and satisfying of needs that exhibited themselves in remarkable textbook fashion. In total, the personal relations with the refugees, volunteers, State Department personnel, and Marines were tremendously satisfying. Imagine the pleasure involved in having a military assignment in which there were immediate, obvious results to nearly everything you did, one in which you affected the future lives and attitudes of thousands of new citizens, and one in which the people you were trying to help frequently said, "Thank you."



Major Townsend received a bachelor of science degree in mathematics and a commission in 1963 through the NROTC program at Marquette University. He earned a master's degree in computer science from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1971. He has served two tours in the Far East, one in Okinawa and a second in Vietnam's Northern 1 Corps, which included seven months as commanding officer of the 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery. Stateside tours included two years as an artillery gunnery instructor at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and four years with the Marine Tactical Command and Control Systems (MTACCS) Test Bed, Camp Pendleton. While waiting for duty at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, he volunteered for the Camp Pendleton Refugee Camp Complex. He is now attached to the 3rd Marine Division in Okinawa.

The Hand of Hope

USMIP 8/1/76

By Major Patrick L. Townsend, U. S. Marine Corps

A Vietnamese refugee created and—with the help of God and a few Marines—constructed a concrete sculpture, which he called the "Hand of Hope," as a lasting memorial to Camp Pendleton's Refugee Camp. Somebody put these youngsters in the giant palm, just as somebody put them and their elders in this and similar camps across the country. And all these displaced Asians, like their hosts, tried to make the best of a bad situation.

The demise of the South Vietnamese Government in late April 1975 led to an influx of over 120,000 Vietnamese refugees into the United States. The concurrent collapse of the Cambodian Government produced thousands more. The last attempt to absorb a large number of refugees, the Cubans of the Sixties, had been poorly managed and was left a source of ill feeling. Thus, the United States determined to better control the introduction of the Southeast Asians into its society. Two areas of improvement were decided upon. Where the large majority of the Cubans had never left their original state of entry, Florida, the new refugees were to be dispersed throughout the country. Where the Cubans had been for the most part left to their own devices to build a new life, the Southeast Asians were to have citizens pledged to assist them on an individual basis.

The first home any of the refugees would have in the United States was to be a refugee camp, the running of which would be a military responsibility. Three were initially established, and a fourth came soon after. A camp was established at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and a second at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, to 25,000 refugees and later added Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, with room for 15,000 more. The Marine Corps operated the Camp

Pendleton Refugee Camp in California with a population of 18,000.

The refugees went first to Guam and then, as room became available, were transferred to one of the four camps in the continental United States. Except for cases involving family reunification, the camp a particular refugee went to was a matter of chance.

The camps were home to the refugees for periods ranging from a couple of days to several months. The length of the stay depended on how quickly the refugee could be "sponsored out," a process which required a security clearance and a sponsor. The sponsor agreed to a moral obligation of insuring that the refugee or refugees had sufficient clothing, food, and shelter until such time as he became financially independent. The security clearance was based on fragmentary records, and it was never made clear at the camp level what would happen if a refugee should fail the criteria.

I was assigned to the Camp Pendleton Refugee Camp from 5 May-15 July 1975. This period began seven days after the official opening of the camp. I will describe some of the problems encountered and the solutions that emerged.

To put my role in perspective, Figure 1 shows the chain of command of the Camp Pendleton Refugee Camp. The camp level, to which I was assigned, was the highest level with direct, continuing contact with the refugees. The camps at Camp Pendleton varied in size, dependent on geographical limitations, from 1,200 to 5,100 residents. I was the commanding officer of Camp 1-2-3, so-called because adjacent areas originally designated as Camp 1, Camp 2, and Camp 3 were under a single command. Camp 1-2-3's population varied from day to day, as did that of all the camps, but the average was 3,500 residents.

My mission was never spelled out to me per se, but over a period of time I came to believe it was twofold. The immediate objectives were to ensure that the refugees received all appropriate benefits and that the camp was trouble free. A long-range, and at least equally important, mission was to give these future citizens the best possible first impression of their new country.

Note Name Magazine
vol 4(4) October 1975

Refugee

Americanizing the Refugees:

Huynh Van Trong Becomes Trong Q. Public

by John Monczunski

The journey to America began like a nightmare. But sitting in John Beckman's living room in Dale City, Va., eight weeks and half-a-world away from the fall of Saigon, Huynh Van Trong was beginning to think that the nightmare had turned into a dream come true; the end of the world somehow had become the end of the rainbow.

After living with the Beckmans for a month, the numbing, cold-sweat confusion of being a stranger in a strange land was beginning to subside. Trong's worries were slowly giving way to cautious optimism. His prospects looked good, and much better than those of the Vietnamese still in refugee camps. Everything might be OK after all.

Before his world vaporized, Trong worked for the Americans at Tan Son Nhut Air Base for 12 years. At first he was a bus dispatcher and then a staff car driver assigned to J-2, army intelligence. Trong wasn't rich but working seven days a week, sometimes 12 hours a day, he could comfortably support his wife and seven children. He owned a motorbike and a modest two-story home near the Presidential Palace in the center of the city.

When the Saigon government began to crumble, all of that evaporated. He knew his job would be held against him and he would have to flee. As the American evacuation began, the icy panic of Saigon's last days quickly melted into a frantic scramble to get out and Trong made the painful decision to leave. He moved his family to a hotel a short distance from the air base where he could quickly pick them up if it became necessary to move fast. As long as he could get them inside, beyond the guard gate, he was sure they would be safely evacuated.

But getting refugees onto the base was the problem. The 47-year-old Vietnamese driver spent his last day at work smuggling people past South Vietnamese police guarding the entrance. His boss, a U.S. Army colonel named LeGrowe, gave him a list of Vietnamese families and Trong drove around the city picking them up.

He ripped holes in the rear seat of the car so that fresh air could reach the trunk. Men, women and children wedged themselves into the rear compartment like so many fish in a can, and Trong took them past the guards, depositing them safely inside the walls of the military compound. All told, Trong made five trips into the



Huynh Van Trong believes the nightmare of Saigon's fall turned into a dream come true for him.

base bringing in as many as 10 children at one time. Finally, Col. LeGrowe told him he'd better leave, too, and ordered him to get his family and go.

Trong sneaked his wife and six children past the guards the same way he smuggled the others in. Although he got them safely on base, he was anything but happy. The family was not really intact. Earlier, officials told him that his children had to have birth certificates listing him as father to be eligible for the airlift. Thinking his 17-year-old-stepson couldn't accompany them, Trong reluctantly left the boy in the care of his wife's mother. The hurt became a double cut when they reached Guam only to find the rules hadn't been enforced.

"When my wife see this, she very mad at me," Trong lamented in his low gravelly voice. Some of the pain of the loss might be taken away, he said, if they could locate a long-lost cousin who married an American and came to the United States several years ago. They would like to locate the cousin and her American husband but they know neither their name nor their address. Complicating things further, Trong said the cousin knew him only as Francois and not by his Vietnamese name. (Trong inherited French citizenship, which he renounced when he began working for the Americans, and a French name from his

grandfather, a Vietnamese farmer who served in the French army and was decorated for bravery in Algeria.)

"If we find her, it make my wife happy. This way we get someone back that (was) lost," he said.

Just about the time Trong was smuggling his family into Tan Son Nhut Air Base, John Beckman '62 and his wife, Peggy (Reuwer) S.M.C. '62 were wishing they could do something to help the refugees. As they watched the newscasts on television, the desire to do something grew stronger. And then they discovered that their parish had made arrangements to sponsor a Vietnamese family.

"When we saw the notice in the bulletin, we thought it was a golden opportunity to channel our frustrations into some constructive activity," Peggy recalled. "It became a case of 'OK, you say you're upset, now put your money where your mouth is.'"

Unlike some other refugee sponsors in the Washington, D.C., area who had served in Vietnam and had Vietnamese friends, John Beckman, a management analyst for the Federal Government Services Agency, knew no Vietnamese personally and the closest he had ever come to the country was 20,000 feet—copiloting a B-52 bomber in 1965-66.

The Beckmans say they had no deep philosophical reason for taking in the Vietnamese family. "It seemed like the thing to do," John explains. "The program came up. It fit like a shoe. There was no big deal really. In fact, the first time someone asked me why we did it, the question took me back a bit. This country has been taking in refugees from the very beginning. If we can't do that now, then we'd really better take that Statue of Liberty down."

Although cynics suggest that the American dream is a myth, the Beckmans won't buy that. Peggy says she can't understand the cynical attitude. "All of a sudden you get the feeling (from some) that everything this country has ever stood for is all gone; or it's something to be ashamed of—it's passe."

They firmly believe in the traditional values and, if anything, see their role as facilitators, oiling up the Great American Dream Machine so that the refugees might also believe. Even though the Beckmans had a house full of six children and number seven two months away, for them there was nothing extraordinary about opening

found the facile lies I felt trapped in, something that would strike through the complacent myths of American nationalism, won out temporarily over the fear. And so, I stood up, denounced the war with all the force I could summon, and was pelted for a few moments by the abuse of my fellow classmates' parents. I was proud, beyond words, to be able to do that, and I'm touched to think that someone must have heard and remembered it. But it wasn't much. There were dozens of people at Notre Dame in those years who were much more genuine organizers, radicals, activists than I; they seemed to give all their time and energy, their hearts and minds. I can think immediately of one who has since been teaching at an inner-city school in Boston, of another who helped organize a free school in Salt Lake City, of another who is studying to be a doctor, of another who is dead. These are the people—not I—who should be speaking now in your columns.

What a nation does will always be at variance with what great numbers of its citizens think it ought to do. But a nation is healthy only when this constant intellectual and moral critique is respected as a valuable corrective for national policy and can make itself heard in the decision-making process. In the '60s, however, moral and intellectual dissent was officially treated as sedition or hysteria, and, as Watergate eventually proved, government was government by cover-up. I do not think the language of public speech was ever more ruthlessly manipulated than it was during the Vietnam years. The drone of official reports whose bland euphemisms obscured the barbarity of military tactics, the banal and vaporous rhetoric with which the chief architects of the war masked their intentions: all America breathed this in with the air. We heard it like a buzz in our ears, and were dulled into uneasy sleep. Vietnam could not have gone on half so long, but for this cloud of words, which maintained an artificial discrepancy between what seemed to be going on and what was.

American bombs have at least stopped falling; American troops have come home. I believe, though, that the corruption of language continues. Now, instead of the rhetoric of pacification, we have the rhetoric of amnesia. Having just engineered the devastation of an entire country, the atomization of a whole culture and people, we are told by our insouciant leaders to

"put the past behind us," to forget Vietnam, to turn instead to "the great tasks that lie ahead of us." I think the worst thing imaginable for us at this point would be to forget Vietnam. America admittedly has a way of forgetting its atrocities. Witness, the systematic annihilation of the native populations of our own country, the appropriation of their lands, the arrogant dismissal of their various cultures. This ugly truth has been conveniently laundered so as to come out looking like a brilliant chapter in our history, a fairy tale for our children. We call it, with bland indifference to the truth, "The Taming of the West." But this doesn't do.

We can embrace the historical fact of Vietnam or we can deny it with neurotic insistence, but we cannot forget it. Vietnam is inside us. It is the appalling image of our own illimitable desires.

Jean-Paul Sartre has written how, although he tried to elude it, he was inevitably politicized by the events through which he lived. Every word and action, he concludes, is political; every man, whether he wants to be or not, is ultimately engaged in his historical situation and must be held responsible for what is made of him. That, in a way, is what I learned at Notre Dame, not from Sartre, whom I read much later, but from a community of people. When I came to Notre Dame the moral outrage I felt against the war in Vietnam was naive and intense. It was also an unconscious attempt, I think, to dissociate myself from a national crime, my own involvement in which I didn't want to admit. But the war was not an anomaly in our lives; dense, many-tentacled beast that it was, it expressed the deepest contradictions in the American ethos. At Notre Dame I came to realize my own complicity with what I condemned. For instance, I did not then, nor do I now, have any justification for the fact that, because of economic and educational privileges, I was offered an escape from military service which thousands of my contemporaries did not have. I was glad of the deferment then, and most of the time could fend off the vicious mathematics it implied. Meanwhile the war was being fought by men my own age and younger who came too exclusively from the economically disadvantaged segments of

our society—men who may in their hearts have been as little disposed to fight as I was, but who hadn't the luxury of an option. I don't think this means my outrage was misplaced or presumptuous, only that, necessarily, it was self-inclusive.

I am aware now that everything I say and do is qualified by the context of security and privilege from which it emerges. I have never had to endure much discomfort, privation or pain, let alone the extreme harshnesses that history—that even the nightly news—teaches me can be visited against human beings. And yet I believe that the dream I cherish of a changed world is not naive, effete nor idealistic, and that the critique I make is not undercut, simply because the social mechanisms I condemn are the very ones which have selected me out, placed in the position, and given me the equipment that makes such critique possible. This is an irony but a healthy one. The greatness of the bourgeois vision has always been that, at its edges, it is generating the critical energy which will eventually destroy it. The antiwar movement was working not for the end of the war alone, but for a change in the whole texture and organization of the society whose logical extension the war was.

So, we live out our lives in the shadow of immense ambiguities. The war in Vietnam is over for us, but social justice, even for our own people, has not been realized. Economic inequality is still the law of the land, cooperation has not replaced profit in the logic of big business, the rapacity of our own dark heart is not subdued. These are things worth working for.

Our culture must undergo a revolution of values, or be destroyed. The alternatives are that plain. I believe that the appeal of reason is strong enough to change men's minds, that the change must go on replicating itself throughout society. Too many people were politicized by the antiwar movement, too much energy for social change generated, for it to be dissipated simply because the immediate goal has been reached. Finally—and this is what makes the struggle important—I believe that men with changed minds can construct a more just and habitable world. If more people come to realize that their own welfare is not an isolated question, but something which must be assessed in wider and ever wider contexts, if they can appreciate that their own interests are best served when the just expectations of other peoples are equally served, then a lot will have been won. □

their home to a family of refugees. It was all quite natural.

Originally, another family from the parish had been selected to host Trong's family. However, the husband was transferred to another part of the country before the refugees arrived and the family was forced to withdraw the bid. Peggy volunteered her home, prefacing the offer with a warning that with six children under 10 years of age it was hectic and she wasn't sure it was the best place for the Vietnamese.

The committee replied that her home was exactly what they were looking for because the Beckmans would be a mirror image of Trong's family. The parish committee reasoned that by living for a month or so with an American family similar to them, the Vietnamese could quickly pick up the subtleties of everyday American life that might otherwise baffle them.

Memorial Day, two weeks later, found John and Peggy at Dulles International Airport along with the bishop of Alexandria, Va., several other dignitaries and a crowd of newspaper reporters and television camera crews waiting for Trong and his family. They were among the first Vietnamese refugees to settle in the Washington, D.C., area and the first to be sponsored by a Catholic parish there.

When the plane touched down and Trong shepherded his family into the airport terminal, he was happy about several things he saw. For one, Washington was warm and sunny. Flying over the Rocky Mountains from Camp Pendleton, Calif., the family noticed snow, and all, including Trong, were frightened that they would freeze in a cold climate. "We land and we see that we no freeze. We were happy," Trong said in halting English.

When Trong and his family arrived at the Beckman home, a neocolonial house at the foot of a small hill, the refugee family found a large sign welcoming them in English and Vietnamese.

The Beckmans did some advance planning to prepare for Trong and his family. Knowing that their Vietnamese houseguests would be accustomed to eating large quantities of rice and that the rice typically sold in American supermarkets would not be the type they're used to, Peggy contacted a wholesaler and bought a 25-pound sack of long grain, unbleached rice.

As it turned out, there was no reason to worry about the food situation. "I told Mr. Beckman that we can eat American food all the way from first day. Many time I



*Huynh Van Trong and his family at the Kings Dominion amusement park.
(Photographs by John Monczunski)*

buy American food at snack bar in embassy and bring home. Maybe two, three times a week," Trong said.

Monday through Friday the two families ate American food supplemented with rice. On weekends Trong's wife, Suzanne, prepared traditional Vietnamese meals. In all the various meals rice was the one constant, and the combined families went through more than 125 pounds in one month.

Shortly after Trong's family moved in with them, John and Peggy discovered that helping refugees sometimes could be as frustrating as watching television newscasts wishing they could help.

When Trong arrived he badly needed a new pair of glasses. In the rush to flee Vietnam he left his pair behind and without them could hardly see. Hearing that the federal government had appropriated extra welfare money for the Vietnamese refugees, the Beckmans inquired at their county welfare department to learn if the refugees were eligible for medical aid. The initial response was yes, so one morning they took Trong into the office, walked his papers through to speed the bureaucracy and Trong walked out with a pair of black, plastic-framed bifocals.

Two days later the eligibility supervisor called and said no benefits were available because the department had not received proper guidelines from the federal government. But the official said the department would honor its initial commitment to Trong and asked the Beckmans to spread the word that refugees in the area should register with them so the department would



John and Peggy Beckman and Trong's wife, Suzanne.

be ready when the guidelines for spending the funds were received.

But a few days later a story appeared in the local newspaper saying that more than 50 refugees in the area had applied for welfare. The story also said the county welfare director pledged not to spend any money because he contended the sponsors were responsible for such expenses and not the state.

"The article made it look like the first thing the refugees did when they got to this country was run down to the welfare office," Beckman said, "but the welfare people were the ones who requested them to do it. These are extra funds set aside by the federal government specifically for the refugees. It's not as if the money were being taken away from our own needy people."

The problem has since been settled and financial assistance and food stamps have been made available. However, as of Sept. 15, medicaid was being withheld pending clarification of welfare department guidelines.

While Beckman fought the bureaucracy, Trong, his family and about 20 other refugees did battle with the English language at twice weekly lessons at the



Suzanne and Trong.

parish center. Trong and some of the other men speak some English but most of the women and children know very little.

The lessons, voluntarily taught by an elementary school teacher and a Vietnamese woman who married an American and has lived in the United States for several years, have a practical bent to them.

During one, for example, the elementary school teacher tries to familiarize the refugees with the names of household items:

"Dishes are washed in the . . . what?" she asks.

"Sink," a Vietnamese girl about 12 years old says tentatively.

"OK, sink."

"Sink . . . sink . . . sink," the class repeats slowly and deliberately, the inflection rising at the end of each repetition.

"Some of us—probably all of us—have dishwashers," the elementary school teacher says.

"I don't," Betty Walker, the Vietnamese woman serving as co-teacher interjects.

"Some of us have electric ones, some of us have hand ones," the other teacher corrects. "Dishwasher."

"Dees-wah-saw . . . dees-wah-saw . . . dees-wah-saw," the class repeats attempting to duplicate the harsh English sounds.

And so the lesson goes. Using illustrations from a Sears catalog and pantomime, the teacher introduces the class to English words—with varying degrees of success.

Besides the language barrier, the two main problems confronting Trong and his family have been finding permanent housing and employment. A month after moving in with the Beckmans, problem number one was solved when the parish found a vacant house in Dale City and rented it on behalf of the refugees. The Beckmans and other parish volunteers



Huynh Thanh Nhan, Trong's four-year-old son.

cleaned the home, fixed it up and collected furniture and appliances. To help the Vietnamese save up a "nest egg" the parish has pledged to pay the rent for at least the first year.

The repair work on the house was finished by the end of June and on June 28 Trong and his family took up residence. They've been living on their own since then, but Trong and his family are still in close contact with the Beckmans and other Holy Family parishioners.

Trong and the 20 or so other refugees who have settled in the Washington, D.C., suburb have been warmly received. Because they were the first refugees in the area, the news media lavished attention on Trong's family and they achieved minor celebrity status. People stopped them on the street just to say hello and some local merchants who recognized them even gave the family free merchandise.

Dale City, a suburban housing development nestled in the hills and dales 25 miles south of Washington, is mainly populated by families of military men and federal employees. (The marine base at Quantico, Va. is a 10-minute drive while the Pentagon and other Washington bureaucracies are 30 minutes away.) Not surprisingly, many Dale Cityites served in Vietnam, have Vietnamese friends and are very sympathetic to the plight of the refugees.

Although very little hostility has been

directed toward them, there have been some minor incidents and John Beckman frets about them sometimes. "I know there still is a lot of bitterness about the Vietnamese war," he said. "Many Americans lost loved ones because of it. But I just hope there isn't a transfer of frustration about that to these people. Of course, you'll always find some cranks."

And the Beckmans have found some. "Once, when we were shopping at the grocery store, a woman standing in front of us at the checkout recognized Trong's family," Peggy recalled. "She said to me, 'Oh, how lucky they are. Why, they'll be Americans in no time. I came here 10 years ago and within a year I was just like any other American.' I said to her, 'Oh, I guess you're familiar with what the Trongs are going through now.' She said, 'Oh, yes, I am. But of course, I don't agree that they should be here. They should have left them in Vietnam.' I just couldn't believe her!"

Of all Trong's problems, employment has been the most vexing. With a flagging economy and soaring prices, his American rainbow sometimes looks a little gray. Jobs, especially in the D.C. area, have been very scarce. Trong and his 21-year-old son, a twice-wounded veteran, lack high-demand skills. In Dale City, a commuter bedroom community, the demand for bus dispatchers, drivers and soldiers is nonexistent.

In July, however, a member of the parish was able to find them cook jobs at a nearby restaurant. The combined income of the two Vietnamese men is about \$200 per week which enables the family to get by. Until they can find something better Trong and his son are content.

Besides the Beckmans, several other parishioners have taken special interest in Trong and his family. One summer day a Marine colonel named Jim McCort drove the family and three young refugees down to Kings Dominion, a Disneylandish amusement park about 70 miles south of Dale City.

McCort decided that the local Little League should do something to welcome the refugees. So as president of the organization he organized the trip.

"Have a great day, the rest of your life," an up-tempo song jingled through the air as they entered the park. Within a short time the children were whisked, spun, jolted, jarred and catapulted by an assortment of rides while Trong, Suzanne and the colonel made the rounds of the shows and exhibits.

Walking through the park, Trong talked about his past and future. He pointed to a clock in the landscape fashioned out of flowers. "We have one like this in Saigon once. But people break it. They cut up. No one cares."

He said he believed corruption in the government was why the war was lost. "No one care. People in government only look for bribe. If you want something, you give money, then you get it."

Someone asked him if he could go back to Vietnam someday just for a visit would he care to do that. "No," he shot back. "This my home now. I think this good place for my children."

On the way back to Dale City, Col. McCort turned and said, "You know, they're going to be all right. They'll be Americans in no time."

Notre Dame's Prof. William T. Liu, who is conducting a study of culture shock and mental health problems of Vietnamese refugees, agrees with the colonel's assessment. Liu believes adjustment should be relatively easy for Trong and his family because they have much physical and psychological support from the parish and other refugees in the area.

"They have enough of their own people for mutual support," he noted. "Washington, of course, is cosmopolitan. There are similar ethnic cultures there and people really don't feel curious."

Most refugees would prefer to live near other Vietnamese in a warm climate, Dr. Liu has found. The need to be with one's own kind apparently is very strong. When he asked refugees what they would do if they were offered a temporary, low-paying job with an uncertain future in a city with many Vietnamese or a permanent, high-paying job where there were no Vietnamese, most chose the low-paying job.

"It's human nature. They will go where their people are. Dispersing the refugees throughout the population is the most stupid thing. Physical isolation will harm their psychological well-being. In reality, the melting pot idea won't work anyway; it never worked with any other immigrant group.

"They really need to be with fellow Vietnamese because, after all, this is a foreign country to them. If the population density is high enough then they can have some services rendered to them. Some entrepreneur will put up a Vietnamese restaurant and it will become a community center. They'll go there, talk Vietnamese, eat Vietnamese food—and that's the joy of life for them."

Like Trong, many refugees express a fear of a cold climate, according to Dr. Liu. "These people are very concerned about the environment of their new home. They are worried about the cold. After all many of them have never been in weather cooler than 75 degrees," he said.

Liu predicts that the majority of Vietnamese will settle in southern California because the climate is familiar and there is a large Asian population whose culture is "sufficiently close to the Vietnamese culture."

According to Liu, many Vietnamese feel there is a lack of understanding of their cultural patterns. And in some cases they're probably right. Americans sometimes show their lack of understanding and offend Vietnamese without even knowing it. Even a simple thing like a name can become a source of cross-cultural faux pas. Unlike Western names, the order of Vietnamese names is family name, middle name, given name, Liu explained.

The real source of confusion, however, is that while Vietnamese surnames come first, they are never used. Only given names are ever used. It is a breach of etiquette to refer to a Vietnamese person by his family name alone.

Another thing which Liu has discovered troubles the Vietnamese refugees is the receptiveness of Americans to them. "Many Vietnamese are quite apprehensive about how they will be received. I remember one woman I interviewed said: 'You know, I worked for the American Broadcasting Company in Vietnam; my husband is an aerospace engineer. Whether we make it in the United States isn't a question of skill; it's a question of whether the Americans will allow us to work.' They are very worried."

Liu is very critical of the organization of the camps. "The fact is all of these people have nothing to do. They're absolutely bored. They're not allowed to organize themselves to do things for themselves so they just lie on their cots in the tents waiting for the next meal.

"Many of them can't understand why they are in the camp. They keep asking that question. They're really treated as if they are prisoners in a military camp, and there is a very strong suspicion of American military people."

The Notre Dame sociology professor and director of the Center for the Study of Man in Contemporary Society is very pessimistic about the length of time it will take to resettle all of the refugees. "If they (immigration officials) continue to do it on a family-by-family sponsorship basis, it will take years," he said.

Liu, who emigrated to the United States from China 20 years ago, would like to see halfway houses established as Mayor Joseph Alioto of San Francisco has proposed. Under such a plan, large numbers of refugees, possibly as many as 200, would be moved to facilities such as defunct college campuses or vacant hospitals.

"If you can do this—get 200 out of the camps at a crack—then I think they can be closed down quickly, speeding up the assimilation of the refugees. Halfway houses give them the security of being with their own people, but at the same time they provide an opportunity to take a little step into the outside world. Gradually, over the weeks, they would become integrated into the American community until they move out on their own."

One of the big edges Trong and his family have had in adjusting to American life is that they were among the first to leave the refugee camps. Liu noted that this group, which included those with at least some English training, have experienced less culture shock than other refugees.

Unfortunately, the fortunes of many refugees aren't quite as bright as Trong's. As of September some 37,000 were still in camps. The Notre Dame professor believes the longer they stay there, the slower and more painful will be the adjustment. Some won't ever adjust. By the end of July more than 500 had asked permission to return to Vietnam.

Sitting in John Beckman's living room on the eve before he moved into his own home, Trong took stock of his situation and considered everything that had happened to him and some of the things that might have happened. "We very lucky," he concluded. □



Refugees in a hurry to learn about U.S.

Drop chopsticks for forks, gobble hot dogs, cram English courses, but still play traditional soccer

By David Winder
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Camp Pendleton, California

If the Vietnamese refugees know nothing about hot dogs, baseball, or apple pie, it won't be for lack of trying.

Answers to everything American are sought in a bombardment of questions:

"Is Colorado really cooler than California?" asked one in a tone that wonders if anything can be cooler than the nippy ocean breeze rustling the grassy hillsides.

"Do the Americans not like us?"

"Are jobs harder to get now?"

"Where would you see a hockey game?"

Despite growing uncertainty about their future, and even misgivings by some on leaving Saigon, most Vietnamese refugees are scurrying to adjust to a new way of life in the United States.

Classrooms under canvas spring up as quickly as chopsticks are dropped for plastic knives and forks; meals that were once lingered over, a la Saigonese, now are taken in breathless cafeteria fashion.

True, the Vietnamese women here at Camp Pendleton have chosen the plain bucket and outside faucet over the gleaming new washing machines offered by the Marine Corps. And the children gave volleyball only a cursory try before dropping the ball and reverting to their more traditional game of soccer.

But generally, the refugees are soaking up like a sponge all they can learn about the U.S. and try hard to get more information.

The most popular books at the tent library? Weighty government information books peppered with bone-dry statistics like the length of the Mississippi River, or the number of representatives in the U.S. Congress, or who defeated the British at Yorktown. Much of the stress is on geography and history.

More practical hints also await the refugees.

Thanks to the Coronado Baptist Church, hourly lectures on basic economics familiarize the Vietnamese with U.S. currency; inform them about banking practices; and educate them to the supermarket.

As Capt. John Curd of the Marine Corps put it, "They have to know they can't go into Macey's and haggle over the price."

While the young children are glued to afternoon television movies, their older brothers and sisters and even parents are busy taking courses. The most urgent: survival English, as a basic as learning to say "Hi" or "Where do I shop for this?"

But there is also a background of confusion, uncertainty, and even depression.

"If we have to stay here a long time, it is better we go back to Saigon," said a well-educated, professional Vietnamese.

The marines here have even volunteered to begin registering those who now desire to return to South Vietnam.

So far, less than 20 of the 18,000 refugees have asked to return. Several said they would have wanted to stay in the United States if their families, still in Vietnam, were with them.

Bryce Torrence, head of the Red Cross here and a project director in Vietnam for 800,000 refugees, concedes "there is a sadness and a



By Richard L. Allman

Refugees — they bend and grow

concern that the American people as a whole don't want them. They have gotten this idea somewhere. I don't feel this personally."

But Mr. Torrence sees them as people of great resilience and flexibility.

"Like the bamboo, they bend, but they continue to grow," he says. "They are also a very patient people, a very grateful people... and they want to become good citizens."

C.S. Monitor p.3 22 May 75

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
CODE PA
HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380

REFUGEE CLIPS

30 APRIL 1975

20,000 Refugees Due At Camp Pen

By SAUL SHAPIRO
Staff Writer

CAMP PENDLETON — Camp Pendleton today prepared to accommodate 20,000 Vietnamese refugees who will begin arriving within two days.

The Pentagon said today that Camp Pendleton will be one of three military bases to house the evacuated

Vietnam War refugees for "up to 90 days or more."

The other bases, which will also be housing 20,000 Vietnamese, are Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas.

BrigGen. Paul Graham, commanding officer of Camp Pendleton, and other base officials conferred this morning on arrangements for food and housing for the Vietnamese refugees, who are scheduled to be flown to the El Toro Marine Air Station in Orange County and later transferred to Camp Pendleton.

Housing facilities at Camp Telaga and Camp San Onofre on the base are expected to be utilized along with tents and other temporary housing. The permanent facilities were described as barracks and quonset huts.


The Pentagon said that the first refugees were expected to arrive at the three military locations within the

next 48 hours. The refugees are presently being housed at Wake Island, Guam and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines.

To date, 40,000 Vietnamese have been evacuated from Saigon and the administration hopes to take out some 85,000.

The Pentagon said that a precedent for the current operation was established in 1956 when 40,000 Hungarian refugees were brought to Camp Kilmer, New Jersey. It took several months to find permanent housing for all of them and to scatter them throughout the United States.

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REFUGEES will be housed in these quonset huts on Camp Pendleton and other temporary facilities.

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PENDLETON SELECTED AS REFUGEE SITE

COPLEY NEWS Service

WASHINGTON — Camp Pendleton will be one of three processing centers in the United States for South Vietnamese refugees.

The others will be in Arkansas and Florida, according to an aide to Sen. John V. Tunney, D-Calif., who was informed today by the State Department.

Tunney's office was given no further details, and officials of the State Department, which is coordinating the refugee evacuation, were not immediately available for comment.

However, the State Department said last week that as many as six of seven such processing centers may be established in the United States.

All refugees entering the United States from Guam, Wake Island or Manila will know their ultimate destinations in the United States before arriving, the department said.

The centers will be used for final immigration processing, health checks and preparation for the final leg of the refugees' journey to cities where sponsors have been arranged.

U.S. diverts refugees to Wake atoll

BY UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

The United States today temporarily diverted flights of American and Vietnamese evacuees from overcrowded facilities on Guam to tiny Wake Island in the Pacific, 1,500 miles to the east.

In Saigon last night, frantic Vietnamese jostled each other to get aboard civilian planes. The Pentagon sent 40 Marines from ships in the South China Sea to the U.S. embassy to control crowds of Vietnamese seeking exit visas.

The 3-square-mile, U.S.-owned Wake atoll is the third Pacific point used by the military since the round-the-clock airlift from Saigon moved into full operation early this week.

Air Force officials first shifted the flights of Americans and their Vietnamese dependents from the Philippines to Guam after President Ferdinand Marcos restricted the use of Clark Air Base as a refugee center.

The United States asked Marcos yesterday to ease his ruling that no more than 200 Vietnamese be allowed on the huge Clark base at any one time.

On Guam, U.S. immigration officials said today they hope to process up to 3,000 evacuees from South Vietnam a day for the trip from Guam to the continental United States.

Immigration officials said if the processing goes as planned, the 20,400 refugees now crammed onto Guam would be flown to the United States within a week's time.

Relief workers erected a huge tent city, and thousands of refugees moved in. Navy Seabees struggled to keep ahead of the influx and throw up more tents.

Rear Adm. George S. Morrison, officer in charge of caring for the refugees, told a news conference the evacuation flights to Guam were suspended in order to allow the Seabees to build more accommodations.

Gen. Louis Wilson Jr., Pacific Air Force commander in Honolulu, ordered 70 men to Wake, 4,000 miles from Saigon, to beef up the 245-man staff there.

The atoll, long a refueling stop between Hawaii and Guam, also has many empty barracks, used after the island's recapture from the Japanese in World War II. It has a population of 1,700 and is administered by the U.S. Air Force.

At Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Airport, Vietnamese with seats already assured on three commercial jets jostled, shoved and pushed over children in immigration lines and screamed at officials to stamp their tickets.

Air Force C141 Starfighter-jets and C130 Hercules turboprops, each jammed with 200 Vietnamese, landed hourly yesterday at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam. Total arrivals in the last 56 hours reached 18,000.

U.S. military authorities on Guam worked to build a tent city to house 50,000 Vietnamese. Gov. Ricardo Bordallo has predicted 130,000 Vietnamese refugees may arrive.

The 68,000 citizens on Guam have begun hoarding food. Some said they

(Cont. on page A-3, col. 6)



TEMPORARY TOWN — Vietnamese refugees mill about "Tent City" on Guam today. Area at

Orote Point on the South Pacific island already houses nearly 3,000 persons. — AP Photo

U.S. diverts refugees

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

fear the Vietnamese may bring in diseases.

U.S. officials in Saigon said the U. S. Air Force flew 31 refugee evacuation flights out of Saigon during the past 24 hours, the highest number of flights in any single day since the emergency evacuation program began.

A U.S. mission spokesman today said the number of Americans re-

maining in South Vietnam was 1,079, down from more than 6,000 last week.

The ratio of Vietnamese to Americans aboard the evacuation flights is 20 to 1, officials said.

A China Airlines official said the private airline is flying its last flight out of Saigon today, leaving only Air France and Air Vietnam still operating flights in and out of Saigon.

Refugees For U.S. Pegged at 130,000

WASHINGTON (AP) —

Robert J. McCloskey, assistant secretary of state for Congressional relations, said Sunday that about 130,000 Vietnamese refugees will be brought to the United States.

"We have authority from the attorney general, using the so-called parole procedure, to bring into the United States something on the order of 130,000," McCloskey said on the NBC interview program "Meet The Press." "Up until yesterday (Saturday) something around 30,000 have been taken out of Vietnam. Some of them have reached the United States, most of them are at Guam, Wake Island and a base in the Philippines."

McCloskey said that voluntary agencies will arrange rehabilitation programs for the refugees.

If the United States evacuated all the Vietnamese who were in some way associated with the United States during the past 15 years, the number "would run up to a million," he said.

"We have to look at it as a practical matter, particularly given the domestic situation in the United States," McCloskey said. "I think it fair that we could absorb the figure that we are talking about in the present situation but I would think that a figure of a million is something that probably we could not absorb and probably not very realistic."

He also said that the delay in evacuating Americans from Saigon is "not as slow as some have charged it to be."

"The numbers of the American community has been reduced by about 4,000 in less than two weeks," he said. "The evacuation of Americans has been steady and downward."

McCloskey said that foreign policy in Vietnam by "different administrations has failed."

"It failed for a variety of reasons but I do think . . . that we can master these problems."

However, he said we have not suffered permanent setbacks in other areas because of Vietnam.

Orphans May Be Last Out

What probably will be the last group of orphans evacuated from Vietnam arrived at Los Alamitos Naval Air Station Saturday night and Sunday in three flights provided by the Military Airlift Command.

With the exception of three infants hospitalized upon arrival and listed as not seriously ill, all children who arrived on the first two flights Saturday were placed aboard commercial airline flights Sunday to be flown to Oregon and Colorado, authorities said.

Sheila Anderson, an official of Friends of Children of Vietnam, said her group had 9 children aboard the two flights, ranging in age from six months to 14 years. She said they flew to Denver Sunday where final processing will take place before they are placed with adoptive parents.

The remaining 33 children on the two flights were brought out of Saigon by Holt International Children's Services. They were flown to Portland where they will be placed in foster homes until arrangements are completed for adoptions.

Jack Adams, an official of Holt International Children's Services, said these arrivals wind up the orphan airlift as far as his organization is concerned. The group has evacuated all its children from the three centers it operated in Saigon. Adams said three American staff members from Holt still are in Saigon trying to arrange to get 80 Vietnam-

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Orphans Arrive on 3 Flights

(Continued from Page A-1)

ese staff members out of the country.

Miss Anderson saw little likelihood of her organization being able to arrange further evacuations.

"It is very possible these children will be the last we'll be able to get out of Vietnam," she said.

Officials at Los Alamitos said they had no information about the third and final flight, scheduled to arrive late last night, except that there were 65 children aboard.

Air station spokesmen said they believed children on the final flight were being brought here by Friends of Children of Vietnam.

Authorities Sunday night said Navy doctors and nurses were standing by for the arrival of the third flight to examine the children and to administer medical aid if needed.

While officials were not positive, they believed the children were to be flown by commercial airline today to their final destination.

21

War refugee wave about to hit nation

United Press International

The wave of Vietnamese refugees is about to burst upon the United States. But not everyone who wants to get out will make it.

More than 30,000 South Vietnamese have already left their crumbling country. Up to 100,000 more will leave Communist-encircled Saigon if time permits and the United States evacuation airlift continues.

However, despite the size of the American relief effort, fueled by millions of dollars and the efforts of thousands of American servicemen, officials in Washington say it will rescue scarcely more than a tenth of the estimated 1 million South Vietnamese whose lives are imperiled by a Communist takeover.

The frightened refugees who left everything behind in Vietnam and the Americans who are sweating on Guam, on Wake Island and in the Philippines to receive them all are convinced that the end of Saigon is at hand. Few of the evacuees have certain plans for their future in the United States.

Packed Air Force planes arrived at Guam every 45 minutes today. Durward Powell, the senior immigration officer on the island, said he hoped to send 3,000 persons a day on toward the United States by postponing some normal screening procedures.

Evacuation flights from Vietnam were bringing people out at a rate of more than 5,000 persons per day, foreshadowing a backlog in the tent city refugee camps.

Assistant Secretary of State Robert McCloskey said yesterday the administration has decided, "as a practical matter," to bring no more than 130,000 Vietnamese to the United States — including those already evacuated — because this country could not absorb an influx of 1 million Vietnamese refugees.

Fresh arrivals in the United States during the weekend included 126 orphans, ranging in age from several months to 10 years, who arrived on two flights at Los Alamitos Naval Air Station near Long Beach, Saturday night and another 65 children

who flew in on an Air Force C141 Starlifter last night. A "sneak-out" flight by Flying Tiger airlines brought 32 of the airline's employees to Los Angeles Saturday.

The refugees left behind their friends and their homes in the hope they can also leave behind their memories of war and their fears of future oppression.

Officials in charge of "Operation New Life" at the American processing centers in Asia were scrambling to complete living quarters for the homeless and hungry Vietnamese and hastening to send them on to mainland United States.

"I didn't want to leave my country," said Tran Thi Lang, a 32-year-old divorcee and mother of two who came with a group of orphaned children to the tent city on Guam. "But I had no choice."

"I wouldn't have been allowed to live under the Communists. And even though I left my country, I will at least be able to live in liberty."

The Pentagon threw more planes into its around-the-clock airlift today, bringing in transport jets from Little Rock Air Force Base.

Tents were sent from a base in Utah. Navy Seabees toiled in 100-degree heat on Guam to install latrines, showers and field kitchens amid the dust clouds billowing over the tent city.

The flights to Guam were suspended for 36 hours during the weekend to allow construction to proceed. During the interim, 2,160 refugees were flown 1,500 miles farther east to tiny Wake Island, where Seabees put up 1,000 tents on an abandoned World War II airstrip.

Nearly 23,000 refugees had arrived by this morning at Guam, where Rear Adm. George S. Morrison, in charge of the refugee operation, said he was prepared to handle as many as 50,000 people at one time.

More than 12,000 Vietnamese were crammed into a gymnasium, two aircraft hangars and a sweltering city of tents in the Philippines, at Clark Air Base and the Naval base at Subic Bay. A 10,000-ton converted military transport brought in 625 evacuees by sea yesterday.

22

A barricade of misery



DAMMING THE FLOOD — South Vietnamese government soldier threatens to swing his weapon at refugees trying to move through barricade

yesterday on road from Long Thanh to Saigon. Papers are being checked to prevent Communists from infiltrating capital. — UPI Photo

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Many Refugees Highly Skilled

Brains, Degrees Make
Up for Things Lost

BY DAVID LAMB
Times Staff Writer

AGANA, Guam—No one has ever questioned Col. Duong Thien Hung's bravery, and when he called his family together in the living room of his Saigon villa the other night he made one point clear.

"If you would respect me any less for leaving," he told his four children, "if you would grow up feeling that your father had been anything but a brave man, then I will stay and if necessary I will die here fighting."

The family's response was unanimous. The next day the colonel put his wife and children on a U.S. C-130 transport plane at Tan Son Nhut Airport. Two days later he, too, boarded a refugee plane, thus ending a 22-year military career that began shortly after he fled North Vietnam in 1954.

Hung, 45, an F-5 pilot three months short of retirement, had flown more missions than he possibly could count. Once he was shot down over

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Ark. Refugee Camp Closes

By Bill Richards

Washington Post Staff Writer

FT. CHAFFEE, Ark., Dec. 20—The final busload of 26 Vietnamese rolled out the gates of this temporary refugee way station today, ending nearly eight months of hectic efforts to relocate some 130,000 persons uprooted during the fall of South Vietnam.

The scattering of the last refugee contingent to nine states from Maryland to California left this sprawling 60,000-acre installation—along with three other now-empty

refugee camps in California, Florida and Pennsylvania—to slip back into the somber obscurity of a peacetime military base.

Crews of soldiers have been at work for weeks here, dismantling the living quarters hastily thrown together for the more than 50,000 refugees who crowded through Ft. Chaffee since it opened May 2 and were spun off to new homes and lives throughout the United States.

Before long the only remaining signs of the multinational pandemonium that

once reigned here will be the presence of a handful of Vietnamese who have settled almost out of sight around here, an occasional glimpse of one of the beautiful ao dais that nearly all of the Arkansas women who showed up to work at Ft. Chaffee eventually purchased from Vietnamese and the sweet memories of the \$1.5 million pumped monthly into the local economy during the refugee camp's tenure.

But even before the speeches and ceremony here

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REFUGEES, From A1

today marking the official closing of the refugee camps there have been signs that for many Vietnamese the migration is far from finished.

Interviews by The Washington Post with refugees around the country and with federal and local officials connected with resettlement programs indicate that growing numbers of refugees are abandoning their official sponsors and heading toward areas of the country with warm weather and existing clusters of Vietnamese.

In California, which has become the focus of much of this secondary migration, the official federal figures made public by the Inter-Agency Refugee Task Force show 27,351 Vietnamese have been resettled there.

Federal and state officials working with Vietnamese in California, however, estimate that the actual figure exceeds 40,000 and is growing steadily.

"The feds originally told us we wouldn't be getting more than about 5,000 refugees," said Robert Gnaizda, deputy secretary of California's Health and Welfare Agency and the head of the state's resettlement program.

California officials have complained bitterly to the federal task force that not only are the Vietnamese settling in areas where unemployment is particularly high but that 51 per cent of the state's Vietnamese refugees—an unusually high percentage according to federal figures for other parts of the country—are on welfare.

Although the federal resettlement program calls for reimbursing states for any refugee expenses, Gnaizda is worried that the \$100 million set aside by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare may run out and California may end up stuck for a bill of between \$10 million and \$20 million.

"We believe that most of the refugees won't be willing to spend more than one winter in the northern states before they decide to come here," Gnaizda said.

In Pomona, an affluent city east of Los Angeles with a population of 87,000 and an unemployment rate of 13 per cent, local officials had to step in to rescue 200 Vietnamese who lost promised jobs when their prospective employer and sponsor went broke.

"We had no idea we'd end up becoming sponsors ourselves," said Pomona City Manager Gerald Gonce. "My staff has other things to do besides run a refugee program."

Pomona officials have met with state and federal authorities about the problem. If jobs cannot be found, Gonce said, some of the Vietnamese may have to move on.

Federal officials in San Diego, where unemployment is at 11 per cent, were startled recently to find that the number of Vietnamese there had jumped from 3,500, when the nearby refugee center at Camp Pendleton closed Oct. 31, to nearly 10,000.

(over)

"It's getting cold in the North and East," said HEW refugee official Arlyn B. Carr, who is in charge of the federal program in San Diego. "The Vietnamese get a letter from a friend out here and if they can get a few bucks they just hop on a bus and take off."

"There's a tremendous difference between refugees and immigrants," said Dr. William T. Liu, a Notre Dame sociologist working with refugees in the San Diego area. "Immigrants are highly motivated and usually plan where they are going. They take root more easily. Refugees are just thrown in and it takes a lot more time and shifting around before they settle."

Ironically, as the last of the federally operated refugee camps was closing at Ft. Chaffee, the first of what some officials predict could be a second-generation series of camps was opening at a rented airfield south of San Diego.

Michael Hanson, president of the Agapi Foundation, a private relocation group that is starting the camp, said the 24 refugees now installed there in barracks once used during a commercial pilot training program all had experienced sponsor "break-downs," where the sponsorship doesn't work out.

"We've had breakdowns coming out of our ears," said Hanson. "I could see this coming back in June but no one in the federal program would listen."

Hanson anticipates 300 more refugees will arrive at the isolated and windswept airport camp in the next few weeks. Each must be sent by one of the 10 voluntary agencies that have been designated by the federal task force as placement organizations for refugees.

For each refugee, Hanson said, his group will get \$10 per day from the voluntary agencies and will turn over \$1 per day to the refugees for spending money. The rest, he said, will go to run the camp and provide intensive language lessons and job training.

Some Vietnamese in San Diego this week expressed skepticism over the plan. "There are no jobs here at all," said Tran Van Tran, a Vietnamese working with HEW in the San Diego area. "At the end of six weeks they'll just dump them all (refugees) back on welfare."

Federal officials at task force headquarters in Washington said they were not aware of the opening of any new refugee camps.

"If it's coming to that already," said Task Force Deputy Director Robert V. Keeley, "I would consider it an act of desperation."

Keeley said that he and

some other federal officials have had second thoughts about the task force policy of dispersing refugees throughout the United States instead of sending them to settle in one place the way, for example, many Cubans have done in Florida.

"I think the reason it was done this way," he said in an interview this week, "was because of political pressure on the task force. If we announced at the start that we were going to cluster the refugees there would have been a terrible hue and cry."

Keeley said he believed that many Vietnamese refugees would eventually group together anyway in Florida

U.S. Task Force Statistics

U. Post 2/8/75

Following are figures from the federal Inter-Agency Refugee Task Force for the Vietnamese refugee program:

—Total number of refugees processed into U.S.—130,600.

—Number of Vietnamese returning to Vietnam—1,546.

—Number of Cambodians waiting to return—130.

—Location of refugee camps: Ft. Chaffee, Ark; Camp Pendleton, Calif.; Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pa.; Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.

—Total money allotted to resettlement program—\$505 million.

—Total allotted to 10

voluntary agencies responsible for refugee relocation—\$65.6 million.

—Cost of setting up and operating refugee camps—\$117 million.

—Date refugee program scheduled to end—Sept. 30, 1977.

(Continued)

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 "Refugee Camp"

and California and near New Orleans and Washington.

"Obviously," he said, "there are going to be some problems. But we don't feel they are going to be large enough to keep the task force in operation."


The job of handling future problems with the Vietnamese is scheduled to be turned over from the inter-agency group to HEW Monday. The official date set by Congress for the end of the \$505 million refugee resettlement program is Sept. 30, 1977.

The tactics of the resettlement effort have taken some sharp twists and turns since they were originally formulated in May. One major shift has been away from placing Vietnamese with individual sponsors and concentrating instead on finding church groups to help refugees become accustomed to life here.

"The ones who went to churches or synagogues have made it," said Donald Whitteaker, an HEW official at Ft. Chaffee. A number of the people who called at the start to be individual sponsors were really looking for cheap labor or domestic help."

Not all states have had the problems with refugees that have cropped up in California. In Minnesota, which has absorbed 3,800 refugees, more than any other midwestern state, there have been few problems finding work for the Vietnamese.

"The advance planning and the meeting between state officials and employers helped make the transition smooth," said Keith Barnes, a production manager for the



The Washington Post

Refugee resettlement figures issued Nov. 30 by federal task force.

Land O' Lakes turkey processing division in Albert Lea, Minn., where six refugees hold jobs.

In Texas, groups of young Vietnamese fishermen have settled along the Gulf Coast. Others have moved to Florida to get jobs with fishing fleets there.

HEW officials are talking with officials of several northwestern states about opening a job training center for refugees in Montana.

In Iowa, seven Vietnamese families with a total of 64 recently moved into a newly refurbished apartment building in the middle of a rundown Des Moines neighborhood.

"Now it's the poor helping the poor—and doing okay so far," said Arzania Williams, director of the federally funded Gateway Opportunity center, which owns the building.

The Southern Ozark mountain community of Grannis, Ark., saw its population of 177 more than double this fall when 250 Vietnamese moved in to work at a local chicken processing factory owned by the Lane Poultry Co.

The company set up a lease-purchase arrangement with the Vietnamese for 40 house trailers and paid for two bilingual Vietnamese teachers to handle the 50 new Viet-

namese pupils in Grannis' five-room elementary school.

"If you're going to make something like this work," explained Lane official Melvin Sullivan, "you've got to devote an awful lot of time to details."

Nguyen Duc Hien, a former Vietnamese cultural attache to Laos who now works in the Grannis school, said only one family has pulled out of Grannis and a number have written from other parts of the country wanting to come and work.

"It's a good and safe place here," he said. "There are jobs and it is quiet and peaceful. I think most of us will stay."