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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2nd Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division(-)(Rein), FMF
APO San Francisco 96602

6/RWA/dlm
5000
9 Dec 1975

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marine Regiment
Subj: Koh Tang/Mayaguez Historical Report
Encl: (1) Koh Tang Assault/Operation Mayaguez Report

1. Enclosure (1) is a report summarizing this organization's activities in the subject operation.
2. It is provided for inclusion in the historical records of the Regiment and records/files at higher headquarters as deemed appropriate.

RW Austin
R. W. AUSTIN

This report is filed in Doc Unit as

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Thursday, September 16, 1976

Dramatic SS Mayaguez Rescue

'Frequent Wind' Marines Cited For Actions

Three Marines from the 5th Marine Regiment were honored Friday for their outstanding performances during Operation "Frequent Wind" and the recovery of the SS Mayaguez last year.

1stLt. Robert E. Lee, 1st Bn., was awarded the Legion of Merit, while 1stLt. Robert E. King, 3rd Bn., and Sgt. Gilbert C. Lutz, 1st Bn., received the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V".


Lee, then a second lieutenant was serving as the officer-in-charge of the Marine Security Detachment from "B" Co., 1st Bn., 4th Marines, 3rd MarDiv., from April 3-7, 1975. While assigned the mission of securing MSCS (Military Sealift Command Ship) Pioneer Contender during Operation "Frequent Wind," Lee stood boldly in view of the armed refugees ... and though fired upon ... began directing his men in disarming and assisting the refugees."

King, also a second lieutenant at the time, was serving as 2nd Provisional Platoon commander, "E" Company, 2nd Bn., 9th Marines, 3rd MarDiv., during the recovery of the SS Mayaguez on May 15, 1975.

He was cited for his "heroic achievement" when his platoon formed a linkup with isolated command groups and captured several individual and crew served weapons in the process.

Sgt. Lutz, was a machine gun squad leader with the 1st Platoon, "G" Company, 2nd Bn., 9th Marines, 3rd MarDiv., during the recovery of the Mayaguez.

"... While assigned to a patrol ... (he) was severely wounded. Refusing evacuation and complete disregard for his own welfare, he constantly exposed himself to enemy fire ... and, by his accurate fire, was instrumental in the suppression of the enemy ..."



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program receives an IBM card stating how much was deposited his/her account. The card also lets the Marine know if there are any discrepancies.

Only regular pay is sent to the bank under the Check-to-Bank program. Per diem, TAD and other such pay still paid to the Marine directly.

There are no extra charges to the Marine from the bank the check sent to.

Unlike the allotment program, Marine's complete paycheck must sent to the bank.

Only Marines with stable accounts

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US Marines run from a CH53 helicopter on Koh Teng Island, Cambodia, during rescue operations of the merchant ship Mayaguez, 15 May 1975. US Air Force photo.

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MR READER FORUM

Don't Confuse the Irish

The proliferation of initials to designate military and paramilitary organizations in Ulster is confusing. Through a slip of the pen, Colonel Norman L. Dodd's article, "The Corporals' War: Internal Security Operations in Northern Ireland," in the July 1976 edition of *Military Review* refers to the Ulster Defence Force (UDF) when he means the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). The UDR is a regiment of 11 battalions of mainly part-time local volunteers commanded by the British General Officer Commanding (GOC) Northern Ireland. It should not be confused with the paramilitary Ulster Defence Association (UDA) or the paramilitary and recently illegal Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).

COL A. T. P. Millen, British Army

Soldier Material, 1976

I have read and seen much in recent years to worry me about the US Army today and its reliability as the bulwark of our nation's security.

However, perhaps the most encouraging thing I have read was the article "The American Volunteer Soldier: Will He Fight?: A Provisional Attitudinal Analysis" by Colonel Charles W. Brown and Professor Charles C. Moskos Jr. (*Military Review*, June 1976).

As a military historian, I was particularly struck by the Brown-Moskos observation "that American soldiers must know the 'why' of their military service if they are to give maximum performance." Let me recall also to you Baron von Steuben's letter to a military friend in Prussia after his experience in training American soldiers:

The genius of this nation is not in the least to be compared to that of the Prussians, Austrians or French. You say to your soldier, 'Do this' and he does it; but I am obliged to say, 'This is the

reason why you ought to do that'; and then he does it.

Brown and Moskos suggest by implication, then, that we have the same basic material for American soldiers as we did in 1778 and through 1945. It is a happy, encouraging thought.

COL T. N. Dupuy, USA, Ret

The Thinking Russian

Do we behold a chink in the concrete wall of our perception of the Soviet threat?

After endless briefings on the "threat" based on World War II history, it is a welcome relief to read Lieutenant Colonel George F. Steger's article, "A Dilemma in Studying Soviet Tactics," in the June 1976 *Military Review*. If Steger is asking the right questions, he may well be forcing us to the assumption that the Soviet is indeed capable of thinking on his feet.

Congratulations on a provocative article! Chinks in walls usually mean more light on the subject!

LTC John W. Burberry Jr., USA

No Small Decision

The US Army basically has a worldwide objective of defending the United States, its Allies and other interests. Although this is often considered in rather narrow functional terms, a broader perspective should be used to encompass the totality of the Army's activities conducted to accomplish this mission. The decisionmaking machinery of the Army and the Department of Defense is urged to keep this "big picture" in mind concerning the forthcoming XM1/Leopard 2AV main battle tank competition. That is, the political, social and economic factors and their impact upon the overall

(continued on page 112)



THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT-- CRISIS MANAGEMENT

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DONALD E. CARLILE, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN MAY 1975, the capture of the US merchant ship *Mayaguez* by a third-rate power initiated an international test of US resolve which, by means of a daring and successful military rescue operation, resulted in increased prestige for the United States as a strong actor on the international scene.

Valuable lessons have been derived from historical precedents involving the use of military force to recover US vessels and citizens. During the early period of the Barbary Wars (1785-1812), the United States had to pay tribute to the Barbary Powers to buy security for our commercial shipping in the Mediterranean Sea. However, these pacific measures failed to halt the attacks on our ships and crews, and thus the construction of vessels for a US Navy appeared to be the only alternative.¹

*The need for backing up our diplomatic effort with the potential influence or actual use of naval power became increasingly imperative and apparent.*²

Later, when the US frigate *Philadelphia* was grounded and subsequently captured by the Tripolitans and its crew made captives, President Thomas Jefferson authorized US agent William Eaton to land with a force which included Marines to free the crew.³ Thus, it is clear that the President's decision to free the *Mayaguez* and its crew from the Cambodian captors is not a seminal event.⁴

The purpose of this article is to examine the *Mayaguez* incident from a decision-making perspective, taking a close look at those factors which were most influential in deciding *what* to do about the capture, if *anything* at all, and *how* to carry out the decision, once made, to rescue the crew and recover the vessel. Conceptually, we will examine certain fundamental choices, some recognized at the time of this incident, some not, which channeled governmental thinking and thus influenced the course of deliberations which led to the decision to take immediate steps to recover the ship and crew.

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Finally, any such study would be incomplete without an examination of the outcome in terms of its effect on the administration, the Congress, the military and the United States as a nation. Some mention will also be made with regard to "lessons learned" from the *Mayaguez* crisis.

THE SEIZURE AND THE RESPONSE

SOS

*Have been fired upon and boarded by Cambodian armed forces at nine degrees 48 minutes north/102 degrees 53 minutes east. Ship is being towed to unknown Cambodian port.*⁵

On 12 May at 0318 in Djakarta, Indonesia, Mr. John Neal of the Delta Exploration Company received this Mayday call from the SS *Mayaguez*. Subsequently, Mr. Neal lost contact with the ship and immediately informed the US Embassy in Djakarta of the communication. At 0512, the Embassy reported to the National Military Command Center in Washington that the *Mayaguez* had been:


*... fired on, boarded, and seized in international waters at about 21 minutes past midnight, 12 May, while traversing a standard sealane and trade route.*⁶

Thus, this provocation by Cambodia set the stage for a crisis management situation at the highest levels of the executive branch. The meetings, consultations, diplomatic initiatives and military actions which followed were pursued with the Executive guidance that the United States would not accept harassment of its ships on international sealanes, and that failure to release the ship and crew could have "serious consequences."⁷

Executive Reaction

In response to Cambodia's seizure of the merchant ship and its crew, the President decided to initiate diplomatic means in seeking the release of the *Mayaguez* and its crew. Since the United States lacked direct channels to Cambodian authorities in Phnom Penh, it was decided to approach the Chinese in Washington and in Peking and to have the US Liaison Office deliver a message to the Cambodian representative in Peking. The People's Republic of China (PRC) representative in Washington refused to accept the message.⁸ On 13 May, the US Liaison Office in Peking delivered a message both to the Cambodian Embassy there and to the

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Foreign Ministry of the PRC. The latter message was returned without comment to the US Liaison Office the following day.⁹

Additional diplomatic actions to secure the *Mayaguez* release through pacific means included a letter delivered by the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. John Scali, to UN Secretary General Waldheim, indicating that the United States planned to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter (the right of self-defense), and a follow-on letter delivered to the UN Security Council.¹⁰

Some 60 hours passed from the time the diplomatic messages were sent to Cambodia and the time the decision was made by the President to begin military action.¹¹ Subsequently, at 1650 on 14 May, orders were issued to begin the military operations for the recovery of the *Mayaguez* and its crew. As the chief decisionmaker, the President consulted with the National Security Council (NSC) on four separate occasions and held consultations with members of Congress (pursuant to Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution) prior to his decision to order *military action*. Ultimately, the combat actions of the US Navy and Marine Corps and the US Air Force in rescuing the crew and recovering the containership were successful. The *Mayaguez* was recovered on 14 May at 2105. The entire crew was taken aboard the guided missile destroyer USS *Wilson* at 2307. Thus, rescue operation achieved success only six hours after the Executive order was issued to begin the military operations.

THE US RESPONDS—WHY?

*We have been informed that a Cambodian naval vessel has seized an American merchant ship on the high seas and forced it to the port of Kompong Som. The President has met with the NSC. He considers this seizure an act of piracy. He has instructed the State Department to demand the immediate release of the ship. Failure to do so would have the most serious consequences.*¹²

At approximately 1350, 12 May, the above statement was read by Presidential Press Secretary Ron Nessen at a White House press briefing. This statement made public for the first time that a commercial vessel with US registry and its American crew had been seized illegally by another nation and that the United States intended to act if the ship and crew were not released immediately.

The President was informed initially of the seizure at 0740 by Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft (then Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs) during the routine morning intelligence briefing.¹³ Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the NSC learned of the incident at an 0800 meeting. At 1205, the President met in the Cabinet Room with the NSC members: Secretary of State Kissinger, Defense Secretary Schlesinger, Central Intelligence Agency Director Colby and General Jones, the Air Force Chief of Staff who was acting on behalf of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Brown who was in Europe at the time.¹⁴ During the course of this 45-minute meeting, the President made two key decisions. He instructed the Secretary of State to use diplomatic initiatives immediately in an effort to convince the Khmer Rouge to release the crew and ship. The diplomatic options available were limited to contacting the PRC in Washington and Peking and to delivering a message to the Cambodian representative in Peking. These two means were judged to be "the only effective and rapid" channels because of the urgency

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Department of Defense

A Marine and an Air Force pararescueman run for an Air Force helicopter during an assault on Koh Tang Island to rescue the US merchant ship *Mayaguez* and its crew 14 May 1975

of the situation and the fact that "no other government which might have been helpful in the situation has any representation in Phnom Penh. . . ." ¹⁵

The second decision was to initiate several military actions which the Chief Executive determined would provide a military force "reasonably necessary to achieve the desired result" should the diplomatic overtures fail.

Pro Bono Publico

The speed of this Executive response should be measured in terms of the external influences upon the decisionmaker. Illustrative of one of these influences was Secretary Kissinger's answer to a question asked at a news conference on 12 May, the day of the *Mayaguez* seizure:

Question: *Do you think this country's prestige has suffered as a result of what's happened in Viet-Nam, in Cambodia, and what's happening in Laos--and what happened today to a merchant ship?*

Secretary Kissinger: *I think that our credibility has declined, and that one of the most important challenges to our foreign policy is to restore it. . . .* ¹⁶

Attempting to assess accurately the perceptions of our allies and potential adversaries is difficult under the best of circumstances; however, it would not be totally inaccurate to speculate that, as a result of the collapse of American policy and position in Indochina, many of our allies felt that the United States might not be counted on as a continued bulwark against foreign "danger."

This influence, coupled with the recent blight of Watergate on "big government," surely was in the forefront among the considerations pondered in arriving at a decision of whether to do anything about the *Mayaguez* capture. An additional assist must have been the lessons learned from the 1968 *Pueblo* crisis, useful as a bench mark and point of reference even though there are only a few parallels in the two incidents.

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Another compelling reason for *immediate* action was the administration's authentic concern for the crew members who were held captive by the Khmer Rouge. This two-week-old regime in Cambodia had clearly demonstrated that its "disregard for life and suffering was even greater than is the rule in most communist countries";¹⁷ thus, the *Mayaguez* crewmen had to be recovered as quickly as possible. The crisis managers could have read former Khmer Rouge atrocities to mean that any unnecessary delays might result in the execution of the captain and 39 American crewmen.

An interesting sidelight regarding the decision to rescue the *Mayaguez* is contained in a report from a West German source, "Secret in Eight Containers: Why the United States Freed the Freighter *Mayaguez*." This *Stern* magazine report describes the contents of eight Sea-Land containers as "highly sophisticated electronic equipment of a top secret nature used by American intelligence . . . in the South-east Asia area."¹⁸ These allegations that the *Mayaguez* was a "spy ship" were voiced early on following the successful rescue operation but were denied quickly by both the administration and Sea-Land Service Chairman, Michael R. McEvoy.¹⁹ McEvoy opened the ship to newsmen on 17 May in Singapore, three days following the rescue, and their collective inspection revealed nothing more than commercial cargo and miscellaneous merchandise for the military base exchanges in Thailand.²⁰

While all of the above considerations were important inputs into the crisis decisionmaking crucible, this analysis would be incomplete without a comment regarding the US military preparedness to enforce an Executive decision to act "with serious consequences" if the ship and crew were not released immediately. When the SOS call was made on 23 January 1968 by the USS *Pueblo*, "time and distance factors made it impossible to respond . . . when the ship was being boarded."²¹ The situation was quite different on the morning of 12 May 1975. The 3d Marine Division on Okinawa was not far away from the Indochinese Peninsula, the destroyer-escort USS *Holt* was about a day's sail away, the aircraft carrier USS *Coral Sea* was on course for Australia when it was ordered to turn about, *P3 Orion* reconnaissance planes were based in the Philippines and *Jolly Green Giant* helicopters were located in Thailand along with pilots experienced in insertions, extractions and evacuations in a hostile environment. Thus, the ingredients for a joint air-sea-land rescue force were reasonably available to the Commander in Chief when the decision was made to prepare for a military rescue effort.

THE JUDGMENT—USE FORCE

The Decision

The President decided that the United States had to draw a line immediately against the illegal actions of Cambodia in order not to be forced later into a "humiliating discussion about the ransom of innocent merchant seamen."²² Since the President had not received a reply through diplomatic channels, the option of resolving this situation diplomatically was exhausted by Wednesday evening, 14 May, when he ordered military operations to commence for the recovery of the *Mayaguez* and crew. The lack of any response from the Cambodians could only be regarded as total intransigence.

Earlier military actions had been initiated in the vicinity of Kompong Som in

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order to maintain close surveillance coverage and to keep the *Mayaguez* captors from moving the ship and crew to the mainland. It was determined that diplomatic efforts to free the crew and recover the ship would have a greater chance of success if the *Mayaguez* were kept away from the Asian mainland. Thus, at approximately 0620 on Tuesday, 13 May, "an A-7 Corsair aircraft reported placing ordnance in the water in front of the *Mayaguez* to signal it not to get underway."²³ Additional persuasion in this regard was necessary on Tuesday evening when several Cambodian patrol boats disregarded warning signals and were subsequently sunk.²⁴

By Wednesday evening, it was decided that waiting another 48 hours before taking any positive military efforts to effect a release would provide more time for the Cambodians to move the ship and the crew to the mainland. The inherent risks involved in a military rescue attempt on the mainland were much greater than the risks involved in rescuing the ship and crew while still isolated from the Cambodian coast. Thus, the risks were weighed and a balance was struck.

On 14 May, the Navy, Marines and Air Force, selectively assigned and prepositioned for the military rescue contingency, were in place. The order was issued at 1652 Wednesday, 14 May, to begin the rescue operation.

Legality

The international legality of the United States' use of military force to free the *Mayaguez* and its American crew has been questioned by some political commentators who argue that the *Mayaguez* was legally seized by the Cambodians inside their territorial waters. The facts in the seizure indicate that the unarmed merchant ship was sailing in the Gulf of Siam about 60 miles from the Cambodian coast and about 8 to 12 miles from the Wai Islands while exercising the internationally recognized, high-seas navigation right of "innocent passage." The previous week, the Cambodians had interfered with a South Korean vessel, and a Panamanian ship had been detained, both in the same area of the *Mayaguez* seizure. Thus, any significant argument that the President initiated some dreadful, illegal act by ordering a military rescue operation pales under scrutiny of the facts surrounding the Khmer Rouge act of illegal seizure.


Other political analysts raise the question of the President's constitutional Executive power to introduce US Armed Forces into the *Mayaguez* crisis. Was this Presidential authoritarianism, or was the order to use military force after consulting with the Congressional leaders well within the confines of the 7 November 1973 Joint Resolution of Congress (Public Law 93-148)? PL 93-148 reads as follows:

CONSULTATION

Section 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. . . .

The War Powers Resolution and the special restrictions that were placed on military operations in Indochina were complied with by the President's consultations (through his Congressional liaison staff) with: the Speaker of the House and President *pro tempore* of the Senate, the bipartisan leaders of the House and Senate, the Chairmen and ranking Republican members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committee, the Chairmen and ranking Republican members of the

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The escort ship USS Holt alongside the containership SS Mayaguez

Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees and the Chairmen and ranking Republican members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.²⁵ Additionally, on the afternoon of Wednesday, 14 May, the President met with Congressional leaders and discussed the military actions he had taken to recover the crew and ship.

Thus, a factual assessment regarding the President's complying or not complying with the War Powers Act, Section 3 (Consultation), indicates that the President fully complied; furthermore, in compliance with Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Act (Reporting), he sent a letter on 15 May 1975 to the Speaker of the House and President *pro tempore* of the Senate.²⁶ This letter reported on the chronology of events from the *Mayaguez* capture on 12 May to its rescue on 14 May.

In the final analysis, the legality for the Executive action in the *Mayaguez* crisis has its deepest roots in the duty of the President to protect US citizens abroad as an inherent principle in his responsibility as Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces.

THE RESCUE

NSC Meeting

The President convened the fourth and final NSC meeting Wednesday afternoon at 1552.²⁷ During the course of this Cabinet Room meeting, the Chief Executive issued orders directing a Marine helicopter assault force to Koh Tang Island to free the *Mayaguez* crewmen thought to be there, and for another Marine force (which was to be placed aboard the destroyer USS *Holt*) to retake the *Mayaguez* and sail or tow the ship to sea as soon as possible. From the National Military Command Center, the order was issued for Air Force Lieutenant General John J. Burns, Commander of the US Support Activities Group (USSAG) in Thailand, to start the

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
military rescue operation.²⁸ Tactical aircraft from the carrier USS *Coral Sea* and from Thailand, in addition to naval gunfire, were authorized to provide combat support for the rescue operation as required.²⁹

The Rescue Force

At 1715 on Wednesday afternoon, helicopters of the 56th Special Operations Wing pre-positioned at Utapao Airfield, Thailand, launched 11 *CH53* and *HH53* (*Jolly Green Giant*) helicopters carrying approximately 227 Marines who had been pre-positioned there as a ground security force.³⁰ Three of these helicopters ferried about 50 Marines, six Navy explosive ordnance disposal technicians, six civilians of the Military Sealift Command who could operate the *Mayaguez* and a US Army captain who spoke Cambodian to the USS *Holt*, arriving about 1858. At 2045, the *Holt* went alongside the *Mayaguez* which was lying dead in the water, and, by 2105, the Marines were in full control of the vessel.³¹ No one was found on board the *Mayaguez* when the Marines boarded.

The other eight *Jolly Green Giants*, containing an assault force from the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines (3d Marine Division), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Randall W. Austin, began the initial assault on Koh Tang Island. The first assault wave of approximately 180 Marines had completed the insertion by 2015. Colonel Austin had consolidated his position in the vicinity of the main landing zone by 2145 with a force of approximately 213.³²

At 1710, shortly after the helicopters had departed Utapao Airfield, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed Admiral Noel Gayler, Commander in Chief, Pacific, to initiate supporting cyclic strike operations from the aircraft carrier USS *Coral Sea* on military targets in the Kompong Som-Ream Airfield and Naval Base on the



Sunken patrol boat in Gulf of Thailand

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US Marines board the SS Mayaguez

mainland.³³ A total of 15 attack sorties expended ordnance against the Cambodian mainland, first to ensure that the Cambodian force on Koh Tang Island was not reinforced; second, to ensure the safe withdrawal of the Marine-reinforced rifle company from the island; and, third, to lodge pressure against the Cambodians to release the crew. According to one author, Charlie Miller, the captain of the *Mayaguez*, believed that the air strikes against the mainland had “taken on a high priority in Phnom Penh” and thus had a profound effect on the *Mayaguez* crew’s release by their captors.³⁴

A Message

At approximately 1902, the Royal Government of the National Union of Cambodia (the Khmer Rouge) made a 19-minute broadcast attacking “U.S. imperialism,” justifying its seizure of the *Mayaguez* and, lastly, indicating that:

*Regarding the Mayaguez ship we have no intention of detaining it permanently and we have no desire to stage provocations. We only want to know the reason for its coming and to warn it against violating our waters again . . . we will release the ship. . . .*³⁵

This broadcast, translated and received in the White House after 2000 on Wednesday evening, made no mention of the time of release and only mentioned the ship, not the crew. Shortly thereafter, the President was informed of the recovery of the *Mayaguez*. The President, when informed of the Khmer Rouge broadcast, discussed the situation with Secretary Kissinger regarding no mention of the crew and told him, “Proceed as we had agreed, with airstrikes and the full opera-

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tion.”³⁶ Secretary Kissinger then had Press Secretary Nessen read a statement in the White House Press Room at 2115 addressed to the Cambodian Government (to be relayed through *Agence France-Presse*) to the effect that the United States would cease military operations as soon as the Khmer Rouge issued a statement that they are prepared to release the crew members “unconditionally and immediately.”³⁷

Success

At 2315 Wednesday evening, the destroyer USS *Wilson* reported that it had picked up the crew of the *Mayaguez*, all accounted for and in good condition.³⁸ A Thai-crewed fishing vessel had brought the *Mayaguez* crew of 40 to the *Wilson* from Koh Rong Sam Lem, an island in the Bay of Kompong Som. At approximately 2400, the President ordered all offensive military operations to cease and to begin the withdrawal.³⁹ At about 0917 on the following day, 15 May, all US Marines were cleared of Koh Tang Island. Thus, three days of crisis management in the White House and National Military Command Center ended on a successful note.

Total casualties included 11 Marines, 2 Navy corpsmen and 2 airmen killed in action; another 3 Marines missing; and 41 Marines, 2 sailors and 7 airmen wounded.⁴⁰

Public complaints from Thailand regarding the use of Thai territory as a base of operations to secure the release of the *Mayaguez* and crew surfaced briefly during the time of the incident and following the rescue operation. However, the Thai subsequently stated “that they were satisfied with the note [from the US Government] expressing regret.”⁴¹

Despite the problems of faulty intelligence regarding the actual whereabouts of the *Mayaguez* crewmen and the understrength estimate of Khmer Rouge troops on Koh Tang Island, this complex, hastily assembled, US joint air-sea-land task force accomplished its military objective: to recover the 40 seamen and the SS *Mayaguez* from the Cambodian captors.

THE NET WORTH

The decisionmaking process in this crisis situation required the President to make a couple of milestone decisions from a mixed bag of widely varying options. In addition, the Chief Executive was compelled to make these decisions with little time for dalliance as he and his advisors perceived the gravity of the situation. Hanging in the balance in this crisis were several fundamental issues regarding the United States of America.

First, the United States is a protector of its citizenry and their rights and privileges at home and abroad; second, the United States, as an actor on the international scene, is a recognized superpower which could not afford to be blackmailed or humiliated by the illegal actions of any equal or lesser power; and, third, the United States could ill afford a *Pueblo*-type outcome—that is, a great loss of confidence by the American people in their Government and its strength.

Thus, because the President decided to do something about the illegal *Mayaguez* seizure and because the actions he directed succeeded in recovering the American seamen and merchant ship, the United States accrued some rather important “by-products.” Mainly, these included a spiritual and moral uplift for the American

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people and a restoration of American credibility both on the domestic and international fronts. More specifically, on the international front, at a time when North Korean President Kim Il Sung was getting audacious with his tunneling efforts across the demilitarized zone into South Korea, the message that "there are limits beyond which the United States cannot be pushed," as Secretary Kissinger said, "and that the United States is prepared to defend these interests . . ." likely had a dampening effect on Kim and his war machine.

The US Armed Forces benefited from the *Mayaguez* rescue in that once again the American public witnessed a successful strategic US military operation accomplished on short notice in response to a crisis situation with explosive potential.

Lessons learned from the *Mayaguez* crisis are too numerous to detail in this article; however, a few lessons appear to have resurfaced from past times and should be mentioned. First, the United States and other great powers can expect to be tested in their resolve from time to time by lesser powers; thus, a crisis decision-making apparatus needs to be kept well-oiled, and practice in crisis management needs to be done by the seniors from time to time.

Our intelligence gathering and analysis machinery needs to be overhauled to provide better, more precise, up-to-date information to the crisis decisionmakers. The total intelligence effort during the *Mayaguez* crisis was somewhat reminiscent of the intelligence collected for the Son Tay Raid or in the nonanticipation of the 1968 Tet offensive.

Our seniors, to include the high-level decisionmakers in the legislative and executive branches, should be wary of either branch becoming omnipotent in the management of crisis situations, remembering that crises are usually situation specific. A marriage of the executive and legislative branches in crisis situations is not just desirable, it is absolutely essential to provide a unified direction and effort toward making the best decision from all the options available.

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
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By MacNelly for the Richmond News Leader

Part II -- Main Edition -- 12 October 1976

WASHINGTON POST - 12 OCTOBER 1976 Pg 20

Troubled Economy Seen Eroding Support for Panama Head

By Joanne Omang
Washington Post Foreign Service

PANAMA CITY, Oct. 11—As military strongman Omar Torrijos marks today the eighth anniversary of the coup that brought him to power, many observers think the engaging, restless general has lost touch with the people he governs.

Supporters of this view believe that Torrijos, who is head of government, is unwilling to recognize the lesson of riots last month: that the economic situation and Torrijos' government apparently are making more people angry than is the issue of the Panama Canal.

"He's been jefe maximo (supreme leader) of a booming economy and that has allowed him to keep the most disparate groups unified and content," said one foreign diplomat. "That's all over now."

The country is overextended in its foreign debt, which is \$1.1 billion and rising and requires 25 cents of every dollar of national income to pay the charges. Disgraced businessmen created an informal investment slowdown earlier this year, while the international slump worsened Panama's export trade.

A drought then brought things to a head, by forcing a slight rise in the prices of rice and milk, which triggered the disturbances from Sept. 10 to 13.

Torrijos continues to blame the U.S. presence in the 10-mile-wide canal zone rather than economic problems for the disorders.

"The profound cause, the real cause was the intent to prove we are not a stable government and that we are not capable of administering the canal," Torrijos said in an interview, most of it conducted as he drove around Panama City in his car.

Insisting that he retains popular support, Torrijos said the economic issue is "only an excuse."

"People know the country is involved in a struggle that demands social sacrifice. There are serious problems, but no group is so unjustly treated as to become violent."

It remains to be seen whether comments on Panama in the U.S. presidential campaign will rekindle Panamanian anger over delays in negotiating a new treaty giving Panama greater control in the Panama Canal Zone.

When Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter made comments in last week's televised debate that sounded more hard-line than those of President Ford, Torrijos called the statements by both men a "grave irresponsibility."

The United States and Panama have announced that negotiations are to resume next month. Apparently fearful of a Carter victory, Panamanian Foreign Minister Aguilino Boyd urged U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to reach a new treaty before he leaves office.

The Panamanian government has backed off early charges that U.S. in-

NEW YORK TIMES

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A Show of Force In Thailand

A short and bloody show of force by Thailand's military has brought about an abrupt change of government. The new regime will be headed by a civilian but there seems no doubt that it will be heavily influenced by the conservative soldiers.

Thirty students were killed in the demonstrations that the military used as an excuse for intervention in the country's politics. Ironically, student riots had brought the civilians to power in 1973, ending military rule that had prevailed for most of this century.

A military junta headed by the former Defense Minister, Adm. Sangad Chaloryu, deposed Prime Minister Seni Pramoj but three days later, a new civilian Prime Minister was appointed. He is Thanin Kralvichien, a Supreme Court justice.

In Thailand's foreign affairs the most important question is whether the new Government will continue the recent efforts to improve relations with the Communist authorities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Hanoi has already called the military takeover a plot by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, apparently reflecting a widespread expectation that the new Bangkok Government will be rightist and will seek stronger ties with the United States.

Vietnam Seeks Western Aid

The Communist-led Government of Vietnam has asked the leaders of the Western financial establishment for reconstruction aid to repair the damages of war. The request, made during a conference in Manila of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, was Vietnam's first official act

as a newly admitted member of the two bodies. Vietnam was admitted in a deal with the United States; Washington did not object and Hanoi agreed to defer United Nations debate over its membership application until after the American Presidential election.

stalled to legitimize the U.S. military control of this country," said Arnulfo B., one of 23,000 students at the national university.

Torrijos is thus attacked from both left and right as he tries to prod negotiations toward a new canal treaty that he can sell to both sides. Most of the 1.5 million Panamanians, according to several businessmen and journalists, only vaguely grasp the canal issue.

Torrijos and his advisers see the canal as, the key to the country's economic future.

"The zone is an economic vacuum for us now," said one of Panama's treaty negotiators, attorney Carlos Lopez Guevara. Development of the zone, now mostly virgin jungle, would open up flat, rich land as well as providing jobs in constructing a port and industry, he said. Tolls for canal passage, everyone readily admits, would rise sharply under Panamanian control.

The students disavow any American links, but for different reasons.

"Torrijos is an American puppet in-

NEW YORK TIMES

10 OCTOBER 1976 (12)

Canal Talks Will Resume

Negotiations over American control of the Panama Canal are to resume in the next few weeks, but the already protracted talks are likely to be made more complicated by mention of the canal in the American Presidential campaign.

Washington and Panama have been bargaining intensively for two and a half years over a new treaty to replace the 1903 agreement by which the United States controls the waterway and the Canal Zone perpetuity. The differences between the two parties include the term of the new pact, the American role in defense of the canal, the amount of money paid to Panama, canal tolls, and the right of the United States to enlarge the canal.

The announcement that United States Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker will return to Panama in two or three weeks came just after the subject had figured briefly in the television debate between President Ford and Gov. Jimmy Carter. Statements about the canal by the two Presidential candidates, both of whom said they would not relinquish control over the waterways, provoked irritation in Panama.

Panama's Foreign Minister Aguilino Boyd called the statements "relics of a colonial era" and Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera, head of the military and Panama's real ruler, said the candidates showed "great irresponsibility."

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NEW YORK TIMES
10 OCTOBER 1976(12) Pg E3

A Troubled Dictator

The Canal Is
Only One of
Panama's
Flash Points

By ALAN RIDING

MEXICO CITY—Conservative opposition in the United States to a new Panama Canal treaty has been visibly strengthened by the Presidential campaign, but internal unrest in Panama has also added obstacles to rapid conclusion of the negotiations.

Hopes for an agreement by early 1977 were first set back by Ronald Reagan's exploitation of the Panama issue during the primaries. And, even though President Ford has announced resumption of the Panama talks, both he and Jimmy Carter expressed opinions during their foreign policy debate last week, that can only make progress more difficult.

Opposition to concessions to Panama have long been a known factor in the United States but, abroad at least, deterioration of the political situation in Panama had not been anticipated as having an impact on the negotiations. Panamanians, both left and right, would like to see their country recover jurisdiction of the United States-controlled Canal Zone, but as student riots in September demonstrated, they are often more preoccupied with other matters: unemployment, inflation and political repression.

As a result, while many abroad continue to see Panama's dictator, Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera, as a gallant David taking on the American Goliath, his popularity at home is lower than at any time since he seized power eight years ago. Growing numbers of Panamanians are no longer willing to accept the official view that to criticize General Torrijos on any issue is to betray Panama over the canal.

The Government has tried to sustain this myth. A dozen opponents of the Government who were deported in January were accused of being in league with Mr. Reagan and American conservatives. The student riots over food prices were also blamed on "U.S. intelligence agencies" and Americans living in the Canal Zone.

These charges may have been believed abroad but they have not been taken seriously in Panama.

The erosion of General Torrijos's strength at home poses a serious difficulty for Washington. Despite his flamboyant anti-American rhetoric, the general has long been the State Department's choice as a negotiating partner. He was seen as the only political figure with the power and prestige to ensure that any draft agreement would be accepted by the Panamanian people.

Anxious to remove the canal issue as a point of friction in its relations with Latin America, the State Department worked out a deal with General Torrijos: Washington would support the Panamanian regime economically and would grant it the most generous treaty that the United States Senate would accept. In exchange, General Torrijos would accept such domestically unpopular points as a continued American military presence in Panama and would guarantee tranquil ratification of the draft treaty.

That scenario was upset by the student riots, the first such disturbances in eight years. Their implication is that General Torrijos may no longer be able to fulfill his part of the bargain without increasing political repression.

It is in an apparent effort to bolster the Torrijos regime

NEW YORK TIMES
10 OCTOBER 1976(12) Pg E4Mayaguez
Revisited

A Democratically controlled Congressional committee, on the eve of the foreign policy debate between President Ford and Jimmy Carter, released a report last week that concluded Mr. Ford has failed to pursue all diplomatic possibilities before launching a major military attack to retrieve the merchant ship Mayaguez, seized by Cambodia in May, 1975.

In the attack, the 39-man crew was recovered, but 41 American servicemen and an unknown number of Cambodians were killed in the American assault.

Last week's report, prepared for a House political and military affairs subcommittee by the General Accounting Office, was more detailed than earlier accounts but contained little that was entirely new. The timing of

its release was significant, however.

A spokesman for the subcommittee denied the timing was unfair to Mr. Ford. Both he and a spokesman for the G.A.O. said the report had been completed last May 11 but the National Security Council had blocked its immediate release because the document contained classified information. The unclassified version that was released was approved Sept. 15.

The Mayaguez issue was raised during the debate but did not figure heavily. Mr. Ford accused the Democrats of partisan politics and the authors of the report of "grandstand quarterbacking."

Mr. Carter said he had not read the report. The Democratic candidate, who is on record May 18, 1975 as supporting the attack, said Wednesday night the incident was an example of what he alleges is the Administration's failure to share foreign policy decisions with the American people.

that President Ford is sending the chief Panama negotiator, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, to resume talks suspended last May. Mr. Ford can also ease General Torrijos's economic difficulties by increasing aid to enable the Panamanian Government to increase spending and thus reduce unemployment, now between 15 and 25 percent. But Panama's economic recession is so profound that too much help would accentuate another trouble, inflation.

The slump of the Panamanian economy, which grew by an average eight percent per year between 1958 and 1972 but expanded by only 1.7 percent last year, is perhaps the main reason for the popular unrest. As a country highly dependent on commerce, Panama was badly hit, first by inflation of 25 percent and then by the world economic recession. The number of ships using the canal and the amount of cargo passing through the Colon Free Zone fell last year, weakening the Government's borrowing power abroad.

To combat the inflation-recession squeeze, the Government introduced higher taxes, tighter credit and a new labor law. From the man in the street, above all the urban poor, this produced resentment towards the Government, especially with the corruption that is believed widespread among top National Guard officers. The student demonstrations were a visible sign of the anger.

There are other frustrations. Liberals and Conservatives in Panama are irritated by the regime's leftist demagoguery and are angered by the continued suppression of political parties. On the left, there is impatience at the absence of the Socialist revolution that General Torrijos promised during his early years in power. For example, a much-vaunted agrarian reform has not taken place and demands for nationalization of the powerful off-shore banking sector have been ignored. Conservatives still view General Torrijos as a Socialist demagogue but many leftists now describe him as a bourgeois dictator.

General Torrijos's low-key response to these developments—he rarely appears in public and spends much of the time at a hideaway 60 miles west of Panama City—has fed persistent rumors of a power struggle within the high command of the National Guard, the real base of his authority. But, despite the apparent strength and ambitions of the Guard's second-in-command, Col. Rodrigo Garcia Ramirez, and of its intelligence chief, Lieut. Col. Manuel Antonio Noriega, no clear successor to General Torrijos has emerged.

From Washington's point of view, either of the two possible scenarios—General Torrijos's shaky survival or his replacement by another Guard officer—augurs badly for the treaty negotiations. Foreign diplomats in Panama feel that Washington would still clearly prefer to complete the negotiations with General Torrijos, and is probably now seeking ways of ensuring his survival, but the diplomats also believe that the weaker he becomes, the less likely he is to obtain broad popular support for a compromise treaty.

Alan Riding writes frequently for The Review on Latin American subjects.

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Early Bird

WASHINGTON POST - 10 OCTOBER 1976 (12)

The Mayaguez Test

WAS THE RELEASE of a long, retrospective and critical GAO study of the Mayaguez incident politically calculated by the Democratic-controlled House International Relations Committee to embarrass President Ford on the eve of his foreign policy debate with Governor Carter? Of course it was, in effect if not by design. But Mr. Ford, who complained of it in the debate, is the last man in America with standing to do so. For if he was rightly concerned at the time about American prestige in the world, it must be remembered that domestic politics had much to do with the way he handled the affair throughout, both in the aspect of "crisis management" and in the aspect of public presentation. He is not the first President to have domestic politics on his mind in dealing with an international crisis, to be sure. But to cry that the incident is now being used politically against him just won't wash.

The House-released report does not adequately describe the political circumstances of Mr. Ford's reaction to the Mayaguez seizure by the new Cambodian government in May 1975. And to leave that part out is simply to ignore the calamities that had just befallen American policy in that part of the world. To state it briefly: The entire American position in Indochina had just collapsed in ruins. Still a relatively new and untested President, Mr. Ford was eager to demonstrate not only the will of America but his own. He gave every evidence of perceiving the Mayaguez incident as an opportunity, however uninvited, to serve these various purposes. The exalted crisis atmosphere with the allusions to JFK in 1962, the photographs of grim shirt-sleeved decision-makers in the Oval Office, the inspired accounts of the President's command and coolness in dispatching men into battle, the orchestration (once the ship and crew were retrieved) of paeans of self-congratulation: politics? Not on your life!

In fact, as we thought at the time, there was something grossly unbalanced about the way the incident

was played. To imagine that a nation's prestige and credibility could be redeemed, or a President's image meaningfully burnished, by throwing the massive weight of American power against a small, war-broken, isolated country like Cambodia was pathetic. Yes, the President had a duty to try to reclaim the crew and ship. Yes, he was operating within limits of time, leverage and information that make it easy enough now to second-guess his tactical decisions. We are not inclined to blame him for invading the wrong island, or for moving ahead without being sure that all available information was at his fingertips, or even for losing more men (41 dead) than he saved (40)—although it baffles us that he should still be touting the operation as a great success. The main point remains that Mr. Ford, by responding reflexively and with overpowering force to an act of piracy by a tiny government, proved practically nothing about how the United States or he personally would cope with a crisis involving real political/military odds.

Frankly, we wish Mr. Carter had made this point. Instead, he contented himself with sniping at Mr. Ford for having been tardy in getting out the facts. Mr. Carter seems to have been impressed by the political harvest that Mr. Ford reaped at the time. "This is what the American people want," he said Wednesday night, "... we obviously had to move aggressively and quickly to rescue (the ship and men)." Unquestionably, the United States did have to do what was necessary in the rescue. But it did not have to magnify the event out of all proper proportion and celebrate it as a classic presidential act of national redemption.

The Mayaguez incident, in its play and in its replay, is a little cameo, offering a revealing glimpse into attitudes toward the use of power. Neither candidate, in our view, has shown that he understands the true terms in which this incident should be judged.

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AIR FORCE MAGAZINE - OCTOBER 1976 (12)

The Risky Business of Technology Transfer

By John L. Frisbee, EXECUTIVE EDITOR

DETERRING the expansion of Soviet territory and influence rests on US technological superiority. That superiority is the product of a happy combination of natural resources and social, political, and economic institutions that have provided and encouraged public education, social mobility, individual freedom, and the rewards of a free-enterprise system. In this unique environment, the US has been and still is able to generate innovations in high technology at a rate rarely equalled elsewhere. That has been our strength, and it could be our undoing.

In contrast, the rigidly controlled, highly centralized Soviet system has produced competent scientists, but in many militarily essential technical areas it has fallen far short of US efficiency in design and serial production—in other words, in technology as distinct from basic research.

The Soviets are trying to close the technology gap by industrial espionage and by acquiring Western technology in other ways. Since 1972, their search for this technology has not been primarily through buying end products they cannot yet duplicate. Such purchases may fill a temporary need, but engineering analysis of finished products rarely reveals the details of Western design and production know-how. Hence, they have turned to other means: coproduction agreements, licensing arrangements, buying entire factories, contracting for training in high-technology areas, and so on. Through these varied routes of technology transfer they hope to fulfill Lenin's prophecy that "the capitalist countries will supply us the materials and technology we lack . . . and need for future victorious attacks upon our suppliers."

suggested earlier, multidimensional. Much US technology is made available to allies, who are not authorized to transfer it to other nations without US approval. However, as US technology is modified by the allied recipient, it gradually loses its American identity, and its controllability, which, at best, is far from airtight. Add to that the fact that the US has no control over export of the indigenous technology of its allies except through voluntary cooperation of the members of CoCom, the Consultative Group Co-ordinating Committee (Japan and the NATO nations, excluding Iceland). The interpretation of what technology may safely be furnished the Soviets, especially in time of economic stress, varies widely among allies and, indeed, among US producers.

As a result of general laxness and inconsistency here and among our allies, the transfer of Western technology to the USSR and Pact nations has, in our opinion, got out of hand to a perilous degree. To take an example, the Soviets have bought from the West nearly 1,000 complete manufacturing plants ranging from automotive to chemical, electronic, and metallurgical production, together with technological training for Russian engineers, managers, and workers. In 1975, Western export to the USSR and Pact countries, a large part of it involving advanced technology, came to about \$30 billion and was limited largely by the Soviets' shortage of hard currency, rather than by Western prudence.

Somewhat belatedly, the Department of Defense, a principal adviser to the Department of Commerce on the issuance of export licenses, has come to grips with the problem—at least so far as US technology is concerned. DoD is in the process of refining, simplifying,

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MAYAGUEZ REPORT PUTS FOCUS ON G.A.O.

But It Was Only One of More Than
1,000 Issued in the Last Year
by the 'Nonpartisan' Agency

By RICHARD L. MADDEN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 9—Officials of the General Accounting Office acknowledge that their agency is not exactly a household word.

Over the past year the office has issued more than 1,000 reports ranging in title from "The Fertilizer Situation—Past, Present and Future" to "Selected Aspects of Nuclear, Powerplant Reliability and Economics."

But one G.A.O. report concluding that the Ford Administration did not exhaust all diplomatic possibilities before launching an attack last year against Cambodia to rescue the cargo ship Mayaguez and her crew has attracted widespread attention in the current Presidential campaign and some officials of the agency are not overly pleased about it.

"There is a general problem the G.A.O. has in its relations with Congress of avoiding being used improperly," Phillip S. Hughes, an assistant comptroller general, said, "I guess I would say we were used in this set of circumstances," he added.

Fuss Over Report

The fuss over the report on the Mayaguez incident points up the unusual and little-known role that the 55-year-old General Accounting Office plays in the Federal Government. The agency is usually referred to as the "auditing arm of Congress" or the "watchdog of Congress." But it prides itself on being nonpartisan and the location of its big but plain headquarters tells something about its place in Washington. It is in a dreary, unfashionable neighborhood roughly halfway between Capitol Hill and most of the Federal departments and agencies in downtown Washington.

On June 23, 1975, a little over a month after the rescue of the crew of the Mayaguez in which 41 American servicemen were killed, presumed dead or listed as missing, a subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, headed by Representative Dante B. Fascell, Democrat of Florida, asked the G.A.O. to make a study of the incident.

The General Accounting Office sent its report to the subcommittee last May 11 but it was classified as secret at the direction of the National Security Council.

Unclassified Version Released

Congressional sources acknowledged that the Democratic majority on the subcommittee had wanted to make the findings public before the Presidential election, and after negotiations with the National Security Council an unclassified version of the report was released last Tuesday and received prominent attention in newspapers the next day—the same day of the debate on foreign policy between President Ford and his Presidential challenger, Jimmy Carter.

That afternoon the accounting office took the unusual step of issuing a statement that it had no control over the release of the report and had been advised that it was released only after copies had been sent to news organizations.

Yet when Mr. Ford was asked about the report in the debate Wednesday night, he said he was "very disappointed in the fact that the G.A.O. released that report because I think it interjected political partisan politics at the present time."

BALTIMORE SUN - 10 OCTOBER 1976 Pg. 2 (12)

Thai coup may strain 'smile' of Vietnam

Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun

Hong Kong—Last week's right-wing military coup in Thailand could have a sharply unsettling effect on relations between Communist Vietnam and its non-Communist neighbors—relations that had seemed to be slowly warming with Vietnam's recent "smiling diplomacy" in Southeast Asia.

The Vietnamese, who established diplomatic ties with Thailand only two months ago, responded to Wednesday's coup with evident shock and dismay. A Hanoi radio broadcast charged that the United States Central Intelligence Agency helped engineer the military takeover and said the coup aimed at "sabotaging the friendly relations" between the Thai and Vietnamese peoples.

There was no immediate indication whether the new military rulers in Bangkok would maintain or break off diplomatic relations with Hanoi.

However, an attitude of deep suspicion and hostility was indicated in published statements by police officials that Vietnamese coins and other forms of identification were found on the bodies of some of the left-wing students killed in Wednesday's battle at Thammasat University.

The implication was that the Vietnamese were involved in what the Thai generals refer to as a Communist plot to seize power in Thailand.

Vehemently anti-Communist, senior Thai military commanders have been in an acute state of nerves ever since the collapse of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos in the spring of 1975 left Communist regimes entrenched on Thailand's eastern and northern borders.

The military suspects Vietnam and Laos of aiding the Thai Communist insurgents—about 18,500 or more armed rebels

operating in scattered pockets in the northern, northeastern and southern regions of the country—and it lives in fear of the day when greatly increased supplies might begin flowing to the Thai Communists from the vast stocks of American arms captured by the Communists in the final campaigns in Indochina.

There is also a not uncommon view that in time the Vietnamese will openly invade Thailand to impose Communist rule there—though few Western analysts share this belief. "Everybody who has been in Hanoi has heard the warning that the next stop will be Bangkok," one prominent Thai—Thanat Khoman, the former foreign minister—said publicly a few months ago.

In spite of unease in the military, the successive civilian governments that ruled for three years before last week's coup opted for accommodation, rather than confrontation, with the Vietnamese Communists.

Most top military commanders were anxious to retain the symbol of a military alliance with the United States by keeping the residual force of a few thousand American troops manning the last bases in Thailand—Utapao Air Base south of Bangkok and the Ramasun intelligence-gathering installation in the northeast.

Last March, however, Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj overrode military objections and ordered the closing of the bases and withdrawal of all but a few hundred American advisers.

Mr. Kukrit lost his re-election bid two weeks later in a district heavily populated by soldiers. His older brother and successor, Seni Pramoj, who was overthrown in Wednesday's coup, carried out the base-closing plan.

He made a reference to being a "grandstand quarterback" 18 months after the event and said his Administration had handled the incident responsibly.

Carter Comments

Mr. Carter said that he had not read the report but that the President had an obligation to inform the American people of the facts about the incident immediately after it had happened.

One accounting office official said that some persons might wonder why "a bunch of accountants" would be studying such a military incident but he contended that the study was part of a number of recent reports by the agency on how the Government responds to crises.

Indeed, when the accounting office was founded by Congress in 1921 it was primarily just an auditing agency, going over the financial records of Government agencies to see how they had spent the money apportioned by Congress.

But in recent years, and particularly under Elmer B. Staats, who has been Comptroller General, or head of the agency, since 1966, the G.A.O. has broadened its scope to investigate whether laws and regulations were being complied with, the efficiency of the Government's operations, and whether the Government operations achieved the desired results.

Staff of 3,800

The agency's professional staff of 3,800 is no longer just accountants but is made up of engineers, mathematicians, statisticians, computer specialists, economists and administrators as well as one medical doctor.

It was the accounting office, for exam-

ple, that helped trace the money that had been laundered in Mexico to help finance the Watergate break-in. In recent months it has, among other things, audited how states and localities spent the revenue-sharing funds received from the Federal Government, criticized the testing of new drugs, questioned the need for the Army's development of a new main battle tank, and recommended an overhaul of the grain inspection system.

As part of the legislation passed last year authorizing Federal loans to help New York City in its fiscal crisis, the accounting office was given the assignment of auditing the city's finances.

Agency Initiates Studies

The G.A.O. estimated that about one-third of its studies were the result of requests by Congressional committees or members of Congress while the rest were initiated by the agency itself. More than 1,000 such requests were made of the agency in 1975, compared with less than 500 in 1971.

Although some Republicans have grumbled that the Democratic majority in Congress tries to use the accounting office for partisan purposes, the agency officials maintain that they try to be evenhanded in the investigations that they undertake. Indeed, they noted, they are sometimes criticized because their studies and recommendations are regarded as being too bland.

And while the agency is regarded as a creature of Congress, the Comptroller General is appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, for a 15-year term. He cannot serve for more than one term and cannot be removed except for cause.

WASHINGTON POST - 9 OCTOBER 1976 Pg. 13 (12)

Panama Asks Kissinger To Settle Canal's Future

UNITED NATIONS, Oct. 8 (UPI)—Foreign Minister Aquilino Boyd of Panama said today that President Ford and Jimmy Carter were vacillating and confused about the Panama Canal and he called on Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to settle the waterway's future before he leaves office.

Boyd told the General Assembly that Panama would accept a new treaty on the canal which did not extend beyond the year 2000, but the United States sought a pact that would last 30 to 50 years, which he said was the remainder of the canal's useful life.

He said Ford and Carter, in their debate Wednesday night, discussed the canal question in a "superficial"

manner. He called it the most explosive issue between the United States and Latin America and said the candidates' attitude showed "great irresponsibility toward the American people."

Ford said the United States "must and will" maintain complete access, defense capability and national security interest in the canal. He said negotiations should continue within those guidelines.

Carter said he would be willing to raise payments for shipments through the canal and perhaps reduce U.S. military emplacements, "but I would not relinquish practical control of the Panama Canal anytime in the foreseeable future."

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER - 10 OCTOBER 1976 Pg. 8 (12)

Troubles in Cyprus buffer zone

By Joe Alex Morris Jr.
Los Angeles Times Service

AKAKI, Cyprus — Aristodemus Vassilia is a wizened Greek Cypriot farmer who lost two sons and his land when the Turkish army invaded Cyprus in 1974 and occupied 40 percent of its territory.

He fled to the south, where for the last two years he has eked out a living raising crops in the three-mile-wide U.N. buffer zone separating the Greek and Turkish sectors.

He was out there the other day, using a hoe to turn the earth around newly planted potato seedlings under a burning Mediterranean sun.

"The United Nations only allows us to go one mile into the zone," he said.

Lands he formerly farmed, deeper in the zone, were lying fallow.

For the last two years, Greek farmers have used the lands in the zone — it amounts to 3 percent of all the land on the island — without any interference from the Turks.

In about the last month, however, Turkish farmers supported by their government and the Turkish Army have been challenging this arrangement. "They shouted obscenities at us, threw rocks and took our tools away," the farmer said.

The farmers asked the United Nations to intervene. "The United Nations said they were not responsible and we were farming there at our own risk," Vassilia added.

Recently, the United Nations did intervene. A U.N. patrol commanded by a British officer moved in here to stop Turkish farmers who were try-

ing to take over land that had been cultivated by Greeks.

In what the United Nations later called "a regrettable incident," a few Turks were beaten and nearby Turkish troops fired shots into the air. The U.N. forces did not fire back, and fortunately the incident ended there.

The Turkish Cypriot government accused the United Nations of attacking its farmers, demanded compensation, and said it would protect the rights of Turkish farmers in the buffer zone. It added ominously:

"The buffer zone is not a region that can be arbitrarily occupied by the Greek Cypriots."

Most of the buffer zone consists of Greek-owned property, and Turks had not protested cultivation by the Greeks over the last two years. Why the sudden change in the Turkish position?

Some observers in Nicosia, the capital, expressed fear that the ultimate Turkish objective was to seize control of the whole buffer zone, raising the Turks' already imbalanced share of the island to about 43 percent. Only about 19 percent of the island's population is Turkish.

The pressure on the buffer zone also dovetails with Turkish demands for a formal status-of-forces agreement covering the U.N. forces on the Turkish Cypriot side. The Turks do not recognize the sovereignty of Archbishop Makarios, with whom the United Nations originally signed an agreement covering the force on the island.

The United Nations agreed to negotiations last year, and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş expects a formal agreement to be concluded soon. If not, he adds, "we cannot agree to prolong the U.N. mandate, which expires at the end of this year."

The ultimate aim of the Turkish strategy is not yet clear. But observers in Nicosia expect more incidents in the buffer zone as the Turks press their claim to at least part of it.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE (12)
10 OCT. 1976 Pg. 2

He designs own A-bomb, thanks U.S.

PRINCETON, N.J. [AP]—A Princeton University senior has designed what he says is a workable version of a nuclear bomb—with information gleaned largely from public documents.

John Aristotle Phillips, 21, designed a 125-pound device the size of a beachball. He said it would have about one-third the power of the 1945 Hiroshima bomb that killed 70,000 persons.

Phillips, who also finds time to be the football team's mascot, spent last semester researching unclassified material in an effort to show that anyone, including terrorists, could build such a device.

DR. FRANK CHILTON, a California nuclear scientist who specializes in nuclear explosion engineering, said Phillips' design, outlined in a 34-page paper, would be "pretty much guaranteed to work."

Chilton, who has done nuclear weapons work with the U.S. Navy and now works for a California defense contractor, said he worked with Phillips on an unrelated project and talked to him this summer about the bomb research.

Chilton told newsmen that Phillips was using technology about 20 years out of date, but he said he sees no reason why Phillips' bomb wouldn't work.

PHILLIPS SAID his bomb would need 6.96 kilograms [15.35 pounds] of plutonium worth about \$100,000. He noted that an actual test would be needed to prove his theories correct.

Phillips said that graduate students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology completed a similar project a few years ago. But he said their research lacked the conventional explosive needed to trigger a real bomb.

THEODORE TAYLOR, a nationally known nuclear expert and former staff member of the U.S. nuclear weapons lab at Los Alamos, Cal., was one of two Princeton professors who worked with Phillips on the project. The other was Dr. Freeman J. Dyson, who was teaching a Princeton course in arms control in which Phillips was enrolled.

Dyson gave Phillips an "A" grade on his paper outlining his bomb.

The United Nations seems unlikely to stop them. A senior U.N. official confirmed that Greek Cypriot farmers were being advised to stay back from disputed areas.

Reviewing the Mayaguez

When Cambodian troops seized the Mayaguez, an American merchant vessel, 60 miles off the Cambodian coast on May 12, 1975, it was clearly the United States Government's duty to take whatever steps seemed necessary to free the ship and its crew. Another "Pueblo" could not be tolerated by the American people—nor would it have been. The action ordered by President Ford accomplished its purpose, although unfortunately only after 41 American lives had been lost.

At the time, while supporting the President's response to the Cambodians' intolerable provocation, this newspaper asked editorially: "Did the White House, after first news of the ship's seizure, exhaust all orderly diplomatic alternatives before moving to recover the Mayaguez and crew by force? Was the force ultimately used the minimum necessary to carry out the rescue mission?" We specifically raised the question whether Peking's potential as an intermediary had been fully explored.

The criticisms contained in this week's report on the matter by the General Accounting Office fall short of providing fully satisfying answers to these questions. They do suggest, however, that Washington's entirely appropriate show of determination was not matched by its diplomatic or military tactics. Even allowing for pressure to act fast under the threat of unpredictable moves by an erratic opponent, it now appears that the White House was at the very least inadequately informed about the progress of diplomatic efforts to release the freighter and its crew.

Similar deficiencies in communications between observers in the field and those in command of the rescue operations led to a combination of military overkill and those tactical miscalculations which were responsible for the high casualty rate. The American action obviously lacked the coordinated precision that distinguished the Israeli raid on Entebbe earlier this year, in a similar effort to free a group of hostages from their terrorist captors.

There are grounds for uneasiness about the manner in which Congress has pursued this inquiry. It is not at all clear why the Political and Military Affairs Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee assigned the task to the General Accounting Office, an agency better suited to audits than to a review of diplomatic and military policies. Nor, as Governor Carter suggested Wednesday night, is it clear why it was necessary to wait 18 months before this information became public.

The capacity of the United States to protect its interests effectively but with minimum force is of utmost importance to this country's role as a major world power. This is a matter not for auditors but for those in Congress who must assume responsibility for overseeing American policies.



CURRENT NEWS

PART I - EARLY BIRD EDITION - 0730

PART II - MAIN EDITION - PUBLISHED AT 1130



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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1976

WASHINGTON STAR
6 OCTOBER 1976(7) Pg 6

Ford Disputes GAO Report On Mayaguez

SAN FRANCISCO (AP) — President Ford has taken sharp issue with a conclusion by the General Accounting Office that hasty action and faulty intelligence cost 41 American lives during the Mayaguez incident last year, according to the President's chief spokesman.

"We disagree with that conclusion," Press Secretary Ron Nessen told reporters who accompanied Ford here yesterday for his second debate with Jimmy Carter.

"The President carried out the actions in the Mayaguez case and believes they were right," he said. "The interval of time has not affected anything."

The GAO report said the U.S. Marine assault on tiny Koh Tang island in the Gulf of Thailand, aimed at rescuing the crew of the American cargo ship Mayaguez that had been seized by Cambodians, was ordered despite pilots' reports that most of the vessel's crew was not there but aboard a fishing boat.

(See GAO REPORT, Pg 2)

GENERAL NEWS SUMMARY FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

OCTOBER 7, 1976

World-Wide

CARTER AND FORD clashed on foreign policy in the second debate.

Jimmy Carter charged that under President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger U.S. foreign policy has ceased to reflect American idealism, costing this country the world's respect. The Democratic nominee accused Ford of abdicating international affairs to Kissinger, under whom Carter said the U.S. has become "the arms merchant of the world." Carter declared that he would end secrecy in the conduct of foreign policy, bringing the people back into the process through "fireside chats" and greater involvement by Congress.

Carter seemed less nervous and more forceful than in the debate on domestic issues. He and Ford clashed frequently, and the debate didn't bog down in statistics.

(See NEWS SUMMARY, Pg 2)

WASHINGTON POST - 7 OCTOBER 1976 Pg 7

101st Airborne Undergoes Crucial Test in Europe

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Foreign Service

WOLFERSTETTEN, West Germany — The famed 101st Airborne Division, which won glory in the Battle of the Bulge in 1945, returned to Europe this month for the first time since World War II and, in a sense, is still fighting for its life here.

The Army's "Screaming Eagles" are a vastly different division now from what it was when its former commander delivered the famous response "nuts" to the German forces that demanded its surrender at Bastogne.

Today, the 101st is the biggest and most controversial division in the Army. The official analysis as to how it performed during several weeks of exercises here will have a big impact on where, if at all, it fits into Army plans for the future.

In the past decade, the 101st, as an airborne division, fought in Southeast Asia. But now, with the Vietnam war over and the Army's attention turned toward the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, the question arises whether the division is equipped for possible conflict in Europe.

The 101st is the Army's only "air assault division." Unlike yesterday's paratroopers, the 101st Division brings its 18,000 troops, artillery and thousands of tank-killing missiles into the battle exclusively by helicopter—more than 400 of them.

Many U.S. Army divisions have troop-carrying and anti-tank-missile-firing helicopters, but the 101st is entirely composed of such forces, training in small hunter-killer groups of heliborne assault forces that have developed helicopter warfare into a highly refined—and expensive—strategy.

With so many pilots, it has more officers than any other division. The way it operates and its huge armada of helicopters help make it the most costly—and force it to depend to some extent on other units to help supply it with ground transportation.

All of these factors have fueled controversy about the new version of the division, as has the fact that the blue- (See 101 AIR BORNE, Pg 2)

NEW YORK TIMES

7 OCTOBER 1976 Pg 6

MIG-25 FOUND TO LAG BEHIND U.S. AIRCRAFT

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 6—After several weeks of dissecting the Soviet MIG-25, Pentagon intelligence experts have concluded that the plane has a limited military mission and lags behind American aircraft in advanced technology.

When a defecting pilot flew the plane to Japan a month ago, the event was hailed as an intelligence windfall that would permit the United States to learn the secrets of what Robert C. Seamans Jr., then Air Force Secretary, said in 1973 was "the best interceptor in production in the world today."

According to Pentagon officials, examination of the plane has not produced any major surprises, either about its capabilities or about the state of Soviet technology. But the plane has provided insight for the Pentagon on how Soviet designers try to minimize costs.

The MIG-25 turned out to be heavier than estimated by the Americans. Its electronic system was found to be more advanced than expected but still a generation or two behind American technology.

Sluggish at Low Altitude

At low and medium altitudes, it was judged to be more sluggish than had been thought, and thus no match for American fighters.

"It is now crystal clear," one official said, "that contrary to the impression in some circles, this aircraft never was designed to fight other fighters."

Rather, he said, the plane was designed as an interceptor against bombers and in that role it is probably the world's fastest, highest flying plane.

It appears to have been designed to meet a threat that never materialized, and thus presents an example of how planning and weapons production can lag behind a changing threat and technology—a problem not unknown to the Pentagon.

The plane is believed to have been originally designed to intercept the high-flying, supersonic B-70 bomber. This program was canceled after the shooting down of the U-2 reconnaissance plane in 1960 made it evident that high-flying (See MIG-25, Pg 2)

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THURSDAY MORNING, 7 OCTOBER 1976

GAO REPORT - CONTINUED

THE GAO, the auditing arm of Congress, conducted the study for the House international military and political affairs subcommittee which earlier had held hearings on the matter.

It said that U.S. pilots had reported that 30 to 40 persons who appeared to be Caucasians were aboard a fishing boat and not on the island where the Mayaguez had been taken by the Cambodian patrol boats that had seized it.

Despite this, the report said, the local U.S. command made its decision to assault Koh Tang on the basis of a report, the basis of which could not be determined, that the crew or most of it was still on the island. It said the command also had faulty information that the island had only about 20 defenders, and did not know of an accurate U.S. intelligence report that there actually were 150.

EIGHTEEN MARINES died and 50 were wounded in the assault. Another 23 Americans, mostly Air Force police, were killed prior to the assault while being airlifted by helicopter from their base in Thailand.

NEWS SUMMARY - CONTINUED

Ford denied that he has run the country's foreign affairs in secret. The President termed the U.S. strong and at peace, and he cited his administration's diplomatic successes in the Mideast and Africa. Ford assailed Carter for proposing defense-budget cuts and charged that the Democrat had said he "would look with sympathy to a Communist government" in Italy. Carter termed that statement "ridiculous."

Carter also disparaged Ford's statement that Yugoslavia, Rumania, Poland and other Eastern European nations aren't satellites of Moscow. "I would like to see the President convince the Polish-Americans and the Czech-Americans and the Rumanian-Americans of that," Carter commented.

Ford said U.S. foreign policy already reflects the morality Carter says he would impart. He added that the U.S. is pressing hard for a new strategic-arms-limitation pact with the Soviet Union, sending food to poor nations and trying to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. Carter, in response, charged that the Republican administrations had overthrown an elected government in Chile, that of Marxist President Allende.

Companies that cooperate with the Arab boycott of Israel will be identified, Ford said. He previously resisted congressional efforts to penalize such corporations. Carter termed the boycott "an absolute disgrace." The Democrat also said he would bar trade with Arab countries if they should reimpose an oil embargo.

Ford charged Carter earlier yesterday with making a slur against blacks when the Democratic nominee said last April that he favored preserving the "ethnic purity" of neighborhoods, a comment for which Carter apologized. The President also defended his handling of the Mayaguez rescue off Cambodia in 1975, contending that a congressional unit's critical report of the matter was "partisan politics."

A Carter tax adviser said that if the Democrat is elected he may propose to cut the tax rate to 50% from 70% for persons in the top bracket and to 10% from 14% for those at the bottom. Nevertheless, the most wealthy would pay more because they would have fewer deductions and exclusions. Joseph Pechman of Brookings Institution said. He and Carter's press aide emphasized that Pechman was only giving his own interpretation of Carter's thinking.

101 AIRBORNE - CONTINUED

bereted soldiers are clearly an elite unit. That concept captured much attention with the Green Berets of the Special Forces in Vietnam.

The 101st is called a "light division," trained to move fast to any trouble spot and fight without the heavy tanks and armor of other divisions.

In the demonstrations here, the 101st put on an impressive show. West Germany's eastern frontiers, which would be the front line in conventional war, are hilly and heavily wooded. The helicopters move in and around the hills at tree-top level.

They are extremely hard to see and, when they move out to fire wire-guided antitank missiles from 10,000 feet away, they seem virtually impossible to spot. The missiles operate over a much longer range than the guns of the Soviet T-62 tanks that would be their main target.

In Vietnam, helicopters proved vulnerable to Communist forces with heat-seeking missiles. The 101st's helicopters have special paint that reduces the heat given off, and defectors that tilt engine exhaust into the airstream of the rotors, thus quickly cooling it.

The 101st's commanders believe that while they would suffer some helicopter losses in battle, their tank-killing potential would be so great against the massive armor of Warsaw Pact forces that their value would be clear.

Gen. Wickham, in an interview here, said the several weeks in Europe had proved, in his view, the ability of the 101st to operate here as a flexible division that could move quickly, wherever needed—keeping its aircraft flying even in Europe's bad weather.

He said the entire division, with the helicopters shipped for the first time by sea, was moved from Ft. Campbell, Ky., to Europe in about five weeks and that it could be done in five days using C-5A air transports.

"This is a controversial division," Wickham said, "and a good deal rode on our performance here. The evaluation teams were looking over our shoulder. The demonstration gives us the best shake we'd had to show what we can do and I think many of the doubting Thomases will have less doubts now."

THAILAND'S GOVERNMENT was overthrown by the armed forces.

Adm. Sangad Chalawyu, an anti-Communist former military chief, seized power eight hours after a campus riot in which a right-wing mob killed at least two dozen leftist students. The students were protesting the return to Thailand of Thanom Kittikachorn, a military dictator they deposed three years ago to establish civilian rule. Adm. Sangad abolished the democratic constitution, dissolved parliament, banned political gatherings and closed newspapers. Premier Seni Pramaj, whom Sangad had served as defense minister, was taken into custody "for his security."

The new rulers said they wouldn't change foreign policy, which has been generally pro-West. An American official in Bangkok said the U.S. would work toward good relations with the coup leaders.

The military government faces formidable problems. Thailand has a high crime rate, a Communist insurgency, difficult rela-

MIG-25 - CONTINUED

bombers were vulnerable to Soviet anti-aircraft missiles. With the B-52 and now with the B-1 under development, the United States shifted to a bomber that could come in at low level beneath the coverage of radar.

Helpless at Low Altitudes

Against a low-flying bomber, the MIG-25 is virtually helpless. It is not designed to operate at low altitudes. Furthermore, it was discovered that the plane does not have "look-down" radar permitting it to distinguish a bomber against the clutter of the ground.

The mission of the interceptor, according to Pentagon authorities, is to counter the SR-71, an American reconnaissance plane that can fly higher and faster and farther than the MIG-25. At one point, the Air Force proposed to build an interceptor version of the SR-71, but that project was dropped when the Soviet bomber threat was displaced by intercontinental missiles.

In somewhat the reverse approach, the Soviet Union made a reconnaissance version out of the MIG-25 interceptor.

In the opinion of Pentagon analysts, the plane provides a useful insight into the straight-forward, sometimes "brute force" approach used by Soviet designers.

Unusually Little Titanium Used

Although Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, director of Defense Research and Engineering, told Congress this year that the Soviet Union led the United States in fabrication techniques for titanium, little of this heat-resistant light metal is used in the MIG-25 and then only at points most subject to heat at supersonic speeds. The designers used the heavier steel in the wings, thus paying a penalty in weight and performance.

Rivets are not necessarily flush and the welding is hand-done and somewhat irregular, complicating the air flow around the plane.

The designers overcame the weight and fabrication problems by using two large and apparently efficient engines. The plane also carries more fuel than had been estimated, again tending to cancel out the weight penalty.

In its electronics, the plane uses miniaturized vacuum tubes at a time when American technology has shifted to transistors and printed circuits. According to one analyst, the vacuum-tube circuitry is of "extraordinary complexity" and "brilliantly engineered."

Example of Cost Consciousness

"It is apparent," one official said, "that the Soviet designers are efficient cost managers who use only as much quality as is needed to solve a problem. They seem to ask why go to the expense of developing something new when we have something proven and cheaper on the shelf. They could come over here and teach us something in the way of cost-conscious management and design."

The plane has an electronic flight-control system that permits ground controllers in effect to fly the plane and vector it toward the target. About all the pilot has to do is take off the plane and push the trigger, which means that high training standards are not necessarily required.

The defecting pilot, Lieut. Viktor I. Belenko, has said in his debriefings, according to Pentagon officials, that he was controlled by ground units out to 40 miles on an overwater mission, by naval units starting at 60 miles and that he never could figure out who was controlling him in the intervening 20 miles.

tions with its Communist Indochina neighbors and a deep division in wealth and viewpoint between urban residents and the rural masses. U.S. troops based in Thailand during the Vietnam war recently were withdrawn because of leftist opposition.



CURRENT NEWS

PART II - MAIN EDITION - 1130

THIS SUPPLEMENTS PART I-EARLY BIRD EDITION



THIS PUBLICATION IS PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL NEWS ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; IT IS NOT INTENDED TO SUBSTITUTE FOR NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS AND BROADCASTS AS A MEANS OF KEEPING INFORMED ABOUT THE NATURE, MEANING AND IMPACT OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NEWS DEVELOPMENTS. USE OF THESE ARTICLES HERE, OF COURSE, DOES NOT REFLECT OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT. FURTHER REPRODUCTION FOR PRIVATE USE OR GAIN IS SUBJECT TO THE ORIGINAL COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1976

WASHINGTON POST 6 October 1976 Pg. 1

Hill Report Faults Mayaguez Action

Associated Press

U.S. Marines were ordered to rescue the Mayaguez crew from a Cambodian island despite reports indicating that the crew was no longer there and with bad information about enemy resistance, a congressional report says.

White House press secretary Ron Neesen said in San Francisco, "We disagree with that conclusion."

"The President carried out the actions in the Mayaguez case and believed they were right," he said. "The interval of time has not affected anything."

The report by the General Accounting Office said U.S. jet pilots had accurately reported seeing all or most of the Mayaguez crew on a fishing boat off the island. But it said U.S. commanders relied instead on an inaccurate report that the crew was on the island.

It also said key planners of the Marine assault on the island, Koh Tang, expected resistance from only about 20 Cambodian soldiers and did not know of accurate U.S. intelligence that there were about 150 heavily armed soldiers there.

The U.S. Marine assault May 15, 1975, on Koh Tang to rescue the ship and crew seized by Cambodian gunboats three days earlier left 18 Marines dead or missing. Twenty-three Air Force men involved in the mission also were killed in a helicopter crash two days earlier.

The report was prepared by the GAO for the Democratic-controlled House International Political and Military Affairs Subcommittee, which released it yesterday with several security deletions. The committee did not say why it released the report at this time.

It was harshly attacked by a top aide to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger as "attempts to second-guess" the fast decisions officials had to make at the time.

The Kissinger assistant, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, condemned the report in a letter reprinted in it as "totally inadequate and misleading."

The report concludes, as had been evident, that the Marine assault and U.S. bombing on Cambodia's mainland did not win release of the Mayaguez crew because it started after the Cambodians had begun releasing the crew.

But it said that "probably could not

MAYAGUEZ...Pg. 2

NEW YORK NEWS 6 October 1976 Pg. 10

CIA & Air Force in Dispute On Range of a Soviet Bomber

Washington (UPI)—The Central Intelligence Agency has been saying all along: that the Soviet Backfire bomber is primarily a medium-range aircraft — not an intercontinental one — and thus does not come under strategic arms limitation agreements.

The U.S. Air Force, however, is not convinced.

According to testimony released yesterday, CIA officials told the Joint Economic Committee in May that the entire U.S. intelligence community has concluded that the Backfire is primarily a medium-range bomber and can be excluded from the current round of strategic arms limitation talks.

"So far, it has been deployed to bases that have been used for the medium bomber," CIA expert Edward Proctor told the committee.

"Therefore, we assumed that at least in the initial deployment it is for the same kind of mission—peripheral and antishipping—as the Badger and the TU-22.

U.S. intelligence experts HAD BEEN DISPUTING Soviet assertions that the swing-wing bomber is a medium range aircraft. By insisting that the bomber can have an intercontinental role, the U.S. has made the aircraft one of the sticking points of the current SALT talks.

The Air force still considers the Backfire to have a limited intercontinental capability that would be enhanced if it were refueled in flight on a mission against the United States.

NEW YORK NEWS

6 October 1976 Pg. 6

Soviet Arms Bind Economy?

Washington (AP) — Sophisticated military equipment is costing the Soviets more than American analysts had anticipated, and may be contributing to economic problems in the Soviet Union, according to Central Intelligence Agency data released yesterday.

SO VIET ARMS...Pg. 2

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
6 October 1976 Pg. 1

Brezhnev: West hurts detente

Associated Press

MOSCOW — Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev accused some Western governments yesterday of sabotaging detente by raising the false issue of a Soviet threat.

He said the Soviet Union was not threatening anyone and repeated Kremlin positions that his country was "ready to reduce armed forces on a reciprocal basis."

He did not name the Western nations he said were undermining detente but it was clear that his remarks were aimed at elements in the United States, among other.

"Some circles in Western countries persistently spread allegations about a Soviet menace and are speculating on the fear which they themselves assiduously arouse," he said.

Brezhnev spoke in an interview with French television from his study in the Kremlin. The interview was also broadcast in Moscow, and a transcript was carried by Tass, the official Soviet news agency.

Brezhnev, 69, wearing a dark suit and four medals, brought up the subject of Western claims that the Soviet Union is arming for war.

He said the need to halt the arms race had become urgent. He attacked those in the West who insist that the

BREZHNEV...Pg. 2

Part II--Main Edition -- 6 October 1976

NEW YORK TIMES

6 October 1976 Pg. 5

SOVIET EXPLAINS AIM OF ITS FOREIGN AID

With Unusual Candor, Moscow Says
It Favors Socialist Nations
That Support Its Policies

By DAVID K. SHIPLER
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Oct. 5—The Soviet Union has begun to make clear its policy of giving preferential treatment in foreign aid to those underdeveloped countries that embrace socialism and support Moscow's positions in world affairs, and of denying help to those considered hostile.

The policy itself may not be brand new, but the candor with which it has been explained in a recent series of public statements is a new confirmation of the pragmatic political purposes that underlie Soviet economic aid programs.

Moscow has outlined a somewhat subtler strategy, but a hard-headed one nonetheless. First, the Russians have rejected the thesis that as an industrialized state the Soviet Union shares with capitalist and former colonial powers an obligation to aid underdeveloped countries.

Position Explained at U.N.

At the United Nations yesterday, a Soviet Government statement declared that "there cannot be any grounds for presenting the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with those demands that the developing countries present to developed capitalist states, including the demand for mandatory transfer of a fixed share of gross national product to the developing countries by way of economic assistance."

Socialist countries, the statement continued, "do not carry the responsibility for the economic backwardness of the developing countries, which was inherited by them from their colonial past."

Second Moscow has stressed its own economic limitations. "The possibilities of the Soviet Union in rendering economic assistance are not unlimited," the Government statement said. "The Soviet state of course cannot neglect the welfare of its own people."

Third, recent articles in the official press have underscored the desirability of fashioning a foreign aid program that can benefit the Soviet Union economically as well as politically. This evidently means generating manufacturing and production capacities in client states that can then supply the Russians with certain needed consumer goods and foods. Afghanistan has received such aid for a chemical and fertilizer factory and an irrigation project, and in turn has exported agricultural produce to the Soviet Union.

'International Division' of Labor

In Soviet parlance, such arrangements are often called the "international division of labor." The current issue of *Kommunist*, the Communist Party's theoretical journal, plays the theme prominently. "It is especially important now," *Kommunist* declared, "that the socialist and developing countries gradually orient their economic relations toward the crea-

MAYAGUEZ...

Continued.

have been known at the time," and said earlier U.S. military strikes and sinking of gunboats probably did influence Cambodia to release the crew.

The report says U.S. jet fighter crews had reported the day before the assault that they had seen 30 to 40 persons who looked like Caucasians on the deck of a fishing boat away from the island.

It said the pilots reported that although they could not be certain they had seen some or all the Mayaguez 40 Caucasian crewmen on the fishing boat, the people were bigger than Orientals and were wearing brightly colored Western gear.

It said the local U.S. command relied instead on a report earlier the same day that "all personnel appear to have been transferred to the island."

The GAO said it was unable to determine why the local command relied on that report, but said, "One might just as easily conclude that the weight of the evidence suggested that most or all of the crew was no longer on Koh Tang."

The GAO said it also was unable to determine why a U.S. intelligence report in Washington of about 150 heavily armed Cambodian soldiers on the island was not passed on to planners of the Marine assault.

It quoted Marine assault personnel as saying that "had the more accurate information been available, the assault would have been conducted more covertly."

tion of a stable and planned public division of labor to enable them to fight even more effectively, the predatory policy of imperialist monopolies."

Fourth, Moscow seems to have developed, in theory at least, a sense of priority governing which nations are to receive Soviet aid. This is essentially a political calculation, though it touches economic considerations as well. "The Soviet people do not conceal their sympathies toward the countries which orient their development in a socialist direction," wrote Ilia A. Kulev, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations, which is the Soviet foreign aid agency.

Priority for Countries Along Borders

By contrast, he said, "the Soviet Union does not cooperate with those states that, for this or that reason, are not prepared for this [cooperation] or pursue directly hostile policies toward the U.S.S.R." His comments were contained in the October issue of *International Life*.

Nevertheless, the Russians have also given high priority to funding projects in countries along the Soviet borders. Ideology notwithstanding, "A narrow band of nations, extending from the Mediterranean to China's southeastern borders, have received 80 percent of the aid," according to an American State Department study.

One of the main beneficiaries has been Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was awarded a \$650 million commitment in 1975—half the total Soviet outlay in foreign aid for that year—to build two thermal power stations and expand Soviet-financed steel and aluminum plants.

BREZHNEV...

Continued

United States must be the strongest military power in the world.

"We have to perfect our defenses, have to, I repeat, since we are faced with the arms race. Voices sound now and again that NATO's leading power must be 'the strongest one in the world,' that NATO as a whole must be building up armaments and thus exerting constant pressure on the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries."

If other countries were really concerned about the growth of Soviet weaponry, he said, they would work "in earnest for reducing armaments."

Brezhnev also criticized assertions that détente benefited the Soviet bloc more than the West.

"Those who believe that we, more than others, need contacts and exchanges in the economy, science and technology are mistaken," he said. "The entire volume of Soviet imports from capitalist countries is less than 1.5 percent of our gross social product."

On the subject of last year's Helsinki agreement on East-West security and cooperation, Brezhnev said that portions of the agreement dealing with international security were the most important elements of the accord but "we, naturally, do not underestimate in the least the importance of cooperation in economy, science and technology, in culture and information, in the development of personal contacts and implementation of measures of confidence."

He did not respond specifically to Western claims that the U.S.S.R. had been slow in implementing the Helsinki agreements, particularly in the area of human rights.

Brezhnev spoke briefly of internal Soviet development, reiterating the line of the 25th Communist Party Congress in February that the party's main goal was "safeguarding the future rise in the material and cultural living standards of the people."

He predicted that the Soviet Union would enjoy "a very good harvest of grain crops" this year, indicating that the 201 million-ton grain target this year will be surpassed. The biggest Soviet grain harvest was 222 million tons in 1973.

SOVIET ARMS...

Continued

In China, the CIA says, military procurement has fallen since 1971, but is expected to grow in the next several years.

CIA Director George Bush said, in the previously secret testimony to the congressional Joint Economic Committee, that the new estimates on Soviet military spending indicate higher costs for Russian defense programs, rather than an increase in the size of the Soviet arsenal. He testified on May 24.

WEDNESDAY MORNING, 6 OCTOBER 1976
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR - 6 OCTOBER 1976 Pg. 27

A new consensus on U.S. foreign policy

By Robert R. Bowie

Many people here and abroad have been deeply concerned that the U.S. would not play its essential role in the world in this critical period. Vietnam and other factors destroyed the postwar consensus. Watergate and other deceptions undermined public trust. And the recession shifted interest to domestic problems.

In recent years, U.S. policy has seemed confused as to its purposes and priorities, often improvised and ad hoc, and lacking public and congressional support. Indeed the campaign debates may reinforce this impression.

A report just issued by the Public Agenda Foundation offers a more hopeful prospect. The method adopted for the report was ingenious. It undertakes: (1) to identify the priorities, principles and interests that should govern U.S. foreign policy, as distilled from intensive interviews with 70 experts, and (2) to determine how far the public would support such policies, as indicated by opinion polls, analyses by specialists, and interviews with some 113 community leaders.

On both counts, the conclusions of the report are encouraging. They seem to me to show that the country is ready to pursue an active and constructive course in international affairs in the years ahead, if it has trusted and intelligent leadership.

The degree of consensus among the foreign policy experts was striking. With some nuances, they generally agreed on the following guidelines:

- The U.S. should give higher priority to close political, economic, and military relations with its core allies in North America, Western Europe, and Japan, and maintain the special ties with Israel.
- It should pursue detente with the Soviet

Union, and especially balanced arms control, actively but more soberly, and seek to improve relations with Communist China, but not at the expense of Taiwan.

- It should maintain a strong defense, based on rough "equivalence" with the Soviet Union, but not seeking "superiority."

- It should address much more creatively and sympathetically the needs of the developing countries (LDCs).

- It should give more weight to democratic values in making and carrying out its policies.

- While the UN, especially the Assembly, enjoys little confidence, many problems — energy, food, proliferation, terrorism, environment, and the economy — must be handled through multilateral measures and international agencies.

The experts differed on the role of Congress and extent of intervention to counter Soviet influence.

The general conclusion of this group was that the U.S. must take the lead "in making the world a better place, both politically and economically, for others, as well as for Americans." But this must be done with a greater sense of proportion, a better balance between mission and power, and more cooperation with others, than in the past. Obviously, as the report adds, such leadership will require a president of unusual capacity, able to work with Congress and to speak to the country.

Such a foreign policy would represent a major shift from the course followed over the last eight years. In speeches during the last year, the Secretary of State has sounded themes like those urged by the experts in the report. But the actual policies pursued in the Nixon-Ford years have given priority to bipolar U.S.-Soviet relations, with less attention to the core allies,

and neglect of the LDCs. It was mainly concern over Soviet influence that attracted attention to areas like the Middle East after 1973, and Africa in 1978. And while relations with Western Europe and Japan have improved from the rock-bottom of several years ago, intimate collaboration is not compatible with highly personal methods of conducting policy. Moreover, the talk about food, global poverty, and the oceans has not been followed up by action.

Suppose a new administration did wish to put into practice the basic priorities and purposes proposed in the report, would the public support them? On this the report is hopeful. While conceding that on many of these issues the general public currently either has limited interest or feels uncertain, the analysis of the data on public attitudes leads to the conclusion that clear and persuasive leadership by the President could mobilize the necessary support for most of the requisite measures.

If the polls are correct, most voters will probably not cast their ballots on the basis of foreign policy issues. Yet the approach of the next president to these issues, and his ability to clarify priorities and purposes and to persuade the Congress and public will be critical for the long-term security and well-being of the country. Judging by the report, however, the next president will find a potential consensus for a constructive foreign policy both among experts and the general public. The question will be whether he has the talents for leadership needed to convert that potential consensus into coherent and effective action.

Dr. Bowie is a member of the Harvard Center for International Affairs and of the Harvard faculty.

NEW YORK TIMES 6 OCTOBER 1976 Pg. 1 MAYAGUEZ OPERATION CRITICIZED IN REPORT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 5—A Congressionally sponsored study of the Mayaguez incident of last year has concluded that the Ford Administration did not exhaust all diplomatic possibilities before launching an attack against Cambodia to rescue the cargo ship and her crew.

The report, made public today by the General Accounting Office, a Congressional agency that conducts audits and investigations of the executive branch, said that while the Administration undertook a number of diplomatic initiatives, "little weight appears to have been given to indications that the Cambodians might be working out a political solution."

The report was ordered by the Political and Military Affairs Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee.

White House Voices Disagreement

The unstated conclusion of the report was that it had not been necessary for President Ford to order bombing of targets in Cambodia or to send marines to the rescue because the Cambodians had already decided to release the crew and the ship. Such a view was expressed in various quarters shortly after the rescue mission.

The White House press secretary, Ron Nessen, said today in California, "Well,

we disagree with that conclusion, if that is the conclusion."

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, an executive assistant to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, in a letter printed in the report, accused of general Accounting Office of "attempts to second-guess the actions of officials acting under the constraints of time." Such attempts, he said, "bring the entire purpose of the report into question."

Mr. Eagleburger's implication was that the report had been released to embarrass Mr. Ford just before his foreign policy debate with Jimmy Carter tomorrow night. Similar accusations about playing politics with foreign policy were made against Mr. Ford shortly after he ordered the military operation.

The G.A.O.'s report did not give the names of countries involved in the diplomatic efforts to obtain the release of the Mayaguez and its crew, but it was learned from Congressional officials that a senior Chinese diplomat in the Middle East had made contact with a foreign ministry official of a neutral country and had asked him to convey a message to the United States.

The message, as stated in the report—with the names omitted—was that the Chinese Government was using its influence with the new revolutionary Communist Government in Cambodia to seek an early release of the ship and "expected it to be released soon."

Although this message was received more than 14 hours before the rescue assault by American marines, the report concluded that "he found no evidence that the State Department attempted to

verify" it.

41 U.S. Servicemen Lost

The Mayaguez, bound from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand, was fired upon by Cambodians 60 miles off the Cambodian coast and eight miles from a group of small islands claimed by both Cambodia and Vietnam, in the early morning hours of May 12, 1975, and was then taken into the port of Kompong Som. The rescue operation was launched late in the afternoon of May 14.

Forty-one American servicemen were killed, presumed dead or listed as missing in rescuing a ship and 40-man crew that —it was later acknowledged—had already been released.

The fact that the crew had been released before the rescue operation has been known. The G.A.O. report added details on how American military pilots had spotted the crew on a fishing boat and not on Tang Island, the target of the marines' attack, and on how the local military command had chosen instead to rely on another assessment that the men were still held on the island.

The report listed what it said had been several other failures to evaluate intelligence and utilize it in military operations and Presidential decisions.

The only information previously made public about Administration diplomatic efforts was that the Government had tried to deliver messages to the new Cambodian Government through the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington, through the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Peking, and directly to the Cambodian Embassy in Peking. Those messages were all returned but were presumed to have been read, Administration officials said at the time.

WEDNESDAY MORNING, 6 OCTOBER 1976

NEW YORK TIMES 6 OCTOBER 1976, Pg 55

Northrop Says F-18 Purchase by Iran Would Require Few U.S. Aides

By RICHARD WITKIN

An Iranian purchase of American-made F-18 fighter planes would require dispatch of only "a very small number" of Americans to Iran to aid in training and maintenance, Thomas V. Jones, chairman of the Northrop Corporation, said here yesterday.

The statement was prompted by concern voiced in a recent Senate staff study that Iran was becoming so dependent on American personnel that it could not go to war "without U.S. support on a day-to-day basis."

Mr. Jones spoke at a luncheon meeting of the New York Society of Analysts at which the company disclosed that 1976 sales were expected to reach about \$1.2 billion and that net income "would be significantly greater than in 1975."

Programs Differentiated

In talking about the F-18 fighter, Mr. Jones was emphatic in distinguishing between this program and those that prompted the Senate staff warnings about excessive manpower commitments to the Iranian Government.

He said that Northrop had sent "very very few" technicians abroad to help the 23 nations that have purchased hundreds of its F-5 fighters. An aide put the total number of such technicians at about 80. And the Northrop chief said the same policy would be followed with the F-18. Iran has said it wants to buy 250 of the craft.

The F-18 is a new lightweight fighter that is based on a Northrop design and will be produced by the McDonnell Douglas Corporation with Northrop serving as a major partner and subcontractor.

The United States Navy and Marines have ordered the plane for carrier use, with 800 planes contemplated, according to Mr. Jones, in the initial program. He said this would represent at least \$1.5 billion for Northrop in 1976 dollars.

The Northrop chairman forecast a potential overseas market for about 2,000 land-based versions of the F-18. The first of these would go to Iran early in the next decade, if the required United States Government approval was granted.

Mr. Jones said he saw no impediments to eventual United States approval. He based this view largely on his company's record of deploying a minimum of personnel with the F-5 and on its promise to follow this policy with the F-18.

Mr. Jones said, in this connection, that the same Senate study that had warned about excessive involvement in Iran had complimented Northrop for minimizing the dispatch of technicians with the F-5. Obviously, the Northrop chairman said, the Iranians would have to be trained to fly and maintain the F-18. But most of this training, he added, would be done in this country.

Reporting on the company's recent business activities, Mr. Jones said the final third-quarter figures would show sales of about \$320 million, an increase of about 30 percent over 1975.

WASHINGTON POST

6 OCTOBER 1976, Pg 12

3 Arrested at White House In Protest of Nuclear Bomb

Three persons were arrested in front of the White House yesterday afternoon and charged with demonstrating without a permit, U.S. Park Police said.

Police said the trio identified themselves as Lee Bryant Griffith, 27 of Baltimore; Douglas J. Wilson, 44, of British Columbia and "John Doe" and said they represented a group called the International Fast which is opposed to use of the nuclear bomb.

NEW YORK TIMES 6 OCTOBER 1976, Pg 2

C.I.A. Sees Soviet's Arms Outlays Increasing Despite Economic Lag

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 5.—The Central Intelligence Agency predicts that the Soviet Union will continue its long-term growth in military spending, although perhaps at a more moderate pace because of its lagging economy.

In testimony given to Congress last May and made public today, the C.I.A. said that a balanced development of the Soviet economy had clearly been "impeded" by the high rate of defense spending, thus presenting the Soviet leadership with a "contentious" and "painful" issue.

At the same time, however, the C.I.A., which last spring substantially increased its estimate of Soviet defense spending, said "it is clear that the Soviets are far more willing than we had thought to forgo growth in the civilian sector (and consumer satisfaction) in favor of expanding military capabilities."

The testimony was by the Director of Central Intelligence, George Bush, and other agency specialists on the Soviet Union before a joint economic subcommittee headed by Senator William Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin.

Mr. Bush saw "many signs that the Soviet economy has entered a period of slower growth, at a time when all major sectors—defense, industrial growth and consumption—are demanding increases."

A 'Most Serious' Setback

Largely because of agricultural crop failures, he said, the Soviet economy last year "suffered its most serious setback" since the Communist Party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, came to power in 1964.

"We are getting reports of food shortages, particularly in meat, as well as stories of work slowdowns and vandalism in the markets, as the people vent their ire," he said. Mr. Bush added that there were no "indications that the leadership has seriously considered diverting resources from military to civilian use in response to consumer demands."

Largely because of a conclusion that

Soviet military equipment is higher priced than had been presumed, the C.I.A. nearly doubled its estimate of the share of Soviet gross national product going into defense. Its current estimate—which some in the Pentagon think is still too low—is about 11 percent to 13 percent.

The C.I.A. also estimated that in the last five years, Soviet defense spending increased annually at an average rate of 4 to 5 percent. The increase in defense spending just about matched the growth in the gross national product. But last year, according to C.I.A. estimates, the growth in Soviet gross national product fell to 2.3 percent.

Justification for U.S. Spending

The past steady growth in Soviet defense spending has been one of the major arguments used by the Ford Administration in justifying increases in the American defense budget.

The United States devotes slightly less than 6 percent of its much larger gross national product to defense.

Measured by what the Soviet military program would cost the United States in dollars, Soviet military spending last year was estimated to have exceeded that of the United States by about 10 percent.

Mr. Bush also testified that the Soviet armed forces were now estimated to total 4,780,000. This included 371,000 assigned to construction and transportation, 330,000 in the border guards, 39,000 assigned to local military commissariats and 12,000 in the Main Political Administration.

These assignments have no exact counterparts in the United States, which maintains a military force of two million.

"Generally speaking," Mr. Bush said, "the U.S.S.R. lags far behind the U.S. in the design and production of advanced electronic components and computers, and in some aspects of missile propulsion and guidance technology."

NEW YORK TIMES

6 OCTOBER 1976, Pg 2

SOUTH KOREA LEADER SAYS CURBS WILL BE CONTINUED

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Oct. 5.—The South Korean Government intends to continue its emergency rule, which its critics charge is curtailing many of the civil rights of its citizens.

Prime Minister Choi Kyu Hah told the National Assembly today that the policy of maintaining the emergency decree in force remains unchanged in view of continuing threats from the Communist Government in North Korea. The decree was issued by President Park Chung Hee 17 months ago during a period of student demonstrations and opposition moves to oust the Government.

Mr. Choi also declared that the Government would not seek to revise the current Constitution, which gives President Park broad powers. Lifting of the emergency and revision of the Constitution have been two main objectives of the opposition New Democratic Party.

The emergency decree outlaws almost all political activities that challenge the Government. The Constitution, which was

NEW YORK TIMES

6 OCTOBER 1976, Pg 2

Indochina Refugees Need Help When at Sea, U.N. Official Says

Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, Oct. 4.—The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees called attention today to the plight of those he termed the "boat people," the Vietnamese and other Indochinese refugees who are fleeing their homeland by sea to escape Communist rule.

Prince Sudruddin Aga Khan told the 31-member Executive Committee for the United Nations refugee program that many refugees were fleeing in fragile craft and needed assistance once they reached the high seas.

approved in a national referendum in 1972, provides Mr. Park a virtual lifetime tenure in the Presidency.

The Prime Minister's policy remarks were made in answer to questioning by Lee Chul Sung, the new leader of the New Democratic Party, who in an overall policy review called for a broad liberalization of the country's politics.

Part II -- Main Edition -- 6 October 1976

NEW YORK NEWS 6 OCTOBER 1976, Pg 46

The Mayaguez matter: Topic A at Debate II?

JAMES WIEGHART

WASHINGTON—One of the proud personal mementos President Ford has added to the White House Oval Office is a handsome, highly polished ship's wheel, bearing the brass nameplate, SS Mayaguez.

The large, wooden-spoked wheel, placed behind and slightly to the right of Ford's desk, adds a nice nautical touch to the rather stark white walls of the attractive, doomed office. But the Mayaguez wheel serves more than just a decorative function

CAPITOL STUFF

—it is there as a reminder to the former congressman from Grand Rapids of the tense hours he spent with his national security advisers in that very same room, sweating out the daring military rescue he ordered of the Mayaguez and its 40-man crew.

To Ford, the rescue of the Mayaguez and its crew from the Cambodian Communists last year was a major military and foreign policy triumph.

The joint Navy, Marine and Air Force operation not only freed the merchant ship and its men, it also severely punished the Cambodian pirates by bombing mainland airport and dock facilities. It was a heady victory for Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger, who personally monitored the rescue, and a timely one too, coming as it did on the heels of the humiliating, forced U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Ford flaunted the rescue as a demonstration of his will and the nation's power to honor American commitments around the globe. The Mayaguez victory was hailed by defeat-weary Americans as proof that their country was still capable of projecting its military might halfway around the globe to protect U.S. interests. Needless to say, Ford's popularity, which had plummeted with the Nixon pardon and the fall of Vietnam, rose sharply.

Even as the toll of American dead mounted in the days following — from the Marine assault on Koh Tang Island and from helicopter crashes — and even after evidence accumulated that the Cambodians planned to free the Mayaguez crew anyway, the general euphoria over the Mayaguez victory continued unabated.

Now, 17 months later, the General Accounting Office reports that the Marine assault on Koh Tang was ordered even though American pilots reported that most or all of the Mayaguez crew had been removed by Cambodian patrol boats a day earlier. The congressional watchdog agency made the study at the request of a House International Affairs subcommittee which held hearings on the rescue last year. Since 28 of 41 U.S. deaths stemmed directly from the assault, the GAO report raises new questions about the wisdom of the rescue effort.

With Ford scheduled to meet Democrat Jimmy Carter today in their second nationally televised debate — this one specifically concerned with defense and foreign policy — it is more than likely that Ford will be questioned about the Mayaguez affair. Carter has already criticized Ford's handling of the Mayaguez seizure. In the now-famous series of interviews he had with Playboy magazine, the former Georgia governor faulted Ford for acting on the basis of insufficient intelligence.

"It's obvious we didn't have adequate intelligence," Carter said. "We attacked an island when the Mayaguez crew was no longer there. There was a desire, I think, on the part of President Ford to extract maximum publicity from our effort, so that about 23 minutes after our crew was released, we went ahead and bombed the island airport."

The GAO report indicates that our intelligence may not have been as inadequate as Carter believed. It now appears that the assault on Koh Tang was ordered even though there was good reason to believe the crew was no longer there.

With American foreign policy interests much more

BALTIMORE SUN

6 OCTOBER 1976, Pg 4

Anti-Soviet blasts imply Mao's foreign policy lives

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS

Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun

Hong Kong—China's tirades against the Soviet Union have continued unabated in the weeks following the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

"The new tsars cast a greedy eye on Western Europe like a hungry wolf with mouth watering," said a published commentary last week on a favorite Chinese theme: the danger of Soviet aggression leading to a third world war.

Distributed by Hsinhua, the official news agency, the commentary outlined the massive dimensions of Soviet military force in Europe and concluded:

"The new tsars have mountains of gunpowder in Europe which is being kept dry. Their purpose is quite clear . . . their gunpowder will set fire not only to West Europe but also to America on the other side of the Atlantic. This is no longer a secret. The new tsars have declared unambiguously that in a future war, the United States will become the chief target of attack on the main battlefield in Europe."

"The long-cherished desire of the new tsars is to destroy the United States . . . dominate the world against the U.S., rather than the reverse." The Chinese made clear they continue to regard Soviet "social imperialism" as a greater danger to world peace than American imperialism.

The continuing anti-Soviet polemics appear designed to demonstrate that whatever domestic policy questions divide the competing factions in the post-Mao Chinese leadership, foreign policy is not so far—at issue.

Among anti-Soviet themes have been attacks on the Warsaw treaty organization, calling it "a tool for enslavement of these [East European] nations, for intimidating West Europe and contending for world hegemony with the United States."

Another, dealing not only with Soviet aggressive intentions but with what the Chinese regard as Russian perversion of Marxist ideology, declared September 18: "The workers and peasants, once the masters of the Soviet state, have now been denied all their political rights and subjected to ruthless fascist repression. The enormous wealth created by the working people is appropriated, artfully or otherwise,

by a junta of bureaucrat monopoly capitalists to their own benefit and is squandered by them.

"The people have been impoverished . . . Their minds are being insidiously poisoned by bourgeois ideology and culture with the consequence that corruption and graft, theft and robbery, blackmail and extortion, and alcoholism swamp the country."

On September 23, in a dispatch on superpower rivalry in Africa, Hsinhua openly voiced China's concern over an apparent weakness in the capitalist West in the face of the Soviet challenge: "The new tsars have been feverishly stepping up their infiltration and expansion in the continent by taking advantage of the appeasement tendency prevailing in the West."

While continuing published attacks on the Soviet Union, the Chinese have also made other gestures apparently planned to demonstrate continuity in Peking's foreign policy during the transition to the post-Mao era.

Perhaps the most dramatic of these was a decision immediately after the chairman's death to allow James R. Schlesinger, the former U.S. defense secretary, to continue a planned tour to regions adjacent to the Sino-Soviet frontier despite the fact that China was in deep mourning.

Mr. Schlesinger, who was fired by President Ford for expressing doubts over the pace of U.S.-Soviet detente and for differences on the U.S. military budget, represents the type of anti-Soviet politician the Chinese would like to see prevailing in the West.

Reports from the Schlesinger tour indicated that Chinese leaders stressed to him the same warnings of Soviet aggressiveness and the same distrust of superpower detente they express in their published propaganda.

Despite the uncertainties clouding China's political future, most Western analysts foresee little chance of a complete about-face in Sino-Soviet relations or a return to the alliance of the two Communist giants that persisted uneasily until the late 1950's.

vitaly affected in such high-stake areas as the Middle East, South Africa, the Korean peninsula and Europe, it would be unfortunate if dispute over the Mayaguez rescue dominated the 90-minute Ford-Carter foreign policy confrontation.

Yet with Carter in substantial agreement over much of Ford's foreign policy—at least in substance, if not in style—there is a real possibility that their differences over Mayaguez may overshadow more important issues, much as the argument between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy over the defense of the relatively unimportant Chinese offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu ate up so much of the time in the first televised presidential debates.

Part II -- Main Edition -- 6 October 1976

BOSTON GLOBE 1 OCT 76 (6)

WILLIAM BEECHER

Mideast peace not so distant?

WASHINGTON — According to the conventional wisdom, there is no sense attempting an over-all settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute until the fires of civil war are dampened in Lebanon.

This notion has been held by top US officials and by several Middle East leaders as well. But the conventional wisdom may, once again, be off the mark.

For it is based on the premise that another Geneva conference is bound to fail unless both Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization are ready to make major mutual concessions with Israel. And while they are mired down in the Lebanon war, the theory goes, neither feels self-confident enough to risk criticism for "caving in" to the Israelis.

Neither Egypt nor Jordan can afford to move out in front of Syria or the PLO without courting even stronger Arab World censure than Egypt got when it appeared to disengage from the common Arab military threat against Israel in the Sinai-2 agreement last fall.

Thus no real progress is possible until the Lebanese crisis is settled. Or so the wise men tell us.

But their whole concept was born in the initial confused stages of the crisis — a time, for instance, when Israel threatened military involvement if Syria intervened heavily with troops. Since then, much has occurred in Lebanon that has defied early predictions.

For the time being at least, Syria and Israel find themselves in the surprising situation of pursuing roughly parallel interests in Lebanon.

Syria's strategy is based in part on assuring that a radical Arab state, strongly influenced by the PLO, does not become established on Israel's northern border. For that could put in the hands of wild-eyed militants the ability to trigger a war with Israel at a time and place not of Damascus' choosing, a war Syria could hardly avoid.

As one evidence of improving relations between Syria and Israel, springing from their community of interest in Lebanon, Israel is now opening its heavily fortified Golan Heights border to members of the Syrian Druse minority who wish to visit relatives. Israeli military men realize this also opens the risk of Syrian spies getting a close-up glimpse of their defenses.

But this modest opening, together with a similar opening of the border with Lebanon to villagers interested

WASHINGTON STAR 5 OCTOBER 1976 (6)

John P. Roche

A Middle East re-run in Kissinger's Africa

There hasn't been an important state funeral in Washington for some time, so it's hard to assess Chairman Kissinger's current standing. Maybe he would be the leading pallbearer, but if current Republican sentiment is any index, he might occupy the box. When I asked an eminent Republican friend why Henry had been sent on an obvious no-win safari to Africa, he replied crisply, "They hope he will be eaten."

Well, Kissinger escaped marination. The amazing thing is how often certain characters can pull the same gig and get away with it. What the Secretary did in his "shuttle-diplomacy" in southern Africa was almost a precise rerun of his Middle Eastern caper. For the benefit of those who arrived late, that shuttle modus operandi worked as follows:

1. Kissinger to Rabin: "Shalom, Itzak. If Sadat, the scoundrel, promised to recognize Israel, open the Suez Canal to your shipping, shoot Yasir Arafat, and open the pyramids to Jewish tourists, would you be willing to evacuate the Sinai?" Rabin: "Well, of course, we would seriously consider it, but there are details to be worked out."

2. Kissinger to Sadat: "Salamma, Anwar. If Rabin, the stubborn hawk, were to evacuate Sinai, and

make Ramadan a state holiday, would you agree to recognize Israel and open the Canal to their ships?" Sadat: "Well, of course, we would seriously consider it, but there are details to be worked out." Kissinger: "Relax, leave the details to me."

3. U.S. press report: "A senior American spokesman close to the thinking of Secretary Kissinger states that Egypt has agreed to recognize Israel in return for the evacuation of the Sinai."

4. Follow-up press report: "A senior official travelling with Secretary Kissinger says the Secretary cannot understand why the peace agreement, so brilliantly negotiated, has been repudiated by both Cairo and Tel Aviv. When the Secretary left, only a few trivial details remained unresolved."

Now he has pulled the same stunt in southern Africa. The difference between the news in our media and on British short-wave was striking. Here the five African presidents were depicted as oozing moderation; on the B.B.C., they were sharpening their knives. Here, Rhodesian leader Ian Smith was joyously accepting the supposed "settlement" — on the B.B.C. I heard Smith say the National Front would agree to gradual transition to majority rule over a two-year period IF there was an im-

mediate and total cessation of guerrilla warfare.

That is a big footnote. It is doubtful whether — even if they wished to do so — the black leaders of the "confrontation states" could stop the guerrillas. Moreover, they claimed a two-year period was not acceptable, and immediately repudiated the Kissinger deal. As his plane flew into the sunset, a senior official travelling with the Secretary in essence said the whole plan had been undone by a misunderstanding over small details. Small details like the difference between two years (Smith) and two to three months (the black leaders) and the continuation or termination of guerrilla warfare.

In short, negotiation on fundamentals (like survival) is simply out of the question. I hold no brief for the whites in Rhodesia — months ago I argued for a program to help them emigrate to Australia — but it is too much to expect them to sign their own death warrants. The odds are at least 100-1 that minority white authoritarian rule in Rhodesia will be replaced by black dictatorship and that the Moshona and Matabele tribes will temporarily put aside their differences to butcher the white tribe. I'm afraid there is nothing we can do to prevent this, but surely no action of ours should encourage it.

in jobs, medical help or family visits, bespeaks a bold intent by Israel to move toward normalization of relations that long since has occurred with Jordan.

Publicly, Israeli leaders give lip service to the possibility of major border rectifications aimed at ending war with its neighbors. But privately they confide that they see little prospect of peace settlement until the basic hostility of Arab leaders is softened. Rather than a change of heart, they hope such leaders will conclude that Israel cannot be destroyed militarily and that needed economic advancement in their nations is impossible in the face of a costly arms race and periodic wars.

Further, Israeli leaders insist another Geneva conference would be a non-starter so long as unreconciled PLO leaders must be seated as equals. The Israelis have hoped that if such peace talks could be delayed long enough, relatively moderate Palestinian mayors on the West Bank of the

Jordan River might become recognized as the logical ones to negotiate, rather than PLO firebrands from outside.

Here again, events in Lebanon, which have eroded the authority and influence of top PLO leaders and embittered their relations with Syrian President Assad, might just open the way to agreement on a Palestinian delegation to Geneva drawn heavily from the West Bank, with a sprinkling of some of the less militant PLO leaders.

None of this would be easy or assured. For it to have any chance of success, someone would have to persuade Egypt and Syria to cool their feud. The United States could play honest broker, especially after the partisan debate of the presidential race is over.

But the prospects are not as bleak as they have been painted, nor necessarily as distant.

William Beecher is the Globe's diplomatic correspondent.



CURRENT NEWS

PART II - MAIN EDITION - 1130

THIS SUPPLEMENTS PART I-EARLY BIRD EDITION



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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1976

NEW YORK TIMES - 5 OCTOBER 1976 Pg 3

British and U.S. Envoys Meet Rhodesia's Premier

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

SALISBURY, Rhodesia, Oct. 4—Assistant Secretary of State William E. Schauffele Jr. and Edward Rowlands, Minister of State at the British Foreign Office, conferred here today with Prime Minister Ian D. Smith on arrangements for the planned conference on the formation of an interim biracial government for the transition to black majority rule.

The envoys arrived here from Pretoria, South Africa, after several days of discussions in interested African countries, and returned there tonight. An informed source suggested that the day of talks had been encouraging but failed to provide any hint of what encouraged them. He balanced this optimism by pointing out that success could not be guaranteed.

While they met behind closed doors with Mr. Smith, and later with representatives of various black and white Rhodesian groupings, a problem emerged that is not within their scope and that endangers the future of the plan mediated by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

The problem is the deep division among the black nationalist factions and their inability so far to designate those who would negotiate with Mr. Smith under British chairmanship on the functions and composition of the interim government.

Black Meeting Postponed

Joshua Nkomo, leader of one faction of the divided African National Council, announced in an angry and rambling news conference today that Bishop Abel Muzorewa, leader of the other faction, had postponed a meeting they had agreed to hold today in order to achieve a united front for the negotiations.

Mr. Nkomo said he could not wait the "two or three days" that the Bishop had proposed and was leaving tomorrow for Zambia, Mozambique and, it appeared, Tanzania to report to the leaders of those countries and to meet with Rhodesian nationalist leaders who operate from beyond this country's borders.

While not ruling out a meeting with Bishop Muzorewa in the future, Mr. Nkomo accused the other nationalist leader of never having engaged in the war that he said brought the white minority regime to agree to yield. "He happens not to control any guerrilla movement," he said of the Bishop.

Twice Mr. Nkomo testily dismissed Bishop Muzorewa's enthusiastic reception on his return yesterday from 14 months of self-exile as "open-Mercedes politics," a reference to the open-top car that drove the Bishop through cheering crowds yesterday from the airport.

Mr. Nkomo reacted angrily to the Bishop's accusation yesterday that Mr. Nkomo was America's choice to head the

(See ENVOYS MEET, Pg 2)

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER - 5 OCTOBER 1976 Pg 1

GAO study criticizes Mayaguez decision

By James McCartney
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — A congressionally sponsored study of the Mayaguez ship seizure by Cambodia last year concludes, in essence, that 41 American lives were lost unnecessarily as a result of hasty U. S. decision-making and poorly coordinated intelligence work.

The study says that a U. S. marine assault on a Cambodian island, intended to free the crew of the Mayaguez, "did not influence" a Cambodian decision to release the crew.

A minute-by-minute reconstruction of the incident, according to the study, demonstrates that the 40-member crew of the captured merchant ship would have been released anyway.

The year-long study, which will be released this week, was conducted by the U. S. General Accounting Office (GAO), an investigative agency of Congress, at the request of the House International Relations Committee. A copy of a 127-page report prepared for the committee has been obtained by The Inquirer.

The seizure of the Mayaguez off the Cambodian coast on May 12 last year was generally considered at the time as a test of President Ford's ability in managing international affairs.

At the time, Ford hailed the recovery of the crew, unharmed, as a diplomatic and military triumph.

After the ship was seized, U. S. reconnaissance aircraft spotted it at Koh Tang island off the Cambodian coast.

U. S. officials drew the conclusion that the crew also was being held at the island. On May 14, U. S. marines landed on Koh Tang and boarded the ship.

It turned out, however, that the crew was not on the island or on the ship, but had been taken to the mainland port of Kompong Som the day

(See GAO STUDY, Pg 2)

NEW YORK TIMES

5 OCTOBER 1976 Pg 9

P. L. O. OPENS TALKS ON ROLE IN LEBANON

By HENRY TANNER

Special to The New York Times

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Oct. 4—Officials of the Palestine Liberation Organization have begun a round of crucial talks with Syrian and Lebanese authorities on the status of Palestinian forces in Lebanon.

The impression here is that the Palestinian leaders, having their backs against the wall militarily, are anxious to get a cease-fire and a political accommodation, but that the talks will be extremely difficult.

Hasan Sabry al-Kholy, the Egyptian envoy of the Arab League here, said at a news conference today that two sets of talks were involved—between Palestinian and Syrian officials and between Palestinians and aides to President Elias Sarkis of Lebanon.

The talks are focusing on when and how to put into effect the so-called Cairo agreements. The accords, which never have been carried out, were supposed to regulate the presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon. Armed units were to be confined to the camps and to southern Lebanon, with the P.L.O. getting guarantees in exchange that its presence in Lebanon would never be questioned by the Christian-dominated government.

Palestinian Weakness Cited

The willingness of the Palestinians to enter into the talks, which are being conducted by middle-level officials, is seen here as a measure of their weakness after the defeat they suffered last week in the mountain area of Ain Tura and Jebel Sanin northeast of Beirut when they were dislodged from long-held entrenched positions by the Syrian Army within two days.

The Palestinians now hold positions in the mountains just east of Beirut, their most advanced stronghold being Aleith.

(See PLO TALKS, Pg 2)

Part II -- Main Edition -- 5 October 1976

GAO STUDY - CONTINUED

before on a Cambodian fishing vessel. The Mayaguez itself was empty.

The crew was picked up at sea on May 14 about an hour and a half after the Marine assault began, and there were immediate questions about whether the assault had forced the release. President Ford suggested strongly that it had.

The GAO study, however, declares there was no connection between the bombing of the Cambodian mainland two events, and adds that U.S. did not contribute to the release, either.

"In retrospect," says the report, "the final Marine assault and the bombing of the Cambodian mainland did not influence the Cambodian decision to release the crew. However, certain U.S. actions probably did influence that decision; for example, the sinking of gunboats and U.S. air activity in the area."

These other activities, however, cost no lives.

The report says that the final death toll from the incident for the United States was 41 killed, and 50 wounded. It estimates that 47 Cambodians were killed, 55 wounded and an "unknown number" missing.

The report questions "the urgency" for the Marine assault — pointing out that by the time it was launched the United States had 200 destroyers and an aircraft carrier in the area, and that "defense officials have not cited any indications that Cambodia was preparing to attack U.S. forces."

The report says, "A postponement might have reduced the risks involved."

The study also makes the point that the marines were put into action so rapidly that "no detailed operational plan for the Marine assault was prepared."

The report says that evidence now available suggests that the seizure of the Mayaguez "was initiated by a local (Cambodian) commander" and that many hours passed before higher Cambodian officials, in the capital at Phnom Penh, learned about it.

Facts now available, the report says, "hardly support a view that expeditious military action was necessary to secure the release of the Mayaguez and its crew."

The report also makes these critical points about U.S. handling of the affair:

- U.S. aircraft gathered sufficient information to suggest strongly that the crew members had been taken to the mainland and on the fishery vessel, but that information was not made available to top administration officials in Washington.

- The United States declined to give weight to indications that the Cambodians might have been willing to work out a political, rather than a military solution to the problem.

- Intelligence agencies underestimated Cambodian strength on the island of Koh Tang. Some information that was available never got to top decision-makers.

- Administration claims at the time that they had broadcast U.S. demands to Cambodia apparently were not true.

The report was particularly critical of the administration on the question

BOSTON GLOBE - 1 OCTOBER 1976(5) Pg 39

Pentagon must justify cuts at bases, including Devens

Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — President Ford signed a \$3.3 billion military construction bill yesterday that commits the Pentagon to detailed studies justifying the closing or sharp curtailment of military bases including Ft. Devens, in Ayer.

The new law requires the Pentagon to conduct economic and environmental impact studies and

report the findings to Congress, which will have 60 days to review the information.

In the case of planned cutbacks at Ft. Devens, the Army expects to complete a draft environmental study in December. After 90 days of public hearings and review, the study would go to Congress for another 60-day period, making it May 1977 before the Pentagon could act to curtail Ft. Devens.

Rep. Robert F. Drinan (D-Mass.) and Sens. Edward M. Kennedy and Edward W. Brooke praised the military base section of the bill, which they helped write.

The President's action yesterday breaks an impasse on the legislation, which authorizes \$3.3 billion in military construction in the fiscal year starting today.

On July 2, Ford vetoed the original version of the bill, which would have delayed by as much as a year all contemplated base closings and cutbacks. The House overrode that veto, but the Senate failed to by 11 votes.

PLO TALKS - CONTINUED

a Druze community, which until a few weeks ago was the headquarters of Kamal Jumblat, the leader of the Lebanese Moslem leftists.

Meanwhile, residential quarters of Beirut came under heavy shelling last night and today.

The only crossing point between east and west Beirut was closed by Moslem forces after heavy firing and shelling in the area.

Civilians Reported Killed

Dr. Kholy, the Arab League mediator, reported that many civilians—men, women and children—were killed and houses dynamited by right-wing Christian militia forces that entered the predominantly Druze village of Salama and Arsun in the mountains east of Beirut in the wake of the Syrian army offensive last week.

The villages had been held by Moslem and Palestinian forces until then. "These were reprisal killings," Dr. Kholy said. "It is what usually happens. These people had not been fighting."

If the Palestinians were driven from Aieff by the Syrian Army, the Palestinians and the Lebanese Moslems in west Beirut would be surrounded and cut off even from southern Lebanon, which has been their only supply route for several months.

The Palestinians thus have not much bargaining power and the crucial question is how hard a bargain the Syrians have decided to drive.

It is believed that the talks are being conducted by Abu Maher and Abu Mazen, two members of the Palestinian leadership who are living in Damascus and who have been going back and forth between here and the Syrian capital for the last few days.

The Syrian leaders and Yasir Arafat and his colleagues in the P.L.O. leadership

of the broadcasts.

"The Secretary of State (Henry Kissinger) and the White House stated that the United States broadcast its response (to a Cambodian message of May 14) directly into Cambodia," the report says.

It quoted Kissinger as saying at the time that "drastic communications measures" were taken by the U.S. to deliver U.S. demands.

"However," the report said, "we found no evidence that the United States did directly broadcast its response to Cambodia."

ENVOYS MEET - CONTINUED

government under majority rule. "I am not engaging in nonsense talking," he said.

Perhaps in rebuttal, Mr. Nkomo emphasized the refusal by the presidents of five African states to accept Mr. Smith's announced plan for forming the interim government.

The principal African objection to the plan negotiated by Mr. Kissinger, Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa and Mr. Smith is the provision entrusting to whites the defense and law and order portfolios in the black-majority interim government.

Mr. Nkomo indicated strongly in his news conference that he felt there was no further American role to play now that Mr. Smith had accepted majority rule and that the British role would be ended once Britain, as the former colonial administrator, had convened a constitutional conference.

There is also disagreement on the nature of the conference Mr. Schauffele and Mr. Rowlands are attempting to arrange. The British minister said on arrival here that the conference would not be a constitutional meeting but would be limited to the forming of an interim government.

are not on speaking terms.

The Syrian press and radio have made it clear that President Hafez al-Assad is determined to bring about a change within the Palestinian leadership.

Shuffle of Palestinian Leaders Seen

It is conceivable, specialists here say, that the Palestinians may agree under Syrian pressure to a shuffle of their leadership.

But it is thought all but inconceivable that they will accept the removal of Mr. Arafat himself. He remains the "Old Man" of the movement and is popular in the camps.

Another key issue in the talks is the timetable for carrying out the Cairo agreements.

The militant right-wing Christians take the position that the withdrawal of the Palestinians into the camps must come immediately—before anything is done to heal the conflict between Lebanese Moslems and Lebanese Christians, who have been fighting for about a year and a half.

The Palestinians on the other hand take the position that the conflict between the Lebanese factions first be settled and an effective Lebanese government restored before they—the Palestinians—can be withdrawn.

Bill Anderson

CHICAGO TRIBUNE 31 MAY 1975

The Mayaguez case: 'dicey' thruout

WASHINGTON—The S. S. Mayaguez was seized and its crew of 39 became prisoners of the Khmer Rouge 60 miles off the coast of Cambodia at 12:21 a. m., eastern daylight time Monday, May 21. [All subsequent time references in this column are eastern, or Washington, time].

By 5:21 a.m. the Pentagon received sketchy details and relayed the word to the White House an hour later. An American P-3 reconnaissance plane took off from Thailand at 7:30 a. m. That was the start of the most extraordinary United States military action since President Jefferson refused to pay tribute to the Barbary Coast bandits.

Confidential reports and Pentagon sources now provide a more complete picture than was available earlier of the operation which cost 28 American lives, with three missing and 30 wounded. It is a story mixed with world power estimates while troops walked a tight rope of constrictions tied to chance and fatal bad luck.

The operation was always "dicey," as one official put it. First off, our forces were limited and scattered. Using equipment and personnel from Thailand was diplomatically sticky. Information about the whereabouts of the merchant crew was never very clear.

One result was that in the beginning, 12 different "options" were drafted. One of them suggested landing Marines by helicopter on the Mayaguez. Air

Force police were considered as an assault force because the Marines were initially far away at Subic Bay [in the Philippines] and in Okinawa.

As airmen were moved for this plan, 23 died in Thailand when a big "Jolly Green Giant" apparently threw off a rotor and crashed. Consideration that the merchant crew might be on Tang Island led to a decision not to shell and bomb the jungle for fear of killing them.

When the big copters came in for a landing at Tang they were hit immediately by intensive ground fire of the Khmer Rouge. Most of the 15 killed in the assault were in the copters of the first wave starting at 7 a.m. Wednesday.

The military tried to offset the absence of firepower to hold down the Khmers with a ruse to conceal the landing spot. The copters made a three-quarter circle of the island, which had showed up on aerial maps as an extremely deep-bedded jungle—with apparently little fortifications.

But the landing spot selected happened to be where the estimated 120 Khmers had concentrated their own firepower. A lucky shot caught the tail of one armored copter. An unlucky 22 Marines were isolated on one side of the island, while their main force of about 149 was on the other.

The destroyer Holt went alongside the Mayaguez at 8:45 p.m. as the Ma-

rines dug in—to report back at 9:05 p.m. that the ship was empty.

Fortunately, communications were excellent. The released crew was spotted by the destroyer Wilson at 10:23 p.m. as the Marines began to see the need for ground reinforcements.

With the crew known to be safe, the Marine ground commander asked for help so he could try to get out with a minimum of casualties. The second landing wave, however, also encountered ground fire at 11:45 p.m., and another copter was damaged.

The force started with only 11 helicopters; losses reduced this to seven. One was hit in going to rescue the 22 Marines. Small landing boats from the Wilson and Holt had to retreat before gunfire.

Then the Navy opened up its guns on the beach in the early hours of Thursday in order that those aboard a downed copter could be rescued. It wasn't until 9:15 a.m. that the Marines, about 213 in all, were removed to the carrier Coral Sea—which had arrived on the scene at the 11th hour at flank speed.

It is believed the three missing Americans are on Tang Island. But the operation was over when the 789 reserve Marines in Thailand were ordered back to home stations. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said during the period, "There are limits beyond which the United States cannot be pushed."

FORD -- CONTINUED

ing 5-ft.-2 dictator, who shows no inclination to step down.

Conscious of Spain's strategic importance to Western defense and of the value the US attaches to its bases here, particularly the submarine base at Rota, Gen. Franco is taking a tough negotiating line with the United States.

Yet his regime has never been so battered or so weak. Marxist Portugal next door is more of a threat to Spain than to anybody else. In the northern provinces, a state of emergency has been declared because of trouble with the Basques. The dispute with Morocco over Spanish Sahara is now at flash point. Split at the seams, Franco's authoritarian state is close to phasing out.

This being so, the timing of President Ford's visit to Spain is causing perplexity.

In the words of an astute Spaniard: "If Ford's purpose in coming here is to prop up Franco, he's too late. If it's to give a boost to Franco's successor, Prince Juan Carlos, he's too early."

MAYAGUEZ -- CONTINUED

dians was relayed to the war room at 5:12 a.m. May 12 from the American Embassy at Jakarta, Indonesia. By 7:30 a.m. the Mayaguez had been placed under aerial surveillance that would continue around the clock until ship and crew were free.

Local air command was under direction of a flying command post code — named Cricket. While diplomatic efforts were being made on Monday, the Navy began precautionary moves in event military action should be ordered.

Quickly Relayed to Press

Military action was indeed ordered by the President, who elected one of three optional plans refined from a larger assortment. The resultant course of events was relayed to the press as quickly as action reports were received. The letter to Stennis contained no new disclosures of substance. However, contrary to some accounts, while ground fire from Cambodians on Tang Island was heavier than expected, the size of the defending force of about 150 had been accurately estimated. The Cambodians fought like veterans.

What will be of particular interest to Russian analysts is the fact that the U.S. was able in a matter of hours to assemble a strike force of marines from Subic Bay in the Philippines and from Okinawa, a carrier task group and two destroyers that had been headed elsewhere, an assembly of troop-carrying and air-rescue helicopters from several Thailand bases and, with an Air Force general in on-scene command, conduct a complicated "vertical envelopment" operation with precision and dispatch. There was no rehearsal no time to get acquainted. It was professionalism of high degree and that, in military matters, the Russians understand.

Weekend Edition -- 1 June 1975

FEATURES COLUMNISTS

NEW YORK NEWS 1 JUNE 1975

Mayaguez Action: a Triumph of U.S. Know-How

By JERRY GREENE

Washington, May 31—It is hardly likely that President Ford found or even expected to find any of his new pals at the NATO summit session overwhelmed by the American recovery of the container ship Mayaguez and its crew from the Cambodians. The relatively minor military incident, as history goes, was hardly the stuff to impress statesmen worried about nuclear warfare.

But it is a dead clinch the Russian military people have been and are giving thoughtful consideration to the Mayaguez operation. Wholly apart from the local cheering, dampened somewhat in the aftermath by the casualty reports, the Mayaguez affair presented to military observers a classic, almost textbook example of what can be done by trained and skilled professionals when a whistle blows.

A detailed chronological account of the action — not the final report which is still under preparation — was included in an eight-page letter just sent from the office of the secretary of defense to Chairman John C. Stennis of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Three pages of statistical summary were attached.

Free of Fancy Phrases

The letter, together with a log of communications of the Pentagon's war room, formally called the National Military Command Center, provides for the first time an overview of the operation from the military side. The letter is bare of fancy phrases or fanciful claims; it tells what the military people did when given a job to do.

The Mayaguez recovery was, although small and seemingly simple, a swift fusing of Air Force, Navy surface and air, and Marine Corps forces drawn from a widely scattered area for a highly complicated performance. The speed and professionalism shown in the operation cannot help but impress any interested outsiders — for there is clear evidence that this precision can be duplicated and substantially expanded elsewhere around the globe if necessary.

In the letter to Stennis, all times were converted to Eastern Daylight Time; the local on-scene time differed by 11 hours. The National Security Council was called into session four times by President Ford during the seizure-recovery period.

CAPITOL STUFF

The Chain of Command

The Pentagon report to Stennis makes no mention of the security council nor of presidential decisions. The chain of command flowed from the President through the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the war room to Adm. Noel Gayler, commander in chief—Pacific at Pearl Harbor, to Lt. Gen. John J. Burns, commander of the 7th Air Force and of the U.S. Support Assistance Group, Thailand, at his base at Nakhon Phanom, deep in the northeast part of that jungle country.

As senior area commander, Gen. Burns was heavily involved in preparing optional plans for action and was in command of the on-scene activities. First word of the ship's capture by the Cambodians.

(See MAYAGUEZ, Pg. 2-P)

BOSTON GLOBE 31 MAY 1975 (1 JUNE)

Ford trying to help Spain get into NATO

RICHARD SCOTT MOWRER

MADRID — A place under NATO's umbrella or, failing that, an upgrading of Spain's military link with the United States to a full fledged defensive alliance. These are Gen. Franco's terms for extending the Spanish bases deal with America which runs out Sept. 28.

Washington would prefer to get Spain into NATO, and this is what President Ford's visit to Madrid this weekend is all about. He will report personally on America's efforts, and his own, to persuade NATO's European members to accept a Spanish linkage to the alliance, especially now that Portugal is sliding under Communist control.

Spain has never been admitted to NATO membership for two reasons. First, because of its World War II record when General Franco backed Hitler and Mussolini. From 1941 until 1944 the Spanish Blue Division fought alongside the Germans on the Eastern front.

Second, because of its undemocratic regime. Portugal under dictator Salazar was acceptable to NATO because it helped the Allies in the war by making available the Azores islands in the Atlantic.

For eight years after the Allied victory, Franco Spain remained ostracized. But the signing of an aid-for-bases agreement with the US in 1953, followed by membership in the United Nations, seemed to open the way to acceptance of a regime the European democracies despised.

"NATO next!" speculated the press with reckless over-confidence, and in those days the Spanish press, tightly controlled by censorship, reflected government thinking.

But in March, 1957, came a chilly squelch from the North. "Here in Norway," the then prime minister, Einar Gerhardsen, announced, "we are of the opinion that it will only weaken NATO if Spain is admitted as a member." The Norwegian ministry of Foreign Affairs followed up with a warning that if Spanish membership was proposed a Norwegian veto was likely. Unanimous consent is required to admit a new member country into the alliance.

Smarting from the rebuff, Franco since then has professed to have no interest whatsoever in NATO membership. But he has never made a move to dissuade the United States from trying to persuade NATO, over the years, to accept Spain.

It is recognized here that full membership in the Atlantic alliance is out of the question as long as Gen. Franco, now 82, remains in power. But last month the Spanish government extracted from the United States a promise that America would make "extraordinary efforts" to establish a closer relationship between Spain and NATO, short of full membership. This condition is part of the slow-moving bases negotiations.

Spain also wants some kind of formal recognition by the NATO countries of its contribution to Western defense. Such recognition would be a shot in the arm for the regime, as Mr. Ford's visit undoubtedly is.

Spain has long resented the fact that through its bilateral military link with the US it is, in effect, contributing to NATO's effectiveness without getting much in return. A security guaranty with America would be welcome, if it could be had, which seems unlikely. NATO protection would be preferred. The snag here is Spain's aging and ail-

(See FORD, Pg. 2-F)

6 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT COLONEL TIFFANY/DR. GORDON

Subj: Some Southeast Asia questions

LFOF

1. On what date did Ban Me Thuot fall? *Attacked 10 March
Fell by 18 March when highlands
were abandoned.*
2. On what date did President Lon Nol leave Phnom Penh? *new week
Post 21 April → 1 April* ~~FOF~~
3. On what date were the two Marines killed at the DAO compound at Tan Son Nhut? *Casualty Branch says 29 April 75.
They were killed approximately 0345 on 29 April Saigon*
4. Which reinforced battalion was airlifted from Okinawa to Utapao? Was it designated a BLT? *Time
BLT 2/9, yes. Oral history*
5. What unit boarded the Mayaguez? Who was its commander? *MCC, Op Sum*
6. What was the unit composition of the landing force at Koh Tang? Who was its commander? *also MCC Op Sum. Name of company commander not available*
7. No elaboration necessary. By close of business Monday, 9 June, please. *is. Included the landing from BLT 2/4. File. Sum of company. Four. Lt Col Randall Rust. landed with the company*

*note: Col John M. Johnson, Jr., USMC
was designated overall GSF commander
for Cambodia contingency operations*

V.R.

S



NEWS RELEASE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINES RECOVER U.S. MERCHANTMAN,
FIGHT KHMER ROGUE
Release No. DLS-159-75
Tel: OX-4-4309

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 27, 1975 (USMC) -- Within three days of the Cambodian seizure of the American merchant ship SS Mayaguez, U.S. Marines boarded and recaptured the ship and assaulted an island during a search for the vessel's crew.

Recovery of the American freighter was not without cost: 11 Marines were killed in action, along with two U.S. airmen and two Navy corpsmen. Another three Marines are listed as missing in action while 41 are carried as wounded. A total of nine Navy men and airmen were wounded in the fray which took place on Cambodia's Koh Tang Island where Mayaguez was anchored.

Mayaguez was fired on and seized May 12 while steaming 60 miles off the Cambodian coast and approximately eight miles from the island of Poulo Wai, 35 miles Southwest of Koh Tang Island.

Events leading to the ship's recovery began with diplomatic efforts to obtain the release of Mayaguez and her crew. During this tense period, more than 1,000 Marines were flown from Okinawa to a U.S. base in Thailand in the event force was needed to recapture the ship.

- more -

2-2-2-2-2

Meanwhile, U.S. recon planes kept close tabs on the ship. When these planes came under fire, and indications of attempts to move Mayaguez' crew were observed, U.S. aircraft in the area attacked several Cambodian gunboats, sinking three, in an effort to isolate Koh Tang Island from the mainland.

When two days of diplomatic maneuvers failed to release the ship and crew, President Ford ordered a land-sea-air assault by combined U.S. forces.

A total of 288 Marines, aboard Air Force "Jolly Green Giant" helicopters, were dispatched to the area in the early hours of May 15. Three helicopters lowered an infantry platoon of 48 Marines aboard the destroyer escort USS Harold E. Holt, one of several Navy ships that had arrived near Koh Tang Island.

The remaining copters flew to Koh Tang where heavy fire was encountered as 112 riflemen from the 9th Marines were landed commencing at 6:09 a.m. in three landing zones on the island's northern end. Another 127 Marines landed later that day, bringing the total number of Marines on the island up to 240. (While plans called for Marines to secure the entire island looking for the captured crew, later developments made this unnecessary.)

At the same time, U.S. Air Force aircraft, joined later by planes from the carrier USS Coral Sea, and guns of the guided missile destroyer USS Henry B. Wilson, part of the Navy's armada at the scene, were supporting the Marine beachhead.

- more -

3-3-3-3-3

Meanwhile, Holt went along side Mayaguez, which was lying dead in the water. In short order, Marines boarded the captured ship, rail-to-rail, as they did 200 years ago. It was vacant, but warm plates of food in the galley indicated a hasty enemy departure.

Back on Koh Tang, Marines consolidated their positions, searching for the captured crew. These plans were quickly changed, however, when it was learned the crew had been released and made its way to Wilson aboard a Thai fishing vessel which the Khmer Rouge had earlier pirated.

The Marines were ordered to cease offensive operations and withdraw, but a quick evacuation was not possible because of intense enemy fire.

The problem was solved by Naval gunfire and heavy air attacks on the Cambodians' jungle positions. The hostile fire was beaten down, and under cover of darkness, helicopters began removing the Marines to Coral Sea. The last Marine was removed 14 hours and 8 minutes after the initial assault.

President Ford announced the recapture of the ship and recovery of the crew on national television. "I wish to express my appreciation and that of the entire nation," he said, "to the units and men who participated in these operations for their valor and sacrifice."

Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger called the operation "eminently successful" and praised the professional skill of the Marines involved.

- USMC -

Washington Post Staff Writer

The official toll of U.S. servicemen known to have been killed in the effort to recapture the American merchant ship SS Mayaguez climbed to 15 yesterday, the Pentagon announced.

Three other servicemen officially are listed as missing in action, though Defense Department spokesman Joseph Laitin acknowledged that "there is little likelihood" that these men are still alive.

Therefore, almost six days after U.S. Marines, Air Force helicopter crews and Navy ships went into a 15-hour battle to try to recover the Mayaguez and free its crew, the final total cost in U.S. lives appears to be 18.

The official figure of 15 dead—11 Marines, two airmen and two sailors—released by the Pentagon yesterday is considerably higher than the preliminary figure of five dead disclosed last Sunday by Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger. Two days earlier, the Pentagon had given still more preliminary estimates of only one killed.

However, in these earlier accountings, the number of men missing and presumed lost was much higher. The 16 men missing that Schlesinger mentioned on Sunday has now been scaled down to three, all of them Marines.

In an attempt to explain the sharp switch from missing to known dead, Laitin said there apparently had been some "double-counting" in the earlier listing of the missing.

The confusion and delay in getting an accurate casualty figure released brought a public display of annoyance with the Pentagon from President Ford's press spokesman on Monday.

Pentagon officials privately are claiming that they, too, are annoyed, mostly at the Marines for an allegedly slow count.

The Pentagon, however, denies that an accurate casualty toll was delayed on purpose so as not to take the glow of success off initial reports of the recapture of the vessel and release of its 39-man crew. The Mayaguez was seized by Cambodian forces May 13 Cambodian time.

Toll in Mayaguez Rescue Is Now at 15 Dead

Laitin said another 50 servicemen—41 Marines, seven airmen and two sailors—were wounded, but that only two were hurt seriously and that both of these were expected to recover. The wounded toll is considerably below the figure of 70-80 used by Schlesinger Sunday.

The Defense Department has said that the Marines used in the battle wound up being scattered over several different recovery ships and at other bases in Thailand, delaying an accurate count.

Laitin said yesterday that there could still be some "minor adjustment" to the figures but the totals now released were "as close to final as possible."

Laitin said 13 of the dead were killed in a helicopter crash just off the beach on Tang Island where the Marines were invading. Another airman died in another chopper crash and another Marine was killed in battle on the island.

The three missing Marines, according to eyewitness reports, were all known to have been fighting on the island and were last seen on the island, according to Laitin.

"But all eyewitness re-

ports so far indicate that no American fighting men were left alive on the beach," Laitin added, suggesting that the bodies of the missing men may still be on the island.

Actually, the indirect toll of dead servicemen in the Mayaguez episode includes 23 other U.S. airmen killed in a helicopter crash in Thailand May 13, before U.S. military action got under way.

In the early stages of planning to recapture the ship, according to Pentagon sources, the only assault-trained U.S. troops in Thailand were a contingent of air policemen and there was some thought of using these troops fast to board the ship. Nineteen of them were being moved aboard the helicopter from bases in Northern Thailand to the big Thai base at Utapao, much closer to the Cambodian coast, when the copter, with a crew of four, crashed. The plan to use the air police was eventually dropped in favor of using Marines.

The French press agency,

quoting unidentified sources of the new Cambodian government, reported from Paris yesterday that 30 U.S. troops had been killed or

wounded in the assault.

Fifteen Marines wounded in the Mayaguez operation were given Purple Heart medals in the Philippines

yesterday after the aircraft carrier Coral Sea, with the Marines aboard, arrived at the big U.S. base at Subic Bay.

Cdr. J. Michael Rogers of the U.S. destroyer Wilson, which picked up the Mayaguez crew members after they were released by the Cambodians, told reporters that the Thai fishing boat that brought the crewmen out to the Wilson was initially thought to be a Cambodian gunboat.

He said, according to United Press International, the Wilson was preparing to force the gunboat away when U.S. spotter planes reported men waving white flags aboard. Thus, it appeared that one more stroke of luck kept the Mayaguez crew free of serious injury. The crew narrowly escaped injury when an alert U.S. pilot held his fire after spotting them a few days earlier being whisked to shore aboard another Cambodia gunboat.

"They drew alongside shouting: 'We are Americans. We are the crew of the Mayaguez. It's good to see you. Good to see the old U.S. Navy,'" Rogers said.

The Pentagon's latest list of men killed in the Mayaguez incident:

Marine Corps
Pfc. Daniel A. Bensedit of Auburn, Wash.
Pfc. Lynn Blessing of Lancaster, Pa.
Pfc. Walter Boyd of Norfolk, Va.
Lance Cpl. Gregory S. Copenhaver of Perryville, Md.
Lance Cpl. Andres Garcia of Carlsbad, N.M.
Pfc. James J. Jacques of Denver, Colo.
Pfc. James R. Maxwell of Center Ridge, Ark.
Pfc. Richard W. Riverburgh of San Diego, Calif.
Pfc. Antonio R. Sandoval of San Antonio, Tex.
Pfc. Kellon R. Turner of Los Angeles, Calif.
Navy
Hospital Corpsman LC Bernard Gause of Birmingham, Ala.
Hospitalman Ronald J. Manning of Tipton, Mo.
These were in addition to the three dead announced Monday, identified as:
Pfc. Richard Vandegier of Buckland, Mass.
Lt. Edwin E. Rum of Dothan, Ala.
Lt. Ashton N. Loney of Albany, N.Y.

15 KIA, 50 WIA, 3 MISSING

Mayaguez Toll: 68

WASHINGTON — After a week of confused casualty reports, the final toll in the Mayaguez rescue operation appears to be 15 dead, 50 wounded and three missing.

Eleven of the KIAs are Marines and there are two each from the Navy and Air Force. Forty-one of the WIAs are Marines, seven are Air Force and two are Navy.

All the MIAs are Marines who were lost during the fighting on Koh Tang island. A Pentagon spokesman said there was "little likelihood" they were alive.

"All eyewitness reports so far indicate that no American fighting men were left alive on the beach," spokesman Joseph Laitin said.

Another official pointed out that it was unlikely Cambodia would keep secret the fact that it held a prisoner, if an American had been captured.

At press time, the names of all the dead and missing had been released and the two Navy wounded were identified. But only 15 of the WIA Marines had been named. All available names are listed below.

ONLY TWO of the men were seriously wounded, the Pentagon said, and both were expected to recover. One is an Air Force man and the other is Marine LCpl. Kenneth J. Fry, who was meritoriously promoted to that grade at his hospital bed at Clark AB, in the Philippines.

One of the Marine dead, LCpl. Ashton

N. Loney, was killed on the island and his body left behind. The others died when their helicopter crashed at sea after being hit by gunfire.

In a Subic Bay press conference, Lt. Col. Randall Austin talked about the Cambodian resistance. He's CO of the 2d Bn., 9th Marines — the unit hastily airlifted from Okinawa for the operation — and accompanied his battalion's Co. G on the assault.

"There was very heavy combat" from the estimated 150 Cambodians on the island, he said. "It was a classic helicopter assault in which, unfortunately, we encountered heavy fire once on the ground."

"There were many instances when the enemy threw hand grenades and our forces picked them up and threw them back," Austin said.

HE ESTIMATED that about 25 Cambodians were killed.

"There was no exact intelligence on the whereabouts of the Mayaguez crew on the island," Austin said. "We were just going to look for the crew members of the Mayaguez, using standard techniques once we were on the island, in places where they were likely to be. My orders were to land and rescue the crew members."

All the Navy dead and wounded are corpsmen. Killed were Hospital Corpsman Second Bernard Gause and Hospitalman Ronald J. Manning. Wound-

ed are Hospital Corpsman Third Stephen J. Poore and Hospitalman David J. Foley.

The Marine KIAs in addition to Loney are:

PFCs Daniel A. Benedett, Lynn Blessing, Walter Boyd, James J. Jacques, James R. Maxwell, Richard W. Rivenburgh, Antonio R. Sandoval and Kelton R. Turner.


Also, LCpls. Gregory S. Copenhaver and Andres Garcia.

The missing are LCpl. Joseph N. Hargrove, PFC Gary L. Hall and Pvt. Danny G. Marshall.

The identified wounded, in addition to Fry, are: Capt. Mykle E. Stahl; Sgt. Victor G. Salinas; Cpl. James H. Jones Jr.; LCpls. Wilburn Goodpasture Jr. and Ronald L. Hughes; PFCs Daniel M. Carrasco, Michael S. Cooper, Kendrick E. Deckard, Mark Dick, Tex E. Duke, David L. Fowler, Jerome N. Wemitt and Larry D. Yerg, and Pvt. David R. Gibbs.

U.S. DESTROYER Holt tows the merchant ship Mayaguez from near Koh Tang Island during an assault on the Cambodian-held island by Marines. The ship's 39-man crew was safely aboard after being freed by their captors.

(UPI Photo)



Pay Debate: Many Due Raises Anyway!

BOB SCHWEITZ

Longevity increases come after... until they reach O-7 when the... pending on their... of

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WASHINGTON STAR 26 MAY 1975 (27)

Why We're Still Waiting for the Casualty Count

By Vernon A. Guidry Jr.
Washington Star Staff Writer

Sometime this week, an official determination is expected that will shift the three Marines listed as missing in action in the battle for the Mayaguez to the killed-in-action column.

That will formally raise the cost of the operation in American lives to 18 and perhaps end the casualty counting process that, at least early last week, seemed to generate more controversy than the operation itself.

The casualty figures issued as final showed 15 dead, 3 missing and 50 wounded. Those figures were released Tuesday afternoon, four and a half days after Marines were lifted by helicopters from a tiny island in the Gulf of Thailand to end the fighting with Cambodian forces over the seizure of the U.S.-flag merchant ship Mayaguez and its crew.

THE OPERATION was proclaimed a success by President Ford and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger before it ended. But as the casualty count dragged on with series of fluctuating figures, spokesmen for both men found themselves denying that the bad news was being withheld to make the rescue of ship and crew look better.

Both defense officials and military men involved in the counting maintain that the final bits of information that permitted release of final casualty figures did not arrive in Washington until late Monday night.

At issue were the numbers themselves, the length of time that was taken to generate accurate ones and also the shifting of numbers from the missing list to the killed-in-action category.

The three-service Mayaguez operation was run through the unified Pacific military command but formal casualty determinations are a responsibility of each service. Within the Defense Department, the Marine Corps was faulted for the delay in casualty counting.

THE EXPLANATION at the Pentagon was one that centered on the difficulties caused by the peculiarities of the operation. But as the delay lengthened this explanation tended to wear thin even within the Defense Department. Frustrations culminated at one point in an order from Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the unified Pacific command to come up with a correct figure, according to two accounts.

Interviews with a number of persons who monitored or participated in the counting and who were in a position to watch the operation unfold indicate that continuous efforts were made to come up with casualty figures, both within normal individual

service channels and outside them as indicated by Brown's order.

But, the interviews indicate, these efforts failed to produce the desired hard casualty figures until the Marines, who experienced the most administrative difficulty as well as suffering the most casualties, were able to re-establish their normal reporting channels following the operation.

AS THE PENTAGON eventually explained, 13 of the casualties, 10 Marines, 2 Navy corpsmen attached to Marine units, and a member of the Air Force helicopter crew, died when the helicopter went down under hostile fire off the beach at Tang Island in the Marine assault. Another airman died when a second helicopter crashed in the sea. One Marine was killed on the island. The three Marines listed as missing were also ashore on the island.

Those facts were not known shortly after 9 a.m., Washington time, Thursday, May 15, when the last Marines were lifted from the beach. Some hours before, the White House had referred questions on details and casualties to the Pentagon and Assistant Defense Secretary Joseph Laitin. The waiting White House press corps was taken aback when Presidential Press Secretary Ronald Nessen announced "you need to go to the Pentagon (for casualty figures)."

"YOU ARE CRAZY!" blurted out one member of the corps to Nessen.

But Laitin had no figures then or much later. Casualty figures had been coming in through operational channels in reports designed to show the flow of battle, not to identify by name the killed, missing and wounded.

Some of these figures were supplied to inquiring reporters with the warning that they were preliminary and subject to change, and with the understanding that they would not be treated as official pronouncements of the Defense Department. These early, preliminary reports indicated either one or two fighting men killed and various numbers wounded.

Laitin appeared at a briefing between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. Thursday to say that casualty figures would not be immediately available. "Any accurate report on casualties will have to remain until the muster (of Marines aboard Navy ships in the Gulf of Thailand) is completed, which should be within an hour or so," Laitin said.

THAT PREDICTION proved wildly optimistic. Slightly more than 1,000 Marines had been flown to Uta-pao, Thailand, for the Mayaguez operation. Around 300 were loaded onto Thai-based U.S. Air Force heli-

copters, most for the assault on Tang Island, others to form the bulk of the boarding party that reached the Mayaguez at anchor near the island after first being brought to the waiting U.S. destroyer Holt.

When the operation ended Thursday morning, Washington time, some of the 300 Marines wound up back in Thailand, some on the Holt, others on the destroyer Wilson and the bulk on the carrier Coral Sea, lately arrived near the island.

The results of the muster of which Laitin spoke were, as one Marine said, "horrible." The results could not be reconciled with the operational reports of casualties, and the counting process was continued, say officers familiar with the events.

BY THURSDAY afternoon, these sources say, the first casualty reports reached the casualty section at Marine Headquarters, Washington, the administrative component with the responsibility of making final determinations on the status of apparent wounded, missing and killed in action, and with notification of next of kin.

This first report, from the senior Marine officer in Uta-pao, listed 10 Marines missing in action and nine wounded.

But such reports, following the normal channel, would soon be cut off. The Thai government, publicly expressing its displeasure with staging of the operation from Thai bases, ordered the Marines out. So Thursday afternoon the Marines, including the senior officer, a colonel with the master roster of Marines involved in the operation, boarded jet transports for the five- to six-hour trip back to their base in Okanawa.

MARINES INVOLVED in the casualty counting argue that this hasty pullout coupled with the fact that the Marines actually involved in the operation were "scattered to the four winds," effectively destroyed the normal casualty reporting process, robbed the operation of a central point to collect and check information and thus contributed greatly to the delay.

At the close of the business day Thursday, the Pentagon announced that no casualty figures would be available until Friday.

By Friday morning, the casualty process seemed to be progressing. Laitin told reporters that the "still unconfirmed casualty list" showed one serviceman killed in action, 13 missing (all from the helicopter crash) and 22 wounded. Laitin indicated that there was not much hope that any of the missing would be

(See COUNT, Pg. 6-F)

Part II -- Main Edition -- 27 May 1975

WASHINGTON POST (PARADE)
25 MAY 1975 (27)**TROUBLESOME
CARGO PLANE**

The C-5A --the Air Force's huge jet cargo plane which has been plagued by spiraling costs and construction defects for 10 years--performed in a less-than-heroic fashion during the United States airlift to Israel in the 1973 Middle East war, according to recently disclosed government figures.

After this country committed itself to the emergency airlift to provide supplies to Israel, the Air Force discovered that 36 of the C-5A's

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 27 MAY 1975

Kissinger has alternate plans if Portugal bans use of Azores

By Reuter

Washington

The United States has alternative plans if Portugal bans use of the Azores as a staging base to supply Israel in another Middle East war, according to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

"We have alternative possibilities, but they are much more complicated and involve a much longer route," he said in a television interview. "It is an additional problem in case there is a Middle East war."

Dr. Kissinger, on the third day of a four-part interview on NBC's Today Show, said recent elections in Portugal indicated gratifyingly that a majority of the Portuguese people favored the democratic parties.

But on future U.S. relations with Portugal, he said communist influence in the Portuguese Government was out of proportion to the party's numerical strength.

"So we have to investigate what the foreign policy of Portugal will be before we can make any final decisions," he said.

couldn't be used because they needed repairs and 10 other planes were grounded because they lacked parts.

In addition, mechanical malfunctions caused the termination of 29 flights and delayed the departure

of 40 other flights.

The government report was released only a few weeks after the C-5A's worst performance--a crash outside Saigon in which more than 100 South Vietnamese orphans were killed.

COUNT -- CONTINUED

found.

THE MARINE casualty section was aware of reports of Marines killed in action but as late as Friday could not match names to the reports for confirmation, says one officer.

One such operational report, received in the Pentagon's command center early in the Mayaguez operation, listed one Marine killed and three wounded by the detonation of a claymore mine.

That death had more documentation than others in the operation since no bodies were recovered. A Navy surgeon on the beach pronounced the Marine dead on the spot but that report was a long time in reaching the casualty section, say Marine sources who offer no reason for the delay.

The decision to change the status of a missing man to killed in action is one with legal and financial implications as well as emotional implications for survivors. "Just because a guy's missing, you don't say he's dead," says an officer. Corroboration of the death is sought through interviews with those in the missing man's unit or those in the area where the man was last seen.

MARINES SAY the problems that arose in getting a head count also hampered efforts at getting corroboration of deaths that would meet casualty office standards.

By Friday, Washington time, the Air Force, with many fewer men involved and with its on-the-scene command structure intact, had established officially that two airmen had been killed. Notification of next

of kin began Saturday, according to the service.

By Saturday, the Marines had confirmed the death of the mine victim and had turned up reports of four more MIAs to add to the 10 from the downed helicopter, according to one officer, who says that misspelled names and inaccurate Social Security numbers raised doubts about the accuracy of the new reports.

BY THIS TIME, substantive reports from the carrier Coral Sea were being received on those wounded, but these reports, according to nearly everyone involved, were inflated by such nonaction-related complaints as headaches, sprained limbs and in one instance, a "puncture wound from a thorn."

Still in doubt, at least officially, at this point was the status of the two Navy corpsmen lost in the helicopter crash.

On Sunday, says one Marine officer, the corps casualty office had found three of the reported missing men on the Coral Sea, but had picked up two more for a total of 13 MIAs, including the 10 Marines lost in the chopper crash.

AT THIS POINT, the Air Force had two men confirmed as killed in action, the Marine Corps one KIA and 13 MIAs, and the Navy two MIAs, according to a number of accounts.

Also at this point Schlesinger appeared on a broadcast interview program and offered figures of 5 killed in action, 16 missing in action and 70 to 80 wounded.

One Defense official says Schlesinger apparently used an operational report rather than casualty office reports as his source for the figures, adding that the high injured number stemmed from the reports from the Coral Sea.

There is also an indication that the corpsmen, who serve with the Marines but are in the Navy, were counted twice, once with the Marines and separately as Navy personnel.

SCHLESINGER and Laitin were out of the country for attendance at a NATO defense ministers' meeting late last week. Attempts to reach Laitin prior to his departure failed.

One Defense official says expectations were that the casualty numbers would be cleared up by last Monday. When they were not, "then everybody got mad."

It was on Monday that Brown's order is said to have gone out to the Pacific command; an indication of impatience with casualty section counting.

On Monday, Laitin held a briefing to trim Schlesinger's total for men wounded down to 49, but he declined to say anything further about other categories, letting stand the secretary's figures of 5 killed and 16 missing. Laitin said he hoped to have a "preliminary final count" by Tuesday. In the meantime, he released the names of the two airmen and the Marine whose next of kin had been notified over the weekend.

BOTH DEFENSE officials and Marines involved say the casualty logjam was broken by an overnight message from the 3rd Marine Division on Okanawa, the parent unit for the Marines participating in the Mayaguez operation, that greeted casualty counters when they arrived at work Tuesday morning.

The message, developed through normal Marine channels, one officer points out, contained a name-by-name roster and information sufficient to shift 10 of the missing Marines into the KIA category and also confirm the deaths of the two Navy corpsmen.

Notification of next of kin was completed by Tuesday afternoon (Marine notification officers were instructed to call headquarters in Washington collect when they had notified relatives) and the figures and all but one of the names, that of a missing Marine for whom notification had not been made, were released at the Pentagon.

UNCOUNTED in the official toll are 23 Air Force police stationed in Thailand who died in a helicopter crash in Thailand prior to the start of the Mayaguez operation.

The crash was announced at the time by the Defense Department in Washington, but it was not then revealed that the air police were being shifted for possible use in the attempt to retake the Mayaguez.

Their deaths were not included in the toll since they did not take part in the operation itself.

The Secretary of State



Press Conference

May 16, 1975
Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

MAJOR TOPIC: Mayaguez Rescue

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I thought that in view of the events of this week and prior to my going to Europe, we might meet here. I don't have any statement.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there have been public complaints from Thailand about our landing of Marines. Was there a violation of Thai sovereignty in this caper? And secondly, can you tell us if there was any concern in the strafing of Cambodian gunboats that since we weren't too sure where our own men were, that we might—the crew was—that we might have hit the American crew?

A: Well first of all, of course, I have to reject the description of what happened this week as a "caper." It was a serious situation in which we were trying to save a group of Americans and recover a ship.

With respect to Thailand we have, of course, a treaty relationship with Thailand in SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization]. And we have had a series of base arrangements with them which, over the period of years, had led to a degree of cooperation in events in Indochina which were in the mutual interest and in which we have greatly appreciated the assistance that Thailand has given us.

In the course of this decade, it may be that a pattern of action has developed that made us assume that our latitude in using these bases was greater than the current situation in Southeast Asia would permit to the Thai Government. And therefore, insofar as we have caused any embarrassment to the Thai Government, we regret those actions.

At the same time it is clear that any relationship between us and another country must be based on mutual interest. And we, I believe, have a reason—or have a right—to expect that those coun-

tries that have an alliance relationship with us look with some sympathy at matters that concern the United States profoundly.

If conditions in the area change, we are prepared to adjust our relationship to new conditions and to have discussions on that subject in a spirit of cooperation.

Q: Mr. Secretary, that was kind of a double-barreled question.

A: What was the second question?

Q: Since we were not so certain—

A: Oh, on the gunboats. One of the most difficult and anguishing decisions we had to make was the risk to Americans in taking these gunboats under attack.

Now we had to balance this, in our view, against the risk as we then saw it—of their being taken to the mainland—and we wanted to avoid a situation in which the United States might have to negotiate, over a very extended period of time, over a group of merchant seamen who had no connection whatever with any governmental activity.

There was one incident in which our pilots were told to determine, insofar as one can under those conditions, whether any Americans were likely to have been on the boat. There was one incident where a pilot, beginning to take a boat under attack, saw a group of individuals that looked to him as if they might have been Americans huddled on the boat, asked for instructions, and was told not to proceed with the attack. And that was one gunboat that reached Kompong Som. So we tried to take it into account, and fortunately it seems there was no injury to anybody.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in light of the Thai Prime Minister's [M.R. Khukrit Pramot] recall of his

Ambassador [to the U.S. Anan Panyarachun] and his announcement of a complete review of all treaties and agreements between the two countries, could you give us your assessment of the diplomatic strains now developing? Also, have you had any communication as yet from the Thai Ambassador?

A: We have not had any formal communication from the Thai Ambassador. But I am assuming that the story is correct.

The Thai Government finds itself, in general, in a complicated position after the events of Indochina, quite independent of this recent operation.

We had, prior to this recent operation, made it clear that we are prepared to discuss with the Thai Government its conception of its requirements, or of the necessary adjustment in the present period. We are still prepared to do this, and we recognize that the Thai Government is under some strains and under some public necessities. And they have to understand, however, that we, too, have our necessities.

Q: Mr. Secretary, was there at any time in this crisis, any chance to resolve it diplomatically?

A: There was no chance during this crisis to resolve it diplomatically. That is to say, we never received a communication—proposition—that would have enabled us to explore a diplomatic solution, and it was—when—by Wednesday evening we had not yet received any reply that the President ordered the military operations to begin.

Q: I would like to clear up one mystifying aspect of this: Why did the Chinese return the note 24 hours later? And did they indicate at the time that it had gotten through to the Cambodian authorities?

A: In this matter the Government of the People's Republic was not responsible for the content of the note. But I am assuming the Chinese Xerox machines can reproduce it within 24 hours.

Q: What was the significance of their returning it, Mr. Secretary?

A: Well, a degree of disassociation from the diplomatic process—a formal disassociation. I don't want to speculate on this, but I wouldn't be surprised.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in view of the attempts at detente with the People's Republic of China, are you dissatisfied with their apparent—or with the way they handled themselves in this situation?

A: The requirements of relationships with some of our potential adversaries have to be seen in a more complicated framework than is often stated.

Both the Chinese and we have certain common interests which have been laid down in

the Shanghai communique, which we have reaffirmed, and which we consider remain valid.

At the same time we do have different perceptions in different areas, and there we will maintain our differences.

Thirdly, one has to keep in mind, in asking other countries to play a role, what their real possibilities are in any given situation.

And finally, one has to leave it to those countries to play their role, either publicly or privately—if they choose to—that they consider appropriate. So on the whole, I don't believe that this is a useful area for me to comment on.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in view of the earlier incidents involving a Panamanian freighter being detained and a South Korean freighter being fired upon, why was there no effort by this Government, earlier on—before the MAYAGUEZ seizure—to warn U.S. vessels to stay out of that area?

A: Well, my understanding is that insurance companies had been notified and that it had been assumed that they would get in touch with these ships. So we were, frankly, not aware that there were any American ships in that area. And when the matter came to our attention—this was not a matter that had ever reached high levels of the Government. It had been dealt with routinely by notification of the insurance companies, which are presumed to have the greatest interest in the preservation of these ships.

Q: I would like to go back to the Thailand question. Why was it, given the known sensitivities of the Thais to this situation in that area, that an effort was not made to at least consult with their Government prior to the sending of the Marines?

A: Well, the assumption was that we were in an emergency situation in which, on occasion, we have acted without having had a full opportunity for consultation, and it was therefore thought that within the traditional relationship it would be a measure that would be understood. In any event, it would have presented massive problems either way.

Q: Mr. Secretary, one of the effects of this incident appears to be a restoration of American credibility and, to some extent, morale. My question is: To what extent was that a consideration in the American operation?

A: The thrust of our discussions concerned the recovery of the ship and the rescue of the men. If there were any byproducts—that can be considered a bonus to the operation, but it was not the principal impetus behind the operation.

We believed that we had to draw a line against illegal actions and, secondly, against situations

where the United States might be forced into a humiliating discussion about the ransom of innocent merchant seamen.

If it had these byproducts—I think to some extent it did have this effect. But this was not the primary motivation behind the action.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Cambodian Minister of Information and Propaganda [Hou Min] has charged that our planes began systematically strafing and bombing the ship about 12 hours after it was seized—the area around the ship. Can you respond to that, please? This would be dawn on the morning of the 13th.

A: I would have to review the actual events. I don't have the log right here.

My recollection would be that it may have started somewhat later, but in any event, the decision was made. It was probably later than 12 hours afterward, but I don't want to tie myself to the time.

A decision was made to try to prevent ships from the mainland from reaching the ship—or ships from the island from reaching the mainland. That, I think probably happened sometime during our night on Monday night. So the timing could be roughly correct, but there must be some Defense Department statement of when the actual strafing started which would be correct.

Q: I just wondered how long we waited for the diplomacy to work before force was used.

A: The methods that were used were not strafing at first. The methods that were used were to try to force ships back to the island.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the only basic criticism that has been directed at the Administration's actions this week is that perhaps the Administration moved much too quickly militarily and did not give diplomacy a chance to work.

A: Come on, Marvin [Kalb, CBS News]—break down. Maybe we did something right. [Laughter] Statistically we are bound to do it sometimes. [Laughter]

Q: Well, in that spirit, could you tell us, or respond to that kind of criticism?

A: Well, when you say diplomacy was given no chance to work—if any communication had been received back, either from Cambodia or from any other source, then we would have had a subject matter for diplomacy on which to act. On the other hand, when this did not happen and when we had received no communication whatsoever, we had to balance the risks that would occur if they tried to move the ship. Since we didn't know whether any of the crew was left on the ship or

whether a Cambodian crew might have been put on the ship, we had to balance the risks if they tried to move the ship; the pressures we were under in neighboring countries; the difficulties that could arise. We therefore decided, after some 60 hours of diplomatic efforts, to try to seize the ship.

It was a balance that had to be struck. We thought the risks of waiting another 24 to 48 hours in the absence of any communication whatsoever from any government were greater than the risks of going ahead.

Q: When the Cambodians did say that they would release the ship, why was it, as I understand it, that the bulk of the military action followed the Phnom Penh radio broadcast that they would release the ship?

A: The Phnom Penh radio broadcast was received in Washington—it was received in the White House at about 8:16 that evening. At that time we had 150 Marines pinned down on the island, and we had the HOLT approaching the ship. At that point, to stop all operations on the basis of a radio broadcast that had not been confirmed, whose precise text we did not at that moment have—all we had was a one-page summary of what it said—a broadcast, moreover, that did not say anything about the crew and referred only to the ship, it seemed to us it was too dangerous for the troops that had already been landed to stop the operation. We therefore took rather drastic measures—drastic communications measures—of informing the Cambodian Government of the fact that we would stop all military operations as soon as the crew was released. And in order to make doubly sure, we released the statement that we had broadcast into Cambodia. We also released that statement to the press—it was verbatim, the same statement—on the theory that perhaps they would read the news tickers faster than they could pick up the other means of communication that we were using.

About 2½ hours after that the crew was released. And after that we stopped all military operations except those which we judged necessary for the saving of Americans that were still on the island.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on that point, questions have been raised in Congress this morning as to whether there was a punitive intent by the United States; and secondly, in relation to that, wasn't there also a hazard that the bombing of the mainland could have hit the crewmen, because there were at least two circumstances where the crewmen could have been hit by American fire—while they were on the ship and while they were on the mainland?

A: Well, when you say "punitive intent"—the intent of the operation was as I described it: To rescue the men and to recover the ship. Obviously any damage that is done in the process has a punitive effect, whatever the intention is. We tried to gear the action as closely to the objective as was possible.

Now, as it turned out, there seems to have been some relationship between the release of the crew and the attacks on the mainland. That is to say, some members of the crew were told that they should tell the WILSON—or the officers on the WILSON—that they were being released on the assumption that this would end the bombing attacks. And when we received this word, around midnight—I mean this additional word, shortly after midnight—then all actions except those that were judged to be immediately necessary for the military operations were stopped.

There was some risk. It was clear that either the attack on the island or the attack on the mainland could lead to American casualties if the Cambodians deliberately moved the prisoners into an area where they would be exposed to attack.

On the other hand, we tried to confine our attack to clearly military objectives so that there would have had to be a very provocative intent on the part of the Cambodians. But it was one of the balances that had to be struck.

Q: Mr. Secretary, when you referred to 60 hours of diplomacy, actually I am told there was fighting which ran through this whole sequence—that there was fighting the night of the 12th, there was some shooting at American vessels the night of the 12th. The Cambodians say that we began strafing at dawn on the 13th. So there was, by both sides' accounts—even though they don't match—there seemed to have been a considerable amount of shooting all during the period when the diplomacy was being attempted. Could we have a better breakdown on that, possibly?

A: For about 60 hours—we made no attempt to seize the ship. We made it very clear from the very beginning—the President in his statement, the communications that were sent to whoever we thought might have a possibility of reaching the Cambodians, and in a number of statements that I made on Monday and Tuesday—we made it absolutely clear that we insisted on the release of the ship and the men.

Then we took collateral actions to make it more difficult for them to move the men and to speed up the pace of their deliberations.

Q: Are you satisfied, Mr. Secretary, that the American message reached the Cambodians? And if you are satisfied, what gives you that—

A: Well, I am positive that our message reached the Cambodians because we delivered it to the Cambodian Embassy in Peking, in addition to everything else.

Q: A technical question for a moment. In response to one before, did you say there was no full consultation with Thailand or no consultation with Thailand?

A: Well, after the troops got into—

Q: Before.

A: Before, there was no consultation.

Q: At all?

A: No.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in Palm Springs you said the United States would face a time of testing, what with events in Indochina. Now, granted that was a private conversation, but much of that conversation has since gone public anyway. I would like to ask you if you think this was indeed a time of international testing of the U.S. resolve; and also what useful purpose was served—that is what has the world learned from the U.S. action regarding the MAYAGUEZ?

A: I have said not only in private conversations, I have stated publicly that events in Indochina would have international consequences. And that they would affect other countries' perception of their position and of our own. I have also said that I believe those consequences were manageable if we were prepared to face them.

Now, this event could well have resulted from an isolated act of a local commander. I am not inclined to believe that this was a carefully planned operation on the part of the Cambodian authorities. Nevertheless, the impact on us was the same—and could have been the same as if it had been carefully planned—if we had been drawn through irresolution into a negotiation over a period of months over the release of people that they had no right to seize to begin with.

What the impact of this may be internationally—I don't want to transform it into an apocalyptic event. The impact ought to be to make clear that there are limits beyond which the United States cannot be pushed and that the United States is prepared to defend those interests and that it can get public support and congressional support for those actions. But we are not going around looking for opportunities to prove our manhood.

We will judge actions in the light of our interests and the extent of the provocation.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you have any reason to anticipate a severance of relations with the United States by Thailand, or that Thailand may move up the date by which we must remove our troops in that country, which I think is 1 year?

A: I do not personally anticipate a severance of relations with Thailand. I believe that relations with other countries must always be based on a mutuality of interest. We are doing other countries no favor when we have a well-considered alliance relationship, because it must be in the mutual interest. Other countries are doing us no favor by having diplomatic relations with us if it doesn't serve their interests. And, therefore, I am assuming that the Thai Government will look at its long-term interests as we will. We are prepared to discuss all issues with the Thai Government in a spirit of appreciation for what Thailand has done over several decades and with a cooperative attitude.

But, as I said the other day, we will not insist on arrangements that other countries no longer consider in their interests.

Q: *Mr. Secretary, you spoke earlier about certain public necessities in Thailand. Are you implying to us that possibly the Thai Government is more interested in continuing a long-term relationship with the United States than some of its public statements might now suggest?*

A: Well, I don't want to speculate about the interests of the Thai Government. There is this reality—that sooner or later the private views and the public views of a government must be brought into relationship with each other. And we can, over a long period of time, only act on those things that a government is able or willing to avow publicly.

I repeat: We are prepared to discuss in a spirit of friendship and cooperation all the concerns that the Thai Government has, and we do regret any embarrassment we may have caused them.

Q: *May I just follow up on that, Mr. Secretary? When you say that the public and private views must be brought into balance, that suggests again that there is a discrepancy between the public and private views.*

A: I don't know. I was trying to respond to your question in which you said maybe there was a discrepancy. And I would say that, even granting there was a discrepancy, then they would have to be brought into balance.

Q: *Is there a discrepancy?*

A: I don't want to speculate on that.

Q: *Well, I mean without speculation, Mr. Secretary, in their private views, were the Thais as forceful as they have been publicly over the past few days?*

A: I just don't want to comment on private views that individuals in the Thai Government might have. We take the Thai Government by its word, and we are acting on the basis of the official communications we've received.

Q: *Are we witnessing in Thailand, Mr. Secretary, an example of the domino theory at work—*

A: Yes.

Q: *—a theory which you said was not invalid not so long ago?*

A: I think we are seeing an effect of the domino theory at work. But it is almost self-evident that any major international event has consequences. The issue isn't whether there's a domino effect but what we can do about the domino effect, or whether we should do anything about the domino effect.

It is clear that a country that was peripherally involved in events in Indochina, but in a rather heavy way, must reassess its position in the light of Indochina events. So in that sense both Laos and Thailand indicate a certain domino effect.

Q: *Mr. Secretary, would you clarify for us the American communications with the Cambodians? Did we specify a deadline as to a specific time when we wanted the ship and the prisoners to be returned? And could you clarify why the Marines landed on an island where obviously the prisoners were not being held? How does that whole sequence work there?*

A: We did not give a time limit. We were considering at various times whether we should give a time limit. Every time we considered it we came to the conclusion that the risk of giving it to any military operation that might be contemplated and to the crew members were greater than the benefits to be achieved by giving a specific time limit, since most of those benefits were really domestic, so that we could say that we had given warning.

So by constantly increasing the severity of our requests we tried to convey an increasing sense of urgency, and, therefore, we approached the Secretary General [of the United Nations]. First of all, a number of public statements were made. Secondly, we approached—on Wednesday—the Secretary General of the United Nations with a letter, which was made public, indicating very clearly that we were going to invoke Article 51 of the United Nations Charter—the right of self defense of the United Nations Charter. And, therefore, we felt we had, in effect, given an ultimatum without giving a specific time.

We had, in fact, drafted something with a specific time as an alternative, but we felt the risks were too great.

Now, with respect to landing on an island on which the prisoners were not. Almost anything we did would in retrospect be subject to this sort of question. We did not know whether the prisoners were on the ship, whether the prisoners were on the island, or whether the prisoners were on the

mainland. We tried to design an operation where we would, as close to simultaneously as possible, bring maximum pressure on the authorities in each place, so that if they were on the mainland there was some reason for the mainland authorities to release them, that if they were on the island we could seize them, and if they were on the ship that would, of course, have been the happiest event of all.

We genuinely thought—or at least we suspected—that a number of them might have been brought to the mainland. We thought that a substantial number of them would probably be on the island. Had we not thought this, there was no reason to land on the island. As it turned out the results achieved tend to justify what was attempted. There's no question that if it hadn't worked many of your questions would now be asked in a different atmosphere.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could one reasonably infer from several of your comments this morning that the United States would look with very great sympathy should the Thais decide to reconsider their involvement with SEATO and indeed conclude that it's in their best interests to withdraw from SEATO?

A: These are decisions which the Thai Government must make. We are in an existing relationship with the Thai Government. We have no reason on our side to change it. It is up to the Thai Government to decide what its interests require. And we will discuss the Thai concerns with the interest and sympathy that an old friend deserves. We are not suggesting to the Thai Government what position it should take.

Q: Mr. Secretary, let's get to something that might appear to be an inconsistency. I think you said that for 60 hours you waited before taking military action. Later on you said that we had to drive our point home with increasing severity. Did you mean that from the very beginning of this operation there was American military action taken to support existing diplomatic action?

A: No. What I meant by increasing severity—meant increasing severity of public statements. I did not mean increasing severity of military action. The military actions that were taken on Tuesday our time were exclusively designed at that point to freeze the status quo as much as possible to keep them from moving the ship and keep them from moving the crewmen. They were not designed as such to bring diplomatic pressure, although they obviously had that result.

Q: Could I ask a question about the disen-

agement from the operation once the objective of releasing the men had been accomplished? Did some of the heaviest attacks actually occur after the men had been released?

A: I would have to check that. Some attacks occurred after the men had been released. At that point our biggest problem was that we had several hundred Marines on the island who were under very heavy attack. There were also 2,400 Communist forces on the mainland, and we wanted to absorb their energies in other things than attempting to intervene with our disengagement efforts on the island. That was the general concept of the operation.

Q: What are the latest figures on American casualties?

A: I think the Defense Department is putting them together and will release them today, or—it may have done it already.

Q: Two other Asian matters. One, the PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government] has been very insistent in trying to get the United States to accept, I gather, their sovereignty by turning over the Saigon Embassy to the Algerian Government. And secondly, do you have any personal comment on the revelation today that a major oil company gave \$4 million to the ruling party in South Korea?

A: Well, on the first, we are studying that question, and we have not yet reached a conclusion.

With respect to the second problem, we oppose illegal actions of American corporations abroad. This action, to the best of our understanding, is not illegal by American law, but it is a matter that we would hope that American companies would take—the propriety of which American companies would take into account—if they should be tempted in the future to engage in political activities abroad.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, Gulf Oil has testified that it was forced to make \$4 million in payments to stay in business in Korea. What is our attitude toward Governments which practice this kind of extortion? And why should we continue to give foreign aid to Governments which conduct this kind of thing?

A: Let me separate two things. One, if this is true—which I am not in a personal position to confirm—then we would regret such an action by a foreign Government toward an American company.

Secondly, what I said about Thailand applies—or what I said about our general attitude toward alliances applies, too. When we have a

security relationship with a country, it is based not primarily on approbation of the governmental structure; it must be based on our belief that there is a mutual interest that both countries have in that security. If that mutual interest does not exist, then the arrangement cannot withstand any significant strain.

We believe that the defense of Korea and the security of Korea is important for the security of the whole northeast Pacific, and it is very important for our—northeast Asia—and it is extremely important for our relationship with Japan, and that is the primary reason we have.

Q: Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, if I may, just for a moment. Isn't there a lesson to be learned from what happened to this Government in Indochina where, for security reasons, we allowed ourselves to become involved with Governments which we might not approve of in terms of our own perception of what a government should be? And are we not in danger now of getting into exactly the same kind of situation in South Korea?

A: It is also a lesson to be learned from the consequences of the collapse in Indochina in terms of international affairs.

I would not make this analogy. The history of our involvement in Indochina was quite different from the history of our involvement in Korea. And to answer this question in detail, I would have to go into a long analysis of the similarities and differences which we can reserve, I think, for another occasion.

Q: Have you had a chance yet to reassess the decision to supply Jordan with Hawk missiles in light of the reports that Syria has promised to supply Jordan with air cover in an exchange for a Jordanian pledge—commitment—to participate in the next war with Israel? And also in light of the reports that there are suspicious Jordanian troop movements along the Jordan River?

A: We have seen no confirmation of either of these reports. And it is, of course, precisely to enable Jordan not to have to participate in defense arrangements with other neighbors that we agreed to continue the discussions on air defense which go back for nearly a year.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would it be in the interests of the United States now to have a diplomatic presence in Saigon?

A: The whole question of our attitude toward the new authorities in Saigon is now being studied.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in your St. Louis speech [May 12] you cautioned the Soviet Union against trying to exploit what they may perceive as Ameri-

ca's weakness, warning that this might put a heavy mortgage on detente. Have the Soviets toughened their position on either CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] or on the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotiations?

A: I did not use the words "American weakness" in my remarks. I want to point out that I said there are four areas that are involved in detente in which three were making reasonable progress. And the fourth—that is, conflict in peripheral areas—was less satisfactory. I think both of these must be stressed and not just the part that was less satisfactory.

Secondly, we do not find that the Soviet Union has toughened its position at the European Security Conference.

With respect to SALT, we are at the exploratory technical phase, and it is now at a point where a political decision will have to be made by both sides to move the negotiations forward and to break some of the deadlocks.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you spoke about the diplomatic results of the Cambodian operation as a bonus. Are you glad this happened?

A: Nobody can be glad to be put into a position where the lives of Americans are at stake. And the anguish of these operations for those who have the responsibility is very grave, because the consequences of failure are very serious, and the loss of life is never one that is easy to contemplate. We would far have preferred if this had not happened.

Our problem was that we could not choose our involvement. We were forced into this. And then when the incident had occurred, we had to act on the basis of what we thought would most save lives and was most in the interests of the United States. But we were not looking for an opportunity.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the last raid on the airfield near Sihanoukville was made a half an hour after the crew members were released, after the Cambodians had met the requirements for cessation of hostilities that the President laid down in his last public statement—that is, the ship was taken and the prisoners were released. Why was this raid not stopped?

A: Because we had some 200 Marines on the island. And we were trying to extricate them, and we were trying to keep the military forces on the mainland from interfering with what could have been an extremely tricky and difficult operation.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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BALTIMORE SUN - 20 JUNE 1975 Pg. 1

Israel claims Golan, Gaza in new map

NEW YORK TIMES
20 JUNE 1975 Pg. 9

CANADIANS DEBATE SALE OF REACTORS

By ROBERT TRUMBULL
Special to The New York Times

OTTAWA, June 19 — The Canadian Government has expressed determination to continue supplying nuclear reactors to developing countries while pressing internationally for stronger safeguards against a spread of nuclear weapons.

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau said Tuesday in a speech at a meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Association, an industrial organization, that a withholding of nuclear technology from needy nations would be irresponsible.

The Canadian Government has taken an active role in organizing a meeting in London this week of nuclear powers to discuss more effective controls over the use of nuclear materials. According to reports from the meeting, the countries in the closed-door deliberations are, besides Canada, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and West Germany.

The Canadian policy has been subject of national debate. Critics of the Government maintain that nuclear agreements with unstable countries or countries under potential military threat risked a repetition India's use of material from a Canadian-supplied reactor to produce a nuclear explosion last year.

Safeguards Questioned

Members of opposition parties, in prolonged debate on the issue in Parliament this week, questioned the effectiveness of inspection procedures. Some speakers also questioned whether future governments in countries receiving nuclear aid could be relied upon to respect previous guarantees, especially if such a country came under

(See REACTORS, Pg. 2)

Tel Aviv (AP)—Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his Labor party have defined Israel's permanent borders—including annexation of the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip—in a peace plan for negotiations with the Arabs, the secretary-general of the party said yesterday.

A Syrian leader said in London that his government is determined to regain the Golan Heights in any Middle East settlement. There was no immediate comment from Egypt.

The plan makes the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip—captured from Syria and Egypt, respectively, in the 1967 war—permanent parts of the state of Israel, the party chief, Meir Zarmi, said.

It establishes the Jordan River as Israel's final security border but leaves the sovereignty of occupied west Jordan open to negotiations, Mr. Zarmi told a meeting of Labor party farmers.

Israel will retain a presence in strategic Sharm el Sheikh at the southern end of the Sinai Peninsula but is prepared to negotiate the region's final sovereignty with Egypt, he said. This indicated that Mr. Rabin's party was willing to return the rest of the vast Sinai Desert and its oil fields to Egypt.

The party peace plan was tantamount to official Israeli policy since the Labor alignment dominates the coalition government. But any peace agreement with the Arabs would need approval in parliament, where Labor does not hold a majority.

Mr. Zarmi said the plan was the "clear, final map" which critics here and abroad have called on the government to produce, showing the borders that Israel wants in a peace settlement.

A Labor party spokesman, Zvi Harmor, however, said that it was a "word map" or set of policies, not an actual chart

(See ISRAEL, Pg. 2)

BALTIMORE SUN
20 JUNE 1975 Pg. 4

Mayaguez query meets a dead end

By THOMAS PEPPER
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—A House subcommittee got virtually nowhere yesterday as it groped through the first few steps of a postmortem into last month's Mayaguez incident.

The lead-off witness, Robert H. Miller, a deputy assistant secretary of state, repeatedly told subcommittee members that he had not participated in key National Security Council meetings and that he did not know the answers to questions they were posing about the incident.

"I don't think we have the right witness," complained Representative Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (D., Mich.).

Representative Dante B.

Fascell (D., Fla.), chairman of the subcommittee on international political and military affairs of the House International Relations Committee, said the panel had asked for higher ranking witnesses from the State Department, but had been told they were too busy. It's an age-old problem," he said.

"Mr. Miller is the right witness to the extent that he can witness," Mr. Fascell said in seeking to defend what little information Mr. Miller was providing.

"At least we got it on the record that he's not sure," Mr. Fascell said. "That's better than guessing. We're getting (See QUERY, Pg. 2)

BALTIMORE SUN
20 JUNE 1975 Pg. 4

China-Soviet tightrope gets tighter for Japan

By MATTHEW J. SEIDEN
Sun Staff Correspondent

Tokyo—Japan's long-brewing diplomatic problems with China and the Soviet Union surfaced abruptly this week with the publication of a Soviet government statement warning Tokyo not to sign a proposed peace and friendship treaty with Peking.

The Russian statement, reportedly released in Moscow by Tass, the Soviet news agency, and printed on the front pages of most Japanese newspapers yesterday, made public Japan's growing dilemma with its two biggest neighbors.

Japan says it wants to be

friends with both Russia and China. However, both Moscow and Peking insist, in effect, that Japan can go with one or the other, but not both.

The immediate problem centers around the word hegemony. Otherwise ready to finally sign a treaty officially ending World War II and establishing friendly relations between Tokyo and Peking, the Chinese insist on including an anti-hegemony clause.

The clause declares that neither Japan nor China "should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pa-

(See TIGHTROPE, Pg. 2)

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Part II -- Main Edition -- 20 June 1975

NEW YORK TIMES
20 JUNE 1975 Pg. 38**C.I.A. SAID TO PLAN
NEW SUBMARINE TRY**

The Central Intelligence Agency plans to make a new attempt to raise the entire Russian submarine sunk in the Pacific, Business Week magazine reported yesterday.

"Any day now the Glomar Explorer, the mysterious salvage ship that raised only part of a Russian submarine sunk in the Pacific, will leave its berth at Pier 1 in Long Beach Calif., for another try," the magazine reported in its current issue.

The magazine said the ship was not owned by Howard R. Hughes's Summa Corporation, which supposedly built her for deep sea mining.

"It was built and outfitted by the Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company, of Chester, Pa., for the Government at a cost of about \$125-million, and it is still Federal property," the article said.

Business Week said two full crews were working on the salvage ship to prepare her for the job. Members are reported to have signed secrecy agreements, one with Global Marine, Inc., which operates the vessel and does the salvage work, and the other with the C.I.A.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 19—The Central Intelligence Agency would not comment today on the Business Week report. However, according to informed officials, permission for a second salvage operation by the Glomar Explorer has not yet been given by the White House and may never be given.

ISRAEL - CONTINUED

with frontiers drawn on paper.

In peace negotiations, he said, there could be give-and-take about exact locations, and

QUERY - CONTINUED

somewhere."

In response to a question from Mr. Riegle, Mr. Miller said he did not know the number of U.S. troops killed in connection with the incident.

Mr. Riegle said he was "absolutely astonished" that Mr. Miller, whose responsibilities include Southeast Asia, did not know this figure and that none of the other State Department officials who came to the hearing with him knew either.

Final Pentagon figures put the death toll at 38—including 15 killed in action and 23 killed in a helicopter accident at a nearby base in Thailand.

The bulk of yesterday's testimony consisted of Mr. Miller's reiterating previously released details on timing of military actions off the Cambodian coast.

REACTOR - CONT'D

a military threat.

Besides India, Canada has supplied reactors to Pakistan and the Nationalist Chinese has sales pending with South Korea and Argentina and is reported to have approached a number of other countries.

Since the Indian nuclear explosion, the Canadian Government has insisted that countries obtaining reactors here must give an explicit guarantee that nuclear fuel produced by the reactors will not be used in an explosive device of any description.

"Canada has raised the standards of safeguards to the point that they are the toughest in the world," Mr. Trudeau said in his speech to the Canadian Nuclear Association.

"And we are constantly on the alert to make them more practical, more effective," he added.

Canada now demands that countries obtaining Canadian reactors agree to on-site inspection

NEW YORK TIMES

20 JUNE 1975 Pg. 2
**Ford Names Margita White
Assistant Press Secretary**

WASHINGTON, June 18 (AP)—President Ford Wednesday named Margita White to a \$36,000-a-year post as assistant press secretary and director of the White House Office of Communications.

She is to succeed Geri Warren, the deputy press secretary, who has resigned to become editor of The San Diego Union in California.

Ron Nessen, the President's press secretary, was asked why Mrs. White was not being given the deputy's title and the \$36,000-a-year salary that was Mrs. Warren's. He said that White House reorganization recently carried out called only two deputy press secretaries and that he already had that number.

Mr. Nessen rejected any suggestion that Mrs. White, being paid less and given lesser title because she was a woman.

ic energy Agency, besides ing apledge not to make clear explosives with Canada supplied facilities.

Aid Under Safeguards

In his speech Mr. Trudeau outlined a three-point plan of continuing to aid developing countries with reactors, enforcing the strongest possible safeguards and fostering growth of the Canadian nuclear industry.

"It would be unconscionable under any circumstances deny to the developing countries the most modern of technologies as assistance in the quest for higher living standards," Mr. Trudeau said.

in a world increasingly concerned about depleting reserves of fossil fuels, about food shortages, and about the need to reduce illness, it would be responsible as well to withhold the advantages of the nuclear

Part II--Main Edition--29 May 1975

EDITORIALS

'For an Adequate Defense'

OMAHA WORLD HERALD
18 May 1975 (29)

"As they did in the Truman years, liberals and Democrats must again take the lead in rallying America to increase our defense capabilities, both nuclear and conventional. The defense budget recently proposed by the Ford Administration would at best keep our defense posture constant. We believe this static policy is not enough, in view of the nature of Soviet policy and the massive regular increases in Soviet military programs, which show no signs of abating. We therefore recommend an increase in our defense capacity, especially for the Navy, for research and development, and for ready conventional forces."

This is the opening paragraph of a statement "For an Adequate Defense" by the Task Force on Foreign Policy of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority.

The "liberals and Democrats" are chaired by Eugene V. Rostow, Yale Law School professor and a former undersecretary of state.

* * *

The membership includes such certified liberals as Norman Podhoretz, editor of Commentary; Albert Shanker, president of the American Federation of Teachers and such certified Democrats as former Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler.

The statement has made a stir on Capitol Hill, where some liberals and Democrats are trying to cut the Ford defense budget and deploring what they maintain is a militaristic posture by the United States.

The Coalition sees things otherwise:

"We are dismayed by the drift toward military vulnerability and political timidity in which this nation seems to be caught up. Unless we set a new and responsible course, the next two years may see the military balance shift decisively towards the Soviet Union and its allies."

The relationship between a strong defense and the national interest is summed up in a sentence:

"Our fundamental national interest in world politics is to achieve and maintain a balance of power which could effectively deter war."

That balance is to be achieved by security ties among China, Japan, Western Europe, "many other countries" and, of course, the United States, and the object is to deter Soviet nuclear and conventional power.

NEW YORK NEWS 29 May 1975

P.S. ON THE FORD SPEECH

And while President Ford is traveling around Europe with the enlarged clout he garnered from Tuesday evening's speech, how about his doing a quiet sales job on the matter of inviting Spain to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, better known as NATO?

Portugal grows shakier and shakier. Spain's armed forces, we are advised by a person who should know, have not been infiltrated by Reds as have Portugal's.

There need be no great rush about asking Spain in. But NATO, we feel, should at least consider such an invitation carefully—and we think Mr. Ford is a logical person to urge that consideration, beginning now.

* * *

The alternative?

"If, on the other hand, we allow ourselves to be deceived by the myth of detente, reduce our military strength, and permit our alliances to erode, we may well suffer irreversible defeats, which could imperil the safety of democracy in America."

The Coalition contends that the Soviets pursue a policy of expansion that threatens America's vital interests in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere.

It sees the Soviet strategic goal in the Middle East as the outflanking of NATO from the South and doubts that American public opinion is "yet fully conscious of the fact that Middle East conflicts are not isolated regional problems, but are integral to the defense of NATO."

This Soviet expansionist policy is "backed by a military building program which has no peacetime parallel in world affairs."

* * *

While America's defense budget measured in constant dollars has been declining steadily for more than 20 years, the Soviets have been increasing at the rate of 5 per cent a year. In the view of this group:

"In the face of the Soviet military buildup and Soviet foreign policy, our defense budget is an invitation to disaster."

Noting that some new Democratic Congressmen want to slash defense spending, the group says that it is "confident these views will fade when our party leaders confront the reality of the international and military situation."

But—

"If we fail to uphold this balance, we Democrats could not escape our share of responsibility for greatly increasing the prospects of political

despotism and eventual war."

So, while there should be a search for a "true and reciprocal detente" with the Soviets and continued disarmament negotiations, we should improve both our strategic and conventional military strength.

Specifically, pending an agreement that limits bombers, "the B-1 is indispensable to help maintain the balance of strategic forces through the 1980s. Research and development for the B-1 should not be further delayed."

* * *

The liberal-Democratic group makes a similarly strong argument for the Trident submarine program "until equitable and verifiable SALT agreements are reached."

The group says that it is convinced the country can afford both the programs essential to our defense and those essential to our domestic well-being.

A greater problem is mobilization of "the will of the people," which will require the joint effort of the President and Congress. The country must be convinced that we need a greater, not a lesser, national defense effort if we are to counter the Soviets and create conditions in which peace can be maintained.

We have given the views of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority in some detail because they are, basically the views of all who believe that a strong military posture is essential to America's survival.

Recent setbacks in the Far East, which occurred after the Coalition's paper was written, have served to emphasize the need for strength and for maintenance of a military establishment, backed by the determination of the people, which would discourage potential enemies and make possible a peace based on strength.

1-B

CB 30 May 75

Part II--Main Edition--29 May 1975

WASHINGTON POST 29 May 1975

Other Voices . . .

The Mayaguez Affair

There is a clear parallel between the case of the "Mayaguez" and the political hijacking of a passenger aircraft . . . Cambodia . . . [was] aiming to . . . show the world that the eagle has lost its claws. Instead they provided a timely opportunity for the U.S. to demonstrate . . . that it will continue to play its global role as the leader and main support of the free world . . .

—Toronto Star (independent).

What has happened is a victory for the hawks in the U.S. Congress and the Pentagon. By its arrogant use of armed might against a small country already ravaged by war the U.S. has lost much and gained little . . . Using a sledgehammer to swat a fly is a strange way of restoring U.S. credibility . . .

—Indian Express, New Delhi, Bombay, Madras (independent).

American prestige . . . will not be restored by a display of might against small countries but by . . . the imaginative role which the world's most powerful country is willing to play in building a new world order based on amity and justice between all countries irrespective of size or their internal systems.

—Financial Express, New Delhi and Bombay (independent).

There were strong voices in the U.S. Congress urging patience during the crisis . . . The U.S. should have paused to think before overreacting . . . For their part the revolutionary regimes of Indochina should try to avoid incidents which can be made an excuse for intervention . . .

—Morning News, Karachi (independent).

Japan should not participate unconditionally in U.S. military reflex action . . . Looking to the future of the U.S.-Japanese alliance we hope the U.S. will use sound political judgment . . .

—Mainichi, Tokyo (moderate).

It was a mistake in judgment . . . to use force . . . The action has shocked ASEAN nations which are groping toward peaceful coexistence with the nations of Indochina.

—Yomiuri, Tokyo (moderate).

Since the Americans abandoned Cambodia and South Vietnam and since the introduction of U.S. marines into Thai territory, Thai-U.S. relations have reached a nadir . . . Public feeling is running high against the Americans . . . Washington must realize that Thailand has its own life to live and must choose its own way . . . Thailand will continue friendly relations with the Americans, as they establish closer relations with the Chinese and Russian people . . .

—Bangkok Post (independent).

Some of the marines airlifted to Thailand came from the Philippines. If we do not end the use of our bases

as departure points for military operations in other countries we will soon be in trouble.

—Daily Express, Manila (Government).

Pres. Ford gambled and succeeded . . . But Southeast Asia no doubt is still convinced about the worth of U.S. commitments. One "Mayaguez" does not prove that Washington has thrown off the deadly lassitude of its Asian performances in recent months.

—New Nation, Singapore (independent).

The rescue of the "Mayaguez" was no throwback to nineteenth-century gunboat diplomacy. Ford knows that there are fixed limits to American power. Washington is shortening its political fronts and will from now on strengthen those alliances which remain important to American security—those with Europe and Japan. U.S. support will of course be related to the readiness of her partners to help themselves. This is the message Ford will bring with him to Europe. He can say loud and clear that America has demonstrated that she is no longer a paper tiger. After the military success, politics and diplomacy will resume their rightful role.

—Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurt (conservative).

The U.S. did not wait long to resort to force when the diplomatic moves seemed to lag. This is the prerogative of a superpower. But it would be better for all of us if the term superpower stood for something else—such as responsibility and justice . . .

—Dagens Nyheter, Stockholm (liberal).

The "Mayaguez" operation underlines America's willingness to . . . interfere if its vital interests are endangered. If the Arabs base their calculations on the hypothesis that the U.S. has finally discarded Israel as a vital interest . . . they will lose far more than a miserable freighter . . .

—Daily Star, Beirut (independent).

If the "Mayaguez" was not so innocent after all there will be awkward questions to answer—the American press can be relied upon to ask them—but so far the evidence is against this. Equally intriguing is what the Cambodians thought they were doing, if they thought at all. Perhaps somebody did some independent bungee-jumping in order to prove his mettle . . . Perhaps it was some sort of deliberate test or provocation designed to discredit the United States or damage still further her relations with Thailand . . . Whatever the explanation the reaction of the United States appears on present evidence to have been both right and effectively executed.

—The Times, London (independent).

The rescue of the American merchant ship "Mayaguez" and her crew has done far more than restore some of the "face" America lost in Indochina after all her military defeats there. It has also given the greatest

nation in the free world renewed confidence in herself. Sad though it be that a superpower should need such a one-sided and relatively trivial encounter to provide a shot in the arm, it is the stimulation that matters to us all, not the size or nature of the hypodermic needle.

—Sunday Telegraph, London (conservative).

The unpredictable ruthlessness of the new Cambodian regime, as shown in its treatment of its own people, may have been a factor in persuading President Ford to take his risky military action to rescue the crew of the arrested American ship "Mayaguez" . . . As it is, President Ford has been lucky. Apart from the lives lost, the chief damage done is to American relations with Thailand and perhaps with some of its other Asian allies . . . The manner in which Thai territory was used as a military base for the Cambodian operation, apparently in spite of the Thai Government's protests, may make other Asian allies look more closely at the military commitments their alliance with America involves them in.

—The Observer, London (independent).

The U.S. military operation ends the debate about whether diplomacy must always be exhausted before taking action . . . Washington has reaffirmed the principle of freedom of the seas . . . This is of prime importance to Israel . . . because of the American commitment to free navigation at the entrance to the Red Sea . . .

—Ma'ariv, Tel Aviv (independent).

Many Americans are extremely pleased that the affair was solved militarily rather than diplomatically and this shows that they really had a need to prove their strength after the staggering blows dealt them in Vietnam . . . They needed a victory . . . to break up a series of defeats and this one fit the bill perfectly . . .

—Le Figaro, Paris (conservative).

After so many political and diplomatic reversals, and the abandonment of millions of South Vietnamese and Cambodians, the United States has won the little war of the rocky islet of Koh Tang . . . Thanks to the brilliant action of some 200 marines, 180 million Americans feel that their honor is safe . . . and that the world must not disregard the ability of its forces to fight back. The sleeping giant can sometimes suddenly come very much alive.

—L'Aurore, Paris (conservative).

What is Mr. Ford trying to do in Indochina? Reopen a war that just ended in an unprecedented debacle? The Republic Administration is very simply fishing for votes; the . . . marines that were killed—and probably also some poor, unsuspecting Cambodians—were sacrificed to the 1978 President elections . . . Gerald Ford and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger . . . were carrying out a domestic political operation aimed at masking their inability to control events both within the United States and without.

—L'Humanite, Paris (Communist).

Compiled by Atlas World Press Review

C 30 May 75

Part II--Main Edition--29 May 1975

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 24 May 1975 (29)

Lessons of Mayaguez incident

The world will share in American relief that the 39 members of the crew of the Mayaguez have survived. President Ford has received the congratulations which always follow a gamble that comes off. It is not dissimilar from the more conventional — as we must now call them — seizures of hostages at embassies: if the authorities risk swift, sharp action and it succeeds, they are congratulated; if it fails, there is recrimination.

That said, the incident is confusing on many accounts. Washington and Phnom Penh are 13 hours apart. Communications within Phnom Penh (filled to Khmer secretiveness) are rudimentary. For example, if Phnom Penh had made public its decision to release the boat and crew, Washington would have had more time in which to stop the marines landing on Koh Tang island. As it was the landing and the broadcast were almost simultaneous. (The broadcast by Hou Nim, the Information Minister, did not mention the release of the crew specifically, but the context of the speech implies it.) Communications between Washington and Phnom Penh were reduced at one stage to exchanges by radio broadcasts. In addition, each side was working to its own set of preconceptions and interpretations. The Khmer Rouge were obsessed with espionage and sovereignty; the Americans with the safety of the crew and the ship. The US wanted to avoid a humiliating insult as a final twist to the collapse of the policies and regimes in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The whole picture was not always given by Washington. Such was the deployment of the Seventh Fleet at the time of the seizure of the Mayaguez that it was not a question of the US holding back from military operations for 60 hours. It was the soonest an operation of that nature could be mounted. When the marines landed on Koh Tang, the Mayaguez was there; but the men were known to have

escaped strafing by American planes and to be on the mainland. If the landing itself was hard to halt in time, it is difficult to explain why the US continued to bomb warehouses and oil storage facilities at Sihanoukville and an airstrip at Ream, when the Mayaguez had already been secured and the crew had been recognised in a fishing boat on their way to freedom. In the end, President Ford got what he wanted, and with some luck. But the train of events shows that military operations are hard to stop once under way.

From this, at least, a certain lesson can be drawn. The sooner diplomatic relations are opened between America and her former enemies in Indo-China, the better. Peace and friendship are not going to develop quickly. Channels of communication are essential if there are not to be more Mayaguez incidents, perhaps, with even more tragic consequences.

There are two wider lessons. One is for the Communists. Surely it is entirely in their long-term interests to facilitate the American withdrawal from South-East Asia. By rubbing their enemies' noses in their defeat through incidents involving United States citizens, they risk drawing American armed forces back into the area, with all the dangers that implies. They should avoid these incidents when they can.

The other lesson is for the Americans. The desire of the President and his advisers not to have the Mayaguez crew carried off to the Cambodian mainland is understandable. Reports from that country suggest enough chaos and random or organised cruelty to make anxiety for their safety a first preoccupation of their government. But what is more worrying is some of the public and Congressional reaction to the Marines' operation. An America licking its Indo-China wounds is understandable. So is an America anxious about its merchant seamen. But an America too eagerly exulting in its ability to hit back after its defeat would be a danger to itself and the world. The guarded support for the President from Senators McGovern and Kennedy, on the information then available, was the right response. Senator Goldwater, on the other hand, said that if President Ford had not sent in troops "every little half-assed nation is going to take shots at us." That attitude, too easily adopted by a nation in America's psychological state, is profoundly disturbing.

WASHINGTON POST

29 May 1975

Defending Europe

The following is excerpted from a recent speech by U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) to the NATO chiefs of staff.

Other than the defense of North America no security interest is more important to the United States than the defense of Europe. Europe is the ancestral home for most Americans, and we remain tied together by history. We share the same sources of civilization, spiritual commitments, and views about democracy and the preservation of free society.

Beyond these strong historical and cultural ties lies some equally important economic realities. Europe is the world's second largest economic power, behind the U.S. and ahead of the Soviet Union. U.S. investments in Europe are now over \$50 billion. Europe is the world's largest exporter and importer. U.S. exports to Europe total over \$50 billion each year, providing jobs for probably over two million Americans. Since 1972, exports by the U.S. aerospace industry alone have generated about 90,000 new jobs. And Europe makes regular technological contributions that benefit American business, military forces, and our daily way of life.

For these reasons, few would argue with me when I say that a major U.S. interest is to help preserve a strong and free Europe.

However, some have suggested that detente with the Soviet Union has reduced the importance of NATO. I don't agree with this assessment. While detente is a desirable goal and while we want to ease tensions with the Russians and other potential adversaries throughout the world we cannot forget that the Soviet goal of defeating Western democracy has never been renounced. Detente should be pursued by the West, but it should be defined as an easing of tensions, not as the arrival of the millennium.

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 24 May 1975 (29)

NATO fragile on the flanks

This month's NATO summit ought to be a useful occasion, perhaps even a decisive one, if the participants will only face all the facts including the disquieting ones. The most important of these is the possibility that Portugal will leave the alliance and, having done so, offer a base to the Soviet navy. If this were to happen — though there is no immediate evidence that it will — the whole basis of NATO strategy would be affected. So would the security of the United States. One Soviet missile-carrying submarine based in Portugal or the Azores would be five times as dangerous to America as one based in Murmansk.

There are no signs at present that the Portuguese Government, still dominated by the Armed Forces Movement, wants to leave NATO. But the same cannot be said of the present Government's possible successors. Already in practice the AFM wants the United States to forgo the use of the Azores as a staging point for ferrying military supplies to Israel. The AFM's argument is that a NATO base in the Azores is all very well so long as it is not used to favour one side or the other in the Middle East dispute, a dispute which is not NATO's direct concern. The

argument is understandable. Portugal does not want to have her oil supply cut off by resentful Arabs.

No more does Spain. But Spain wants to be accepted as a respectable member of the Western world. It has already granted bases to the United States, though not to NATO, and is known to want closer defence arrangements with the West. In Washington there are sympathetic ears to Spanish words, and Spain may perhaps be seen, as a potential substitute for Portugal. The Spanish Government has mentioned both in Washington and in Bonn its interest in a closer defence relationship with the US, and the matter seems even to have come up in President Ford's talk with Mr Wilson. Whatever the reaction in Washington, it must be clear that other Governments will not tolerate any NATO invitation to Spain.

Another disquieting possibility for NATO is that when Marshal Tito dies the Soviet Union could, by fair means or foul, regain its once-paramount influence in Yugoslavia. On paper at least the Yugoslav Federation is a fragile structure — multilingual, multi-racial, and multi-religious. Hitler did more to unite it than anyone else could have

done. That it has stayed united is a tribute above all to Tito himself. The danger that it would dissolve without him cannot be ignored. And if it dissolves there would be many in the Kremlin who would see a chance of expansion and would want to seize it. The Soviet Defence establishment now owns a vast and modern fleet. It is an immensely expensive collection of ships which would mightily enhance Soviet prestige and influence if only it were not based on inconvenient and inadequate harbours in the Arctic, the Black Sea, and the far northern-western Pacific. A dependable base in Yugoslavia would multiply the Soviet fleet's effectiveness as surely as one in Portugal.

Neither of these unnerving developments need happen. But if either of them did NATO's strategic position would worsen. Originally the alliance had no need to worry about a Soviet navy. Today the naval threat to western security is as serious as any other. The heads of Government ought not to be content simply to exchange compliments when they meet. What they will need to do is to undertake a good deal of concerted contingency planning and to agree on a united diplomatic effort.

Part II--Main Edition--29 May 1975

LOS ANGELES TIMES 28 May 1975 (29)

Portugal: a Time for Caution

The prospects for democracy in Portugal seem to deteriorate by the day.

The Armed Forces Movement, which seized power from the rightist dictatorship 13 months ago, appears determined to ignore the Socialist Party's victory in the April election, and to collaborate with the expansion of Communist Party power.

It seems clear, nevertheless, that President Ford has gone the wrong way and that the European Common Market has gone the right way in responding. For Portugal is not yet a hopeless case.

Ford told some foreign correspondents last week that he intended to talk to America's European allies about tossing Portugal out of NATO on the ground that a Communist "element" is intolerable in the military alliance put together to resist communism. That is a clumsy way to put it. Portugal is not yet a Communist state. But its leaders are deeply suspicious of American intentions, and can fill any plaza with angry protesters by just breathing the initials "CIA."

The nine members of the European Economic Community have proposed a major economic assistance program for impoverished Portugal. Implicit in any such deal would be maintenance of some semblance of democracy. It is an offer more likely to influence Lisbon than are Ford's threats.

The Atlantic allies must do what they can to discourage the Soviet Union from constructing a new

satellite. Moscow must be made to understand that any such adventures would take a heavy toll in the process of detente and set back any prospect for the European security conference that Comrade Brezhnev wants so much before the Soviet Communist Party Congress next year. But this message is best delivered quietly, not shouted from the White House rooftop.

It is a delicate moment in Portugal. Deep divisions persist within the Armed Forces Movement, and within the broader body of the military. Those favoring a Communist solution may dominate for the moment, but their power appears limited, and any move to deliver Portugal as a puppet of Moscow would stir no small reaction.

Much of today's extremism is an understandable reaction to years of a feudal concentration of power and wealth in a few families in collusion with the Fascist government. Capitalism and free enterprise are despised by many because they are known only by the Portuguese model. The reputation of private business was further clouded by the feverish speculation that accompanied a marginal effort at reform before the 1974 coup.

At the moment, no one knows the extent of government economic control following nationalization of the banks, which may have controlled as much as half the industry.

It is a time for caution among the Western allies.

DETROIT NEWS 22 May 1975 (29)

House rejects U.S. pullout

The House of Representatives has firmly rejected an amendment ordering the return of 70,000 troops now serving overseas. Congressmen voted 311 to 95 against a troop reduction that would have severely weakened military strength overseas and eroded the belief of other nations in America as never before.

Rep. Ronald V. Dellums, D-Calif., who proposed the amendment to a military appropriations bill, said he had no clear idea about where the troop withdrawals should be made, other than to loosely specify the western Pacific, that is, Thailand, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.

If that proposal had gained favor in Congress, renewal of war would be inevitable and probably soon in Korea. Any evidence of a weakening in the American will or commitment in Asia is an invitation to Communist aggression.

The import of the Dellums amendment goes far beyond that. Its passage also would have dealt a severe blow to our European allies, who are beginning to sense the growing dangers that surround NATO.

Europeans have watched with alarm the crumbling of NATO's strength, with the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus; the obvious weakening of Italy, which is in

a constant economic-political turmoil, and the swing of Portugal to the left.

Adding to this long list of woes is the decision of Great Britain to reduce drastically its defense budget. Bonn's reaction has been acerbic, with the Germans suggesting Britain is on a "bargain basement" binge with its military and that Britain, by cutting its defense commitment, is engaging in "unilateral disarmament."

The British and Germans are quarreling over statistics. The British claim their defense contribution to Europe is second only to that of the United States. Germany says this is an illusion—that Britain is a poor fifth.

Europe is worried that detente and inflation may do what the Red Army and the Warsaw Pact have not attempted to do—bring about the downfall of NATO.

The other anxieties in Europe about uncertain freshmen congressmen and the growing trend toward isolationism in America have been answered by two events in recent days—the rescue of the freighter Mayaguez in the Gulf of Siam and the rejection of troop withdrawals—so firmly done—by the House of Representatives.

With exciting rapidity, these two events have changed the image of America abroad—and not a moment too soon.

TIME MAGAZINE

2 June 1975 (29 May)

Lift the Boycott?

For too many years Cuba has been under the control of an alien power. Under the direction of the Soviet Union, the Cuban regime has become an instrument of the Kremlin's secret intelligence service, the KGB, for spreading the Soviet brand of totalitarianism to other nations of this hemisphere. The regime in Cuba is simply not one of concern to Cubans only, it is of concern to every citizen of this hemisphere because of its intimate links to a hostile foreign power, and because of the ruthless suppression of civil liberties that it seeks to export.

Cuba also provides facilities for the Russian navy that on short notice can be augmented so as to accommodate the Soviets' most modern nuclear-armed submarines.

The sanctions maintained against Cuba by the Organization of American States [May 19] must be retained if the Cuban people are ever to have a chance for freedom. But whether or not they are retained, I shall oppose any attempt by the U.S. to restore formal diplomatic or economic relations with Castro Cuba until Castro Cuba purges itself of the Soviet presence.

James Buckley
U.S. Senator, New York
Washington, D.C.

4-E

107-001
AND A VESSEL, WASHINGTON

NESSER SAID FORD ORDERED THE ATTACK UNDER HIS "AUTHORITY TO PROTECT THE LIVES AND PROPERTY OF AMERICANS AGAINST ACTS OF AGGRESSION."

ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WAR POWERS ACT GIVE FORD THE RIGHT TO PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES IN AN EMERGENCY, CONGRESS SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED THE PRESIDENT FROM USING TROOPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER THEY WERE PULLED OUT OF VIETNAM IN 1973.

"I HOPE WE ARE NOT GOING DOWN THE SAME ROAD WE FOLLOWED IN THE TONKIN GULF INCIDENT OF 1964," SEN. HENRY JACKSON, D-WASH., SAID. "THIS IS A TIME FOR COOL HEADS, NOT A TIME TO EXERCISE THE USE OF FORCE."

JACKSON SAID THE SINKING OF CAMBODIAN SHIPS COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A PROVOCATIVE ACT. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT ALL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WOULD BE CONTINUED TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE MAYAGUEZ AND ADDED THAT CHINA "COULD PLAY A KEY ROLE."

BUT VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER INDICATED DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN FRUITLESS SO FAR.

"I SUPPOSE IF THEY (DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS) HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL WE WOULD HAVE HAD THE SHIP AND CREW BACK," HE SAID.

UP-076

ADD 5 VESSEL, WASHINGTON

A WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN SAID FORD ORDERED THE ATTACK LAST NIGHT AFTER RECEIVING "A STRONG CONSENSUS OF SUPPORT AND NO OBJECTIONS" IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE LEADERS OF CONGRESS.

LAITIN DID NOT SAY WHAT WEAPONS WERE USED AGAINST THE GUNBOATS.

THE ATTACK CAME AS FORD AMBUSHED AN EMERGENCY U.S. MILITARY FORCE IN THE AREA, INCLUDING 3,100 MARINES WHO LANDED IN THAILAND TODAY AND THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER USS CORAL SEA, WHICH WAS STEERING TOWARD THE AREA IN THE COMPANY OF SEVERAL DESTROYERS.

THE MILITARY ACTION SIGNED AN APPARENT FAILURE OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO AVERT A CRISIS. OFFICIALS WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THE RESULTS OF CONTACTS THAT REPORTEDLY WERE MADE WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF CHINA, AN ALLY OF THE NEW COMMUNIST REGIME IN CAMBODIA.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MILITARY ACTION INTERRUPTED DEBATE ON THE HOUSE FLOOR OVER AID TO VIETNAMESE REFUGEES.

REP. JOHN SEIBERLING, D-OHIO, SAID THE ACTION WAS A DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE "PLAIN LANGUAGE" OF THE 1973 LAW PROHIBITING THE INVOLVEMENT OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN INDOCHINA. REP. JOHN ANDERSON, R-ILL., REPLIED TO MEMBERS NOT TO REACH ANY JUDGMENT UNTIL THE FACTS ARE KNOWN.

UP1 85-14 01:22 PED

PRESS

(BY HELEN THOMAS)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- DESPITE THAI WARNINGS THEIR COUNTRY WILL NOT BE USED FOR A SHOW OF MILITARY FORCE, SOME 1,100 U.S. MARINES LANDED IN THAILAND TODAY TO AWAIT PRESIDENT FORD'S NEXT ORDERS TOWARD RECOVERY OF THE CAMBODIAN-HELD AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIP MAYAGUEZ. FORD, WHO MET WITH HIS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTO THE EARLY MORNING TODAY, RETURNED TO HIS OFFICE AT 7:40 A.M. AND SCHEDULED YET ANOTHER NSC MEETING AS THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CRISIS INTENSIFIED. NEW U.S. MILITARY MOVES WERE EXPECTED.

PRESS SECRETARY RON NESSEN SAID THERE HAD YET BEEN "NO FINAL DECISION" ON FORD'S NEXT STEP, BUT HE NOTED FORD WAS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, WHOM HE PROMISED TO INFORM IN ADVANCE OF ANY MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE CAMBODIANS WHO PIRATED THE AMERICAN SHIP.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE MARINES AT U TAPAO AIR BASE IN THAILAND PROMPTED A STRONG OFFICIAL DENUNCIATION FROM THE THAI GOVERNMENT -- THE LAST U.S. ALLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA -- AND AN OUTBREAK OF ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN BANGKOK. NESSEN REFUSED TO COMMENT ON THAI DEMANDS TO MOVE THE MARINES ELSEWHERE.

THE MARINE AIRLIFT WAS ORDERED BY FORD YESTERDAY AS THE FIRST STEP IN A SHOW OF FORCE TOWARD THE CAMBODIAN ARMED FORCES WHO HAVE BEEN HOLDING THE MAYAGUEZ AND ITS 39-MAN AMERICAN CREW SINCE EARLY MONDAY.

THE SHIP WAS BEING HELD BY FIVE CAMBODIAN GUNBOATS ABOUT 30 MILES OFFSHORE IN THE GULF OF SIAM, ACCORDING TO INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FROM U.S. SURVEILLANCE PLANES, ONE OF WHICH WAS FIRED UPON YESTERDAY.

THERE WERE INDICATIONS AT LEAST SOME OF THE CREWMEN HAD BEEN TAKEN ASHORE BY THEIR COMMUNIST CAPTORS.

UPI 85-14 10:48 RED

UP-059

(VESSEL)

(BY HELEN THOMAS)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- THE UNITED STATES HAS SUNK THREE CAMBODIAN GUNBOATS IN APPARENT RETALIATION FOR THE KHMER ROUGE'S FAILURE TO RELEASE THE CAPTURED AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIP MAYAGUEZ, THE PENTAGON SAID TODAY.

UPI 05-14 12:22 PED

UP-059

ADD 1 VESSEL, WASHINGTON (UP-059)

ASSISTANT SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER ROBERT GRIFFIN WAS ASKED ABOUT REPORTS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD SUNK GUNBOATS WHICH HAD FIRED ON AMERICAN RECONNAISSANCE AIRPLANES.

HE SAID, "I HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY THE WHITE HOUSE ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENTS OF WHICH YOU SPEAK."

UPI 05-14 12:25 PED

UP-853

ADD 3 VESSEL, WASHINGTON

THE PENTAGON ANNOUNCEMENT SAID AMERICAN AIRCRAFT SANK THREE CAMBODIAN GUNBOATS AND DAMAGED ABOUT FOUR OTHERS.

A PENTAGON SPOKESMAN SAID THE ACTION WAS TAKEN BECAUSE THERE WERE INDICATIONS THE CAMBODIANS INTENDED TO REMOVE CAPTIVE AMERICANS FROM THE SHIP. HE SAID AMERICAN AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN "RECEIVING FIRE" FOR SOME HOURS BEFORE THE GUNBOATS WERE ATTACKED.

"THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE CAMBODIANS APPEARED TO BE ATTEMPTING TO MOVE CAPTIVE U.S. CREWMEN FROM THE SHIP AND FROM THE ISLAND OF KOH TANG TO THE MAINLAND," PENTAGON SPOKESMAN JOSEPH LAITIN SAID.

THE MAYAGUEZ REMAINS ANCHORED OFF THE ISLAND. THE SHIP HAS A CREW OF 39 AMERICANS.

LAITIN SAID THE ATTACKING U.S. AIRCRAFT FIRST GAVE WARNING -- BUT HE DID NOT INDICATE HOW -- AND THEN "BEGAN EFFORTS TO BLOCK THIS MOVEMENT".

"THREE CAMBODIAN PATROL CRAFT WERE DESTROYED, ABOUT FOUR OTHERS WERE DAMAGED AND IMMOBILIZED," HE SAID.

UPT 05-14 12:30 PED

UP-864

ADD 4 VESSEL, WASHINGTON

LATTIN SAID ONE OF THE DAMAGED CAMBODIAN BOATS SUCCEEDED IN REACHING KOMPONG SOM, THE PORT ON THE CAMBODIAN MAINLAND ABOUT 35 MILES FROM THE ISLAND OF KOH TANG.

HE DECLINED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS.

LATTIN SAID THE FIRST OF THE NAVY WARSHIPS ORDERED TO THE GULF OF SIAM, THE DESTROYER ESCORT HOLT, HAD ARRIVED IN THE AREA OF KOH TANG ISLAND.

SOME 1,100 U.S. MARINES MEANWHILE WERE IN THAILAND AWAITING ORDERS FROM ON THE NEXT U.S. MILITARY MOVE. AND THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER USS CORAL SEA WAS STEAMING TOWARD THE AREA.

LATTIN SAID U.S. AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN FIRED ON BY THE CAMBODIAN PATROL BOATS FOR SEVERAL HOURS BEFORE THE ATTACK ORDER WAS GIVEN. THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN MAINTAINING 24-HOUR A DAY SURVEILLANCE OVER THE KAYAGUEZ.

UPT 85-14 12:43 PED

UP-081

ADD 6 VESSEL, WASHINGTON

NESSEN SAID FORD ORDERED THE ATTACK UNDER HIS "AUTHORITY TO PROTECT THE LIVES AND PROPERTY OF AMERICANS AGAINST ACTS OF AGGRESSION."

ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WAR POWERS ACT GIVE FORD THE RIGHT TO PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES IN AN EMERGENCY, CONGRESS SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED THE PRESIDENT FROM USING TROOPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER THEY WERE PULLED OUT OF VIETNAM IN 1973.

"I HOPE WE ARE NOT GOING DOWN THE SAME ROAD WE FOLLOWED IN THE TONKIN GULF RECORD OF 1964," SEN. HENRY JACKSON, D-WASH., SAID. "THIS IS A TIME FOR COOL HEADS, NOT A TIME TO EXERCISE THE USE OF FORCE."

JACKSON SAID THE SINKING OF CAMBODIAN SHIPS COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A PROVOCATIVE ACT. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT ALL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WOULD BE CONTINUED TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE MAYAGUEZ AND ADDED THAT CHINA "COULD PLAY A KEY ROLE."

BUT VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER INDICATED DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN FRUITLESS SO FAR.

"I SUPPOSE IF THEY (DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS) HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL WE WOULD HAVE HAD THE SHIP AND CREW BACK," HE SAID.

STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ROBERT FUNSETH SAID THE UNITED STATES IS CONTINUING ITS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO OBTAIN RELEASE OF THE SHIP, BUT HE REFUSED TO ELABORATE. HE SAID THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD REASONABLE ASSURANCES THAT THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED THE DEMAND, BUT SO FAR THERE HAD BEEN NO REPLY.

UPI 05-14 01:36 PED

UP-082

(UN)

UNITED NATIONS (UPI) -- THE UNITED STATES ASKED SECRETARY GENERAL KURT WALDHEIM TODAY TO AID IN OBTAINING THE RELEASE OF THE U.S. MERCHANT VESSEL AND CREW SEIZED IN CAMBODIA.

IT ALSO SERVED NOTICE THAT IT WOULD TAKE "SUCH MEASURES AS MAY BE NECESSARY" TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AND PROPERTY.

U.S. AMBASSADOR JOHN SCALI CALLED ON WALDHEIM AT 1 P.M. TO PRESENT THE FORMAL LETTER AND APPARENTLY TO ADVISE HIM OF THE SINKING OF CAMBODIAN GUNBOATS BY AMERICAN AIRCRAFT IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT THE TRANSFER OF THE CREWMEN OF THE SHIP MAYAGUEZ.

"AS YOU ARE NO DOUBT AWARE," SCALI SAID IN HIS NOTE TO WALDHEIM, "MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY INITIATED CERTAIN STEPS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS."

"IN THE ABSENCE OF A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO YOUR APPEALS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS FOR EARLY ACTION BY THE CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES, MY GOVERNMENT RESERVES THE RIGHT TO TAKE SUCH MEASURES AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AND PROPERTY."

THESE MEASURES WOULD BE TAKEN UNDER UN CHARTER PROVISIONS FOR SELF-DEFENSE, SCALI TOLD WALDHEIM.

UPI 05-14 01:39 PED

UP-083

(REACTION)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- THE SINKING OF THREE CAMBODIAN PATROL BOATS BY U.S. AIRCRAFT DREW MIXED REACTION FROM CONGRESS TODAY, WITH SEN. HENRY JACKSON, D-WASH., WARNING THIS IS "NOT A TIME TO EXERCISE THE USE OF FORCE".

"I FIND NO FAULT WITH IT (THE BOMBING)," COUNTERED SEN. JOHN PASTORE, D-R.I. "IN FACT, I AGREE WITH IT."

SEN. JAMES EASTLAND, D-MISS., ALSO SAID HE APPROVED OF THE ATTACKS, SAYING, "WE'VE GOT TO PROTECT OUR MEN AND WE'VE GOT TO PUNISH CAMBODIA FOR ITS PIRACY."

VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER SAID THE SHOOTING AROSE FROM THE APPARENT FAILURE OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO FREE THE U.S. MERCHANT SHIP MAYAGUEZ, SEIZED BY THE CAMBODIANS MONDAY.

JACKSON EXPRESSED FEAR THE SHOOTING INCIDENT MIGHT LEAD THE UNITED STATES DOWN A SIMILAR PATH STARTED BY THE TONKIN GULF INCIDENT IN 1964.

"THIS IS A TIME FOR COOL HEADS, NOT A TIME TO EXERCISE THE USE OF FORCE, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL FOR OUR DEFENSE," JACKSON SAID.

SEN. DICK CLARK, D-IOWA, ALSO COUNSELED RESTRAINT. "I THINK THE CALL FOR MORE MILITARY ACTIVITY IS PREMATURE," HE SAID. "DO WE BOMB CITIES? WHAT ARE OUR MILITARY OPTIONS?"

BUT PASTORE CALLED THE SEIZURE OF THE SHIP "AN AFFRONT TO THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS" AND URGED THAT CAMBODIA BE GIVEN A SEVEN-DAY ULTIMATUM TO RELEASE THE SHIP.

"OR," HE ADDED, "I WOULD SUGGEST THAT WE GO IN AND TAKE IT OUT."

UPI 05-14 01:42 PED

UP-084

ADD 7 VESSEL, WASHINGTON

HESSEN DECLINED TO SAY WHETHER RUSSIA AND CHINA HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE ACTION BEFOREHAND AND WHAT MOVES HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO PREVENT ANY EXPANSION OF THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

HESSEN ADDED THE UNITED STATES WAS IN CONTACT WITH THE THAI GOVERNMENT.

UPI 05-14 01:44 PED

UP-100

(VESSEL CREW)

CHICAGO (UPI) -- THE CHAIRMAN OF THE REMEMBER THE PUEBLO COMMITTEE SAID WEDNESDAY HALF OF THE CREW OF THE CAPTURED AMERICAN VESSEL MAYAGUEZ HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE SHIP BEFORE THE AMERICAN RETALIATORY ATTACK ON CAMBODIAN GUNBOATS.

THE REV. PAUL LINDSTROM SAID HE GOT THE EVACUATION INFORMATION LATE TUESDAY FROM A "PENTAGON SOURCE" WHO SAID IT CAME FROM RECONNAISSANCE PLANES. THE SOURCE, LINDSTROM SAID, TOLD COMMITTEE MEMBERS TUESDAY HE WAS CONVINCED "ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN TO STOP REMOVAL OF ADDITIONAL MEN FROM THE SHIP."

"AT LEAST HALF OF THE CREW MEMBERS OF THE MAYAGUEZ, INCLUDING THOSE WHO WERE INJURED BY THE COMMUNIST CAMBODIANS DURING THE CAPTURE, HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THE SHIP," LINDSTROM SAID. HE SAID EARLIER AT LEAST FOUR CREW MEMBERS WERE INJURED DURING THE COMMUNIST CAPTURE.

"THE CREW MEMBERS WERE TAKEN BY BOAT TO THE COAST. THEY WERE LAST SEEN BEING TRANSPORTED BY TRUCK TO AN AREA BETWEEN CAMBOT AND SIHANOAKVILLE IN CAMBODIA," HE SAID.

LINDSTROM SAID HE SUPPORTED THE ATTACK ON THE CAMBODIAN GUNBOATS BUT SAID PRESIDENT FORD MAY HAVE WAITED TOO LONG.

"WE FULLY APPROVE OF THIS AND WE TRUST WE WILL NOT STOP SHORT OF THE FULL SUCCESS WHICH MUST BE THE IMMEDIATE RETRACTION OF ALL OF THE MEN AND THE RETURN OF THE SHIP AS WELL AS PUNITIVE STEPS AGAINST THE CAMBODIANS FOR THEIR ACT OF BANDITRY AND CRIME AGAINST AMERICAN CITIZENS," LINDSTROM SAID.

"AS I SAID YESTERDAY, I THINK THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN. IF IT HAD BEEN IMMEDIATE, THE MEN COULD HAVE BEEN RESCUED BEFORE ANY WERE TAKEN OFF AND THE CAMBODIANS MOVED IN THEIR FLOTILLA OF NAVY SHIPS. THE LONGER WE WAITED, THE MORE DIFFICULT THE SITUATION IS. THE MEN ARE GOING TO SUFFER THE CONSEQUENCE OF MR. FORD'S INACTION."

UPI 05-14 03:02 PED

UP-101 CORRESPONDENTS

THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE IS MEETING IN CLOSED SESSION AT 2:30 P. M. TODAY ON THE SHIP SEIZURE--ROOM S-116, CAPITOL

UPI 05-14 03:03 PED

UP-147

ADD 4 VESSEL, WASHINGTON

"WE DECIDED TO GO IN BECAUSE WE DIDN'T WANT ANYONE TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ISLAND TO THE MAINLAND," SAID SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY-KISSINGER AS HE ARRIVED FOR ANOTHER EMERGENCY SESSION OF FORD'S NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

ON CAPITOL HILL, ASSISTANT SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER ROBERT GRIFFIN SAID THE AIRSTRIKE SEEMED TO SUPPORT A STRATEGY OF ISOLATING THE MAYAGUEZ AND ITS CREW OFFSHORE "UNTIL WE COULD GET THERE AND GET OUR MEN OUT."

PENTAGON SOURCES SAID THE INBOUND ATTACK CARRIER CORAL SEA WOULD LIKELY PICK UP THE MARINES IN PREPARATION FOR A POSSIBLE COMMANDO-STYLE ASSAULT ON KOH TANG, THE ISLAND 30 MILES OFF THE CAMBODIAN COAST WHERE THE MAYAGUEZ IS ANCHORED.

THE SOURCES SAID THE AIRSTRIKE APPEARED TO HAVE DESTROYED OR DRIVEN AWAY ALL BUT ONE OF THE 30-FOOT FIBERGLASS PATROL BOATS GUARDING THE MAYAGUEZ, BUT MORE MIGHT BE HIDDEN IN THE DENSE SHORELINE FOLIAGE OF KOH TANG.

REP. BELLA ABZUG, D-N.Y., SAID THE STRAFING VIOLATED LEGISLATIVE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN INDOCHINA. "THE LAST THING WE NEED NOW IS TO GO BACK TO BOMBING CAMBODIA," SHE SAID. "ALL IT WILL DO IS KILL MORE CAMBODIANS AND AMERICANS."

BUT REP. MORRIS UDALL, D-ARIZ., SAID, AS ONE WHO OPPOSED THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, "I FEEL COMPELLED TO STATE MY SUPPORT FOR THE LIMITED MILITARY ACTION TAKEN BY PRESIDENT FORD AFTER DIPLOMACY APPARENTLY FAILED."

"THE ISSUE AT STAKE IS NOT THE RECKLESS INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN POWER INTO SOUTHEAST ASIA," SAID UDALL, AN ANNOUNCED PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, "BUT WHETHER THE UNITED STATES HAS THE WILL TO RESPOND TO AN ARROGANT AND BLATANTLY ILLEGAL ACT OF PIRACY."

SEN. GEORGE MCDOVERN SAID THE U.S. "MUST RESIST EVERY EFFORT OR EXCUSE TO RESUME A CONFLICT WHICH ENDED ONLY WEEKS AGO."

REP. CHARLES WILSON, D-TEX., COMMENTED: "I AM A BIT DISAPPOINTED THAT WE DIDN'T SINK EVERYTHING IN THE HARBOR."

UPI 05-14 06:20 PED

UP-148

(CORRESPONDENTS:

THE PENTAGON HAS ISSUED AN OFFICIAL CORRECTION TO ITS STATEMENT ABOUT THE U.S. AIRSTRIKE NEAR KOH TANG ISLAND, OMITTING ALL REFERENCE TO THE FOUR PATROL BOATS REPORTEDLY DAMAGED BECAUSE "THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT VERIFICATION TO SUPPORT THIS PART OF THE STATEMENT." HENCE THE FOLLOWING SUBSTITUTES FOR THE FIRST FOUR PARAGRAPHS OF (UP-184):

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- RETURNING TO COMBAT IN INDOCHINA, U.S. WARPLANES SANK THREE CAMBODIAN PATROL BOATS NEAR THE PIRATED AMERICAN FREIGHTER MAYAGUEZ WEDNESDAY WHILE 1,100 MARINES AND A NAVY TASK FORCE MOVED IN FOR A POSSIBLE RESCUE RAID.

ON ORDERS FROM PRESIDENT FORD AND WITH THE APPROVAL OF KEY CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, AIR FORCE FIGHTERS STRAFED THE FIBERGLASS PATROL BOATS WITH CANNON FIRE FOR 3 1/2 HOURS TO STOP THEM FROM MOVING THE 39 MAYAGUEZ CREWMEN FROM AN OFFSHORE ANCHORAGE TO THE CAMBODIAN MAINLAND.

THE PENTAGON AT FIRST ANNOUNCED THREE BOATS WERE SUNK AND FOUR DAMAGED WITHOUT LOSS OF A SINGLE U.S. PLANE, BUT IT LATER RETRACTED ITS REPORT ABOUT THE FOUR DAMAGED SHIPS ON GROUNDS "THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT VERIFICATION" TO SUPPORT THE DAMAGE CLAIMS.

THE FATE AND EXACT WHEREABOUTS OF THE CAPTIVE MAYAGUEZ CREW REMAINED UNCERTAIN.

LATER WEDNESDAY, CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS OF BOTH PARTIES WERE SUMMONED TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR WHAT ONE SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "AN EMERGENCY MEETING" STARTING AT 10 A.M. EDT.

THIS FOLLOWED PRESIDENTIAL CONFERENCES WITH TOP NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISERS.

UPI 05-14 06:34 PED

✓ THE MAINLAND.

ONE SOURCE SAID, "WE THINK SOME ARE ON THE ISLAND, AND SOME ARE ON THE SHIP" BUT HE SAID SOME COULD ALSO HAVE BEEN ON THE ~~PATROL BOATS~~ SUNK OR DAMAGED TUESDAY NIGHT BY U.S. FIGHTER AIRCRAFTS.

ONE PATROL BOAT GOT AWAY TO THE MAINLAND, SO THERE WAS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME OF THE CREW MIGHT BE ON THE MAINLAND.

THE EASIEST MOVE, ONE SOURCE SAID, WOULD BE FOR THE DESTROYER ESCORT HOLT, ALREADY ON THE SCENE, TO PULL ALONGSIDE THE MAYAGUEZ AND TOW IT AWAY. BUT IF ALL THE CREWMEN WERE NOT ABOARD, THAT WOULD NOT SOLVE THE PLANNERS' PROBLEM.

NAVY SOURCES SAID THE 3,000 TON HOLT COULD TOW THE 10,000 TON MAYAGUEZ. BUT THEY SAID THE HOLT WOULD NOT SET UP A TOW UNLESS IT WAS CERTAIN NO MORE PATROL BOATS WERE LURKING AROUND.

THEY SAID THE PREFERENCE WAS TO PUT SAILORS ABOARD THE MAYAGUEZ TO SAIL THE FREIGHTER AWAY UNDER ITS OWN POWER. THE PENTAGON DOES NOT KNOW IF THE MAYAGUEZ HAS BEEN DISABLED AND CANNOT MOVE UNDER ITS OWN POWER.

ABOUT 1,100 MARINES HAVE BEEN FLOWN TO THAILAND AND THE THAI GOVERNMENT, WORRIED OVER ITS RELATIONS WITH THE NEW COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT NEXT DOOR IN CAMBODIA, HAS ORDERED THEM OUT.

SOURCES SAID THE ADMINISTRATION WAS CONSIDERING HELICOPTERING THE MARINES OUT TO THE CARRIER CORAL SEA, WHICH WAS DUE IN THE GULF OF THAILAND LATE WEDNESDAY.

THE CHOPPERS COULD THEN LAND THE MARINES ON KOH TANG WHERE THE TROOPS COULD SWEEP THE ISLAND, SEARCHING FOR THE CREW.

UPI 05-14 00:05 PED

R279

B A

KHMER 5-15

BULLETIN

BANGKOK (UPI) -- RADIO PHNOM PENH SAID THURSDAY THE KHMER ROUGE WILL RELEASE THE U.S. MERCHANT SHIP MAYAGUEZ, SEIZED BY THE CAMBODIAN COMMUNISTS EARLIER THIS WEEK.

UPI 05-14 08:17 PED

R280

U I

KHMER 5-14

URGENT

1ST ADD KHMER BANGKOK R279 X X X WEEK.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE AT IN A 19-MINUTE COMMUNIQUE READ OVER RADIO-PHNOM PENH BY INFORMATION MINISTER DEFENSE MINISTER HU NIM, IN WHAT WAS THE FIRST PUBLIC REFERENCE BY THE CAMBODIAN COMMUNISTS TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MAYAGUEZ SINCE IT WAS CAPTURED ON MONDAY.

"OUR RONGC (ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION IN CAMBODIA) WILL ORDER THE MAYAGUEZ TO WITHDRAW FROM CAMBODIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS AND WILL WARN IT AGAINST FURTHER ESPIONAGE OR PROVOCATIVE ACTIVITIES," HU NIM SAID.

"THIS APPLIES TO THE MAYAGUEZ OR ANY OTHER SHIPS, LIKE THE SHIP FLYING THE PANAMANIAN FLAG WHICH WAS RELEASED ON 9 MAY."

UPI 05-14 08:31 PED

A283

U. I.

VESSEL 5-14

URGENT

3RD NIGHT LD 0257 PREVIOUS WASHINGTON

BY UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA SAID THURSDAY IT WOULD RELEASE THE U. S. MERCHANT SHIP MAYAGUEZ, SEIZED BY THE KHMER ROUGE ON MONDAY.

THE PHNOM PENH RADIO BROADCAST WHICH WAS HEARD IN BANGKOK CAME AFTER THE UNITED STATES WARPLANES SANK THREE CAMBODIAN PATROL BOATS NEAR THE SEIZED FREIGHTER MAYAGUEZ WHILE 1,100 MARINES AND A NAVY TASK FORCE MOVED IN FOR A POSSIBLE RESCUE OPERATION.

IN WASHINGTON, PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY RON NESSEN SAID PRESIDENT FORD HAD BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE CAMBODIAN BROADCAST BUT THERE WOULD BE NO IMMEDIATE COMMENT.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE AT 7:07 A. M. EDT WEDNESDAY IN A 19-MINUTE COMMUNIQUE READ OVER RADIO PHNOM PENH BY INFORMATION MINISTER DEFENSE MINISTER HU NIM. IN WHAT WAS THE FIRST PUBLIC REFERENCE BY THE CAMBODIAN COMMUNISTS TO THE MAYAGUEZ SINCE IT WAS CAPTURED ON MONDAY.

"OUR REGNUC (ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION IN CAMBODIA) WILL ORDER THE MAYAGUEZ TO WITHDRAW FROM CAMBODIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS AND WILL WARN IT AGAINST FURTHER ESPIONAGE OR PROVOCATIVE ACTIVITIES," HU NIM SAID.

"THIS APPLIES TO THE MAYAGUEZ OR ANY OTHER SHIPS, LIKE THE SHIP FLYING THE PANAMANIAN FLAG WHICH WAS RELEASED ON 3 MAY."

MORE

UPI 05-14 08 47 RED

0204

U 1

VESSEL 5-14

URGENT

1ST-ADD 3RD NIGHT LD VESSEL UNOATED AS 283 X X X MAY.

THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE WORD ON THE FATE OF THE MAYAGUEZ' 39-MAN CREW.

IN WASHINGTON, THE PHNOM PENH ANNOUNCEMENT CAME JUST AS PRESIDENT FORD WAS ENDING A SPECIAL MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON THE MAYAGUEZ SITUATION.

WEST VIRGINIA SEN. ROBERT BYRD, THE ASSISTANT DEMOCRATIC LEADER, TOLD REPORTERS AFTER THE MEETING THAT THE PRESIDENT INFORMED THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS "OF ACTIONS THAT ARE PLANNED AND UNDERWAY."

HE DECLINED TO SPECIFY ANY ACTIONS, BUT SAID HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD BE CLEAR "WITHIN A FEW HOURS." ASKED HOW LONG IT MIGHT TAKE, HE SAID "I WOULD HOPE WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS" ~~THAT IT WOULD BE OVER.~~

ASKED IF AIR STRIKES WERE INVOLVED, HE SAID, "I THINK THE ANSWER TO THAT IS OBVIOUS".

BYRD SAID "THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CREW IS NOT KNOWN-" BUT HE SAID "THE FEELING IS THAT MOST OF THEM OR AT LEAST SOME ARE ON THE ISLAND" AND THAT SOME MAY STILL BE ON THE SHIP OR ALREADY ON THE MAINLAND.

BYRD SAID FORD "HAS DECIDED ON A COURSE OF ACTION FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE" BUT HE DECLINED TO ELABORATE.

SEN. JOHN SPARKMAN, D-ALA., CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE SAID PLEDGED "TO DO HIS BEST TO GET THE CREW MEMBERS BACK." PICKUP 2ND PDH. 2ND NIGHT LD. ON ORDERS

UPI 05-14 00 32 PED

8 R

VESSEL 5-14

BULLETIN PRECEDE
WASHINGTON (UPI) -- THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCED WEDNESDAY THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS RECAPTURED THE MERCHANT SHIP MAYAGUEZ AND REQUESTED THAT THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT UNCONDITIONALLY AND IMMEDIATELY RELEASE MEMBERS OF THE CREW.

UPI 05-14 09:21 PED

0223

U R

VESSEL 5-14

URGENT
ATH LD 0223 PREVIOUS UNDATED

BY MELLEN THOMAS

UPI WHITE HOUSE REPORTER
WASHINGTON (UPI) -- THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCED WEDNESDAY THAT THE CAPTURED MERCHANT SHIP MAYAGUEZ HAS BEEN RECAPTURED IN REMERGED AMERICAN FIGHTING IN INDOCHINA. IT DEMANDED THAT THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT RELEASE MEMBERS OF THE CREW.

IN A MESSAGE TO THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT, THE UNITED STATES SAID: "AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE SEIZED THE SHIP AND AS SOON AS YOU ISSUE A STATEMENT THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO RELEASE THE CREW MEMBERS YOU HOLD UNCONDITIONALLY AND IMMEDIATELY, WE WILL PROMPTLY CEASE MILITARY OPERATION."

MORE

UPI 05-14 09:24 PED

0224

R R

VESSEL 5-14

1ST-700 4TH NIGHT LD VESSEL WASHINGTON 0223 XXX OPERATION "

WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY RON NESSEN ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT FORD WELCOMED A REPORT FROM PHOU KHAM PENH THAT THE KHMER ROUGE WAS READY TO RELEASE THE SHIP.

BUY AT THE SAME TIME, NESSEN ANNOUNCED A SERIES OF MILITARY MEASURES WHICH FORD HAD DIRECTED TO BEGIN WEDNESDAY EVENING WASHINGTON TIME. THEY WERE:

U.S. MARINES TO BOARD THE MAYAGUEZ
MARINES TO LAND ON KOH TANG, THE SMALL ISLAND WHERE THE MAYAGUEZ WAS STOPPED, IN ORDER TO RESCUE ANY CREW MEMBERS THERE.
U.S. AIRCRAFT FROM THE USS CORAL SEA TO UNDERTAKE "ASSOCIATED MILITARY OPERATIONS" IN THE GULF OF THAILAND IN ORDER TO PROTECT AND SUPPORT THE OPERATIONS TO REIN IN THE VESSEL AND MEMBERS OF THE CREW.

MORE

UPI 05-14 09:28 PED

A295

R A

VESSEL 5-14

2ND ADD 4TH NIGHT LD VESSEL WASHINGTON A293 XXX CREW.

NESSEN ALSO READ REPORTERS A STATEMENT WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN PREPARED BEFORE THE BROADCAST BY RADIO PHNOM PENH ANNOUNCING THAT THE NEW CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT WAS WILLING TO RELEASE THE SHIP. IN THAT EARLIER STATEMENT, NESSEN SAID:

"IN FURTHER PURSUIT OF OUR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE SS MAYAGUEZ AND ITS CREW, THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED THE FOLLOWING MILITARY MEASURES, STARTING THIS EVENING WASHINGTON TIME:

"--U.S. MARINES TO BOARD THE SS MAYAGUEZ.

"--U.S. MARINES TO LAND ON KOH TANG ISLAND, IN ORDER TO RESCUE ANY CREW MEMBERS AS MAY BE ON THE ISLAND.

"--AIRCRAFT FROM THE CARRIER CORAL SEA TO UNDERTAKE ASSOCIATED MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE AREA IN ORDER TO PROTECT AND SUPPORT THE OPERATIONS TO REGAIN THE VESSEL AND MEMBERS OF THE CREW."

MORE

UPI 05-14 09:34 PED

A296

VESSEL 5-14

3RD ADD 4TH NIGHT LD VESSEL WASHINGTON A293 XXX CREW."

NESSEN MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE MILITARY ACTIONS FORD ORDERED WERE ALREADY UNDER WAY WHEN THEY WERE MADE PUBLIC.

"IN PURSUIT OF OUR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE SS MAYAGUEZ AND ITS CREW, THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED THE FOLLOWING MILITARY MEASURES, STARTING THIS EVENING WASHINGTON TIME." THEN HE TICKED OFF THE ORDERS FORD HAD GIVEN.

ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY, HE ANNOUNCED THAT THE UNITED STATES WELCOMED THE PHNOM PENH RADIO BROADCAST AND AIDES STRESSED THE WHITE HOUSE HOPED TO GET THE MESSAGE THROUGH TO THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT THROUGH NEWS CHANNELS.

THE MESSAGE TO THE CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES SAID:

"WE HAVE HEARD A RADIO BROADCAST THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO RELEASE THE SS MAYAGUEZ. WE WELCOME THIS DEVELOPMENT, IF TRUE.

"AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE SEIZED THE SHIP. AS SOON AS YOU ISSUE A STATEMENT THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO RELEASE THE CREW MEMBERS YOU HOLD, UNCONDITIONALLY AND IMMEDIATELY, WE WILL PROMPTLY CEASE MILITARY OPERATIONS."

THE WHITE HOUSE DID NOT SAY WHETHER ANY CREW MEMBERS WERE ABOARD THE SHIP WHEN IT WAS SEIZED.

THE NEW DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS WERE ANNOUNCED IN THE WHITE HOUSE NEWS CENTER AS THE PRESIDENT WAS ENTERTAINING PRIME MINISTER JOHANNES DEN UYL OF THE NETHERLANDS AT A DINNER IN THE STATE DINING ROOM.

THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON THE STRONG MEASURES FORD ORDERED WAS PREPARED BEFORE THE PHNOM PENH BROADCAST WAS HEARD. IT WAS THE FIRST PUBLIC REFERENCE BY THE CAMBODIAN COMMUNISTS ON THE SEIZURE AND WAS READ OVER RADIO PHNOM PENH BY INFORMATION AND DEFENSE MINISTER HU NIN.

IT SAID

PICKUP 5TH PGH: "OUR AGNUC

UPI 05-14 09:41 PED

0297

R A

TEXT 5-14

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCED THAT THE FOLLOWING "URGENT MESSAGE" WAS SENT WEDNESDAY NIGHT TO CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT:

"WE HAVE HEARD A RADIO BROADCAST THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO RELEASE THE S.S. MAYAGUEZ. WE WELCOME THIS DEVELOPMENT IF TRUE.

"AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE SEIZED THE SHIP. AS SOON AS YOU ISSUE A STATEMENT THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO RELEASE THE CREW MEMBERS THAT YOU HOLD, UNCONDITIONALLY AND IMMEDIATELY, WE WILL PROMPTLY CEASE MILITARY OPERATIONS."

A WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN GAVE NO INDICATION HOW THE MESSAGE WAS SENT.

OFFICIALS SAID THEY THOUGHT THAT NEWS MEDIA MIGHT BE THE FASTEST CHANNELS FOR DELIVERY OF IT.

UPI 05-14 09:43 PED

UP-104

(VESSEL)

(BY HELEN THOMAS)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- RESUMING INDOCHINA COMBAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN TWO YEARS, U.S. WARPLANES SANK THREE CAMBODIAN PATROL BOATS AND DAMAGED FOUR OTHERS WEDNESDAY TO PROTECT THE CREW OF THE PIRATED U.S. MERCHANT SHIP MAYAGUEZ.

WITH THE SITUATION SHIFTING FROM DIPLOMATIC TO MILITARY CRISIS, THE UNITED STATES ALSO AIRLIFTED 1,100 MARINES TO THAILAND OVER BITTER THAI PROTESTS AND SENT NAVY SHIPS STEAMING INTO THE GULF OF SIAM WHERE THE CAMBODIANS HAVE HELD THE MAYAGUEZ AND 39 CREWMEN SINCE MONDAY.

MILITARY SOURCES SAID THE INBOUND ATTACK CARRIER CORAL SEA MIGHT PICK UP THE MARINES IN PREPARATION FOR A POSSIBLE COMMANDO-STYLE BOARDING AND RESCUE OF THE THE MAYAGUEZ, WHICH WAS ANCHORED NEAR KOH TANG ISLAND ABOUT 30 MILES OFF CAMBODIA'S COAST.

THE FATE OF THE CAPTIVE AMERICANS WAS UNKNOWN FOLLOWING THE STRAFING ATTACK, WHICH PENTAGON SPOKESMEN SAID PREVENTED ALL BUT ONE CAMBODIAN BOAT FROM REACHING THE MAINLAND. SPOKESMEN SAID THEY DID NOT KNOW WHETHER ANY OF THE AMERICANS WERE ABOARD THE SUNKEN OR DESTROYED CRAFT.

THE UNITED STATES ALSO KEPT ITS OPTIONS OPEN FOR DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS, HOWEVER, BY FORMALLY ASKING U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL KURT WALDHEIM TO HELP SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE MAYAGUEZ AND ITS CREW.

CONGRESS DIVIDED BETWEEN SUPPORT AND ANGER IN ITS REACTION TO THE WARPLANE ATTACK, BUT THE WHITE HOUSE, SAYING PRESIDENT FORD HAD EVERY RIGHT TO PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES, SAID CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS HAD BEEN ADVISED IN ADVANCE AND GOT "A STRONG CONSENSUS OF SUPPORT."

PENTAGON SPOKESMAN JOSEPH LAITIN SAID THE WARPLANES BEGAN THEIR STRAFING RUNS THROUGH ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE WEDNESDAY MORNING -- TUESDAY NIGHT WASHINGTON TIME -- IN WHAT WAS THE FIRST INDOCHINA COMBAT ACTION FOR U.S. FORCES SINCE CONGRESS FORBODE FURTHER MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN MID-1973.

"THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE CAMBODIANS APPEARED TO BE ATTEMPTING TO MOVE CAPTIVE U.S. CREWMEN FROM THE SHIP AND FROM THE ISLAND OF KOH TANG TO THE MAINLAND," LAITIN SAID.

LAITIN SAID U.S. SURVEILLANCE PLANES REPORTED THOSE "INDICATIONS" ABOUT 8:30 P.M. EDT TUESDAY AND THE UNITED STATES WARNED CAMBODIA AGAINST SUCH A MANEUVER BEFORE THE WARPLANES ATTACKED. HE DECLINED TO SAY HOW THAT WARNING HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED.

"THREE CAMBODIAN PATROL CRAFT WERE DESTROYED BY U.S. AIRCRAFT, FOUR OTHERS WERE DAMAGED AND DEMOBILIZED," HE SAID.

PENTAGON SOURCES SAID THE WARPLANES BLASTED THE SHIPS WITH CANNON FIRE BUT DROPPED NO BOMBS.

"THE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN RECEIVING FIRE FOR SOME HOURS BEFORE THIS. THE DESTROYER ESCORT U.S. HOPE IS NOW IN THE AREA."

AT THE WHITE HOUSE, SPOKESMEN SAID FORD NOTIFIED LEADING SENATORS AND HOUSE MEMBERS IN ADVANCE OF HIS INTENTIONS TO ORDER A PROTECTIVE AIR STRIKE, GOT GENERAL APPROVAL AND ACTED UNDER HIS "AUTHORITY TO PROTECT THE LIVES AND PROPERTY OF AMERICANS AGAINST ACTS OF AGGRESSION."

DECLASSIFIED

THE SPOKESMAN SAID "THE (WHITE HOUSE) CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON OFFICE REPORTS THERE WAS A STRONG CONSENSUS AND NO OBJECTIONS."

NEITHER WHITE HOUSE NOR PENTAGON SPOKESMEN WOULD COMMENT FURTHER AT THAT POINT ON WHAT FURTHER ORDERS FORD MAY HAVE GIVEN HIS FORCE AND NAVY UNITS REGARDING POSSIBLE COMBAT ACTION. THEY STRESSED FORD STILL MEANS TO GET THE SHIP AND ITS CREW RETURNED FORTHWITH.

FORD HAS MET SEVERAL TIMES WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE THE MARGAREZ WAS CAPTURED MONDAY AND HE SUMMONED ANOTHER COUNCIL MEETING WEDNESDAY.

THE WHITE HOUSE DECLINED TO SAY WHETHER CRIM -- WHICH REPORTEDLY HAS BEEN GOING AS WASHINGTON'S DIPLOMATIC INTERMEDIARY WITH THE DECEASED -- OR THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE OF THE AIRSTRIKE.

WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMEN DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS IN DIPLOMATIC CONTACT WITH THAILAND OVER THE THAI DEMAND THAT THE MARINES BE REMOVED "IMMEDIATELY."

UPI 05-14 03:26 PED

UP-105

NO. 1 VESSEL, WASHINGTON (UP-104)

PRIME MINISTER KUKRIT PRADOM HARSHLY DENOUNCED THE MARINE AIRLIFT ONTO THAI SOIL AND DEMANDED THEIR WITHDRAWAL SOON AFTER AIR FORCE C-44 TRANSPORTS DELIVERED THE MARINES TO U TAPAO AIRBASE ON THE GULF OF SIAM.

THE UNITED STATES APPARENTLY MADE THE MOVE WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THAILAND, CAUSING SERIOUS DIPLOMATIC FRUSTRATION WITH ITS LAST MAJOR ALLY ON THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN MAINLAND.

ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATORS GREETED THE NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR, CHARLES WHITEHOUSE, WHEN HE ARRIVED AT BANGKOK AIRPORT. THEY CARRIED PLACARDS READING "BASTARD FORD, GET YOUR TROOPS OUT" AND "U.S. GO HOME."

ON CAPITOL HILL, MANY CONGRESSMEN SUPPORTED FORD'S AIRSTRIKE DECISION WHILE OTHERS EXPRESSED ALARM AND ANGER.

"SOMETIMES YOU HAVE TO HIT THEM OVER THE HEAD WITH A TWO-BY-FOUR TO GET THEIR ATTENTION," SAID HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER JOHN RHODES.

SEN. JOHN PASTORE, D-K. I., SAID, "IF IT IS TRUE THAT WE (U.S. PLANES) WERE FIRED UPON I FIND NO FAULT WITH IT. IN FACT, I AGREE WITH IT."

SEN. HOWARD BAKER, R-TENN., SAID "IT WOULD APPEAR THAT AIR POWER HAS PREVENTED THE AMERICAN CREWMEN FROM BEING TAKEN" ABOARD THE CAMBODIAN PRISONERS.

SEN. JOHN STENNIS, D-MISS., DESCRIBED THE AIRSTRIKE AS "SOMETHING WE HAVE TO DO" AND SEN. JAMES EASTLAND, D-MISS., SAID, "I FAVOR STRIKING THEM--WE'VE GOT TO PROTECT OUR MEN AND WE'VE GOT TO PUNISH CAMBODIA FOR ITS PIRACY."

OTHER CONGRESSMEN DISAPPROVED

"THERE ARE NOT GOING DOWN THE SAME ROAD WE FOLLOWED IN THE TONKIN GULF RECORD OF 1964," SAID SEN. HENRY JACKSON, D-WASH. "THIS IS A TIME FOR COOL HEADS, NOT A TIME TO EXERCISE THE USE OF FORCE."

SEN. DICK CLARK, D-IOWA, CALLED THE AIRSTRIKE "PREMATURE" AND URGED CAUTION.

UPI 05-14 03:32 PED

DECLASSIFIED

UP-111

ADD 2 VESSEL, WASHINGTON

PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY RON NESSEN TOLD REPORTERS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S AIDES IN CHARGE OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON CALLED CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ABOUT THREE HOURS BEFORE THE SINKING OF THREE CAMBODIAN VESSELS AND INFORMED THEM WHAT WAS BEING DONE.

NESSEN SAID ALL TOP CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, INCLUDING CHAIRMEN OF KEY COMMITTEES, WERE INFORMED IN ADVANCE AND "AFTER THE INFORMATION WAS GIVEN TO THE MEMBERS, THEIR COMMENTS WERE WRITTEN DOWN AND PASSED TO THE PRESIDENT."

BUT SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER MIKE MANFIELD COMPLAINED IN A STATEMENT THAT HE WAS "NOTIFIED AFTER THE FACT." HE SAID HE "DID NOT GIVE MY APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL BECAUSE THE DECISION HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE."

REP. JOHN SEIBERLING, D-OHIO, SAID THE ACTION WAS A DIRECT VIOLATION OF "PLAIN LANGUAGE" IN THE 1973 WAR POWERS ACT RESTRICTING U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY IN AND AROUND INDOCHINA. "DOES THE PRESIDENT HAVE ANY RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN ACTS OF HOSTILITY WITHOUT THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF CONGRESS?"

REP. DANTE FASCELL, D-FLA., A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, COMPLAINED: "WE ARE AT LEAST ENTITLED TO THE FACTS SO WE CAN HAVE SOME IDEA OF WHAT IS HAPPENING, RATHER THAN READING IT IN THE NEWSPAPERS. THE LAST THING WE NEED TO DO IS BE KEPT IN THE DARK."

SEN. EDWARD KENNEDY, D-MASS., SAID: "IT APPEARS THAT THE UNITED STATES MAY HAVE ACTED WITH UNDUE HASTE. OUR MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE SINCE THE SEIZING OF THE AMERICAN MERCHANT VESSEL HAS BEEN THE SAFE RETURN OF THE CREW. IT IS UNCLEAR TO ME, HOWEVER, WHETHER WE HAD EXHAUSTED EVERY POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT."

BUT SEN. STUART SYMINGTON, D-MO., SAID: "I THINK WE SHOULD DO WHATEVER NECESSARY TO GET THE AMERICANS OFF THE SHIP. I'VE NO COMPLAINTS ABOUT IT. I THINK WE'VE GOT TO GET THOSE MEN BACK."

SEN. JOHN TOWER, R-TEX.: "I THINK IT WAS EMINENTLY APPROPRIATE. IT WAS NOT JUST RETALIATORY. ACTION IN THIS INSTANCE HAS GOT TO BE QUICK AND HAS TO BE DECISIVE."

UPI 05-14 03:54 PED

UP-112

(MARINES)

BANGKOK (UPI) -- THAILAND FORMALLY PROTESTED TO THE UNITED STATES WEDNESDAY AGAINST THE ARRIVAL OF U.S. MARINE REINFORCEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CAMBODIAN SEIZURE OF AN UNARMED AMERICAN FREIGHTER. IT DEMANDED THE MARINES BE WITHDRAWN IMMEDIATELY.

THE REPORTED SINKING OF THREE CAMBODIAN GUNBOATS BY U.S. WARPLANES CAUSED LESS OF A FUROR THAN THE UNEXPECTED ARRIVAL OF 1,100 MARINES ON THAI SOIL.

"AT THE MOMENT OUR REACTION WON'T BE VASTIC, BECAUSE WE CONSIDER IT A RETALIATORY ACTION," SAID AN OFFICIAL IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE.

"BUT IF THE MARINES DO ANYTHING, IT MIGHT BE DIFFERENT."

(A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN IN WASHINGTON DECLINED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS REGARDING THE THAI PROTEST. HE WOULD SAY ONLY "WE ARE IN DIPLOMATIC CONTACT WITH OUR EMBASSY IN BANGKOK ON THIS QUESTION.")

AMERICAN SOURCES DESCRIBED THE CONFRONTATION AS A LOW POINT IN U.S.-THAI RELATIONS IN THE POST WORLD WAR II ERA.

UPI 05-14 01:57 P20

03-114

CORRECTION:

IN VESSEL (UP-104) IN 12TH PGH READ IT X X X USS
 HOLT (FIXING SPELLING)
 UPI 05-14 04:04 PED

UP-115

BDD 3 VESSEL, WASHINGTON

"WE THINK SOME ARE ON THE ISLAND AND SOME ARE ON THE SHIP AND
 MAYBE SOME WERE ON THE CAMBODIAN PATROL BOATS," ONE PENTAGON SOURCE
 SAID. "BUT WE JUST DON'T KNOW FOR SURE."

PENTAGON SOURCES SAID WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON A NAVY DESTROYER ESCORT,
 THE USS HOLT, WAS WITHIN SIGHT OF THE MAYAGUEZ AND MIGHT TRY TO TOW
 THE FREIGHTER AWAY IF THE COAST SEEMED CLEAR.

THE SOURCES SAID THE AIRSTRIKE, WHICH LASTED THREE AND ONE HALF
HOURS, APPEARED TO HAVE DESTROYED OR DRIVEN AWAY ALL BUT ONE OF THE
 30-FOOT FIBERGLASS PATROL BOATS THAT HAD BEEN GUARDING THE MAYAGUEZ
 ALTHOUGH MORE COULD BE HIDDEN BENEATH HEAVY FOLIAGE AROUND THE SHORE
 OF KOH TANG ISLAND.

THE SOURCES SAID THE ATTACKING AIR FORCE PILOTS HAD BEEN
 INSTRUCTED TO TRY AND CRIPPLE THE PATROL BOATS WITHOUT SINKING THEM,
 BUT ADDED "THAT CAN'T BE DONE WITH ALL THAT MUCH ACCURACY" AND THREE
 OF THE CRAFT WERE SUNK.

UPI 05-14 04:07 PED

UP-123

(FORD)

(BY RICHARD E. LERNER)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- PRESIDENT FORD WAITED AT LEAST 11 HOURS BEFORE INFORMING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WEDNESDAY THAT U.S. WARPLANES HAD ATTACKED CAMBODIAN BOATS FOR A POTENTIALLY GRAVE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS.

A SHORT TIME LATER, FORD CALLED THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTO SESSION AT THE WHITE HOUSE FOR THE THIRD TIME IN 24 HOURS TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO GAIN RELEASE OF THE U.S. CARGO SHIP THE CAMBODIAN FORCES COMMANDEERED IN THE GULF OF SIAM.

THE PRESIDENT CONFERRED PERIODICALLY WITH SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER AND WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS SOUGHT TO PORTRAY A SENSE OF CALM.

DURING THE PRESIDENT'S ONLY PUBLIC APPEARANCES, AT THE START AND END OF A MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER JOHANNES DEN UYL OF THE NETHERLANDS, FORD GAVE NO VISIBLE EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS UNDER GREAT PRESSURE. AT ONE POINT, HE AND KISSINGER EXCHANGED JOKES ABOUT SOCCER WITH THE DUTCH LEADER.

ADMINISTRATION SOURCES SAID THE FIRST U.S. AIR STRIKES AGAINST CAMBODIAN PATROL BOATS BEGAN BY 1 A.M. EDT WEDNESDAY AND AT LEAST FIVE OF THEM HAD BEEN HIT WITHIN AN HOUR. FIRST PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE OPERATIONS CAME ABOUT NOON FROM THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT. THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL EXPLANATION FOR THE DELAY IN ANNOUNCING THE DEVELOPMENTS.

AT THAT POINT, WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY RON NESSEN SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS EITHER ABOUT THE MILITARY ACTION OR THE STATUS OF THE 39-MAN CREW ABOARD THE MERCHANT SHIP MAYAGUEZ WHEN IT WAS SEIZED MONDAY.

ASKED IF THE UNITED STATES WAS NOW AT WAR WITH CAMBODIA, NESSEN REPLIED, "NOT THAT I AM AWARE OF."

ADMINISTRATION SOURCES SAID FORD DECIDED TO ORDER THE AIR STRIKES LATE TUESDAY AFTERNOON FOLLOWING THE FIRST IN THE SERIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS.

NESSEN SAID CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS THEN WERE ADVISED ABOUT 5:30 P.M. EDT BY WHITE HOUSE AIDES, WHO REPORTED THAT "THERE WAS A STRONG CONSENSUS OF SUPPORT AND NO OBJECTIONS."

FORD'S NEXT MEETING WITH THE COUNCIL STARTED ABOUT 10:20 P.M. TUESDAY, SOON AFTER KISSINGER RETURNED FROM A SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT IN KANSAS CITY, AND IT RAN A LITTLE OVER TWO HOURS. OFFICIALS SAID THAT AFTER THAT SESSION IN THE CABINET ROOM, FORD SPENT A FEW MINUTES IN THE OVAL OFFICE AND THEN HEADED TO THE RESIDENCIAL QUARTERS, GETTING TO BED ABOUT 1 A.M. FOR ABOUT FOUR HOURS OF SLEEP.

THEY SAID HE GOT NO PHONE CALLS THROUGH THE NIGHT, UNLIKE THE EVENING BEFORE WHEN HE WAS AWAKENED TWICE TO BE GIVEN SITUATION REPORTS.

FORD GOT TO HIS DESK ABOUT 7:40 A.M. AND AFTER RECEIVING HIS REGULAR EARLY MORNING INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING, HE MET WITH KISSINGER FOR ABOUT 45 MINUTES. HE SAW THE SECRETARY OF STATE THREE MORE TIMES THROUGH THE MORNING IN ADVANCE OF WEDNESDAY COUNCIL MEETING.

UPI 05-14 04:46 PEO

DECLASSIFIED

10-20-1964

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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DECLASSIFIED

A282

U 1

KHMER 5-15

URGENT

15T LD A279

BANGKOK (UPI) -- CAMBODIA SAID THURSDAY IT WOULD RELEASE AN AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIP MAYAGUEZ, WHICH IT SEIZED ON MONDAY, BUT NOT UNDER ANY THREAT FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

SHORTLY AFTER THE CAMBODIAN ANNOUNCEMENT ON RADIO PHNOM PENH, THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCED IN WASHINGTON THAT U.S. MARINES ALREADY HAD RECAPTURED THE SHIP AND THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD TOLD THE PHNOM PENH GOVERNMENT IT WOULD CEASE MILITARY OPERATIONS WHEN IT HAD BEEN ASSURED THE CREW WOULD BE FREED.

"BASED ON THE POSITION THAT WE ARE UNWILLING TO PROVOKE ANY DISPUTE, AND AS A PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE, WE WILL RELEASE THAT SHIP," SAID A CAMBODIAN COMMUNIQUE READ OVER RADIO PHNOM PENH BY INFORMATION MINISTER HU NIM.

"BUT WE WILL NOT ALLOW THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS TO VIOLATE OR SPY IN OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS," THE BROADCAST SAID, ACCORDING TO AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION.

"WE WILL NOT ALLOW THEM TO THREATEN US TO RELEASE THE SHIP AT ANY SPECIFIC TIME."

MORE

UPI 05-14 19 02 PEO

A303

U A

VESSEL 5-14

BULLETIN

5TH NIGHT LD A293

BY HELEN THOMAS

UPI WHITE HOUSE REPORTER

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- THE AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIP MAYAGUEZ, ABANDONED BY ITS CAMBODIAN CAPTORS, WAS SEIZED BY U.S. MARINES WEDNESDAY NIGHT AS ANOTHER FORCE BATTLED COMMUNISTS ON THE ISLAND OF KOH TANG IN SEARCH OF THE CREW. THE WHITE HOUSE DEMANDED UNCONDITIONAL AND IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE 39 CREWMEN.

MORE

UPI 05-14 19:04 PED

A304

U A

VESSEL 5-14

1ST ADD 5TH NIGHT LD VESSEL WASHINGTON A303 XXX CREWMEN

THE PENTAGON SAID THE FORCE OF SOME 200 MARINES FLOWN IN FROM THAILAND WAS ENCOUNTERING RESISTANCE AS IT ONTO THE FIVE-MILE-LONG AND MILE-WIDE ISLAND 20 MILES OFF THE COAST OF CAMBODIA, BUT HAD NO IMMEDIATE REPORTS OF CASUALTIES.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESS SECRETARY RON NESSEN READ A MESSAGE TO THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES SAID:

"AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE SEIZED THE SHIP AND AS SOON AS YOU ISSUE A STATEMENT THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO RELEASE THE CREW MEMBERS YOU HOLD, UNCONDITIONALLY AND IMMEDIATELY, WE WILL PROMPTLY CEASE MILITARY OPERATIONS."

NESSEN SAID PRESIDENT FORD HAD ORDERED THESE MEASURES:

--U.S. MARINES TO BOARD THE MAYAGUEZ

--MARINES TO LAND ON KOH TANG IN ORDER TO RESCUE ANY CREW MEMBERS THERE.

--U.S. AIRCRAFT FROM THE USS CORAL SEA TO UNDERTAKE "ASSOCIATED MILITARY OPERATIONS" IN THE GULF OF THAILAND IN ORDER TO PROTECT AND SUPPORT THE OPERATIONS TO REGAIN THE VESSEL AND MEMBERS OF THE CREW.

PENTAGON OFFICIALS SAID THE RENewed FIGHTING IN INDOCHINA WAS LIMITED TO THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF THE SHIP AND KOH TANG, AND THERE WERE NO MILITARY OPERATIONS GOING ON ELSEWHERE. BUT OTHER SOURCES SAID ADDITIONAL PLANNED OPERATIONS WERE CANCELLED.

THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF THE OPERATION FOLLOWED WORD FROM THE NEW KHMER ROUGE GOVERNMENT OVER RADIO PHNOM PENH THAT CAMBODIA WAS RELEASING THE SHIP. BUT THE BROADCAST, WHICH APPEARED TO HAVE FOLLOWED THE ACTUAL SEIZURE OF THE MAYAGUEZ BY MARINES, SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE CREW.

PICKUP 9TH FOR NESSEN ALSO

UPI 05-14 20:12 PED

KHMER 5-15

URGENT

1ST ADD 1ST LD KHMER BANGKOK R302 X X X SPECIFIC TIME."

THE BROADCAST MADE NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICAN CREWMEMBERS ABOARD THE MAYAGUEZ, BUT IT DID SAY:

"ON MAY 14, AT 5:30 A.M., SIX U.S. F105 AND F411 PLANES CONTINUED STRAFING AND BOMBING OPERATIONS. ACCORDING TO FIRST REPORTS, TWO OF OUR PATROL BOATS SHIPS HAD BEEN SUNK. THE SCOPE OF DAMAGE AND THE CASUALTIES OF OUR PATROLMEN AND THE AMERICAN CREW IS NOT YET KNOWN."

THE BROADCAST CONDEMNED THE AMERICAN AIR ATTACKS AS A "BARBAROUS ACT BY U.S. IMPERIALISTS."

THE BROADCAST BY INFORMATION MINISTER HU NIM, MADE AT 7:07 P.M. EDT WEDNESDAY AND MONITORED IN BANGKOK WAS THE FIRST PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY THE KHMER ROUGE THAT THEY HAD SEIZED THE MAYAGUEZ, AN UNARMED MERCHANT VESSEL UNDER U.S. MILITARY CHARTER, ENROUTE FROM HONG KONG TO THE PHILIPPINES.

"ON MAY 12, AT 2 P.M., OUR PATROL SHIP SPOTTED A LARGE SHIP HEADED TOWARDS OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS," THE BROADCAST SAID.

"THE SHIP CONTINUED ON ITS WAY DEEPER INTO KHMER TERRITORIAL WATERS, PASSING POULO WAI ISLAND, ABOUT FOUR OR FIVE KILOMETERS TO THE EAST," THE BROADCAST SAID. "OUR PATROL SHIP THEN INTERCEPTED THE SHIP TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT TO HIGHER AUTHORITY. WHILE INVESTIGATING THEM, TWO F105'S CIRCLED OVER THE SHIP THE ENTIRE DAY. SINCE DAWN OF MAY 13, FOUR TO SIX F105 AND F411 CONTINUED TO FLY OVER POULO WAI ISLAND, TANG ISLAND AND IN THE AREA OF THE PORT OF SIHANOUKVILLE (KOMPONG SOM)."

HU NIM SAID THE MAYAGUEZ DELIBERATELY ENTERED THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF CAMBODIA.

"WE ARE SURE THAT IT WAS NOT BY ERROR IN NAVIGATION BECAUSE THE AMERICAN SHIP HAS ELECTRONIC RADAR AND MODERN SCIENTIFIC EQUIPMENT," HE SAID. "IT WAS A VIOLATION OF OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS -- SPYING, IN ORDER TO CHEAT WORLD OPINION AND TO ACCUSE CAMBODIA OF PROVOKING A DISPUTE."

"THE FORD ADMINISTRATION MUST BE RESPONSIBLE, BEFORE CAMBODIA AND HER PEOPLE, BEFORE THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD, AS WELL AS BEFORE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR POLITICIANS, FOR THEIR ACTS OF SPYING AND VIOLATIONS OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY."

MORE

UPI #5-14 19 29 PED

R A

VESSEL 5-14

2ND ADD 5TH NIGHT LD VESSEL WASHINGTON A303 XXX CREW

NEAR-TIME HOUSE DEMOCRATIC LEADER THOMAS P. O'NEILL GAVE THIS ACCOUNT OF INFORMATION GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS BY PRESIDENT FORD IN AN EARLY EVENING BRIEFING:

~~THE UNITED STATES SENT CAMBODIA A 24-HOUR ULTIMATUM THROUGH CHINESE DIPLOMATS TO RETURN THE SHIP AND CREW OR MILITARY OPERATIONS WOULD START. WHEN NO REPLY WAS RECEIVED BY THE DEADLINE, FORD ORDERED THE MILITARY MOVEMENTS.~~

~~THE CAMBODIAN BOATS ATTACKED BY U.S. PLANES AS THE ENGAGEMENT OPENED WERE SAILING UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS FROM KOH TANG TO THE CAMBODIAN MAINLAND, AND THE DECISION WAS MADE TO STOP THEM SINCE THEY MIGHT BE TRANSPORTING THE AMERICAN CREW TO THE MAINLAND.~~

~~"EIGHT SHIPS LEFT THE ISLAND, THREE WERE SUNK AND FOUR WERE DAMAGED AND TURNED BACK," O'NEILL SAID. "THE EIGHTH WAS SO CROWDED THAT IT WAS THOUGHT IT CONTAINED THE AMERICANS AND IT WAS NOT ATTACKED."~~

~~"I HAVE A TREMENDOUS FEELING OF UNEASINESS ABOUT THE WHOLE THING," O'NEILL SAID. "WHAT IS GOING TO DEVELOP OVER THE TROOP LANDING AND THE BOARDING OF THE SHIP? IF WE DON'T FIND THE MEN WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?"~~

PICKUP AS BEFORE 9TH PGH: NESSEN ALSO

UPI 05-14 10:37 PED

A311

R I

KHMER 5-15

CORRECTION IN 1ST ADD 1ST LD KHMER BANGKOK A308 4TH PGH BONG: THE BROADCAST BYV ETC. READ IT X X X ENROUTE FROM HONG KONG TO SINGAPORE. (SINGAPORE INSTEAD THE PHILIPPINES AS SENT).

UPI NEW YORK

UPI 05-14 10:38 PED

H312

01

KHMER 5-15

2ND ADD 1ST LD KHMER BANGKOK 8302 X X X INTEGRITY

THE BROADCAST MADE NO MENTION OF THE LANDING OF U.S. MARINES, THE SEIZURE OF THE SHIP BY MARINES OR FIGHTING GOING ON ON THE ISLAND OF KOH TANG, WHERE MARINES WERE SEARCHING FOR THE CREW.

IN FACT, THE BROADCAST WAS APPARENTLY MADE BY HU NIN WHEN THE KHMER ROUGE WERE STILL IN CONTROL OF THE SHIP.

"FOR THE MAYAGUEZ, WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF KEEPING IT INDEFINITELY OR TO PROVOKE ANY DISPUTE," HU NIN SAID. "WHAT WE WANT TO FIND OUT IS WHAT THE SHIP'S INTENTION WAS AND WE WANT TO WARN THEM NOT TO VIOLATE OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE FUTURE."

"IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT OUR PATROL SHIPS INTERCEPTED THE MAYAGUEZ, TO INVESTIGATE THEIR INTENTION AND REPORT TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES FOR A DECISION TO ALLOW IT TO LEAVE CAMBODIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS, AND TO WARN THEM NOT TO SPY AND PROVOKE DISPUTES, AS WE DID WITH ANOTHER SHIP, FLYING THE PANAMANIAN FLAG, WHICH WAS RELEASED BY US ON MAY 9."

INCLUDES PREVIOUS

UFI 83-14 18:46 FEB

DECLASSIFIED

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2 H
VESSEL 5-14
BULLETIN PRECISE

WASHINGTON (UPI) - A COMMODORE NAVAL VESSEL PULLED ALONGSIDE THE
U.S. DESTROYER WILSON LATE MONDAY NIGHT AND TURNED OVER ABOUT 30
AMERICAN CREWMEN OF THE FREIGHTER WARRAGEZ.
UPI 55-14 11:24 PED

UPI 55-14 11:24 PED

0019
2 H

VESSEL 5-14
BULLETIN

STH WENT TO 0300
OF HELICOPTERS

UPI WAVE HOUSE REPORTER

WASHINGTON (UPI) - A SMALL COMMODORE NAVAL VESSEL FLYING WHILE
THOSE PULLED ALONGSIDE IN MONDAY DESTROYER IN THE GULF OF THAILAND
LATE MONDAY NIGHT AND TURNED OVER ABOUT 30 AMERICAN CREWMEN OF THE
WARRAGEZ WENT ON THE WAVE.
UPI 55-14 11:24 PED

DECLASSIFIED

H328

U R

VESSEL 5-14

1ST-408 5TH NIGHT LO VESSEL WASHINGTON H319 XXX OTHERS

THE ANNOUNCEMENT FROM PENTAGON CHIEF SPOKESMAN JOSEPH LAITIN ALSO DISCLOSED THAT AIRCRAFT FROM THE CARRIER USS CORAL SEA HAD ATTACKED THE REAM AIRFIELD NEAR THE MAINLAND CAMBODIAN PORT OF KOMPONG SOM.

HE GAVE NO REASON FOR THE AIR STRIKE.

EARLIER U.S. MARINES HAD SEIZED THE SHIP AFTER IT WAS ABANDONED BY ITS CAMBODIAN CAPTORS, AND ANOTHER MARINE FORCE HAD LANDED ON THE ISLAND OF KOH TANG, 30 MILES OFF KOMPONG SOM, IN SEARCH OF THE CREW.

PENTAGON OFFICIALS SAID THE KOH TANG FORCE WAS MEETING SOME ARMED RESISTANCE AND AT LEAST "A COUPLE" OF HELICOPTERS HAD CRASHED.

LAITIN SAID THAT ABOUT FIVE MINUTES AFTER THE ATTACK ON REAM AIRFIELD DEFENSE SECRETARY JAMES R. SCHLESINGER TELEPHONED PRESIDENT FORD TO TELL HIM THAT THE CAMBODIAN NAVY VESSEL WAS ALONGSIDE THE DESTROYER WILSON AND THAT THE APPROXIMATELY 30 AMERICAN CREWMEN WERE BEING TAKEN ON BOARD.

LAITIN SAID THE WILSON WAS LYING OFF KOH TANG ALONG WITH THE DESTROYER ESCORT HOLT.

MORE

UPI 05-14 11:34 PED

VESSEL 5-14

2ND ADD 6TH NIGHT LD VESSEL WASHINGTON A319 XXX HOLT

LATIN SAID THE AMERICAN FLAG WAS FLYING FROM THE MAYAGUEZ AFTER A BOARDING PARTY HAD RETAKEN THE SHIP. HE SAID SOME PEOPLE WERE OBSERVED ABOARD THE SHIP BEFORE IT WAS RETAKEN, BUT NO ONE WAS FOUND BY THE BOARDING PARTY.

HE SAID, HOWEVER, "THERE WERE DISHES IN THE MESS WITH WARM FOOD ON THEM." HE SAID THE BOARDING PARTY HAD YET TO MAKE A THOROUGH SEARCH OF THE 10,000 TON VESSEL.

EARLIER THE WHITE HOUSE HAD DISCLOSED THE MARINE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SHIP AND ISLAND A FEW MINUTES AFTER THE NEW KHMER ROUGE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED OVER PHNOM PENH RADIO THAT IT WAS RELEASING THE SHIP. THE KHMER ANNOUNCEMENT, WHICH APPARENTLY FOLLOWED ACTUAL SEIZURE OF THE SHIP BY THE MARINES, DID NOT MENTION THE CREW.

ACCORDING TO A CONGRESSMAN AMONG A GROUP OF LEADERS BRIEFED BY FORD IN EARLY EVENING, THE MILITARY ACTIONS WERE ORDERED AFTER CAMBODIA IGNORED AN ULTIMATUM TRANSMITTED THROUGH CHINESE DIPLOMATS TO GIVE UP THE SHIP AND CREW WITHIN 24 HOURS OR FACE RECOVERY BY FORCE.

THE ACTIONS BEGAN WITH THE SINKING OF THREE CAMBODIAN GUNBOATS AND DAMAGING OF OTHERS BY U.S. AIR FORCE PLANES WHEN IT APPEARED THE VESSELS WERE BEING USED TO REMOVE THE CREW TO THE MAINLAND.

PICKUP 3RD PDH AT THE WHITE HOUSE

UPI 05-14 11:48 PED

A326

R A

VESSEL 5-14

WITH VESSEL

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- PENTAGON SOURCES PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING PARTIAL TIMETABLE OF EVENTS IN THE RESCUE OF THE SS MAYAGUEZ AND CREW.

7:20 PM EDT -- THE FIRST MARINES WERE LANDED BY HELICOPTER ON THE ISLAND OF KOK TANG.

9:00 PM EDT -- A BOARDING PARTY WENT ONTO THE MAYAGUEZ.

10:30 PM EDT -- THE DESTROYER WILSON RADIOED THAT A SMALL BOAT WAS APPROACHING WITH WHITE FLAGS FLYING.

11:00 PM EDT -- FIGHTER AIRCRAFT ATTACKED REAM AIRFIELD ON MAINLAND CAMBODIA.

11:14 PM EDT -- DEFENSE SECRETARY JAMES R. SCHLESINGER TELEPHONED PRESIDENT FORD THAT ABOUT 30 CREWMEN FROM THE MAYAGUEZ WERE BEING TAKEN ON BOARD THE WILSON AT THAT TIME FROM THE SMALL CAMBODIAN NAVAL VESSEL.

UPI 05-14 11:34 PED

A327

D 4

CALLS 3-15

HIGH VESSEL

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- THE WHITE HOUSE RELEASED FIGURES WEDNESDAY SHOWING THAT TELEPHONE CALLERS WERE OVERWHELMINGLY IN FAVOR OF PRESIDENT FORD'S MILITARY ACTIONS TO RESCUE THE CAPTURED AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIP MAYAGUEZ AND HER CREW FROM CAMBODIAN DETRIMENT.

AS OF 10:30 P. M. EDT, THE WHITE HOUSE SAID, IT HAD RECEIVED 778 TELEPHONE CALLS FAVORING FORD'S ACTION, 98 AGAINST.

ON THE USE OF U.S. BASES IN THAILAND AS A STRONG POINT FOR MARINES, THE CALLS REGISTERED 6 IN FAVOR AND 21 AGAINST.

UPI 05-14 10:55 PED

A328

MARINES 5-14

URGENT

2ND NIGHT LD 0230

BY FREDERICK H. MARKS

BANGKOK (UPI) -- THE UNITED STATES TRANSFERRED ITS 4,100-MAN MARINE TASK FORCE FROM THAI SOIL TO A U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIER THURSDAY. A SPOKESMAN FOR PREMIER KUKRIT PRANON SAID THE MARINE FORCE WAS PLACED ABOARD THE USS CORAL SEA IN THE GULF OF THAILAND.

THAILAND WEDNESDAY PRESENTED A FORMAL DIPLOMATIC PROTEST TO THE UNITED STATES OVER THE PRESENCE OF THE MARINES, SENT TO COPE WITH THE SEIZURE OF AN AMERICAN MERCHANT VESSEL BY CAMBODIA, AND DEMANDED THEIR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL.

PICKUP 3RD PGM: "AT THE MOMENT"

UPI 05-14 11:59 PED

WHEEL 9-14
 7TH NIGHT 10 4118
 BY HELEN THOMAS
 UPI WHITE HOUSE REPORTER

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- MILITARY SOURCES SAID EARLY THURSDAY THE CAMBODIANS HAVE RELEASED ALL 35 CREWMEN FROM THE AMERICAN FREIGHTER MAYAGUEZ WHICH WAS RECAPTURED BY MARINES A SHORT TIME EARLIER IN THE GULF OF THAILAND.

MORE

UPI 05-13 12:23 AED

H334

OUR LEADS ON RA AP

VESSEL 8-14

1ST ADD 7TH NIGHT 10 VESSEL WASHINGTON 6213 XXX THAILAND

THE PENTAGON FIRST ANNOUNCED THAT A CAMBODIAN NAVAL VESSEL FLYING WHITE-FLAGS SURRENDERED ABOUT 30 CREWMEN TO A U.S. DESTROYER LATE WEDNESDAY AFTER MARINES LANDED ON A CAMBODIAN ISLAND AND U.S. WARPLANES BOMBED A MAINLAND AIRFIELD.

LATER, A MILITARY SOURCE SAID, "IT LOOKS LIKE WE HAVE THEM ALL."

A MARINE BOARDING PARTY FROM THAILAND FOUND THE MAYAGUEZ DESERTED BUT A 130-MAN FORCE DISPATCHED TO NEARBY KOU TANG ISLAND IN SEARCH OF THE CREW RAN INTO ARMED RESISTANCE AND THE PENTAGON SAID AT LEAST "A COUPLE" OF HELICOPTERS HAD CRASHED.

THE OPERATIONS WERE ORDERED AFTER U.S. AIR FORCE PLANES FROM THAILAND SANK THREE CAMBODIAN GUNBOATS AND DAMAGED OTHERS WHEN THE VESSELS APPEARED TO BE ATTEMPTING TO TAKE THE MAYAGUEZ CREW TO MAINLAND CAMBODIA 18 MILES FROM THE SHIP.

ACCORDING TO ONE LONG-ASSUMED ARMY LEADER, OFFICER BY PRESIDENT LARRY J. BROWN, THE GUNBOATS WERE RETREATED AFTER CAMBODIA'S AIR FORCE ROYAL COMMANDER GENERAL SAID IN WASHINGTON TRANSMITTED CAMBODIA'S OFFICIAL POSITION. THE ARMY SAID THE CREW WOULD BE FREE WITHIN 24 HOURS.

PICKUP WAS FOR THE CREW AND OFFICER. THE PENTAGON OFFICER SAID THE CREW WOULD BE FREE WITHIN 24 HOURS.

UPI 05-13 12:28 AED

0125

0 6

ESCAPE 3-11

WREST AND ESCAPE CHARGED WHILE THE POLICE SAID.

CHARGES WERE SAID THE TWO HUSBANDS WERE RELEASED A SHORT DISTANCE FROM THE PRISON. THE CHARGES WERE SAID NO INJURIES WERE REPORTED.

POLICE CONTINUED THE SEARCHING OF SURROUNDING THE PRISON.

UPI 66-15 12 23 AED

0126

0 6

STATEMENT 3-14

MURDER

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- PRESIDENT FORD ANNOUNCED EARLY THIS MORNING ALL 35 CREW MEMBERS FROM THE CAPTURED MERCHANT VESSEL HARBORER WERE RESCUED AND THAT U.S. MARINES HAD REACHED THE SHIP LATE MONDAY.

"I HAVE NOW RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE VESSEL HAS BEEN RECOVERED INTACT AND THAT THE ENTIRE CREW HAS BEEN RESCUED," FORD SAID.

HE SAID THE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST KHAMR ROUGE POSITIONS ON THE MAINLAND WERE CONTINUING, BUT HE SAID "THE FORCES THAT ACCOMPLISHED THE MISSION WILL SUFFER UNDER HOSTILE FIRE AND ARE PREPARING TO DISCHARGE."

HE ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS HIS GRATITUDE TO THE ENTIRE NAVY AND TO THE UNITS WHO WERE INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION FOR THEIR BRAVERY AND THEIR SACRIFICE.

ONE-THIRD OF THE CREW WERE KILLED FOR HIS FATHER.

ONE-THIRD OF THE CREW WERE KILLED FOR HIS FATHER.

UPI 66-15 12 24 AED

A337

U A

ADVISORY 5-14

WE ARE PREPARING A SUBSTANTIAL 8TH NIGHT LEAD VESSEL, INCORPORATING PRESIDENT FORD'S REMARKS THAT ALL 39 CREWMEN OF THE MALAGUEZ ARE SAFE. WE WILL BEGIN MOVING IT ON THIS WIRE WITHIN 30 MINUTES.

UPI-WASHINGTON

UPI 05-15 12:35 AED

A338

R A

STATEMENT 5-14

CORRECTION STATEMENT WASHINGTON A336 4TH PMH BONG: "I WISH TO EXPRESS, READ XXX APPRECIATION AND THAT OF THE ENTIRE NATION AND TO THE UNITS AND THE MEN WHO PARTICIPATED IN THESE OPERATIONS (FIXING QUOTATION).

UPI-WASHINGTON

UPI 05-15 12:37 AED

A001

R A

SKED 5-15

EDITORS:

GOOD MORNING. THE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL REPORT FOR THURSDAY AFTERNOON NEWSPAPERS WILL INCLUDE:

VESSEL

THE UNITED STATES HAS RECOVERED THE AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIP MAYAGUEZ AND ALL OF ITS CREW. ON ORDERS OF PRESIDENT FORD, U.S. MARINES BOARDED THE VESSEL, ABANDONED BY ITS CAMBODIAN CAPTORS. MARINES LANDED ON THE ISLAND OF KOH TANG, MEETING RESISTANCE. A CAMBODIAN NAVAL VESSEL, FLYING WHITE FLAGS, RETURNED THE CREWMEN. WE WILL HAVE AN UNDATED GENERAL DAY LEAD (VESSEL), RUNNING ABOUT 800 WORDS. PICTURE.

THERE WILL BE SIDEBARS AS DEVELOPMENTS WARRANT.

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
• WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the
NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION to:

COMMANDER TASK GROUP 79.9

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious service from 13 May to 15 May 1975 while conducting operations to recover SS MAYAGUEZ and her crew which had been seized in the Gulf of Thailand by units of the Cambodian Navy. Operating under the handicaps of a paucity of enemy intelligence relating to strengths and disposition, a total lack of accurate information as to the location of the American crew of MAYAGUEZ, a crucial shortage of helicopter assets, and inadequate maps of the terrain to be assaulted, the units of Commander Task Group 79.9, with operational control of Battalion Landing Team, Second Battalion, Ninth Marines, quickly planned and executed their mission, exhibiting exemplary professionalism and determination in the face of unprecedented military and political pressure. As a result of their courage, perseverance, mutual cooperation, and selfless devotion to duty, the officers and men of Commander Task Group 79.9 were instrumental in the successful recovery of SS MAYAGUEZ and her crew; thereby reflecting great credit upon themselves and upholding the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Secretary of the Navy

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THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, May 15, 1975 A 17

Response Differs From That of Previous Presidents

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Johnson found himself confronted with the capture of the Pueblo spy ship and a Navy patrol boat; President Nixon with the shooting down of the unarmed EC-121 spy plane, and President Ford with the seizure of the merchant ship Mayaguez. Grim similarities exist in all the incidents.

But in what is probably the most significant difference from a national policy standpoint, only Mr. Ford opted for an immediate and fierce military response.

The Mayaguez incident, like the others before it, already has raised compelling questions.

Why did not U.S. authorities knowledgeable about hostile actions in the area warn the skipper of the Mayaguez?

Was there another intelligence gap that precluded the drafting of military contingency plans for capture on the high seas?

Did the President under-react or overreact?

In all four incidents, there were warning signs of hostile action that apparently were ignored or not taken seriously by U.S. policymakers. Charges of "intelligence gap" were sounded after both the Pueblo and EC-121 incidents, and are already being heard in reference to the Mayaguez capture.

The Navy failed to call off the Pueblo's eavesdropping mission off North Korea despite the warnings broadcast from North Korea that spy ships would not be tolerated. Also, as another sign of its hostile mood, North Korean guerrillas attacked the presidential Blue House in South Korea in a vain assassination attempt while the Pueblo was out on its mission in January, 1968. But Pueblo skipper Lloyd M. Bucher was not told of that or other bellicose actions.

"Would not such an attack" on the Blue House, asked Chairman Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.) of a House Armed Services subcommittee investigating the Pueblo capture, "show a definite escalation in the risk of a mission like the Pueblo?"

"From a point of view of hindsight," replied Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, then chief of naval operations, "it certainly does." Moorer added that U.S. military leaders at the time did not see the Blue House raid as a break in the overall pattern of North Korean infiltration.

The Pueblo was captured by North Korean torpedo boats and a subchaser off the port of Wonsan on Jan. 23, 1968. One of her 83-man crew was killed during the capture. But the remaining 82 were released by North Korea after 11 months of captivity.

The North Korean govern-

ment claimed that the Pueblo had intruded into territorial waters, a claim disputed to this day by Bucher. He said the ship never got within the 12-mile limit asserted by North Korea as territorial waters.

The U.S. patrol boat—called an LCU for Landing Craft Utility—sailed into Cambodian waters July 17, 1968, after Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk had warned American ships to stay out of his part of the Mekong River.

The State Department said then that the patrol boat had indeed "inadvertently intruded" into Cambodian waters. The Cambodian government said it would release the 11 American soldiers and one South Vietnamese aboard in exchange for 14 bulldozers. Sihanouk released the 12 men on Dec. 19, 1968, with no mention of receiving bulldozers or any other com-

(over)

sideration from the American government.

Nixon, after referring disparagingly in his political campaign to the lack of executive action after the Pueblo was captured, risked further North Korean retaliatory action in 1969 by letting a Navy EC-121 plane fly off that country on an electronic eavesdropping mission. The plane was shot down by North Korean Migs on April 14, 1969. All 31 men aboard died when the plane plunged into the Sea of Japan.

The danger signals flying before the Mayaguez was boarded by armed Cambodians on Monday some 60 miles off the Cambodian coast included the harassment and capture of other ships in the same area last week.

A Cambodian gunboat stopped a Panamanian ship last Thursday and a South Korean freighter was fired upon May 4 in the general

area where the Mayaguez was seized. The South Korean Ministry of Transportation, apparently as a result of that attack, issued a warning to ships in that area.

But there was no indication that American officials issued any warnings before the Mayaguez was seized.

Another similarity between the Pueblo, EC-121 and Mayaguez incidents was the decision to rely on international law—not armament—for protection. The U.S. government is insisting now, as it did in the Pueblo and EC-121 incidents, that the merchantman had the international right of passage.

Bucher, before he set forth was ordered to rely on the right of international passage on the high seas rather than his only armament—two old .50 caliber machine guns. The EC-121 and Mayaguez were not armed at all.

Johnson said after the Pueblo capture that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had advised against retaliatory action because it might provoke another Korean war while the United States was tied down in Vietnam.

Johnson's aides said that their primary aim was to get the 82 men from the Pueblo crew back home alive.

Nixon, according to those who were with him at the time, fumed when his military advisers failed to come

up with what he considered for the downing of the EC-121 practical ways to retaliate.

President Ford took a big gamble in taking direct military action—and won as far as rescuing the 40 crew members of the Mayaguez. It still was not clear early this morning whether American servicemen had been killed in the rescue attempt.

Public Reaction Favors Bombings to Free Ship

The White House press office reported that initial reaction to the bombing of Cambodian gunboats was running strongly in favor of the President.

As of 10:30 p.m. yesterday, the White House had received 73 telephone calls favoring getting the ship out, 98 against and nine calls from people merely commenting on the situation.

The White House also

received 250 calls from people favoring bombing the ships, 51 calls against, and 295 telegrams favoring the bombing and 90 against.

A State Department spokesman said only four telegrams had been received there as of 4:45 p.m. yesterday. They can be characterized as urging a vigorous American response," he said.

Washington Post 15 May 1975

U.N. Aid Sought

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

Five hours before U.S. Marines moved in to rescue the Mayaguez and its crew, the United States yesterday asked the secretary general of the United Nations for assistance in obtaining their release.

It was a last diplomatic effort in an incident in which diplomacy became a futile exercise partly because of the uncertain situation in Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge was still in the process of establishing governmental control.

U.S. Ambassador John Scali delivered the letter to Secretary General Kurt Waldheim an hour after the first military steps had already been taken when American planes sank three Cambodian patrol boats.

Scali officials said, set no deadline for the release of the ship and the crew but Marines were already positioning themselves to move. At 7 p.m., the United Nations issued a statement saying: "the Secretary General is making all possible efforts to achieve a solution to the problem of the U.S. merchant vessel Mayaguez by peaceful means. For this purpose, the Secretary General has communicated with the governments of Cambodia and the United States and has offered his good offices to the parties. He has also appealed to them to refrain from further acts of force in order to facilitate the process of peaceful settlement."

But even while the appeal was being announced by a U.N. spokesman, American officials were forwarding a letter reporting to the U.N. Security Council on the military action. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter requires that "measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council."

In its first letter, the United States asked for U.N. assistance but at the same time served notice that it would "take such measures as may be necessary to protect the lives of American citizens and property" in accordance with the inherent right of self-defense condoned by the U.N. Charter.

See DIPLOMACY, A 16, Col. 2

Establishing a public record of its position, the United States called the secretary general's attention to the "threat to international peace which has been posed by the illegal and unprovoked seizure by Cambodian authorities of the . . . vessel . . . in international waters." It said the ship was unarmed.

Waldheim, according to a spokesman, was "giving the matter urgent attention with a view to finding a way of solving the problem by peaceful means." U.N. officials said he contacted the Chinese mission to the United Nations and was

sending an "open letter" to Phnom Penh similar to one he had sent when the French expressed concern over the fate of persons who had sought refuge in their embassy in Cambodia.

There was no evidence, officials said, that the cable had been instrumental in any way in getting the release of those persons.

Diplomats in the United Nations and in Washington conceded that there were few diplomatic avenues open to the United States. Waldheim, said one official at the United Nations, could offer his "good offices" but this presented a problem "because we don't know who

we're dealing with on the other side."

The appeal to the secretary general followed several earlier direct American attempts to get Chinese assistance in contacting Cambodian authorities. On Monday, the day the Mayaguez was seized, Acting Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll called in Ambassador Huang Chen, the head of the Chinese liaison office in Washington. Informed sources said this was followed up by contact with appropriate Chinese officials in Peking on "several" occasions.

One U.S. diplomat said, "We had to prove to the world we resorted to every

(over)

conceivable (diplomatic) approach.

In Moscow, the Soviet news agency Tass swiftly reported the U.S. attacks on Cambodian naval vessels but made no comment, United Press International reported.

A brief Washington dispatch said a Pentagon spokesman "explained the American Air Force strike by maintaining that the Cambodians were attempting to move to the mainland some of the crew from the American ship they detained on Monday."

The agency Tuesday quoted some western reports as saying the U.S. mer-

chant ship Mayaguez may have been engaged in spying activities.

Tass also reported 1,100 U.S. marines had been sent to Thailand in connection with the incident.

Approach to Sihanouk On Ship Release Fails

By John Burns

Toronto Globe and Mail

PEKING, May 14 — Attempts by U.S. diplomats here to engage Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the Chinese government in efforts to secure the release of the American container ship Mayaguez reached a standstill Wednesday in the wake of the nega-

tive response to the initial representations on Tuesday.

Officials of the U.S. liaison office refused any official comment on the representations but it was learned that Prince Sihanouk and the Peking embassy of the Khmer Rouge government had failed to respond to requests for the ship's immediate release.

The Chinese foreign ministry, asked to intervene with the Phnom Penh authorities on Washington's behalf, was understood to have refused on the ground that the matter was not its concern.

The official Hsinhua News Agency had not reported the seizure more than 48 hours after it occurred and diplo-

rats attached significance to the noncommittal stance taken by vice premier Teng Hsiao-Ping, who was questioned about the incident in Paris.

Teng, who has been in effective day-to-day control of the government since Premier Chou En-Lai went into hospital a year ago, was asked what China would do if Washington took military action to get the vessel back. Teng was reported to have answered that there was nothing Peking could do to it—a mild response when compared with Peking's forthright support of North Korea's seizure of the U.S. spy ship Pueblo seven years ago.

Washington Post 15 May 1975

Congress Rallies Behind President

Members Briefed

By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Ford received strong support last night from most of the top congressional leaders who heard him outline plans for landing forces on the island of Tang to retrieve a captured ship and its crew, according to several members who were present at the briefing session.

Referring to Cambodia's seizure of the ship, House GOP Leader John J. Rhodes (R-Ariz.) said, "I said from the start it was an act of piracy; we should try to handle it through diplomacy, but if needed, we could use force . . . I have no objection to what happened."

Senate GOP Whip Robert P. Griffin (R-Mich.) said response of congressional leaders to the plan was "generally favorable" and he supported the administration actions "under the circumstances."

Senate Democratic Whip Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), who had strongly urged quick action in the last few days, said, "I support the effort to land Marines on the boat and the island in an effort to recapture the ship and save the crew."

Other members present said there were some demurrals to the President's plan, at least in several aspects. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), long a foe of military action, emphasized particularly his strong concern about plans for possible selective bombing of targets in Kompong Son on the mainland. Sens. John L. McClellan (D-Ark.) and Byrd also reportedly expressed concern on the proposed mainland bombing plan.

Rhodes, Griffin and Byrd all said there weren't any indications that Cambodia had been given a specific time ultimatum—to return the ship by a set deadline or face attack—but Rhodes said a note warning Cambodia that it "must be prepared to accept the consequences" if it didn't give up the ship and crew was given to the Chinese liaison office here and it appeared that the Chinese forwarded it to Cambodia.

Earlier yesterday, before the landing on Tang was announced, there was widespread support in Congress for some forceful solution, despite suggestions from

See INFORM, A16, Col. 1

(over)

some members that military action be delayed to press for a diplomatic solution.

Rep. Wayne Hays (D-Ohio), expressing a widely held view, said after the U.S. sank three Cambodian vessels that he was "only sorry they didn't sink 17 rather than three."

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, after a three-hour briefing with administration officials, unanimously approved a resolution condemning Cambodian seizure of the Mayaguez and supporting the President's right to use force under the constitution to retrieve it, albeit within the limits imposed by the War Powers Act.

That act declares that if the President, in some emergency, must use force without first coming to Congress for a declaration of war or similar advance authorization, he must report his action to Congress and must cease the military operation within 60 days unless Congress specifically votes to continue it.

While a few senators—including George McGovern (D-S.D.) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.)—and House members were urging caution, declaring that there may have been too much haste to use force, the broad mood was different.

There seemed to be an almost pervasive sense, that, the United States having been humiliated in Vietnam, it must now strike with

force to show that it would not tolerate what many saw as an arrogant act of international lawbreaking by a tiny nation.

President Ford informed members of Congress of his plans to use U.S. forces, but the incident may have reopened some old wounds involving congressional charges that the White House acts without consulting Congress sufficiently in international affairs.

On Tuesday afternoon, after he had decided on the bombing of the Cambodian ships, President Ford instructed his congressional liaison men, Max Friedersdorf, Bill Kendall and Pat O'Don-

nell, to speak to congressional leaders and let them know of the plans to use some form of force. Bombing wasn't specified.

At about 5:30 p.m. Tuesday, the liaison men called Rhodes, and then a long succession of leaders including Mansfield, Byrd, GOP Senate Leader Hugh Scott and Griffin.

Several of the senators who were informed simply thanked Kendall and O'Donnell for the information. Others, like Armed Services Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.), Byrd, Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) and James Eastland (D-Miss.) specifically endorsed it.

On the basis of these con-

tacts, White House press secretary Ron Nessen issued a statement yesterday that leaders had been given "consultation" and that it had produced "a strong consensus of support and no objections."

Late last night, most of the same leaders were called to the White House and were told of further plans to send U.S. forces directly in to take control of the Mayaguez. The President reportedly also said he would comply with the requirement of notification to Congress under the War Powers Act.

Sen. John Sparkman (D-Ala.), Foreign Relations Committee chairman, told

reporters after the meeting that he had been called by phone twice on Tuesday and briefed last night. "I call that a pretty good degree of consultation."

Mansfield, however, had an entirely different view. He issued a denial that there had been meaningful consultation.

Early yesterday he said, "I was not briefed either yesterday morning or this afternoon, nor was I consulted before the fact. I was notified after the fact about what the administration had already decided to do. I did not give my approval or disapproval."

Last night, after the White House meeting, he repeated

his views, "We were informed, not consulted. I repeat, informed, not consulted."

The difference between Mansfield's view and Nessen's lies in how you interpret the word "consult." To Mansfield and many others, "consult" means to get prior

advice of Congress, ask its opinions and pay it some real attention in formulating a decision. To others, it simply means to let Congress know.

President Ford did go much further than several of his recent predecessors in letting Congress know

what he intended to do. But it also seems clear that the basic decisions for action had been taken before the congressional leaders were contacted, and probably only would have been reversed had there been total and unremitting opposition from all the congressional leaders.

Washington Post 15 May 1975

Families End Long Nights of Anguish

The families of the crewmen on the Mayaguez merchant ship reacted joyfully this morning to the news that all hands were safe—ending long nights of anguish.

"I'm just thrilled," said Lorene Anderson of New Orleans, wife of the ship's chief steward, Ervin Anderson, 55.

"They did what they had to do," she said of the American servicemen who went to the rescue. "I'm just

sorry if some of our Marines got hurt.

"I'm sedated right now," she added. "It's just been too much." Her doctor put her on sedatives because of the strain, she said.

Linda Shemper of Hattiesburg, Miss., daughter of Frank T. Conway, who was in the ship's engineering department, said the rescue was "just fantastic. But I just feel terrible about the poor Marines."

Mrs. Shemper said she was beginning to lose hope

of seeing her father again "because of all the shooting" yesterday. "Now I can't wait until he comes home."

Cathy Wesley of Rochester, N.Y., sister of Mayaguez crewman Robert (Ted) Friedler, said, "I did not want to see any bombing or bloodshed. But apparently the Cambodians now realize that we mean business, that we are not messing around."

Said Marion Bock of Bogota, N.J., wife of Mayaguez radio officer Wilbert N.

Bock: "When we first got the news, we were kissing one another."

"Thank God," was all Joyce Mullis could say. She is the niece of James C. Mullis, 49, and she immediately asked the reporter to call Mullis' mother. But Mrs. Mullis, according to her other son, John, "couldn't even hold a conversation, she's so happy. She's 74 years old, and this has been a great strain on her."

Mullis, also a seaman, lives

(over)

ing in Mobile, Ala., said: "We're just tickled to death that it's all over with. I suggested this . . . I felt we should give them a little time, then tell them we were coming in and take some action to save those boys."

"I'm a merchant seaman myself, and I'd want to know my government was coming to get me."

Mrs. Adah Doyle of Toledo, Ohio, first heard the news that her son, John, was safe when a reporter called. "Are they coming home," she asked immediately. "I kind of felt maybe they would, but I'm not sure."

Mrs. Doyle said she was sure her son would return to the sea even after what she called this "harrowing experience."

Jerry Gilbert, 22-year-old son of crewman Earl C. Gilbert, said, "Maybe the world will realize now that the U.S. is not going to sit back and let everybody push us around."

He said the Gilbert family stuck close to their television set in their Pascagoula, Miss., home yesterday—waiting anxiously for some word about the ship and her crew.

In Toledo, Ohio, Terrence Doyle, brother of crewman John Doyle, 47, said: "I'm glad they finally did something besides sit on their thumbs."

Mrs. Francis Pastrano, of Kenner, La., heard the good news on television. No one from the government had called to tell her, her husband, 59 was safe. "We just heaved a sigh of relief," she said. "I'm so glad they're safe."

She said her husband has been away from home almost six months. "I thought all along they'd get those men back," she said.

Yolande Stancato of Kenosha, Wis., whose brother, Salvatore E. Puntillo, is a deckhand on the ship, said, "We've got a houseful of people here and we're celebrating with coffee and rolls. No Italian wine now. We'll wait until Salvatore comes home for that."

Mrs. Stancato said that her brother Robert's 7 and 4-year-old daughters had been allowed to stay up as the news of the action began to break. "They got to hear the President say their uncle was safe," she said.

She said the family as of midnight Washington time, had not heard from any government officials, though they had received a telegram and a phone call from the ship's owners.

"I was afraid for the ones taken off the ship until the President came on. I think he did well. I just hope nobody was hurt," Mrs. Stancato said.

For San Francisco's Albert Minichiello, 63, who is scheduled to retire in two months on an engineer's pension, this last, memorable voyage will be capped with a party at a neighborhood bar and grill.

Frank Diamos, who described himself as Minichiello's life-long friend and who operates Coffee Don's on 22d Street in San Francisco's Mission District, said, "It's going to be quite a celebration for Al when he gets back. Al's a member of a club here we called the 'over the hill gang' and we're going to have a beer bust."

This story was compiled from reports by Washington Post Staff Writers Marilyn Berger, Wilson Morris and George C. Wilson.

Washington Post 15 May 1975

Families End Long Nights of Anguish

The families of the crewmen on the Mayaguez merchant ship reacted joyfully this morning to the news that all hands were safe—ending long nights of anguish.

"I'm just thrilled," said Lorene Anderson of New Orleans, wife of the ship's chief steward, Ervin Anderson, 55.

"They did what they had to do," she said of the American servicemen who went to the rescue. "I'm just

sorry if some of our Marines got hurt.

"I'm sedated right now," she added. "It's just been too much." Her doctor put her on sedatives because of the strain, she said.

Linda Shemper of Hattiesburg, Miss., daughter of Frank T. Conway, who was in the ship's engineering department, said the rescue was "just fantastic. But I just feel terrible about the poor Marines."

Mrs. Shemper said she was beginning to lose hope

of seeing her father again "because of all the shooting" yesterday. "Now I can't wait until he comes home."

Cathy Wesley of Rochester, N.Y., sister of Mayaguez crewman Robert (Ted) Friedler, said, "I did not want to see any bombing or bloodshed. But apparently the Cambodians now realize that we mean business, that we are not messing around."

Said Marion Bock of Bogota, N.J., wife of Mayaguez radio officer Wilbert N.

Bock: "When we first got the news, we were kissing one another."

"Thank God," was all Joyce Mullis could say. She is the niece of James C. Mullis, 49, and she immediately asked the reporter to call Mullis' mother. But Mrs. Mullis, according to her other son, John, "couldn't even hold a conversation, she's so happy. She's 74 years old, and this has been a great strain on her."

Mullis, also a seaman liv-

(only)

ing in Mobile, Ala., said: "We're just tickled to death that it's all over with. I suggested this . . . I felt we should give them a little time, then tell them we were coming in and take some action to save those boys."

"I'm a merchant seaman myself, and I'd want to know my government was coming to get me."

Mrs. Adah Doyle of Toledo, Ohio, first heard the news that her son, John, was safe when a reporter called. "Are they coming home," she asked immediately. "I kind of felt maybe they would, but I'm not sure."

Mrs. Doyle said she was sure her son would return to the sea even after what she called this "harrowing experience."

Jerry Gilbert, 22-year-old son of crewman Earl C. Gilbert, said, "Maybe the world will realize now that the U.S. is not going to sit back and let everybody push us around."

He said the Gilbert family stuck close to their television set in their Passagoula, Miss., home yesterday—waiting anxiously for some word about the ship and her crew.

In Toledo, Ohio, Terrence Doyle, brother of crewman John Doyle, 47, said: "I'm glad they finally did something besides sit on their thumbs."

Mrs. Francis Pastrano, of Kenner, La., heard the good news on television. No one from the government had called to tell her, her husband, 59, was safe. "We just heaved a sigh of relief," she said. "I'm so glad they're safe."

She said her husband has been away from home almost six months. "I thought all along they'd get those men back," she said.

Yolande Stancato of Kenosha, Wis., whose brother, Salvatore E. Puntillo, is a deckhand on the ship, said, "We've got a household of people here and we're celebrating with coffee and rolls. No Italian wine now. We'll wait until Salvatore comes home for that."

Mrs. Stancato said that her brother Robert's 7 and 4-year-old daughters had been allowed to stay up as the news of the action began to break. "They got to hear the President say their uncle was safe," she said.

She said the family as of midnight Washington time had not heard from any government officials, though they had received a telegram and a phone call from the ship's owners.

"I was afraid for the ones taken off the ship until the President came on. I think he did well. I just hope nobody was hurt," Mrs. Stancato said.

For San Francisco's Albert Minichiello, 63, who is scheduled to retire in two months on an engineer's pension, this last, memorable voyage will be capped with a party at a neighborhood bar and grill.

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This story was compiled from reports by Washington Post Staff Writers Marilyn Serger, Wilson Morris and George C. Wilson.

Washington Post 15 May 1975 "Marines Rescued" page three

The Mayaguez crewmen are known to have been taken off their ship to the island soon after their capture and the Marines were seeking to rescue any still on the island.

Despite the attempts to move crew members to the Cambodian mainland, 34 miles away, Defense Department sources said late yesterday, as the Marine attack was getting underway, that they "thought" most of the crewmen were still on the island, but they were not certain.

Defense Department spokesman Joseph Laitin acknowledged that one of the roughly seven or eight Cambodian patrol boats in the area succeeded in getting to Kompong Som on the mainland. Senior officials also said this boat appeared to carry about 40 passengers and that U.S. pilots thought they saw some "Caucasian faces" aboard and may have chosen not to fire on that boat when those faces were sighted.

Though officials concede that from a military standpoint there are very few significant targets in a rural country like Cambodia—even more so after the new Communist rulers have dispersed the urban population into the countryside—plans for either bombing of airfields or mining of ports have been considered, it was learned.

In moving the Marines directly from Thailand onto the USS Holt and the island, the United States may well have complied with a demand by the nervous government of Thailand to get the Marines out of the country fast. On the other hand, by moving the Marines virtually into direct combat from those bases, the United States appeared to

be disregarding a Thai demand that it not use Marines from its bases to take back the captured ship by force.

A Thai Foreign Ministry official called the earlier sinking of gunboats an act of "madness—taken with no thought for the consequences to Thailand," the Associated Press reported.


Meanwhile, the United States, which had virtually no forces except airplanes in the vicinity of the Cambodian coast when the incident took place last Monday, is now building up a sizable force.

Aside from the Coral Sea, destroyers and some 1,100 Marines, another attack carrier, the Hancock, was steaming toward the area and a helicopter carrier, the Okinawa, with more Marines aboard, was also heading for the Gulf of Siam. The Okinawa and the Hancock were thought to still be about a day's sailing time away.

In addition, there were indications that Air Force tankers for mid-air refueling were being moved from their regular bases and that some other warplanes at bases in Japan and on Guam were at least being placed in a higher state of readiness.

In describing the attack on the patrol boats, the Penta-

(over)



By Joseph P. Mastrangelo—The Washington Post
Area where Mayaguez was captured by Cambodians.

gon first said that in addition to the three boats reportedly destroyed, four others were damaged and immobilized. Later, however, Laitin said there wasn't enough information to verify that four had been damaged.

The entire outbreak of firing at the patrol boats—which began late Tuesday night Washington time, Wednesday morning Cambodian time, is still somewhat confusing. Pentagon sources say apparently some of the vessels were coming out from Kompong Som, others were heading into the port, and one or two others may have been hiding in coves.

Laitin said that U.S. planes, prior to their attack on the boats, had been receiving small-arms fire from the Cambodian boats. Laitin said that after giving warning (presumably by shots across the bow) the U.S. planes attacked in an effort to block the movement of the captive crewmen to the mainland.

Yet the vessel which may have had crewmen aboard wasn't stopped. Some Pentagon sources said they were confident that there were no Americans on the ships that were destroyed. Others said they were not completely confident.

The Cambodian statement, monitored in Bangkok, said, according to United Press International:

"On May 12, at 2 p.m., our patrol ship spotted a large ship headed towards our territorial waters.

"The ship continued on its way deeper into Khmer territorial waters, passing Poulo Wai Island, about four or five kilometers to the east. Our patrol ship then intercepted the ship to investigate and report to higher authority. While investigating them, two F-105S circled over the ship the entire day. Since dawn of May 13, four to six F-105 and F-111 continued to fly over Poulo Wai Island, Tang Island and in the area of the port of Siha-noukville (Kompong Som)."

Hu Nim said the Mayaguez deliberately entered the territorial waters of Cambodia.

"We are sure that it was not by error in navigation because the American ship has electronic radar and modern scientific equipment," he said. "It was a violation of our territorial waters—spying, in order to cheat world opinion and to accuse Cambodia of provoking a dispute."

"The Ford administration must be responsible, before Cambodia and her people, before the people of the world, as well as before the American people and their politicians, for their acts of spying and violations of Cambodian territorial integrity.

The broadcast was apparently made by Hu Nim when the Khmer Rouge thought they were still in control of the ship.

"... for the Mayaguez, we have no intention of keeping it indefinitely or to provoke any dispute," Hu Nim said. "What we want to find out is what the ship's intention was and we want to warn them not to violate our territorial waters in the future.

"It is for this reason that our patrol ships intercepted the Mayaguez. To investigate their intention and report to higher authorities for a decision to allow it to leave Cambodian territorial waters, and to warn them not to spy and provoke disputes, as we did with another ship, flying the Panamanian flag, which was released by us on May 9."

Washington Post 15 May 1975

Marines Rescue Ship and Crew; 4 Helicopters Lost; Jets Raid Coast

By Michael Getler and Carroll Kilpatrick
Washington Post Staff Writers

U.S. armed forces recaptured an American merchant ship and recovered all its 40 crew members last night as Marines fought their way onto tiny Tang Island against opposition from Cambodian forces.

President Ford announced the successful recovery to the nation shortly before 12:30 a.m. today. He praised the "valor and sacrifice" of the troops that carried out the operation.

The Pentagon said early this morning that no total of U.S. casualties was available, but it was reliably reported that at least four of the 12 Air Force helicopters went down during the initial landings on Tang Island and the destroyer escort USS Holt.

Shortly after 10:30 p.m. Washington time, the U.S. destroyer Wilson reported sighting a small boat flying white flags. At 11:15 p.m., Defense Secretary James R.

Schlesinger called Mr. Ford with the news that the small boat held about 30 of the 40 crewmen and that they were safely boarding the Wilson.

It was still not clear early this morning whether the crewmen were released by Cambodian forces or were rescued.

Later it was learned that all the crew members were safe, presumably all of them found aboard the small boat, and that five Thai citizens had also been recovered. They were presumed to be the crew of a Thai fishing boat captured several days ago by the Cambodians.

At 11:09 p.m., U.S. fighter-bombers from the aircraft carrier Coral Sea launched air strikes against the airfield at Ream near the Cambodian port of Kompong Som. Mr. Ford said air strikes were made against "nearby military installations."

Presidential press spokesman Ron Nessen acknowledged that there were "some casualties" among the U.S. Marines

(over)

and other forces. One helicopter crashed on Tang Island and two at sea. A fourth went down on the coast of Thailand and a fifth, according to informed sources, landed safely in Thailand but was badly damaged by gunfire.

In announcing the safe recovery of the Mayaguez and its crew early this morning, President Ford said: "The forces that have successfully accomplished this mission are still under hostile fire and are preparing to disengage."

Sources indicated that U.S. air strikes against the Cambodian mainland had been halted.

Mr. Ford said: "I wish to express my deep appreciation and that of the entire nation to the units and the men who participated in these operations for their valor and for their sacrifice."

The President reached the decision on final plans for the military operation during a lengthy mid-afternoon meeting with the National Security Council.

Nessen said the "military operations were well under way before" the United States received the first Cambodian government statement on the incident since the Mayaguez was seized Monday—an offer to return the ship.

But the two-pronged assault had already successfully recaptured the Mayaguez with Marines who were helicoptered to the destroyer escort USS Holt and then stormed over the rail when the Holt drew alongside the freighter.

Other Marines, flying in helicopters from bases in Thailand, landed on three-mile-long Tang Island under fire from Cambodians.

Jet fighter-bombers from the U.S. aircraft carrier Coral Sea also attacked the island in support of the Marines.

The first Cambodian announcement came in the form of a communique read over radio by Information Minister

See SHIP, A16, Col. 1

Hu Nim at 7:07 p.m. Washington time. In the 10-minute broadcast, he said, according to an unofficial translation:

"Based on the position that we are unwilling to provoke any dispute, and as a peace-loving people, we will release that ship . . . but we will not allow the U.S. imperialists to violate or spy in our territorial waters. We will not allow them to threaten us to release the ship at any specific time."

The U.S. Marine operation against the island had begun about 6:30 p.m. Washington time.

The White House announced it had sent the following urgent message to Cambodian authorities after the Marine operation was under way and after Washington had received the Cambodian offer to return the Mayaguez:

"We have heard a radio broadcast that you are prepared to release the SS Mayaguez. We welcome this development if true.

"As you know, we have seized the ship. As soon as you issue a statement that you are prepared to release the crew members that you hold, unconditionally and immediately, we will promptly cease military operations."

A White House spokesman gave no indication how the message was sent to the Cambodian government with which the United States has no relations and which has kept itself sealed off from the outside world since conquering Phnom Penh April 17.

The official confirmation that the United States had retaken the Mayaguez and landed Marines on Tang Island came from the White House at 9:15 last night, Washington time.

White House press secretary Ron Nessen made the dramatic announcement as President Ford, described as weary from a long two days of crisis meetings, was having dinner with the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Johannes Den Uyl.

The Marine operation came hours after U.S. Air Force warplanes destroyed three Cambodian patrol boats.

American A-7 jets and AC-130 gunships operating from bases in Thailand strafed the patrol boats after there were indications that the Cambodians appeared to be attempting to move captive American crewmen from the ship and the island to the mainland," the Pentagon said.

(Continued)

Washington Post

MAY 15, 1975

Fifth Year



A 14 Thursday, May 15, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST



By Frank Johnston—Washington Post

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, at the White House, awaits word of developments in the ship recovery.

Ford: Entire Crew Has Been Rescued

President Ford early today made a brief statement to announce the rescue of the U.S. merchant ship *Mayaguez* and its crew members.

At my direction, United States forces tonight boarded the American merchant ship *SS Mayaguez* and landed at the island of Koh Tang for the purpose of rescuing the crew and the ship, which had been illegally seized by Cambodian forces. They also conducted supporting strikes against near-

by military operations, or military installations.

I have now received information that the vessel has been recovered intact and the entire crew has been rescued.

The forces that have successfully accomplished this mission are still under hostile fire and are preparing to disengage.

I wish to express my deep appreciation and that of the entire nation to the units and the men who participated in these operations for their valor and for their sacrifice.

Timetable of Events In Mayaguez Recovery

United Press International

Pentagon sources provided the following partial timetable of events yesterday in the recovery of the *S.S. Mayaguez* and crew.

7:20 p.m. EDT—The first Marines were landed by helicopter on Tang Island.

9:00 p.m. EDT—A boarding party went onto the *Mayaguez*.

10:30 p.m. EDT—The destroyer *Wilson* radioed that a small boat was approaching with white flags flying.

11:09 p.m. EDT—Fighter aircraft attacked Ream airfield on mainland Cambodia.

11:14 p.m. EDT—Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger telephoned President Ford that 30 crewmen from the *Mayaguez* were being taken on board the *Wilson* at that time from the small Cambodian naval vessel.

12:28 a.m. (today) EDT—President Ford announced that all crewmen and the vessel had been rescued.

Washington Post 14 May 1975

U.S. Airlifting Marines to Thailand

Site Near Seized Freighter

Ford Insists Cambodians Release Ship

By Michael Getler
and Carroll Kilpatrick
Washington Post Staff Writers

The United States has begun airlifting Marines from bases in the Philippines and Okinawa to Thailand for a possible military showdown that could come within the next 24 hours over the seizure Monday of an unarmed American merchant ship by Cambodian gunboats.

By this morning, sources said the United States would probably have flown hundreds of Marines on Air Force C-141 transports into the big Utapao airbase in Thailand.

Air Force helicopters—capable of carrying battle-equipped Marines—were being relocated in Thailand, it was understood.

At a White House briefing yesterday, press secretary Ron Nessen was asked if President Ford had set a deadline or a 15-second ultimatum for release of the vessel and its 39-man American crew.

"If you are asking if he has set a definite minute or hour for the release of the ship," Nessen replied, "the answer is no."

Nonetheless Nessen stressed that the President was demanding that the Mayaguez be freed immediately.

"Immediate is immediate," Nessen said. "The President wants the ship released now."

While attempts to free the vessel through diplomatic contacts with third countries, including China, continue, the United States is moving into place a military force which—by sometime today—will give the administration the ability to take military action to recapture the vessel if the President decides to use force. One senior administration official summed up the situation with the question: "Do you scare the hell out of them or kick the hell out of them?"

Earlier the United States had very little usable military power in the immediate vicinity with the exception of military reconnaissance planes, AC-130 gunships and jet fighter-bombers that have

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kept a continuous watch over the area.

Aside from the Marines on this morning at least one and possibly more Navy destroyers are expected to reach the area as lead elements of a larger task force that includes the aircraft carrier Coral Sea, which is expected to be within range of the area later today.

If the vessel is not released soon, Mr. Ford faces a tough decision since the use of force could endanger the safety of the American crew. The administration has ruled out any deal for return of the ship. Reporters traveling with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger learned yesterday that the Cambodians will not be given anything in exchange for the ship.

Sources say there are indications, based on reports from reconnaissance pilots swooping low over the ship and island in the face of small arms fire, which hit the wing of one jet, that many if not all of the crew members have been taken off the ship and moved by two small boats to the island.

Sources stress that almost all information on exactly what is happening on the scene is sketchy.

There were also reports that the Mayaguez, which was lying motionless near the island of Koh Tang about 30 miles south of the Cambodian port of Kompong Som, had begun to move.

Informed sources, however, said the merchant ship — as

of late yesterday afternoon Washington time — did not appear to be leaving but there were indications that another vessel — possibly a gunboat — was departing.

Information apparently based on sensors aboard U.S. reconnaissance planes indicated that the Mayaguez's smoke stack had cooled down, indicating that its departure was not imminent. When the ship was first fired upon and boarded some 60 miles off the Cambodian coast the assumption in the White House was that the vessel was to be taken into Kompong Som. Mr. Ford's initial announcement even stated that the vessel had already been forced into that port.

As it turned out, however, the Cambodians only took the ship to the tiny rock island.

U.S. officials are puzzled why the Cambodians didn't take the ship all the way to port initially, and view that decision as the only encouraging sign that the vessel may be released without a fight.

The failure to take it into Kompong Som also produced an immediate shift in U.S. military strategy. If the ship had reached port, the chances of getting the vessel back or saving the crew from being transported inland would have diminished fast.

With the vessel and crew, as of yesterday, still offshore, the administration now seems intent on assuring that the vessel does not reach port and is moving military forces into position where they could stop it and it is hoped, rescue the crew.

Informants say there are no accurate estimates of the size of the force guarding the ship or the island or whether reinforcements are being sent.

There also is still apparently no hard identification of the captors as Cambodians, though no one in the administration seems to doubt that they are Khmer Rouge forces. The Cambodian radio has made no mention of the Mayaguez incident.

At the Pentagon yesterday, spokesmen were asked about reports that several foreign vessels in recent days had been intercepted by Cambodian gunboats in the same general area and why these incidents failed to produce a warning to U.S. mariners.

The White House said Monday that a Panamanian ship had been detained May 7 by the Cambodians and it was also disclosed that a South Korean freighter had been fired upon but fled from captors on May 4. A Thai fishing boat was also seized in the area last week.

U.S. officials said only that word travels slowly among commercial shipping companies. However, the South Korean Transportation Ministry put out a warning to ships in the area immediately after its vessel was challenged. The Pentagon after the Mayaguez was captured and more than a week after the other incidents, yesterday issued a warning to mariners.

The White House has said it has no information that any of the Mayaguez crewmen have been injured.

A U.S. Navy P-3 patrol plane,

the first U.S. craft on the scene yesterday morning was hit by small arms fire from the island, but the plane was not disabled.

During most of yesterday, the Ford administration clamped a tight lid on information about what was going on, in part because of two National Security Council meetings.

Late last night Mr. Ford called the second National Security Council meeting of the day. Mr. Ford met with Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger, Kissinger, CIA Director William E. Colby and other council members.

There was no general agreement on what military course to follow if peaceful efforts to win the ship's release failed.

None of the military options are viewed as very attractive by military men in terms of assuring the safety of the crew.

Further adding to the sensitivity of the issue was a statement in Bangkok by Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj of Thailand that his country would not permit the United States to use Thai bases for military action against Cambodia, including any armed attempt to recapture the Mayaguez.

The political situation with Thailand, increasingly worried about its relations with a new Communist-led Cambodia, made the entire situation "hyper-delicate" in the words of one defense official.

Yet, U.S. F-4 Phantom and A-7 fighter-bombers from Thai bases were already circling the captured ship and marines were being flown to Utapao. Later in the day, however, after reports that the United

(Continued)

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States had alerted U.S. Marines for movement to Thailand, reached Bangkok, a Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman according to the Associated Press said. We will have to wait for complete details before we can make any comments.

At the White House news briefing, Nessen was questioned at length about possible U.S. military action. Nessen indicated that no final decision had been made but added that Mr. Ford would consult with the Congress before taking action.

The President warned Monday of "serious consequences" for what he called an "act of piracy" in seizing the Mayaguez "on the high seas" in international waters, some 60 miles from the Cambodian coastline. However, the presence of the ship roughly 8 miles off the tiny and disputed island of Poulo Wai at the time it was seized, raises a potential question because Cambodia claims 12-mile territorial waters.

U.S. officials, and Sea-Land Corp., the ship's owners, insist the Mayaguez was in international waters and view it as absurd to consider being within 12 miles of a tiny "rock pile" as a violation of territorial waters.

Chinese Aide Amused By Intervention Query

PARIS, May 13 (AP) — Chinese Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping burst into laughter when asked how Peking would react to a possible American intervention to recover a U.S. merchant ship captured by Cambodia.


"If they intervene, there is nothing we can do," Teng told reporters.

Other Chinese officials accompanying Teng, regarded as the No. 3 person in the Peking hierarchy, also laughed

at his remark. Teng left in doubt whether he intended his remark to be taken seriously, and the other members of his delegation refused to elaborate.

Teng emerged from the Elysee palace after a one-hour meeting with President Valéry

Giscard d'Estaing on the second day of his official visit to France and said: "We had some very frank discussions on the international problems which interest us." He indicated that the subjects discussed included Indochina and Europe, but gave no details.



By Joseph P. Mastrangelo—The Washington Post

Inset shows Koh Tang Island, where American merchant ship is being held.

Authority Is Cited For Use of Force

By Stephen Isaacs
Washington Post Staff Writer

The White House feels the President has legal authority to use American military forces, if necessary, to rescue the American ship and crew seized by Cambodia.

Various restrictions on the use of American troops in Indochina do not apply to this type of situation, a high White House official maintained yesterday.

Those congressional prohibitions, the official said, "were designed to stop American participation in hostilities in which American life and property were not at issue."

"There is no legal restriction against doing whatever he feels he has to do commensurate with the situation. He not only has the constitutional authority, he has the constitutional duty to protect the lives and property of Americans."

This view coincides with that of Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.), one of the key movers behind the War Powers Act of 1973, which limits use

of troops to 60 days in the absence of a declaration of war.

After emerging from the White House following a brief ceremonial meeting with the President, he said, "My feeling is the President is determined the ship and crew must be returned [but] he's keeping his shirt on. I believe the President will consult with Congress on this matter when he is ready to take military action."

Last night, Javits told a reporter that the War Powers Act "doesn't take away any of the President's powers, but it does give Congress power to stop him if it feels he's going too far."

"The President's constitutional power extends to protecting United States shipping on the high seas against attack or seizure."

"Under international law, he has the right of hot pursuit after an American vessel wherever pirates take it."

Washington Post

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"If he commits the armed forces of the United States, he's got to notify us immediately, and the War Powers Act takes effect, which establishes our power if we feel action by the armed forces will lead us into war."

"There's strong sentiment here in the Congress," Javits said, "not to rush, not to be precipitate, but to be firm in getting the ship and the crew back."

Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said, "The attack and seizure cannot be tolerated. We must be firm and as severe as necessary to protect Americans on board and to assure their

safe return as well as the recovery of the ship."

"We must protect our citizens and our shipping on the high seas, as well as the honor of our country."

And Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.), the majority whip, suggested the President should set a deadline, perhaps as short as 48 hours, for the Cambodians to release the ship and crew.

If Cambodia does not release the ship and crew by then, Byrd said, the United States "should take whatever action is necessary, including military force."

Sen. James L. Buckley (Cons. R-N.Y.), who on Monday suggested retaliatory air and sea strikes against Cambodia, said yesterday the United States should use

"conventional high explosives."

"You don't have to 'nuke' them," said Buckley. "It means select a target with care, go about it with a scalpel, eliminate it, and go home."

Seven different pieces of legislation now contain prohibitions affecting the use of American force in Indochina, with varying language. The current appropriations act for the Defense Department states:

"None of the funds herein appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by U.S. military forces in on over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia."

Prior to the evacuation from South Vietnam, the

State Department legal advisers reportedly told the White House that such provisions did not specifically apply to the President's inherent right to protect the lives of Americans.

A number of precedents involving the President's role as commander in chief of American forces have been so cited, including the use of American transports in the Congo in 1964, American troops in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and stretching back to the use of U.S. Marines in China during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 to protect American missionaries.

At least one senator, Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.), would like to see the U.S. Navy used now.

"Let's get away from all this talk about using the Chinese as intermediaries," Hollings said yesterday. "If that is the philosophy, then we ought to make China an ally. Our Chief of Naval Operations

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Relatives Ask Action On Seizure

From News Dispatches

"If we don't do something about it, it is just like putting up a sign to the world and saying, 'Come on, slap my face.'"

Richard English's anger at the news that his brother, Third Officer David English, had been captured aboard the U.S. freighter Mayaguez by Cambodian gunboats reflected the sentiments of other families who waited yesterday for word of the 39 crew members.

Richard English, of Seattle, Wash., is also a merchant marine deck officer. He described his brother as "a cocky type person. I'm sure he wants the government to come in there after him at any cost."

In Mobile, Ala., the wife of Boatswain James C. Mullis said the country must act to get her husband and others released.

"I think they (armed forces) should go in there and get them released," Mrs. Mullis said. "I just hope nothing happens to him before he's released."

Martherine Pastrano, 63, wife of mess cook Francis Pastrano, said yesterday she was "shocked—I couldn't believe it," when her daughter broke the news of the ship's capture on Monday. "All I can do is wait and pray," she said. "I have faith that the government will get it back."

Mrs. Pastrano said her husband has been a merchant seaman for 30 years. He left on the Mayaguez last September.

"He hadn't wanted to because his trade is chief cook, but he had to take it or his name would have been down so far on the [union] list he would have had to stay in port for months," Mrs. Pastrano said.

In Van Nuys, Calif., Judy Jessen learned her son, James C. Myregard, 30, had been taken prisoner by the Cambodians when a Los Angeles television crew burst into her real estate office Monday and asked for an interview. "It [the news] shook me up," she said. "I told them [the TV crew] I couldn't possibly do the interview because I was too upset."

She said she felt confident her son would return because "I have faith in President Ford."

"He had been in the war zone dozens and dozens of times and I knew that merchant ships had been fired on in the war area. He didn't worry about that, though. I was the one who worried," she said.

William E. Gilbert said he thinks the government "is doing all that they can do" to free his father, Earl C. Gilbert, and his shipmates.

Gilbert, 52, enlisted in the merchant marine at the age of 18 and is two years away from retirement, his son said during a telephone interview from the family home in Pascagoula, Miss.

"This was supposed to be one of his last cruises," he said, noting that the elder Gilbert has not seen his family since last August when he boarded the Mayaguez for a one-year cruise.

"With the Marines sent to Thailand that might help some," he said. But he added that the U.S. should retaliate after the ship and its crew have been freed.

"They [the United States] just can't let it go at that. If they do, somebody will do it again since the Cambodians have been allowed to get away with it once," he said.

"I don't even know what they did it for in the first place. . . . My father's been at sea since he was 18 and this is the first trouble of any kind he's ever had."

Gilbert said his mother is "too upset even to talk about it. We're supposed to take her to the hospital tonight. She's taking it very hard."

In the Rochester, N.Y., suburb of Greece, Mrs. June Fedyk said her son, Raymond E. Fedyk, 29, had planned to leave for the United States to visit an ailing brother.

Mrs. Fedyk said her son, a nine-year merchant marine veteran, boarded the Mayaguez because it departed from Hong Kong earlier than his scheduled ship, and would arrive in California sooner.

"If my other son wasn't sick, he probably wouldn't have been on that ship," Mrs. Fedyk said. "We're trusting in the Lord that he'll bring those boys home safely."

17 May 1975

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

The Mayaguez Affair

THE NEW CAMBODIAN government's seizure of the American merchant ship Mayaguez poses an unwanted and difficult challenge to the Ford administration. Obviously, the United States must protect its citizens and their property from arbitrary acts by foreign states. Particularly at this moment of post-Vietnam uncertainty, the government is bound to be worrying about whether its will is still being taken seriously in the world. And yet the facts of this incident are still very few and dim. Certainly the basic prerequisites for the use of force—that the facts be known, that the Congress and the public be informed of the choices and risks, and that diplomatic alternatives be exhausted—have not yet been met.

What we do know is that an unarmed merchant ship under charter to the U.S. military, carrying supplies but apparently not weapons to U.S. military bases in Thailand, was intercepted in what Cambodia claims are its territorial waters eight miles from an island sitting 60 miles off the Cambodian coast in the Gulf of Siam. Whether this was an act of "piracy," as the administration at once claimed, is not clear to lawyers. In the absence of any explanation from the new, uncommunicative and intensely nationalistic government of Cambodia, one can only speculate on what its purposes were. To be tough and anti-American? To assert a territorial claim to an island also claimed by the Vietnamese? To take a chip for bargaining against the return of Cambodian property taken abroad by members of the former government? To protest the delivery of military supplies to American military installations on the territory of a neighboring state, Thailand, with which Cambodia has

poor relations?

The United States has approached Peking for help in obtaining the release of the ship and its crew of 39. But there are no visible results as yet, and it is far from certain that China could do very much, even if it wanted to. Some approach to the United Nations Secretary General might also be appropriate. What would certainly not be appropriate, however, would be the policy recommended by Sen. James L. Buckley (Con.-R.N.Y.): "immediate punitive air and naval attacks." That he could toy so cavalierly with the lives of the 39 hostages, without having any way of knowing what actually had happened, and without considering what the targets or costs or risks of renewed bombing might be, suggests a truly astonishing inability to learn anything from Vietnam. The appeal by Sen. John Sparkman (D-Ala.) to retrieve the ship "any way we can" was only slightly less ill-considered.

The administration itself has threatened Cambodia with "the most serious consequences." It would have done much better first to build its case. As it was the administration last night found itself in the awkward if not untenable position of making plans to fly marines into American bases in Thailand, despite the Thai government's publicly stated refusal to permit use of those bases for military action against Cambodia. In fact, the administration should not be raising the specter of force until it can supply the American people with convincing evidence of the rightness of its case as well as an explanation of why there is no effective alternative. American honor is being tested. But so, after Vietnam, is American common sense.

Washington Post 13 May 1975

Cambodia Seizes U.S. Merchant Ship

By Michael Getler
and Carroll Kilpatrick
Washington Post Staff Writers

An unarmed U.S. merchant ship was fired upon and seized by the crew of a Cambodian gunboat in the Gulf of Siam early yesterday morning.

The capture of the civilian vessel, reportedly some 60 miles off the Cambodian coast, immediately was branded an "act of piracy" by President Ford, who warned of "serious consequences" unless the ship and its 40-man crew were promptly released.

The episode was greeted with both shock and anger in Congress, with reaction ranging from a call for "immediate punitive air and naval attacks" by Sen. James L. Buckley (Cons.-R-N.Y.) to a call for "a little patience" and caution at the outset from Sens. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) and Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.).

After an emergency 45-minute meeting of the National Security Council at noon yesterday called by Mr. Ford, both White House and State Department spokesmen said the United States was taking immediate steps to obtain prompt release of the ship. But State Department spokesman Robert L. Funseth said it would not be "helpful at this time" to discuss publicly just what the United States would do about the seizure.

It appeared that Washington was making diplomatic efforts to free the

ship and not contemplating immediate military measures.

Shortly after word of the seizure reached Washington early yesterday morning, U.S. reconnaissance planes were ordered into the area. An American aircraft carrier, believed to be the

Coral Sea, and several destroyers also were heading toward Cambodia but they were said to be a few days sailing time from the coast.

White House press secretary Ron Nessen, who announced the seizure of the vessel the Mayaguez, owned by

Sea-Land Corp. of Menlo Park N.J., said the ship was captured after being fired upon about 60 miles off the Cambodian coast and about eight miles from a small rock island that apparently has been claimed by Vietnam and Cambodia for several years.

However, Sea-Land Corp. said the ship was 85 miles from the closest shoreline of Cambodia.

The United States considers all waters more than three miles off shore as being international waters, and President Ford yesterday charged that

the ship had been seized "on the high seas" and forced into the Cambodian port of Kompong Som.

Cambodia, however, is one of about 40 nations claiming that territorial waters extend 12 miles seaward. This could raise a question of whether the presence of the ship some eight miles off the coast of a tiny, disputed island will be used as a rationale by the new Communist government in Cambodia for intercepting it.

However, international law recognizes a "right of innocent passage," under which a ship has a right to pass through a nation's territorial waters, providing it poses no threat to the nation.

There was a variety of reasons offered yesterday as to why the Cambodians seized the ship. Some sources thought the newly victorious Cambodians "might just be feeling their oats." Others speculated that they were trying to insure their claim to offshore islands and to extended offshore waters which may contain oil.

Late yesterday, Nessen said he had been told that a Panamanian ship also had been stopped by the Cambodians several days ago, and subsequently had been released.

Information on the entire episode available yesterday was very sketchy.

According to the Sea-Land Corp., about 5:30 a.m. yesterday (Eastern Daylight Time), the captain of the vessel, Charles Miller of Fountain Valley

(over)

Callit radioed that he was being fired upon and boarded by what appeared to be a Cambodian gunboat.

A company official said the Mayaguez left Hong Kong, its home port, on May 8 and was due to arrive in Sattahip, Thailand, yesterday or today.

The ship, one of a fleet of 10,700-ton container-type cargo ships, was reportedly sailing in commercial shipping lanes and was carrying what is described as a mixed cargo, including some military cargo that the firm described as "PX supplies, commissary supplies and some spare parts, but no guns, no ammunition."

The list of crew members indicates

that all but four members of the 40-man crew have American addresses.

Nessen yesterday said as far as he knew no one on the ship had been injured. Pentagon sources said last evening it still was not clear whether the vessel had reached the Cambodian port Kompong Som.

Concern over the safety of the crew would apparently make quick military retaliation low on the likely lists of U.S. options, and both Pentagon and State Department officials stressed that steps being taken to gain release of the ship and crew involved diplomatic and not military steps.

State Department officials said only that "we are using diplomacy" in the effort to get the boat released.

It was clear that the United States

had contacted China — probably the only country that has influence in Phnom Penh.

Chinese envoy Huang Chen was called to the State Department yesterday afternoon to see Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll who is acting Secretary of State while Henry A. Kissinger is in the Midwest.

Nessen told reporters yesterday that no matter what Cambodia claims as its territorial waters, "we consider the ship to have been in international waters."

Asked if the ship might have been engaged in espionage in any way, Nessen told reporters: "The answer is a flat no."


The President's stern demand to the Cambodians was applauded by retired Navy Cdr. Lloyd M. Bucher, who was the captain of the spy ship Pueblo, which was captured by the North Koreans in 1968.

"I suspect that what must be done here is very strong and very immediate action in order to prevent this tail-twisting of the United States from going on" more and more frequently, he said.

Bucher said he didn't know what action the United States could take to recover the crew because he didn't have all the facts. "But I do know this. It is the federal government's responsibility to protect flag carriers on the high seas and in this instance it's a pretty clear-cut seizure which is entirely illegal."

In his call for swift military counter-action, Buckley said: "In no other way can we underscore the fact that we will no longer tolerate acts of international banditry."

Sen. John Sparkman (D-Ala.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the United States should attempt to retrieve the vessel "any way we can," adding that "if a person shoots at you, you've got a right to shoot back."



By Hal Hoover—The Washington Post

Intended course of ship bound for Thailand and point of seizure.

Sen. James B. Allen (D-Ala.) called the seizure "an outrage which we cannot let go unchallenged. I don't favor precipitate action, but it's a question of national honor . . . and if force is necessary, then force must be used."

Javits said he agreed with Mr. Ford's description of the seizure as piracy and that the President, under the War Powers Act, "would have the right to act."

However Javits said the capture may have been an ill-considered move by the new Khmer Rouge government.

"I believe a little patience is deserved, rather than cause a new incident or attack," he said.

Humphrey said, "We should stop, look and listen. Use reason first."

Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), the normally hawkish and outspoken former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, declined to make any immediate comment.

"I remember the Pueblo, so I want to know more about that ship before I say anything," he said.

Efforts to gain release of the ship and crew were launched by the National Maritime Union in an appeal to the International Transport Workers Federation for support.

The international federation, based in London, has a membership of some 6 million seamen.

National Maritime Union President Shannon J. Wall called the act "piracy" and called upon every organization and nation to bring "every kind of pressure—economic, political and moral—on the Cambodian leaders."

Sea-Land President Paul F. Richardson said he and other company executives had been in close touch with military authorities since the seizure. He sent President Ford a telegram expressing gratitude for his "prompt reaction."

(Continued)

PACIFIC STARS & STRIPES
25 Mar 76
page 8

Staff Sec

DIVISION OF INFORMATION DAILY PRESS CLIPS
OF 9 Apr 76

24 Decorated for Mayaguez Rescue

CAMP SCHWAB, Japan (Special) — Twenty-three Marines and a Navy Corpsman were awarded Navy Achievement Medals here Friday for their participation in the rescue of the SS Mayaguez last year.

Maj. Gen. Herbert L. Wilkerson, commanding general, III Marine Amphibious Force/3d Marine Division, presented the awards to members of 2nd Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment who stormed ashore on Koh Tang Island during the Mayaguez rescue operation.

The citations commended the men for their individual actions during the actual assault and for their rescue efforts in aiding wounded comrades.

Lt. Col. Roger E. Simmons, 2/9 commanding officer, assisted in presenting the awards.

The servicemen who received the awards are:

S. Sgt. Charles D. Wright, Clark H. Hale, and Robert C. Pruitt; Sgt. Ricardo Rodriguez and Victor G. Salinas; Cpl. Neptali Rivera; Lance Corporals Allen F. Bailly, Danny A. Valentine and Roy J. Williams; Pfc. George W. Wagers III, Roy C. Campbell, Rodney J. Townley, Richard Garcia, Lowell R. Gallagher, Robert D. Dochniak, Jesse Beard Jr., Terence L. Brooks, Richard A. Frazee, Clarence D. Spinks, James K. Pearson, Michael D. Hennen, Alvin Hopkins, and Stephen G. Haun; and PO 3.C. David J. Foley.

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NEW YORK TIMES 21 APRIL 1976, Pg 14

**Captain of Mayaguez Seeks
Return of Marines' Remains**

MANILA, April 20 (UPI)—he captain of the United State cargo ship Mayaguez said today that he wanted to meet with the Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister, Teng Sary, and request the return of the remains of two marines killed during the battle to recover his ship last year.

Capt. Charles Miller, told

newsmen, when the Mayaguez docked at Manila said that he was making the move on his own initiative and had not been asked to do so by relatives of the men. He also refused to disclose the names of the two marines.

Captain Miller said the two were among those killed when marines stormed an island during the battle after the Mayaguez was seized by Cambodian Communist forces.

speech is only a step behind preventing it.

we are confident that she will live up to her name.

MILWAUKEE JOURNAL 8 October 1976 (4 Nov)

Carl Bird
5 Nov 76

Was the Raid Necessary?

The Ford administration has labeled as "politics" a congressionally sponsored General Accounting Office report critical of the president's handling of the Mayaguez affair last year. Politics, unfortunately, has surrounded much of the discussion of the US rescue of the seized merchant ship and its crew from the very beginning. The administration is just as guilty.

Whether the military rescue and raid, in which 41 US servicemen were lost, was necessary to secure the release of the ship and crew from Cambodia is likely to be debated for some time. The administration says yes. The report says that the White House didn't heed the diplomatic steps that were underway,

leading to the unwritten conclusion that force probably was uncalled for. It is a fact that the crew had been released before the raid got underway. Whether the threat of force led to that release is unknown.

The administration now claims that it is being second guessed. But the White House did a great deal of political chest pounding following the incident, presumably to impress everyone with its decisive, tough attitude. Maybe Ford has some well deserved lumps coming in return.

About the only one who can take quiet satisfaction in the present state of events is Wisconsin's Sen. Nelson, who was a lonely voice for restraint at the time of the raid.

BALTIMORE SUN

27 JULY 76, Pg 2

**Mayaguez raid
toll is raised**

Washington (AP)—The Marine Corps said yesterday that it has decided that three missing members of a machine-gun team were killed in action in last year's operation to rescue the crew of the merchant ship Mayaguez from Cambodian captors.

The announcement raised the official casualty count in the Mayaguez operation to 18 killed and 50 wounded, most of them marines.

In addition, 23 men, mostly Air Force policemen, were killed in a helicopter crash while en route from a Thai base for possible use in the rescue of the 39-man crew of the merchant ship.

The three marines declared dead were:

- Lance Cpl. Gary L. Hall, son of Mr. and Mrs. Seldon Hall, Covington, Ky.

- Cpl. Joseph N. Hargrove, husband of Mrs. Edna G. Hargrove and son of Mrs. Charlotte Kornegary, both of Mt. Olive, N.C., and son of Rudolph Hargrove, also of Mt. Olive.

- Pfc. Danny G. Marshall, son of Mrs. Fay M. Marshall, Waverly, W. Va., and Eugene G. Marshall, Parkersburg, W. Va.

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