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HEADQUARTERS
 Marine Wing Headquarters Group One
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
 FPO, San Francisco, 96601

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 5750
 Ser:
 13 January 1966

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 Subj: Command Chronology; month of December 1965 (U)

Ref: (a) WgO 5750.1B

Encl: ✓(1) Command Chronology, Marine Wing Headquarters Group One
 ✓(2) Command Chronology, Marine Wing Headquarters Group One, Chaplain
 ✓(3) Command Chronology, Headquarters & Headquarters Squadron One
 ✓(4) Command Chronology, Marine Air Support Squadron Two
 ✓(5) Command Chronology, Marine Air Control Squadron Six
 ✓(6) Command Chronology, Marine Air Control Squadron Seven
 ✓(7) Command Chronology, 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion
 ✓(8) Command Chronology, 2nd Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion

*Filed
 Sep*
 MWHG-1

1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosures (1) through (8) are hereby submitted.

2. This letter is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of enclosures.

E. I. Lupton
 E. I. LUPTON

CMD CHRON

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Dec 1965

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HEADQUARTERS
Marine Wing Headquarters Group One
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO, San Francisco, 96601

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA SHEET

1. Unit Designation and Locations

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Marine Wing Headquarters Group One	DaNang, RVN
Headquarters & Headquarters Squadron One	DaNang, RVN
Marine Air Support Squadron Two	DaNang, RVN
Marine Air Control Squadron Six	Okinawa
Marine Air Control Squadron Seven	Chu Lai, RVN
1st Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion	DaNang, RVN
2nd Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion	Chu Lai, RVN

2. Period covered by this report. 1 December 1965 to 31 December 1965.

3. Task Organization. (Same as in para. 1 above.)

4. Name and Rank of Commanding Officer and Staff, MWHG-1

Commanding Officer	Colonel E. I. LUPTON
*Executive Officer	LtCol N. E. DAYVAULT
S-1/Adjutant	Capt M. L. BRANDTNER
**S-2	Capt W. F. MULLEN
S-3	LtCol C. E. SHOWALTER
S-4	Major R. H. MARCINAK

*Appointed Executive Officer as relief for LtCol B. E. COOK, 3Dec65

**Appointed S-2 Officer as relief for Capt H. R. STENNIS, 10Dec65

5. Name and Rank of Commanding Officers of Subordinate Units.

H&HS-1	Major C. A. LIDDLE
MASS-2	LtCol R. L. CUNNINGHAM
MACS-6	Major F. L. DELANEY
MACS-7	LtCol R. R. MILLER
1st LAAM Bn	LtCol C. L. EYER
2nd LAAM Bn	Major R. F. PENICO

6. Average Monthly Strength of MWHG-1 during period 1 to 31 December 1965

<u>OFFICER - USMC/USN</u>		<u>ENLISTED</u>	
<u>NA</u>	<u>AG</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
71	228	2316	62

ENCLOSURE (1)

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~~SECRET~~NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. GENERAL. During the period 1 to 31 December 1965, Marine Wing Headquarters Group One continued providing the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing support with respect to air control and air defense agencies, administration and maintenance of Wing Headquarters camp facilities. Units of MWHG-1 participated in HAWK FIREX-65 during the period 1-19 December 1965.
2. PERSONNEL. A major shift of personnel between MACS-6 and MACS-7 occurred on 8 Dec 1965, involving a total of 8 officers and ⁵⁰ enlisted men. The move was completed in one day utilizing C-130 aircraft, and direct turn-around airlifts from Chu Lai, RVN to Futema, Okinawa. Approximately 250 personnel from MWHG-1 departed Vietnam during December, constituting the largest loss of personnel the group has sustained to date. The majority of personnel returning to CONUS were from the 1st LAAM and 2nd LAAM Battalions. On 3 December 1965, LtCol N. E. DAYVAULT became the Executive Officer of MWHG-1, relieving LtCol B. E. COOK who rotated to CONUS.
3. ADMINISTRATION. Routine administration progressed throughout the month of December, with particular emphasis being directed toward more stringent use of TAD, and the updating of unit files, directives, and publications. A new Group Locator system was established and a more realistic and effective reports control system was put into effect. Preparation began for the semi-annual inventory of the Group S&G files.
4. MORALE/WELFARE. Liberty in DaNang was resumed in December. R&R continued to provide the main source of recreation for MWHG-1 personnel. December saw the opening of Saigon, Tokyo, Taipei, and Manila as additional R&R centers. Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Okinawa continued to provide the bulk of R&R quotas within the command during the reporting period.
5. CASUALTIES. On 10Dec65, Col Michael R. YUNCK, G-3, 1st MAW, was seriously wounded while directing air support operations on "Operation Harvest Moon". There were no other battle casualties during December 1965. Total number of non-battle casualties for MWHG-1 during Dec65 was 12.
6. INTELLIGENCE/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. During the month of December 1965, MWHG-1 issued 6 final top secret, 4 interim top secret, 11 final secret, and one interim secret security clearances to attached personnel.
7. AIR DEFENSE. During the month of December 1st and 2nd LAAM Battalions, conducted 119 ANTI-AIRCRAFT warfare exercises. For practice purposes designated 499 aircraft as hostile. See post exercise report on HAWK FIREX-65, concerning details of practice firing conducted during December 1965.
8. GROUND DEFENSE. No Ground Defense drills were conducted during the month of December.

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9. SPECIAL OPERATIONS. Marine Air Support Squadron Two provided Air Control Support facilities for "Operation Harvest Moon". Units of MWHG-1 participated in HAWK FIREX-65. 1st and 2nd LAAM Battalions fired a total of 42 missiles during this exercise.

10. TRAINING. Units of MWHG-1 conducted 165 hours of General Military Subject Training, of which included practical application. Fam Firing was conducted with the following:

- a. U.S. Rifle, 7.62mm, M-14
- b. Pistol, caliber .45
- c. Submachine Gun, caliber .45, M3A1
- d. Machine Gun, 7.62mm, M60
- e. 3.5" Rocket Launcher

11. NBC WARFARE. Calibration of MWHG-1 radic instruments continues.

12. LOGISTICS. In addition to routine logistics, fourteen (14) trucks, M38A1, were distributed to G sections and staff sections of 1st MAW Headquarters. Previous transportation problems have been considerably lessened since these were replacement vehicles for the M-677 Cerlist that were constantly on deadline due to spare part shortages. At the completion of HAWK FIREX-65, VC-5 and VC-3 personnel and equipment were loaded and flown to their base station. Continuous "around the clock" operations of M-36 vehicles assigned to the 1st LAAM Bn has resulted in 32 of these trucks being involuntarily deadlined. The previous reported indicated a shortage of CV-boots, since then, Fleet Logistic Support Group has prefabricated 25 sets, 19 of which have been installed. Records are being kept to determine the average life of these prefabricated canvas boots. Preliminary reports show a life of 240 to 1500 hours of operation. Since it requires four (4) man hours for the installation of one set, their reliability is at first glance doubtful. Further records will be kept during the dry season so that their reliability may be matched against the records acquired during the wet seasons. Authorization to perform third echelon engineer repair has markedly reduced the number of deadlined generators. The distribution of four (4) forklifts throughout the Wing, will save many man hours previously expended due to hand loading and unloading of equipment.

13. SPECIAL ACTIVITIES. See enclosure (2) for Morale/Religious Program. Civic Action/ISO follows:

a. CIVIC ACTION

(1) Medical team conducted seven sick calls and treated 259 Vietnamese. Treatments included worms, anemia, skin infections, diarrhea, abcess, pneumonia, bronchitis and lung infection.

(2) Dental team conducted one sick call, treated 20 Vietnamese and pulled 23 teeth.

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(3) Ninety-one bars of soap and 55 pounds of salt were distributed during the sick calls.

(4) Department of Defense Viet-Nam booklets were distributed to all unit civic action officers.

(5) Supplies for Vietnamese villagers were delivered to 1st LAAM Bn, 2nd LAAM Bn, H&HS-1, and MACS-7.

(6) The movie, "War Within a War" was shown at the MWHG-1 outdoor theater and Officers' Club to an estimated audience of 250 marines.

b. ISO

(1) An Omaha TV station interviewed one MWHG-1 Marine for a Christmas show.

(2) Five promotions were forwarded to Fleet Home Town News Center.

(3) Three articles were forwarded to Wing ISO. Subject matter included 2nd LAAM participation in HAWK FIREX-65, and a meritorious mast.

✓TAB A Post Exercise Report of Hawk Firex 65
w/3 Encls.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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HEADQUARTERS
 Marine Wing Headquarters Group One
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
 FPO San Francisco, 96601

3:CES:esh
 3700
 25 Dec 1965

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From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
 Via: (1) Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 (2) Commanding General, III MAF

Subj: Post Exercise Report of HAWK FIREX 65

Ref: (a) 1st MAW OP ORDER 306-66
 (b) MWHG-1 OP ORDER 1-66

Encl: (1) Subject report
 (2) Photographs of HAWK FIREX 65 (NOTAL)
 (3) Range Clearance Notices (Vietnamese)

1. In accordance with para 3.b.(9), of reference (a), this post exercise report is submitted.

2. In addition to the basic report the following is submitted:

- a. Exercise Name: HAWK FIREX-65 WESTPAC
- b. Location: CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam
- c. Period Conducted: 1-19 December 1965
- d. Major Troop Units Participation

MWHG-1 Overall Coordinator

1st LAAM Bn fired HAWK missiles for training

2nd LAAM Bn fired HAWK missiles for training and provided site and equipment

MACS-7 operated a TAOC

MASS-2 operated TPQ-10 radar for drone control

MAG-36 provided range sweep and drone recovery helicopters

MAG-16 provided transportation and drone recovery helicopters

Fleet Composite Squadron Five provided BQM-34A jet drones and F-8D aircraft for towing targets

ENCLOSURE (1) TAB A

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Fleet Composite Squadron Three provided MQM-39A propeller drones as targets

e. The mission of the HAWK FIREX was accomplished. Both participating LAAM Battalions fired their annual training allowances of missiles from a tactical position in a combat area.

f. Difficulties of this exercise, such as monsoon weather, war time conditions for all participants and scattered location of units, were met realistically and exceptional training was accomplished because of the enemy environment.

g. Unusual features were the large amount of missiles fired in this one FIREX, the counterinsurgency locale, the very large logistic effort involved and the successful utilization of a target towed by a manned aircraft as a HAWK target.

h. Comments and recommendations are made at the close of each major section of the basic report.

E. I. LUPTON

Distribution:

- 1 CMC
- 3 CG FMFPAC
- 1 CG III MAF
- 1 CG 1st MAW
- 1 CG 2nd MAW
- 1 CG 3rd MAW
- 1 CG 1st MARDIV
- 1 CG 3rd MARDIV
- 1 CG FMEFLANT
- 1 COMNAVWESTPAC
- 1 CG MCB 29 Palms
- 1 CO MCAS Yuma
- 1 CO VC-5
- 1 CO VC-3
- 1 MCS Quantico

POST EXERCISE REPORT OF HAWK FIREX 65

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. ORGANIZATION. Units and participation
2. PLANNING. Chronology of planning
3. OPERATIONS. Chronology of daily events, chart of results of each attempt to fire, recapitulation chart and VIP listing.
4. SUPPORTING UNITS COORDINATION. Coordination effected throughout the FIREX.
5. INTELLIGENCE. Effect of the counterinsurgency locale.
6. LOGISTICS. During FIREX operation and execution.
7. ADMINISTRATION.
8. COMMUNICATION.

Enclosure (1)

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1. ORGANIZATION

a. Enemy Viet Cong forces surrounding the FIREX area are listed in ref (a). They are not tabulated in this report. Viet Cong capabilities in the area and involvement in the FIREX are included in para (5) intelligence.

b. Friendly forces participating in FIREX 65 and a statement of their participation is listed below:

(1) The government of the Republic of Vietnam through COMUSMACV provided authority to conduct the FIREX and clearance for the firing range, both air and surface.

(2) CG III MAF provided an interpreter for the range sweep helicopter, LCM shuttle service to the island firing site, and other assistance.

(3) Fleet Composite Squadron Five (VC-5) provided BQM-34A jet drones which towed TDU-22B targets. They also towed targets with the F-8D aircraft and utilized US2C aircraft for range sanitation and logistic flights. They provided drone control equipment and helicopter drone recovery gear.

(4) Fleet Composite Squadron Three (VC-3) provided MCM-39A propeller drones and control equipment. They also augmented VC-5 with personnel and one LP2E aircraft.

(5) HAWK Improvement Team from USAMICOM Redstone Arsenal Ala. provided telemetry and BCC event recorders for monitor of firing.

c. 1st MAW units participating in FIREX 65 were tasked as shown below.

(1) MWHG-1 performed as overall coordinator of the FIREX. Units of MWHG-1 included MASS-2, MACS-7, 1st and 2nd LAAM Battalions.

(2) The TAOC established at Chu Lai by MACS-7 and the 2nd LAAM Battalion was utilized as the control center for the shoot, in accordance with existing procedures and ref (b).

(3) 1st LAAM Bn and 2nd LAAM Bn rotated batteries at the firing site and Operation Sections at the TAOC so that each firing unit was exercised and so that operational alert at all batteries was maintained.

(4) MASS-2 established and operated a TPC-10 radar at the Battery firing site for drone control operations.

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(5) MAG-36 and MAG-16 each provided helicopters for transportation, logistics, and drone recovery throughout the FIREX.

(6) VMGR-152 provided logistic and personnel lifts.

(7) 1st MAW G-3 published firing notices, Frag orders, NOTAMS and aided MWHG-1 in coordinating the FIREX.

(8) 1st MAW G-4 provided ramp space and other facilities for the support of VC-5 at DaNang and Chu Lai.

d. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) COMMENT: The organization for this FIREX was adequate.

(2) RECOMMENDATION: That the same organization be used in the next FIREX.

Enclosure (1)

1-2

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2. PLANNING

a. Commencing in August 1965, comments and recommendations were submitted to higher authority concerning a firing exercise for the LAAM Batteries of 1st MAW.

b. Detailed discussions were conducted on FIREX site locations available at that time. Due to large scale tactical air operations being conducted near LAAM Battery locations adjacent to major airfields these sites were not considered feasible.

c. During September 1965 the 2nd LAAM Bn arrived in country and assumed tactical positions in the Chu Lai enclave. One of these locations, Mui An Island, the site of "A" Battery 2nd LAAM Bn was determined the most desirable FIREX location.

d. Requests were also initiated in September to COMUSMACV to make arrangements for air and sea space and to grant authority to conduct the Annual Service Practice (ASP) at Chu Lai. Dates were established as 1-22 Dec 1965 for the FIREX.

e. Other subjects discussed in September for the FIREX included:

- (1) Visitor Control
- (2) Rotation of firing Batteries
- (3) Range Safety

f. COMNAVAIRPAC advised the use of MQM-39A (prop drones) and BQM-34A (jet drones) with towed TDU-22B targets. Each missile Battery was authorized to fire six missiles during this FIREX. Nine missiles were to be sent from Okinawa and the remaining twenty-seven from CONUS.

g. A coordination visit to Fleet Composite Squadron Five (VC-5) at Okinawa was conducted during the period 1-5 Nov by 1st MAW and MWHG-1 representatives. Preliminary planning of drone / targets available, aircraft availability for the FIREX and support required was completed with VC-5.

h. Appropriate Operation Orders were issued for the FIREX by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, MWHG-1 and Fleet Composite Squadron Five establishing operational plans for the exercise and logistical support for participating units.

i. Enclosure (3) to the basic report is a range clearance notice given to local Vietnamese fisherman in the firing area. An English translation is attached.

j. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) COMMENT: Permission to conduct the FIREX was obtained only after much logistic effort had already taken place.

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RECOMMENDATION: It is highly recommended that permission be obtained and use of air and sea space be approved before any actual movement of equipment or personnel takes place in future FIREX's.

(2) COMMENT: Weather was detrimental factor in the FIREX.

RECOMMENDATION: Although inclement weather actually postponed only one day of firing, the weather was marginal on many occasions. Operations of drones takes considerably better weather than the HAWK system requires so when planning a shoot which is to utilize drone targets it is highly recommended that a period of the year not in the monsoon season be chosen for a FIREX in Vietnam.

(3) COMMENT: The TAOC was planned and operated primarily as a range clearance facility and missile unit control center.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that a joint AAWEX and FIREX be held. This utilization of a full TAOC directed by a SAAMC could be exercised by having fighter aircraft intercept targets outside the missile effective range, break away, then have the missile destroy the target.

(4) COMMENT: Report procedures were changed during the FIREX. A special FIREX SITREP was added after commencing the shoot.

RECOMMENDATION: This special SITREP was a valid requirement and allowed higher echelons to be better informed of FIREX progress. This report is recommended for future FIREX's.

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3. OPERATIONS

a. Prior to giving the daily chronology of the shoot a recap of the planned daily schedule is presented.

At 0730H each day range sweep by US2C aircraft and loudspeaker equipped helicopter with interpreter aboard would commence. Personnel from MWHG-1, drone recovery swimmers from 1st Force Recon Co. and visitors would depart DaNang for the firing site by helicopter at 0800H. This was normally a 45 min. flight. The range was usually clear by 0900H. DP2E aircraft with BQM-34A drones and DF-8A aircraft were on station by 0945H. MQM-39A propeller drones were available at all times as required. Firing was normally scheduled to commence at 1000H and targets were utilized as scheduled by the firing Battery. Helicopters were available for recovery of drones, both MQM-39A, which were returned to the firing site, and BQM-34A, which were taken to the VC-5 area at DaNang. Upon commencement and secure of daily operations the interested control units were notified. Notices of imminent missile launches were broadcast to aircraft on guard channel. At the completion of each days firing personnel from DaNang were returned to DaNang, personnel from the firing batteries were rotated, and SITREP's submitted on the activities of that day.

b. A major landing exercise (Harvest Moon) was being conducted by the III MAF during this FIREX. This required close coordination between range control facilities and also required tight consolidation of logistic requirements because of tactical requirements for helicopters.

c. Operations commenced on 1Dec65 with tracking practice of a TDU-22B target towed by a DF-8A aircraft. UH1E and US2C aircraft commenced range clearance and communication checks in preparation for live firing on 3 Dec. This practice continued on 2 Dec.

d. Live firing began on 3Dec65. The first target was a TDU-22B towed by a BQM-34A. The first missile experienced a bad gyro stabilizer and was destructed by the battery. The second missile destroyed the target.

Another BQM-34A towed a TDU-22B and the first missile at this new target also experienced a bad gyro stabilizer and was battery destructed. Only one missile was fired at this target.

A MQM-39A drone was launched but the range became foul so no missile was launched at this target.

Another MQM-39A was launched. A missile went within lethal range but did not fuze. It was destructed by the battery.

e. No firings were conducted on 4 Dec.

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f. On 5 Dec many local fishing boats were in the range. However they were cleared of the area by the use of helicopters and assisted by the Vietnamese Navy JUNK FLEET at Chu Lai.

Three MQM-39A drones experienced difficulties and were unsuccessfully launched. The fourth drone, a BQM-34A towing a TDU-22B apparently received radio frequency interference and prematurely actuated recovery sequence and parachuted into the water.

An MQM-39A was successfully airborne at 1212H and destroyed by a missile at 1221H. The rest of the drone launches on this date were successful.

One missile missed a TDU-22B towed by a BQM-34A because of loss of radar lock and was destroyed by the battery. Two missiles successfully destroyed MQM-39A drones. One missile destroyed itself shortly after launch, one missile lost front video lock and was battery destroyed and one missile failed to leave the launcher (blowdown).

VIP's observing the shoot on 5 Dec were General Thi, CG I Corps, the Commanding Generals of each of his Corps Divisions, the Mayor of DaNang, CG III MAF, CG 1st MAW and ADC.

g. The first missile fired on 6 Dec had a bad gyro stabilizer and flew into the water. A second missile destroyed the target. The third missile fired came within 18 feet of a MQM-39A but did not fuze properly. Another missile, destroyed the target.

h. Fourteen members of the press observed the FIREX on 7 Dec 65. CG FMFPAC and party arrived at 1031H and shortly thereafter a launch attempt was made but the missile had a blowdown. One minute later a second missile was launched and destroyed an MQM-39A drone.

A F-8D aircraft was airborne towing a TDU-22B for a first attempt at shooting a target towed by a manned aircraft. However, radar difficulties delayed this shot. An MQM-39A drone was launched at 1120H to show CG FMFPAC launch and control techniques. The F-8D aircraft shot was again attempted at 1130H but the missile experienced a blowdown and did not launch. No firing was conducted on 8 Dec 65. On 9 Dec firing personnel from 1st LAAM and 2nd LAAM exchanged places and tracking practice was held.

i. On 10 Dec the first missile attempted resulted in a blowdown. The second missile lost front video lock and self destructed. The third missile had a blowdown. The fourth missile also lost front video lock and was battery destroyed. The fifth missile of the day was launched at 1434H but destructed 1/3 mile from the launcher, for an as yet undetermined cause.

j. The first missile fired on 11 Dec destroyed a MQM-39A drone. The second missile, also fired at an MQM-39A drone, lost front video lock and was destroyed by the battery. Another missile, fired at this target, experienced the same difficulty and was battery destroyed.

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k. The shoot on 12 Dec resulted in the first known shot at a target towed by a manned aircraft. Commander E. R. Murry, CO VC-5 flew an F-8D aircraft with a TDU-22B target towed on five miles of cable. "C" Battery 2nd LAAM Bn, destroyed the target with a missile. The target was presented on a course ten degrees away from a straight-in shot. The aircraft flew a programmed turn which allowed the angle of separation of target and aircraft to increase while the target still had closure rate. When the aircraft had no closure rate the missile was fired.

Another attempt at the same type target was made but the missile experienced blowdown. No firing was conducted on 13 Dec.

l. On 14 Dec firing was mostly conducted at BQM-34A jet drones that could alternately stream two TDU-22B targets. VIP's observing the shoot were Army and Air Force representatives from the 97th Arty Grp, USA, Saigon; USA Hdqts USARPAC, and Det "A" 620th TAC Sqdn.

The first missile did not fuze and was battery destructed. The next missile destroyed the first TDU-22B. The third missile did not fuze properly and was destructed. The fourth missile destroyed a TDU-22B. The fifth missile destroyed the BQM-34A because the TDU-22B was not streamed far enough behind the drone. The sixth missile of the day destroyed an MQM-39A target.

m. RADM Hartman, COMFAIRWESTPAC, observed the FIREX on 16Dec65. The first missile, fired at an MQM-39A target, detonated 21 feet from the target. Although the target was not destroyed it was declared a hit. The second missile lost lock and missed the target.

No firing was scheduled or conducted on 17 Dec. Firing was scheduled for 18 Dec but could not be performed because of inclement weather.

n. On 19Dec65, twelve combat ready missiles were fired at a variety of targets. These missiles did not have telemetry so results could not be accurately tabulated. Results, as known, are as follows. The first missile at 1220H, fired at an MQM-39A drone, intercepted and detonated at intercept but did not down the drone. Missile two and four suffered malfunctions, which were alike. They detonated 4 seconds after launch. It is suspected that the S&A devices, manufactured by PICATINNY ARSENAL, serial #9777 and #9778, lot #PA7-22, were faulty. Missile number three did not fuze and was battery destructed. The fifth missile detonated at the target, the target engine was heard to cease, and shortly thereafter it disappeared from the radar.

A F-8D aircraft streamed a TDU-22B target and the target was fired at by missile number six. The missile did not fuze but it is suspected that it hit the target for the target began spinning and the pilot reported he felt a tug on the tow cable.

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Missile seven was also fired at this same spinning TDU-22B and it destroyed the target. Missile number eight destroyed an MQM-39A. Missile nine, also fired at the F-8D/TDU-22B presentation destroyed the target. This was at 26,000 feet and at 17 kilometers.

Missile number ten veered right and missed an MQM-39A. The eleventh missile destroyed the MQM-39A by a direct hit even though there was no fuzing. The last missile of the day, number twelve destroyed an MQM-39A target with a direct hit.

o. Two charts are included in this Operation Section. The first chart depicts the results of each attempt to fire a missile. The second chart is a recapitulation of the missiles fired in order of lot number. These charts are as accurate as present statistics allow. Upon receipt of the HAWK Improvement Team telemetry reports, the results can be updated. These HIT reports should be available in 30 to 60 days after this FIREX.

p. A more detailed listing of VIP's and the dates they attended is included in this Operation section.

q. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) COMMENT: Target evaluation as a result of this FIREX suggest that a target towed by a manned aircraft is the most desirable target for well trained HAWK units. The MQM-39A propeller drone is not a suitable test of the parameter of the HAWK because of two factors. It has no beacon so must be flown within roughly 18 miles of the radar for positive control. Secondly, it is limited in speed. However the MQM-39A requires much less logistic support than the BQM-34A and it is always readily available for launch.

The BQM-34A jet drone, which tows TDU-22B targets, presents a good test for the HAWK system but the logistic effort is considerable.

The towed target/manned aircraft configuration presents both the least logistic effort and the best target presentation. However, it is imperative that HAWK units firing at this target be well trained and have well maintained equipment to assume a minimum risk for the manned aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: That manned aircraft be utilized to tow targets whenever the training of firing units is adequate. Also, that evaluation of the merits of both the MQM-39A and the BQM-34A be continued with emphasis being placed both upon the good presentation capabilities of the BQM-34A and the good request response time of the MQM-39A.

(2) COMMENT: Location of the drone presentation squadron at DaNang to support a FIREX at Chu Lai is too cumbersome.

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RECOMMENDATION: That joint location of the firing unit and the support squadron at or near the same airfield be planned for any future FIREX in the Republic of Vietnam.

(3) COMMENT: Local aircraft occasionally violated the firing range airspace even though NOTAMS were published, local units were notified of the firing schedule, the schedule was noted on the 1st MAW FRAG order and notification was continually being given on guard channel prior to missile firing.

RECOMMENDATION: That units having operational control over local aircraft make an added effort to assure that all pilots know of the danger area and the time that it is in effect.

(4) COMMENT: Training, for both of the LAAM Battalions and MACS-7 was most beneficial. Morale of participating units, although high to begin with, has materially improved as a result of this exercise. Successful completion of a FIREX of this magnitude in this locale has been a big boost not only for morale but a boost in confidence as well.

RECOMMENDATION: That training in the form of continually more difficult AAWEX's be performed during the next year to prepare for FIREX 66.

(5) COMMENT: Dual target could not be attempted.

RECOMMENDATION: That two sets of telemetry equipment be available so that double shots could be attempted in the next FIREX.

(6) COMMENT: This FIREX which exercised two HAWK batteries was large in scope and somewhat cumbersome in logistic effort.

RECOMMENDATION: The logistic effort would be even larger to conduct separate FIREX's at different times so the advantages of holding a joint FIREX of this sort outweighs the disadvantage. It is recommended that joint exercises of this nature be continued.

(7) COMMENT: Both VC-5 and VC-3 support was outstanding. Utilization by VC-5 of a manned aircraft towing a target and the excellent and timely propeller drone presentation by VC-3 were of particular excellence during the FIREX.

RECOMMENDATION: None

CHRONOLOGICAL TABULATION OF FIRING RESULTS

ATTEMPT NUMBER	DATE TIME	UNIT FIRING	TYPE TARGET	RESULTS	POSSIBLE MISS HIT		
1	3Dec 1052	A 2dLAAM	TDU-22B Towed by BQM-34A	Bad gyro stabilizer destroyed by Battery		X	
2	3Dec 1059	-do-	-do-				X
3	3Dec 1221	-do-	-do-	Bad gyro stabilizer missile went into water		X	
4	3Dec 1657	-do-	MQM-39A	Bad fusing did not detonate - destroyed by Battery - passed within 6.9 ft of target	X		
5	5Dec 1221	-do-	MQM-39A				X
6	5Dec 1411	-do-	TDU-22B towed by BQM-34A	Lost front video lock Destroyed by Battery		X	
7	5Dec 1510	B 2dLAAM	MQM-39A				X
8	5Dec 1550	-do-	MQM-39A	Bad telemetry - lost lock destroyed by Battery		X	
9	5Dec 1600	-do-	MQM-39A	Blowdown			
10	5Dec 1605	-do-	MQM-39A	Lost front video lock destroyed by Battery		X	
11	5Dec 1643	-do-	MQM-39A				X
12	5Dec 1010	-do-	MQM-39A	Bad gyro stabilizer Missile went into water		X	

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ATTEMPT NUMBER	DATE TIME	UNIT FIRING	TYPE TARGET	RESULTS	POSSIBLE MISS HIT	
13	6Dec 1031	B 2dLAAM	MQM-39A			X
14	6Dec 1421	C 2dLAAM	MQM-39A	Bad fusing - Missile did not detonate	X	
15	6Dec 1432	-do-	MQM-39A			X
16	7Dec 1035	-do-	MQM-39A	Blowdown - bad hydroulic arming system		
17	7Dec 1036	-do-	MQM-39A			X
18	7Dec 1130	-do-	TDU-22B towed by F-8D	Blowdown - bad hydraulic arming system		
19	10Dec 1125	A 4thLAAM	MQM-39A	Blowdown		
20	10Dec 1148	-do-	MQM-39A	Lost front video lock destroyed by Battery	X	
21	10Dec 1156	-do-	MQM-39A	Blowdown		
22	10Dec 1157	-do-	MQM-39A	Lost lock after launch destroyed by Battery	X	
23	10Dec 1434	-do-	MQM-39A	Missile exploded $\frac{1}{2}$ mile off launcher	X	
24	11Dec 1120	-do-	MQM-39A			X
25	11Dec 1133	-do-	MQM-39A	Lost front video lock Destroyed by Battery	X	
26	11Dec 1140	-do-	MQM-39A	Lost front video lock destroyed in water	X	

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ATTEMPT NUMBER	DATE TIME	UNIT FIRING	TYPE TARGET	RESULTS	POSSIBLE MISS HIT		
27	12Dec	C	TDU-22B 2nd LAAM followed by F-3D				X
28	12Dec 1539	-do-	-do-	Blowdown - hydraulic failure in missile			
29	14Dec 1034	C 1st LAAM	TDU-22B followed by BQM-34A	Did not fuse - destroyed by Battery		X	
30	14Dec 1044	-do-	-do-				X
31	14Dec 1056	-do-	-do-	Lost front video lock destroyed by Battery		X	
32	14Dec 1150	-do-	-do-				X
33	14Dec 1203	-do-	-do-				X
34	14Dec 1347	-do-	MQM-39A				X
35	16Dec 1047	B 1st LAAM	MQM-39A				X
36	16Dec 1059	-do-	MQM-39A	Lost front video lock destroyed by Battery		X	

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RESULTS OF COMBAT READY MISSILES FIRED ON 19DEC65

ATTEMPT NUMBER	DATE TIME	UNIT FIRING	TYPE TARGET	RESULTS	POSSIBLE MISS HITS		
1	19Dec 1220	B 1stLAAM	MQM-39A	Intercepted and missile destructed, drone did not crash.	X		
2	19Dec 1236	-do-	-do-	Missile destructed itself 4 sec after launch S&A unit bad.		X	
3	19Dec 1237	-do-	-do-	Bad fusing - passed target but did not detonate - destructed by Battery		X	
4	19Dec 1246	-do-	-do-	Missile destructed itself 4 sec after launch S&A device bad.		X	
5	19Dec	C 2ndLAAM	-do-	Intercepted target, drone engine stopped and shortly thereafter drone disappeared			X
6	19Dec 1405	-do-	TDU-22B towed by F-8D	Bad fusing, did not detonate. Pilot felt tug on tow cable & TDU-22B started rotating	X		
7	19Dec 1422	A 2dLAAM	-do-				X
8	19Dec 1440	-do-	MQM-39A				X
9	19Dec 1519	-do-	TDU-22B towed by F-8D				X
10	19Dec 1557	-do-	MQM-39A	Missile turned after launch - lost control crashed in water		X	
11	19Dec 1558	-do-	-do-	Intercepted target, drone disappeared - Lost illuminator just prior to intercept - No fusing	X		
12	19Dec 1615	-do-	-do-				X

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SECRETHAWK FIREX 65

MISSILES

BLOCK NO. TOTAL HIT MISS POSSIBLE MALFUNCTION

6-7	30	14	15*	1	GYRO STABILIZER	- 3
					BLOWDOWN	- 6 REPAIRED
					FUZING	- 3
					LOSS OF LOCK	- 9*(3 NO CONTEST DRONE TURNED)
					PREMATURE DETONATION	- 1

35	4	3		1		
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45	5	2	2	1	FUZING	- 2
					GUIDANCE	- 1

85	3		2	1	GUIDANCE	- 1
					S&A DEVICE	
					DETONATING PREMATURELY	- 2

100 & above 0

SUSPECTED CRACKED ROCKET MOTORS

TOTAL	<u>42</u>	19	19	<u>4</u>		
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DRONES

MQM-39A	17
BQM-34A	3
TDU-22B	6
TOTAL	<u>26</u>

SECRET

SECRETLIST OF VIP'S AND DATES ATTENDING FIREX

<u>DATE</u>	<u>VIP'S</u>
3 Dec 65	BGEN M. E. CARL, AWC
5 Dec 65	MGEN L. W. WALT, CG III MAF BGEN K. B. MCCUTCHEON, CG FMAW BGEN J. M. PLATT, ADC MGEN NGUYEN CHANH THI, CG I CORPS BGEN NGUYEN VAN CHUAN, CG 1ST ARVN DIV BGEN HOANG XUAN LAN, CG 2ND ARVN DIV COL THANH, C/S I CORPS LTCOL TON THAT KHIEN, C/S 1ST ARVN DIV LTCOL HONG, G-3 I CORPS LTCOL HUENG, CO 41ST TAC WING
7 DEC 65	LTGEN V. H. KRULAK, CG FMFPAC and party plus 14 members of the press
14 DEC 65	COL S. C. BUCHANAN, (USA) CO 97TH ARTY GRP and party COL P. F. HUNT, (USA) HDQTRS USARPAC FORT SHAFTER, HAWAII, and party LTCOL C. H. FAIRBURN, (USAF) DET "A" 620TH TAC Sqdn and party
15 & 16 DEC 65	RADM P. E. HARTMAN, COMFAIRWESTPAC and party

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CONFIDENTIAL**4. SUPPORTING UNITS COORDINATION**

a. Coordination planning of FIREX 65 was necessarily quite complicated because of several factors. First, this was the first FIREX conducted in the Republic of Vietnam as well as the first one conducted in the hostile environment of counterinsurgency operations. The successful completion of the FIREX without hostile incidents or large errors in coordination is considered the result of the excellent cooperation exhibited by all involved units.

b. The Republic of Vietnam was most cooperative in giving permission for the HAWK FIREX and in allowing the Marine Corps use of off-shore waters, and air space at the firing site. This coordination was effected by liaison between 1st MAF, III MAF, 2nd Air Division, CONUSMACV and the Republic of Vietnam.

c. Notices to local fishermen, notices to ships at sea and NOTAMS were published which described the firing area and the time frame of the exercise. Overall, these notices served their purpose well. Generally, the range area of sea and airspace was declared clear before firing was scheduled. On most occasions when the range was penetrated by surface vessels a range clearance helicopter with loudspeaker aboard was able to divert the vessel. On other occasions, when vessels would not divert, the delay was short enough so that the scheduled firing of the day was completed.

A combination of radar surveillance by MACS-7 at Chu Lai, MASS-2 TPQ-10 and 2nd LAAM Bn radar at the firing site, cross-tell plots from 2nd Air Division. CRC Panama, as well as visual observance from the firing site was sufficient to adequately survey the range area.

d. Coordination difficulties were experienced between participants because of their varied locations. These difficulties consisted primarily of time delays in passing schedule changes to units at DaNang from Chu Lai. However the versatility of VC-5 and VC-3 in having a variety of ~~tags~~ readily available was most instrumental in keeping the FIREX on schedule. Communications, with rare exception worked quite well between the TAOC, drone control, the aircraft, and the firing site.

e. Logistic coordination was necessarily difficult because of field conditions and separation of participants. However, arrangements were worked out which satisfactorily provided sufficient operating ramp space for aircraft, billeting and messing, ground handling equipment, and communications. A great deal of the success of the logistic effort during the actual FIREX is due to participating units, external to 1stMAW, adapting readily to conditions considerably less desirable than normal.

f. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) COMMENT: Coordination within local aircraft groups could have been more detailed.

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RECOMMENDATIONS: More detailed briefings should be given to aircraft units operating in the local area to assure they honor the airspace. Also, more detailed briefings should be given the drone recovery helicopters. This shortcoming was brought about by communication difficulties between DaNang and Chu Lai and to much reliance on Frag orders to pass the word.

(2) COMMENT: Visual observation at the firing site was of greater importance than anticipated because of the close proximity of Chu Lai airstrip. They will be increased for the next FIREX.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

(3) COMMENT: The success of the coordination effort can be evaluated as the result of the excellent cooperation shown between all units participating in this FIREX.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

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SECRET**5. INTELLIGENCE**

a. Location of possible enemy units are not listed in this report. At the start of the FIREX the last known location of enemy units was plotted. They were listed in ref. (a). However, because the enemy can and does move, the information was of questionable nature. It was assumed the enemy could harass the FIREX site by sniper fire, small arms raids, or by infiltration.

It was also known that Soviet AGI (Intelligence Collector) ships operated in WESTPAC and could possibly observe, interfere, or monitor the FIREX.

b. It was necessary to publish a notice of the danger area to local fishermen at the firing site. It can be assumed that the enemy, therefore, knew of the FIREX. However, there were no incidents during the exercise. The local fishermen cooperated in keeping the range clear. There was no known ECM interference or monitoring by the enemy. The immediate location of the firing site, Mui-An-Hoa island, is rather heavily populated by Vietnamese. The continued friendly relations between these people and the Marines on the island was responsible for the lack of incidents.

CONFIDENTIAL**6. LOGISTICS**

a. Logistic requirements for a FIREX of this size are considerable. The effort can be divided into two phases; preparation and execution.

b. During the preparation phase equipment and units were positioned at their various locations. Nine of the FIREX missiles were shipped to DaNang by LST from Okinawa. The remaining twenty-seven were transported to Chu Lai by the USS Catamount which arrived on 3 Dec 1965.

VC-3 arrived at DaNang by two C-118 aircraft from NAS North Island, California and was transported to Chu Lai by Marine C-130.

VC-5 flew their own aircraft to DaNang where they established a base camp. Two C-130 from Naha and one C-124 from ATSUGI flew personnel and equipment to DaNang.

c. During the execution phase VC-5 was supported at DaNang by various units. 1st LAAM Bn provided billeting, messing, and transportation. Officers of VC-5 were billeted in the Wing Headquarters Compound. Temporary storage, maintenance and operational facilities were erected by MWHG-1 on a newly constructed taxi strip at the north end of the DaNang airstrip. Refueling and towing services was provided by MAG-11 which also furnished a missile repair shop. Communications were established at this site by MWHG-1. Wrecker and fork lift service was provided as required. Billeting and messing facilities were provided by 2nd LAAM Bn at the firing site for VC-3 and the HIT team. MASS-2 installed a AN/TPQ-10 radar at the firing site and furnished their own billeting. They were furnished messing facilities by 2nd LAAM Bn.

d. Logistic support of the firing site required a means of water transportation. On occasion, the available LCM boats had to be utilized for higher priority tasks which degraded the support effort.

e. During the FIREX, VC-5 performed many logistics lifts of equipment and personnel. They utilized every opportunity to furnish transportation to support the FIREX.

f. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) COMMENT: The logistic effort was handicapped because of the short lead time.

RECOMMENDATION: The previous recommendation that suggested an earlier time frame for allocation of air and sea space for the FIREX should solve this problem.

(2) COMMENT: Missiles for the FIREX arrived late.

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RECOMMENDATION: Missiles for any future FIREX should be ~~pro~~positioned long enough ahead of the exercise to allow adequate time for check-out.

(3) COMMENT: Need for water transportation to resupply the firing site was a detrimental factor.

RECOMMENDATION: That during any future FIREX at this particular site more LCM vehicles be made available for support.

7. ADMINISTRATION

a. There were no unusual administration problems during FIREX 65. Units performed their own administration. MWHG-1 furnished safe storage of classified traffic for VC-5 throughout the exercises.

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Enclosure (1)

SECRET**8. COMMUNICATIONS**

a. Communications was one of the problem areas during the planning phase but it worked well during the operation. In general, the communications as established were normal to a TAOC environment. The TAOC was located at a distance from the firing site, which is normal, and it functioned as designed. UHF communications were established between the drone launch and range sweep aircraft, the TAOC and a VC-5 drone control VAN. This was all on one net. It worked well because the general schedule of events allowed usage for a sequence of events so that seldom did the net become too crowded.

In general, the communications nets peculiar to the HAWK FIREX worked better than the existing wire and radio nets between in-country units. Many times the nets from Chu Lai to DaNang were too poor for use. This did not materially delay the shoot but made administration traffic difficult.

b. There was, at one time, difficulty with drone beacon frequencies. The frequency used by VC-5 in the BQM-34A beacon was cleared and allocated by COMUSAMCV for use by VC-5 and 1st MAW. This frequency was found to interfere with some similar equipment operated by the U.S. Air Force in Vietnam. Although the frequency had not been cleared for use by the Air Force the FIREX participants cooperated by coordinating usage time with the Air Force and ultimately changed frequencies so there would be no interference.

c. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) COMMENT: Administrative nets were not as reliable as operational nets.

RECOMMENDATION: The previous recommendation that participants operate from the same airfield enclave should solve this problem

(2) COMMENT: Drone Control Interference.

RECOMMENDATION: The interference problem was solved this time by cooperation between the users during the FIREX. It is recommended that this interference problem be researched more thoroughly next time and that U.S. Air Force honor frequency assignments given to FIREX participants. ~~These assignments should be made available to the participants in advance of the exercise.~~

(3) COMMENT: Ship to shore frequencies were not listed in the communication plan.

RECOMMENDATION: That the international distress frequency of 500 KC, MSTS Common frequency of 4150 KC, and the Navy Harbor Common frequency of 2716 KC be included in the communication plan for use in range clearance.

OFFICE OF THE CHAPLAIN
MARINE WING HEADQUARTERS GROUP 1
FIRST MAW, III MAF
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

12 January 1966

From: MWHG-1 Chaplain

To: S-3 Officer

Subj: Command Chronology for December

Ref: Group Order 5750.1

1. Morale and Religious Programs

a. Roman Catholic. Two Masses on Sunday at 0800 and 1730. Mass is also held on the first Friday of each month at 1730. Catholic Coverage at this time is provided by Chaplain Dillon (MAG-11) and Chaplain McGuire (Div.) because MWHG-1 does not now have a Catholic Chaplain. During the month of December a Special Mass was celebrated by Cardinal Spellman. Transportation was arranged for those who desired to attend this mass.

b. Protestant. Two Sunday Services are provided for those of the Protestant faith. These are at 0930 and 1930 in the Marine Chapel. The 0930 Service is conducted by the III MAF Chaplain and the Wing Chaplain. The 1930 Service is conducted by the MWHG-1 Chaplain. In addition to these services, the MWHG-1 Chaplain conducts Sunday Services at 1st LAAM at 1015 and at "C" Battery on Hill 327 at 1300. A Bible Study Class is also held on Wednesday at 1900.

c. Jewish. Service is held for the Jewish personnel on Friday at 1930 and on Saturday at 0830. These Services are under the direction of the Division Jewish Chaplain.

d. Special Services.

1) Christmas Services. Several Special Worship Services were held in the MWHG-1 area during the Christmas Season. On Christmas Eve Rear Admiral James Kelly, CHC, USN held a Special Service in Marine Chapel. Other Services were: Catholic, Episcopal, Protestant Communion, all at Marine Chapel. Mass and Protestant Worship were also conducted at 1st LAAMS. On Christmas Day Mass and Protestant Worship were held at both Marine Chapel and 1st LAAMS.

2) Hanukkah Services. Six of the eight Hanukkah Services were conducted at Marine Chapel.

3) RLDS Services are held on Sunday at 1300, Episcopal Services at 1600 and on the 1st Sunday of each month Lutheran Communion is observed in Marine Chapel.

ENCLOSURE (2)

OFF CHAP MWHG-1

CMO CHRON

DEC 1965

e. Films. During December two Religious films were shown to "C" Battery on Hill 327.

2. Civil Affairs and Welfare Activities.

a. Attended a Luncheon at the Evangelical Protestant Church of Hai Chau.


b. Delivered three loads of scrap wood and soap to the Sacred Heart Orphanage.

c. Accompanied the Commanding Officer of MASS-2 as he delivered a gift of 17,700 Piasters to the Evangelical Protestant Church of Hai Chau.

d. Delivered a load of scrap wood and soap to the Worldwide Evangelization Crusade Orphanage.

e. Made an official visit to the Christian and Missionary Alliance Compound.

Very respectfully,



Gerald T. Richards
LTJG, CHC, USNR

ENCLOSURE (2)