

MARINE COMPOSITE RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON 1 (-)
 Marine Aircraft Group 11, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Adv)
 FPO, San Francisco, 96601

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MAG-11 S&C

No 1342-65

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 8 September 1965
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From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group One One

Subj: Command Chronology for the month of August 1965, submission of

Ref: (a) WGO 5750.1
 (b) CMC ltr Ser 002E961 of 20 Feb 61
 (c) VM CJ-1 (-) ltr 80:CWT:rlh Ser 008A23865 of 26 Aug 65

Encl: (1) Resume of Flight Operations

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following comments are submitted:

a. Operations & Training.

1. During this reporting period VM CJ-1 EF-10B aircraft conducted electronic counter measures against fire control radars in the Vinh, Than Hoa and Nam Dinh areas in North Viet Nam in support of seventeen 2nd Air Division and fifteen 7th Fleet "Rolling Thunder" strikes, with three additional missions having been conducted in support of 2nd Air Division strikes ("Left Hook") on SA-2 missile sites on the 9th, 11th and 31st of August. The strikes on the 9th and the 11th were unsuccessful due to the sites having been vacated during the interim between site location (by a combination of tactical ELINT and photo reconnaissance) and strike execution. VM CJ-1 participation on these two missions involved a passive/active ECM role consisting of missile radar detection, strike aircraft warning and then electronic jamming of the emitter. The SA-2 site strike on the 31st was considered a success from an Electronics Warfare point of view in that the site was located purely by tactical ELINT (the missile radar having been stimulated into emitting by other reconnaissance and tactical aircraft penetrating the general area) with the strike force having been launched within a short subsequent time interval (in this case about 2 hours). The missile site was visually located by the strike force but only one strafing run was accomplished. VM CJ-1 participation on this mission was limited to launching on the strike phase from a ground alert status and conducting electronic jamming against the missile radar under attack.

2. In addition to the above missions, twenty-three tactical ELINT missions ("IRON HAND") in North Viet Nam were conducted in support of 2nd Air Division, the majority of which were for collection and location of SA missile associated radar emissions.

ENCLOSURE 42

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VM CJ-1

CMD CHRON

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3. VMJ-1 RF-8A aircraft flew twenty-three in-country photo reconnaissance missions during the reporting period in support of III MAF, photographing areas in the vicinity of Van Thuong, Chu Lai, Quang Tri, Hue and Danang. Statistics on VMJ-1 Yankee Team Detachment are not available at this time, however its activities have been the subject of a special quarterly report to CG, 1st MAF.

4. Flak was encountered by the EF-10B aircraft on four missions but no damage was sustained. No ground fire was noted by the RF-8A aircraft.

5. A breakdown of sorties and hours by type mission for both the EF-10B and RF-8A aircraft is contained in enclosure (1).

6. Additional and more technical comments regarding Electronic Warfare are submitted to CMC via CG, 1st MAF and CG, FMFPAC on a quarterly basis in accordance with reference (b), the most recent report being contained in reference (c).

b. Combat Readiness. Combat readiness was affected to a moderate degree by the crash of an RF-8A aircraft shortly after take-off on 22 August. The aircraft was destroyed but the pilot ejected successfully. Combat readiness in all other areas remains high.

c. Personnel and Administration.

1. The average daily strength of VMJ-1 (-) during this reporting period was 20 officers and 114 enlisted.

2. Overall Squadron Manning Levels are:

- a. NA - 62%
- b. AEO - 81%
- c. AGO - 50%
- d. SNCO - 100%
- e. Enl - 106%

d. Logistics. Initial status notification on priority requisitions (AOCP & ANFE) habitually takes four to six days for both EF-10B and RF-8A aircraft parts. However, current aircraft availability remains acceptable, 80% for the EF-10B and 75% for the RF-8A.


O. W. CORMAN

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A. IN-COUNTRY

1. PASSIVE EW

1 1.0

2. IN SUPPORT OF 1ST MAW/III MAF

a. EF-10B

0 0.0

b. RF-8A

32 58.2

3. OTHER (CROSS-COUNTRY, TEST, FAM)

a. EF-10B

9 16.0

b. RF-8A

6 11.7

B. OUT-OF-COUNTRY

1. ACTIVE EW

a. IN SUPPORT OF 2ND AIR DIVISION

50 125.2

(VNAF)

3 6.0

b. IN SUPPORT OF 7TH FLEET

48 109.8

2. PASSIVE EW

a. IN SUPPORT OF 2ND AIR DIVISION

50 121.5

b. IN SUPPORT OF 7TH FLEET

0 0.0

MONTHLY TOTALS

196 443.4

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