

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

DEVELOPMENT CENTER
MARINE CORPS DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION COMMAND
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

MEMORANDUM for

11/18
*Maj Gen Davis**Ray:*

*This may turn out
to be a noose but I must
give it a go.*

*I believe we are in
at least general agreement on
this subject and I would welcome
any change or comments you
might have.*

*If you would prefer de-
letion of the reference to you I
will do so, although I think
the point is of great signif-
icance*

ed

SECRET ATTACHED



DEPUTY FOR EDUCATION
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134

19 Nov

1969

MEMORANDUM for Myrtle Armstrong

Al:
I concur with your sentiments
and views.

Only suggestion: pg 5 --
I would hesitate to accuse AO3H
since they might well have "guidance"
-- and would no doubt react adversely
in any event -- delete first 5
lines?

Ray

HISTORICAL DIVISION ROUTING SHEET

Rtg	Opr Code		In	Out
3	G	Dir, MarCor Hist & Museums		
2	G	Dep for Hist	<i>HK</i>	<i>28 Sep 59</i>
1	G	Hist Sec	<i>HK</i>	<i>9/26</i>
	X	Oral Hist		
		Curr Hist		
		Gen Hist		
		Ref Sec		
		Sp Archivist		
		Ref Unit		
		Library		
		Documentation		
		Unit Hist		
		Admin Sec		
		Dep for Mus		
		MarCor Art Sec		

Remarks: Attached are classified papers of historical significance and importance given to me by Gen Armstrong during our first interview session yesterday. These are ours to keep. It is requested that guidance be provided regarding declassification/downgrading of these documents and their final disposition.

VRspy,



ASSISTANT WING COMMANDER
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602

file

Danmy
19 Dec 69

Dear Al,

Read your letter to Ray with much interest — also your response to the air/ground crew letter. Yes I'm a little tired of the act myself but I think the communications & feedback improve daily — and they will continue to do so as long as we give proper visibility to our professional performance.

As you may know I spent the first six months out here as a Super-delay air officer with the 3rd MAR DIV. Bill Jones and Regan Fuller were great. I was —

II

referred to many times out of the fire base as the Asst Division Commander. I was able to check out every mission and run down each story & rumor. This was followed up by liaison teams going to everyone concerned (including the riflemen and the snuffly hooking-up boys in the LSA)

Things were not good. Many troops didn't not only didn't admire aviation they had absolutely no faith we would be on hand at the time they needed us.

There were two major problems: Supervision & human relations. The lieutenants & corporals in the FSCC, the TABC, the DASC, and in the OV-10s were running the war. They didn't tell anybody why planes were

III

late or didn't show. So everyone
 got ~~mad~~ mad, there was finger-
 pointing, blame and the air/ground
 team was in shambles!

Well, for what its worth I'm enclosing
 my report submitted as the 3rd MARDIV
 was packing out. You might check the
 Division endorsement plus paragraph 14 of my
 basic report. Not stated in the report
 was the fact that I fired half the NAs
 who interfaced in any manner with the
 Division. a disgruntled officer in a lousy
 salesman.

I'm now with the 1st MARDIV and
 things are better here. Better mostly
 because Orin Simpson was a Wing

IV

booster, not because everyone understood aviation and loved us. Much missionary work to do here - plus some transfers.

Ed Wheeler now has the Duroy - . We worked closely together up north because I also handled air support for the entire XXIV Corps. Ed is great!

So, with Day's "can-do" attitude everything ^{a more} gets to Durnin or the butty - - or the PFC waiting for water is TOLD WHY.

Day is terrific. He never questions my flying. In fact I'm probably the first AWC to caution the CC on flying such dangerous missions. He even takes classified over! I'd hate to see him do another "stretch" up north!

Incidentally when CMC was out here last summer he said some nice things about you and your work - and he

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said them at the III MAF conference for
one and all to hear. I was pleased.

In re-reading your response to
the Green Letter it occurs to me that
we agree on the air/grd subject -
or enough said. Toss the
enclosures in the burn-bag when
they have served their purpose

More withdrawal planning while
900 trucks per day move on the Hockimish
Trail. It feels lonely out here and
I don't like the feeling!

Hope all goes well with you, Al.
Please write if I can do anything for
you out here.

R+R next month!!

Best
Smoke



19 January 1970

Major General Allan J. Armstrong, USMC
Director, Development Center
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134

Dear Al:

First, let me apologize for not writing to you before this time; however, the war and the air/ground team has kept me pretty busy.

I am enclosing a copy of the briefing that I gave to the Commandant. Much of it is old hat to you but I tried to express some of my views concerning our air/ground team. I hope that they will not be contrary to anything that you are doing and perhaps maybe helpful.

I believe that we have made some significant progress and I am only sorry that I was not here a year ago.

There are a few people that will say that I have given away the store; however, I do not believe that I have. Actually, what I have tried to do is bring the ground closer to the picture and it has had a remarkable effect.

My philosophy has been that if the ground wanted to try something and it was humanly possible, we would launch. By now the partners in the crime have found a much greater reluctance to try to commit us to questionable missions. Prior to my time, it appeared that the reluctance to commit helicopters was often blamed on aviation when, in fact, some of the things suggested

19 January 1970

were impracticable from both an aviation and ground standpoint. By putting them square in the middle, I find that we have no problems at all.

I had nothing but the best of cooperation from both Bill Jones and Orme Simpson and Ed Wheeler is also very easy to work with. I am just sorry that I did not have an opportunity to do some of the things with Bill and Orme I am now doing with Ed Wheeler. We are well underway toward accomplishing the things I mentioned in the briefing.

If the briefing generates any questions in your mind, please don't hesitate to drop me a line and I will try to explain further. In the mean time, take good care of yourself and best of luck on the spring scramble. General Chapman was here but didn't mention the assignment of anyone this spring. If you hear any good rumors, please let me know as information seems to get out here last.

Sincerely,



W. G. THRASH

Major General W. G. THRASH, USMC
Commanding General
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING BRIEFING

FOR

GENERAL L. F. CHAPMAN JR., USMC
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

10 JANUARY 1970

CHART 1

ENTIRE
BRIEFING
RE-CLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

1 FEB 1973
16m [unclear]
Col USMC

INTRODUCTION:

GENERAL CHAPMAN, GENERAL NICKERSON, GENTLEMEN, WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED THE FIRST HALF OF FISCAL YEAR 1970, AND ARE EMBARKING ON THE SECOND HALF, THEREFORE THE BRIEFING THIS MORNING WAS DEVELOPED TO ACCOMPLISH THREE THINGS.

FIRST, TO REVIEW OUR TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS FOR THE FIRST HALF OF FY-70.

SECOND, BASED UPON OUR EXPERIENCE IN THE FIRST HALF, TO SET FORTH THE MAJOR PROGRAMS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF OUR TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS DURING THE SECOND HALF.

THIRD, TO OUTLINE THE FIRST WING REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING FOR PHASE III, BASED UPON THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

CHART 2

FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS FOR THE FIRST HALF OF FY-70

THE FIVE PRINCIPAL AREAS OF OUR TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS THAT WILL BE COVERED ARE SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE.

IT IS BELIEVED THAT THEY WILL PROVIDE AN OVERALL APPRECIATION OF THE MAGNITUDE OF OUR OPERATIONS AND A COMPOSITE PICTURE OF WHAT WE HAVE DONE.

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TOP SECRET

AT THE SAME TIME THEY WILL SERVE TO ILLUSTRATE THE PROPORTINATE EFFORT OR BALANCE MAINTAINED BETWEEN OUR VARIOUS IN-COUNTRY AND OUT-OF-COUNTRY COMMITMENTS.

CHART 3

FIGHTER/ATTACK SUPPORT

THIS SLIDE SHOWS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF FIXED WING FIGHTER/ATTACK AND RELATED SORTIES FLOWN BY THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING DURING THE FIRST HALF OF FY-70.

THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SORTIES FLOWN WAS 25,903, OF WHICH 19,482 WERE FLOWN IN-COUNTRY, AND 6,421 WERE FLOWN OUT-OF-COUNTRY.

A BREAKDOWN OF THIS SHOWS THAT 75% OF THE SORTIES WERE FLOWN IN-COUNTRY AND 25% OUT-OF-COUNTRY.

UNDER THE SINGLE MANAGER CONCEPT THE 7TH AIR FORCE FLIES 55% OF THEIR SORTIES OUT-OF-COUNTRY AND 45% IN-COUNTRY. THROUGH PERSONAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THEM WE NORMALLY PROVIDE 25 TO 35 SORTIES PER DAY FOR THEIR OUT-OF-COUNTRY OPERATIONS. WE CAN INCREASE OR DECREASE THIS NUMBER DEPENDING UPON CONDITIONS IN I CORPS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF TARGETS IN THE STEEL TIGER AREA.

FOR PROGRAMMING PURPOSES WE USE A 1.0 SORTIE RATE FOR ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT.

THIS ROUGHLY EQUATES TO 100% CNO UTILIZATION, AND AFFORDS US THE CAPABILITY TO SURGE TO 1.4 OR 1.5 IN CASE OF AN EMERGENCY.

WE NORMALLY PROVIDE BETWEEN 75 TO 100 BARCAP SORTIES TO CTF-77 EACH MONTH. THROUGH AN AGREEMENT WITH VICE ADMIRAL WEISNER WE CAN ADJUST THIS FIGURE AS THE SITUATION REQUIRES.

THIS MISSION MAINTAINS OUR AIR TO AIR PROFICIENCY AS WELL AS COORDINATION WITH CARRIER TASK FORCE OPERATIONS.

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IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO THE NAVY, HAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED OUR OTHER OPERATIONS, AND HAS THE SIDE BENEFIT OF MAINTAINING CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH THE FLEET.

OUR VMJ SQUADRON PERFORMS THE MAJORITY OF ITS MISSIONS OUT-OF-COUNTRY OR IN THE DMZ.

THEIR MISSIONS ARE FRAGGED PRINCIPALLY BY III MAF AND THE 7TH AIR FORCE. THEY PROVIDE PHOTO AND IR COVERAGE IN-COUNTRY, OUT-OF-COUNTRY, AND THE DMZ.

THE ESM OPERATIONS SUPPORT B-52 STRIKES, DRONE OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM, CTF-77 OPERATIONS, AND NAVY AND AIR FORCE OPERATIONS IN THE STEEL TIGER AREA NORTH.

OUR TANKER MISSIONS ARE FLOWN WITH THE KC-130 IN SUPPORT OF OUR IN-COUNTRY AND OUT-OF-COUNTRY OPERATIONS.

ALL OF THE OUT-OF-COUNTRY FIGHTER/ATTACK MISSIONS ARE FLOWN IN THE STEEL TIGER NORTH AND SOUTH AREAS IN SUPPORT OF 7TH AIR FORCE OPERATIONS.

THESE OPERATIONS INCLUDE ALL TYPES OF INTERDICTION MISSIONS AS WELL AS FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER OPERATIONS.

CHART 4

FIGHTER/ATTACK SUPPORT IN-COUNTRY

THIS SLIDE SHOWS THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE 19,482 IN-COUNTRY SORTIES, FLOWN DURING THE FIRST HALF OF FY-70.

THE FIGURES SHOW THE SUPPORT TO THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION UNTIL ITS DEPARTURE IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER.

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THE FIGURES SHOWN FOR THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION ARE THE SORTIES FLOWN FOR FY-70 INCLUDING THOSE PROVIDED TO THE UNITS THAT TOOK OVER THE AREA VACATED BY THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION.

SINCE ALL OF THIS AREA WAS UNDER THE COGNIZANCE OF XXIV CORPS, WE HAVE COMBINED THE TOTALS OF THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION AND THE 101ST AIRBORNE TO ILLUSTRATE THE WEIGHT OF OUR EFFORT.

THE 7,500 SORTIES FLOWN IN THE XXIV CORPS AREA DURING FY-70 CONSTITUTES 39% OF THE TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN IN I CORPS.

THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION RECEIVED 30% OF THE TOTAL, AND THE AMERICAL DIVISION RECEIVED 24%.

THE REMAINING 6% WAS FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE ARVN AND ROKMC.

APPROXIMATELY 22% OF ALL SORTIES FLOWN WERE ASRT OR BEACON DROPS.

I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FULFILL THE AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENT OF ALL OF THE MAJOR COMMANDS SUPPORTED AND REDUCE OUR SORTIE RATE TO AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL.

CHART 5

FIRST MAW FIXED WING SORTIE DISTRIBUTION

THIS SLIDE SHOWS AN AVERAGE DAY OF OUR FIXED WING SORTIE DISTRIBUTION. IT OCCURRED SEVERAL DAYS AGO AND PROVIDED THE WING A 1.09 SORTIE RATE WITH 190 SORTIES FLOWN.

IT WILL JUST GIVE YOU A MENTAL PICTURE OF WHAT WE DO ON DAY-TO-DAY BASIS. OUR TPQ AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT WERE ALL FLOWN IN-COUNTRY WITH THE DISTRIBUTION AS SHOWN.

THE STEEL TIGER MISSIONS WERE ALL FLOWN IN LAOS.

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WE HAD 9 BEACON HOPS, 6 FOR THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION AND 3 FOR THE AMERICAL.

THE AMTI, FLOWN WITH THE A6A ARE FLOWN OUT-OF-COUNTRY IN LAOS AGAINST TRUCK TRAFFIC CLOSE TO THE BAN KARAI AND MUGIA PASSES.

WE FLEW 6 OUT-OF-COUNTRY TACTICAL AIR COORDINATOR MISSIONS WITH THE TA4F.

WE NORMALLY FLY 8 TO 10 OV-10A IN-COUNTRY OBSERVATION MISSIONS, HOWEVER ON THIS PARTICULAR DAY WE HAD ONLY ONE.

WE ALSO HAD 7 ECM MISSIONS OUT-OF-COUNTRY, AND 4 PHOTO MISSIONS.

THE TOTAL DISTRIBUTION IS AS SHOWN AT THE BOTTOM OF THE CHART.

ON THIS PARTICULAR DAY APPROXIMATELY 64% OF THE MISSIONS WERE FLOWN IN-COUNTRY AND 36% OUT-OF-COUNTRY.

CHART 6

FIRST MAW FIXED WING SORTIE RATE AND UTILIZATION

STARTING IN JULY WE BEGAN A CONCERTED EFFORT TO GRADUALLY REDUCE OUR SORTIE RATE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME FULFILL ALL AIR REQUIREMENTS OF THE MAJOR COMMANDS BEING SUPPORTED.

BY CAREFUL PROGRAMMING AND ELIMINATION OF NON-ESSENTIAL MISSIONS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN AN AVERAGE SORTIE RATE OF .946 FOR THE FIRST HALF OF FY-70. AT THE SAME TIME THIS REDUCTION HAS GIVEN US AN AVERAGE CNO UTILIZATION RATE OF 99% FOR THE SAME PERIOD.

THE NET RESULT HAS BEEN A MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN MAINTENANCE AS WELL AS FLIGHT SAFETY.

THE SHARP DIPS AND RISES ON THE SLIDE NORMALLY INDICATE PERIODS OF EXTREMELY POOR WEATHER FOLLOWED BY GOOD WEATHER AND A MARKED INCREASE IN

TOP SECRET

GROUND OPERATIONS AND CONTACTS WITH THE ENEMY.

WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED A CHANGE IN THE ONE MONTHLY UTILIZATION RATES FOR BOTH FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT.

IT SHARPLY REDUCED THE HOURS ON THE F4, A6, AND A4.

IN THE HELICOPTERS THE CH-53 INCREASED FROM 31.5 TO 50 HOURS PER MONTH, AND THE CH-46 INCREASED FROM 48.5 TO 60 HOURS PER MONTH.

THESE CHANGES WILL NECESSITATE SOME CHANGES IN OUR SCHEDULING TO BRING OUR PROGRAM INTO BALANCE, BUT WE DO NOT FORSEE ANY PROBLEMS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WILL TAKE A COUPLE OF MONTHS TO MAKE THE ADJUSTMENT.

THE OLD RATES WERE USED ON THIS SLIDE FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES.

CHART 7

HELICOPTER SUPPORT

AS NOTED ON THIS SLIDE, THE FIRST MAW HELICOPTERS FLEW 66,498 HOURS DURING THE FIRST HALF OF FY-70.

OF THIS AMOUNT 44,969 HOURS WERE FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE FIRST AND THIRD MARINE DIVISIONS.

IN EQUATING THIS TO THE TOTAL TIME FLOWN IT SHOWS THAT ONLY 68% OF THE TOTAL HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME WAS FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE DIVISIONS.

THE REMAINDER OF THE TIME WAS FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS. 13% WAS REQUIRED FOR SUPPORT OF III MAF COMMITMENTS, AND 6% WAS FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE ROKMC. 10% WAS REQUIRED BY THE FIRST WING FOR TEST FLIGHTS, AVIATION SUPPORT MISSIONS, AND TRAINING. THE REMAINING 3% WAS FLOWN PRIMARILY IN SUPPORT OF THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP.

TOP SECRET

I MENTION THIS ONLY TO ILLUSTRATE THE REQUIREMENTS THAT WE BELIEVE WILL EXIST IN ANY FUTURE COMBAT OPERATION AND THINGS WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINATION OF HELICOPTER REQUIREMENTS BY TYPE AS WELL AS THE BASIC STRUCTURE.

CHART 8

FIRST MAW HELO FLIGHT HOURS EXPENDITURES

THIS SLIDE SHOWS THE HELICOPTER FLIGHT HOUR EXPENDITURES FOR THE MONTH OF DECEMBER.

IT IS APPROXIMATELY 1000 HOURS BELOW THAT WHICH WE NORMALLY FLY, HOWEVER THE WEATHER IN DECEMBER WAS EXTREMELY POOR DUE TO THE MONSOON SEASON.

IT SHOWS A DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL EFFORT AS WELL AS THE AMOUNT OF TIME DEVOTED TO THE PRINCIPAL TYPES OF MISSIONS.

FIRST, IN THE FAR RIGHT HAND COLUMN, YOU CAN SEE THAT THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION RECEIVED 65% OF THE TOTAL TIME, THE ROKMC 10%, III MAF 12%, FIRST MAW 11%, AND OTHERS INCLUDING THE ARMY AND ARVN 2%.

THESE PERCENTAGES HAVE BEEN FAIRLY CONSTANT THROUGHOUT THE FIRST HALF OF THIS FISCAL YEAR AND WERE MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY.

ON THE BOTTOM LINE OF THE SLIDE ARE THE PERCENTAGES OF THE TOTAL TIME THAT WERE DEVOTED TO THE PRINCIPAL TYPES OF MISSIONS PERFORMED.

IN THE TROOP AND CARGO MISSION WE NORMALLY EXPEND 27% TO 30% OF OUR EFFORT, AND IT HAS BEEN FAIRLY CONSTANT.

THE RECONNAISSANCE INSERT/EXTRACT AND MED EVAC MISSIONS USUALLY AVERAGE ABOUT 10%.

THE ARMED HELO MISSIONS ARE USED TO SUPPORT ALL OF THE OTHER TYPES OF MISSIONS WHEN REQUIRED, AND USUALLY RUN ABOUT 30%. DURING DECEMBER THIS WAS

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DOWN TO 26%.

MUCH OF OUR PROBLEM DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THIS FISCAL YEAR CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE FACT THAT WE HAVE BEEN GUNSHIP LIMITED.

IF YOU ARE RUNNING 8 TO 10 MISSIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY AND THEY ALL REQUIRE GUNSHIP SUPPORT, YOU SIMPLY RUN OUT AND SOME OF THE MISSIONS MUST BE DELAYED UNTIL GUNSHIP SUPPORT CAN BE PROVIDED.

SOME OF OUR UH-1E GUNSHIPS HAD TO BE CONVERTED TO SLICKS TO FULFILL THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND COMMAND AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS.

IT CREATES A NIGHTMARE IN SCHEDULING AND HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF FRUSTRATION TO THE DIVISIONS.

A CHANGING TACTICAL SITUATION ON THE GROUND CAN ALSO SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THESE REQUIREMENTS OVERNIGHT.

IT IS MOST DIFFICULT TO FIND A SOLID BASE ON WHICH TO DETERMINE THE OVERALL GUNSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS CONFLICT AS WELL AS FUTURE COMBAT OPERATIONS.

A MAJOR AREA OF CONCERN, AND ONE IN WHICH WE ARE SEEKING THE ANSWER, IS THE REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND MISCELLANEOUS MISSIONS.

AS NOTED ON THE CHART THIS REQUIRED 37% OF OUR TOTAL FLIGHT TIME DURING DECEMBER. IT NORMALLY REQUIRES BETWEEN 30% TO 35%

IN THIS CONFLICT IT SEEMS THAT VERY FEW PEOPLE MOVE BY JEEP OR AUTOMOBILE AND ONLY BULK SUPPLIES AND MATERIAL BY TRUCK.

COMMAND AND CONTROL INCLUDES ROUTINE VISITS TO SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS, RECONNAISSANCE BY COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS, STAFF VISITS, BRIEFINGS, AND ROUTINE TROOP REPLACEMENTS.

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ADMINISTRATIVE MISSIONS INCLUDE ROUTINE COURIER HOPS, MAIL RUNS, TROOP SHUTTLES, ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPLY, AND OTHER HOPS THAT ARE NOT TACTICAL IN NATURE.

THE "OTHER" CATEGORY INCLUDES VIP VISITORS, TRAINING, AIR RECOVERY, MAINTENANCE, SEARCH AND RESCUE AND A MULTITUDE OF OTHER REQUESTS THAT APPEAR DAILY.

IN SUMMARY, ALL OF THESE ARE VALID REQUIREMENTS THAT MUST BE PROVIDED FOR, AND WE ARE NOT COMPLAINING.

OUR ONLY THOUGHT IS THAT FOR ANY FUTURE CONFLICT WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THEY EXIST, AND ESTABLISH A STRUCTURE AND HELICOPTER COMPLEMENT THAT PROVIDES FOR THEM.

IF WE FAIL TO DO SO, THEN THE CAPABILITY OF THE SUPPORTED DIVISION OR DIVISIONS WILL BE REDUCED BY THE 20% TO 30% OF THE AVAILABLE AIR EFFORT THAT THEY SHOULD REASONABLY EXPECT FOR TACTICAL OPERATIONS.

I REFER TO THIS AS THE ECONOMIC FACTS OF LIFE AND NOT A MANAGEMENT PROBLEM.

CHART 9

1ST MAW HELICOPTER HOURS AND UTILIZATION.

THE 1ST MAW HELICOPTERS AVERAGED 11,044 HOURS PER MONTH AND HAD AN AVERAGE UTILIZATION OF 114% FOR THE FIRST HALF OF FY-70. WE COULD NOT HAVE CONTINUED INDEFINITELY TO OPERATE THE HELICOPTERS AT 150% OF UTILIZATION AS WE WERE DOING IN JULY AS MAINTENANCE AND FLIGHT SAFETY HAD DETERIORATED TO AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL.

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OUR PRESENT UTILIZATION RUNS BETWEEN 100% AND 110% AND WE HOPE TO KEEP IT AT THAT LEVEL.

INITIALLY WE WERE ABLE TO REDUCE THE TEMPO OF OPERATIONS DUE PRIMARILY TO THE COOPERATION OF THE DIVISION COMMANDERS, AND BETTER MANAGEMENT. THE DEPARTURE OF THE 3RD MARINE DIVISION DURING OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER AND THE REDEPLOYMENT OF OUR ASSETS IN COUNTRY FURTHER AIDED OUR EFFORTS.

OUR UTILIZATION FOR THE AH-1G STILL AVERAGES AROUND 130%, BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY DEMAND FOR GUNSHIPS, HOWEVER WE HOPE TO REDUCE THAT IN THE NEAR FUTURE BY INCREASING THE AVAILABILITY OF THE UH-1E GUNS. THE RESTRUCTURING WHICH WAS JUST COMPLETED SHOULD HELP US IN THIS RESPECT.

THE LOW DIP FOLLOWED BY THE PEAK UTILIZATION DURING OCTOBER WAS DUE TO THE EXTREMELY BAD WEATHER FOLLOWED BY GOOD WEATHER AND NUMEROUS ENEMY CONTACTS.

CHART 10

OPERATIONALLY READY AIRCRAFT RATES

SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE IS THE MONTHLY AVAILABILITY OF THE PRINCIPAL AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTER TYPES OF THE 1ST MAW.

THE AVERAGE AVAILABILITY OF THE A-4, A-6, F-4 AND OV-10, SHOWN IN RED, INCREASED FROM 60% TO 69% OPERATIONALLY READY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE FISCAL YEAR.

IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE REDUCTION OF THE SORTIE RATE TOGETHER WITH A VIGOROUS MAINTENANCE PROGRAM ARE THE PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR THIS INCREASE.

IN THE HELICOPTER FIELD, WHICH INCLUDES THE AVERAGE AVAILABILITY OF ALL TYPES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CH-53, THE RATE INCREASED FROM 67% TO 71%

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WHILE WE HAVE NOT MADE A DRAMATIC INCREASE WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO RECOVER FROM THE LOW POINT OF 61% THAT DEVELOPED DURING AUGUST DUE TO OVER UTILIZATION IN PREVIOUS MONTHS.

IN BOTH FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING WE ARE ENDEAVORING TO MAINTAIN AN OPERATIONALLY READY STATUS OF 70% FOR COMBAT.

THE CH-53 IS A PROBLEM UNTO ITSELF. IN SPITE OF OUR BEST EFFORTS WE SIMPLY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN A SATISFACTORY AVAILABILITY.

IT HAS BEEN PLAGUED BY SUPPLY, MATERIAL, AND PERSONNEL PROBLEMS, HOWEVER I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE INCREASED OUR GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE AIRCRAFT, AND MATERIAL AND SUPPLY SUPPORT ARE IMPROVING. IT IS HOPED THAT BY THE REDUCTION OF ONE SQUADRON WE CAN CONCENTRATE UPON THE OTHER FOR A MARKED IMPROVEMENT.

CHART 11

FY-70 1ST MAW OPERATIONAL/DEA ACCIDENTS

THE OPERATIONAL ACCIDENT RATE AS OF 1 JANUARY FOR THE FIRST HALF OF FY-70 IS 1.87. THIS COMPARES WITH AN OPERATIONAL ACCIDENT RATE OF 2.25 FOR FISCAL YEAR 1969.

WE BELIEVE THAT MUCH OF THIS REDUCTION CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO A REDUCTION IN THE UTILIZATION OF BOTH FIXED AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT WHICH PERMITTED MORE TIME FOR A VIGOROUS MAINTENANCE AND FLIGHT SAFETY PROGRAM.

OUR ACCIDENT RATE, DUE TO DIRECT ENEMY ACTION, IS NOT SHOWN ON THE CHART, BUT IS 2.68 FOR THE FIRST HALF OF THE FISCAL YEAR. THIS COMPARES

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FAVORABLY WITH THE RATE OF 3.65 FOR FISCAL YEAR 1969.

A PORTION OF THIS REDUCTION IS CERTAINLY DUE TO A REDUCTION IN THE TEMPO OF THE WAR, HOWEVER IT IS MY CONSIDERED OPINION THAT MUCH OF THE CREDIT CAN BE GIVEN TO IMPROVEMENT IN OUR TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES THAT WE HAVE EMPLOYED.

IN JULY AND AUGUST WE LOST SIX FIXED WING AND 14 ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT DUE TO DIRECT ENEMY ACTION.

SINCE THAT TIME OUR LOSSES HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED.

THE TWO FIXED WING LOSSES DURING DECEMBER WERE DUE TO THE TREMENDOUS BUILD UP OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT IN LAOS, WHERE BOTH AIRCRAFT WERE LOST, BUT BOTH CREWS RECOVERED. THE SECOND AIRCRAFT WAS LOST SUPPORTING THE DOWNED PILOTS OF THE FIRST AND WE HAD TO DISREGARD NORMAL FLIGHT POLICY.

OUR PRINCIPAL LOSSES IN ROTARY WING ARE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE MED EVAC AND RECONN INSERT/EXTRACT MISSIONS. AS YOU WILL NOTICE FROM THE CHART WE HAVE HAD A TOTAL OF 16 MAJOR ACCIDENTS DUE TO ENEMY ACTION WHILE PERFORMING THESE MISSIONS.

MANY OF THE MED EVAC MISSIONS ARE EXECUTED WHEN WE ARE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY AND UNABLE TO USE FIXED WING IN SUPPORT. THE SAME IS TRUE OF THE RECONN EXTRACTS WHEN MANY TIMES THE TEAM CANNOT BREAK CONTACT AND THE EXTRACT IS UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS WHILE THE TEAM IS UNDER FIRE ON THE GROUND.

THIS IS A BRIEF SUMMARY OF OUR AIR OPERATIONS AND I WOULD NOW LIKE TO DISCUSS SOME OF THE IMPROVEMENTS THAT WE HOPE TO MAKE IN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS.

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CHART 12IMPROVEMENT OF FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS DURING THE SECOND HALF OF FY-70

BASED UPON OUR EXPERIENCE DURING THE FIRST HALF OF FY-70, WE NOW BELIEVE THAT WE ARE IN A POSITION TO REWRITE SOME OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO OUR OPERATIONS HERE IN VIETNAM. WE HOPE TO INCORPORATE THE LESSONS LEARNED, AND ORIENT THEM TO THE CURRENT TACTICAL SITUATION.

WE HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY OF STUDYING THE YOUNGDALE BOARD AND OPERATING THE AUXILIARY WING HEADQUARTERS AT QUANG TRI. I PERSONALLY HAVE HAD THE PRIVILEGE OF WORKING WITH BILL JONES AND ORME SIMPSON.

IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE APPRECIATION TO THEM FOR THE SUPPORT THAT THEY GAVE TO THE FIRST WING IN OUR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE MUTUAL PROBLEMS AND SATISFY THEIR REQUIREMENTS.

MY ONLY REGRET IS THAT WE DID NOT HAVE THE TIME TO FULLY REALIZE THE AIR-GROUND CAPABILITY AND CLOSE COORDINATION THAT ALL OF US WERE SEEKING.

I WILL NOT GO INTO THE DETAILS CONCERNING THE REVISIONS TO THE BASIC ORDERS, BUT WILL BRIEFLY COVER SOME OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF MATTERS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

FIRST, WE HAVE HAD VERY LITTLE DIFFICULTY WITH OUR FIXED WING OPERATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE SINGLE MANAGER CONCEPT WITH ITS RESTRICTIONS HAS BEEN CUMBERSOME, IT HAS NOT LED TO SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES.

THROUGH A GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT WITH THE 7TH AIR FORCE WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONTROL THE WEIGHT OF OUR EFFORT BETWEEN IN-COUNTRY AND OUT-OF-COUNTRY OPERATIONS.

TOP SECRET

AT THE SAME TIME WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MANAGE OUR IN-COUNTRY STRIKES TO PROVIDE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIFFERENT COMMANDS IN I CORPS.

IT IS AWKWARD AT TIMES, HOWEVER OUR WORKING RELATIONSHIPS ARE GOOD AND WE DO NOT FORSEE ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS.

IN SUBSTANCE, THE SINGLE MANAGER CONCEPT IS WORKING AND NONE OF THE SERVICES CONCERNED WISH TO REOPEN THE ISSUE AT THIS TIME FOR FEAR OF LOSING SOME OF THE FLEXIBILITY WHICH WE ALL HAVE INCORPORATED INTO THE SYSTEM ON A PERSONAL BASIS.

THE REWRITE OF THE ORDER FOR AIR OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM, WHICH WE WILL PUBLISH BEFORE THE END OF THIS MONTH, IS PRIMARILY AN UPDATE DUE TO REDEPLOYMENTS, CHANGES IN PROCEDURES, AND REVISION TO CERTAIN POLICIES CONCERNING OUR OPERATIONS. THE PRINCIPAL CHANGES RELATE TO FIXED WING OPERATIONS.

IN THE HELICOPTER FIELD WE ARE DEVOTING OUR EFFORTS TOWARD DEVELOPING MAXIMUM RESPONSIVENESS TO ALL REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE CAPABILITY OF OUR ASSETS.

THE REVIEW OF THE III MAF ORDER, AND THE REWRITE OF THE TWO WING ORDERS ARE DEDICATED TO THIS PURPOSE.

OUR EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL KEY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAXIMUM RESPONSIVENESS.

FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE TACTICAL SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND HOW THE DIVISION COMMANDER DESIRES TO ACCOMPLISH HIS ASSIGNED MISSION.

CORRELATED WITH THIS IS THE DEGREE OF AUTONOMY WHICH THE DIVISION COMMANDER DESIRES TO DELEGATE TO HIS SUBORDINATE TASK FORCE, OR REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS, AND THE RELATION OF THEIR OPERATIONS TO THE DIVISION AS A WHOLE.

NEXT IS A FUNDAMENTAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE AVERAGE HELICOPTER ASSETS

TOP SECRET

AVAILABLE DURING A NORMAL DAY AND THE SURGE CAPABILITY THAT CAN BE REASONABLY ANTICIPATED TO MEET EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS.

FINALLY, A CLOSE AND PERSONAL COMMUNICATION MUST BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN AVIATION AND GROUND COMMANDERS AND STAFF, AT ALL ECHELONS OF COMMAND.

GENERAL WHEELER HAS JUST TAKEN OVER THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION AND WE ARE ENDEAVORING TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM THAT WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO HIS REQUIREMENTS BASED ON THE GUIDELINES THAT I HAVE STATED.

SHOWN ON THE NEXT SLIDE ARE SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL ACTIONS THAT WE HAVE TAKEN TO DEVELOP THE PROGRAM.

AS THE PROGRAM IS DEVELOPED IT WILL BE INCORPORATED IN THE OPERATION ORDERS SHOWN.

CHART-13

IMPROVEMENT OF HELICOPTERBORNE OPERATIONS PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING ACTIONS

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPANJER ATTENDS THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION MORNING BRIEFING FOUR OUT OF SEVEN DAYS A WEEK, AND REPORTS DIRECTLY TO ME ANY DISCREPANCIES, COMPLAINTS, OR PLANS OF THE DIVISION THAT MAY HAVE A BEARING ON AIR OPERATIONS.

I HAVE GENERAL WHEELER'S CONCURRENCE IN THIS ARRANGEMENT.

IN CONJUNCTION WITH NUMBER TWO, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW STANDARD FRAG ORDER, WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THE FOLLOWING:

GENERAL WHEELER WAS HERE RECENTLY AND WE PRESENTED TO HIM THE "DAILY STANDARD FRAG ORDER" FOR SUPPORT OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION, AND THE NORMAL "ADD ONS" THAT WE RECEIVE.

THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION DOWN THROUGH THE REGIMENTS IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING THIS ORDER TOGETHER WITH PERSONNEL FROM THE WING.

TOP SECRET

GENERAL WHEELER AND I HAVE HAD SOME DISCUSSIONS SINCE THAT TIME ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

BASED UPON THE STATED DESIRES OF THE DIVISION, THE WING AND THE DIVISION WILL DEVELOP A NEW DAILY STANDARD FRAG ORDER INCLUDING THE ORDER OF PRIORITY FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SCHEDULED MISSIONS.

EACH MONTH THEREAFTER WE WILL HOLD A SCHEDULING CONFERENCE TO REVIEW DISCREPANCIES AND BRING THE ORDER UP TO DATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR DESIRES AND OUR CAPABILITY TO FULFILL THEIR REQUESTS.

BASED UPON THE REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPED FOR THE FRAG ORDER, THE WING WILL DEVELOP TACTICAL PACKAGES FOR SPECIFIED MISSIONS, SCHEDULING TECHNIQUES TO MEET REQUIRED REACTION TIMES, LOCATION OF ASSETS FOR EFFECTICIENT UTILIZATION, AND THE COMMAND ECHELON AUTHORIZED TO CONTROL SPECIFIC MISSIONS.

UNDER THREE, I AM PROPOSING THE TEMPORARY ESTABLISHMENT OF A COLONELS BILLET FROM THE WING AT THE DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER, I BELIEVE IT WILL GREATLY IMPROVE THE UTILIZATION OF OUR ASSETS AND ENHANCE COORDINATION BETWEEN AIR AND GROUND.

IN SUBSTANCE, THE ALLOCATION OF OUR DAILY ASSETS MUST REMAIN AT THE WING TACTICAL AIR DIRECTION CENTER DUE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF COMMANDS OTHER THAN THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION.

ALSO REQUESTS FOR EMERGENCY ADD ON MISSIONS THAT OCCUR AFTER THE DAILY FRAG ORDER HAS BEEN PUBLISHED MUST BE ADJUDICATED AT THE WING LEVEL SINCE THE ASSETS REQUIRED MUST BE TAKEN AWAY FROM SOME OTHER COMMAND.

ON THE OTHER HAND THOSE HELICOPTERS WHICH ARE ASSIGNED IN SUPPORT OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION ON THE DAILY FRAG CAN BEST BE CONTROLLED FROM THE FIRST MAW DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER LOCATED AT THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS.

THE HOUR TO HOUR CHANGES WHICH OCCUR THAT REQUIRE CANCELLATION, DIVERT, OR AUGMENTATION CAN BE ADJUDICATED AT THIS POINT. IN THE EVENT A SITUATION

TOP SECRET

ARISES WHEREIN THE REQUIREMENTS EXCEED THE CAPABILITIES OF THE HELICOPTERS ASSIGNED THE MATTER WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE WING TACTICAL AIR DIRECTION CENTER FOR AUGMENTATION.

THE ASSISTANT WING G-3 FOR HELICOPTER OPERATIONS WOULD HAVE THE ENTIRE FACILITIES OF THE DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER TO EXERCISE THIS CONTROL AND SCHEDULING.

HE WOULD OPERATE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE DIVISION AIR OFFICER, WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE DIVISION COMMANDER FOR PROGRAMMING OF DIVISION REQUIREMENTS IN COLLABORATION WITH THE DIVISION STAFF.

IN SUBSTANCE, HE WOULD BE THE FIRST MAW CONTROLLING AND SCHEDULING AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT MISSION ASSIGNMENTS PROVIDED TO HIM BY THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION.

IT IS BELIEVED THAT HIS PHYSICAL PRESENCE AT THE DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER WILL ALLEVIATE MANY OF THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THE PAST.

AS FOR NUMBER FOUR, IN COORDINATION WITH THE DIVISION WE HAVE ALREADY INTRODUCED A NEW STRIKE HELICOPTERBORNE PACKAGE CALLED "KINGFISHER".

THIS AIRBORNE PACKAGE OF PLATOON SIZE RECONNOITERS THE AREA AND IMMEDIATELY LANDS AND ATTACKS WHEN SUITABLE TARGETS ARE DISCOVERED. THE SUCCESS TO DATE HAS BEEN OUTSTANDING AND WE ARE FURTHER REFINING THE TECHNIQUES OF ITS EMPLOYMENT.

BASED UPON THE CURRENT TACTICAL SITUATION, AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE DIVISION WISHES TO EMPLOY FORCES, WE ARE ALSO WORKING ON QUICK REACTION, ANTI-PERSONNEL DETECTION, MEDICAL EVACUATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL, STRIKE, RECONN INSERT/EXTRACT AND OTHER TACTICAL PACKAGES TO EXPLOIT THE CAPABILITIES OF THE AIR-GROUND TEAM.

THE DEGREE TO WHICH WE WILL BE ABLE TO DEDICATE SPECIFIED PACKAGES FOR CERTAIN MISSIONS WILL DEPEND UPON THE SITUATION, THE FLEXIBILITY WHICH IS

TOP SECRET

DESIRED IN THE SCHEDULING, AND THE AVAILABLE ASSETS.

WE ARE WORKING IN CLOSE CONJUNCTION WITH THE DIVISION TO ENSURE THAT THEY OBTAIN THE MAXIMUM EXPLOITATION OF OUR AIR CAPABILITY TO FURTHER GROUND OPERATIONS.

IT WILL TAKE A LITTLE TIME TO FULLY REALIZE THIS POTENTIAL, AND IT WILL REQUIRE CONSTANT REVIEW, UPDATE, AND CHANGES, HOWEVER I AM SATISFIED THAT WE ARE MAKING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS.

THE KEY TO ITS SUCCESS IS CLOSE AND PERSONAL COMMUNICATION BETWEEN AIR AND GROUND AT ALL ECHELONS OF COMMAND.

NUMBER FIVE IS PERHAPS THE MOST MISUNDERSTOOD AND UNFORTUNATE PROBLEM THAT HAS DEVELOPED DURING THE COURSE OF THIS WAR.

IT IS MY CONSIDERED OPINION THAT COMMON SENSE AND A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN AVIATION AND GROUND OF THE ROLE OF EACH WAS THE ONLY THING THAT WAS NEEDED TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM.

MY POLICY IN THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING IS THAT ANY MISSIONS REQUESTED BY THE DIVISION THAT IS WITHIN OUR CAPABILITY WILL BE LAUNCHED.

I ASK ONLY THAT AVIATION RETAIN THE AUTHORITY IN TWO AREAS.

1. THE COMPOSITION OF THE FLIGHT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO THE PERSONNEL EMBARKED AS WELL AS THE HELICOPTERS COMMITTED.

2. THE AUTHORITY TO LAND OR NOT TO LAND THE EMBARKED TROOPS AT THE POINT OF CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY.

IN THE FIRST CASE IF WE DEVELOP A TACTICAL PACKAGE TO PERFORM A SPECIFIC MISSION THERE IS NO REASON WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE COMMITTED BY THE APPROPRIATE GROUND COMMANDER TO WHICH IT HAS BEEN DEDICATED AND PHYSICALLY LOCATED WITH.

IF THE AVIATOR IN CHARGE OF THE FLIGHT BELIEVES THAT HE HAS INSUFFICIENT

TOP SECRET

ASSETS TO PERFORM THE MISSION. BASED ON TACTICAL CONDITIONS, HE SHOULD REQUEST AUGMENTATION FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY.

IF AUGMENTATION CANNOT BE PROVIDED AND THE MISSION IS OF AN EMERGENCY NATURE -- THE FLIGHT WILL LAUNCH.

IF WEATHER RENDERS THE FLIGHT ABSOLUTELY IMPRACTICAL THEN IT MUST BE CANCELLED AND REFERRED TO HIGHER AUTHORITY. IF THE WEATHER IS MARGINAL OR QUESTIONABLE AND THE GROUND COMMANDER DESIRES TO ATTEMPT THE MISSION -- IT WILL BE LAUNCHED.

IF, AFTER HAVING BEEN ADVISED OF POOR WEATHER, LACK OF APPROPRIATE PREPARATION OF LANDING ZONES, OR OTHER FACTORS THAT RELATE TO AVIATION OPERATIONS, AND THE GROUND COMMANDER INSISTS, THE MISSION WILL BE LAUNCHED.

IF THE JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE GROUND COMMANDER IS QUESTIONED, I WOULD REFER THE MATTER TO THE DIVISION COMMANDER FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.

FOR THE SECOND PART, THE AUTHORITY OF THE AVIATION COMMANDER TO LAND OR NOT TO LAND THE EMBARKED TROOPS.

THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE THAT HAS BEEN MANIFEST WITH THE NAVY IN OUR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS SINCE THEIR INCEPTION AND IS UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED DOCTRINE.

THE CAPABILITY OF THE AVIATION COMMANDER TO LAND IN THE LANDING ZONE IS A MATTER OF HIS SOLE JUDGMENT AND CANNOT BE DIVESTED FROM HIM.

THIS IS A DECISION THAT HE MUST MAKE AND ONE FOR WHICH HE HAS BEEN TRAINED.

THE WIND, THE WEATHER, THE VISIBILITY, THE TERRAIN, ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE AND A MYRIAD OF OTHER FACTORS ARE JUDGMENTS UPON WHICH HE MUST MAKE A DECISION, AND A DECISION THAT HE IS BEST QUALIFIED TO MAKE.

TOP SECRET

WHILE IT MAY BE VERY EASY TO DEVELOP A HYPOTHETICAL CASE OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AVIATION AND GROUND COMMANDER, I HAVE NOT ENCOUNTERED A SINGLE CASE DURING MY CURRENT TOUR WHERE THIS HAS OCCURRED.

IN THE EVENT THAT A DECISION OF THE AVIATION COMMANDER "NOT TO LAND" IS QUESTIONED, I CAN ASSURE THE DIVISION COMMANDER THAT APPROPRIATE ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN.

WITH THE FOREGOING PRINCIPLES IN MIND AND THE ACTIONS THAT WE HAVE TAKEN, I BELIEVE WE CAN MAKE SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN OUR HELICOPTERBORNE OPERATIONS DURING THE SECOND HALF OF FY-70.

CONCURRENT WITH THESE PLANS WE ARE ALSO IN THE PROCESS OF PROGRAMMING THE PHASE III REDEPLOYMENTS OF THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING AND I WILL BRIEFLY COVER OUR PROGRAMMING TO DATE.

CHART-14

LOCATION OF MARINE UNITS SUBSEQUENT TO PHASE TWO REDEPLOYMENT

GENERAL CHAPMAN, SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE ARE THE LOCATIONS OF OUR TACTICAL UNITS AT THIS TIME.

WE HAVE A DETACHMENT OF MAG-16 AT PHU BAI WITH TWO HMM SQUADRONS. THE REMAINDER OF MAG-16 IS AT MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY AND CONSISTS OF THE VMO, TWO HML, TWO HMM, AND TWO HHN SQUADRON.

MAG-11, IS AT DANANG AND MAG-12 AND 13 ARE AT CHU LAI:

AT PRESENT WE HAVE A TOTAL OF 192 HELICOPTERS AND 186 FIXED WING AIRCRAFT.

WE HAVE RECENTLY RECEIVED THE DIRECTIVE FOR THE PHASE III REDEPLOYMENT AND HAVE DEVELOPED OUR PLANS AS SHOWN ON THE NEXT SEVERAL SLIDES.

CHART-15

FIRST MAW UNITS SCHEDULED FOR REDEPLOYMENT PHASE III

TOP SECRET

SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE ARE THE UNITS SCHEDULED FOR REDEPLOYMENT, TOGETHER WITH THEIR STRENGTH, LOCATION, AIRCRAFT, AND SUGGESTED PRIORITY FOR RETROGRADE.

FIRST, WE DESIRE TO REDEPLOY HMM-361 AND THE DETACHMENT OF H&MS-16, WHICH HAS THE SQUADRON IMA CAPABILITY.

THE REASON IS THAT IT WILL PERMIT US TO MOVE ONE OF THE HMM SQUADRONS NOW AT PHU BAI TO MARBLE MOUNTAIN TO PROVIDE BETTER CH-46 SUPPORT TO THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION.

THE SECOND PRIORITY IS THE REDEPLOYMENT OF VMFA-542 TOGETHER WITH ITS IMA DETACHMENT.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PRIORITY IS TWO-FOLD. FIRST IT WILL MAKE SPACE AVAILABLE AT DANANG BASE AND WE WILL MOVE VMD-2 WITH 18 OV-10A FROM MARBLE MOUNTAIN INTO THE SPACES VACATED BY VMFA-542.

THE OV-10 HAS DIFFICULTY IN CROSS WIND OPERATION FROM MARBLE MOUNTAIN AND IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN AN INSTRUMENT CLEARANCE FROM THIS FACILITY DUE TO ITS PROXIMITY TO THE DANANG BASE.

SECOND, THE MOVEMENT OF VMD-2 FROM MARBLE MOUNTAIN WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY SPACE TO MOVE THE SECOND HMM SQUADRON FROM PHU BAI TO MARBLE MOUNTAIN. AT THIS TIME WE WOULD RECOVER THE 164 PERSONNEL SPACES, SHOWN AT THE BOTTOM OF THE CHART AS A DETACHMENT OF MAG-16, WHICH ARE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE TWO HMM SQUADRONS NOW AT PHU BAI.

OUR THIRD AND FOURTH PRIORITIES ARE THE TWO VMA SQUADRONS OF MAG-12. THIS IS IMPORTANT IN THE SENSE THAT THE TACTICAL SQUADRONS MUST PRECEDE THE H&MS AND MABS IN THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE GROUP.

OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT MAG-12 WITH ONE VMA SQUADRON WILL REDEPLOY TO IWAKUNI, WITH THE SECOND VMA SQUADRON BEING REDEPLOYED TO CONUS.

WE FORSEE NO DIFFICULTY IN THE REDEPLOYMENT OF ANY OF THE UNITS AT THIS TIME.

TOP SECRET

CHU LAI AIR BASE IS PRESENTLY BEING OPERATED BY MAG-12, HOWEVER, WE ARE CURRENTLY IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSFERRING THIS FUNCTION TO MAG-13.

CHART-16

FIRST MAW ACTIONS DURING PHASE III TO CONSOLIDATE LOCATIONS IN RVN

SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE ARE THE ACTIONS THAT I PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED TO CONSOLIDATE OUR UNITS HERE IN VIETNAM.

HMM-161 WOULD MOVE FROM PHU BAI TO MARBLE MOUNTAIN TO REPLACE HMM-361.

VMD-2 WOULD MOVE FROM MARBLE MOUNTAIN TO DANANG IN THE SPACE VACATED BY VMFA-542 AND BE REASSIGNED TO MAG-11.

HMM-262 WOULD MOVE FROM PHU BAI TO MARBLE MOUNTAIN IN THE SPACE VACATED BY VMD-2.

VMA-311 WOULD REMAIN AT CHU LAI AND BE REASSIGNED FROM MAG-12 TO MAG-13.

CHART-17

FIRST MAW LOCATIONS AND COMPOSITION 15 APRIL 1970

AT THE END OF PHASE III, THE FIRST MAW TACTICAL GROUPS WILL BE AS SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE.

MAG-11 WILL BE AT DANANG BASE WITH TWO VMA-AW, ONE VMCFJ, AND ONE VMD SQUADRON.

MAG-16 WILL BE AT MARBLE MOUNTAIN WITH TWO HML, FOUR HMM, AND ONE HWH SQUADRON.

MAG-13 WILL BE AT CHU LAI WITH ONE VMA, AND THREE VMFA SQUADRONS.

THE WING HEADQUARTERS GROUP, THE WING SUPPORT GROUP, AND THE MARINE AIR CONTROL GROUP WILL REMAIN IN THEIR PRESENT LOCATIONS AT DANANG.


TOP SECRET

THE FIRST MAW WILL HAVE 162 HELICOPTERS, AND 149 FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. OF THIS TOTAL 89 WILL BE FIGHTER/ATTACK OR ATTACK AIRCRAFT.

BASED UPON THE TACTICAL SITUATION AT THIS TIME I BELIEVE THAT THE MIX OF FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT THAT WE WILL HAVE ON HAND WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO FULFILL OUR AIR REQUIREMENTS.

IN THE EVENT OF AN ESCALATION, WE HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE ANY TYPE OF SUPPORT REQUIRED UNTIL ADDITIONAL REINFORCEMENTS CAN BE BROUGHT INTO COUNTRY.

GENERAL CHAPMAN, THIS CONCLUDES MY BRIEFING, ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?



**1st MAW BRIEFING
FOR**

GENERAL LEONARD F. CHAPMAN, JR.

USMC

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING
TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS FOR THE
FIRST HALF OF FY-70

1. FIGHTER / ATTACK SUPPORT - IN COUNTRY AND OUT OF COUNTRY.
2. FIXED WING UTILIZATION AND SORTIE RATE.
3. HELICOPTER SUPPORT - HOURS, CARGO, AND PASSENGERS.
4. HELICOPTER HOURS AND UTILIZATION.
5. FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING AVAILABILITY.
6. FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING ACCIDENT RATE - OPERATIONAL / DEA.

SUBJECT

517-7

120
100
100
100
100

HANK HOA

SANCA

TANKER

ECM

VREN



SONG HOA

PHOTO

1 JUL - 31 DEC 69

FIGHTER ATTACK SUPPORT

NO. OF SORTIES 19,487
TOTAL TONS OF ORDNANCE 47,975

NR. OF SORTIES 3,227

TONS OF ORDNANCE 974

3rd MARDIV

4,293

101st ABN(AM)DIV**1st MARDIV**NR. OF
SORTIES 541TONS OF
ORDNANCE 1,099**ROK****AMERICAL
DIVISION****ARVN**

NR. OF SORTIES 697

TONS OF ORDNANCE 929

FIRST MAW FIXED WING SORTIE DISTRIBUTION

TYPE	101ST/1ST/ 5 MECH	1ST MAR DIV	AMERICAL	ROKMC	ARVN	OUT-OF- COUNTRY	TEST TRNG INC	TOTAL
TPQ	37	14	2					53
● S(IC)	14	20	18		2			54
S.T.						23		23
BEACON		6	3					9
AMTI						13		13
AIR DEF/ESCORT						2		2
FLAK								
NIGHT CAS								
O/C TAC(A)/VR						6		6
● I/C TAC(A)/VR		1						1
I/C FAC(A)/ARTY								
ECM						7		7
PHOTO	3		1			4		8
BARCAP								
TEST TRNG INC							14	14
TOTAL	54	41	24		2	55	14	190

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

6


SBRTIE RATE

1st MAW FIXED WING SORTIE RATE & UTILIZATION

1st & 2nd QTRS FY-70

AVG. SORTIE RATE

AVG. UTILIZATION



7

HELICOPTER SUPPORT

1 JUL 68

TOTAL

HRS 17.421

PAX 97.576

CGO 28.174

3rd MAR DIV

HRS 66.498

PAX 413.326

CGO 44.654

101st ABN(AM)DIV

1st MAR DIV

 HRS 8.972
 PAX 36.998
 CGO 4.770

111 MAF OTHER

HRS 8.428

PAX 25.730

CGO 757

AMERICAN
DIVISION

ARVN

HRS 470

PAX 10,739

CGO 696

SOG

HRS 1.042

PAX 0

CGO 0

1st MAW

HRS 7.352

PAX 19,413

CGO 2,750

1st MAW HELO FLIGHT HOURS EXPENDITURES

DECEMBER 1969

	TROOPS CARGO HRS	RECON SUP HRS	MED-EVAC HRS	ARMED HELO HRS	C & C HRS	ADMIN HRS	**OTHER HRS	TOTAL HRS	% of TOTAL %
1st MAR DIV	1764.6	166.3	584.6	1607.2	631.7	571.4	478.6	5804.4	65
ROKMC	356.6	0	3.2	147.9	239.2	73.9	33.8	854.6	10
III MAF	107.8	30.0	56.0	423.7	187.9	96.1	142.0	1043.5	12
1st MAW	169.1	0	4.6	2.3	95.9	111.5	649.2	1032.6	11
*OTHER	1.7	0	0	177.9	0	12.1	8.1	199.8	2
TOTAL HRS	2399.8	196.3	648.4	2359.0	1154.7	865.0	1311.7	8934.9	
% TOTAL HRS	27	2	8	26	12	10	15		100 %

* ARMY, ARVN, ETC

**MAINT, TRNG, SAR, TAR, VIP


1st MAW HELICOPTER HOURS & UTILIZATION

1st & 2nd QTRS FY-70

AVG HRS/MO


AVG UTILIZATION

HOURS



10

OPERATIONALLY READY AIRCRAFT RATES



FIXED WING
(A-4, A-6, F-4, OV-10)

HELOS
(EXCEPT CH-53)

CH-53

SECRET

	SEA		SEA	
	IN	OUT	IN	OUT
JAN			1	6
FEB			5	8
MAR			3	3
APR			0	1
MAY			1	3
JUN	2	2	2	2
JUL				
AUG				
SEP				
OCT				
NOV				
DEC				
TOTAL	11	12	12	23

UNITED STATES

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
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1990

11	11
2	2

MINOR ACCIDENTS TO DATE

QPR		QEA	
SW	HW	FW	HW
41	0	8	5

REA REGION
ESTATE/EXTRACT

5	2
---	---

TOTAL FILTHS AS OF 1 JAN

122,526

trial A/C lost

2

ACCORDANCE WITH

127

TOTAL KITCHEN LOST

9/22

**IMPROVEMENT OF FIXED WING AND
ROTARY WING TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS
DURING SECOND HALF OF FY-70**


1. REWRITE OF 1ST MAW OPERATION ORDER 303-69, AIR OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM AND LAOS.
2. REVIEW OF III MAF FORCE ORDER P-3310.1, STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR HELICOPTER OPERATIONS.
3. REWRITE OF 1ST MAW OPERATION ORDER P-3310.14A, COMBAT STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR HELICOPTERS AND LIGHT ARMED RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT.
4. REWRITE 1ST MAW OPERATION ORDER P-3310.15, STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR AIR CONTROL OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS.

IMPROVEMENT OF HELICOPTERBORNE
OPERATIONS - PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING
ACTIONS

1. DIRECT LAISON OF THE ASSISTANT WING COMMANDER, 1ST MAW, WITH THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION.
2. DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW STANDARD FRAG ORDER FOR HELICOPTER REQUIREMENTS OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION.
3. ESTABLISHMENT OF A 1ST MAW COLONELS BILLET, ASSISTANT G-3 FOR HELICOPTER / VMO OPERATIONS AT THE 1ST MAW DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER.
4. COORDINATED DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN 1ST MAW AND 1ST MARINE DIVISION OF STANDARD AND DEDICATED AIR / GROUND PACKAGES FOR SPECIFIED MISSIONS.
5. COORDINATED EDUCATION AND TRAINING BETWEEN 1ST MAW AND 1ST MARINE DIVISION CONCERNING COMMAND, CONTROL, AND DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY AT ALL ECHELONS OF COMMAND, FOR HELICOPTERBORNE OPERATIONS.

14

LOCATION OF MARINE UNITS SUBSEQUENT TO PHASE II REDEPLOYMENT



1st MAW UNITS SCHEDULED FOR REDEPLOYMENT PHASE 111

	STRENGTH	LOCATION	ACFT	PRIORITY FOR REDEPLOYMENT
HMH-361	233	MMAF	18 CH-53	(1)
DET H&MS-16(IMA)	36	MMAF		
VMFA-542	328	DANANG	15 F-4	(2)
DET H&MS-11(IMA)	52	DANANG		
MAG-12				
H&MS-12	403	CHU LAI		(5)
MABS-12	365	CHU LAI		(6)
VMA-211	218	CHU LAI	20 A-4E	(3)
VMA-223	218	CHU LAI	20 A-4E	(4)
MATCU-62	68	CHU LAI		
DET MWHG	25	DANANG		
DET MACG-18	50	DANANG		
DET MAG-16	164	PHU BAI		

TOTAL 2,160

**1st MAW ACTIONS DURING
PHASE 111 TO CONSOLIDATE LOCATIONS IN RVN**

UNIT	LOCATION	RELOCATION	PRIORITIES
HMM-161	PHU BAI	MMAF	(1)
VMO-2	MMAF	DANANG AIRFIELD	(2)
HMM-262	PHU BAI	MMAF	(3)
VMA-311 DET H&MS-12(IMA)	CHU LAI	REASSIGN FROM MAG-12 TO MAG-13	(4)

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1st MAW LOCATIONS AND COMPOSITION

15 APRIL 1970

