




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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG 1st MAW 1tr 3:TGK:kwn 5750 Ser: 003F25267 of 9Sep67

Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D) From:

To:

Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology, July

1967; submission of

#### Forwarded.

This endorsement is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED when removed from the basic correspondence.

By direction

3977 135

HEADQUARTERS 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force Pacific FPO San Francisco 96602

3: TGK: kom 5750

Ser: 003F 25267

SEP 91987

Unclassified upon removal of enclosure

From:

Commanding General

To:

Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Via:

(1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology, July 1967;

submission of

Ref:

(a) MCO 5750, 2A

(b) FMFPacO 5750.8

Encl:  $\sqrt{(1)}$  Subject report

- 1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the subject report consisting of Parts One, Two, Three and Four is hereby submitted.
- 2. The original copy only contains complete documentation.

John S. PAYNE Chief of Staff

28/MCD/gl

001 063-67 1 000 1967 (unclassified upon removal of basic material)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG 1st MAW 1tr 3:TGK:kwn over 5750 Ser: 003F25267 of 9Sep67

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronology, July 1967; submission of Subj:

Copy to: CG, lst MAW

1. Forwarded.

PART ONE

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 1 JULY 1967 - 31 JULY 1967 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

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#### UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS, 1st MARINE AIRCRAFT WING - COMMANDER & STAFF

#### COMMANDING GENERAL

Major General N. J. ANDMRSON: 2 June - 31 July 1967

#### ASSISTANT WING COMMANDER

Brigadier General R. P. KELLER: 1 April - 31 July 1967

#### CHIEF OF STAFF

Colonel H. H. IONG: 1 April - 31 July 1967

### ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1

Lieutenant Colonel H. D. STOTT: 4 May - 31 July 1967

## ASSISTANT G-1

Major J. A. ROGERS: 4 May - 31 July 1967

#### ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

Colonel G. H. DODENHOFF: 3 August 1966 - 5 July 1967 Colonel R. D. LIMBERG: 6 July - 31 July 1967

#### ASSISTANT G-2

Lieutenant Colonel L. R. VAN DEUSEN: 14 February - 22 July 1967 Lieutenant Colonel F. L. FERRELL JR: 23 July - 31 July 1967

# ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

Colonel D. D. PETTY JR: 6 February - 31 July 1967

#### ASSISTANT G-3

Lieutenant Colonel H. WOLF: 5 May - 31 July 1967

# CPERATIONS OFFICER, G-3

Lieutenant Colonel A. W. TALBERT: 7 February - 17 July 1967 Lieutenant Colonel G. H. KELLER: 18 July - 31 July 1967

# ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4

Colonel J. E. BONNER JR: 7 June - 31 July 1967

#### ASSISTANT G-4

Lieutenant Colonel A. E. JAMES: 1 September 1966 - 20 July 1967 Colonel C. B. ARMSTRONG JR: 21 July - 31 July 1967

#### OPERATIONS & PLANS, G-4

Lieutenant Colonel J. W. EVANS: 16 February - 31 July 1967

# ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5

Lieutenant Colonel E. R. ROGAL: 10 June - 31 July 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

#### UNCLASSIFIED

ADJUTANT

Major J. G. HALLET: 23 April - 31 July 1967

AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER

Major K. M. JOHNSTON: 2 June - 31 July 1967

CHAPLAIN

Commander P. J. FERRERI, ChC USN: 26 February - 31 July 1967

COMMUNICATIONS/FLECTRONICS OFFICER

Lieutenant Colonel R. V. ANDERSON: 21 July 1966 - 31 July 1967

WING SUPPLY OFFICER

Colonel R. DEWEES JR: 1 April - 31 July 1967

COMTROLLER

Lieutenant Colonel W. C. SIMANIKAS: 22 November 1966 - 31 July 1967

· INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER

Major T. M. D'ANDREA: 26 January - 14 July 1967 Major A. W. REALSEN: 15 July - 31 July 1967

INSPECTOR

Colonel H. HUNTER JR: 16 June - 3 July 1967 Colonel J. S. PAYNE: 4 July - 31 July 1967

LEGAL OFFICER

Lieutenant Colonel R. K. CULVER: 1 August 1966 - 31 July 1967

STAFF MEDICAL OFFICER

Captain O. GRAY JR, MC USN: 20 June - 31 July 1967

STAFF SECRETARY

Major D. F. KELLEY: 25 June - 31 July 1967

SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER

Major C. D. TIMONEY: 24 August 1966 - 31 July 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

# 2. (S) TASK ORGANIZATION/IOCATION/UNIT COMMANDERS 1-31 JULY 1967

WIT	LOCATION	COMMAN DERS
1ST MAN	DANANG, RVN	Major General N. J. ANDERSON 2 June - 31 July 1967
MWHG-1	DANANG, RVN	Colonel K. T. DYKES 6 April - 31 July 1967
MVSG-17	DANANG, RVN	Colonel J. E. HANSEN 15 June - 31 July 1967
MAG-11	DANANG, RW	Colonel A. O. SCHMAGEL 1 June - 31 July 1967
MAG-12	CHU LAI, RVN	Colonel B. P. GIBSON JR 16 February - 31 July 1967
MAG-13	CHU LAI, RVN	Colonel D. H. JOHNSON 5 February - 31 July 1967
MAG-16	MARBLE MOUNTAIN, RVN	Colonel S. F. MARTIN 23 April - 31 July 1967
MAG-36	KY HA, RVN	Colonel O. S. TOSDAL 29 March - 1 July 1967 Colonel F. E. WILSON 2 July - 31 July 1967

# 3. (U) AVERAGE STRENGTH FOR JULY 1967

USM C USM		<u>usn</u>			!
Officers:	1,653**	Officers:	72	Officers:	1,725
Enlisted:	14,246	Enlisted:	306	Enlisted:	14,552
Total:	15,899	Total:	378	Total:	16,277

\* NA - 902, AGO - 751

4. (C) The following very important persons visited elements of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as indicated:

DATE	NAME	RANK/SERVICE	BILLET
9-10 July 9-10 July 9-10 July 9-10 July		RAdm/USN Adm/USN Civilian Civilian Honorable Honorable Gen/USA Gen/USA Adm/USN Honorable RAdm/USN RAdm/USN	COMFAIRWESTPAC CNO Designate Minority Counsel Chief Investigator Sec of Defense ASD (PA) SecNav Nominee COMUS MACV Chairman JCofS Pacific Commander Attorney General Comm TF 77 Comm TF 77.7



#### MARRATIVE SUMARY

During the month of July, G-5 Division conducted a thorough review of all new and previously submitted minor new construction requests to validate requirements and prepare an overall FNAC priority list for submission to III NAC for integration into a Marine Command I Corps priority list.

At DaNang Air Base considerable construction effort was expended on repair of facilities damaged by the 15 July rocket attack. The Tango Sector rehabilitation project was approximately 75% complete. MAG-11 headquarters building was 70% complete; parachute building, 80%; utilities, 70%; and the south ready anmo pad was completed.

At Phu Bai, considerable construction progress was realized during the month of July. The troop housing was 30% complete; the 18,000 SF hangar, 50%; the covered storage building, 80%; and site preparation for the second hangar and new apron commenced.

At Marble Mountain Air Facility the control tower was completed, primary power distribution was 80% complete, six STRAAD storage buildings were completed, and the COR shop was 50% complete.

At Chu lai, the three MAG-12 VMA hangars were 88%, 88%, and 95% complete and the MAG-13 hangar was 60% complete. The Chu Lai West control tower was 90% complete; the MAG-13 motor transport shop was completed; and the MAG-13 ready ammo pad estimated at 12% complete, and the MAG-12 power check pad was completed.

# NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The Danang Air Base came under rocket attack for the third time in less than six months on 15 July. The attack began about CO25 hours as an estimated 30 to 50 rockets fell on Danang Air Base. The incoming rounds are believed to have been Russian-made 122 mm rockets. Marine losses were relatively light in view of the ferceity of the attack. There were fifteen Marines wounded. Two F-8Es were destroyed. Moderate damage occurred to one A-6A and one F-8E. The following aircraft received minor damage: six UH-3ADs, four A-6As, one EA-6A, one TF-9J, one EF-10B, one C-117 and one KC-13O.

Air operations during July saw fixed wing flying about 700 more sorties than during June while helicopters were flying slightly less than during the record-setting previous month.

Fixed wing aircraft flew a total of 7,827 sorties in support of Southeast Asia operations. There were 12,946 tons of ordnance delivered by 6,413 attack sorties. III MAF forces were supported by 6,165 attack sorties, or 96 per cent of the attack sorties flown. First MAW provided an attack sortie rate of 9.0 attack sorties per battalion per day (for 19 Marine and 3 ROK battalions in country). This sortie rate includes both CAS and DAS sorties flown in RVN and the Tally Ho area in support of the battalions.

ARWN forces were supported by 75 attack sorties, 1.2 per cent of the total attack sorties flown. For U. S. Army units operating in I Corps, the 1st MAW flew 16 attack sorties, or 0.2 per cent of the Wing's total attack sorties flown during July.

Additional III MAF support consisted of 216 photo, 6 side-looking radar, 49 infrared and 167 electronic countermeasures sorties.

In support of Project Delta/SOG, 1st MAW provided two Huey gunships daily plus two GH-46s throughout the majority of the month.

Operations supported by 1st MAW aircraft during July included Kingfisher, Ardmore, Malheur II, Beacon Guide, Fremont, Cumberland, Stockton, Bear Chain, Pecos, Dragon Head I, II and III, Hickory II, Crockett, Gem, Bear Claw, Buffalo, Choctaw, Cimarron, Calhoun, Beacon Torch, Beaver Track and Elliot.

Air Support Radar Teams, located at Dong Ha, Phu Bai, Danang and Chu Lai, controlled 1,776 sorties, attacking 3,801 targets.

The reported BDA for 1st MAW in RWN was: 251 KRA (C), 692 KRA (P), 1,245 structures destroyed, 335 structures damaged, 567 bunkers destroyed, 180 bunkers damaged, 11 bridges destroyed, 11 bridges damaged, 34 craters enlarged, 82 AA positions destroyed, 41 AA positions damaged, 177 secondary explosions, 132 secondary fires, 146 road cuts, 17 tunnels destroyed, 7 tunnels damaged, 155 trenches damaged, 11 boats damaged, 9 caves damaged, 2 railroads damaged, 13 mortar positions destroyed, 6 ford cuts, 4 trucks destroyed, 1 storage area destroyed, 2 rice paddies damaged and 13 rocket positions destroyed.

First MAW aircraft flew a total of 956 jet fixed wing attack sorties in Lacs and North Vietnam. There were 728 Direct Air Support sorties in the Rolling Thunder and Tally Ho area in support of III MAF. Twenty Steel Tiger sorties were flown. In support of 7th Air Force and 7th Fleet, 208 sorties were flown in Route Packages I through VIB. Additionally there were 51 electronic countermeasures sorties flown in support of the 7th Air Force and 145 in support of Task Force 77 in conjunction with III MAF.

The reported BDA in Lacs and North Vietnam by the 1st MAW was: 79 secondary explosions, 84 secondary fires, 7 bunkers destroyed, 3 bunkers damaged, 7 trucks damaged, 2 road cuts, 2 caves damaged and 1 AA position destroyed.

During July, helicopters flew 41,561 sorties. Flying 15,149 hours, helicopters carried 56,993 passengers and 6,332.4 tons of cargo. A total of 15,559 tasks were performed.

Weather conditions over most of I Corps were excellent throughout most of July with air operations being hampered only from 25 to 28 July due to light rain, stratus and scattered thunderstorms.

In addition to the two F-SEs lost during the 15 July rocket attack, there were eleven other aircraft reported as lost during the month; one A-6A, two F-4E, three A-4E, one F-SE, one UH-34D and three CH-46A. Of these losses, four were due to enemy action and seven were operational.

On 6 July intensified SAM activity was encountered in the DMZ area. Missiles were fired at a KC-130 flareship, an EF-10B EW support aircraft, a flight of two A-4s and a flight of two F-4s. At approximately 062230H an A-4E on a SHRIKE-ANTI-SAM mission noted SAM signal activity and fired a SHRIKE ARM at the Fanseng radar just prior to being struck by a missile. The pilot was rescued the following morning from a position several miles inside North Vietnam. Although no BDA on this firing is available, it is significant that the Fanseng was not observed to radiate throughout the remainder of the month. After this encounter, very little enemy threat radar activity was noted in the DMZ and Tally Ho area. Throughout the month? however, the entire area continued to



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be regarded as one containing a SAM threat. This was based on intelligence reports that placed equipment providing an SA-2 capability in the IMZ area and sporadic Fansong intercepts from therein. Twenty-four hour electronic warfare cover was maintained throughout the month to provide SAM warning to 1st MAW aircraft.

MACS-4 initiated the first USMC operational employment of Marine Tactical Data Systems (MTDS) in support of combat operations during the month. Other 1st MAW task organization changes saw HMM-265 deploy to the SLF on 12 July, as HMM-164 returned from the SLF to join MAC-16. Minor reorganization of the Wing Headquarters was accomplished when base development ceased operations as a separate Wing Staff section, G-5, and was merged into G-4 as the month ended.



T. C. ) Came of one

PART THREE SIGNIFICANT EVENTS


MACHURARY COLD

#### 1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUPPORTED BY 1ST MAN AIRCRAFT

- a. (S) Operation Kingfisher: A multi-regimental search and destroy operation to defend combat base areas, airfield and artillery facilities at Dong Ha and other vital installations in area of operation. Operation commenced 161601H July and continues through this reporting period. For the period 16-31 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 926 sorties delivering 1870.5 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 60 structures destroyed, 33 damaged, 167 bunkers destroyed, 57 damaged, 36 AW positions destroyed, 24 damaged, 45 secondary explosions, 17 secondary fires, 3 tunnels destroyed, 2 damaged, 48 trenches damaged, 40 KBA (C), 121 KBA (P), 6 mortar positions destroyed, 1 railroad damaged, 7 road cuts, 1 ford cut and 1 cave damaged. Helicopters flew 2539 sorties for 1051.9 hours, lifting 1316 passengers, 415 med evacs and 229.4 tons of cargo.
- b. (S) Operation Ardmore: Third Marine Division (minus), (reinforced), conducted screening, surveillance and spoiling operation to destroy enemy personnel infiltrating into and through the Khe Sanh area. Operation commenced 170001H July and continues through this reporting period. For the period 17-31 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 248 sorties delivering 481.2 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 21 bunkers destroyed, 15 damaged, 15 KBA (C), 55 KBA (P), 2 gun positions destroyed, 23 secondary explosions, 68 secondary fires, 52 structures destroyed, 7 damaged, and 1 boat destroyed. Helicopters flew 148 sorties for 50.1 hours lifting 56 passengers and 1.4 tons of cargo.
- c. (S) Operation Malheur II: A search and destroy operation conducted by two infantry and one artillery battalions of Task Force Oregon (U.S. Army), in Quang Ngai Province. The operation commenced 080601H June and continues through this reporting period. For the period 1-31 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 33 sorties delivering 62.3 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 2 KBA (C), 10 structures destroyed, 3 damaged, 6 bunkers destroyed, 3 damaged, 1 trench damaged, 2 rice paddies damaged and 1 storage area destroyed.
- d. (S) Operation Beacon Guide: A tem-day operation in Thua Thien Province from 210730H 30120CH July. The first two days of the operation was an amphibious assault on the beach, followed by search and destroy in the area of operation with extensive night patrols. Cumulative casualties: USMC 5 WIA (minor); Enemy 3 KIA (P), 17 Det, and 4 PW/VC. For the period 21-30 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 42 sorties delivering 66.4 tons of ordnance. Helicopters flew 181 sorties for 85.8 hours and lifted 8 passengers.



- e. (S) Operation Fremont: The Fourth Marines (minus), (reinforced), conducts battalion size search and destroy operation characterized by extensive patrol and ambush to interdict enemy locations and deny enemy access to rice producing coastal populated areas in Thua Thien Province. Operation commenced 100001H July and continues through this reporting period. For the period 10-31 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 79 sorties delivering 136.1 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 6 KBA (C), 23 KBA (P), 2 secondary explosions, 18 secondary fires, 151 structures destroyed, 14 damaged and 2 trenches damaged. Helicopters flew 511 sorties for 200.1 hours, lifting 435 passengers and 30.5 tons of cargo.
- f. (S) Operation Cumberland: An operation in Thua Thien Province providing security in the Nam Hoa area and for the construction of route 547. Elements of the 4th Marines provide security with artillery support from 3/12. Operation commenced 031630H June and continues through this reporting period; suspended from 072000H July to 171200H July. For the period 17-31 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 66 sorties delivering 129.7 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 1 tunnel damaged, Helicopters flew 239 sorties for 117.5 hours lifting 223 passengers and 1.4 tons of cargo.
- g. (S) Operation Stockton: Two day search and destroy operation in Quang Nam Province by 7th Marines (minus), (reinforced), to investigate routes of ingress to Rocket Belt, and capture or destroy enemy forces encountered. Operation commenced 270800H and terminated 291200H July. Cumulative casualties: USMC 3 WIA (med evac), 1 MJA (minor); Mnemy 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 VC KIA (P). For the period 27-29 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 8 sorties delivering 14.8 tons of ordnance. Helicopters flew 253 sorties for 62.9 hours, and lifting 576 passengers.
- h. (S) Operation Bear Chain: A search and destroy operation by SLF 2/3 in Thua Thien Province 200630H 261200H July. Cumulative casualties: USMC 10 KIA, 62 WIA; Enemy 21 KIA (C) and 37 KIA (P). For the period 20-26 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 29 sorties delivering 51.5 tons of ordnance. Helicopters flew 391 sorties for 181.4 hours and lifted 85 passengers.
- i. (S) Operation Pecos: A five-company search and destroy operation by the 7th Marines in Quang Nam Province 200800H 270700H July. Cumulative casualties: USMC 1 WIA (minor); Enemy 2 VC KIA (C), 3 VC KIA (P), 5 INC and 4 CSWC. For the period 20-27 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 51 sorties delivering 101.5 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 3 structures destroyed, 2 damaged, 5 secondary explosions, 1 KBA (C), 2 KBA (P), and 1 bunker destroyed. Helicopters flew 860 sorties for 301.9 hours lifting 863 passengers, 8 med evacs and 44.5 tons of cargo.



- j. (S) Operation Dragon Head III: A combined search and destroy operation by ROKMC, 2d ARWN and 196th Bgd in Quang Ngai Province 180800H 261245H July. For the period 18-26 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 16 sorties delivering 23.7 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 2 KBA (C), 5 KBA (P), 24 structures destroyed, 10 damaged, 4 bunkers destroyed, 1 trench damaged and 2 road cuts.
- k. (S) Operation Hickory II: Third Marine Division (minus), (reinforced), in combined operation with the 1st ARWN Division destroyed enemy forces and military facilities north of the Cam Lo River and south of the IMZ in northern Quang Tri Province. Operation commenced 140900H and terminated 161600H July. For the period 14-16 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 286 sorties delivering 536.6 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 2 KBA (C), 3 KBA (P), 110 structures destroyed, 53 damaged, 52 bunkers destroyed, 29 damaged, 12 gum positions destroyed, 9 damaged, 7 secondary explosions, 13 secondary fires, and 10 trenches damaged. Helicopters flew 213 sorties for 116.9 hours, lifting 135 passengers and 7.3 tons of cargo.
- 1. (S) Operation Crockett: The 26th Marines provided defense for the Khe Sanh combat base and facilities in Quang Tri Province by extensive patrolling within artillery range from 131500H May to 162400H July. Cumulative casualties: USMC 52 KIA, 255 WIA; Enemy 206 KIA (C), 417 KIA (P), 3 Det, 26 wpns cptrd and 2 PW. For the period 1-16 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 186 sorties delivering 316.4 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 16 KBA (C), 26 KBA (P), 1 bridge destroyed, 1 damaged, 3 secondary explosions, 3 secondary fires, 50 bunkers destroyed and 16 damaged. Helicopters flew 131 sorties for 63.6 hours lifting 23 passengers and 0.6 tons of cargo.
- m. (S) Operation Gem: A three day search and destroy operation in Queng Nem Province by 3/7 in coordination with ARVN forces. Cumulative casualties: USMC 1 WIA; Enemy 1 VC KIA (C), 21 VC KIA (P), 1 VC PW and 2 Det. For the period 12-15 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 26 sorties delivering 18.5 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 10 KBA (P), 62 structures destroyed, 1 damaged, 3 secondary explosions, 1 secondary fire, and 3 trenches damaged. Helicopters flew 97 sorties for 39.2 hours and lifted 285 passengers.
- n. (S) Operation Bear Claw: A search and destroy operation in Thua Thien Province by SLF 2/3 from 031130H 19120CH July. Cumulative casualties: USMC 10 KIA, 62 MIA; Enemy 21 KIA (C), and 37 KIA (P). For the period 3-19 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 46 sorties delivering 89.1 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 4 KBA (C), 17 KBA (P), 1 structure destroyed, 16 bunkers destroyed, 6 damaged, 9 secondary explosions, 13 secondary fires, 2 AA positions destroyed and 2 trenches damaged.



- c. (S) Operation Buffalo: A search and destroy operation by elements of the Third Marine Division in Quang Tri Province, 02100CH 140859H July. This operation was a continuation of Operation Cimarron. Cumulative casualties: USMC 159 KIA, 885 WIA, 1 MIA; Enemy 1290 KIA (C), 513 KIA (P), 13 Det, 2 PW and 100 wpns cptd. For the period 2-14 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 608 sorties delivering 1214.8 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 22 KBA (C), 78 KBA (P), 71 structures destroyed, 6 damaged, 104 bunkers destroyed, 25 damaged, 28 secondary explosions, 7 secondary fires, 29 trenches demaged, 11 AA positions destroyed, 8 damaged, 2 road cuts, 6 mortar positions destroyed, 2 damaged and 1 tunnel damaged. Helicopters flew 1035 sorties for 388.0 hours, lifting 660 passengers, 157 med evacs and 88.1 tons of cargo.
- p. (S) Operation Choctaw: During this reporting period battalion 2/4 provided security for the Fourth Marines CP complex, Hill 51 and the Phong Dien district headquarters, while conducting extensive patrolling of the assigned area of operation. This operation commenced 220001H May and terminated 092400H July. Cumulative casualties: Friendly 18 KIA, 153 MIA; Enemy 160 KIA (C), 287 KIA (P), 11 PW/VC, 4 PW/NVA, 1 Ret/VC, 84 Inn Civ, 117 Det, and 34 wpns cptd. For the period 1-9 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 21 sorties delivering 35.6 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 2 secondary fires. Helicopters flew 127 sorties for 46.5 hours lifting 180 passengers and 2.6 tons of cargo.
- q. (S) Operation Cimarron: A seven battalion search and destroy operation in Quang Tri Province which began 010001H June as a continuation of Operation Prairie IV and terminated 02100CH July. Cumulative casualties: Friendly 136 KIA, 846 WIA, 5 MIA; Enemy 563 KIA (C), 413 KIA (P), 153 Det, 24 Inn Civ, 87 wpns cptd and 4 PW. For the period 1-2 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 335 sorties delivering 667.2 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 68 KBA (C), 138 KBA (P), 26 secondary explosions, 10 secondary fires, 13 rocket positions destroyed, 15 AA positions destroyed, 75 bunkers destroyed, 6 demaged, 37 trenches demaged, 10 structures destroyed and 2 road cuts. Helicopters flew 1343 sorties for 338.8 hours lifting 799 passengers, 332 med evacs and 238.3 tons of cargo.
- r. (S) Operation Calhoun: Elements of the 1st and 5th Marines conducted a search and destroy mission in Quang Nam Province from 250300H June to 011200H July. Cumulative casualties: USMC 6 KIA, 36 MIA; Enemy 24 VC KIA (C), 27 VC KIA (P), 3 VC PH and 31 Det. For 1 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 4 sorties delivering 1.0 tons of ordnance. Helicopters flew 91 sorties for 23.9 hours lifting 153 passengers and 14.7 tons of cargo.



s. (S) Operation Beacon Torch: SIF consisting of Blt 2/3 and Ham-16k (Rein). Objective was the destruction of VC/NVA forces within the operating area in Quang Nem and Quang Tin provinces. This operation began 180620H June and terminated 012k00H July. Cumulative casualties: USMC 11 KIA, 72 WIA; Enemy 85 VC KIA (C), 84 VC KIA (P) and 31 Det. For 1 July, fixed wing aircraft flew 2 sorties delivering 4.0 tons of ordnance. Reported BDA was 2 KBA (P) and 2 structures destroyed.

# 2. (S) DAILY SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

#### 1 JULY

(U) Col Arthur O. SCHMAGTM assumed command of MAG-11. The change of command ceromony was conducted on 30 June, at the HAMS-11 flight line. (Appendix 11)

#### 2 JUI,Y

(C) Maj Bruce A. MARTIN, WMF(AM)-232, was forced to eject due to battle damage inflicted during a close air support mission in the EMZ. Although the F-8E aircraft was lost, Maj MARTIN suffered only minor injuries. (Appendix 11)

#### 5 JULY

- (U) Capt R. M. ONDRICK, WMF(AW)-232, dropped the 50,000th ton of ordnance delivered by MAG-11 aircraft since the Group came in country in July 1965. (Appendix 11)
- (C) LtCol NEECON, of WMO-6, led a section of armed gunships in support of reconnaissance team "Canal Zone". The team was extracted after three flights of fixed Wing aircraft were controlled in close air support. (Appendix 15)

#### 6 JULY

- (C) MACS-4 became fully operational, with the first employment of Marine Tactical Data Systems in support of combat operations. (Appendix 10)
- (C) An A-4E, from VMA-311, piloted by Maj R. E. BRUBAKER, on a SHRFKE-AVEL-SAW mission in the vicinity of the DMZ was downed by a SAM. The pilot suffered minor injuries after ejecting and was rescued the following morning by an Air Force SAR helicopter. (Appendix 3)





#### 8 JULY

(S) Dong Ha came under mortar and artillery attack at 133CH. Three UH-1Es, ten UH-34s, one APS antenna, fuel bags and hoses were damaged. There was one MA. Dong Ha came under fire again at 1730H with no damage resulting. (Appendix 14)

#### 10 JULY

(S) A WNO-3 armed UH-1E was hit by enemy fire five miles north-west of Phu Bai. One crewmember was WIA. (Appendix 14)

#### 12 JULY

(S) HAM-265 replaced HAM-164 on the SLF with HAM-164 assuming the CH-46 role at Phu Bai. (Appendix 14)

#### 15 JULY

- (C) MACS-7 departed RW, joining 3d MAW. (Appendix 10)
- (S) MAG-12, commenced the use of the CE-1-3 catapult at Chu Lai, using the short cross-wind runway. (Appendix 12)
- (C) At 150025H Danang Air Base received an estimated 30 to 50 rounds of 122mm rockets. The southern portion of the Air Base received the majority of the rounds. Artillery counter-battery was executed on suspected rocket positions. Artillery and TPQ-10 missions were conducted on possible escape routes. USAF casualties: 8 KIA, 138 WIA (40 hospitalized). USAF had two C-130s and six F-4Cs destroyed, while nine F-4s, one HH-43, twelve C-123s, one C-47 and one C-130 were damaged. USMC casualties were 15 WIA. USMC had two F-8s destroyed. Aircraft receiving damage were: One F-8, five A-6As, one EA-6A, one TF-9J, one EF-10B, one C-117, six UH-34s and one KC-130. Other damage reported was: Ten huts destroyed, two huts minor damage, one avionics shop, operations room and motor pool area.

#### 19 JULY

(S) MAG-16 units, based at Phu Bai, dispersed four CH-46s, five UH-1Es and twelve UH-34s to MMAF overnight due to increased state of alert at Phu Bai. (Appendix 14)



#### 21 JULY

(C) A C-117 of H&MS-12 received light semi-automatic fire while on a radio-relay mission. The aircraft received one hit resulting in two U.S. WIA (minor). (Appendix 2)

#### 23 JULY

(U) At 213CH, the 9th Engineer Battalion received one incoming M-26 fragmentation grenade. It was hurled or catapulted a distance of over 200 yards, indicating that the VC are employing some type of sling or crossbow arrangement. There were no casualties. (Appendix 13)

#### 24 JULY

(C) One CH-46 from HMM-165 was hit by intense enemy ground fire. The pilot was forced to land near Con Thien. The pilot and crew were extracted by the number two aircraft. A repair crew was flown in, the aircraft was repaired and returned to Ky Ha on 27 July. (Appendix 15)

#### 25 JULY

- (S) An HMM-361 UH-34 was hit by moderate small arms fire five miles northwest of Dong Ha, the pilot was UTA. (Appendix 14)
  - (S) Dong Ha came under an artillery attack at 1910H. (Appendix 14)

#### 26 JULY

(U) Capts J. FAULKNER and J. McCORD, from WMFA-542, ambushed 20 Viet Cong in a box canyon, killing 14 and destroying five fortified structures. (Appendix 7)

#### 29 JULY

(C) A flight of four aircraft from HNN-165 departed Ky Ha on a strike mission in support of ROK Marine Corps. After picking up its troops, the flight proceeded to the drop zone, where the first two aircraft received enemy fire while on approach. A total of 319 troops were lifted. No fixed wing or UH-1Es participated. (Appendix 15)



# 3. AIR OPERATIONS

a. (S) Fixed Wing Jet. 1st MAW jet operations during July flew a total of 7,827 sorties. Sortie breakdown for 1-31 July is as follows: (Appendix 3)

(S) III MAF SUPPORT CAS/IZP 1031/378 DAS 4303 Escort 286 ID 147 Photo/ECM 271/167 Other 633 Total Sorties 7216	(S) 7TH AF SUPPORT SI/TH 20 RT/TA 236 ECM 51 Total Sorties 307
(S) 7TH FLT SUPPORT EQM 145 Total Sorties 145	(S) US ARMY SUPPORT CAS/DAS 1/15 Total Sorties 16
(S) ARWN SUPPORT CAS/DAS 1/74 Total Sorties 75	(S) ROKMC SUPPORT CAS/DAS 20/48 Total Sorties 68


Grand Total Sorties: 7,827

- (S) Of DAS and ID sorties listed, 1,990 were TPQ-10 controlled and there were 202 Red Blazer flights.
- b. (S) <u>Helicopter Operations</u>. During July, 1st MAW helicopters flew 41,561 sorties for 15,149.2 hours. A total of 56,993 troops/passengers and 6,332.4 tons of cargo were lifted. (Appendix 3)
- c. (C) Electronic Countermeasures/Photo. Photographic activities of VMCJ-1 varied considerably from that of June. There were 380.3 hours logged, during which 265 sorties were flown in completing 301 missions with 9 missions cancelled and 64 missions pending. A total of 180,962 feet of paper was utilized in processing 83,636 negatives. (Appendix 2)
- 4. (U) Casualties. Following is a breakdown of 1st MAW casualties for July 1967. (Appendix 1)

HOSTILE

NON-HOSTILE

Total medical evacuees: 59
\* Includes 4 USN, \*\* Includes 1 USN, \*\*\* Includes 5 USN.



5. (U) Awards. The 1st MAN Awards Section processed 3,228 awards in July. (Appendix 1)

FORMARDED TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS	RECEIVED FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS		
Legion of Merit 1 Silver Star 4 Distinguished Flying Cross 31 Bronze Star Medal 8 Navy Commendation Medal 45 Single Mission Air Medal 31 Cert. of Comm. CG, FMFPAC 16 Total 136	Silver Star  Distinguished Flying Cross 35  Bronze Star Medal 7  Navy Commendation Medal 41  Single Mission Air Medal 20  Cert. of Comm. CG, FMFPAC 2  Total 111		
Air Medals awarded at 1st MAW: Purple Hearts awarded at 1st MAW:	2,872 109 2,981 Grand Total3,228		

- 6. (SNF) Intelligence/Counterintelligence. During July activities of the 1st MAN G-2 consisted principally of maintaining and disseminating information and intelligence concerning fire incidents and hits involving Wing aircraft; maintenance of air order of battle and air capabilities of North Vietnam and Communist China; and maintenance of Order of Battle, target folders and other data concerning selected targets in North and South Vietnam and Laos.
  - (U) The majority of 1st MAM Photo Interpretation (0241) personnel continued to function under OpCon of III MAF.
- (U) Coordination of intelligence efforts and exchange of information with the following units continued during the period: III MAF; 1st MARDIV; 3rd MARDIV; 7th AF (Saigon); USAF 35th Tactical Fighter Wing; Det. C-1, Special Forces; Command Task Unit 77. (Appendix 2)
- 7. (U) Informational Services. All significant events occurring during the month of July, within the 1st MAW, were covered by ISO writer/photographer teams. There were no casualties among ISO personnel although its writers and photographers accompanied helicopters on every major operation, as well as numerous medical evacuations, resupply and transport missions.
- (U) Wing ISO made 125 news releases during July while its Photo Lab processed 8,240 prints in the following categories: 6,601 prints to accompany news releases; 1,387 photos of technical matters; 240 SRB and ID prints; 12 photos for Fleet Home Town release; and 3,400 feet of motion picture film. ISO also forwarded 2,502 Fleet Home Town News stories and 125 taped interviews. (Appendix 7)



8. (U) Chaplain Activities. During the month of July, Divine Services were provided seven days per week in the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Chaplains of the Wing conducted 7 lectures on the Religions of Vietnam and 12 Indoctrination lectures. A total of W\$ 458,842 was donated to deserving Vietnamese institutions along with considerable amounts of food, clothing, medical supplies and other items. (Appendix 9)

#### 9. (C) Logistics

- a. (C) Air Freight. Marine Air Freight and Passenger Terminal at Danang, Air Base, processed 28,658 passengers, 2,616 tons of cargo and 1 ton of mail in July.
- (C) Cargo and passengers moved through Danang Air Base by USAF and MAC for Navy and Marine Corps totaled 9,424 tons of cargo and 34,541 passengers.
- b. (C) Embarkation. 1st MAW cargo moved in and out of Danang by surface means in July totaled 1,580 tons.
- c. (C) Ordnance. Class VA munitions expended during July by 1st MAW tactical units set a new record of 14,383 tons.
- d. (0) <u>Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System (TAFDS)</u>. The following amounts of fuel were issued during July: JP-4 12,526,045 gallons; AvGas: 1,255,156 gallons. Total issued: 13,781,201 gallons.
- e. (C) <u>Food Services</u>. The 1st MAW is now operating 22 messes subsisting an average of 19,000 men daily. Ration cost for July was approximately \$1.57 per man, per day. (Appendix 4)
- 10. (U) Supply. The deadlined rate of Ground Support Equipment continues to be a matter of great concern. Major problem areas continue to be a lack of readily available spare parts, quality of production, environmental conditions and operating techniques. The SATS Weapon Loader continues to lead the list in ratio of deadlined equipment versus on-hand equipment. Continuing correspondence has been initiated between this Headquarters and CG, FMFPac to alleviate this problem.
- 11. (C) <u>Communications/Electronics</u>. The 1st MAW Military Affiliate Radio System handled 1,022 phone patches and 5,685 messages in July. Total message traffic handled by 1st MAW Communications Center in July was 102,229 of which 50,164 were outgoing and 52,135 were incoming messages. (Appendix 6)



12. (C) Base Development/Military Construction. During the month of July, G-5 Division conducted a thorough review of all new and previously submitted minor new construction requests to validate requirements and prepare an overall FMAN priority list for submission to III MAF for integration into a Marine Command I Corps priority list.

At Danang Air Base considerable construction effort was expended on repair of facilities damaged by the 15 July rocket attack. The Tango Sector rehabilitation project was approximately 75 percent complete.

This marks the final date of operation of the G-5 as a separate staff division. Commencing 1 August 1967 1st MAW Base Development will operate under the cognizance of ACofS, G-4. (Appendix 5)

13. (U) Weather Summary. From 1 to 6 July a series of minor waves caused an increase of high and mid-level cloudiness over Southeast Asia. Low-level winds continued to remain southerly to southwesterly throughout the period. An increase in moisture in the low levels from 2 to 5 July, caused an increase in thunderstowns and rainshower activity. Patchy fog and stratus in the valleys also resulted from the moisture.

Throughout the entire period of 6 to 13 July, the low-level winds continued to be southwesterly. A speed maximum in the low-level winds caused a slight increase in rainshower and thunderstorm activity over the mountains. Patchy fog and stratus continued to form in the valleys during the early morning hours.

Conditions for air operations were excellent over most of I Corps from 1 to 13 July, except briefly over the mountains during the afternoon due to rainshower and thunderstorm activity.

From 13 to 15 July, the direction of the low-level winds slowly shifted to a southerly flow. Cloudiness decreased during this period, visibility was generally unlimited. Low stratus and fog continued to form in the valleys during the morning hours.

From the 16 to 20 July, easterly flow was observed in the lower levels. Mostly clear skies and unrestricted visibility prevailed over I Corps. Weather effects on air operations was generally excellent.

Weak southwesterly flow prevailed from 20 to 24 July. Ceilings averaged 4,000 feet over most of I Corps. Scattered rainshowers and thunderstorms occured over all of I Corps.



#### UNCLASSIFIED

On 25 July a series of troughs and surges of speed caused a considerable increase in cloudiness. Light rain, stratus and scattered thunderstorms hampered air operations over all of I Corps through 28 July.

On 29 July decreasing speed in the lower level winds caused a lifting of ceilings and a decrease in cloud coverage through 31 July. The major weather factor over the mountains for the period was scattered thunderstorms.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET NOFORN

PART FOUR

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

SECRET NOFORN

SECTION TO

UNCLASSIFIED

. APPENDIX 1

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- APPENDIX 4 1ST MAW G-4 & WING SUPPLY COMMAND CHRONOLOGY (C)


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- APPENDIX 20 MISCELLANDOUS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (SNF)

UNCLASSIFIED

4-2

ANGTONIA IN



1:0EK:0ek 750 14 Aug 067

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Subj: Command Chronology for the month of July 1967

Ref: (a) Wing Order 5750.10

Encl: √(1) Wing Order 1050.7N Ch 2

√(2) Career Advisory New Letter
√(3) Roster of Key G-1 Personnel

- 1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) through (3) are submitted.
- 2. As of 31 July 1967 the total number of Local National Civilians employed by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing increased from 1085 to 1136. This total includes 395 funded by appropriated funds and 741 paid from non appropriated funds. The total 1st Marine Aircraft payroll for Local National Civilians was approximately 3,718,588 \$RVN of this total 1,738,358 \$RVN was appropriated funds and 1,980,230 \$RVN was non appropriated funds.
- 3. During July 183 officers and 958 enlisted personnel rotated to CONUS.
- 4. During July 171 officers and 889 enlisted personnel joined the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
- 5. During July 1 officer and 282 enlisted personnel extended their overseas tour.
- 6. During July 4 officers and 415 enlisted personnel were granted special leave.
- 7. Reenlistment rates for the month of July were as follows:

CARLEER	FIRST TERM	TOTAL
85%	33%	55%





1:0EK:oek 5750

8. Casualties for the month of July were as follows:

HOSTILE			NON HOSTILE				
KĽÁ	WIA:	DOW	MIA	CPT	DTH	INJ	TOTAL
10	134*	0	0	0	6	83**	233*+₩

Total medical evacuees - 59

Total returned to duty - 0

Cumulative total - 1967 (all types of casualties) - 1,285

#Includes 4 USN
\*\*Includes 1 USN
\*\*\*Includes 5 USN

9. Average strength total for the month of July were as follows:

	MARTNES	NAVY	TOTAL
Officers	1653*	72	1725
Enlisted	1/1,2/16	306	14552
Total	15899	378	16277

\*NA-902, AGO-751

- 10. MMHG-1 opened a snack bar and soft drink case lot sales. This activity sells cold soft drinks, sandwichs, pastry, cigarettes, assorted candy, and packaged snacks.
- 11. MAG-11 opened a concessionaire operated laundry and dry cleaning call office.
- 12. MAG-12 built an addition to their warehouse.
- 13. The MAG-13 Exchange Outlet now has electricity for operating cash registers, and other related Exchange Office and Store equipment.
- 14. The following concessionaire operated facilities were established at FAG-16:
  - a. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Call Office.
  - b. Portrait painting.
- c. A Snack Bar opened on the beach, and sells cold soft drinks and snacks.





1:0EK:oek 5750

- 15. The following damage was a result of the rocket attack on 15 July 1967:
- a. Warehouse in the MWSG-17 area--doors Butler building were blown open, merchandise was blown to the deck. Damage resulted to jewelery, electronics, and other miscellaneous merchandise.
- b. MWHG-1 store, doors blown open, merchandise scattered on the deck. Damage resulted to jewelery, electronics, and other miscellaneous merchandise. Merchandise was reduced for sale, and some items surveyed.
- c. MAG-11 had heavy demage resulted to building, fixtures and merchandise. Merchandise disposed of by markdown and survey. The Exchange has been repaired. New snack bar building was a total loss. This new building was empty.
- d. There was minor damages to NWSG-17 Exchange, and the Barber Shops located at NAG-11 and NWHG-1.
- 16. Entertainment and recreation during July included the following:
- a. 10 July 1967 hiss Miller and the Good Guys appeared in the Tango Sector area.
- b. The Beauties and the Beasts made 10 appearances in the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units in DaWang and Chu Lai; the appearances were as follows:
  - 10 July "A" Battery 1st IAAM Bn
  - 11 July MACS-4 and "B" Battery 1st LAAM Bn
  - 12 July MASS-2 and "C" Battery 1st LAAM Bn
  - 13 July MdSG-17
  - ll July MAG-11
  - 15 July MAG-16
  - 16 July Mas Battery 1st IAAM Bn and Hads-1
  - 17 July MAG-13
  - 18 July MAG-12, 2nd IAAM Bn
  - 19 July MAG-36, MASS-3
- c. 30 July 1967 Tessie Reyes and the Las Vegas Trio appeared in in 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units in Dong Ha.

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- d. 31 July 1967 Tessie Reyes and the Las Vegas Trio appeared in MAG-16 area.
  - e. During July recreational tours included the following:
    - (1) DaWang to Chu Lai 17
    - (2) Chu Lai to DaNang 6
    - (3) Cultural and Education tour of DaNang 29
    - (4) Fishing Trips 186

H. D. STOTT

#### OPERATING FORCES PARENT COMMAND CODES

UNIT	COMMAND CODE	•
MWHG-1 MAG-11 MAG-12 MAG-13 MAG-16 MAG-36	A C D E G L	
MWSG-17	Н	

#### OPERATING FORCES UNIT CODE

UNIT	UNIT CODE	UNIT	UNIT CODE
H&HS-1, MWHG-1	FA	VMFA-542	HN
H&MS-11, MAG-11	FE	HMM-163	JA
MABS-11, MAG-11	FF	HMM-164	JВ
H&MS-12, MAG-12	FH	HMM <b>-1</b> 65	JC
MABS-12, MAG-12	FJ	HMM-262	N
H&MS-13, MAG-13	${ t FL}$	HMM-263	JE
MABS-13, MAG-13	FM	HMM <b>-2</b> 65	JF
H&MS-16, MAG-16	FS ·	HMM-361	JG
MABS-16, MAG-16	FT	HMM-362	JH
H&MS-17, MWSG-17	fV	HMM-363	$\mathbf{J}\mathbf{J}$
WERS-17, MWSG-17	FW	HMH <b>-4</b> 63	JM
H&MS-36, MAG-36	GÐ	VMO-2	KA
MABS-36, MAG-36	Œ	VMO-3	KB
VMCJ-1	GS	VM0-6	KD
VMF-115	GX	matcu-62	KG
VMA-121	GY	matcu-67	KF
VMA-211	HA	MATCU-68	KN
VMA-223 =	HD	MASS=2	KW
VMF (AW )-232	HE	MASS-3	KY
VMF(AW)=235	HF	MACS-4	KZ
VMA (AM )-575	HG	MACS-7	${f r}$
VMA-311	HH	<b>1</b> ST IAAM BN	LG
VMFA_314	HJ	2ND LAAM BN	IH
VMA (AW)-533	MH	11TH DENTAL CO	WZ2

ENCLOSURE (5) Ch-2 (1 Jul 1967)

#### HEADQUARTERS 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Pacific FPO San Francisco 96602

WgO 1050.7N Ch 2 l:JIR:rs 1 Jul 1967

#### WING ORDER 1050.7N Ch 2

From: Commanding General To: Distribution List

Subj: Emergency Leave

Encl: (1) Enclosure (5) to the Basic Order

To direct pen changes and to transmit enclosure (5) to the 1. Purpose. basic order.

## 2. Action.

- a. Make the following pen corrections:
- (1) Page 1, basic order; add to the list of enclosures "(5) Operating Forces Parent Command and Unit Codes".
- (2) Page 2, paragraph 10 of enclosure (2); delete "CC:13AHD0000" and insert "CC:\*B\*\* \*\*\* 1104D00".
  - (3) Add the following asterisk notations to page 2, enclosure (2):

"\*\*Insert Parent Command Code (one digit-Group Code) as shown in enclosure (5)".

"\*\*\*Insert Unit Codes (two digits - Squadron/Battalion Codes) as shown in enclosure (5)".

"Example of Cost Codes (CC) for H&HS-1, MWHG-1 is CC:8BAFA1104D00".

b. Insert enclosure (1) as enclosure (5) to the basic order.

DISTRIBUTION "A"



1831 God LANGE, STOTT.

# CAREER ADVISORY NEWSLETTER



# 1" MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

ENCLOSURE (2)

#### JULY 1967

The Wing Career Advisory Newsletter is published primarily for Career Advisory Personnel. This Newsletter is not intended for general distribution nor is it directive in nature. Although the information contained should be disseminated as quickly as possible. Any information, questions or suggestions concerning the Career Advisory program are welcome by this office, which is located in building 70, Da Nang AB, telephone "Moment 337".

Wing Career Advisory Officer

Capt. M. T. DOMINGUEZ

Wing Career Advisory NCO

GySgt E. S. LOGAN

Wing Education NGO

Sgt W. D. RATCLIFF

Sgt J. F. SULLIVAN 

#### SHORT TIMER'S DUE FOR EARLY RELEASE

Washington - Enlisted Marine veterns of Vietnam who has returned to the States and are "short timers" may soon begin getting earlier releases. Usually, if they are not going to ship over, they have been released upon return if they had no more than 60 days to go. The theory is that you can't get much use out of a man with that little time to do. The Navy has just announced that the returning Vietnam veterens with less than six month to serve on his cruise and who does not want to ship over maybe release as much as six months early. Those with critical skills however, may have to stay longer, even to the end of their enlistment. Previously the Navy had release such men if upon return the had three months to go. The change doubled the period permitting release six months early instead of three months.

The Marine Corps, asked whether it was considering a similar move, replied that the directive laying down the 60 day early release rule is under study and a decision is expected soon.

#### NAVY HIKES SPARE-TIME TUITION AID

WASHINGTON - Pushing for better education opportunities, the Navy has:

- 1. Taken the dellar limit off tuition aid, thus opening the way for payment of 75 percent of the tuition for off-duty study.
- 2. Opened the road for exceptional Navy and Marine enlisted men to go directly to the Naval Academy without spending a year at Academy prep.

The Navy now pays only \$14.25 per semester hour for an enlisted man's or officer's night school or other eligible course on his own time. This amounts to a top of \$42.73 for a standard three-hour course.

But the tuition for three semester hours at college is likely to run over \$100-\$120 is not unusual. By paying for 75 of it, \$90 on a \$120 course, the service would more than double the help it has been giving. The new rate is effectice for courses begun July 1 this year or later.

While the new rate of pay will be a big help to a lot of people, it is no general bonanza. There is not enough money in the Navy's off-duty education appropriation this year to pay the new rate to all who will nedd it. Commanding Officers are directed to give priority consideration for tuition aid to those who can't get G.I Bill or other help. The tuition aid change was directed by a Department of Defense instruction issued about three months ago.

Another part of the package is an order to Commanding Officers to see to it that there is an educational service officer aboard and that all people coming onto the command shall be counseled within 30 days about educational opportunities in the Navy.

On the Academy front, enlisted who meet the qualifications and get the COs blessing may apply to BuPers by next November 1 for admission next July 1. This is a trial to see who it works. It doesn't effect the academy prep program, which requires filing by May 1 for entry in the Naval Preparatory School in September and the Academy the following July 1. The applicant must be no less than 17 or have passed his 21st birthday by the July date for entering the academy. He must have a satisfactory high school education er equivalent. His score on the GCT-ARI test must be at least 118 and no waivers. He must have two years of obligated service and must be prepared to put up \$12.50 for the cellege board examinations and \$300 for initial uniform costs when he reports.

#### NAVY TIMES

#### 

CG FMFPac message 142051Z Feb67 lists Pacific Ocean area duty stations available for use as reenlistment incentives. Reassignment of personnel between the security forces/Marine Corps Base, Pacific and WestPac FMF units is a continuing program which offers excellent potential to assist our retention effort. Maximum use of these stations as reenlistment options is encouraged. The below listed stations will be granted for first term reenlistments of three or more years.

1. MB, NAS, Barber's Point

2. MB, NAD Oahu

3. MB, NAVB, Pearl Harbor

4. Camp H. M. Smith

5. MCAS Kaneohe

6. MCAS, Iwakuni

7. MB, NAS Atsugi

8. MB, FITAct Sasebo

9. MB, NAVB Yekesuka

10. MB, NAF, Naha

11. MCAF, Futema

12. Camp Butler

13. MB, NAVB, Subic Bay

14. MB, NAVSTA, Sangley Point

CG FMF PAC INFO BULLETIN 1133 June 67

#### ATLATIC DUTY STATIONS

Below is a list of overseas stations, Atlantic, extracted from MCO P5400.6B, List of Marine Corps Activities, which may be requested as options for four or 6 year reenlistments.

1. MB, NAVSTA Bermuda

2. MB, NAVSTA Roosevelt Rds

3. MB, San Juan

4. MB, Rodman, Canal Zone

5. MB, NAVSTA Argentia, NF

. MB, NAVFOR Iceland

7. MarDet, NAVACT London

8. MB, NAVACT, Rota Spain

9. MB, NAVSUPACT Naples

10. MB, Kenitra Morocco

11. MarDet, NAVSTA Trinidad

CG FMF PAC INFO BULLETIN 1133 June 67

OPTIONS FOR MOS'S 2841, 2851 and 2861

A wide choice of I&I staffs and MARTD's are affered as reenlistment options for Radio Repairmen, Aviation Radio Repairman, and Radio Technicians. The 18 I&I staffs and seven MARTD's listed below are available for immediate assignment for corporals and sergeants in MOS's 2841, 2851, and 2861 who reenlist for four or more years. Commanders are requested to ensure that all eligible Marines are appraised of these billet vacancies. Since the billets are for immediate assignment, emphasis is on Marines due for rotation and reassignment. Submit requests by message to this headquarters.

#### 2841 Cpl or 2861 Sgt (1st enlist)

I&I Staff 6th CommBn, ForTrps,

USMCR, Ft Schuyler, NY

I&I Statt #th CommBn, ForTrps,

USMCR, Brooklyn, NY

I&I Staff, HqCo 25thMar,

USMCR, Worchester, Mass

I&I Staff Co "C" 4th CommBn,

ForTrps, USMCR, Hunt, NY

I&I Staff 4th FSR, ForTrps,

USMCR, Freemansburg, Pa

I&I Staff 5th CommCo, ForTrps

USMCR, Greensboro, NC

I&I Staff 4th Anti Tank Bn

USMCR, Rome, Ga.

I&I Staff 4thBn, 14th Mar, USMCR, Birminham, Ala

I&I Staff 2d 155 Btry, ForTrps

USMCR, Texarkana, Tex

I&I Staff 5th ForReconCo ForTrps

USMCR, Albuquerque, N. M.

I&I Staff 3d Bn, 24thMar, USMCR

New Orleans, La.

I&I Staff HqCo, 24thMar, USMCR

Indianapolis, Ind.

I&I Staff MaintBn, 4th FSR, For-

Trps, USMCR, Wichita, Kan.

I&I Staff 2ndBn, 24thMar USMCR

Chicago, Ill.

I&I Staff HqCo, 23rdMar, USMCR Alameda, Calif I&I Staff 3d Anglico, ForTrps, USMCR, Long Beach Calif.

I&I Staff lstBn, L4thMar,
USMCR, Los Angeles, Calif
 I&I Staff 2dBn, 23rdMar,
USMCR, Santa Monica, Calif

#### 2851 Cpl or 2861 Sgt (1st Enl)

MARTD, NAS, Dallas, Texas MARTD, NAS, Brooklyn, N. Y. MARTD, NAS, Glenview MARTD, SU 1, MARTD, Glenview at Chicago, Ill.

MARTD, NAS Los Alamitos, Calif MARTD, NAS Alameda, Calif MARTD, NAS South Weymouth, Mass

CG FMF PAC INFO BULLETIN 61133 June 67

\*

COMBAT COMMISSIONS

Another means of advancement has been opened for enlisted Marines in Vietnam. MCO 1421.7 authorizes commanders to nominate Marines who demonstrate outstanding combat leadership for appointment to commissioned grades. Requirements are outstanding combat leadership while under fire, U. S. Citizenship rank of PFC or higher, maximum age of 20 and not have reached 37th birthday by end of fiscal year commissioned, maximum GCT 110, satisfactory disciplinary record, unquestionable moral integrity and commissioned officer caliber. Nominations may be submitted at any time to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code DPB) via the normal chain of command.

MCO 1040.14B announces policies and procedures for the appointment of warrant officers and enlisted Marines to limited duty officer grade and enlisted Marines to warrent officer grade. Two categories of limited duty officers are established. Permanent male warrant officers with 10 to 14 years of active service are eligible for appointment to temporary LDO status as first lieutenants. When selected for promotion to Major, they will be reappointed to permanent grade of Captain and continue to serve as LDO's. Male Staff Commissioned officers with 15 to 23 years of active service are eligible for appointment to LDO status as second lieutenants. Marines in this second category will have a terminal grade of Captain. The warrents officer program is opened to Marines in the grade of Corporal and above with 6 through 12 years of active service. Waiver of the minimum 12 years of service may be recommended.

CG FMF PAC INFO BULLETIN 1133 June 67

IT IS A GOOD CAREER STAY WITH IT

#### CAREER NOTES

Right now, there has never been a more better way to get your Career on the right track. With the duty station available to the young 1st termer Marine. Did you know that you could stay overseas in the Pacific or Atlantic for a period of FIVE YEARS? Maybe you did, but never-the-less it is possible at this time. After a tour in Vietnam a single or in some cases married personel, may extend his time for Furk (4) years or more and be given a choice of duty virtually anywhere. Some Marine would like State Department, some would like Sea Duty, These are only two of the many available to Marines at this time. Most; and I would say all Marines come into the Marine Corps to travel? Sure they travel to Vietnam- but after a tour here a man can go just about anyplace, True, some MOS are critical, but there is always the option for reenlistment. THE MARINE CORPS IS A GOOD CAREER SO LETS STAY WITH IT.

GYSGT LOGAN Career Adv NCO

#### 

Designated dates of campaign periods for Marines who have served in Vietnam and are eligible to wear campaign ribbons have been announced in SECNAV NOTICE 1650. The following campaign periods for the Vietnam operations have been designated: March 15, 1962 to March 7, 1965, Vietnam Advisory Campaign; March 8, 1965 to December 1965, Vietnam Defense Campaign; and 1 July 1966 to a date to be announced will be authorized to wear a ribbon which, as yet, has not been announced. A Bronze Star is eligible to be worn by eligible personnel on the suspension ribbon and ribbon bar of the Vietnam Service Medal for each of the above campaigns in which personnel have participated. Only one star is authorized for each campaign. Stars are not authorized to be worn on the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, since on this medal denot participation in more than one authorized area of occupation, such as Lebanon, Taiwan, Cuba, etc. Servicemen serving in Vietnam during these dates and believe they rate such campaign medals are urged to contact their respective commands in order that an entry can be made in the Service Record Book

#### DECLASSIFIED

#### ROSTER OF KEY G-1 PERSONNEL

BILLET	RANK/NAME	DATE
ACofS, G-1	LtCol Harry D. STOTT	1-31Jul67
Wing Clubs	LtCol Raymon A. CAMERON	1-31Ju167
Asst G-1/Pers Req & ActgO	Haj John A. Rogers	1-31Ju167
Personnel Officer	Maj DAVID D. JOHNS	1-31Ju167
Pers RespO	Maj Charles E. KNETTLES	1-31Ju167
Special Services Officer	Maj Clement D. TIMONEY	1-31Jul67
Career AdvisoryO/EdO	Capt Marino T. DOMINGUEZ	1-31Ju167
Admin Officer	2ndLt Glen V. FOULER	1-31Ju167
IRO	2ndLt Robert D. BROOKS	1-31Ju167
CCRO	2ndLt Thomas F. BINGHAM	1-31Ju167
Exch0	2ndLt Don C. LACEY	1-31Ju <b>1</b> 67
CID	2ndLt Frederick C. STILSON	1-31Ju167
Admin Chief	MSgt Joe L. ROGERS	1-31Ju167
Personnel Chief	GySgt Clarence L. HAMILTON	1-31Ju167

#### G-3 Section Supporting Documents Appendix 3

- Tab 1 Wing Awards Officer Command Chronology July 1967
  - 2 Wing Legal Office Command Chronology July 1967
  - " 3 Msg 06 July 1967 Subj: 1st MAW JOPREP/OPREP-3/Pinnacle/005
  - " 4 Briefing for the Commandant of the Marine Corps
  - 5 1st MAW Fixed Wing & Helo Flight Sorties & Flight Hours
  - " 6 Chart of G-3 Chain of Command
  - " 7 Chart 1st MAN Status Board
  - 8 1st MAN C-3 Officer & Enlisted Personnel Roster

# HEADQUARTERS 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Pacific FPO San Francisco 96602

7B:kpd/2 1650 14 Aug 1967

From: Wing Awards Officer

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Attn: Historian)

Subj: Command Chronology, July 1967

Ref: (a) WgO 5750

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following is submitted:

The Wing Awards Section processed 3228 awards during July. The types and numbers are as follows:

PROCESSED AND FORWARDED HIGHER HEADQUARTERS	то	RECEIVED FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS	
Legion of Merit	l	Silver Star	6
Silver Star	4	Distinguished Flying	
Distinguished Flying		Cross	35
Cross	31	Bronze Star	7
Bronze Star	8	Single Mission Air	
Single Mission Air		Medal	20
Medal	31	Navy Commenndation	41
Navy Commendation	45	Certificate of Commen-	
Certificate of Commen-		dation from Commanding	
dation from Commanding		General, FMFPac	2
General, FMFPac	<u> 16</u>		
	•	TOTAL	111
TOTAL	136		

Air Medals awarded at 1st MAW 2872

Purple Hearts awarded at 1st MAW 109

TOTAL 2981

GRAND TOTAL 3228

W. B. GUYN

WING LEGAL OFFICE 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Pacific FPO San Francisco 96602

17:RKC:jrj 5000/1 AUG 7 1957

From: Staff Legal Officer

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) WgO 5710.1B

Encl:  $\sqrt{(1)}$  Subject Report

1. Pursuant to reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith:

R. K. CULVER

STAFF SECTION REPORTING: Wing Legal Office, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

LOCATION: Danang, Republic of Vietnam

REPORTED PERIOD: 1-31 July 1967

PART ONE:

#### 1. STAFF:

Lieutenant Colonel Ralph K. CULVER, USMC, Staff Legal Officer
Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. SPENCE, USMC, Assistant Staff Legal Officer
Captain Michal B. COTTEN, USMCR, Trial/Defense Counsel
Captain David B. KING, USMCR, Trial/Defense Counsel
Captain Charles H. MITCHELL, USMC Trial/Defense Counsel
Captain John POST, USMCR, Trial/Defense Counsel
Captain Donald R. PRICHARD, USMCR, Trial/Defense Counsel
Lieutenant Jared O. BAUCH, USNR, Navy Law Specialist
2nd Lieutenant Michael I. WALLING, USMC, Trial/Defense Counsel

- 2. Not Applicable.
- 3. Average Monthly Strength: 9 officers, 10 enlisted.
- 4. None.

PART TWO:

1. No significant events occurred during the reporting period.

PART THREE:

1. None.

PART FOUR:

1. None

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

6 JULY 1967

FROM: CG FIRST MAW

TO:

NMCC CINCPAC CINCPACFLT CG FMFPAC

INFO: COMSEVENTHELT

CINCPACAF COMUSMACV AMEMB BANKOK

SEVENTH AIR FORCE

COMNAVAIRPAC (AIR MAIL)

CG III MAF CTE 70.2.1.1 COMUSMACTHAI

CONFIDENTIAL JPCCO

FIRST MAW/JOPREP/OPREP-3/PINNACLE/005 (U)

A. REFERENCE

A1. LOSS OF A-4E (BUNO 151032)

A2. 6 JULY 1967

H. AT APPROX 062230H AN A-4E OF VMA-311, MAG-12 OPERATING OUT OF CHU LAI ON A SHRIKE - ANTI-SAM MISSION AT 25 THOUSAND IN VICINITY OF DML/DMZ WAS OBSERVED TO BE HIT BY WHAT APPEARED TO BE A SAM BY WINGMAN. BOTH AIRCRAFT WERE RECEIVING STRONG FIRE CONTROL RADAR SIGNALS. BOTH PILOTS OBSERVED FIRING OF TWO SAMS, GAVE WARNING CALL AND BOTH AIRCRAFT ENTERED HIGH G SPLIT-S MANEUVER. DETONATION OCCURRED SLIGHTLY BEHIND AND BELOW WINGMAN'S AIRCRAFT. PILOT SUCCESSFULLY EJECTED AND WAS DOWN IN DMZ NORTH OF BEN HAI RIVER.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

AT APPROX 16-59N AND 106-59E. SURVIVAL RADIO SIGNAL INTERCEPTED BY MARINE A-6 AIRCRAFT IN AREA AND INFO PASSED TO APPROPRIATE AGENCIES. RESCAP PROVIDED BY MARINE A-6A, A-4ES, KC-13OF, AIR FORCE HC-13O AND NAVY EA-3B. JOLLY GREEN RECOVERED PILOT SUCCESSFULLY AT 070820H AND RETURNED HIM TO DANANG. PILOT SUFFERED DISLOCATED KNEE. FINAL REPORT THIS INCIDENT.

<u>GP-4</u> <u>DIST:</u> <u>G-3, S/S</u> - - -

/S/ E. R. ALLEN
E. R. ALLEN, CAPT
REPORTS OFF, G-3
MOMENT 23

RELEASED BY /S/ H. H. LONG

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

Tederick (. Carolin

SECRET

PART TWO
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

SECRET

# BRIEFING FOR THE COMMANDANT

OF THE MARINE CORPS

#### **DECLASSIFIED**


U. S. MARINE CORPS PROTECTAPH

THRENGIS ARBRAFT WING/
EXAMINE UNIV VIET NAM
FOR SAR FRANCISCO, SALIF. 96608


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**DAY** 31


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


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S 4	DAS	3590	3198	286	146500.2	
	ESCORT	368	312	147		
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· ·	TOTAL	222		75		
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US ARMY	CAS/DAS OTHER	7/19				
N. S.	SL/TH	234	. 16	20		
* }	RT/TA	4 44	324	236		INCLUDE KT PAF/TF11
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	OTHER	722	387	307		
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	ESCORT OTHER					
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ı.	FOR ALL	8703	7108	7827		


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
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İ	LOGISTIC TROOP CARRIER	£ **	1. 7.12	327		
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	TACT AIR COORD(AIRBORNE)	122	97	. 6		
	TACT AIRCRAFT RECOVERY	12:	<i>(y)</i>	,		
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	MAINTENANCE	458	140	199		
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[	ADMIN/LIAISON	1224	142	737		
	PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE		11			
ļ	OTHER	230	209	150		


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
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## ANTI-AIR WARFARE

	SORTIES COMMITTED/DAY	TO TO See
ARTO AIR ALERT	8	1,696
ADEX		1
LAAM FIREX		1

## AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

ACTIVE ELECTRONIC MARFARE	9	2,008
MULTI SENSOR SORTIES  ACTUR FLEATOANNA ANA DEA DE	7 . a	1,521 1,738

OFFICIAL

O. S. MARINE DORYS

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NUMBER OF THE STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PRO

## **CONTROL**

- I. AIR DEFENSE CONTROL
  - A. INTR OF MTDS
  - B. ALT TAOC ICTZ
- 2. OFFENSIVE AIR AND ASSAULT SUPPORT CONTROL
  - A. TADC
  - **B. DASC (4)**
  - C. ASRT (5)
- 3. AERIAL RECCE
  - A. TADC
  - B. DASC
- 4. MAJOR OBJECTIVE
  - A. EXPLOIT CAPABILITIES OF MTDS
    - (I) HELO CONTROL
    - (2) AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
    - (3) REAL TIME INFO AT TADC/DASC

# UFFICIAL U. S. MARINE CORPS PHOTOGRAPH

PRESIDENT TERVICES OFFICE BRANCISCO, CALIF. 86601

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# OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES

	AVG PER DAY	TOTAL
CAS	39	8,217
DAS	106	22,501
INTERDICTION	24	4,988
TOTALS	169	35,706

U. S. MARINE CORPS PURITOGRAPH

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MARINE UNIT VIET NAME NAME OF THE PROPERTY 
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## ASSAULT SUPPORT

	AVG/DAY	TOTAL
HELO TROOPS	1,707	361,807
HELO CARGO LIFT (TONS)	177	37,634
C/C SORTIES	12	2,683
GUN ESCORT SORTIES	175	3,785
FIXED WING TROOPS	939	200,014
FIXED WING FLARE SORTIES	2	506
FIXED WING CARGO (TONS)	109	23,263
FIXED WING AIREF SORTIES	2	406

#### DECLASSIFIED

- I. DERIVATION OF FMAW TASKS EXPRESSED IN THE FIVE DOCTRINAL MARINE AVIATION FUNCTIONS
- II. PERFORMANCE DATA
- III. COMBAT RESULTS-BDA

#### DECLASSIFIED

OFFICIAL C. S. MARIE AND A. S.

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# III MAP CAMPAIGN INTENTS 8 JAN -8 AUG 67

- I OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT
  - I. CONDUCT SUSTAINED, COORDINATED, UNILATERAL OR COMBINED GROUND & AIR OPNS TO DESTROY VC/NVA MAIN AND GUERILLA FORCES, AND NEUTRALIZE BASES AND SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION POINTS WITHIN ICTZ
  - 2. MAINTAIN ACTIVE AIR AND GROUND SURVEILLANCE OF THE LAOTION BORDER AND SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ AND KNOWN LAND AND WATER INFILTRATION ROUTES INTO ICTZ
  - 3. PROVIDE CAS AND DAS TO ACCELERATED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FAVORABLE WEATHER. DAY AND NIGHT
  - A MAINTAIN TEMPO IN NORTHERN TWO PROYINCES
  - 5. PROVIDE SUPPORT TO CIDG CAMPS WITHIN ICTZ
  - 6. CONTINUE THE OUT OF COUNTRY AIR STRIKES IN SUPPORT OF CINC PAC AND III MAF OBJECTIVES

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### U. S. MARINE CORPS PHOTOGRAPH

INJURNATIONAL SERVICES OFFICE

LAC MARINE AIRCRAFT WING/

HARINE UBIT VIET NAM

PO. SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. 96608

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## II. ASSAULT SUPPORT

- 1. EXPLOIT SUPERIOR MOBILITY AND FIRE POWER, WITH RAPID FOLLOW UP OF COMBAT LIFT AND RESUPPLY
- 2. UTILIZE FAVORABLE WEATHER FOR COMBAT OPS INVOLVING HELOS, TAKING THE FIGHT INCREASINGLY TO THE ENEMY

## III. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

- 1. MAINTAIN RECO/SURVEILLANCE OF LAOTIAN BORDER AND DMZ INFILTRATION AREAS
- 2. CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE OF ASHAU VALLEY
- 3. CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE OF INLAND WATERWAYS IN ICTZ
- 4. CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE IN AREAS OF SUSPECTED ENEMY ACTIVITY TO DEVELOP TARGETS FOR AIR STRIKE
- 5. CONTINUE TO PROVIDE PASSIVE AND ACTIVE ELECTRONICS WARFARE SUPPORT TO ALL AIR ACTIVITIES WHERE ENEMY ELECTRONIC ORDER OF BATTLE INDICATES

# UPPICIAL U. S. MARINE CORPS EUROPORAFII

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## IV ANTI AIR OPERATIONS

- 1. PROVIDE FIXED WING ANTI AIR DEFENSE TO ICTZ
- 2. PROVIDE ANTI AIR MISSILE CLOSE IN DEFENSE TO SUPPORT BASES IN ICTZ

## V. AIR CONTROL (WITH MTDS)

- 1. PROVIDE COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF ALL FMAW AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS WITHIN ICTZ
- 2. PROVIDE GROUND CONTROL RADAR BOMBING
  TO AFFORD NIGHT AND ALL-WEATHER
  OFFENSIVE COMBAT SUPPORT IN ICTZ
- 3. PROVIDE RADAR SURVEILLANCE AND FIGHTER DIRECTOR CONTROL TO SUPPORT ANTI AIR DEFENSE

## U. S. MARINE CORPS PHOTOGRAPH

AFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICE
1st MARINE AIRCRAFT WING/
MARINE UNIT VIET NAM
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. 96601

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PHOTOG

## LOGISTIC ITEMS OF INTEREST

# I BASE DEVELOPMENT PHU BAI

II CH-46 OPERATIONAL
AIRCRAFT SHORTAGE

# ASSUMPTIONS FOR CH-46 RECAP

- A. 11 CH-46A ACFT WILL ARRIVE ON 20 AUG 67
- B. HMM-364 WILL ARRIVE 1 NOV 67 WITH 24 CH-46D ACFT
- C. CH-46 ATTRITION IS 3 ACFT LOST PER MONTH
- D. PAR CYCLE IS 4 MONTHS PER ACFT
- E. 12 ACFT CONTINUALLY UNDERGOING BATTLE DAMAGE REPAIR

# OFFICIAL J. S. MARINE CORPS PHOTOGRAPH

INFORMATIONAL SERVICES OFFICE

1st MARINE AIRCRAFT WING/
MARINE UNIT VIET NAM

FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. 96667

# QUARTERLY RECAP OF WESTPAC CH-46 A/C FOR FY68

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
AUTH. FORCE LEVEL	96	120	120	120
TOT. A/C ASSIGN	105	121	121	112
ASSIGN A/C IN PAR	20	28	38	27
ASSIGN AIC BAT DAM	11	14	15	12
TOT NON-EFF A/C	32	42	53	39
TOT "EFF	73	79	68	73
DEFICIT	23	41	51	46

# J. S. MARINE CORPS PHOTOGRAPH

130 MARINE ARCRAFT WING/
HARINE UNIT VIET NAM

FRO SEM FRANCISCO, CALIF. 96608

# CONCLUSION

1. ONE (1) SQUADRON EQUIVALENT
CH-46 AIRCRAFT REQUIRED
NOW. ADDITIONAL HELICOPTER
SQUADRON EQUIVALENT
REQUIRED 3 QUARTER

ACTION RECOMMENDED TO ALLEVIATE - PROBLEM

1. FILL SHORTAGES IN CH-46A

AIRCRAFT WITH CH-46D AIRCRAFT

## DECLASSIFIED


## U. S. MARINE CORPS PHOTOGRAPH

AFORMATICHAL SERVICES OFFICE

181 MARINE AIRCRAFT WING/
MARINE UNIT VIET NAM

500, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. 96688

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			(5 F48	56		15 CHOP TO MAG 15		
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				4 UH340				Market Williams .
			24 CH53A	24				
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364	NLOW DIKE		24 UH1E 24 UH1E 24 CK46D	224				I TO CONUS
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MAC IS REIGHT HMS IS IS	SHOWCASE CORAL WAY	INAKUNI	1CH70 3TIA		COL C KIMAK			
	SMON SHOE BLACK ACE DECEMBER		15 F4B 20 A4E			15 CHOP TO MAG 13		
300	ANCESTOR BIRD CALL	FUTEMA	12 KC130				CBOF 10 MAG 12	
HMM 362 HMM 265 MACS 65	CLIP CLOP BONNIE SUE STAMP	LPH C SCHWAB	24 UH34D 24 CH46A		CTG 79.4 CTG 79.5		I CHOP TO MAG 36	

1ST MAW G-3 OFFICER & ENLISTED PERSONNEL ROSTER AS OF 1 AUGUST 1967

				•
RANK/NAME/SERNO/MOS	BOQ(BKS August 196	)/ROOM 7 (RTD)	ASS IGNMENT	CLNC
CYSCT HENRY L. HABERSKI 45968	37/1461	22	TAL	TS
	SEPTEMBER 1	967 (RTD)		
MAJ IRA C. ANDERSON 069699/73		302-8	MCLFDC LO(AVN)	TS
MAJ DON A. BRIGHAM 076038/753		•	I CORPS DASC LNO	TS
MAJ EDWARD P. CARROL 071988/		302-8	WPNS EAPL/TGT OFF	TS
MAJ J. R. LINDSAY FR27822		•	7 AR AFLINO	TS
MAJ MICHAEL P. REEVES 069717		302-14	ASST AC/ATC OFF	TS
CAPT RICHARD D. HEARNEY 0838		302-10	ASST OPS OFF(FW)	TS
CAPT TIMOTHY KANE 088260/756	L	402-8	ASST OPS OFF(HELO)	TS
CPL JERRY ENSIGN 2100520/704	1 OCTOBER 19	109	OPNS	s
MAJ J. D. WATSON 069714/7562,		402-12	ASST ACO	TS
MAJ JOHN P. REICHERT 064568/	7515/7517	402-12	EWO	TS
CAPT JAMES L. HUGHES 078699/		402-5	BRIEFING OFF	S
CAPT DONALD P. KLINGLER 0801		402-5	ASST OPS OFF(HELO)	
CAPT HAROLD K. MILLS 083528/		402-3	ASST EWO	TS
CAPT MICHAEL N. WINKELBAUER		302-10	ASST OPS OFF(FW)	TS
1LT BRUCE K. MOORE 091364/68		DNG HILT	WEATHER OFF	S
	- ((-		ATO 4 TATALO	ma
GYSGT JOHN P. BRENNAN 107198 CPL PAUL E. PASTWIK 2145732/		24 5 <b>4</b>	TRAINING OPS	TS S
CFL FAUL E. FASIMIR 214) ()2/	OHL	<i>)</i> 4	O. D	, •
	NOVEMBER 19	67 (RTD)		
LTCOL RICHARD E. HEMINGWAY O		402-6	PLANS/STAT OFF	TS
LTCOL HOWARD WOLF 036729/751		4-12	ASST C=3	TS
MAJ ORVAL E. DONOVAN 061288/		402-9	ASST PLANS OFF	TS
1LT JAMES N. STEWART 089303/	7568/6602	20-8	ASST EWO	TS
•	DECEMBER 196	7 (RTD)		
CAPT CONNIE A. BARSKY 079405	/7562/6302	20=13	ASST NATOPS OFF	TS
CPL RANDY BROWN 2184017/7041		54	OPNS	s
CPL DAVID DUBOIS 2209498/704		105	OPNS	TS
CPL LOUIS R. JACKSON 1983377		105	TAL	C
CPL JOSEPH P. SCHWARTZOTT 21		105	OPNS	S
	• • •			
	JANUARY 19			ma.
LT COL GORDON H. KELLER JR.			OPNS OFF	TS
LTCOL URAL W. SHADRICK 05160	11/7562	4 <del>-5</del>	ASST OPNS OFF	TS
MAJ CHARLES H. O'ERIEN 06047		302 <b>–1</b> 3	ASST PLANS OFF ATCO	TS TS
MAJ GEORGE W. THYDEN 070141/ MAJ THEODORE J. TOBEN 071535		402 <b>-1</b> 2	-	
FINE THEODORE OF TOREN C(1)	()02/()02/	1,00, 402-5	MODE OTHO OTT (TIME	, 10
CPL GLEN W. PARKER 2128784/	7041	54	OPNS	s

## DECLASSIFIED

rank/name/serno/mos	70 <b>0</b> (Bi	SMUCCA	ASSICT THE	CLIC
<u>F</u> e	ebruary	<u> 1968 (RTD)</u>		
MAJ WALTER J. MCMANUS 056733/6702 2/LT PETER C. KENDALL 099668/7002 WO-1 NORMAND J. CHAREST 098499/700	I 02/6709	302-3 NG HILT 20-1	ACO(MTDS) CFF OPSTAT/COACT CFF ASST MTDS COUND	TS TS S
LCPL GREGORY H. SMITH 2211087/014	1	105	OTHS	$\mathfrak{S}$
1	March 19	e6s (RTD)		
CAFT WENDELL O. GRUBBS 075272/753; WO-1 THOMAS G. KERR 098912/4302	2	20-11 1	ASST REPURTS OFF HISTORICAL OFF	TS TS
MSGT GERALD J. KRYGTER 645275/704 GYSGT CHARLES E. KING 1301914/704 GYSGT JOHN T. O'BRIEN 592302/5711 SSGT FRANK A. SCOTT 1513625/7041 CPL ROBERT M. BOSSARTE 2160509/14 CPL STUART D. GILBERT 2241872/70	l 61	24 22 106 111 67 54	NCOIC OFNS NBO/TRATEING ATCO TAL OPNS	16 2
	April 19	968 <b>(</b> RTD)		
2/LT LOUIE F. SCHNEIDER 097814/70	02	o.	ADMIN OFF	TS
LCPL CHARLES E. WAGERS 2332861/01	41	109	ORAL HIST	S
	Mav 190	S (RTD)	·	
MAJ MILTON H. JERABEK 060129/0802	Commence of the Commence of th	302~23	TRANS/NEC OFF	TS
GYSGT CHARLES V. MARQUEZ JR. 1078 SSGT DONALD P. DORR 1688580/7041 CPL GARY L. KRUGER 2107943/7041	931/014	1 22 111 54	orai, hist reforts atoo	S 5 5
	June 1	960 (RID)		
CAPT EARL R. ALLEN 073609/7532		302-30	REPORTS OFF	TS
GYSGT DUNALD M. HERMAN 1123245/70 SSGT JOHNNIE R. FRANKLIN 1513539/		23 307	ADMIN REPORTS	TS S
	July 1	965 (RUL)		
COL JOEL E. BONNER, JR. 018307/99	07	44	ACOSS, 0-3	TS.
LCPL NORMAN R. CARLSEN 2185474/70	41	$10l_r$	REPORTS	\$
	August	1968 (RTD)		
MSGT JAMES E. GILBREATH 570284/57 CPL RAYMOND P. BEAUDOIN 2209085/7 CPL DAVID R. MINIOE 2116654/7041 CPL KENLETH W. NAGLE 2147775/7041 LCPL CARL H. SHULER 2284324/7041	704.1. `	22 54 56 104 56	NBC CPNS HISTORICAL HISTORICAL CPUS	93 3 5 5 5

HEADQUARTERS

1st Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Pacific FPO San Francisco 96602

> ly: GVC :rnl 5750 Ol<sub>4</sub>A22067 8 Aug 1967

CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal of classified enclosures)

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Subj: Command Cronology for July 1967 (U)

Ref: (a) WgO 5750.1C

Encl:  $\sqrt{(1)}$  Organizational Data  $\sqrt{(2)}$  Narrative Summary

(3) WgO 4355.2 (w/original only)

 $\sqrt{(4)}$  WgO PlO340.2A Ch 4 (w/original only)

1. In accordance with provisions of reference (a), enclosures (1) through (4) are submitted as the G-4 Command Chronology for the month of July 1967.

By direction

3111-67 1

**BM14** 

Bucknessities after 19 years.

CONFIDENCE

100-4

1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING: G-4 DIVESION

Organization Data

Period Covering: 1-31 July 1967

Location: Quang Nam Province, Republic of Vietnam

## Head of Division and Principal Subordinated

Assistant Chief of Choff Assistant G-4 Assistant G-4

Operations & Tree College

Assistant Operations & Plans Officer

Laso Development Officer
Administrative Officer
Ordnance Officer
Ordnance Officer

Assistant Ordnance Officer Motor Transport Officer

Assistant Motor Transport Officer

Engineer Officer

Assistant Engineer Officer Assistant Engineer Officer

SATS Officer

Embarkation/Air Freight Officer Aircraft Maintenance Officer

Assistant Aircraft Maintenance Officer

Avionics Officer

Assistant Avionics Officer Assistant Avionics Officer Air Frame/Power Plants Officer Tlight Equipment Officer

LOX Officer

MONT OF THEEL

Wing IMAL Officer

AMO Briefing Officer/Tech Pubs O

3M Analysis Officer

Assistant 3M Analysis Officer

Food Services Officer Food Services Officer TAFDS Officer

Pire Marshal Logistics Chief Col J. E. BONNER, JR.

Col C. B. ARMSTRONG, JR. (Crom 21. July)

LtCol A. E. JAMES
LtCol J. W. EVANS

LtCol G. W. VAUGHAN (From 26 July)

Capt R. T. RUMBIN
2ndLt D. BRADY

LtCol H. A. STILES (To 17 July) Maj W. D. FARRIS (From 18 July)

CNO-3 J. F. AILES Maj J. M COLS 2dLt G. R. O'CONNOR

LtCol L. J. PRADLEY

Capt L. D. BURN TT (To 17 July)
Capt J. H. SCHAEFER (From 18 July)
Capt J. P. SCHUBERT (To 1h July)

Capt W. B. POSS LtCol W. J. VAN LLAN Maj C. K. SIME JR. Maj H. R. MLLICTT

Maj C. D. CATES (To 20 July)

WO C. A. ARTHUR
Maj C. J. SEALS JR.
2ndLt W. M. DATHELL
2ndLt D. DAVIS
2ndLt F. J. TORRES
2ndLt T. J. HARR RAH

lstLt J. C. MATTS 2ndLt E. P. LOFTUS (Prom 26 July)

lstLt E. R. HUMM

Maj B. J. NECHOLS (To 20 July) Capt M. R. HESTER (From 21 July)

2ndLt f. c. FARMEND 2ndLt E. M. LUISA & . MGySgt G. W. COLELET

ENCLOSURE (1)

## NARRATIVE SUMMARY

## CONFIDENTIAL

- 1. Logistics
  - a. (C) Air Freight and Air Delivery
- (1) During the month of July 1967, the following amounts of cargo and passengers were transported by Marine aircraft into and from DaNang.

		PAX				CARGO	(S/T)
	MAW	DIV	MISC	MAW	DIA	MISC	MAIL
IN	2330	8952	0	216	<b>3</b> 78	0	
TUC	3643	13065	<b>66</b> 8	8 <b>94</b>	1128	0	0

(2) Cargo and passengers (Navy and Marine Corps) moved in and out of DaNang by 315th and Military Airlift Command:

	315th	•		MAC	
PAX-		CARGO (S/T) 1080	PAX		CARGO (S/T)
IN 7344		1080	10464	7	2482
OUT 6197		4868	10536	•	9 <b>9</b> 4

- (3) There were no air deliveries for the month of July 1967.
- b. (C) Embarkation
- (1) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing cargo moved in and out of DaNang by surface means was as follows:

Shipped From DaNang:	1,182 S/T
Received:	3 <b>9</b> 8 S/T
Awaiting Shipment:	67
Scheduled For Shipment:	1 17 18 67 ·

- c. Total cargo moved for the month of July 1967: 13,621 S/T.
- d. (C) Ordnance
- (1) Class (VA) Munitions expended during the month of July by tactical units of the First Marine Aircraft Wing was a new record of th, 383 tons. A total of 2,579 Fire Bombs, 63 CBU 24's, 47,943 GP bombs, 27,477 Aircraft Rockets, 443,423 Rds of Gun Ammo and 6 SHRIKE Air to Ground Missiles were expended.
- (2) Resupply of Class (VA) Munitions to the First Marine Aircraft Wing during the month of July both by air and surface was 11,549 tons.



## e. (C) Food Services

- (1) The Wing Food Services Office and the Wing Food Technician visited Wing Food Services facilities at Dong Ha, Phu Bai, Chu Lai and Danang during the month of July. The Food Services facilities were in good condition with continued evidence of self improvement throughout. Special comment on the improvement of MAG-16 at Dong Ha. The quality of the food and the operation of the mess has greatly improved.
- (2) MACS-7 Mess Hall was secured on 15 July 1967 for the return of MACS-7 to CONUS. Equipment and personnel were re-assigned to needy units in the Wing.
- (3) The Chu Lai Installation Food Service Coordinator billet at Chu Lai was discontinued during the bonth of July. The Asst. Wing Food Service Officer, 1st Lt. W.AV.R, will no longer serve in the coordinator capacity.
- (h) No damage occurred to Food Service equipment during the 15 July rocket attack on the DaNang Air Base and only slight damage to the mess facilities with MWHG-1 having a complete new roof installed on their mess. Food Service personnel assisted in setting up an Aid Station at MWHG-1 mess hall following the attack.
- (5) The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is now operating twenty-two messes subsisting an average total of 19,000 men daily. The ration cost has been approximately \$1.57 per man per day.
  - f. (C) Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System (TAFDS)
- (1) On 3 July, Dong Ha equipment and personnel casualties incurred during mortar attack.

(a)	Tank, 10,000 gal., repaired	(2) EA.
	Hose, 2" x 50"	(2) SA.
(c)	Pump, 350 GPM, repaired	(1) EA.
(d)	JP-4	500 gal
(e)	Personnel wounded	(1) EA.

(2) On 4 July, Dong Ha equipment destroyed during mortar attack.

(a) Hose, h" x 50' (1) EA.

- (3) On 5 July, Capacity of JP-4 at MAG-12 TAFDS increased to 260,000 callons.
- (4) On 7 July, Dong Ha equipment damaged and destroyed during mortar attack.

a) Tank, 10,000 gal. repaired	(1) IA.
b) 115/145	100 gal
<b>2</b>	ENCLOSURE (2)

(5) On 8 July, Dong Ha equipment damaged and destroyed during mortar attack.

(a) Tank, 10,000 gal repaired		(5) EA.
(b) Hose, 2" x 50'		(1) EA.
(c) Hose, 4" x 50'	, ,	(3) EA.
(d) Meter, repaired		(1) HA.
(e) JP-4		500 gal
(f) 115/145		300 gal

- (6) On 8 July, capacity of JP-4 at Markle Mt. TAFDS decreased to 60,000 gal.
- (7) On 15 July, MAG-11 equipment and personnel casualties incurred during rocket attack.

(a) Hose, 4" x 50'	(4) EA.
(b) Hose, 2" x 50'	(6) EA.
(c) Tank, 10,000 gal, repaired	(6) EA.
(d) Pump, 350GPM, awaiting parts	(1) BA.
(e) Personnel wounded	(2) EA.

- (8) On 16 July, An Hoa TAFDS capacity increased to 30,000 gal JP-4, and 20,000 gal, 115/145.
- (9) On 16 July, capacity of 115/145 at Khe Sanh TAFDS increased to 30,000 gal.
- (10) On 27 July, Dong Ha equipment damaged and destroyed during mortar attack.
  - (a) Tank, 10,000 gal, repaired (1) EA. (b) 115/145 800 gal
- (11) On 27 July, MAG-36 installed TAFDS at ROK CP. Capacity is 10,000 gal 115/145.
- (12) The following amounts of Class III (A) were issued during July, 1967 (U.S. gallons):

JP-4	115/145
<del>3,20</del> 8,917	410,748
1,977485	•
4,621,998	
500.839	200,889
421,978	193 <b>,61</b> 1
205,994	138,717
	3,208,917 1,977485 4,621,998 500,839 421,978

ENCLOSURE (2)

UNIT	JP-4	115/145
MAG-36	124,338	122,384
AN HOA	119,949	35 <b>,</b> 239
TAM KY	50,980	28 <b>,</b> 962
ROK CP*		3,479
M/SG-17	1,213,713	73 <b>,</b> 945
KHE SANH	79,854	42,182
TOTAL	12,526,045	1,255,156

### \*- Opened 27 July 1967

(13) Total Class III (A) issued by 1st MAW during July, 1967 was 13,781,201 gallons.

## g. (C) Avionics/ Aircraft Maintenance

- (1) On 4 July, COMNAVAIRPAC 3M Team in conjunction with the First MAW 3M Team visited MAG-16 units at Marble Mountain.
- (2) On 5 July, CNAP and Wing 3M Team visited MAG-16 units located at Phu Bai.
  - (3) On 6 July, CMAP and Wing 3M Team visited units located at Dong Ha.
- (4) On 12 July, Cdr. F. E. MC CORD and LCdr. J. D. WALLACE, CONFAIR-WESTPAC RVN Detachment visited the First MAW (AMO) on liaison problems.
- (5) On 12 July, the quarterly maintenance and material task committee meeting was held at the Wing AMO office.
- (6) On 13 July, Mr. P. W. FIEDLER, Mr. I. STHDEROFF and Mr. J. d. HAZLEY all from Boeing/Vertol Company visited the Wing (AMD) in conjunction with the present CH-46 accident and incident problems.
- (7) On 15 July, LtCol W. J. VAN LIEW the First MAN Maintenance Officer visited all First MAN facilities in the DaNang area to evaluate the damage to aircraft and equipment resulting from enemy rocket and mortar attack.
- (8) On 16 July, the Wing 3M Team commenced training for HTM-164 at Marble Mountain.
- (9) On 21 July, Mr. B. E. FRANCOIS from Bosing/Vertol visited the Wing (AMO) in regards to the CH-46A environmental problems in RVN.
- (10) On 23 July, personnel from MAG-15 Futema arrived at Wing (AMD) to commence 3M instructor training.

  ENCLOSURE (2)

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- (11) On 24 July, the Wing AMO and Power/Plants Officer and Group Safety Officers attended the Wing Safety Officer's meeting.
- (12) On 25 July, 2/LT E. P. LOFTUS checked into the Wing 34 Section as 1/LT J. C. WATTS' replacement.
- (13) On 26 July, Mr. R. L. VAUGHN, GS-12 and Mr. J. A. AMGRESS GS-11 from NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC, FMFPac, Hawaii visited the Wing AMO on maintenance assistance problems.
- (14) On 29, 30 and 31 July, the Wing 3M Team made staff visits to MAG-13 units.

## h. (U) Motor Transport

- (1) On 24 July, the taxi service was implemented in the DaNang area.
- (2) "Rough Rider" Convoys. FMAW provided personnel and vehicles for "Rough Rider" Convoys upon request of III MAF as indicated:
- (a) From 10 July to 12 July provided three M36 trucks and 17 drivers.
- (b) From 12 July to 14 July provided three M36 trucks and 6 drivers.
- (c) From 14 July to 17 July, provided three M36 trucks and 6 drivers.
- (d) From 18 July to 19 July provided three M36 trucks and 6 drivers.
  - (e) From 20 July to 31 July, provided 3 M-36 trucks and 6 drivers.
  - (3) Maintenance Management Assistance Team.
    - (a) During the period of 8 to 11 July, the teas visited 10-1/.

(b) On 12 July the team visited 1st IAAI Bn.

(c) During the period of 13 July to 18 July, the team visited 2d IAAH Bn.

## i. (U) Engineer

- (1) Field lighting sets were installed at Khe Sanh and An doa airfields.
  - (2) Repairs to the runway were made at Khe Sanh airfield.

ENCLOSURE (2)
CONFIDENTIAL



- (3) Construction of reverments for helicopters by use of drums was continued at Ky Ha and Marble Hountain. Tenjaluminum reverments for helicopters were erected at Dong Ha.
- (4) CE-1 catapult on the crosswind runway was certified or operations. A total of 66 catapult launches were made by A-4 and F-2 aircraft.
- (5) Road improvement, bunker construction, and installation of protective wire were accomplished at A Battery and C Battery, let LAAM Bn.

CONEDENTIAL

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- 9. Refueling incidents and subsequent fires which have occurred indicate that a mechanical malfunction of the pressure nozzle may have been a contributing cause factor.
- 10. It has been determined that the pressure nozzle can be moved to the chosed position, disengaged from the aircraft and still not be in a positive-lock closed condition. This situation results when the ring-key on the nozzle face remains partially engaged and the open-close handle assembly is therefore not flush with the cam on the nozzle shell grip. This allows the handle assembly to rotate freely from close to open while disengaged from the aircraft. This circumstance probably results from far for the tension under the ring-key or from some foreign object introduced above the ring-key. Either of these examples could cause faulty ring-key positioning and thus allow the open-close handle to be inadvertently rotated during engagement/disengagement thereby releasing fuel under residual pressure.
- II. It is incumbent upon all commanders to insure that personnel who have occasion to use these pressure nozzles are instructed concerning this possible malfunction. Special attention should be directed to the importance of insuring that the open-close handle is in the fully closed position prior to both engagement and disengagement from the aircraft and that the ring-key is fully seated by spring pressure following disengagement. This will assure that a positive-lock has been effected thereby precluding the possibility of accidential rotation of the open-close handle during subsequent refueling engagement.

HEADQUARTERS

1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FFO San Francisco 96602

21: RW1: mn 5700 AUG 1 9 1967

From: Wing Supply Officer

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) Wing Order 5750.10

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in reference (a) the following is submitted for inclusion in the Command Chronology for July 1967.

### 2. ORGANIZATION

Colonel R. DENEES, JR. Wing Supply Officer

Major R. H. AXTON Assistant Wing Supply Officer

Major R. W. McIMMIS Marine Corps Supply Officer

Capt F. G. HERSHLEY Aviation Supply Officer

1st Lt. T. W. RAY Officer-in-Charge Management Team

2nd Lt. W. H. BEIJ. Officer-in-Charge Management Instruction Team

2nd Lt. R. M. PERKINS Assistant Marine Corps Supply Officer

MGySgt R. E. STEVENS, JR. Wing Supply Chief

#### COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

### 1. Supply Situation

a. The deadline rate of Ground Support Equipment continues to be a matter of great concern. Major problem areas continue to be a lack of readily available spare parts, quality of production, environmental conditions and operating techniques. The SATS Weapons Loader continues to lead the list in ratio of deadlined equipment versus on hand equipment. Continuing correspondence has been initiated between this Headquarters and CG, FIFFac to alleviate this problem.

12. 12. 22. 1

- b. The Wing is presently experiencing a high MORS "G" rate on the CH46A aircraft. CG, FNAW 281218Z May predicted that 25 out of 68 A/C would experience a MORS "G" condition due to Aft Transmission rejection.
- c. Another problem creating an abnormally high MORS "G" condition on the CH46A aircraft is the current Rotor Blade inspection as directed by MAVAINSYSCOLD 072245Z Jul 67, necessitating the radiographic inspection, by serial number, of the majority of Rotor Blades held within the FMAW due to cracks materializing in the spars of various Rotor Blades.
- d. The NORS "G" rate for all other aircraft supported is maintaining approximately a level rate for combat conditions and hours flown.
- e. Continuous and heavy use of air to ground UHF radio AM/GRC-48 is hampered by shortages of high usage parts for this 20 year old radio. Some cormon parts are now being obtained from Wing units Supply Officers Stores under the recently authorized project 11 MM funds from CG FMFac. The recently authorized procurement of excess MM air conditioners for use with the TFQ-10 radar system is expected to improve the reliability and life expectancy of the AM/GRC-48 parts.
- 1. This Headquarters has a supply assist working with CG, FNFPac to obtain the below listed part which is deadlining an urgently required Pulse Acquisition Radar of 2nd LAMI Battalion. (CG 1st MAW msg 010650Z Aug 67 and 021316Z Aug 67 refer):

## Qty 1 FSN 1430-775-6425

g. This Headquarters has a supply assist working with CG, FAFPac to obtain the below listed parts which are deadlining an AN/MPQ-39 Hawk Radar Set of 1st LAAM Battalion: (CG FMAN 290846Z Jul 67 refer)

Qty	1	PSN	1430-888-7169
Qty	2	fsn	1430-967-7029
Qty	1	<b>FS</b> N	5950-882-8971

- h. 1st MAW has a T/E deficiency of a quantity of 9 AN/UPM-32 Radar Test Set in support of the AN/TPQ-10 radar system. The test sets have been evacuated for repair to 3D FSR. CMC advises that no assets are available. 3D FSR advises that the sets have been "X" coded, however, based on the 1st MAW requirement, cannibalization will be effected and as many rebuilt sets as is possible will be constructed. 1st MAW is operating with AN/UPM 32 test sets on loan from aviation assets.
- i. Late in June 1967 an expanded Interservice Supply Support Agreement was negotiated with the 97th Artillery Group, Saigon to provide for energency support of the 1st MAW Hawk Meapons System to include reparables and limited energency repair and calibration. CG, FMFPac msg 291935Z Jul 67 approved the draft ISSA forwarded by this Headquarters. The ISSA has been signed by an official of this Headquarters and has been forwarded to the 97th Artillery Group, Saigon, for final approval by CG, U. S. Army Missile Command.

- j. Individual clothing in popular sizes is generally in short supply throughout the Wing. It was expected that when the Wing was recently authorized a second pair of tropical boots and an initial issue of tropical utilities that the shortage of individual clothing would be minimized by the issuance of the tropical clothing. However, the Wing has received only partial issues of the tropical items. If additional assets of clothing are not received the clothing situation can become a critical problem.
- k. MAG-16 has an urgent requirement for 55 GPM pumps to pump water at Marble Mountain, Dong Ha and Phu Bai. CG, 1st MAW msgs 201146Z Jul 67 and 021315Z Aug 67 to 3D FSR request supply assistance in furnishing a quantity of 5 pumps.

## 2. Class I. Class II. Class IIA. Class IV and Class IVA

## a. Class I. N/A

b. <u>Class II and IIA.</u> Critical shortages in this category are discussed above and are included in the reports of the FLC and Red Ball listing.

#### c. Class IV and IVA.

- (1) Class IV. Sandbags have been difficult to obtain. Most units have large unfilled requirements for improving defensive perimeters and for aircraft revetment purposes. Chu Lai units particularly are having difficulty in obtaining sandbags and barbed wire stakes.
- (2) <u>Class IVA.</u> These stocks are located at Navy Supply Activities and are released only to satisfy contingency requirements.

#### 3. Marine Corps Items in Short Supply

- a. Of the items listed in paragraph 3 of reference (b), only the items listed below are considered in short supply:
- (1) Handset H-138. One unit (MAG 13) reports this item is in short supply and is required for use with radio set PRC-25 for perimeter defense and crash crew communications.
- (2) Stake, Barbed Wire. 8'. Is in short supply in three units (MASS-3, MACS-4 and MAC-36). It is used for placing concertina wire around defensive perimeters.
- (3) <u>Battery BA 386.</u> MAG-16 is short of this item for their SB 86 switchboard. MAG-36 is also short of this item.
- (4) <u>Battery 6TN.</u> Three units (MASS-2, MASS-3 and 2nd LAAM Bn) report the subject iten in short supply. In MASS-2 one vehicle is deadlined and in 2nd LAAMS this iten is used heavily for generator support.

HEADQUATERS
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602

WgO 4355.2 4:HRE:PU:der 20 Jul 1967

## WING ORDER 4355.2

From: Commanding General To: Distribution List

Subj: 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Calibration Qualification Program

Ref: (a) Joint COMNAVAIRPAC/BUWEPSFLTREDREPAC Inst 4355.2 of 20Feb62

(b) CG FMAW spdltr 043A00267 of 21Jan67

(c) BUWEPS Inst 5450.8A of 13May61

(d) BUWEPS Inst 4355.22 of 25Jun64 (e) ICE CUBE 1tr PU:rcm over 4730 of 30May67

(e) ICE CUBE It' Purrem over 4730 of 30May67 (f) COMFAIRWESTPAC NOTICE 4355 of 29May67

(g) NAVORD Inst 4355.1 of 24Jun64 (formerly BUWEPS 4355.1)

(h) COMNAVAIRPAC Inst 10550.11 of 8Apr66

(i) BUWEPSFLIREADREPAC Inst 10510.1 of 20Jun62

Encl: V(1) Navy Calibration Program, Labels and Tags

√(2) FMAW FORM 4355.lA, Report of Delay in Repair/Calibration of

Test and Measuring Instructions

- √(3) FMAW FORM 4355.1, Instrument Non Availability Report
- l. Purpose. To assign responsibilities for the inspection, repair and Calibration/Qualification of all test and measuring devices organic to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
- 2. Cancellation. Wing Order Pl0550.11
- 3. Background. The Wing Commander is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of a Calibration/Qualification program which will provide the required Calibration Support to electrical, electro-mechanical and physical test and measuring devices organic to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
- a. Reference (a), provides information and guidance, repair, modification, and Calibration of Navy/Marine Corps test and measuring devices.

## 4. Definitions

a. Metrology - The science of measurements.

- b. Calibration Laboratories Laboratories designed to provide direct Calibration support to plant account and field organizational test and measuring devices. Note: Laboratories are differentiated from qualification shops by the scope and range of their capabilities and by their designed and controlled environment.
- compares an OPERABLE item of Fleet test equipment with a standard of higher accuracy in order to determine that the Fleet item meets certain pre-determined specifications. The Calibration process involves the use of Approved Calibration Procedures and may include any adjustments or incidental repair necessary to bring the item being Calibrated within specified limits.
- d. Incidental Repair Those repairs found necessary during calibration of an OPERABLE equipment to bring it within specified tolerances, including the replacement of parts which have changed value sufficiently to prevent repair work is normally performed in the Laboratories incidental to the calibration of test equipment or standards.
- e. Approved Instrument Calibration Procedures Those procedures promulgated by (MEC) Metrology Engineering Center, Pomona. Note: Aeronautical weapons special support procedures will normally be prepared by the prime contractor and be published under the cognizance of Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, (NATSF).
- f. Operable An equipment is operable when, from its most recent performance history and current cursory electrical and physical examinations, it displays an indication of satisfactory performance for all its functions.
- g. Qualification The process by which test equipment is checked against a measurement Standard/Device of higher accuracy and adjusted or repaired as necessary in order to determine that the equipment meets some pre-determined specification, (manufacturers tolerance or other). Qualifications are valid measurements performed by Fleet Maintenance Activities on test equipment for which adequate Measurement/Standard devices have been authorized and used. In addition these measurement standards must themselves be calibrated by a Navy Calibration Laboratory periodically in order for the Qualifications to be valid.
  - h. Additional definitions may be found in:
- (1) Enclosure (1), of NAVORD Instruction 4355.1 of 24 June 1964 (formerly NAVWEPS Instruction 4355.1)
- (2) Section 2, of Pacific Area Calibration Schedule (published quarterly by Metrology Division NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC)
  - (3) COMNAVAIRPAC/BUWEPSFLIREADREPAC Instruction 4355.2 of 20 Feb 1 67

- (4) Enclosure (1), of MCO 4355.5A of 13 May 66
- (5) Enclosure (4), of BUWEPS Instruction 4355.22 of 25 Jun 64
- (6) Enclosure (1), of COMNAVAIRPAC Instruction 10550.11 of 8 Apr 66

## 5. Information

- a. The In Country Calibration Complex (IC3), commonly known as "ICE CUBE" is an established transportable Navy Calibration Laboratory, assigned to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to provide Calibration support to the Wing.
- b. Local operational control of "ICE CUBE" rests with the Wing G-4, and is exercised through the Wing Avionics Officer.
- c. The provisions for administrative, motor transport, external security, and supply support are the responsibility of the CO, MWSG-17, in accordance with reference (b).
- d. The Administrative Control, and over all program management of the In Country Calibration Complex remains with WAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC, in accordance with references (c) and (d).

#### 6. General Program Requirements

- a. All test and measuring equipment used within this Air Wing will be identified and suitably labeled or tagged in one of the following categories:
  - (1) CALIBRATED
  - (2) LIMITED CALIBRATION
  - (3) REJECT
  - (4) INACTIVE
  - (5) CALIBRATION NOT REQUIRED
- b. Each test and measuring equipment (including any personally owned) used in repair, modification, or Inspection/Checking of Wing equipments Weapons Systems, and requiring Calibration, shall be scheduled, Calibrated and returned in a timely manner.
- c. Test and measuring equipment in a REJECT or INACTIVE status, or overdus for Calibration shall not be used for quantitive or qualitive measurements.
- d. Navy Calibration Program labels and/or tags illustrated in enclosure (1) shall not be removed or altered by anyone other than Calibration Laboratory personnel.

e. Test measuring equipment and Calibration standards Organic to this Wing shall be periodically immpected and cleaned as necessary by the operators of such equipment.

### 7. Responsibilities

#### a. Wing Avionics Officer

- (1) Ensure that the contents of this order are complied with.
- (2) Promulgate to supported activities information relative to the Calibration Program.
- (4) Coordinate the overall Calibration effort within the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

## b. Calibration Supported Organizations

- (1) Each activity will submit to ICE CUBE a list of equipments requiring Calibration, including on-site items in accordance with reference (e). This listing should be submitted 45 days prior to the beginning of each quarter e.g. 15 May, 15 Aug, 15 Nov and 15 Feb.
- (2) Deliver to the applicable Group Avionics section each test and measuring device as scheduled for calibration during the period indicated, and prior to the due date on the Calibration label affixed thereto. Any instrument/device scheduled for on-site Calibration will be made available during the period scheduled and prior to the Calibration due date.
- (3) Upon determination that an Instrument/Equipment will not be available as scheduled, and at least five days prior to its due date, forward to the Calibration Laboratory a report to that effect with the reasons therefor, utilizing report form let MAW 1355.1A (3-66), enclosure (3). The Calibration Laboratory will thereupon make adjustments and take other action as appropriate.
- (4) Immediately remove from service and ferward to Calibration Laboratory for corrective action any Instrument/Device whose accuracy becomes questionable.
- (5) Upon receipt of new test equipment that does not have current Calibration label, forward same to the Calibration Laboratory for inspection and Calibration. This action will empty experies
- (a) That defective instruments will be returned to the manufacturer for corrective action under warranty provisions of the programmement contract, if applicable.

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- (b) Calibration prior to use.
- (c) That the instrument will receive periodic Calibration.
- (6) Provide an accurate inventory of all test and reasoning equipment in their custody when required.
- (7) Continually evaluate the application of assigned equipment to determine the limit and extent of Calibration actually required. Then feasible, supported organizations shall request LERTED CHARACTER. Thamples of HERTED CHARACTER which can be tailored to better meet the users requirements are: Signal to erators and spectrum analyzers for which the user has only one range or partial function requirements. Initially Calibration and/or repair to those partial functions and ranges would nate Calibration and/or repair turn around time, and might often prevent deadlining an important test instrument for parts that are not necessary for the limited functions required. Responsibility for accepting test instruments with ETHERED CALIBRATION conty.
- (C) Inform the Calibration Laboratory, when any instruments become HEACTIVA, i.e., the measurement requirement for the subject instrument no longer emists.
- (9) Insure that all Equipments/Devices in their possession are Labeled in accordance with paragraph 5. a.
- (10) Equipments being delivered to the Calibration/Amalification site (Cha Iai or Danang) will be transported in such a manner to proclude damage to the Test/Measuring device. Equipment carrying cases will be utilized at all three where available. Equipment will be transported on a fadded surface and so positioned to prevent bouncing, rolling, jarring, etc.
- (11) All equipments submitted for Calibration/Repair will be accompanied by all accessories, cables, adapters, data cards and namuals normally used with the equipment.
- (12) Calibration/Qualification personnel are directed to monitor those equipment improperly transported, back, damaged or incomplete and report such incidents by letter to this Headquarters attention G-4.
- (13) Test/Reasuring equipment not within Calibration/Qualification the limits (asnoted by the affined label or tag) will <u>RCT</u> be used under any circumstances. A missing label disqualifies the equipment.
- (a) In any areas not specifically covered above reference (b) applies.
  - c. Officer in Charge of In Country Calibration Corplet "ICH SUBL"

- (1) Under the direction of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Avionics Officer, to supervise, administer, and control the efforts of all Calibration/Qualification activities and personnel within the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
- (2) Maintain and operate standards of electrical, electronic, mechanical and physical measurement traceable to the National Bureau of Standards (NBS).
- (3) Assure the standardization of measurement and maintenance of a high level of quality control through a periodic inspection and Calibration of Navy/Marine Corps test and measuring instruments.
- (4) Coordinate the forwarding, publication and dissemination of the Quarterly Calibration Schedules to cognizant Commands.
- (5) Prepare and publish a monthly Calibration Schedule for all Navy/Marine Corps test and measuring instruments organic to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing requiring periodic inspection and Calibration. Distribution of this schedule shall be made 15 days prior to the schedule date.
- (6) Determine the Calibration requirements of individual test and measuring instruments organic to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
- (7) Maintain adequate records and files to provide a history of the conditions, repair, modification and Calibration of individual test and measuring instruments.
- (8) Perform acceptance Inspection/Calibration on each new measuring instrument received as organic property of the Wing. If any instrument fails to meet required specifications with minor adjustments or incidental repair, it will be returned to the manufacturer if warranty is still valid, subject to the approval of the Wing Avionics Officer.
- (9) Identify and suitably label all Wing test and measuring instruments which are INACTIVE or which do not require periodic Calibration.
- (10) Provide on-site Calibration service to installed test and measuring equipment which is not readily moveable, or to which movement would render Calibration suspect.
- (11) Provide measurement service and technical assistance in the areas of electrical, electronic, electro-mechanical, physical and mechanical measurement.
- (12) Periodically inspect, repair and Calibrate all applicable test equipments maintained in MWSG-17 Supply.

- (13) Provide pickup and delivery service to all locally supported Intermediate Repair Activities, coordinate shipment and delivery of test equipments to remote supported activities.
- (14) Screen all test and measurement instructions and standards both "IN\_HOUSE" and supported, that require shipment to other DOD or Navy/Marine Corps Repair/Calibration facilities.
- (15) Conduct a continuous program of educating the users of test and measuring equipment in matters pertaining to the care, maintenance, operation and application of the Wings test and measuring instruments.
- "(16) Establish and conduct an "IN-HOUSE" quality assurance program to assure the highest quality Calibration Service.
- (17) Provide inspection/Calibration service to Marine Corps units and DOD activities not organic to FMAW as required or directed. All such services shall be accomplished on a reimburseable basis, workload permitting. Work scheduling, funding, customer liaison and estimates shall be coordinated with the Officer in Charge ICE CUBE, Wing Avionics Officer and MWSG-17 Supply Officer as appropriate.
- (18) Utilizing enclosure (2), advise the user of any test and measuring devices received for inspection, or calibration if any delay in excess of five days in the completion of the required work is anticipated and give the reasons therefore.
- (19) Submit the quarterly test equipments requirements report to CONFAIRNESTPAC with copies to NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC, CG FMFPAC and CG FMAN in accordance with reference (f).
- (20) Combine and forward quarterly Calibration Schedule to MAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC Attn: Metrology with copies to CG FMFPAC, CG FMAW and COMFAIRWESTPAC, in accordance with reference (a).
- (21) Submit to NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC a summary of both qualification and Calibration performed per activity per month in accordance with BUWEPFLTREAD-REFFAC Inst 10510.1 of June 1962 with copies to CG FMFPAC CG FMAW and COMFAIRWESTPAC. Report will be submitted prior to the 15th day of each calendar month.
- (22) Forward all test equipment requirements beyond the capabilities of ICE CUBE directly to applicable NCL, i.e. Atsugi or Cubi Point in accordance with reference (f).
- (a) In any areas not covered specifically, reference (a) applies.

#### 8. Special Program Requirements

a. Labels, tags and forms:

- (1) Reference (g) contains information required to obtain necessary labels, tags and forms utilized in properly administering the Calibration program.
- (2) Custodians of Test/Measuring equipment having completed Calibration/Qualification will NOT accept the equipment from the laboratory/Site unless the required Label/Tag is attached.
- (3) Reference (a) prescribes the forms to be utilized for the Movement/Control of test equipment to the Calibration sites.
  - b. Test and measuring equipment Calibration/Qualification cycles:
- (1) Electrical/Electronics as specified in the Metrology Requirement list (METRL) NAVWEPS-17-35MTL-1.
  - (2) Torque tools each 30 days
  - (3) Pressure gauges, dial type each 30 days
  - (4) Pressure gauges non-dial type each 90 days
  - (5) Cable tensiometers each 30 days
- (6) Local maintenance qualification standards to be calibrated by a Navy Calibration Laboratory not to exceed 180 days.

#### c. Training:

- (1) All personnel involved in the Calibration/Qualification of Test/Measuring equipment will be intimately familiar with reference (a).
- (2) An energetic and effective program will be instituted and continued to insure Calibration/Qualification personnel are available and fully trained to perform their mission within the maintenance levels assigned cognizance. Maximum utilization of OJT will preclude loss of this capability.
- (3) One Avionics man per month per Marine Air Group will be assigned TAD to ICE CUBE Da Hang for training and Metrology Orientation.
- (4) In the event training cannot be arranged this headquarters will be advised and assistance requested.
  - d. Repair of Test Measuring/Equipment

- (1) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Intermediate Maintenance Units (IMA's) will implement a program of repair of Test/Measuring equipment to the depth within limitations of tooling and technical publication. Parts in depth allowed to support the program will be requisitioned through normal supply channels and technical skills will be developed through use of ICE CUBE or OJT.
- (2) Refer to BUWEPS Instruction 4700.2A Chapter 3 for assignment of Qualification/Repair functions to IMA Units.

#### e. Qualification

(1) Qualification segment of the Navy Calibration Program is scheduled for each Group. When implemented the program will function under local directive promulgated by each Group. This directive will include but not be limited to the following:

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- (a) Test and measuring devices authorized for qualification indicating mandatory recall at intervals as specified in NAVWEPS 17-35MTL-1 and reference (h).
- (b) Insure that only properly trained personnel are authorized to use qualification standards.
- (c) Assign responsibility for control and issue of labels, tags and forms.
- (d) Mandatory re-calibration of all qualification standards in use by the designated qualification activity.
  - (e) Insure only approved procedures will be utilized.
- (f) Assign responsibility for maintenance of inventory and records.
  - (g) Assign responsibility for quality control.
- (h) Designate a Qualification Programs Officer, under the cognizance of the IMA Aircraft Maintenance Officer, responsible for the local program in accordance with applicable directives.
- (2) Under the cognizance of the Qualification Program Officer each Qualification Activity will:
- (a) Insure that standards/test equipment used for qualification are periodically calibrated by a Navy Calibration Laboratory.
- (b) Perform test equipment qualification test procedures as outlined in reference (h).

NgO 4355.2 20 Jul 1967

- (c) Request applicable standards servicing labels and tags as outlined in reference (h).
- (d) Affix the appropriate label and tags to all equipment qualified.
- (e) Submit a monthly production report to ICE CUBE with a copy to CG, FMAW (Attn: G-4) listing all instruments/devices qualified or rejected in the previous month utilizing the report form outlined in enclosure (1) of reference (i).
- (f) Maintain a record system for items to be qualified. Minimum requirements are:
  - (1) Mfg P/N/Mfg Code/Nomenclature/Serial Number.
  - (2) Qualification procedures utilized.
  - (3) Date of last servicing.
  - (4) Reason for submission (normal recall, operational

failure).

- (5) Equipment location.
- (6) Condition received (in or out of tolerance).
- (7) Work performed and man hours expended, (normal qual, parts replaced and label attached).

H. H. LONG

Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "A"

CALIBRATION PROGRAM
PERIODIC CHECK
NOT REQUIRED




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NAVY
CALIBRATION PROGRAM
LIMITED USE
(REFER TO ATTACHED TAG)



BLACK ON YELLOW

WgO 4355.2 20 Jul 1967



DUE

BLACK ON WHITE

CALIBRATION NOT REQUIRED



NOT USED FOR QUANTITATIVE MEASUREMENT

na**vy** Olijebration Program

ORANGE ON WHITE

NAVY
CALIBRATION PROGRAM
REJECT
(REFER TO ATTACHED TAG)

BLACK ON RED

INACTIVE
CALIBRATE
BEFORE USE

CALIBRATION
PROGRAM
DATE

GREEN ON WHITE

HAVY CALIB. PROGRAM

LIMITED USE (REFER TO ATTACHED TAG)

DUE


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ENCLOSURE (1)

WgO 4355.2 20 Jul 1967

Consumption of the Constitution of the Constit	A JOHN STEPHEN	La raidi. Processos	Name of the state of
REPAIR TIE (HANDOURS)  NAVIERS FORM 4,355/120 (5-64) (EMOR)		REFAIR LOTIVITY SUPPERVISOR DATE CORRECTIVE ACTION	REJECTED



ENCLOSUME (1)

Wg0 4355.2 20 Jul 1967

OTHER  OTHER  OTHER  OTHER  OTHER  OTHER  OTHER  OTHER  OTHER  OTHER	CR RAIGES OUTS	TECHLICIAN SUPERTISON  DATE FUNCTIONS ON RANGES NOT SERVICED	1 -
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11ND-GEN-4355/3 (7-62) ACTIVITY	
NAME PLATE DATA	
SERIAL NO.	
ITEM NO.	

ENCLOSURE (1)

Wg0 4355.2 20 Jul 1967

#### CALIBRATION LABORATORY 1st Marine Aircraft Wing FPO San Francisco 96602

PU:dda 10550/1

From: To:	OIC, Calibration Laboratory
Subj:	Report of Delay in Repair/Calibration of Test and Measuring Instrument
	ere will be a delay in repair/calibration and return of instrument(s) below for the reason(s) checked:
WRT NO	. MFG MODEL NO. DESCRIPTION/NOMENCLATURE SERIAL NO ESTIMATED COMP DATE
	Instrument(s) Publication(s) not available/inadequate to perform Calibration/Repair.
	Instrument(s) placed in REJECT status pending receipt of repair parts required to complete repair/calibration.
	Priority workload requirements will delay the completion of report/calibration.
Calibr	the instrument(s) listed above is/are urgently required, request ation Laboratory be advised and an effort will be made to expedite tion and return. Please call extension "ICE CUBE".

ENCLOSURE (2)

WgO 4355.2 20 Jul 1967

From: Fo: Via:	OIC, Calibration Laboratory Avionics Officer, Marine Wing Support	t Group-17
Subj:	Instrument Non-availability Report	
Ref:	(a) Wg0 4355.2	
l. In as una	accordance with reference (a), the for vailiable for calibration during the	ollowing instrument is reported month of:
MO	NUFACTURER: SERIAL DEL NO.: LOCATIONEN/DESCRIPTION:	
2. Th	e reason(s) for non-availability is/a	re as follows:
	Erroneously scheduled; not due unt	il•
	Instrument not held by this Branch	/Section.
	Additional identifying information	required. Contact
	Request this item be placed in an requirement for this instrument to "copy to" box.)	INACTIVE status. Measurement mporarily non-existent. (Check
	Priority workload requires constandate be extended days. (Check	t use. Request calibration due k "copy to" box.)
Γ	Instrument transferred to	on
	Other	
$\Box$	Copy to Avionics Officer lstMAW	EMOTOCIDE (A)
LJ 1st M	AN FORM 4355/1 (3-67)	enclosure (3)

#MADQUARTERS

Lat Marine Aircraft Wing

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

FPO San Trancisco 96602

J

WgO Pl0340.24 CH4 4:FRF:rnl 25 July 1967

#### Wing Order Plo340.2A CH4

From: Commanding General To: Distribution List

Subj: Standing Operating Procedures for Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing Systems

Encl: (1) New page insert to NgO Pl0340.2A

1. Purpose. To transmit a new page insert and direct pen changes to the basic order.

#### 2. Action

- a. Insert new page 2-3 contained in enclosure (1) hereto.
- b. On page iii under TABLE OF CONTENTS Section II under PAGE Section II after 2-2 add: 2-3.
- c. On page iv under TABLE OF CONTENTS Section VI under PAGE Section VI after 6-2 add: 6-3 and 6-4.
- 3. Certification. Reviewed and approved this date.

Chief of Staff

Distribution: "D"

HEADQUARTERS 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Tacific PPO San Francisco 96602

> 52: 16: ': grm 5750

23 AUG 1967

## CONFIDENTIAL

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, C-3 (Attn: Historian)

Subj: Command Caronology

lef: (a) left 5750.10

Encl: (1) Organizational Data (2) Larrative Summary (3) Significant Lyents

- 1. Anclosures (1) through (3) are submitted in accordance with reference (a).
- 2. This letter is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of enclosures (2) and (3).

E. R. ROGAL By direction

ERROSE.

#### ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

G-5, 1st MAN

G-5

1 July 1967 - - 31 July 1967

ACofS, G-5

Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. ACGAL 1 - 31 July 1967

Asst G-5

Major John S. HOLLIS 1 - 31 July 1967

Project Officers

Wajor Richard PEREZ 1 - 31 July 1967 Captain William A. ACHITAM 1 - 31 July 1967 Captain Robert G. FULTON 1 - 31 July 1967

Draftsman

Sergeant Daniel A. KOVACH 1 - 31 July 1967

Clerks

Corporal George H. MIRCHER 1 - 31 July 1967 Lance Corporal James C. HAAHR 1 - 31 July 1967

Enclosure (1)

#### ITEMS OF INTEREST

### CONFIDENTIAL

3 July 67 - Com NSA ltr NK/GLB:bh over 11010 Ser: 644/2354 dtd 3 Jul 67 to CG, FMAW indicated that the MAG-12 and MAG-13 ready ammo pads exceeded Minor New Construction funding limits and required MCON funding. G-5 initiated action by which COMNAVFORV Rep, DaNang reprogrammed necessary MCON funds. (U)

G-5 submitted a memorandum to G-3 concerning the scope of facilities to be built at Phu Bai funded by MCON Line Item C-546. Included was an estimate of additional housing required for a future proposed base loading. (U)

<u>4 July 67</u> - Copies of Basic Facilities Requirement Sheets, prepared in conjunction with the staff of each group, were forwarded to the respective group for information and retention. (U)

11 July 67 - G-5 attended the monthly meeting of the FMAW Base Development Board. All new minor construction projects were reviewed and interlineated into a priority list to be submitted to III MAF for subsequent integration into an overall I Corps Marine commands construction priority list. (U)

13 July 67 - CG, FMAW msg 1310102 July 67 to CG, FMFPac requested approval of a plan to house FMAW air crews in air conditioned quarters and requested assistance in procurement of necessary facilities. (C)

15 July 67 - CG, FMAW ltr 52:JSH:lvr over 11000 dtd 15 Jul 67 to CG, III MAF submitted the FMAW priority list for minor new construction projects for funding during the 1st quarter FY 68. (U)

17 July 67 - CG, FMAW ltr 52:JSH:jch over 11130 dtd 17 Jul 67 to COMNAVFORV Rep, DaNang made additional real estate available to the 138th Aviation Company at DaNang for use as cantonment. (U)

20 July 67 - CG, FMAW ltr 52:RGF:gwm over 11000 dtd 20 Jul 67 to COM 30 RGR requested that construction of facilities funded under MCON Line Item C-546 at Phu Bai commence as soon as possible. (U)

23 July 67 - CG, FMAW ltr 52:WAM:jch over 11000 dtd 23 Jul 67 to COMNAVFORV Rep, DaNang requested that the design of the 90,000 SY of aircraft parking apron at Phu Bai funded by MCON Line Item C-546 be expanded to include an additional 75,000 SY. (U)

29 July 67 - G-5 Project Officer attended a III MAF meeting concerning MCON Line Item C-134A for recreation and support facilities for Phu Bai, Chu Lai, and DaNang. Additional facilities for FMAW personnel at Phu Bai will be programmed into this line item. (J)

31 July 67 - CG, FMAW ltr 52:RP:jch over 11000 dtd 31 Jul 67 to CG, III MAF provided FMAW comments on the COMNAVFORV Rep, DaNang study concerning

Enclosure (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

the encroachment of the Chu Lai crosswind runway approach zone. (U)
This marks the final date of operation of the G-5 as a separate staff division. Commencing 1 August 1967 the FMAW Base Development Office will operate under the cognizance of ACofS, G-4. (U)

2

HEADQUARTERS lst Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Pacific FPO San Francisco 96602

> 10:TCD:wdg 5750 010821767 AUG 5 1967

From: Communication-Electronics Officer To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Subj: Command Chronology

(a) Wing Order 5710.10 Ref:

Encl: J(1) 1st NAW CEO 1tr 10:JSH:dlj 1000 of 1 Jul 1967, subj: MONTHLY PERSONNEL ROSTER

√(2) CG 1st MAN Mag 020050Z Jul 1967, subj: VEHICLE GENERATING SYSTEM, PU-656/M P/O AN/ARC-83/87

(3) CG 1st MAN Msg 020051Z Jul 1967, subj: AIRBORNE DASC

(4) CG lst MAN Msg 022349Z Jul 1967, subj: AIRBORNE RETRANSMISSION (5) CG lst MAN ltr 10:RVA:dlj 2305/10 of 1 Jul 1967, subj: UP-GRADING OF III HAF CABLE SYSTEM

√(6) CG 1st MNJ 1tr 10:RVA:dlj 2302/2 of 2 Jul 1967, subj: HIGH FREQUENCY ANTENNAS

√(7) CG 1st MAN Msg 030645Z Jul 1967, subj: REALIGNMANT FIRST MAN COLM SUPPORT TO KHE SANH

(8) THIRD ANDORSEMENT on OIC MATCU-62 ltr 4/LEM/jwk 4015 of 25 Jun 1967, subj: GROUND ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT (TEST EQUIPMENT) ALLOWANCES; ELQUEST FOR EDDIFICATION OF

(9) CG 1st MAW 1tr 10:RFS:wdg 2302/32 of 3 Jul 1967, subj: RADIOS FOR HING TAXIS

(10) CG lst MAW ltr 10:RVA:dlj 2300/6 of 3 Jul 1967, subj: MTDS COMMUNICATION PLAN

 $\sqrt{(11)}$  CG 1st MAV 1tr 10:RVA:wdg 2300/6A of 3 Jul 1967, subj: RADAR SUFFORT TO MIDS

√(12) 1st MAN CEO memo 10:RVA:wdg 2000 of 4 Jul 1967, subj: MEDICAL COORDINATION CENTER

√(13) CG 1st MAN Msg 040850Z Jul 1967, subj: AIRBORNE DASC COMMUNICATIONS

√(14) CG 1st MAW 1tr 10:MAM:wdg 10551 of 5 Jul 1967, subj: MACS-7 EQUIPMENT STATUS

(15) CG 1st MAN Msg 060120Z Jul 1967, subj: WING SUPPLY COMM SUPPORT

(16) THIRD ENDORSELENT on CG MCSA Phila ltr 843:FM:ff UER 3-67 of 14 Jun 1967, subj: UNSATISFACTORY EXPUTPMENT REPORT ON RADIO SET AN/TRC-273


(17) CG 1st 1AW Msg 060701Z Jul 1967, subj: LONGLINE CIRCUIT CANCELLATION

CONTRACTAL

3035-67 11


A/1/3-6

10:TCD:wdg 5750



- √(18) CG 1st MAW 1tr 10:REF:wdg 2030 of 7 Jul 1967, subj: COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE REQUEST
- V(19) 1st MAW CHO memo 10: EVA: wdg 11120 of 7 Jul 1967, subj: BUILDING REHABILITATION/MINOR CONSTRUCTION
- ♥(20) CG 1st MAI Msg 070542Z Jul 1967, subj: AUTODIN
- √(21) CG 1st MAN Msg 071334Z Jul 1967, subj: CIRCUIT CANCELLATION
- (22) SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, MACS-4 ltr 10:TJL:rkl 4700 of 3 Jul 1967, subj: UNSATISFACTORY EQUIPMENT REFORT: FORWARDING OF
- (23) SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, MACS-7 ltr TKB:dmh 2000 of 3 Jul 1967, subj: TAOC TAFE RECORDING SYSTEM; EVALUATION OF
- (24) CG 1st MAN Msg 110612Z Jul 1967, subj: DEDICATED TELETYFE CIRCUITS
- $\sqrt{(25)}$  CG 1st MAN Msg 110254Z Jul 1967, subj: MTDS COMM EAPANSION
- J(26) 1st MAW CEO memo 10:RVA:wdg of 11 Jul 1967, subj: FMFPAC MATERIAL/MAINTENANCE REVIEW REFORT
- (27) 1st MAN CEO MEMO 10:EMM:wdg 10551/3 of 11 Jul 1967, subj: PROCUREMENT OF COMMERCIAL AIR CONDITIONERS FOR MAHG-1 RADAR EQUIPMENT
- (28) CG 1st MAN 1tr 10:RFS:wdg 4441/1 of 13 Jul 1967, subj: MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE
- (29) CG 1st MAN Msg 130752Z Jul 1967, subj: FIXED PLANT TTY EXPUIP
- (30) CG 1st MAN Spoltr 10:RVA:wdg 13110/2 of 13 Jul 1967, subj: FIXED PLANT TELETYPE EQUIPMENT
- √(31) CG 1st MAN Msg 140731Z Jul 1967, subj: INITIAL ISSUE AND PROVISIONING OF AN/TPX-28 INTETROGATOR SET
- (32) 1st MAN CEO memo 10:RVA:tcd 2100 of 16 Jul 1967, subj: FROCESSING OF OUTGOING MESSAGES
- J(33) CG 1st MAW Spdltr 10:RVA:dlj 2302/32 of 16 Jul 1967, subj: RADIO SET, AN/PRC-25
- (34) CG 1st MAW Msg 180835Z Jul 1967, subj: CMDR 7TH AF NIGHT ALFA FRAG O
- (35) CG 1st MAW Msg 190505Z Jul 1967, subj: NAVCOMOPNET REQUIREMENTS IN RVN
- √ (36) CG 1st MAW 1tr 10:RVA:dlj 2302/7 of 19 Jul 1967, subj: FM

  CRASH COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
- (37) 1st MAW CEO memo 10:TCD:dlj 1000 of 22 Jul 1967, subj: WING COMM-ELECT OFFICER, DESIGNATION OF
- (38) 1st MAW CEO memo 10:RVA:wdg 5440 of 22 Jul 1967, subj: // ESTABLISHMENT OF MCAS, CHU LAI
- /(39) CG 1st MAN Msg 230052Z Jul 1967, subj: AIRBORNE RETRANSMISSION (40) CG 1st MAW Msg 230745Z Jul 1967, subj: AIRBORNE/AIR TRANSPORTABLE
- (41) CG 1st MAW 1tr 10:RVA:wdg 4400/2 of 24 Jul 1967, subj: UHF RADIO AUGMENTATION FOR 2D LAAM BN.
- (42) 1st MAW CEO memo 10:RVA:tcd 2110 of 24 Jul 1967, subj: III MAF COURTESY MESSAGES



10:TCD:wdg 5750

CONFIDENTIAL

 $\sqrt{(43)}$  CG 1st MAN 1tr 10:RMF:wdg 2305/10 of 25 Jul 1967, subj: UP-GRADING OF III MAF CABLE SYSTEM

- √(44) CG 1st MAW Msg 280114Z Jul 1967, subj: R&E FROCRAM FY 68 √(45) CG 1st MAW Msg 270814Z Jul 1967, subj: CHANGE TO WGO P02000.6A
- √(46) 1st MAH CEO memo 10:KMH:dlj 1000 of 29 Jul 1967, subj: STAFF DRAFTSMAN (MOS 8771); REQUEST FOR

√(47) CG 1st NAW Msg 311328Z Jul 1967, subj: ASRT RELOCATION

- (48) Navy Commendation Medal; recommendation for, case of Captain Emmett W. MACCORKIE, 090694/2502/3002, United States Marine Corps
- √(49) 1st MAW CEO 1tr 10:RFB:dlj 1000 of 31 Jul 1967, subj: REASSIGNMENT: REQUEST FOR
- 1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), enclosures 1 through 49 are submitted.
- 2. The 1st MAW NAIS Radio Station Traffic count for the month of July 1967, is as follows:

	Phone Patches	Message Traffic
Outgoing	1007	3564
Incoming	<u> </u>	2121
Total	1022	<del>5685</del>

The total message traffic handled by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Communication Center for the month of July 1967 was 102,229 of which 50,164 were outgoing and 52,135 were incoming.

- (5) <u>Lamp Incandescent.</u> This item is in short supply throughout the Wing. For the most part this shortage effects the adequacy of lighting in working and living areas. 2nd LAAMS has had difficulty in obtaining replacement lamps for perimeter defense lighting.
- (6) <u>Green Towels.</u> This item is in short supply but is not considered critical.
- (7) Green Underclothing. This item is generally in short supply throughout the Wing for the popular sizes. This is creating a problem in that white underclothing (individual clothing) is also in short supply. At one time units were able to substitute green for white to ensure that a man had his issue quantity of underclothing. With the shortage of both kinds this problem is continuing and will become critical if relief is not forthcoming soon.
  - (8) Acetylene. Is in short supply in 2nd LAAM Bn and MAG-11.
- (9) <u>Tires 900 X 20.</u> lst LAAM Bn is in short supply on this item to replace marginal in-use tires on Battalion trucks.
- (10) 708 Cards. FISG Bravo is NIS of this item and Wing Chu Lai units are having a problem in obtaining adequate quantities. This Head-quarters has effected internal redistribution to aid this problem, however there are no longer quantities to redistribute.
- (11) Sheets and Pillowcases. The Wing is experiencing a shortage of sheets and pillowcases. Long lead time for requisitions through the garrison property system is creating shortages which will lead to a health and morale problem.

#### Significant Events

- 1. The Wing Supply Officer briefed RAdm White, CONFAIRNESTPac, on the concept of supply in FMAN and supply problems on 1 July 1967.
- 2. During July the head of the ASO Packaging and Preservation Section accompanied by FMFPac supply representatives visited all wing units to assist in improving methods utilized to store pack and ship high value aeronautical material. The FMFPac team further investigated the progress made in implementing the "Admiral Shinn Sends" message on management of aeronautical material and equipment.
- 3. The FMFPac Supply Operations Assistance Team completed its assistance vists with all wing units (except MACS-4) in preparation for the forthcoming GAO visit.

- 4. The reconciliation of all outstanding requisitions of the 1st MAN LAAM Battalions with each of their supply sources as directed by CG FMFPac 150204Z Jul 67 was completed. Complete documentation was delivered by courier to 1st and 3d FSR and by certified Air Mail to the ICP Phila Pa. on 31 July 1967.
- 5. The Wing Supply Officer and the Wing Marine Corps Supply Officer attended a III MAF Supply Conference at FLC on 4 July 1967.
- 6. The Wing Supply Officer briefed representatives of the U.S. Senate Military Preparedness Sub-committee on general supply natters on 5 July 1967.
- 7. The Wing Supply Officer and the Wing Marine Corps Supply Officer attended the III MAF Pre-Logistics Conference on 13 July 1967.
- 8. The Wing Supply Officer and Wing Marine Corps Supply Officer attended the FATPac 9th Periodic Logistics Conference during the period 17 20 July 1967.
- 9. The Wing Aviation Supply Officer visited VMGR-152 on Okinawa, MAG-15 at Iwakuni, MSD Yokosuka and COMFAIRWESTPac during July to discuss transfer of UH34 parts, classified supply matters, update of the Storm Project and general aviation supply matters.

RICHES J

## CONFIDENTIAL

3. FOR CO THIRD PARELY. RECOMMEND ESTABLISHMENT OF SU CKTS FROM THIRD HARDEV UNIT AT KHE SAGH TO LANDSMARK BRAVO AND TO LANDSMARK CHARLIE, ROUTED VIA THIRD MARRIY MULTI CHARMEL SYSTEMS.

PACES PRIVER MAJOR

R. V. ANDERSON LICOL

CONFIDENTIAL

#### HEADQUARTERS let Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Parce, Pacific PPO San Francisco 96602

1000 1000 1 Jul 1967

From: Ameletant Communication-Electronics Officer
For Communing Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron-1

Subja Manchly Personnel Restor

Ref; (a) Sqdn0 1080,2

L. In accordance with reference (a), the following report of paramonal assigned to this section as of 30 July 1967 is submitted:

#### A CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH

ARDERSON, Robert V. PAUVER, Romald E. MURRAY, MILLIAGE HAGGORKIER, Romatt W. MUTT, Semmel. SHAMI., New Y. LINENG, Robert R. HINKEL, James S. BROADMEAD, Robert P. WEDNELL, George M. HICHGLS, Rabin J. HUHH, Thomas G. LAHERAD, Edward G. Jr., PARTIE, Predstak L.,	IACol Major Copt Copt Magt Magt Magt Cyagt Cyagt Opl Opl Opl	016851/2502/0605 060566/2502/5905 073678/2502/5903 090691/2502/5903 52:1382/2591 1088176/2861/8062 1136305/5916 859813/2591 632218/2591 81221616/2551 2137637/0311 2129707/2533 2807685/2533	A/CHO ESO A/GEO Ming Comm Chief Miner Chief Reder Chief A/Comm Chief Admin Chief MOOZO MARS HARS Operator Clerk Typhet MARS Operator MARS Operator	Aug Peb Aug Peb Peb Jul Hev Dee Jul Jul Jun	657666666666666666666666666666666666666
HUMM, Thomas G. LAMMAD, Romard G. Jr., PARTIS, Fredrick L., JOHNSON, Boyle L.	Opl	2129707/2533	MARS Operator	Jul	67 68 68 68

R. R. PAUVER

D20050Z

UNGLAS/EPTO

PRIORITI/ROUTINE

PROFILE CO FIRST NAW

101

MAG-CHE TWO MAG-CHE SIX MAG-THRISE SIX

DEFO: OO PETPAG OO III MAF

UNILLAS/S FT 0

VEHICLE GENERATING SISTEM, PU-656/S P/O AN/NEG-83/87

- L. ACTION ADDRESS REPORT PAILORS OF SUBJ ROBER DUE TO
  - A. STATOR VAILURE SUBSECUENT TO SALT WATER INMERSION.
- B. BOTOR SHAPT DAMAGE BUE TO INCORRECT TOLERANCE BETWEEN SHAPT AND PULLEY.
- C. NO OF AN /NRO-83/87 ON HAND WETH SUBJ CENERATING SYSTEM INSTALLED.
- 2. REPORTS TO THIS HQ (ATTE: CRO) HET & JUL 67. HEG REPORTS REQUIRED.
- 3. USE OF AN/MRC-83/87 WITH SURJ CENERATING SYSTEM INSTALLED IN RESTRICTED TO ABSOLUTE MINIMUM CONSISTENT WITH OPERATIONAL CONGULMENTS.

R. E. PAUVER HAJOR A/GEO HO-LO

R. V. ANDERSON LTCOL

TIDOS-ENCLOSURE (2)

OZCOSIZ CONFIDENTIAL

PRICRITY LJUL67 WDG

FROM: CG FIRST NAW

CG NINTH MAB TO:

INFO: CG FMPPAC

MAHG-ONE

VMER-ONE FIVE TWO

CONFIDENTIAL

AIRBORNE DASC (U)

A. CG FIRST MAW 250316Z JUN 67

- 1. REF A PROPOSED A FLAN FOR THE EVALUATION OF AN AIRBORNE DASC IN RYM. THE CONCEPT OF REP A WAS VERBALLY APPROVED BY CG FMFPAC ON 27 JUN 67. THERE IS A TENTATIVE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE AIRBORNE CASC ON 7 JUL 67.
- 2. REQUEST ONE KC-130, CONFIGURED AS AIRBORNE DASC, BE AT DET. YMOR-ONE FIVE TWO, DANANG AB NLT 041300H JUL 67.
- 3. LT D. WOOD, RAD O, H AND HS-ONE, WILL ARR FUTEMA 2 JUL 67 TO ACCOMPANY A/C TO DAMANG.
- 4. NEW SUBJ. LIT WOOD WILL CARRY SILICON CONTROLLED RECTIFIER FOR AM/TPQ-10 SER A6 TO FUTEMA.

CP-L

R. B. FAUVER MAJOR HD-10 A/CEO

LICOL R. V. ANDERSON MO-10

CONFIDENTIAL

Abob- ENGLOSURE (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

**FOUTINE** 

OZZZZZZ PROM: CO PIEST NAW ROUTINE 1JUL67 WDG

TO:

HAHG-ONE

MAG-ONE ONE MAG-ONE TWO MAG-ONE THREE MAG-ONE SIX MAG-ONE SEVEN MASG-ONE SEVEN

CONFIDENTIAL

AIRBORNE RETRANSMISSION

- 1. ADDEMS, LESS MANG-ONE, BL PREPARAD TO RESPOND TO AIRBORNE RETRANSMISSION FRAG MISSION BY 6 JUL 67. AUTOCAT CONFIGURATION REDUIRED.
- 2. MMHG-OME PROVIDE EQUIP AND ASSISTANCE, WITHIN CAPABILITY, UPON REQUEST FROM MAGS. DIRIAUTH.
- 3. FRAG O WILL SPECIFY PREQ FOR INITIAL CONTACT, RETEAMS FREQ AND CALL SIGNS FOR STANLEY MANOCAT NODE. AUTH AND NUCO REQUIRED FOR EA MISSION.

GP-4

R. E. FAUVER MAJOR A/GEO MO-10 R. V. ANDERSON LTCOL CEO MO-10

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS

1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco, 96602

10:RVA:dlj 2305/10 1 Jul 1967

From: Commanding General

To: Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1

Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group-11
Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Support Group-17

Subj: Up-grading of III MAF Cable System

Encl: (1) I Corps Coordinator Notice 2300 of 25 June 1967 NIF

(2) I Corps Coordinator Instruction 2300.2 of 12 June 1967 NIF

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in sub-paragraph 3 b and c, enclosure (1), addressees are requested to submit their requirements to this Headquarters (Attn: CEO) by 15 July 1967.

R. V. ANDERSO By direction HEADQUARTERS

1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602

10:RVA:dlj 2302/2 2 Jul 1967

From: Commanding General

To: Command

Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1

Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group-36

Subj: High Frequency Antennas

Ref: (a) CG 1st MAW spdltr 10:RVA: dwe 2302/2 of 23 Nov 1966

1. Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1 is scheduled to receive the following special high frequency antennas for a six month troop test:

a. One Collins 637B-1A

b. One Collins 637D-1A

c. Two Collins 637E-1A

d. One Granger 747CA-7

2. The application instructions contained in reference (a) are hereby modified in that:

a. One Collins 637E-1A will be forwarded to the Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group-36 for an evaluation by CHU LAI based Wing units.

b. Remaining antennas will be erected in the Wing antenna farm and will be rotated among Wing Command Net No. 2, the TAC net, MAG-16 Command Net and MARS Station NØEFB nets.

c. Radio logs on all circuits will specify antenna type in use, operating frequency, hours of operation and rear field measurements (when available).

d. Monthly progress reports will be submitted to this Headquarters (Attn: CEO) with the first report due on 15 Aug 1967.

By direction

CONFIDENTIAL

METLER 0.306452

ROUTINE COLUMN TO

PROME CO PIRET NAM

OD THIRD MARDEY TOP

NAME-OFF NAG-CHE SIX

IEFO: CO THIED MARRIY

MAG-CHE SIX DRY ALPA MAG-CHE SII DET BRAVO

ON THIRD MARKET FOR ACTION AND PASS TO MAG-ONE SILL DET BRATO

CORPIDENTIAL

REAL TORREST PIRST BUT COME SUPPORT TO KEE SAME (U)

#### 1. FOR MICHO-CHE

A. REMOTE PERST MAN STATION ON MAD-CHE SIX COMMAND MAT (MF/38B) TO WING TADG.

B. PROVIDE ONE SMR, 89-22, AND TWO NOS 2511 TO MAG-ORE STI DET ALFA POR RETABLISHMENT OF SMITCHDIO GENTRAL AT KHE SAME.

O. RESURE CENTINUOUS AVAILABILITY OF TAC MET AT LAND-SHARK CHARLIS.

B. BE PRIPARED TO ACCEPT OF CETS FROM THIRD MARRIEV UNIT AT THE SARN TO LANDSMANK BRAVO AND LANDSHAME CHARLIE.

#### 2. FOR MAD-CEE SIX

A. RETARLISH SMITCHING CHATRAL AT KHE SAUR. DIRECTORY MANE RESIDENCE.

- (1) OR 1 SE, ROBO HA THE TO KEE SAME THE. (2) OR 2 OE, ROBEANS ALPA TO ETHINATE (3) B. CHANNELIZE DONG HA-KHE SANK AN/MAC-62 LINK AS POLA

  - CH 2 CH, ROSEANN ALPA TO NISDEAL CH 3 CH, ROSEANN ALPA TO NISDEAL

  - CH L CO THIRD MARDIN USE
- C. MINIMAL LOCALS AS REQUIRED. INCLUDE KIN OF ONE LATERAL THURK TO THERD MARRIEV SHE AT ERR SAME.

CONFIDENTIAL

APP 6 - ENCLOSURE (7)

### CONFIDENTIAL

D. IN W/MCS PHIL RE HAVCOMOPMET HAS PRODUCED VALUABLE PIXED PLANT TIT TRAINING AND PROVIDED OTHERWISE NOT AVAIL REPAIR PARTS SUPPORT TO FIRST MAW FIXED PLANT TIT EQUIP.

E.	RECOMMEND	THE MINATION	FIRST	MAW	NAVCOHOPNET	REMAIN	NC5	HIL.
----	-----------	--------------	-------	-----	-------------	--------	-----	------

GF-4

W. E. MUFRAY CAPT EEO MO-10 R. V. ANDERSON LICOL CRO NO-10

CONFIDENTIAL

10:RVA:dlj 1/14 3 Jul 1967

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on OIC MATCU-62 ltr 4/LFM/jwk 4015 of 25 Jun 1967

Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (Code: 4241C3) To: Via:

(1) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

(2) Industrial Manager 12th Naval District

(3) Commandant of the Marine Corps (4) Industrial Manager, Potomic River Naval Command

Subj: Ground Electronics Equipment (Test Equipment) Allowances; request for modification of

1. Forwarded recommending approval.

Copy to: CO MABS-16 OIC MATCU-62

4: CFB: dmc 4000 JUL 2 1967

#### SECOND ENDORSEMENT on OIC MATCU-62 1tr 4/LEM/jwk 4015 of 25 Jun 1967

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 16

To: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (Code: 4241C3)

Via: (1) Commanding General, First Marine Aircraft Wing

(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

(3) Industrial Manager 12th Naval District

(4) Commandant of the Marine Corps

(5) Industrial Manager, Potomic River Naval Command

Subj: Ground Electronic Equipment (Test Equipment) Allowances; request for modification of

- 1. Fowarded recommending approval.
- 2. It is noted that the combat bases of Dong Ha and Khe Sanh are some 20 miles apart in the most northern portion of the Republic of Vietman.

The MARTIN

Copy to: CO MABS-16 OIC MATCU-62

#### **DECLASSIFIED**


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ETHER TENTHS TO 6. 000 110 20 00 1/17 /500 men 101 686 25 Jun 10/7

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(1) Commodian Collicar, Test a Airest of Groun 16
(2) Commodian Capatri, Test Taxino Airent of Wing
(3) Commodian Capatri, Test Taxino Airent of Wing
(5) Commodian Conord, Test Taxino Force Pacific
(6) Industrial Conord 12th ovel Michigat
(7) Commodest of Mr. Ingle Comps
(6) Industrial Capatri, Primad First Movel Compa 17-j- g

Subj: Ground Electronic Bouter as & (Next Equip ont) Allermoss; naturate for modification of .

1. Forwarded for consideration.



WK WILL TA 4015 25 June 1967

From: Officer in Charge To: Commander, Laval Air Systems Command , Oode: 424103) Via: Commanding Officer, Marine Air Base Squadron 16 Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 16 Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific Industrial Manager 12th Naval District Commandant of the Harine Corps

Industrial Manager, Potomac River Maval Command

Subj: Ground Electronic Equipment (Test Equipment) Allowances, request for modification of

Ref:

- Buseps Inst 10550.11 of 21Jul64 (a)
- (b) CG, FiFPac msg 101952Z Jun67
- NASC 1tr AIR-4241C3:TBL of 30Jan67 (NOTAL)
- NASC msg 1618438 Jun67
- 1. In accordance with reference (a) and as directed by reference (b), it is requested that allowances for Test Equipment as contained in reference (c) be modified as follows:

a.	Equipment	Present Allowance	On Hand	Desired Allowance
	AN/USM-140 ()	2	1%	3
	TS-1771/U (FE-11	.) 1	1	2

- A second AN/USI-140D is being furnished by action reference (d)
- 2. The requirement for listed test equipment have been reviewed and the following justifications submitted:
  - a. AWUSILLO: Oscilloscope (or equivalant)
    - (1) Requirements:
- (a) One Oscilloscope required on a daily basis at Khe Sanh for sensitivity checks, alignment and trouble shooting/repair of and THL-8 radars.

- (b) One Oscilloscope required on a dilly basis at Dong Ha for the following equipments:
- is mandatory for these equipments, as well as being required for trouble shooting and repair.
  - 2: MV/FM-36. Used for maintengace and trouble shooting.
- 3. At C. N-4. Required for mainly analytic and trouble shooting in several areas (a recommended item for the CPL-4 on the EFN Required Test Equipment List).
- 4. AN/UFS-10. Required on a continuing basis for maintenance and alignment of the 10 and APA-125 indicators.
- 5. Maintenance. An Oscilloscop: is required on an "on call" basis to meet numerous requirements of all sect. ons, in minor problem areas.
- (c) Calibration requirements have then based on a 120 day cycle to date, with an unknown turn-around time. In this instance, twice during this period, this unit would be left with one challescope, to be shuttled between operating sites, dependent upon unreliable transportation. In the event of a major break down, one site would be inclined of a suitable scope to perform mandatory checks. This same problem occurs when a scope is deadlined, since no repairs have been affected in RVW and recalibration is generally required. Then repairs have been affected. To provide this unit with sufficient test equipment to perform messary daily checks at both sites, one additional Oscilloscope is a required necessity.
- (2) The present situation has been partially alleviated by a USH-105 Oscilloscope presently held by this unit. This equipment was retained from the AN/ISQ-A and has been deadlined three times in the past six months (for an approximate total of 90 days) contributed primarily to age and long, continuous usage and lack of repair parts/facilities. This equipment requires disposition and will be requested, as suitable oscilloscopes are made available.

### b. Wattmeter IE-11A (TS-1771/U)

### (1) Requirements:

- (a) One RF wattmeter is required for daily power checks of some seven operational radios located at line Janh (Tower & GCA).
- (b) One RF wattmeter is required for daily power checks of some twelve operational radios located at Dong Ha (Tower & GCA plus back up).
- (c) One RF wattheter is a necessity for continued use in radio maintenance. This unit, by necessity, maintains all radios utilized at both airfield sites, (Approximately 60 radios of various types).

(2) MATCL-02 presently possesses (1) RF wattmeter RE-LLA: An additional wattmeter is urgently required to fullfill present demands.

2. It must be pointed out that the propent requirement for a third Oscilloscope will no longer exist it the two Oscilloscopes, Al/USI-137 (AM/USM-32) authorized by reference (d/, are provided in the immediate future.

Z. A. TOGEL

## HEADQUARTERS let Marine Aircraft Wing Floot Marine Force, Pacific FRO San Francisco 96602

10:RFS:wdg 2302/32 3 Jul 1967

From: Commanding General

To: Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Support Group-17

Subj: Radios for Wing Taxis

Ref: (a) Telephone conversation Capt HRUNEILE and MSgt SHAUL on 24 June 1967

- l. A requirement exists for radio communication between five Berless vehicles which are to be used as Wing taxis and the taxi dispatcher. This Headquarters desires to utilize AW/VRC-33 or similar type radio equipment to meet this need, and is currently investigating the means of obtaining this equipment.
- 2. The possibility of utilizing radio sets AN/PRC-25 as an interim solution has also been investigated. Current commitments prohibit the intra-wing transfer of AN/PRC-25's to satisfy this need. However, ref (a) indicated that two AN/PRC-25 radio sets are currently provided to the MMSC-17 Motor Transport section, four are assigned to contingency requirements, and three are back-up sets.
- 3. MNSG-17 is requested to provide four additional radio sets AN/ RNG-25 to the Motor Transport section to be used in the Seriess Wing taxis. However, these additional radios will be provided with the stipulation that they are subject to immediate recall should they be required to fulfill higher priority commitments.

R. V. ANDERSON By direction

# HEADGEARTERS Let Marine Aircraft Wing Finet Harine Force, Pacific FPG Sam Francisco 96602

10:RVA:415 2300/6 3 Jul 1967

From Commanding Comment.

To: Commending Officer, Marine Ming Headquarters Group-L

Subj: NTDS Communication Flan

Ref: (u) 20/201 002300 of 18 June 1967

l. Establish following multi-charmel systems in support of enclosure (1), reference (a):

AM/MED-62 link, Monkey Hountain to DONG HA. Chammelination as follows:

Ch 1 - MACS-L TACC to MATCU-62 App Control

Ch 2 - MACH-L TACC to DONO HA DASC

Ch 3, Ch 4 - Routed from Mordony Mountain to DANAMI vice AN/TRO-

97

b. AN/THO-97 link, Merdony Neumtein to DANAND. Channelization as postrayed enclosure (1), reference (a) and as specified sub-paregraph last, above (Ch 3, Ch 4 - AN/MHC-62).

- 2. Establish following circuits from Morkey Hountain to GHT LAIs
  - a. SU, MACS-4 TACC to MATCH-67 App Control
  - b. SU. HAGS-4 TAGE to CHU LAI DAGE
  - C. Utilize existing Ali/TEC-97 systems.
- 3. This Headquarters will request following AN/MRG-80 circuits from Headery Meuritain to PRU BAI:
  - a. SU, MACS-4 TAGO to HATCH-68 App Control
  - b. SU, MACS-L TACC to HIU BAI DASC

LOUTVALGES 2300/6

h. Smisting sole user circuitry, as required by MACS-h, should be partied at CRC and routed to MACS-h via codating cable.

R. V. ANDESTRUM By direction

# HEADQUARTERS 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Facific FPO San Francisco 96602

10:RVA:wdg 2300/6A 3 Jul 1967

From: Commanding General

To: Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1

Subj: Radar Support to MTDS

Ref: (a) CG PMFFAC 0103432 Jul 1967 PASEF

(b) ADMINO FMFPAC 160315Z Dec 1966

- 1. Reference (a) authorizes the retention of AN/TPS-34 Ser A6 in support of MTDS and specifies the conditions which must be fulfilled. Reference (b) authorized addition of one Radar Set, AN/TPS-37 to III MAF Prov T/E P4960.
- 2. Retention of Radar Set, AN/TPS-37, Ser No. 39, by MACS-4, is authorized under the same conditions specified in reference (a).

R. V. ANDERSON By direction

# HEADQUARTERS 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Pacific FPO San Francisco 96602

10:RVA:wig 2000 4 Jul 1967

#### MEMOR ANDUM

From: Communication-Electronics Officer

To: Assistant Wing Commander

Via: Chief of Staff

Subj: Medical Coordination Center

Ref: (a) CO, 1st Med Bn 1tr 3/RCO/dlb 2000 of 8 June 1967

(b) CG 1st MAW 1tr 16:JJZ:1wl 2000 (undated)

- l. Reference (a) represents a request from the lat Medical Batallion for a common user trunk line to the MOMENT switchboard and cites a need for the coordination of medical evacuation as justification. It has been determined that the lat Medical Batallion had previously submitted a similar request to the Commanding General lat Marine Division, their parent command, and had been refused. Reference (b) forwarded a concept for the establishment of a Medical Coordination Center to the Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force. Although not expressly stated, it was envisioned that this Center be established at the DANANG East hospital.
- 2. The communication concept in support of reference (b) prescribed direct access communication, via FM radio and sole user telephone circuits, among all coordination facilities. In support of this concept a sole user telephone circuit has been installed between the Ring TADC and lst Medical Batallion.
- 3. In summary, III MAF action on reference (b) is unknown; the Medical Coordination Center was never planned for location within the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing; the 1st Medical Batallion has direct access to the Wing TADC.

Very respectfully

E. V. ANDERSON

### CONFIDENTIAL

MIOSITY OSSOZ FROM: CG FIRST MAN

FRICKITY. 4JUL67 WDG

TO: FIRST MAN

CG THIED MARDIY

CONFIDENTIAL

AIRBORNE DASC COMMUNICATIONS (U)

- A. WOO PO2000.6A
- 1. AIRBORNE DASC WILL OPERATE PERIODICALLY ON TEST BASIS 5 THRU 7 JULY.
- 2. CALL SIGN IS LANDSHAFE XEAY.
- 3. FREQUENCIES ASSIGNED:

A .	TATC	305.1MC	AMBER
₿.	TAD	348.0MC	CHOCCLATE
C.	TAD	339.1MC	AQUAMARINE
<b>D</b> •	ОН	315.6HC	PLATINUM
E.	HD/TAR #4	43.5MC	YELLOW
7.	TAR	(F) 2227	(S) 3895 KCS

4. AI BORNE DASC ALSO GUARDS TAC #1. PRISOS IAN REF A.

GP-4

	FAUVER	MAJOR	E.	v	·	ANDLESON	LTCOL
A/CEO		MO-10	CE	Ø			MO-10



### HEADQUARTERS 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Pacific FFO San Francisco 96602

10:EMM:wdg 10551 5 Jul 1967

From: Commanding General

To: Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1

Subj: MACS-7 Equipment Status

Ref:

(a) MCO 10551.7

(b) CG FMFPAC 2218532 Apr 1967

(c) CC FIRST MAN 0608122 Jun 1967

(d) CG FMFPAC 1405342 Jun 1967

- 1. Reference (a) directs that each Marine Air Control Squadron committed to a combat zone be provided one AM/TPX-28 in addition to those rated on the table of equipment. MACS-7 holds this additional AM/TPX-28. In view of MACS-7's departure from RVN, it is requested that MACS-7 invoice one of its operational AM/TPX-28's to MACS-4.
- 2. Reference (b) directed MACS-7 to invoice one AN/UFS-1 with AN/TFX-28 to MACS-4. It is requested that this be effected as soon as possible.
- 3. Reference (c) requested authorization for HERS-1 to retain five AN/MRC-40 radios from the T/E of MACS-7, as an expanded maintenance float. By reference (d), CG FMPac concurred and passed this request to CMC recommending that these radios be included in the III MAF Provisional T/b. To date this request has not been answered; however, approval is expected. It is recommended that, after MACS-7 is "non-operational", the five AN/MRC-40 radios be invoiced from MACS-7 to MAGS-1.

R. V. ANDRESON By direction OGOIZEZ ROM: CG FIRST MAW UNCLAS/EFTO

ROUTINE 6JUL67 WDG

TO: CG FMFPAC

UNCLAS/E F T O

WING SUPPLY COMM SUPPORT

- A. WCBUL 2000 OF 28 FEB 67 B. CG FIRST MAW 010150% JUL 67
- 1. THE 60 WPM TTY LOOP, EST BY REF A, HAS NOT PROVIDED RELIABLE SERVICE TO WING SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS.
- 2. EQUIPMENT FAILURES, IN THE AN/TGC-LLA/V AND TH-5, ARE FREQUENT. NON-COMM PERS OFERATING THE EQUIP CANNOT PERFORM THE NEAR CONSTANT ADJUSTMENT REQUIRED FOR THE AN/TGC-LLA/V AND DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE USE OF THE EQUIPMENT. THE TERMINAL EQUIP, AT ALL SUBSCRIBERS, IS NOT AFFORDED ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. POWER FAILURES ARE COMMON.
- 3. SUBJ SUPPORT IS A VALID REQUIREMENT AND AT THOSE TIMES WHEN THE LOOP HAS BEEN RELIABLE, SUBSCRIBERS HAVE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION.
- 4. IN THE INTEREST OF IMPROVEMENT TO SUEJ SUFFORT, REF B SOLICITS SUBSCRIBER COMMENTS. INITIAL INPUT INDICATES FROBLEM AREAS CENTERED IN UNTHAINED OPERATORS AND EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE. THIS WILL BE SUBJ OF IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.

R. E. FAUYER MAJOR MO=10

R. V. ANDERSON LTCOL CEO MO-10

Apple - ENCLOSURE (B)

### DECLASSIFIED

10:RVA:wdg 4700 6 Jul 1967

THIRD INDORSEMENT on CO MCSA Phile ltr 843A:PM::ff UER 3-67 dtd 14 Jun 1967

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

To: Commanding Officer, 2d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion,

Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Via: Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: Unsatisfactory Equipment Report on Eadio Set AN/TEG-278

1. Forwarded.

R. V. ANDERSON By direction Ø60701Z

RESTINE

CHPILENTIAL

ROUTINE CFJURG?

PROME OF FERST NAME

TON OG III HAP

A. CO III MAP NOO 1142122 JUN 1967

LONGLINE CINCUIT GANGELLATION (U)

L. REG CARCELLATION OF CIRCUITS DEEV EXIS, AND DEEV KINS, DEEV AND KINS.

2. PHU BAI SUBSCRIBER SCHRIBLED FOR PHASSOUT. COM RE-QUIRRENTS REMAINING OPERATIONS WITH TACTICAL EQUIPMENT.

- 3. CUITACT PERSONNEL
  - (1) PHU BAL, LE BAY, ROSEABN-16
  - (2) HET HIM, WO VAN MEER, MET HIM SMITCH.
  - (3) LOT MAN, HAS PAUVER, 1980 GLOPS.

L. RECOMMEND APPLICATION AGAINST III HAY REQUIREMENTS (0) AND (0) STATED REF A. OP-4

R. E. PAUVER HAJOR

R. V. ANDERSON LITOOL

ENCLOSURE (11)

### HEADQUARTERS let Marine Aircraft Wing Floot Marine Porce, Pacific FPO San Francisco 96602

10:REF: wdg 2030 7 Jul 1967

From: Commanding General

To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Communications Assistance Request

l. It is requested that 5th Communication Battalion install a twenty five pair cable from the AF SSO frame to the let LAAM Battalion. The cable is needed to replace field wire new in wee.

2. The operations officer of 5th Comm Bm. is familiar with necesmany details for this project.

> R. V. ANDERSON By direction

# HEADQUARTERS Let Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Pacific FFO San Francisco 96602

10:RVA:wig 11120 7 Jul 1967

#### MEMORAMOUN

From: Communication-Electronics Officer

To: Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1

Subja Building rehabilitation/minor construction

Ref: (a) CHO memo to AMC of 27 Feb 1967

(b) CG lat MAW ltr 10:RVA:dlj 11120 of 12 Apr 1967

Encl: -(1) Proposed HATDOCKS Form 2351 N IF

1. By approval of reference (a), an expansion of the Wing Communication Center, a re-location of the Wing Communication Center, a re-location of the Wing Communication Center, a re-location of the Wing Communication and SSO terminal facility and an AUTODIN installation has been programmed for Bldgs 712, 713 and 714, TANOO Sector, DANANG AB. Reference (b) requested that GC, MANG-1, initiate action for the necessary rehabilitation/minor construction.

2. In view of an impending deadline for the submission of Special Project Requests, enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith as a recommended submission to ACof5, G-5.

Respectfully

R. V. ANDERSON

Copy to: ACof8, G-5 (less encl)

 $\forall b p$  ( - enclosure (14)

### CONFIDENTIAL CONTIDENTIAL

ROUTING

PROM: OO FILST MAN

ROUTINE 7.3111.67

GP-L

TO: CG III MAF

IMPO: MAG-ONE THO

COMPIDENTIAL

### ADTORCE (U)

- A. CG III MAY OFD522E JUL 67 NOTAL
- B. OG FIRST MAY LER 2008VA:BLJ 2030/6 OF 30 JUNE 67 NOTAL
- C. OG FIRST MAN 2207962 JUNE 67
- D. CO III MAY ESE LOY/YOS SHE CLASSO OF 22 JAN 67 NOTAL
- I. CHO 202159E JAN 67
- 1. REF A REQUESTED ADVISE DATES FIRST MAN AUTOGRE SITES WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR ACCEPTANCE OF BUILTAL SUBSCRIBER TERMINAL ROSIP.
- 2. REF B PWDED PROPOSED FLOCK PLANS FOR PIRST MAY AUTODIN INSTALLATIONS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WG HQ DETE IS PLANNED FOR OME INCATION. A BOD FOR MAG-ONE TWO COME CAT (DITE LOCATION) IS UNEMPARE. A SPECIAL PROJECT REQUEST FOR THIS BLOG HAS BARN APPROVED BY FIRST MAY AND IS IN DESIGN HT WAS. blog 714 (see micl one, ref b) will be avail or or about 1 AUG 671 MOMENTER, AND SURVEY, COMESTR FUNDING AND CONSTR REQUESTS HAVE NOT RFT NOT BEEN SUMMITTED. NAVDOCKS FORM 2951 WILL BE SUBMETTED BY 15 JUL 67. REF C APPLIES.
- 3. PRECISE DETS CONFIGURATION IS UNLINOWN. REF D INDICATED THOSE REQUIREMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN FROMD TO CINCPAC FOR VALIDATION. SUB PARA IA, REF E, INDICATES THAT FEW DETE TERMINALS WILL BE OPERATIONAL IN PY 44. INFO AVAILABLE TO THIS HQ INDICATES A POSSIBLE INTERIN USE OF UNIVAC 1004 SYSTEM. REQUEST ADVICE.

			<b>-</b> -	 	-	** **	- **	-		-	-	 -	
R. E. A/CHO	Pauver	10.10k 10-10					R. CE		AN	D <b>ig</b>	:501		001 -10
ACof5	, Q- <u>5</u>												

App 6- enclosure (20) CONFIDENTIAL

07/3342

INFO HIED-CHE

UNCLAS/B F T O

GURGUIT CANCELLATION

CO III MAP

1. TO FURTHER PRECUIRMENT CIRCUIT BERY KING. REQUEST CANCELLA

2. CONTACT PERSONNEL.

A. CHU LAI, LT BANKERS, PARSER 16.

B. DARANO, MAJOR PAUVER, 6179.

R. R. PAUVER MAJOR A/CEO NO-RS

R. V. ANDERSON LICEL

App 5 - ENCLOSURE (2/)

101RVA rudg 4700/1 8 Jul 1967

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, MACS-4 ltr 10:TJL:rkl 4700 of 3 July 1967

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code ACAC) Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Unsatisfactory Equipment Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded.

R. V. ANDERSON By direction

100/ped

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CG MCSA Phila ltr 843A:FMK:ff over UER 3-67 dtd 14 Jun 1967

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Commanding Officer, 2d Light Antiaircraft Battalion, Marine Wing Tos

Headquarters Group-1, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF Via:

(1) Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF (2) Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1, lst Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF

Subj: Unsatisfactory Equipment Report on Radio Set AN/TRO-27B

1. Forwarded.

Copy tos CG MCSA Phila OG FMFPAC

10D6/aht 40/00/10 2 6 JUN 1967

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG MCSA Phila ltr 843A: FMK:ff UER 3-67 of 14Jun67

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Commanding Officer, 2d Light Antiaircraft Battalion, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF To:

(1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, FMF (2) Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF Via:

(3) Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1,

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FNF

Subj: Unsatisfactory Equipment Report on Radio Set AN/TRC-27B

1. Forwarded for compliance.

By direction

Copy to: CG MCSA Phila



### UNITED STATES MARINE COR

MARINE CORPS SUPPLY ACTIVITY
1100 SOUTH BROAD STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19146

299

N REPLY REFER TO 843A:FMK:ff UER 3-67 14 June 1967

From: Commanding General

To: Commanding Officer, 2nd LAAM Battalion, Marine Wing Headquarters Group - 1, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, III Marine Amphibious Force, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, FPO, San Francisco 96602

Via: (1) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, FPO, San Francisco 96602

> (2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, FPO, San Francisco 96602

(3) Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FPO, San Francisco 96602

(4) Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group - 1, FPO, San Francisco 96602

Subj: Unsatisfactory Equipment Report on Radio Set AN/TRC-27B

Ref: (a) CMC 1tr CSY-3-jjb dtd 26 May 67 to CG, MCSA Phila., Pa.

(b) Your UER 3-67 dtd 5 May 67 to CMC (CSY)

- 1. Reference (a) forwarded reference (b) for action. Reference (b) reported premature failures of nine (9) Planar Triode Electron Tubes, FSN 5960-902-0468, which were replaced by the contractor.
- 2. A review has indicated that the Planer Triode Electron Tube type 7910 used in the Radio Sets AN/TRC-27B are warranted for one year or one thousand hours of operation whichever is shorter. The equipment contractor will continue to replace premature failures until completion of Marine Corps Contract CSY-3-FY63-4/A.
- 3. It is recommended that Planar Triode Electron Tubes failing during warranty continue to be returned to the contractor for replacement. Additional requirements should be fulfilled by requisitioning the Planar Triode under FSN 5960-902-0468. Upon completion of the current

28182

843A:FMK:ff UER 3-67 14 June 1967

Contract the tube manufacturer will warrant the Planar  $T_r$ iode Type 7910 against defects for one year of shelf life, three months of service from date of installation or two hundred hours of service, which ever occurs first.

4. Your interest in Marine Corps equipment is appreciated and future reports are solicited.

A. L. SHERBOND

Copy to: CMC (CSY-3)

MARINE AIR CONTROL SQUADRON FOUR Marine Wing Headquarters Group One 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

10:TJL:rkl 4700 3 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO4C)

Via:

(1) Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1 (2) Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Sub.j: Unsatisfactory Equipment Report; forwarding of

Rof: (a) MCO 47001C

Encl: /(1) Copy of Unsatisfactory Equipment Report 18-67 of 3 July 1967

l. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in accordance with paragraph 6a of reference (a).

direction

LIDVSidar 4700/1 5 July 1967

FORST ENDORSEMENT

Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group - One

Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code MinC) Tos

(1) Commanding General, 1st Marino Aircraft Wing (Attas G-4) (2) Commanding General, Plact Marine Force, Pacific VLas

le Ferrarded.

D. V. STONELL By direction

EXPEDITE

UNSATISFACTORY EQUIPMENT REPORTANTE 10293-90 (REV. 10-84)
SUPERSEDES 8-59 EDITION WHICH WILL BE USED

	ne Marine Corps (C	ode CS Y ), w	ashingto	on, D.C. 20380	•		;
FROM. (Redort organization FIACS—dy NWH PERSON SUBMITTING REPORT (R		, FMFPac, I	PO Se	9 un Francisco	6602 , Calif.	18-67	
Lt. T. M. O				I.M. OV	,	3 July J	L967
		Ethi over 1769	on FART	/ COMPONENT			
Kadome Section	on, airlock p	anel		PART NO. 4890260601 FEDERAL STOCK NO.	40DEL	N/A	
Westinghouse		END ITEM IN	Neu Ch. di	<u>5840-876-69</u>	16	n/a	
Radar Set AN, MANUFACTURER Westinghouse	/TPS-22B		MARINE COMPS REGISTRATI  N/A  FSN  5840-861-60	MODEL	6 2B (MTDS)		
		ACQU!S	ITION DA				
CONTRACT NO. Unknown	SOURCE RECEIVED FRO		tow,	California		DELIVERY DATE 21 April	67
MILEAGE	Hours	RUN		ROUNDS FIRED		MONTHS	IN USE
120	SINCE REBUILD	N/A	ACTIVITY	PERFORMING OVERHAUL  N/A	DATE OF	OVERHAUL N/A	
		DEFIC	IENCY DA	TA .			
DETAILS AND REMARKS	QUANTITY DEFECTIVE	HUMBER OF PREVIOUS F	AILURES	Aug 1966	. —	D DURING WARRANTY PER	0011

The subject airlock has separated from the radome section at the cemented seam at a length of approximately 4 feet. This squadron has experienced 2 prior failures of this nature during the past 12 months. The first separation was severe enough to result in requisitioning an entire new airlock assembly. The airlock outlined herein is the replacement for the original faulty one. Therefore it is respectfully recommended that action be taken to provide the replacement hard antenna modification kit to using units as soon as possible. The environmental conditions experienced by this squadron at the present operating site will preclude the use of the AN/TPS-22B in a short period of time unless the airlock separation problem is solved or a replacement airlock panel radome section is provided every quarter.

NOTE: Do not use reverse side. Head extra sheets with line reading "FROM." above.

10:RVA:redg 2000 8 Jul 1967

SECOND EMBORSEMENT on CO, MACS-7 ltr TKB:dmh 2000 of 3 July 1967

Prom: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: TACC Tape Recording System; evaluation of

- 1. Forwarded.
- 2. A requirement exists for the ability to record air-ground transmissions in the TAOC and the recommendation contained in subparagraph 4. f., basic correspondence, is germane.

R. V. ANDERSON By direction

6:KTD:jth 2000 5 July 1967

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO MACS-7's ltr TKB: dat over 2000 of 3 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Via: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

/ Subja TAOC Tape Recording System; evaluation of

1. Forwarded.

DECLASSIFIED

### MARINE AIR COMTROL SQUADRON-7 Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1 First Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific F O Sun Francisco 96602

TKB:dmh 2000 5 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Porce, Pacific

Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1

(2) Commanding General, First Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: TACC Tape Recording system; evaluation of

Ref: (a) CO, MACS-7 ltr RRM: cla over 2000 of 27 Nov 1965

(b) CG, FMFPas ltr 4C/2:jf over 4441/8 of 29 Dec 1965

- 1. This letter is being submitted in accordance with instructions contained in paragraph (3) of reference (b) requesting an evaluation, and report on the present tape recording system now in use by MACS-7. Reference (a) requested that funds be made available for the purchase of two (2) Stereo Tape Recording Decks, one (1) amplifier, and one (1) speaker on the open market. Reference (b) requested the authority to purchase two (2) Stereo Tape Recorders and to give an avaluation on the performance of the equipment.
- 2. On or about 12 April 1966, two model M-8 Akai Tape Recorders were produced from outside the supply system for operational use by MACS-7 in order to improve and standardise the present documentary record system used in monitoring and recording emergency situations as they occur on a minute by minute basis over designated URF radio nets in the TACC. The model produced proved inadequate and overly sophisticated for the purpose for which it was purchased. The tape recorders were then modified locally to provide a VCK (voice operate to transmit) capability.
- 3. Three main problem areas soon became apparent during the course of time that the tape recorders were put into use by the TACC. Pirst and foremest was the non-availability of spare parts followed by excessive wear and overheating.
- (a) Non-availability of spare parts tubes, switches, capacitors and transistors were almost impossible to obtain, as they were non-available in the Marine Corps supply system and were obtainable only through open purchase.
- (b) Excessive wear flucuations in 60 cycle power affected the major component parts in the B+ and bias sircuits, resulting in blown capacitors which had to be replaced at a rate of one every two or three weeks.
- (c) Overheating Due to the hot and humid climatic conditions that prevail in Vietnam, it became apparent that a need for a more efficient cooling system would have to be made available as excessive internal temperatures caused the

2000 5 July 1967

L2 (sudio transfermer) inductor to leak wax inside both tape recorders.

- 4. <u>Recommendations.</u> It is recommended that Marine Air Control Squadrons desiring the use of tape recorders to monitor and record information required by the TACC should consider a model which would contain the following features and/or specifications.
- (a) A variable voltage regulator be made available to allow continuous normal operations during fluctuations in sixty (60) cycle power.
- (b) He equipped with an ample cooling system to prevent physical damage to the tape recorders when operating under hot and humid weather conditions.
- (c) Procurement of a solid state model over a conventional vacuum tube model, thus eliminating the generation of additional heat problems.
- (d) That the model selected be a single speaker 2-track mono recorder as the model N-8 Akai 4-track stereo tape recorder proved to be inadequate and overly sophisticated.
- (e) That the tape recorder along with spare parts be made available in either the Marine Corps or Nevy supply system, and that the model produced have a VOX (voice operate to transmit) capability.
- (f) The continued success achieved by the operations center of MACS-7 clearly demonstrated how much more efficiently an air control unit could perform its mission by having a tape recording system available in its table of equipment. Two models currently employed that we recommend be considered for use by other air control squadrons are the TR-1510 recorder/reproducer manufactured by Magnasyne Corporation now being used by MATCU-67 in Vietnam, and the RD-312/TSQ-18 magnastratured by Tektronix now in use by MATCU-65 at Yuma.

T. E BIRK. JR.

1106122

UMULAS/EFT

CONDIG

PROM: CO PIRST MAN

TOS MANO-CHE
MAO-CHE CHE
MAO-CHE THREE
MAO-CHE THREE
MAO-CHE SIX
MAO-CHESE AIX

UNCLASE PTO

#### DEDICATED TELETIPE CLEENING

L. IN THE INTEREST OF IMPROVING RESPONSIVENESS OF RECORD COME ANGEL SELECTED STAFFS OF THIS NO AND MAGE, THE POLICE-ING IMPROVING MAKE BEEN NOTABLISHED.

A. A RIGH 60 WIM LOOP BETWEEN WING SUPO AND MAG SUPO.

P. A HUNE COVERED 60 WAN LOOP RETWEEN MUNO OFMS CHATER AND 83/32 WORKING ANNUE IN THE MAGS.

- 2. A THERTER ISOP IS A SUPPLICULT CKY TO OPERATE, IT REQUIRES STREET CENTRE DESCIPLINE AND DELPOIS ERRING. FOR THIS REASON, QUALIFIED MOS SING WILL BE ASSISTED TO BE SUB-SCRIBER TREETING. MY SUPPLICATIVE CIRCUITS.
- ). MAINTHANGE OF SUBSCRIBER TESTINAL ROUP IS A RESPONSE-BILITY OF THE RESPECTIVE COM-MINE SUPPORTING ACTIVITY. MAINTENANCE RESULTS, HOWEVER, WILL BE DIRECTLY PROPORTIONAL TO THE INCREE OF HEVIRGHETAL CONTRAL AFFORDED THE TERMINAL ROUP.
- L. IN CHEMIC TO MEET OF PERS REQUIREMENTS, HOURS OF OPEN

A. WO SUPPLY LOOP: COOR-OPENS MICO-MOOR.

B. G-3/0-2 LOOP: CONTINUOUS, CHOUP SUBSCRIBERS MAY OPERATE RECRIVE HODE ONLY ITCOM-OFOCK.

B. E. FAUVER HAJOR AJCHO MO-20 R. V. ANDERSON LITCOL

App 6- ENCLOSURE (24)

CONFIDENTIAL

FRIORITY

CONFI DENTIAL

PRIORITY 10JUL67

WDG

1102542 FROM: CG FIRST MAW

TO:

MOHG-ONE

MAG-TIREE SIX

MAG-ONE SIX DET ALFA MAC-ONE SIX DET BRAVO

INFO: CG FIRST MARDIV SEVENTH COMM BN MACRON-POUR MAG-ONE SIX

MAG-TIPLE SIX FOR WG COMM COORD CHU LAI MAC-ONE SIX DET ALFA FOR WC COMM COORD DONG HA MAG-ONE SIX DET BEAVO FOR MG COMM COORD PHU BAI

CONFIDENTIAL

MTDS COMM EXPANSION(U)

- A. WCBUL 002300 OF 18 JUN 67 NOTAL
- B. CG FIRST MAN LTR 10:RVA:DLJ 2300/6 of 3 JUL 67
- FOR MARG-ONE
  - A. EXPAND REFS A AND B AS FOL:
- (1) ESTABLISH AN/TEC-97 LINK, MONKEY MT TO CHU LAI. EQUIP WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE BY A REALIOCATION OF III MAF ASSETS WHICH ENTAILS ASSIGNMENT OF TWO AN/TRC-97 TERMINALS FROM SEVENTH COMM BN. THESE TERMINALS WILL REMAIN AT CHU LAI, WILL NOT INCLUDE CENERATORS AND WILL BE OFERATED JOINTLY BY MAHG-ONE AND SEVENTH COMM BN. THIS WILL REQUIRE A HEALIGNMENT OF FIRST MAW DANAND-CHU LAI AN/TEC-97 CHANNELS. DIRLAUTH CG FIRST MARDIV/ SEVENTH COMM BN FOR THIS INSTALLATION.
- (2) ROUTE FOL MACRON-FOUR CHANNELS FROM MODREY MT TO CHU IAI VIA SYSTEM ESTABLISHED SUE PARA IA(1). ABOVE:
  - (A) SU VOICE TO MAG-ONE THREE DUTY OFF
  - (B) SU VOICE TO CHU LAI EAPCON
  - (C) SU VOICE TO SECOND LAAM BN. AAOC
  - (D) CU VOICE TO SECOND LAAM BN. SWE

Apple-ENCLOSURE (25)

CONFIDENTIAL.

### CONFIDENTIAL

- (E) SU VOICE TO CHU LAI DASC
- (F) SU VOICE TO CHU LAI ASRT
- (G) RESERVE ONE CH FOR SUITTY TO CHU LAI RAFCON
- (3) ASSIGN ONE CH ON MONKEY MT-DANANG AN/TRC-97 LINK TO DANANG ASET.
- (4) ROUTE A SU VOICE FROM MONKEY MT TO DONG HA ASRT VIA EST AN/MRC-62. PARTY THIS CKT, AT DONG HA, TO BOTH ASRTS.
- B. THIS HO WILL REQUEST A CH FOR A SU VOICE FROM MORKEY MT TO PHU BAI ASRT AND A SU VOICE FROM MONKEY MT TO SAR COORD CENTER.
- 2. FOR ALL
  - A. MOMENT 69 COORD ALL CKT ACTIVATION.
  - B. ACTIVATION DESIRED ASAP.

GP-4

R. E. FAUVER MAJOR A/CEO MO-10 R. V. ANDERSON LTCOL CEO

MO-10

CONFIDENTIAL

## HEADQUARTERS 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Pacific FPO San Francisco 96602

10:RVA:wdg 3000 11 Jul 1967

#### MEMOR ANDUM

From: Communication-Electronics Officer
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

Subj: FMFPac Material/Maintenance Review Report

- 1. The following comments are forwarded for consideration in preparation of a reply to the Commanding General's comments concerning equipment maintenance techniques in the LAAM Ens and other indicated items in the subject report:
- a. Item. Inventory and repackaging of Comm-Elect repair parts in MASS-2.

Comment. Concur in action taken.

b. Item. Utilization and condition of UHF radio equipment in HaHS-1.

Comment. Improvement of supply support is beyond the capability of this command. Required spare parts are on valid FRI 02 requisitions and appropriate follow-up action has been initiated. Specific repair parts deficiencies are reported on the Report of Deadlined Combat Essential Equipment and the Monthly Logistics Summary Report. Concur in action taken.

c. Item. Calibration and maintenance of test equipment in 1st LAAM Bn.

<u>Comment.</u> Concur in action taken and the fact that, in accordance with TM 4700-15/1 and Wing Order 4700.1, electronics test equipment does not require a PM check list.

d. Item. Maintenance of radio equipment in 1st LAAM Bn.

Comment. The Wing CEO does not concur that Radio Set, AN/TRC-27, as a part of Radio Relay Set, AN/MRC-60, must be installed in the equipment shelter. This unnecessarily shortens the life of a critical part (Flanar Triode Electron Tube) and has been reported to

10 tRVA twdg 3000

CMC by a UER. Concur in the action taken.

- e. <u>Item</u>. Radar maintenance in 1st LAAM Bn.

  <u>Comment</u>. Concur in action taken.
- f. Item. Wire equipment maintenance in 1st LAAM Bn.

  Comment. Concur in action taken.

Respectfully,

R. V. ANDERSON

### HEADQUAFTERS 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Fleet Marine Force, Facific FFO San Francisco 96802

10:EWH: wdg 10551/3 11 Jul 1967

### MEMOR ANDUM

From: Communication-Electronics Officer

To: Supply Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1

Via: Wing Supply Officer

Subj: Procurement of Commercial Air Conditioners for MANG-1 Radar Equipment

Encl: (1) CO 1st MAW 230637Z Jun 1967 (2) CO FMFFAC 070136Z Jul 1967

- 1. Enclosure (1) requested four commercial air conditioners to be used to back up the HD-610 air conditioner used on AN/UFS-1 Radar Sets belonging to MMED-1. Enclosure (2) approved this request and furnished guidance for the procurement of these air conditioners.
- 2. In accordance with enclosure (2) it is requested that MARC-1 Supply submit a high priority open purchase requisition to the Force Logistics Command Garrison Property Supply Officer for four 24,000 BTU 60 cycle air conditioners.
- 3. In view of the urgency of need for this equipment, it is requested that a representative from this office be permitted to walk the requisition to FIC and to arrange to hand carry the FIC requisition for this material to the actual procurement agency at Camp Butler. Hopefully, this representative can pick the equipment up after purchase in OKINAWA and escort it back to DANANG.

T. V. ANDERSON

Abo - ENCLOSURE (27)

#### DECLASSIFIED

RECEIN 306372 CC PIVET MAL

THOLAS/IFT)

BUILTY TES

20 s

CC PRPRAC

INTO: GG MARD MAF

GG MISA FHETA

GG FORMOCCUM

MACRON SEVER

ented her Mwrg ore

TENLAS/AFTO 1--24

PSH L120-226-5LCL ATE CONDETIONER RE-(10

A. CO PLYRAG LOSSETE JUN 67

B. CHI 1515ICK JULY (F (BOTAL)

G. GG EESA CANDLE IND 67

l. Rif a statio that info received from ilsa fhila intigated ED ASSETTS OF SUBJECT AND CONDUCTIONERS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE, AND QNISTIONAL ACCEPTABILITY OF COLUMNIAL UNITS.

20 RIN B LIND G ARE INCLUSIONS FOR USUUE AND DEFURE OF RELIGIES OF THREE ED-510 AIR CONDITIONERS TO FILL THE FOLICHING MIGS-SEVEN DOG TULDENS:

100978-7136-0009 RFR 1100976-7136-0009 72926 HFF 72928 72924 HPT 72924

IT APRANTO TO THIS EVENDONARTEES THAT THESE AT COMDITIONERS tians withen about to be shifted or hiels already in shifteen,

imer-siveh net has custody of sle an/ulz-l radars and noice OF EAST RUDARS HAVE ARE CONDITIONERS. MAID-SEVEN WIND PURPORT to comes with two anythrales whencen are conditioneds. The ex-MINING FOR LEVISSIOS WILL BE RESPECTED TO THEM CLICIVIA CUSTCULARS ALONG WITE A VALLE PAGE-SETTE REOR FOR AH EL-ALO.

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IN ANY CASE, IN THEY OF THE FEITHER HEAT CONDITIONS CURRENTLY DITTED PERFECTACIO, RECLEST AUTERATE TO PURCHACE POUR CONTRACAL OH ICHTICATION OF THE STATE OF ALE CONDIMINATE UNITS, FROM LOCAL SOURCES, TO DE USED IN MONATEIN

ye moonie

DIST G-4, WSO, S/S, CP. To

MELOL 10-10

End (1)



ZVI GASKCASØAVV KMC476

RR RUMHAT DE TUNHENA DSBB 1889136 ZHY EEEKA R 0701342 JUL 37 IN CG MIFPAC TO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW INFO RUMHMF/CG III MAF RUEDLHA'CG MCSA' PHILA RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCHD" (BODY) RUMHAW/MWHG ONE -RUABSR/THI/D FS REMHAW/MACRON SEVEN -HT UNCLAS E F T O

107/18-40/9 mg 6) Action Change Malle

AIR CONDITIONER HD-610 A. CG MCS/ PHILA 171844Z/JUN67 (NOTAL)

B. CO FIRST MAW 230637Z/JUN67

C. MACRON SEVEN 242254Z/JUN67 (NOTAL)

D. FMFPACO 4441,6 OF IMAY67

1. REF A PROVIDES SHIPPING INFO REQUESTED FARA 4 REF E. RAF C REPORTS RECEIPT OF THE SUBJ EQUEP ON DOC NO "2928

2. REQUIST THREE SUBJ EQUIP SHIPPED TAW REF A BE

PACE 2 RUHHFMA 6960 UNCLAS E F T O RETAINLD

VN FOR INSTALLATION IN ANTUPS-IS BEING RETURNED TO ORIGINAL CUSTODIANS. 3. REQUEST CONTAINED IN PAR 5 REF B FOR AUTH LOCAL PURCHASE FOUR COMMERCIAL AIR CONDITION UNITS APPROVED. FACC REMENT AND ACCOUNTIFE IAW REF D. 



HEADQUARTERS

list Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602

10:RFS:wdg ឯរៀវ/1 13 July 1967

From: Commanding General:

To: Commanding Officer, Marine Mir Support Squadron-2

Commanding Officer, Marine Air Support Squadron-3

Vias Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Caroupal

Subj: Modification of Allowance

Encle (1) CMC ltr AChC-frf-35 of 32 June 1967 with first endorsement

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded for appropriate action.

R. V. ANDERSO By direction

3 JUL 1967

### FIRST LANGUAGEMENT on the liter ADAC-Left-16 of 12 June 1967

Commanding Corprel, Floot Marine Perce, Facilie

Communiting Off | nor, Earling Air Support Squadron-5, Marine Wing imadeparture Gring-3, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, Floot Marine Force (1) Communiting Seneral, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, Floot Farine Force Th:

Visi

(2) Communiting Officer, Herine Wing Hoodquarters Group-3, 3d Harine Aircraft Wing, Flort Farine Force

July: Rodification of Allowances

THE REAL PROPERTY.

M. M. BLUE By direction



### DEPARTMEN' OF THE NAVY HEADQUARTERS UNITE' STATES MARINE CORPS WASHING ( )N, D. C. 20380

IN REPLY REFER TO A04C-jrf-36 1 2 JUN 1967

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps

To: Commanding Officer, Marine Air Support Squadron-5, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-3, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Marine Corps Air

Station, El Toro, Santa Ana, California 92709

Via: (1) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 96602

(2) Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing 92709

(3) Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-3 92700

Subj: Modification of A lowances

Ref: (a) CO, MASS-5, NVHG-3, 3d MAW ltr 21:RAH:klm 4441

of 29 Dec 1966

(b) T/E M-8640

(c) CMC 1tr A04C-lc-36 of 20 Apr 1967

1. Reference (a) requested modification of the allowances authorized in reference (b). The following change is approved and will appear in the next printed revision to reference (b):

		ALLOWAI	ALLOWANCE			
T/A NO.	NOMENCLATURE	PRESENT	NEW			
20500	DECODER GROUP, AN/GPA-60	0	. 2			

- 2. In view of the comments contained in the third endorsement on reference (a), the increased allowance for T/A #22880 TEST SET ELECTRON TUBE TV-7D/U and T/A #21430 MULTIMETER AN/PSM-4D authorized by reference (c) will satisfy the requirements set forth in the justification. Accordingly, the requested changes are not approved at this time.
- 3. This letter constitutes authority for the requisition of the approved item.

Copy to:
CG FMFLant
CG MCSA Phila
CG MCSC Albany
CG MCSC Barstow
CG III MAF

G. F. SIMT By Carlon

27519

PRICEITY 30152% UNCLUS/ETTO

PRICRITY 1338167 WIN

FROM: CG FIRST NAW

20: CG III MAP

INFO: GG PMFPAC

MING-ONE

UNCLAS/B F T O

PIXED PLANT TTY EQUIP

- A. CG FIRST MAN LIR CAA19167 OF 10 JUL 1967 (C)
- B. CG PIRST MAN LIR SER OLA16467 OF 3 JUL 1967 (C)
- 1. THE D/L RATE OF SUBJ EQUIP IS INCREASING AT AN ALARMING rate in first haw. This pact is reflected in a comparison OF RECENT REPORTS OF DEADLINED COMPAT ESSENTIAL EQUIP (LATEST REPORT, REF A) AND MONTHLY LOGISTIC SUMMARY REPORTS (LATEST REPORT, REF B).
- 2. IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR WHAT IS CONSIDERED AN EXCESSIVE PAILURE RATE IN SUBJ EQUIP, THIS HO HAS DISCOVERED A POSSIBLE INCOMPATABILITY AMONG VARIOUS END ITEMS OF THE SUBJ EXUIP. THIS DISCOVERY IS IDENTIFIED AS FOLI
- A. TERMINAL EQUIP OF THE RECEIVE SIDE OF AN GRESTES COVERED CET SHOULD BE GEARED FOR SEVEN PT ZERO UNIT CODE OPN. THRAILMAL EQUIP ON THE RECKIVE SIDE OF A ROMBLES COVERED CAT SHOULD BE GEARED FOR SEVEN PT FOUR TWO UNIT CODE OPN.
- B. THE AN/YOC-100, TT-192A, AN/UCC-25 ENVIP IS GRARED FOR SEVEN PT ZERO ZERO UNIT CODE OPN. THE AN/UGC-20, TT-171C, TT-473, TT-187C, AN/UGC-6/5, TT-171 AND AN/POG-59 EQUIP IS GEARED FOR SEVEN PT POUR TWO UNIT CODE OPN.
- C. INTERMIXING THE ANOVE TERMINAL MOUIP MITH ROMILUS/ CRESTES OF RESULTS IN MATING SEVEN PT ZERO ZERO UNIT CODE EQUIP WITH SEVEN PT FORE TWO UNIT COME ROUIP. THIS MISMATCH results in prequent, random garbles but nore important, creates STRESS THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE GEAR TRAIN OF THE TERMINAL EQUIP.
- 3. FIRTHER INVESTIGATION HAS REVEALED THAT GRAR SETS ARE AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE RIGHER SEVEN PT ZERO ZERO OR SEVEN PT FOUR TWO BRIT CODE OPN.

UNCLASSIFIED

101874 mig 13110/2

13 July 1967

Commanding General Floot Marine Force, Facific FFO San Francisco 96602

Subje Fixed Mant Teletype Equipment

Bef: (a) 00 FIRST MAN 1307522 JULY 1967

Refigurace (a) discussed a needed gear ratio conversion in subj equipment of lat Marine Aircraft Wing communication centers.

### Requirements as follows:

X

AN/ACC-20	195361	TTAN	SIX.	SOURCE DECUMENT Bul 11975, Jul 1964, Sect 1, Fg 1-10
**da-	195363	-do-	2	through 1-13.
-	195365	-do-	2	and and the second seco
-	195362	-do-	2	
	195360	-40-	2	
-40-	195366		2	
-tr-	195367	-do-	· 2	
-	195372	CAN SLEEVE	2	
77-1730	153459	GEAR	ă	Bul 11690, Jumn 1965, Sept 1 and 2,
	163503	-de-	ă	Pg 5-45
	163505	GEARSET	8	
-de-	163460	GEAR	ä	
	150440	1400	8	
2 4674	153459	One	6	Bul 11498, June 1965, Sect 1 and 2,
-do-	163503	-40-	6	Pg 5-45

CO, MANG-1

Commanding General 1st Marine Aircraft Hing Floot Marine Porce, Facific PPO San Francisco 96602

Abb b- enclosure (30)

# HEADQUARTERS Let Merine Aircreft Ving Fleet Merine Force, Pacific FTO Sen Proceduce 96602

liceReacted 2100 16 July 1967

#### MERCRANIAN

Press Commication-Electronics Officer
The Ming Adjutant
Old, Ming Commication Conter

bolds Proceeding of outgoing mesuages

Boft (a) MgO PELOU-AC

- le The present method of precessing outgoing messages in the Wing Comm Center does not provide a true NAS MENN SHOT copy to the releasing staff continue. The reproduced ditto met copy provides only a NRO of that particular messages it does not specify a time of transmission nor does it indicate the transmitted version.
- 2. Your emments are requested on the fallowing proposals
  - so Noticly paragraph 305, reference (s), to provide thats
- (1) Outgoing messages be presented to the come center on Heral Message from Ello in an original and carbon copies. Selices up to eight susp out carbons are smallable with the Maral Message form.
- (2) The Empings form be completed LAW figure 3, reference (a), retaining present limit on medians characters/lime.
- by The reproduction of ditte met espice will not be required in the Comm Center; message form corbons will be used for this purpose. One earless will be returned to the originating staff section with DTG affixed. One carbon copy will be passed to Mag Distr Center (with DTG affixed) as an outgoing live file.
- a. ONO proofs prepared tape against mag form original, delivers tape and carbon copies to Relay Comber and files original as Come Comber autogaing file copy.
- d. Tope Souter passes tope to apprepriate direct operator(s) and as a Shal with places completed tope on TD to Resempe Histr Conter.

Apple Emel (32)

MACS-POUR RATED UNDER PROVISIONS OF ENCL (2), REF A. AND REF F.

3. REF A. SET TARGET DATE FOR IN SERVICE DATE OF AN/TPX-28 AT 1 JUNE 66. TO DATE THIS HQ HAS RECEIVED NO INITIAL PROVISIONING OR ETA FROM THIRD FSR AS REQUESTED IN RAF E. DUE TO THE LONG TIME LAPSE IT IS ASSUMED THE EQUIPMENT IN THE PROVISIONING PACKAGES HAS BEEN LOST.

4. REQ AUTHORITY TO PLACE MATERIAL RATED AS INITIAL PROVISION-ING, SERVICE KITS, AND REASONABLE AMOUNT OF OPERATING SPARE PARTS ON PRI O2 REQN IAW PROVISIONS OF REF G. OPERATING SPARE PARTS WILL BE BASED ON PROJECTED USEAGE AND LIMITED USE OF EQUIPMENT BY FIRST MAW UNITS. AN OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR SUBJ EQUIP.

E. W. MACCORKLE CAPT A/CBO HO-10 R. V. ANDERSON LECOL CEO MO-10 ROUTINE UNCLAS/EFTO ROUTINE
/ 4073/ 2
FROM: CG FIRST MAW WDG

TO: CG PMEPAC

INFO: MHG-ONE
THIRD FSR
MASS-TWO
MASS-THREE
FIRST LAAM BN.
SECOND LAAM BN.

UNCLAS/B F T O

INITIAL ISSUE AND PROVISIONING OF AN/TPX=28 INTERACATOR SET

- A. MOO 10551.7 W/CH 1
- B. CG FMFPAC 1104342 JUNE 66
- C. ADMINO PMPPAC 020252Z SEPT 66
- D. CG FIRST MAW 161310Z SEPT 66
- B. CG FIRST MAW 270240Z JAN 67
- F. CG PNFPAC 082146Z MAR 67
- G. CG PMFPAC 290102Z AFR 67
- 1. REF A. OUTLINES ISSUE AND PROCEDURES FOR PLACEMENT OF SUBJ ITEM IN SERVICE. REF B. DIRECTED FIRST MAW TO PLACE SUBJ ITEM IN SERVICE IAW REF A. AND DIRECTED THIRD FSR TO REPORT WHEN INITIAL ISSUE AND PROVISIONING COMPLETED.
  REF C. REQUESTED STATUS OF PROVISIONING AND PROJECTED DATE FOR IN SERVICE CAPABILITY OF SUBJ EQUIP. REF D., IN REPLY TO REF C., ADVISED FIRST MAW UNITS COULD NOT PLACE AN/TPX-28 INTO SERVICE DUE TO LACK OF INITIAL PROVISIONING. REF E. UPDATED FIRST MAW AN/TPX-28 STATUS AND QUERIED THIRD FSR ON ETA OF WING ALLOWANCES AND INITIAL PROVISIONING.
- 2. CURRENT FIRST MAW AN/TPX-28 STATUS IS AS FOLLOWS:

UNIS	RUC	TE /	ALLOW	O/H	SERVICE KIT O/H
MACS-FOUR	00979	8630	6	5	3
Macs-seven	00974	8630	4	4	3
MASS-THO	00982	8640	2	1	0
MASS-THREE	00981	8640	2	2	0
1ST LAAN BN	21960	8620	2	2	0
2D LAAM BN	22960	8620	2	1	0

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MACS-FOUR NO FIRST MAW UNIT HAS RECEIVED AN/TPX-28 INITIAL PROVISIONING. MACS-FOUR RECD PROVISIONING WHILE IN THIRD MAW. ADDITIONAL AN/TPX-28 EQUIPMENT FOR

Apple-ENCLOSURE (31)

10:RVA:wdg 13110/2

EM ITEM	F/u	ITAK	JTY	SOURCIA DOCUMENT
77-473	163460	GOAF	311	,
-do	163505	GRARSET	6	
-10-	150440	RUB	6	
-do-	164349	SIG GEN	6	
-do-	UM	Shaft assy	6	
17-1870	164,285	CAM SHAFT	9	Bul 1161B, Dec 65, Sect 1
-do-	173595	Grarset	9	and 2, 1g 6-12
AN/UGG-6	153459	CHAR	17	Bul 1169B, Jan 65, Sect 1
-do-	163503	-do-	17	and 2, Fg 5-45
-do-	163460	-do-	12	
-do-	163505	<b>GEARSET</b>	12	
-do-	150440	HUB	17	
-do-	164349	SIC GEN	12	
-do-	UNK	Shaft assy	12	
-do-	163454	Calres BT	12	
do	163502	-do-	12	
-do-	164285	CAMBRAFT	12	
-do-	163451	CHARBET	11	
-do-	179963	GLAR	11	
-do-	179962	-do-	11	•
-do-	192680	Plate, I work	11	
-do-	159284	GEAR	11	
A R/FGC -59	164339	GEAR.	4	Bul 11808, Jul 65, Sect 3,
-do-	164340	-00-	4	4 and 5, Fg 3-3, 4-10 and
-do-	162213	MOU KIT	12	5-3
-do-	161520	DELT	12	
-do-	162216	PATAL MAR	12	
-do-	162215	H <b>U</b> 6	12	
-do-	162214	CROSS SHAFT	12	
-do-	156400	SPROCKET	12	
-do-	174229	can sleeve	12	
-do-	173589	Charset	4	
-00-	UNK	SPECCEST	12	

<sup>3.</sup> Two FDEA BCS, one receive only DCS, JF and MAVCOMMOF circuits in Ming comm center are ROMBLUS covered. Thirteen FDUX internal circuits are CRESTES covered. The complete lack of back-up equipment, maintenance float and rotatable spares necessitates a continual shift of terminal equipment configurations for priority circuit restoration. The requirements listed in paragraph 2, above, will enable the Ming comm center to provide the proper gear rationmeter between this terminal equipment.

R. V. AMDERISON by direction

<sup>4.</sup> Request priority procurement assistance.

- on the Materibution Contar marine the incoming and with origing hive Alle by 186 comparison, reproduces expice 186 drafters! distribution gains on any form and slot Alles for plat up.
- In their the above proposite
- as The releasing staff section will know when a mag was transmitted and how the transmitted version reads
  - by One ditte mestine will be made available to Mag Mistr Conter.
- o. A continuous record of in-eletion handling times will be sentiable for every message released from the Ming Ma.
- to these prepared until apply to all units renaiting some and crypto goard from thing from Contarts

R. V. ALDERSON

Carry but

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## HEADQUARTERS 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Pacific FPO San Francisco 96602

10:RVA:dlj 2302/32 16 Jul 1967

#### SPEEDLETTER

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code CSY-3, AO4C)

Via: (1) Commanding General; III Marine Amphibious Force

(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Radio Set, AN/PRC-25

Encl: √(1) Circuit Diagram, Module A-2h, Radio Set, AN/PRC-25

The following information is submitted as an expanded Unsatisfactory Equipment Report, subject equipment:

#### Problem

- a. During retransmission utilizing AN/PRC-25 radios, many sets tend to produce a motor boating effect. This motor boating is due to following sequence of events.
- (1) When set # 1 is receiving a signal its squelch relay K-3 is activated which keys set # 2.
- (2) When set # 1 ceases to receive an incoming signal, the squelch relay of set # 1 deactivates allowing ser # 2 to revert to the receive condition.
- (3) When set # 2 reverts to the receive condition, its squelch relay K-3 activates for a brief interval (approximately 1-2 seconds). This brief activation of K-3 in set # 2 causes set # 1 to be keyed for this brief interval.
- (4) At the end of this brief interval, K-3 of set # 2 deactivates, unkeying set # 1. As set # 1 reverts to the receive condition, its squelch relay K-3 operates for a similar brief interval. This in turn briefly keys set # 2, and the sequence repeats itself.
- b. The results of the repetition is that sets # 1 and # 2 continue to alternately key each other generating the motor boating effect.

10:RVA:dlj 2302/32:


#### Background

- a. The output circuit of the Tone Squelch Module A-2h currently in use in our sets, is as shown in enclosure (1). This circuit, differs from the diagram depicted in TM 11-5820-398-35, and is used for the following explanation.
- b. Q-5 acts as an electronic switch which controls the operation of the squelch relay K-3. When Q-5 is forward biased it conducts and K-3 activates. When Q-5 is biased at cut-off it does not conduct, and K-3 is deactivated.
- c. During the Squelch Mode of operation 10 VDC is applied to J2 pin 1 during both receive and transmit condition. Q-5 is biased beyond cut-off, until a 150 cycle tone is applied to the input of Module A-24. This 150 cycle tone is rectified by Q-4 and filtered by C-9. This filtered negative voltage (less positive) is applied to the base of Q-5, causing conduction in Q-5 and operation of K-3, breaking the squelch. When the 150 cycle tone is removed, Q-5 reverts to cut-off and K-3 deactivates. There is a slight delay in Q-5 reaching cut-off due to the RC time of C-9 charging from its less positive to more positive voltage. During the squelch mode K-3 is made to operate during the transmit condition, to unsquelch the set and provide sidetone to the operation.
- d. During the retransmit made of operation the squelch relay K-3 of the receiving set (set # 1) is activated, which keys the other set. However, K-3 in the transmitting set (set # 2) is prevented from operating as this would key set # 1, preventing retransmission.

#### Cause

- a. As stated above K-3 does not operate during the transmit condition when in the retransmit mode. This is accomplished by removing the 10 VDC to Tone Squelch Module A-24 during the transmit condition.
- b. When the 10 VDC is removed from A-24 the following conditions exist.
  - (1) All points are at 0 voltage.
- (2) R-18 and C-9 form an RC network, the junction of which is connected to the base of C-5.
- (3) K-3, which has a DC resistance of 1.5 K ohms, and R-19, which is 33 K ohms, form a voltage divider network, the junction of which is connected to the emitter of Q-5.

### Circuit diagram, Module A-24, Radio Set, AN/PRC-25



Enclosure (1)

10:RVA:dlj 2302/32

c. When the 10V DC is reapplied to Module A-2h (set reverting to receive condition) the following sequence occurs:

- (1) Approximately 9.5 Volts positive is instantaneously felt on the emitter of Q-5 due to the effect of the K-3 and R-19 voltage divider.
- (2) Initially the voltage accross C-9 (applied to the base of Q-5) is 0, and the voltage increases in a positive direction at a rate determined by the RC network R-33 and C-9.
- (3) During this initial phase, when voltage is reapplied to A-2h, the emitter of Q-5 is positive in respect to the base of Q-5. Since Q-5 is a PNP transistor, this is a forward bias condition, and Q-5 conducts briefly until the circuit stabilizes.
- (h) This **prief** conduction of Q-5 causes K-3 in set # 2 to operate, which keys set # 1 briefly. After set # 1 has been briefly keyed, it reverts to the receive condition, and the sequence takes place in set # 1. This repetition of events accounts for the motor boating of the two sets.

#### Solution

a. A capacitor C-X connected as shown on enclosure (1) produces a voltage dividing network consisting of C-9 and C-X. If the ratio of C-X to C-9 is greater than the ratio of R-19 to the DC resistance of K-3, then the initial voltage felt at the base of Q-5 will be more positive than the initial postive voltage felt at the emitter, and Q-5 will remain at cut-off, when the 10V DC is reapplied to A-24.

b. The actual capacitance of C-9 has not been determined, however, trial and error has shown that a 10 ufd capacitor works best. A capacitor larger than 10 ufd tends to increase the delay cited in paragraph 2c. A capacitor of less than 10 ufd does not always produce the desired result. The 10 ufd capacitor used on bench set-up was physically too large to mount inside the A-24 module. Two 8 ufd capacitors, physically small enough to fit inside Module A-24, were mounted in two spare Modules. These two modules were tested in various AN/FRC-25 radios that had exhibited the motor boating. The results were very good, though not as good as the bench set-up using a 10 ufd capacitor.

c. It should also be noted that this solution does not effect the sensitivity of the squelck circuit.

10:RVA:dlj 2302/32

#### Related Information

- a. CG 1st Mardiv message 1711592 of Dec 1966 addressed this same problem area. It recommended that the squelch gain control R-15 be adjusted until relay K-3 ceased to activate with a 35 millivolt audio signal applied to squelch module A-24.
- b. This solution would appear to reduce the sensitivity of the squelch circuit, and thereby reduce the operating range of the overall retransmit circuit. In addition, paragraph 93 of TM 11-5820-398-35 states that relay K-3 should activate when a 150 cycle signal of 20% 5 millivolts is appled to the squelch circuit.
- 2. Recommend that a complete investigation of suggested solution be conducted and, if verified, that this solution be incorporated in an urgent MI to the subject equipment.

By direction

Copy to: CG 1st MarDiv CG 3d MarDiv

### CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY/NOUTING
180835-2
PROORY OF FIRST MAY

PRIGRITI/ROUTINE 1AJUL67

**10**:

CHER 7TH AF TOR

THE

MO-ONE ONE

CHER 7TH AF KEEP FOR ACTION AND PASS TO TAGS AND DIO

COMPIDENTIAL

7TH AF HEGHT ALFA FRAG & (U)

L. DELAT IN RECEIPT OF SUBJ FRAG O IS GREATING PROBLEMS IN ASSIGNMENT OF SPHCIFIC MERSIONS. FOR MEANING TORM 050245% JUL 67 WAS NOT RECEIVED FIRST NAM COME GRE WHILL 060022 JUL 67. YOUR 050345% JUL 67 WAS NOT RECEIVED WHILL 0513152 JUL 67. IT ISRAOOMMENSOD THAT THESE MIGG BE FILED TO GO FIRST MAN VIA CET K767, WITH APPROPRIATE PRECEDENCE, AND EMPLOY OUT BIPCOAGT AS ALT BOSTS.

2. NEW SUBJ. TACTICAL UNITS OF THIS WING HAVE AN OPERATIONAL MEED FOR THE BALLY ESTIMATE OF SAN COB, AND SUFFLENINGS THRESTO, ISSUED BY CHER 75M AF. REQUEST VERLYY INCLUSION OF CO FIRST NEW AND ING-ONE GRE IN YOUR SA-2 ADDRESSEED. RESONANT THREE MOSS ALSO BE FILED VIA CET 1747, EMPLOYING CET DJEGGAS? AS ALT ROUTE.

W. R. MERRAY CAPT

R. Y. AMPERSON LICOL GND MO-10

Apple ENCLOSURE (34)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

100505

PROM: CG FIRST MAN

19JULY 67

PRICEITY/ROUTING

20: CO PRETAC

IMPO: GO III MAF

COMPIDENTIAL

HAVCOMPRIE REQUIREMENTS IN RYN (U)

- A. CG PHPPAC OPOGLOS JULY 67
- 1. REF A REQUESTED DATA AND ROUTING COMMENTS/REGOMMENTATIONS RE RAYCOMPREST.
- 2. POL DATA DEVELOPED DURING FRO 10-16 JULY 67. PORMAT LAN PARA L. REF A.
  - A. HR OF NEGS EMETTED:

    - (1) 10 JUL 0, 11-0, 12-0, 13-0, 14-0, 15-0, 16-0 (2) 10-2, 11-5, 12-9, 13-7, 14-1, 15-3, 16-5 (3) 10-1, 11-7, 18-4, 13-4, 14-2, 15-5, 16-2 (4) 10-19, 11-14, 12-16, 13-6, 14-10, 15-9, 16-11 (5) 10-5, 11-17, 12-5, 13-0, 14-10, 15-2, 16-5

    - (6) 10-43, 11-99, 12-42, 13-26, 14-27, 15-29, 16-29
  - B. IR OF HEGS RECEIVED:
    - (1) 10-0, 13-0, 12-0, 13-0, 14-0, 15-0, 16-0
    - 2) 10-34, 11-44, 12-42, 13-36, 14-17, 15-27, 16-41

    - (3) 10-8, 11-14, 12-8, 13-11, 14-8, 15-19, 16-13 (4) 10-42, 11-99, 12-92, 13-49, 14-25, 15-46, 16-54
- 3. FOL COMMENTS AMCOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMITMENTIONS
- A. TERMINATION OF MATCOMOPHER AT MES PELL PROVIDES BEST IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO SEVENTH FLT UNITS.
- B. SUPPLY TRY FOR PHIL, JAPAN AND COMES IS PASSED VIA NAVCOMPRIST AND PIRST MAN HAS RECEIVED A MINIMUM OF SERVICE RECEIPTS FOR THIS TRAFFIC.
- C. MCS PHIL HAS DEMONSTRATED RESPONSIVE ALT ROUTE SERVICE FOR PIRST MAN OPERATIONAL REPORTS.

App 6-ENCLOSURE (35)

#### A. RECOMMEND TRATS

- A. A PRICRITY INVESTIGATION OF THIS POSSIBLE INCOMPAS-PRICRY BE COMMUTED WITHIN IZI MAP FIXED PLANT COM GEN.
- B. THE DELIVERY OF ADDITIONAL PLAND PLANT THE MUSICP MEQUIPMED BY CHE SPECTR AGLS—JMS—36 OF 6 MIR 67 BE REPRESTIVE AND THAT THES EQUIP BY GRAND PER SEVEN PT 2200 ZHRO OFN.
- 5. THIS HQ, BY SUPPRATE CORRESPONDENCE, HAS REQUIRED THE MIGHESIANT REPAIR PARTS TO LIVERY THE CLAR RATIO CONVERSION REQUIRED IN PIRST MAN PILED PLANT TIT OFF.

W. R. MURAY GAPT

r. V. Anderson lines (20)

#### MARQUANTES Let Marine Airwest Mag Most Murine Perus, Pasisie 370 des Pression 96602

10-17/10-64 126-7/1 19-741 1961

From Committing Concret. The Committing Concret, Root Karine Ferre, Panisie

John III Greek Committeetten Rysigment

neft (a) Hardistyndan lår leblickenid (b) do mejold ned socialis för 1967

 Informer (n) advised that radio sate M/NS-60 veril set be evallable with ingust 1966, Informer (b) offerred againtense and requested information concessing on hand access, and current additions, requirements.

to there are entrustly of radio asto M/TEP-33 and one radio ast M/MH-by as band in the lot Harine Mrayer's Hings the additional regularments are as follows

#### a de la Reila

			91
inhelence 11-6/7	THE THE	91-47657	\$
Anbulance H-L3/16	9h-Nilse		1
Admiliante S-270	300077	•	1
	90-22060		1
Yesh Dendh Harmon			1
Intelle Spare			1
	Take 1		242
Mare treat 5308	73-00062, 73-00064,	73-0006	3

App6-ENCLOSURE (36)

#### DECLASSIFIED

		10127A14LJ 2302/7
<u>Inclination</u>	Serial /	ST
Great Truck IID-5	71-01219, 71-01227	2
Ambulance Cerlist	94-4763, Dadge 94-61719	2
Base Station		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Yest Bench Harness		1
<b>Roteble</b> Spare		1
PAG-32		
Annual Comment	Serial /	SEX
Reseas Truck NB-1	72-00897, 72-00892, 72-00932	3
Fire Truck 5308	77-00529, 30-okok	2
Grash Truck HB-5	72-00200, 72-02093, 72-02095 72-0206	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
GED Vehicle N-38Al N-670 N-37	71-35160 91-17629, 91-17632, 91-17633 303273	ì
Test Bench Rayness		1
Rotable Spare		2
<u>140-73</u>		
Becarity month	Serial f	Qter
Fire Truck 530	96-29637	1
Resease KB-5	71-01120, 71-01225, 71-01229	3
Ambulance N-679	91ml;7636, 91ml;7637	2
Runnny Sweeper MA-1.	57-03.309	1
809 H-378	33-82 38	1
Air Pield OPS 1009	39-7700	i

# HMANGHARTERS let Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Perce, Pacific FFO San Francisco 96602

10:Tabedlj 1000 22 Jul 1967

#### MEMBARILLE

From Communication-Electronics Officer Tot Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

Subje Wing Come-Blee Officer, designation of

1. Effective 0800, F August 1967, LACOL Escutt M. WOLLEY 018507/2500/ 0210 is designated as the let MAN Communication-Electronics Officer as replanement for 1400l Rebert V. ARDERSON.

2. LACOL ANDERSCHE! date of detackment is 2 August 1967 for further rotation to CONUS.

R. V. ANDERSON

### HEADQUARTERS 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Pacific FPO San Francisco 96602

10:EVA:wdg 5440 22 Jul 1967

#### MEMORANDUM

From: Communication-Electronics Officer
To: Chief of Staff

Subj: Establishment of MCAS, CHU LAI

Ref: (a) CO, MAG-13 ltr 6:DHJ:jlh 5440 of 18 July 1967

- 1. Reference (a) has been reviewed and the following comments are forwarded for consideration:
  - a. Concur in paragraph 3.
- b. Do not concur in the use of MATCU as a source of personnel for the proposed Air Base Operations for the following reasons:
- (1) Number of proposed personnel (7 officers, 83 enlisted) exceeds the MATCU T/O (7 officers, 61 enlisted).
- (2) MDS's are proposed which are not in the MATCU (MDS 2811, 3531).
- (3) Contradicts the undersigned's recently submitted proposal to organize MATCU's into a Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron within the Marine Air Control Group.
- 2. Concept of the formation of a Marine Corps Air Station, CHU LAI is supported; it is suggested that once an Air Station is established, provisions of the Fleet Augmentation Program, MCO 5300.3A, would apply.
- 3. It is further recommended that the total proposal be staffed by the Wing Comptroller for possible budget implications of lat Marine Aircraft Wing interest.

Very respectfully,

K. M. WORLEY

+pp&-enclosure (%)

23 00 52Z.

COMMINIMULAL

ROUTINE 22JUL67 WC

FROM: CO FIRST MAN

TO: CG III MAF

INFO: MAHG-ONE

MAC-ONE ONE MAC-ONE TWO MAC-ONE THREE MAC-ONE SIX MAC-THREE SIX

CONFIDENTIAL

AIRBORNE RETRANSMISSION (U)

A. CG FMFFAC 060542Z APR 67

- 1. THIS HO DESIRES TO CONFIGURE SEVEN ON-HAND C-117 WITH AN AUTOMATIC AIRBORNE RETRANSMISSION CAPABILITY. THE NECESSARY ANTENNA AND CABLING HAS BEEN INSTALLED, AND A TOTAL OF THREE AUTOMATIC RETRANSMISSION FACKAGES (TWO AN/GRC-125/ONE HE-456) ARE AVAILABLE IN PIRST MAN ASSETS.
- 2. REF A DISCUSSES POSSIBLE ALTERNATE EQUIP PACKAGES AND THE ADDITION OF A MULTI-CHANNEL AND SECURE VOICE CAPABILITY.
- 3. IN INTEREST OF IMPROVING FIRST MAW AUTOCAT CAPABILITY FOL COURSES OF ACTION ARE RECOMMENDED FOR CONSIDERATION:
- A. PROCURE FOUR AN/CRC-125/ME-456 PACKAGES FOR III MAP FROV T/E AND ALLOCATE TO FIRST MAV.
- B. INCLUDE FIRST HAW IN EVALUATION TASKS FOR EQUIP PACKAGE DISCUSSED SUB-PARA 1.A.(2), REF A.

CP-4

R. E. PAUVER MAJOR A/CEO MO-10 K. M. WORLEY LTCOL CEO MO-10

APP 6- ENCLOSURE (9)

ROUTI ME. FROM: CG FIRST MAN CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE 22JUL67 WIX

TO:

CC PMPPAC

INFO: CG III HAF

CONFIDENTIAL

AIREOFNE/AIR TRANSPORTABLE DASC (U)

- A. CG FIRST MAW 020051Z JUL 67 NOTAL
- 1. NAVELECSYSCOM WEST DIV REP HAS ADVISED THAT DEVELOPMENT OF PROTOTYPE OF SUBJ EQUIP HAS BEEN COMPLETED.
- 2. RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION OF EVALUATION OF THIS PROTOTYPE WITHIN FIRST MAW,
- 3. RELATED SUBJ. AIRBORNE DASC REQUESTED BY REF A RETURNED FUTEMA 15 JUL 67. EVALUATION REPORT UNDER PREPARATION AND WILL BE FWDEO SEPARATELY.

CI	-	•																											
-	-	-	-	•	-	•	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	_	-	-	-	-	-	-	 -	_	-	 _	-	_	•

R. E. FAUVER MAJOR A/CEO MO-10 K. R. WORLEY LTCOL CEO NO-10

#### HEADABARTARS ist Marine Aircraft Ming Floct Marine Force, Pacific FFO San Francisco 96602

10 iRVA rudg hh00/2 2k Jul 1967

From: Commanding General

To: Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Sandquarters Group-1

Subj: Wif Redio Augmentation for 2d LAAN Bm.

Ref: (a) ADMINO PHYPAC MG 1500312 JUL 1967

(b) CO, 24 LAAM Bm. lar 3/RLN/dow 2302 of 18 July 1967 with PIRST ENGERSEMENT

- 1. Reference (a) granted approval for HARD-1 to retain five AN/HRC-40 radios formerly carried on the T/R of MACS-7. These redics were to be sayried as sugmentation to the lat Harine Aircraft king allowance on the III MAT provisional T/E PA960.
- 2. In response to reference (b) approval is granted for MARMAL to invoice two AN/ARC-60 radios to the 2d LAAN Em. These two redice will continue to be carried on T/E 76960.

k. M. HORLLY By direction

Copy to: ACoff, G-4 MSC

### HRANCUARTERS 1st Herine Aircraft Wing Float Herine Perce, Pacific FPO Sen Preceion 96662

lo: Evalted 2110 24 Ma 1967

#### **EMPLICA**

From Commission-Lectronics Officer

To: Officer-in-Charge, Wing Communication Center

Subje III MAF Courtery Messages

l. Courtecy distribution of III MAF messages to the let Merine Aircraft Wing will be discontinued on 27 July 1967.

- 2. In lime thereof, please arrange for courier pick-up of those III MAF messages which will be eletted for internal distribution to Deputy Communication III MAF (Air) by the III MAF Communication Conter. These messages must be delivered, daily, to the Chief of Staff, let Marine Aircraft Ming. by COSCH.
- 3. The Ming Courier will might a courier delivery receipt at the III MAF Communication Contor and will obtain a similar receipt from the Mag Staff Secretary's officerapen delivery. SECRET messages should be listed by Date-Time-Group and accountable serial number. The Staff Secretary should prepare a separate been report for III MAF SHORET messages and deliver this been report to the III MAF Communication Contor (Nessage Distribution).
- h. By copy of this memorandam, GEO III MAF is requested to arrange the exciter pick-up arrangements described in paragraph 2 and 3, shows.

E. H. WORLSY

Copy tos CHO, III MAF Staff Sceretary, lst MAW

ENCLOSURE (42)

## HEADQUARTERS let Herine Aircraft King Floot Herine Force, Facific FFO San Francisco 96602

10:23F redg 2305/10 25 Jul 1967

From: Commanding Constal

To: Commanding Coneral, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Up-grading of III MAF Cable System

Haf: (a) ICCN 2300 of 25 June 1967

Back: (1) Cable Route, BANANG Area NIF

- 1. In accordance with reference (a) the field wire lines of this command are indicated on enclosure (1). This is one line, a FLYING BISC to ROARDING HOUSE common upon. For information contact Captain promptle at FLYING BISC-10.
- 2. It is requested that, if possible, a suble pair be provided to replace this field wire line.

E. H. WOLLSY By direction

Copy to: CO, MGS-17 (less enclosure)

#### DECLASSIFIED

		101 RYA1 (G.) 2302/7
ikeuirenent	Sorkal /	ST
ono Vehicle 1:-3541	91-71760	1
Test Serah Barnese		1
Rotable Spare		2
MAG-16		
Requirement	344.4.1	يغد
Resour ND-5	71-01098, \$1-01117, \$1-01223 71-01226, 71-01230, 71-01325 71-01031, \$1-01118, \$7-01221 71-01113, \$7-01069, \$71-01224	12
Rescue MB-1	72-00099	1
Fire Truck 11-5308	73-00528	1
Nesous N-533A	73-0118, 73-01226	2
Rescue N=5300	73-08067, 73-08063	2
Astrolance 1-670	91-17621	1
Ambulance M-679	91-11631, 91-117635, 91-117667 91-117627	14
Truck 8-678	93-07673	1
Test Dench Harmes		1
Notable *pare		2
*W-3		
Recuirement	Serial P	
Grado Truck XD-5	71-0114, 71-0115, 71-0119 71-01257, 71-01259, 71-01250	6
Reserve Truck 530A	73-01229 <b>, 79,012</b> 93	2
Territor Provide (CVII)	73-02070	1

		101 HYA1 dlj 2302/7
Requirement	Serial #	9
Ambulance	94-47663, 94-47662, 94-47664	3
Test Bench Harness		3
Retable spare		1
M690-17		
Requirement	Serial #	G ty
Truck N-378	306348, 306510	2
Ambulance M-43	9 <b>1-67</b> 565	1
QND Vehicle H-109	On Regn On Regn	1
Mix Station Fire State	lon, 800	2
Test Bench Harness		1
Retable Spare		1
MATCH-68 (MAG-16)		
Requirement	Serial #	Q <b>ty</b>
AW/TRC-131	A-35	1
<u> </u>		
He Requirements		
NATOF-68		
No Requirements		

<sup>3.</sup> To improve the MWHG-17 Ming Text service in the Densing area complex, it is desired to install AM/VNG-33 or similar type equipment in the Ming texts. These requirements are as follows:

#### DECLASSIFIED

				10:EVA::01 2302/7
Recall resemb	Sec	242		
Cardiat N-677	91-47569. 91-47656.	91-47612 91-47612	94-47393	5
Pinnd Station Elepatcher				1

R. V. ANDRESN By direction PRIORITY/ROUTINE 2801142

FROM: CG FIRST MAW

CG FMFPAC

INFO: CG III MAF CC FOR LOGGIND HATE-ONE

2801 14

FRICRITY/ROUTINE 27JUL67 **WDG** 

UNCLAS/E F TO

TO:

R AND B PROCHAM PY 68

- A. CG PMPPAC 1405462 JUL 67
- B. CG FIRST MAW SPDLTR 10:RVA:WDG 10551/10 OF 21 AFR 67
- C. CG FMFFAC 0206272 JUN 67 NOTAL
- 1. REP A REQUESTED MOMINATIONS FOR SELECTED ITEMS OF EQUIP TO SUBJ PROGRAM.
- 2. FOL MOMINATIONS SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION:

T/A NO.	NOMER	্ৰাপ
21760	RADAR SET, AN/TFS-37	T
2 <b>1</b> 9 <b>9</b> 0	RADIO SET, AN/MRC-40	5
22010	RADIO SET, AM/MRC-47A	2 NOTE 1
22 <b>030</b>	RADIO SET, AN/MRC-63	1
22190	RADIO SET, AN/MRC-62	4
21787	RADAR SET, AN/UFS-1C	2
21715	RADAR COURSE DIRECTING	
	CENTRAL, AN/TPQ-10	3 NOTE 2

- NOTE 1. RECOMMEND ONLY AN/ORC-27 COMPONENTS BE INDUCTED.
- NOTE 2. RECOMMEND INCREASE OF FMFPAC ALLOWANCE FROM ONE TO THREE. REF B. APPLIES
- 3. REF C. ADDRESSES USE OF RADAR SET, AN/TES-34 IN MINS BY MACRON-FOUR. FROGRAMMED DELIVERY OF RADAR SET, ANTIPS-34B WOULD RELEASE RADAR SET, AN/TPS-34A SER A6 AND THIS SYSTEM IS RECOMMENDED FOR SUBJ FROCKAM.

R. E.	FAUVER	MAJOR	ĸ.	M.	WORLEY	LTCOL
A/CEO		MO-10	CEC	•		MO-10

A CofS, G-4

Php 6- Enclosure (44)

### CONFIDENTIAL

270814

CONNIDERTIAL

MANUAL TO

PROPE CO FIRST MAN

70e F

PIRCT MAN

IMPO: CHIR SEVENTA AIR PORCE

CO III MAP

SIX TWO ZERO-TACRON-DAHANO
OLA 3D AIR REDCUE GROUP-DAHANO

A FLT POURTE AGG-DANAMO

#### CONFIDENTIAL

CHANGE TO WOO POZOGO\_64 (OCT)

2. EFFECTIVE OF RECEIPT HAKE FOL CHANGES TO GOI, PAGE 2-15 AND PARA 203 FREQ HUMERICAL SEQUENCE.

A. PAD # 3 (RUNY) 263\_9 VICE 313\_5

B. FAD # 4 (JANE) 236-1 VICE 336-4

C. FAD # 5 (MELTE) 272\_9 VICE 362\_6

DEST: CEO, G-3, TAGC, MAG-11, 1st LAM, MMHG-1, MMGG-17.

R. E. PAUVER MAJOR A/CEO MO-GE

CEO HO-LOCK

CONFIDENTIAL

### HEADQUARTERS let Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Porce, Pacific FPO San Francisco 96602

10:1960:d1j 1000 29 Jul 1967

#### MEMORARILLA

From: Communication-Electronics Officer
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-1

Subje Staff Drafteman (MOS 8771); request for

- 1. Fresent T/O provides for the billet of "Staff Bruiteman", MOS 8771, in the CSO section.
- 2. Current N/L does not apparently assign a draftman to the "ED section.
- 3. A draftman is considered necessary to the functioning of the CEO section in order to perform the following tasks:
- a. Assist in the preparation of line route maps, traffic diagrams, DCS tranking systems, smiti-channel radio relay schematic diagrams, and wire gystem sketches peculiar to communication-electronics business.
  - b. Assist in the preparation of other sketches and overlays.
  - c. Reproduce sketches and overlays.
  - d. Operate mechanical drafting equipment and lettering sets.
  - e. Furnish knowledge of conventional signs one symbols.
  - f. Prepare charts and diagrams to assist other staff sections.
- g. Perform preventive maintenance to drafting equipment authorized and retained within this section.
- to Presence of a draftman in the CEO section will immeasurably enhance this section's ability to disseminate required technical information rapidly. Response to technical problems will be speeded in all cases where disgrammed instructions can accompany directives to air groups and squadroms.

Apple ENCLOSURE (46)

10:1000 dlj

5. It is therefore requested that the Assistant Chief of Staff, F-ly initiate exclicat action to suggest this so tions M/L by the addition of a staff draftsman, NOS 8771.

L. M. MOPLEY

31/3282 CONFIDENTIAL

Those OS TIMET KAN

TO: CO HEL BAP
CO SKIED HARRY

THEFORE MANAGEMENT BRAND
HASS-THO DASC DET CHARLES

COMPIDENTIAL

ASST RELOCATION (8)

A. PHONOGE THERD MARRIEV CHO AND PURNT HAN CHO OF 30 JUL 67

l. For 60 III Map. REQUEST SU VOICE CET (AM/MHO-80), PHE BAI TO MOMENT MEP, 20/2600 HERTE EXECUTE, TO PROVIDE STREET ACCUSS, HACKON FUR TO ASET RESCRATED PHE BAI AREA.

2. FOR GG THIRD MANUEY.

A. IN CONFIRMATION HEF A. REQUEST TWO (2) AN/THE-ET VOICE CENCULTS FROM HIS ASSET LOCATION FRO BAI AREA TO FOLTONIHATIONS.

- (1) ONE CH TO PME BAI DASC.
- (2) CHE CH TO AMARIG-BO TENNISHAL PHU BAL.

B. LOO MERTE PAR FOR MATERIAL AT ASSET MELOGATION SETS.

- 3. FOR MAINS-CHE.
  - A. INSTALL THE (E) ME/PRO-ET VOICE CINCUITS AS FOR-
    - (1) TERRITATE CHE CH AT PHU BAI MAND
- (2) PATCH ONE CH FROM MYTRE-MY TO AN/MRG-SG AT PHE BAL. AT HOMEST MY PATCH THIS OR TO EXISTENC CARLE FOR EXTREMION TO MACRON FORE.

Abb 6 ENCLOSURE (49) CONFIDENTIAL

### CONFIDENTIAL

- B. MYTHOT CHATGUE TRANSPIR OF RELOCATED AN/TYQ-16 FROM MASS-THER TO MASS-THD, TRANSPIR VILL INCLUDE MAINT LOS BOOK AND MAINT FLOAT.
- C. RELOCATED ASST ASSUMES VOICE CALL KING LEAR ALFA.
  AMET REMAINS BOMD HA ASSUMES VOICE CALL REVISTATE DELFA.
  - D. WER TAD FREQ ASSIGNED LANDSHARE CRAELIE REF S.
- L. MERLANCE MAIN-ONE AND THIRD MARRIET FOR THIS RELOCA-

A. S. PAUVER MAJOR A/CHO MI-34 CHO MA-35

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE OF OF THE PAGES

#### HEADQUARTERS let Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Pacific FRO San Francisco 96602

10:RVA:wdg 1650 31 July 1967

Prom: Lieutement Colonel Robert V. ANDERSON, United States Narine Gerpe

To: Commanding General, Plant Marine Force, Facific

Ma: (1) Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 1

(2) Commanding Officer, Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1

(3) Commanding Ceneral, 1st Marine Aircraft Ming

Subj: Navy Commendation Medal; resommendation for, case of Captain Emmett W. MCCCRXIX, 090694/2502/3002, United States Marine Corps

Ref: (a) FMFTae Order F1650.14

Engl: (1) Proposed disting

- l. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), it is recommended that Captain Smooth W. MACGORKIE, 090694/2502/3002, United States Marine Gorpe, attached to and serving with Marine Wing Head-quarters Group 1, let Marine Aircraft Wing, he awarded a Mary Commendation Medal for meritorious service.
- 2. During the period & October 1966 to 31 July 1967, Captain MACCORLE performed the duties of an assistant communication-electronics afficer, let Marine Aircraft Ming. In this capacity, Captain MACCORLE, on his oun initiative, established and maintained a daily status of communication-electronics supply support to the let Marine Aircraft Ming. Through clone liaison, therough research and tireless effort he was continually sware of critical modes and, through foresight, determination and energy, was able to insure the satisfaction of these media. In two specific instances he was able to procure repair parts, through unafficial sources; without these parts, the fixed plant teletype equipment in the Ming Communication Center would have been inoperative and the manual telephone suitching central, AN/MIC-1, would have been useless.
- 3. He applied the same energy, resolution and resourcefulness to the problem of strayed shipments. He traveled the length of South Vietnam in search for missing redar parts and, on other occasions, has successful in locating two critical shipments destined for Marine Air Traffic

App6-ENCLOSURE (48)

## HEADQUARTERS let Herine Aircraft Wing Fleet Herine Force, Pacific FPO Sen Francisco 96602

10:RPB:dlj 1000 31 Jul 1967

From: Communication-Electronics Officer
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, 3-1

Subje Reassignment; request for

1. It is requested that let Lt HERRY, C. J. 085664/5910 RTD Jul 68, currently assigned to MASS-2, be reassigned to the Wing CEO section as relief for Capt E. W. MACCORKLE who is rotating to CONUS during August 1967.

K. H. WORLEY

10:EVA:wdg 1650

Control Unit-67 when all official recourse had been exhausted.

- h. Captain MACCORLE's shility to presure that which was needed, either officially or unefficially, from military and divilian sources, was unique and directly resulted in a reduction of the deadline rate of the communication-electronics combat essential equipment of the lat Marine Aircraft Ming, from 225 to a one-time low of \$5.
- 5. Captain MADCORELS's initiative, determination and uncelfish devotion to duty have directly combribated to the successful operation of the lat Marine Argerett Wing communication-electronics system and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
- 6. The nature of the meriterious service described above and the facts contained in the proposed election are personnelly known to me.
- 7. The smard is for direct participation in combat operations and the Combat Distinguished Device is recommended.
- 8. Captain McCornelE has received no previous awards.
- 9. Captain MCCCRKLE has not previously been recommended for an award.
- 10. The date of detachment from present duty assignment will be during August 1967 for release from active duty.
- 11. No other recommendation will be submitted in connection with this service.

R. V. ANDERSON

In the name of the Secretary of the Navy, the Commanding General, Flact Marine Force, Facific takes pleasure in presenting the NAVI COMMENDATION MEDAL to

CAPTAIN EMETT W. MACCORIE
UNITED STATES MARINE CONPS RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For meritorious service while serving with Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, from 4 October 1966 to 31 July 1967, and in operations against insurgent Communist Seroes in the Republic of Vietnam. As an assistant Communication-Electronics Officer, let Marine Aircraft Wing, Captain MACCORKIE displayed substanding initiative, determination and resourcefulness in previding direct repair parts support to the communication-electronics equipment of the let Marine Aircraft Wing. He was not content to rely salely upon official programma chammels, but explayed every pendide segree with outstanding results. He was directly responsible for contributing to a significant reduction in the deadline rate of compat escential communication-electronics equipment. Through his painstaking efforts, tireless searshing and continuous, direct personnal interest, Captain MACCORRIE retrieved lost/strayed shipments of critical equipment, supervised the delivery of this equipment to the destined user and applied the results of his experiences to concrete recommendations for future improvement in this necessary area of support. By this high order of professionalism, exemplary attitude, initiative and devotion to duty: Captain MACCONELE unheld the highest traditions of the United States Maval Service."

Captain MACCORKIE is authorized to wear the Combat "Y".

For the Secretary of the May

V. R. KRULAS Lieutenant General, V. S. Harine Corps Commanding

## HEADQUARTERS 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Fleet Marine Force, Pacific FPO San Francisco, 96602

16:00:1w1 6000 1 August 1967

From: Wing Medical Officer

To: Commanding General (Attn: ACofs, G-3)

Subj: Medical Chronology for the month of July 1967

Ref: (a) WgO 5750-1B

Encl: (1) WgO 3750.12C

1. Conferences and visits made by the Wing Medical Officer during the month of July 1967.

a. On 1 July 1967 ENS A. M. THRAIL, MSC, USN was appointed to the rank of LTJG.

b. On 5 July 1967 the Wing Medical Officer and HMNM C. W. PARKER, USN, Wing Medical Administrative Chief visited Marble Mounta\n Air Facility to present awards to hospital corpsmen in HMM-262.

- c. On 6 July the Wing Medical Officer and Wing Medical Administrative Chief visited III MAF Headquarters on medical matters and visited the WEC Leprosy Clinic in Danang on Med Cap.
- $d_{\rm o}$  On 7 July 1967 the Wing Medical Officer visited Station Hospital NSA for a conference with the Senior Medical Officer.
- e. On 8 July 1967 the Wing Medical Officer, Wing Sanitation Officer and Wing Medical Administrative Chief inspected medical facilities at MACS 4 CANTONMENT.
- f. On 10 July the Wing Medical Administrative Officer was letached. ITJG A. M. THRALL, MSC, USN assumed duties of Wing Medical Administrative Officer.
- g. On 12 July 1967 the Wing Medical Officer visited Wing Medical elements and Delta Medical Battalion, 3rd Marine Division at Dong Ya.

h. On 14 July LCDR D. R. LAWSON, MSC, USN reported for duty as the Wing Medical Administrative Officer.

i. On 14 July 1967 the Wing Medical Officer made limison visit to the Sanh to visit C & C Company detachment of Alpha Medical, 3rd Marine Division.

- j. On 17 July 1967 the Wing Medical Officer attended a I Corps Senior Medical Officer conference and dinner at Station Hospital NSA, Danang with VADM R. B. BROWN, MC, USN, Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and RADM John CURREN, CINCPAC Medical Officer.
- k. On 20 July 1967 the Wing Medical Officer visited Wing Medical Units of MAG-11, 1st LAANS Bn and MWSG-17.
  - 1. On 20 July 1967 Wing Order 3750,120 enclosure (1) was published.
- m. On 24 July 1967 the Wing Medical Officer and Wing Medical Administrative Chief visited Wing Units in Chu Lai.
- n. On 24 July 1967 the Wing Medical Officer and Wing Administrative Chief made a civil action visit on the island of Culaore.
- o. On 25 July 1967 the Wing Medical Officer attended medical conference at III MAF Headquarters.
- p. On 25 July 1967 Captain F. AUSTIN, MC, USN arrived to study stress factors in the Wing.
- q. On 26 July 1967 the Wing Medical Officer with Captain F. AUSTIN, MC, USN briefed the Commanding Officer of MAG-16 and the Flight Surgeons on study project.
- r. During the month 181 water samples were examined by the Preventive Medicine Section for evidence of bacterial contamination.
- s. On 7 and 25 July 1967 Sanitation inspection of III MAF Transient Facility was conducted by Wing Preventive Medicine Section.
- t. The Wing Preventive Medicine Officer made inspection and assistance visits to MAG-12 Chu Lai on 5 July 67; MAG-13 Chu Lai on 6 July 67; MAG-36 Ky Ha on 7 July; MAG-16 Phu Bai on 18 July and MAG-16 Forward at Dong Ha on 24 July.
- u. On 5 and 19 July 1967 spraying for insect control was conducted at the WEC Children's Home, a Wing civic action project.

Oscar Gray of CSCAR GRAY, JR.

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco, 96602

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Committee of the following of the following

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> WgO 3750.12C 16:0G:1wl 20 Jul 1967

#### WING ORDER 3750.12C

From: Commanding General To: Distribution List

Subj: Medical Officer's Report

Ref:

- (a) OPNAVINST 3750.6F
- (b) FMFPACO 3750.5D
- (c) WgO P3759.F
- 1. Purpose. To promulgate supplementary instructions and guidelines for the submission of Medical Officer's Report.
- 2. Cancellation. Wing Order 3750.12B
- 3. Scope. The provisions of this order are applicable to all units attached to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
- 4. Background. The Medical Officer's Report (MOR) of an aircraft mishap should be a carefully worked document based on exhaustive investigation from the medical viewpoint of such mishaps. In combat more than in peacetime, malfunctions and failures of aircraft systems and components resulting in aircraft mishaps must be promptly reported so that corrective action can be taken before problems become severely detrimental to combat readiness. Mishaps in a combat zone are classified as either "direct enemy action" or "operational."

#### 5. Action

- a. The commanding officer or convening authority shall direct the preparation of a Medical Officer's Report (MOR):
- (1) In cases of "direct enemy action" mishaps if he determines that valuable aeromedical factors may be learned.
- (2) On all operational mishaps (all aircraft accidents, ground accidents, or incidents) in a combat area, a modified MOR will be made in accordance with paragraph 22, a, (3) of reference (a) which involves the following:
- (a) Any injury to personnel defined in paragraph 9 of reference (a).
- (b) Failure of, damage to, or difficulty with safety and survival equipment.

WgO 3750.12C 20 Jul 1967

- (c) Human factors such as physiological, psychological, sociological, pathological, etc., if such a report may contribute to aviation safety.
- (d) Any emergency in flight egress or unintentional separation from the aircraft.
- (e) Live parachute jump accidents which result in injuries to parachute riggers or other personnel during training or other intentional parachute jumps.
- b. The flight surgeon shall comply with provisions of reference (a) and (c), noting the additional requirements for copies of the MOR in accordance with paragraph 39, (b) of reference (a). In addition he shall:
- (1) Direct his investigation toward understanding and reducing injury and death as it concerns human factors only. The flight surgeon will not attempt to analyze engineering specifics of the ejection seat, air frame, power plants, etc., but shall advise other board members on any matters disclosing failed parts or design that he may have uncovered or suspected.
- (2) Not comment on flight techniques and procedures unless qualified in that model aircraft; otherwise comments made must indicate the source whether from interview with other qualified pilots or from information derived from the pilot's handbook.
- (3) Include a statement on the number of days the pilot has been in-country, number of days since last out of country for four (4) or more days, flight hours in-country and number of missions in-country as required by reference (b).
- (4) Acquaint other board members with his findings for their analysis and conclusions.

H. H. LONG Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: "A" & "B"

OFFICE OF THE WING CHAPLAIN
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, FMF, Pacific
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3 August 1967

From: Wing Chaplain

To: Assistant Chief of Staff G-3

Subj: Command Chronology for July 1967

Ref: Wing Order 5750.1A

1. Each chaplain assigned to a group within the First Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPAC, is asked to submit a chronology to his own S-3. This command chronology is a composite report.

a. <u>Divine Services</u>. During the month of July, Divine Services were provided seven days per week in the Wing for Protestant and Catholic personnel. Jewish personnel were provided services by Jewish layleaders. The LDS and Christian Science men were provided services at the Air Force Chapel with Lay Services for small groups. Special Orthodox, LDS, and Episcopal Communion Services were held Sundays at the Wing Chapel.

In the month of July Wing Chaplains conducted 221 Sunday Services, with an attendance of 8,628. Weekday Services totaled 288 with an attendance of 2,249. 3 Memorial Services were held in the Wing with an attendance of 223. 12 services were conducted outside the Wing with 463 attending.

- b. Moral Leadership. Chaplains in the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing gave 7 lectures on the Religions of Vietnam with 450 attending. Chaplains gave 12 Indoctrination Lectures with 731 attending.
- 2. <u>Civic Action</u>. During the month of July the following donations were made in cooperation with or through the chaplains offices:

12.	CMA Sacred Heart Orphanage DaNang Baptist Mission Cu Loa Re Island Lyson Protestant Mission An Tan Orphanage Vietnamese Scholarships Tam Ky Church & Orphanage Civil Action Program Thanh Duc School Nhat Le School Binh Son Orphanage Bishop Chi	165,340 63,300 52,000 49,900 41,000 29,500 17,582 12,390 7,260 5,900 5,900 2,360	Piasters  "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "
13.	Bishop Chi	2,360	·
14.	Orphanage at Hue	1,410	11

## DECLASSIFIED





b.	ı.	Food	6,090 lbs.
	2.	Loads of Wood	20 loads
	3.	Cement	310 bags
	4.	Clothes	420 lbs.
	5.	Health Kits	800 kits
	6.	Paper	70 reams
	7•	Medical Supplies	50 lbs.
	8.	Writing Tablets	300
	9.	Camp cots	36
	10.	Fill dirt	_ 4_loads

P. J. FERRERI

## DECLASSIFIED





## Miscellaneous Supporting Documents Appendix 20

- Tab A After Action Report Beaver Track SLT 79.5 w/4 Encls.
  - B After Action Report Beacon Torch SLT 79.5 w/3 Encls.
  - " @ After Action Report 3/7 Operation Gem w/1st Endorsement & 2 Encls.
  - " 2 Aviation Safety Bulletin #25
  - " E Aviation Safety Julletin #26





Special Landing Force Bravo Fleet Marine Force Seventh Fleet FPO San Francisco, California

3:JCT:dsa Ser: 0026-67 30 July 1967

SECRET-NOFORN (Downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosures)

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Seventh Fleet

Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO/HICKORY II

Encl: (1) SLF After Action Report, Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO/HICKORY II
(2) BLT 2/3 After Action Report, Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO/
HICKORY II

V(3) HMM 164 After Action Report, Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO/

(4) HMM 265 After Action Report, Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO/

1. Enclosure (1) contains Special Landing Force Bravo subject After Action Reports. Enclosures (2) thru (4) amplify enclosure (1).

J. G. DIONISOPOULOS

# SECRET - NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

# BEAVER TRACK





CTG 79.5



SECRET - NOFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
Copy of Copie

HEADQUARTERS Battalion Landing Team 2/3 FPO, San Francisco 96602

2nd 3N, St. C. A.A. a. CONTROL NO. 00282-69 COPY NO. 48: 60 03/JJ0/pgr 3000 17 July 1967 Ser No. 0032-67

#### SECRET

From: Commanding Officer

Commander, Special Landing Force Bravo

Combat After Action Report (Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO; HICKORY II).

(a) MAPS: VIETNAM, AMS 1:50,000 L7014, Sheets 6342 I, 6442 IV. Ref:

(b) CTG 79.5 Frag Order (Operation BEAVER TRACK).
(c) 3rd Marines Frag Order (Operation CIMARRON 7-67).
(d) 3rd Marines Frag Order (Operation HICKORY II 1-67).

Encl: /(1) Overlay of Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO. Overlay of Operation HICKORY II.

1. Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO; HICKORY II

## 2. Dates of Operations

- (1) EEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO: 040700H 140659H July 1967
- (2) HICKORY II: 140700H 170920H July 1967
- 3. Location. Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO and HICKORY II were conducted in Gio Linh and Cam Lo Districts, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.

#### 4. Task Organization

BLT 2/3 Major BEARD (4-13 July 1967) H & S Co (-) (Rein) Det, Hq Bn, 3rd Mar Div Major BROUJOS (14-16 July 1967) Det, Hq Co, 3rd Mar Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar Lt Col HERICH Det, 15th Dental Co (17 July 1967) 2nd Clearing Plat (Rein), Co B, 3rd Med Bn 1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn 1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3rd MT Bn 1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn Det, LSU, for Log Cmd

GP 4 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

Co E (Rein) Capt BOGARD Co E Det, H & S Co 1st Sec, 81mm Mort Plat Det, Med Plat Det, Intel Sec Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bm Co F (Reim) 1st Lt KOEHLER Co F Det, H&S Co 2md Sec, 81mm Mort Plat Det, Med Plat Det, Intel Sec FAC Tm Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bm, 12th Mar Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Eagr Ba Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Ba Co G (Rein) Capt SHEEHAN CoG Det, H & S Co 3rd Sec, 81mm Mort Plat Det, Med Plat Det, Intel Sec FAC Tm Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bm, 12th Mar Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Emgr Bm Det, 1st Flat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Br Co H (Rein) Capt CULVER Co H Det, H & S Co 4th Sec. 81mm Mort Plat Det, Med Plat Det, Intel Sec Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn 106mm RR Plat 2nd Lt EIMS "B" Btry (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar Capt FILE 3rd Plat (Reim), Co B, 1st AMTRAC Bm 2nd Lt RUSH 3rd Plat, Co B Det, H & S Co, 1st AMTRAC Bm

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2nd Plat (Redim), Co. A. 3rd. AT But The Pitter Add garages 2nd Riztifico A . and erew amon'i appropriate for Detaillatin Co., Brit Allohn feet at some DAV HAR you

2nd Lt LAWLER

3rd Plat. Co B. 3rd Recon Bn

1. 12 E . 1 . 1 1st Lt CARRIGAN

J. applies the little and the tree of the section of the 2nd Plat s(Red n ) on Co A 1 3 rd Tank and the set of the last and the

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Supporting: Forces I result works off to partit to disperse to out a factor of the disperse to the second of the second of the disperse to the second of the secon a. Air and artillery were available to the BLT during both operations in covered in this report, and were used extensively in both preplanned and 880. immediate missions. Nava gun fire was not available to the BLT during these operations.

- b. Combat support and combat service support units attached to the BLT did not directly support the battalion ashore unless they were originally task organized to one of the companies. These supporting units were landed on D+5 and were CHOPPED OPCON to parent organizations of the 3rd Marine Division.
- c. On D-Day, Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO, 1st Plat, Co B, 3rd Tank Ba, CHOPPED OPCON to the battalion at Cam Lo artillery position. The assignment of these weapons proved to be a hindrance rather than an aid to the battalion's movement in its assigned AO. The personnel of this unit were ready and willing to provide support desired, however, maintenance problems and terrain were constant obstacles to their overall effectiveness.
- d. Each rifle company was provided close combat engineer support for the destruction of enemy fortifications. The attachment of this support, at rifle company level, proved to be the most effective method of employment, allowing immediate and effective destruction of enemy fortifications as the battalion moved through areas where search and destroy missions were conducted.

#### • . Air Support

(1) CAS was considered to be excellent overall, and in view of the number of times it was requested, it was considered to be very timely. Target accuracy during BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO was among the best that the battalion has witnessed in recent operations. Fixed wing aircraft conducted 18 missions and delivered a total of 124,000 pounds of ordnance.

- (2) Logistical support, MEDEVAC and tactical troop movements by helicopters were considered satisfactory. There were two occasions in which response to emergency MEDEVAC requests took more than 60 minutes. All other MEDEVAC requests were answered expeditiously.
- f. Artillery. The battalion received excellent artillery support throughout both operations. Delays in counterbattery clearances were not so prevalent as those experienced in previous operations. On one occasion, almost instantaneous 8" counterbattery fire on a 140mm rocket position silenced enemy fire, and TAC (A) reported the position destroyed. The continuous artillery fired in support of Company F, when heavily engaged with an estimated 200 NVA, on 8 July, turned a near stalemate to an overwhelming defeat of an enemy unit whose losses numbered well over 100. A total of 6,088 rounds of artillery of assorted types were fired in support of the battalion.

#### 6. Intelligence

## a. Enemy Strength, Situation and Capabilities Prior to Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO.

## (1) Exemy Strength

- (a) 31st NVA Regiment Strength: 2,400 Location: Gio Linh District
- (b) 32rd NVA Regiment Strength: 2,000 Location: Nghe Am Province
- (c) 90th NVA Regiment Strength: 2,100 Location: Con Thien Area
- (d) 29th NVA Regiment Headquarters Strength: 800 Location: YD 096665
- (e) 7th Battalion, 29th NVA Regiment Strength: 400 Location: YD 085646
- (f) 9th Battalion, 29th Regiment Strength: 400 Location: YD 085646

- (g) 803rd NVA Regiment
  Strength: 2,600
  Location: North Quang Tri Province
- (h) The enemy is armed with 82mm mortars, 60mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, 57mm recoilless rifles, 12.7mm AA/MG, 120mm rockets, automatic weapons and individual arms.
- (2) Enemy Situation. The enemy in unknown strength was moving south from the DMZ, threatening Con Thien and the MSR between Con Thien and Cam Lo.
  - (3) Enemy Capabilities. The enemy had the capability to:
    - (a) Attack or defend with up to one NVA Regiment.
- (b) Reinforce in connection with (a) above with up to one NVA Regiment.
- (c) Harass friendly forces using mortars, surprise firing devices and sporadic small arms fire.
  - b. Exemy Strength and Situation During Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO.
    - (1) 4 July 1967. There was negative enemy contact on 4 July 1967.
- (2) 5 July 1967. Enemy contact on 5 July 1967 was limited to semi-automatic fire received at coordinates YD 105672. Fifteen fortified positions were destroyed at coordinates YD 104643 and one command detonated antitank mine was discovered and evacuated from coordinates YD 099659.
- (3) 6 July 1967. Moderate contact and enemy mortar attacks characterized 6 July 1967. A probe of Company E lines at coordinates YD 107672 by an estimated 25 NVA at 0535H resulted in 5 KTA (confirmed) and 12 KTA (probable). A search of the area resulted in the recovery of two (2) SKS carbines, five (5) barrel magazines with 1,000 rounds of ammunition, 12 AK-47 magazines and pouches, two (2) cartridge belts each with 20 clips of 7.62 ammunition, 16 Chicom grenades, one (1) M-26 grenade, one (1) corpsman's bag with pills, dressings, viles and cintment. Also at 0535H, the Battalion CP and Company G received 40 rounds of 60mm mortar fire at coordinates YD 105656. At 0800H Company H at coordinates YD 115675 received semi-automatic fire accompanied by 60mm mortar fire and two (2) RPG rocket rounds. Fire was returned resulting in 14 KIA (confirmed) and 19 KIA (probable). At 1030H, the attached tanks spotted NVA in dark green uniforms with soft covers and at least two wearing body armor and helmets. Tank fire resulted in 16 KIA (confirmed) and 10 KIA (probable). At 1530H, a patrol from Company H received 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire at coordinates YD 113675 and at 2125H, Company H at coordinates YD 114667 received 25

rounds of 60mm morter fire. Semi-automatic fire was recolved from the vicinity of YD 108677. A single command detenated character was set off at coordinates YD 095663 and two command detenated character was set off almost simultaneously at coordinates YD 101667. Manage casualties for 6 July 1967 were 37 KIA (confirmed) and 40 KIA (probable).

- (4) 7 July 1967. 7 July 1967 saw a marked decrease in enemy activity. One enemy was fired on at coordinates YD 113667 and one M-14 magazine and pouch were recovered. A small base camp with 10 bunkers and 15 foxholes was discovered at coordinates YD 115667. Two of the bunkers had fresh blood stains in them. A search of the area in the vicinity of coordinates YD 101671 following an artillery barrage revealed many blood stains and dressings. Twenty-one well built bunkers, a mertar pit and six (6) rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition were discovered at coordinates YD 107676. Another mortar position and bunker were destroyed at coordinates YD 086673. One anti-tank mine was discovered and destroyed at coordinates YD 085658. Four enemy were engaged by semi-automatic fire at coordinates YD 116675 resulting in 1 KIA (confirmed), 2 KIA (probable), and the capture of assorted 782 gear.
- (5) 8 July 1967. Heavy contact was made on the afternoon of 8 July 1967. Semi-automatic fire was first received at coordinates YD 098661. Artillery and air was called in resulting in 4 KIA (confirmed) and 6 KIA (probable). Upon returning to the area, autometic fire and grenades were received. The ensuing fight resulted in 35 KIA (confirmed) and 20 KIA (probable). Shortly thereafter, 200-250 MVA were engaged in the vicinity of coordinates YD 089654 - YD 081654. Artillory and air were called in as the enemy elected to close and fight attempting to overrun friendly forces. The results were 43 MA (confirmed), 60 MA (probable) and 1 AL-47 captured. Estima utensile were discovered at seordinates YD 107671. One anti-tank mine was destroyed and one RPG launcher, a pack. a bloodstained set of utilities, a helmet and a morter tube cover were evacuated from coordinates YD 115676. Supper files was received and a bouncing betty set off at coordinates YD 092661. An unknown exploding device was set off at coordinates YD 116676. A search of this area was thoroughly made revealing two containers of mortar fuses, seven (7) AK-47 magazines and ammunition, two Chicom gronades, two home made demolition kits and 782 gear. On the evening of 8 July 1967, the Battalion CP and Company G received 12 rounds of 120mm reckets. Through the evening of 8 July 1967, Battalion TAC Net #1 was subject to interference from NVA jamming. Enemy loses for 8 July 1967 were 82 KIA (confirmed) and 86 KIA (probable).

- (6) 9 July 1967. Actual contact with the enemy on 9 July 1967 was negative. An unknown exploding device was tripped at coordinates YD 101655. The Battalion CP was subjected to nine (9) rounds of 120mm rocket fire from the vicinity of coordinates YD 053704. A bivouae area was discovered at coordinates YD 105652 and enemy bunkers were destroyed at coordinates YD 096614, YD 090654 and YD 098674. Twenty fresh graves each containing one or two bodies were discovered at coordinates YD 090655 along with three (3) 82mm mortar rounds and 24 60mm rounds which were destroyed. The graves were believed to contain enemy dead from the action of 8 July 1967. A search in vicinity of coordinates YD 090400 yielded eight (8) RPG rockets, three (3) Chicom granades, one (1) Chicom claymore, eight (8) blasting caps, 100 feet of electrical wire, three (3) boosters of RPG and 500 rounds of AK-47 ammunition destroyed, and 782 gear, documents, Lactian money and four (4) gas masks evacuated.
- (7) 10 July 1967. A bunker complex and six (6) 82mm mortar rounds destroyed at coordinates YD 103661 was the extent of enemy presence noted on 10 July 1967.
- (8) 11 July 1967. Enemy effectiveness on 11 July was evident only by a tank blowing an AT mine at coordinates YD 128638.
- (9) 12-13 July 1967. There was megative enemy contact on 12 and 13 July 1967.
  - c. Enemy Strongth, Situation and Capabilities Prior to Operation Hickory II.
- (1) Enomy Strongth. The enomy was reported to have moved two companies of the 29th NVA Regiment into the area of operation to support local enemy forces.
- (2) Enemy Situation. The area of operations had been occupied by friendly forces up to 48 hours before Operation BEAVER TRACK/HICKORY II. No significant enemy contact had been made. It was believed that elements of the 29th MVA Regiment were conducting recon operations in the area.
  - (3) Enomy Capabilities. The enemy was capable of:
- (a) Harassing with small arms fire, mortars and surprise firing devices.
- (b) Attacking or defending on a limited scale when given a favorable tactical situation.

## d. Enemy Strength and Situation During Operation HICKORY II.

- (1) 14 July 1967. No actual enemy contact was made on 14 July 1967. Enemy surprise firing devices were set off at coordinates YD 075622, YD 076620 and YD 072635. None of these devices were command detomated. One Chicom claymore mine was discovered at coordinates YD 070635. Late in the evening of 14 July 1967, Company E received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from coordinates YD 083644.
- (2) 15 and 16 July 1967. There was negative enemy contact on 15 and 16 July 1967. Operation BEAVER TRACK/HICKORY II terminated on 17 July 1967.
- e. Summary of Significant Enemy Activities. No new or significant enemy tactics or activities were revealed during this operation. Enemy tactics of utilizing surprise firing devices, mortars, and small probes is standard when friendly forces are semi-stationary in the field. The one major engagement seemed to have resulted from NVA troops being on the move when engaged by friendly forces. Since these friendly forces were initially small in number, the enemy sensing a distinct tactical advantage, choose to attack, attempting to overrun initial friendly forces and subsequent reinforcements.

#### 7. Mission

## a. Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO

- (1) At L-Hour on D-Day land in LZ CANARY and deploy to an assembly area to be designated and be prepared for employment as directed in 3rd Marine Division area.
- (2) At H-Hour on D-Day conduct S&D operations north of Cam Lo attacking on a south to north axis in area bounded on north by YD 69, in west by YD 04, in south by Cam Lo River and in east by YD 12. In conjunction with S & D operations, a detailed search will be made for possible mortar/rocket sites and arms caches.
- b. Operation HICKORY II. Conduct S&D operations on a south to north axis establishing blocking positions in vicinity as shown on operations overlay (enclosure (2)). Be prepared to CHOP OPCON from 3rd Marines on or about 16 July 1967.

#### 8. Concept of Operations

## a. Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO (Enclosure (1))

(1) At L-Hour on D-Day BLT 2/3 conducts an administrative heloborne move with four reinforced rifle companies and a command group into

IZ CANARY, deploys to a designated assembly area for employment as directed in 3rd Marine Division rea. Attached units BLT 2/3 prepare to land and CHOP OPCON to parent organizations of 3rd Marine Division.

- (2) Second Battalion (Roin), 3rd Marines, consisting of a command group and four reinforced rifle companies, conducts S&D operations morth of Cam Lo River. Operation consists of two phases: Attack on south to merth axis to LOA (YD 69), turning and attacking to the west. When attack crosses Phase Line Blue, second phase commences with attack to continue on a morth to south axis to Cam Lo River.
- b. Operation HICKORY II. Second Battalion (Rein), 3rd Marines establishes blocking positions with four rifle companies and a command group in vicinity as designated in operations overlay (Enclosure (2)).

## 9. Execution

## a. Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO

- (1) 040640H. CO 2/3 and Company H doparted USS Tripoli and arrived Cam Lo at 040705H.
- (2) 040810H. Command Group Alpha arrived LZ CANARY and moved to vicinity YD 136615.
- (3) 040820H. Company H completed lift to LZ CANARY and moved to vicinity ND 140614.
- (4) 040950H. Company F completed lift to LZ CANARY and moved to vicinity YD 133619.
- (5) 041045H. Company E completed lift to LZ CANARY and moved to vicinity ND 137619.
- (6) O41200H. Tanks from 3rd Tank Bm. Plt \*Bm OPCON to 2/3 moved to vicinity ND 146613.
- (7) 041250H. Company G completed lift to LZ CANARY and moved to wicinity ND 138617.
  - (8) 041300H. 2/3 CHOPPED OPCON to 3rd Marines.
- (9) 041300H. Frag Order 7-67 received from 3rd Marines for 4 and 5 July 1967.
- (10) 041330H. Lead Elements of Company F commenced movement to the west. Section of tanks with Company F and one with Company H. Units moving to be positioned for sweep to the morth on three axises.
- (11) 041730H. All units positioned for the night with night activities. Units were located at: Command Group Alpha and Company G at YD 108616, Company E at YD 110620, Company F at YD 108617 and Company H at YD 115626.
  - (12) 050300H. Issued Frag Order 52-67 to all units.

- (13) 050700H. All units displaced and moved in a mortherly direction on three axises.
  - (14) 050915H. Company F secured objective #1 with me opposition.
  - (15) 050945H. Company E secured objective #2 with no opposition.
- (16) 050945H. Company E discovered 15 fortified bunkers located at YD 104643 which were destroyed by demolitions.
- (17) 051505H. Company E received sporadic smiper fire from YD 105672. Returned fire with small arms. Sustained one (1) KIA and one (1) WIA.
- (18) 051650H. Lead elements of Company G discovered one enemy setting up what appeared to be a land mine at YD 099659. Enemy fled and was fired upon. Patrol followed in pursuit with negative results.
  - (19) 051806H. Received Frag Order from 3rd Marines.
  - (20) 052015%. Issued Frag Order 53-67 to all units.
- (21) 060535H. Perimeter of Company E at YD 107672 probed by approximately 25 enemy with small arms. Returned fire with machine gum. Artillery was called in and machine gum fire drows the enemy into artillery impact area. Excellent effect on target area. Search of area at first light produced 14 enemy KIA (confirmed) and 19 KIA (probable), as there were bloody bandages and dragging imprints. Miscellaneous 782 gear, medical bag, two (2) Chicem carbines SKS type, two (2) cartridge belts 20 clips each of 7.82 amme, 16 Chicem grenades, five (5) barrel magasines with pouches were captured.
- (22) 060540h. Company G and Command Group at ID 105656 received approximately 40 rounds 61mm mortars resulting in one KIA and four WIA's evacuated. Fourteen non-evac's were also recorded. 81mm mortar and artillery was fired on the enemy suspected position ceasing enemy fire.
- (23) 060800H. Company H patrol received small arms and 60mm mortar fire. Fire was coming from a church in the area at ID 123674. Patrol returned small arms fire and utilized fire from two tanks that was with the patrol. Tanks received RPG rocket rounds, one hitting the turret and one hitting tracks, but both tanks were still eperable. Artillery mission conducted firing 156 rounds on enemy position, resulting in enemy cease fire. Patrol had one KIA and six WIA's.
- (24) 060930H. Patrol from Company F hit by claymore mine at YD 095663 which appeared to be command detomated. There was no further contact. Company F sustained three (3) KIA's and one (1) WIA.
- (25) 061000H. Company G established PPB at YD 101667 and sent forward elements to check out area. Two command detomated claymores exploded. Area was covered with small arms fire and followed wires which set off mines.
- (26) 061030H. Tank plt commander reported seeing NVA at YD 117673 in dark green uniforms with soft covers, and at least two were wearing body armor and US helmets. Tanks took enemy under firewith 90mm and 50 cal MG. There was good coverage with 16 KIA (confirmed) and 10 KIA (probable).

(27) 061222H. Company E patrol took one round sniper fire from YD 108677. Echo returned fire with small arms.

(28) 061417H. Company E called air strike on 8 enemy bunkers at YD 108677. Patrol sent out to search the area. Patrol was taken under fire. Patrol pulled back and called in artillery. Patrol sustained two WIA's.

(29) 061420H. Frag Order from 3rd Marines received.

(30) 061530H. Patrol from Company H took 15 rounds of 60mm mortar while returning to CP. Mortar fire received from YD 115674 was silenced with artillery and mortar fire. Patrol had 12 WIA evac and one WIA non medevac.

(31) 061800H. Mortar fire from YD 113675 was received at Company H position. Artillery was called in at enemy position resulting in two secondary explosions.

(32) 061930H. Frag Order 54-67 Issued to all units.

(33) 062125H. Approximately 25 rounds of 60mm mortars were received by Company H VD 11667. Artillary was called in on suspected position

by Company H YD 114667. Artillery was called in on suspected position.

(34) 062215H. Company E heard movement forward of their lines. A total of 99 rounds artillery was delivered at YD 101671 into suspected enemy area. At early light area was checked and patrol discovered drag imprints, bloody stains and bandages, determining 8 probable KIA\*s.

(35) 070630H. Company H observed one silouhette of enemy by perimeter at YD 113667. Fired M-79 at target; checked area at first light, discovered

blood soaked 1214 magazine and pouch.

(36) 070745H. 20 feet of communication wire was discovered by Company. E patrol at YD 105672 at trail crossing. Junction was also marked by small rock pile. Wire was destroyed and rocks were scattered.

(37) 070930H. Patrol from Company H discovered what appeared to be a small NVA Camp at YD 115667. Ten bunkers 4 ft X 6 ft were discovered along with 15 fighting holes. Fresh blood found in two bunkers and traces of blood

on bamboo matting. Bunkers were destroyed.

(38) 071115H. Company E patrol found extensive bunker complex at YD 107676 consisting of 21 bunkers which were well built and well hidden; about a week old. One mortar pit was also discovered along with six 82mm mortar rounds which were destroyed.

(39) 071414H. Company F patrol discovered anti-tank mine at YD

095658 which was destroyed.

(40) 071500H. Patrol from Company E discovered one bunker 4. X 6.

and a reinforced mortar pit at YD 096673.

(41) 071530H. Company H patrol received small arms fire from YD 116675. Four enemy dressed in gray uniforms were running from a hut. Enemy were taken under fire. Area was searched and found one pack with miscellaneous 782 gear, which was full of bullet holes and blood soaked. One AK-47 magazine pouch with five full magazines, two chicom grenades, a battle dressing which had the following writing, Tien 32710RT and C3 KY were captured.

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(42) 971840H. Received Frag Order from 3rd Marines.

(43) 072030%. Frag Order 55-67 issued to all units.
(44) 080400H. Company Elistening post heard movement and sounds of metal by perimeter YD 167671. Grenade was thrown and noise stopped. Early light, area was checked and eating utensils were found throughout the area.

(45) 080800H. Company R patrol discovered a CH-34 with the markings A4551 at YD 115676. It had been completly stripped. An anti-tank mine, RPG Rocket launcher, one empty booster propellent tube and misc 782 gear were found mear the wreckage.

(46) 081015H. A patrol from Company H was collecting enemy equipment discovered at YD 116676. It was being destroyed when an unknown device was set off. Patrol r ceived 8 "IA's. Equipment found were 2 containers with mortar fuzes 7AK-47 magazines with armo, 2 chicom gremades, 2 home made demolitions and misc 782 grar.

(47) 081030H. Patrol from Company I moved to blocking position to assist Company G patrol and received sniper fire. Patrol tripped a bouncing betty at YD 092661 which resulted in 2 KIA, 1 WIA. Enemy was taken under

fire with 60mm mortars and patrol remained in blocking position.

(48) 081030H. Company G patrol discovered bunker area at YD 098661 and was searching when taken under small arms fire. Patrol manuevered against the enemy receiving automatic fire and gremades. Patrol disengaged and called in artillery which had g od coverage on the target. Air was also utilized. One artillery round fell short in midst of ten men. Fixed wing heavy ordnance was used on bunker complex. Action results were 2 KIA, 17 WIA evac, 8 non-evac, 4 enemy KIA confirmed and 6 KIA probables.

(49) 081300H. Company G returned to bunker complex at YD 098661 after heavy air bombordment. On entering area Company G was taken under automatic weapon fire and gremades from enemy bunkers. Enemy inside appeared wounded and could not withdraw. Bunkers were knocked out. Area contained living quarters, field mess, 2 cook shacks. Company Commander reported bodies, and pieces of bodies over most of the bivouse area. Results of action were four !TA, 35 enemy KIA and 20 probables.

(50) 081630H。 Capt O'BRIEN relieved Capt SHEEHAN as CO Company G.

Capt SHEEHAN was wounded and evacuated.
(51) 081835H. Command Group and Golf received 12 artillery rounds from vicinity YD 079677. Counter battery of artillery and fixed wing was

used on enemy suspected position.

(52) 081/30H. Two squads from Company F were conducting routine patrolling. One squad received heavy automatic fire and was pinned down in vicinity YD 089654-081654. One platoon and unengaged squad moved to aid. Company Commander moved unit to assist with four squads as all units were engaged in heavy fire fight. Link up was made and continuous artillery was delivered on the enemy with outstanding results. Estimated 200 to 250 NVA were in the area.

In sweeping the area, Foxtrot discovered 73 enemy KIA 30 probables. Bodies were in fresh graves with one or two bodies in them. Twenty-four rounds of 61mm mortars, three 82mm mortars, one AK-47 were also found. Foxtrot had one 60mm mortar destroyed, one FRC 25 radio, one KIA, 21 WIA evac, 20 nonevac.

(53) 0°1850H. Possible NVA jaming of Bn TAC met interfered but did not over-ride transmission.

(54) 0821151. Received Frag Order from 3rd Marines.

(55) 082140H. Command Group received one enemy gremade. Returned fire with small arms and gremades. Listening post returned to perimeter.

(56) 082245H. Frag Order 56-67 issued to all units.

(57) 090805H. Company G patrol discovered old bivouac area at YD 105652 with fighting holes, 2 cooking shacks. Area was uninhabited.

(58) 090950H. Company E discovered 2 bunkers 4x6 ft at YD 096664. Bunkers reinforced and had not been used for some time.

(59) 091030H. Company F patrol discovered 15 bunkers at YD 090654.

Each bunker able to house about 15 persons. Bunkers were destroyed.

(60) 091230H. Company E patrol found a hut 25\*x30\* at YD 098674. In the inside there were two bunkers 15°x10° constructed with bamboo and mud; appeared to have been used recently.

(61) 091415H. Company F patrol during search of area vicinity YD 101655 detonated exploding device believed to be buried mine resulting in 5 VIA's.

(62) 091400H. Company H discovered the following at YD 10674: 3 packs with misc 782 gear, 4 gas masks and a exploxive device, 8 RPG rockets, 3 chicom grenades, 1 chicom claymore, demolitions equipment, Loatian money and various documents.

(63) 091804H. Received Frag Order from 3rd Marines.

(64) 091810H. Command Group received 9 rounds of high velocity RR type weapon. Returned file with artillery and fixed wing. Enemy fire was silenced. Enemy believed to be at YD 053704.

(65) 092030H. Issued Frag Order 57-67 to all units.
(66) 100825H. Company E found bunker complex of approx 25 of various sizes which were well camouflaged. Six 82mm rounds, 20 empty 82mm cans were also found and destroyed.

(67) 102020H. Frag Order received from 3rd Marines.

(68) 102210H. Issued Frag Order 58-67 to all units (69) 110800H. Tank with Echo Company exploded anti-tank mine at YD 128536. It damaged track wheels, I track, and I shock absorber.

(70) 111865H. Frag Order received from 3rd Merines. 2/3 to conduct local patrolling in new assigned area vicinity of YD 0859.

(71) 112100H. Issued Frag Order 59-67 to all units.

(72) 121030H. Patrol from Golf received 7 rounds of small arms fire. Patrol checked the area and found one ARVN test firing carbine. Fatrol withdrew from the area.

(73) 122100H。 Received Frag Order from 3rd Marines.

(74) 122130H。 Issued Frag Order 60-67 to all 2/3 units.

(75) 2/3 remained static, with local patrolling. 130700H。 ative enemy contact.

> (76)Received Frag Order 1-67 for operation HICKORY II. 131000H。

(77) Frag Order 61-67 issued to all units 2/3. 131930Н。

(78) 131930H。 FAC Team chopped from "G" to "E".

#### b. Operation HICKORY II

140700H。 2/3 jumped off on Operation HICKORY II.

(2) 141010H. Major BEARD Co 2/3 medevac to rear, relieved by Major BROUJOS.

> 141100H。 Company F secured Objective #1.

> (4) 141130H. Company H secured Objective #2.

(5) 141200H. Company H while searching Objective #2 at YD 075622 set off a anti-presonnel mime. Three M-26 frag gremades also discovered and were constructed as surprise firing devices. Company H sustained one (1) KIA and one (1) WIA.

(6) 141230H. Company E secured Objective #3.

(7) 141615H. Company E, while searching out area at Objective #3,

had one surprise firing device go off resulting in one WIA.

(8) 141550H. Company E discovered three claymore mimes and two anti-personnel mines which were wired. They were destroyed in place at YD 070635。

(9) 141500H. Received Frag Order from 3rd Marines.

(10) 141540H. Wille conducting search of Objective #3. Company E detonated anti-personnel mine which was rigged with trip wire resulting in one WIA evacuated and one WIA non evacuated at YD 070635.

(11) 141700H. While Company E was loading med evacuations in landing zone, one Chicom grenade rigged as surprise firing device was set off resulting in one KIA and 9 WIA's.

(12) 141720H. Frag Order 62-67 issued to all units.

(13) 142300H. Company E received approximately 40 rounds 82mm mortar fire from vicinity ID 083644. Returned fire with artillery and 81mm mortar with good coverage. Company suffered one WIA non medevac.

(14) 151815%. Received Frag Order from 3rd Marines.

(15) 151915H. Frag Order 63-57 issued to all units.

(16) 160600H. BLT 2/3 reconstituted. Backload to ARG shipping commenced.

#### 10. Results

#### Friendly Losses

USMC

ENLISTED

MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 164
Marine Aircraft Group 16
lst Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3:DJW:djw 003A20667 **24** July 1967

#### SECRET - NOFORN

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commander, Task Group 79.5

Subj: After Action Report, Operation BEAVER TRACK; submission of

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67

Encl: (1) Chronology of Significant Events (2) Analysis of Helicopter Operations

(3) Statistical Summary

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in reference (a), enclosures (1) through (3) are submitted.

2. This letter may be downgraded to Unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1), (2) and (3).

J. R. PLUMMER

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#### CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

## 4 July 1967

Eight CH-46's of HMM-164 were launched to move BLT 2/3 to LZ CANARY (YD 136615), in support of Operation BEAVER TRACK.

A number of administrative flights were flown to Dong Ha, Phu Bai and Camp Carroll.

Two CH-46's launched to resupply BLT 2/3, carrying a total of 9,700 pounds of cargo and 6 medevacs. One CH-46 went down at YD137616 with transmission problems.

## 5 July 1967

Numerous administrative flights launched to Dong Ha, YD 136616, Phu Bai and Danang in support of HMM-164 and the SLF.

Four CH-46's were launched on a resupply mission for BLT 2/3, carrying 30,700 pounds of cargo and 12 medical evacuations.

## 6 July 1967

Two CH-46's were launched on numerous medical evacuation missiocarrying a total of 50 medevacs, of which 30 were emergency. On one occasion the medevac aircraft were mortared in the zone at YD 103670.

Numerous resupply missions were flown, carrying a total of 33,900 pounds of cargo.

## 7 July 1967

Two CH-46's were launched to Danang on administrative flights and inter-ship transfers. One aircraft was used as Command and Control aircraft.

Four aircraft launched on a resupply mission in support of BLT 2/3, carrying a total of 27,380 pounds of cargo and 30 medevac Two of the resupply aircraft were diverted to take 10 medevacs to the hospital ship Sanctuary.

#### 8 July 1967

Four CH-46's launched to Dong Ha for medevac and resupply and resupply missions in support of Operation BEAVER TRACK.

Enclosure (1)
SECRET - NOFORN

One aircraft was hit by small arms fire while waving off at YD 096654 to evade mortar fire in the zone.

Two aircraft were used to move 43,500 pounds of cargo between LPD-5 and LPH-10. Other cargo carried totaled 28,250 pounds, also, 84 medevacs were carried.

## 9 July 1967

Numerous resupply missions were flown in the Dong Ha area, in support of BLT 2/3. Also flown were medical evacuation missions. A total of 38,600 pounds of cargo was carried, along with 10 medevacs.

Numerous administrative flights were flown.

## 10 July 1967

Four CH-46's were launched to Dong Ha for resupply missions and medical evacuations.

Four aircraft were used on inter-ship and Danang administrative flights. A total of 24,490 pounds of cargo and 11 medevacs were carried, six medevacs being emergency cases.

## 11 July 1967

Three CH-46's were launched on administrative flights to Dong Ha, Quang Tri, Phu Bai and Danang.

Four CH-46's were launched to shuttle ammunition between LST-1147 and LPH-10. A total of 93,480 pounds of cargo was carri

Four CH-46's were launched to Dong Ha for resupply and medevamissions, carrying a total of 37,046 pounds of cargo and 2 medeva

#### 12 July 1967

Two CH-46's were launched to Dong Ha for water can pick-up. A total of 500 pounds of cargo was carried.

At 1200 HMM-164 was relieved of SLF "B" responsibilities by HMM-265 and went ashore at Phu Bai.

Casualties: NONE

## Intelligence/Counter Intelligence

A/C Fired	On Inc	idents	A/C Hit	Hits	Sorties	Hours
1 .		1	1	3	1,129	360.8
Ratio of					* the	3:1.0 1:376.3
Ratio of	aircraft	hit to	sorties	flown:	Batan	1:11:29
Ratio of Tetio of						1:1

Breakdown of fire incidents with respect to altitude:

<u>Incidents</u>	A/C Hit	<u>Altitude</u>
1	. 1	0-499
O	0	500 <b>-</b> 999
0	0	1000-1499
0	0	1500+

## ANALYSIS OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

#### 1. General

The operational concepts employed in Operation BEAVER TRACK were in accordance with the approved doctrine for helicopter operations.

## 2. Analysis

## a. Ship-to-Shore Movement

(1) The movement of the battalion ashore was an administrative lift. There were no significant problems encountered during the lift.

## b. Operations Ashore

(1) Resupply from the LSA at Dong Ha to the battalion was expeditious and efficient. The staging of the resupplies was adequate. Having the aircraft stage from Dong Ha, while making the aircraft unavailable for use aboard ship, was more efficient utilization of aircraft.

## 3. Problems Encountered

No significant problems of an operational nature were encountered. Lack of spare parts continued to derogate aircraft availability.

## 4. Conclusions

a. The concept of staging the resupplies from an LSA ashor is sound and desirable.

b. The spare parts problem requires more attention in order to maintain a higher level of aircraft availability.

Enclosure (2) SECRET - NOFOKN

## STATISTICAL SUMMERY

## OFERATION BEAVER TRACK

## 4 JULY - 12 JULY 1967

DATE	SORTIES	PASSENGERS	CARGO*	<u>MEDEVACS</u>	FLIGHT HOURS
4 July 5 July 6 July 7 July 8 July 9 July 10 July 11 July 12 July	199 106 148 116 159 120 108 161	864 130 180 144 246 151 140 92 34	4.8 15.4 16.9 13.7 35.9 21.2 12.2 68.2 0.6	9 12 50 30 84 23 11 2	61.6 41.6 42.7 37.1 42.4 41.7 40.2 43.0 10.5
TOTAL	1,129	1989	188.9	221	360.8

<sup>\*</sup> Denotes Short Tons

Enclosure (3)
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#### SECRET-NOFORN

## COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT, OPERATION BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO/HICKORY II

Map: Vietnam, AMS Series L-7014, 1:50,000, Sheets 6342 I and 6442 IV.

## 1. GENERAL.

- a. Operation BEAVER TRACK was conducted by the Amphibious Ready Group/ Special Landing Force north of the Cam Lo river in Quang Tri Province, I Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam.
- b. The operation, held in conjunction with, and in support of 3d Marine Division Operations BUFFALO and HICKORY II, commenced on 4 July 1967 with an administrative heloborne move into landing zone CANARY (YD 143614). The operation was terminated at 0920H on 17 July 1967.

## 2. TASK ORGANIZATION

Special Landing Force	Colonel H. D. WORTMAN (4-6 July)
BLT 2/3	Colonel J. G. DIONISOPOULOS (7-17 July) Major W. O. BEARD (4-12 July)
, -	Major J. R. BROUJOS (13-16 July)
HMM_164	LtCol E. W. HERICH (17 July) LtCol R. D. MCKITRICK (4-12 July)
HMM-265	LtCol W. R. BEELER (12-17 July)

#### 3. INTELLIGENCE

## a. Enemy Situation and Capabilities Prior to Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO/HICKORY II

- (1) Enemy Situation. Enemy ground forces in the objective area had been reported as the 31st NVA Regiment and 32nd NVA Regiment, 341st NVA Division; 90th NVA Regiment and 803rd NVA Regiment, 324B NVA Division; 29th NVA Regiment, 325 NVA Division; and the 270th NVA Regiment (possibly the 32nd NVA Regiment, 341st Division).
- (2) Enemy Capabilities. With forces enumerated above, the enemy possessed the following capabilities:
- (a) Attack installations, isolated units and outposts with elements of two reinforced divisions (341st and 324B Divisions) and two Regiments (29th and the 270th).
- (b) Defend in positions occupied at the time with forces locally available.
- (c) Reinforce with forces in and just north of the central and eastern portion of the DMZ.

1

Enclosure (1)





- (d) Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks, ambushes, terrorism and sabotage.
  - (e) Use mines and surprise firing devices.
  - (f) Employ SAM's and SSM's from NVN and/or border areas.
  - (g) Employ limited air strikes from NVN.

## b. Enemy Situation and Factors-During Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO/HICKORY II.

- (1) Enemy Situation. The enemy incorporated practically every weapon available to him in an attempt to gain a major military victory in the wicinity of the DMZ. Contacts ranged from perimeter probes to heavy combat involving a reinforced company of 200 to 250 NVA. It is believed this unit was attempting to infiltrate into the vicinity of Camp Carrol and conduct an all out assault preceded by artillery and rocket attack. Bunkers in the objective area were well constructed and strategically located providing the enemy with excellent protection from artillery and air strikes and affording him coverage of likely avenues of approach. Mines and hidden firing devices were used extensively throughout the objective area causing injury to several personnel and damage to one halicopter.
- (2) Enemy Tactics. The enemy tactics were those usually associated with a well trained regular force; attack with mortars from well concealed and varied positions followed by small arms and automatic weapons fire; harassment by sniper fire and mines against friendly units on the move and SA/AW fire while in defense.

#### c. Terrain and Weather.

- (1) Terrain. Consisted of low rolling hills with an average range from 30 to 70 meters high. Vegetation coverage ranged from knee high scrub growth to dense undergrowth with occasional trees 30 feet in height. The objective area was crisscrossed with footpaths and trails. Fordable streams posed no problem.
- (2) Weather. Generally hot and dry throughout the operation. Average maximum temperature was 92 degrees. Scattered low and middle clouds throughout the objective area. Thunderstorn clouds formed every afternoon around 1400 and provided overcast skies and low ceilings to 800 to 1000 feet. Winds averaged SW at 8-16 knots.
- 4. Mission. On D-Day at L-Hour Special Landing Force Brave conduct an administrative helo lift into Cam Lo District Quang Tri Province prepared

Enclosure (1)





for deployment in 3D Mar Div area of responsibility.

5. Concept of Operations The operation was planned as a reinforcing operation utilizing a heloborne and waterborne administrative landing. The operation was conducted by landing the SLF in designated area's prepared for deployment in the Third Marine Division area of responsibility. The operation was characterized by a high state of readiness and organization permitting instantaneous response to a request for deployment. The inherent mobility of the SLF was maximized.

## 6. Execution

- a. Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO/HICKORY II were executed in accordance with CG Third Marine Division Operation Order 39-67. 3D Marine Regiment Operation Frag Orders Buffalo 7-67. Hickory II 1-67 and CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67 implemented by Frag Order for Operation BEAVER TRACK.
- b. D-Day was established as 4 July 1967 with L-Hour 0700. By 1000 on D-Day all rifle companies and Command Group Alpha had landed in Landing Zone Canary and were preparing for deployment in accordance with 3D Marine Regiment Operation Frag Order Buffalo 7-67. Command Group Bravo remained aboard the USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) coordinating offload of remaining BLT elements. For details, see enclosures (2) through (4).

#### 7. Commander's Analysis.

#### a. Planning

- (1) On 2 July 1967 the SLF Backloaded from Operation BEACON TORCH and commenced preparations for the retation of HMM 164 and HMM 265 scheduled for 3-4 July 1967 at Phu Bai. However, CG III MAF requested that the ARG/SLF be made available for possible employment in Third Marine Division area of responsibility. (CG III MAF 021514Z July 67). Commander Seventh Fleet approved the request and directed compliance (Com 7th Flt 030730Z July 1967)
- (2) On 3 July 1967 CTG 79.5 commenced planning with Third Marine Division and formulated plans for the employment of the SLF. During the Planning phase, the following steps were accomplished.
  - (a) Maps, area analysis and enemy order of battle were procured.
- (b) Communications frequencies were assigned and coordinated, including ship-to-shore Orestes for rapid and secure transmission of tactical information.
  - (c) Procedures for casualty evacuation and reporting.
  - (d) Command relationships were finalized.

3

Enclosure (1)





- (e) Logistic support procedures were arranged.
- (f) It was determined that the SLF would maintain a liaison officer at Third Marine Regiment.

## c. Command Relationships.

- (1) Operation BEAVER TRACK was not considered an Amphibious Operation. An amphibious objective area was not established, and the control/coordination of supporting arms were not the responsibility of the CATF. The entire operation was conducted under the operational control of the in-country commander after the SLF passed the high water mark enroute to the assembly area.
- (2) Once ashore operational control of 2nd Battalion 3D Marines passed to the 3D Marines. Operational control of attached units passed to their parent unit or a like unit operating in the Dong Ha area.
- d. <u>Supporting Arms</u>. It was neither feasible nor practicable for the SLF to assume control or coordination of supporting arms as all Landing Force units were immediately chopped to in-country Commander.
- e. Communications Since Operation BEAVER TRACK was not an Amphibious Operation no requirement existed for establishing command and control nets associated with the amphibious assault. Planning for BEAVER TRACK was limited to an in-country visit for the purpose of coordinating frequencies and to obtain the frequencies of established in-country force under whose OPCON the BLT would be operating. This was the first operation with the 3D Marine Division in which frequencies were acquired from Division rather than III Marine Amphibious Force, and proved to be a successful method of coordinating frequencies. Because of distances involved from the SLF Headquarters to the Battalion, operating north of Cam Lo, the principal means of communications was the PRC-47. The Special Landing Force also provided liaison parties to Third Marine Regimental CP, to the casualty reporting facility at Dong Ha, and a team, with the SLF Air liaison Officer daily, to the LSA at Dong Ha for the control of helicopters. Operation BEAVER TRACK marked the first time that high frequency radio was used on the SLF TAC #1 net on a continuous basis. BEAVER TRACK was the first operation during which the SLF utilized in-country communications repair facilities. Electronic Maintenance Company, First FSR, provided excellent service support. KY-8 (Nestor Crypto System) operations to Third Mar Div and to the Third Marine Regiment again were used extensively, coordinating the offload and back load of the BLT, and proved invaluable in allowing instantaneous, secure coordination of assigned missions. The availability of secure votes transmissions has been a definite asset

Enclosure (1)



to the SLF. The rapidly changing situation during an operation requires constant and continuous control and coordination between the Landing Force Commander, the BLT, and in-country forces.

## f. Readiness of the SLF

- (1) The SLF, embarked on the Seventh Fleet Amphibious Ready Group Alpha shipping (the USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10), the USS OGDEN (LPD-5), the USS MONTICELLO (LPD-35) and the USS TERRELL COUNTY (LST-1157)), is prepared to fullfill amphibious contingencies which may arise within the Seventh Fleet area of operations. Continuous emphasis is placed on personnel, training, supply and equipment readiness.
- (2) The SLF readiness posture was again clearly demonstrated in the planning and execution of Operation BEAVER TRACK. Upon the completion of Operation BEACON TORCH on 2 July 1967 the ARG/SLF was preparing to proceed to Phu Bai for the rotation of HMM 164/HMM 265. The request from CG III MAF was received early 3 July 1967 and the SLF commenced landing at 0700 on 4 July 1967. This rapid response and ultimate success of the operation, although unique from past committments, has again shown the flexibility, mobility and the all-around combat capability inherent in the ARG/SLF Navy/Marine team concept.

## g. Logistics

- (1) It was determined during pranning for the BEAVER TRACK/HICKORY II operation that required resupply would be provided by the LSA located at Dong Ha. Resupply from the LSA commenced on D + 1 and continued throughout the operation.
- (2) In order to ensure rapid reaction to resupply and emergency medevacs, a minimum of two helicopters were positioned at MAG-16 adjacent to the LSA. A detachment of Shore Pary and BLT Supply representatives were positioned at the Operations Center of the LSA for coordination of resupply.
- (3) The requirements of the using units were consolidated at the Battalion CP and forwarded to the LSA by HF radio. This system minimized delay in reaction time.
- (4) The LPH was designated as the Casualty Evacuation Center. BLT 2/3 casualties were evacuated by helicopter directly to the LPH. Because of the close proximity of the Medical Receiving Station at Dong Ha, it was necessary to assign a liaison NCO there to insure onward evacuation to the LPH after initial treatment or accountability of those casualties evacuated elsewhere.

5

Enclosure (1)

8. The following comments on BLT 2/3, HMM 164 and HMM 265 After Action Reports.

## A. BLT 2/3

- (1) PARA llc(5). It is agreed that the medical evacuation procedures used during operation BEAVER TRACK did not provide BLT 2/3 the same service they normally receive. However the decision to off-load the BAS and C and C Plt was made by the CG Third Mar Div in order to provide better medical support for all units participating in the operation.
- (2) PARA 13a. Unable to comment on this particular situation since as stated it ocurred after the BLT reported to OPCON 3D Marines.
- (3) PARA 13c. CG Third Mar Div ordered the complete off-loading of BLT 2/3 equipment on the assumption that the BLT would remain ashore for a prolonged period. The backloading from Dong Ha was complicated by the need to back load two BLT's simultaneously and the lack of sufficient staging area at Dong Ha ramp. Concur that the 2/3 personnel put forth max imum effort, making the best of a poor situation.

#### B. HMM 164


(1) PARA 2b. Concur that staging aircraft at the LSA under control of the SLF Air Officer, provided the SLT with expeditious resumply. This system will be used in future operations as the tactical situation dictates.

#### C. HMM 265

(1) PARA 3a. The feint was controlled by the 3D Marines, the CH-46 were provided from SLF assets while the UH-1E's were from in-country assets. The short time frame did not provide for a joint briefing. The conclusion set forth in PARA 4a. is concurred in and will be used in all SLF controlled operations.

6

Enclosure (1)



OPS/DES/res 3480 27 July 1967

SECRET - NOFORN

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commander, Task Group 79.5

Subj: After Action Report, Operation BEAVER TRACK; submission of

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67

Encl: (1) Chronology of Significant Events

(2) Analysis of Helicopter Operations

(3) Statistical Summary

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in reference (a), enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are submitted.

2. This letter may be downgraded to Unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1), (2) and (3).

WILLIAM R. BEELER

TPP-265 38 of 52



#### CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

12 July 1967

HMM-265, under the command of ItCol. William R. BEELER, on-loaded aboard the LPH-10, relieving HMM-164 as supporting squadron to CTG 79.5. All flight operations were in the support of moving the squadron aboard from the Hue-Phu Bai Airfield.

13 July 1967

Four aircraft were launched to Dong Ha to carry out routine resupply and medical evacuation missions in support of BLT 2/3 during Phase II of Operation BEAVER TRACK. BLT 2/3 was in a blocking position near Cam Lo.

Routine administrative flights were conducted in support of the SIF and the IPH.

14 July 1967

BIT 2/3 was supported by four CH-46's on routine resupply and medical evacuations from Dong Ha.

At 0315, four CH-46's launched from IPH-10, on a simulated troop lift and feint operation from IZ Eagle to YD 045613. Enemy fire was received but no hits were taken. The flight made three simulated landings into the zone.

EP-160 sustained moderate battle damage from a land mine detonation in the Gray Rebel "E" IZ at YD 070635 during an emergency medical evacuation. Eight ground troops were wounded and one KIA resulted from the blast. These were medevaced by EP-160's wingman to LPH-10.

15 July 1967

Elements of BLT 2/3 were supported by several routine resupply and medical evacuation flights.

Routine administrative flights were launched in support of the SIF and the IPH.

EP-160 was flown from Dong Ha and returned to IPH-10 for battle damage repair.

16 July 1967

Routine resupply, medical evacuation and admininstrative flights were flown in support of BIT 2/3.

During a routine admininstative flight, EP-164 experienced an engine failure, requiring the pilot to make a precautionary landing at Quang Tri (MACV Pad) where the aircraft remained until 17 July when it was flown back to IPH-10 by a recovery crew.

17 July 1967

Squadron aircraft conducted external resupply of 90,000 pounds of ammo from IST 1157 to IPH-10.



#### ANALYSIS OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

#### 1. General

The replacement of HMM-164 by HMM-265 midway through Operation BEAVER TRACK proved timely for such a move. Since BLT 2/3 was in its mopping up stages, flight support commitments were kept to a minimum which enabled the two squadrons to replace one another within their respective commands without decreasing the overall operational readiness to either supported unit.

#### 2. Analysis

#### a. Operations Ashore

- (1) During Operation BEAVER TRACK, normal flight operations consisted of resupply, medical evacuations, troop lifts, Command and Control missions, and administrative flights to the Danang Area. Resupply missions were conducted from both the LPH and the logistic support area located at YD 242596.
- (2) The tactical air controller (airborne), necessary gunship cover and fixed-wing support during the feint operation conducted on 14 July was provided by the First Marine Aircraft Wing.
- (3) Back-loading flight operations of the SLF were normal. Two aircraft moved 45 tons of ammunition from the LST 1157 to the LPH.

#### 3. Problem Encountered

- a. Some difficulty was encountered with the supporting UH-1E gunships during a feint operations ashore. By not attending a common briefing conducted by the SIF helicopter commander, certain tactical details were left uncovered to the UH-1E pilots who had received their frag order via the communications channels.
- b. Air to ground communications with the supported ground unit proved adequate.

#### 4. Conclusion

- a. The SIF Helicopter Commander should conduct an operational brief attended by all pilots involved whether they are attached or in support of the operation for a particular day or for an extended period of time.
- b. The overall operational procedures proved adequate during the period of this report.

During the remainder of the day, routine administrative flights were flown in support of the back-loading of PIT 2/3.

Operation BEAVER TRACK terminated at 1800.

Casualties: None

Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence

A/C Fired On Incidents A/C Hit No. Hits Sorties Hours
4 1 0 0 702 248.3

Preakdown of fire incidents with respect to altitude:

Incidents

A/C Hit

O

0-499

ENCLOSURE (1) SECRET - NOFORN

Medical supplies captured

Miscellaneous 782 gear captured

USN

KIA WIA MIA DOW O O O	KIA WIA MIA 0 7 0
b. Enemy Losses	
CATAGORY	TOTAL
NVA KIA (comf) NVA KIA (prob)	148 116
Individual weapons captured	_5
Fortifications destroyed	65
Fighting holes uncovered	15
Ammunition destroyed	10 000 man
S/A	12,000 rds.
82mm	9 rds.
60mm	24 rds.
Chicom gremades	21
Demolitions	25 lbs.

11. Administrative Matters. The Administrative Plan was adequate to support all combat operations during Operations BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO and HIC-KORY II. The Serial Assignment Table was modified to support the landing of four rifle companies and a CP group into a single landing zone. No administrative problems arose throughout the operation. While combat operations were being conducted, the battalion rear dislocated from its position afloat and established a rear at the Dong Ha Combat Base. Offloading was of a general nature and approximately 95% of all organic equipment and operating stocks of the Battalion Landing Team was offloaded. Prior to the cessation of Operation HICKORY II, the Battaliom Landing Team closed its rear and again established itself aboard assigned shipping.

## Supply Techniques, Combat Loads, Ammunition and Weapons Carried by Assault Troops.

(1) As during all amphibious operations, ammunition, rations, and special equipment were staged aboard assigned shipping on D-1. These items were also issued on D-1 except for high explosives which were issued just prior to embarking helicopters. The only change from the prescribed load as stated in the Administrative Plan and the Battalion SOP for Operations was the reduction in the number of rations carried. The attachments were issued their prescribed load just prior to their movement ashore.

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15 lbs.

65 lbs.

- (2) Resupply of the battalion was conducted from the LSA located in Dong Ha. On D-Day a detachment from the shore party platoon and battalion supply was moved to the LSA to coordinate resupply. Helicopters from the direct support squadron were positioned within the Dong Ha complex to insure timely resupply and casualty evacuation in accordance with the tactical situation.
- (3' During the last three days of Operation BEAVER TRACK/BUFFALO while the battalion was in a reserve status resupply with the exception of Company E was conducted from the battalion rear. Rough riders composed of organic vehicles moved the required rations and ammunition from Dong Ha to the battalion located northwest of Cam Lo. Echo Company because of its position forward of the rest of the battalion, and its inaccessability to wheeled vehicles continued to be resupplied from the ISA by helicopter.
- (4) At the onset of Operation HICKORY II, the source of resupply was again moved back to the LSA. No problems in resupply arose from these changes of resupply sources. Additionally, special foodstuffs were obtained from assigned shipping and delivered to the field during both operations.
- (5) Battalion supply continued normal supply functions throughout this period both from assigned shipping and from the battalion rear in Dong Ha. Battalion supply again had the responsibility for the collection of 782 gear and weapons of casualties. It should be noted that throughout these operations, jungle utilities and cleaning rods were not available through the supply system.
- (6) The weapons and ammunition carried by assault troops were normal and no special weapons or munitions were used. Malfunctions of the MI6Al rifle continued to exist; however, their occurance was not as frequent as during Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN.
- b. Maintenance. Normal second echelon maintenance was conducted by the Battalion Landing Team throughout the operation. No special problems concerning maintenance were encountered.

# c. Medical Evacuation, Treatment, and Hospitalization

(1) First echelon medical care was provided by eight corpsmen in each line company and four with the command group. Attached units were provided first echelon care by their unit corpsmen. First echelon care consisted of first aid, evaluation of wounds for possible evacuation, and care of minor medical problems.

- (2) Second echelon (Collecting and Clearing Platoen and BAS Medical Officers) and third echelon care (Surgical Team) was provided aboard the USS Tripoli, LPN-10. This combined group was able to provide complete medical treatment and hospitalization in a well supplied, 2½ operating room, clean, secure, facility. Only those patients requiring the specialized care of a neurosurgeon, opthalomolocist, or maxillo-facial surgeon, had to be evacuated to the hospital ship Repose or the NSA hospital in Da Nang.
- (3) Hospitalization for up to 300 patients was provided aboard the Tripoli.
- (4) Medical evacuation was provided by helicopter squadron HMM 164 from 4 July thru 9 July. Evacuation was rapid and efficient, and no mortality or morbidity occurred during the helicopter evacuation from the field to the USS Tripoli.
- July when the BAS and C and C platoon were offloaded; elements going to Dong Ha, Phu Bai and Quang Tri. This resulted in patients having to be evacuated quite circuitously from the field to the Dong Ha BAS, then to "D" Med Collecting and clearing Platoon, and then to 3rd echelon centers of Phu Bai, NSA Hospital, or the USS Repose. The attendant disadvantages could have reduced the promptness and effectiveness of medical care if substantial casualties had occurred during this period.

# (6) Casualties were as follows:

	US	MC	•	USN	
	opp	ENL	•	<u>off</u>	ENL
KIA	0	14		0	0
DOW s	0	2 .		0	0
WIA's (evac)	8	114		0	7
WIA's (non evac)	2	71		0	0
Non Hostile (evac)	1	38		0	1

Of the non-hostile evacuations, seven causes of malaria were diagnosed, and the remainder represent sprains, heat casualties, minor infections and other non serious conditions.

- (7) No treatment of indigenous personnel was attempted, nor any MED CAP program initiated.
- d. <u>Transportation</u>. Initially, only those vehicles required to support the detachment at the LSA were offloaded; however, practically all organic vehicles were subsequently offloaded during general offloading.

All tactical moves of troops and casualty evacuation were conducted by the direct support helicopter squadron. resupply of the battalion was conducted both by organic vehicles and helicopter as stated in paragraph 11 (a) above. The Collecting and Clearing Platoon had one  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck destroyed when it hit a mine on the road between Dong Ha and Quang Tri. This vehicle is presently being held by FLSU, and the paper work to drop this vehicle from the BLT account has begun. A M-37 personnel carrier belonging to the 1st Plat, Co A, 3rd Engr Bn was damaged and will require parts for repair. The necessary parts have been ordered to accomplish repair. No other difficulties involving transportation were encountered. The 9th Motor Transport Battalion furnished support for the movement of the Battalion Landing Team during offloading and backloading.

# e. Communications

- (1) Only the operational communication channels were established within the BLT during Operation BEAVER TRACK/HICKORY II. Since the battalion was OPCON Third Marines, a station was activated on Third Marines Regimental TAC. Internally, the normal configuration of TAC and ADMIN was used.
- (2) In order to pass administrative traffic to SLF shipping, a HF/SSB net was activated with the battalion CP, a relay element, and the SLF staff all providing stations on the net. Also, a VHF/FM relay element was provided as a backup.
- (3) TACLOG was established with a station in support of the ISA. This net was also used to facilitate and coordinate backloading.
- (4) A SQUIRE switchboard was briefly installed at Dong Ha with trunks to both PERFORMANCE DELTA and LEGION.
  - (5) No radio relay was used during the period covered.


#### f. Medical Evacuation

- (1) Evacuation by helicopter squadron HMM 164 left nothing to be desired. No DOW's were as a result of delay in evacuation.
- (2) Seven cases of Malaria faliciparum were evacuated. These were contracted despite scrupulous distribution of the chloroguineprimaquine prophylaxis.
- 12. Special Equipment and Techniques. None


## 13. Commander's Analysis

- a. The coordination of supporting arms when the battalion CHOPS to a regiment ashore continues to be a serious problem and one which was not absent from the battalion's recent operations. Unnecessary delay in emergency counterbattery fires has proven costly to the battalion in the past and is a continual problem. Check fires in artillery are too frequent and are initiated usually at the division FSCC for aircraft which have not yed arrived on station. This battalion has never received a satisfactory explanation to inquiries made concerning check fires and counterbattery delays. It is the opinion of the undersigned that an oversafe policy for aircraft protection is being followed which is jeopardizing the safety of ground elements actually engaged with the enemy.
- b. Once again the battalion demonstrated its combat readiness by its ability to respond to a call to land within 48 hours. On 2 July 1967, the battalion backloaded from Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN after sixteen days ashore, and landed 0700 4 July in the vicinity of the Cam Lo artillery position in support of the 3rd Marines.
- c. The order to offload all of the battalion's equipment from ARG shipping to the Dong Ha Combat Base contributed to the loss of a number of items of personnel gear of members of this battalion. Although Shore Party elements of both 2/3 and 1/3 worked tirelessly to move equipment belonging to both battalions, there was insufficient landing craft, shore party and transportation facilities to effect the offloading and backloading expeditiously of two battalions.
- d. The continuous artillery fired in support of Company F on 8 July 1967 when they were engaged with an estimated 200-man NVA force was effective and contributed materially to the routing of the enemy unit which appeared to be trying desperately to disengage from contact. The action of the artillery forward observer team with Company F and the battery supporting this action was outstanding.

# Beaver Track / Buffalo



DECLASSIFIED



Special Landing Force Bravo Fleet Marine Force Seventh Fleet FPO San Francisco, California

> 3:WAW:dsa Ser: 0023-67 18 July 1967

SECRET-NOFORN (Downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosures)

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Seventh Fleet

Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN (U)

Encl: 4(1) SLF After Action Report, Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN

(2) BLT 2/3 After Action Report, Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN

√(3) HMM 164 After Action Report, Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN

1. Enclosure (1) contains Special Landing Froce BRAVO After Action Report for Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN. Enclosures (2) and (3) amplify enclosure (1)

UPERATION ORDER

# SECRET - NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

# AFTER ACTION REPORT

# BEACON TORCH





CTG 79.5

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# STATISTICAL SUMMARY

# OPERATION BEAVER TRACK

# 12 July - 17 July 1967

DATE	SORTIES	PASSENGERS	CARGO	MEDEVACS	FLIGHT HOURS
12 July	77	142	22.5	0	75.0
13 July	88	124	4.9	24	23.7
14 July	126	144	15.1	23	24.1
15 July	1 26	106	12.9	23	55•4
16 July	112	251	20,6	5	20.2
17 July	193	152	62.1	0	49.9
TOTAL	702	919	138.1	75	248.3

Copy 36 of \$3 copies

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# COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT - BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN

Map Reference: AMS, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6640 I, II, III & IV.

1. <u>Introduction</u>: Operation BEACON TORCH was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted in accordance with NWP 22(A), utilizing waterborne and helicopter assault forces. It was conducted 20 miles south of Da Nang in the Duy Xuyen District of Quang Nam Province and the Thang Binh and Que Son Districts of Quang Tin Province, I Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam. Inclusive dates for Operation BEACON TORCH were 18 June to 2 July 1967. The SLF participated in Operation CALHOUN, a division size operation, with the 1st Marine Division during the period 25 June to 1 July 1967.

# 2. TASK ORGANIZATION.

Special Landing Force BRAVO BLT 2/3 HMM 164 Colonel H. D. WORTMAN
Major W. O. BEARD
LtCol R. D. MC KITRICK

#### 3. INTELLIGENCE

- a. Enemy Situation and Capabilities Prior to Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN.
- (1) Enemy Situation. Enemy forces in the objective area had been identified as 1st and 3d Battalions, 3rd NVA Regiment; V.28 Local Force Company; V.29 Local Force Company and two unidentified Local Force Companies.
  - (2) Enemy Capabilities. The enemy was capable of:
    - (a) attacking with a force of up to one NVA Regiment (3rd) or
- (b) defending at a time and place of his choosing with a force of up to one NVA Regiment or;
- (c) reinforce with a force of up to one NVA Regiment (21st), two separate LF Battalions and four separate LF Companies supported by elements of an NVA Artillery Regiment.
  - b. Enemy Situation and Factors During Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHCUN.
- (1) Enemy Situation. This operation was limited to small enemy unit contact; light probes and harassing action with mortars, automatic weapons,

Enclosure (1)

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small arms and surprise firing devices. First contact with the enemy occured as the second heliborne wave landed in landing zones Wren and Cardinal. The enemy delivered several rounds of automatic weapon and small arms resulting in minor damage to the helicopters. Armed UH-IE's, on station, quickly suppressed the enemy fire and heliborne operations continued unopposed. Heaviest contact with the enemy occured on D-Day when H 2/3 engaged an estimated 100 Viet Cong. Air strikes were called resulting in 23 enemy KIA (confirmed) and 44 enemy KIA (probable). The remaining contacts with the enemy consisted of light mortar attacks, A/W and S/A fires, mines and surprise firing devices.

(2) Enemy Tactics. The enemy displayed those tactics usually associated with a well trained and organized regular force. They used the well constructed bunkers for protection from air strikes and artillery, the numerous trench systems for evasion and tunnel complexes for concealment. Sniper activity was frequent and accurate. The enemy used small unit tactics with exceptional professionalism, occasionally pressing larger forces but usually relying on the hit and run concept.

# c. Terrain and Weather.

- (1) Terrain Features. Terrain features in the TAOR consisted primarily of poorly drained flat area of rice cultivation, elevation rarely exceeding 20 meters. To the west, the elevation rose sharply and the topographs became extremely rough. The hills and mountainous areas were dissected by numerous perennial and intermittent streams.
- (2) Weather. The objective area was presently in the dry season. The temperatures ranged from 85 to 105 degrees causing a number of heat casualties as well as hampering the lift capability of helicopters. Light haze and fog were present during early morning, limiting visibility from five to seven miles but had no adverse effect on the operation. One thunder storm occured during the final days of the operation which held up resupply for one hour then passed rapidly to the south.
- 4. <u>Mission</u>. Special Landing Force BRAVO commencing at L and H-Hour on D-Day conducted a heliborne and waterborne assault landing south of the Cua Dai River; conducted search and destroy operations to the SW to vicinity Base Area 116 to destroy enemy forces, supplies and installations; and, upon completion of mission, when ordered, executed a tactical amphibious withdrawal.

## 5. Concept of Operations.

a. It was planned that the SLF would conduct search and destroy oper-

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Enclosure (1)

ations in the area south of Cua Dai River along the Axis Phuong Tri (BT 220540), Tay Thanh (BT 172503), Mong Nghe (BT 130483) to Pagoda Valley (BT 060460). Upon completion of operations vicinity Pagoda Valley, search and destroy operations would be conducted eastwardly along axis Xuan Lu(1) (BT 145441), An Thanh (2) (BT 195461), Ha Tay (BT 238481).

b. The inherent mobility of the SLF was to be exploited initially to ensure a rapid buildup of combat power ashore thus gaining maximum surprise and shock effect. Search and destroy operations were to be conducted immediately and be characterized by aggressive movement on the part of small units to locate and destroy enemy forces in zone. Maximum reliance was to be placed on use of supporting arms throughout the operation.

#### 6. Execution

- a. Operation BEACON TORCH was initiated by COMSEVENTHFLT 090814Z June67. Execution was in accordance with CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67 implemented by CTG 79.5 150103Z Jun67. Frag Order for Operation BEACON TORCH.
- b. D-Day was established as 18 June 1967 with L-Hour at 0600H and H-Hour at 0800H. L-Hour was confirmed at 0615H. Company "F" in the first helicopter wave touched down 2000 meters south of LZ CARDINAL (BT 191500) at 0621 without opposition. Deviation from plans was caused by HU-IE flight leader error in marking zone and delay in completing LZ preparation by close air support. Subsequent helicopter waves landed Companies "H" and "E" and the Battalion Command Group in LZ CARDINAL. Company "G" landed over Red Beach at 0800H without opposition. The landing force secured initial objectives and was firmly established ashore by 20 June. Control was passed ashore at 0600H on 21 June and OPCON of the SLF was passed to CG, III MAF, thence, immediately, to CG, 1st Marine Division. Search and destroy operations were conducted east of the railroad bisecting the AOA from 18-24 June. From 25 June to 1 July the SLF participated in 1st Marine Division Operation CALHOUN. Operation BEACON TORCH was terminated upon completion of the tactical withdrawal of the SLF to ARG shipping on 2 July 1967. For details, see enclosures (2) and (3).

#### 7. Commander's Analysis.

#### a. Planning

(1) On 12 June the SLF in ARG shipping returned to Vietnam from an upkeep period at Subic Bay, R.P., and began backloading BLT 2/3 at Dong Ha. At the request of CG, III MAF, planners reported to Headquarters, 1st Marine Division, Da Nang, at 0800 on 12 June to commence planning for future operations (CG III MAF 060630Z Jun67).

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- (2) Planning continued through the issuance of final orders on 16 June. During the planning phase, the following steps were accomplished.
- (a) Maps, aerial photograpy, area analysis and enemy order of battle were obtained and limited aerial reconnaissance of the AOA was conducted.
- (b) Current intelligence was obtained from 1st Marine Division, 1st Marines, and U.S. Army Sector Advisor, Hoi An.
- (c) Arrangements were made for processing and evacuation of PWs, detainees, refugees, civilian casualties and captured material.
- (d) Interrogation Translator Teams and Document Exploitation Teams were requested from III MAF.
  - (e) Logistic support procedures were arranged.
- (f) Radio frequencies were obtained and assigned and the communications plan was published.
- (g) The AOA was agreed upon and command relationships were finalized.
- (h) A naval gunfire support ship was requested and requirements for air support were determined and requested.
- (i) 1st Marine Division was requested to position one platoon of 155mm howitzers at Thang Binh (BT 170415) to reinforce fires of SLF artillery.
- (j) Additional helicopter support was requested consisting of three armed and one unarmed UH-IE, and two CH-53 for landing artillery and heavy lifts.
- (k) Arrangements were made to provide liaison with 1st Marine Division and to exchange liaison parties with District Headquarters at Hoi An.

# b. Command Relationships.

(1) Operation BEACON TORCH was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP 22(A). During the Amphibious Phase, operational control of the SLF was with CTG 76.5. Control was passed ashore and operational control of the SLF was passed to III MAF and thence.

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Enclosure (1)

immediately, to 1st Marine Division at 210600H June 1967 (CG, III MAF 210146Z Jun67). Operational control was passed directly back to CTG 76.5 from 1st Marine Division at 012400H Jul (CG, 1stMarDiv Jul67).

- (2) At various times during the operation the SLF provided liaison officers to 1st Marine Division, 1st Marines, 5th Marines, and to District Headquarters, Hoi An.
- c. Supporting Arms. Supporting arms were available to the SLF in unusual quantities during BEACON TORCH.

# (1) Air.

- (a) Fixed wing air support was readily available and was utilized when required. After initial neutralization of landing zone CARDINAL, fixed wing close air support was on station until L + 180. Aircraft on strip alert could be obtained within 30 minutes thereafter.
- (b) Four armed UH-IE helicopters were assigned to the SLF and based aboard the LPH. This enabled the provision of escort to all CH-46 flights as well as on call support to troop units on the ground. The UH-IE crews controlled fixed wing air strikes in addition to providing support with onboard ordinance.
- (c) Aircraft for aerial observation was limited to a period of about 5 hours on D-Day when a armed UHIE was employed. Since ground observation was severely limited in the majority of the area of operation, the lack of air observation was a limiting factor in the employment of artillery and naval gunfire.

# (2) Artillery.

- (a) Artillery attached to the SLF consists of one 105mm howitzer battery. To provide additional artillery support to BEACON TORCH 1st Marine Division was requested to position a 155mm howitzer platoon at Thang Binh (BT 170415), on the southern boundary of the AOA, on D-1 to reinforce SLF artillery. Two platoons were provided. The availability of this artillery permitted forward observers to call for artillery fire immediately upon landing. Medium and heavy artillery which could reach any portion of the AOA ashore was also available from BT 108583 near Hoi An. Fires were requested from this unit on several occasions consisting primarily of H and I fires and preplanned defensive targets.
- (b) Mobility of SLF Artillery was dependent upon helicopters. The 105mm battery was initially landed in LZ CARDINIAL the afternoon of D-Day.

Enclosure (1)

One displacement was made to BT 153453 from whence the battery was backloaded to ARG shipping on 2 July. All movements were accomplished by CH-53 helicopters provided by 1st Marine Air Wing.

- (3) Naval gunfire. HMAS HOBART was scheduled to support 1st Marine Division during the period 17-20 June, In response to the request for naval gunfire support, CTG 70.8 assigned both HMAS HOBART and USS HUBBARD (DD-748) to support BEACON TORCH. After H-Hour, when it became apparent that both ships would not be required by the SLF, HMAS HOBART was released to provide general support fires for the 1st Marine Division. The USS HUBBARD (DD-748) continued to provide support until the termination of the Amphibious Phase. Naval gunfire support was not again required until the amphibious withdrawal. USS AULT (DD-698) was assigned to support the withdrawal commencing at 0700 on 2 July. However, due to a change of plans, USS AULT reported in the evening of 1 July and departed the area at 0400 on 2 July. USS PROVIDENCE (CLG-6), which was to have replaced USS AULT at 0700 on 2 July, did not arrive on station until after 0900. Because of the availability of close air support on station during the initial heavy contact with the enemy and the subsequent scarcity of suitable targets, naval gunfire received little utilization during BEACON TORCH.
- (4) Coordination. Coordination of supporting fires was conducted in accordance with current doctrine. During the amphibious phase, liaison officers were exhanged between the SLF and 1st Marine Division FSCC. When control of supporting arms was passed ashore, the SLF Fire Support Coordinator moved ashore and established himself in the BLT 2/3 FSCC. Communications were established with 1st Marine Division FSCC by radio relay direct line reinforced by a FM radio circuit. Supporting arms communication with division FSCC and all stations ashore were generally good while communication with SACC aboard ship was infrequent and very poor on FM circuits. BLT 2/3 FSCC performed all coordination procedures appropriate to an infantry battalion while the SLF FSC carried out the coordination required with higher and adjacent units. When the battalion command group moved deep inland to Pagoda Valley with the Battalion FSCC, an austere SLF FSCC was maintained in the BLT rear command post utilizing the Naval Gunfire Liaison Team to operate required communications. No problems were encountered with fire support coordination.

#### d. Communications

(1) The USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) was scheduled for installation of the new family of FM radios and KY-8's while in Subic Bay, P.R., during late

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Enclosure (1)

May - early June for upkeep. The necessity to transfer LFORM ammunition during this same period precluded the energizing of antennas to test the newly installed communications equipment prior to leaving Subic Bay.

- (2) Also, the extremely poor weather conditions during the upkeep period prevented completion of top-side location and connection of antennas. Once underway for RVN the ship's electronics technicians worked to complete the overall installation. Upon arrival in RVN, during the backload of BLT 2/3, a limited operational test of the VRC-46's was conducted, but only over very short distances and not under tactical conditions.
- (3) (a) On D-Day for Operation BEACON TORCH all of the Landing Force nets were programmed for operation utilizing ship's VRC-46 radios. It became apparent shortly after L-hour that these radios would not be reliable at the distances dictated by the tactical situation. The more critical circuits soon had to be shifted to deck mounted Marine radios.
- (b) The majority of the frequency assigned by 1st Marine Division were between 55 and 65 megacycles. Interference, presumedly from high power transmitters aboard ship, soon rendered all frequencies above 50 MC completely useless. After several attempts to locate the source of the interference, it was determined that a high frequency transmitter used by the ship to communicate with Japan was the cause of the interference. An emergency request to 1st Marine Division for additional frequencies below 50 Megacycles and a request to the ARG Staff Communication Officer to relocate the transmitter antennas for the NTX entry partially solved the problem.
- (c) A concerted effort was made to shift the landing force nets back to ship's radios, only to discover that the wiring and connection of antennas was inadequate or incomplete. In several instances antennas were cross wired or not connected at all.
- (d) Those antennas which were connected and operating were not performing as required due to improper location and poor siting. Two antennas for the VRC-46 radios were located too close to ship's stacks, thus exposing the matching units to excessive heat. One antenna was mounted behind the antenna mast aft of the super-structure, and two antennas were mounted horizontally, level with the flight deck.
- (e) Despite repeated attempts to establish reliable communications with the landing force and with 1st Marine Division using ship's VRC-46 radios, the deck-mounted Marine radios provided the only positive means of contact from ship-to-shore.

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Enclosure (1)

- (f) Only after continuous and diligent effort on the part of SLF and Naval Comm personnel to correct malfunctions and disrepencies was the SLF able to begin phasing ship's VRC=46 radios into operation on landing force circuits.
- (4) KY-8. The configuration, as installed by SRF, Subic, for radio communication using the KY-8 did not meet the requirements of the SLF. An intricate series of changes had to be performed on several patch panels to enable the radio to be used in the plain and cipher modes. The KY-8 was situated in the SLF operations office and the VRC-46 was located in a transmitter room quite a distance from the operations office. Signal loss from the long line lead from radio to trunk line to radio central to KY-8 to the remote unit was considerable and not able to maintain solid contact with distant stations. To insure communications on the covered circuit with lst Marine Division and the BLT, it became necessary to rely on the deckmounted MRC-110. Subsequently, the KY-8 was placed at the same location as the radio and was able to provide reliable secure voice transmission.

## (5) Radio Relay

- (a) Initially, the GRC=10's aboard ship were not properly calibrated and aligned and were unable to function properly. The SLF was able to obtain technical assistance from 1st Marine Division and soon was able to establish Radio Relay contact with them. The Radio Relay plan provided for a link from the SLF (afloat) to division and from the BLT (ashore) to division. One channel from the BLT would be connected directly to the SLF through division.
- (b) Again, antenna location aboard the LPH was not desirable nor was it conducive to sound, continuous communications. This fact, plus the discovery that two radio relay antennas were faulty due to internal flaws, rendered radio relay approximately 25% effective.
- (c) The unreliable radio relay performance placed an extremely heavy burden of traffic on tactical communications circuits.
  - (6) Communications Augmentation.
- (a) The SLF provided liaison officers to District Headquarters, Hoi An, 1st Marines and 5th Marines. It was necessary to request special assistance from 1st Marine Division to provide these officers with radio operators and still provide the communications required by the SLF operations office aboard the LPHs. Four radfor operators were assigned to TG 79.5 from Churbai to ensure a constant, rapid exchange of vital intel-

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Enclosure (1)

ligence among the liaison officers and the Landing Force Commander.

(b) An attempt was made to use the Canadian Multiplex unit between 1st Marine Division and TG 79.5 to alleviate the problem created by lack of VHF frequencies. This attempt met with very little success, due mainly to the requirement for two relatively clear frequencies ten megacycles apart for reliable operation.

#### e. Logistics

- (1) Prior to the commencement of the BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN Operation, liaison was established with Force Logistics Command to coordinate logistic support from in-country sources. It was agreed that logistic support for the SLF forces ashore would initially be provided from embarked supplies aboard ARG shipping, thereafter, at D Plus 4, from a LSA at Thang-Binh. Activation of the Thang-Binh LSA, however, was subsequently deferred until 1 July 1967 and as a result logistic support for the first phase of BEACON TORCH was of necessity provided entirely from supply resources aboard ARG shipping.
- (2) Commencing on 25 June, D-Day for operation CALHOUN, all classes of supply, with exception of water, emergency ammunition and BB 451 battery charger service required in support of the operation, were provided from the Dinh-Ban LSA controlled by the 1st Marine Regiment. A small Shore Party detachment was assigned by BLT 2/3 to augment LSA personnel and to process and stage resupply requirements received from the field.
- (3) Resupplies were delivered direct to units ashore by helicopters assigned to the SLF. Resupply procedures established ashore and aboard ship were adequately responsive to SLF needs. No unusual logistic problems were encountered.
- (4) The LPH was designated as the Casualty Evacuation Control Ship. BLT casualties were evacuated by helicopters directly from the field to the LPH for initial medical treatment and further evacuation when required. Responsibility for casualty reporting was exercised by SLF. There was no deviation from procedures formerly standardized as a result of previous operations.

#### f. Civic affairs.

(1) Provisions were made to evacuate all refugees to Hoi An regardless of the province from which they originated. There they would be further placed, as appropriate, by GVN representatives.

Enclosure (1)

- (2) On 21 June BLT 2/3 established its command post vicinity BT 116473, an area containing a large number of civilians. A MEDCAP program was commenced on 23 June and continued daily until leaving the area on 27 June. During this period medical care was provided to 261 Vietnamese and dental care to 10 Vietnamese. Six civilians were evacuated to USS TRIPOLI for medical treatment.
- 9. Readiness of the SLF SLF BRAVO, embarked in ARG BRAVO shipping (USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10), USS OGDEN (LPD-5), USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35) and USS TOM GREEN COUNTY (LST-1159)) is prepared to respond to contingencies which may arise anywhere within the Seventh Fleet Area of Operations. Continuous emphasis is placed on personnel, training, supply and equipment readiness. The success of Operation BEACON TORCH reflected the continued readiness of the SLF
- 10. The following comments on BLT 2/3 and HMM 164 After Action Reports are included.

# A. BLT 2/3

- (1) PARA 13A. The landing of the initial helicopterborne assault is covered in paragraph 6.b of this report.
- (2) PARA 13B. Concur that the delay in the movement of B/1/12 could have had a disastrous effect on the operation. However the Ch-53 is not permitted to enter a Landing Zone that is under fire. The Zone in question was under fire during this period. The withdrawal of B/1/12 was made with CH-53's from a secure Zone and no problem were encountered.
- (3) PARA 13C. Concur that the enemy controlled the beach area prior to the landing and that there were enemy in the area during the withdrawal, However when an area is swept clear of enemy but the tactical situation does not permit permanent occupancy, it is highly probable the enemy will filter back in.

#### B. HMM 164

- (1) PARA 3A. The excess flying requirements placed on the UH-lE Pilots is done only as an operational necessity. Concur with the solution set forth Paragraph 4b.
- (2) FARA 3B. The CH-53 A/C were not attached to the SLF but were requested from CG First MAW on a as needed basis. The attachment

Enclosure (1)

# **DECLASSIFIED**

SECRET-NOFORN

of the UH-1E Detachment to the embarked Helicopter squadron is the normal procedure used by the SLF. The Phrase "operated independently of the embarked squadron" is misleading. The only departure from normal procedure was the UHIE pilots were briefed by the SLF operations duty officers. This was necessitated by the short time frame on most missions during the early stages of the operations.

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Enclosure (1)





HEADQUARTERS
Battolion Landing Team 2/3
FPO, San Francisco 96602

00270-67

20 60

03/JJ0/pgr 3000 3 July 1967 Ser No. 0028-67

#### SECRET

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commander, Special Landing Force Bravo

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation Beacon Torch/Calhoun)

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, AMS 1:50,000 L7014, Sheets 6640 I, 6640 II, 6640 IV.

(b) CTG 79.5 Frag Order (Operation Beacon Torch).

(c) CTG 79.5 Frag Order (Operation Calhoun).

Encl: √(1) Overlay of Operation Beacon Torch/Calhoun.

- 1. Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN
- 2. Dates of Operation:
  - a. BEACON TORCH 180600H 021300H July 1967
  - b. CALHOUN 250600H June 011200H July 1967
- 3. Location. Operation Beacon Torch/Calhoun was conducted in Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province, and Thong Binh and Que Son Districts, Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam.
- 4. Task Organization:

BLT 2/3 H & S Co (=) (Rein)

(Rein) Major BEARD

Det, Hq Bn, 3rd Mar Div Det, Hq Co, 3rd Mar

Det, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Dat, 15th Dantal Co

2nd Clearing Plat (Rein), Co B, 3rd Med Bn

lst Plat (-) (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn

lst Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3rd MT Bn

1st Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

Det, (-) LSU, For Log Cmd





Capt BOGARD Co E (Roin) Co E Dat, H & S Co 1st Soc, 81mm Mort Plat Det, Med Plat Dot, Intel Soc Dot, B Btry (Roin), 1st Bn 12th Mar Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn Dat, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn Capt VAUGHAN Co F (Roin) Co F Dat, H & S Co 2nd Soc, 81mm Mort Plat Dot, Mod Plat Det, Intel Sec FAC Im Dot, B Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar Det, 1st Plat (Roin), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn Dot, lst Plat (Roin), Co C, 3rd SP Bn Capt SHEEHAN Co G (Roin) Co G Dot, H&S Co 3rd Soc, 81mm Mort Plat NGF Spot Tm Dot, Med Plat Det, Intol Soc Dot "A" (-) BJU-1 Dot, B Btry (Roin), 1st Bn, 12th Mar Det, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn Capt CULVER Co H (Rein) Co H Dot, H & S Co 4th Sec, 81mm Mort Plat Det, Mod Plat Dot, Intel Sec Dat, MAM (\_) BJU\_l Dot, B Btry (Roin), 1st Bn, 12th Mar Dot, 1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn Dot, 1st Plat (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn 2nd Lt. ELMS 106mm RR Plat Capt FILE "B" Btry (\_) (Roin), 1st Ed, 12th Mar





Provisional Company
Det, (-), LSU, For Log Cmd
lst Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3rd MT Bn
lst Plat (-) (Rein), Co C, 3rd SP Bn

1st Lt HUGHES

3rd Plat (Roin), Co B, 1st AMTRAC Bn 3rd Plat, Co B Dot, H & S Co, 1st AMTRAC Bn

2nd Lt RUSH

2nd Plat (Roin), Co A, 3rd At Bn 2nd Plat, Co A Dot, H & S Co, 3rd AT Bn

2nd Lt LAWLER

3rd Plat, Co B, 3rd Recon Bn

1st Lt CARRIGAN

2nd Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Tank Bn 2nd Plat, Co A Dot, H & S Co, 3rd Tank Bn 2nd Lt O'NIEL

# 5. Supporting Forces

a. Air, artillery and Naval gunfire, were the supporting forces available to the BLT. Naval gunfire was not utilized due to the availability of air or artillery when support was required. The effectiveness of air and artillery support is discussed below.


b. Tanks were utilized during the first three days of the operation, where their effectiveness appeared to be as much psychological as actual thus limiting their use due to a lack of appropriate targets. As the BLT moved farther inland, the tanks were back loaded to amphibious shipping as the tanks were not capable of crossing the Troung Giang River.

c. Each rifle company was provided close combat engineer support for the destruction of enemy fortifications. The attachment of this support, at rifle company level, proved to be the most effective method of employment, allowing immediate and effective destruction of enemy fortifications as the battalion moved through areas where search and destroy missions were conducted.

#### d. Air Supports

(1) Fixed wing and UH-lE's provided by the 1st MAW, were used for preplanned and immediate missions, especially during the initial portion of the operation as targets were discovered. Particularly noteworthy is the excellent close air support provided by the UH-lE's.





- (2) Logistical support, MEDEVAC, troop landing and tactical troop movement support were furnished by CH-46's from HMM 164 while CH-53's from lst MAW provided movement for the Artillery Battery. Logistical support was satisfactory, although at times, delay in response to early morning logistical requirements caused delay in tactical movement. The two troop movements conducted by CH-46's were deficient in that landing zones actually utilized were not those requested and approved, resulting in a loss of tactical mobility. The delay in completing the displacement of Battery Bb by CH-53's was also unacceptable and could have adversely affected the tactical situation. The response to MEDEVAC requests, especially from units on the move was immediate and very satisfactory.
- e. Artillery. Artillery support was available and utilized by the battalion during this operation. Support was received from 2d Battalion, 12th Marines and all missions were either preplanned or immediate. The preplanned missions consisted of H & I fires and night defensive registrations around plateon and company patrol bases and other likely avenues of enemy approach. Immediate missions were requested on suspected enemy positions and ambush sites during daylight patrolling activities. A total of 815 rounds of 105mm fire was delivered in support of the battalion.

# 6. Intelligence

- a. Enomy Situation, Strength and Capabilities Prior to Operation  $\tt BEACON\ TROCH.$
- (1) Enomy Situation. The area of operation was a forward logistics base and possible training area for support of operations in the river delta and coastal plains.
  - (2) Enomy Strongth:
    - (a) 1st Bn, 3rd NVA Regiment Strength: 200 Location: BT 013385
    - (b) 3rd Bn, 3rd NVA Rogiment Strength: 200 Location: BT 087373





- (c) 3rd NVA Rogiment (Headquarters) Strength: 210 Location: BT 080260
- (d) V-28 Local Forco Company Strongth: 100 Location: BT 160470
- (e) V-29 Local Force Company Strongth: 100 Location: BT 190530
- (f) Unidontified NVA Battalion Strength: 400 Location: BT 190530
- (g) Unidentified Local Force Company Strength: 100 Location: BT 220520
- (h) District Local Guorrilla Forces

District Strength
Quo Son 702
Duy Xuyon 852

- (i) The enemy was equipped with 120mm mortars, 82mm mortars, 81mm mortars, 60mm mortars, 57mm RR, 14.7 AA/MG, automatic weapons and small arms.
  - (3) Enomy Capabilities. The enemy had the capability to:
    - (a) Attack with a force of up to one NVA Regiment.
    - (b) Dofond with a force of up to one NVA Regiment.
    - (c) Roinforce in cornection with (a) or (b) above.
- (d) Evade direct contact and resort to spoiling attacks, ambushes, and harassment with mines and surprise firing devices.
  - b. Enemy Strength and Situation During Operation BEACON TORCH.
- (1) 18 June 1967. The helicopter landing of companies H and F in the vicinity of coordinates BT 214173 was unopposed, although three of the assault helicopters did receive semi-automatic fire from the vicinity of coordinates BT 217497. The waterborne assault at coordinates BT 230518 by Company G was unopposed. At 0935H, Company H received semi-automatic fire and two 60mm rounds. The main enemy force encountered in the vicinity of coordinates BT 211504 consisted of an estimated 100 men





wearing light green uniforms. This force, believed to be a main force company, choose to defend from approximately 1540H until being driven from its position late in the evening. Contact was then broken by the enemy unit. Semi-automatic fire and sniper fire was received during the day at coordinates BT 194495 and BT 206493. On the evening of 18 June 1967, the Battalion CP received two hand grenados at coordinates BT 202482. Enemy casualties for 18 June 1967 were 31 KIA (confirmed), 50 KIA (probable) and 2 VCS.

- (2) 19 June 1967. 19 June 1967 was characterized by sniper and semi-automatic fire. Fire was received from the vicinity of coordinates BT 211517 and BT 166519. One VCS carrying 3 green uniforms was captured at coordinates BT 172528 while signaling to three VC. Two thousand 1bs. of rice was discovered and destroyed at coordinates BT 172528. Enemy losses for 19 June 1967 were 1 KIA (probable), 1 VCS, 3 uniforms and 2,000 pounds of rice.
- (3) 20 June 1967. 20 June 1967, was similar to 19 June, in that the enemy employed semi-automatic fire and sniper fire to harass friendly troop activity from approximately 0700H to 1900H. Fire was received from vicinity of coordinates BT 162497, BT 195487, BT 170528, BT 214557, BT 169528 and BT 202482. Eight bunkers and 7 rounds of 57mm receilless rifle ammunition were discovered and destroyed at vicinity coordinates BT 214557. One VCS was apprehended at coordinates BT 167522 and two more VCS at coordinates BT 139488. Enemy losses for 20 June 1967 were 4 KIA (confirmed), 3 VCS, 8 bunkers and 7 rounds of 57mm receilless rifle ammunition.
- (4) 21 June 1967. Light enemy contact characterized the majority of 21 June 1967, with sniper fire and automatic weapons fire received from coordinates BT 202482, BT 145502 and BT 203448. On the evening of 21 June 1967, Company G was taken under fire by 20 NVA soldiers dressed in light green uniforms at coordinates BT 090478. Upon receiving fire from Company G, the enemy broke contact and moved west. Bicycle tracks on a 50 yard front with deep wheel impressions were discovered on an axis from coordinates BT 090478 to BT 093486 to BT 090488 to BT 091496. Enemy losses for 21 June 1967 were 2 KTA (confirmed), and 2 KTA (probable).
- (5) 22 June 1967. Shiper and semi-automatic weapons fire from coordinates BT 096480, BT 202488, BT 098473 and BT 116404 constituted enemy contact on 22 June 1967. One VCS was apprehended at coordinates BT 112482. Company G encountered a M=15 anti-personnel mine at coordinates BT 083490. Company E discovered 100 unexploded "Butterfly" bomblets at coordinates BT 080507. Enemy losses for 22 June 1967 were 1 VCS.





- (6) 23 June 1967. On 23 June 1967, contact was limited to semiautomatic weapons fire from coordinates BT 068447 and BT 063484. An exploding device and an anti-personnel mine were found and destroyed at coordinates BT 078496 and two more mines were discovered and destroyed at BT 092452. One VCS was apprehended at coordinates BT 119477 and three more from BT 142462. Three hundred pounds of rice were discovered and evacuated from coordinates BT 075478 and 1,500 additional pounds from BT 081482. Company E found Butterfly bomblets at coordinates BT 119487. Enemy losses for 23 June 1967 were 4 VCS and 1,800 pounds of rice.
- (7) 24 June 1967. Contact with the enemy on this day consisted of semi-automatic fire received at coordinates BT 157456 and contact with an estimated 20 VC at coordinates BT 089470. Company G reported 8 KIA (confirmed) as a result of an air strike at coordinates BT 089470. The following fortifications/positions were destroyed: Mortar position and trench line at coordinates BT 131454; three fresh fighting holes at coordinates BT 122460 and a tunnel complex at coordinates BT 089470. One VC was captured at coordinates BT 089470. Equipment and supplies captured on 24 June 1967 included: 6,000 pounds of rice, 4,000 pounds of potatoes, eating utensils for 200 men and a seabag of documents and medical supplies at coordinates BT 081481; a uniform, civilian clothes, a gas mask, eating utensils and a bicycle at coordinates BT 089470; and fifteen sand bags of sugar, 300 pounds of charcol, a small amount of medical supplies and 6,460 pounds of rice at coordinates BT 089470. In addition to these supplies and equipment, enemy losses for 24 June 1967 were 8 KIA (confirmed) and 1 VC captured.
- c. Enemy Situation, Strength and Capabilities-Prior to Operation CALHOUN:
- (1) Enemy Situation. The area of operation was a forward logistics base and possible training area for support of operations in the river delta and coastal plains.
- (2) Enemy Strength. No known enemy units were reported in the Area of Operations.
  - (3) Enemy Capabilities. The enemy has the capability to:
- (a) Avoid contact and harass friendly units with sniper fire and surprise firing devices.
  - (b) Reinforce the area of operations.
- (c) In connection with (b) above, to attack or defend locally if offered an advantageous tactical situation.





# d. Enemy Strength and Situation-During Operation CALHOUN.

- (1) 25 June 1967. One incident of sniper fire at coordinates BT 157456 constituted enemy contact on 25 June 1967. Three VCS were apprehended at coordinates ET 075465 and another at BT 084446. Four bear traps, 500 pounds of rice and 100 pounds of tapicca were discovered at coordinates BT 055448, and 4,000 pounds of rice and six bear traps at BT 055447. A VC, tentatively identified as chief of training and operations cadre on the province level was shot and killed at coordinates BT 055447. Records and supplies were recovered. In addition to the supplies listed above enemy losses for 25 June 1967 were 4 VCS, and 1 KIA (confirmed).
- (2) 26 June 1967. Contact with the enemy on 26 June 1967, was limited to firing on 3 VC at coordinates BT 044434, resulting in 1 KIA (confirmed), and the recovery of 1 rifle and 1 pair of shoes. One tunnel was discovered and destroyed at coordinates BT 061461, and caves at coordinates BT 068467 and BT 053412. A total of 27,800 pounds of rice and 250 pounds of sugar were discovered and evacuated from coordinates BT 062455. BT 052447, BT 066464 and BT 052445. In addition to the supplies and equipment listed above, enemy losses for 26 June 1967 were one KIA (confirmed).
- (3) 27 June 1967. On 27 June 1967, one VCS was apprehended at coordinates BT 159450 and two more VCS at BT 156449. An exploding device with markings "Bomb, fuse, FMN 7 A/H", was found and destroyed at coordinates BT 122473. A cigarette lighter with "403" on the front was discovered at coordinates BT 156449. In addition to the 3 VCS, enemy losses for 27 June 1967 included 10,000 pounds of rice discovered and evacuated from coordinates BT 059441.
- (4) 28 June 1967. There was negative enemy contact on 28 June 1967. Bunkers were discovered and destroyed at coordinates BT 091444 and BT 097441. One VCS was detained at coordinates BT 166448. Enemy losses for 28 June 1967 were one VCS.
- (5) 29 June 1967. Enemy contact on 29 June 1967, was limited to sniper fire at coordinates BT 162460 and 3 VC engaged at coordinates BT 135429. Two civilians reported 50 enemy at coordinates BT 113427 at 0800H moving rapidly in a southwesterly alrection. They were dressed in black pajamas, carried packs and were armed with carbines and rifles. Due to a difference in accent, 25 of the enemy were believed to be NVA. One VCS was apprehended at coordinates BT 127476. Enemy losses for 29 June 1967 were two KIA (confirmed), 1 KIA (probable), two VCS and eight are cks of rice.





- (6) 30 June 1967. On 30 June 1967, semi-automatic rifle fire was received from coordinates BT 192454, BT 207464, and BT 217465. Friendly fire into these three areas resulted in enemy losses for 30 June 1967, of 5 KIA (confirmed), 3 KIA (probablo), as well as a Chicom granado, one AK-47, one carbine and Discernaneous NVA 782 gear recovered at coordinates BT 192454.
- (7) 1 July 1967. Enemy contact on 1 July 1967 was limited to semi-automatic fire received from the vicinity of coordinates BT 239448. Ten punji pits and spider holes were discovered and destroyed at coordinates BT 241482. One of the punji pits was rigged with a Chicom grenade. Enemy losses for 1 July 1967 were two VCS apprehended at BT 235485.
- (8) 2 July 1967. Early on the morning of 2 July 1967, the enemy probed friendly lines with automatic and semi-automatic weapons fire at coordinates BT 244478. At first light, one MAS-36 rifle, an ammunition belt, a pouch and three medical vials were discovered at coordinates BT 242481 and two Chicom grenades and an M-26 grenade at coordinates BT 244476. In addition to this equipment, enemy losses on 2 July 1967 were three KIA (confirmed), and three KIA (probable). Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN terminated at 021300H July 1967.
- e. <u>Summary of Significant Enomy Activities</u>. There were no significant enemy activities during Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN. However two points are worthy of comment.
- (1) The Viet Cong appeared to completely control the civilians in the area of operations east of the Truong Giang River. Indoctrination and enemy propaganda seemed extensive, civilians/VCS were generally uncooperative, and the civilians in most case flatly refused to be evacuated to RVN areas, even though they were exposed to artillery fire and air strikes.
- (2) In the area known as "Pageda Valley", the Viet Cong made no visible attempt to defend rice caches or to evacuate the 31 tons of rice captured in this area. This situation is attributed equally to two reasons: (a) The enemy did not expect the operation to extend the length of "Pageda Valley"; and (b), once friendly forces reached into the valley in force, defense of the area until the rice caches could be evacuated was no longer tactically advisable or advantageous since the cache would still have been lost as well as casualties in its defense.





#### 7. Mission

- a. Operation BEACON TORCH. On D-Day at L-H hour BLT 2/3 lands in designated Landing Zone/Beach areas to secure Landing Force Objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4; conducts search and destroy operations in assigned sector with maximum effort to prevent the enemy from infiltration/exfiltration from area; designates one rifle company as Landing Force reserve, prepared to land by helicopter or surface; provides platoon size sparrow hawk force from reserve company.
- Operation CALHOUN. BLT 2/3 on order conducts Search and Destroy operations in assigned Area of Operation, and be prepared to execute a tactical withdrawal.

# 8. Concept of Operations

# a. Operation BEACON TORCH

(1) BLT 2/3 conducted a helicopter/waterborne assault into an assigned landing/boach area to secure Landing Force Objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4. Two rifle companies with a command group landed by helicopter, secured the zone, moved to secure Landing Force Objectives 1 and 2 and conducted clearing operations in the center of the assigned ZOA north to the Cua Dai River. One company with tank support landed over red beach and moved north to secure Landing Force Objective 4. Either assault force would be directed to seize Landing Force Objective 3. The artillery battery, provisional company, a second command group, and reserve company would be landed by helicopter on order of the Battalien Commander, to aid in securing assigned objectives.

# b. Operation CALHOUN

(1) BLT 2/3 conducted diligent search and destroy operations to the southwest in assigned ZOA and on ordor, conducted a tactical withdrawal from the area.

#### 9. Execution

#### a. Operation BEACON TORCH

- 180630H. Assault elements, Company F landed LZ CARDINAL. (1)
- (2) 180646H. Company & secured LZ CARDINAL.
- (3) 180745H. Command Group A landed LZ CARDINAL
- (4) 180756H. Assault elements, Company H landed LZ WREN. Received small arms fire vicinity BT 217497.
- (5) 180800H. Company G, landed Red Beach.
  (6) 180845H. Company F, received information from civilians that route of march to north was mired, vicinity of BT 437212.

1.2





- (7) 180857H. 2nd Platoon (Rein), Company A, 3rd Tank Battalion landed Red Beach.
- (8) 180930H. Company H, received small arms fire and two rounds 60mm mortars vicinity of BT 468212. Called in gun ships with negative results. No casualties.
- (9) 180945H. Company H, discovered four (4) killed and four (4) wounded civilians vicinity BT 468212. Wounded civilians evacuated to HOI
- (10) 180950H. Command Group A received small arms fire vicinity BT 479207. No casualties.
  - (11) 180955H。 Company E, landed LZ WREN.
- (12) 181130H. Company E, received small arms fire from vicinity of Objective #1. Returned fire and continued in advance. No casualties.
- (13) 181135H. Company H, received small arms fire vicinity BT 495205. Estimated enemy force as platoon size, well dug in. Returned small arms fire with 60mm mortars and gun ships. No casualties.
  - (14) 181140H. Company G, moving for Objective #4.
- (15) 181210H. Company G, uncovered two (2) enemy suspects vicinity BT 538220, who were evacuated to rear area.
- (16) 181245H. Company E, engaged in fire fight with enemy size force of seven (7) vicinity BT 185500. One (1) enemy confirmed at this time. No friendly casualties.
- (17) 181255H. Company E, search of area indicated blood trails and used bandages. Three (3) enemy KIA (probable). No friendly casualties.
- (18) 181255H. Company H, observed enemy size of thirty (30) in open area vicinity BT 205500. Called in gun ships.
  - (19) 181330H. Composite Company, (GR November) landed LZ WREN.
- (20) 181330H. Company F, observed enemy size force of ten (10) in vicinity BT 195469. Called in fixed wing. Pilot reported two (2) enemy KIA (confirmed).
  - (21) 181425H. Company E, secured Objective #1.
- (22) 181515H. B Battery, 1st Battelion, 12th Marines landed LZ WREN.
- (23) 181530H. Company E, discovered fifty (50) punji traps and fighting holes vicinity of BT 177508. Destroyed obstacles and positions.
- (24) 181540H. Company H, reported one hundred (100) enemy wearing light green uniforms carrying packs and weapons vicinity of BT 211504. Engaged enemy with small arms fire, 60mm mortars and fixed wing. returned fire in Company H area. Result of air coverage 23 enemy KIA (confirmed) and 44 enemy KIA (probable).
- (25) 181555H. Command Group B landed LZ WREN.(26) 181600H. Company H, pulled back from enemy contact to call in additional air support vicinity of BT 211504. Company H suffered five (5) KIA, fourteen (14) WIA and forty three (43) Non-Battle Casualties.





(27) 181605H. Company F, moved to assist Company H vicinity of BT 211504. Swept area west of Company H with negative results.

(28) 181645H. Company G, started sweep of Objective #4, supported by gunships, resulting in three (3) enemy KLA (confirmed).

(29) 181852H. Company G, evacuated one (1) family of five (5)

to HOI AN. Family had previously identified two (2) VCS.

(30) 181815H. Command Group, GR November and Battery receiving small arms fire vicinity of LZ WREN.

(31) 181900H. Company E secured Objective #2.
(32) 181900H. Companies F and H receiving small arms fire and eight (8) rounds of 61mm mortar fire vicinity of BT 206504, and BT 206493. Company F suffered 1 KIA and 7 WIA. Company H suffered 6 WIA.

181900H. Received Frag Order #1 from CTG 79.5.

(34) 181915H. Company G, secured Objective #4. (35) 181930H. Company F, swopt area front of Company H with small arms fire, 60mm and 81mm mortars. Called in fixed wing support vicinity BT 214504. Results of swoop were two (2) enemy KIA (confirmed) and two (2) enemy KIA (probable).

(36) 182240H. Issued Frag Order #38-67.

(37) 182315H. Command Group received two (2) enemy grenades during probe of perimeter. No casualties.

(38) 190900H. Company G, upon destroying two (2) 500 pound bombs

vicinity of BT 210560, suffored one (1) WIA from bomb fragments.

(39) 190945H. Company F, received sniper and automatic fire vicinity BT 211517. Returned small arms fire, 60mm and 81mm mortar fire. Three (3) friendly WIA and one (1) enemy KIA (confirmed) and one (1) enemy KIA (probable).

(40) 191145f. Company H, vicinity of BI 203513 encountered enemy force of 15. Taken under fire by small arms. Enemy believed to have

moved in northwesterly direction. No casualties.

(41) 191150H. Detached Tanks from Company G to vicinity of Com-

panies F and H, in direct support of Company F.

(42) 191200H. Company E, received sniper fire from hut vicinity of BT 166519, returned fire with M-79. Hut destroyed and sniper silenced. One (1) onemy KIA (probable).

(43) 191300H. Beach Jumper Team detached from Company G, returned

to USS Tripoli.

(44) 191335H. Composito Company, discovered 500 pounds of rice, vicinity of BT 200478. Rico evacuated to HOI AN.

(45) 191615H. Company H, uncovered eight (8) vats of buried rice, each weighing about 250 pounds vicinity of BT 185518. Destroyed rice by burning due to being on move and unable to evacuate.

(46) 191705H. Company E, discovered woman signalling across river vicinity of BT 169521. Three (3) enemy seen and taken under small arms fire. One enemy KIA (confirmed). One (1) detained evacuated to HOI AN.





191830H. Companies F and H secured Objective #3.

191845H. Attached Tanks returned to Company G positions.

(49) 191850H. Received Frag Order #2 from CTG 79.5.

(50) 191900H. "B" Battery received sniper fire in vicinity of CP. Returned fire with small arms and sniper silenced. "B" Battery sustained two (2) WIA's.

(51) 192200H. CP receiving probes of perimeter. No casualties. (52) 192345H. Issued Frag Order #39-67.

(53) 200740H. CP receiving sniper fire. Returned fire with small arms silencing sniper. H & S Company suffered two (2) WIA.

(54) 200845H. Company E, executed river crossing

BT 163515.

(55) 200930H. Company H, jumped off from Objective ... in movement to river crossing position, vicinity of BT 169522.

(56) 200930H. Beach Jumper Toam rejoins Company G.

(57) 201000H. Company E, receiving small arms fire vicinity of Objective #6. Returned fire with 60mm mortars and small arms. No casualties。

(58) 201055H. Company E, secured Objective #6.

(59) 201200H. Composite Company patrol vicinity of BT 195487. Received small arms fire. Returned fire with small arms. One (1) enemy KIA (confirmed). Apprehended three (3) VCS detainees which were evacuated to USS Tripoli. Destroyed 15 enemy positions.

(60) 211230H. Composite Company patrol returned to CP with one (1) woman and one (1) child that had been wounded seriously. Evacuated to USS Tripoli.

- (61) 201230H. Company G, discovered eight (8) bunkers and seven (7) rounds of 57mm Recoilless Rifle ammunition, vicinity of BT 215553. Destroyed in placo.
- (62) 211250H. Issued modification to Frag Order #39-67. Company E to seize Objective #7. Company G to land in assigned LZ and seize Objective #8, then proceed onto Objective #9. Upon seizure of Objective #7, Company E be prepared to seize Objective #10.

(63) 201335H. Lead elements of Company H across river at vici-

nity BT 169522 encountered great difficulty in fording.

(64) 201400H. Company G, landed LZ Blue Jay. Upon being lifted, received small arms fire vicinity of BT 210558. Returned fire, resulting in one (1) enemy KIA (confirmed).

(65) 201500H. Companies E and G, secured Objectives #7 and #8

respectively.

(66) 201600H. Company H completed river crossing and moving to-

ward Objective #5.

(67) 201655H. Company H, received small arms fire vicinity of BT 170528. Called in artillery, firing 70 rounds 105mm. Results were six (6) enemy KIA (probable), with excellent target coverage.





(68) 201700H. Company F, arrived CP perimeter and assumed responsibility with Composite Company.

(69) 201705H. Company H, apprehended one (1) VCS vicinity of BT

166522. Evacuated to USS Tripoli.

(70) 201730H. Company G, apprehended two (2) VCS vicinity BT 139488. Evacuated to USS Tripoli.

(71) 201800H. Company H secured Objective #5.

(72) 201900H. Company H, received small arms fire vicinity BT 169528. Called in artillery gilencing enomy fire. No casualties.

(73) 201900H. H & S Company received small arms fire in the vicinity of CP. Returned small arms fire. H & S Co suffered two (2) WIA's.

202000H. Received Frag Order #3 from CTG 79.5. (74)

- (75) 202150H. Fomale CHIEN HOI truned herself in at CP peri-She was slightly wounded. meter.
- 202210H. CP perimeter received small arms fire on outer (76) edge of perimeter. Called in gun ships. No casualties.

(77) 202300H. Issued Frag Order #40-67.

(78) 210820H. Company G, secured Objective #9.

(79) 210830H. Company E, secured Objective #10. (80) 210930H. Company H, received small arms fire vicinity BT 145502. Returned fire with artillery. Company H suffered two (2) WIA's.

(81) 210930H. Company F, received sniper fire into CP perimeter. Returned fire, sniper silenced. Company F suffered (1) WIA.

(82) 211200H. Company F, squad size patrol received small arms fire vicinity of BT 200480. Roturned fire, and observed enemy in spider

traps and fighting positions. Three (3) friendly WIA's.

(83) 211700H. Company G, rocoived small arms fire from an estimated enemy force of about twenty (20) men dressed in light green uniforms. Returned small arms fire with morturs and gun ships. Results were two (2) onemy KIA (probable), and two (2) friendly WIA's.

(84) 211700H. Command Groups A and B displaced forward to join

with Company H, vicinity of BT 122473.

(85) 211750H. Roceived Frag Order #4 from CTG 79.5.

(86) 212210H. Issued Frag Order #41-67.

(87) 220730H. Company E, located one hundred (100) butterfly bomb-

lets vicinity of BT 080507. Marked and reported location.

(88) 220930H. Company H, apprehended one (1) male, age 35, vicinity of BT 112482. Detained did not have ID card, and was sent to USS

(89) 221030H. Company H, apprehended one (1) VCS vicinity of BT

112482. Detained and sent to USS Tripoli.

(90) 221145H. "B" Battery received sniper fire his position. Returned fire, resulting in enemy cease fire. "B" Battery sustained one (1) WIA.





(91) 221150H. Company G, upon clearing his position, set off one (1) land mine vicinity of BT 083488. Mine explosion caused eighteen (18) friendly WIA's.

(92) 221205H. MBW Battery and Composite Company completed lift

to new firing position, vicinity of BT 150450.

(93) 221605H. Upon lifting Company F to new LZ vicinity BT 113473, support gun ships engaged enomy force of about 15. Resulting in three (3) enemy KIA (confirmed), and ten (10) enemy KIA (probable).

(94) 221615H. Company F, completed lift to LZ located BT 113473.

(95) 221615H. Company G, engaged enemy size force of about six (6), vicinity of BT 098475. Enemy fled west. Two (2) enemy KIA (prob).

(96) 221705H. Company G, discovered seven (7) enemy bunkers vicinity of BT 098476. All were destroyed in place.

(97) 221710H. Company H, apprehended one (1) VCS which was slightly wounded in foot. Detained had no ID card and was evacuated to USS Tripoli.

(90) 221940H. Company G, while being re-supplied sniper engaged helicopter with small arms fire. Suspected enomy sniper position covered by gun ships. Results one (1) enemy KIA (probable).

(99) 222000H. EAS commenced this AM, MEDCAP program in 2/3 CP area. Results of treatments: 10 men, 10 women and 8 children. Usual ailments were infected sores and minor ailments.

(100) 222005H. Received Frag Order #5 from CTG 79.5.

(101) 222300H. Issued Frag Order #42-67.

(102) 230710H. Company E, discovered exploding device vicinity of BT 078496. Destroyed in place. No casualties.

(103) 230815H. Company H. Apprehended one (1) VCS, vicinity of

BT 119477. Evacuated detained to USS Tripoli.

- (104) 231015H. Company E, received small arms fire vicinity of BT 068477. Returned fire with small arms and mortars. Enemy fire ceased. No casualties.
- (105) 231300H. Company E, uncovered approximately 300 pounds rice, vicinity of BT 075478. Destroyed rice in place by burning.

(106) 231430H. Company E, uncovered about 1,500 pounds of buried rice, vicinity of BT 081482. Rice was bagged and evacuated to HOI AN.

- (107) 231555H. Company F, engaged four (4) VCS, one armed with carbino. Fired upon enemy with small arms, and armed VCS took off in westerly direction. Remaining three (3) VCS were apprehended and evacuated to USS Tripoli.
- (108) 231545H. Company G, discovered a tunnel complex, vicinity of BT 094453. Complex searched with negative results and was destroyed in place.
- (109) 231600H. Company F, discovered old trench line about 100 feat long, vicinity of BT 134445. Destroyed in place.





(110) 231700H. BAS MEDCAP program troatods 20 women, 9 men and 18 children, all for minor ailments.

(111) 231800H. Received Frag Order #6 from CTG 79.5. (112) 231830H. Issued Frag Order #43-67.

(113) 240730H. Company E, uncovered 7 tens of rice, 2 tens of potatoes, vicinity of BT 081481. Fice bagged and evacuated to HOI AN.

(114) 240825H. Company F, discovered one (1) mortar position with trench line. Position was newly constructed and was destroyed in place. Trench line was located vicinity of BT 13:454.

(115) 241100H. Company G, taken under fire from enemy force of about fifteen (15) located vicinity of BT 089470. Returned small arms fire with 60mm mortars and on station gun ships. Negative results. Company G sustained one (1) WIA.

(116) 241115H. Company G. Enemy was taken under fire again by gun ships while attempting to remove wounded from vicinity of BT 089470.

Enemy losses were eight (8) KIA (confirmed).

(117) 241420H. Composite Company received sniper fire vicinity of "B" Battery perimeter. Returned fire and sniper silenced. Composite Company suffered two (2) WIA s.

(118) 241605H. Company G, approhended one (1) VCS who was slightly wounded and had ono (1) grenade with him, vicinity of BT 089470. Evacu-

ated to USS Tripoli.

(119) 241800H. Company F, approhended one (1) VCS vicinity of BT 095450. Detained was evacuated to USS Tripoli.

(120) 241800H. BAS MEDCAP program troated: 10 men, 8 women and 12 children, all for minor ailments.

(121) 241800H. All units at required positions LOA.

(122) 241805H. Operational Order for CALHOUN.

(123) 241900H. Issued Frag Order 44-67.

# b. Operation CALHOUN

(1) 250600H. Operation Calhoun commenced.

(2) 250950H. Company G. apprehended three (3) VCS, vicinity of BT 075466. Evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(3) 251130H. Company F, apprehended one (1) VCS, vicinity of BT 076447, evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(4) 251300H. Company E, Located 1,000 lbs. of rice, vicinity of BT 070455. Rice bagged for evacuation to DIEN BAN.

(5) 251440H. Composite Company, received sniper fire vicinity of "B" Battery perimeter. Returned fire and sniper silenced. One (1) friendly WIA.

(6) 251445H. Company G, discovored four (4) unarmed bear traps and 500 pounds of rice, vicinity of BT 055448. Traps destroyed and rice evacuated to DIEN BAN.





(7) 251600H. Command Group A, displaced forward to Company F position.

(8) 251600H. Company G, located old trench line vicinity of BT 056445. Also discovered approximately 4,000 poulds of rice, 100 pounds tarioca, two (2) unarmed bear traps. Destroyed trench line and

traps. Food supplies were evacuated to DIEN BAN.

- (9) 251715H. Company G, discovered one (1) male and one (1) female vicinity of BT 044434, moving on trail. Both were challanged, and began too run. Company G took VCS under fire, killing male, and wounding female. Searched area, but was unable to locate female. Contents of malo's pack disclosed one (1) typewriter, one (1) M26 grenade, documents. Material sont to DIEN BAN for evaluation. One (1) VC KIA (confirmed).
  - (10) 251940H. Received Frag Order #1 for Operation CALHOUN.

(11) 252255H. Issued Frag Order #45-67. (12) 260800H. Company E, discovered tunnel complex vicinity of BT 061461. Dostroyed in place.

(13) 260830H. Company F, uncovered approximately 1,000 pounds of rice vicinity of BT 062455. Rice bagged and evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(14) 260920H. Company F, uncovered approximately 6,000 pounds of rice, vicinity of BT 052447. Rice bagged and evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(15) 260930H. Company H, displaced to "B" Battery position. (16) 260930H. Company E, uncovered approximately 600 pounds of rice, vicinity of BT 066464. Rice bagged and evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(17) 260935H. Company F, discovered 200 pounds of sugar, vici-

nity of BT 052445. Sugar was evacuated to DIEN BAN.

- (18) 261050H. Company G, observed three (3) VC vicinity of BT 044434. Took under fire, killing one (1). Other two took off in westorly direction. Search of area disclosed blood stains. Captured one (1) M-1 riflo. One (1) VC KIA (confirmed).
- (19) 261105H. Company E, discovered six (6) refugees vicinity of BT 048447. Refugees were three (3) young women, age 18 to 20 and three (3) children all without ID cards. Evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(20) 261330H. Company E, located cave, vicinity of BT 068467.

Destroyed in place.

- (21) 261730H. Company E, discovered cave, vicinity of BT 053462. Destroyed in place.

(22) 261755H. Received Frag Order #2 from CTG 79.5. (23) 262200H. Issued Frag Order #46-67. (24) 270730H. Two (2) platoons Company E displaced forward by helicopters to conduct Search and Destroy from high ground to valley at BT 030460.

(25) 270945H. Company F, discovered approximately 10,000 pounds of rice, vicinity of BT 059441. Rice baggod and evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(26) 270950H. Company H, apprehended one (1) VCS vicinity of BT 159450. Evacuated to DIEN BAN. Suspect believed to have hidden his weapon prior to being captured. Searched area but was unable to find weapon.





(27) 271000H. Command Group B, located exploding device, vicinity BT 122473. Unable to destroy, and marked in place.

(28) 271600H. Company H, apprehended two (2) VCS, vicinity of BT

156449. VCS evacuated to DIEN BAN.

(29) 271700H. Company G, reported stray cattle forward of his position. Approximately 84 head of cattle were evacuated to DIEN BAN with ARVN personnel as escorts.

Received Frag Order #3 from CTG 79.5. (30) 27180*5*H。

(31) 272236H. Issued Frag Order #47-67.
(32) 280620H. Received modification to boundary change to CTG 79.5 Frag Order #3.

Issued modifications of boundaries our Frag Order (33) 280645H.

#47-67。

(34) 281015H. Company H, captured one (1) VCS, vicinity of BT VCS evacuated to DIEN BAN. 166448。

(35) 281100H. Command Group "A" displaced to "B" Battery position.

Move completed 281220H.

(36) 281300H. Company F, located two (2) bunkers, one at vicinity of BT 091444, the other at BT 097441. Destroyed in place.

(37) 281330H. Command Group "B" communication personnel displaced

to join Command Group Aco.

(38) 281500H. Command Group "B" (-) returned to USS Tripoli.

Received Frag Order #3 from CTG 79.5. (39) 281810H。

Issued Frag Order #48-67. (40) 282020H。

- (41) 290755H. Company E, apprehended one (1) VCS male, age 25, without ID card, vicinity of BT 12848. Evacuated to DIEN BAN.
- (42) 290905H. Company E, apprehended one (1) VCS and approximately 8 crocks of rice, vicinity of BT 127446. Suspect and rice evacuated to DIEN BAN.
- (43) 291100H. Company F, two (2) civilians at BT 113427 reported about 50 VC this area. VC are armed, carrying packs and wearing black pajamas, moving in southwost direction. Called in gun ship to search surrounding area. Negative results.

(44) 291400H. Company H, received sniper fire, vicinity of BT 162462. Returned fire with small arms fire and 60mm mortars, and

searched area with negative results.

(45) 291700H. Company F, observed three (3) VCS vicinity of BT 135429. One (1) suspect armed, other two (2) carrying full rice bags. Suspects taken under fire, killing two (2) carrying rice. Other unable to locate. Two (2) VCS KIA (confirmed), one (1) VCS KIA (probable).

(46) 291810H. Received Frag Order #4 from CTG 79.5.

(47) 292030H. Issued Frag Order #49-67.

(48) 292030H. Naval Gun Firo Team chopped OPCON to Company H

from Command Group "A".





(49) 301035H. Company G, received small arms fire from vicinity of BT 192454 from enemy size force of about eight (8) VC dressed in black pajamas. Roturned fire with small arms and 60mm mortars and called in gun ships. Four (4) VC KIA (confirmed), and three (3) enomy KIA (probable). Captured one (1) AK-47, 1 carbine and miscellaneous 782 gear.

(50) 301440H. Company H, secured Objective #14.

(51) 301445H. Company F, landed LZ PIGEON. (52) 301555H. Company G, upon river crossing vicinity BT 207464, received small arms fire. Returned small arms fire and enemy fire was silonced. One (1) friendly WIA.

(53) 301600H. Company F, upon socuring LZ PIGEON taken under fire vicinity of BT 217465. Returned fire and enemy fire silenced. One (1) friendly KIA, three (3) friendly WIA and one (1) VC KIA (confirmed).

(54) 301630H. Command Group "A" helo-lifted to LZ PIGEON, joined

with Company F.

- (55) 301825H. Company F, engaged enomy in fighting positions, vicinity of BT 223460. Called in gun ships. Excellent coverage of enemy areas. Search disclosed six (6) enemy KIA (confirmed), and five (5) enemy KIA (probablo).

- (56) 301925H. Received Frag Order #5 from CTG 70.5. (57) 302115H. Issued Frag Order #50-67. (58) 010832H. Company G, lead elements on Objective #16, and sweeping objective.
- (59) 010915H. Company G, apprehended two (2) VCS on Objective #16 without ID cards. Evacuated to DIEN BAN.
  - Company H, on Objective #15. (60) 011045H。
  - (61) 011200н。 Operation CALHOUN terminated.

## c. Operation BEACON TORCH (continued)

- (1) 011200H. Composite Company completed helo-lift to assigned shipping.
- (2) 011510H. Company H, located 10 punji and spider traps, vicinity of BT 241482. Ono (1) punji trap was booby trapped with a Chicom grenade. All were destroyed in place.
- (3) 011700H. Company H, located one (1) 82mm mortar round vicinity of BT 214482. Dostroyed in place.
  - (4) 011815H. Received Frag Ordor #6 from CTG 79.5.(5) 011930H. Issued Frag Ordor #51-67.

- (6) 012015H. Company H, received small arms fire his perimeter. vicinity of BT 239488. Roturned small arms fire. Two (2) friendly WIA.
- (7) 012315H. Company H, received small arms fire his perimeter. Returned fire with gronados and 60mm mortars. Enemy fire silenced. Five (5) WIA's minor for Company H.





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#### SECRET

- (8) 020200H. Company G, received small arms fire from estimated enemy probe of six (6) men. Returned fire with small arms and mertars. Company G sustained (1) KTA and one (1) WTA.
- (9) 020600H. Company H, search of perimeter lines disclosed blood stains and tracing of bodies that had been drug away. One (1) MAS-36 rifle and ammo pouch found in search. Three (3) enemy KIA (confirmed), and three (3) enemy KIA (probable).
- (10) 020720H. Company G, search of his lines disclosed two (2) Chicom gronades, and spent 9mm brass casings. Nogative enemy casualties. (11) 020730H. "B" Battery and Company H, helo-lifted to assigned

shipping.

(12) 020820H. Company F, helo-litted to assigned shipping.

- (13) 020930H. Company E and Command Group RA holo-lifted to assigned shipping.
  - (14) 021000H. Company G, returned to shipping via LVTS. (15) 021150H. All units returned to assigned shipping.
  - (16) 021300H. Operation BEACON TORCH torminated.

## 10. Rosults

#### (a) Friendly Losses

## (1) Operation BEACON TOFICH/CALHOUN

#### USMC

OFFICERS KIA WIA 0 1	MTA O	DOW O		KIA 11	2 77 6	<u>MIA</u> 0	DOW 1
			USN				
OFFICERS KIA WIA	MIA	DOW		ENLIS KIA	WIA	MIA O	<u>DOW</u> 0

## (b) Enemy Losses

CATOGORY	BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN
NVA/VC KIA (confirmed)	86
NVA/VC KIA (probablo)	87
NVA/VC POW	4.
DETAINEES	28
WEAPONS CAPTURED/DESTROYED	4
FORTIFICATIONS DESTROYED	22





MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUIDRON 164
Marine Aircfaft Group 15
Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade
FPO San Francisco, California 96601

3:CHO:djw 3480 JUL 2 0 1967

SECRET - NOFORN

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commander, Task Group 79.5

Subj: After Action Report, Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN; submission of

Ref: CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67

Encl: (1) Chronology of Significant Events

(2) Analysis of Helicopter Operations

(3) Statistical Summary

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in reference (a), enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are submitted.

2. This letter may be downgraded to Unclassified upon the removal of enclosures (1), (2) and (3).

J. R. PLUMMER

00148-67

Cress 9 152





SECRET - NOFORN

#### CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

#### 18 June 1967

Operation BEACON TORCH began with a 12 plane strike into landing zones BT200490, BT195495, BT192502. 585 troops were helo lifted from LPH-10, LPD-5 and LSD-35 to the shore. During the day 89 battle evacuations were picked up by Hall-164 pilots and two aircraft were launched on emergency medical evacuation/resupply missions. Heavy fire was received during the initial strike and gradually tapered off as the day progressed. YT-21, YT-22, YT-8 and YT-15. YT-16 received hits during the

#### 19 June 1967

Flight activities consisted of resupply missions to elements of the Second Battalion, Third Marines ashore, with the resupply aircraft picking up medical evacuations as they flew in the resupplies. 48,050 pounds of cargo was carried into the companies as they requested them. 30 medical evacuations were taken to the LPH-10, most of which were heat casualties. Sniper fire was reported at BT166514, BT199534 and BT193502. YT-16 received a hit and crew chief was wounded (minor) at BT193502.

## 20 June 1967

An eight plane troop lift was delayed in the morning due to an aircraft accident. YT-15 had an apparent power loss and went into the water as it lifted off the LPH. Two crewmen were rescued and two were lost at sea. Later on in the day LtCol McKITRICK led a 4 plane flight to complete the troop lift. 211 troops were lifted from BT214554 to BT152492.

32,450 pounds of cargo and 20 medical evacuations were taken to the LPH-10. Sniper fire came from BT207507, BT192543, BT182540, BT199498, BT130500, and BT137503. YT-11 took one hit at BT137503, YT-22 took one hit at BT204495 and YT-20 took one hit at BT207507.

#### 21 June 1967

Continued resupply and support of Social Dattalion, Third Marines as requested. Troops were lifted from BT199489 to BT112519, from BT199489 to BT118478 and from BT199489 to BT152455. The number of troops lifted totaled 222. 18,150 pounds of cargo was carried, along with 16 medical evacuations. Aircraft received fire at BT199489. No hits were received.

Enclosure (1) SECRET - NOFORN

#### "COMMAND MESSAGE"

By
Colonel B. P. GIBSON JR.
Commanding Officer, MAG-12

Sometime during September or early October the first extended periods of IFR flight conditions, for the transitional period between the summer and winter monsoon seasons, will occur in I Corps. Typically, shifts from "5,000 scattered" to "200 feet with heavy precipitation" occur with little or no advanced warning. For many pilots the first shift in flying weather conditions will occur between takeoff and landing of a routine scheduled mission. Whether or not the mission is completed in a routinely professional manner at the home or a divert field will depend on the effectiveness of the advance preparations made at all levels of command, as well as those made by the pilot himself.

A review of last year's accidents during the North East monsoon season reveals that: seven were caused by pilots attempting to fly VFR in marginal weather; three resulted from loss of flight instruments; hydroplaning caused two. An analysis in many instances indicates that properly conceived and enforced SOP's for fuel Binges, arrested landing, routine instrument procedures and divert fields could have prevented the tragic loss of pilots and aircraft.

Let's review last year's experience during this summer's season of good flying weather and determine what potential remedial and anticipatory steps can be taken to lossen the chance of a repeat performance. First we must plan to employ evailable sir support capabilities with prudence and a special degree of economy of force not always necessary in good weather. Next, the strike weather priority system must be reviewed to insure the proper relationship between mission urgency and unit foul weather delivery capability. It can be expected that, initially, recalibration from the norms achieved by the veterans of a long hard monsoon season will be needed. We must familiarize ourselves with limitations imposed by all-weather recovery facility saturation to determine capacity in terms of equipment condition, operator availability and state of training.

At all levels of command, scheduled review and practice of bad weather techniques should be the order of the day. Pilots must sharpen up their instrument procedures and controllers should be conditioned for the pressures they will face under lowering callings and growing stacks. Scheduled days of full scale simulated instrument recoveries have helped here in the past, both to remind the pilots and the controllers of the heavy traffic problems which will occur during the North East monsoon season.

In the squadron, for the new pilot, a totally different attitude from that which is encouraged in CONUS operations must be developed regarding foul weather operations. Assigned combat priorities may dictate frequent


#### DECLASSIFIED

requirements for visual delivery of ordnance, or the extraction of a Recon Team, under ceiling and visibility conditions which are characteristically avoided as "unsafe" in training. The few veterans of last year's North East monsoon must be identified to lead the way in redeveloping the necessary broad base of operating experience which will have deteriorated due to transfers and disuse during the summer season.

From the standpoint of the Intermediate Maintenance Activity and the Group Aviation Supply Support Center it would be wise to review the usage data and maintenance support requirements for such items as flight instruments and communications/navigation gear during the past October to April period. Supply and technician support should be planned for the monsoon level rather than on a linear projection of recent good weather experience where an inoperable TACAN may be a minor inconvenience rather than a guaranteed sortic cancellation factor.

Now is the time to review bingo and divert plans. There are new airfields available which we didn't have last year, particularily in the II Corps Area. Fair weather trips to divert facilities are required for advance checkout of all facets of a tactical divert (e.g. support equipment, debriefing communications, maintenance capability, etc.)

All of these tasks and many more must receive command attention now if we are to be ready for the bad weather ahead. These suggestions presented above are certainly not sufficiently extensive to serve as a checklist. They are merely the salient recollections of a "Wetback" of the Class of 1966/1967, RVN, which are passed to you who will be the alumni of the 67/68 North East meason - good luck and happy wet landing.



FMAW ACCIDENT/HOURS STATISTICS

DECLASSIFIED

CUMULATIVE FY-67	3.21	3.64	2.95	273	2.87	2.80	2.73	2.74	2.69	2.56	2.69	2.61
CUMULATIVE FY-66	4.16	3.22	2.21	2.12	2.00	2.21	2 <b>.38</b>	2.29	2.24	2,05	2,02	1.93
NUMBER OF ACDTS FY67	8	9	3	4	7	5	5	7	6	4	11	5
NUMBER OF ACDTS FY66	6	4	1	4	3	7	7	4	5	1	3	2
HOURS FLOWN FY-67	24896	21.778	21170	20187	19816	20515	21660	24534	262Q	25571	30263	26127
HOURS FLOT W	3.44,07	16585	18558	21039	19120	22931	21673	22804	25399	21438	18607	20444
	.011.	ATIC	SEP	L OCT	NOA .	DEC	JAN	FEB.	MAR	APR	1 AY	JUN

2.61	
1.93	
74	
47	
82719	
43005	

STATESTICS

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## HOWGOZIT (FY-67)

## lstMAW

TOTAL HOURS	-	282,719
ACCIDENTS	-	74
ACCIDENT RATE	•	2.61

## **GROUPS**

UNIT	HOURS	ACCIDENTS	RATE
MAG-11	41,402	12	2.90
MAG-12	48,223	6	1.24
MAG-13	19,792	· 5	2,53
MAG-16	93°,706	37	3.95
mag-36	935 و 73	12	1,62
MWSG-17	5,661	2	<b>3.</b> 53

NOTE: The above statistics include only those hours flown and operational accidents incurred while units were attached to lstMAW.

## FY-67 ACCIDENTS BY TYPE A/C AND CAUSE FACTORS

	MATERIAL FAILUR	E/MALFUNCTION			
TYPE	ENGINE FAILURE	/ OTHER	PILOT	OTHER PERS	UNDET
UH-34	9	6	6	1	0
Сн-46	3	3 <del>**</del> *	6	0	0
UH-lE	3	C	7	0	0
CH-53	0	C.	1	0	0
0-1C	3	1.	1	0	0
C-45	0	C <sub>1</sub>	1	0	0
F-4	0	<u>j</u> į.	3	1	. 0
F-8	3	2	3	0	0
A-4	1	1	1	1	* 1
C-117	<u> </u>	1.	1	0_	0
TOTALS	22	18 **	30	3	1

<sup>\*</sup> Probable Material Failure

<sup>\*\*</sup> Includes failure of Buckeye Pressure Fuel Nozzle in one accident





FIGHTING HOLES UNCOVERED AMMUNITION CAPTURED/DESTROYED

EQUIPMENT CAPTURED RICE/FOODS DESTROYED RICE/FOODS EVACUATED MEDICAL SUPPLIES 12

7 rounds 57mm RR 15 Chicom grenades

N/A

8 Tons

32 Tons

25 Pounds

11. Administrativo Mattors. The Administrative Plan again proved adequate to support all combat operations during Operation BEACON TROCH/CAL-HOUN. The only medification was the reduction in rations prescribed to be carried by the troops as previous operations have proven that with a CH-46 squadron in direct support, resupply can rapidly be conducted, permitting the prescribed load to be lessened. The Sorial Assignment Table with change #1 was applied without change as two assault companies were landed by helicopter, one by armored amphibious tractor, and one held in reserve capable of landing by either of the above transportation modes. No administrative problems arose throughout the operation.

## a. Supply Techniques, Combat Loads, Ammunition, and Weapons Carried by Assault Troops.

- (1) As during previous operations involving amphibious techniques, ammunition, rations, and special equipment were staged aboard assigned shipping on D-1. All of these supplies with the exception of high explosives were also issued on D-1 to scheduled waves and those on-call units known to be committed on short notice. High explosives were issued on D-Day just prior to leading assigned assault transportation. The only change to the prescribed lead as stated in the Administrative Plan and the Battalion SOP for Operations was the reduction in rations carried as indicated in paragraph (11) above. No other changes were made, and the prescribed lead proved effective to support all combat operations.
- (2) Resupply was totally conducted from assigned shipping though D+7. The only resupply effected on D-day was water, which had been staged aboard the USS Tripoli in expectation of this need. It has been noted that during the first two days of combat operations from air conditioned shipping that the need for water and the frequency of heat casualties is far higher than during subsequent days ashore. All classes of materials were drawn from assigned shipping; however, as during previous operations, the majority of items was drawn from the LPH. Only items peculiar to combat support units and class IV items were drawn from the other ships. Resupply was conducted with the direct support helicopter squadron being the sole means of transportation.





- (3) On D+8, the majority of rosupply requirements was shifted from the assigned shipping to a LSA located in DIEN BAN. In order to affect this change without interruption to normal resupply, a detachment from the BLT's Shore Party unit was transferred to DIEN BAN on the day prior to commencing resupply from that source. All classes of supplies were available through the LSA. The assigned shipping continued to resupply water, class II items, and additional foodstuffs not available through the LSA. The change over was conducted smoothly, and the reliance of resupply from two sourses caused no breaks in normal resupply. Energoncy resupply was conducted from assigned shipping throughout the operation.
- (4) Battalion supply continued normal supply functions from assigned shipping. The supply section provided class II support in the field as required, and served as the main collection agency for personnel and government offects of those casualties returned to the USS Tripoli. Besides landing the disposition of the effects of KIA's and WIA's, battalion supply had the responsibility of re-arming and re-equiping those casualties returned to the field. We need combat support units were assigned the mission of providing security of the Brave Command Group, the supply section effected the issuance of weapons and accessories compatable to the mission assigned.
- (5) The weapons and ammunition carried by the assault troops were normal and no special weapons or munitions were used. Certain ordenance items became in short supply in the LFORM; however, these items were available through the LSA, and the shortages are currently being rectified from the ASP located in Danang. As during previous operations, upon firing the weapon, the individual had the rifle explode. The probable cause for this was obstructions in the bore; however, a JAG investigation is being conducted to determine the exact cause. Frequent stoppages also occurred.
- b. Maintenance. Normal second echolon maintenance was conducted by the Battalion Landing Team throughout the operation. Two M50Al tanks developed generator problems after their return to assigned shipping. One generator was drawn from the LSU spare parts block and the other obtained from the 1st Tank Battalion in Danang. Repair was accomplished by individuals from the tank plateon. In addition a horizonal tube used with gunner quadrent was obtained from Danang to effect repair to a 105mm howitzer in the field.

## c. Medical Treatment, Evacuation, and Hospitalization.

(1) First Echolon Medical care was provided by eight corpsmen in each line company, four corpsmen with the Alpha Command Group, three corpsmen with the Reave Group and by corpsmen with each of the attached units.





- (2) Second echolon care (Collecting and Clearing Company), and third echolon care (Surgical Team) was provided aboard the USS Tripoli.
- (3) Patients were evacuated by helicopters of HMM 164 directly from the field expediently and efficiently. No deaths or increased morbidity were as a result of delay in evacuation procedures.
- (4) All sick and wounded from BLT 2/3 were evacuated to the USS Tripoli LPH 10 with the exception of one head injury which was sent to the NSA Hospital at Danang for Neuro Surgical care.
  - (5) Casualties from the operation were as follows:

	US	1710		SN
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
KIA	ō	11	0	ī
WIA	1	116	0	4
DOW	0	1	0	Ó
Non-battlo	2	116	Ō	5

- (6) The non-battle casualties consisted mainly of heat exhaustions and sprains. No significant incidence of malaria, hepatitis or other infectious diseases was encountered.
- (7) A MEDCAP program was set up for six days within the Bravo Command Group. See Civic Action Section.
- d. Transportation. Only limited vehicles were off loaded during the Operation, and those were primarilly communication vehicles. CH-46 holicopters were used for all tactical moves of the troops except for the landing of one assault company by LVT. The 105mm howitzer battery was landed and displaced by CH-53 helicopters. The backload of the Battalion Landing Team (-) on D+14 was accomplished by helicopter and LVT in like manner to the assault landing.

### o. Communication

(a) Communications involved with Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN were in the ARG/SLF concept. During the initial phase of the operation, communications with shipboard elements were via VHF/FM and HF/SSB equipment. As the buildup ashere continued, and with the establishment of a command post, radio relay equipment was provided for telephone communications with higher authority. Channels were alloted to FSCC and ALO officers for Thoto communication with their respective counterparts in higher commands. In addition, a HF/SSB Tactical Air Request net was established to facilitate air requests.





- (b) The general area of operations provided poor conditions for radio communications. Generally the ground itself was dry sand, several feet in depth. Consequently, ground and counterpoise were nearly impossible to establish. PRC-47 equipment could be grounded only with the use of a ground red and wetting, and then a ground could be maintained only so long as the red remained wetted. Although equipment range remained good, frequency everyide of as much as ten MCS was experienced, even from distant stations. All stations within twenty-five meters of each other with a frequency seperation of less than six to eight MCS every in the immediate locale, but did not necessarily bether distant stations. Radio Relay equipment in one instance everyed a VHF/FM TAC circuit. Almost in every case the difficulty could be directly attributed to existing conditions.
- (c) Radio Rolay circuits wore difficult to establish and equally difficult to maintain. Radio Rolay utilization of the MRC-62 equipment ship-to-shore with either directional or emai-directional antennas has never proved satisfactory. Initially, ship-to-shore relay was attempted and once again proved to be unsatisfactory. Later, Radio Relay was established with 1st MARDIV, and, although the shot from the Battalien location to the Division Command Post was partially effective, the relay set up from shore to ship was rarely operational.
- (d) In contrast to the Radio Rolay attempt, a MRC-109 was utilized and proved most satisfactory. In a stationary location, the MRC-109 was equipped with 2 VRC-46°s, 1 KY-8, and 1 GRC-125, all on vehicular power, and all 100% effective. It was found that the KY-8 required cooling with wet tow is, but remained operational with negative card-warp.
- (c) It is obvious that the MRC-109 is a much more productive lift than the MRC-62. The MRC-109 requires only one lift and can be carried internally, whereas the van requires two external lifts. Moreover, the MRC-109 is mobile once on the ground. Most important, it is more reliable than the MRC-62, and provides a covered circuit. In the SLF concept, the advantages of a MRC-109 lift ever a MRC-62 are categorically evident.

## f. Medical Evaluation

- (1) The concept of combined 2nd and 3rd ocholon care aboard the USS Tripoli worked extremely well, and casualties were handled efficiently and rendered excellent care.
- (2) HMM 164 provided excellent evacuation of patients to the USS Tripoli.
- (3) The psychological offer of fast, officient medical care in an environment detached from combating a definite morale factor to the troopers.

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g. Civic Action. During Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN, the battalion conducted a limited MEDCAP program from 23-27 June in MONG NGHE (2) Hamlet, Que Son District, Quang Tin Province, RVN. A total of 261 patients were received (83 women, 49 elderly men, 129 children). The majority of cases treated were skin disorders that were caused mainly by the lack of personal hygiene. The children were thoroughly bathed and seap provided by USS Tripoli was distributed to families. The elderly patients were suffering mainly from generic conditions for which no treatment could be provided. Dental treatment for approximately 10 persons was also provided. This treatment consisted mainly of extractions. Six villagers were evacuated to USS Tripoli. Two women were treated for shrapnel wounds, however, the other four were suffering from ailments of long standing (cancer, genital defects) which would have required prolonged care, and thus, could not be treated extensively. The program, though limited, was successful and well received by the local populace.

## 12. Special Equipment and Techniques. Nono

#### 13. Commandor's Analysis

- a. The initial helicopterborne assault by the battalion during Operation BEACON TORCH was seriously hampered when the assault force was landed approximately 2,000 meters south of the intended area. Not only did this require that the assault force move an extra 2,000 meters in pursuance of assigned objectives but could have had serious consequences in the coordination of the helicopterborne assault with the waterborne assault. As it was, the contract which was made with an enemy force on the afternoon of the assault was lost due to the subsequent disengagement by the enemy under cover of darkness, while disengagement could have been provented, had contact been initiated earlier and the enemy force overrun prior to darkness.
- b. The delay in completing a movement by CH-53°s of Battery "B", 12th Marines, which was in direct support of the BLT did not have an adverse tactical effect since immediate artillery response was not required. However, this situation remained potentially dangerous during the three days required to complete this move. A delay of this type, had full support of the battery been required, could have had disastrous effects.
- c. Operation BEACON TORCH was a soarch and destroy operation in an area completely controlled by the enemy. Although this operation proved successful in completing the assigned mission, the area encompassed by this operation was immediately reoccupied by the enemy as evidenced by his presences upon the return of the BLT to the beach area.





- d. The helicopter tactical troop movement accomplished during operation CALHOUN again placed the BLT at a temperary disadvantage as units were landed 1,000 meters south of the assigned landing Zone. Although again a potential serious situation, this disadvantage was quickly overcome by the rapid movement of all units to assigned areas.
- o. Operation CALHOUN, a search and destroy operation was extremly successful in denying the enemy huge quantities of food supplies, primarly rice. The discovery and evacuation of in excess of 31 tens of rice in the area of operation was the result of diligent and determined work by all elements of the BLT and close cooperation with HMM 164 evacuation aircraft.

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CG, 1st MARDIV (25)



FIRST ENDOSEMENT on CO 3rd Ba, 7th Mar 1tr GMB/dlj Ser 3480 of 23 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Combat After Action Report; Operation GMM

- 1. The Combat After Action Report for Operation GEM is readdressed and forwarded herewith.
- 2. The deciding factor in the successful accomplishments of Operation GEM was the close coordination effected between USMC and ARVN units. The colocation of the USMC/ARVN command posts enabled rapid liaison and, in particular, sared valuable time in the clearance of artillery fire and air strikes. This close liaison contributed immeasurably to the well coordinated movement of the operating forces and permitted fruitful employment of supporting arms.
- 3. Enemy contact in the operation area clearly indicates that the WI continue to harbor and operate in the area. This Headquarters concurs with the recommendation contained in paragraph 15.a of the basic report, and future plans of the 7th Marines encompass extensive operations in the area until the enemy is denied their present freedom of movement.
- 4. The evacuation of over 1700 refugees from the area is considered noteworthy in that their removal will deter the enemy's ability to obtain support from the area.
- 5. The differences noted in the amount of chemy casualties as assessed by the ARVN units and as assessed by their US Advisors are caused by the ARVN having found numerous fresh grames in the FAU BINH (1) (ATS72530) village complex. The ARVN did not have sufficient time to excavate these graves, but roughly determined an additional 100 VC KIA's from their presence.

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From: Commanding Officer

Commanding Officer, 7th Marines To:

Subj: Combat After-Action Report, Operation GEM

Ref: (a) Divo 34.80.1

Expl:  $\sqrt{(1)}$ Overlay Phase I Overlay Phase II

Gade Name. Operation GEM

Dates of Operation. 1212 00 to 151800 July 1967

Location. DAI LOC District HEEU DUC District, QUANG NAM Province, EVN

Control or Command Headquarters. Third Battalion, Seventh Marinas.

5. Task Organization.

3rd Bn(-)(Rein), 7th Marines.

LICOL COUNSELMAN

GMB/dlj 34.80

23 July 1967 S & C FILES

BEALOUS RIFES MARENE DIVISION, PMD

3rd Bn. 7th Mar. Log No

827-67 COPY # 12642

H&S Co(-)

Command Group Alpha

Co K(Rein)

Im, Scout Sniper Plt., 7th Marines HST Tm., 1st Shows Party Bn

FO Tm, Etry I, 3rd Rm, 11th Marines

CAPT PIATE

CAPT HICKS

CAPT JONES

Co M(Rein)

Co L(-)(Refin.)

FO Tm., Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines

FO Tm., Btry I, 3rd Bn., 11th Marines

HST Tm., 1st Shore Party Bn

3rd Plt., Co C, 1st AT Bn

LT ALEXANDER

1st Plt, Co A, 3rd Amtrac Bn

LT METCALFE

6. Supporting Rrces.

a. Artilleny. Battery I, 3rd Bn., 11th Marines, reinforced by two
(2) LVTH's located on Hill 65, provided direct support for Operation GEM. Battery K, 4th Bn, 11th Marines, reinforced by wwo (2) 155mm SP gums from Battery M, 4th Bn, 11th Marines, furnished general support artilllery throughout the operation. A total of 2 missions were submitted by units. of this organization operating in the GEM area. Three (3) of these missions involved enemy contact. H&I and illumination missions were fired effectively. Fire coordination between this organization and the 51st ARVN Artillery Battery encountered no difficulties during Operation GEM.

Air. A significant amount of air support was employed during Phase II of Operation (EM, although there was no requirement for air support during the operation's first phase. Phase II began on D plus 3 with companies K and M being helilifted into predesignated blocking positions south of the VU GIA River. This move required twelve: (1.2) CH-46 aircraft, which shuttled a total of 285 troops in two successive lifts.

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Intensive landing zone preparatory fires were completed prior to the actual troop insertion. In accomplishing these fires three (3) flights of AME fixed wing aircraft and two (2) flights of FAB fixed wing aircraft together dropped a total ordence load of 40,000 pounds. These flights were credited with fifteen (15) structures destroyed . After the troops were in position, UHIE gunships, which had been controlling the preparatory fires, coordinated additional close air support missions involving four (4) flights of AMR aircraft and one (1) flight of F4B aircraft. These combined flights dropped a total ordance load of 25,000 pounds and were credited with thirty (30) structures destroyed, one (1) secondary explosion, and four (4) enemy killed-by-eir. Additional direct support missions were successfully flown that same afternoon. These consisted of two (2) flights of A4U aircraft and one (1) flight of F8E aircraft. These combine of lights dropped a total ordance load of 20,000 pounds and were creditied with eight (8) enemy killed -by-air (Probable). On the afternoon of D plus 3, Company L was retracted to meet a contengency commitment in the Rocket Belt south west of Da Kong airfield. This extraction was made by four (4) UH-34 and two (2) CH-46 helicopters. A total of 667 troops were lifted during Operation GIM.

- c. Anti-Tank. Four (4) Ontos from 3rd Flt., Co C, lst Anti-Tank Bn., and two (2) Ontos from 1st Plt., Co C, lst Anti-Tank., occupied blocking positions 1,2,3,4,6, and 7 in support of an individual infantry platoon at each position. These positions were located along the north bank of the SONG VU GIA from AT 810545 to AT 900565. The Ontos were employed only during the first phase of the operation and did not actively engage the enemy.
- d. Marine attached eleven (11) Amphibious Tractors were employed in support of ARVN forces engaged in Operation GEM. On D day the transported elements of the 37th and 39th Ranger Battalion, ARVN, and lst Proposition of the 37th and 39th Ranger Battalion, ARVN, and lst Proposition of the operational area. The moves were completed without serious difficulties. On D plus I the Ambracs were again employed to provide rapid troop transport to 37th and 39th Ranger units as part of there scheme of maneuver. There was no requirement for Amphibious Tractor support during Phase II of the operation. One (1) Marine attached to Ambracs was wounded and medically evacuated on D plus I. None of the vehicles sustained any damage from enemy action.

#### 7. Intelligence.

- a. VC Strength, Location, Disposition, and Situation Anticopased in the Objective Area.
- (1) It was anticipated that the Q-14B Local Force Company (strength of 70,100), the R-20 Battalion (strength 550) and approximately 30-40 guerillas per village would be located in, and would defend the objective area from fortified villages.
- (2) It was furthur anticipated that blements of the V-25 Battalion, T-89 Battalion, and 3rd Battalion, 31st Regiment would attempt to reinforce these units if necessary.
- (3) Intelligence was furnished by the DAN LOC District Intelligence Operation Coordinations Center (DISCC), aerial observer reports and Brave reports, which are all furnished on a continuous bacis.
- (4) The volume of intelligence reports furnished by the sources listed indicated that a large enemy force would be in the general objective area. Extensive trench systems and fighting holes constructed prior to the operation indicated that the VC were definately preparing to defend the area.

#### b. Actual Situation encountered.

- (1) The first phase of Operation GEM restricted all of the Battalion's blocking elements to static positions along the friendly nowth bank of the SONG VU GIA. Consequently no new meaningful or indicative intelligence was gathered, since this entire area was already extensively and regularly patrolled by standard Battalion Operating Procedures.
- (2) During Phase II of the operation companies M and I established their predetermined blocks south of the VU GIA River. Shortly therafter Company K was entracted from its blocking position in order to meet a contingency commitment in the Rocket Belt south west of Da Nang airfield. Contact with enemy forces was negligible and not productive of anything of noteworthly intelligence value. The static nature of the Company M mission prevented any real scruting of the surrounding hamlets and terrain.
- (3) The supporting role played by the Battalion during Operation GEM did not conduce to the accumulation of any intelligence.

#### d. Terrain and Weather.

- (1) A critical piece of high ground was selected as the primary blocking position of Company M. No obstacles or VC determents were reported by the company during its stay on the hill.
- (2) The weather was seasonally hot, but caused no heat casualties. No doubt the minimum physical exertion required by the blocking mission was important.
- 8. <u>Mission</u>. 3rd Bn (-) (Rein), 7th Marines participates with ARVX forces in a jointly coordinated six (6) day, two phase, search-and-destroy operation in the INDEPENDENCE/ARIZONA area.
- 9. Concept of Operation: During Phase I; 3rd Bn(-)(Rein), 7th Markles operates as blocking force, establishing positions on the north side of the SONG VU GIA from AT 810545 to AT 900565. During Phase II helilift three companies into three company-size blocking positions at AT 797494, AT 805475, and AT 830476.

### 10. Execution.


a. D-Day (12 July 1967) Co M moved by foot into their assigned blocking positions at AT 843552, AT 832554, and AT 041545 by H bour minus 2. K Co. was trucked toward blocking positions at AT 870572, AT 859566, and 855560 by H minus 1. L Co. moved by foot from the Battalian CP on Hill 37 to establish their blocking positions at AT 895564 and AT 878564 by H minus 1. The Battalian forward command group departed from Hill 37 for Hill 65 at 0900 and began establishing the forward CP at 0940 on Hill 65.

A Co. K blocking force received 1 round of VC sniper fire at 1200 from AT 864562 and called in an 31mm mortan mission to silence the activity.

A fire team patrol from Co. L detained a 24 year old VCS without proper identification at 1315 while subject sat in beat on northern bank of VU GIA River at AT 896503. The VCS was processed to DAI LCC for further interrogation.

At 1350 a Co. In first taken received 10 rowalts uniper fire from AT 877556 while patrolling river bank. The patrol returned 6 rounds of 60mm mortar fire to silence the activity.

At 1400 Co L's blocking force at 879563 received 15 rounds sniper fire from an estimated four VC at AT 877556. Friendly forces fired. 3 rds of 60mm mortar, 35 rounds of 5.56 and called in a 105mm ertillery fire mission to silence the enemy activity.



At 1855 a Co M fire team patrol observed 16 VC dressed in black pajamas with rifles and patks traveling from # 809599 in a westerly direction along a trench line. The patrol fired 100 rds of 5.56mm and called in a 36 round artillery mission. Subsequent search of the area produced negative results.

As of 122400H cumulative casualties for elements of this battalion involved in Operation GEM were:

<u>U</u>	SMC	AG	
NIA	O.	$KIA(\overline{C})$	0
$V \perp V$	. 0	KIA(P)	Q.
$\mathtt{MBC}$	0	WIA	Q
$\mathbf{MIA}$	O	$\mathfrak{D}\mathfrak{h}\mathbf{T}$	1

#### b. <u>D-Day plus J. (13 July 1967)</u>

At 0830 a Co L patrol at AT 880563 received 12 rds of sniper fire from AT 874559. The patrol returned 30 rds of 7.62 at the estimated 2 VC snipers to silence further activity. Begining at 1400 a total of 546 refuges were shuttled from south to north across the SONG VU GIA at AT 878565 by Co K and local PF's. All refugees were across by 1720 and sent to DAI LOC District Headquarters.

At 2030 1 VCS was observed by an Army helicopter at AT 826552 crossing the VU GIA River from south to north. Co M apprehended this individual. He was dressed in black pajamas and possessed an identification .com d.

As of 132400H cumulative casualties were:

	MC	vo	
KIA	0	KIA(C)	0
$\mathtt{W} \mathbf{I} \Lambda$	0	KIA(P)	5
NBC	9	WIA	ő
MILA	0	DET	2

#### c. <u>D-Day plus 2 (14 July 1967)</u>

At 2035 an amtrac accidentally hit a Vietnamese child while joing through a vallage at AT 870573 during darkness. Elements from Go K treated the injured child and called in a medical evacuation belicopter.

At 2325 a Co K blocking element at AT 654560 threw an M-26 grenade at suspected enemy movement. One friendly USMC was inadvertently wounded (non-med-evac) by shrapnel. A search of the area produced negative results.

As of 142400H cumulative casualties were:

USM	<u>IC</u>	VG	
KIA	o	KIA (C)	o
$\mathtt{WIA}$	1	KIA (P)	5
NBC	0	AIW	õ
MTA	O	DET	2

## d. <u>D-Day plus 3 (15 July 1967)</u>

At 0800 a Co b patrol discovered 4 willow colored pressure type mines measuring 4 inches high and 3 inches in disheter. They were emplaced near openings in a hedge row where Marines would likely pass. The patrol desiroyed the mines.

At 1025, while on patrol, near AT 807A70 a Co M unit discovered a VC, aged 25, who had been wounded by a UH-LE gunship. He was dressed in black pajames. A search of the vicinity turned only a pack of rice on the VC. He was sent to DAI LOC for interrogation.

At 11.30 a fire team patrol from Co M observed 14 VC in black pajames with packs and rifles moving in a southwesterly direction toward

the mountains from AT 807497. A 155mm artilloxy fire mission was called but an accurate surveillance was obscured by the irregular terrain. Estimate mated 5 VC KIA (P).

As of 151800 cumulative casualties were?

US	Ma	ΛG	
KIA	O	KIV	0
WIA	2	KIA(P)	20
MBC	0	WIA	C
MXA	0	Diff	3

As of 151800H only Co M was still involved in supporting ARVN forces from a blocking position south of the VU GIA River. The battalion thus maintained a liaison staff at the operation CP on Hill 65 from this time on until. the entire operation was terminated on D plus 5.

#### 11. Personnel.

a. Friendly Forces cumulative casualties b. ARVN communities casualties

(1) ETA 11

(2) WIA 44

(%) KIA(G) 177 (2) KIA(P) 28

Mosses - ·

£ 54 1

.

(3) DETAINEES 27

do, ARVII totals for enemy losses

f. U. S. Army Advisor totals-Ene-

KIA (C) 79

MA (P) 20

Neskinges De

134 Jagedy 1701 Carolina de la composição de la composição de la composição de la composição de la composição de la composição

- KIA Q (2) WIA(NE) 1
- (3) WIA(E) 1
- MBC O
- C. Minemy Losses
  - KIA.(C) 13\*
  - (2) KIA(F) 15
  - (3) DAT 3 REFUGEES 50 (h)
- Captured Equipment
  - (i) Weapons

(a)

- - 4 Carbines (b)

6-K-1433

- 2 M=1.5g (c)
- 2 Colt .45 Cal. Fistols (d)
- (e) I MAS 36.
- (f) 1-6K-47
- (2) Miscellaneous
  - 1. box (24) electric blasting caps (b) 1 AT mine
  - (c) 3 bags of documents

#### \* Includes 12 KBA reported TACA's

(a)

12. Administrative Matters. Planning was therevishe detailed and encountered no difficulties. When companies I and K were surmarily helilifted out of the operation to rapidly reinforce rocket belt ference southwast of Da Mang - -timely adjustments were initiated and executed without incident,

- Supply. All resupply suring Operation GDM was by wathlobe, usually a. Supply. All resupply suring Operation test was my venture, access, truck. Resupply was made daily and with no problems, primarily due to the proximity of supply sources and deployed process. From carried a prescribed loss of 3 MOI's, two espherm of weter, and a 24 of amountation.
- b. <u>Maintenance</u>. No significant problems were encountared with bracked vehicle maintenance. Fuel resupply was primarily accomplished by truck.
  - c. Treatment of camualties, Med-evac for USMS was adequate.

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- d. <u>Transportation</u>. Trucks were employed to expedite the insertion of Co K into its Phase I blocking positions. Puring Phase II helicopters were used to insert and retract USMC troops. The battalion forward command group was transported to and from Hill 65 by truck.
- e. <u>Communications</u>. Since the battalion forward command group was situated on Hill 65 and very near its deployed units, no serious problems arose.
- 13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

#### 14. Commender's Analysis


- a. During Operation GEM the battalion forward command group was located on Hill 65 and operated in close conjunction with the ARVN command group. The effect of this arrangement greatly enhanced control and coordination throughout the operation. Critical supporting arms were employed more rapidly and with probably more devastating ultimate results by virtue of expedited clearances. Each command group was able to remain completely abreast of the tactical situation and react accordingly with no fear of misunderstanding. Air and artillery support livison benefitted continually from the arrangement.
- b. It is my considered opinion that the INPMIENDENCE/SRIZONA/GEM area merits continued close scruting and regular large-scale operational attention. All indications force the conclusion that large numbers of well-armed VC are constantly active throughout this area. The nature of the terrain and general configuration of rivers provides positive, provising assets to our further operations there.
- c. The SONG THU BON and SONG VU GIA remain fordable at several points for both tanks and Amtracs. Both can usefully be employed in future operations, although the element of suprise would be obviously compromised somewhat.
- d. Approximately 1701 refugees were eventually evacuated from the operational area and processed through the DAI LCC District Headquarters for resettlement. In addition, one Vietnamese child, injured by an America, was medically evacuated.

#### 15. Recommendations.

- a. That continuous short duration operations be conducted in this area until the VC freedom of movement, which they now enjoy, has been eliminated.
- b. That in future combined operations with ARVN Forces colocated CP's be utilized whenever feasible.

J.D. COUNSHIMAN
Lieutenens Colonel, U. S. Marine Comps
Commanding

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
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
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Operation Overley-Operation (FM)
Phase II

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


# AVIATION SAFETY


BULLETIN

NUMBER 26

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#### COMMAND AVIATION SAFETY MESSAGE

By Colonel D. H. JOHNSON Commanding Officer, MAG-13

Over 80 per cent of all aircraft accidents in the 1st MAW last year were attributed to maintenance/material cause factors. If we hope to decrease our accident rate, more attention must be devoted to the prevention of maintenance/material caused accidents.

The first and most important step in reducing maintenance/material caused accidents is to recognize that a problem exists and then take preventative action before an accident occurs.

How can we recognize that a maintenance/material problem exists? What are some of the indicators which point to an accident in the making?

When reviewing yellow sheets from previous flights have you observed such comments as: "Ground checks OK" or, "Cannot duplicate gripe on ground, next pilot check?" If the answer to this question is yes, then you may be heading for a maintenance/material caused accident.

Does the same gripe appear again and again on consecutive yellow sheets? Again, if the answer is yes you may be heading for a maintenance/material caused accident.

When the pilot arrives on the flight line for his preflight inspection is the aircraft ready for flight? If not, you may be heading for a maintenance material caused accident.

Is each major item of equipment bench tested or operated on a test stand before it is installed on an aircraft? If the answer is sometimes or not always, you may be heading for a maintenance/material caused accident.

What actions may be taken to prevent a maintenance/material caused accident?


The first and most obvious action is to ensure that maintenance procedures are in conformance with existing instructions. There is a right way and a wrong way to do a job. Let's make sure we are doing it the right way.

Next, ascertain that an effective maintenance quality control section is functioning within each maintenance department. Only the most technically qualified and dedicated personnel should be assigned to this section. And, this section must be made to feel it has command backing.

Lastly, and most importantly, the command must ensure that adequate time is made available to perform maintenance/material functions. In combat no less than in peacetime, flight schedules must not exceed the capabilities of the maintenance/material personnel. Sufficient turn-around-time between flights must be provided to permit each Marine involved in the complicated air operation to perform his function in an orderly and systematic manner.

- 5

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•	J⊎ื่	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	
HOURS FLOIN FY-67	<b>248</b> 96	21778	21170	20187	19816	20515	21660	2453lij	26202	25571	30263	26127	282719
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CUMULATIVE FY-68	2.91					,	)	100 mg	· ·				

# IST MAW ACCIDENT BRIEFS

## NOT DIRECT ENEMY ACTION (OPERATIONAL)

## 1. A-hE A/B ENGINE FAILURE

The aircraft lost engine oil pressure and started a high precautionary approach with flaps up, when the engine seized. The Aircraft landed 500 feet short of overrun and came to rest on the overrun.

## 2. A-4E C/G ENGINE FAILURE

The aircraft lost engine oil pressure at 15,000 feet, 15 miles north of Chu Lai. Ordnance was jettisoned and a high precautionary approach was made to runway 14 west. Engine seized at 2,000 feet of altitude, and excessive sink rate set up which could not be corrected prior to landing.

## 3. A-LE A/F ENGINE FAILURE

The aircraft was taking off, and beyond abort position when a loud noise was neard by the pilot. Ground personnel observed flames coming from tailpipe, and then the pilot ejected. Aircraft crashed and was consumed by fire.

## 4. A-6A A/1B, 1F HOT REFUELING

At completion of flight, and with the aircraft chocked in the hot refueling area, an explosion occurred as plane captain was attempting to attach Parker refueling nozzle to the aircraft. Suspect initial explosion was due to ingestion of JP-4 vapors and spray into starboard engine. Ensuing fire engulfed forward portion of aircraft. Suspect malfunction of Parker fuel nozzle.

#### 5. F-4B A/G BLC SYSTEM FAILURE

Immediately after takeoff the BLC warning light illuminated. Pilot lowered the flaps immediately and continued to climb. Right fire warning light illuminated, pilot reduced right throttle to idle and advanced left throttle to A/B power. Aircraft could not maintain altitude, right fire warning light was still illuminated, so pilot secured right engine and the fire warning light extinguished. Pilot was unable to maintain altitude and jettisoned stores at 1000 feet MSL. The port fire and overheat warning lights illuminated. NFO ejected at approximately 400 feet and pilot ejected at approximately 200 feet MSL. Lead aircraft observed flames of great intensity coming from beneath the aircraft aft of NFO's cockpit. Suspect failure of BLC system.

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### 6. 68-20 C/G MATERIAL FAILURE

The aircraft was on post calendar test hop. Gear was retracted after takeoff in normal manner. Port gear indicated unsafe, gear recycled and port gear remained up. A gear up landing was made on foamed runway. Cause factor: Material failure of bolt on port main landing gear door.

#### 7. CH-46 A/G ENGINE FAILURE

After take-off, at approximately 75 ft, one of the engines fell off the line. Pilot started a right turn to a clear area and directed co-pilot to attempt re-start. Other engine failed and aircraft landed with a left drift, rolled over on left side and burned. Suspect material failure/malfunction.

8. CH-46 A/4A FAILURE OF AFT VERTICAL DRIVE SHAFT THRUST BEARING ASSEMBLY

Aircraft was cruising at 2000 feet 90-100 knots when nose pitched up 45 degrees and returned to level attitude. Aircraft began rapid vertical descent and nose pitched up 90 degrees, continued to descend vertically as if backing down, until ground contact. The aircraft contacted the ground in an extreme nose high attitude and in a 40-60 degree left bank. Fire consumed the aircraft immediately after impact. Cause factor was material failure of aft vertical drive shaft thrust bearing assembly.

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#### ADMINISTRATIVE NOTES

- 1. The following information is included herein in an attempt to assist in clearing up a few "grey" areas relative to mishap reporting procedures as outlines in OPNAVINST 3750.6F.
  - a. AAR's are to be assembled in file folders for submission.
- b. Identification of the assembled AAR, on the lip of the outer front cover will be as contained in paragraph 38.
- c. For identification, information placed at the top of each endorsement must contain the wording set forth in paragraph 40i. All copies of the endorsement must show copy distribution.
- d. Endorsements become additional pages to the basic report and pages should be numbered consecutively following the last page of the basic report or the last page of the preceding endorsement, as applicable.

The best personal survival equipment in the world cannot function to save your life if you do not have it with you or if you do not know how to use it!!

#### MAINTENANCE AND SAFETY

John E. Kennedy Senior Maintainability Engineer Lockheed-California Company

I have been working on many projects in the last three years not associated with active military programs and have just recently returned to the fold. When I was asked to write an article on the subject of maintenance and safety, it occurred to me that I should catch up on what new tricks maintenance people have developed in this time which could create unsafe aircraft conditions due to maintenance causes. I decided that one place to start would be to review recent issues of the United States Air Force publication, "Aerospace Maintenance Safety".

The main idea of this review was to find out "what's new?" After reading several issues, I sat back and asked again = "What's new?" The answer came out = "Nothing". To check my reaction, I went all of the way back to May 1953 and started reading the old issues of "Aircraft Accident and Maintenance Review". Sure enough = nothing new. This should come as no surprise when we stop and think about it. After all, people are still the same. We still use landing gears, electrical systems, and hydraulic systems, all of which require the same basic techniques, methods, knowledge, and types of people, whether the aircraft is an F-104 or a B-17. So -- instead of writing about the causes and cures of some new and exciting maintenance/safety problems, I decided to review the perennial problems of maintenance. All of them are important and the list may not truly reflect an order of rank. But then, can we really "rank" maintenance problems, each of which has resulted in very costly accidents, and unfortunately, in some cases, loss of life.

I. Most of us think of FOD in relation to jet engines ingesting things lying about engine run-up areas, on taxiways, and on runways. Although much damage is caused from the above reasons, and much money is consumed in repairing this damage, there is another type of FOD. This FOD is purely maintenance-generated, and it can only be eliminated by the maintenance technician himself. This is the extensive aircraft damage which can be caused when tools and parts are left inside the aircraft after a maintenance task is completed. In too many cases they are found jamming control sticks, in wheel wells preventing gear retraction, in fuel control areas preventing proper engine operations, and similar places. All of these are calculated to give a pilot gray hair while he makes the decision to fight the aircraft back to the ground or to bail out and leave the airplane to find its own way back to the ground. We have reviewed many stories which prove that many pilots must have considerable courage and detailed knowledge of their aircraft to even think of trying to get it back down. We certainly admire the pilot who, during an over-water flight, suddenly found himself with a stick "freeze-up". The stick would move neither fore nor aft. He managed to control the pitch attitude by cautious use of trim, speed-brake, gear, and flaps and made a

successful straight in approach at his destination. A small open end wrench was found embedded in the lead counterweight on the horizontal stabilizer control linkage. The wrench had jammed between the counterweight and an aft section bulkhead.

There is not much use in pointing out problems, if we can't suggest solutions. These problems are easy to solve — GOOD HOUSEKEEPIG! But how do we get good housekeeping on every aircraft, every day, all year. Only YOU can do it — and there are some well-known techniques for doing this job.

FIRST - Tool and part count. ALWAYS keep track of your tools. Know how many you have, and every time you leave an aircraft, count them and be sure they are all in your tool box. If you are going to Supply to pick up a part, going for a coffee break, lunch, or leaving the aircraft for any reason, take your tools with you. It may add a few minutes to the total maintenance task. It could save an airplane and a pilot's life. An old trick is not to take your whole tool box aboard the aircraft. Leave it outside on the ground and take only the tools you need to do the job. If you made a mistake, and took a wrong tool, don't lay it somewhere in the aircraft while you go to get the right tool. Bring it back cut with you, and put it in the tool box.

SECOND - Don't bring that handful of muts and bolts and washers, etc. aboard the aircraft just because you think you will need them. Keep a space in your tool box, or carry a bag of some sort where you can keep these things on the ground until you are ready to use them. Then you can count accurately the number and types of hardware you need to do the job. When you take a unit apart, don't put attaching hardware on the nearest handy shelf in the aircraft. The hardware you will reuse should go in one pocket, and that which can't be used in another pocket. If you drop a piece of hardware, don't shrug your shoulder and forget it, FIND IT. Even if you are forced to take some other unit apart. Better yet - don't drop it.

Now what about those little bits of wire that probably wound up in the airplane because the mechanic had to snip off the end of the wire, and the piece fell where it couldn't be retrieved? We would like to pass an idea suggested in an issue of the USAF Aerospace Safety Magazine. Start with a pair of standard 6—inch diagonal wirecutters. Close the jaws and fill the cavity with windshield sealing compound (or equivalent). Allow 24 hours for the compound to set, then split along the plier cutting edges with a razor blade or very sharp knife. The compound remains pliable and will hold the wire ends securely until they are picked off by the mechanic and properly disposed of.

II. Poor Maintenance Practices. This is a very broad heading — so what do we mean? We are talking about a lot of very little things which, just like the screwdriver that is jammed in the control stick, causes some aircraft to be lost every year. Some of these little things are: The cotter pin that was left out; the tab washer that was not correctly bent; the bolt installed backwards; the extra washer under the bolt head because the bolt





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#### ANALYSIS OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

### 1. General

Although operational concepts employed in Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN were normal, the change from USS Princeton to USS Tripoli, with a smaller flight deck, required some significant revision of detailed operational planning. Salient factors are discussed in the following analysis.

## 2. Analysis

## s. Ship.to-Shore Movement

- helicopters participate in the initial assualt landing of the BLT. The flight deck of the Iwo Jima class LFH, with squadron and BLT embarked, will accommodate only six CH-46A aircraft with rotors spread and turning. Other ready aircraft must be repositioned and readied for flight after the first six aircraft have been launched. The minimum time required from launch of the first six aircraft to the launch of the second flight of six aircraft is approximately twenty-five minutes. This time includes repositioning and turn-up of aircraft and loading of amphibious troops. The fuel versus troop loading of the helicopters must be carefully considered, due to the orbit time required by the first six aircraft prior to departing for the initial landing zone. Close coordination must be maintained in the recovery, refueling and loading of aircraft for subsequent waves.
- (2) The ship-to-shore movement of Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN was significantly enhanced by the attachment of two CH-53A aircraft and four armed UH-1E helicopters. Although the additional number of aircraft tended to compound the problem of limited deck space available, their addition to the landing force was definitely advantageous.

#### b. Operations Ashore

- (1) During Operation BEACON TORCH, operations ashore were normal and consisted of troop lift, resupply, armed escort, medical evacuation, tactical air control (airborne) and command/control missions.
- (2) During participation in Operation CALHOUN, operations were continued from the LPH, with resupply missions conducted from both the LPH and the logistic support area established at BT065585.

#### c. Miscellaneous Operations

(1) Due to amphibious operational commitments, which conflicted with normal underway replenishment of Amphibious Ready Group shipping, the squadron conducted both day and night vertical replenishment missions from USS Ogden (LPD-5) to USS Tripoli (LPH-10).

Enclosure (2)

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## SECRET - NOFORN

(2) Resupply of ordnance for the attached UH-LE helicopters was delivered to the LPH by MAG-16 CH-53A aircraft.

# 3. Problems Encountered

- a. Due to the constant demand for their services, the pilots and crew members of the attached UH-IE armed helicopters were required to operate in excess of the generally accepted maximum crew duty hours. This situation represents a compromise of aviation safety standards.
- b. The attached CH-53 and UH-1E helicopters (until D + 8) operated independently of the embarked squadron. It is considered that better control and coordination of helicopter operations can be accomplished if all embarked aircraft are placed under the operational control of the embarked squadron commander.
- c. Some difficulty was encountered in the coordination, staging and loading of supplies for units ashore. In several instances, this situation resulted in resupply of the units ashore having to be conducted after dark. Some improvement was realized as the operation progressed.
- d. Due to the tempo of operations and the limited deck space available on the LPH, difficulty was encountered in accomplishing necessary maintenance inspection flights and aircraft turn-ups for maintenance purposes. This situation resulted in excessive down time on several aircraft.
- e. Non-availability of aircraft spare parts continues to be a critical problem for the embarked squadron. No significant improvement of this situation has been apparent during this operation.

# 4. Conclusions

- a. The limited operating space on the Iwo Jima class LPH requires constant close coordination by all units operating from or in conjunction with Amphibious Ready Group shipping.
- b. The attached UH-1E helicopters should be provided with at least one spare crew to provide for adequate crew relief.
- c. All embarked aircraft should be placed under the operational control of the embarked squadron commander to accomplish better control and coordination of air operations.
- d. The degradation of combat effectiveness of CH-46A equipped squadrons due to inadequate spare parts support is still a cause for serious concern at all echelons of command.





### SECRET - NOFORN

# 27 June 1967

Heavy resupply missions were flown, carrying 55,400 pounds to companies of the Second Battalion. Third Marines ashore.

20 ARVN were lifted from BT068448 to Hoi An airstrip.

Aircraft received fire from BT052541; no hits were received.

# 28 June 1967

HMM-164 shuttled 102 troops within the companies of the Second Battalion, Third Marines. Resupply and medical evacuation missions were completed with no incidents. No enemy fire was received throughout the day.

# 29 June 1967

HMM-164 aircraft flew resupply in support of BEACON TORCH/C/LHOUN. Several administrative hops to Danang were also flown. All resupply missions were completed before darkness.

# 30 June 1967

HMM\_164 lifted 2.2 tons of cargo and 14.0 combat troops in support of Second Battalion, Third Marines. Fire incidents were reported by squadron aircraft at BT195485 and BT158471. No hits were received. Numerous administrative flights were also flown during the day.

## 1 July 1967

HMM-164 flew resupply and medical evacuations this date. Second Battalion, Third Marines made preparations for helo lift-withdrawal from the area.

Operation C/LHOUN terminated at 1200 this date.

# 2 July 1967

All companies with exception of Golf company were picked up and lifted to LPH\_10, LPD\_5 and LSD\_35. Golf company was evacuated by LVT's.

Operation BENCON TORCH torninated at 1800 this date.

Enclosure (1)





SECRET \_ NOFORN

Casualties: One WIA and two DIA on 20 June 1967.

# Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence

A/U Fired Un In	cldents A/C Hit	Hits Sorties	nours
77	38 17	24 1,84	5 486.8
Ratio of aircraft h Ratio of aircraft h Ratio of aircraft h	its to sorties f	lown:	1:3.21 1:18.46 1:26.0
Ratio of aircraft h			1:74 637

Breakdown of fire incidents with respect to altitude:

Incidents	A/C Hit	<u> Altitude</u>
25 5 2 5	7 5 1 3	0-499 500-999 1000-1499 1500 + UNKNOWN

Enclosure (1)

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STRUCT \_ NOFORM

# STATISTICAL SULMARY

# OPERATION BEACON TORCH/CALHOUR

18 June - 2 July 1967

DATE	SORTIES	PASSENGERS	C/RGO*	MEDEVICS	FLIGHT HOURS
18 June 19 June 20 June 21 June 22 June 23 June 24 June 25 June 26 June 27 June 29 June 30 June 1 July 2 July	207 138 100 114 163 156 177 83 137 173 124 74 73 110 16	585 290 297 251 261 136 250 102 153 257 208 81 140 286 74	5.9 25.0 17.1 16.2 11.6 51.2 25.0 16.2 29.2 31.3 14.8 12.2 2.2 19.5 2.4	89 30 20 18 78 14 6 9 10 7 2 2 6	53.7 38.0 25.4 43.3 33.8 44.3 41.6 30.3 34.6 39.0 26.0 19.0 18.4 7.0
TOTAL	1,845	3,361	277.8	308	486.8

<sup>\*</sup> SHORT TONS

Enclosure (3)

SECRET - NOFORN

# IST MAW ACCIDENT BRIEFS JUNE 1967

# l. <u>UH-lE</u> B/G AIR TAXI ACCIDENT

PILOT ERROR

Upon completion of refueling, the helicopter had 1050 pounds of fuel on board. The aircraft was then lifted to a hover, the RPM held, and the pilot elected to taxi around the aircraft parked in the fuel pits upwind of his position.

As the UH-lE began moving across the area toward the runway it encountered turbulance from the rotor wash of the other aircraft in the fuel pits. The RPM began to decay and the pilot elected to land. The touchdown was successful and the RPM was then regained.

After about a minute of waiting the pilot once again lifted to a hover and checked his RPM. He noticed a normal transient droop and the RPM stabilized at 6600 RFM. Once again he elected to continue air taxiing to the runway. This time however, the nose was pointed some 30 degrees or more out of the wind as the air taxi was begun. After traveling to a point near the runway, the pilot again experienced turbulence from a passing helicopter and the nose of the UH-LE began to swing rapidly to the right. The pilot attempted to maintain control using left rudder to stop rotation of the aircraft. The rotation was brought under control with the nose approximately 180 degrees out of the wind. During this attempt the RPM had decayed badly. The RPM warning light and horn were activated. As seen as the nose was downwind the pilot experienced loss of aft cyclic control due to insufficient aft cyclic being available. The aircraft was now temporarily out of control. During this short period of time the aircraft inadvertantly touched down in the rough terrain adjacent to the runway. The aircraft rolled over, crashing and coming to rest on its side.

All switches were secured and the crew abandoned the aircraft. The crash crew foamed the smoking engine and no fire ensued.

The primary cause of the accident was considered pilot error. Had the pilot's judgment been to delay his attempted departure on this mission long enough for the other helicopter to depart the area, this accident would have been prevented. Facilities was considered to be a contributing factor in that the fuel pits afford locations for the simultaneous refueling of four aircraft which must be parked in a rectangle at approximately one-half to one rotor diameter separation between aircraft, thus causing a rotor wash hazard.

# 2. UH-34 A/1A, 1B, 2G POSSIBLE CONTROL MALFUNCTION MATERIAL FAILURE

On an approach to the fuel pits, the aircraft began to pitch forward and nose down. The pilot applied aft cyclic and turned off the automatic stabilization equipment. The nose down pitch continued to increase and the aircraft struck the ground in an estimated 70 degrees nose down attitude, turned over, exploded and burned. Pending completion of the Aircraft Accident

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Investigation, the cause is undetermined. Materiel failure/malfunction is suspected.

# 3. <u>A-4E</u> A/F

ENGINE FAILURE

MATERIAL FAILURE

As number two in a flight of two on a CAS mission, the aircraft was climbing out in the vicinity of 16000 to 18000 feet. Suddenly several explosions were heard by the pilot coming from the engine section followed by loss of electrical power, oxygen pressure and control of the elevator and ailerons. The pilot pulled the emergency generator release handle, but did not regain electrical power. Hydraulic power was disconnected from the flight controls, but control of the elevator and ailerons could not be regained.

In the meantime the engine flamed out. For some reason the pilot attempted an airstart at this point with no results. The pilot finally realized the futility of such action with no control except rudders, with which he maintained wings level, and ejected.

At the time of ejection the aircraft was 20-30 degrees nose down between 4000 and 5000 feet AGL. The ejection was successful and the pilot was picked up in five minutes, however, the pilot lost his helmet during the ejection due to an untightened chin strap. His oxygen mask was hanging loose from one connection also at the time of ejection. The mask struck the pilot in the mouth on ejection and caused minor injury.

The cause of the accident was considered to be material failure of an unknown engine component.

# 4. F-8E A/A

FUEL PUMP FAILURE

MATERIAL FAILURE

Fifteen minutes after take off, the pilot reported a boost pump failure. The aircraft was at an altitude of approximately 6000 feet and 375 knots airspeed. The engine flamed out almost immediately thereafter. The Emergency Power Package (EPP) was extended and power regained, but relight attempts were unsuccessful. The pilot reported no fuel flow indication.

The pilot made a controlled ejection, wings level, 250 knots, in the vicinity of 800 feet AGL. The aircraft crashed into the sea. The MB MK 5A ejection seat apparently operated successfully. The chute opening and descent by the pilot into the water appeared normal in all respects. However, when the pilot was picked up, he was found unconscious face down in the water. Fatal injury was due to drowning. Why the pilot was apparently incapacitated upon water entry could not be determined. Possible flight equipment factors are being investigated.

The aircraft engine, tail section and various fuselage components were salvaged. Investigation revealed that the splines of the engine driven fuel pump coupling, and the inner spline of the fuel pump drive spur gear were eroded to the extent that the pump failed. The primary cause of the accident, therefore, was material failure of the aforementioned engine component.

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was too long. Another aspect of this problem is the control linkage that you have taken apart to gain access to another part. You have it all back together except for the insertion of the cotter pin when it is time to quit, or you are called away to do something else. The mechanic who finishes the job for you may not know that you took the linkage apart, so he just finishes the primary job. The result is an accident locking for a place to happen! And eventually it may. So again, what can you do about it?

Of course, the first obvious answer is to know your job thoroughly, and don't forget the little things. If you wind up with an "extra" piece of hardware, recheck the whole job and find out where it goes. If you wind up with not enough bits of hardware, check to see if you used two pieces of hardware where only one piece was called for.

If a unit is partially assembled and you can't finish the job, DON'T leave it that way. Completely disassemble it before you leave. In that way, the mechanic who has to finish the job can readily see what has to be done. Another way to handle this situation would be to locally manufacture a few red streamers with the word MAINTENANCE in one inch letters. This streamer would be at least fifteen (15) inches long. Now - everytime you leave the aircraft - no matter what the reason - hang this streamer on the parts of the aircraft that are not completely back together. It would be pretty hard for someone to miss the point if the work to be completed is not obvious - like putting in a cotter pin, bending the ears on a tab washer, or setting the correct torque on a couple of bolts, leave a note attached to the streamer.

Also important to maintenance safety is the inspector. An inspector's function is to double check that a job is done correctly and completely. All of the hints I have mentioned also apply to inspectors - especially the tool counting. I have a picture of an inspector's mirror which was left unnoticed in a jet intake. When the engine was started, the handle was pulled off the mirror and went through the engine and inflicted considerable damage.

III. Incorrect Maintenance. Electrical/electronic mechanics still connect wrong wires to wrong terminals; pneumatic/hydraulic mechanics still cross connections; flight controls are still being rigged backwards so that up is down and down is up.

Although aircraft designers put considerable effort into designing equipment so you can't cross connect things, so help me, mechanics still do it. And sometimes they go to great extremes to do it. Case on record. In connecting some cables together a mechanic found that the cables were too long. He cut one cable, swaged a new terminal on, and made his connection. He soon found a pair of cables that were too short. So he took one off, got a longer cable and made his connection. That is a lot of work to go through just to do a job wrong! When things don't fit correctly find cut why! You may find you are trying to mate the wrong pieces together.

About the only solution we can offer for this one is to suggest that more care be exercised. When electrical connectors don't fit together easily, maybe a pin is bent, or the locating key isn't mated. Don't grab those extra big pliers and wrench it together. Be your own inspector. Check your work and be sure it is right. In control systems, or in any system with mechanically moving parts, get some help. Have someone move the control stick and check that the movements are in the right direction. Look very carefully at bolt areas. Too much damage has been caused by bolts being inserted into a control rod backwards. See that no part of a bolt scrapes against adjacent parts or structure. You can be sure it was not designed to do so. If it does, you can be equally certain that the bolt is in backwards or that you used the wrong bolt.

Are you willing to bet your life on the quality and correctness of your work? If not, then you better do that job over again until you are satisfied that you could bet your life on your workmanship and win.

### FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE

- 1. Good housekeeping habits on and about air facilities are a means of reducing FOD damage to aircraft engines. One area that can be easily overlooked is the high power turn up area. A reason for this is that more than one unit will utilize the area, and there may be a tendency to rely on some other unit to accept the responsibility of policing and maintaining cleanliness of the area.
- 2. Since high power turn up areas are not used as much as other areas, it is easy to overlook assigning housekeeping responsibilities. The consequences may be immediate noticeable engine damage or delayed reaction to FOD. In addition to specifying the need for users to police high power turn up areas prior to use, area responsibility must be assigned to a unit. Unless the responsibility is assigned and enforced, the turn up area can degenerate into a foreign object collection area. All ComFairs are requested to insure that responsibility for the high power turn up areas are assigned to a unit, and regular periodic inspections for cleanliness are conducted. Cleanliness of this area is just as important as cleanliness of runways, taxi strips, parking aprons, and in hangars. Reduction in engine availability due to other causes imposes a strain on logistics and to compound this strain with avoidable FOD further reduces already scarce assets.

Quoted from a COMMAND MESSAGE

"I know of no way of judging the future but by the past" -- Patrick Henry

# BLADE STALL

Ву

# Major D. V. McDONALD HMM-163

In an examination of the conditions which produce blade stall in a UH-34D helicopter we could almost cite our operating environment as a classic example of a combination of factors to be avoided. Blade stall is unfortunately considered by most pilots to be one of those obscure phenomenon that you read about in basic but never experience due to the flight envelope being so liberal. First lets examine the results of blade stall, its warning indications, and the conditions that cause it. Fully developed blade stall causes complete loss of control of the aircraft. You're just out of luck if you let it develop fully. Your nose will pitch up and you will roll to the left. Any corrective cyclic movement will more than likely aggrevate the situation and you will certainly land with a resounding clang in probably a most undesirable attitude. However lets look at the bright side of it. As there is adequate stall warning in a fixed wing aircraft there is adequate blade stall warning in a rotary wing aircraft. The warning in both types of aircraft is similar. A roughness of control, a shuddering of the entire aircraft and if uncorrected a final uncontrollable oscillation of the aircraft. The factors that lead us into this particularly nasty condition are these:

High gross weights, high altitudes, high power with relatively low rotor RPM, high temperature, high angle of bank and abrupt maneuvers that increase the "G" load factor. Sound familiar?

High gross weights. Our birds with a crew of 4, the armor plate, two M=60's, normal survival equipment, and 800 lbs of fuel gross out at 11,000 lbs. Let's throw 4 troops with weapons, in the belly for this overfly and bring our total gross weight up to 12,000 lbs.

High altitude. Back in "injun" country to avoid enemy ground fire you will probably fly around 3500 pressure altitude.

High power and relatively low rotor RFM. Lets just make an estimate about 35" map and 2400 RFM while trying to save gas and the engine.

High temperature. That s no secret around here. On the deck if its  $40^{\circ}$ C its about  $25^{\circ}$ C at 3500 ft.

High angle of bank. The recon team leader down in the belly always wants a second look at that zone you just passed, and if you are #2 man you have to cut to the inside of the leader to keep up with him. Lets say a 360 abrupt maneuver. (I know all the HAC's are extremely smooth but we have to give the aircraft to the copilots once in awhile).

So put all these quite common factors together, dig out page 4-3 of the NATOPS MANUAL and lets see what you get. Right again hobin! About 74

That 74 kts gents is the onset of blade stall. You've got 10 more kts to go before you get in to drag divergence. That means if you rolled into your bank with 85-90 kts you're very apt to do your first and only bona fide "Octer Flugeroon."

Before we examine the corrective measures for blade stall lets look at a few simple preventive measures. The simplest way to approach the problem is reduce all the values you can on the chart to afford a more comfortable margin. Obviously you can't do much about the temp and I'm certainly not going to recommend flying any lower. I don't like those bullet holes anymore than the rest of you. The gross weight? We have to do the job and carry what we can. The ones we can limit however affect our safe margin dramatically. Fly the lower air speed. 75 kts is not unreasonable, keep your turns up at 2500 RPM at altitude, and lastly limit yourself to 150 angle of bank. If you still persist in pushing yourself into a blade stall condition then its time to turn to page 4-2 of NATOPS and memorize the following four steps:

- Increase RFM (when possible)
   Gradually decrease collective
- 3. Gradually decrease severity of the maneuver (angle of bank)
- 4. Gradually decrease airspeed

I stress the gradually because, if you have already entered mild blade stall, any abrupt movement will aggrevate it. Those are the corrective measures. With just a little thought on the prevention side you will never have to use them.

#### WHO DONE IT.

When Cheops built his pyramid of mortar, stone and brick, He thought he'd put a night shift on and do the job up quick. But government inspectors found a lot of work unsound And salled the superintendent in to show him what they found. The big boss looked upon the scrap and grief was in his gaze, He sadly shook his head and said, "We don't do that on days",

The leaning tower of Pisa is a wonder to behold, But here's a little inside dope that never has been told; It's a very ancient story that forever runs the same: "The day shift didn't do it; tis the night shift thats to blame". On those very ancient blueprints, a tower straight is seen, But bungling on the night shift made the leaning tower lean.

Taken from Approach

# CHU LAI CROSSWIND RUNWAY AND SATS CATAPULT

# Submitted by Marine Aircraft Group-12

During the coming North-East monsoon period we can expect here at Chu Lai increased operations off of our crosswind runway. For those new pilots to this area and for any divert pilots who may happen to be here during the crosswind use, this command would, in the interest of Safety, like to pass on some useful information concerning the operations and procedures involved. This is primarily for information and should you ever need the crosswind runway MAG-12 will give you a complete brief to any launches.

# 1. The Crosswind Runway

The crosswind runway is 4777 ft in length, 72 in width with an AM-2 surface. The elevation at the catapult is 15 ft.

# 2. The Catapult

The CE-1-3 Shore based expeditionary catapult is powered by two (2) J-79 Turbo jet engines. The engines furnish power to a free turbine which is coupled through a gear box to a capstan. The capstan furnishes power to an endless (spliced) steel cable. That provides for a launch stroke up to 1650 ft. The principle employed is similar to a ski tow operation. Bidirectional launches are possible, however, due to local terrain conditions, only launches to the East will be conducted.

# 3. Aircraft Positioning and Launches

The nose wheel of the aircraft is positioned on the "Launch Dolly" which is held captive to the power cable during the launch stroke. In preparation for a launch stroke the cable is held motionless by a brake mechanism. The aircraft is attached to the dolly and placed under tension through aircraft holdback and bridling systems. When the catapult jet engines throttles are advanced (In conjunction with the aircraft power) the hold back mechanism becomes separated and the aircraft is accelerated to a preplanned launch speed which has been computed in the catapult console. As the aircraft rotates, the hylon bridle falls free from the aircraft. The dolly continues in the direction of launch until it strikes the tensioned terminal arrestor ropes. Upon striking these ropes, the dolly becomes disengaged from the cable and is automatically returned to the battery end at which time it is caught and held by another set of hylon arrestor ropes. The dolly is released and repositioned and the catapult is ready for the next aircraft launch.

# 4. Techniques

The plane director (Yellow Shirt) will direct the pilot to taxi his aircraft in the direction of the dolly. At a predetermined point a tiller bar will be inserted in the aircraft nose wheel to facilitate directional control. The importance of having the aircraft positioned in the dolly area correctly cannot be overemphasized. Although all areas that the aircraft will travel are ramped, careful use of aircraft power will ensure a smooth, non-interrupted approach to the bridling and tensioning operations. When the aircraft nose wheel is positioned on the launch dolly the hold back and hold back bar (Tension Bar) are applied at this time the plane director will signal the pilot to gradually add power in order to remove slack from the nold back cable. The bridle is then attached from the hook up point on the dolly to the conventional CAT hooks on the aircraft. At this time the plane director signals to the deck edge man for tension to be taken. After tension has been taken the plane director relinquishes control to the catapult officer (Yellow Shirt). The catapult officer, upon taking control signals a 2 finger windup at which time the pilot accelerates his engine to 100%. By a series of light signals the catapult is brought to a final ready condition. The catapult officer continues a 2 finger windup and upon receiving a right hand salute from the pilot indicating that he is ready, the catapult officer points in the direction of launch. Upon receiving this signal, the console operator energizes the "fire" switch which launches the aircraft. The pilot should hold full forward stick until he observes the cut off lights which are located to the left at approximately the 1,000 foot marker, turn from "Green" to "Amber". Upon receiving the "Amber" signal the pilot rotates the aircraft. Caution if the pilot attempts to rotate prior to observing amber signal the aircraft will try to fly with the dolly still attached to the aircraft and a shredded bridle and resultant damage to catapult is possible.

# Notes

- 1. All control personnel will wear the color "Yellow" displayed prominently.
- 2. A safety NCO will be in the area at all times to ensure safety measures are complied with.
- 3. A quick release feature can be employed if it becomes necessary to remove an aircraft from the dolly after tension has been taken. The quick release mechanism is located in the holdback assembly. The pilot retards throttle to idle, the release mechanism is released which disengages the hold back assembly causing the bridle to fall free. The aircraft is then taxied off the dolly and away from the battery end.
- 4. Alf "Suspend" operations become necessary the signal is given by crossing arms above head.
- 5. In the event a premature launch or "Cold" catapult shot occurs and the aircraft is between the returning dolly and the battery end, it is

mandatory that the pilot taxi/steer the aircraft to the right in order to remain clear of returning dolly.

- 6. An M-21 arresting gear is installed on the East end of the X-wind runway to be used for emergencies only.
- 7. Launching bulletins will be made available and will be discussed with pilots prior to using the catapult.
- 8. All hand and arm signals are standard aircraft carrier type signals.

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# THE KEY IS YOU

"Xvxn though my typxwritxr is an old modxl it works quitx wxll except for onx of thx kxys. I wishxd many times that it worked perfectly. It is true that there are forty six kxys that function wxll xnough, but just one kxy not working makes the difference.

You may say to yoursxlf, "Wxll I am only onx pxrson. I won't make or break a program." But it does make a difference because a safety program to be afficient needs the participation of every employee.

So the next time you think you are only one person and that your efforts are not needed remember my typewriter and say to yourself, "I am a key person in our safety program and I am needed very much."

The HOT DOPE Sheet April 1967

# COMBAT AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORTING CG, FMFPac msg 160417Z Aug 67

- "A. OPNAVINST 3750.6F

  1. PARA 22B OF REF A GIVES TIME LIMIT OF THIRTY (30) DAYS FOR SUBMISSION AAR AND MOR.
- 2. THIS PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO CIVE REPORTED GUSTODIAN THERTY (30) DAYS FROM DATE OF ACCIDENT TO DATE OF SUBMISSION.

# "ONE OF OUR BEST"

Frank K. Everest, Jr.
Brigadier General, United States Air Force
Director of Aerospace Safety

IT WOULD BE HARD even to guess at the number of times I have heard this expression used to describe a person involved in an accident. Usually, there is a bewildered expression on the speaker's face; always, there is some head shaking by the others in the group. To them it is patently impossible that "one of our best" could ever trigger or ever have an accident.

Could it be that this is exactly why the man was involved? We recognize and we take the most stringent safety precautions to protect ourselves and our people from the potential dangers of inexperience. But what is done to guard against the potential dangers of experience? Statistics show that the trend of accidents moves progressively downward as the experience increases. But, only to a certain point. The trend then tends to level off.

The belief that experience is often its own worst enemy is generally accepted-by all, that is, but those with the most experience. Is there any "one of our best" who will ever admit to complacency or inattention, particularly where it concerns critical maintenance of high-performance equipment or aircraft? Yet for every case in which a technician was turned loose on an assignment beyond his experience level, there could well be another instance in which "one of our best" was too confident and too complacent at a decisive point in the work or the inspection. It should be understood that experience carries with it much of the same disaster potential that is too often associated only with inexperience.

One of many examples concerns a highly qualified pilot, cross-country in a first-line fighter, who lost his TACAN, the only nav aid aboard. The weather ahead was clear and he was under radar control, so he elected to press on. Sure enough, destination weather closed in. Radar control brought him down, but he recognized the risk and asked himself in all honesty: What would I have done had I lost my radio? Here is a vivid case of an unwise decision traceable to the complacency/experience combination.

How many pilots, how many times, have been contentedly cruising along at altitude and suddenly realized that the ejection seat safety pin was still in place? If an engine had failed at takeoff, the most critical time of the flight, the pilot would have been trapped in the cockpit. Inexperience leading to forgetfulness, or experience leading to complacency; the result would have been exactly the same.

In the face of the strict definition, most maintenance men (and most everybody else) would sincerely deny that they are influenced by obvious complacency and indifference. But these are deceptive attitudes, and not easily recognized. It is not as simple as contrasting conscientious, devoted work with carelessness or inattention. These attitudes relate to the grey area between the extremes, and the many shades of the grey. There is a point between the variations at which most people are vulnerable, and can easily

fall victim to the dangers represented by the attitudes.

For a maintenance man it may begin the day he gives a quick look, instead of careful attention to the check list which by now he may consider routine. As the months or years roll by and he gains experience, he may unconsciously lose the fine touch of meticulous attention to detail, even while he faithfully follows the prescribed motions and procedures. Eventually a fuel line may not be reconnected, or a bolt not sufficiently tightened. "One of our best" has stepped back across the narrow line that divides the conscientious professional from the heedless amateur.

This is but one of the problems of experience. If we recognize the others, we can whip them. But first we must forget any philosophy that says with experience comes immunity from error. From there we must go on to accept the clear fact that the spread between conscientiousness and complacency is the finest of distinctions calling for the finest of consistency applied to every job.

It Takes "all of the best" to do it.

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### MAINTAINANCE NOTES

Ever notice the reaction of a man being shown a hot item - like the promotion list, for instance. Chances are that after you've show it to him - he looked - read - yet snatched it from your hand and said "Let me see it." What he meant is - Let me feel it. He wanted to confirm with another of his senses that he did in fact see it. He wanted to be sure.

This brings us to the point we'd like to make. How often have you even after a second look decided to feel for a cotter pin to make sure it was in place? From experience we know that complex arrangements of push rods, links and bellcranks tend to blend together as one color. This situation coupled with eye-strain makes the possibility of overlooking the elusive cotter pin even greater. As in the case of the promotion list, when it comes to checking cotter pin installations - make sure you "SEE" it - feel it.....

Taken from APPROACH

# BASIC ATTITUDE

The potential danger of jet wash and wing tip vortices as described herein is minor compared to the cause of the pilot's difficulty.

The crews of a scheduled three plane F-4B division were briefed for an ordnance hop, and the takeoff set for 1400. The first two aircraft made normal, uneventful takeoffs. At 1407 our pilot released his brakes and added power.

The takeoff run was normal until immediatly after the aircraft became airborne. As the gear broke the deck the pilot encountered jet wash, so he initiated a turn to the right to get clear. At full afterburner power, gear down, the starboard wing began to drop. The pilot countered with opposite aileron. The wing continued to drop and full left stick seemed to have no effect.

At 100 and 120 kts, in a 30-degree bank with the nose 45 degrees above the horizon, the pilot assumed that the aircraft had become uncontrol-lable and ordered the RIO to eject.

Immediately after the RIO ejected the pilot was able to level his wings, gain airspeed and continue to climb. Slow flight tests subsequently showed no control difficulties and a safe landing was effected.

Severe injury to the RIO and a near accident had occurred because the fundamentals of flight were momentarily forgotten or disregarded. Then he encountered the jet wash at listoff the pilot tried to avoid it instead of continuing straight ahead in an effort to attain maneuvering speed. Acceleration was further hampered by the pilot's failure or inability to; (1) reduce the angle of attack and, (2) raise the gear. By turning out of the jet wash he had increased lift required at a most critical and inopportune time.

His CO concluded that: "In view of the apparent disregard of aeronautical fundamentals by the pilot, the primary cause factor is considered to be COMPLACENCY."

TAKEN FROM APPROACH June 1967

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You need survival gear or another insurance agent.

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# WEATHER OUTLOOK FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER By lstLt B. K. MOORE lst MAW METEOROLOGIST

Climatic Brief: During the first half of September all of Southeast Asia remains under the influence of the southwest monsoon. Traces of the northeast monsoon begin to appear later in the month, but areas affected are mostly north of 16° N latitude in North Vietnam and Laos. This is the beginning of the autumn transition season; the period when neither monsoonal flow is predominant, and the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ICZ) begins it's southward trek. The autumn transition is the shortest of the four seasons and usually lasts from mid-September to mid-October.

Low Level Operations (2000:, 3mi): During September there are 22 to 27 days favorable for low level operations along the coastal sections of I Corps. Over the mountains and the eastern slopes there are an average of 7 to 15 days favorable in the afternoons and evenings. Morning restrictions are mainly due to fog and stratus in the mountain valleys with convective cloudiness accounting for the afternoon restrictions.

Mid Level Operations (5000', 5 mi): From the coast to 15 to 20 miles inland there are 20 to 25 favorable days for mid-level operations. Over the remainder of I Corps there are 2 to 5 days in the morning hours and 10 to 15 days favorable for mid-level operations during the afternoon and evening.

Winds: Heralding the approach of the northeast monsoon, northerly to northeasterly winds, predominate north of 16° N latitude. South of 16° N latitude prevailing direction is westerly. Mean speeds continue to decrease, but local surface winds, both direction and speeds, are influenced by local topography and can deviate significantly from mean winds. Channeling can be expected in the mountain regions where valleys or passes face the prevailing wind, particularly those close to coastal sections. South of 16° N a westerly flow predominates to about 20,000 feet. Above this altitude northeasterlies prevail.

Precipitation: September is the beginning of the wet season for the coastal regions of I Corps and the panhandle of North Vietnam. Actually its the latter part of September, normally that kicks off the wet season which will continue through March. From the DMZ southward to just north of Danang and inland for about 20 miles, 20 to 24 inches of rain is normally accumulated, with the Dong Ha area amounting to 25 inches of rain. From Danang to Chu Lai and inland for 30 miles, then northwestward to the Laos border, 15 to 17 inches are accumulated. In all other areas of I Corps, the normal amount of rain for September is 10 to 15 inches.

Temperature: The average maximum temperature in the eastern portion of I Corps is in the high eighties while the average minimum temperature is in the mid-seventies. In the western portion, the maximum temperature is in the low eighties and the average minimum is in the low seventies.

Relative Humidity: During September the mean relative humidity is 84%, this is 7% greater than August average. The higher elevations are often obscured in convective cloudiness.

Thunderstorms: Five to ten days are classified as thunderstorm days throughout I Corps. From Vinh northward along the coast to the coast of China thunderstorms occur on 10 to 15 days.

Sea Temperatures: The average sea surface temperature is 82°F off southern I Corps northward through the Gulf of Tonkin.

Currents: A weak surface sea current flows northward from 14° 30'N to 17°N and continues northward in the eastern portion of the Gulf of Tonkin. In the northern Gulf of Tonkin the current flows southwestward to 17°N.

Typhoon and Tropical Storms: September is the month of maximum typhoon activity in the Western Pacific. From 1947 through 1965 a total of 27 tropical storms, 13 of which reached typhoon intensity, formed in or moved into the South China Sea. Sixteen of these storms were close enough to Southeast Asia to adversely affect the weather with strong winds, torrential rains and some flooding. Eight storms, including 2 of typhoon intensity, moved inland over North Vietnam and 2 subsequently reached the Laotian border. Four storms, one of typhoon intensity, moved onshore over the northern part of the Republic of Vietnam and three continued on into Central Laos.

Moon Phase: New Moon, 4 Sept; First Qtr, 11 Sept; Full Moon, 18 Sept; Last Qtr, 26 Sept.

# Lunar Illumination (%):

1234567	15 08 03 00 00 03 09	11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.	60 70 79 87 93 97	22: 23: 24: 25: 26: 27:	90 84 77 68 59 49
8.	17	18.	91 99	28.	39
9.	27	19.		29.	29
<b>TO</b> *	37	20.	98	30°	20

FLIGHT EQUIPMENT NOTES

By

LT. William M. Darnell

Wing Flight Equipment Officer

# 1. PK Type Liferafts

"As a result of numerous investigations by the Aerospace Crew Equipment Laboratory (ACEL), ballast bags have been incorporated as a standard design accessory on production contracts with an approximate manufacture date of June 1965 and subsequent for all PK type liferafts. A ballast bag is cemented on both sides of the floor at the aft end of the raft. It consists of a slotted pocket which is designed to retain sea water. The ballast bags have three main purposes:

(a) To aid in raft boarding.

(b) To increase the stability of the raft in a seaway.

(c) To preclude the raft from becoming airborne during helicopter pick up, thereby minimizing the possibility of raft-rotor entanglement.

"Currently only newly procured PK type rafts have the ballast bags; however, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) is conducting a study to determine the costs and feasibility of providing ballast bag kits for possible retrofit action by Fleet activities. Upon completion of the NAVAIRSYSCOM studies, information regarding any retrofit action will be disseminated to all concerned."

--Naval Air Engineering Center letter C-714:WJZ:jmc, 3100 (1) a-200 (8850) dated 16 May 1967 refers--

2. Wire Escape and Evasion Saw (Part of the SEEK-1 and SEEK-2 Kits)

The wire escape and evasion saw will cut easily in any direction. However, for the most efficient operation, use as follows:

- a. Keep blade taut and straight; work movement of arms as though one arm was spring-loaded and the other pulled the blade.
- b. Short strokes are most effective; only use as much of the blade as needed.
  - c. Light pressure is best; heavy pressure will jam and kink the blade.
  - d. Avoid sharp bends.
- e. Metal and wood can be severed with ease if strokes are true in direction.
- f. If the end lug is unscrewed, the blade can be fished through tiny holes in partitions or bulkheads, etc.

A bow saw can be fashioned by using a length of a sapling slightly longer than the wire saw, and fastening the rings to the sapling in the same manner as an archer's bow.

# 3. WHAT TO DO WITH PARACHUTES THAT HAVE BEEN USED

A reminder on disposition of parachutes and related equipment that has been used during emergency ejections and bailouts. The following information is taken from the PARACHUTE MANUAL (NW 13-5-501, Section I, paragraphs 1-38 and 1-39):

- 1-38: "Parachutes and actuators which have been recovered following emergency bailout or ejection shall be removed from stock and turned in to the nearest supply activity on an exchange basis. The turned in parachute shall be shipped to the Commanding Officer, Naval Aerospace Recovery Facility, El Centro, California, marked 'For Naval Aerospace Recovery Facility Evaluation and Testing"
- 1-39: "To provide the Naval Aerospace Facility with sufficient information to properly evaluate and improve these parachutes for service use, a brief summary of the ejection or bailout shall be enclosed with each parachute turned in after emergency use. This summary shall contain the following information:
  - a. Activity.
  - b. Date, time and place of the emergency escape.
  - c. Serial number of parachute assembly and automatic actuator.
  - d. The name, rank or rate of the involved personnel.
  - e. Type of aircraft, the altitude and airspeed if known.
  - f. Was the emergency exit successful in all respects/if not, list the difficulties encountered.
  - g. Did the parachute and automatic actuator function properly?
  - h. Remarks or additional information as deemed appropriate.

### 4. NOMEX FLIGHT GLOVES

Proper nomenclature of the Nomex Flight Glove is as follows: Gloves, Summer, Flying Type, CS/FRP-1 (NOMEX/LEATHER). These gloves were developed to supersede all the following gloves which have been available through regular supply channels over the past two years:

- a. Gloves, Flying, Summer Type B-3A, cream color
- b. Gloves, Flying, Leather, Summer, Type B-3A, grey color
- c. Gloves, Flight Personnel HAU-7/P, cotton leather

Action is currently underway to establish the type GS/FRP-1 summer flying glove as a standard supply item through Defense Personnel Support Center. The federal stock number will be provided when assigned. (COMNAVAIRPAC NOTE 13000 dtd 10 March 67 refers).

# 5. SHROUD LINES AND COLLAPSED PARACHUTE CANOPIES

After pulling the face curtain, finding out that all the egress systems worked as advertised and enjoying the nice parachute ride into the water - its a very frightening experience to find yourself under a collapsed parachute canopy and what seems like a million shroud lines just waiting to get all entangled with you and your survival equipment. A person finding himself in a situation like this could easily become alarmed and jeopardize his chances for survival frantically trying to remove the canopy by thrashing around with his arms and kicking his feet. All motions like those are just asking for trouble. Remaining calm, with your lifevest inflated of course, and keeping your legs still you can get from beneath the canopy by pulling it from one direction, right over your head. Once you are clear of the canopy you can start on the shroud lines. Your shroud cutter is very effective and even more so when a little tension is applied to the line you are cutting.

Just remember......KEEP COOL.....DON'T LET THOSE SHROUD LINES GET YOU!!!

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## BAREHEADED

A pilot, flying with his helmet strap fully loose and his oxygen mask inserted in the left Sierra fitting only, had to eject at a very low altitude immediately after take-off. His helmet flew off on ejection and he sustained a severe cerebral concussion on the ground impact. When he was found his hard hat was 30 yards back down the line of flight.

"Because the pilot did not have his helmet chin strap cinched snugly," the investigating flight surgeon reported, he lost his head protection on ejection. He habitually did not cinch his chin strap. The chin strap must be cinched to insure head protection and should remain so throughout every flight. "Neither did this pilot have his oxygen mask on," the flight surgeon continued. "In this particular situation it was of no significance except that it was just one more routine function that the pilot was too hasty to perform, perhaps just one more irritation. Nevertheless, NATOPS dictates that the oxygen mask must be worn properly on all jet flights. In an acute emergency situation with almost reflex ejection, the mask is of no use or protection against facial burns or other injuries if it is dangling from one fitting or lying in the lap. Further, the advantages of preoxygenation are lost." The pilot will be hospitalized an estimated six to eight months.

APPROACH Apr67

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Safety in depth requires that each man: acknowledge the effect his work may have on others; lay aside his apathy in the face of routine; apply himself to the limits of his ability; and have enough respect in himself to profit from the experience and direction of just supervision.

# 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Aviation Safety Officers as of 15 August 1967

- \* Major B. T. LADD
- \* Capt. P. G. FARRELL
  - Capt. B. G. RUTLEDGE
- \* Major J. N. KEATHLEY
- \* Major H. C. DEWEY
- \* Major J. R. DAILEY
- \* Major G. HARLAN
  - Major E. SAHAYDAK
- \* Capt. A. TANZMAN
- Capt. B. G. BUTCHER
  - Major V. H. BACIK
- \* Capt. H. F. PYLE
  - Capt. F. L. HATTON
  - Major C. R. ALEXANDER
- \* Capt. J. K. ALBRIGHT
- \* Major D. W. HENDERSON
- \* Major J. E. CARROLL
- \* Major C. R. CHELIUS
  - Capt. L. DELMORE III
  - Capt. J. E. BARR
- \* Capt. P. E. WALTON
- \* Capt. R. T. RANDALL
- \* Major J. L. PIPA
- \* Major F. L. YOHE
  - Major W. T. READ
  - Hajor G. L. LARKIN
- \* Major C. L. SMITH
  - Capt. B. F. MCMILLIAN

Major W. P. ARNOLD

\* Indicates USC School Trained

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Marine Aircraft Group 11

Marine Fighter (AW) Squadron 232

Marine Fighter (AW) Squadron 235

Marine Fighter (AW) Squadron 242

Marine Composite/Reconnaissance

Squadron 1

Marine Aircraft Group 12

Marine Attack Squadron 211

Marine Attack Squadron 223

Marine Attack Squadron 311

Marine Attack (AW) Squadron 533

Marine Aircraft Group 13

Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron 115

Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron 314

Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron 542

Marine Aircraft Group 16

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463

Marine Observation Squadron 2

Marine Observation Squadron 3

Marine Aircraft Group 36

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263

Marine Observation Squadron 6

Marine Wing Service Group 17

5. F-8E A/D POSSIBLE THROTTLE ON CABLE FAILURE

MATERIAL FAILURE

Upon completion of a TPQ run the wingman of a flight of two noted a slight resistance to throttle movement in the 90 to 93 percent RPM range. As the leader turned, the wingman increased throttle and turned with him, but the engine did not respond. The pilot noted no apparent resistance to throttle movement at this time. A check of the instruments revealed the RPM at 90 percent and decreasing; EGT was 500 degrees and also decreasing. The wingman reported he was losing power and turned to head for the sea. He established a 225-250 knot glide and attempted a high RPM airstart in normal fuel control. During this attempt the APC switch was held on but the engine did not respond. The pilot placed the throttle in idle and noted the fuel flow guage was indicating zero. He extended the Emergency Power Package (EPP) and selected manual fuel control. Another unsuccessful air start attempt was made in manual fuel control. The throttle was left in the idle position and the pilot "thumbed" the ignitor, but the engine continued to lose RFM and EGT.

At 6000 feet the pilot decided to eject, turned the aircraft away from populated areas, gave his position, brought the aircraft into a nose up attitude and pulled the face curtain. The canopy left the aircraft immediatly, but the face curtain seemed to hang up on the pilot's helmet. The pilot bent his head down against his right shoulder and pulled again. This time he was ejected at approximately 4000 feet. Seat separation and parachute deployment were normal. The pilot was rescued by helicopter in ten minutes.

Due to the inaccessibility of the aircraft in hostile territory, investigation of the wreckage was not possible. Therefore, the exact cause of the accident could not be determined, however, the most probable cause was considered by the board to be failure of the Throttle On Gable, (P/N NAS 313-16-730), causing the fuel control to retard to the idle cut off position.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

# ARE YOU STANDARDIZED OR MECHANIZED ?

By Major Herbert H. Guderian, USA

From the day you got into the aviation program, you've heard the terms "mechanical flying" and "standardization." It was constantly pitched at you, "Don't be mechanical and by all means get standardized." So, lets examine these terms and see how they apply to pilots.

You've seen the precise individual who is unvarying in his method of executing any specific mansuver. Like, by the numbers, man; so you point your finger of derision at him and say, "He is a mechanical pilot." But have you ever seen him have an accident that was caused by some mistake he made? By the same token, how prepared is he to cope with an emergency situation for which he hasn't rehearsed all the numbers?

Our next specimen under the microscope is the "Tiger." You know, the guy who flies an airplane as if it were made of case hardened steel. A real throttlebender. He's the one who lands shorter, takes off onicker and flies lower over the treetops than anyone else. You point the same derisive digit at him and say, "He is a nut. He is looking for a place to become a catastrophe." Of him you say, "He's not standardized."

Our third subject bears the name and demeanor faintly resembling Caspar Milquetoast. He's the timid soul, the go-around champ of the base. He flies his bird as if it were an assemblage of balsa wood and tissue paper, precariously held together with glus. No chance taker, never an accident in his long career but his fair share of precautionary landings. "No guts, you sneer. You gotta be aggressive," You can't really tell if he's mechanical or over-standardized.

Last we have the average pilot, the one who is part of the large majority of the Army's aviators. He's the journeyman, well schooled, level headed, the man who goes out periodically and plactices basic flying. He passes his first instrument check because he stays current. His commander feels confident when he sends him out on a mission. We point at him and say proudly, "That's my idea of a pilot." We never hang that nasty handle "mechanical pilot" on him. Of course, he is standardized.

A rough interpretation of Webster's definition of mechanical: machine-like, automatic, as if from force of habit, lacking spontaneity, expression or intelligence.

Now, here's an eye opener. A general definition of standardization: to make standard or uniform, cause to be without variations or irregularities. Doesn't sound like there's too much difference. Our precise friend fits that " cause to be without variation" to a tee. So he must be standardized. But "machinelike" fits him too. So, what is he?

Our "tiger" certainly doesn't meet the requirements of "mechanical." And I dare say he isn't exactly standard either.

Old Caspar seems to incorporate some traits from each category.

Lat's face one basic fact about flying. After you've met the exacting requirements demanded by your flight instructor, and you've been turned loose with your new silver win's. Your personality comes to the fore. The day after you braduate, you begin to develop a thing called technique. There is no one way to fly an airplane. Forget what Webster says. It's your way to fly your bird. By the book definition, you are neither mechanized nor standardized.

I offer you my definition of me hanical flying and standardization. I base these definitions on a background of seven years of IPing in the U=6, five years as an instructor examiner, four years as a U-8 IP, and the teachings of instructor pilots I have known.

Mechanical flying is flying by rote. It's flying by the numbers because it was taught that way. What was good three years ago in flight school is good today. You know exactly as much about your aircraft and your own capabilities as you did then.

Standardization, to me, is flying within the limitations of your aircraft and your own self-analyzed aspabilities. It's the practice of respecting forces on the bird. It's keeping the engine power within the limits prescribed by the engineers who designed to It's experimenting after calculating.

We grown with apprehension when we face a stan-ride and say, "That nasty old IP is going to tell me I don't know how to fly this machine." We try to second-guess the IP and fly the way we think he would. In reality, that IP wants to see your technique, how you do it. Is it safe? Is it within the limits for long aircraft, engine and pilot life?

There are some quaint old expressions we can use at this point? "There's more than one way to skin a cat" and "You have to learn to walk before you can run." Applied to flying, both are filled with meaning. There are more ways to fly than just one, but you do need to learn one way first.

The next time you self-analyze your flying, ask yourself if you do something because you were told it was the best way, or because you've satisfied yourself that it really is. If you have an unvarying routine you go through on base leg, is it because the book says to do it or because it's a technique that suits you and helps you and serves as an assist to your timing and pattern adjustment?

It's possible to be mechanical, standardized and individualistic all at the same time. If it makes you a better, safer pilot, don't knock it, Buddy. Those millionnile airlane pilots have been getting by for years that way.

Reprinted From USA AVIATION DIGEST May 1967

# IT'S HOT, HIGH AND HUMID

The following Anymouse was submitted by a 1st MAW Helo Squadron in June of 1966 and appeared in that issue of Approach. It vividly points out how the above factors can affect helo performance and in this case in very hostile terrain.

"While on standby for SAR we got the word to launch two H-34 helos for a downed pilot pickup. Upon alert, my leader and I sent our crews and copilots out to the aircraft while he and I briefed as best we could. When plotting the available bearings on the chart we realized we would be going North to a classified area.

After getting airborne and on course we soon made contact with our cover aircraft and flew into the pickup area with no trouble. Upon reaching the crash scene we spotted the open chute of the downed pilot and made radio contact with him on his survival radio.

The situation dictated a hoist pickup. The pilot was standing on a tree limb about 80 ft. from the tree tops and about 100 ft. above the ground. As the hoist in the leader's helo was found to be malfunctioning, I was told to go down and attempt the pickup.

Because of the altitude, about 3000 ft., the leader cautioned me to watch my rotor turns and I made my approach so as to leave enough room for a hover over open terrain.

I gradually slid into position so I could drop the heist. Upon reaching zero kts indicated I stopped the rate of descent to check my hovering capability. Using about 2700 turns and 17% MAP I had no rate of descent but was drifting slightly left. The downed pilot was on the leeward slope of a ridge and about the time I put in cyclic control to stop the drift we hit the downdraft of the ridge.

We picked up a rate of descent. I wrapped on a few more turns and went to his inches, which was max power. I couldn't stop the sink rate and my turns started falling off so I lowered the collective to regain the turns, but that just increased the rate of descent.

We were soon hitting tree foliage but I remembered a small ravine to my left and I decided to try to keep it flying. Reaching the ravine area I lowered the nose to regain speed. I guess we were down about four or five hundred feet into the ravine (trees above us on both sides) until there was enough airspeed for recovery.

The aircraft suffered blade damage on all main and tail rotor blades from hitting the trees and there were a couple of gouges in the fuselage to boot.

We bumped up to altitude and vectored in two turbine choppers to make the pickup then departed for home and repairs. Possible prevention could have been to check maximum power available. I didn't realize I could draw 48 inches and that extra bit might have helped if used soon enough. Also I could have gotten rid of a 300-pound raft that we had in the belly. Lastly I could have made sure I was hovering for my check instead of keeping my sideward motion.

MARTCOM BULL 3750 of 22 May 67

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# ADMINISTATIVE NOTES

- 1. Occasionally mail addressed to CG, FMFPAC is received at this command. In most cases the error in delivery can be attributed to incorrect addressing. CG, FMFPAC ZIP code is 96610.
- 2. Some 1stMAW units not located in the Da Nang area continue to airmail reports to the Wing. Airmail takes up to 10 days to receive while Guard Mail is usually received in 24 hours. Use of Guard Mail facilities is encouraged.
- 3. The abreviated Incident/Ground Accident Report format is not to be used by units in a combat area. See paragraph 22.a.(2) on page 13 of OpNav Inst. 3750.6F for the proper reporting instructions.
- 4. A pilot information sheet is required by FMFPAC Order 3750.5D for all mishaps wherein Pilot factor was involved, even though it may have been classed as "Direct Enemy Action".
- 5. Only major accidents (ALFA & CHARLIE damage) are included in a unit's accident rate.
- 6. Damage incurred by aircraft as a result of an enemy mortar or rocket attack while sitting on the ground is reportable by a FLASH report and a MESSAGE report.

### AAR FORMS

The following is quoted from CpNav Inst. 3750.6F.

"a. A supply of OPNAV Form 3750-1 (AAR), OPNAV Form 3750-8 (MOR), and OPNAV Form 3750-13 (Rescue Report) may be requisitioned from the cognizance symbol "I" (FPSO) Stock Points in accordance with S & A Publication 2002.

b. A supply of worksheets (OPNAV Form 3750-1) and preprinted stencils (OPNAV Form 3750-1A) will be ordered separately according to the requirements of the activity concerned. Requests for preprinted stencils should be held to minimum stock requirements due to the tendency of stencils to dry out in storage, making them unusable.

## MATERIAL FACTOR ACCIDENTS

Material factor accidents have been very prominent in briefs carried in recent issues of the Weekly Summary. From January 1967 through the end of May there have been 97 major aircraft accidents attributed to this cause factor, or over forty percent of all reported Navy major aircraft accidents. Comparison with recent years statistics reveals that there has been a steady climb in material cause factor accidents both in number and percent of total as follows:

# FISCAL YEARS

ć	3	61		(*************************************	6 <b>5</b>	6	6	67 (t	hrough Ma	<u>y</u> )
No .	%	No.	76	No.	*	No.	<b>%</b>	No.	%	_
120	23.3	146	29 <b>.3</b>	3بلا	31.3	156	32.7	167	36.5	

Most failures of aircraft equipment do not cause accidents. When possible, redundancy is provided for critical systems and components that could cause the loss of the aircraft. However, even in redundant and more critical systems, failures decrease safety margins and often increase work loads on the aircraw.

The design of a military aircraft has always been a compromise. Performance, reliability, size, weight, maintainability and cost are a few of the more widely known factors which are played one against another until a practical weapons system is evolved.

To say that military aircraft are designed to fail would be an exaggeration. However, it should be recognized that aircraft designers recognize that their designs are not infallible. For this reason, redundancy is provided; for the same reason pilots receive hours of training until emergency procedures are on the habit level of response.

Almost every part of an aircraft has a MTEF, mean time between failure, established for it. The joker in the deck is that first word "Mean" or average. Just because a MTEF is 1000 hours, there is absolutely NO reason to expect all samples of that part to go 1000 hours. Some will go longer but others will not make that level, because there is no way to guarantee that each part's exposure to wear or stress is identical.

The failure of a part or system in service does not automatically indicate poor performance on the part of the Maintenance Department. Even a series of identical failures in a squadron does not necessarily point to deficiencies but possibly to the exposure of all the squadrons aircraft to a more severe operating environment than the average.

What a part or system failure SHOULD point to is the need for a report. Hopefully, this can be as routine as a UR. At the worst the failure could require an AAR. In either case the report is a MUST. Only when all failures are reported do the MTBF statistics become meaningful.

In some areas there is a misguided belief that there is some sort of stigma attached to the reporting of unsatisfactory material or equipment, the requesting of engineering analysis, or the investigation of a minor mishap from which a lesson could be learned. This condition exists even though all senior commands have repeatedly encouraged these reports and one commander noted, unfavorably, a squadron especially lax in reporting.

Give the entire aviation organization the benefit of your experience. Make it routine in your organization for meaningful reports to be made as simply and as often as possible.

NASC WEEKLY SUMMARY, 12-18 June 67

"It was one of those nights. The CRUSADER jockey spread his wings prior to leaving the line and enroute to the duty had to fold them to permit a civilian jet liner to pass. On takeoff, he noted his speed was normal but the take-off roll distance was excessive. After liftoff, the gear was raised and the nose seemed to be sensitive in yew and pitch. At about 200-300 foot altitude after the wing was lowered, the machine commenced a series of large pitch and yew evolutions. (PC-1 and PC-2 were fluctuating 800 pounds.)

Recognizing the dilemma at hand, the credulous CRUSADER driver attempted to lock the wing but could not get the locking handle to move into the forward locking detent. Meanwhile, airspeed had built to 260 knots and altitude to 4,600 feet. The driver then raised the wing and started a shallow right turn back towards the field, dumping fuel on routs. (Angle of attack in the turn was approximately 14 units.)

Altitudes, airspeeds, and angle of attack from here on in are not accurately recalled as this pilotos main concern was getting it back on the rurway.

Just before touchdown, the incredulous performer realized the landing gear had not been extended and placed the gear handle in the down position. Too late—the boneyard bound bird landed gear up, wing up, wings folded and, after coming to rest, was abandoned by the red-faced birdman.

Grandpaw Pettibone says: Great balls of fire! It's a good thing this flight ended when it did "cause, if there was any more moving parts on this airplane, you can bet this fella would ve had "em all in the wrong place at the right time.

A red face is a mighty cheap price to pay for forgettin! the check list, but this kind of performance ain! t much of a boost to the professional standing of an aviator. If Ole Gramps had a nickel for every accident caused by people ignorin! this handy placard, I could buy that farm and retire.

Before you push that kerosene converter handle forward next time, eyeball yourself in the rear view mirror "cause that"s the guy responsible for your safety. " (MAYAL AVIATION NEWS, March 1967)

Wing ASO Comment: The above article is reprinted with the thought that it could happen here. In fact, this accident did occur in the 1stMAW at Da Nang last August, and a similar incident occurred this past May. Grandpaw Pettibone's observation about locking in the rear view mirror is apropos.

# THERE'S NO FUN IN THIS "HYDROPLANING"

# Captain Robert M. MacIntosh, USAF FSO, Vance AFB, Okla

(The following mission as written while attending the FSO Course at the University of Southern California)

It is a typical summer afternoon, hot and humid, and a thumderstorm has just passed the area. The light twin engine jet transport is on a gusty final with several senior officers on board. The mission is very short and heavy fuel weight and crosswinds require high final approach and landing speeds. The touchdown is, as usual, smooth but slightly long. End of story...mot quite.

As aerobraking is accomplished the aircraft veers into the wind. It appears to be slipping on the main gear. The pilot corrects for the weathervane condition with ruder and calls for flaps and speedbrake up to Fil all lift. He lowers the nose and applies braking. The aircraft again weathervanes, differential braking with aft control wheel pressure has absolutely no effect. It requires full ruider to straighten the aircraft. Over onehalf of the runway has gone by with totally ineffective braking.

The pilot moves both throttles to off (battery powered hydraulics) to remove all thrust and prepare for the mud. At the three-quarter point on runway rollout there appears to be some brake effectiveness. The retardation improves rapidly in the last 1500 feet and the aircraft stops 100 feet from the barrier. Only the hum of electronic equipment and great gasps of relief can be heard throughout the aircraft.

What caused this weathervaning, side slipping, unretarded mass, and what can be done about it?

The aircraft was hydroplaning on runway surface water. Hydroplaning is caused by a wedge of water building up under the tire rather than being squeezed aside by the tread design. The wedge action continues with increased speeds until all contact between the tire and the runway surface is lost. The aircraft is now supported on a film of water. NASA studies indicate hydroplane action may occur with current tread designs, when water depths exceed one-eighth of an inch. Typical thunderstorm rainfall can create runway runoff water in excess of one-eighth of an inch for considerable time periods. A requirement to land in water over the critical depth set the stage for hydroplaning.


Will excess weight on the tires squeeze out this water film or wedge and allow runway contact?

No. it will not! Weight changes produce only slight changes in

tire footprint area. Hydroplaning is not a function of tire force or weight. This is a truly unusual property of fluids and pneumatic tires. Hydroplaning is controlled by speed and tire inflation pressure. This fact is hard to believe, but your FSO can show you an excellent flight test film which illustrates this point? Again, weight has little effect on hydroplaning action, only speed and tire inflation pressure.

Refer to Figure 1 and notice the speeds of full (100 percent) and partial (75 percent) hydroplaning. At the partial hydroplans speed, only one-fourth of the tire footprint touches the runway. Even this contact is wet friction with a corresponding wet RCR. (Runway condition readings)

# HYDROPLANE SPEED Dependent on Tire Pressure



What can pilots and supervisors do about hydroplaning?

To avoid hydroplaning:

- l. Avoid high airspeed touchdowns required by heavy gross weights, limited amounts of flaps, or gusty wind conditions (especially crosswinds).
- 2. Stop operations on runways when water depths exceed one-eighth inch.

When mission priorities require operations which may encounter hydroplaning, pilots should:

- Delay landing to allow maximum runway drainage.
- 2. If weathervaning and side-drift occur, maintain directional control with the flight control system. Differential braking will be totally ineffective.

- 3. Slow the aircraft with maximum aerodynamic drag. Do not raise flaps or speedbrake in an attempt to increase wheel weight it won't help!
- 4. Attempt only light wheel braking while hydroplaning. The wheels may lock easily due to spindown. Abrupt changes in water depth could cause skidding and tire failure.
- \* NASA Langley Research Center Film #L-775, Hazards of Tire Hydroplaning to Aircraft Operation.

FSO Kit...Feb/Mar 67

# HELO WEIGHT LIMITATIONS

From recent incident report. UH-23 pilot making approach to carrier noted drop in NG (Gas Generator Speed) and suspected partial power loss. Experienced rotor RPM decay. Aborted ani made water landing. Inflation gear and emergency throttle expeditiously actuated, cargo jettisoned and rotor RPM regained. Safe landing subsequently accomplished. This is graphic example of predictable consequences of helo operations under conditions of high temperature, high density altitude and low wind conditions. Requirement for compliance with NATOPS weight limitations has equal application to all rotary wing aircraft. Insure pilot knowledgeability of limitations and compliance therewith.

QUOTED FROM A COMMAND MESSAGE NASC WEEKLY SUMMARY, 19-25 JUN 67

## GENERAL INFORMATION

The collection of data is an essential element of the aircraft accident prevention program. The timely and accurate submission of preliminary/supplemental message reports, and the processing of AARs within the time limits as prescribed by OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F, are two of the more important reporting procedures for gathering and up dating data for the Navy's program. All commands are requested to insure that these required reports are submitted in accordance with the provisions set forth in the aforementioned insturction.

COMNAVAIRFAC NOTE 3750 of 10 JUL 67

GOOD INFORMATION

The attention of all pilots is invited to an article in the June 1967 issue of APPROACH magazine entitled "Wet Asphalt Runways". The article was written by Captain F. M. STONE, USMC, a past ASO of MAG-11. It discusses recommended techniques for landing on wet runways during the monsoon weather.

MONSOON OPERATIONS

By
Major G. R. CAMPO
CO, VMFA-115

By the time the monsoon season starts in late September, or hopefully October we will have had six months of clear weather contact flying and dry runway landings. Coupled with the good weather, the incentive to expedite recoveries to facilitate quick turn arounds causes a sharp decline in the number of instrument approaches executed. If a continuing program of Instrument Training is not established now, the skills and techniques learned last year will be lost.

The most serious demand placed upon us by the monsoon is on individual instrument flying proficiency. Since the requirements of a combat situation are constantly changing and often immediate, it may not be possible to be selective in scheduling individual aircrews to fly in extremely poor weather conditions. Therefore the instrument proficiency of every crew member must be maintained at a high level.

Every instrument training program is divided into a ground school phase and a flying phase. In our situation is is preferable to conduct both phases simultaneously.

Instrument ground school need not be too basic, but should be designed to keep the crews current on taksoff techniques, enroute procedures and the varied types of recoveries available. A thorough brief on the capability and limitations of facilities such as approach control and GCA is helpful. An understanding of the procedures of controlling agencies can often help a pilot to minimize his launch and recovery delays. Detailed briefings should be conducted on departures, published penetrations, communications procedures, cruise control, fuel management, fuel required to reach alternate airfields, airspeeds, altitudes, descent points and the facilities to be expected at those alternates. Emergency procedures should be covered thoroughly. Pilots must be able to handle emergencies quickly and accurately and still fly basic instruments. Aircraft malfunctions during critical periods of flight such as take-offs and landings, demand correct reactions from crews, and those reactions come from a thorough knowledge of emergency procedures.

Ordnance delivery during the monsoon season becomes a dangerous mixture of IFR and VFR flying. Launch weather minimums for various types of missions should be covered as well as recovery weather minimums. Techniques for getting to and from target areas should be discussed and flight leaders should be rebriefed on all the factors involved in establishing bingo fuels, low angle delivery techniques and associated hazards, such as frag patterns and ground fire exposure. For visual delivery it is suggested that no more than a two plane element be employed. The use of retarded bombs and napalm enable crews to deliver ordnance in conditions that would prohibit the use of unretarded bombs and rockets. Flexibility is attained by "desnaking" the bomb at the last minute for TFQ's.

The success that an organization may obtain during the monsoon season is directly related to the professional attitude and training of each crew. NATOPS and Squadron SOP's are only as strong as Commanding Officers make them.

# WEATHER OUTLOOK FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST

 $\mathbf{B}\mathbf{y}$ 

lstLt. B. K. MOORE lstMAW Meteorologist

Low Level Operations (2,000, 3 mi.): During August there are 23 to 25 days favorable for low level operations throughout most of I Corps with the exception of the western mountain region near the Lactian border. In this area, there are 5 to 9 days favorable in the afternoon and evening. Morning restrictions are mainly due to fog and stratus in the mountain valleys with connective cloudiness accounting for the afternoon restrictions.

Mid-Level Operations (5,000°, 5 mi.): From the coast to 15 - 20 miles inland there are 20 to 25 favorable days for mis-level operations. Over the remainder of I Corps there are 2 to 5 days in the morning hours and 5 to 15 days favorable for mid-level operations during the afternoon and evening.

Winds: Low level flow over all of Southeast Asia is west to southwesterly, and extends to 15,000 feet. Above 20,000 feet the flow becomes northeasterly and prevails to 40,000 feet. The mountain valleys west of Dong Ha face the prevailing winds. The winds are forced through the valleys creating a Venturi effect. This effect creates extremely gusty surface winds at Dong Ha, reducing visibility in blowing sand and dust.

Precipitation: Mean monthly precipitation ranges from 5 inches along the coast to 10 to 15 inches in the mountains and near the Lactian border. The mean number of days with measureable precipitation ranges from 10 days along the coastal sections, to 15 and 20 days over the mountains. Maximum monthly values range from 10 inches over the southern coastal sections, and 15 to 25 inches over the remainder of I Corps. Maximum 21 hour rainfall varies due to topography and prevailing winds. From 3 to 6 inches is common in the southern coast, while 6 to 9 inches is not uncommon over the rest of I Corps.

Temperatures: Mean maximum temperatures range from the low nineties on the coastal plains to the mid to low eighties in the mountains. Mean minimum temperatures are in the high high seventies on the coast and high sixties to low seventies over the mountains.

Relative Humidity: During August the mean relative humidity along the coast is 75%, and 85% at higher elevations. The higher elevations are often obscured in connective cloudiness.

Sea Temperature: The average sea surface temperature off shore of I Corps is 33 degrees during the month with a variability of about 3°F.

Currents: Along the I Corps coast a northerly flowing current prevails with a mean speed of 0.4 to 1.0 knots.

Tropical Disturbances: From 1947 to 1965 a total of 18 tropical storms, 8 of which reached typhoon intensity, formed or moved into the South China Sea during August. Eleven of these storms were close enough to Southeast Asia to adversely affect the weather with strong winds, torrential rains and some flooding. Nine storms, including 2 of typhoon intensity, moved on shore in North Vietnam, and 5 of these storms subsequently moved over Laos. Three storms were close enough to northeastern Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam to cause damage to these countries. During August the incidence of storms in the South China Sea is one per year and the incidence of typhoons is one every two years.

Moon Phase: New moon, 6 Aug; First qtr, 12 Aug; full moon, 20 Aug; last qtr, 29 Aug.

Lunar	Illumination	(%)	ô

1.	27%	7:	13.	52%	19。 99%		79% 31. 24%	
2.	19%	8	5% 14.	63%	20. 100%	26.	71%	
3.	71%	9. 1	15.	73%	21. 99%	27.	62%	
4.	6%	10. 19	9% 16.	82%	22。 96%	28.	52%	
5.	2%	11, 29	9% 17.	90%	23。 9 <b>2</b> %	29.	43%	
6.	0%	12. 40	0% <b>1</b> 8.	95%	2կ. 86%	30。	33%	
يد	يد يد يو	E 36 36 36 3		V V V				

# WHIRLY WISDOM

Remember that the blades of the 540 rotor system can droop as low as 517 above the ground. This is approximately 122 less clearance than the standard rotor system. Always use caution when approaching or leaving any UH-1 aircraft equipped with the 540 rotor system when the blades are turning.

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# FLIGHT EQUIPMENT NOTES

By 2/Lt William M, DARNELL Wing Flight Equipment O

# 1. MK-79 MOD O SIGNAL ILLUMINATION KIT 2T1370-866-9788-X667

Proper procedure for obtaining this item is for the FLIGHT EQUIFMENT SECTION to request them through their individual SQUADRON ORDNANCE SECTION in the same manner as required for the MK-13 MOD O DAY and NIGHT DISTRESS SIGNAL. This request goes from the Squadron to the Group and the Group to the Wing in the usual manner and Wing fills the request. Even though some squadrons state they can't get these kits, Wing Ordnance states they do not have any outstanding requests on them......WHAT GOES ON HERE....?????

# 2. M-37 SURVIVAL WEAPON

EIGHTY of these smub-nosed .38 caliber revolvers will be distributed to certain units of the First Marine Aircraft Wing in the near future for evaluation. The M-37 revolver offers a distinct advantage over the standard .38 caliber revolver due to it being lighter and more compact.

# 3. ABSTRACT FROM THE 9TH MEETING OF THE AVIATION PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT TEAM (APSET)

a. KOCH FITTINGS

NAVAIR investigation results on a failed fitting received from CNAP was determined to be an isolated case. NAVAIR advised that a one time inspection bulletin will be issued to identify and prevent discrepancies of this nature. NAVAERORECFAC has issued a training film titled, "PARACHUTE RELEASE AND RESCUE" that incorporates KOCH fittings. The number of this film is NM 10125.

# b. AIRFORGE ADJUSTABLE UNIVERSAL TORSO HARNESS

CNAP proposed that NAVAERORECFAC obtain and evaluate the AIRFORCE adjustable torse harness for NAVY requirements and submit results to NAVAIR. The results of this proposal, if satisfactory would permit a large reduction of the 12 sizes currently carried in the NAVY supply system.

NAVAERORECRAC will provide a status report in August 67 at the next APSET meeting.

### c. MICROPHONES

Failures of amplifiers AM-3597A and AM-4326/A used with dynamic microphones attributed to transient voltages has been verified in the laboratory and all new production will incorporate protection for pulses up to 350 volts.

New microphones were made available for evaluation during May 67. One type is an Inertial Type Oxygen Mask microphone designed to prevent objectional contact with the users lips, particularly in small A-13 masks. The other is an Inertial Type Tissue Contact (Bone conduction) microphone for mounting within the helmet and is considered to be most useful in high ambient noise areas. These units will be made available to AIRLANT, AIRPAC, ACEL, and NATC for evaluation.

NAVAIR will provide status report at the next APSET meeting.

# 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Aviation Safety Officers as of 18 July 1967

* Major K. M.	JOHNSTON	Ist Marine Aircraft Wing
* Capt. P. G. Capt. B. G. * Major J. N. * Major H. C. Major J. R.	RUTLEDGE KEATHLEY DEWEY	Marine Aircraft Group 11 Marine Fighter (AW) Squadron 232 Marine Fighter (AW) Squadron 235 Marine Attack (AW) Squadron 242 Marine Composite/Reconnaissance Squadron 1
* Major G. H. * Major E. * Capt. A. Capt. M. R. Major V. H.	SAHA YDAK TANZMAN SNEDEKER	Marine Aircraft Group 12 Marine Attack Squadron 211 Marine Attack Squadron 223 Marine Attack Squadron 311 Marine Attack (AW) Squadron 533
* Capt. H. E. Major R. E. + Capt. C. R. + Capt. J. P.	FROST ALEXANDER	Marine Aircraft Group 13 Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron 115 Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron 314 Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron 542
* Major D. W. * Major J. E. * Major C. R. Capt. L. Capt. J. B. * Capt. P. F. Capt. J. H. * Major J. L.	CARROL CHELIUS DELMORE BARR WALTON MARSHALL	Marine Aircraft Group 16 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 Marine Observation Squadron 2 Marine Observation Squadron 3
* Major F. L. * Major W. T. Capt. G. L. Capt. T. C. Capt. B. F.	READ LARK IN	Marine Aircraft Group 36 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 Marine Observation Squadron 6

Capt. F. J. WELDON Jr.

Headquarters & Maintenance Squadron 17

- + Indicates 5 day NASC School Trained
- \* Indicates USC School Trained