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COMMAND DIARY
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12 (-)
1.-31 MAY 1965

MAG-12

CMD DIARY

UNCLASSIFIED

1

Enclosure (3)

~~SECRET~~

May 1965

HEADQUARTERS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, FMF, Pacific
 III Marine Amphibious Forces
 FPO, San Francisco 96601

3:DRH:jdg
 1000
 Ser: 003A16065
 9 June 1965

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Adv)

Subj: Command Diary

Ref: (a) MCO 3480.1
 (b) III MAPO 3121.1A

Encl: ✓(1) MAG-12 Command Diary
 ✓(2) MARS-12 Command Diary
 ✓(3) H&MS-12 Command Diary

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosures (1) thru (3) are submitted.

J. D. Noble
 J. D. NOBLE

1stMAW SEC NO.	COPY NO.
A165-65	1

MAG-12 S&C#	COPY#
806-65	1

ORIGINAL

UNCLASSIFIED

HC-12
Command Diary

1. Organizational Data Sheet.
2. Narrative Summary.
3. Supporting Documents.

4. Organizational Data Sheet.
5. Narrative Summary.
6. Supporting Documents.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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MAG-12 COMMAND DIARY NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. Introduction. Combat operations for MAG-12 commenced at 161750H (160950Z) May 1965, upon arrival of the Group Commanding Officer, Colonel J. D. NOBLE and members of the Executive and Special Staff at the CHU LAI airfield construction site. However, MAG-12 planning and embarkation is considered of vital significance to subsequent operations and warrants coverage to insure the availability of complete historical records. With this in mind, the Narrative Summary will be divided into two parts for this submission: A. Non-Combat Operations, B. Combat Operations.

A. Non-Combat Operations. Prior to receipt of warning for deployment to the Republic of Vietnam, MAG-12 was based at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan as a unit of the 1st MAF with H&MS-12, MABS-12, VMA-225 and VMA-311 attached. VMCF-1 was attached for administrative and logistic support under OPCON of the 1stMAF, and VMA-214 (Deployed to NAS Cubi Point For ordnance training) was attached for OPCON with administrative and logistic control being retained by MAG-13. At this time MAG-12 readiness posture was primarily orientated to preparation, planning, and readiness for contingency operations as LFA/CTU 79.3.2 and execution of Annex E to 201 (YR) Plan (STOP STRIKE TARGETS). On 30 March 1965, CO, MAG-12 was briefed by CG, 1stMAF on initial considerations to establish a Marine Corps Expeditionary SATS-type airfield at CHU LAI. MAG-12 was requested to furnish one (1) officer as a Group representative to participate on a liaison visit to the Republic of Vietnam as well as nominating Major COSTELLO (MAG-12 G-1) to act as a SATS Project Officer for CG, 1stMAF in view of his previous experience at MCS Quantico with SATS development. Immediately following return of this Liaison team, Major COSTELLO began planning an expeditionary airfield under the direction of CO, MAG-12 with guidance furnished by CG, 1stMAF as to mat type and availability, field dimensions and capabilities desired. On 11 April, CO, MABS-12 was directed to commence detailed planning for early deployment of elements necessary to install essential SATS equipment to support the operations of three VMA squadrons on or about D+21 at CHU LAI Airfield. (See MABS-12 Command Dairy this period). A chronological sequence of significant staff activities during this period follows:

- 15 Apr Staff Journals opened. MAG-12 remains prepared for contingency operations as LFA/CTU 79.3.2.
- 20 Apr VMA-225 alerted for possible deployment to RVN under OPCON MAG-16 (-) or MAG-11 (Reinf). MABS-12 alerted to plan for embarkation requirements to emplace essential SATS equipment on an expeditionary airfield.
- 23 Apr VMA-225 alert cancelled. Shipping provided to MABS-12 with instructions to commence loading USS Windham County 240600I.

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- 26 Apr Requested four (4) Butler Buildings from FMEPac for use as aircraft maintenance shelters at CHU LAI.
- 27 Apr Detachment Group Communications embarked aboard Windham County, MAB-12 from ALPHA dropped OPCON 3rd MEB. USS Windham County sailed for CHU LAI.
- 28 Apr CO, MAG-12 and key personnel from 1stMAW, MAG-12 Staff, and MAB-12 visited III MEF Headquarters for advanced planning. (Supporting Document #1)
- 1 May S-2 commenced initial planning. Preparation underway to procure maps and to provide advance liaison party prior to commencement of Air Operations in RVN.
- 7 May Embarkation conference for all squadrons to establish assignment of advance shipping.
- 8 May JAWC requirements were discussed with 1stMAW G-4 and after determination of availability of approximately 1000 bottles for initial operations, 1stMAW requested 30 day mount out and automatic re-supply from ComSery Group 3. Request for additional grants of Project 40 OMNO and Project 11 funds based on programmed costs incurred in mounting out. Requests for Navy and Marine Corps equipment required for mount out submitted to CG, 1stMAW.
- 10 May Group Staff personnel assigned to movement echelons for deployment. Critical parts for MATCU-67 arrived and were prepared for shipment to CHU LAI the following day.
- 11 May Arrangement made for LST shipping to pick up Section M shortages enroute to objective area Okinawa. Liquid Oxygen for initial operations will be flown to CHU LAI when required.
- 12 May MAG-12 Embarkation Order 301-65 approved.
- 13 May Administration Order and Embarkation Order 301-65 published (Supporting Documents #2 and #3).
- 14 May Operations Order 301-65 published (Supporting Document #4). LST 1166 USS Wastinaw City and LSD 19 USS Comstock commenced loading. Development chart of CHU LAI initiated (Supporting Document #5).

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15 May CO, MAG-12 and representatives from each staff section departed Iwakuni for MAF Futaba, Okinawa, enroute CHU LAI via DANANG.

At completion of this non-combat period, VMA-225 and VMA-311 were in place at MCAS Iwakuni flying ordnance, tactics, and FMFP training sorties; VMA-214 remained deployed NAS Cubi Point for ordnance and tactics training; MABS-12 (-) Deployed to CHU LAI, RVN and H&MF-12 embarked for deployment to CHU LAI.

B. Combat Operations. The Commanding Officer, MAG-12 arrived at CHU LAI constructed a site at 160950Z May 65 and established his CP at MABS-12 Headquarters, 15° 25'N, 108° 42'E. An immediate decision was made not to include MAG-12 F-4 aircraft in the movement to CHU LAI due to anticipated support problems for these two aircraft. (They were subsequently transferred to MWSG-17). Immediate command and staff cognizance was assumed in matters of air base planning, security, liaison with LIT-4, MCB-10, and 1stMAW (Adv). A chronological description of significant events follows:

17 May Briefing by Colonel NOBLE and staff for MGen KRULAK, CG, FMFPac, MGen FOWLER, CG, 1stMAW, and BGen CARL, CG, 1stMarBrig. CO, MAG-12 commenced submitting Daily SLIPKIPS (Supporting Document #6). Daily staff conferences commenced.

18 May MAG-12, S-3 representative commenced attending daily RLT-4 briefings.

19 May S-4 coordinated camp hospital requirements and location, and ordnance storage facility. Conducted liaison with Operations Officer of MCB-10 in regards to camp construction. Security coordination with LIT-4 arranged by S-3. Condition II (Base Defence Alert) drill held.

20 May Ordnance storage site selected. S-2 and S-3 conducted liaison with 1stMAW. VADM BLACKBURN (COMSEVENTHFLT) inspected airfield construction. BGen CARL visited CP.

21 May MAG-12 submitted priority listings for airfield construction to CO, MCB-10. Gen THROCKMORTON, Deputy COMUSMACV visited CHU LAI.

22 May Information received that F-2 MOREST will arrive by LST 627 from DANANG. USS OKINAGAN arrived off CHU LAI with 1st load of class V(A). Colonel SILVERTHORN USMC, 7th Fleet Liaison Officer visited the CP. USAF and NSA personnel visited CHU LAI to select a site for installation TROPO - SCATTER comm system.

23 May Briefing by Colonel NOBLE and staff for MGen KRULAK, CG, FMFPac, MGen FOWLER, CG, 1stMAW, and BGen CARL, CG, 1stMarBrig. CO, MAG-12 continued submitting Daily SLIPKIPS (Supporting Document #6). Daily staff conferences continued.

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- 23 May Colonel GRAHAM, MAT Engineer, visited CP. First hot breakfast served. Warshaw County L30 L-65 arrived with MABS-12 (REAR). Protestant church services held in mess area.
- 24 May Initial coordination and establishment of AAFS and TAPDS undertaken. MABS-12 Ordnance Officer reported damage to class V(A) ordnance being unloaded from OKAWAGAN. Closer supervisor was instituted to minimize this damage. A Condition II Base Defense Alert and drill was held. Vietnamese press toured airfield construction.
- 25 May BGen McCUTCHEON (AVC 1stMAW) inspected airfield construction progress.
- 26 May S-4 inspected ordnance dump and assigned fire fighting equipment to the area. Additional damage to class V(A) incurred as a result of offloading techniques. Corrective action taken by all concerned. BGen WESMORELAND, COMUSMACV and LGen COLLIER, CG, III MAF inspected airfield construction. Decision reached that airfield will not be ready to accept aircraft scheduled on 28 May. Tentative new date is 31 May. CG, MAC-12 departed to DANANG (HQ 1stMAW (Adv)) for conference with BGen McCUTCHEON (Now CG, 1st MAW (Adv)).
- 28 May CG and Supply Officer from the Logistic Support Unit visited CP and stated they were prepared to furnish Class I, III, and IV supplies to MAC-12. Scheduled helicopter logistic run cancelled due to sniper fire. BGen CARL and BGen YOUNGBASE USMC (J-2 COMUSMACV) visited CHU LAI. Base Defense Condition II set due to probing action of VC in vicinity. BGen McCUTCHEON and Admiral WALD USN briefed on airfield construction by CG. Eight (8) A-4C of VMA-225 arrived Cubi Point to fly in to CHU LAI on call.
- 29 May French and Belgian TV personnel took TV pictures of airfield complex. Base Defense Condition I set. No VC contact. Secured without incident. Six (6) A-4E of VMA-311 arrived. NAS Cubi Point to fly in on call. CG to Cubi Point to arrange for the initial increments of VMA-225 and VMA-311 to fly to CHU LAI.
- 30 May MATCU-57 up and operating on all equipment except CCA (TPN-8 Radars). Permanent CP officially occupied by Group staff and MABS-12 CG and staff. BGen COLLIER (CG, III MAF) and BGen DEPUTY USAF (Deputy J-3 COMUSMACV) inspected airfield construction. LCU supply flown in from DANANG due to delay in getting results of sample taken from LOX manufactured by MAC-12.

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31 May Severe weather enroute between NAS Cubi Point and CHU LAI forced cancellation of plan to fly in aircraft from VMA-225 and VMFJL to officially open CHU LAI airfield. Heavy rain during the past two days at CHU LAI produced washes in runway shoulders and caused engineers from FMFPac, MCB-10, 1st Assault and 1st MAW to propose new methods for sub-grading runway and taxiway to CG, 1st MAW. All SATS systems up and operating. Airfield fully capable of supporting combat operations.

2. Considering the relatively short planning time available, the embarkation and movement to the objective area at CHU LAI was conducted **effectively**. MAG-12 schedule for execution was generally ahead of planning schedule due primarily to months of arduous work on embarkation planning for contingency operations. Morale was high throughout this period in spite of transition from the moderate climate of Iwakuni (73°) to the intense tropical heat of CHU LAI (103°). Plans for the base camp were executed with only minor changes due to terrain variations from what obtained from map studies. Major setbacks were experienced by MCB-10 in airfield construction as covered in Daily REPORTS contained in Supporting Documents to this report and the Command Story of MAG-12. At the close of this period, MAG-12 and all attached units are fully prepared to commence combat operations, when directed, from CHU LAI Airfield. Supplementary information, airfield and camp layouts, records of MCB-10 progress as well as communications/electronics narrative summary are included as Supporting Documents for this period.

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Supporting Documents*

<u>No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>
✓ 1	CO MAG-12 Memo for file "Visit to III MEF Hq on 28 April 1965 concerning Chu Lai."
✓ 2	MAG-12 AdminO 301-65.
✓ 3	MAG-12 EmbarkO 301-65.
✓ 4	MAG-12 Cpnf O (with appendices) 301-65.
✓ 5	Development Chart of Chu Lai Airfield.
✓ 6	Daily SITREPC 16-31 May. (*1-16)
✓ 7	MCB 10 Progress Chart.
✓ 8	Communications-Electronics Narrative.
✓ 9	Periodic Personnel Report No. 1-65.
✓ 10	Periodic Personnel Report No. 2-65.
✓ 11	Drawing of Chu Lai Airfield and Base Camp.
✓ 12	Photograph of Airfield and Base Camp at end of this period.

*(Original only).

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HEADQUARTERS
Marine Aircraft Group 12
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, FMF, Pacific
FPO, San Francisco 96601

3:jdg
Ser: 007A12065
30 April 1965

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MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer
To: File

Subj: Visit to III MEF Hq on 28 Apr 65 concerning Chu Lai

1. The following resume of matters discussed at the subject meeting is made for record purposes. The below listed personnel attended the conference.

Col	J. D. NOBLE	MAG-12
COL	W. M. GRAHAM	3d MarDiv Engr O
LtCol	D. I. RITTER	Asst G-4, III MEF
LtCol	C. COOKE	1st MAW Engr O
Major	F. F. COSTELLO	S-1, MAG-12/Wing SATS O
Cdr	J. N. BANNISTER	MCP-1C
LCdr	C. H. SCHIEBER	MCB-1C
Ens	B. V. MC BRIDE	MCB-10
BUON	A. C. MALKIEWICZ	MCB-10
1stLt	E. CONERA	MABS-12 Utilities O

2. MAG-12 rough plan for location of all facilities associated with the Expeditionary airfield was provided the Asst G-4, III MEF and the CO, MCB-10. It was agreed that facilities directly associated with the airfield had priority for the real estate between the strip and the beach. Asst G-4 advised that the units of the MEF involved in this area were also informed of this policy.

3. It was reiterated that construction of the SATS and the installation of essential components to meet the objective date was of the highest priority. It was agreed that the following tasks would be performed by the CB's in consonance with this policy:

(a) Construct MWR through airfield support area and roads to essential equipment sites and the Ordnance Dump Area.

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT NO. 1

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(b) Prepare ordnance dump to permit storage of Avn Ordnance on 22 May.

(c) Prepare sites for MATCU and airfield operations equipment as strip is developed.

4. CB's will provide construction assistance on the following items as feasible.

(a) TAFDS sites.

(b) Camp and support area development.

5. Asst G-4, III MEF advised that there would be 2 AAFS and 3 TAFDS installed. Location discussed by 1st MAW engineer and Asst G-4, III MEF.

6. Requirement for an additional 12,000 square feet of taxi way matting was given to Asst G-4, III MEF. This matting will meet requirement to widen maintenance area by 18' to make it possible to taxi aircraft into parking areas. It also includes matting to widen the refueling area to 60' so that taxi way will not be blocked by refueling aircraft.

7. Butler Huts. The Asst G-4, III MEF was requested to expedite shipment of the 4 Butler buildings to Chu Lai if/when released by CG, FMFPac.

J. D. NOBLE

cc: CG FMAW (Attn: G-4
CO, MABS-12

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Copy No _____ of 69 Copies
 MAG-12 (CTU 79.3.2)
 MCAS, IWAKUNI, Japan
 131445 I May 1965

Administrative Order 301-65 to Accompany Operation Order 301-65

Ref: (a) MAP: RVN AMS Series L 509 sheets ND 49-1 and 49-13; 1:250,000
 (b) Annex A to FMAW OP Order 301-65
 (c) MAG-12 OP Order 301-65

Time Zone: India in Okinawa & Japan; Hotel in RVN

1. GENERAL.

- a. MAG-12 provides logistical and maintenance support for VMA's 214, 225, 311 and for an expeditionary airfield.
- b. Deployment of Group elements to objective area will be primarily by surface lift augmented by limited flight echelon consisting of Command Post, aircraft, minimum support equipment and personnel.

2. SUPPLY.

a. Supply Sources.

- (1) Initial supply support will be from mount out stocks air-lifted to the objective area and embarked in initial shipping.
- (2) III MAF will install 2 AAFS of 420,000 gallons capacity each and 1 TAFDS of 60,000 gallons capacity filled by bottom laid line to AOG.
- (3) Class III (A) and V (A) will be prepositioned at objective area as directed by Com Serv Grp Three and Com Seventh Flt.
- (4) Logistic support above that of initial deployment will be stored on the Da Nang complex and coordinated by Force Logistic Group.
- (5) MWSG-17 provides supply and maintenance support from Iwakuni.

b. Prescribed Loads.

Class I-2 days MIC

Class II-Minimum Essential

Class II (A)-30 day pack up

Class III-2 days packaged/drummed vehicle tanks 3/4 full

Class III (A)-None

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Class IV-IV (A) minimum essential

Class V-BA + 2 days

Class V (A)-None

c. Supplies and Equipment to be Embarked.

Class I-30 days ("B" rations)

Class II-30 days. All units carry basic medical allowances.

Class II (A)-45 days

Class III-30 days

Class IV-IV (A) To be determined.

Class V-BA + 30 days

Class V (A)-None (Prepositioned 30 days)

d. Supplies and Equipment in Objective Area.

Class III (A)-Da Nang-3AAFS-1,260,000 gal
2AAFS-180,000 gal

Objective Area- 2AAFS-840,000 gal
1TAFDS-60,000 gal

Additional TAFDS to be installed by MABS-12

Class V (A)-Objective area 30 days for two A4 Squadrons to be prepositioned 30 days for third A4 Squadron when required.

Maintain supply levels as prescribed in paragraph 2. (B) of reference (b).

e. Control.

- (1) All supplies landed with Wing elements in the objective area will be controlled by Commanding Officer MAG-12.
- (2) All replenishment supplies will be initially controlled by CG 1st MAW until establishment of Logistic Support Area.
- (3) Upon establishment of Logistic Support Area the CG III MAF will establish custody and control of all replenishment supplies except Class II (A) and III (A) which will continue to be controlled by CG 1st MAW.

SECRETf. Resupply.

- (1) Resupply will be phased into objective area as shipping becomes available.
- (2) 30 days replenishment plus 15 days mount out augmentation (not shipped with deployed units) will be embarked in first available shipping.
- (3) Items required on an emergency basis will be requisitioned from FLSG except Class II (A), special items of Class III (A) and Class IV (A).
 - (a) FLSG will screen these requisitions to ensure that excess airlift requirements are not generated during critical periods.
- (4) Resupply of POL will be via AAFS to TAFDS. Class III (A) will be maintained at maximum level bulk storage facilities will permit.
- (5) FLSG will be responsible for supply, resupply and maintenance of all types of special or project equipment required.
- (6) Routine requisitioning, less aviation peculiar items, will be submitted directly to BLSG initially; FLSG when established.
 - (a) Marine Corps aviation peculiar items will be requisitioned directly from 1st MAW. Requisitioning will be initiated in appropriate time to ensure timely resupply.
- (7) Medical resupply lists Alpha and Bravo.

3. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION.a. Evacuation.

- (1) The health of all embarked personnel is the immediate concern of the ships senior medical officer.
- (2) Troop medical personnel will render assistance to ships medical personnel.
- (3) Casualties occurring in landing craft or in helicopters during ship to shore movement remain in craft from return to designated casualty receiving ships.

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- (4) Casualties occurring during initial operation (prior to establishment of medical facilities ashore) will be evacuated to designated casualty receiving ships.
- (5) Upon establishment of medical facilities ashore, casualties will be evacuated to clearing stations designated by 3d MAB.
- (6) Evacuation Policy:
 - (a) D-Day to D plus 34 - 10 days
 - (b) D plus 35 to D plus 70 - 30 days
 - (c) After D plus 70 - to be announced
- (7) Maximum use will be made of air evacuation as provided by CG, 1st MAW.
- (8) In unsafe areas, military ambulances will move in convoy and be provided armed escort.
- (9) Evacuation by rail will not be undertaken without approval of III MAF.
- (10) Water transportation will be used only when craft are under US control.
- (11) Casualty Overload.
 - (a) All units having medical sections be prepared to furnish medical personnel, supplies and equipment, on order, to reinforce units having casualty overload.
 - (b) Priority will be given to rapid collection and evacuation of casualties to Division, Wing, and ships medical facilities.
- (12) Precedence of Casualties.
 - (a) Urgent: emergency patient who must be evacuated immediately as a life saving measure.
 - (b) Priority: Patient who should be evacuated immediately as a life saving measure.
 - (c) Routine: Patient who should be evacuated within 72 hours.

SECRET(13) Priority of Treatment.

- (a) US Military personnel
- (b) Allied Military and para-military personnel
- (c) US Citizens
- (d) POW's
- (e) Others

b. Hospitalization.

- (1) Primary medical treatment or Battalion aid station type service, as appropriate, will be provided by organic medical units of III MAF. Units not having medical personnel assigned will be treated on an area basis as determined by CG, III MAF.
- (2) Maximum utilization will be made of RVN medical facilities for RVN civilian patients. RVN civilian patients may be provided emergency life saving care by US medical facilities, but will be transferred to RVN facilities as soon as possible.
- (3) Shipboard medical facilities to be announced, will provide hospitalization initially.
- (4) III MAF hospitalization facilities - units to be advised of locations.
- (5) Civilians.
 - (a) US - to be evacuated by military channels as expeditiously as practicable.
 - (b) Others - to be given emergency medical care compatible with existing situation.
- (6) POW's to be provided medical support in accordance with Geneva Convention of 1949.

c. Sanitation and Preventive Medicine.

- (1) Maximum sanitary discipline under existing conditions.
- (2) Untreated water is not to be considered potable.

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- (a) Water is to be secured from approved sources only.
- (b) Water purification tablets or boiling to be used on all water from other than approved sources.
- (3) Preventive Medicine.
 - (a) All personnel will be immunized against smallpox typhoid, tetanus, diphtheria, plague and cholera.
 - (b) Gamma Globulin shall be administered in accordance with existing instructions prior to entry or within two weeks thereafter.
 - (c) Maximum anti-malaria measures will be effected to include:
 - 1. Chemo Prophylaxis prior to entry into area and continuing after arrival.
 - 2. Use of insect repellents required.
 - 3. Use of mosquito netting and hoods required.
 - 4. Complete uniforms to be worn at all times when not otherwise protected to prevent exposure.
 - 5. Clothing to be impregnated as necessary.
 - (d) Food from approved sources only.
 - (e) Human waste and garbage disposal shall be rigidly controlled.
 - (f) Anti-Venom shall be obtained as available.

- d. Medical Supply and ReSupply.

- (1) All units carry basic allowances.
 - (2) Medical resupply lists Alpha and Bravo for resupply.

- 4. TRANSPORTATION.

- a. Requests for Air transportation as follows:

- (1) Cargo-Via S-4
 - (2) Personnel-Via S-1

SECRETb. Roads.

- (1) ELT-R responsible for traffic control in assigned zone of action.
- (2) All vehicles traveling through CP's or troop housing area during hours of darkness will be preceded by a ground guide.

5. SERVICE.a. MABG-12 (-)

- (1) Provides air base facilities and services, and operates airfield at Chu Lai.
- (2) Provides camp construction, utilities, and maintenance.
- (3) Provides mess and laundry facilities.
- (4) Provides base storage and distribution of Classes I, II, III (A), V, and V (A) supplies.
- (5) Provides photographic facilities and services.
- (6) Provides and operate base air freight and air traffic control.
- (7) Provides 3rd echelon maintenance of organic communications-electronic material (less SSP), motor vehicles and support equipment.
- (8) Establishes and operates all medical evacuation stations at Chu Lai.
- (9) Establishes and operates a 20 bed hospital.

b. H&MS-12 (-).

- (1) Provides intermediate aircraft maintenance.
- (2) Provides administrative and supply support for HQ, MAG-12.
- (3) Provides logistic and administrative flight support.
- (4) Provides postal and disbursing services.
- (5) Establishes a rear echelon at Iwakuni for supply support coordination.

c. ALL Units.

- (1) Responsible for organizational and 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance.

SECRETd. General Maintenance.

- (1) Maintenance of class II and II (A) material in accordance with current Group and Wing instructions except as provided herein:
 - (a) Units responsible for 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance.
 - (b) BLSC provide 3d echelon and backup 2nd echelon maintenance support when established ashore.
 - (c) Limited initial 4th echelon maintenance ~~satellited~~ on 3rd MAR DIV LSG until FLSG established.
 - (d) Units utilize organic capability to maximum extent prior to requesting maintenance support.
 - (e) Maximum utilization of knowledge and skill of unit personnel is imperative (to identify specific malfunctions and include such information with request for contact team service).
 - (f) Evacuate equipment through normal channels. Equipment requiring maintenance and repair beyond capability of FLSG will be evacuated when and as directed by this Headquarters.

e. Construction.

- (1) Limited to minimum necessary for operation of air field and eventual combat operations.
- (2) Major construction projects will be coordinated through this Headquarters.

6. PERSONNEL. Annex A7. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. Formal property accountability will prevail unless otherwise directed.

b. Fiscal Instructions.

- (1) Normal fiscal procedures in accordance with existing directives.
- (2) Payment will be made in US currency, and/or US treasury check. Individuals are limited to a maximum of \$200 in any one month.

SECRETc. Captured Materials.

- (1) Captured enemy material having technical intelligence significance will be evacuated through technical intelligence channels.
- (2) Materials of intelligence value will be reported and evacuated through intelligence channels.
 - (a) Report location to MAG-12 S-2.
 - (b) Use of material by troops prohibited, except in emergency, until reissued.

d. Debarcation. Ships arriving in objective area will be off loaded over beach NIS 9 extended seaward by causeways.e. Priorities for Air Cargo.

- (1) In accordance with existing instructions.

f. Salvage:

- (1) Advise BLSG of location, nature and amount of salvage for collection.
- (2) All units ensure that military supplies and equipment captured or otherwise recovered are safeguarded to preclude capture and use by the enemy.

g. Graves registration: Annex A (Personnel)h. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Be prepared to provide on order, supply, maintenance, emergency medical and dental support to US in-country units, RVN forces and allied forces.
- (2) Be prepared to provide on order, common item supply support and limited services for US forces, and minimum essential support of indigenous forces.
- (3) Within capabilities, assist indigenous and other allied forces in accomplishing logistic tasks.

i. Reports.

- (1) Units will submit a daily periodic logistic report as of 1600 at 1600 each day in format set forth in NAVMC-1110-A03F.

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- (2) Monthly Redlog reports will be submitted as of the 18th at 1200 the 18th of each month.
- (3) Other reports as required.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL J. D. NOBLE

W. B. Higgins
W. B. HIGGINS
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

ANNEX:

A-Personnel

DISTRIBUTION: Annex H (Distribution) to operation order 301-65

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy no. 67 of 69 Copies
 MAG-12 (OTU 79.3.2)
 MCAS IWAKUNI, JAPAN
 121200 I May 1965

Embarkation Order 301-65 to Accompany Operation Order 301-65

- Ref: (a) CG, FMAW msg 050648Z (S)
 (b) FMFM 4-2 (4-2)
 (c) FMFAC Order P4600.1F (SOP for Embarkation)
 (d) FMAW Order P4600.1E (SOP for Embarkation)

Time Zone: India-Japan

REC-12	COPIES
687-65	67

1. ORGANIZATION OF EMBARKATION.

a. General: This plan provides information and instructions for embarking the units attached to MAG Twelve.

b. Assignment to Shipping: Annex A (Organization for Embarkation and Assignment to Shipping).

2. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO BE EMBARKED.

a. Organic equipment. Type and amount in accordance with reference (a).

b. Types and Amount of Supplies.

(1) See reference (a).

(2) Annex B (Allocation of Supplies and Equipment).

c. Preparation for Embarkation.

(1) Ref (b), (c) and (d).

(2) All organic supplies and equipment are to be marked as prescribed in reference (d).

(3) All vehicles will be embarked with fuel tanks 3/4 full. Expeditionary MOGAS cans will be full.

(4) Gasoline Tankers will be empty and purged. MARS Refueler Pool personnel will ensure this.

(5) All vehicles will be mobile loaded to maximum rated capacity, but not higher than the height of the cab.

(6) All vehicles will be loaded so that no equipment extends beyond the tailgate.

(7) MOGAS expeditionary cans not filled will be purged and empty. All cans will have serviceable gaskets.

(8) All water expeditionary cans to be embarked empty will be cleaned and have serviceable gaskets.

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(9) All water trailers will be empty.

(10) Cargo loaded in vehicles must be securely lashed to prevent damage.

(11) Upon arrival at staging area vehicles will be marked with grease pencil and masking tape located on hood and sides indicating :

- (a) Unit- example VMA & #.
- (b) Ship- Example LST- #4.
- (c) Tank Deck or Maindeck for LST example-T/D or M/D.
- (d) Superdeck or Well deck for LSD example-S/D or W/D.
- (e) Hold # and deck for APA example-Low/H #1 Hold, 1st

Plat, #3 Hold.

d. Allocation of Supplies and Equipment: See Annex B (Allocation of Supplies and Equipment).

e. Movement:

(1) See Annex C (Movement and Loading Schedule) and Annex D (Assignment of Staging Area).

(2) Maximum use will be made of organic embarkation vehicles for movement of cargo and equipment to staging areas.

(3) S-4 MAG Twelve will request additional Motor Transport for embarkation movement from MWSG-17 S-4 Officer.

(4) S-4 MAG Twelve will request mobile light generators for loading after sunset from MWSG-17 S-4 Officer.

(5) S-4 MAG-12 will arrange messing schedule with MCAS General Mess.

(6) All embarking units will submit to this Headquarters (Attn: S-4) a list of the following personnel no later than 0800 Thursday 13 May 1965:

- (a) Embarkation Team Commander.
- (b) Embarkation Officer/NCOIC .
- (c) Commanding Officer of Troops.
- (d) Working parties of 15 personnel, broken down into 3 teams of 5 personnel each with an NCO in charge. There should be a minimum of two (2) of these 15 men working parties to allow for rest.

3. EMBARKATION POINTS AND CARGO ASSEMBLY AREAS.

a. Assignment of Staging Areas.

(1) See Annex D . (Assignment of Staging Areas)

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(2) Staging areas within individual squadron areas will be designated by the Embarkation Team Commanders.

b. Preparation.

(1) S-4 MAG Twelve will ensure that staging areas are prepared prior to staging of equipment and cargo.

4. CONTROL.

a. Traffic Circulation and Control.

(1) See Annex B: (Assignment of Staging Areas).

(2) Privately owned vehicles will not be permitted within the staging and embarkation areas.

b. Security.

(1) Each unit Embarkation Team Commander is responsible for security on all his units equipment and cargo in the staging area.

c. Embarkation Control Office.

(1) The MAG Twelve Embarkation Officer will establish his Embarkation Control Office at the CAS Special Service Post House, Bldg #339 Phone #3530. Embarkation teams will submit all reports and co-ordinate movements through this office.

5. MOVEMENT AND EMBARKATION OF PERSONNEL.

a. Embarkation will continue on a twenty four-hour basis until completed.

b. Units move by bus and trucks from present location.

c. Embark no personnel other than advance parties until notified by this Headquarters.

d. Uniform, equipment and baggage.

(1) Personnel.

(a) Uniform and equipment for embarkation is as follows:

(1) Utilities W/boots, helmet, and personal weapon.

(2) Field Transport Pack.

(3) All personnel will carry two (2) full canteens and first aid packet.

(4) All **camouflage** equipment will be worn green side out.

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(2) Baggage to accompany embarking personnel is as follows:

(a) Officers and Staff NCO.

(1) One (1) locker box, one val pack/B-4 bag, and small handbag.

(b) Enlisted.

(1) One (1) sea bag and one (1) small hand bag.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Reports and Loading Plans.

(1) Loading Status Reports.

(a) Upon commencement of loading the Embarkation Officer of each ship will submit by phone to the 3-4 Embarkation Office #3210 at 0800, 1200, 1600 and every four (4) hours thereafter the following:

Name-# Number of Ship
ALFA-Time commenced loading
PAPA-% Personnel loaded
CHARLIE-% Cargo loaded
VICTOR-% Vehicles loaded
TANGO-Estimated time of completion of loading
FOXTROT-Actual time of completion of loading
Other Items of Interest

(2) Sailing Reports: The Embarkation Team Commander will submit by message the Sailing Report with an Info copy to CO, MAG-12 and Commanding General FMAW, to the Commanding General 3rd MAB within 24 hours after sailing. The Sailing Report will include the following:

- (a) Identity of the ship.
- (b) Dates and times loading commenced and completed.
- (c) ETD, ETA and destination.
- (d) The designation of all units and detachments embarked, and the officer and enlisted strengths of each (Navy and Marine Corps personnel shown separately).
- (e) When embarkation teams include commanders of Squadrons or larger units, their names will be reported.
- (f) The number by type, of crew-served weapons.
- (g) The number, by type, of wheeled and tracked vehicles.
- (h) The number, by type, of aircraft.
- (i) The number, by type, of all other major items of equipment.
- (j) Total square feet of vehicles and equipment embarked.
- (k) Summary of each class of supply embarked.

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(1) Sailing Reports will be classified in accordance with the degree of security required, but not lower than CONFIDENTIAL.

(3) Report of Shipboard Accomodations and Space Embarked Troops:
The CO of troops will submit upon completion of movement a report of conditions aboard ship to the Commanding General FMAW with **copies to CO, MAG-12 & the Commanding Officer of the ship involved.** This report will include:

- (a) Berthing-sufficiency/cleanliness
- (b) Messing-sufficiency/quality
- (c) Any other items of interest.

(4) Loading Plans.

(a) All smooth copies (prior to loading) are to be submitted to this Headquarters (Attn: S-4) no later than 0800 Thursday 13 May 1965.

(b) All corrected smooth copies are to be submitted to the ship and the Embarkation Control Officer immediately upon completion of loading.

(5) Advance Parties:

(a) All ships stream loading will require advance parties. The strength and composition of the advance parties will be determined by Embarkation Team Commanders in conjunction with the requirements of each ship. Direct liaison by Team Embarkation Officers with Ships Combat Cargo Officers or First Lieutenants is directed, to determine the number of personnel to be provided for Ships Platoon, and working parties.

(b) Advance parties will move aboard ships prior to commencement of loading.

(c) Advance parties will be billeted and messed in designated ships when practical. Arrangements will be made between Embarkation Team Commanders and ships concerned.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL J. D. NOBLE

W. B. Higgins
W. B. HIGGINS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

CONFIDENTIALANNEXES:

- ✓ A - Organization for Embarkation and assignment to Shipping
- ✓ B - Allocation of supplies and equipment
- ✓ C - Movement and loading schedule
- ✓ D - Assignment of Staging area
- ✓ E - (DISTRIBUTION) to Embarkation Order 301-65

DISTRIBUTION: Annex E (Distribution to Embarkation Order 301-65)

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MCAS IWAKUNI, Japan
121200I May 1965

Annex A (Organization for Embarkation and Assignment to Shipping) to
Embarkation Order 301-65

Time Zone: India-Japan: Hotel RVN

EMBARKATION TEAM ALFA

1. Embarkation Team Commander- Major PARCHEN
2. Embarkation Officer- Captain NELBACH
3. Ship LSD-19 USS COMSTOCK
4. Units: MABS-12, VMA-225, VMA-311- Elements
5. Personnel to be embarked 15 officers 130 enlisted
6. Commanding Officer of troops Major PARCHEN

EMBARKATION TEAM BRAVO

1. Embarkation Team Commander- Major RANDALL
2. Embarkation Officer- Captain NELBACH
3. Ship LST-
4. Units MABS-12
5. Personnel to be embarked 10 officers 327 enlisted
6. Commanding Officer of troops- Major RANDALL

EMBARKATION TEAM CHARLIE

1. Embarkation Team Commander- Captain CAPOZZA
2. Embarkation Officer- 1st Lt STEWART
3. Ship LST-
4. Units- VMA 225/311
5. Personnel to be embarked 2 officers 125 enlisted
6. Commanding Officer of troops- Captain CAPOZZA

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EMBARKATION TEAM DELTA

1. Embarkation Team Commander- Captain WOLF
2. Embarkation Officer- Captain MACAFEE
3. Ship LST
4. Units: H&MS-12, VMA-214 veh.
5. Personnel to be embarked max officers max enlisted
6. Commanding Officer of troops- Captain WOLF

EMBARKATION TEAM ECHO

1. Embarkation Team Commander- 1st Lt BARTLETT
2. Embarkation Officer- 1st Lt YANCEY
3. Ship APA USS NAVARRO
4. Units: Group Supply, VMA-214 cargo
5. Personnel to be embarked 5 officers 78 enlisted
6. Commanding Officer of troops- 1st Lt BARTLETT

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL J. D. NOBLE


W. B. HIGGINSLieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

Distribution: Annex E (Distribution) to Embarkation Order 301-63.

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Annex B (Allocation of Supplies and Equipment)

Ref: None

Time Zone: India-Japan: Hotel RVN

EMBARKATION TEAM ALFA

<u>Class</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Cube</u>	<u>Wt</u>
I. Rations M1C	4 Pallets	208	4800
I. Rations "B"	35 Pallets	1820	42,000
III. MOGAS/Diesel	maximum		
IV. Field Fortification	maximum		
V. BA + 30			

EMBARKATION TEAM BRAVO

<u>Class</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Cube</u>	<u>Wt</u>
I. Rations M1C	16 Pallets	832	19,200
I. Rations "B"	35 Pallets	1820	42,000
III. MOGAS/Diesel	maximum		
IV. Field Fortification	maximum		
V. BA + 30			

EMBARKATION TEAM CHARLIE

<u>Class</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Cube</u>	<u>Wt</u>
I. Rations M1C	4 Pallets	208	4800
I. Rations "B"	35 Pallets	1820	42,000
III. MOGAS/Diesel	maximum		
IV. Field Fortification	maximum		
V. BA + 30			

EMBARKATION TEAM DELTA

<u>Class</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Cube</u>	<u>Wt</u>
I. Rations M1C	20 Pallets	1040	24,000
I. Rations "B"	15 Pallets	780	18,000
III. MOGAS/Diesel	maximum		
IV. Field Fortification	maximum		
V. BA + 30			

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EMBARKATION TEAM ECHO

<u>Class</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Cube</u>	<u>Wt</u>
I. Rations MIC	3 Pallets	156	3600
I. Rations "B"	23 Pallets	1196	27,600
III. MOCAS/Diesel	maximum		
IV. Field Fortification	maximum		
V. BA + 30			

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL J. D. NOBLE

W. B. Higgins

W. B. HIGGINS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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 121200 I May 1965

Annex C (Movement and Loading Schedule)

Ref: None

Time Zone: India-Japan: Hotel R/T

MOVEMENT AND LOADING SCHEDULE

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Stage</u>	<u>Load</u>
MABS-12 -	Tues 11 May	On Order 14 May
Elements VMA-225	Tues 11 May	On Order 14 May
Elements VMA-311	Tues 11 May	On Order 14 May
VMA-225	Thurs 13 May	On Order 15 May
VMA-311	Thurs 13 May	On Order 15 May
H&MS-12 -	On Order	On Order
Element VMA-214	On Order	On Order
Group Supply -	On Order	On Order
Elements of VMA-214	On Order	On Order

Loading once commenced will continue around the clock until completed.

The order to commence staging and loading will be originated from the Group S-4 MAG-Twelve.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL J. D. NOBLE

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Annex D (Assignment of Staging Areas) to Embarkation Order 301-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: India-Japan: Hanoi RVN

Staging Area Assignment

#1-H&MS-12, Bulk Cargo and possible VMA-214

#2-VMA-225, Bulk Cargo

#3-VMA-311, Bulk Cargo

#4-MABS-12

#5-Spare & POL

#6-Group Supply

#7-H&MS-12

#8-All Vehicles

A-Alternate for #4 & #6


B-Alternate for #4 & #6

C-Alternate for #9

#2-Alternate for VMA-225

D-1

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Ref: None

CMC	(4)	H&MS-12	(4)
COMUSMACV	(3)	MABS-12	(4)
CMCS	(2)	VMA-225	(4)
CG, FMFPAC	(2)	VMA-311	(4)
COM7THFLT	(2)	VMA-214	(4)
CG, AIRFMFPAC	(2)	MAG-11	(2)
CG, III MAF	(4)	MWSG-17	(2)
CG, FMAW	(5)	MWHG-1	(1)
CG, 3rd MARDIV	(1)	S-1	(2)
CG, 3rd MEB	(2)	S-2	(2)
CG, 9th MEB	(2)	S-3	(3)
CDR, 2nd Air Div	(1)	S-4	(3)
CTF 76	(2)	File	(2)

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 MCAS IWAKUNI, JAPAN
 140800I May 1965

Operation Order 301-65 (Expeditionary Airfield at Chu Lai) *u/c 11-1*

Ref: (a) Maps: RVN AMS Series 1509 Sheets ND 49-1-ND 49-13 1:250,000
 (b) FMAW OORDER 301-65 (AdminO FMAW 040250Z May (TS))
 (c) MAG-12 Order 3710.5
 (d) NWP-22(A)
 (e) LFM 01
 (f) FM 31-11
 (g) CG FMAW 050645Z May (C)
 (h) CINCPAC 240425Z Apr (TS)

MAG-12 S&C#	COPY#
692-65	64

Time Zone: I in Japan; H in RVN

Task Organization:

MAG-12(-)

Colonel NOBLE

H&MS-12(-)

LtCol KIRKLAND

MABS-12(-)

LtCol WILSON

VMA-225

LtCol BAKER

VMA-311

LtCol STENDER

VMA-214

LtCol O'KEEFE

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

(1) Annex A (Intelligence)

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b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) COMUSMACV is overall US Commander in RVN and exercises operational control of all US Forces in RVN.
- (2) III MAF provides Marine ground and aviation units and a Navy MCB to land, seize, construct, operate and defend an expeditionary airfield at CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam.
- (3) CG, 3d MAB conducts amphibious landing at CHU LAI as Landing Force Commander and passes landing force units to OPCON of CG, 9th MAB upon establishment ashore.
- (4) CG, 9th MAB continues operations in DANANG area; 9th MAB will be dissolved and its forces become part of III MAF upon arrival CG, III MAF.
- (5) 1st Marine Air Wing deploys Wing HQ (Advance) to DANANG on order and provides support from IWAKUNI and/or DANANG.
- (6) MWSG-17 provides supply and maintenance support from IWAKUNI.
- (7) MAG-16 continues operations at DANANG in support of 9th MAB and III MAF.

2. MISSION.

Marine Aircraft Group Twelve on order moves in increments by sea and air to the vicinity of CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam, lands administratively, installs facilities, operates an expeditionary airfield commencing D+21 and conducts air operations as directed.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. Annex B (Concept of Operation)

b. H&MS-12(-)

- (1) On order embarks in assigned sea and air lift and deploys to CHU LAI, lands and establishes facilities to provide maintenance and supply support for the squadrons of MAG-12 and administrative and logistical support for headquarters, MAG-12 at an expeditionary airfield to be operational by D+21. This will be accomplished as follows:
 - (a) On order embark an element of headquarters MAG-12 aboard LSD and elements of H&MS-12 aboard LSTs and an APA and deploy to CHU LAI.

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(b) On order, the advance element of MAG-12 headquarters deploys to DANANG aboard C-117, refueling at NAS Cubi Point en route, and proceeds to CHU LAI via helicopter.

(2) Annex C (Air Movement).

(3) Airfield operations. Reference (c).

(4) Annex D (Air Schedule).

(5) Be prepared to provide one provisional rifle company for airfield defense (Annex E).

c. MABS-12(-)

(1) Detachment A, MABS-12 embarks on LST 1170 (Windham County) on 25 April, sails at 0800I 26 April, reports OPCON to CG, 3d MAB on 28 April and on D-Day lands vicinity CHU LAI, Republic of Vietnam and installs facilities for an expeditionary airfield to be operational by D+21.

(2) On order deploys MATCU personnel and supplies aboard C-130 aircraft to CHU LAI.

(3) On order remaining elements of MABS-12 embark aboard LSTs and deploy to CHU LAI to complete installation of, and to operate, an expeditionary airfield.

(4) Annex C (Air Movement).

(5) Airfield Operations. Reference (c).

(6) Be prepared to provide one provisional rifle company for airfield defense (Annex E).

d. VMA-225

(1) On order embark advance elements aboard LSD and LST and deploy to CHU LAI.

(2) On order deploy 20 A-4C aircraft, using inflight refueling, and personnel and equipment aboard C-130 aircraft to NAS Cubi Pt.

(3) On order deploy 12 A-4C aircraft and personnel and equipment aboard C-130 aircraft from Cubi Point to CHU LAI.

(4) Be prepared to commence close air support operations and helicopter escort in support of III MAF or to conduct attack missions in the Republic of Vietnam, North Vietnam or Laos upon arrival CHU LAI.

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- (5) On order deploy remaining 8 A-4C aircraft from Cubi Point to CHU LAI.
- (6) Annex C (Air Movement).
- (7) Airfield Operations - Reference (c).
- (8) Annex D (Air Schedule).
- (9) Be prepared to provide one provisional rifle company for airfield defense. (Annex E).

e. VMA-311

- (1) On order embark advance elements aboard LSD and LST and deploy to CHU LAI.
- (2) On order deploy 20 A-4E aircraft, using inflight refueling, and personnel and equipment aboard C-130 aircraft to NAS Cubi Pt.
- (3) On order deploy 12 A-4E aircraft and personnel and equipment aboard C-130 aircraft from Cubi Point to CHU LAI.
- (4) Be prepared to commence close air support operations and helicopter escort in support of III MAF or to conduct attack missions in the Republic of Vietnam, North Vietnam or Laos upon arrival CHU LAI.
- (5) On order deploy remaining 8 A-4E aircraft from Cubi Point to CHU LAI.
- (6) Annex C (Air Movement).
- (7) Airfield Operations - Reference (c).
- (8) Annex D (Air Schedule).
- (9) Be prepared to provide one provisional rifle company for airfield defense (Annex E).

f. VMA-211

- (1) Continue training at NAS Cubi Point.
- (2) Provide assistance as required to VMAs 225 and 311 at Cubi Point.
- (3) On order assume standby posture at Cubi Point and be prepared to deploy 20 A-4C aircraft and personnel and equipment aboard C-130 aircraft in increments to CHU LAI on 24-hour notice.

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- (4) Be prepared to commence close air support operations and helicopter escort in support of III MAF or to conduct attack missions in the Republic of Vietnam, North Vietnam or Laos upon arrival CHU LAI.
- (5) Annex C (Air Movement).
- (6) Airfield Operations. Reference (c).
- (7) Annex D (Air Schedule).
- (8) Be prepared to provide one provisional rifle company for airfield defense (Annex E).

g. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) References (d), (e) and (f) contain applicable doctrine for planning.
- (2) Maintain highest order of host-guest relationships within RVN; pay scrupulous attention to cultural and religious taboos.
- (3) Avoid destruction of civilian life and property whenever possible; defeat of the VC is contingent upon support of the native populace for RVN and US forces.
- (4) Place unrelenting emphasis on military and physical security and civilian control.
- (5) Training for all hands will stress:
 - (a) The Geneva Convention (applicable portions).
 - (b) Conduct of the individual Marine.
 - (c) Civil affairs and civic action.
 - (d) Military and physical security.
 - (e) Handling of POWs.
 - (f) Transportation security.
 - (g) Cultural and religious taboos in RVN.
 - (h) First aid, buddy aid, prevention of heat casualties.
 - (i) Code of Conduct.
 - (j) Booby Traps. See reference (g).

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- (6) All movement reports will be classified SECRET
- (7) Rules of engagement. See reference (h).
- (8) Reports. Annex F.
- (9) No public statements except as authorized by CG, FMAW.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. See Administrative Order 301-654.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

- a. Annex G (Communications-Electronics Plan).
- b. MAG-12 Command Post.
 - (1) Planning - MCAS Iwakuni.
 - (2) Deployed - CHU LAI

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL J. D. NOBLE



W. B. HIGGINS
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

ANNEXES:

- ✓A - Intelligence
- ✓B - Concept of Operation
- ✓C - Air Movement (To be issued) NIF
- ✓D - Air Schedule (To be issued) NIF
- ✓E - Airfield Defense (To be issued) NIF
- ✓F - Reports
- ✓G - Communication-Electronics
- ✓H - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex H (Distribution)

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 Marine Aircraft Group 12
 MCAS, IWAKUNI, JAPAN
 140800I May 1965

Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Order 301-65

Ref: (1) III MEF OORDER 301-65
 (2) MAG-12 GruO PO3800.1A (Intelligence) SOP

Time Zone: Hotel

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

In 1956 when Ho Chi Minh realized that his plan to take over South Vietnam without a struggle had failed, he called out his secret supporters in the south and the terror began. Since that time Viet Cong operations have steadily progressed from small guerrilla forays into large mobile unit operations. Units have correspondingly progressed from the cell to regiments of three battalions supported by a heavy weapons battalion. Weapons likewise have grown in numbers, in quality, in caliber, and in sophistication. The 105mm howitzer, USSR 85mm field guns, and 4.2" mortars are now available to the Viet Cong.

In fact the Viet Cong have progressed to the point where, it is felt in some quarters, they are ready to assume "the classic conventional military offensive" which is the final stage of guerrilla warfare. Recent Viet Cong activity tends to support this theory somewhat. The Viet Cong recently fought government forces (six battalions) to a standstill in a battle about twenty-five miles south of Da Nang. Additionally, entire battalions of the regular North Vietnamese Army have infiltrated and are no doubt conducting operations. In summary, the Viet Cong have increased their tempo of operations from simple acts of terror and sabotage to regular military operations. For a detailed study of Viet Cong forces located within the AOA see Appendix I (Intelligence Estimate).

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

a. General. In addition to gathering information relative to particular EEI, all units must actively collect and report, on a continuing basis, all pertinent information on weather, terrain, hydrographic conditions, and the enemy situation.

b. Requirements. The following information is considered vital and must be sought on a continuing basis:

(1) Enemy forces.

(a) Suspected or confirmed locations of anti-aircraft weapons; any change in AAA defenses.

(b) Suspected or confirmed artillery and mortar positions.

A-1

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SECRET

- (c) Identification of hostile units.
- (d) Any indication of enemy activity directed toward the airfield such as:
 - 1. Hostile artillery or small arms fire.
 - 2. Presence of armed individuals or suspicious groups among the surrounding civil population.
 - 3. Change in attitude on the part of the civil populace
 - 4. Unusual activity among the civil populace (some times the Viet Cong kill all the dogs in a village to prevent detection and in some instances have forced the people to move from the vicinity of an area that is to be attacked).
 - 5. Evidence of sabotage or espionage.
 - 6. Indications of Viet Cong intelligence collection efforts.
- (e) Location of Viet Cong camps, dumps, assembly areas, rendezvous points and trails.
- (f) Any buildup of aircraft or airfields within striking distance
- (g) Any general movement of DRV/CHICOM forces from normal operating areas.
- (h) Location and activity of armor.
- (i) Any significant change in the flow or pattern of DRV/CHICOM forces radio traffic which indicates imminent military actions.
- (j) Suspected or actual employment of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons; presence of such weapons.
- (2) Enemy atomic means.
 - (a) Presence of radiac equipment in hands of troops.
 - (b) High airburst registration of artillery.
 - (c) Existence of extensive overhead cover and protection.
 - (d) Presence of exclusion areas or areas under exceptional security control.

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- (e) Use of guided missiles; medium or heavy rockets.
- (f) Anxiety reaction of POW's, native personnel, and line crossers, towards remaining in forward areas.

(3) Terrain.

- (a) Significant errors or omissions in maps.
- (b) Presence of obstacles to foot traffic or vehicles.
- (c) Status of bridges along MSR.
- (d) Presence of fords at major streams.

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS. (See Section IV GruO PO3800.1A)
4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, AND CAPTURED MATERIAL. (See Section V GruO PO3800.1A (Intelligence SOP)).
5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS. (See Appendix IV)
6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. (See Appendix V)
7. REPORTS. (See Section VIII GruO PO3800.1A (Intelligence SOP)).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL J. D. NOBLE



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LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
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APPENDIXES

- ✓ I Intelligence Estimate
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- ✓ III DRV Air Defense Capability (To be issued) *NIF*
- ✓ IV Evasion, Escape, Survival
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Dist: Annex H (Dist) to Operation Order 301-65

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 Marine Aircraft Group 12
 MCAS, IWAKUNI, JAPAN
 140800I May 1965

Appendix 1 to Annex A (Intelligence Estimate) to Operation Order 301-65

Ref: (a) AMS L509, 1:250,000, sheets ND 48-4, 8; ND 49-1, 5; NE 48-16;
 NE 49-13

1. MISSION.

a. Basic mission. Land advance elements of MAG-12 in the Chu Lai area as soon as possible on D-Day to assist in the construction of a tactical airfield. Upon completion of the field on D+21 land one VMA squadron and commence operations, rapidly building up to a MAG of three squadrons. Afterwards be prepared to conduct operations as required.

b. The purpose of this estimate is to determine the effects of the weather, terrain, and enemy forces located in the Chu Lai area on Marine Aircraft Group 12 operations within the Amphibious Objective Area in the Chu Lai area beginning tentatively on 5 May 1965.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. (Including their effects on enemy capabilities and on the commander's mission).

a. Weather.

1. Southern Vietnam. Southern Vietnam is a tropical zone-- between 9° and 17° north of the equator. Heavy rains fall throughout the country except in the extreme south where the moisture-laden air often passes over the low flatlands of the lower Mekong Delta, releasing little precipitation until forced up over the highlands. Heavy rainfall is vital to the wet-rice economy of the country. Annual precipitation reaches 203 centimeters in Saigon in the south and 295 centimeters at Hue in the north. Average temperatures in southern Vietnam range from 75° F in January to 85° F in July. The coastal areas are often subject to destructive tropical typhoons that sweep in from the east from July to November. Only about 10 percent of the Mekong lies inside the country and this portion runs through the country south of Saigon. During the rainy season, large areas are flooded by torrential downpours, and villages often become isolated islands.

b. Terrain.

1. The northern half of South Vietnam consists of relatively low, deeply dissected and heavily forested mountains, and a narrow, discontinuous coastal plain. The southern half consists of a rolling plateau and the Mekong Delta. Modern mechanized warfare would be

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difficult, or impossible throughout the country, especially from early June through November when precipitation is high and paddies are flooded. Limited conventional and airborne operations could be carried out in the Mekong Delta. The rugged highlands and forests, which form a major part of the country, are ideally suited for the conduct of guerrilla operations. Only two land approaches exist; the ANNAM Coastal Plain, which is poorly suited as a conventional invasion route, and the Mekong Delta.

2. ANNAM Coastal Plain. The ANNAM Coastal Plain is a narrow interrupted plain which is nowhere over 20 miles wide. It is made up of a series of small deltas backed in places by gently rolling terraces with elevations of 100 to 300 feet. Individual deltas are small, having been formed by short rapid streams with small drainage basins, and are often separated from each other (particularly south of AUI NHON) by rugged, densely forested headlands of the ANNAN CORDILLERA. These rocky promontories provide numerous bays and several good, though small harbors. The ANNAM Coastal Plain is the only good natural route for north-south movement, and is the site of an all-weather highway and a single-track meter-gauge railroad. Confined as they are to the coast, these routes are highly vulnerable to naval bombardment. The road and railroad go from one isolated lowland section to another via steep, heavily forested slopes and narrow defiles; these serve as excellent sites for interdiction and ambush by guerrilla forces. They could also be developed as defenses against an enemy utilizing the coastal plain as an invasion route.

All land suitable for cultivation has been cleared and is usually devoted to the rice paddies. Flooding of paddies is most extensive from early June through November and confines movement of vehicles to existing roads and embankments. This region is unique in South Vietnam because heavy rains continue until late December. Thereafter, the fields dry and movement conditions improve. Beach ridges, with sand dunes, as high as 150 feet alternate with low wet belts and lagoons paralleling the shore line. Beach ridges are generally barren and well suited for cross-country movement whenever sand dunes are low. Most streams cannot be forded during the wet season, but construction of low-level temporary bridges is possible. Natural vegetation, which covers half the region, generally indicates terrain which is too rugged for farming and, thus, does not favor cross-country movement. The most prevalent natural vegetation consists of rain forests and open forest. The former, consisting primarily of thick stands of broadleaf evergreens with dense underbrush and numerous vines, provides excellent concealment but makes penetration very difficult even for foot troops. Open forests occur in areas of relatively light precipitation and consist of widely-spaced deciduous trees and low brush. Movement is fair for foot troops and may be passable for vehicles if tree spacing permits. Concealment from the air is poor during the dry season when the trees shed their leaves. Forested areas favor unconventional warfare.

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3. ANNAN CORDILLERA. The ANNAN CORDILLERA constitutes almost all of south Vietnam north of the Mekong Plateau. It is a severely dissected mountainous area, with maximum elevation ranging from 4,500 to 7,000 feet in the vicinity of DALAT and from 3,000 to 4,000 feet elsewhere. The CORDILLERA slopes steeply down to the Coastal lowlands on the east and more gently down to the Mekong Plateau in the west, resulting in a strong contrast between the short, swift, eastward flowing streams with their steep-walled narrow valleys, and more sluggish westward flowing streams with their broader flatter valleys. All streams are swollen and difficult to ford during the rainy season. Locally, valleys cut through the narrower section of the CORDILLERA forming narrow passes at elevations of 1300 to 2500 feet.

Rain forests cover three quarters of the region and are difficult even for foot troops to penetrate. Open forests occur whenever topography limits rainfall. These are easier to penetrate due to wide spacing of trees and light underbrush.

Very few roads traverse the mountain chain and they are generally usable only during the dry season from early November through March.

Mountain dwellers have developed numerous tracks and trails which could be used by foot troops. Troops could also travel in the stream beds during the dry season. All routes would be highly vulnerable and could easily be dominated by guerrillas. Conventional operations would be impracticable. All operations would be complicated by the prevalence of malaria.

4. CHU LAI.

This portion is limited to the general vicinity (25 mile radius) of the airfield site at Chu Lai.

The airfield site at Chu Lai is located on a relatively flat sandy coastal plain. Elevations in the immediate vicinity of the field consist of sand dunes less than 80 feet elevation. This coastal plain is narrow averaging three to four miles wide with the terrain rising rapidly inland to elevations in excess of 1300 feet within seven miles and to approximately 4,600 feet within fifteen miles.

The coastal plain is broken into small farms, sand dunes, and swampy areas. Many small hamlets and individual dwellings are found throughout the area. The plain is bisected by highway one and a railroad which traverses it in a north-south direction. The plain in the vicinity of the landing beach appears to be well drained except for a marsh located just west of the airfield site. At the mouth of the landing beaches the plain consist of low swampy area.

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Inland the mountains are covered by tropical jungle growth with small villages and individual dwellings located along the water courses.

a. Critical terrain features.

1. The mountainous area extending from the landing beach area to the Do Xa Redoubt encompassing the promontaries at BT 550; (hill 417), BT 6705 (hill 453), BT 5411 (hill 190), BS 6694 (hill 344), BT 4003 (hill 1345), BS 3796 (hill 4600), and BS 2192 (hill 4760) dominates the airfield site. Friendly control of this area is essential to uninterrupted air operations.

b. Observation and fields of fire.

1. Observation over the flat coastal plain is generally good but limited by the flat terrain. However, this flat terrain would offer excellent fields of fire for small arms and crew served weapons. In the mountains the higher elevations offer a more commanding view but this advantage is often offset by the presence of thick jungle growth. Fields of fire are also limited by this growth.

c. Obstacles.

1. The swamp just west of the airfield site would hinder motor vehicles in cross-country movement. One definite obstacle is the absence of a suitable road net in the area. The rugged nature of the mountainous terrain with its jungle vegetation also constitutes an obstacle to movement of foot troops and vehicles.

d. Avenues of approach.

1. Avenues of approach are limited to highway one which traverses the area in a north-south direction. However, a network of native trails suitable for men and animals extends throughout the area. Cover and concealment is relatively poor on the coastal plain due to the open flat terrain. In the mountains cover and concealment is excellent.

e. Politics.

1. The government is a republic with a constitution and a popularly elected National Assembly. The republic is a centralized state whose divisions have certain self-governing features. The executive branch at every level of administration is the strongest branch of government, completely dominating the political scene. The Republic of Vietnam is firmly anchored in the Free World. Relations between the Republic of Vietnam and Cambodia are somewhat strained because of conflicting claims over certain provinces in the Western part of Vietnam, use of the port of Saigon, as well as the use of guerrilla infiltration across Cambodian territory. The nationalist government has continually sought firm commitments from the major Western

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Powers to support it in the event of an open attack by the DRVN. In spite of the "umbrella" provided by SEATO, the problem of Communist aggression faced by the Saigon government remains extremely serious.

Political parties, or groups calling themselves such, have existed in Vietnam for over 30 years. Many of these groups were really little more than lobbying agencies for special interests. There are three major political parties in the Republic of Vietnam today: the National Revolutionary Movement, the Revolutionary Workers' Party, and the Movement for the Struggle for Freedom. In addition to these organizations there are other splinter groups which, when banded together, make up a small independent movement strong enough to hold 15 seats in the National Assembly.

f. Economics and Industrial Development.

1. Most Vietnamese earn their livelihood from the land by rice cultivation. Eighty-five percent of the people are engaged in rice farming. Rice represents the country's chief export product. Other crops include citrus fruits, corn, tea, and coffee. Industries include lumber, sugar, refining, and fish processing. Mining in the past has been a relatively minor economic activity. Known deposits of industrial significance are limited. Commercially valuable petroleum deposits have not been found to date. Clay, limestone, phosphate rock, molybdenite, lead bismuth, gold, and copper are found in limited quantities in scattered areas. A recent coal mine survey indicates that coal reserves total 31 million tons, of which about 60 percent can be exploited for commercial use. This amount should be adequate for from 12 to 15 years' demand. In the southern basalt highlands north and west of Saigon, the French established great rubber estates which are among the highest producing in Asia.

g. Sociology.

1. An estimated 12.8 million people live in an area of 168,350 square kilometers in the Republic of Vietnam. The bulk of the population lives in the Mekong Delta and along the coast. Over 2 million people live in Saigon-Cholon. There is a greater agricultural diversification and abundance in this country than in northern Vietnam. The people are nearly all Vietnamese (85 percent). The others are French, Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis, and Cambodians. The mountainous areas are very thinly populated. The main ethnic differences are between the lowlanders and the highlanders. The lowlanders are thought of as being more civilized than the highlanders. The variety of skills and knowledge gives the lowland people a far wider range in choice of occupation and avocation.

Buddhism--brought in from India via China--has traditionally been the main religion. But it is actually Confucianism, essentially a comprehensive system of ethical precepts rather than a religious, which has determined Vietnamese outlook and governed Vietnamese conduct and loyalties for over 2,000 years. Its influence has permeated every religion in the Republic of Vietnam. The most important development in religion recently has been the emergence of the Cao-Dai and Hoa-Hoa sects. Both represent a distinct

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departure from traditional Vietnamese religion and Confucian doctrine in that their beliefs combine as never before both religious and political meaning. About 10 percent of the population are Catholics (highest proportion of any Far East country except the Philippines), and there are small groups of various Protestant bodies.

5. ENEMY SITUATION.a. Composition.

Enemy forces located in the AOA consist of five Main Force Battalions (regular Viet Cong Army) and one regimental headquarters, all unlocated, but within a 25-mile radius of the center of the AOA. There are also six battalions and another regimental headquarters located within a 50-mile radius. In addition to the above an estimated 450 local force troops (units directly subordinate to a province or district) are operating in the vicinity of the Trai Can River Estuary. See Tab A (Enemy Disposition Overlay).

b. Strength and combat efficiency.

Battalion strength is approximately 500 personnel. See Tab B (Viet Cong T/O and E Tables). The combat efficiency of the main force units is rated excellent. This area has traditionally been a center of Communist strength (Ho Chi Minh was born in nearby Quang Ngai province) and the area has always endured high levels of Viet Cong activity. With a majority of the population either actively Viet Cong, or least offering little resistance, the local forces are also rated excellent.

c. Arms and armament.

See Tab B (Viet Cong T/O & E).

d. Recent and present activities.

This area has existed for some time in a precarious balance between government forces and the Viet Cong. The area is an important axis of Viet Cong infiltration. The Viet Cong reportedly control the Bay of Ung Dung Quat, and the Cape Dat Vian Ka area is believed to be a main infiltration beach-head. Approximately 450 local force personnel operate in the area of the Trai Can River Estuary. Typical Viet Cong daily activity consists of terrorizing local inhabitants, collecting taxes, establishing administration control over the area, and when feasible, attacking government force units.

e. Time and space.

See paragraph h. (Reinforcements). In general, Viet Cong time and space factors are limited to foot troops and animal transport within the AOA. However, utilizing the trail network throughout the area the Viet Cong have a cross-country mobility capability that is often more rapid than government forces who with their vehicles are road-bound on the limited highway network. The recent stepped-up air interdiction of traditional supply routes no doubt has adversely affected Viet Cong time and space factors by obligating them to move at night and/or along routes that are concealed from aerial observation.

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f. Logistical considerations.

The Cape Dat Vian Ka area is believed to be a main infiltration point for personnel and supplies destined for the Do Xa Redoubt. In addition, the Do Xa Redoubt sits astride the Ho Chi Minh trail which is the main artery for personnel and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. Logistics in terms of short tons per day, 30 day supply level, etc. cannot be stated. However, since the Viet Cong carefully staff any operation, logistical considerations (always very austere by US standards) will be adequately measured and applied to the situation. The recent stepped-up bombing of supply routes, together with government forces capture of several food supply dumps have no doubt adversely affected Viet Cong logistics.

g. Personnel considerations.

Units are currently carried at T/O strength (personnel strength varies from 300 - 600 per battalion). Infiltration of personnel from North Vietnam coupled with local recruiting seems to have been adequate until recently. Recent stepped-up bombing of communication routes is reported to have lowered the morale of the Viet Cong. A vigorous Government civil action program together with the presence of large Marine Corp Units in the area with increased overall military activity would definitely have a further detrimental effect on Viet Cong personnel.

h. Reinforcements.

Although units are not definitely located, the Viet Cong forces are capable of massing four battalions in the Amphibious Assault Area (AAA) led by a regimental headquarters, and supported by a heavy weapons battalion. The Viet Cong can reinforce the above with two to three battalions within 72 hours.

i. Peculiarities and weaknesses.

The Viet Cong are dependent on North Vietnam for all supplies and equipment except that which is captured from government forces or locally obtained. Further, these supplies after reaching South Vietnam travel chiefly by human and animal transport over jungle trails constantly sought by government air and ground forces. Interruption of this vulnerable supply route will have adverse effects on Viet Cong capabilities.

Personnel also reach the Viet Cong after clandestine entry from North Vietnam by methods stated above. Local recruits are obtained by volunteers, intimidation, blackmail, etc. When government forces are present in an area, are active, and gain the support of local peoples Viet Cong recruiting suffers as a consequence.

A very noted peculiarity of the Viet Cong is their reluctance to reinforce or attempt to aid a Viet Cong unit engaged in a losing battle. This reluctance apparently stems from the idea that the unit committed is expended and nothing is to be gained by wasting additional troops on a battle that is lost or at least in doubt.

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j. Assistance from neighboring forces.

Introduction of complete North Vietnamese army units of battalion size into South Vietnam has been reported. However, none of these forces have been reported within the AOA.

6. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.a. Concentrations.

The enemy is capable of opposing our operations at Chu Lai by:

(1) Massing four battalions against Chu Lai within 24 hours, controlled by a regimental headquarters and supported by a heavy weapons battalion.

(2) Reinforcing the above with two to three battalions within 72 hours.

(3) In conjunction with local and guerrilla forces, conducting sabotage and espionage against US Forces at any time after the landings.

(4) Employing mortars against the airfield site.

b. Analysis and discussion.

Capability 1 and 2 if adopted would entail moving large numbers of personnel and relatively large amounts of equipment over considerable distances. Detection of this force with the resultant employment of all combined arms available to the Task Force could have disastrous results for the Viet Cong.

Capability 3 and 4 if adopted would merely be an extension of current type activities.

In the past the Viet Cong have steadfastly refused to commit their forces to battle unless victory was assured beforehand. It is extremely doubtful that the Viet Cong would engage a force known to be armed with much heavier firepower, numerically equivalent to their own forces, and supported by substantial Vietnamese government forces in the area.

7. CONCLUSIONS.a. Relative probability of adoption.

In view of the above the Viet Cong will probably offer token opposition to the landing and subsequent airfield operations. Afterwards he will actively harrass operations by acts of sabotage, terrorism, raids, mortar and artillery fire, sniper fire, etc.

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b. Effect of enemy capabilities on the Marine Aircraft Group 12 Mission.

The Viet Cong will harrass, and possibly temporarily disrupt air operations but will not prevent accomplishment of the mission.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL J. D. NOBLE

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EXECUTIVE OFFICER

TABS:

- A - Enemy Disposition Overlay (To be issued)
- B - Viet Cong T/O & E (To be issued)

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140800I May 1965

Appendix 2 (Maps and Charts) to Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Order
301-65

Ref:

Time Zone: HOTEL (Effective for Operations)

1. MAPS AND CHARTS.

a. Planning Maps and Charts.

- (1) MAG-12 stocks limited supplies of maps of the area of operations.
- (2) SLF embarks with contingency map packets.
- (3) Maps and Charts needed by MAG-12 units will be issued by S-2, MAG-12.
- (4) Standard map for planning is 1:250,000, AMS Series L509

b. Operational Maps and Charts.

- (1) Standard tactical map is 1:50,000, AMS Series

c. Position Referencing System.

- (1) The UTM grid system will be used for ground operations.
- (2) Aircraft in support of ground forces will use the system prescribed for ground forces.
- (3) Geographic coordinates will be used in any area not covered by the UTM grid system. If a possibility of confusion exists as to which system is being used, state the reference system in all correspondence.
- (4) When referring to towns, villages, etc., include coordinates in addition to name.

d. Resupply. Requests for map resupply will be submitted to S-2, MAG-12.

e. Issue. Specific sheets to be issued within each series are shown below.

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Operational Navigation Charts ONC Scale 1:1,000,000 Sheets J-10, 11; K-9, 10 (4) Sheets.

Pilotage Charts PC Scale 1:500,000 Sheets 617-A, B, C, D, 737-A, D, 739-A, B, C, D, 738-A, B, C, D (14) Sheets.

Aeronautical Approach Charts Scale 1:250,000 Sheets 556C-II, III; 616A-III, IV; 616B-III, IV; 616C-I, II, III, IV; 616D-I, II, III, IV.

Aeronautical Ground Charts AGC Scale 1:250,000 Sheets NC48-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15; NC49-1; ND 47-3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16; ND 48-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16; NE 48-1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; NF 47-8, 12, 16; NE 49-13; (67) Sheets.

Global Navigation Charts GNC 1:5,000,000 Sheets 13N (1) Sheet.

AMS 1206 Continental Southeast Asia 1:2,500,000 (1) Sheet.

AMS 1301 World Scale 1:1,000,000 Sheets NC48, 49; ND47, 48, 49; NE47, 48, 49; (8) Sheets.

AMS 5202 Indochina Road Map Scale 1:2,000,000 (1) Sheet.

AMS L7011 Scale 1:50,000 Sheets 5842-II; 5942-I, IV; 6043-I, IV; 6244-III; 6144-I, II; 6146-II; 6246-I, II, III, IV; 6347-II, III; 6447-IV; 6448-II, III; 6449-I, II; 650-II; 6452-I, II; 6453-I; (24) Sheets.

AMS Indochina and Thailand Scale 1:250,000 Sheets NC48-3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15; ND48-4, 8, 12, 16; ND49-1, 5, 9, 13; NE48-12, 16; NE49-13; (21) Sheets.

AMS L701 Indochina Scale 1:50,000 Sheets 5967-I, IV; 6065-I; 6066-I, II; 6067-I, II, III, IV; 6164-I, II; 6165-I, II, III, IV; 6166-I, II, III, IV; 6167-II, III, IV; 6262-I; 6263-I, II, III, IV; 6264-IV; 6363-III, IV; 6364-IV; 6265-II, III, IV; 6360-I; 6361-I, II, III, IV; 6362-I, II, III, IV; 6457-I; 6458-I, II; 6459-I, II, IV; 6460-I, II, III, IV; 6461-II, III, IV; 6462-III; 6556-I, II, III, IV; 6557-I, II, III, IV; 6558-I, II, III, IV; 6559-I, II, III, IV; 6560-II, III, IV; 6655-I; 6656-I, II, III, IV; 6657-I, II, III, IV; 6658-I, II, III, IV; 6659-II, III, IV; 6747-I, II, III, IV; 6748-I, II, III, IV; 6749-I, II, III, IV; 6750-I, II, III, IV; 6751-I, II, III, IV; 6752-I, II, III, IV; 6753-I, II, III, IV; 6754-I, II, III, IV; 6755-I, II, III, IV; 6756-I, II, III, IV; 6757-II, III, IV; 6758-III, IV; 6847-I, III, IV; 6848-I, II, III, IV; 6849-I, II, III, IV; 6850-I, II, III, IV; 6851-I, II, III, IV; 6852-I, II, III, IV; 6853-III, IV; 6854-III, IV; 6855-III; (166) Sheets.

AMS L909 Vietnam City Plans Various Scale, Sheets KONTUM, PLEI-KU, SAIGON, DANANG, HUE, DALAT, QUI NHON (7) Sheets.

AMS Gazetteers to AMS 1:250,000, Maps of Indochina.

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TACCTA MAPS VIETNAM

1. QUANG TRI
2. HUE
3. DANANG
4. NHA TRANG
5. SAIGON
6. KANTUM
7. VINH
8. THAN HOA
9. HAIPHONG
10. DING HAI

Any available of VIETNAM as produced.

AMS L509 Indochina and Thailand Scale 1:250,000 Sheets ND48-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9; ND49-1; NE47-2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16; NE48-1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; NE49-13; NE47-8, 12, 16; NF48-5, 9, 13, 14; ND47-3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16; NCH7-3, 7; (52) Sheets

AMS L7012 LAOS Scale 1:50,000 complete set.

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Maine Aircraft Group 12
First Marine Aircraft Wing
MCAS, IWAKUNI, JAPAN
140800I May 1965

Appendix 4 (Escape, Evasion, and Survival) to Annex A (Intelligence)
to Operation Order 301-65

1. General. It is assumed that E&E studies contain an explanation of and diagrams of all "safe" or refuge areas in that particular country where downed pilots can be assured of successful evasion and eventual rescue. However, the selection of stable "safe" areas in Vietnam is impracticable and will continue to be so due to the fluid military situation. It is therefore of utmost importance that all pilots be thoroughly familiar with standard E&E techniques, and understand the nature and types of indigenous people that may be encountered. Should immediate rescue not be possible, the downed pilot must be able to live off the land, withstanding climatic problems, and evade enemy capture.

2. SURVIVAL AND EVASION IN SOUTH VIETNAM. (The information presented below is taken from "Escape/Survival in South Vietnam," a pamphlet produced by the Combat Intelligence Branch, 2nd Air Division, U.S. Air Force. The recommendations are of value to anyone operating in or near the area; however, they deal solely with land survival. It should be noted that, in situations where a choice exists, and while military conditions in the country remain relatively unchanged, sea survival is in most cases a better alternative).

a. South Vietnam (SVN or RVN) is bordered by North Vietnam on the north and by Laos and Cambodia on the west. Aircrews in an emergency situation near the SVN border should NOT cross into a neighboring country. North Vietnam is a Communist country, and the area of Laos bordering SVN is controlled by the communist Pathet Lao Group. Personal security in Cambodia is highly questionable, the Viet Cong (VC) operate with impunity all along the border within Cambodia. The USAF Search and Rescue coordinating unit in SVN has no clearance for air search operations within Laos or Cambodia, as this function is considered the responsibility of the Laotian and Cambodian Air Force. Normal diplomatic channels, with the usual red tape, must be utilized for air clearance and it is estimated that the launching of search operations would be delayed at least 24-36 hours. In addition, since government relations between SVN and Cambodia are severely strained, incidents which may further aggravate the situation should be avoided.

b. After the decision to bail out or crash land has been made, attempt to locate your position and transmit particulars, including your intentions, over the radio. Before landing, try to note area terrain features, direction of easiest travel, possible helicopter landing zones, nearby villages, water sources, and enemy troops. Once on the ground, dense undergrowth may prevent visual sightings.

c. Do not carry any items of identification on your person, except

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those required by the Geneva Convention or by your service. Personal letters, business cards, official correspondence, military orders, flight maps, and other seemingly insignificant items can be of great value to an experienced enemy interrogator. You should burn, bury or otherwise hide any items of personal or military significance as soon as feasible after landing.

d. Move away from the immediate area of your aircraft in order to lessen the possibility of being captured by the Viet Cong. Weaponry aboard certain aircraft and the possibility of capturing aircrew members may make a downed aircraft the subject of immediate VC attention.

e. Unless in a "war zone" or heavily infiltrated VC area, remain hidden in the general vicinity of the aircraft and have signals ready. Begin an evasion trek only if Search and Rescue does not locate you in a reasonable time (48 hours or two clear days). If in a densely forested area, seek out the nearest clearing. It offers a better chance of rescue than a trek through the thick undergrowth. Because a wrecked aircraft is more easily spotted than an individual, remaining near the aircraft enhances rescue possibilities. Air rescue is the best bet; a sizable and continuing search effort is launched in the case of an air crash. (One recent search and rescue mission utilized 137 aircraft flying a total of 740 hours on 298 sorties). All search patterns will center on the crash site and will be oriented to terrain features; that is, parallel to ridgelines and valleys rather than perpendicular to them. Once sighted by SAR aircraft, you should remain at that location weather conditions permitting, rescue should be effected within two hours after sighting or at first light the next day. Recovery will generally be made by helicopter; however, when helicopter recovery is not practical, airborne troops will be dropped in and deployed to secure the area. Airborne recovery should not be expected during the hours of darkness, but flare ships and speaker-equipped aircraft are available and may be used during day and night operations in the search area.

f. Signaling equipment (flares, mirrors, signal fires, and parachute panels) should not be used until it is determined that an aircraft is within range to observe signals. Search and Rescue aircraft continuously monitor radio frequencies 243.0 and 121.5 mcs during search operations; however, 15 and 45 minutes after the hour are established distress call times. Lacking a wrist watch, the downed crew member should make periodic distress calls.

g. The SAFE Area concept does not apply in South Vietnam, and no coordinate-outlined areas can be recommended. In the most general terms, river valleys, open plains and coastal areas are more likely to be under government control than are densely forested mountainous areas and thickly foliated swampland regions.

h. When in mountainous terrain, it is suggested that you remain high on the ridgeline, since these areas are less likely to be populated and will have less undergrowth than the well-watered ravine areas. Because enemy patrols are often made along established trails in mountainous areas, it is generally best to sacrifice ease of movement for security

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and to travel off the beaten paths. Day travel only is advised in dense jungle regions and night travel only is recommended in open delta and coastal areas.

i. In the delta, both friendly and VC patrols are made along the dikes and levees rather than through the rice paddies. Most night patrols are unfriendly, so it behooves the evader to stay off these raised areas. Many of the lowland regions along the coastline and bordering rivers and canals are tidal and overgrown by dense mangrove swamps. Heavy mud and widespread root growth make travel in such areas tedious.

j. Pick your evasion route with great care. Note that trails may be booby trapped and/or under surveillance. Booby traps include snare traps, spring loaded knives or spears, triggered firearms, bamboo or metal spikes, pitfalls, triggered grenades and land mines. In addition, the Montagnard tribal peoples of the highlands areas are excellent trackers, and you should take great care in covering your trail in the immediate vicinity of the crash site, villages, and settlements. Dawn and dusk are the quietest times of day and sound seems to carry best then. If the evader is unable to observe the area visually, he may be able to utilize these periods for listening. Sounds from woodcutters, patrols, road traffic, and villages may warn of danger.

k. Once the evasion track has been decided upon, head for a known secure installation, such as an air base or large town. Be on the lookout for indications of friendly activity; watchtowers, outposts, strategic hamlets. Outposts generally have a triangular shape, and the GVN flag is usually in evidence. A few settlements are under VC control (so-called VC Combat Hamlets), and therefore a thorough survey of any hamlet is necessary before approaching the perimeter. "VC Combat Hamlets" may be ringed by 6-10' anti-helicopter stakes and are generally devoid of people, except for a few women and children left behind by the VC. Enter a friendly settlement openly by the main gate if possible. Do not approach at night because guards may shoot before you can identify yourself. There are literally thousands of friendly outposts and settlements scattered throughout the countryside. Many of the fortified villages and outposts are equipped with two way radios.

l. Do not contact the local population; your contact might prove to be a Viet Cong, a VC sympathizer, or a SVN National who might compromise your presence for a reward. If contact is forced upon you, attempt to follow the local customs as much as possible. Many of the Montagnard tribal groups have strict rituals and taboos. No house should be entered except by invitation. None of the many sacred objects of the village should be molested in any way. These can include large rocks, fine strands of bamboo, small spirit houses near native homes (and the offerings place therein), burial grounds and any objects in the houses, especially fireplaces, altars, drums, gongs, and wine jugs. Hearty familiarity or "back slapping" behavior will be strongly resented by some tribes. It is particularly important not to pass anything over a native's head, to pat or touch the heads of native children, or to interrupt a meal. All of these are considered very bad omens. The only safe attitude when with the tribal peoples is one of quiet patience, strict

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obedience to tribal customs, and apparent interest in their handiwork; the ability to sketch or play a musical instrument or entertain them in some other way can be helpful.

m. A religious temple or mission might normally be considered safe, but this is not always true in South Vietnam. These structures have been overrun and utilized by the Viet Cong in the past, and it is recommended that temples and churches be avoided.

n. The evader should be aware that in certain VC-dominated areas anything that moves is subject to attack. Take cover if a fighter aircraft appears to be on a gunnery pass in your area. In addition, there are numerous ordnance jettisoning areas used by the VNAF throughout the country.

o. The climate in SVN is generally mild, but in the central and northern highlands it can be quite cold during the rainy season (Oct-Apr) with temperatures down to 45-50 degrees. The country receives up to 200 inches of rain annually. It is suggested that aircrews wear fatigue uniforms, because the normal flight suit leaves much to be desired in a jungle environment; it tears easily and, once wet, is slow to dry. Scratches are more of a problem than heat in the jungle, and under no circumstances should flight clothing be short sleeved.

p. Snakes, deer, members of the cat family, and buffalo are in the area, although the probability of encounter is slight. Jungle noises may be very frightening, but are normal and should be expected; they are not necessarily a response or reaction to the evader's presence. When traveling through the jungle, you will inevitably pick up leeches and ticks on exposed areas of the body. Heat and/or iodine placed directly on the offending insect will cause it to loose its grip so that it may be brushed off. Pulling or ripping the insect off may dismember it, leaving a part in the skin.

q. Vietnam is exceedingly rich in natural foods, and should it become necessary, living off the land offers no problem. Practically all vegetables, nuts, roots, and wild animals are edible; however, it is wise to avoid unfamiliar plants with yellow or purple flowers or those with milky sap. One safe guide for the evader is the monkey; whatever he eats may safely be eaten by humans. If the evader wishes to pilfer cultivated foods, he should take only a few items from each area in order not to attract attention. Food taken from cultivated fields should never be eaten raw, because of the wide use of human excrement as fertilizer. South Vietnam is well watered, so drinking water should be available. In the upland area, water is found in ravines; the delta is intersected with many streams and canals. All water should be boiled or chemically treated before drinking.

r. Transportation arteries provide access to friendly forces for the

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evader. Naval patrols cover most of the coastline and also the larger rivers and canals of the country. Armored and armed "Wickam Trolleys" continually patrol the railroad lines, and trains run on a regular basis. Highway traffic contains many military vehicles during the daylight hours (90% of all GVN movements are in daylight). Major bridges and intersections are guarded by military and paramilitary forces.

s. The Blood Chit should be used as a last resort. Do not seek out persons to present the chit to, but use it if your situation unavoidably forces contact with the local populace. The standard Southeast Asia Blood Chit is now available with the Vietnamese and French languages applicable to SVN. A new blood chit specifically for SVN, and including Montagnard languages and symbols, is in development. Many individuals carry watches, cigarette lighters, mirrors, compasses, and silver coinage to be used as barter items.

3. SUGGESTED MINIMUM E&E SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| a. Machett or large knife | j. URG 4/10/11/ or SARAH |
| b. Matches (waterproof) | transmitter |
| c. Compass | k. Ration |
| d. Water purification tablets | l. First aid kit (include snake |
| e. Plastic water bag | bite kit) |
| f. Flares (smoke/star, min 2 ea) | m. Blood chit |
| g. Anti-malarial protection | n. Survival map |
| h. Insect repellent | o. Pointee - talkee |
| i. Signaling mirror | |

(Having equipment in the aircraft is no guarantee you will have it when you reach the ground. It is suggested that as many of the items as possible be carried on the person.

4. Your mental attitude is the most important factor in an E&E situation. The "will to survive" and the careful and patient execution of well-laid plans are prerequisite to success.

5. SUMMARY. The following important items should be remembered:

- Move away from aircraft crash site, but remain hidden in the general area for 48 hours before beginning an evasion trek (unless in a heavily infested VC area).
- Be ready to signal Search and Rescue aircraft upon sighting, and utilize the radio at 15 and 45 minutes after the hour even if aircraft are not sighted.
- Travel in the deltas only at night and in upland mountainous regions only during daylight hours.
- Avoid contact with the population. Expose yourself only when persons are evaluated as friendly.

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e. Head for nearest large town or air base; be on the lookout for watchtowers, outposts, strategic hamlets, roads, railroads, and canals, all of which may provide access to friendly forces.

6. BIOLOGY.a. Dangerous Marine Animals.

(1) Inedible Fish. Several species of inedible fish are present in the area, being usually most common around coral reefs and in estuarine locations. Very poisonous species include the shield moray and speckled moray, found hiding in and around coral reefs. The flesh of the first occasionally causes fatalities. Other species of known inedible fish include the spiny burrfish and the estuarine puffer, forests' barracuda, the brilliant trigger fish, and the great barracuda. In addition to these definitely toxic species, there are several species of otherwise harmless fish which spoil rapidly when caught and cause ptomaine poison when eaten.

(2) Venomous Fish. Scorpion fish are most abundant around coral reefs and near river mouths, and often lie partially buried in mud or on mud and sand bottoms. Two of the more virulent species are the New Guinea scorpion fish found near river mouths. Scorpion fish are rough-skinned, large-headed fish with large fins.

Among the venom-spined marine catfish in the area, possibly the most venomous is the eel catfish, which is particularly abundant in bays, near mouths, and generally near shore. Sting rays are very numerous in the area. Sting rays are more dangerous than eagle rays in that the eagle rays are more adapted to free swimming and are less likely to be encountered on shallow bottoms. The sting ray, with its undulating mode of swimming, becomes covered with mud, sand, or silt when it settles on the bottom and becomes hidden. In areas of extensive sea grass beds, sting rays are encountered most commonly lying on small sandy or muddy patches where grasses are present.

(3) Aggressive Fish. The estuarine puffer and the blocky puffer which are widely distributed throughout the area, are not only inedible, but they also have a habit of attacking fishermen and bathers and of inflicting a bite which may become septic. Moreover, the favorite place of attack is the genital organs.

Several species of shark that are reported to have attacked men are around the coral reefs and off the river mouths in this area. Barracuda and grouper live along rocky shores and on the seaward side of coral reefs. Both are large (up to 10 feet), strong jawed fish which lurk near coral heads, reefs, or pilings, and attack without provocation. Although the two fish are not similar in shape appearance, both are capable of inflicting serious wounds with their formidable array of teeth. Moray eels do not attack without provocation. Commonly found around coral reefs hidden in the crevices of the rocks, they strike viciously if stepped on, cornered or handled. The common reef moray in this area may grow to a length of 9 feet.

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(4) Other dangerous marine life. The lumpy surgeon fish and the horned surgeon fish are prevalent in the area. These fish have long sharp knife like fins which will cut deeply if the fish are handled. Jellyfish in the area include several species which are dangerous to man. Some of the more dangerous are the sea wasps which come to the surface in the morning and evenings, in harbors and semi-brackish estuaries. Maximum numbers are found in June and August with heavy population in bay areas in October and November.

Several species of sea urchins found among coral reefs along the coast are violently poisonous.

Four species of venomous one shell are common among coral reefs of the area. They stab quickly with their radula and discharge venom into the wound if picked up and handled.

Sea snakes of the area include a majority of the known species. The venom of several species is more toxic than that of the cobra. They are marine animals that congregate in the fissures of cliffs, on reefs, and on rocks. During the breeding season in May and June, they congregate by hundreds on the tiny coral islets. At such times the snakes are usually active and aggressive, so that walking in such areas is highly dangerous and on mud flats where they bask during the day. They are easily distinguished from terrestrial snakes by the long body and paddlelike tail, and from eels by the scaled skin.

The estuarine crocodile, also a hazard is found both in the brackish water off river mouths and out to sea. Reaching a length of 20 feet, this animal is most dangerous when the nest is approached, at which time it will attack fiercely. The nest is always on shore, usually within 200 feet of water, and often on mud flats, in grass marsh, or like locations. The estuarine crocodile is on record as being a man eater.

(5) Bioluminescence. Marine bioluminescence, the production of light by plant and animal life, is caused principally by concentrations and activity of species of three groups of animals.

The first of these groups, protozoa, is present in this area in greatest numbers in autumn and winter. Of the many bioluminescent species, the sea surface protozoan bioluminescence is characterized by a sheet-like glowing of the water surface at night occasionally to such a degree that it is possible to read medium size print by the light produced.

The second group is the jellyfish, which produce a dull light singly, but when drifted together in shoals, give off a brilliant flashing light. Significant numbers of bioluminescent species are likely to occur in midsummer in harbors, bays, and off river mouths.

The third group is the several species of which copepods, tiny shrimp like crustaceans, are luminescent and produce an intermittent sparkling light. They are most abundant off shore in autumn and winter.

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(6) Algae. The algae in this area are small compared to the giant kelp common in more northerly waters; however, a few species of significant size and abundance are present in the area.

Great floating masses of Sargassum and other algae are encountered in this region.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL J. D. NOBLE



W. B. HIGGINS
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

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Marine Aircraft Group-12
 First Marine Aircraft Wing
 MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan
 Date: 140800I May 1965

Appendix 5 (Counterintelligence) to Annex A (Intelligence) to Operations Order
 301-65

References: (a) MCO 3850.1B
 (b) FMFM 2-1
 (c) 1stMAWO 03850.2
 (d) GroupO PO3800.1A

1. General. The enemy forces have a considerable capability in the areas of sabotage, espionage and subversion. It may be expected that the facilities of all inimical intelligence agencies will be brought to bear against our forces. In addition to the "hard core" forces, sympathizers and overt supporters, those threatened with enemy reprisal may be expected to provide the enemy with a large and reasonable effective intelligence gathering potential as well as a source of potential saboteurs.

a. Primary efforts will be directed toward; sabotage (introduction of fire bombs in supplies and ammunition, sugar and sand in fuel tanks, foreign objects in aircraft); espionage (theft of classified information, communications intercept and questioning of personnel; and subversion (introduction of information intended to adversely affect the morale of our forces and turn the local civilian populace against us,

b. The duties and functions of Counterintelligence (CI) specialists are set forth in references (a), (b), (c), and (d).

2. Military Security.

a. General.

(1). Initially, strict compliance with the security measures outlined in reference (d) will be adhered to, with special emphasis on the following:

(a) Appropriate measures will be implemented to safeguard sensitive areas, but WILL NOT be marked with signs such as "LIMITED AREA", "EXCLUSION AREA" etc.

(b) Ensure that positive emergency destruction plans are prepared and maintained throughout the period of operational commitment.

(c) Dissemination of exact target areas and dates will be held to an absolute minimum consistent with operation necessity.

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(d) Classified documents will not be carried in aircraft flying over enemy held territory.

(e) Positive identification of personnel embarking and debarking vehicles and/or aircraft is essential. Those personnel not properly identified will be taken into custody and held pending positive identification.

(f) Commanders give special attention to physical security of aircraft parking areas, supply, and ammunition storage areas and motor transport parks.

(g) Establish dismount points for motor vehicles coming into CP areas to prevent congregation of vehicles in these areas.

(h) All civilian and foreign military personnel not vouched for will be carefully searched on entering or leaving the base. Close attention will be given to vehicles and packages. Familiarity and laxness in this search caused by daily contact will not be tolerated. It is assumed that ARVN military or paramilitary forces will be available to assist in this task.

b. CHALLENGE AND PASSWORDS.

(1) Primary and alternate challenges and passwords are effective from 1200 to 1200 daily. Precautionary measures must be taken to avoid compromise of challenges and passwords. Messengers will be used to disseminate the challenge and password, but identifying code numbers can be transmitted by electrical or visual means.

(2) Compromise or suspected compromise will be reported immediately to this headquarters by the most expeditious means and the reporting unit will immediately put alternate countersigns into effect.

(3) Challenge and password will be published separately.

c. COMMUNICATION SECURITY. See Annex G (Communication-Electronics).

d. SECRECY DISCIPLINE AND TRAINING.

(1) Prior to debarkation, all troops will be given general indoctrination in security and basic counterintelligence, including, but not limited to the code of conduct, handling POW and personal censorship and proper use of the challenge and password. Instructional material will be provided by Group S-2.

e. Counterespionage, Countersabotage, and Countersubversion are all Counterintelligence functions and will not be instigated by subordinate units.

(1) The enemy is not adverse to using women and children to collect information pertaining to our forces.

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(2) All unauthorized persons attempting to gain information or access to military facilities or areas will be delivered to the counterintelligence interrogation center (location to be announced) for processing.

(3) Official visitors only will be permitted in the MAG-12 area (an escort will be provided when directed).

(4) No personal diaries, letters, or documents, including unit leaders' notebooks, will be carried by personnel of this command.

(5) Use of personal cameras will be governed by GroupO 3500.1.

(6) Security inspections will be conducted daily and upon displacement of command post for classified material and or military information left adrift.

f. COUNTERSABOTAGE.

(1) Areas occupied by MAG-12 can expect to be saturated with low-level enemy agents for the purpose of sabotage and diversionary nuisance-type incidents. In addition, it is anticipated that organized guerrilla groups and raiding parties will be employed. Adequate physical security is essential to the successful accomplishment of missions assigned to MAG-12.

(2) All incidents of attempted or suspected sabotage will be reported to MAG-12 immediately.

(3) Members of friendly military forces may enter installations of this Command when authorized by Commanding Officer, MAG-12, subject to the restrictions placed upon security areas.

(4) All friendly personnel will be treated courteously but firmly in effecting protection of areas from espionage sabotage.

(5) Accredited press representatives will be referred to this headquarters.

g. COUNTERSUBVERSION.

(1) Planting and spreading rumors is a particularly vicious practice and works to the detriment of the morale of our personnel. Commanders will take positive action to eliminate this practice; reporting all rumors of substance to this headquarters.

h. CIVIL SECURITY.

(1) This headquarters will coordinate establishment of controls for entry to military areas.

(2) Local labor will not be employed by units of this Command for duties in CP's, mess halls, supply dumps, clubs, or for personal services.

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3. PHYSICAL SECURITY.

a. All squadron commanders will be responsible for instituting the following security measures within their own areas:

(1) Continued indoctrination in the use of password and countersign and informing all personnel the daily password and countersign.

(2) Placing of barbed wire about key areas such as refueling areas, supply dumps, avionics areas, ordance areas, aircraft parking areas, and such other areas as deemed necessary.

(3) Complying with appropriate portions of Annex E (Airfield Defense)

(4) Posting of warning signs around the squadron area. These signs will be in English, French and Vietnamese and will be worded generally as follows:

Authorized personnel only
Danger -- No Trespassing
Keep Out

The Group S-2 will assist in furnishing language phrases necessary to make these signs as soon as qualified personnel are available.

(5) Request counterintelligence assistance from Group S-2 in matters pertaining to security.

(6) Establish a strict control of visitor and escort system within their respective areas.

b. Commanding Officer MABS-12 will be responsible for the following security measures in addition to those listed above:

(1) Train and supervise a guard force for the overall internal security of the airfield.

(2) Prepare safety signs directing all personnel to stay clear of the airfield. These signs will be placed at various intervals around the airfield. These signs will be in English, French and Vietnamese. This is to provide safety as well as security.

(3) To provide armed guards and transportation for all personnel apprehended on or near the airfield. These apprehended personnel will be taken to the POW Compound which will be designated at a later date.

(4) To coordinate the internal security of the airfield with the external security provided by RLT-4.

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(5) Provide information and orders to S-2 on all security measures taken by MABS-12 for the internal security of the airfield.

(6) Ensure that all personnel arriving by air at the air freight and helo terminal have proper authority for entry to the airfield. Notify S-2 of all incoming civilians and foreign nationals as soon as information is available. Detain all personnel who do not have permission to enter the airfield and notify S-2 immediately for instruction.

(7) Ensure that guard personnel are available to proceed to the station operations area to surround any unidentified aircraft that may be forced to land.

(8) Notify S-2 of all incoming transport type aircraft.

4. Counterintelligence personnel will constantly conduct security inspections as directed by Group S-2 with the view of improving the over all security of the individual squadrons as well as the airfield.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL J. D. NOBLE



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MCAS, IWAKUNI, JAPAN
140800I May 1965

Annex B (Concept of Operation) to Operation Order 301-65

Time Zone: I in Japan; H in RVN.

1. MISSION. Marine Aircraft Group Twelve deploys in increments to the CHU LAI area, Republic of Vietnam, lands commencing D-Day, establishes an expeditionary airfield to be operational by D+21 and conducts close air support, helicopter escort and attack missions as directed.
2. CONCEPT.
 - a. The concept is to deploy squadrons or increments of squadrons in the following time sequence:
 - (1) 25 April MABS-12 detachment loads USS Windham County (LST 1170) with personnel and equipment sufficient to establish facilities to operate an expeditionary airfield, sails on 27 April, reports OPCON to CG, 3rd MAB, lands D-Day vicinity CHU LAI, establishes facilities for an expeditionary airfield which becomes operational and receives tactical aircraft starting on D+21.
 - (2) 11 May MABS-12 detachment (MATCU personnel) deploys by airlift to CHU LAI.
 - (3) 15 May Elements of MAG-12 Headquarters and advance elements of VMA-225 and VMA-311 embark aboard LSD at Iwakuni and deploy to CHU LAI.
 - (4) 16 May Commanding Officer and elements MAG-12 Headquarters depart for CHU LAI via C-117D.
 - (5) 17 May H&MS-12 detachment and remaining elements of MABS-12 embark aboard LSTs at Iwakuni and deploy to CHU LAI.
 - (6) 21 May Remainder of H&MS-12 embarks aboard APA and deploys to CHU LAI.
 - (7) 24 May MAG-12 Headquarters deploys to Da Nang via C-117D aircraft and proceeds to CHU LAI via helicopter. LSTs offload CHU LAI.
 - (8) 26 May VMA-311 deploys to NAS Cubi Point with 20 A4E aircraft and 5 C-130 loads of personnel and equipment.

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- (9) 27 May VMA-225 deploys to NAS Cubi Point with 20 A4C aircraft and 5 C-130 loads of personnel and equipment.
- (10) 28 May VMA-225 deploys 12 A4C aircraft and 5 C-130 loads of personnel and equipment to CHU LAI. VMA-311 deploys 12 A4C aircraft and 5 C-130 loads of personnel and equipment to CHU LAI.
- (11) 29 May VMA-214 continues training at NAS Cubi Point, prepared to deploy 20 A4C aircraft and 8 C-130 aircraft loads of personnel and equipment to CHU LAI by increments on 24-hour notice.
- (12) 2 June H&MS-12 elements embarked on APA debark at CHU LAI.

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140800I May 1965

Annex F (Reports) to Operation Order 301-65

Time Zone: I in Japan; H in Objective area.

1. The following reports will be submitted as indicated:

<u>REPORT</u>	<u>DUE</u>	<u>SUBMITTED BY</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
X Air Attack Report	As appropriate	Squadron S-3s	NWIP 10-1(A) Page XIV
X Air Combat Report	As appropriate	Squadron S-3s	NWIP 10-1(A) Page XIV
○ Air Schedule Changes	ASAP	Squadrons	Para. 1, Appendix 1 to Annex F
— Aircraft Mishap Report	As appropriate	Appropriate squadron	Wing Order 03750.10D
— Aircraft Availability Report	Monthly (by 2nd)	Squadrons	NWIP 10-1(a) Page XV
— Aircraft Mission Log	Daily (by 1200)	Squadrons	NWIP 10-1(A) Page XV
X Aircraft Vulnerability Report	As appropriate	Squadrons	NWIP 10-1(A) Page XV
— Deployment Report	As appropriate	Squadrons	WgO 3000.2A para. 5.g.
Monthly Mission Report	Monthly (by 2nd)	H&MS-12	NWIP 10-1(A) Page XV
— Movement Reports	As appropriate	Squadrons	Supplement to NWIP 10-1(A)
— Operational Damage Report	Monthly (by 2nd)	Squadrons	NWIP 10-1(A) Page XVI
— Operational Readiness Report (REDOPS)	As appropriate	Squadrons	Change 4 to CINCPAC INST 005440.1D
— Operations Summary	Daily	Group S-3	Para. 2, Appendix 1 to Annex F
Overdue Aircraft Report	20 minutes after ETR	Squadrons	
Sailing Report	As appropriate	Squadrons	WgO 3000.2A Para. 5.g.
X Situation Report	Daily (by 1600)	Squadrons	CG, III MAF 071545Z May (C)

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2. Upon arrival at destination, start a new Master Flight Log; include final leg of flight to destination as first entry.

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Appendix 1 to Annex F (Reports) to Operation Order 301-65

Time Zone: I in Japan; H in Objective area.

1. Air Schedule Change (AIR SKED).

- a. Include following information but omit paragraphs not applicable.

<u>PARAGRAPH</u>	<u>CONTENT</u>
ALFA	Event Number
BRAVO	Mission
CHARLIE	Number and type of aircraft
DELTA	Time on Station
ECHO	Report to/on Net
FOXTROT	Entry point and altitude
GOLF	Armament
HOTEL	Remarks

2. Operation Summary (OPSUM).

- a. Use short title "OPSUM" for report identification.
- b. Use the following format but omit paragraphs not applicable.

<u>PARAGRAPH</u>	<u>CONTENT</u>
ALFA	Report date
BRAVO	Number of sorties scheduled
CHARLIE	Number of sorties that accomplished mission
DELTA	Number of sorties cancelled due to weather
FOXTROT	Number of sorties cancelled or incomplete due to mechanical defects
GOLF	Number of CAP sorties flown
HOTEL	Number of CAS sorties flown
INDIA	Number of attack sorties flown
JULIET	Number of smoke laying sorties flown
KILO	Number of sorties by photographic aircraft
LIMA	Number of supply sorties flown
MIKE	Number of transport sorties flown
NOVEMBER	Number of SAR sorties flown
OSCAR	Number of evacuation sorties flown
PAPA	Number of administrative sorties flown
QUEBEC	Number of reconnaissance sorties flown
ROMEO	Number of liaison sorties flown

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PARAGRAPH

CONTENT

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Remarks

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ANNEX G (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 301-65

- Ref: (a) CG FMAW Operation Order 301-65
 (b) CO MAG-12 Operation Order 301-65
 (c) FMAW Order P02000.1 (FMAW COMPLAN FOUR)
 (d) MAG-12 Order P2000.1 (MAG-12 COMPLAN ONE)

TIME ZONE: HOTEL (In the Objective Area)

1. SITUATION.a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) Enemy ECM capabilities include imitative deception, jamming, sabotage of communication facilities, and intercept and analysis of U.S. forces radio communications.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) See reference (a).

- (2) MWHG-1 (FMAW (ADV)):

(a) Provides Comm/Crypto guard for FMAW units in RVN.

(b) Establishes at earliest possible time radio relay circuit between Danang and Chu Lai to link FMAW (ADV) and MAG-12 via relay site at hill 327. Channelization as follows:

Channel One; G-3/S-3 Hotline
 Channel Two; Common user Voice
 Channel Three; Common user Voice; (with superimposed secure KW-7 (Orestes) TTY (60 WPM) terminating in the Comm-Center)
 Channel Four; To be designated.

(c) Activates multichannel radio (AN/TSC-15) circuit to MAG-12 as required. Channelization same as Radio Relay, except that secure TTY will be Channel Four Alfa on AN/TSC-15.

(d) Hotlines, as required.

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- (e) Wing Command Net #1 and FMAW TAC Net, as required.
- (f) Net Control of Wing Command Net #2, when directed.
- (3) Command Posts.
 - (a) See reference (a).

2. MISSION.

- a. Upon arrival at Chu Lai comm-elect elements install, operate, and maintain communication-electronics facilities to support MAG-12 in execution of references (a) and (b) and subsequent operations in RVN.

3. EXECUTION.a. Concept.

- (1) This ANNEX is in consonance with reference (a) and provides for the comm-elect support of MAG-12 elements at Chu Lai to include the establishment of a tactical CP for CO MAG-12. Communications elements of MAG-12 phase into Chu Lai and establish required communications facilities. Primary means of internal Group communications will be wire.

b. MABS-12.

- (1) Communications elements currently deployed Chu Lai initially enter Wing Command Net #2 (Former Wing Liaison Net).
- (2) Establish external communication link with RIT-4 until directed to shift Comm/Crypto guard to FMAW (ADV) Danang.
- (3) When directed activate Radio Relay Terminal station to link with Danang, (relay located Hill 327 (coord 738971)). Report coordinates your terminal when established to CG FMAW (ADV) (ATTN: CEO). Channelization in accordance with sub-paragraph 1 b(2) (b) above.
- (4) Be prepared, on order, to activate multichannel radio link (AN/TSC-15) to Headquarters FMAW (ADV), channelization in accordance with sub-paragraph 1 b (2) (c) above

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- (5) Be prepared to terminate external Long Haul Air Traffic Control Voice Circuits when provided by senior Air Traffic Control Agency in RVN.
- (6) Shift Comm/Crypto guard to CG FMAW (ADV), when directed.
- (7) Provide Comm/Crypto guard for FMAW units at Chu Lai.
- (8) Be prepared to enter Wing Command Net #1 and FMAW TAC Net, when directed.
- (9) Install, operate, and maintain an internal communications system in accordance with references (c) and (d) to support MAG-12 in the execution of references (a) and (b).
- (10) Be prepared to provide internal communication support to subordinate units upon request.

c. H&MS-12.

- (1) Be prepared to furnish back-up radio equipment for Group Common UHF, W400.

d. VMA's 214, 225, 311.

- (1) Install, operate, and maintain ~~internal~~ squadron communications employing organic equipment in accordance with this ANNEX and reference (c).

e. MATCU-67.

- (1) Install, operate, and maintain comm-elect facilities to control and support air field operations at Chu Lai in accordance with this ANNEX.

f. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Communications Center.
 - (a) Operations in accordance with ANNEX A to reference (c).
 - (b) GMT (ZULU) time will be used for all message traffic addressed to units external to III MAF. Internal messages will use local (HOTEL) time.
- (2) Messenger Service.

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- (a) MAG-12 staff and squadrons will pick-up all incoming message traffic at MAG-12 Adjutant office and deliver all outgoing message traffic directly to the communication center.
- (b) Maximum use of helicopter messenger service, when established, between Danang and Chu Lai will be used for low precedence, external message traffic to reduce the load on electrical transmission circuits.

(3) Radio.

- (a) See Appendix 1 (Radio Frequency Plan) to this ANNEX for radio frequency assignments, nets, and AN/TSC-15 channelization.
- (b) See Appendix 2 (Call Signs) to this ANNEX for tactical call signs.
- (c) Radio discipline in accordance with DNC-5 and ACP-122.
- (d) Radio Procedure in accordance with ACP-125 as appropriate.

(4) Radio Relay and Wire.

- (a) In accordance with ANNEX C to references (c) and (d).
- (b) Use Voice Call Signs as switchboard code name, Appendix 2 (Call Signs) to this ANNEX.
- (c) A telephone directory, Appendix 3 to this ANNEX, will be affixed to each field telephone and a copy of the telephone traffic diagram, Appendix 4 to this ANNEX, will be provided each staff section/squadron.
- (d) Non-tactical squadrons submit unit telephone requirements to this headquarters, Attn: CommO. VMA squadrons of this command install organic telephone/switchboard equipment.
- (e) Alert systems, see Appendix 5.
- (f) Radio relay installation will be as shown in Appendix 6 to this ANNEX.

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(5) Cryptographic Instructions.

- (a) See reference (c) for general cryptographic instructions.
- (b) KW-7 (Orestes) will be common on-line crypto system within FMAW (ADV).
- (c) Employ effective edition of KAK-2641 on KW-7 secure circuits for secret and below.
- (d) KL-47 (Adonis) will be used for off-line encryption. Effective edition of KAK-2697 will be used between FMAW (ADV) units.
- (e) Refer to CSPM-1C paragraph 1-17 for instructions and procedures.
- (f) Effective edition of KAC-138 for number protection will be used in plaintext messages.
- (g) Effective edition of KAA-60 will be used for all PACOM joint authentication purposes.
- (h) Effective edition of KAA-38 will be used for COMBINED (US/UK/NZ/AUST) authentication purposes.
- (i) Effective edition of KAC-132 will be used for the encryption of tactical messages classified Confidential or lower (EFTO). However, this system may be utilized for the encryption of messages of any classification in the event an urgent tactical situation arises where a more secure system is not available. When this is done advise CG FMAW (ADV) (ATIN: CEO) of reason by fastest means available. Routine logistic and admin messages will not be encrypted in this system.

(6) Visual and Sound.

- (a) See Appendix 7 (Visual and Sound) to this ANNEX.
- (b) Additional Visual and Sound instructions are contained in ANNEX E to reference (c).

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS.

- a. See ANNEX A to reference (a) and MAC-12 Admin and Logistics Order 301-65.

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- b. Submit classified Movement Reports in accordance with Supp-1 to NWIP 10-1.
- c. MABS-12, MATCU-67, and H&MS-12 will coordinate local second and third echelon repair as far as practicable.
- d. Tactical squadrons will send inoperative communication equipment to MAG-12 communications for screening/repair.
- e. Report critical shortages of Comm-Elect personnel to FMAW (ADV) (ATTN: CEO).
- f. Report Comm-Elect equipment status in accordance with current directives.
- g. Report and expedite shipment of captured enemy communications equipment to FMAW (ADV) (ATTN: CEO) for processing.
- h. Emergency helicopter delivery of Comm-Elect items dependent upon availability of aircraft. Submit request to FMAW (ADV) (ATTN: CEO).
- i. FMAW (ADV) maintenance facilities will provide third echelon and back-up second echelon maintenance support for units with first and second echelon capability and third echelon back-up support for FMAW units with third echelon capability, less radar equipment. All other maintenance support and back-up will be provided for in ANNEX A to reference (a).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL J. D. NOBLE

W. B. Higgins
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Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDIXES:

- 1...Radio Frequency Plan
- 2...Call Signs
- 3...Telephone Directory
- 4...Telephone Traffic Diagram (To be issued)
- 5...Alert Systems
- 6...Radio Relay Installation
- 7...Visual and Sound

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Appendix 1 (Radio Frequency Plan) to ANNEX G (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 301-65

Ref: (a) ANNEX B (Communication-Electronics) to FMAW Operation Order 301-65

TIME ZONE: H (in the Objective Area)

1. FREQUENCIES.

- a. The following frequency assignments effective for MAG-12 units in RVN:

(1) Single Channel Radio Circuits (HF).

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>NET</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>EMISSION</u>
ALL FMAW UNITS RVN	Wing Cmd #1	W353	4453(P)	3A3J
		W365	3964(S)	3A3J
		W324	5620(ADD)	3A3J
		W331	8955(ADD)	3A3J
ALL FMAW UNITS	Wing Cmd #2 (Former Wing Liaison Net)	W99	11592(P)	3A3J
		W104	17571(S)	3A3J
		W220	23736(ADD)	3A3J
		W72	2212(ADD)	3A3J
		W78	5302(ADD)	3A3J
		W84	7621(ADD)	3A3J
		W96	10734(ADD)	3A3J
ALL FMAW UNITS RVN	Tactical Air Command	W310	3959(P)	3A3J
		W371	4694(S)	3A3J
		W326	8907(ADD)	3A3J
		W313	8859(ADD)	3A3J
MAG-12	MATCU-67 Air Control Coordination	W328	3151	6A9B
		W336	2890	6A9B
MAG-12	MATCU-67 Air to Ground (Tower)	W339	5564	6A9B
MAG-12	As Directed by MAG-12	W300	3143	6A9B
		W320	10084	6A9B

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RLT-4	Command #1	B-5	4005(P)	3A3J/3A7J
		B-6	9051(S)	3A3J/3A7J
RLT-4	Command #2	B-7	6774(P)	3A3J/3A7J
		B-8	3952(S)	3A3J/3A7J

(2) Single Channel Radio Circuits (VHF-FM).

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>NET</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>EMISSION</u>
MAG-12	MATCU-67 Tower Helo Control	W374	40.7	36F3
MAG-12	MATCU-67 Crash Net	W386	40.82	36F3
FMAW UNITS DANANG	Local Security Danang	W379 W378	39.0(P) 42.3(S)	36F3 36F3
FMAW UNITS CHU LAI	Local Security Chu Lai	W377 W382	39.1(P) 43.2(S)	36F3 36F3

<u>Channel</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>NAME</u>
1	340.2	CHU LAI TOWER (P)
2	360.2	CHU LAI TOWER (S)
3	276.2	PANAMA
4	—(C)	LANDSHARK
5	—(C)	PERFIDE
6	—(C)	RED
7	—(C)	GREEN
8	363.8	DA NANG APP CONTROL
9	236.6	DA NANG TOWER
10	316.0	CHU LAI DEPT CONTROL
11	321.0	CHU LAI APP CONTROL
12	315.6	RADAR #1
13	329.4	RADAR #2
14	340.8	RADAR #3
15	—(C)	FAD #1
16	—(C)	FAD #2
17	364.2	SAR COMMON
18	316.0	UNF/DF HOMER
19	323.5	MAG-12 COMMON
FMAW (ADV) (T)	W310	3938(PRI)
MAG-12 (T)	W339	5604(SEC)
FMAW (ADV) (T)	W341	6529(SEC)
MAG-12 (T)	W315	8939(ADD)
FMAW (ADV) (T)	W305	10052(ADD)
		6A9B
		6A9B
		6A9B
		6A9B
		6A9B

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(5) Multichannel Radio (VHF).

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>EMISSION</u>
FMAW (ADV) (T)	W430	54.3	80F9
RELAY PT (R)	W430	54.3	80F9
RELAY PT (T)	W427	69.7	80F9
FMAW (ADV) (R)	W427	69.7	80F9
MAG-12 (T)	W431	55.6	80F9
RELAY PT (R)	W431	55.6	80F9
RELAY PT (T)	W428	68.4	80F9
MAG-12 (R)	W428	68.4	80F9

- (6) Additional UHF Frequencies for MATCU use will be published when received.
- (7) TACAN Channel 50 will be utilized by MATCU.
- (8) The following Radar Frequencies are effective for MATCU-67.
- | | |
|-------------|---------------|
| Acquisition | 1250-1350 MCS |
| Precision | 9000-9699 MCS |
- (Report activation of frequency utilized to CG FMAW (ADV) (ATTN: CEO))
- (9) FMAW Units currently operating in RVN will continue to use previously assigned frequencies. Overall frequency coordination for FMAW (ADV) units will be accomplished subsequent to establishment FMAW (ADV) CP.
- (10) AN/TSC-15 channelization as follows:

Channel One.....G-3/S-3 Hotline
 Channel Two.....Common user Voice
 Channel Three...Common user Voice
 Channel Four A..Secure KW-7 (Orestes) TTY (60 WPM)
 terminating in Comm-Center.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL J. D. NOBLE

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Appendix 2 (Call Signs) to ANNEX G (Communication-Electronics)
 to Operation Order 301-65.

Ref: (a) JANAP-119, Voice Call Sign Book (U)
 (b) Annex B (Comm-Elect) to FMAW OPORD 301-65
 (c) FMAW Order PO2000.1, (COMPLAN FOUR)

TIME ZONE: H (in the Objective Area)

1. CALL SIGNS.

- a. In accordance with references (a) through (c) the following voice call signs are effective throughout the objective area.
- b. Sections within MAG-12 will use radio call of their unit suffixed by the telephone number assigned in Appendix 3 to this ANNEX. For example: MAG-12 S-2 "OXWOOD 2"
 MAG-12 S-2 CIT "OXWOOD 2A"

UNITCALL SIGN

III MAF
 III MAF (COLL)
 THIRD MAB
 THIRD MAB (COLL)
 NINTH MAB
 NINTH MAB (COLL)

 CG FMAW
 CG FMAW (COLL)
 AWC FMAW
 CG FMAW (ADV)
 CG FMAW (ADV) (COLL)

PARCHMENT
 MOON DASH
 YEAST CAKE
 APRIL SHOWERS
 SUGAR BOWL
 MILLBROOK

 MOMENT
 COACH DOG
 KIRKBRIDE
 IRON FLINT
 PAUL BUNYAN

MWHG ONE
 H&HS ONE

LIFE SAVER
 DISEMBARK

MAG ONE ONE
 H&MS ONE ONE
 MABS ONE ONE
 VMF FIVE FOUR TWO
 VMF FIVE THREE ONE
 VMF FIVE ONE THREE

CONDOLE
 BUCK TOOTH
 REACH
 CASTOR OIL
 CHIEFTAIN
 FLY TRAIN

MAG ONE TWO
 MABS ONE TWO
 H&MS ONE TWO

OXWOOD
 GYPSY GOLD
 BUSH ROSE

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>
VMA TWO ONE FOUR	APPLE
VMA TWO TWO FIVE	HATRED
VMA THREE ONE ONE	CHAIN
VMCJ ONE	COTTON PICKER
MAG ONE SIX	ROSE ANN
MAG ONE SIX (-)	MINIVER
HMM ONE SIX ONE	BARREL HOUSE
HMM ONE SIX TWO	OLD HARRY
HMM ONE SIX FOUR	NORTH BROOK
HMM THREE SIX ONE	TAR BUSH
HMM THREE SIX TWO	CLIP CLOP
HMM THREE SIX THREE	WILL POINT
HMM THREE SIX FOUR	WHITE GOLD
HMM THREE SIX FIVE	RUTLEDGE
HMM ONE SIX THREE	OVERPAY
VMO TWO	DEADLOCK
MWSG ONE SEVEN	PICKLE
MABS ONE SEVEN	FLASHY SIR
MAMS ONE SEVEN	FOLLOW
TACC	TAP DANCER
MASS TWO (DASC)	LAND SHARK
MASS TWO	DEVASTATE
MACS SEVEN	COFFER DAM
MACS NINE	BEACH BOY
LAAM ONE	WINGMAN
2ND RADIO BN	HAIRCUT
1ST BN 12TH MARINE	KING JAMES
SHORE PARTY	NEGOTIATE
BLSG	MORTUARY
BEG	HARD HAT
DET 1ST RECON BN	MEAL TIME

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL J. D. NOBLE

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Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
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Appendix 3 (Telephone Directory) to ANNEX G (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 301-65

Ref: Wing Order PO2000.1 (COMPLAN FOUR)

TIME ZONE: H (In the Objective Area)

1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS.

- a. When answering the telephone the person answering will identify himself by using the directory number with the switchboard code name prefixed. For example: This is OXWOOD 3.

b. Office numbers:

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
*1	G-1 or S-1
*2	G-2 or S-2
*3	G-3 or S-3
*4	G-4 or S-4
*5	Chief of Staff or Executive Officer
*6	Commanding General or Commanding Officer
*7	Adjutant
*8	Ordnance Officer
9	Assistant Wing Commander
*10	Communication Electronics Officer
*11	Communication Center (INCOMING)
*12	Communication Center (OUTGOING)
*13	Aides/Sgt Major
*14	Senior Air Controller/MATCU
*15	Aircraft Maintenance Officer
*16	Surgeon or Medical Officer
*17	Legal Officer
*18	Disbursing Officer
*19	Chaplain
20	Postal Officer
*21	Supply Officer
22	Tactical Air Control Officer
*23	NBC and Special Weapons Officer
24	Liaison Officer
*25	Aircraft Safety Officer
26	Naval Gunfire Officer
*27	Provost Marshall/Group Guard
*28	Radio Central (Station)

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29 Reconnaissance Officer
 *30 Teletypewriter and Crypto Repair
 *31 Wire Chief
 32 Inspector
 33 Public Telephone
 *34 Headquarters Commandant or Air Base Commander
 *35 Motor Transport Officer/Dispatcher
 36 Anti-Tank Officer
 *37 Special Service Officer
 38 Staff Secretary
 *39 Embarkation Officer
 *40 Dental Officer
 *41 Informational Services Officer
 42 Anti-Aircraft Officer
 43 Historical Officer
 *44 Marine Corps Exchange Officer
 *45 Target and Flak Analysis Officer
 *47 Personnel Officer
 *48 Radar Officer
 *49 Electronics Officer (Maintenance or Supply)/Avionics Officer
 *50 Fiscal Officer (Comptroller)
 *51 Refuelers
 *52 S&C Files/Registered Publication Officer
 *53 Supply Dump
 *54 Utilities Officer
 *55 Commanding Officer H&MS-12
 * Trunk to VMA-214 Switchboard
 * Trunk to VMA-225 Switchboard
 * Trunk to VMA-311 Switchboard

*Telephones installed in MAG-12 CP area.

- c. Where two or more telephones are installed in the same office the number designation as shown on the above list will be preceded by one, two, or three (depending on the number of additional phones) and zeros sufficient to raise the number to a three-digit number.

EXAMPLE:

Adjutant.....7
 1st additional phone.....107
 2nd additional phone.....207

Air Officer.....14
 1st additional phone.....114

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
Appendix 5 (Alert Systems) to ANNEX G (Communication-Electronics)
to Operation Order 301-65

Ref: (a) MAG-12 COMPLAN ONE

TIME ZONE: H (In the Objective Area)

1. ALERT SYSTEMS.

- a. Crash Crew Alert System will be installed according to the below diagram.




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- b. The S-3 Alert System shall be installed in accordance with the below diagram.



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
Appendix 6 (Radio Relay Installation) to ANNEX G (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 301-65

Ref: None

TIME ZONE: H (In the objective area)

1. RADIO RELAY INSTALLATION.

- a. A multichannel radio relay shot will be installed from Cmt Lat to FFW (ADV) at Danang using Hill 327 as a relay site. The installation will be established in accordance with the diagram below:



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CHANNELIZATION: Channel One.....G-3/S-3 Hotline
Channel Two.....Common user Voice
Channel Three....Common user Voice, (With
superimposed secure KW-7
(Orestes) TTY (60 WPM)
terminating in the Comm-
Center)
Channel Four.....To be designated.

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Appendix 7 (Visual and Sound) to ANNEX G (Communication-Electronics)
 to Operation Order 301-65

Ref: (a) ANNEX B (Communication-Electronics) to FMAW Operation
 Order 301-65

TIME ZONE: H (In the Objective Area)

1. VISUAL AND SOUND.

- a. The below listed visual signals are effective for units operating on the ground, rivers, and sea in the RVN I CORPS sector.

PYROTECHNIC SIGNAL

MEANING

White Star	Radio out of order.
White Star, Cluster	Radio out of order.
Red Star	We are being surrounded or attacked by the enemy.
Red Star, Cluster	We are being surrounded or attacked by the enemy.

AIRCRAFT PYROTECHNIC

MEANING

Yellow Star	Request radio contact on Joint Force frequency.
Green Star	Request enemy direction.
Green Star, Cluster	Request enemy direction.

SMOKE SIGNALS

MEANING

Yellow	Friendly unit is staying here.
Green	Request ammunition resupply.
Red	Request medical evacuation.

HAND GRENADE SMOKE

MEANING

Green	Helicopter landing area.
Red	Artillery shelled area, do not land here.
Violet	Inoperative aircraft landed.

SMOKE SIGNALS FOR AIRCRAFT
 HAND GRENADE SMOKE

MEANING

HCN	Artillery fire on this target.
Yellow	Friendly unit's position.
Red	Enemy position.

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Time Zone: I in Japan; H in Objective area.

CMC	(4)
COMUSMACV	(3)
CMCS	(2)
CG, FMFPAC	(2)
COM7THFLT	(2)
CG, AIRFMFPAC	(2)
CG, III MAF	(4)
CG, FMAW	(5)
CG, 3d MARDIV	(1)
CG, 3d MAB	(2)
CG, 9th MAB	(2)
CDR, 2nd AIR DIV	(1)
CTF 76	(2)
HEMS-12	(4)
MABS-12	(4)
VMA-225	(4)
VMA-311	(4)
VMA-214	(4)
MAG-11	(2)
MMSG-17	(2)
MWHG-1	(1)
S-1	(2)
S-2	(2)
S-3	(3)
S-4	(3)
File	(2)

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
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SECRET

CHU LAI DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULE THRU DEPLOYMENT



PLANNED
ACTUAL

SECRET

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DATE 16 MAY 65		ROUTED BY BENZING CPL		CHECKED BY		PHONE EXT. NR.	PAGE 1 of 1	PAGES
MESSAGE NR.	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
	161350Z	ACTION				X		
		INFO				X		

FM: MAG-12 (ADV)

TO: CG III MAF

INFO: CG FIRST ~~MAF~~ (ADV)
 FIRST MAF (REAR)
 MAG-12 (REAR)
 ZEN/NCB ONE ZERO

SECRET

SITREP NR ONE AS OF 161000Z

1. CONSTR STATUS AS FOLLOWS: READ IN FIVE COLUMNS

ITEM	DATE STARTED	COMPL THIS PD	COMPL TO DATE	RQD
ROAD CONSTR	D+1	0	3.5 MI	UNQ
EXCAV Rwy	D+2	5%	48%	100%
EXCAV TW	D+6	4%	8%	100%
MAT UNLOADING	D+2	0	2373 BDLS	5073 BDLS
ASPHALT UNLOADING	D+6	200 DRMS	1800 DRMS	5000 DRMS
STABIL Rwy	D+6	300 FT	300 FT	8000 FT
STABIL TW	D+9	150 FT	150 FT	9200 FT
MAT LAYING Rwy	D+9	20 FT	20 FT	8000 FT

2. LATERITE STABILIZATION OF RUNWAY AND TAXIWAY PROVIDING SATISFACTORY SUBGRADE. THIS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO FASTER MAT LAYING AND LONGER LIFE FOR Rwy.

3. ADD TD-18 DOZERS AND 10 YD SCRAPERS ARRIVED 161400H FROM DANANG TO SUPPORT CB AIRFIELD CONSTR.

4. MABS-12 (-) TEMPORARY CAMPSITE REMAINS 95% COMPLETED. RQR WELL FOR WATER AND SHOWER FACILITIES. CB WILL PROVIDE CLAM SHELL CRANE TOMORROW TO DIG WELL.

5. MAG CAMPSITE SURVEY 75% COMPLETED. CLEARING AND LEVELING IN CAMPSITE 12% COMPLETED.

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DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)
161450Z

SUPP. Doc. #6

NAVAL MESSAGE

OPNAV FORM 2110-28 (REV. 9-61)

RELEASED BY

DRAFTED BY

PRIORITY

SECRET

DESTROY BY BURNING

FROM: MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (ADV)
 TO: CG III MAF
 INFO: CG FIRST MAW (ADV)
 FIRST MAW (REAR)
 MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (REAR)
 ZEN NC3 ONE ZERO
 MABS-12 (-)

171441Z

Has Been Sent

SECRET

BITREP NEW AS OF 171000Z

1. NCB CONSTR STATUS AS FOLLOWS: READ IN FIVE COLUMNS

ITEM	DATE STARTED	COMPL THIS PD	COMPL TO DATE	ROD
ROAD CONSTR	D PLUS 1	0	3.5 MI	UNK
EXCAV RMY	D PLUS 2	75%	55%	100%
EXCAV TW	D PLUS 6	0	8%	100%
MAT UNLOADING	D PLUS 2	0	2373 BDLS	5073 BDLS
ASPHALT UNLOADING	D PLUS 6	0	1800 DRMS	5000 DRMS
STABIL RMY	D PLUS 8	200 FT	500 FT	8000 FT
STABIL TW	D PLUS 9	0	150 FT	9200 FT
MAT LAYING RMY	D PLUS 9	310 FT	330 FT	8000 FT
MAT LAYING TW	D PLUS 9	150 FT	150 FT	9200 FT

2. MAT LAYING OPERATION PROCEEDING SATISFACTORILY, TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED MAT LAYING TO ALLOW STABILIZATION TO PROGRESS SUFFICIENTLY TO PROVIDE ROOM ON RUNWAY BETWEEN CREWS TO AVOID INTERFERENCE OF OPERATIONS.

3. TWO DOZERS AND TWO SCRAPERS OBTAINED FROM DANANG COMMENCED DEEP FILL AT MPOPOINT RMY. UNDERSTAND THAT FOUR DOZERS WERE TO BE SENT BUT ONLY TWO RECEIVED. ALL DOZERS VITALLY NEEDED. REQ YOU VERIFY IF FOUR ALLOCATED FOR RMY WORK. ONE TD-18 RECEIVED HAS BAD PCU CLUTCH PRECLUDING USE WITH SCRAPER. NCB-10 DOES NOT HAVE TD-18 IN T/E THEREFORE NO SPARE PARTS.

4. NCB EXPECT TO COMMENCE CONTINUOUS 24 HR OPERATION ON ALL PHASES OF RUNWAY/TAXIWAY CONSTR 180800H

5. TEMPORARY CAMPSITE REMAINS 95% COMPLETED.

6. SURVEY OF MAG CAMPSITE 75% COMPLETED. CLEARING & LEVELING 18% COMPLETED.

7. GEN KRULAK AND HIS PARTY ATTENDED A COMBINED MAG-12/NCB-10 BRIEFING AT CP TODAY.

Dist. File, Comm, CO, S-1, S-2, S-3,

J. D. Noble S-4, MABS

GP-4

17/94
 A. WILSON, LTCOL, USMC
 CO, MABS-12

J. D. NOBLE, COLONEL, USMC
 CO, MAG-12

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

FROM: MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (ADV)
 TO: CG III MAF
 INFO: CG FIRST MAW (ADV)
 FIRST MAW (REAR)
 MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (REAR)
 ZEN NCB ONE ZERO
 WABS-12 (-)

181750Z

SECRET

SITREP NR 3 AS OF 181000Z

1. NCB CONSTR STATUS AS FOLLOWS: READ IN FIVE COLUMNS:

ITEM	DATE STARTED	COMPL THIS PD	COMPL TO DATE	RQD
ROAD CONSTR	D+1	0	3.5 MI	UNK
EXCAV R/W	D+2	8%	63%	100%
EXCAV TW	D+6	15%	23%	100%
MAT UNLOADING	D+2	261 BDLS	2634 BDLS	5073 BDLS
ASPHALT UNLOADING	D+6	0	1800 DRMS	5000 DRMS
STABIL R/W	D+8	400 FT	900 FT	8000 FT
STABIL TW	D+9	0	150 FT	9200 FT
MAT LAYING R/W	D+9	210 FT	520 FT	8000 FT
MAT LAYING TW	D+9	0	150 FT	9200 FT

2. STILL EXPERIENCING SOME SLOWNESS IN STABILIZATION OPERATION DUE TO INEXPERIENCED OPERATORS ON MOTOR GRADERS. PERSONNEL IMPROVING AND HAVE DEVELOPED A TRACTOR DRAWN LAND PLANE CONSTRUCTION OF RAILROAD RAIL WHICH GREATLY SPEEDS LEVELING & GRADING OPERATION. STRUCK AREA OF UNSATISFACTORY MATERIAL IN BORROW PIT. BORROW OPERATIONS HAVE SHIFTED TO ANOTHER SITE IN IMMEDIATE AREA WHICH PROVIDES SATISFACTORY STABILIZATION MATERIAL. SEARCH BEING MADE FOR ANOTHER LATERITE DEPOSIT WITHIN ADJOINING AREA. LOWER QUALITY MATERIAL BEING MIXED WITH SAND TO OBTAIN SATISFACTORY SUBGRADE CONDITION.

3. HAVE AGAIN SUSPENDED MAT LAYING OPERATIONS DURING NIGHT HOURS TO ALLOW STABILIZATION TO PROCEED FURTHER AHEAD OF MAT LAYING. EXPECT TO RESUME MAT LAYING 190800H.

4. QUALITY OF MATTING OFFLOADED SO FAR FROM MERRICK EQUAL TO THAT FROM WASHBURN. OF THREE HUNDRED BUNDLES OF AM 2 MATTING OPENED SO FAR ONLY FIVE PLANKS HAVE HAD DAMAGED INTERLOCKS & CHARACTER OF DAMAGE DOES NOT RENDER THEM BEYOND USE ON RUNWAY AND CROSS TAXIWAYS.

PAGE NO. 1 OF 2 PAGES

18/44

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181750Z
MAY 65

5. ONE ADDITIONAL TD-18 DOZER FROM DANANG TURNED OVER TO NCB ONE ZERO BY SHORE PARTY.

6. TEMPORARY CAMPSITE REMAINS 95% COMPLETED. 131150Z

7. SURVEY OF MAG CAMPSITE REMAINS 75% COMPLETED. CLEARING & LEVELING 20% COMPLETED.

GP-4

J. E. Gardner
J. E. GARDNER, CAPTAIN, USMC
ASS'T S-3 MAG-12
DRAFTING OFFICER

J. D. Noble
J. D. NOBLE, COLONEL, USMC
CO, MAG-12
RELEASING OFFICER

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

CO/adj

Has Been Sent

*Dist: File, Comm, CO, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4
MAB5-12(-1)*

181750Z

PAGE NO. 2 OF 2 PAGES

MAY 55

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

FROM: MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (ADV)
TO: CG III MAF
INFO: CG FMAW (ADV)
MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (REAR)
ZEN NCB ONE ZERO
MABS -12 (-)
FMAW (REAR)

191335Z

SECRET

SITREP NR 4 AS OF 191000Z

1. NCB 10

A. CONSTRUCTION STATUS AS FOLLOWS (READ IN FIVE COLUMNS):

ITEM	DATE STARTED	COMPL THIS PD	COMPL TO DATE	QTD
ROAD CONSTRUCTION	D+1	0	3.5 MI	UNK
EARTHWORK RUNWAY	D+2	5%	68%	100%
EARTHWORK TW	D+6	3%	26%	100%
MAT UNLOADING	D+2	451 BDLS	3085 BDLS	5072 BDLS
ASPHALT UNLOADING	D+6	0	1800 DRMS	5000 DRMS
STABILIZATION RMY	D+8	500 FT	1400 FT	8000 FT
STABILIZATION TW	D+9	0	150 FT	9200 FT
MAT LAYING RMY	D+9	140 FT	660 FT	8000 FT
MAT LAYING TW	D+9	0	150 FT	9200 FT

B. MAT LAYING RECOMMENCED 191200H. WILL ATTEMPT TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS ON A TWENTY FOUR HOUR BASIS. STABILIZATION GRADING IMPROVING. SOME DELAY ENCOUNTERED IN RELOCATING SHOVELS IN BORROW PIT TO OBTAIN A BETTER QUALITY MATERIAL. A SEARCH WILL BE MADE TOMORROW FOR A NEW LATERITE DEPOSIT PER WING ENGR CONVERSATION WITH C.O. NCR AND FORCE ENGR.

C. 1ST CARRYING SIX DUMP TRUCKS FOR MCB TEN HAS NOT YET ARRIVED. BRAVO ENGINEERS CONTINUING TO PROVIDE THREE DUMP TRUCKS AND THREE M2-18 DOZERS DURING DARKNESS HOURS.

D. ROAD CONSTRUCTION IS BEING CONTINUED BY B COMPANY, 3D ENGINEER BATTALION.

19/03

HAS BEEN SENT

191335Z

MAY 65

PAGE NO. 1 OF 2 PAGES

copy 2 of 6

2. MAB-12

A. TEMPORARY CAMPSITE 100% COMPLETED. SECOND ATTEMPT AT DIGGING WELL MOST SUCCESSFUL. PUMPED 22,000 GALS IN 6 HRS WITHOUT NOTICEABLE DROP IN WATER LEVEL.

B. SURVEY OF MAG CAMPSITE 80% COMPLETED. CLEARING AND LEVELING 25% COMPLETED.

C. PORTABLE AIR CONTROL TWR NOW LOC ADJACENT TO HELO LANDING SITE IN VIC OF CP (COORD 538069). WILL GUARD NAVY FRI TWR FREQ 340.2 AND CAN BE CONTACTED IF ASSISTANCE NEEDED. REQ HELO INBOUND FOR THIS CP CONTACT TWR TEN MINUTES OUT GIVING INFO ON PERSONNEL AND/OR CARGO TO BE OFFLOADED.

D. MGEN FONTANA AND GEN CARL VISITED CP THIS AFTERNOON.

GP-4

W T Macy
W. T. MACY, MAJOR, USMC
ASS'T S-3 MAG-12
DRAFTING OFFICER

J D Noble
J. D. NOBLE, COLONEL, USMC
CO, MAG-12
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

Has Been Sent
Dist: File, CO, S-4, MAB-12(-)
S-3, Comm

CO
ag

PAGE NO. 2 OF 2 PAGES

19/43

191335 Z
MAY 65

PRIORITY

SECRET

Destroy by burning

FROM: MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (ADV)
 TO: CG III MAF
 INFO: CG FMAW (ADV)
 MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (REAR)
 ZEN NCB ONE ZERO
 MAES-12 (-)
 FMAW (REAR)

201315Z

CCN: 016

SECRET

SITREP NR 5 AS OF 201000Z

1. NCB - 10

A. CONSTRUCTION STATUS AS FOLLOWS, READ IN FIVE COLUMNS:

ITEM	DATE STARTED	COMPL THIS PD	COMPL TO DATE	RQD
ROAD CONSTRUCTION	D+1	0	3.5 MI	UNK
EARTHWORK RUNWAY	D+2	8%	76%	100%
EARTHWORK TAXIWAY	D+6	2%	28%	100%
MAT UNLOADING	D+2	398 BDLS	3493 BDLS	5073 BDLS
ASPHALT UNLOADING	D+6	600 DRMS	2400 DRMS	5000 DRMS
STABILIZATION RWY	D+8	400 FT	1800 FT	8000 FT
STABILIZATION TW	D+9	0	150 FT	9200 FT
MAT LAYING RUNWAY	D+9	482 FT	1142 FT	8000 FT
MAT LAYING TW	D+9	0	150 FT	9200 FT

B. SINCE FINE GRADING CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED AFTER DARK WILL DIVERT AT LEAST ONE TRACTOR/SCRAPER TO HAULING STABILIZATION MATERIAL FROM PIT TO RUNWAY TO SPEED UP STABILIZATION PROCESS. EARTHWORK FOR NEXT 2500 TO 3000 REQUIRES ONLY MINOR CUTS AND FILLS AND SHOULD PROCEED RAPIDLY. 2500 LIN FT OF RUNWAY ON GRADE. DIVERSION OF TRACTOR/SCRAPER WILL NOT SLOW SUBGRADE EARTH WORK MATERIALLY AND SHOULD GREATLY SPEED UP STABILIZATION PROCESS. NEXT SIT REP WILL COVER THIS POINT FURTHER AFTER EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM ONE DAYS OPERATION.

C. STILL NO ADVISE AS TO EXPECTED ARRIVAL OF 1ST WITH SIX ADDITIONAL DUMP TRUCKS. COMCBPAC CHIEF OF STAFF HAS REQUESTED AIR SHIPMENT OF FOUR ADDITIONAL M51 FROM M3B THREE ON GUAM IN CASE ARRIVAL OF 1ST DELAYED. REQUEST AIRSG EXPECTED ARRIVAL OF 1ST AND DUMPS. WILL ADVISE EXPECTED ARRIVAL OF DUMPS FROM GUAM AS SOON AS KNOWN.

D. GOOD SOURCE OF ADDITIONAL LATERITE STABILIZATION MATERIAL LOCATED WITHIN VERY SHORT DISTANCE OF PRESENT PIT. HAUL ROAD TO BE EXTENDED TO UTILIZE ADDITIONAL SOURCE NEXT PERIOD.

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copy 287

2. MARS-12 (-)

A. SURVEY OF CAMPSITE 90% COMPLETED. CLEARING AND LEVELING 30% COMPLETED.

B. D-6 TRACTOR D/L AND ONLY D-4 AVAILABLE FOR CLEARING AND LEVELING. UNABLE TO OBTAIN TRACTOR ASSISTANCE BECAUSE OF PRIORITY ON RWY CONSTR. LIMITED AVAILABILITY MT ALSO RESTRICTING CONSTR EFFORT.

GP-4

W. T. Macy
W. T. MACY, MAJOR, USMC
ASS'T S-3 MAG-12
DRAFTING OFFICER

J. D. Noble
J. D. NOBLE, COLONEL, USMC
CO, MAG-12
RELEASING OFFICER

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

Dist: Gls, CO, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, MARS, Conn

Has been sent
CO / 1
001 / 9

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

FROM: HARAIRGRU ONE TWO (ADV)
 TO: CG III MAF
 INFO: CG FMAW(ADV)
 FMAW (REAR)
 HARAIRGRU ONE TWO (REAR)
 ZEN NCB ONE ZERO
 HARS-12 (-)

2L 13 50Z

SECRET

SITREP NR 6 AS OF 211000Z

1. NCB 10

A. CONSTRUCTION STATUS AS FOLLOWS, READ IN FIVE COLUMNS:

ITEM	DATE STARTED	COMPL THIS PD	COMPL TO DATE	RQD
ROAD CONSTRUCTION	D+1	0	3.5 MI	UNK
EARTH WORK RUNWAY	D+2	3%	79%	100%
EARTHWORK TAXIWAY	D+6	6%	34%	100%
MAT UNLOADING	D+2	558 BDLS	4051 BDLS	5073 BDLS
ASPHALT UNLOADING	D+6	600 DRMS	3000 DRMS	5000 DRMS
STABILIZATION RWY	D+8	500 FT	2300 FT	8000 FT
STABILIZATION TW	D+9	0	150 FT	9200 FT
MAT LAYING RUNWAY	D+9	516 FT	1658 FT	8000 FT
MAT LAYING TW	D+9	0	150 FT	9200 FT

B. COMMENCED INSTALLATION OF DRAINAGE CULVERT BENEATH NORTH CROSS-TAXIWAY. EXPECT TO COMPLETE INSTALLATION NEXT PERIOD AND RECOMMENCE STABILIZATION OF TAXIWAY IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER.

C. EARTH WORK ON RUNWAY AND TAXIWAY SLOWED BY LOSS OF ONE ADDITIONAL TD-24 TRACTOR. TRACTOR REPLACED IN PULLING SCRAPER BY SACRIFICING ONE TD-24 PUSH DOZER.

D. MRS-200 TRACTOR PULLING 10 YARD SCRAPER FOR HAULING LATERITE STABILIZATION MATERIAL SO SUCCESSFUL, ONE MRS-200 TRACTOR ALSO COUPLED TO 18 YARD SCRAPER TO HAUL LATERITE OVER STABILIZED HAUL ROADS.

E. SIX DUMP TRUCKS AND SIX OPERATORS ARRIVE 210930 ABOARD THOMASTON. HOWEVER RLT REPORTEDLY DIRECTED SHORE PARTY GROUP TO DIVERT THEIR USE TO CONSTRUCTION OF MSR. CO, MCB TEN PRESENTLY INVESTIGATING THIS REPORT. WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS DETAILS ARE AVAILABLE.

PAGE NO. 1 OF 2 PAGES

Copy 2 of 7

2. MAB-12 (-) ~~SECRET~~

A. SURVEY OF CAMPSITE 95% COMPLETED. CLEARING AND LEVELING 35% COMPLETED.

B. UNABLE TO OBTAIN TRACTOR ASSISTANCE. D-6 TRACTOR REMAINS D/L. ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO RECEIVE ONE OR POSSIBLY TWO TD-24 FROM ACE TOMORROW BETWEEN BARGE MOORING AT MIDPOINT OFFLOADING AREA FOR MATING.

GP-4

W. T. MARY
W. T. MARY, MAJOR, USMC
ASS'T S-3 MAG-12
DRAFTING OFFICER

J. D. Noble
J. D. NOBLE, COLONEL, USMC
CO, MAG-12
RELEASING OFFICER

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

Dist. LB, CO, S-2, S-3 S-4, MAB
Comm

CO 1/4
ag 1/4

PAGE NO. 2 OF 2 PAGES

copy 2 of 7

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

FROM: MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (ADV)
 TO: CG III MAF
 INFO: CG FMAW (ADV)
 FMAW (REAR)
 MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (REAR)
 ZEN NCB ONE ZERO
 MABS-12 (-)

221425Z

REGISTERED 11/1/64
 AT 25/1/64

SECRET

SITREP NR 7 AS OF 221000Z

1. NCB 10

A. CONSTRUCTION STATUS AS FOLLOWS, READ IN FIVE COLUMNS:

ITEM	DATE STARTED	COMPL THIS PD	COMPL TO DATE	RQD
ROAD CONSTRUCTION	D+1	0	3.5 MI	UNK
EARTHWORK RUNWAY	D+2	3%	82%	100%
EARTHWORK TAXIWAY	D+6	5%	39%	100%
MAT UNLOADING	D+2	392 BDLS	4443 BDLS	5073 BDLS
ASPHALT UNLOADING	D+6	600 DRMS	3600 DRMS	5000 DRMS
STABILIZATION RWY	D+8	400 FT	2700 FT	5000 FT
STABILIZATION TW	D+9	0 FT	150 FT	500 FT
MAT LAYING RUNWAY	D+9	328 FT	1986 FT	800 FT
MAT LAYING TW	D+9	0	150 FT	900 FT

B. PROGRESS SLOWED CONSIDERABLY THIS PERIOD DUE TO SIX HOUR SHUT DOWN DURING DARKNESS HOURS DURING ALERT DUE TO VIC. ACTIVITY IN AREA AND NUMEROUS EQUIPMENT BREAKDOWNS.

C. EXPECT TO RECOMMENCE MAT LAYING ON TAXIWAY DURING NEXT PERIOD.

2. MABS-12(-)

A. SURVEY OF CAMPSITE 100% COMPLETED CLEARING AND LEVELING 50% COMPLETED.

GP-4

J. E. Gardner
 J. E. GARDNER, CAPTAIN, USMC
 ASS'T S-3 MAG-12
 DRAFTING OFFICER

J. D. Noble
 J. D. NOBLE, COLONEL, USMC
 CO, MAG-12
 RELEASING OFFICER

DRAFTING OFFICER

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

FROM: WASHINGTON ONE TWO (ADV)
TO: CG IIX MAF
INFO: CG FFAW (ADV)
FFAW (REAR)
WASHINGTON ONE TWO (REAR)
SEN HQB CEN ZBRO
MABE-12 (-)

CCN-014
231310Z

SECRET

SIGNED BY S AS OF 231300Z

1. AGO 10

A. CONSTRUCTION STATUS AS FOLLOWS, READ IN FIVE COLUMNS:

TYPE	DAYS STARTED	COMP. PERCENT	COMPL TO DATE	REQ
ROAD CONSTRUCTION	D-1	0	3.5	UNK
EMERGENCY RUNWAY	D-2	3%	8%	100%
FAIRWEATHER TAXIWAY	D-6	4%	13%	100%
FLT UNLOADING	D-2	216	1489 BBL	5073 BBL
ACFT UNLOADING	D-6	0	3600 DRMS	5000 DRMS
STABILIZATION RUNWAY	D-8	300 FT	3000 FT	8000 FT
STABILIZATION TW	D-9	0	150 FT	150 FT
FLT LANDING RUNWAY	D-9	314 FT	2300 FT	8000 FT
FLT LANDING SW	D-9	0	150 FT	9200 FT

B. COMMENCED ROUGH GRADING FOR PADS FOR M-2 AND M-21. MOREST GRAD AT TEMPORARY LOCATIONS 1850 AND 2050 FT SOUTH OF NORTH END OF RUNWAY. EXPECT TO COMPLETE PADS DURING NEXT PERIOD.

C. CULVERT UNDER NORTH CROSS TAXIWAY COMPLETED EXCEPT FOR HEADWALLS. WILL DISCONTINUE STABILIZATION OF TAXIWAY DURING NEXT PERIOD.

2. MAG-12

A. CLEARING AND LEVELING OF CAMPSITE 80% COMPLETED.

B. WASHINGTON COUNTY 1ST 1166 COMMENCED OFFLOADING AT 230730H. ESTIMATE COMPLETION ABOUT 240600H.

C. 1ST 117 COMMENCED OFFLOADING M2 MOREST AT 231630H. MOREST PLACEMENT BEING MOVED FROM SOUTH CAUSEWAY TO RUNWAY INSTALLATION POSITION 1850 FT FROM NORTH END OF RUNWAY.

PAGE NO 1 OF 2 PAGES

D. M-24 MOREST MOVED INSTALLATION POSITION 2050 FT FROM NORTH END OF RUNWAY.

E. MRM-16 TACAN INSTALLED AT 230980H ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE RUNWAY APPROXIMATELY 1500 FT FROM NORTH END OF RUNWAY.

GP-4

W. T. Macy
W. T. MACY, MAJOR, USMC
ASS'T S-3 MAG-12
DRAFTING OFFICER

J. D. Noble
J. D. NOBLE, COLONEL, USMC
CO, MAG-12
RELEASING OFFICER

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

Has Been Sent
Dist: File, CO, S-3, S-4, MABS, Comm

PAGE NO 2 OF 2 PAGES

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

FROM: HARRAIRGRU ONE TWO (ADV)
 TO: CG, III MAF
 INFO: CG, FMAN(ADV)
 FMAN(REAR)
 HARRAIRGRU ONE TWO (REAR)
 ZEN HCB ONE ZERO
 WABS-12(-)

24 1255Z
 CCN-624

SECRET

SITREP NR 9 AS OF 241000Z

1. NCB 10

A. CONSTRUCTION STATUS AS FOLLOWS, READ IN FIVE COLUMNS:

ITEM	DATE STARTED	COMPL PERCENT	COMPL TO DATE	DOD
ROAD CONSTRUCTION	D-1	0	3.5 MI	UNK
EAST SIDE RUNWAY	D-2	2%	87%	100%
EAST SIDE TAXIWAY	D-6	3%	40%	100%
PAV LANDING	D-2	0	1689 DMS	5073 DMS
ASPHLT UNPAVING	D-6	0	3600 DMS	5000 DMS
STABILIZATION RUNWAY	D-6	100 FT	3000 FT	8000 FT
STABILIZATION TAXIWAY	D-9	0	150 FT	2200 FT
PAV LANDING RUNWAY	D-9	166 FT	2466 FT	8000 FT
PAV LANDING TAXIWAY	D-9	0	150 FT	9200 FT

B. SIX HOURS LAST DURING EXTREME HOT DRY PERIOD DUE TO SHOVEL BREAKDOWN IN BORROW PIT. AS A RESULT ONLY 100 FT OF RUNWAY STABILIZED. FOR PAST THREE DAYS HAVE ONLY BEEN ABLE TO KEEP EIGHT M51 IN OPERATING CONDITION OUT OF TOTAL ASSET OF TWENTY FIVE OF EIGHT TD-24 TRACTORS RUNNING BUT EXPERIENCING CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY WITH NUMEROUS BREAKDOWNS.

C. COMBASSING OF OTHER UNITS IN CHU LAI AREA FOR M-51 DUMPS AND TD-16 TRACTORS YIELDS NEGATIVE RESULTS. ALL IN USE ON WBR AND CLASS V(A) DUMPS.

D. REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL STABILIZATION IN FACTU, MOREST AND SQUADRON AREAS DICTATED BY THE SOFT SAND INCREASE DEMANDS ON SLOWEST OPERATION IN SEQUENCE. IN ORDER FOR FIELD TO BE OPERATIONAL EVEN AT BARE MINIMUM STANDARDS ALL OF THESE REQUIREMENTS MUST BE SATISFIED. WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND AND UNDER PRESENT PRODUCTION RATE, IT IS APPARENT THAT COMPLETION OF 4600 FT OF RUNWAY AND 3300 FT OF TAXIWAY/PARKING AREA CANNOT BE ATTAINED PRIOR TO 2 JUNE 1965.

PAGE NO. 1 OF 2 PAGES

2. MAG-12

A. WASHTENAW COUNTY (LST 1166) COMPLETED OFFLOADING MABS-12 (REAR) AND DEPARTED AREA 241215H.

B. LST COMSTOCK ARRIVED AT 241000H AND COMMENCED OFFLOADING BY MIKE BOATS AT 241230H.

C. TWO M-47 DUMP TRUCKS AND TWO ROADGRADERS PROVIDED TO MCB-10 TO ASSIST IN AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION.

D. CLEARING AND LEVELING OF CAMPSITE 85% COMPLETED.

E. CO, MAG-12 HAS BEEN INFORMED BY CO, MCB-10 THAT IT WILL REQUIRE A MINIMUM OF APPROXIMATELY 9 MORE DAYS TO COMPLETE CONSTRUCTION OF NORTHERN HALF OF AIRFIELD SO THAT TAXIWAYS AND BULK OF A/C MAINTENANCE AREA CAN BE USED. CO, MCB-10 ESTIMATES THAT APPROXIMATELY 4000 FT OF RUNWAY AND 2000 FT OF TAXIWAY WILL BE COMPLETED BY 28 MAY. CO, MAG-12 DEPARTED 1600 FOR FMAW(ADV) HQS FOR DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT

GP-4

W T Macy
W. T. MACY, MAJOR, USMC
ASS'T S-3 MAG-12
DRAFTING OFFICER

J. W. Harris
J. W. HARRIS, LTJG, USMC
S-4, MAG-12
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

DESTROY BY BURNING

PRIORITY

Dist: file CO, S-3, S-4, MABS

Common

This was for the MCB-10 on 25 May by 3300' 400' TW. by 28 May

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

FROM: MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (ADV)
 TO: CG, III MAF
 INFO: CG FMAW (ADV)
 FMAW (REAR)
 MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (REAR)
 ZEN NCB ONE ZERO
 MABS-12(-)

251246Z
MAY 65

SECRET

SITREP NR 10 AS OF 251000Z

1. NCB 10

A. CONSTRUCTION STATUS AS FOLLOWS, READ IN FIVE COLUMNS:

ITEM	DATE STARTED	COMPL THIS PD	COMPL TO DATE	RQD
ROAD CONSTRUCTION	D+1	0	3.5 MI	UNK
EARTHWORK RUNWAY	D+2	1%	88%	100%
EARTHWORK TAXIWAY	D+6	4%	50%	100%
MAT UNLOADING	D+2	0	4689 BDLS	5073 BDLS
ASPHALT UNLOADING	D+2	0	3600 DRMS	5000 DRMS
STABILIZATION RUNWAY	D+8	0	3100 FT	8000 FT
STABILIZATION TAXIWAY	D+9	250 FT	400 FT	9200 FT
MAT LAYING RUNWAY	D+9	110 FT	2576 FT	8000 FT
MAT LAYING TAXIWAY	D+9	150 FT	300 FT	9200 FT

B. DISCUSSED MINIMUMS REQUIRED TO LAND AIRCRAFT ON 28 MAY WITH REPS FIRST MAN, MAG-12 AND MABS-12. FOLLOWING ARE RESULTS OF THAT DISCUSSION; 3300 FT RUNWAY, NUMBER ONE AND NUMBER TWO CROSS TAXIWAYS, 400 FT OF TAXIWAY AND FUELING AREA WITH MOST PADS STABILIZED. FURTHER AGREED UPON FOLLOWING FOR COMPLETION BY 6 JUNE. 4600 FT RUNWAY, 3500 FT TAXIWAY, MAINTENANCE AREA AND PARKING AREAS PLUS MATCU AREA STABILIZED AND 150' X 150' PARKING AREA FOR C-130 AIRCRAFT STABILIZED.

2. MAG-12

A. 1ST 1165 WASHOE COUNTY COMMENCED OFFLOADING AT 250845H. ESTIMATE COMPLETION 261200H.

B. 1ST VERNON COUNTY ARRIVED 251430H OFFLOADING WILL COMMENCE UPON DEPARTURE WASHOE COUNTY.

C. 1SD COMSTOCK COMPLETED OFFLOADING 251530H.

D. ALL MABS-12 EQUIPMENT, CARGO AND PERSONNEL NOW IN PLACE. PORTICUS HEAMS, VMA-311 AND VMA 225 HAVE ARRIVED.

PAGE NO 1 OF 2 PAGES

CCN: 02.0

2076

E. CLEARING AND LEVELING IN CAMPSITE 90% COMPLETED. CAMPSITE BEING EXPANDED TO ACCOMMODATE UNITS AS THEY ARRIVE.

F. BEEN MCCUTCHEON VISITED THE CP AND MADE A TOUR OF CAMPSITE AND AIRFIELD CONSTR AREA.

GP-4

W T Macy
W. T. MACY, MAJOR, USMC
DRAFTING OFFICER
ASS'T B-3 MAG-12

J D Noble
J. D. NOBLE, COLONEL, USMC
CO, MAG-12
RELEASING OFFICER

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

Has Been Sent

Dist: Lb, CO, S-3, S-4, MABS,

CO / 11
adj /

PAGE NO 2 OF 2 PAGES

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

FROM: MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (ADV)
 TO: CG III MAF
 INFO: CG FMAW (ADV)
 FMAW (REAR)
 MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (REAR)
 ZEN NCB ONE ZERO
 NABS-12

261410Z

SECRET

SITREP NR 11 AS OF 261000Z

1. NCB 10

A. CONSTRUCTION STATUS AS FOLLOWS, READ IN FIVE COLUMNS:

ITEM	DATE STARTED	COMPL THIS PD	COMPL TO DATE	RQD
ROAD CONSTRUCTION	D+1	0	3.5 MI	UNK
EARTHWORK RUNWAY	D+2	2%	90%	100%
EARTHWORK TAXIWAY	D+6	0%	50%	100%
MAT UNLOADING	D+2	147 BDLS	4836 BDLS	5013 BDLS
ASPHALT UNLOADING	D+2	0	3600 DRMS	5000 DRMS
STABILIZATION RUNWAY	D+8	100 FT	3200 FT	8000 FT
STABILIZATION TAXIWAY	D+9	150 FT	850 FT	9200 FT
MAT LAYING RUNWAY	D+9	346 FT	2922 FT	8000 FT
MAT LAYING TAXIWAY	D+9	76 FT	376 FT	9200 FT

B. WITH RECEIPT OF REPAIR PARTS, AND HYDRAULIC FLUID WERE ABLE TO BRING FIVE M51 DUMPS BACK INTO OPERATION. 12 TO 14 M51 RUNNING ALL DAY WITH TWO SHOVELS OPERATING IN BORROW PIT. IF EQUIPMENT STATUS REMAINS AS AT PRESENT OR IMPROVES THROUGH RECEIPT OF ADDITIONAL REPAIR PARTS COMPLETION OF 3300 FT OF RUNWAY AND 400 FT OF TAXIWAY WITH TWO CROSS TAXIWAY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO FIRST LIGHT 28 MAY.

2. MAG-12

A. LST 1165 WASHOE COUNTY CONTINUES OFF LOADING. ESTIMATED COMPLETION 262000H. ~~IT IS NOTED THAT~~ LST VERNON COUNTY WILL ~~BE ABLE TO~~ MARRY TO CAUSEWAY ~~THAT~~ ~~IS~~ 47 2100H.

B. CLEARING AND LEVELING IN CAMPSITE AREA REMAINS 90% COMPLETED. D-6 TRACTOR D/L FOR TRUCK REPAIRS SHOULD BE UP THIS P.M.

C. GEN WESTMORELAND AND MGEN COLLINS VISITED THE AIRFIELD CONSTR AREA. THEY WERE MET ~~AND~~ BY GP CDR AND C.O. NCB-10.

GP-4

W. T. MACY, MAJOR, USMC
 ASS'T S-3 MAG-12
 DRAFTING OFFICER

J. D. NOBLE, COLONEL, USMC
 CO, MAG-12
 RELEASING OFFICER

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTRUCT BY BURNING

FROM: WASHINGTON ONE TWO (ADV)
 TO: CG III MAJ
 INFO: CG BUNNY (ADV)
 FAW (TMR)
 WASHINGTON ONE TWO (UNCL)
 2-11-68 CGS ZEPH
 WASH-22

271400Z

SECRET

STREET NR 12 AS OF 261300Z

1. NR 10

A. CONSTRUCTION STATUS AS FOLLOWS, READ IN FIVE COLUMNS:

ITEM	DATE STARTED	COMPL DAYS TO	COMPL TO DATE	RMD
ROAD CONSTRUCTION	D-1	0	3.5 MI	UNK
BARRIERS RUNWAY	D-2	15	91%	100%
BARRIERS TAXIWAY	D-6	25	54%	100%
MAT UNLOADING	D-2	51 DAYS	4917 BOLS	5075 BOLS
ASPHALT PAVING	D-2	0	3600 BOLS	5000 BOLS
STABILIZATION RUNWAY	D-8	300 FT	3500 FT	3000 FT
STABILIZATION TAXIWAY	D-7	160 FT	1000 FT	1000 FT
MAT LAYING RUNWAY	D-9	300 FT	3054 FT	3000 FT
MAT LAYING TAXIWAY	D-9	75 FT	450 FT	2200 FT

B. EXPERIENCING SOME DIFFICULTY WITH PREVIOUSLY USED M982 MATING
 MAYNET LUGS ON PLANKS BADLY WENT OUT OF ALIGNMENT AND SOME PLANKS BENT AND
 WARPED ALUMINUM CAP SCREWS TWISTING OFF BEFORE RUNNING DOWN. HAVE
 HAD TO SWITCH TO STEEL CAP SCREWS ONLY. WILL RE EVALUATE NEEDS AND
 REQUEST ADDITIONAL STEEL CAP SCREWS IF NECESSARY.

C. TWELVE M5A DUMPS HAULING CONTINUOUSLY 361 LOADS HAULED BETWEEN
 270000H AND 271200H. SPARE PARTS ASSISTING IN KEEPING TWELVE DUMPS IN
 OPERATION IN SPITE OF CONTINUED BREAKDOWNS.

2. 1200-12

A. 1ST 1161 VERNON COUNTY CONTINUES OFFLOADING ESTIMATED COMPLETION
 280200H.

B. TAPS UNIT INSTALLED AT NORTH END OF TAXIWAY WITH THREE DAPS READY
 TO RECEIVE FUEL.

C. ESTIMATE M-2 AND M-24 MARCHES WILL BE COMPLETELY INSTALLED BY NEXT
 REPORTING PERIOD.

D. CLEARING AND LEVELING IN CAMP AREA 90% COMPLETED.

Copy 297

HAS BEEN

27/22

~~E. ENLISTED RESSHALL COMPLETED. MDS. HEMS, 225 AND 311 ENLISTED
 BULLETING TENTS UP WITH LIGHTS INSTALLED IN MAGS AREA ONLY. COMPANY
 GROUP OFFICERS TENTS WILL BE UP NEXT REPORTING PERIOD. GROUP CH
 APPROXIMATELY 20% COMPLETED.~~

E. ROAD CUT TODAY TO LOX POSITION. WILL REQUIRE STABILIZATION
 BEFORE UNIT CAN BE MOVED INTO POSITION. ESTIMATE UNIT WILL BE IN
 POSITION AND PRODUCING ON ~~HEX~~ 29 MAY.

F. TWO MARINE CORPS MRC 62 RADIO RELAY UNITS RECEIVED AND ARE
 OPERATIONAL. US ARMY MRC 82 RADIO RELAY ARRIVED AT 271700H AND WILL
 BE OPERATIONAL TOMORROW.

GP-4

W. T. Macy
 W. T. MACY, MAJOR, USMC
 ASS'T S-3 MAG-12
 DRAFTING OFFICER

J. D. Noble
 J. D. NOBLE, COLONEL, USMC
 CO, MAG-12
 RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET
 DESTROY BY BURNING

*Dist: Fil, CO, S-3, S-4, MAGS,
 MCB-10, Comm*

PAGE NO. 1 OF 2 PAGES

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

FROM: MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (ADV)
 TO: CG III MAF
 INFO: CG FMAW (ADV)
 FMAW (REAR)
 MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (REAR)
 ZEN WEB ONE ZERO
 MABS-12

SECRET

SITREP NR 13 AS OF 281000Z

1. NCB 10

A. CONSTRUCTION STATUS AS FOLLOWS, READ IN FIVE COLUMNS

ITEM	DATE STARTED	COMPL THIS PD	COMPL TO DATE	RQD
ROAD CONSTRUCTION	D+1	0	3.5 MI	UNK
EARTHWORK RUNWAY	D+2	0	91%	100%
EARTHWORK TAXIWAY	D+6	3%	55%	100%
MAT UNLOADING	D+2	164 BOLS	5071 BOLS	5073 BOLS
ASPHALT UNLOADING	D+2	0	3600 DRMS	5000 DRMS
STABILIZATION RUNWAY	D+8	200 FT	3700 FT	8000 FT
STABILIZATION TAXIWAY	D+9	200 FT	1200 FT	9200 FT
MAT LAYING RUNWAY	D+9	242 FT	3318 FT	8000 FT
MAT LAYING TAXIWAY	D+9	168 FT	614 FT	9200 FT

B. STABILIZATION AND FINE GRADING SLOWED APPRECIABLY DUE TO RAINFALL DURING NIGHT. ALL OPERATIONS INTERRUPTED FOR TWO HOURS (1000-1200) DURING MORNING DUE TO V.C. ACTIVITY.

C. IN CONFERENCE WITH CO, MAG-12 AGREED TO HAVE 3700 FT OF RUNWAY, NUMBER ONE AND TWO CROSS TAXIWAYS AND 600 FT OF TAXIWAY/MAINTENANCE AREA BY DAYLIGHT 31 MAY.

2. MAG-12

A. 1ST VERNON COUNTY COMPLETED OFFLOADING AT 280600 H.

~~B. 1ST GENERATOR INSTALLED THIS AFTERNOON.~~

~~C. M-2 MOREST OPERATIONAL. M-24 MOREST REQUIRES ADDITIONAL MAINTENANCE AND SHOULD BE OPERATIONAL BY NEXT REPORTING PERIOD.~~

~~D. MATCU STABILIZED AREAS BEING REPAIRED. SHOULD BE ABLE TO START INSTALLING SOME OF THE COMPONENTS NEXT REPORTING PERIOD.~~

~~E. TANKS AT NORTH END OF TAXIWAY INCREASED TO SIX BAGS. ESTIMATE TANKS WILL BE FUELED BY 291700H.~~

F. CLEARING AND LEVELLING IN CAMP SITE AREA REMAINS 90% COMPLETED.

E. RADN WARD AND BGEN MCOUTCHEON VISITED THE CP AND AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION SITE. BGEN CARL AND BGEN YOUNGDALE ALSO VISITED THE CP AND WERE BRIEFED.

GP-4

J. F. Gardner
 J. F. GARDNER CAPTAIN, USMC
 ASS'T S-3, MAG-12
 DRAFTING OFFICER

J. D. Noble
 J. D. NOBLE COLONEL, USMC
 CO, MAG-12
 RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET
 DESTROY BY BURNING

*Dist: Lib, CO, S-3, S-4, MABS.
 MCB-10, Comm*

PAGE NO 2 OF 2 PAGES

B

C

D

28/60

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING2915042
MAY 65

FROM: HARBURG ONE TWO (ADV)
 TO: CG III MAP
 INFO: CG HMAW (ADV)
 HMAW (REAR)
 HARBURG ONE TWO (REAR)
 ZEN NOB ONE ZERO
 HARS-12

SECRET

STREP NR 34 AS OF 291000Z

Neil File

1. NOB IO

A. CONSTRUCTION STATUS AS FOLLOWS, READ IN FIVE COLUMNS:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>DATE STARTED</u>	<u>COMPL THIS PD</u>	<u>COMPL TO DATE</u>	<u>RQD</u>
ROAD CONSTRUCTION	D+1	0	3.5	UNK
EARTHWORK RUNWAY	D+2	0	91%	100%
EARTHWORK TAXIWAY	D+6	5%	57%	100%
MAT UNLOADING	D+2	67 BDIS	5138 BDIS	5073 BDIS
ASPHALT UNLOADING	D+2	0	3600 DRES	5000 DRES
STABILIZATION RUNWAY	D+8	200 FT	3900 FT	8000 FT
STABILIZATION TAXIWAY	D+9	100 FT	1300 FT	9200 FT
MAT LAYING RUNWAY	D+9	228 FT	3546 FT	8000 FT
MAT LAYING TAXIWAY	D+9	248 FT	962 FT	9200 FT

B. STABILIZATION OF ACCESS ROADS AND EQUIPMENT PADS MATCH AREA, AND ACCESS ROAD AND WIDE SHOULDER IN TAFDS AREA VIRTUALLY COMPLETED EXCEPT FOR FUTURE EXPANSION. STABILIZATION EFFORT SOMEWHAT SLOWED BY ADDITIONAL RAINFALL DURING NIGHT. FOUR HOURS LOST DURING EARLY MORNING HOURS BECAUSE OF SHUTDOWN DUE TO VC ACTIVITY IN VICINITY OF BORROW PIT.

C. MAT LAYING ON RUNWAY AND TAXIWAY SLOWED SOMEWHAT IN ORDER TO COMPECE CLEANUP OF RUNWAY AND TAXIWAY FOR RECEIPT OF AIRCRAFT MORNING 31 MAY. HARS-12 FIRE TRUCKS PERFORMING YEOMAN SERVICE WASHING DOWN MATTING.

2. MAG-12

- A. ALL MATCH EQUIPMENT NOW ON SITE AND CONTROL TOWER ERECTED.
- B. M-21, MOREST NOW OPERATIONAL.
- C. LOX PLANT NOW IN PRODUCTION.

PAGE NO 1 OF 2 PAGES

29/17

2 47

2915042

D. CLEARING AND LEVELLING IN CAMPSITE AREA 95% COMPLETED.

E. ABC TELENEWS PARTY TOURED AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION AREA AND CAMPSITE. FRENCH NEWS PARTY AND A BELGIUM PRESSMAN ALSO TOURED THE AREA.

GP-4

J. E. Gardner
J. E. GARDNER, CAPTAIN, USMC
ASS'T S-3 MAG-12
DRAFTING OFFICER

D. R. Harris, Jr.
D. R. HARRIS, JR., LTJG, USMC
MAG-12 S-3
RELEASING OFFICER

Dist. Ltr, CO, S-4, S-3, MABS, MCB-10, Comm

Has Been Sent

29/17

PAGE NO 2 OF 2 PAGES

2915042

2915042

SECRET

PRIORITY

DESTROY BY BURNING

FROM: MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (ADV)
 TO: CG III MAF
 INFO: CG FMAW (ADV)
 FMAW (REAR)
 MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (REAR)
 ZEN NCB ONE ZERO
 25 MABS-12

① 23420312
 MAY 65

SECRET

SITREP NR 15 AS OF 301000Z

1. NCB 10

A. CONSTRUCTION STATUS AS FOLLOWS, READ IN FIVE COLUMNS:

ITEM	DATE STARTED	COMPL THIS PD	COMPL TO DATE	RRQD
ROAD CONSTRUCTION	D+1	0.3 MI	3.8 MI	UNK
EARTHWORK RUNWAY	D+2	0	91%	100%
EARTHWORK TAXIWAY	D+6	2%	59%	100%
MATTING UNLOADED	D+2	0	5138 BDLS	5073 BDLS
ASPHALT UNLOADED	D+2	0	3600 DRMS	5000, DRMS
STABILIZATION RUNWAY	D+6	0	3900 FT	8000 FT
STABILIZATION TAXIWAY	D+8	100 FT	1400 FT	9200 FT
MAT LAYING RUNWAY	D+9	0	3546 FT	8000 FT
MAT LAYING TAXIWAY	D+9	0	962 FT	9200 FT

B. HEAVY RAINS DURING NIGHT RESULTED IN COMPLETE SHUT DOWN FOR NINE HOURS. WET SUPERGRADE RENDERED IT IMPOSSIBLE TO LAY MATTING ON RUNWAY OR TAXIWAY DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. IF WEATHER HOLDS, EXPECT TO RECOMMENCE MAT LAYING ON TAXIWAY DURING NEXT PERIOD.

C. AT INSISTANCE OF MAG-12 RECOMMENCED HAULING LATERITE FOR MATCU AREA AND ORDNANCE HAUL ACCESS ROADS AT 300930H EVEN THOUGH HAUL ROADS BADLY SOFTENED BY RAINFALL. RESULTANT DAMAGE TO HAUL ROAD ALLEVIATED SLIGHTLY BY KEEPING ONE MOTOR GRADER CONSTANTLY ON ROAD. ESTIMATE ADDITIONAL TWO DAYS CONSTANT MAINTENANCE GRADING AND FILLING DAMAGED SPOTS.

2. MAG-12

A.. MATCU EQUIPMENT OPERATIONAL: TOWER, UHF, DF AND TACAN. ESTIMATE SEARCH RADAR (UPS-1) WILL BE OPERATIONAL BY 302300H. PRECISION RADAR NOT INSTALLED. EXPECT TO COMMENCE INSTALLATION DURING NEXT REPORTING PERIOD.

B. TAFDS FULLY FUELED AND READY FOR OPERATION.

C. CLEARING AND LEVELING IN CAMPSITE REMAINS 95% COMPLETED.

D. WEN COLLINS AND BGEN DEPUY WERE CONDUCTED ON A TOUR OF THE
AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION.

GP-4

J. E. Gardner
J. E. GARDNER CAPT, USMC
ASST S-3, MAG-12
DRAFTING OFFICER

D. R. Harris Jr.
D. R. HARRIS JR., BICOL, USMC
S-3, MAG-12
RELEASING OFFICER

PRIORITY

SECRET
DESTROY BY BURNING

Dest, Jale, CO, S-3, S-4, MABS, Comm

HAS BEEN SENT

PAGE OF 2 PAGES H.

34/24

SECRET

PRIORITY

DESTROY BY BURNING

FROM: MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (ADV)
 TO: CC III MAP
 INFO: CC FRAW (ADV)
 FRAW (REAR)
 MARAIRGRU ONE TWO (REAR)
 ZEN NOB ONE ZERO
 MARS-12

311600Z
 MAY 65
 Viet folder

SECRET

SITREP NR 16 AS OF 311000Z

1. NOB 10

A. CONSTRUCTION STATUS AS FOLLOWS, READ IN FIVE COLUMNS:

ITEM	DATE STARTED	COMPL THIS PD	COMPL TO DATE	REQ
ROAD CONSTRUCTION	D-1	0	3.8 MI	UNK
RAILIN WORK RUNWAY	D-2	0	91%	100%
EARTH WORK TAXIWAY	D-6	3%	62%	100%
MATTING UNLOADED	D-2	0	5138 BDLS	5073 BDLS
ASPHALT UNLOADED	D-2	0	3600 DRMS	5000 DRMS
STABILIZATION RUNWAY	D-6	0	3900 FT	8000 FT
STABILIZATION TAXIWAY	D-8	0	1400 FT	9200 FT
MAT LAYING RUNWAY	D-9	0	3546 FT	8000 FT
MAT LAYING TAXIWAY	D-9	0	962 FT	9200 FT

B. CONTINUED RAINFALL MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE INCLINES ON HAUL ROADS TO AND FROM BORROW PIT.

C. ARCHITECT ENGINEER REPRESENTATIVE TOOK CALIFORNIA BEARING RATIO TESTS OF STABILIZED RUNWAY SUBGRADE. TEST RESULTS INDICATE CBR OF SLIGHTLY OVER 5 IN SATURATED STABILIZATION MATERIAL. THIS INDICATES THAT SUBGRADE AS STABILIZED WILL BE WEAK WHEN SUBJECTED TO SOAKING ACTION OF RAIN AND WILL SETTLE UNDER PLANE WHEEL LOADS. DISCUSSIONS WITH ARCHITECT ENGINEER REP, COMMANDER 30TH NCR, AND EMPAC ENGINEER OFFICER CONCLUDED THAT MOST PRACTICAL METHOD OF COMPACTING SAND WAS THROUGH THE AID OF SALT WATER SOAKING OF SUBGRADE AND THEN LAYING MATTING DIRECTLY ON COMPACTED SAND. WILL CONSTRUCT CLAY FILLED DITCH ALONG EDGE OF RUNWAY/TAXIWAY MATTING TO ASSIST IN RETAINING SAND AND MOISTURE DURING COMPACTION PROCESS.

D. HAVE ARRANGED FOR USE OF BULK FUEL TRANSFER PUMPS AND HOSE TO LIFT SEAWATER FROM BAY TO AIRFIELD SITE. WILL COMPACT SAND BY ROLLING WITH LOADED DUMP TRUCKS. FINAL GRADING AND SHAPING OF SUBGRADE WILL BE DONE WITH MOTOR GRADERS AND WEIGHTED DRAG. HAVE COMMENCED DIGGING SIDE DITCHES AND WILL COMMENCE FILLING DITCHES AS SOON AS HAUL ROAD CAN BE MADE PASSABLE TO TRUCKS.

Page 1 of 2 pages

31/15

2. MAC-12

A. MABS-12 FURNISHING TWO (2) JAFDS PUMPS AND PERSONNEL FOR SALT WATER SOAKING OF SUBGRADE. BULK FUEL COMPANY FURNISHING SUCTION AND DELIVERY HOSE FOR PUMPING SALT WATER TO RUNWAY AND TAXIWAY. INSTALLATION OF FIRST PUMPING SYSTEM 30% COMPLETED. WILL BE PUMPING TO BOTH TAXIWAY AND RUNWAY NEXT REPORTING PERIOD.

B. METCU SEARCH RADAR (UPS-1) OPERATIONAL TO 50% CAPACITY. PRECISION RADAR INSTALLED AND BEING TESTED. NEGOTIATIONS IN PROGRESS WITH 1964 CONGRP USAF FOR FLIGHT CHECK.

C. MK-8 MOD C (FRESNEL LENS) IN PLACE ON RUNWAY 32. INITIAL OPERATIONAL INSPECTION EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETE BY 010700H.

D. CLASS V (A) DUMP PRESENT INVENTORY 1, 817, 588 POUNDS.

E. APA NAVARRO COMMENCED OFF LOADING AT 311330H. OFF LOADING WAS SECURED AFTER FIRST TWO MIKE BOATS EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES WITH ROUGH WATER. AND LOW TIDES. ESTIMATE OFF LOADING WILL RECOMMENCE 312400H.

F. CLEARING AND LEVELING IN CAMPSITE AREA 97% COMPLETED.

G. LTCOL DUNCAN AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VARIOUS NEWS MEDIA ARRIVED 310645H AND DEPARTED 310830 AFTER CANCELLATION OF SCHEDULED PROGRAM. COL HORN, FMFPAC ENGRO AND W. O. THORNTON WING ORDO REMAINING OVERNIGHT DUE UNAVAILABILITY HELO LIFT.

GP-4

J. L. Gardner
J. L. GARDNER CAPT, USMC
ASS'T S-3, MAC-12
DRAWING OFFICER

D. R. Harris Jr.
D. R. HARRIS JR., LTCOL, USMC
S-3, MAC-12
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

PRIORITY

DESTROY BY BURNING

Page 1 of 2 pages

31/15

HAS BEEN SENT

Qx De Mo QSL UR NR 02 ZUB 31/1715Z KKKK
JEL: File, CO, S-3, MABS, COMM, S-4,

DATE	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
TOYS FROM D.D.W.	12	41	12	2	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
MATING UNLOADED	16	39	283	674	571	1488	0	0	0	261	451	378	550	392	346	0	0	147	54	164	67	0	0	0	0
CUMULATIVE TOTAL	255	640	1314	1885	2374																				
CHARGE PREP																									
LENGTH OF RUNWAY	1500	0	0	300	200	400	300	0	300	17	10%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
CUMULATIVE LENGTH	1500			1800	2000	2400	2700																		
LENGTH OF TAXIWAY																									
CUMULATIVE LENGTH																									
STABILIZATION																									
LENGTH OF RUNWAY	300	900	400	300	400	300	400	300	400	300	100	0	100	300	200	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CUMULATIVE LENGTH	300	1200	1600	2000	2400	2700	3100																		
LENGTH OF TAXIWAY	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	350	450	100	250	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CUMULATIVE LENGTH	100	100																							
LOTT LAYING																									
LENGTH OF RUNWAY	20	310	210	140	450	510	320	314	166	110	246	130	240	220	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CUMULATIVE LENGTH	20	330	540	680	1130	1640	1960	2274	2440	2550	2796	2926	3166	3386	3596	3796	3996	4196	4396	4596	4796	4996	5196	5396	5596
LENGTH OF TAXIWAY	150	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CUMULATIVE LENGTH	150																								

PLANNING

PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION FROM A COMMUNICATIONS STANDPOINT WAS HAMPERED FOR TWO REASONS;

FIRST, THE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER FOR MAG-12 WAS IN THE HOSPITAL DURING THE PLANNING FOR EMBARKATION.

SECONDLY, SUFFICIENT INFORMATION WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO THOSE WHO NEEDED IT FOR DETAILED PLANNING. THIS SECOND REASON RESULTED FROM EITHER A LACK OF INFORMATION OR FROM THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THE INFORMATION.

PRIOR TO GOING TO THE HOSPITAL THE COMMO HAD WORKED UP A PLAN FOR EMPLOYING MABS-12 IN A ~~■~~ SATS CONCEPT. ACCORDING TO HIS FIGURES AUGMENTATION WAS REQUIRED FROM H&HS-1.

WHEN EMPLOYMENT WAS ORDERED, H&HS-1 WAS ALSO DEPLOYING MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO AUGMENT US.

SWITCHING FROM AN ORIGINAL THREE PHASE PLAN FOR MOVEMENT TO A TWO PHASE PLAN NECESSITATED TAKING MORE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT IN THE FIRST SHIPPING THAN PLANNED. VERY LITTLE EQUIPMENT WAS LEFT BEHIND. A MRC-62 RADIO RELAY TEAM AND VAN WAS CONSIDERED AN ESSENTIAL ITEM FOR COMMUNICATIONS TO DANANG. PROPAGATION CHARTS SHOWED THAT HF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT FROM CHU LAI TO DANANG. THE RADIO RELAY TEAM WAS ATTACHED FROM H&HS-1

MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE

EMBARKATION WAS COMPLETED EARLY MORNING 27 ^{APR}~~MAY~~ WITH TROOPS BOARDING THE NIGHT BEFORE. CRYPTO EQUIPMENT AND ALL CLASSIFIED MATERIAL WAS PALLETIZED AND STORED IN THE BACK OF A M-35 ON THE MAIN DECK. AN ARMED GUARD WAS ON DUTY 24 HOURS A DAY.

MARINE COMMUNICATORS WORKED WITH SHIPS PERSONNEL IN THE SHIPS COMM CENTER. THEY MAINTAINED A FILE OF ALL MESSAGES PERTAINING TO MARINE UNITS EMBARKED. A TELETYPE TECHNICIAN WAS PROVIDED TO ASSIST SHIPS PERSONNEL. THE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER WAS AUTHORIZED ACCESS TO SHIPS CRYPTO ROOM TO ASSIST SHIPS PERSONNEL IN DECRYPTING MARINE TRAFFIC. PLANNING CONTINUED ABOARD SHIP BUT LITTLE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED UNTIL SHORTLY BEFORE COMING ASHORE.

ON 3 MAY COMM-ELEC ANNEX TO THIRD MEB OPORDER 301-65 WAS RECEIVED. IT CONTAINED INFORMATION FOR MEB COMMUNICATIONS ONLY AND NOTHING ON WING. ON 10 MAY WE RECEIVED COMM-ELEC ANNEX TO FIRST MAW OPORDER 301-65 INCOMPLETE. IT WAS TRANSMITTED IN FOUR SECTIONS AND WE RECEIVED ONLY THE FIRST TWO. FREQUENCIES WHICH WE NEEDED WERE NOT RECEIVED. ON 8 MAY AN ADVANCE PARTY INCLUDING THE COMMO CAME ASHORE TO LOOK OVER THE AREA AND MAKE LIASON WITH RLT-4 AND OTHER UNITS. THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF MABS-12 WAS ASHORE AFTER FLYING IN BY HELICOPTER FROM DANANG. HE SENT A MESSAGE ESTABLISHING OUR SHIP AS HIS COMM GUARD. COMM GUARD REMAINED ABOARD THE LST UNTIL UNLOADING WAS COMPLETED.

UNLOADING

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT NO. 8

UNLOADING OVER THE CAUSEWAY COMMENCED ON 11 MAY. AS SOON AS OUR MRC-87 CAME ASHORE WE CAME UP AND CHECKED IN OUR WING CMD NET #2. AS PREVIOUSLY PLANNED WE ALSO MAINTAINED 24 HOUR GUARD ON RLT-4 TACTICAL NET FOR AREA DEFENSE.

SOME DELAY IN BEGINNING OUR COMM INSTALLATION RESULTED FROM OFF LOADING THE SHIP INTO ONE DUMP AREA, THEN MOVING THE ENTIRE DUMP TO ANOTHER AREA BEFORE MOVING INTO A TEMPORARY CP LOCATION. POOR ORGANIZATION OF THE DUMP AREA RESULTED IN COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT BEING IN THE CENTER WITH NO WAY TO GET TO IT UNTIL OTHER EQUIPMENT WAS MOVED.

WE TIED INTO THE EXISTING WIRE SYSTEM ASHORE THROUGH MCB-10 SWITCHBOARD. USED PRC-6'S AND 10'S TO COORDINATE THE OFF LOADING OF THE SHIP AND THE MOVE FROM ONE DUMP AREA TO THE OTHER. DURING THE MOVE A MOUNT OUT BOX CONTAINING PRC-6'S FELL FROM THE BACK OF A TRUCK AND WAS RUN OVER BY A FORK LIFT. FIVE PRC-10'S, CONTAINED IN THE BOX WERE CRUSHED. TRAFFIC ON THE BEACH WAS EXTREMELY LIMITED BECAUSE OF THE SOFT SAND. HEAVILY LOADED TRUCKS HAD TO BE PULLED BY AMTRACKS OR TRACTORS.

MAY 12-15

INSTALLED COMMUNICATIONS ATTEMPTORY CP. A CONSTANT CONCERN WAS COMMUNICATIONS FOR OUR LOCAL PERIMETER SECURITY AT NIGHT. A PHONE SYSTEM WAS DESIRED AND INSTALLED. TRUNK LINES WERE RUN TO MCB-70 GIVING US WIRE COMMUNICATIONS WITH SHORE PARTY AND RLT-4.

WE SWITCHED OUR COMM GUARD TO RLT-4 UPON COMPLETION OF UNLOADING AND WE WOULD DELIVER AND ~~WILL~~ PICK UP OUR TRAFFIC FROM THEM. DUST AND SAND WAS EXTREMELY BAD. ALL EQUIPMENT NOT ACTUALLY OPERATING WAS SEALED AND STOWED IN IT'S CONTAINER. WHEN OPERATING EQUIPMENT IT WAS OFTEN NECESSARY TO REMOVE THE COVER TO PREVENT OVER-HEATING. ONE BIG PROBLEM WAS THAT WE HAD NO DECKING IN OUR COMM CENTER TENT AND IT WAS LOCATED NEAR A MAIN ROAD. OUR MRC-62 WAS OFF-LOADED FROM THE M-37 AND PLACED ON SITE IN POSITION. THE M-37 WAS NEEDED FOR TRANSPORTATION AND FOR LAYING WIRE. OPERATED MESSAGE CENTER, CRYPTO CENTER, RADIO CENTRAL SWITCHBOARD, ~~SWITCHBOARD~~ AND REPAIR ALL IN ONE GP TENT. IT WAS CROWDED BUT ONLY TEMPORARY SO IT WAS SATISFACTORY. WIRED COMM CENTER FOR BOTH OUR OWN POWER AND CAMP POWER. FOR ALL OUT DEFENSE OF AREA SUFFICIENT PEOPLE WOULD REMAIN IN COMM CENTER TO OPERATE AND/OR DESTROY MATERIAL IF NECESSARY.

MAY 16-21

OUR RADIO RELAY WAS INSTALLED AND OPERATING. TRIED A DIRECT SHOT TO THE COMPOUND IN DANANG, BUT IT WOULD NOT WORK. AFTER A RELAY WAS INSTALLED ON HILL 327 AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED AND A BAD CO-AXIAL CABLE WAS REPAIRED THE SHOT WAS IN SOLID. HAD GENERATOR TROUBLE WITH PB-75'S WHICH POWERS MRC-62. EXTENDED CAMP POWER LINES TO R.R. SITE TO PROVIDE POWER WHILE GENERATORS WERE BEING REPAIRED. WING PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR RADIO RELAY BUT SOME LOCAL REPAIR AVAILABLE THROUGH FSR TEAM ON THE BEACH. DUST IS EXTREMELY HARD ON TGC-14'S. ON 17 MAY MAG-12 C.O. AND STAFF SECTIONS CAME ABOARD. WE STARTED GUARDING AS MAG-12 ADVANCE ON 18 MAY. AS THE CAMP SPREAD OUT IT WAS NECESSARY TO INCREASE THE PERIMETER DEFENSE. MOVING BUNKER LOCATIONS MEANT EXTENDING OR RE-RUNNING WIRE LINES TO KEEP SECURITY COMMUNICATIONS IN. CONTINUED TO LAY MORE LOCAL LINES AND TO OVER-HEAD ALL LINES IN THE CP AREA. WITH ALL THE CONSTRUCTION AND TREE CHOPPING IN PROGRESS IT WAS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP LINES IN. WITH ONLY FOUR WIREMEN AND A WIRE CHIEF THEY PERFORMED A TASK ~~WAS~~ A 10 MAN SECTION WOULD

HAVE BEEN PROUD OF. THIS IS THE AREA WHERE AUGMENTATION IS NEEDED.

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE AN ABSOLUTE NECESSITY IN THIS CLIMATE. DRY DUSTY DAYS AND DAMP NIGHTS. CAUSED SOME CONDENSATION IN EQUIPMENT.

OPERATING FROM CAMP POWER PROVED DISASTEROUS DURING PERIODS WHEN ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT AND CIRCUITS WERE BEING ADDED. FLUCUATIONS IN VOLTAGE WERE THE DIRECT CAUSE OF SEVERAL POWER SUPPLY FAILURES ON TGC-14'S. BECAUSE OF THE POOR GROUND IT WAS FOUND NECESSARY TO TIE ALL EQUIPMENTS TOGETHER ~~WOM~~ BY A GROUND STRAP AND THEN USE A GROUND ROD FROM THIS. WITH EQUIPMENT GROUNDED SEPARATELY ENOUGH POTENTIAL WAS DROPPED THROUGH THE SAND ITSELF TO CAUSE TROUBLE. A RASH OF KW-7 FAILURES WAS ATTRIBUTED TO THIS CAUSE.

IT WAS NECESSARY THAT EVERYONE PITCH IN TO DO WHAT HAD TO BE DONE AT THAT TIME. EVERY MAN WAS REQUIRED AT SOME TIME OR ANOTHER TO WORK OUT OF HIS MOS. THIS SUPPORTS THE CONCEPT OF CROSS TRAINING ESPECIALLY IN COMMUNICATIONS. ALSO DISCOVERED THAT THE WHITE, THIN TELETYPE TAPE BECAME DAMP AT NIGHT AND WILL NOT OPERATE IN THE TD OF THE GGC-3. YELLOW, HEAVIER TAPE WAS OBTAINED FROM RLT-4 AND WORKED PERFECTLY.

JOINED TWO NEW MEN ON 20 MAY - ONE GY/SGT 2561 AND ONE S/SGT 2539.

MRC-62 VAN WAS RUNNING VERY HOT INSIDE. HEAT MAY HAVE CAUSED FAILURE OF TWO TRANSMITTERS. HAD RR TEAM CONSTRUCT SHADE OVER TOP OF VAN TO KEEP THE SUN OFF WHICH RESULTED IN A TEMP DROP OF ABOUT 10 DEGREES INSIDE THE VAN. HAD ONE WIREMAN DOWN WITH HEAT PROSTRATION.

MAY 22-24

RADIO EQUIPMENT HELD UP WELL. CHANGED FILTERS IN TRC-75'S TWICE A DAY. BEGAN A RECONNAISSANCE OF NEW CP AREA FOR RADIO SITES. ALSO TOOK A SECOND LOOK AT OVERALL TELEPHONE REQUIREMENTS FOR CAMP. KEEPING TELEPHONES TO A MINIMUM AND PLACING THEM ONLY WHERE THEY ARE REQUIRED WOULD TAKE A TOTAL OF 130 EE-8'S (SOME 35 OF THESE PHONES ARE REQUIRED BY THE PERIMETER GUARD. THIS MEANS THAT WE WILL REQUIRE AN ADDITIONAL 82 TELEPHONES TO MEET REQUIREMENTS AND GIVE US A SMALL BACKUP. THE TRUNKS AND LOCALS COMMING INTO THE SWITCHBOARD WILL REQUIRE 4 SB-86'S TO ACCEPT THEM. WE PRESENTLY HAVE 2 SB-86'S. THE GUARD REQUIRES AN SB-22 FOR THE GUARD WIRE SYSTEM. THE TELETYPE TRAFFIC IS PICKING UP AS WE JOIN ~~ED~~ MORE PEOPLE AND UNITS. WE RATE ONE GGC-3 TAPE REPERFORATOR. WE SHOULD HAVE ANOTHER SINCE WE ARE USING TAPE RELAY PROCEDURE. MUCH BETTER COPY IS OBTAINED IF A MESSAGE IS SENT AT A CONSTANT SPEED BY TAPE. WE HAVE EXPERIENCED NUMEROUS FAILURES AND DOWN TIME WITH JUST ONE GGC-3.

THE T/O AND T/E OF MAG COMM SECTION IS JUST NOT ADEQUATE FOR THIS TYPE OPERATION. AUGMENTATION WITH FOUR WIREMEN AND THE ABOVE ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT ARE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL FOR ~~GOOD~~ COMMUNICATIONS.

COMM O WENT TO DANANG FOR, 3RD MAF COMM O/COMM CHIEFS MEETING ON 24 MAY. CHECKED WITH THE WING CEO ON AVAILABILITY OF SOME OF THE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED. WING COULD NOT PROVIDE BY AUGMENTATION.

PHASE TWO PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT BEGAN ARRIVING ASHORE ON 24 MAY. EXPECTED TO GET TWO ADDITIONAL 2511'S BUT ONE BROKE HIS LEG AND DID NOT COME.

25-31 MAY

ALL COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL ASHORE, HOWEVER FOUR MEN HAD TO RETURN TO IWAKUNI TO KEEP MAG 12 (REAR) MESSAGE CENTER OPEN. UNITS OF THE TACTICAL SQUADRONS ARE PHASING ASHORE. CONTINUED TO INSTALL LOCAL TELEPHONE LINES. BY NECESSARY A NEW TELEPHONE DIRECTORY WAS PUBLISHED PERIODICALLY AS UNITS JOINED AND INFORMATION BECAME AVAILABLE. RADIO AND RADIO RELAY OPERATING FAIRLY SMOOTH. ONE PU-454 WENT DOWN AND WE HAD DIFFICULTY GETTING IT REPAIRED- A MATTER OF PRIORITY. THE SITUATION ON REPAIR PARTS IS VERY CRITICAL. GROUP SUPPLY WAS NOT ASHORE. ITEMS ON ORDER FOR 10 DAYS ON PRIORITY 2 HAD NOT COME IN. THE MOST CRITICAL ITEM WAS AN/TGC-14'S WHICH GAVE CONSTANT REPAIR PROBLEMS NOT ONLY IN PARTS BUT IN ADJUSTMENTS.

ADDITIONAL CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS TO DANANG AND SAIGON WERE NEEDED BY MATCU FOR AIR CONTROL. AN MRC-80 TROPOSPHERIC SCATTER UNITS WAS PROVIDED BY MACV. ALSO WING HELILIFTED IN A MRC-62 COMPLETE/ LESS THE PRIME MOVER ON 26 MAY. IT WAS INSTALLED AND ON THE AIR THE SAME DAY. THE MRC-80 ARRIVED ON THE EVENING OF 27 MAY. IT WAS SITED AND INSTALLED THE NEXT DAY AND NIGHT WITH THE HELP OF OUR PEOPLE. THEY WERE ON THE AIR 29 MAY BUT HAD GENERATOR TROUBLE AND THEY NEEDED A NEW AMPLIFIER IN THE VAN. AS OF 31 MAY THE STATUS OF THEIR EQUIPMENT HAS NOT CHANGED EXCEPT THAT WE TIED THEM INTO CAMP POWER. WE ARE NOT USING THAT VAN (NOR CAN WE) FOR ANY CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS. TROUBLE WAS EXPERIENCED IN MAKING THE NECESSARY CONNECTIONS FROM MARINE MRC-62 EQUIPMENT AT DANANG TO TIE IN OUR EQUIPMENT TO FILL THE MATCU REQUIREMENTS. BY 31 MAY ALL CHANNELS WERE IN EXCEPT THE CHANNEL TO SAIGON.

PLANNING AND INSTALLATION OF THE CP WAS STARTED. CABLES WERE MADE OUT OF SLASH WIRE TO SERVE AS MAIN ARTERIES THROUGH THE CAMP.

A 52 PR COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE CABLE WAS OBTAINED FROM WING FOR THE INTENDED USE OF CROSSING THE RUNWAY AND TAXIWAY UNDER GROUND. FOUR INCH COMMUNICATIONS CONDUITS WERE PLANNED TO BE LAID UNDER THE MATTING AT MIDFIELD. HOWEVER FOR SOME REASON THEY DID NOT ARRIVE. INSTEAD TWO TWO-INCH CONDUITS WERE LAID. AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE MAIN TELEPHONE CABLES WERE STRUNG ON POWER POLES BUT UNDER THE POWER LINES. IN NEW CP AREA ALL TENTS WERE DECKED. AGAIN THE COMM CENTER WAS WIRED TO ALLOW US TO SWITCH FROM CAMP POWER TO OUR OWN PU-239 BY THROWING A SWITCH. THE S-126 SHELTER WAS MARRIED UP TO OUR GP TENT TO SERVE AS THE CRYPTO ROOM. ALL GENERATORS AND VANS WERE SANDVAGGED AND DUG IN FOR PROTECTION AND TO REDUCE NOISE.

A SHORT RAINY SPELL LASTING 3 DAYS PROVIDED US WITH A LOOK TO THE MONSOON SEASON. ALL RADIOS AND TELEPHONES USED BY SECURITY GUARD HAD TO BE RECALLED FOR PM AND WATERPROOFING. MANY OF THE EE-8'S REQUIRED TO BE DRIED IN A HOT BOX BEFORE THEY WOULD OPERATE.

TRUNK LINES WERE RUN TO THE INFANTRY UNITS PROVIDING OUR SECURITY

AND RLT-4 IS IN PROCESS OF BRINGING TWO TRUNKS AND A S-3 HOT LINE TO US.

ADDITIONAL COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE CABLE AND THE TELEPHONES, SWITCHBOARDS, TELETYPE AND ADDITIONAL 2511'S ARE DESPERSTELY NEEDED.

Copy _____ of _____
MAG-12, 1st MAW
Chu Lai, Republic of S. Viet Nam
281200 May 1965

Disposal Instructions: Destroy by burning

1. STRENGTHS.

a. Authorized Manning Level and On Board Strength.

	<u>USMC</u>					<u>USN</u>	
	<u>Officers</u>		<u>Enlisted</u>			<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
	<u>M/L</u>	<u>O/B</u>	<u>M/L</u>	<u>O/B</u>		<u>O/B</u>	<u>O/B</u>
H&MS-12	29	24	277	216			
MABS-12	12	15	361	348		3	17
MATCU-67	10	8	54	52			
VMA-225	34	3	184	96			
VMA-311	34	8	184	118		1	1
TOTAL	119	58	1060	830		4	18

(VMA-214 not included in totals - none aboard).

(VMCJ-1 no longer attached to this command.)

(1 - Civilian TechRep currently on board.)

b. Gains. None. Personnel strength build up during period result of organic units and personnel arriving via air and sea.

c. Losses.

- (1) Battle Casualties - None
- (2) Non-battle casualties - 14 USMC enlisted and 1 USN temporarily non-effective due to heat exhaustion and minor injuries.
- (3) Administrative Losses - None
- (4) Other non-effectives - 2 USMC Officers; 1 TAD, 1 Hosp.
- 1 USN Officer Hosp. while sick.
- 4 USMC enlisted; 2 EnLv; 2 Hosp.

2. REPLACEMENTS.

a. Replacements received - none.

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Periodic Personnel Report No. 1-65 (Cont'd)

3. DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER.

- a. No disciplinary problems to date.
- b. No unusual events or problems have occurred.

4. PRISONERS OF WAR.

- a. No prisoners captured.
- b. No unusual events or problems have occurred.

5. GRAVES REGISTRATION. No personnel this command, enemy or civilian dead processed during period.

6. MORALE AND PERSONNEL SERVICES.

a. State of morale. Excellent. Morale has attained and remained at a high level. Contributing factors are the challenge and work load inherent in the establishment of a forward air field, an excellent beach for recreational use, installation of showers, laundry facilities, field mess, the issuance of PX mount-out supplies, rapid receipt and dissemination of U. S. Mail.

b. Awards Made. None

c. Significant Activities of Personnel Services.

(1) Effected two emergency leaves with Red Cross verification and assistance.

(2) Effected two Welfare Reports, via the Red Cross, initiated by the individual Marines.

d. No unusual events or problems have occurred.

7. CIVIL ARRAIRS - MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

a. Number of Civilians Processed. One civilian apprehended, 261020 May 1965, on North of the Northern causeway selling hats. Subject transferred to Civilian Collection Point, 261100 May 1965.

b. Measures taken to meet essential civilian needs. No requirement for same within area of operations.

c. No other activities concerning the civil population or unusual events have occurred.

8. PERSONNEL PROCEDURES.

a. No unusual events or problems encountered in relation to the classification, assignment, promotion, rotation or other personnel procedures.

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Periodic Personnel Report No. 1-65 (Cont'd)

9. INTERIOR MANAGEMENT. All personnel currently on board and office spaces are temporarily housed in 122 General Purpose Tents. All shelters are adequate to carry out the functions of this command.

10. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES. No civilians are employed by this command or members thereof.

11. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Significant Events. Build up of personnel strength this command has continued. Growth in personnel strength during period covered is as follows:

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
35	614	3	17

b. Current total on board strength is contained under paragraph 1.a. above.

c. Two Disbursing Officers and two enlisted personnel joined this command on 27 May 1965. The disbursing section is operational as of 28 May 1965.

J. D. NOBLE
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

PERIODIC PERSONEL REPORT

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Copy _____ of _____
 MAG 12, 1st MAW
 Chu Lai, Republic of S. Viet Nam
 040600 June 1965

Periodic Personnel Report No. 2-65

Period Covered: 280001 May to 032400 June 1965

Ref: (a) NAVMC-1110-A03F

Disposal Instructions: Destroy by burning

1. STRENGTHS.a. Authorized Manning Level and On Board Strength.

	<u>USMC</u>				<u>USN</u>	
	<u>Officers</u>		<u>Enlisted</u>			
	<u>M/L</u>	<u>O/B</u>	<u>M/L</u>	<u>O/B</u>	<u>Officers</u> <u>O/B</u>	<u>Enlisted</u> <u>O/B</u>
H&MS-12	29	26	277	217		
MABS-12	12	15	361	355	4	17
MATCU-67	10	9	54	51		
VMA-225	34	13	184	104		
VMA-311	34	12	184	118	1	1
VMA-214	34	1	184	10		
TOTAL	153	76	1244	855	5	18

(VMCJ-1 no longer attached to this command).

b. Gains. None. Personnel strength build up during period result of organic units and personnel arriving via aer and sea.

c. Losses.

- (1) Battle Casualties - None
- (2) Non-battle casualties - 12 USMC enlisted temporarily non-effective due to heat exhaustion and minor injuries. One other USMC enlisted air evacuated to Japan with a broken arm.
- (3) Administrative Losses - None
- (4) Other non-effectives - 2 USMC Officers; 1 TAD, 1 Hosp
 - 1 USN Officer Hosp while sick
 - 4 USMC enlisted; 2 EmLv, 2 Hosp

2. REPLACEMENTS.

a. Replacements received - None.

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Periodic Personnel Report No. 2-65 (Cont'd)

3. DISCIPLINE. LAW AND ORDER.a. State of discipline. Excellent.b. Status of Administration of Justice.(1) Courts-Martial. No courts-martial awarded.(2) Pending.

(a) Investigation of alleged larceny - 1 - Art 121, UCMJ.

(b) Awaiting charges for sleeping on post - 2 - Art, 113, UCMJ.

(3) Unusual Events. None4. PRISONERS OF WAR.

a. No prisoners captured.

b. No unusual events or problems have occurred.

5. GRAVES REVIISTRATION. No personnel this command, enemy or civilian dead processed during period.6. MORALE AND PERSONNEL SERVICES.a. State of Morale. Excellent.b. Awards Made. None.c. Other Activities Influencing Morale.

(1) On 1 June 1965 the forward air field at Chu Lai became operational with the landing of four A4c's of VMA-225 and four A4E's of VMA-311.

(2) The commencement of limited combat flight operations on 1 June 1965.

(3) The expectation of commencing full scale flight operations in the near future.

(4) The continued improvement of working and living conditions.

(5) The commencement of R&R quotas.

(6) Hot meals which are being served twice daily, adequate shower facilities, issuance of limited quantities of beer, issuance of mount-out PX supplies and the excellent beach facilities for recreational swimming have contributed to the excellent state of morale.

d. Unusual Events. None.

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Periodic Personnel Report No. 2-65 (Con'd)

7. CIVIL AFFAIRS - MILITARY GOVERNMENT

- a. Number of Civilians Processed. None
- b. Evacuated. None
- c. Remaining on Hand. None
- d. Measures Taken to Meet Essential Civilian Needs. None
- e. Unusual Events. None

8. PERSONNEL PROCEDURES.

- a. No unusual events ^{or} problems encountered in relation to the classification, assignment, promotion, rotation or other personnel procedures.

9. INTERIOR MANAGEMENT.

- a. Type of Shelters Utilized. General Purpose Tents are utilized to shelter all personnel and office spaces.

b. Quantity of Shelters Utilized. Two hundred and seventy six G. P. Tents are currently erected and in use. Twenty of the two hundred and seventy six G. P. Tents are had decked. All shelters adequately serve their intended purpose.

- c. Unusual Events. None

10. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES.

- a. Number of Civilians Employed. None

11. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. The morale, esprit-de-corps and can do attitude of the officers and men of MAG-12 is most gratifying.

b. MAG-12 personnel have installed and/or activated all functional components of this expeditionary airfield in a thoroughly professional manner as construction progress permitted.

c. In addition to the airfield construction all personnel and Headquarters sections have been adequately housed with mess and shower facilities provided.

d. It is anticipated that an officer, SNCO and enlisted lounge will be constructed within the next two weeks.

e. An outdoor movie theater will be constructed for recreational purposes by 10 June 1965.

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Periodic Personnel Report No. 2-65 (Con'd)

f. No unusual events have occurred.

J. D. NOBLE
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT NO 12, NAG-12 C/Chronology, May 1965

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5-29-65 D+22
AERIAL VIEW OF CHU LAI
AIRSTRIP TAKEN FROM
RIGHT OF RUNWAY
WAB5-12 PHOTO