

HEADQUARTERS
Marine Aircraft Group 12
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96601

3:JLS:ajw
5750
13 November 1965

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Attn: G-3)

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) WgO 5750.1A

Encl: (1) Command Chronology for the month of October 1965

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted.
2. This letter is down graded to UNCLASSIFIED upon the removal of enclosure (1).


REX WILSON
Executive Officer

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mag-12

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MARINE AIRCRAFT
GROUP 12

CHU LAI REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 OCTOBER 1965 to 31 OCTOBER 1965

MAO-12 SEC#	COPY#
1436-65	1.

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ORGANIZATIONAL DATA SHEET

A. COMMANDING OFFICER AND STAFF

L. E. BROWN	COLONEL	USMC	COMMANDING OFFICER
W. B. HIGGINS	LT.COLONEL	USMC	EXECUTIVE OFFICER
			1 OCT 65 to 5 OCT 65
R. WILSON	LT.COLONEL	USMC	EXECUTIVE OFFICER
			5 OCT 65 to 31 OCT 65
R. L. CRANE	1st LT.	USMC	ADJUTANT
F. H. WHITTON	CAPTAIN	USMC	S-1
E. E. BROWN	CAPTAIN	USMC	S-2
W. J. WEBSTER	LT.COLONEL	USMC	S-3
J. W. HARRIS	LT.COLONEL	USMC	S-4

VMA 311

B. COMMANDING OFFICER AND STAFF

B. J. STENDER	LT.COLONEL	USMC	COMMANDING OFFICER
S. F. SHEA	MAJOR	USMC	EXECUTIVE OFFICER
D. C. WATKINS	CAPTAIN	USMC	S-1
D. M. STONE	CAPTAIN	USMC	S-2
D. L. ROWE	CAPTAIN	USMC	S-3
G. C. PSAROS	CAPTAIN	USMC	S-4

VMA 214

C. COMMANDING OFFICER AND STAFF

K. O. O'KEEFE	LT.COLONEL	USMC	COMMANDING OFFICER
A. S. OHLGREN	MAJOR	USMC	EXECUTIVE OFFICER
V. R. HUGHES	CAPTAIN	USMC	S-1
C. F. CRIGLER	CAPTAIN	USMC	S-2
R. W. CHAPIN	MAJOR	USMC	S-3
D. E. BAKER	CAPTAIN	USMC	S-4

VMA 224

D. COMMANDING OFFICER AND STAFF

T. E. MULVIHILL	LT.COLONEL	USMC	COMMANDING OFFICER
R. E. HAWES	MAJOR	USMC	EXECUTIVE OFFICER
E. H. LONEY	CAPTAIN	USMC	S-1
D. A. RUDICILLE	1st LT	USMC	S-2
J. T. HAGEN	MAJOR	USMC	S-3
B. R. BOOHER	CAPTAIN	USMC	S-4

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VMA 211

E. COMMANDING OFFICER AND STAFF

W. E. GARMAN	MAJOR	USMC	COMMANDING OFFICER
E. D. CHANEY	MAJOR	USMC	EXECUTIVE OFFICER
H. P. L. MILLER	CAPTAIN	USMC	S-1
J. S. BOARDMAN	2d LT.	USMC	S-2
J. J. MCCARTHY	MAJOR	USMC	S-3
R. W. CASPOLE	CAPTAIN	USMC	S-4

MABS 12

F. COMMANDING OFFICER AND STAFF

J. W. PARCHEN	MAJOR	USMC	COMMANDING OFFICER
R. L. TALBERT	MAJOR	USMC	EXECUTIVE OFFICER
J. C. ARCHBOLD	CAPTAIN	USMC	BASE OPERATIONS OFFICER
A. A. NELBACH	CAPTAIN	USMC	BASE SERVICES OFFICER
R. H. STOUT	WARRANT OFFICER	USMC	ADJUTANT

H&MS 12

G. COMMANDING OFFICER AND STAFF

J. W. KIRKLAND	LT. COLONEL	USMC	COMMANDING OFFICER
J. L. STONE	CAPTAIN	USMC	EXECUTIVE OFFICER
B. D. THOMPSON	CAPTAIN	USMC	1 OCT 65 to 16 OCT 65
J. D. DAVENPORT	1st LT.	USMC	EXECUTIVE OFFICER
			16 OCT 65 to 31 OCT 65
			ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

H. TASK ORGANIZATION AND UNIT LOCATIONS
NONE

I. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTHS

VMA 311

USMC OFFICERS	29
USN OFFICERS	1
USMC ENLISTED	171

VMA 224

USMC OFFICERS	30
USN OFFICERS	1
USMC ENLISTED	180

MABS 12

USMC OFFICERS	26
USN OFFICERS	4
USMC ENLISTED	525
USN ENLISTED	19

VMA 214


USMC OFFICERS	28
USN OFFICERS	0
USMC ENLISTED	169

VMA 211

USMC OFFICERS	31
USN OFFICERS	1
USMC ENLISTED	181
USN ENLISTED	2

H&MS 12

USMC OFFICERS	36
USN OFFICERS	0
USMC ENLISTED	390
USN ENLISTED	0

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MAG 12

USMC OFFICERS	174
USN OFFICERS	8
USMC ENLISTED	1565
USN ENLISTED	23

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NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the month of October, MAG-12 flew a total of 704 missions, 1,573 sorties, 2182.8 hours and dropped 554.5 tons of bombs. On the 26th a new record for sorties per day was set when a total of 123 sorties were flown. This also established a new sortie rate per aircraft of 2.5 in one day. No monthly highs were recorded due to four days of heavy rains, causing almost complete stand down. The rains started on the 14th and the first day of full operation was not until the 18th.

The Commanding Officer and main body of VMA-224 arrived on the 4th, bringing MAG-12 back to three full squadrons.

For almost the entire month, MAG-12 aircraft operated off less than 4500 feet of runway, making takeoffs with the use of JATO. It was during this period, 7 October in the early evening, that several aircraft were inadvertently loaded with MK 7, MOD 1 JATO on one side and MK 7, MOD 2 on the other. When fired, a violent swerve resulted. Two aircraft got airborne just as they reached the edge of the runway, the third one swerved off the runway and received structural damage.

LtGen KRULAK visited Chu Lai Airfield on 10 October and became one of the "Plank Owners" when he was presented a piece of runway matting by Sgt THOMPSON of the MOREST unit. These "Plank Owners" are an exclusive group of personnel, consisting only of members of the first units to arrive at Chu Lai Airfield.

The following day, 11 October, MAG-12 gained its fourth squadron. The advance elements of VMA-211, consisting of 6 aircraft and 40 enlisted men, arrived and started operations in close coordination with VMA-311.

The first attack on the Chu Lai Airfield by the VC came at 0010H on the 28th of October 1965. Two groups of four each attacked the VMA-224 flight line and immediate area. Through the alertness of the Group Guard and Crash Crew they were taken under fire and either killed or driven off. The VC inflicted strike damage to two aircraft, overhaul damage to three aircraft, and minor damage to three aircraft. Details are in appendix (1) of part four of this report. The personnel have been recommended for personal awards; members of Crash Crew and the Group Guard have been recommended for Letters of Commendation.

General WESTMORELAND visited Chu Lai Airfield on 31 October, presented the Purple Heart to Sgt MASON for wounds received during the VC attack, and personally commended the direct participants for their actions during the attack.

VMA-214 recorded two firsts in October when Captain CAREY logged the 5000th MOREST landing since the field became operational and 1st Lt. FITTS logged the 2000th Combat Sortie for the "Blacksheep" squadron.

October was a normal month from an operational aspect.

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1. Personnel. For their direct participation in helping to defend the flight line, the following personnel have been recommended for the listed awards:

Sgt MENDENHALL	Silver Star
Sgt SCHREINER	Silver Star
SSgt WASANO	Bronze Star
Sgt MASON	Bronze Star
Sgt HORNE	Navy Commendation Medal
Cpl COOPER	Navy Commendation Medal
Cpl MEYERS	Navy Commendation Medal
LCpl MACLEOD	Navy Commendation Medal
LCpl SOMERS	Navy Commendation Medal
Pfc CHRISTIANSEN	Navy Commendation Medal

Their actions during the VC attack are in Appendix (1) of part four of this report.

On 10 October the following members of VMA-224 were presented awards they qualified for during the 2nd MAW Annual Complex:

Major HAWES
Lt SODERSTROM

Major HAGEN
Lt SMITH

Captain LEWIN
CWO 2 RICHARD

Of the 15 events that were in the meet, VMA-224 won 10 to become known as the "Top Guns" of the 2nd MAW. No one squadron has previously won this many of the total events.

Captains E. E. BROWN, R. D. MILLER, J. C. ARCHBOLD, J. GARDNER, and 1st Lt. R. L. CRANE were awarded their first Air Medal by Colonel BROWN on 20 October.

2. Civil Affairs/Military Government. First Lieutenant A. L. BURNAFORD 086168 USMC was appointed as the Group Civil Affairs Officer on 17 October. 1st Lt. BURNAFORD is currently engaged in investigating the policies, procedures and all sources of supply relating to the establishment and operation of an effective Civil Affairs Program.

3. Morale/Welfare Program. The slight increase in R&R quotas to Hong Kong and Bangkok plus a substantial one for Futema has increased morale in MAG-12.

On 30 October, two days after the VC attack on Chu Lai, a display of captured weapons and equipment was set up near the MAG-12 messhall. This display was of particular interest to all hands and had a very high influence in instilling confidence in the personnel that the airfield was securely guarded internally, at least.

4. Air Operations. The squadrons expended the following ordnance during October:

Bombs	4,153
Rockets	429 Aero 7D Pods - 8,051 2.75 FFAR
20MM	20,000 rounds

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Napalm	52 tanks
JATO	1,521 bottles

This is not such high usage as was the case in September because four days of heavy rains almost halted flight operations for that period. The total ordnance expended and sorties flown was reduced by approximately 14%.

The MOREST unit trapped 1,529 A4 aircraft.

MATCU-67 handled 6,483 air operations and 421 Ground Controlled Approaches.

5. Ground Defense. Two Air Defense drills and one Ground Defense drill were conducted during the month.

Ground defense in conjunction with the Group Guard has been bolstered by additional personnel. This requirement was made in an effort to minimize the chances of success of further VC infiltration into the area. On two consecutive nights, 30 and 31 October, infiltrators were spotted in the Chu Lai enclave. Squadrons have doubled their internal security around sleeping and working areas during the evening hours.

6. Logistics. LST 546 offloaded 770.9 long tons of Class V(A) munitions. LST 488 offloaded Snakeye fins.

During October, Air Freight was relocated to a more appropriate location and handled a record amount of mail and cargo.

Passengers	7,361
Mail	259,527 lbs
Cargo	1,200,672 lbs

34% "A" rations and 66% "B" rations were served in the MAG-12 mess.

7. Supply

a. Navy furnished material remains at the 60 day level as previously reported. The AOCP/ANFE rate of this command (6.9%) is the lowest in COMNAV-AIRPAC. This is attributed to the maintenance program at both group and squadron level and the supply responsiveness of Navy Supply Depot, Yokosuka. The shipment of priority materials by parcel post has been most effective in expediting receipt of supplies. Almost all supply problems encountered within this command are considered to be directly related to lack of adequate transportation facilities.

b. A total of 810 requisitions have been placed since 4 June 1965; 17% of the requisitions have been filled.

8. Motor Transport

a. Cerlist vehicle/availability averaged 49% during the month, due to failure of the starter and transmissions.

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b. GySgt TUCKER, a III MAF representative, made a technical inspection to determine the effect of hard usage and environmental conditions on the section "M" vehicles. He proposed a REHAB and evacuation schedule be presented to the MAF.

c. Facilities are still inadequate to support 4th echelon maintenance as reported last period. The proposed Butler building date of construction is still unknown.

9. Engineering

a. Major engineering efforts were concerned with flooring tents in the billeting and maintenance area, road maintenance, improvement in base drainage system, and construction of culverts.

b. Maintenance on all equipment is restricted by quantity of spare parts received, and the number of qualified repair personnel. Over age of many items of equipment and environmental conditions have affected them to such a degree that constant maintenance is required.

10. Maintenance

a. Lack of maintenance facilities, shortage and slowness of parts delivery hamper availability of ground support equipment. At the end of October, availability of MB-1's stood at 50%.

b. The Power Plants Division performed twenty one major checks, canned and preserved eleven engines, and locally built up six J-52 quick engine changes. Four aircraft were preserved for overhaul.

11. Ordnance

a. Heavy rains flooded the ordnance compound, resulting in the moving of Mk-7 trailers, the SATS shelter, and the napalm mixing shed to higher ground. A ditch has subsequently been cut through the compound which will help to alleviate this problem.

b. One pallet of Mk-7 Mod 1 JATO with 30 degree nozzles were received. An aircraft was lost as the result of using one 30° bottle and one 15° bottle (Mk-7 Mod 2). The aircraft received structural damage as it swerved off the runway, making it necessary for the pilot to eject.

c. LST 488 arrived with 5000 unbanded 250 lb. GP bombs. These were returned to NAVMAG Subic for banding.

12. Special. The attack on Chu Lai Airfield on 28 October is explained in detail in the Commanding Officers final report to CG, 1st MAW. This report is attached as Appendix (1).

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- ✓1. FINAL REPORT OF VC ATTACK
- ✓2. MAP OF VC ROUTE TO AND FROM AIRFIELD
- ✓3. LEFT VIEW OF WE 22
- ✓4. RIGHT VIEW OF WE 22
- ✓5. SACHTEL CHARGE DAMAGE
- ✓6. VC KILLED BY SENTRY ON POST #6
- ✓7. VC KILLED BY CRASH CREW
- ✓8. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT TAKEN OFF VC
- ✓9. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT TAKEN OFF VC
- ✓10. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT TAKEN OFF VC
- ✓11. SPARE MACHINE GUN CLIPS
- ✓12. HAND GRENADES AND EXPLOSIVES TAKEN OFF VC
- ✓13. CHU LAI OPERATIONS SUMMARY 1 JUNE - 31 OCTOBER 1965

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CHRONOLOGY OF VC ATTACK ON AIRCRAFT AT OHU LAI AIRFIELD DURING EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 28 OCTOBER 1965

FACTS. (#) Refers to corresponding position on attached diagram.

1. Weather conditions: Clear night with no moon. Visibility with out illumination was approximately 40 feet.
2. Bare foot prints in the sand, found after daybreak, indicated the VC approached the airfield from the northwest.
3. At a point 1000 feet south of the north end of the runway and 600 feet west of the runway the VC split into at least two groups.
4. One group crossed the runway about 1200 feet from the north end of the runway and near the middle and rear of VMA-224 flight line.
5. Sentry on Post #4, standing at the rear of a revetment, challenged a group of four VC as they walked slowly towards the parked aircraft. (1)
6. A VC threw a grenade at sentry on Post #4, who ran behind the revetment to the front of the flight line to escape the frag pattern. As he reached the front of the revetment, the grenade exploded.
7. As sentry on Post #4 ran towards the VMA-224 hangar, he spotted one VC in front of the aircraft. The sentry tried to fire one shot from his shotgun. The gun misfired and a VC threw a satchel charge at him, which did not explode.
8. The sentry on Post #4 took up a position behind a piece of ground support equipment along side VMA-224 hangar. He then fired two shots at the VC in front of the aircraft who was firing a grease gun at the aircraft. (2) The VC disappeared behind the aircraft.
9. Sentry on Post #4 saw several explosions under the aircraft to his front. He remained at this position until the attack was over. He did not see any more VC during the attack.
10. Sentry on Post #5 was standing near the tail and south of WK-16 when he heard a challenge from Post #4. He then heard an explosion and automatic weapon fire.
11. The sentry fired at the automatic weapon muzzle flashes, then ran to the of the aircraft. There he saw a VC running south towards him firing an automatic weapon at the line of aircraft.
12. The sentry fired two shots at the muzzle flashes and returned to the tail of the aircraft, where he spotted one VC at the next aircraft firing an automatic weapon. He fired two shots at the VC. (3) The VC stopped firing his automatic weapon and staggered.
13. The sentry on Post #5 then ran over to the ground support area between VMA-224 and H&MS-12 hangar to reload his shotgun. He did not see any more VC during the attack.

Appendix #1

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14. Sentry on Post #6 was standing 30 feet south of the tail of WE-19 when he heard a challenge from a post north of him followed by explosions and automatic weapons fire.

15. The sentry on Post #6 took up a position facing the runway. The Sergeant of the Guard and one supernumerary came out of VMA-214 hangar, crossed the taxiway and set up in positions facing the runway.

16. A few seconds later an explosion on WE-22 set the aircraft afire. A VC ducked under the tail of WE-19 and the sentry on Post #6 turned to his right and shot the VC in the face and chest. The VC fell on the ramp and tried to get up. The guard shot him again. The VC was dead when examined minutes later. (4)

17. At the same time the sentry on Post #6 shot the VC, the Sergeant of the Guard and the supernumerary took three VC under fire. The VC crossed the runway and went over the hill on the other side. The crash crew moments before, taken this group under fire. At that time there were four. One dropped mortally wounded and two others staggered as if hit. One led the remaining group of three across the runway shouting to them as they went. This was the group taken under fire by the Sergeant of the Guard and the supernumerary. Two of this group were later found dead just west of the runway. (See items 22, 23 and 24 below).

18. One supernumerary sleeping outside the VMA-214 hangar, north side, was awakened by the blast on WE-22. (5) As he got up to grab his rifle and clip he saw a VC crouching between H&MS-12 hangar and a jet engine. The VC spotted him and pointed his automatic weapon at him but did not fire. The VC ran between the tents towards the MSR. The supernumerary stated that the VC was the same man he handed a ladder to when the Vietnamese were building two culverts on the MSR behind VMA-124 hangar.

19. MOREST man at east MOREST engine (6) heard guard shout "Halt" twice, followed immediately by automatic weapon fire and explosions on VMA-224 flight line. He saw three or four figures running south down flight line.

20. Another group of VC approached MOREST tent from the northwest side (7). The MOREST personnel who were in a tent and at the MOREST engine on west side of runway heard the explosions and firing on the flight line. Seconds later a VC grenade exploded against the west side of the MOREST tent; the interior of the tent was shielded from the blast by a wooden box, and one man was knocked down but no one was wounded. In the morning an unexploded VC grenade was found beside the MOREST engine.

21. Crash crew personnel were located in two tents and on MB-1 crash vehicle. (8) They heard explosions and automatic weapon fire from VMA-224 flight line area. NCOIC shouted to put out lights and set up a hasty defense outside around the tent. NCOIC observed three or four VC running south on flight line area, one firing an automatic weapon and dropping something behind several aircraft.

22. Crash crew personnel deployed around tent and MB-1 vehicle. (9) LVT man ran across runway to LVT parked on west side. Immediately after the explosion on the VMA-214 flight line, crash crew men saw four VC coming from direction of runway, going east toward flight line. VC were first observed at a range of only 10-12 feet. A VC threw a grenade or explosive charge over the heads of three men and against the side of the MB-1 truck; the explosion wounded one man (fragment in leg) and injured one when it knocked him down. MB-1 truck was

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badly perforated with fragments. The VC did not fire any weapons.

23. The four VC then moved southward, angling back toward runway. One was hit and fell (10). Crash crew continued flying at the VC as they crossed the runway. As they crossed the runway, VC shouted in Vietnamese several times. Two observers believe at least one more of these VC was wounded. Three VC passed by south side of LVT (witnessed by LVT crew man who was in cockpit beneath LVT, and by crash crew man); they then disappeared over sand dune.

24. Wounded VC was found near runway beyond LVT (11). An unexploded grenade was found near crash crew MB-1 truck.

25. MOREST man at east MOREST engine saw one VC move south of MOREST and angle across runway heading west. Foot prints, an unexploded grenade, and a blood trail were found in the morning.

26. The Group Commander arrived on the scene approximately five minutes after the attack and directed subsequent actions.

27. WE-22 was burning and one attached bomb exploded low order and drove itself through the top of the hangar. Another bomb cooked off shortly thereafter and is the one which knocked down the crash crew man as noted elsewhere in this report.

28. The ramp area was saturated with JP-4 from two badly leaking aircraft which caused a further serious threat until fires were extinguished, bombs defused and removed and the leaking aircraft towed out of the line area. (Details and sequence of this action are included later in this report).

29. At about 0030, and upon bringing the fire on WE-22 under control, maintenance, ordnance and EOD personnel were directed to sweep the entire flight line area and to make a detailed inspection of each aircraft in order to locate satchel charges, hand grenades and other demolitions. Five unexploded satchel charges were found on the aircraft and six satchel charges and hand grenades were found in the immediate area on the taxiway. All were dearmed and collected by EOD. At this point, photographers were directed to report to the flight line, which they did at about 0050.

30. At about 0100, the Group reserve company was directed to make an infantry sweep, from south to north, from the dunes just west of the runway area through the flight line area for the purpose of locating VC dead/wounded and weapons/demolitions. Later at 0500 this same company made a sweep from the MSR to the beach in search of the missing VC believed to be in that area.

31. The Group S-2 was directed to start tracing foot prints, blood stains, etc., at first light to determine positively entry/exit points. This was done with remarkable skill and excellent results were obtained as attested to by the attached diagram. Concurrently, the Group Maintenance Officer was directed to conduct a detailed damage assessment of the aircraft. The results of this latter analysis have subsequently been included in routine reports.

32. Condition II was secured 45 minutes after first light at approximately 0700. All inspections were completed, debris cleaned up, and the Group was ready to conduct normal flight operations by 0730.

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At first light two sets of bare foot prints were found in the ditch on the left side of the MSR, one large and one small. No direction of exit could be determined (12).

34. Also at first light three sets of bare foot tracks were noted leading back along the same path from which the VC had entered the airfield complex. One set of tracks showed a trail of blood from the left foot (13).

35. Several grenades and satchel charges were found along the escape route.

36. The following is a complete listing of the various ordnance items and miscellaneous gear which were found scattered throughout the airstrip area on dead and wounded VC and in the proximity of K Company CP (14).

a. Weapons

- 1 - U. S. Cal. .45 Pistol #978264
- 1 - Thompson Submachinegun #402844
- 1 - Submachinegun, Red China 7.62mm
- 2 - TNT charge, small 200 gram - 2 blocks
- 5 - TNT charge, large 200 gram - 3 blocks
- 6 - Concussion grenades
- 6 - Frag grenades

b. Magazines and Ammo

- 2 - Mags M3A1 w/63 rds 7.62
- 3 - SubMG mags 45 rds 7.62
- 3 - Mags .45 Cal. w/19 rds
- 4 - Mags Thompson SubMG w/114 rds
- 1 - Mag M-14 empty
- 1 - Mag w/25 rds .45 Cal.

c. Other

- 1 - Leather belt
- 3 - Field dressings
- 2 - Ponchos
- 4 - Bags rice
- 1 - U. S. canteen cover
- 2 - Magazine pouches
- 1 - Grenade holder
- 1 - Surgical kit U. S.
- 3 - Cartridge belts

FIRE FIGHTING AFTER THE ATTACK

1. Minutes after the explosion on the VMA-214 flight line, and as the three VC were crossing the runway toward the south and the LVT, Sgt WASANO, NCOIC crash crew section, shouted for the ME-1 to go to the fire. Corporal MYERS stopped firing and raced to the cab. Without waiting for a full crew, and with men grabbing holds and swinging aboard, he drove directly to ME-22, ablaze on the line. As the truck stopped at the aircraft, a low order explosion from a 250 pound

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red submachineguns to create confusion and damage the aircraft. Approached the sentry on Post #5, the sentry fired several times with a shotgun, wounding one.

4. The three VC continued south setting off a satchel charge under WE-22. When the lead VC ducked under WE-19 the sentry on Post #6 shot and killed him. The two remaining VC broke off the attack and ran between the hangars and tent area across the MSR and jumped in the ditch. The VC remained in the ditch for only a few seconds then recrossed the road making their way through the tent and avionics van area. They crossed the flight line area and escaped back in the general direction from which they originally entered the Chu Lai Airfield area.

5. That the second party of four VC moved southeast behind the BOMST position, then eastward across the runway to the crash crew area. At the crash crew area they were taken under fire by both the crash crew and members of the guard on the flight line. They threw a grenade and an explosive charge, then retreated southward to the runway. One VC was wounded and abandoned on the east side of the runway; the remaining three moved across the runway, past the LVT, and over the sand dune. Two dead VC found the following morning west of the runway are believed to be members of the original party of four.

6. That of the first party of four, one VC was killed, one wounded, and two escaped; of the second party of four, one was wounded and captured; two were killed beyond the runway, and one is unaccountable for from the information available.

7. Before daybreak units other than MAG-12 found two dead VC and one wounded VC about 2000 feet northwest of the runway. The wounded VC threw a grenade at the search party and was killed by the search party. These are believed to be the group that departed from the flight line area to the northwest, one of which was trailing blood.

8. Eight VC entered the Chu Lai Airfield, one VC is unaccounted for, and the other seven were killed within close proximity of taxiway/ runway complex.

9. Alert action by many individuals broke up the basic attack and prompt action by others, in terms of fire fighting, bomb handling and demolition collection, prevented further damage.

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bomb occurred. One crash crew man was knocked down but none were wounded. The men on the truck, and others who ran up, immediately began fighting the fire with foam and with hand held PKP bottles.

2. The MB-5 from the hot pad drove up and the crew assisted in fighting the fire.

3. At SSgt WASANO's direction, Sgt MASON, whose leg had been injured by the earlier VC explosive blast, made his way back to the crash crew area to get the other MB-5. Sgt MASON drove the truck to the fire, then was evacuated to the dispensary.

4. The fire at WE-22 was put out in minutes. However, the area as noted earlier, was saturated with JP-4 which had run under the matting and under adjacent aircraft. A potentially serious flashback fire occurred but was brought under control before any further damage occurred.

5. At this point ordnance personnel from VMA-214 began defusing and dropping to the deck the unexploded bombs on WE-22 and other aircraft on the line, while the crash crew stood by for further action if needed. Several of the bombs were too hot to handle and the crash crew had to keep up a steady stream of foam so that disarming and removal could be accomplished.

6. Immediately after the dispatching of the MB-1 to the VMA-214 aircraft fire, an MB-5 was sent to the VMA-224 area. There, WK-24 was burning internally from what was later determined to have been a thermite grenade placed against the fuselage and fuel well. Hand held PKP extinguishers, wielded by crash crew members, were used to put out this fire. No foam was needed, and no other fires occurred in the VMA-224 area.

7. As the fires were brought under control and the bombs were defused at WE-22 (VMA-214), and after man power pushing attempts failed, a fire truck was hooked to the wreckage and it was pulled off the line back to the laterite shoulder. Also, WK-2, leaking fuel from bullet holes, was pushed and towed by a water tanker from the flight line back to the laterite shoulder.

8. An MB-5 truck was dispatched to standby in the VMA-211 area at the south end of the field.

9. The crash vehicles were reserviced and ready for action again by 0200. No other fires or incidents occurred in the area.


CONCLUSIONS

1. That the party of VC that attacked the airfield proper consisted of eight men; that this group approached the airfield from the northwest and split into two parties of four VC each.

2. That one party of four VC crossed the runway 1200 feet from the north end and entered VMA-224 flight line. When the VC spotted the sentry on Post #4 they threw a grenade at him. Then one VC from the party headed north putting satchel charges under WK-22 and WK-7. He then doubled back to join the other three who were placing satchel charges and throwing grenades under the aircraft as they proceeded south.

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
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
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
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
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CHU LAI OPERATIONS SUMMARY
1 JUNE - 31 OCTOBER 1965

	TOTALS	OCTOBER TOTALS
AVER NO. A/C ON BOARD (ALFA STATUS)	59	58
AVER NO. A/C AVAILABLE	47	49
PERCENTAGE A/C AVAILABLE	82%	84%
AVER SORTIE RATE (PER A/C ON BOARD)	0.9	0.9
AVER SORTIE RATE (PER A/C AVAIL)	1.1	1.0
HIGH SORTIE RATE PER A/C ONE DAY (49) (123 SORTIES)		2.5
LOW SORTIE RATE PER A/C AVAIL ONE DAY (50) (11 SORTIES)		0.2
FLIGHT TIME BY SQUADRON		
VMA-311	3,911.8	723.3
VMA-224	531.1	531.1
VMA-214	3,248.9	731.5
VMA-211	196.9	196.9
SORTIES BY SQUADRON		
VMA-311	2,672	504
VMA-224	403	403
VMA-214	2,323	528
VMA-211	138	138
TOTAL MISSIONS COMBAT	2,656	641
TOTAL MISSIONS OTHER	259	63
TOTAL ALL MISSIONS	2,915	704
TOTAL SORTIES COMBAT	7,301	1,485
TOTAL SORTIES OTHER	477	88
TOTAL ALL SORTIES	7,778	1,573
TOTAL HOURS COMBAT	10,390.6	2,070.5
TOTAL HOURS OTHER	671.1	112.3
TOTAL ALL HOURS	11,061.7	2,182.8
AVER COMBAT SORTIE DURATION (HRS.)	1.4	1.4
AVER ORDNANCE PER COMBAT SORTIE (TONS)	0.5	0.4
TOTAL ORDNANCE IN TONS	4,142.3	554.5
<u>ORDNANCE EXPENDED ON TARGETS (TOTAL)</u>		
MK-79	346	36
MK-81 (Incl SNAKEYES)	9,651	1,107
MK-82	3,508	75
MK-83	200	14
MK-84	31	0
MK-12	34	2
2.75" (Aero 7D)	12,968	3,271
ZUNI (LAU-10)	879	0
H1-Drig (250#GP)	4,650	2,730
BULLPUPS	56	12
20MM	291,749	36,688
CBU	6	0
JATO	4,299	1,305

APPENDIX 13

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