

HEADQUARTERS, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-13
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac
FPO, San Francisco 96602

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Subj: Command Chronology Period 1-31 July 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) WGO 5750.1C

Encl: ✓(1) MAG-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 July 1967
✓(2) H&MS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 July 1967
✓(3) MABS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 July 1967
✓(4) VMFA-542 Command Chronology Period 1-31 July 1967
✓(5) VMFA-314 Command Chronology Period 1-31 July 1967
✓(6) VMFA-115 Command Chronology Period 1-31 July 1967

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1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the subject report is submitted as enclosures (1) through (6).
2. Upon removal from the subject report, this letter is downgraded to Unclassified.

Edward N. LeFavre

EDWARD N. LE FAVRE

1st MAW SSC No.	Copy No.
3203-67	1

MAG-13	
S&C #	67-1240
COPY	#1

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MAG-13
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
FOR
1-31 JULY 1967

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART ONE: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. Commanders and Staffa. Headquarters, MAG-13 (1-31 July)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>RANK</u> <u>ACTUAL</u>
DAN H. JOHNSON	CO	COL	COL
HARRY G. ROBINSON	XO (1-20 July)	LTCOL	COL
LYNN F. WILLIAMS	XO (21-31 July)	LTCOL	LTCOL
ALONZO B. MCCALL	ADJ	CAPT	2NDLT
JOSEPH P. KRATCOSKI	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ
FRANK CRUZ JR	S-1	MAJ	MAJ
GEORGE W. BROKATE	S-2	MAJ	CAPT
BILLY D. FRITSCH	S-3 (1-21 July)	LTCOL	MAJ
HERBERT V. LUNDIN	S-3 (22-31 July)	LTCOL	LTCOL
CHARLES M. BENGELE	S-4	LTCOL	MAJ

b. H&MS-13 (1-31 July)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>RANK</u> <u>ACTUAL</u>
LYNN F. WILLIAMS	CO (1-19 July)	LTCOL	LTCOL
JAMES E. MILLER	CO (20-31 July)	LTCOL	MAJ
JAMES E. MILLER	XO (1-19 July)	MAJ	MAJ
HARRY R. SMITH	ADMINO	LT	2NDLT
DANIEL H. CHARRON	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ
GORDON R. SCHLAGEL	OPNSO	CAPT	CAPT

c. MABS-13 (1-31 July)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>RANK</u> <u>ACTUAL</u>
KENNY C. PALMER	CO (1-27 July)	LTCOL	LTCOL
RICHARD E. CAREY	CO (28-30 July)	LTCOL	LTCOL
RAY B. STICE	XO	MAJ	MAJ
HAROLD E. WILSON	ADMINO	CAPT	CWO
ROBERT L. BAINBRIDGE	BASEOPNSO	MAJ	MAJ
STEPHEN R. FOULGER	BASESERVO	MAJ	MAJ

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d. VIFA-542 (1-31 July)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
FREDERICK L. FARRELL JR	CO (1-18 July)	LTCOL	LTCOL
JOHN HUBNER	CO (19-31 July)	LTCOL	MAJ
RAY D. FENDERGRAFT	XO (1-2 July)	MAJ	MAJ
JOHN HUBNER	XO (3-18 July)	MAJ	MAJ
CLARENCE B. MILLER JR	XO (19-31 July)	MAJ	MAJ
PAUL M. COLE	S-1	LT	MAJ
VINCENT M. LEVITSKY	S-2	LT	CAPT
JOHN HUBNER	S-3(1-18 July)	MAJ	MAJ
HARVEY D. BRADSHAW	S-3(19-31 July)	MAJ	MAJ
DAVID G. SPEARMAN	S-4(1-2 July)	WO	CAPT
EVERETT W. KRANTZ	S-4(3-31 July)	WO	1STLT
HARVEY D. BRADSHAW	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

e. VIFA-314 (1-31 July)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
FRANK D. TOPLEY	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
VIRGIL B. BRANDON	XO	MAJ	MAJ
ROBERT L. BRUTHE	S-1	LT	CAPT
RICHARD A. BARTON	S-2	LT	CAPT
CHARLES S. ESTERLINE	S-3	MAJ	MAJ
WALTER J. COSTELLO	S-4	WO	CAPT
GERALD E. WALSH	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

f. VIFA-115 (1-31 July)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
GUY R. CAMPO	CO (1-27 July)	LTCOL	LTCOL
KENNY C. PALMER	CO (28-31 July)	LTCOL	LTCOL
MATTHEW B. PECK	XO	MAJ	MAJ
CHARLES S. CAMASKIE	S-1	LT	CAPT
ROGER A. GURLEY	S-2	LT	CAPT
THOMAS K. DUFFY	S-3 (1-2 July)	MAJ	MAJ
FREDERICK S. TEMER JR	S-3 (2-31 July)	MAJ	CAPT
BERNARD H. THOMAS	S-4	WO	MAJ
RICHARD T. DOUGLAS	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

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2. Task Organization and Unit Location

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>	<u>Date of Office</u>
MAG-13	CHU LAI, RVN	COL DAN H. JOHNSON	1-31 July
HEMS-13	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL LYNN F. WILLIAMS	1-20 July
HEMS-13	CHU LAI, RVN	MAJOR JAMES E. MILLER	20-31 July
MABS-13	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL KENNY C. PALMER	1-25 July
MABS-13	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL RICHARD E. CAREY	25-31 July
VMFA-542	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL FREDERICK L. FARRELL JR.	1-18 July
VMFA-542	CHU LAI, RVN	MAJOR JOHN HUBNER	18-31 July
VMFA-314	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL FRANK D. TOPLEY	1-31 July
VMFA-115	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL GUY R. CAMPO	1-28 July
VMFA-115	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL KENNY C. PALMER	28-31 July

3. Average Monthly Strength

	USMC				USN	
<u>SQUADRON</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>NFO</u>	<u>AG</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
HEMS-13	13*	6	25	363	0	0
MABS-13	4	1	13	567	3	31
VMFA-542	17	13	6	318	1	0
VMFA-314	17	16	3	309	1	0
VMFA-115	19	19	4	322	1	0
	—	—	—	—	—	—
GROUP	70	55	51	1879	6	31

*This figure includes one NAP.

4. Important Visitors to the Command

a. Rear Admiral Marshall W. WHITE, COMFAIRMESTPAC, visited MAG-13 on 1 July 1967. He was accompanied by Captain Paul A. ANDERSON, Assistant Chief of Staff Operations.

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PART TWO: NARRATIVE SUMMARY

MAG-13 flew 2037 combat sorties for a total of 2371.3 Hours delivering 3910.8 tons of ordnance. The MAG-13 C-117 flew 89 sorties for a total of 110.4 hours.

Operations supported include Choctaw, Cimmaron, Buffalo, Gem, Hickory II, Bearchain, Beacon Guide, Malheur II, Fremont, Pecos, Cumberland, Ardmore, and Kingfisher.

Operations were in support of III MAF and the 7th Air Force and ARVN Forces.

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PART THREE: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. Personnel

a. During the month of July, MAG-13 had a loss of ten (10) officers and one hundred fifty-six (156) enlisted personnel due to rotation and transfers. During this same period, fourteen (14) officers and one hundred six (106) enlisted personnel reported to the Group for duty.

2. Awards

a. There were two hundred fifty-four (254) Air Medals and stars in lieu of Medals awarded to members of this Group in July. In addition thirteen (13) Vietnamese Crosses of Gallantry and one (1) Bronze Star were awarded.

b. Major John HUBER and Captain James P. FAULKNER received the Distinguished Flying Cross.

3. Casualtiesa. Non-hostile casualties

(1) Total for July.....	38
(2) Total returned to duty.....	33
(3) Total MedEvac out of RVN.....	5
(4) Total number of man days lost.....	251

b. Hostile casualties

(1) Killed in Action.....	2
(2) Wounded in Action.....	0

4. Civic Action

a. Through the MAG-13 Chaplain's Office, 4 boxes of food, clothing, toys and 300 writing tablets were distributed to the Dong Cong school at Chu Lai.

b. The Group Medical Department administered medical assistance to 1218 Vietnamese in the village of An Tan.

5. Industrial Relations

a. MAG-13 is presently utilizing forty-one (41) funded employees.

6. Intelligence/Counterintelligence

a. MAG-13 S-2 continued routine Briefing and Debriefing of assigned aircrews. Routine intelligence operations were continued.

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7. Training

a. The Command information and indoctrination as set forth by Group Order 1560.1 is being conducted for all newly joined personnel.

b. The first phase of indoctrination and familiarization firing of the XM-16E1 Rifle has been completed. Fifteen hundred thirteen (1513) have been so instructed.

c. Weekly intelligence briefs are given by the MAG-13 S-2 for SNCO's and members of the Group Guard. Similar briefs are conducted by the squadrons for all enlisted personnel.

8. Airfield Operations

a. During July there were 27,209 takeoffs and landings on the Chu Lai Runways. There were 475 arrested landings and 936 instrument approaches.

9. Combat Operations

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Hours</u>
HEIG-13 TF-9J	71	69.0
C-117D	89	110.4
VI FA-542 F-4B	709	830.0
VI FA-314 F-4B	678	796.8
VI FA-115 F-4B	579	675.5
<hr/>		<hr/>
Total	2126	2481.7

10. Supplya. Navy Supply

(1) A new AVCAL (Aviation Consolidated Allowance List) has been received which will be used to re-outfit completely the MAG-13 Supply Section for F-4B aircraft. FMFPac has sent a team down to assist in this re-outfitting and steps have been taken to relocate certain F-4B items from other Wing Organizations to this Group.

b. Marine Corps Property Section

(1) A Field Supply Analysis Team conducted an inspection of this section on 16 July. Results were satisfactory with minor discrepancies. These discrepancies were corrected by 20 July 1967.

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PART FOUR: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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15 JULY 1967

Terrorism against indigenous personnel. According to an agent source, the VC in Ap Binh hamlet issued a warning to the residents that none of the peasant girls would cut or wear their hair short in "the western style". Source said the people paid no attention since no punishment was stated for the offense. During the night of 4 or 5 March 1967, the VC entered the dwelling of a woman whose daughter had cut her hair short, and shot the daughter in the face, as punishment and warning to others.

Terrorism against U.S. Personnel - There is an assassination team operating in the Saigon vicinity using M-16 rifles against U.S. military and AID (Agency for International Development) personnel and Vietnamese who work with and for the free world forces. In view of the recent hanging of a Vietnamese laundry woman, and the disappearance of an Army man in An Tan, the Chu Lai installation Coordinator cautions all personnel to be alert at all times to their physical surroundings and the indigenous personnel in their immediate vicinity. When on official business to and from units, personnel will proceed directly with no unauthorized stops or visits. It is apparent that the kidnapping of U.S. personnel is now a primary objective of the communists, in addition to the usual assassinations.

Angry Dragon. ROKMC units in Operation Angry Dragon II underway in the southwesterly portion of the Chu Lai TACR gained light to moderate contact with enemy units of up to company size and inflicted casualties on the enemy of 87 KIA confirmed and 43 KIA probable.

War trophies can KILL. On 17 June, elements of 2ndBn, 1st Marines located a VC booby trap south of Danang. Propaganda leaflets had been placed in a split bamboo stake approximately one inch in diameter, tied to the base of the stake which had been stuck into the ground, was a piece of nylon fishing line leading to a buried tube containing two BA-30 batteries. There were two connecting wires in the tube, one tied to the piece of nylon line and the other tied to a concealed wire leading to a claymore mine. The mine was cut in half and placed in a tree trunk at waist level approximately 15 meters away. The bark of the tree was replaced so as to conceal the mine. Any attempt to pull the stake from the ground would detonate the mine.

Enemy movement. Some days ago VC local forces moved 80 "tubes" by sampans from Ky Hoa Island (just north of the sand ramp) to An Tay (1) hamlet to the west of MAG-36. These tubes were 1 meter long (39.37") and appeared to have fins sticking out the ends. This is possibly a new type weapon or a modified 42" 140mm or 120MM rocket. The sampans returned to Ky Hoa and the tubes are stored in the immediate Chu Lai vicinity. Villagers in An Tan have been digging shelters for their families during the past two weeks.

Chu Lai Vicinity. Enemy initiated incidents in the Chu Lai TAOR and eastern Quang Tin decreased by about 50% in the past few weeks, but action consisted primarily of mining, sabotage, and small scale harassment along Highway 1 from the Quang Nam border south to Tam Ky city. On June 15 a Marine unit made contact with a sizeable enemy force 5 miles west of Tam Ky. The Marines pressed the attack and accounted for 25 enemy KIA. A recent returnee places the 21st NVA Regiment in this general area, with a strength of approximately 900 men. There are upwards of 3,600 communist troops within 15 nautical miles of MAG-13, excluding the 21st Regiment and including two battalions which arrived here during the past two weeks.

Duc Pho. Operation Malheur II continued with light to moderate contact with enemy units. Ten miles south of Quang Ngai an Army patrol located an enemy base camp area and two caches containing 50 tons of rice. Two Army brigades have relieved 3/7 in that operating area.

Danang. Enemy initiated activity in the Danang TAOR decreased during the past two weeks. A Marine unit in Operation Arizona contacted an unknown sized enemy force. The Marines accounted for 35 enemy KIA and 3 detainees. Other action reported in the Danang TAOR consisted of booby traps, grenades, mining, and harassing fire.

On 25 June the perimeter guard at the 1st LAAMS Bn. at Marble Mountain took one incoming hand grenade. The grenade was propelled a distance of at least 100 feet over a clump of trees. This indicates the enemy's capability of catapulting grenades beyond the normal range of the human arm, either by use of a sling or a crossbow device. Such techniques can be expected anytime anywhere in I Corps. The distance from a bunker or post to the nearest cover which may conceal an enemy which was formerly considered prohibitive for grenade throwing must now be extended out 100 feet.

At 2210 on 1 July, a Mag-13 phantom received moderate automatic tracer fire while on take-off, about 2 miles south of the runway. There were no hits.

Operation Calhoun terminated on 1 July, accounting for 24 enemy KIA confirmed and 27 more KIA probable.

Operation Beacon Torch also terminated on 1 July, with 85 enemy KIA confirmed and 84 enemy KIA probable.

July 9 - 14 is a critical period. In other words, this is a time when the dark moon period coincides with the time of the high tide. It is during these nights that the VC are most likely to try to attack.

On 18 June, the 94th Main Force Bn. moved from Quang Nam to an area approximately 5 miles west of Chu Lai. They intend to combine with local forces and probe the Chu Lai Air Base.

On 21 June the VC 402nd Bn moved to a position about 10 miles west of Chu Lai. Since then, they have been trained in how to assist the local guerillas in harassing the coming presidential election.

During the night of 25 June, the VC Autonomous Committee Chairman and a band of guerillas returned to an area approximately 8 miles NW of Chu Lai. They propagandized the inhabitants of a local village, going from house to house, warning them not to participate in any voter education classes for the coming presidential election, and collecting "troop support fund taxes".

On 26 June, about 20 VC appeared in a small village about 4 miles NW of Chu Lai, and harrassed the inhabitants by seizing food and military clothing

Just Rewards. Marines are often tempted to give articles including money and cigarettes to the Vietnamese to establish good will or as a reward for services. Such gifts and rewards may be out of proportion to what is received in return. Get in the habit of giving only when you receive. Reward those who have justly earned it and keep limits on the size and type of rewards.

The Marine who learns to speak Vietnamese is encouraging our allies and thus helping to win the war.

<u>ENGLISH</u>	<u>PRONUNCIATION</u>
Hello (or goodbye), sir	Chow ong
mam	Chow bah
miss	Chow koh
children	Chow kak em
How are you, sir?	Ong mahn joy kung
mam	Bah " " "
miss	Koh " " "
I am your friend.	Toy lah bahn
Thank you, sir.	Cum on ong
ETC.	

If you see any sniper fir or suspected enemy activity, contact the Group Intelligence Officer immediately. Recently, there has been too much delay in reporting incidents to the S-2. Remember, when in doubt CALL!

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MAG-13 TACTICAL BRIEF

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30 July 1967

16-DAY WALK FOR U.S.A

Four Negro youths from Georgia showed up at the Capitol after a 16-day walk from Atlanta to Washington, D.C., marching on support of the United States' position in Vietnam.

"We do not agree with some of our leaders who think this country should not be in Vietnam," said Willie Hunter, 18, the group's leader and spokesman, at a news conference in the office of Speaker John W. McCormack.

"Too many people of our age are out burning their draft cards and protesting," he said. "We feel the Negro is a first-class citizen and should support the U.S. flag where it flies."

Hunter, a recent draft registrant, said city officials who greeted the marchers along their route generally expressed surprise to see young Negroes taking such dramatic action to express their support of the administration's position.

OLD GLORY'S JOURNEY SYMBOLIZES SUPPORT

On Saturday, April 15, many miles from Vietnam's jungles, in New York's Central Park, a band of war protesters, bitter in their dissent over the United States' policies in Vietnam, burned an American flag and stomped it into the ground. The act outraged Americans everywhere.

Among the outraged were the organizers of a "Support Our Boys in Vietnam" parade which took place a month later, also in New York City. A supporter, actor Chuck Connors, acquired from Congressman Edward Reinecke (R-Calif.) an American flag which had flown over the U.S. Capitol. Congressman Reinecke, Connors, parade chairman Raymond Gimpler, and Medal of Honor Society president Thomas Kelly went to New York and raised the flag on the exact spot of the earlier desecration.

Connors then carried the flag in the "Support" parade down Fifth Avenue. He brought it back to Los Angeles with him and, in the presence of a four-service honor guard, turned it over to Sergeant Billy Swindle who carried it to San Francisco.

There Mayor John Shelley formally presented it to Vietnam-bound First Sergeant William Pickle who brought it half-way around the world to Saigon. Here he presented it to General W.C. Westmoreland, to be flown over American compounds as a symbol of the support given American fighting men by their fellow countrymen.

This flag will continue to have special meaning. Said Chuck Connors, "If ever an American flag is desecrated or burned again on American soil, and I pray this will never happen, I will ask General Westmoreland to return this flag to the United States. I will hand-carry it to the site of that desecration and, joined by thousands, will rededicate this flag and return it to General Westmoreland and our brave fighting men in Vietnam."

NORTH VIETNAM VC DIFFICULTIES

A captured VC document states that VC difficulties stem from low fighting spirit and fear of hardships and sacrifice. Some units also refuse to engage RVN/Allied forces or fire at low-flying aircraft for fear of retaliation. The document also revealed that VC tactics have resulted in damage to the population to such extent that the populace react by grabbing VC weapons and injuring VC soldiers. However, VC still fire at U.S. aircraft whenever possible. They are taught to fire even when we are rolling in in final attack.

VC POLICY ON THE CAPTURE OF U.S. PERSONNEL

A review of recent intelligence reports and captured documents indicates a marked increase in the value placed by the VC on the taking of U.S. prisoners. This drive for U.S. prisoners is illustrated by the fact that the VC have recently been reported and observed carrying U.S. wounded on stretchers from the battlefield as prisoners. The VC inaugurated a three-phase campaign aimed at capturing more Americans. Phase one stressed the importance of taking U.S. prisoners. Phase two included dissemination of slogans such as, "A live U.S. prisoner is equal to ten dead American aggressors," and the presentation of special ropes to VC soldiers to be used in securing captured U.S. soldiers. Phase three consisted of the presentation of rewards and congratulations to individuals and units who have been responsible for capturing U. S. personnel.

A U.S. Army unit near Duc Pho captured an enemy hospital containing 22 friendly POWs. Twelve of the POWs were shackled; all had malnutrition.

ROK MARINES AMBUSH VC

On 19 July, a ROKMC unit ambushed a VC company about 15 miles south of Chu Lai. They reported 33 Confirmed VC Killed.

VC SPY SYSTEM

There is an active VC Intelligence system presently operating in the Chu Lai area. The VC are attempting to gather information pertinent to the Chu Lai base in two ways. Children are being sent to the surrounding outposts and to the base itself to solicit and passively collect information. Secondly, some of the indigenous laborers working on the Chu Lai base have relatives working for the VC, and some of these laborers have been recruited by the VC. These people, on and near the base, watch the activities of the GVN and U.S. Forces and report to their VC agent handlers or to families with relatives who are following the VC.

Propaganda activities have also been organized in the villages and hamlets around Chu Lai by the VC to gain the people's support, to organize guerrilla forces, and to construct VC installations in this area. Report all enemy or suspected enemy activity to MAG-13 S-2.

ENEMY ACTIVITY-CHU LAI

At 2210 on 23 July, the Combined Action Unit (CAU) in Sam Hai was taken under fire by an unknown-sized enemy force. The friendlies returned fire and drove the VC away. There were no friendly casualties.

At 2152 on 23 July, the 9th Engineer Battalion received one incoming M-26 fragmentation grenade. It was hurled or catapulted a distance of over 200 yards, indicating that the VC are employing some type of sling or crossbow arrangement. There were no casualties.

At about 2130 on 22 July, the chief of Dong Xuan, a hamlet on Ky Xuan Island, about 2 miles north west of MAG-13, was assassinated by the VC. The hamlet chief had been cooperating with the Revolutionary Development Program. Program, in which 59 Vietnamese men and women assist and train a village for 6 months.

SUCCESSFUL CIVIC ACTION

MAG-13 presently has two Civic Action community programs just west of Highway #1 at Long Phu (1) and Long Phu (2). Particularly successful civic action programs have been established based upon a friendly cooperative relationship between Marines and the people of villages. All assistance must be coordinated through the MAG-13 Civil Affairs Officer, in S-4.

NORTH VIETNAM

U.S. Marine pilots flew one of their deepest raids into North Vietnam Sunday in a strike on the Thai Nguyen Power Plant 30 miles north of Hanoi. It was the Marines' first strike on the sprawling generators, pounded by other U.S. planes five times before. Damage to the plant was not reported. Marines flew at night from Danang Air Base.

CHU LAI

A tunnel complex was located 2 miles south of MAG-13. The area was searched and the tunnels destroyed.

ROCKET/MORTAR/SAPPER ATTACK INDICATORS

1. Kidnapping and terrorism of villagers, harassment and small attacks around an installation.
2. People moving away from village adjacent to a military installation en masse.
3. Inclement weather, high tides and poor moon illumination.
4. Probing attacks of perimeter defense to determine disposition and speed and force of reaction.
5. Familiar pattern of neighboring village routine noticeably altered (road traffic etc.).
6. New emplacements or firing within mortar, recoilless, rocket range.
7. Reports from POWs, defectors, villagers and low agents.
8. Vietnamese worker absenteeism in unusual numbers.

Report any enemy information gained from indigenous personnel or unusual activities to MAG-13 S-2.