

HEADQUARTERS, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-13  
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac  
FPO, San Francisco 96602

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**SECRET**

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From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: Command Chronology Period 1-31 October 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A  
(b) WGO 5750.1C

Encl: ✓(1) MAG-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 October 1967  
✓(2) H&MS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 October 1967  
✓(3) MABS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 October 1967  
✓(4) VMFA-542 Command Chronology Period 1-31 October 1967  
✓(5) VMFA-323 Command Chronology Period 1-31 October 1967  
✓(6) VMFA-115 Command Chronology Period 1-31 October 1967

*Filed w/ Cmd Chron*

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the subject report is submitted as enclosures (1) through (6).

2. Upon removal from the subject report this letter is downgraded to Unclassified.

*Edward N. Le Faivre*

EDWARD N. LE FAIVRE

MAG-13	
S&C #	67-1705
COPY	#1

1st MAW S&C No.	Copy No.
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MAG-13

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MAG-13  
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
FOR  
1-31 OCTOBER 1967

ENCLOSURE (1)

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## SECRET

PART ONE: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. Commanders and Staff

## a. Headquarters, MAG-13 (1-31 October)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u> <u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
EDWARD N. LE FAIVRE	CO	COL	COL
LYNN F. WILLIAMS	XO (1-6 Oct)	LTCOL	LTCOL
KENNY C. PALMER	XO (6-28 Oct)	LTCOL	LTCOL
ALONZO B. MCCALL	ADJ	CAPT	2NDLT
JOSEPH P. KRATKOSKI	SGTMAJ (1-27 Oct)	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ
ANTHONY B. KOUMA	SGTMAJ (27-31 Oct)	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ
THOMAS K. BURK JR.	S-1	MAJ	MAJ
GEORGE W. BROKATE	S-2	MAJ	CAPT
HERBERT V. LUNDIN	S-3	LTCOL	LTCOL
LAURENCE A. CAMPBELL III	S-4	LTCOL	MAJ

## b. H&amp;MS-13 (1-31 Oct)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u> <u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
PAUL SIEGMUND	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
HARRY E. TAYLOR	XO	MAJ	MAJ
JAMES S. GAHAGAN	FLTOPSO (18-31 Oct)	MAJ	MAJ
DANIEL H. CHARRON	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ
HARRY R. SMITH	ADMINO	LT	2NDLT

## c. MABS-13 (1-31 Oct)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u> <u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
RICHARD E. CAREY	CO (1-5 Oct)	LTCOL	LTCOL
LEROY A. MADERA	CO (6-31 Oct)	LTCOL	LTCOL
RAY B. STICE	XO	MAJ	MAJ
HAROLD E. WILSON	ADMINO	WO	CWO
CHARLES S. ESTERLINE	BASEOPSO	MAJ	MAJ
STEPHEN R. FOULGER	BASESERVO	MAJ	MAJ

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## d. VMFA-542 (1-31 Oct)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
RICHARD C. MARSH	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
ROBERT N. HUTCHINSON	XO	MAJ	LTCOL
JOHN F. SPENCER	S-1	LT	CAPT
JOHN R. MCCORD	S-2	LT	CAPT
CLARENCE B. MILLER JR.	S-3	MAJ	MAJ
HARVEY D. BRADSHAW	S-4	WO	MAJ
HARVEY D. BRADSHAW	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

## e. VMFA-323 (1-31 Oct)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
EDISON W. MILLER	CO (1-13 Oct)	LTCOL	LTCOL
HARRY T. HAGAMAN	CO (13-31 Oct)	LTCOL	LTCOL
JOHN L. THATCHER	XO (1-5 Oct)	MAJ	MAJ
PAUL G. BOOZMAN	XO (5-7 Oct, 13-31 Oct)	MAJ	MAJ
HARRY T. HAGAMAN	XO (7-13 Oct)	MAJ	LTCOL
GEORGE BERTHELSON	S-1	LT	CAPT
WILLIAM I. NORTHLICH	S-2	LT	CAPT
LEE T. LASSETER	S-3 (1-7 Oct, 13-31 Oct)	MAJ	MAJ
PAUL G. BOOZMAN	S-3 (7-13 Oct)	MAJ	MAJ
HENRY D. FAGERSKOG	S-4	WO	MAJ
CHARLES W. BROWN	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

## f. VMFA-115 (1-31 Oct)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
KENNY C. PALMER	CO (1-5 Oct)	LTCOL	LTCOL
RICHARD E. CAREY	CO (6-31 Oct)	LTCOL	LTCOL
LEROY A. MADERA	XO (1-3 Oct)	MAJ	LTCOL
CARL L. BATTISTONE	XO (4-31 Oct)	MAJ	LTCOL
BOB B. ROGERS	S-1	LT	CAPT
ROGER A. GURLEY	S-2 (1-15 Oct)	LT	MAJ
DARRYL R. GRIFFING	S-2 (16-31 Oct)	LT	CAPT
CARL L. BATTISTONE	S-3 (1-3 Oct)	MAJ	LTCOL
FREDERICK S. TENER	S-3 (4-19 Oct)	MAJ	CAPT
JACOB W. MOORE	S-3 (20-31 Oct)	MAJ	MAJ
JAMES A. GORDON	S-4 (1-15 Oct)	WO	CAPT
ROGER A. GURLEY	S-4 (16-31 Oct)	WO	MAJ
CHARLES L. ZANGAS	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

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2. Task Organization and Unit Location

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>	<u>Date of Office</u>
MAG-13	CHU LAI, RVN	COL EDWARD N. LE FAIVRE	1-31 Oct
H&MS-13	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL PAUL L. SIEGMUND	1-31 Oct
MABS-13	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL RICHARD E. CAREY	1- 4 Oct
MABS-13	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL LEROY A. MADERA	4-31 Oct
VMFA-115	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL KENNY C. PALMER	1- 5 Oct
VMFA-115	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL RICHARD E. CAREY	5-31 Oct
VMFA-323	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL EDISON W. MILLER	1-13 Oct
VMFA-323	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL HARRY T. HAGAMAN	13-31 Oct
VMFA-542	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL RICHARD C. MARSH	1-31 Oct

3. Average Monthly Strength

USMC				USN		
<u>Squadron</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>NFO</u>	<u>AG</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
H&MS-13	13*	5	27	295	0	0
MABS-13	5	1	12	556	4	24
VMFA-542	20	15	3	270	1	1
VMFA-323	18	15	5	268	1	4
VMFA-115	17	15	4	286	1	0
MAG-13	73	51	51	1675	7	29

\*This figure includes 2 NAP's - (MGySgt J. J. QUINN)  
(MGySgt J. A. CONROY)

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PART TWO: NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Marine Aircraft Group-13 continued in meeting its commitments in the war effort by flying 2070 combat sorties and logging 2177.6 combat hours. 3448.6 tons of ordnance were dropped during the month of October. The C-117D flew 125 combat support sorties for 116.1 hours of flight time.

Most of the combat operations were directed at blocking enemy infiltration and neutralizing NVA artillery near the DMZ. Operations supported included Neutralize, Kingfisher, Fremont, Wheeler, Dragon Fire, Ardmore, Formation Leader, Osceola, Wallowa, Onslow, Granite, Medina, and the winter campaign in the Ashau Valley.

Significant BDA included 37 KBA confirmed, 115 KBA probable, 470 structures destroyed, 202 structures damaged, 4 artillery positions destroyed and 4 artillery positions damaged. (Complete list in paragraph 9 of Part Three.)

During the month of October MAG-13 lost 3 aircraft. Two officers, Major G. G. JACKS and First Lieutenant F. E. MACGEARY were killed in action. Two other officers are presently listed as missing in action. They are Lieutenant Colonel E. W. MILLER and First Lieutenant J. H. WARNER. Also, one officer received injuries sustained during ejection. (See Part Three, paragraph 4). Dates of losses are

13 Oct - VMFA-323 - Direct Enemy Action  
19 Oct - VMFA-542 - Operational Loss  
29 Oct - VMFA-323 - Direct Enemy Action

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PART THREE: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. Personnel. During the month of October, Marine Aircraft Group-13 had a loss of twenty-three (23) officers and one hundred and forty (140) enlisted personnel due to rotation and transfer. During the same period, twenty-seven (27) officers and sixty-four (64) enlisted personnel reported to the Group for duty.

2. Administration. During the reporting period over 270 enlisted were promoted. By 31 October, MAG-13 had obtained a percentage of 88.2% participation in the Savings Bond program.

3. Awards. There were two hundred and forty-nine (249) Air Medals and stars in lieu of medals received by members of this Group during the month of October. Four DFC's were delivered to members of this command. Recipients were: Major L. T. LASSETER, Captain M. E. COSTELLO, Captain J. P. FAULKNER, and Captain J. R. MCCORD.

4. CasualtiesNon-hostile casualties

a. Total for October.....	42
b. Total returned to duty.....	14
c. Total MedEvac out of RVN.....	4
d. Total number of man days lost.....	346

Hostile casualties

a. Killed in Action.....	2
b. Wounded in Action.....	1
c. Missing in Action.....	2

The two KIA's were Major Glen G. JACKS and First Lieutenant Fred E. MACGEARY, which occurred while taking off from Chu Lai on a routine TPQ mission. They experienced aircraft malfunctions immediately after liftoff and were turning towards the sea when their fully loaded aircraft plunged to the deck killing both crewmembers.

The one WIA was Captain James J. HARE III who received back injuries while ejecting from his aircraft. Major Daniel I. CARROLL, who piloted the battle damaged aircraft, also ejected but received negative injuries.

The two MIA's are Lieutenant Colonel Edison W. MILLER and First Lieutenant James H. WARNER. Their aircraft received battle damage from 37 MM anti-aircraft fire while conducting a strike in the TALLY HO area. Both crewmembers were forced to eject when the aircraft became uncontrollable. Lt WARNER was observed landing safely in a gully south of a village near Cape Mui Lay, while LtCol MILLER's parachute was observed to go into a treeline alongside the village. Both crewmembers have been declared missing in action, presumed captured.

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5. Civic Action. On 8 October a brunch was held for the political leaders of Ky Lien village. Colonel E. N. LE FAIVRE (Commanding Officer, MAG-13), and other members of this command were well received. The guests were so appreciative that they reciprocated on 26 October with a dinner of their own. Invited guests were Colonel LE FAIVRE and a selected staff from MAG-13.

On 23 October over 200 CARE school kits and a blackboard were distributed to the school in Long Phu.

On 31 October a camp-out was held at Ky Lien District High School.

Progress is also apparent of the increasing good will between the local Vietnamese people and members of MAG-13. This is apparent by the growing number of invitations offered to members of the command to participate in the Vietnamese activities.

MEDCAPS continue to be well received.

6. Intelligence. Briefing and debriefing of aircrews, and orientation to new aircrews were conducted. The weekly S-2 "Tactical Brief" was published. (See Supporting Documents, Part Four).

General Intelligence briefs were given each Thursday at 1530 for officers and SNCO's of the five squadrons in the Group.

7. Industrial Relations. MAG-13 employs 40 LNC's of which 34 are MARCOR funded and 6 are AIK funded.

8. Airfield Operations. Operations on the West Runway went very smoothly for the month of October. Operations were secured at 1900 on 27 October for repainting of the centerline. Operations commenced 8 hours later. A total of 8,673 aircraft were recovered during the month of which 1,683 were arrested landings.

9. Combat Operations

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Hours</u>
H&MS-13 TF-9J	78	111.0
C-117D	125	116.1
VMFA-542 F-4B	520	607.0
VMFA-323 F-4B	656	767.8
VMFA-115 F-4B	491	575.7
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	2070	2177.6

Operations Supported:

Kingfisher	Formation Leader	Ashau Barrier	Medina
Fremont	Ardmore	Neutralize	
Wheeler	Osceola	Onslow	
Dragon Fire	Wallowa	Granite	



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Significant Bomb Damage Assessment

KBA (Confirmed).....	37
KBA (Probable).....	115
Structures (Destroyed).....	470
Structures (Damaged).....	202
Bunkers (Destroyed).....	138
Bunkers (Damaged).....	41
Secondary Explosions.....	25
Secondary Fires.....	45
Bridges (Destroyed).....	3
Bridges (Damaged).....	1
Trucks (Destroyed).....	2
Tracked Vehicles (Destroyed).....	2
Artillery Positions (Destroyed).....	4
Artillery Positions (Damaged).....	4
AA Positions (Damaged).....	4
AA Positions (Destroyed).....	2
Automatic Weapons Positions (Destroyed).....	5
Automatic Weapons Positions (Damaged).....	4
Mortar Positions (Destroyed).....	9
Sampans (Destroyed).....	10
Sampans (Damaged).....	10
Trenchline Destroyed (Meters).....	1055

10. Base Development. The West Field's centerline was repainted on 28 October. Normal flight operations resumed the next day. Also, construction was completed on the H&MS-13 engine shop.

11. Morale/Welfare. Attendance continued to rise at services at the new chapel. An all time high mark of 1199 persons attending services for the month represents a 76% increase over the attendance of services held in the old chapel.

12. Training. Several schools were held by contact teams visiting the Group. Courses included Training for Automatic and Engineer Equipment, Operation of SATS loaders, Floodlights, NC10A and the 3M System. The following formal schools were utilized by MAG-13 in October:

<u>School</u>	<u>Quota</u>
Jungle Escape and Survival School	1
Military Justice Course	1
NCO Leadership School	2
Carrier Advisory School	1
EOD Refresher Training	1
Vietnamese Language School	1
Embarkation School	2

13. Electronic Countermeasures. The installation of the "Shoehorn" ECM/Warning Equipment continued during the month of October.

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PART FOUR: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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## MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF

2 OCTOBER 1967

VC ACTIVITY

During the night of 23 September, Combined Action Platoon Lima-2 ambushed an estimated VC platoon five miles southwest of Chu Lai. Two VC bodies were found, and the CAP believes that they killed at least three more. There were no friendly casualties.

On 22 September the telephone line to An Tan was cut in front of the Ly Tin District Headquarters, two miles north of MAG-13.

At 1630 on 23 September, F/17 Cavalry received approximately 50 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire, just south of MAG-13 across Highway 1. The Army called for artillery support and gunships. A patrol and dog team checked the area and found blood trails which indicated that at least one VC was killed in the encounter, with no friendly casualties.

At 0241 on 24 September, nine miles east of Chu Lai along the coast, an element of 4/31 received about twenty unknown explosions, just outside of their perimeter. They called for flareships and artillery support. There were no friendly casualties. Intelligence sources estimate that this was 57 mm Recoilless Rifle fire.

At 0710 on 26 September, a Vietnamese standing in a group near the Main Gate out on Highway 1 throw a grenade into the road. Luckily, due to nervousness, lack of training, or sheer stupidity, he forgot to pull the pin. A small boy picked it up and gave it to the MP at the gate. Unfortunately, the VC got away in the crowd.

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

Anytime Vietnamese troops or civilians are seen unescorted in the MAG-13 area, Swiss 67, Corporal of the Guard should be called. He will send an escort out for them. Courteously ask them to wait where they are, and we will get a ride for them. Air Freight is supposed to notify Group Guard as they arrive, but sometimes they start walking. Many of these people are village and district officials. Extreme tact is called for.

Do not answer questions by non-U. S. military personnel who are not escorted by a Marine officer. Refer all questions by members of the press to S-2. All members of the press are to be accompanied by an officer escort for their protection in the combat zone.

Since June 1967 there have been cases of MAG-13 personnel receiving unsolicited mail from various "hometown newspaper services", "research surveys", and "U. S. Army Informational Services". The form is usually a Questionnaire asking how we rate our leadership, how we "feel about the war", our "opinion of the Vietnamese Army", etc. Some of these letters may be sincerely motivated but it is also obvious that they can be used by communists in the United States

to undermine our efforts in Vietnam.

The Marine Corps conducts command surveys to determine information to assist Civic Action and all other phases of our effort. An example is the survey of I Corps in 1966 which determined that 46% of the Vietnamese questioned by an American University sociologist said they felt Americans liked them as people. However, of the Marines questioned, 62% listed positive qualities they liked about the Vietnamese such as their friendly nature, their religious devotion, and their love for children.

Personnel receiving such unsolicited correspondence, should turn it into MAC-13 S-2 so that its validity can be determined by the Office of Naval Intelligence and the F. B. I.

As an example, the following is a Wing Counterintelligence Report for maximum dissemination on Unsolicited Seditious Literature:

"The weekly newspaper Berkeley Barb which is published in Berkeley, Calif. features articles concerning the Vietnam Day Committee, Sexual Freedom League, and other organizations of this nature, has recently announced the pending publication of The Bond. This publication is described in its own pages as the national anti-war newspaper for servicemen. The Bond intends to reach the servicemen with various types of anti-war information.

"The publishers of The Bond have stated that they intend to distribute their publication free by First Class mail in inconspicuous envelopes to as many servicemen as they can reach and to solicit each reader to send them rosters of other men within the unit as well as names of any other persons he knows in the service.

"Commanders and NCOIC's are herein alerted that personnel within their units may receive an unsolicited copy of this publication. If and when copies of the paper appear, it is requested that they be turned over to the Group S-2 office with whatever amplifying material is available. . . ."

#### SECURITY

Dispose of all classified material, official documents, and personal mail for discard by burning only. The enemy uses family addresses in his writing and phoning campaign.

In writing letters home it is best to "wait until you read it in Stars and Stripes". Generally your dependents' morale can be helped more by saying you are encircled by friendly troops, artillery, and aircraft rather than by saying you are surrounded by 10,000 wily communist insurgents.

The communists have all our field radios and have an active wiretapping and radio monitoring program in Vietnam. Report any suspicious incidents to S-2. Do not discuss impending troop movements or deployments, the password, friendly coordinates or defensive positions on the phone. Assume the phone is always tapped. Use call signs only, instead of unit designations.

Items of a military nature which seem trivial may be of great value to the enemy or those sympathetic to him, if they are inadvertently released by folks at home. Try to write about things and people which your family and friends can relate to easily, such as your Sergeant. Do not discuss the latest casualties, weapons, or the latest troop movements. One never knows how cousin Freddie, the idealistic draft-card burner might use a letter.

Whenever a safe is found open after working hours or by indication of an attempt to penetrate a security area, notify the squadron duty officer, immediately.

BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

During the week ending 30 September, reported BDA for MAG-13 aircraft was: 16 KBA (confirmed), 57 KBA (probable), 238 military structures destroyed and 53 damaged, two mortar positions destroyed, two rocket positions destroyed, two caves destroyed, one truck damaged, 10 secondary explosions, and five secondary fires. As always, this represents only that BDA which was actually observed and reported by ground or airborne Forward Air Controllers, and does not include bomb damage from our radar drops and other unobserved impacts.

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## MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF

16 OCTOBER 1967

ENEMY ACTIVITY

During the early morning on 5 October, an estimated VC company attacked the bridge at Binh Son, ten miles south of Chu Lai on Highway One. PF's accounted for at least 12 VC dead.

At 0400 on 10 October, an Army base camp ten miles northwest of Tam Ky came under a combined mortar and ground attack. Twenty sappers attempted to overrun the American position with satchel charges and small arms. Nine sappers were killed, and the rest were driven off.

At 0730 on 7 October, A/4/31 engaged six to eight VC four miles east of MAG-13. One VC body was found. At 0845, they engaged two more, and killed one.

At 0755 on 7 October, B/4/31 made contact with six VC and killed one.

VC FLOWER POWER

Two hundred pounds of marijuana, valued at \$100,000, was found recently in a large bunker and tunnel complex ten miles northwest of Chu Lai by the 101st Airborne Division.

Army Intelligence sources stated that the VC and NVA might have been using the marijuana to stimulate their troops going into battle. This is considered unlikely, however, because marijuana not only affects muscular coordination, but also affects hearing, seeing, and makes it difficult for an individual to properly judge distances.

Instead, the Communists were properly attempting to have agents sell the marijuana to Americans in local villages to raise money to buy food and equipment for their troops, as they have in the past.

MAO'S THOUGHTS

The following is a quotation from "Mao's Thoughts", the "Little Red Book" which is being used by the Red Guard as a source of inspiration for the Cultural Revolution:

"We are advocates of the abolition of War,  
We do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war,  
And in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun."

BDA

During the week of 8-14 October, MAG-13 aircraft flew sorties in support of Operations Dragonfire, Fremont, Kingfisher, Medina, and Wheeler. Due to inclement weather, it was especially difficult to assess bomb damage. However, BDA which was reported by ground and airborne Forward Air Controllers included: 10 VC KBA (confirmed), 7 VC KBA (probable), 26 military structures destroyed and 9 damaged, 8 bunkers destroyed, one bridge damaged, one treeline with positions destroyed, 1000 pounds of rice destroyed, 30 meters of trenchline destroyed and 30 meters damaged, two secondary explosions, and two secondary fires.

TRIPLE THREAT

The VC are now using the 140 mm rockets in three ways, like the German 88 was used in World War II. Their normal use is as a ground-to-ground weapon with a maximum effective range of about 10,000 meters. They are also employed as flat-trajectory direct-fire weapons, like a recoilless rifle. In this way they have been used to destroy bunkers and buildings. Their third use is as an anti-aircraft weapon. In this role, the 140 mm rocket has a point detonating fuze, but no self-destruct device. It is normally not very effective in this capacity.

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

The enemy has an active intelligence penetration system operating in and around this cantonment. It is staffed by a nucleus of willing communists and supported by people who have been duped or directly coerced into giving aid and comfort to the enemy.

An individual Vietnamese unarmed worker doesn't have much of a chance against the Cong after the sun goes down. It is VC guns against his children.

All suspicious or hostile acts involving indigenous personnel, third-country nationals, and other visitors to MAG-13 should be immediately reported to the Group S-2 Officer, by phone, by the observer of the incident or by his superiors. Our Vietnamese are required to be under direct observation either by a Marine escort or by an American civilian attached to MAG-13 as a technical representative, when outside their working space. The observer should request assistance from the nearest Marine or from Group Guard Company to very tactfully detain the subject while the observer makes the call to S-2. Indigenous workers must be detained without the use of force. Place yourself in their path and hold up one hand to indicate "halt." The words "Dung Lai" will be said clearly and loudly. No blows will be struck.

A suspicious act is defined as follows:

1. Attempting to conceal or carry off any material.
2. Entering any structure other than their normal place of work or their quarters.
3. Handling equipment other than their tools.
4. Making sketches or maps.
5. Digging or emplacing articles in the ground or in installations.
6. Photographing restricted areas such as the flight line, command posts or communications, or defensive installations.

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# MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF

30 OCTOBER 1967

## WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

Every Thursday the Group Intelligence Officer delivers a 25-minute briefing on the Chu Lai TAOR, I Corps, and the Southeast Asia Theatre:

for Officers and Staff NCO's in the Staff Club at 1530-1555,

for Sergeants and below, in the Enlisted Club at 1600-1625.

## COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

There have been several recent cases in the Chu Lai area, of Vietnamese civilians and American military personnel attempting to purchase, or advertising to purchase, weapons, magazines, webbed gear, and other items useful to the enemy. Regardless of claims to the contrary, Popular Forces troops are not permitted to have weapons and other U. S. government equipment obtained through other than their own normal supply channels. MACV estimates that roughly three-fourths of the proceeds of "trading" with U. S. personnel in equipment, narcotics, pornography, and prostitution is finally obtained by the Communists through percentage "tax" agreements or by coercion.

## MARIJUANA

Although marijuana can be easily procured retail from prostitutes, vendors, and street urchins, it has been long suspected that the Viet Cong have been the prime wholesale and distribution sources. Recently, fifteen pounds of marijuana was seized from the Viet Cong during Operation Wallowa, lending credence to the Viet Cong involvement in marijuana traffic in the Chu Lai vicinity.

The Vietnamese do not use marijuana. Prior to the entry of large numbers of U. S. Armed Forces, it was not prevalent in South Vietnam. It is apparent that the U. S. Armed Forces are the target for sales by the Viet Cong.

Marijuana sales provide the VC with a sources of income to finance and supply their operations. In addition to the obvious financial benefits, the sales provide them a means to effectively remove U. S. personnel from their duties through incapacity and court-martial. In this connection it is obvious that every purchase of marijuana by U. S. personnel is a direct assist to the Viet Cong war effort.

Communist China is of course the world's chief exporter of narcotics as a "crop". Within the U. S. and Canada, the Mafia has the distribution network through Hong Kong and Beirut.



FROM VIETNAM WITH LOVE

The following typed leaflet was found on 29 September 1967, approximately three miles west of Chu Lai, with letters, post-cards, and photos apparently taken from seven dead Marines of the 1st MarDiv and from a number of dead soldiers of the 196th Lt. Infantry Brigade:

US FIGHTING MEN BELONGING TO THE  
(UNIT WRITTEN IN WITH INK)

"These are letters, cards and photos which were taken during our fights against US units belonging to (UNIT IS WRITTEN IN WITH INK).

"Those who had these souvenirs may be no more reading these letters which full of love and family and native sentiment, we regret to know that the US Government's aggressive policy has caused many desolation, suffering and deaths for the American youths and destroyed the happiness of so many families of yours. We know that among you, only few still believe the deceitful words of the US ruling circles in saying that United States needed to send it's troops to South Vietnam to defend the USA, defend the Free World or for 'a sacred duty'.

"Some of you are counting the day to be back with their honeys, some others said that when their terms of service is over, they will not stay in Vietnam only one day more even if they will be voted to President. Many of you didn't conceal their abhorrence before terrorism, destruction and massacre toward the Vietnamese people, they are afraid of being taken to tasks by their parents if they stain their hands in these unhuman acts.

"Friends! There is not any hatred between our peoples. We are fighting for our Independence and freedom, and you are only the victims of the aggressive policy. We should understand each other better, so as to join the American people in struggling for an early end of this war by withdrawing from South Vietnam all American and Satellite troops, letting the Vietnamese people settle themselves their internal affair.

"By the way, we would like to tell you that the SVNLF had acknowledged that you have been forced to fight in Vietnam and so we have given kind treatment to captured US officers and men. Many of them were released and came back to their own families. In the coming days, some others will be given their liberty.

"If any of you don't want to stain your hands in the crimes of the US Government in South Vietnam, or if you are afraid of being punished due to your anti-war acts...do pass over to the side of the SVNLF. The Front will help you to immigrate into any country, as your requirement.

"Finally we would like you to convey these letters, cards and photos to the relatives of these unfortunate people. It is our wish that they will know who had caused such mourning and suffering for them as well as for hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese families; It is President Johnson and the warlike US ruling circles.

"We firmly believe that, due to the growing anti-Vietnam war movement of the American people and of yourselves that this desolation and destruction will be ended soon."

THE SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION ARMY

PROBABLE INCREASE IN VC ACTIVITY

The enemy traditionally announces grandiose plans to celebrate communist historical dates, and days of national significance. Many times these plans fail to materialize. However, it has been noted that there is increased enemy activity immediately before and after a significant date.

It is believed that the enemy needs a propaganda lift at this time to offset his recent losses, and the most obvious occasion appears to be in connection with the Vietnamese Presidential Inauguration on 31 October. This date assumes more significance when it is noted that the VC celebrate 1 November as the date of the overthrow of the Diem regime and as "All Saints/War Memorials Day." Increasing the probability of an attack during this period is the fact that there will be very little lunar illumination.

As always, Danang and Chu Lai Airbases are high priority targets, both for their propaganda value and for the decreased air support a successful attack would provide. Increased security precautions during this period are considered warranted.

BDA

During the week of 22-28 October, MAG-13 aircraft flew missions in support of Operations Kingfisher, Ardmore, Fremont, Knox, Wallowa, Wheeler, and Dragon Fire. Bomb damage assessment reported by ground and airborne Forward Air Controllers included:

5 KBA (confirmed), 41 KBA (probable), 97 military structures destroyed and 27 damaged, 65 bunkers destroyed and 22 damaged, 5 tunnels destroyed and 5 damaged, 2 bridges destroyed, 1 supply dump destroyed, 6 mortar positions destroyed, 1 anti-aircraft position damaged, 55 meters of trench-line destroyed, 5 secondary explosions, and 2 secondary fires.

As always, this represents only that BDA which was actually observed and reported by ground or airborne Forward Air Controllers, and does not include bomb damage from our radar drops and other unobserved impacts.