

HEADQUARTERS
 Marine Aircraft Group-13
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
 FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

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 13 Jan 1968

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From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: Command Chronology Period 1-31 December 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
 (b) WgO 5750.1C

Encl: ✓(1) MAG-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 December 1967 *Filed w/ Cond Chron*
 ✓(2) H&MS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 December 1967
 ✓(3) MABS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 December 1967
 ✓(4) VMFA-323 Command Chronology Period 1-31 December 1967 } *Filed*
 ✓(5) VMFA-314 Command Chronology Period 1-31 December 1967 } *Sup*
 ✓(6) VMFA-115 Command Chronology Period 1-31 December 1967

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the subject report is submitted as enclosures (1) through (6).
2. Upon removal from the subject report this letter is downgraded to Unclassified.

Philip D. Shutler
 PHILIP D. SHUTLER
 By direction

1st MAW SAC No.	Copy No.
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S&C #	68-047
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MAG-13
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
FOR
1-31 DECEMBER 1967

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART ONE: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. Commanders and Staff

a. Headquarters, MAG-13 (1-31 December 1967)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
EDWARD N. LE FAIVRE	CO	COL	COL
PHILIP D. SHUTLER	XO	LTCOL	LTCOL
MARTIN J. BASAR	ADJ	CAPT	WO-1
ANTHONY B. KOUMA	SGT MAJ	SGT MAJ	SGT MAJ
CARL E. R. BLACK	S-1	MAJ	MAJ
GEORGE W. BROKATE	S-2 (1-19 Dec)	MAJ	CAPT
ROGER A. GURLEY	S-2 (20-31 Dec)	MAJ	MAJ
HERBERT V. LUNDIN	S-3	LTCOL	LTCOL
DON J. SLEE	S-4	LTCOL	LTCOL

b. H&MS-13 (1-31 December 1967)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
PAUL L. SIEGMUND	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
HARRY E. TAYLOR	XO	MAJ	MAJ
JAMES S. GAHAGAN	FLTPOSO	MAJ	MAJ
HAROLD G. DEAN	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	LTCOL
HARRY R. SMITH	ADMINO	LT	1STLT

c. MABS-13 (1-31 December 1967)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
LEROY A. MADERA	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
JOHN I. HUDSON	XO	MAJ	MAJ
HAROLD E. WILSON	ADMINO	CAPT	CWO
GEORGE W. FRITSCHI	BASEOPSO	MAJ	MAJ
DANIEL I. CARROLL	BASESERVO	MAJ	MAJ
CALEB C. DUNN	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ

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d. VMFA-323 (1-31 December 1967)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
HARRY T. HAGAMAN	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
PAUL G. BOOZMAN	XO	MAJ	MAJ
ARTHOR J. DELAHOUSSEY	S-1 (1-13 Dec)	LT	CAPT
EDWARD R. BAILEY	S-1 (14-31 Dec)	LT	MAJ
WILLIAM J. NORTHLICH	S-2	LT	CAPT
HENRY G. MILLER	S-3	MAJ	MAJ
NOEL E. DOUGLAS	S-4	WO	CAPT
WARREN A. FERDINAND	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

e. VMFA-314 (1-31 December 1967)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
FRANK D. TOPLEY	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
ROBERT H. SHULTZ	XO	MAJ	LTCOL
WILLIAM D. BAUER	S-1	LT	MAJ
RICHARD A. BARTON	S-2	LT	CAPT
RONALD W. KRON	S-3	MAJ	MAJ
ROBERT L. BAINBRIDGE	S-4	WO	MAJ
GERALD E. WALSH	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

f. VMFA-115 (1-31 December 1967)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
RICHARD E. CAREY	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
CARL. L. BATTISTONE	XO	MAJ	LTCOL
BARRY L. GRIFFING	S-1	LT	CAPT
ROBERT E. BARKER	S-2	LT	1/LT
JACOB W. MOORE	S-3	MAJ	MAJ
ROGER A. GURLEY	S-4 (1-4 Dec)	WO	MAJ
DENIS . SHORTAL	S-4 (5-31 Dec)	WO	CAPT
CHARLES L. ZANGAS	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

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2. Task Organization and Unit Location

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>	<u>Date of Office</u>
MAG-13	CHU LAI, RVN	COL EDWARD N. LEFAIVRE	1-31 Dec
H&MS-13	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL PAUL S. SIEGMUND	1-31 Dec
MABS-13	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL LEROY A. MADERA	1-31 Dec
VMFA-323	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL HARRY T. HAGAMAN	1-31 Dec
VMFA-314	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL FRANK D. TOPLEY	1-31 Dec
VMFA-115	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL RICHARD E. CAREY	1-31 Dec

3. Average Monthly Strength

<u>Squadron</u>	USMC				USN	
	<u>NA</u>	<u>NFO</u>	<u>AG</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
H&MS-13	16*	6	20	449	0	0
MABS-13	4	0	15	462	4	23
VMFA-323	20	16	5	260	1	0
VMFA-314	18	17	5	256	1	0
VMFA-115	19	15	4	274	1	0
	—	—	—	—	—	—
MAG-13	77	54	49	1701	7	23

* This figure includes one NAP - MGySgt J. A. CONROY

4. Important Visitors to the Command

On 23 December Rear Admiral JAMES W. KELLY, USN, Chief of Chaplains dedicated the new MAG-13 chapel. MAG-13 was in the role as host during his stay.

Mr. BOB HOPE visited the Chu Lai area in December with his Christmas Show. He was warmly repected and his show enjoyed by all.

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PART TWO: NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Marine Aircraft Group-13 flew 1477 combat sorties for 1806.0 combat hours in December. 3043.004 tons of ordnance were dropped by this group.

The C-117D flew 36 combat support sorties logging 41.4 hours of flight time. The C-117D conducted scheduled administrative/logistic flights and assumed the flare alert on two occasions before it left for Japan for corrosion control work on the wingspars.

Operations supported included Kentucky, Fortress Ridge, Citrus, Kent, Headshed, Lancaster, Lamson, and Shock Four. Missions flown included close air support, deep air support, Tally Ho, Helicopter Escort, Landing Zone Preparation, Visual Reconnaissance, Armed Reconnaissance, newly initiated Barcap missions for MAG-13 and due to deteriorating weather a larger number of Steel Tiger missions than were flown last month.

Significant BDA included 62 KBA confirmed, 95 KBA probable, 209 structures destroyed and 75 damaged. (Complete list in para 9, Part Three).

During the month of December, MAG-13 lost one aircraft (TF-9J) to ground fire. The aircraft was hit by fire in the Ashau Valley. Both crewmen ejected after the aircraft became uncontrollable. Due to excellent response from the Air Force "Jolly Green" both crewmen were picked up safely after spending 3 hours of Christmas Day in the Ashau Valley area.

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PART THREE: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. Personnel. During the month of December, Marine Aircraft Group-13 had a loss of sixteen (16) officers and two hundred and two (202) enlisted personnel due to rotation and transfers.

During this same period, thirteen (13) officers and one hundred and fifty-six (156) enlisted personnel reported to the group for duty.

2. Administration. During the reported period 2 officers and 38 enlisted personnel were promoted. By 31 December, MAG-13 had 89.5% participation in the savings bond program.

3. Awards. There were two hundred and eighteen (218) air medals and stars in lieu of medals received by members of this command. The following were awarded:

- a. Distinguished Flying Cross.....4
- b. Navy Commendation Medal.....6
- c. Bronze Star.....3
- d. Air Medal.....17
- e. Silver Stars in lieu of Air Medal.....31
- f. Gold Stars in lieu of Air Medal.....153
- g. Navy Achievement Medal.....1

4. Casualties.

Non-hostile casualties:

- a. Total for December.....40
- b. Total return to duty.....16
- c. Total medivac.....5
- d. Total number of man days lost.....236

Hostile:

- a. Killed in Action.....0
- b. Wounded in Action.....2
- c. Missing in Action.....0

5. Civic Action. During the first week in December, MAG-13 finished up it's rabies inoculation program, inoculating over 175 dogs and giving the 14 day series of shots to 15 people. Each dog was registered with the Chu Lai Veterinarian and each person was given a record of the series of shots which is being kept at the hamlet's chief's headquarters.

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A part of December was devoted to setting up Christmas parties. MAG-13 held three different parties for the people of the area. H&MS-13 held one for a number of orphans just prior to their own squadron party. The Chaplain conducted another party for over 200 children. There was a tremendous response of volunteer labor for these parties. The Group as a whole had a party for over 500 children in its civic action hamlet. Toys, school materials and other donations from the U.S. were distributed.

During December the MEDCAP program continued in its operation. An elderly man from Long Phu was taken to the 1st Hospital Company and operated on for cataracts. Another boy was treated for scarlet fever at the 1st Hospital and is reported to be doing well.

MAG-13's dispensary is nearing completion with only the inside floor, doors and windows left to build. The completion date is programmed for the middle of January.

6. Intelligence. Briefing and debriefing of aircrews and orientation to new aircrews were conducted. Publication of the weekly S-2 "Tactical Brief" continued (See Supporting Documents, Part Four). The booklet "Who are the Viet Cong" has been distributed on a continuing basis to all officers and SNCO's.

General Intelligence Brief is given each Thursday by the Group Intelligence Officer for Sergeants and below. Weekly intelligence briefs are also given to the Group Guard dealing mainly with the Chu Lai TAOR.

7. Industrial Relations. MAG-13 presently has 37 LNC under employment.

8. Airfield Operations. The integration of MAG-13 and MAG-12 Base Operations sections has been very successful. However the lack of personnel in both MAG-12 and MAG-13 will hamper the overall effectiveness of this operation during the coming months.

There were a total of 13,056 take offs/landings on the West Runway during December of which 1,655 were arrested landings.

9. Combat Operations.

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Hours</u>
H&MS-13 TF-9J	63	87.9
C-117D	36	41.4
VMFA-323 F-4B	428	593.1
VMFA-314 F-4B	428	540.5
VMFA-115 F-4B	456	543.7
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Total	1411	1806.6

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Operations Supported:

Kentucky	Headshed	Steel Tiger
Fortress Ridge	Lancaster	Tally Ho
Citrus	Lamson	Barcap
Kent	Shock Four	

Significant Bomb Damage Assesment.

KBA (Confirmed).....62
 KBA (Probable).....95
 Structures (Destroyed).....209
 Structures (Damaged).....75
 Bunkers (Destroyed).....87
 Bunkers (Damaged).....35
 Secondary Explosions.....16
 Secondary Fires.....6
 Trenchline Destroyed (Meters).....750
 Fighting Holes (Destroyed).....18
 Mortar Position (Destroyed).....1
 Automatic Weapons Positions (Destroyed).....7
 Bridges (Destroyed).....6
 Road Cuts.....96
 Ford Cuts.....5
 Sampans (Destroyed).....3
 Rice (Destroyed).....1 Ton

10. Base Development. A new seahut was constructed by NSAD in front of the old tower to provide space for the transfer of MAG-12 Aerology Section to the West Field.

The MAG-13 Recreation Hall has been completed with a library, weight lifting room, recording equipment and large multi-purpose room. Lighting has been added for night time use.

New Runway buildings have been constructed on Chu Lai West and Cross Wind runways for the Launch and Recovery Sections.

11. Morale/Welfare. Morale in MAG-13 was given a fine shot in the arm with the arrival of the Bob Hope Christmas Show. Most of the Group personnel were able to attend the 3 hour show and their reaction was enthusiastic to say the least.

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R&R continues to maintain high morale with this command. Nearly all quotas for R&R are fulfilled.

Scheduled movies and floor shows are well received and attended. Church attendance remains high. Special Christmas and New Year Divine Services were held with very good response.

12. Training. Normal on-the-job/technical training continued within each unit of the group. The M-16 fam firing continues at a good pace as the new rifle range constructed by Group Guard is put to good use.

The following formal schools were utilized by MAG-13 in December:

<u>School</u>	<u>Quotas</u>
Jungle Environment and Survival Training	5
Corrosion Control School	1
NCO Leadership School	1
Welding Certificate Program	1

13. Electronic Counter Measures. The installation of the "Shoe Horn" ECM/Warning equipment continued during the month of December.

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PART FOUR: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
10 DECEMBER 1967ATTACK ON BINH SON

Shortly after 0100 on 3 December, the Binh Son District Headquarters, nine miles southeast of MAG-13, was attacked by approximately 500 VC. The attack came from two directions and was supported by mortar and recoilless rifle fire. One group of VC attacked the bridge on Highway One just north of Binh Son to cut off U. S. Army reinforcements from the Chu Lai area. The main attack came from the east of Binh Son.

The attack was beaten off by the Popular Forces with the aid of Army gunships and ROK artillery support.

Friendly casualties were one U. S. Advisor KIA and one ROK officer KIA. Six U. S. Army personnel were WIA. The Popular Forces suffered light casualties. The Viet Cong lost 35 KIA, confirmed by body count. Three VC weapons were captured. The District Headquarters itself was virtually destroyed by fire.

The following night at 0100, Binh Son was again hit by five to seven rounds of 82 mm mortar fire. Friendly artillery suppressed the mortars, but the Headquarters received sporadic small arms fire for several hours.

MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

Along with the general increase in contact with the enemy south of Chu Lai, there have been four mine and booby trap incidents in the past week. These have resulted in friendly casualties of one KIA and 14 WIA.

The one KIA was the Civic Affairs Officer of the 198th Light Infantry Brigade. He was killed and three others were wounded when their vehicle struck a mine on Highway One, seven miles south of MAG-13, on 3 December.

Not far from this incident, a USMC 3/4 ton truck hit a mine on 5 December. Eight of the passengers were wounded.

On 4 December, Army combat engineers located and evacuated three mines on Highway One south of Chu Lai.

In addition, three Army troopers were wounded in booby trap incidents in the southern part of the Chu Lai TAOR.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYBDA RECAP

During the week of 1-7 December, Marine Aircraft Group-13 flew missions in support of III MAF operations throughout I Corps. Bomb damage assessment as reported by Air and Ground Controllers during this period included:

- 2 KBA Confirmed and 12 KBA Probable
- 18 military structures destroyed and 2 damaged
- 8 bunkers destroyed and 2 damaged
- 2 trenchlines destroyed
- 1 rocket and ammo dump destroyed
- 1 enemy outpost destroyed
- 2 automatic weapons positions destroyed
- 4 secondary explosions and 2 secondary fires
- 33 road cuts and 1 probable road cut

The above BDA is that actually observed by Forward Air and Ground Controllers. It does not include any BDA by our radar controlled drops, or as a result of any unobserved impacts.

During the period of 19-25 November, the First Marine Aircraft Wing flew 1,487 sorties of which 1,428 were in support of III MAF operations. The BDA for the entire Wing for that period included:

- 145 KBA Confirmed
- 128 military structures destroyed and 195 damaged
- 98 bunkers destroyed and 21 damaged
- 8 trenchlines damaged or destroyed
- 3 supply caches destroyed
- 1 mortar position destroyed
- 6 boats destroyed and 4 damaged
- 2 bridges destroyed and 1 damaged
- 1 truck damaged
- 2 artillery positions destroyed
- 2 automatic weapons positions destroyed
- 30 secondary explosions and 37 secondary fires
- 31 road cuts

LESSONS LEARNED FROM SAPPLER ATTACKS

A fixed installation such as Chu Lai Air Base presents a lucrative target for enemy sapper and rocket attacks. Experience from rocket and mortar attacks on similar installations in Vietnam indicate that many casualties are sustained by personnel attempting to reach bunkers once an attack starts.

Evidence indicates that fewer casualties occur if personnel caught in the open immediately hit the deck and roll, not run, to the nearest ditch. Personnel caught in a building should seek cover under bunks, desks, etc. No attempt should be made to run from a building out to a bunker some distance away.

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Recently a Japanese peace group brought about the defection of four sailors from the U. S. S. Intrepid. This has focused new attention on the existence of groups which attempt to subvert U. S. military personnel. The following is extracted from a Chief of Naval Operations message:

"There are genuine pacifist groups, in the United States and abroad, who seek to change U. S. policy by constitutional means. There are also groups, who under various fronts and slogans, seek only to subvert the loyalty and morale of military personnel and to otherwise obstruct U. S. military operations. It is not easy to distinguish between a bonafide pacifist group and a subversive group trying to exploit a serviceman. Subversive groups have no interest in the individual they attempt to subvert besides his propaganda value as a defector. Once he has served his purpose, a defector will be abandoned. The defector must still face punishment as a deserter no matter how long he remains in a foreign country. The statute of limitations is lifted as long as the deserter remains outside the jurisdiction of the United States."

"Personnel going on R&R, TAD orders, or leave in a foreign country should be alert to the possible existence of a worldwide organization seeking to embarrass the U. S. by convincing military personnel to defect. Any attempt or approach to cause defection, whether actual or suspected, should be reported to the nearest U. S. military activity."

Commanding Officers are directed by OPNAV Instructions and MACV Directives to notify the Naval Investigative Service through Group S-2 of any actual or attempted defection. Attempted defection is considered any attempt to seek political asylum.

GENERAL WALT SPEAKS:

The former Commanding General of III MAF summed up our effort in the Republic of Vietnam this way:

"When you add it all up, this business of being a professional Marine and a statesman may very well be the biggest challenge of our lives."

"It is my belief that together with freedom seeking Vietnamese we are going to win the hearts of these people and win a lasting peace."

"More than that, we are helping to establish here, in South East Asia, a strong, free country which I am convinced will someday be the corner stone of freedom for this part of the world. It will prevent our next generation from having to fight a much stronger enemy much closer to home."

Lieutenant General Lewis M. Walt

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
18 DECEMBER 1967

REWARDS PROGRAM

All personnel are required to obtain the following information from vietnamese personnel who turn in any weapon or ammunition.

- (1) The name of the individual who turned in the weapon
(Have him print it out for you in VIETNAMESE)
- (2) The date time groups and exact location where the marine was approached.
- (3) The type weapon and number and type of rounds.

All personnel are required to bring this printed information and the subject items immediately and directly to group S-2 for exploitation and the prompt distribution of the appropriate rewards. The unauthorized withholding of enemy material or friendly military equipment is subject to action under the UCMJ.

MINING INCIDENTS

All vehicles going outside the Chu Lai Command fence should have a one sandbag protective layer on the floor of the cab. All personnel should be alert to discolorations of soil, comm wires leading to the road and indigenous personnel in a position to observe traffic and trigger command detonated mines. In a recent command detonated mining attack against a MAG-13 truck the communists employed a shaped charge which penetrated a five foot thickness of Highway One and a steel culvert, triggered by a simple battery electrical device and fifty yards of comm wire.

Personnel should return disciplined aimed fire immediately upon those indigenous personnel who fire upon them, or who flee from the immediate area of the vehicle immediately after the mine has been detonated. Indiscriminate firing upon personnel or a village is prohibited.

BDA RECAP

The below BDA is that actually observed by Forward Air and Ground Controllers. It does not include any BDA by our radar controlled drops, or as a result of any unobserved impact.

During the period of 19-25 November, the First Marine Aircraft Wing flew 1,487 sorties of which 1,428 were in support of III MAF operations. The BDA for the entire Wing for that period included:

46 KBA Confirmed
498 military structures destroyed and 195 damaged
99 bunkers destroyed and 21 damaged
8 trenchlines damaged or destroyed

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3 supply caches destroyed
 1 mortar position destroyed
 6 boats destroyed and 4 damaged
 2 bridges destroyed and 1 damaged
 1 truck damaged
 2 artillery positions destroyed
 2 automatic weapons positions destroyed
 30 secondary explosions and 37 secondary fires
 31 road cuts

SOURCE: FIRST MAW ISO NEWS RELEASE

LESSONS LEARNED FROM SAPPER ATTACKS

A fixed installation such as Chu Lai Air Base presents a lucrative target for mortar, sapper and rocket attacks. Experience from rocket and mortar attacks on similar installations in Vietnam indicate that many casualties are sustained by personnel attempting to reach bunkers once an attack starts.

Evidence indicates that fewer casualties occur if personnel caught in the open immediately hit the deck and roll, not run; to the nearest ditch. Personnel caught in a building should seek cover under bunks, desks, etc. No attempt should be made to run from a building out to a bunker some distance away.

THE CHIU-HOI OFFER AND WHAT IT MEANS

A message delivered to the Nation in 1963 by then PRESIDENT Ngo Dinh Diem states:

"It is in this spirit (referring to the spirit of optimism and confidence in the future expressed earlier in the message) and in the sight of a truly independent free and strong Vietnam, in conformity with our lasting sense of justice a fraternal appeal is made to all those who, straying on the wrong path, have let themselves be abused by the Communists' deceitful propaganda. We invite them to join the national cause while there is still time; to grasp quickly this change now given to them to return to the side of honor, to regain their dignity as men, and to fulfill the longings of their cherished families.

"Those having families and means of subsistence will be authorized to rejoin their families, or to reside in the hamlet or strategic quarter of their choice subject only to the approval of the administrative committee.

"Those having no means of subsistence nor family support, can be assured of the assistance of the Government.

"Those having skills and ability after a period where they become conscious of the requirements of the national cause, during which they will have proven by concrete acts their total detachment from Communism, will see their services accepted. Those who have trespassed against the law...will have the opportunity to redeem themselves by meritorious patriotic acts..."

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THE HIDDEN GOVERNMENT

"Hanoi's entire military-political apparatus in the sections of South Vietnam under its control has been called a "shadow government." Establishment of such a "government" as a replacement and rival of the real government in Saigon was a basic objective of the North Vietnamese war-makers from the beginning.

"As admitted practitioners of Mao's guerrilla warfare strategy, the North Vietnamese leaders set out to gain control of the countryside, hamlet by hamlet, village by village, district by district, until the cities and the government in Saigon were isolated and surrounded. The government forces would then be annihilated in a massive general offensive, the concluding stage of protracted warfare."

SOURCE: Pamphlet--"Who Are The Viet Cong?"

WAR OF LIBERATION

"The seedbed for revolution is social unrest. The factors which disturb a society often include economic injustice, political instability ethnic differences and regional rivalries. The individual is bitter about the past, unhappy with the present, and fearful of the future. He wants a change, and he wants it "now."

"To exploit social unrest, the communists developed a strategy they called "a war of liberation" or a "people's War." The success of such a war depends upon the communists' use of deception, especially in the beginning--to make sure that few people are aware that the war has one goal and one goal only: the ultimate establishment of a communist state."

SOURCE: Pamphlet "Who Are The Viet Cong?"

GENERAL WALT SPEAKS:

The former Commanding General of III MAF summed up our effort in the Republic of Vietnam this way:

"When you add it all up, this business of being a professional Marine and a statesman may very well be the biggest challenge of our lives.

"It is my belief that together with freedom seeking Vietnamese we are going to win the hearts of these people and win a lasting peace.

"More than that, we are helping to establish here, in South East Asia, a strong, free, country which I am convinced will someday be the corner stone of freedom for this part of the world. It will prevent our next generation from having to fight a much stronger enemy much closer to home"

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
31 DECEMBER 1967LETTERS GONE ASTRAY

Recently, Counter-Intelligence turned over to MAG-13 S-2 a packet of three personal letters and one Squadron Plan of the Day. These were found in the An Tan dump. Innocent though it may seem, a POD may provide the enemy with information on our defense planning and give the enemy some idea of a unit's effective strength.

There are many uses Vietnicks back in the United States could make of personnel letters. Parts of a letter may be taken out of context to produce a distorted idea of what a Marine feels about the war. A home address may be used to harass a service family back home.

Group Order 5511.7 directs "that all information on paper be destroyed by burning only".

DEFECTIONS OF U. S. MILITARY PERSONNEL

Recently a Japanese Peace Group brought about the defection of four sailors from the U. S. S. Intrepid. This event has focused new attention on the existence of a group or groups which attempt to subvert U. S. military personnel.

There are genuine pacifist groups, both in the United States and abroad, who seek to change U. S. policy by constitutional means. There are also groups, who under various fronts and slogans, seek to subvert the loyalty and morale of military personnel and to otherwise obstruct American military operations. It is not easy to distinguish between a bona fide pacifist group and a subversive group trying to exploit a serviceman. These subversive groups have no interest in the individual serviceman they attempt to subvert beyond his propaganda value as a defector. Once he has served his purpose, a defector will be abandoned. The defector must still face punishment as a deserter no matter how long he remains in a foreign country. The statute of limitations is lifted as long as the deserter remains outside U. S. jurisdiction.

Personnel going on R&R, TAD orders, or leave in a foreign country should be alert to the possible existence of a worldwide organization seeking to embarrass the U. S. by convincing military personnel to defect. Any attempt or approach to cause defection, whether actual or suspected, should be reported to the nearest U. S. military activity.

Commanding Officers are directed by OPNAV Instructions and MACV Directives to notify the Naval Investigative Service through S-2 of any actual or attempted defection. Attempted defection is considered any attempt to seek political asylum.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYDEFENDING AMERICA'S STAKE IN ASIA

The Vietnam War is the third time in one generation that the United States has had to come to the defense of freedom in Asia. The cost in lives has been great.

World War II in the Pacific cost the United States 106,000 dead to assure the defeat of Japan. The Korean Crisis resulted in 33,629 dead and the Vietnam War has thus far cost 15,000 Americans killed.

VC TERRORISM

The Viet Cong are employing terrorism on an increasing level throughout the Republic of Vietnam. In the first ten months of 1967, 2700 Vietnamese civilians were killed by VC assassins. This is an increase of 60 percent over 1966, when 1700 were killed. The usual targets for assassination are hamlet and village officials and members of Revolutionary Development Teams. There are three RD Teams to the north and west of Chu Lai. All three have been a target for Viet Cong terrorists at least once.

The most shocking act of VC terrorism occurred several weeks ago at the hamlet of Dak Son, 24 miles northeast of Saigon. After pummeling Dak Son with a mortar and rocket barrage, the VC swarmed through the hamlet's defenses against little resistance.

The VC swept through the hamlet and hosed down each bunker and each hut with flame throwers. When their fuel was expended, the VC left. They left behind 67 charred bodies, mostly women and children, as the montagnard defenders had to retreat under the VC attack. Other villagers were sealed forever in their burned out bomb shelters, so that the actual death toll is estimated at 175. Another 200 villagers were marched off as prisoners by the VC.

What had the villagers done to incur the wrath of the Viet Cong? The montagnard residents of Dak Son had steadfastly refused to switch their allegiance from the government to the VC. Thus, the VC had to make an example of Dak Son as what happens to people who defy the "Liberation Army".

In light of increased enemy terrorist activity, MACV has reiterated previous instructions on personal security. Attention of all personnel is directed to the following:

1. Avoid large crowds of civilians.
2. When outside the cantonment, refrain from forming groups of more than three or four.

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3. When outside the cantonement, perform frequent vehicle inspections for time bombs, booby traps, hidden or concealed explosives.

4. Keep doors and windows of vehicles closed consistent with operational and ventilation requirements.

5. Always be alert. Be wary of situations out of the ordinary. Watch the children. They are more likely to reveal their feelings of fear or distrust.

6. Report suspicious or unusual acts to U. S. Military Police and Group S-2.

DELAYED ACTION FUZES

The enemy has developed a delayed action fuze for all his high explosive rounds, from 60 mm on up. The fuze is designed to detonate the round two and a half to eight hours after impact. This type of round was used recently against an Army brigade base camp. It is likely that this round will be used in the future on airfields, supply depots, and other fixed installations. This now makes it possible for the enemy to shell Chu Lai in the daylight, as there will be no blast on impact to indicate an attack is in progress. The noise level with airplanes and blasting will cover any launch noise.

To counter this threat, all personnel are cautioned to report all holes, burst, smoke, impacts or any other sign of a delayed action type round. An incoming round will also make a whooshing sound for about half a second before impact. Any indications of impacts should be reported immediately to MAG-13 EOD (phone 166).

Personnel must stay away from the general impact area of any rounds. The shrapnel from an 82 mm round can cause casualties at 50 yards.

BDA RECAP

During the week of 21-28 December 1967, MAG-13 aircraft flew missions in support of III MAF ground operations through out I Corps. Bomb damage assessment reported by air and ground controllers included:

- 75 structures destroyed and 36 damaged
- 33 bunkers destroyed and 19 damaged
- 7 KBA (Confirmed) and 14 KBA (Probable)
- 4 trenches destroyed
- 13 secondary explosions and 3 secondary fires
- 32 road cuts
- 4 bridges destroyed
- 3 automatic weapons positions destroyed
- 1/2 ton of rice destroyed and 2 supply caches destroyed
- 1 truck damaged

The above BDA is that actually observed by Forward Air and Ground Controllers only. It does not include the results of our radar-controlled drops or the many unobserved impacts.

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