

HEADQUARTERS

Marine Aircraft Group-13
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
 FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

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 12 Feb 1968

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 Subj: Command Chronology Period 1-31 January 1968
 Ref: (a) MC0 5750.2A
 (b) Wg0 5750.1C

Encl: (1) MAG-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 January 1968
 (2) H&MS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 January 1968
 (3) MAES-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 January 1968
 (4) VMFA-323 Command Chronology Period 1-31 January 1968
 (5) VMFA-314 Command Chronology Period 1-31 January 1968
 (6) VMFA-115 Command Chronology Period 1-31 January 1968

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the subject report is submitted as enclosures (1) through (6).
 2. Upon removal from the subject report this letter is downgraded to Unclassified.

Edward N. Le Faivre
 EDWARD N. LE FAIVRE

1st MAW S&C No.	Copy No.
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MAG-13	
S&C # 68-217	
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MAG-13

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

FOR

1-31 JANUARY 1968

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~PART ONE: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA~~UNCLASSIFIED~~1. Commanders and Staff

a. Headquarters, MAG-13 (1-31 January)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		T/O	ACTUAL
EDWARD N. LE FAIVRE	CO	COL	COL
PHILIP D. SHUTLER	XO	LTCOL	LTCOL
MARTIN J. BASAR	ADJ	CAPT	WO-1
ANTHONY B. KOUMA	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ
CARL E. R. BLACK	S-1	MAJ	MAJ
ROGER A. GURLEY	S-2	MAJ	MAJ
HERBERT V. LUNDIN	S-3 (1-12 Jan)	LTCOL	LTCOL
FRANK D. TOPLEY	S-3 (13-31 Jan)	LTCOL	LTCOL
DON J. SLEE	S-4	LTCOL	LTCOL

b. H&MS-13 (1-31 January)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		T/O	ACTUAL
PAUL L. SIEGMUND	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
HARRY E. TAYLOR	XO	MAJ	MAJ
JAMES S. GAHAGAN	FLTOPSO	MAJ	MAJ
HAROLD G. DEAN	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	LTCOL
HARRY R. SMITH	ADMINC	LT	1STLT

c. MABS-13 (1-31 January)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		T/O	ACTUAL
LEROY A. MADERA	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
JOHN I. HUDSON	XO	MAJ	MAJ
HAROLD E. WILSON	ADMINC	WO	CWO-4
GEORGE W. FRITSCHI	BASEOPSO	MAJ	MAJ
DANIEL I. CARROLL	BASESERVO	MAJ	MAJ
CALEB G. DUNN	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ

d. VMFA-323 (1-31 January)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		T/O	ACTUAL
HARRY T. HAGAMAN	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
PAUL G. BOOZMAN	XO	MAJ	MAJ
EDWARD R. BAILEY	S-1	LT	MAJ
WILLIAM J. NORTHLICH	S-2	LT	CAPT
HENRY G. MILLER JR.	S-3	MAJ	MAJ
NOEL E. DOUGLAS	S-4 (1-12 Jan)	WO	CAPT
DENNIS F. O'BLOCK	S-4 (13-31 Jan)	WO	CAPT
WARREN A. FERDINAND	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

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e. VMFA-314 (1-31 January)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>CLASSIFIED</u>		<u>RANK</u>
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	
FRANK D. TOPLEY	CO (1-13 Jan)	LTCOL	LTCOL	LTCOL
HERBERT V. LUNDIN	CO (14-31 Jan)	LTCOL	LTCOL	LTCOL
ROBERT H. SCHULTZ	XO	MAJ	LTCOL	MAJ
WILLIAM D. BAUER	S-1	LT	MAJ	MAJ
RICHARD A. BARTON	S-2 (1-15 Jan)	LT	CAPT	CAPT
RONALD W. KRON	S-3	MAJ	MAJ	MAJ
MARTIN W. MEREDITH	S-4	WO	MAJ	MAJ
GERALD E. WALSH	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ	MAJ

f. VMFA-115 (1-31 January)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>CLASSIFIED</u>		<u>RANK</u>
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	
RICHARD E. CAREY	CO (1-16 Jan)	LTCOL	LTCOL	LTCOL
GERALD W. VAUGHAN	CO (17-31 Jan)	LTCOL	LTCOL	LTCOL
CARL L. BATTISTONE	XO	MAJ	LTCOL	MAJ
DARRYL R. GRIFFING	S-1	LT	CAPT	CAPT
ROBERT E. BARKER	S-2	LT	1STLT	1STLT
JACOB W. MOORE	S-3	MAJ	MAJ	MAJ
DENIS L. SHORTAL	S-4	WO	CAPT	CAPT
CHARLES L. ZANGAS	A/C MAINTO (1-16 Jan)	MAJ	MAJ	MAJ
JAMES R. THROGMORTON	A/C MAINTO (17-31 Jan)	MAJ	MAJ	MAJ

2. Task Organization and Unit Location

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>	<u>Date of Office</u>
MAG-13	CHU LAI, RVN	COL EDWARD N. LE FAIVRE	1-31 Jan
H&MS-13	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL PAUL L. SIEGMUND	1-31 Jan
MABS-13	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL LEROY A. MADERA	1-31 Jan
VMFA-323	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL HARRY T. HAGAMAN	1-31 Jan
VMFA-314	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL FRANK D. TOPLEY	1-13 Jan
VMFA-314	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL HERBERT V. LUNDIN	14-31 Jan
VMFA-115	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL RICHARD E. CAREY	1-16 Jan
VMFA-115	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL GERALD W. VAUGHAN	17-31 Jan

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3. Average Monthly Strength

USMC					USN	
<u>Squadron</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>NFO</u>	<u>AG</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
H&MS-13	15*	6	25	414	0	0
MABS-13	4	0	14	466	3	19
VMFA-323	19	15	5	241	1	0
VMFA-314	16	14	4	253	1 (1-30)	0
VMFA-115	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>251</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
MAG-13	71	52	52	1625	6	<u>19</u>

*This figure includes one NAP - MGySgt J. A. CONROY

4. Important Visitors to the Command

a. General Leonard F. CHAPMAN Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, visited Marine Aircraft Group-13 on 7 January 1968 and viewed the operating areas of all squadrons.

b. Senator MOSS from the state of Utah visited Marine Aircraft Group-13 on 30 January 1968. He visited the flight line, hot pad, was briefed by Group S-3 and witnessed a typical aircraft launch and recovery.

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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~PART TWO: NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Marine Aircraft Group-13 flew 1675 combat sorties for 1926.5 combat hours in January. 3161.223 tons of ordnance were dropped by this group.

Operations supported included Kentucky, Niagara, Scotland, Lancaster, Wallowa, Shock Four and the Ashau Valley Campaign. Missions flown included Close Air Support, Deep Air Support, Tally Ho, Steel Tiger, Helicopter Escort, Landing Zone Preparation, Visual Reconnaissance, Air to Air Intercept Practice Scramble and TPQ.

Significant BDA included 24 KBA confirmed, 13 KBA probable, 166 structures destroyed and 52 structures damaged. (Complete list in para 9, Part Three)

During the month of January, MAG-13 lost one F-4B to ground fire and four F-4B's to a rocket attack on 31 January 1968. The aircraft downed by ground fire was hit while conducting Close Air Support in the Khe Sanh area. The plane became engulfed in flames and uncontrollable. Both crewmen ejected safely and were picked up by helicopter and returned to Chu Lai.

On 31 January at 0400, MAG-13 was subjected to an intense rocket attack at which time the area received some 31 rounds of 122 MM rocket fire. One rocket impacted directly on a bunker containing seven MAG-13 officers. Two of the officers were killed instantly and one died later on the way to the hospital. The remaining four officers sustained minor to severe injuries.

Damage to the MAG-13 area was concentrated in the Hangar, flight line and officer living area. The coming of daylight brought about repair work on hangars, revetment areas and living quarters. MAG-13 was in the air again at noon on the 31st of January.

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PART THREE: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. Personnel

During the month of January, Marine Aircraft Group-13 had a loss of thirteen (13) officers and two hundred and thirty-six (236) enlisted personnel due to rotation and transfers. During this same period, seventeen (17) officers and one hundred and sixty-five (165) enlisted personnel reported to the Group for duty.

2. Administration. During the reporting period, 4 officers and 24 enlisted personnel were promoted. By 31 January, MAG-13 had 89.87% participation in the Savings Bond Program.

3. Awards. There were nine (9) Air Medals and stars in lieu of medals received by members of this command.

4. Casualties

Non-hostile Casualties

a. Total for January.....	14
b. Total Returned to Duty.....	6
c. Total MedEvac.....	4
d. Total Number of Man Days Lost.....	134

Hostile Casualties

a. Killed in Action.....	3
b. Wounded in Action.....	5
c. Missing in Action.....	0

5. Civic Action. English classes have been started by volunteers from VMFA-323 in Long Phu I. Much interest has been shown with many of the adult people of the hamlet attending.

Ten NCO's and Officers attended the 1st MAW Personal Response School held at Chu Lai. The officers and men returned to their units ready to carry on their individual Personal Response Programs. Other units outside of MAG-13 have asked our NCO's to conduct Personal Response Classes in their units.

Numerous personnel attended dinners in the hamlet in celebration of TET. Unfortunately the joyousness was cut short due to the increased VC activity in the area.

6. Intelligence. Briefing and debriefing of aircrews and orientation to new aircrews were conducted. Publication of the weekly S-2 "Tactical Brief" continued (see Supporting Documents, Part Four). The booklet "Who Are the Viet Cong" has been distributed on a continuing basis to all officers and SNCO's.



General intelligence briefs are given each Thursday by the Group Intelligence Officer for Sergeants and below. Weekly intelligence briefs are also given to the Group Guard dealing with the Chu Lai TAOR.

7. Industrial Relations. MAG-13 presently has 43 LNC under employment.

8. Airfield Operations. All facilities are operational at the West field. East field was utilized twice as emergency back-up for jet aircraft while West field was down with fouled deck.

There were 35,930 takeoffs and landings at Chu Lai Air Base. The joint service Air Freight and Passenger Terminal handled 14,702 passengers, 3,898 tons of cargo and 673 Air Medical Evacuation Patients. Launch and recovery made 1,445 aircraft arrests, of which 23 were declared emergencies; a cumulative total of 12,890.

9. Combat Operations

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Hours</u>
H&MS-13 TF-9J	71	92.7
VMFA-323 F-4B	524	580.6
VMFA-314 F-4B	530	586.5
VMFA-115 F-4B	550	666.7
Total	1675	1926.5

Operations Supported

Kentucky	Lancaster	Ashau Valley
Niagara	Wallowa	Tally Ho
Scotland	Shock Four	BarCap

Significant Bomb Damage Assesment

KBA (Confirmed).....	24
KBA (Probable).....	13
Structures (Destroyed).....	166
Structures (Damaged).....	52
Bunkers (Destroyed).....	122
Bunkers (Damaged).....	23
Secondary Explosions.....	28
Secondary Fires.....	5
Trenchline Destroyed (meters).....	205
Road Cuts.....	89
Ford Cuts.....	2
Anti-Aircraft Artillery (Destroyed).....	2
Automatic Weapons Positions (Destroyed).....	7
Tunnel Complexes.....	1
Bridges (Destroyed).....	2
Trucks.....	1 Destroyed/1 Damaged
Livestock.....	1 Pig Destroyed

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~~SECRET~~10. Base Development

Aerology sections of MAG-12 and MAG-13 were combined to form an airfield weather service. The new aerology section is located in front of the old tower.

A new rotating beacon was installed on top of the H&MS-13 hangar. It is of the stateside type with the split white beam.

The mess hall was equipped with nine 50 KVA transformers. These are to provide power for the newly installed electrical fixtures and appliances.

11. Morale/Welfare. January brought the arrival of Chaplains John J. NOLAN and Ralph V. SAMPLES and the departure of Chaplain Wayne L. NIEDERHUTH. MAG-13 now has its own Catholic and Protestant chaplains full time.

R&R continues to maintain high morale within this command. Nearly all quotas for R&R are fulfilled. Scheduled movies and floor shows are well received and attended.

12. Training. MAG-13 personnel had the benefit of a presentation by the Americal Division Counterintelligence Team on the 13th of January. They brought out many points of interest in their talk called "Patriotism, Drugs and You".

A representative of the 3rd Military Police Bn, gave a "Marihuana Preventions and Problems" presentation on the 22nd of January. It was presented to officers and SNCO's and pointed out the recognition signs and countermeasures to use against the drug.

Aircrews had the benefit of a presentation on the 14th of January by LtCol LEWIS from VMCJ-1. The talk was mainly on the capabilities of the EA-6 and EF-10 aircraft. The role of VMCJ-1 in the Rolling Thunder was presented along with points of interest for MAG-13 aircrews flying BARCAP missions in support of the EA-6.

Another presentation on the 19th of January was on the MTDS. Members of the various Air Control Squadrons presented MAG-13 aircrews some of the capabilities and limitations of the system.

Normal on-the-job/technical training continued within each unit of the group.

The breakdown for schools attended in January is as follows:

JEST	4	Embarkation	1	Welding Certification	2
KY 28	12	Vietnamese Language	1	Personal Response	10
Exchange Operations	1	EOD	1		

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13. Electronic Countermeasures. The installation of the "SHOEHORN" ECM/Warning equipment continued during the month of January.

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
7 JANUARY 1968THE "WINTER-SPRING" OFFENSIVE

In December 1967, reports were received from intelligence sources that the enemy planned an offensive effort which was to start after Christmas. The enemy's objective was to regain control of the people of the coastal areas of I Corps and to tie down Free World Forces in yet another battle area.

Events since Christmas Day indicate that reports of the "winter-spring" offensive were not just speculation. The enemy has attacked numerous government installations in the Chu Lai area. ARVN troops south of Chu Lai have made heavy contact with Viet Cong units. The Americal Division is heavily engaged in its Wheeler/Wallowa area of operation, in sharp contrast to last week. The enemy has paid heavily in his attacks and has no significant successes to show for his efforts.

On 28 and 29 December, the 2nd ARVN Division encountered enemy forces in the Quang Ngai area, 20 miles south of Chu Lai. The enemy suffered 97 KIA and lost ten weapons in these two engagements. ARVN troops fought an estimated reinforced VC battalion in an all day engagement, 16 miles south of Chu Lai on 31 December. Once again the enemy paid heavily as 111 VC were killed and 11 VC were captured. The ARVNs also captured 37 weapons.

At 0200, on 2 January, four hours before the New Years Day truce was due to end, the enemy attacked two government headquarters in the Chu Lai area. Ly Tin District Headquarters, three miles north on Highway One, repelled a VC mortar and ground attack (see separate article). At the same time, the ARVN compound at Nghia Hanh, 26 miles south of Chu Lai came under mortar and recoilless rifle fire. Gunships of the 3rd Brigade/4th Infantry Division helped drive away the attacking VC. The enemy lost 72 KIA by body count and six PWS. Twenty weapons were captured. Villagers west of Nghia Hanh reported that the VC had passed their way carrying "many dead and wounded".

Early on the morning of 3 January, elements of the 2nd NVA Division launched mortar and ground attacks on two friendly positions in the Wheeler/Wallowa area of operations. At the same time three other positions were receiving harrassing mortar and small arms fire. The enemy also used 122 mm rockets in these attacks. The NVA did succeed in overrunning part of one position, but were driven off by artillery firing at point-blank range into the oncoming enemy. The enemy broke contact at daybreak but sporadic contact continued throughout the day. The enemy lost heavily in these attacks, with 329 NVA or VC killed confirmed by body count. About 50 weapons were captured including a flamethrower, mortars, and

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recoilless rifles. A number of PWs were captured and should shed some light on the enemy's intentions.

Also on the morning of 3 January, at 0400 Danang Air base was hit by about 30 122 mm rockets. The attack lasted only about 15 minutes as an AC-47 spotted the attackers and took them under fire. A patrol the next morning found 80 abandoned rockets in the launch area, indicating that the enemy had to break off his attack prematurely. Damage to Danang Air Base itself was light and casualties were minimal. Marine and Air Force units carried out their assigned missions on the day of the attack with no delays.

ATTACK ON LY TIN

The Ly Tin District Headquarters, three miles northwest of MAG-13 on Highway One, is the government's civil and military headquarters for an area roughly corresponding to a county in the U. S. In addition to handling the civil and administrative functions for a civilian unit of county size, the District is also responsible for police protection. The District Chief is also the local military commander as well as head of the civilian government, and commands the Popular Forces of the District.

A District Headquarters is thus a lucrative target for the VC. Destruction of a District Headquarters leaves the area without a civilian government and undermines the confidence of the people in the government's ability to defend them. These are the reasons the VC choose to attack Ly Tin.

The enemy coordinated his ground attack with a mortar barrage and used a 57 mm recoilless rifle to knock out defensive positions in the Headquarters compound. The enemy blew gaps in the defensive wire with Bangalore torpedoes and succeeded in breaching the perimeter at one point. However, the Popular Forces drove off the attackers with the timely assistance of two Army APCs from Hill 69. Seven of the sappers who penetrated the perimeter were cut down by 50 caliber fire at 50 yard range. The VC entered the area at 0600 to recover dead and wounded and was driven off again with the aid of Americal Division gunships.

The Headquarters itself suffered light damage from the attack and casualties among the PFs were light. The MACV advisor team suffered no casualties. The Army estimates 47 VC killed, with 32 enemy bodies being recovered. One VC was captured, along with 26 individual weapons. A 57 mm recoilless rifle and five B-40 rocket launchers were captured.

The attackers are believed to be two companies of a Main Force Sapper Battalion, probably the same unit that attacked Chu Lai in April 1967. The sappers were supported by a local force VC company.

The enemy attack was carefully planned and was coordinated with harassing attacks on other nearby friendly units. CAP K-5, further north on Highway One was hit by mortars and heavy small arms fire. The Army units on Hill 69 were hit by harassing fire, and culverts were blown for some distance north on Highway One.

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The following message from CG, III MAF was received by this command. Although it is directed to all officers and Staff NCOs, it is of general interest to all members of the command:

"In the beginning of each New Year, it is traditional for us to make 'resolutions' to do, or avoid, certain things during the ensuing year. As military men, we have undertaken the responsibility of leadership during warfare, and in the little things we do or fail to do may result in the saving or loss of men's lives. I believe those resolutions which better our role in providing professional leadership will not only improve the efficiency of our units but will also pay dividends in lives saved both on and off the battlefield. Toward this end, I offer you, as troop leaders, some resolutions to improve your effectiveness during the coming year:

"A. To meticulously supervise all subordinates in the care and handling of individual weapons, with particular emphasis upon strict observance of safety procedures.

"B. To demand strict fire control discipline in the employment of all weapons, not only to insure that the rules of engagement are not violated, but also to insure that there is no needless endangering of non-combatants during engagements. Particular care is required in the targeting and laying of indirect fire weapons.

"C. To insist upon obedience to all safety procedures by the operators of motor vehicles, machinery and heavy equipment, and to take immediate corrective action when safety regulations, including those demanded by common sense, are being violated.

"D. To be intolerant of mistakes and carelessness on the part of yourself and your subordinates and to devote time to the study of appropriate field manuals so that your battlefield actions and decisions will be professional.

"E. To be alert to the personal problems of subordinates, and to take appropriate action to forestall greater problems.

"These are but a few of the resolutions which you, as a small unit leader can adopt to improve your efficiency and productivity. I am convinced that these, coupled with other resolutions you may impose upon yourself, will go far toward saving human lives and contribute immeasurably to the accomplishment of our mission.

"My best wishes for continued success to you and your men during the New Year."

Commanding General, III MAF

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
14 JANUARY 1968ROCKET ATTACKS CONTINUE

As part of his "Winter-Spring Offensive", the enemy has launched two rocket attacks in the Danang area since the beginning of the new year. There is evidence that at least two other rocket attacks on Danang were aborted because Marine patrols discovered the launching sites and destroyed the previously constructed emplacements.

The first rocket attack was on the morning of 3 January. The enemy launched 30 122 mm rockets at Danang Air Base. Casualties were light, with only one man being seriously wounded. Three aircraft were destroyed and 16 were damaged to varying degrees. Damage to the base itself was light.

Damage would have been much greater if the enemy had been able to complete his attack. An AC-47 "Spooky" aircraft spotted the attackers at the launch site. The aircraft immediately took the enemy under fire and forced him to break off the attack 15 minutes after the first rocket was fired. The enemy was forced to leave some of his armament behind. The next morning a Marine patrol checked the launch site and discovered 80 unfired rockets. The launch site was about 8000 meters southwest of the Air Base.

The enemy launched his second attack at 2200 on 7 January. The target for this attack was the Force Logistic Command facility, four miles northwest of Danang Air Base. Forty-two 122 rockets were fired. The rockets impacted in a billeting area and at the comm center. No one was killed in the attack, although 29 Marines were wounded.

At about the same time, a nearby Sea Bee battalion received one 140 mm rocket. The rocket did no damage however. This is the first report of the enemy employing a 140 mm rocket in his current offensive.

OPERATION WHEELER/WALLOWA

The 2nd NVA Division continues to strike at troops of the Americal Division. Since the enemy started his attacks on the Americal on 3 January, 1,109 NVA and VC troops have been killed.

The enemy has used every weapon in his arsenal from small arms to 122 mm rockets. He has employed tactics ranging from ambushes to human wave attacks, but has not overrun any Americal Division unit yet. On 3 January, a friendly position was penetrated but concentrated artillery fire, fired point blank, broke up the attack. An Americal company was caught in an ambush on 6 January. Out of 103 men in the unit, 79 were killed, wounded, or missing. The NVA were not able to overrun the company perimeter. When help arrived, 24 NVA bodies were found along with 16 weapons.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYESPIONAGE: PAST AND PRESENT

Espionage is far from a new concept in warfare. The earliest reports of spying are in the Bible, and date back before Christ. Regarding spying, the Bible says, "The Lord spake unto Moses saying, 'Send men, that they may search the land.' And Moses sent them to spy out the land and the people, whether they be strong or weak, few or many. And what the land is, whether it be good, or bad, and what cities they dwell in whether in tents or strongholds."

Espionage, or the act of spying, has become increasingly important in modern warfare. Production capability, raw material supplies, technical development, and scientific discoveries play such a major role in determining the victor.

In Vietnam, espionage is conducted daily against Marine units. VC intelligence services diligently seek information on a variety of subjects: Marine Corps strength, equipment, planned operations, and defenses. Agents are interested in everything from general information available in newspapers, even Stars & Stripes, to highly classified information vital to our security. All Marines have some information the enemy would like to have; be it on personnel, operations, equipment, or installations.

To gain some insight into the effectiveness of VC espionage, the following is presented as an example.

In early 1966, a Marine search and destroy operation discovered important intelligence items in a VC tunnel complex. One of the items was a complete drawing of a large U. S. installation. The drawing pinpointed all the unit locations with notations as to the types of defenses. The information on the map was collected over a relatively short period of time, by highly trained Viet Cong espionage agents. The enemy collects seemingly unrelated bits of information to create a big picture, just as our Military Intelligence does.

Since the end of 1966, the Viet Cong have increased their espionage efforts against Marine units in I Corps.

Each individual Marine has a part in preventing the Viet Cong from obtaining vital information. As a starting point, it should be noted that military business and discussion of military information should be conducted in the office or shop and not in the barracks, the club, or in An Tan.

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RADIO HANOI SAYS:

The following is Radio Hanoi's version of the 11 April 1967 mortar attack on Chu Lai:

"The Liberation Armed Forces in Quang Nam Province (S-2 comment: Chu Lai is in Quang tin Province) destroyed 38 aircraft, mostly jets, in a fierce mortar attack on the U. S. Airbase in Chu Lai on the night of 11 April, according to Giai Phong Agency. The LAF simultaneously launched a violent attack on the command of the U. S. regiment and enemy unit defending the air base.

"After only three minutes shelling, apart from the aforesaid number of aircraft destroyed, 475 G. I.'s most of them officers, pilots, and technicians, were killed or wounded. The LAF turned the air base into a sea of fire, thus paralyzing it for two days.

"The next morning, three M-113 APCs which moved out from the air-base were hit by the guerillas mines and set ablaze. All 65 Yanks aboard the vehicles were killed or wounded.

"This was the sixth attack mounted by the LAF on this air base since October 1965. In these attacks, the LAF destroyed altogether 220 aircraft and wiped out more than 1500 G. I.'s."

Another broadcast gave the communist version of earlier attacks on Danang and Chu Lai:

"In two assaults upon Danang Air Base, . . . , the Patriotic Armed Forces wiped out nearly 1600 G. I.'s, and destroyed 110 aircraft, 231 vehicles and the radar center, and burned a storage of over two million liters of gasoline. The attack on 5 March against the Chu Lai Marine Air Base resulted in 300 U. S. casualties and 40 aircraft destroyed."

S-2 comment: These broadcasts are obviously untrue and for propaganda purposes only. The sad fact is that millions of people who have no other source of information believe this sort of thing to be true.

MAG-13 BDA RECAP

In the week of 5-12 January, MAG-13 aircraft was credited with the following Bomb Damage Assessment:

19 bunkers destroyed and 1 damaged
28 structures destroyed and 9 damaged
12 secondary explosions and 2 secondary fires
27 road cuts
6 KBA,(Confirmed) KBA Probables are no longer reported.
3 trenchlines damaged or destroyed
4 ford cuts

It should be noted that the above BDA is only that reported by Forward Air and Ground Controllers only. It does not include BDA from unobserved impacts or from radar controlled drops.

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
21 JANUARY 1968

OPERATION MUSCATE

Operation Muscatine has been in progress for one month to the south of Chu Lai. The area of operations is between Binh Son and Quang Ngai City. Units of the Americal Division have been conducting search and destroy operations trying to root out the remaining Viet Cong in the area.

Up to 20 January, troops of the Americal Division have been credited with 353 kills in the Muscatine area of operation. A total of 101 enemy weapons have been captured.

In the largest single encounter of the operation, a reconnaissance unit from the Americal killed 80 Viet Cong and captured ten more on 17 January. In addition 35 individual weapons were captured. The Army unit suffered only two wounded, neither of whom required evacuation. This engagement took place 16 miles southeast of Chu Lai.

BATTERIES AND BOOBY TRAPS

The Viet Cong use discarded batteries from U. S. communication and electronic equipment as a power source to detonate mines and booby traps. Even simple flashlight batteries can be used to supply enough power to detonate a mine.

To prevent the Viet Cong from using discarded batteries against friendly troops, all batteries must be destroyed and properly disposed of. While a battery may be too weak to supply sufficient power to a radio or flashlight, it may still contain enough energy to detonate an explosive charge. Batteries should not be discarded in trash barrels as much of MAG-13's trash ends up outside the cantonement where enemy hands can carefully salvage all usable gear.

To destroy a battery, it is necessary to completely destroy its inner cells or cells. A smashed battery may still contain good cells. The battery jacket should be torn open to expose the cells. For a one cell battery, such as a flashlight battery, this is not necessary. All cells can then be cut into pieces and the severed pieces smashed.

Batteries can also be destroyed by burning, or they can be turned over to EOD for destruction.

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COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION OF PRISONERS

Recently several Combined Action units near Danang were overrun by the Viet Cong. Two of the Marines who were captured by the VC have been put on display in some of the villages north of Danang, according to intelligence sources. The VC are displaying them to villagers to show that American Marines are not invincible.

Although this type of exploitation is a violation of the prisoner's rights according to the Geneva Convention, the communists continue to try to extract all possible propaganda value from their captives.

Typical is the following radio broadcast from Hanoi, which is supposed to be a letter to American servicemen from a captured Marine:

"To my fellow soldiers: My name is LCpl Richard Gordon Burgess 2094229, formerly part of "A" Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. (S-2 comment: There is no "A" Company in the 3rd Battalion of any Marine Regiment.)

"I was captured by the South Vietnam National Liberation Force on 25 September 1966 north of Quang Tri Province. (S-2 comment: 3/1 has never operated "north of Quang Tri Province".) Since that time, I have been given the opportunity to come into contact with the Vietnamese people and to understand the truth about this dirty war which you are having to take part in. I am very proud that I have this chance to tell you about the unjust war that our government is waging here in Vietnam.

"Before I came to Vietnam, I was told by my superiors that I would be fighting for the freedom of the South Vietnamese people and to stop the spread of communism. I was also told that if I were captured I would either be killed or tortured.

"But both of the above are quite the contrary. The cause of my being captured was a wound in my right arm where my elbow used to be.

"I am very thankful to the doctors and staff for saving my arm. Even when there were times when the infection in my arm got very bad, the doctors never gave up hope of saving it.

"From the hospital I was taken to a camp, which is where I learned the truth about this dirty, immoral, and illegal war that our government is carrying on here in Vietnam. The Vietnamese people are not out for American blood. They are fighting only for their independence, democracy, freedom, and the reunification of their country.

"As you know, after the defeat of the French colonialists in May 1954 and after the Geneva Agreements were signed in July 1954, the people of Vietnam were to hold a general free election no later than July 1956 to gain the reunification of their country. This was in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Agreements.

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"But step by step our government violated the 1954 Geneva Agreements and prevented the Vietnamese people from holding the general free elections that were to be held in July of 1956. It waged the aggressive war in Vietnam.

"It is a dirty, immoral, and illegal war that our Government is waging against the Vietnamese people. The 1954 Geneva Agreements prohibited foreign interference, stating that there was to be no interference in the Vietnamese people's political affairs from any other country, and strictly prohibiting planes, weapons, and troops from being brought into Vietnam. But the U. S. Government violated and sabotaged the Geneva Agreements by bringing planes, weapons, and troops into Vietnam and also constructed hundreds of strategic bases in South Vietnam. The United States has used in South Vietnam planes, artillery, and toxic chemicals to kill innocent people, kill the livestock, and destroy crops.

"The people of Vietnam only want all aggressors to leave their country so that their internal affairs can be settled by themselves, as was stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

"I have given you the facts and the truth about the war here in Vietnam. IT is your American heritage to stand up for the truth and defend the truth. Give your voice in protest against this dirty, immoral, illegal and aggressive war. Throw down your arms and demand your repatriation so that you can go back home to your families and loved ones. Will you die for an unjust war? Will you die in this foreign land that you have no just reason for being in or wanting to be in? Protest now. Go Back to the land that you and I love and cherish most."

Such is an example of communist propaganda using the name of an American.

BLACKMARKET ACTIVITY

There has been sufficient black market activity in I Corps to cause the Commanding General, III MAF to caution all personnel to avoid contributing to the black market problem.

Vietnamese service personnel have been the principle offenders by using U. S. service personnel to purchase such items as refrigerators, TV sets, and luggage or personal items such as cigarettes and beverages. U. S. personnel may be offered rides by Vietnamese personnel or approached at entrances to PX's and asked to render a small service by making a PX purchase. The Vietnamese will then sell these PX items on the black market. Often the profits end up in the hands of the Viet Cong.

All personnel are cautioned that PX purchases made for non-authorized personnel may lead to disciplinary action and suspension of PX privileges. One consequence of flagrant black market activities is a limitation on the type and quantities of items sold through the PX system.

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
28 JANUARY 1968

KHE SANH

Khe Sanh is in the northwestern corner of South Vietnam. The Marine Base at Khe Sanh itself and the Lang Vei Special Forces camp effectively block Communist infiltration into this part of South Vietnam, and force infiltrators to take the round about route through Laos. Should the Communists capture Khe Sanh it would give them effective control over all of western Quang Tri Province. Perhaps more important, it would be the big propaganda victory the Communists have been seeking in their current "winter-spring" offensive.

There has been little contact in this area since last May's battles for Hills 881 and 861. However, in the past few weeks, friendly reconnaissance has reported sighting increased numbers of NVA troops south and west of Khe Sanh. It became apparent that the enemy was planning some sort of move against Khe Sanh. To counter this threat, the 26th Marine Regiment at the Khe Sanh Combat Base was reinforced and the defenses improved.

The enemy opened the current battles by shelling Khe Sanh, the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, and Camp Carroll. Even though Camp Carroll lies about 16 miles east of Khe Sanh, the Communists were probably trying to knock out the artillery which can support Khe Sanh. On the morning of 21 January, the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, six miles southwest of Khe Sanh, repulsed an NVA mortar and ground attack. Marines of the 26th Regiment made contact with an NVA battalion in the vicinity of Hills 881 and 861. Khe Sanh itself has not been hit by ground attacks, but has received constant fire from mortars, rockets, and heavy artillery. The base has been damaged severely by the constant shelling.

MAG-13 aircraft have been supporting units in the Khe Sanh area with both Close Air Support missions and radar controlled drops. Our targets have been mortar and rocket positions and enemy troop concentrations. The entire First Marine Aircraft Wing has diverted much of its resources to support Khe Sanh. A MAG-12 aircraft was credited with 100 KBA in a strike five miles southeast of Khe Sanh.

Three attack aircraft have been shot down while supporting friendly troops. All four crewmen in the downed aircraft have been recovered. A MAG-13 Phantom was shot down on 22 January, seven miles southeast of Khe Sanh. The two crewmen punched out successfully and were extracted to safety by a helicopter minutes after hitting the deck.

The artillery fire from both sides continues and it still remains to be seen what the enemy intentions are.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYVIET CONG SAPPER TACTICS & COUNTERMEASURES

Sappers are the elite of VC forces. Sappers are trained in demolitions and are employed to breach defensive obstacles in an attack on a fixed installation. There are two Sapper Battalions operating in the Chu Lai area. In any attack on a fixed installation, sappers would undoubtedly be employed. Thus, the following discussion on sapper tactics is presented.

The VC conduct thorough reconnaissance in preparing an attack on an installation. Detailed sketches of weapons locations, defenses, and locations of key personnel are prepared and studied. Specific missions and individual targets are assigned and the entire plan rehearsed.

Sapper attacks commence under the cover of mortar fire, while teams crawl forward to breach wire and to clear a path for the assault force. In many cases, explosives taken for mortar fire are actually bangalore torpedoes and satchel charges. Thus, the VC often penetrate defenses undetected before mortar fire lifts. Once inside the target area, teams will rapidly and methodically inflict the greatest amount of damage possible to pre-selected targets. A systematic destruction of bunkers, aircraft, vehicles and storage areas will follow. The enemy will then rapidly withdraw to predetermined rally points.

The major weakness of sapper attacks is their inflexibility. The attack is planned, rehearsed and conducted on the basis of reconnaissance. The VC study our activities to find a pattern they can use to their advantage. The enemy can be confused and disrupted by some of the following countermeasures:

1. Use of multiple listening posts which are shifted daily.
2. Constant and aggressive night patrolling.
3. Three or four separate apron/concertina fences ringing the installation. A gap of 75 to 100 meters should be left between fences and warning devices employed in the clear area between fences.
4. Crew served weapons should be relocated often in no set pattern.
5. Fighting positions should be covered so that observation can be maintained without exposure to incoming fire.
6. Vietnamese who enter the installation should be carefully screened and should not be used to build defensive positions.
7. Illumination and surveillance during suspected attacks.
8. Use of internal sentries at key locations on the installation.
9. An SOP for Internal Defense and mutual fire support plan should be prepared.
10. Most important, the members of a command must always be aware that an attack threat exists. Laxness can easily develop in a unit in a fixed location and this tendency must be actively countered.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYMORTAR ATTACK ON CHU LAI

A company of the 14th Aviation Battalion of the Americal Division came under mortar attack at 2340 on 27 January 1968. The unit which was attacked is located in the southeastern corner of the Chu Lai Base, and was also mortared on 30 August 1967. This attack lasted about five or ten minutes as about 65 rounds were walked through the area. An enemy mortar position was in view of the the Army bunker line. The enemy mortar crew was taken under fire by the bunkers but enemy casualties were not determined.

Friendly casualties were very light. No aircraft were destroyed, although there was minor damage to eight. The speed of friendly reaction no doubt limited the length of the attack and prevented any greater damage.

TET AND THE TRUCE

The Tet holiday period, 30 January to 1 February is an important and significant holiday to the Vietnamese. In past years, since American involvement in the Vietnam War, Tet has always meant a long truce. However, in the past, the enemy has used truce periods to resupply his units and to move into position for attacks. The last truce period was the bloodiest ever in this war. The Viet Cong locally used the cover of the truce to launch two attacks on nearby government headquarters. In III Corps, the enemy lost 375 killed in an unsuccessful attack on an American base camp.

As a result of this type of past experience with truce periods, the Allied Forces have agreed to only a 36-hour truce during Tet, starting at 1800 on 29 January. General Westmorland has stressed the need for constant vigilance during Tet.

MAG-13 BDA

On 23 January, MAG-13 had the opportunity to witness three of its aircraft conducting a Close Air Support mission on a mountain five miles west of MAG-13. An Army patrol had spotted 15 to 30 VC and the aircraft were launched in response to a request from the Americal Division. The three aircraft dropped 24-500 pound bombs and six napalm tanks. The BDA could not be determined, although the FAC reported excellent target coverage.

BDA for MAG-13 aircraft during the week of 19-26 January 1968:

- 25 KBA
- 38 structures destroyed and 7 damaged
- 30 bunkers destroyed and 9 damaged
- 38 road cuts
- 30 secondary explosions and 2 secondary fires
- 2 gun positions destroyed
- 5 automatic weapons positions destroyed
- 2 AA sites destroyed

Much of the above BDA was in support of Marines in the Khe Sanh area. One MAG-13 strike in this area resulted in 16 secondary explosions.

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
4 FEBRUARY 1968

LOCAL AREA ATTACKS, 31 JANUARY 1968

The rocket and mortar attack on Chu Lai on the morning of 31 January was but one in a series of enemy attacks in southern I Corps. At about the same time, the enemy launched large scale attacks on the provincial capitals of Tam Ky and Quang Ngai City.

The enemy lost about 500 KIA in his Quang Ngai City attack, 22 miles south of Chu Lai. The ARVN troops captured 5 prisoners. The enemy simultaneously attacked the airfield, the MACV compound, Subsector Headquarters, and the bridge on Highway One just north of the city. Although the enemy lost heavily in his attack, he did succeed in releasing about 600 prisoners from the Quang Ngai City jail.

At Tam Ky, 17 miles northwest of Chu Lai, the enemy attacked the provincial headquarters, Regional Forces Headquarters, the airstrip, and the motor pool compound. Enemy losses in this attack were 486 KIA and 63 prisoners captured. The prisoners captured in the attack revealed that over a regiment participated in the attack.

Although both of these attacks were conducted by VC Main Force and Local Force units, it has become apparent from PW interrogations that NVA personnel were integrated with the VC to achieve the coordination required.

Intelligence sources indicate that the Chu Lai rocket attack was conducted by an NVA rocket battalion which normally operated in the mountains northwest of Chu Lai. Local VC units, at the same time, harassed the entire Chu Lai defense perimeter with small arms fire. The southern sectors of the base received an unknown number of mortar rounds during the course of the attack. However, the MAG-13 area was the primary target of the attack.

Army units outside of Chu Lai were also in contact with the enemy during the morning and day of the 31st. Two army outposts in the immediate Chu Lai area received mortar and ground attacks, and the An Tan bridge was severely damaged by mortar fire.

The rocket attack on Chu Lai came from a site six miles to the southwest of MAG-13. The enemy prepared his rocket firing positions on the slope of a mountain under the cover of trees. On the night of the attack, the trees blocking the line of fire were cut down. Other potential rocket sites and troop concentrations have been reported by Army patrols and air observers in the same general area since the 31st. There points have been hit with both air and artillery strikes, resulting in several secondary explosions.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYTHE 122 mm ROCKET

The Russian made 122 mm rocket has been used against many targets in I Corps since it was first used against Danang in February 1967. The 31 January attack on Chu Lai is the first time it was used in this area.

The 122 mm rocket gives the enemy an artillery capability which can be fired at a target and then quickly dismounted and moved to a new target area, before the first launch site is located by friendly troops. The rocket is fired from a launcher tube mounted on a tripod mount. The angle and deflection of the launcher tube can easily be changed on the tripod mount. The launch assembly can be set up in about two and a half minutes and displaced in slightly less time. The total weight of the launcher tube and tripod mount is 121 pounds, with the heaviest single part weighing 57 pounds.

A 122 mm rocket round weighs 102 pounds and can be broken into three parts for easy transport. The heaviest piece weighs 59 pounds. The entire 122 mm rocket package is easily transportable and requires no motor transport. Thus, no unit is safe from this mobile weapon. The standard 122 mm rocket has a range of 11,000 meters. A booster unit will increase the range to 19,000 meters.

The NVA and VC also employ a 140 mm rocket. The 140 mm however can not be as accurately aimed as the 122 mm. More site preparation is required for a 140 mm rocket attack. It is perhaps for these reasons that the 140 mm rocket has not been used in the enemy's current offensive.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: PERSONAL COMPROMISE

Should you ever suspect that you have been approached, or an attempt made to involve you in a conspiracy to commit espionage, report all available information to your Commanding Officer as soon as possible. Do not attempt to get out of an embarrassing situation yourself. Do not attempt to be a self-appointed counter-spy.. Counter-intelligence is a job for professionals. The procedure to follow is to discuss the situation with your commander, even if it involves discussing possible indiscret behavior on your part. Personal indiscretion is a far less serious matter than violation of the espionage laws.

BDA RECAPS

During the week of 27 January-2 February, MAG-13 aircraft were credited with the following Bomb Damage Assessment by Forward Air and Ground Controllers:

8 KBA
 69 structures destroyed and 28 damaged
 15 bunkers destroyed and 8 damaged
 33 road cuts
 2 trenches destroyed
 14 secondary explosions and one secondary fire
 2 automatic weapons positions destroyed
 10 sampans destroyed
 1 bridge damaged
 1 tunnel complex uncovered

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18 FEBRUARY 1968CHU LAI ROCKET ATTACKS

The rocket attack threat to Chu Lai continues. Recent overcast weather has hampered the Army's observation aircraft in spotting potential launching sites and troop concentrations. At night Army artillery has kept up a constant harrassing and interdictory fire against suspected sites and suspected troop movements. There have been several reports that the H&I fire and illumination flares have prevented the enemy from making ground attacks on Chu Lai.

There have been three rocket attacks on Chu Lai since the first attack on 31 January. On 5 February, at 2320, the enemy fired about 16 rockets at the Americal Division Headquarters area. Fourteen rocket impacts were located and it is believed that several others landed in the sea. The rockets destroyed two buildings, but did no damage to Headquarters facilities. There were 13 wounded, none seriously.

The next day an Army patrol located the rocket site at a range of 10,000 meters from the target area. At the launch site were found five firing pits and assorted rocket carrying gear and fuze covers.

The following night at 0313 on 7 February four rockets impacted in the general area between MAG-13 and the beach. Six rocket trails were spotted and it is possible that two rockets overshot the target and went into the sea. There were no casualties and no damage was done except for a hole in the east runway which was quickly repaired. The enemy's target was probably the fuel tanks near the beach.

At 2044, on 14 February, 12 rockets were fired generally at the MAG-13 area. There was a tremendous spread in the impacts, from the motor pool to beyond the southeastern end of the MAG-13 cantonement. The rockets fell between the eastern runway and the western runway. One Marine in a gun tower was very slightly wounded by a splinter from a rocket which impacted near the tower. There was no other damage reported.

The following day, Army troops were helolifted into the general area where the rockets were fired from. A MAG-13 mission made a strike on the landing zone minutes before the troops went in. The Army unit made no contact and could only locate several rocket carrying cases.

This last attack defied the usual Viet Cong SOP for attacks. It came very early in the evening. Ordinarily the enemy will not start an attack until after 2400, and will choose periods of very low lunar illumination. There was 100 percent lunar illumination on the night of 14 February.

The VC may be trying to tell us that they will strike anytime, any place.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYA JOB WELL DONE

The enemy's Tet offensive appears to have ground to a halt. Several messages have been received by this command expressing the appreciation of a job well done by members of MAG-13 for their part in supporting Free World Military Assistance Forces in defeating the NVA and Viet Cong.

From the Commanding General of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam:

"I extend my personal congratulations and convey as well the official commendation of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, to men and women of the command for outstanding professional performance during the period of the enemy's Tet Truce aggression beginning 29 January 1968.

"Your alertness, aggressiveness, professionalism, and courage--individually, by team, and by unit--add new luster to your outstanding reputation. During one week, in conjunction with the Forces of the Republic of Vietnam and our Free World Allies, you have blunted the enemy's offensive and turned the tables on him. You have destroyed more of the enemy in seven days than the United States has lost in the seven years of war since 1 January 1961.

"I know you share my respect for the admirable performance of the Vietnamese and Free World comrades in arms in this mutual triumph. We are proud to fight side by side with such Allies.

"But we can not relax for a moment. We must continue to stand ready for the enemy's possible second wave attack. As you maintain your resolute alert for what may come next and go on the offensive, again let me assure you of my profound pride in your conduct and performance and my confidence that the defeats we are inflicting on the enemy may measurably shorten the war."

General William C. Westmoreland

From the Commanding General of the First Marine Aircraft Wing:

"The Ordnance personnel of this command have assembled, inspected, and loaded for ultimate use against the insurgent forces who oppose freedom in South Vietnam, 16,289 tons of air delivered munitions during the month of January 1968. This feat is unequalled in the history of the First Marine Aircraft Wing.

"It is with sincere appreciation and a great feeling of pride in your ability that I offer my congratulations for the herculean efforts you have put forth. I am quite confident of your ability to equal or surpass this in the future should the occasion arise."

Major General Norman J. Anderson

It might also be noted that at most bases the day to day work of supporting the air war had to be performed under the ever present threat of enemy ground or heavy weapons attack.

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
25 FEBRUARY 1968TANKS INTRODUCED INTO KHE SANH AREA BY NVA

The North Vietnamese recently used tanks to overwhelm the defenders of the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, southwest of Khe Sanh. The NVA used ten tanks in their 7 February assault. The defenders of the camp and friendly aircraft knocked out seven of the tanks, but the armor gave the enemy enough shock effect to overrun the camp.

Although the enemy armor has been reported in the DMZ before, this is the first time the NVA used tanks against a friendly unit in South Vietnam. Since the fall of Lang Vei, additional tanks have been sighted in the vicinity of Route Nine, southwest of Khe Sanh. In the past week enemy armor was spotted northeast of Con Thien.

The tank in use by the enemy in the Khe Sanh area has been identified as the Russian built PT-76 Amphibious Tank. This tank has been in use by reconnaissance units of the Russian Army since 1952. The PT-76 is completely amphibious, but cannot be used in rough waters in the manner our Amtracs can be employed. The tank is capable of a speed of six miles per hour in water and 21 miles per hour on land.

Since the PT-76 is used primarily for reconnaissance rather than to support infantry assaults, it is comparatively lightly armored. The tank has a maximum armor thickness of one inch and as a result weighs only 15.4 tons. Compared to other tanks of its class the PT-76 is also lightly armed. It mounts only a 76 mm gun and a 7.62 machine gun mounted coaxially with the 76 mm gun.

With two NVA divisions deployed west and southwest of Khe Sanh, it is possible that MAG-13 aircraft will engage this tank in future weeks on CAS and DAS missions.

BDA RECAP

During the week of 15-22 February 1968, MAG-13 aircraft flew missions throughout I Corps in support of the ROK Marine Brigade, U. S. Army units, and Marine operations in northern I Corps.

Bomb damage assessment as reported by Forward Air and Ground Controllers was as follows:

51 structures destroyed and 13 damaged
1 bridge destroyed
12 sampans destroyed and 5 damaged
5 bunkers destroyed
11 KBA

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A War Trophy is defined as an item of enemy property, used as war material, and acquired in the combat zone within a specified period of time. Further, the item must be authorized for retention as a War Trophy by the provisions of existing regulations.

Certain categories of gear, which may be enemy property, may not be taken home as War Trophies. Property of the U. S. Government or of any other allied nation, even if captured from the enemy, is not authorized as War Trophies. The two exceptions to this are the '03 Springfield rifle and the British Enfield rifle, M1917.

With respect to firearms, the following are not permitted as War Trophies: sawed off rifles and shotguns, rifles or shotguns under 26 inches in overall length, weapons capable of automatic or semiautomatic fire (except pistols), weapons over .45 caliber in size, and weapons which can be concealed on the person. Generally, the above are in accordance with the National Firearms Act of 1934, and welding the barrel shut or discarding essential parts does not make the weapon an authorized war trophy.

Homemade weapons or modified commercial weapons are also prohibited along with live ammunitions, explosives, flammables of any type, and nameplates from any type of equipment.

An authorized War Trophy must also be screened by intelligence. If the item is found to have no intelligence value, it may then be taken home as a War Trophy. Items required for intelligence vary from time to time, and it cannot be flatly stated which items must be retained for intelligence. Enemy equipment is not only required for intelligence study, but is also used for training and instructional purposes.

Should an individual desire to take a piece of enemy equipment home as a War Trophy, the first step is to take the item to Group S-2 for intelligence screening and for issuance of two certificates, if the item meets the requirements for an authorized War Trophy. The owner will be issued the Certificate of Intelligence Screening and the War Trophy Registration/Authorization Form. If the item is a firearm, an additional certificate is required, the Registration of War Trophy Firearms.

It must be emphasized that no War Trophy will be permitted to enter the United States without all required certificates. All War Trophies must be hand carried and presented for inspection along with the required certificates. No War Trophies may be sent to the United States through the mail.

Some units and individuals continue to use captured enemy equipment. This violates a MACV directive for handling, reporting, and exploitation of captured enemy material. All enemy equipment, regardless of type, must be turned into intelligence.

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