

HEADQUARTERS

Marine Aircraft Group-13
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
 FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3:SLB:dlh
 5750
 Ser: 003A10468

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: Command Chronology Period 1-31 March 1968

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
 (b) WgO 5750.1C

Encl: (1) ✓ MAG-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 March 1968
 ✓ H&MS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 March 1968
 ✓ MABS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 March 1968
 ✓ VMFA-323 Command Chronology Period 1-31 March 1968
 ✓ VMFA-314 Command Chronology Period 1-31 March 1968
 ✓ VMFA-115 Command Chronology Period 1-31 March 1968

Encls
 Sep

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the subject report is submitted as enclosures (1) through (6).

2. Upon removal from the subject report this letter is downgraded to Unclassified.

J. H. Berger
 J. H. Berger

MAG-13	
S&C #	68-534
#1	

1st MAW S&C No.	Copy No.
1561-68	1

DECLASSIFIED

MAG-13

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

FOR

1-31 MARCH 1968

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

PART ONE: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. Commanders and Staff

a. Headquarters, MAG-13 (1-31 March)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
EDWARD N. LE FAIVRE	CO (1-24 MAR)	COL	COL	
JAMES H. BERGE JR.	CO (25-31 MAR)	COL	COL	
PHILIP D. SHUTLER	XO	LTCOL	LTCOL	
MARTIN J. BASAR	ADJ	CAPT	WO-1	
ANTHONY B. KOUMA	SGTMAJ (1-11 MAR)	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ	
LEONARD R. LANG	SGTMAJ (12-31 MAR)	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ	
CARL E. R. BLACK	S-1	MAJ	MAJ	
ROGER A. CURLEY	S-2	MAJ	MAJ	
FRANK D. TOPLEY	S-3 (1-8 MAR)	LTCOL	LTCOL	
ROY A. SEAVER	S-3 (9-31 MAR)	LTCOL	LTCOL	
DON J. SLEE	S-4	LTCOL	LTCOL	

b. H&MS-13 (1-31 March)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
PAUL L. SIEGMUND	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL	
HARRY E. TAYLOR	XO	MAJ	MAJ	
JAMES S. GAHAGAN	S-3	MAJ	MAJ	
HAROLD G. DEAN	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	LTCOL	
HARRY R. SMITH	ADMINO	LT	1STLT	

c. MABS-13 (1-31 March)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
LEROY A. MADERA	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL	
JOHN I. HUDSON	XO	MAJ	MAJ	
HAROLD E. WILSON	ADMINO	CAPT	CWO-4	
GEORGE W. FRITSCHI	BASEOPSO	MAJ	MAJ	
DANIEL I. CARROLL	BASESERVO	MAJ	MAJ	
CALEB G. DUNN	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ	

d. VMFA-323 (1-31 March)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
HARRY T. HAGAMAN	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL	
PAUL G. BOOZMAN	XO	MAJ	MAJ	
HENRY G. MILLER JR.	S-3	MAJ	MAJ	
EDWARD R. BAILEY	S-1	LT	MAJ	
PHILIP R. KRUSE	S-4	WO	CAPT	
WARREN A. FERDINAND	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ	

e. VMFA-314 (1-31 March)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>RANK</u> <u>ACTUAL</u>
HERBERT V. LUNDIN	CO		LTCOL LTCOL
ROBERT H. SCHULTZ	XO		MAJ LTCOL
RONALD W. KRON	S-3 (1-9 MAR)		MAJ MAJ
PHILLIP L. ELLIOT	S-3 (10-31 MAR)		MAJ MAJ
PHILIP M. HINKLE	S-1		LT MAJ
JOHN M. HERRING	S-2		LT CAPT
MARTIN W. MEREDITH	S-4		WO MAJ
GERALD E. WALSH	A/C MAINTO		MAJ MAJ

f. VMFA-115 (1-31 March)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>RANK</u> <u>ACTUAL</u>
GERALD W. VAUGHAN	CO		LTCOL LTCOL
CARL L. BATTISTONE	XO (1 MAR)		MAJ LTCOL
JACOB W. MOORE	XO (2-31 MAR)		MAJ MAJ
JACOB W. MOORE	S-3 (1 MAR)		MAJ MAJ
HENRY O. GROOMS	S-3 (2-31 MAR)		MAJ MAJ
DARRELL R. GRIFFING	S-1		LT CAPT
ROBERT E. BARKER	S-2		LT LT
DENIS L. SHORTAL	S-4		WO CAPT
JAMES R. THROGMORTON	A/C MAINTO		MAJ MAJ

2. Task Organization and Unit Location

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>COMMANDING OFFICER</u>	<u>DATE OF OFFICE</u>
MAG-13	CHU LAI, RVN	COL EDWARD N. LE FAIVRE	1-24 March
MAG-13	CHU LAI, RVN	COL JAMES H. BERGE	25-31 March
H&MS-13	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL PAUL L. SIEGMUND	1-31 March
MABS-13	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL LEROY A. MADERA	1-31 March
VMFA-115	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL GERALD W. VAUGHAN	1-31 March
VMFA-314	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL HERBERT V. LUNDIN	1-31 March
VMFA-323	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL HARRY T. HAGAMAN	1-31 March

3. Average Monthly Strength

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>USMC</u>				<u>USN</u>	
	<u>NA</u>	<u>NFO</u>	<u>AG</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
H&MS-13	*16	6	24	418	0	0
MABS-13	4		16	412	5	21
VMFA-115	15	14	4	252	1	4
VMFA-314	17	14	4	243	1	0
VMFA-323	15	14	4	244	1	0
Group	67	48	52	1569	8	25

* This figure includes one NAP - MGySgt J. A. CONROY

4. Important Visitors to the Command

Major General THARIN, Deputy Commander, FMFPac, visited the Group while touring Chu Lai on 22 March.

Colonel TREADWELL from FMFPac Headquarters and his inspection team visited Chu Lai for the purpose of inspecting MAG-13. The inspection team inspected all areas of interest in MAG-13 and after three days departed the area. Results of the inspection will be used by MAG-13 to improve any weak areas that may exist.

PART TWO: NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Marine Aircraft Group-13 flew 1971 sorties for 2244.5 combat hours in March. 4245.015 tons of ordnance were dropped by this Group.

Operations supported included Kentucky, Niagra, Scotland, Wheeler/Wallowa, Lancaster II, Samauri IV, Salina, Muscatine, Jeb Stuart, Worth, Houston and Napoleon. Missions flown included Close Air Support, Direct Air Support, Visual Reconnaissance and TPQ.

The Khe Sanh area was the main target for MAG-13 aircraft. Both TPQ and visual dive bombing were used extensively to thwart the massive NVA/VC build up in that area.

Significant BDA included 177 KBA confirmed, 91 KBA probable, 222 structures destroyed and 66 structures damaged. (Complete list in paragraph 9, PART THREE)

PART THREE: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. Personnel. During the month of March, Marine Aircraft Group-13 had a loss of twenty (20) officers and one hundred and ninety-seven (197) enlisted personnel due to rotation and transfers. During this same period, seventeen (17) officers and two hundred and forty (240) enlisted personnel reported to the Group for duty.

2. Awards. There were two (2) Distinguished Flying Crosses, five hundred and ninety-nine (599) Air Medals, one (1) Navy Achievement Medal and thirteen (13) Meritorious Mast received by members of this command during the month of March.

3. Casualties

Non-hostile

a. Total for March	25
b. Total returned to duty	22
c. Total MedEvac	5
d. Total number of man days lost	145

Hostile

a. Killed in Action	0
b. Wounded in Action	0
c. Missing in Action	0

4. Civic Action. March brought about an increase in the number of MED CAPS to the villages of Long Phu II and An Tan. A MED CAP conducted by VMFA-115 resulted in the innoculation of 300 children.

As a result of the 25 March VC mortar attack on An Tan, 21 people are homeless. MAG-13 provided clothing (which had been privately donated to MAG-13 Civic Action) for 15 children and 6 adults. Building materials are being sought to rebuild the destroyed homes.

Captain Robert E. KAIN JR. is the new Civic Action Officer as Captain John DAY returned to the states on the 20th of March.

5. Intelligence. Briefing and debriefing of aircrews and orientations to new aircrews were conducted. Publication of the weekly S-2 "Tactical Brief" continued (See Supporting Documents, Part Four). The booklet "Who are the Viet Cong" has been distributed on a continuing basis to all Officers and SNCO's.

General Intelligence briefs are given each Thursday by the Group Intelligence Officer for Sergeants and below. Weekly Intelligence briefs are also given to the Group Guard concerned mainly with the Chu Lai TAOR.

6. Industrial Relations. MAG-13 presently has thirty three (33) Local Nationalist Citizens (LNC) under employment.

7. Airfield Operations. All facilities are operational on the West Field. The sites for the installation of the E-28 arresting gear are now under construction. The E-28 gear will be located 1300' from each end of the West Field. The south site and gear is estimated to be operational by 7 April 1968.

The controlled take-off and landings at Chu Lai totaled 40,084 which is an all time record for Chu Lai Air Base. The launch and recovery section arrested 1,065 aircraft of which 24 were declared emergencies.

8. Combat Operations

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Hours</u>
H&MS-13 TA-4F	61	78.4
	61	46.7
VMFA-323 F-4B	585	671.1
VMFA-314 F-4B	686	778.3
VMFA-115 F-4B	<u>578</u>	<u>670.0</u>
Total	1971	2244.5

Operations Supported

Kentucky	Wheeler/Wallowa	Salina
Niagra	Lancaster II	Jeb Stuart
Scotland	Samauri IV	Worth
Houston	Napoleon	Steel Tiger
		Tally Ho

Significant Bomb Damage Assessment

KBA (Confirmed)	177
KBA (Probable)	91
Structures (Destroyed)	222
Structures (Damaged)	66
Bunkers (Destroyed)	209
Bunkers (Damaged)	42
Secondary Explosions	11
Secondary Fires	23
Fighting Holes	30 Des
Road Cuts	17

Trucks	3 Des/2 Dam
Mortar Positions	4 Des/1 Dam
Automatic Weapons Positions	25 Des
Trench Line	2460 Meters Des
Anti-Aircraft Positions	1
Artillery Piece Destroyed	2

9. Base Development. During the month of March the MABS-13 Utilities Section completed over eighty (80) written and verbal work requests. The requests varied from small jobs, such as the installation and repair of Air Conditioners, to larger jobs like the completion of the 450 K.V.A. transformer bank for the mess hall. The Water Point supplied approximately 2,100,000 gallons of water for the personnel in the MAG-13 contonement.

10. Morale/Welfare. MAG-13 church attendance remains high in Catholic, Protestant and Latter Day Saints services. During the month the Group Catholic Chaplain celebrated Mass to the 1/46th on Hill 54, 9th Engineers on Hill 35 and the 197 LIB.

Along with church services the chaplains work on counseling and interviews, Red Cross Cases and visit the hospital in the Chu Lai area. The Catholic Chaplain has been standing the Duty Chaplain at the 2nd Surgical Hospital.

R&R continues to maintain high morale within this command. ~~Mostly~~ All quotas for R&R were filled.

11. Training. Normal on-the-job/technical training continued within each unit of the Group. The following formal schools were utilized by MAG-13 in March:

<u>School</u>	<u>Personnel Attending</u>
NCO Leadership	3
Embarcation School	3
Corrosion Control	5
Vietnamese Language	1
Nuclear Weapons Refresher	2
Clubs and Mess Management	1
VHF 101 Radio	1
Transistor Fundamentals	2
Personal Response	25
	—
Total attending =	43

12. Electronic Countermeasures. The use of the "Shoe Horn" ECM/Warning Equipment continued as the majority of missions flown by MAG-13 were in the SAM Hi threat areas. Installation of "Shoe Horn" equipment continues as aircraft are available for induction.

SECRET

PART FOUR: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- ✓ I MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF DTD 3 MARCH 1968
- ✓ II MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF DTD 17 MARCH 1968
- ✓ III MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF DTD 24 MARCH 1968
- ✓ IV MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF DTD 31 MARCH 1968

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYNOT TO BE REMOVED FROM
MAG-13 CANTONEMENT

TO BE DESTROYED BY BURNING ONLY

THIS INFORMATION IS
TO BE POSTED ON UNIT
BULLETIN BOARD ONLYMAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
3 MARCH 1968THE LINEUP IN LAOS

Somewhat obscured by the NVA/VC Tet offensive has been the intensification of the communist effort to take over the supposedly neutral country of Laos. No doubt the communist effort in Laos is somewhat related to the forthcoming showdown at Khe Sanh. The NVA must supply any attack on Khe Sanh through Laos. As the communists push further into Laos, the more secure their supply routes become, both via the Ho Chi Minh Trail from North Vietnam and the Sihanouk Trail through Cambodia and Laos.

Understanding the situation in Laos is difficult because of the different factions fighting in the country. The anti-communist forces of the Kingdom of Laos are the Royal Armed Forces (FAR). The FAR has an Army, an Air Force, and a River Flotilla. All the Laotian government's armed forces are dependent on foreign aid for their maintenance.

The Pathet Lao is the military force of the Laotian Communist Party. The avowed objective of the Pathet Lao is to take over the entire country. The Geneva Conference of 1954 established Laos as a neutral country, with the Pathet Lao cooperating in a coalition government. However, the coalition collapsed in 1959 and Laos has been in a state of civil war since. In recent years the Pathet Lao have been supported by increasing numbers of North Vietnamese Army troops. The Laotians consider the NVA to be the Viet Minh. There are also several dissident neutralist groups who are somewhat loosely allied with the communists. These groups represent minority ethnic groups who are either disenchanted with the Royal Laotian government or who find cooperation with the communists to be profitable.

Complicating the situation is the Neutralist Army of Kong Le. Kong Le is a former Laotian Army officer who took over the government in a coup in 1960. His army was eventually ousted from the Laotian capital and he allied himself with the Pathet Lao. In 1962 he had a falling out with the communists and has fought them since. However, Kong Le has resisted the integration of his army into the Laotian army and continues to be an independent force.

For the past few years, the situation in Laos was more or less stabilized with the communists controlling the mountainous eastern half of Laos. The government maintained control of the more populated western lowlands and plateaus. Since December, the communists, primarily NVA, have threatened the southern Laotian cities of Attopeu and Saravane. At one point in southern Laos the communists penetrated to within 33 miles of the Mekong River. In the north, the communists recently overran a government outpost, 50 miles from the capital city of Vientiane.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THE COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM

The Combined Action Program was initiated in August 1965 and has grown to about 90 platoons throughout I Corps. The basic unit in this joint US-ARVN program is the Combined Action Platoon (CAP). The CAP is made up of a Marine rifle squad and a Navy Corpsman, along with a 35-man Popular Forces Platoon. The Marine squad leader does not command the PFs, rather he advises the PF platoon leader. On the other hand, the PF platoon leader does not command the Marines. The emphasis in the Combined Action Program is on cooperation rather than a strict chain of command. In practice, a Marine fire team will work with one PF squad. The Marines, being experienced infantrymen, attempt to transmit their skill and knowledge to the PFs, who are citizen soldiers, serving in the defense of their own communities. After a PF platoon becomes self-sufficient, the Marine squad will move to a new location. The result for the hamlet is a well-trained and motivated home defense force.

A group of Combined Action Platoons in a particular operating area are formed into a Combined Action Company (CACO). The CACO is commanded by a Lieutenant or a Captain, who also has a small company headquarters group. In a particular region, the CACOs are organized into a Combined Action Group (CAG). The CAG administers personnel and supplies for all its CAPs and coordinates with the Vietnamese authorities.

One CAG is headquartered here at Chu Lai and controls the CAPs in southern I Corps. The CAG controls three CACOs. CACO Lima is to the south of Chu Lai, generally in Binh Son District. To the northwest of Chu Lai, in Ly Tin District, is CACO Kilo. CACO India is fairly new, and operates in the northwestern part of the Chu Lai TAOR. This CACO will soon establish CAPs in the vicinity of Tam Ky, 17 miles northwest of Chu Lai.

The local CAPs have had some outstanding successes in recent months. In January, a group of Marines and PFs from CAP L-5 teamed up with an Army platoon to raid a VC rest center, at An Cuong, 16 miles southeast of Chu Lai. The combined task force killed 33 VC and scattered 300 others with no friendly losses.

One of the CACO Kilo platoons ambushed a VC sapper unit on Ky Hoa Island after the VC had made a successful sapper attack on an Army helo pad. The CAP killed four VC and captured one other. These were the only casualties inflicted on the VC in that particular operation. The pris. gave information which enabled friendly intelligence to piece together the entire enemy operation.

Many of the local CAP units were harrassed by enemy ground and mortar attacks during the recent Tet offensive. None suffered anything more than very light casualties and none were in any danger of being overrun.

It is difficult to evaluate the CAP Program at this time because the Program will be expanded in the future and methods of operation are constantly scrutinized. It can be said that in the Chu Lai area, the Viet Cong have never been able to control the villagers after a CAP unit has moved in.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

VC BOOBY TRAPS

The current threat of VC terrorist activity requires all personnel maintain continuous vigilance for clandestine devices designed to inflict injury to personnel and damage to Allied equipment.

Recently in the Saigon area, a U. S. vehicle at an enlisted quarters was booby trapped. The trap was designed to cause a M-26 grenade to detonate when the vehicle's clutch was depressed. In this case the grenade was discovered by the intended victims before the driver started the vehicle. EOD was called and the trap was dismantled. This terrorist attempt was made during daylight hours in a densely populated area.

About a week ago, in a large city south of Chu Lai, an ARVN jeep was booby trapped while its passengers were in a restaurant. In this case, the trap was not detected. All the passengers in the jeep were killed when the trap detonated.

All personnel are cautioned that good judgement and alertness can reduce the effectiveness of enemy booby trap tactics. A suspicious attitude may save a life or valuable equipment.

YOU THINK YOU HAVE PROBLEMS?

The following is a letter to the editor that appeared in an East Coast hometown newspaper:

"I have a complaint to make against the draft board. I do not find it just to sit down and do nothing about an idea in which I and a great majority of Americans believe.

"I am for the Vietnam War and strongly believe in the American viewpoint of Communist containment. My problem is that I want to enlist in the Army, but neither the Army nor any of the other branches wants me. I tried three times to enlist but was rejected every time.

"I am not an American citizen and the country whence I came does not share my feelings about Vietnam or the American viewpoint. I hold a student visa which supplies the draft board with an excuse to refuse my application for enlistment.

"I have been in the United States for a little less than three years. A number of my best friends have been and are still being drafted. I would like very much to go over and fight alongside my American friends for a cause for which I am willing to give my life. Please tell me if there is anything that I can do. I am extending my plea to the American public who, through democracy, can do something about my situation. Thank you."

SERGE IVARO

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOT BE REMOVED FROM
MAG-13 CANTONEMENT

TO BE DESTROYED BY BURNING ONLY

THIS INFORMATION IS
TO BE POSTED ON UNIT
BULLETIN BOARDS ONLY

MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
17 MARCH 1968

ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE CHU LAI AREA

The only significant contacts with the enemy in the past week have been south of Chu Lai. On 14 March, Marines and Popular Forces soldiers of CAP Lima-3 gave chase to several VC and ended up engaging a platoon sized VC force. This engagement took place eight miles southeast of MAG-13. The PFs and Marines killed three VC and captured three others. In addition, 70 pounds of TNT were captured and a tunnel complex was located and destroyed. There were no friendly casualties in this engagement.

At 2000 on 13 March, a patrol from CAP L-4 spotted a loaded sampan in the Tra Bong River, six miles southeast of MAG-13. The sampan refused to stop for inspection and was fired on by the CAP patrol. An Americal River Patrol Boat was called in. The patrol boat took the VC sampan under fire, causing a secondary explosion. The explosion completely destroyed the sampan. Nine VC bodies were recovered, and it is believed that the other four VC on the sampan were also killed.

The District Headquarters at Binh Son received four rounds of mortar fire and small arms fire on the evening of 15 March. There were no friendly casualties. Binh Son was also mortared on 7 March resulting in damage to one building.

In the Operation Muscatine area, east and south of Binh Son, contact had been negligible until the morning of 16 March. Army ground troops once again made contact with the Viet Cong battalion which operates below the Batangan Peninsula, 22 miles southeast of MAG-13. By 0900 on 16 March, Americal ground units and gunships had accounted for 90 VC killed and friendly units were still in contact.

Although there has been little contact with the enemy in the immediate Chu Lai area, the enemy appears to be intensifying his booby traps and mine warfare campaign against friendly troops. There have also been many civilian casualties as a result of the enemy's indiscriminate placing of booby traps. Enemy booby traps constantly take new forms. As an example, about ten days ago, an Americal soldier bought a silver cigarette lighter in An Tan. The lighter was booby-trapped and caused minor injury to the owner. A check revealed that seven other men in the same unit had purchased the same type of lighter.

Occassionally, the enemy's booby traps will backfire on him. On 9 March, an Army patrol came on two Viet Cong planting a mine in a road ten miles south of MAG-13. In their haste to escape, the VC detonated the mine. Both VC were killed in the explosion.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

On the same day, Army MPs discovered a 155 mm artillery round 12 meters off Highway One. The round was found two miles below the main gate to Chu Lai Base, right across the road from the base perimeter. Quite possibly, this was a dud round with which the VC planned to mine Highway One. This is a particularly heavily travelled stretch of road.

Although contact with the enemy may be sparse, there is still plenty of evidence that the Viet Cong are still in the immediate Chu Lai area.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE NOTE

During his recent offensives, the enemy succeeded in stealing and counterfeiting documents used by both Vietnamese and U. S. military personnel. These documents included identification cards, transportation authorizations, leave papers, operational orders, civilian ID cards, and passes allowing entrance to military compounds. By use of forged passes, the enemy was in some cases able to gain entrance to strategic areas prior to the launching of an attack.

The enemy has also used friendly military equipment to either escape detection or pass through friendly checkpoints. To an untrained American eye, it is difficult to tell VC wearing stolen equipment from ARVN troops. To an aerial observer, it is also difficult to tell a group of VC wearing Marine flak jackets, helmets, and web gear from a Marine unit on patrol.

It is emphasized that, regardless of classification, no documents or forms be permitted to fall into enemy hands. Group Orders require that all paper be burned. All military equipment, whether serviceable or not, should be turned into the proper channels rather than being carelessly discarded.

MAG-13 BDA RECAP

During the week of 3-15 March, MAG-13 aircraft flew missions in support of Marine, Army, and ROK Marine operations throughout I Corps. Bomb Damage Assessment as reported by air and ground Forward Air Controllers included:

25 VC or NVA Killed By Air
 67 structures destroyed and 38 damaged
 21 bunkers destroyed and 3 damaged
 1 truck destroyed and 1 damaged
 19 secondary explosions and 0 secondary fires
 1 road cut
 1 automatic weapons position destroyed
 1 mortar position destroyed
 715 meters of trench lines destroyed

It should be noted that the above BDA is only part of the actual total. In many cases, controllers are not able to accurately assess BDA because of hostile fire. Also the target may be obscured by smoke or haze. Many MAG-13 missions are also radar controlled and the impacts are not actually observed.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOT TO BE REMOVED FROM
THE MAG-13 CANTONEMENT

TO BE DESTROYED BY BURNING ONLY

THIS INFORMATION
IS TO BE POSTED
ON UNIT BULLETIN
BOARDS ONLY

MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF

24 MARCH 1968

NEW VC WEAPONS: THE VERY OLD AND THE VERY NEW

In the early days of the Vietnam war, many Viet Cong units were armed with obsolete rifles, homemade mortars, and such gear as they could capture from Government troops. Today, thanks to his outside sources of supply, even the Local Force Viet Cong are armed with a complete inventory of modern weapons, from the AK-47 Assualt Rifle to 122 mm rockets.

Since the Tet Offensive, Allied intelligence have found evidence of three new weapons used by the VC. Going back to the Middle Ages concept of catapulting rocks or fire bombs into enemy-held fortresses, the Viet Cong have recently been catapulting satchel charges into friendly installations. The VC place a "kicker" charge next to a standard satchel charge in a sloped trench. When the kicker charge is detonated, the satchel charge will be hurled up to 300 meters by the blast. Thus, the charge can easily clear obstacles from some distance outside friendly lines. Thus far, the catapulted charges have yet to do any particular damage to friendly positions.

In keeping with their war of terrorism and sabotage, the Viet Cong have developed an explosive charge which to the untrained eye looks exactly like an ordinary building block. The blocks are gray in color, similar to mixed concrete. Each block weighs about 30 pounds. EOD experts have estimated that a single block contains enough explosive to knock out an ordinary size highway bridge. Since Tet, this device has been discovered at three bridge sites in I Corps.

The 122 mm rocket has been in use by the VC/NVA forces for over a year. It gave the enemy a portable artillery which could reach friendly installations from miles away. However, this weapon requires many porters for both the rockets and the launcher. Recently, an even more portable rocket has been employed by the enemy. This weapon is the Chinese Communist-manufactured 107 mm spin stabilized rocket. While this rocket is similar to the 122 mm rocket in its employment, it weighs only 42 pounds completely assembled. The 122 mm rocket weighs 105 pounds and must be broken down into three parts for transport. The 107 mm rocket is three feet long, fully assembled, and thus can be carried easily by one man. The range of the 107 mm rocket is about 9000 meters, just 2000 meters less than the range of the heavier 122 mm rocket.

The 107 mm rocket has not been employed in I Corps as of yet. During Tet, it was used against friendly installation in the southern part of Vietnam.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED MATTER

Security Violations result from bad habits and often pose a threat to national security. Security violations take on a more serious aspect when they occur in installations located in foreign countries because of their greater vulnerability to hostile exploitation. If a specific type of security violation is repeated, it is an indication of a bad habit.

These bad habits are usually the result of haste, inconvenience, or plain carelessness in the daily handling of classified information.

The Officer conducting an investigation for a document that cannot be accounted for frequently reaches the conclusion that the document was probably inadvertently destroyed. This could be so, but on the other hand, the document could be in existence and in the possession of hostile intelligence.

The only violations known, of course, are those that have been discovered and reported. No one will ever know how many have actually occurred, but were not discovered.

The most common violations of security are:

1. A safe left open overnight,
2. Classified documents left unsecured overnight,
3. The discussion of classified information over the telephone.

All personnel must be aware of their security responsibilities. Report all security violations, whether actual or suspected, to Group S-2 for further investigation.

MAG-13 BDA RECAP

During the week of 15-22 March 1968, MAG-13 aircraft flew missions in support of Operations Scotland, Lancaster, Kentucky, Napoleon/Saline, Samurai IV, Worth, and Wheeler/Wallowa. MAG-13 aircraft had an unusually productive week and were credited with the following Bomb Damage Assessment:

35 NVA or VC Killed by Marine Air
39 structures destroyed and 16 damaged
72 bunkers destroyed (including one supply bunker) and 10 damaged
2 bridges damaged
1 truck destroyed
5 road cuts
13 secondary explosions and 6 secondary fires
2 recoilless rifle positions destroyed
7 automatic weapons positions destroyed
1 mortar position destroyed and 2 damaged
1 artillery position destroyed
1 anti-aircraft artillery position damaged
370 meters of trenchline destroyed

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THE ARVN GI:

Our counterpart in the Vietnamese Armed Forces uses American weapons, American equipment, and is often supported by American aircraft and artillery. However, the terms under which he serves are vastly different from the terms an American serviceman agrees to serve under.

While an American serviceman signs for a given length of service, the ARVN soldier is enlisted for the duration of the war. His term of service is considered to date from January 1, regardless of when he actually entered the armed forces.

During his six weeks of basic training, the ARVN soldier covers the same military subjects as an American soldier. After basic training, the infantrymen receive three addition weeks of Advanced Infantry Training. Those soldiers assigned to other MOSs will receive either formal school training or in many job classifications, on the job training.

The ARVN soldier's pay depends on his rank and the size of his family. An ARVN private with a wife and child receives about 45 dollars per month. A sergeant with a wife and two children receives about 64 dollars monthly. An ARVN lieutenant with a wife and three children earns about 100 dollars per month. The ARVN soldier also receives special pay for certain jobs, such as hazardous duty pay and flight pay. Unlike all in-country U. S. servicemen, the ARVN soldier does not receive hostile fire pay.

The ARVN soldier receives medical care for both himself and his family. Recently a PX system was established which will enable the ARVN soldier to save money in the purchase of some staple food items.

OPERATION MUSCATE

Last week, units of the Americal Division moved into an area in which American units rarely operate. Two Army companies mauled a VC battalion with the assistance of supporting arms. The encounter took place in the Operation Muscatine area, 20 miles southeast of MAG-13 on 15 March.

When an Americal company on a sweep operation ran into enemy opposition, a second company was combat assualted into a blocking position north of the enemy unit. The area between the two Americal companies was subjected to artillery bombardment and was worked over by gunships. The two companies then advanced towards each other against sporadic enemy fire. A total of 123 Viet Cong bodies were found on the battlefield. The enemy survivors apparently had some time to police the battlefield as only three individual weapons were captured, along with 40 60 mm mortar rounds.

The Army lost two men killed and ten wounded. Nearly all the friendly casualties were due to mines and booby traps.

Operation Muscatine started in late December and has thus far accounted for over 900 enemy killed in action. Three crew served weapons and 163 individual weapons have been captured.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOT TO BE REMOVED FROM
MAG-13 CANTONEMENT

TO BE DESTROYED BY BURNING ONLY

THIS INFORMATION IS
TO BE POSTED ON UNIT
BULLETIN BOARDS ONLY

MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
31 MARCH 1968

LOCAL ENEMY ACTIVITY

Each month during the period of low lunar illumination, the local Viet Cong manage to initiate some sort of attack on friendly unit or installations in the Chu Lai area. This may be a large scale attack such as the attack on Ly Tin District Headquarters on 2 January or the Tet rocket attacks on Chu Lai. The enemy may also mount some sort of harrassing attack such as the 5 March attack on the Sand Ramp. A harrassing attack may do little damage to friendly installations. However, the local populace are once again reminded that there are still VC in the area and they are still capable of offensive action.

The VC carried out a series of attacks on the morning of 25 March, when the 9th Engineers, An Tan village headquarters, and the An Tan Bridge were all hit. At about 0100, mortar rounds started falling in and around the 9th Engineer Battalion compound. In a four minute period, the enemy fired about 25 rounds. Friendly casualties were light and damage to facilities was negligible.

The mortar fire came from south of the An Tan Bridge along the An Tan River, behind the hamlet of Tich Tay. The MPs at the bridge did not observe the mortars being fired because the VC took the bridge under small arms fire at the same time.

A second group of VC meanwhile moved on An Tan. Several mortar rounds landed in a group of houses on the main street of An Tan. The enemy's target was probably the village headquarters right across the street. However, the rounds were short of their target and destroyed three houses and injured 21 people.

Outside of An Tan, the Popular Forces soldiers intercepted a group of Viet Cong who were moving into An Tan. The VC were driven off after an exchange of small arms fire. The PFs believe that this VC force was a sapper party moving in to destroy government facilities in An Tan.

Based on past experience, the Viet Cong will not initiate an attack if there is more than 40 percent lunar illumination. This figure will not be reached until 5 April. Quite possibly there may be another round of VC attacks by then. There are indications that the enemy is planning another attack against the cities of South Vietnam. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that Chu Lai would also be one of the targets, to tie up aircraft which might otherwise be supporting friendly units elsewhere in I Corps.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYTHE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

The Vietnamese Government's Chieu Hoi Program provides amnesty to persons who had previously supported the activities of the Viet Cong or NVA, and who voluntarily decide to return to the side of the Government. The word "Chieu" means to appeal, while "Hoi" means to return.

The Chieu Hoi Program weakens the enemy by loss of personnel by defections. In addition, the Government gains valuable intelligence information and can utilize the services of returnees in both tactical and psychological operations. Tactical support includes locating and identifying enemy personnel and locating enemy weapons and supply caches. Psychological operations support includes writing letters by Hoi Chanhs (Chieu Hoi ralliers) to the remaining enemy and making tape recordings for aerial and ground loudspeaker broadcasts to encourage other defections.

Under the Chieu Hoi program, defectors are given food, clothing, shelter, safety, the opportunity to be reunited with their families. The Hoi Chanhs may also be given vocational training or jobs.

After defecting, the Hoi Chanh is retained for two months in one of the 52 Chieu Hoi centers located at province, Corps, or national levels. High ranking defectors are sent to the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon, where political indoctrination is most intense. There are six Chieu Hoi centers in I Corps, one in each province plus one in Danang.

In I Corps, some of the Hoi Chanhs have entered the Kit Carson Scout Program, which was initiated by the Marines, but which has now been adopted by all Free World Military Assistance Forces in I Corps. Many enemy weapons have been captured by the Americal Division in their TAOR as a result of information provided by Hoi Chanhs.

In early 1968, an entire Viet Cong Platoon rallied to the Government in the Americal's Wheeler/Wallowa operating area. More recently, the entire VC infrastructure of the village of Phu Dien in the Wheeler/Wallowa area defected to the government. Constant and effective allied operations in their area had convinced them they were on the losing side.

WHAT'S HAPPENING?

One of the best methods of combatting rumor spreading in a command is a systematic and effective troop information program. MAG-13 S-2 attempts to provide such a program by means of this weekly Tactical Brief. However, the amount and type of information which can be disseminated in a Brief of this nature is limited by both space and security considerations.

Much addition information can be passed at an oral brief. Thursday is MAG-13's briefing day. Three briefs are presented:

At 1300, Group Guard is briefed at the Enlisted Club. All Officers and Staff NCOs are briefed at 1530 in the Staff Club, followed by a brief for Sergeants and below at 1600 in the Enlisted Club.

All three briefs last about 25 minutes.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYROCKET ATTACK WARNINGS

In the four previous rocket attacks on Chu Lai Air Base, the alert siren did not sound until the rockets had impacted. However, in each attack the control tower saw the rocket trails in the sky. To give additional warning to troops in the living area and to night crews, the tower will flash the word of the rocket sightings to the Operations Duty Officer, who will then sound the alert siren.

The rocket trails are visible in the sky for two or three seconds after launching. The flight time of a 122 mm rocket varies with the range. Flight time is about half-a-minute at 3000 meters to almost a full minute at the maximum range of 11,000 meters. The rockets that have hit Chu Lai have all come from a range near the maximum.

Personnel will now have some time to get under cover before the first impacts.

KEYS TO UNDERSTANDING

There may be as many reasons for being in Vietnam as there are Americans. Some will say they were ordered here and that is reason enough.

Many men find deeper reasons for being in Vietnam after they arrive and see for themselves the plight of the people and VC terrorism.

There has never been a question about which 100 percent of the people agreed on 100 percent of the time. The very nature of our government at home encourages free speech and allows people to think for themselves. One of the basic reasons for having a Marine Corps is to protect the liberties of our people at home including those who disagree with us.

Another reason for having a Marine Corps is the value we attach to Human Life. It is precisely because every human life is valuable that brave men go out to put their lives on the line to protect those whose lives are threatened.

For some Marines, the larger picture is more important. Most of the members of the South East Asia Treaty Organization are now represented in Vietnam with troops, engineer or air support, or medical teams. These countries are constantly aware of the threat to their safety if communist expansion goes unchecked. Many smaller countries, which exist in mortar range of communist states, are keenly watching the conflict to see if we keep our word to answer the Republic of Vietnam's request for assistance.

From the FMFPac Unit Leader's Personal Response Handbook)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY