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Namine Aircraft Group-13 lst Tamine Aircraft Ming Theet Marine Force, Pacific TTC, Can Francisco, California 96602

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From: Cormanding Officer

To: Corrending General, 1st Marine Aircraft Ming

Subj: Command Chronology Period 1-30 April 1968

Ref: (a) 1730 5750.2A (b) 750 5750.13

Corrend Chronology Feriod 1-30 April 1968
(2) UNIG-13 Corrend Chronology Period 1-30 April 1968
(3) FAPS-13 Corrend Chronology Period 1-30 April 1968
(4) WEA-323 Corrend Chronology Period 1-30 April 1968
(5) WEA-314 Corrend Chronology Period 1-30 April 1968
(6) WEA-115 Corrend Chronology Period 1-30 April 1968


- 1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the subject report is submitted as enclosures (1) through (6).
- 2. Upon removal from the subject report this letter is downgraded to Unclassified.

PHILIP D. SHAMLER BY DIRECTION

揮動 1974-68 1

MAG-13 S&C # 68- 681

APR :



# TARY OFF: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

# 1. Commanders and Staff

a. Headquarters, MC-13 (1-30 April)

a. Beadquarters, 1905-13 (1	-30 April)	
MACA	DILLET	T/O ACTUAL
JAMES H. TOWN JR. PULLE D. GHUTER PACTUL J. DACE IMOUARD R. LAUG GARLE. R. WAGE ROCER A. GRRIPY PULLTAN H. ALLEN ROY A. GRACER DON J. SIME	50 ADJ SGTAJ S-1 S-2 (1-18 Apr) S-2 (19-30 Apr) S-3 S-4	GOL GOL LEGOL VIGOL GAFT NO GOMENT GOMENT LIAT LIAT LIAT LIAT LEGOL LEGOL LEGOL LEGOL
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d. WFA-323 (1-30 April)		RAINC
<u>la e</u>	BILLTT	T/O ACTUAL
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# e. WTA-314 (1-30 April)

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# f. 771-115 (1-30 Apr)

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DARRY, R. GRETTHIC	S-1 (1-22 Apr)	$T_{i}$	Cabi
MILIAN J. CRITTIN	S-1 (23-30 Apr)	ĽŢ	TAJ
ROTERT T. BARTER	7-2	I/T	1/IT
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JANGS E. TUROS ORTON	A/C MADITO (1-2 Ap	r) HAJ	MAJ
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
# 2. Task Organization and Unit Location

ORGANIZATION	<u> LOCATIOM</u>	CONTANDING OFFICER	DAME OF OFFICE
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# 3. Average Fonthly Strength

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17734-13	۷,		14	454	3	20
77 TrA=115	1.4	15	4	255	1	4
V TA-314	12	14	4	252	1	0
TF TA-323		<u>15</u>	_3	248	_1	_0
$\mathbb{T}O\mathbb{T}\Lambda \mathcal{V}$	61	78	47	1677	-6	24

\*This figure includes 1 MAP (MGySgt J. A. COMROY)



#### **DECLASSIFIED**





### A. Truordant Visitora to the Cormand

Neutenant Coneral MAS. Assistant Commandant, toured the MC-13 area on 27 April 1950, visiting with aircross and maintenance personnel and observing ordence cross uploading aircraft. On 29 April Prigadier Coneral MAS. Assistant Ming Commandor, was briefed on operational, personnel and logistic matters affecting MC-13. To toured the MC-13 contonerant and talked with aircross and maintenance personnel.






#### TART TWO: MUSTATUVE SUPPLY

Varine Aircraft Group-13 flew 2244 sorties for 2520.1 hours and dropped 5427.709 tons of ordnance, each of which exceeded any previous months combat operations since MAG-13 arrived in-country.

Operations supported during this period were Scotland II, Mentucky, Ballard Valley, Jeb Stuart II and III, Delaware, Brilliant Dragon, Ashau Valley, Samurai IV, Carentan II, Purlington Trail, Mancaster, Meesler/Mallova, Bauter Garden, Muscatine, 547, Morfolk Victory, Jasper Square, Pegasus, Rice, Black Dragon, Mapoleon, Saline. Missions flowm in support of the above operations included Close Air Support, Direct Air Support, Landing Sone Frens, Interdiction and Visual Reconnaissance. The Ashau Valley operation was a primary target during this period, a total of 305.0 tons of ordnance were dropped. Another primary target was operation Perasus. During this operation a total of 502.2 tons of ordnance were dropped.


Significant PDA included 124 UPA confirmed, 546 structures destroyed and 160 damaged. (Complete list in Fara 8, PARE THIS).






#### PART THE SIGNIFICANT STRIPS

- 1. <u>Personnel</u>. During the month of April, Parine Aircraft Group-13 had a loss of 29 Officers and 134 enlisted personnel due to rotations and transfers. The Group joined 17 Officers and 263 enlisted.
- 2. <u>Administration</u>. Twenty (20) Veritorious masts were awarded and 93 enlisted men were promoted during this period.
- 3. Awards. Two Distinguished Flying Crosses, one Furple Heart, 23 Certificates of Commendation and 54 Air Medals were awarded during this reporting period.
- A. <u>Sasualties</u>. There were no Hostile casualties during this period. The total non-hostile casualties for the month of April were 20. Thirtoen (13) of these twenty (20) were returned to duty and 2 were evacuated.
- 5. <u>Civil Affairs</u>. Seventeen village and herlot officials attended the LAG-13 Officer's club happy hour on 3 April. Vietnamese officials included the My Lien village chief, police chief and assistants, harlet chiefs from all four of Chu Lei new life hamlets, and assistants. <u>UAG-13 Commanding Officer extended a welcome to the Vietnamese and the evening was successful in establishing friendly relations with the civilian officials.</u>
- 170CAP to long Phw II on 7 April conducted treatment for twenty-five (25) villagers as dental patients and sixty (60) villagers as medical patients. Lectures were given on the use of soap and forty pounds of soap was distributed.
- FDCAP to Long Phu I on 9 April resulted in medical treatment for forty (40) villagers. The 'AG-13 Executive Officer and LtGol L. A. FADEA, president of the FAG-13 Civil Action/Personal Response Council, addressed all the Long Phu I officials at a post luncheon in the Group conference room.
- MAG-13 medical personnel treated 450 children from the Catholic and Buddhist Orphanage/School in An Tan.
- MAG-13 continues its aid to Long Phu I and II and their construction of schools, dispensaries, roads and bridges remains constant; also classes in English are being conducted in both hardets.
- 6. <u>Intelligence</u>. Briefing and debriefing of air crews and orientation of new air crews remains constant. Fublication of the weekly 5-2 "Tactical Priof" continues (See Supporting Documents, Part Tour).



#### **DECLASSIFIED**



General Intelligence briefs are given each Thursday by the Group Intelligence Officer to all personnel in INC-13, also special weekly intelligence briefs are given to the Group Guard concerning the Chu Ini INC.

7. <u>Airfield Operations</u>. The installation of the new 3-28 Arresting Cear was completed on 7 April. This year had 4 arrestments, 2 aborts and two early hooks.

The U-21 expressing gear received 650 arrestments, for a total of 65% arrestments with 27 declared emergencies. The cumulative total is now 15,5%5 expressments.

The Joint Services Air Freight and Dassenger terminal handled 3,7% passoncers and ACT tons of cargo.

### 6. Combat Operations


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771-323 F-W	575	64.7.
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Total Total	2214	2520


#### Operations Jupported

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Tentucky	Prillient Dragon	Loncastor	Horfolk Tictory
rollard Tallor	Ashan Valley	Theeler/Wallows	Jasper Sauare
	Samurai IV	Baxter Carden	Tegasus
Job Stuart TT	Carentan II	l'uscatine	Rice
Plack Dragon	Hapoleon	Saline	

#### Significant Tonh Dange Assessment

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Structures (Destroyed)		•	۰	۰		0	•	۰	0	۰		546
Structures (Damaged)	•	c	٥	•	•	0	0	•	٥	•	•	160
Funkers (Destroyed) .	0	٥	•	•	•	•	٥	٥	٥	٥	•	371
Punkers (Danaged)												79
Secondary Times	۰	٥	e	•	٥	۰	9	0	•	ó	•	42
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9. <u>Pase Development</u>. Construction of covering for Lircraft revetments in progress. Six revetments completed, remaining revetments scheduled for completion by 31 May.

Tactical aircrews quarters are 20% complete.

New Normand Punker at Group Headquarters started, completion date approximately 15 May.

10. <u>Communication/Slectronics</u>. The Communications Section received the AN/TCG-37 for evaluation. New switch board bunker constructed. Switch board now located in this bunker and operating.

#### 11. Supply


- a. 305 excess AFA repairable items were sent to UTD Subic Pay.
- b. 3200 excess USA items were sent to MSC Californ and other Supply Office's with the Mirst Marine Air Ming.
  - c. 21 items were added to the ICA Fool.
  - d. Started processing the excess APA items.
- e. A provisioning conference was held with the Carwood Tractor representative to discuss the problems and needs of the Carwood Uractor and SARS vectors loader.
- 7. During the latter part of the month construction was started on the new MAA Pool.

#### 12. Forale/TelCare

- a. Roligious Services
  - (1) Protestant Services
    - (a) Sunday-9; attendance-396
      (b) Bille Study-16; attendance-186

IIII-3





- (2) Catholic Services
  - (a) Sunday-11; attendance-782 (b) Meek-day-28; attendance-325
- (3) Latter Day Saints (Mormon)
  - (a) Sunday-4; attendance-39
- Services rendered other than at MG-13
  - (1) Catholic Services

    - (a) WSAD Services (2) Attendance (172) (b) FIGG Services (2) Attendance (27) (c) 198th LEB Services (2) Attendance (40)
  - (2) Protestant Services
    - (a) Americal Artillery Bat. Services (1) Attendance (27)
- Counseling and Interviews

Counseling-54 Intervieus-97

- Hospital Visits-4
- 13. Training. Mormal on the job and technical training continued with in each squadron. The following formal schools were utilized by MG-13 in April.


School	Personnel Attending
UCO School. Corrosion Control Corcer Advisory MCV Orientation Course Prolosive Ordnance Military Justice Casic Supply Acet. Molding Cortification	2 1 1 1 1 1
Forsonnel Tesponse	28

14. <u>Rectronic Countermeasures</u>. The use of the "Shoe Morn" FCI /Marning Revignent continued as the majority of missions flown by MC-12 were in the SAT HI threat areas. Installation of "Shoe Morn" equipment continues as aircraft are available for induction.

PART FOUR: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

#### TABLE OF CONTENTS

VI MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL PRIFE OF 7 APRIL 1968
VII MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL PRIFE OF 14 APRIL 1968
VII MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL PRIFE OF 21 APRIL 1968
VIV MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL PRIFE OF 28 APRIL 1968



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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF 7 APRIL 1968

#### AMERICAL SWEEP OPERATIONS

During the past week, a company of the 198th Light Infantry Brigade has been searching the mountain range about ten miles to the southwest of MAG-13. This is the general area from which the 31 January rocket attack originated.

While no contacts with the enemy have resulted from the Army sweep, the soldiers have turned up many signs of recent enemy presence in the area. On l April, a battalion size base camp was discovered in a mountain valley. Apparently the enemy had left the base camp over a month ago. In the camp were found two complete 122 mm rockets and parts of several other rockets. Tuenty shipping containers for rockets had also been left behind. The soldiers destroyed three structures which the enemy had built at the base camp.

The following day, a possible base camp site was found less than a mile away from the first discovery. At this particular site, the VC had built huts and animal pens and had planted crops. However, there was no sign of military activity in the area.


On 3 April, the same Army unit located another VC base camp. The enemy had constructed 25 underground living areas, each large enough for a squad. There were about a dozen huts at this camp. Several gas masks and CS grenades were found by Army troops searching the area.

The entire area of the Army's sweep had been heavily booby trapped by the enemy before he left. Army troops located many Malayian whip traps and disarmed many other booby traps during the sweep.

#### ARMY SPLASH PARTY INTERRUPTED BY VC

Recently, in the Americal Division's Wheeler/Wallowa area north of Tam Ky, the crew of an APC stopped for a break in a sweep operation at waterway a short distance from the sea. The crew enjoyed a few minutes of swimming, while nearby a group of VC who were concealed in innocent looking sampans watched. The VC apparently decided to harrass the GIs with a few rounds of small arms fire.

The APC crew, highly irritated at having its swimming party interrupted, jumped to their vehicle and returned the enemy fire with a 50 caliber machine gun and the M-60's mounted on the vehicle. When the firing stopped, 13 enemy sampans had been sunk. The price paid by the enemy for a little harrassment was 22 Viet Cong killed in action.





#### ARERICA'S BALAHCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM

Recent international developments have shaken the world's confidence in the U.S. dollar. Previously, an American dollar was as "good as gold". The lessening of confidence in the stability of the dollar is due to several causes:

deficit financing by the U.S. government, where more money is spent than is taken in by taxes and other government sources of revenue

the U. S. has spent 16 billion dollars more overseas than it has received from abroad since 1960

U. S. gold reserves have dropped by 7.3 billion since 1960 while foreign claims on U. S. gold have risen by 11.5 billion in the same period of time.

The American government is taking steps to meet this problem by limiting expenditures overseas and cutting deficits in the national budget. As American servicemen in Vietnam, we can contribute to strenghtening the position of the dollar.

Spending on the local Vietnamese economy should be limited to the barest minimum. Under no circumstances should transactions with Vietnamese personnel be made in either American dollars or in MPC. Piasters are the only authorized form of payment with Vietnamese off the base.

It can be expected that communist nations will try to undermine our currency by printing and passing couterfeit bills. Personnel should be on the lookout for bogus bills and should heed MACV directives which are issued when counterfeit bills are discovered.


When out of Vietnam on RCR, TAD orders, or leave in foreign countries personnel should avoid excessive, unnecessary spending. As many dollars leave the U. S. as a result of foreign travel, our government has considered restricting the ammount of money that American citizens may spend overseas.

#### UNAUTHORIZED DISCUSSIONS OVER TELEPHONE SYSTEMS

Many military switchboards are now employing Vietnamese telephonoperators. While these operators are cleared by Vietnamese security agencies, this is still a logical place for the enemy to try to plant agent. Even loyal Vietnamese may be coerced into reporting information they overhear by threats on their family. During the Tet offensive, the enemy penetrated some bases and may have succeeded in tapping phone lines.

All personnel are warned to avoid discussing classified or sensitive information over the phone systems. Land lines are generally considered more secure than radio communication, but are not 100 percent secure.

Coordinates of friendly installations and critical dates and times should be shackled prior to transmission over the phone.





#### NEW VC TECHNIQUES FOR MINE WARFARE

The enemy has recently developed a new technique for placing command detonated mines. The VC attach three separate wires to command detonated mines. The primary wire, the one actually used to detonate the mine, is well concealed. The other two wires are decoys. When the decoy wires are found and disconnected making the mine "safe", Marines have a tendency to gather around and look at the emplaced mine. When this occurs, the VC use the still connected primary wire to detonate the mine, causing a large number of casualties among the onlookers. Marines should be aware of the fact that wires easily seen are meant to be found. The enemy is not careless in the placement of his mines and booby traps.

The VC have become adept at predicting American reactions to incidents of this sort. After one mine is detonated the enemy will place other mines to cause casualties among the rescue or recovery force. As an example, during the past week, a bridge was blown on Highway One north of Tam Ky. A mine was placed next to the bridge which was struck by an armored vehicle supporting the mine clearing crew. The vehicle was badly damaged with the crew being either killed or wounded. A wrecker was called in to remove the damaged vehicle and struck another mine which the enemy had carefully placed. Failure to anticipate the enemy cost many casualties, in this instance, and loss of two vehicles.

#### MARINES STRIKE BACK AT KHE SAMH

There are signs that the enemy's grip around Khe Sanh may be weakening. During the past week the number of incoming rounds taken by the Khe Sanh Combat Base dropped to a daily average of less than 140. This is a considerable drop from daily shellings which have seen as many as 1300 rounds impact around the base.

The respite in shellings and better weather for use of air strikes has permitted Marines inside the beseiged base to move outside the perimeter on patrols and sweeps. Until recently, no Marine patrols had been able to move outside the perimeter, because of enemy units which had tunnelled right up to the wire.

On 29 March a Marine patrol killed four NVA and captured a rocket launcher in a small contact southwest of the perimeter. The following day, a campany sized sweep located an NVA battalion in a fortified complex less than a mile from the Khe Sanh perimeter. The Marines called in air strikes and artillery on the enemy. Under the pounding the enemy pulled out of his positions and left 115 dead in the fortifications. Earlier that day, 15 other NVA were killed by another Marine patrol.

On 5 April, Hill 471, some 2000 meters south of the Khe Sanh perimeter, was occupied by Marines. A battalion sized NVA force tried to dislodge the Marines at 0515 on the 5th of April. By 0730 the NVA force had been driven off. The NVA lost 122 dead. Three prisoners were captured, along with 97 weapons.

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MAG-13 S-2 THOTICAL BRIEF

### KHE SANH GALLISON KILLEVED

The two-and-a-half month siege of Khe Sanh is now history. The spearhead of a combinded services task force reached Khe Sanh on 7 April. This force was made up cofelements of the 1st Air Cavlry Division, 3rd Division Marines, and ARVN Airborne units. Armored units led the drive down Route Nine with a Marine Company up front. The task force started at Ca Lu, the command post for the operation, 12 miles to the east. Units of the Air Cavalry Division leapfrogged ahead and alongside of the column and occupied strategic highground.

It had been anticipated that the column moving down Route Nine would encounter stiff resistance and would probably be ambushed. However, the expected enemy resistance did not maferialize, although the road had been mined and booby trapped and all the bridges needed rebuilding.

About one-and-three-quarters miles south of the Khe Sanh airstrip, Hill 471 rises in a commanding position over Route Nine. As this hill had to be taken before the relief column could safely enter Khe Sanh, Marines moved out of their perimeter to occupy the hill on 4 April. Early on the morning of 5 April, a battalion of NVA supported by mortar fire and RPG rockets attacked the Marine perimeter on Hill 471. After two hours, the NVA were forced to withdraw. Marines killed 122 NVA and captured three prisoners. The Marines found 97 individual weapons after the NVA retreated.

On 8 April, the 1st Air Cavalry took over responsibility for the defense of khe Sanh. Marines of the 26th Regiment moved out into the attack to search for the retreating NVA in the mountains. The North Vietnamese who had formerly completely surrounded the base appear to be avoiding a fight. Many weapons caches have been found by Allied troops. One of the largest was located by the Air Cavalry, four miles south of Khe Sanh. It included 1500 mortar rounds, 150 B-40 rockets, 2000 grenades, 72 weapons, and 50,000 AK-47 rounds. Three miles east of Khe Sanh, a motorcycle was captured, along with 18 weapons, after a short battle in which 14 NVA died. Southeast of Khe Sanh, the Cavalrymen captured a damaged armored car and two 14.5 mm anti-aircraft machineguns. In his haste to leave Khe Sanh, the enemy has been forced to abandon much in the way of military equipment and at least 300 of his dead.

On 10 April, units of the Air Cavalry Division reoccupied the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, five miles west of Khe Sanh. There was no resistance. The campled been in enemy hands since it was overrun on 7 February by NVA troops supported by tanks.



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#### NEW AMERICAL OPERATIONS

During the past week, Americal Division opened two new operations. On 3 April, Americal and ARVM infantrymen, supported by tanks and APCs jumped off on a search and destroy operation southwest of Tam Ky. After five days, 72 Viet Cong had been killed and 26 weapons captured. The largest single contact started on the afternoon of 9 April when the VC fired on a gunship. Infantry and armor moved in on the enemy, who were fighting from prepared positions. The battle ranged over a wide area until nightfall when the VC withdrew from the battlefield. The ground troops accounted for 19 VC while gunships and two airstrikes killed 19 more.

The enemy has generally been avoiding contact since in this area. On the morning of 12 April, the VC attempted to strike back. Two Americal units southwest of Tam Ky were mortared, although there were no casualties. Elsewhere, an armored units was hit by a mortar barrage and eight 122 mm rockets. There were light casualties as a result of this attack.

South of Quang Ngai City, another operation opened on 3 April. This operation is aimed at destroying enemy units that pose a threat to the Province capital of Quang Ngai City. By 13 April, only 15 VC kills had been confirmed although there have been many small unit engagements. As is often the case when a friendly operation starts, the enemy has apparently been hiding. Several abandoned base camps have been located, along with food supplies and assorted military gear. On 12 April, Americal infantry located a weapons cache of 55 individual and three crew-served weapons. The cache was found in a mountainous area eight miles southwest of Quang Ngai City. The enemy has been in these mountains since the Tet offensive, recovering from heavy losses suffered in an attack on Quang Ngai City.

## PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ON SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

The following is an excerpt from a recent message from the President to the Secretary of Defense.

"It is imperative that every possible precaution is taken to ensure that classified information, whether elementary in character or not, does not pass to those not entitled to receive it. Carelessmess in this regard on the part of anyone in your organization can endanger the lives of American servicemen and the safety of other American citizens as we you are directed to review security measures and practices in your department to make certain that everything possible is done to maintain the integrity of classified information and that all persons having access to classified material have been fully cleared through appropriate procedures."

From the foregoing it is readily apparent that the President is deeply concerned that classified information, whether in document form or otherwise, not be passed to those not cleared to receive it.

All sections are urged to review their access lists, making certain that personnel requiring access be appropriately cleared and the names of such personnel be carried on the current Group Access List.



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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF 21 APRIL 1968

### THE SITUATION IN I CORPS

The following message from the Commanding General of III MAF, summarized the current situation in I Corps:

"During the past few weeks we have seen significant changes not only in I Corps, but in South Vietnam. The enemy has been beaten badly in some areas; he has withdrawn from others; the Khe Sanh defenders have assumed the offensive. Concurrently the President has suspended bombing north of the 20th Parallel. Most significant has been some evidence of a desire of the North Vietnam government to discuss the war.

"I feel resonably sure that, since the public announcements concerning discussions, an air of optimism prevails among our families at home. By now we are getting mail which might express their optimisms. I have a feeling that with the talk of peace some of us are also assuming an air of optimism and complacency which if continued can be degrading to our mission, which has not changed. The enemy continues to kill or wound, our troops are still involved in operations against a very active enemy. In fact we must press the offensive relentlessly during the good weather season.

"I have noted in the past few days that we are taking casualties in areas where heretofore during repeated enemy contacts we suffered only a few casualties. These casualties could be the result of a tendency to relax, to get out of our holes and to remove our flak vests. It is when we get careless or overly defident that we can get hurt.

"I need not remind anyone that we are far from any peac South Vietnam. We cannot afford to relax our vigilance one minute. It behooves commanders at all levels to counsel troops at each opportunity regarding the necessity for continued tactical and personal security."

LtGen Cushman





# VC FEMALE TERRORISTS

Recent intelligence reports indicate that the Viet Cong. have been using one of the oldest weapons in warfare--sex. A number of KIAs and MIAs have been reported in the Danang area since I January, which Counter Intelligence has traced to female terrorists.

South of Danang, one Marine was reported missing in action from his ambush position. The CI investigation revealed that the Marine had been lured from his position by two Vietnamese females. The two women involved were believed to be from a VC terrorist group.

In February, it was reported that about 200 VC, mostly women, had graduated from an assassination school. It has been noted that there has been an increase in acts or sabotage and terror against ARVN, US, and other allied personnel in I Corps. One tactic has been for VC women to use sex in attempting to entice allied personnel into insecure areas where they could be killed or captured.

In March, CI investigated the dissappearance of three American servicemen. CI concluded that one man was killed and the other two are still missing. One of the three had observed three females, swimming in the nude, in a river. These women were probably jures.

The approach reportedly used by female terrorists is to strike up a casual conversation with Americans. Certain information is elicited from the American, including how long he has been in-country, whether he misses his family, and if he wants to go home very badly. Should the American indicate he is single, the girl will offer to arrange a rendezvous elsewhere. The meeting place will of course be in an area not fully under friendly control.

Other "Fancy Female" cadres who can speak English, have been trained to gather intelligence or to encourage defection among Allied military personnel. These female cadres are highly trained and highly motivated to the VC cause. The are instructed to use "prostitution" if necessary to subver Allied servicemen.

# LOCAL ENEMY ACTIVITY

Enemy activity continues at a low level in the Chu Lai area. Mines and booby traps accounted for most of the friend-ly losses. Several Americal outposts in the Chu Lai TAOR have been mortared. However, the mortar attacks: have caused only very light casualties.

The largest recent enemy encounter was six miles southeast of Chu Lai, where a combined ambush made up of Army troops and Marines of a CAP unit ambushed a platoon size enemy force. Nine VC were killed, with no friendly losses.

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### THE VOLUNTEER INFORMAMT PROGRAM

The Volunteer Informant Program is a method to obtain enemy weapons and munitions, information on the enemy's plans and movements, and information concerning the locations of mines and booby traps. Basically the Program offers rewards, monetary or material, to Vietnamese civilians for information or weapons or munitions which he can furnish U. S. Forces.

Some of the information desired by friendly intelligence is:

identity and location of members of the VC infrastructure plans of the enemy information on VC or NVA units and personnel location of enemy weapons and ammunition caches location of enemy mines and booby traps.

Leaflets are distributed by Psyop (Pschological Operations) personnel. Vietnamese language tapes are also broadcast to local villages. The leaflets tell the Vietnamese to turn in to U.S. troops various items of equipment and tell him what he will be paid for it. Some examples of payments for weapons and information for which rewards will be paid are as follows:

location of minus and booby traps
individual weapons
hand grenades
artillery and rocket ammunition
crew served weapons
rocket launchers
information leading to neutralization or
destruction of VC/WA infrastructure personel up to 10,000 \$VN

By encouraging Vietnamese civilians to bring enemy information, weapons, and munitions to U.S. Forces, we can be aware of the enemy's plans and take steps to thwart his plans. His abilit conduct operations can be limited if we capture his supplies caches. The friendly casualty rate will be lowered consideration and booby trap incidents are eliminated.

In the Chu Lai area, the majority of friendly casualities in the Operation Muscatine area have been due to mines and booby traps. Psyops was initiated to cut down the rate, and Vietnamese civilians have been very cooperative in turning in ordnance and pointing out mines and booby traps.

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## FUTURE VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE HOLIDAYS

The enemy has in the past chosen to celebrate his holidays with attacks on allied installations throughout the Republic of Vietnam. There are five holidays during the month of May which have special significance to the enemy.

l May is "May Day" or the "Communist International Holiday". This is a day of celebration throughout the Communist world. It is a day of speechmaking extolling the virtue of Communism and of military parades.

5 May is the birthday of Karl Marx, whose writing are one of the foundations of world communism.

7 May is the anniversery of the fall of the French fortress of Dien Bien Phu. Few military victories have had such
a great psychological impact. This communist victory in 1954
led to the eventual French withdrawal from Indochina and to
the establishment of the communist regime in North Vietnam.

16 May marks the date of the final French withdrawal from Indochina in 1955.

19 May is a day of double significance to the North Vietnamese and to the communists in the south. This is the birthday of Ho Chi Minh and also the anniversery of the establishment of his Viet Minh Front in 1941. This organization fought the Japanese during World War II and evertually ousted the French from Indochina. By a variety of names, this movement is still the driving force behind Vietnamese communism.

While there is no particular evidence at this time of any special enemy activity to commemorate any of these date all personnel are cautioned to be particularly conscious of security during these periods.

#### LOCAL ENGINY MOTIVITY

Each month during the period of low lunar illumination, the local VC units become much more active. The past week has seen two major attacks and many other harrassing attacks and probes on Chu Lai area units.

(Continued on page 2!

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## LOCAL ENEMY ACTIVITY (continued)

On the morning of 24 April, the enemy rocketed Chu Lai and one hour Lattacked CAP Lima-5. CAP Lima-5 is located 12 miles southeast of MnG-13 in the village of Phuoc Thuan. The CAP is located on a peninsula and as a result the enemy was able to approach from the southwest by land and from the southeast by boat. Some VC were seen approaching the CAP in scuba gear. The enemy force which was estimated at 150 to 200 men, quickly encircled the CnP and penetrated the outer defensive wire with bangelore torpedoes. Even though the combined Marine and Popular Forces platoon was vastly outnumbered and outgunned by the VC, the enemy could not break into the perimeter. The Americal Division provided the CAP with illumination and dispatched two APCs to the scene. After about four hours, the VC withdrew and left ll bodies behind. Six individual weapons were captured along with a B-40 rocket launcher and a 57 mm recoilless rifle. One of the enemy dead was a VC captain, who had on his body a five-paragraph order for the attack. It is estimated that at least 14 other VC died in the attack and their bodies were carried off when the attackers withdrew.

An hour after the CAP came under the attack, Chu Lai came under rocket attack, with the first volley of six rockets impacting at about 0245. Three volleys of six rockets each were fired. There were no casualties as a result of the rockets themselves. However, MAG-13 Sick Bay treated 54 men the next day for injuries ranging from stubbed toes to a three-inch cut. These were incurred while moving to bunkers.

The next morning a patrol from the 198th Light Infantry Brigade found the launching site in "Rocket Valley". The site was 10,500 meters from impact area. There were six individual rocket launching positions along with assorted packaging for rockets.

Shortly before Chu Lai was rocketed, an army observationst, 2000 meters from the rocket site was mortared. There were no casualties.

The following night, two VC were detected cutting the outer wire on the perimeter of a LALM battery on Ky Hoa Island a scout dog alerted his handler, who then fired on the VC. The VC, however, were able to make their escape. The next morning a ten-foot gap was found in the fence.

At about 0100 on 26 April, the Chu Lai Defense Command went to Condition Yellow when mortar rounds were reported falling in the bunker line of one of the helicopter units in the southeastern corner of the Chu Lai base. Nine or tenrounds impacted, but caused no damage or casualties.

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# THE AMERICAL DIVISION

The army first came to Chu Lai in april of last year. The 1st Marine Division's Task Force Xray had to be shifted north to cope with the increased enemy threat along the DMZ. To fill the gap, the army airlifted to Chu Lai an assortment of units from thoughout the Republic under the project name of Task Force Oregon. Task Force Oregon took over defense of the Chu Lai TaoR and the Duc Pho TaoR. Shortly thereafter, units of the Task Force moved out on search and destroy operations west and north of Chu Lai. By September of 1967, Task Force Oregon controlled three brigades, each from a different division and the independent 196th Brigade. On 22 September, Task Force Oregon became the Americal Division, marking the third time the Division has been activated since the Guadacanal campaign.

The Division has controlled up to five brigades at one time. Units of the Division have participated in Operations Lake, Benton, Cook, Malheur I and II, Wheeler/Wallowa, Muscatine, Norfolk Victory, and Burlington Trail. In early February, several battalions of the Division were placed under control of the 1st Marine Division and turned back the 2nd NVA Division as the enemy drove towards Danang.

Today, the Americal Division controls three brigades deployed from Duc Pho to Hoi An, a distance of over 80 miles along the South China Sea.

The Americal Division has not attracted the big headlines in its operations as for the most part it has been engaged in small unit contacts. It has provided a screen against large enemy units, behind which the Government's pacification program has slowly made progress. In its first 11 months, the Division has rolled up an enemy body count of over 13,400 VC and NVA. Their kill ratio has been nearly 13 to one.

#### CRATER ANALYSIS

Crater analysis is the study of shell craters to determine such information as the direction of fire, the type contains, and blast and fragmentation characteristics. Based on this type of analysis, it was determined that the 24 April rocket attack came from an azmuth of 260 degrees. This provided a starting point to begin the search for the launching site.

However, several of the craters had been ruined for intelligence study by personnel walking in the area and carrying off parts of the rocket. All craters should be brought to the attention of Group S-2. A guard should be left at the crater to prevent disturbance of the crater. Piaces of the rocket can be kept as souvenirs if registered at S-2 as War Trophies. However, the fragment should not be removed by souvenir hunters until analysis is completed.