

HEADQUARTERS
 Marine Aircraft Group-13
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
 FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

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From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: Command Chronology Period 1-31 May 1968

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
 (b) WGO 5750.1C

Encl: (1) ✓ MAG-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 May 1968
 ✓ H&MS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 May 1968
 ✓ MABS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 May 1968
 ✓ VMFA-323 Command Chronology Period 1-31 May 1968
 ✓ VMFA-314 Command Chronology Period 1-31 May 1968
 ✓ VMFA-115 Command Chronology Period 1-31 May 1968

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the subject report is submitted as enclosures (1) through (6).

2. Upon removal from the subject report this letter is downgraded to Unclassified.

J. N. Styer

1st MAW SAC No.	Copy No.
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MAG-13
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
FOR
1-31 MAY 1968

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~~SECRET~~PART ONE: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. Commanders and Staff

a. Headquarters, MAG-13 (1-31 May)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
JAMES H. BERGE JR.	CO	COL	COL
PHILIP D. SHUTLER	XO	LTCOL	LTCOL
MARTIN J. BASAR	ADJ	CAPT	WO
LEONARD R. LANG	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ
CARL E. R. BLACK	S-1 (1-30 May)	MAJ	MAJ
ROBERT H. SCHULTZ	S-1 (31 May)	MAJ	LTCOL
WILLIAM H. ALLEN	S-2	MAJ	MAJ
ROY A. SEAVER	S-3	LTCOL	LTCOL
DON J. SLEE	S-4 (1-15 May)	LTCOL	LTCOL
HARRY T. HAGAMAN	S-4 (16-31 May)	LTCOL	LTCOL

b. H&MS-13 (1-31 May)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
PAUL L. SIEGMUND	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
HENRY G. MILLER	XO	MAJ	MAJ
CHARLES R. CONNOR	S-3	CAPT	CAPT
HAROLD G. DEAN	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	LTCOL
LAWRENCE J. GALLAGHER	ADMINO	LT	CAPT

c. MABS-13 (1-31 May)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
GEORGE L. BRUSER	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
CHARLES V. V. SMILLIE JR.	XO	MAJ	MAJ
HAROLD E. WILSON	ADMINO	CAPT	CWO
GEORGE W. FRITCHI	BASE OPSO (1 May)	MAJ	MAJ
CHARLES J. CONLON	BASE OPSO (2-31 May)	MAJ	CAPT
DANIEL I. CARROLL	BASE SERVO (1-4 May)	MAJ	MAJ
JACOB W. MOORE	BASE SERVO (5-31 May)	MAJ	MAJ

d. VMFA-115 (1-31 May)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
GERALD W. VAUGHAN	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
JACOB W. MOORE	XO (1-4 May)	MAJ	MAJ
JOHN I. HUDSON	XO (5-31 May)	MAJ	MAJ
HENRY O. GROOMS	S-3 (1-20 May)	MAJ	MAJ
JAY N. BIBLER	S-3 (21-31 May)	MAJ	MAJ

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
WILLIAM J. GRIFFIN	S-1	LT	MAJ
WILLIAM A. McMAHON	S-2	LT	CAPT
DENIS L. SHORTAL	S-4	CAPT	WO
EHRHARD K. A. WINKELBRANDT	A/C MAINTO (1-20 May)	MAJ	MAJ
RONALD G. KROPP	A/C MAINTO (21-31 May)	MAJ	MAJ

e. VMFA-314 (1-31 May)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
HERBERT V. LUNDIN	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
ROBERT H. SCHULTZ	XO (1-30 May)	MAJ	LTCOL
CARL E. R. BLACK	XO (31 May)	MAJ	MAJ
PHILIP M. HINKLE	S-3	MAJ	MAJ
JAMES R. DEVORE	S-1 (1-14 May)	LT	1/LT
BERNARD D. SCHMIDT	S-1 (15-31 May)	LT	CAPT
JOHN M. HENRY	S-2	LT	CAPT
MARTIN W. MEREDITH	S-4	CAPT	MAJ
GERALD E. WALSH	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

f. VMFA-323 (1-31 May)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
HARRY T. HAGAMAN	CO (1-15 May)	LTCOL	LTCOL
DON J. SLEE	CO (16-31 May)	LTCOL	LTCOL
DANIEL I. CARROLL	XO	MAJ	MAJ
HENRY G. MILLER	S-3 (1-6 May)	MAJ	MAJ
KARL S. SMITH	S-3 (7-31 May)	MAJ	MAJ
EDWARD R. BAILEY	S-1	LT	MAJ
PHILIP R. KRUSE	S-4 (1-8 May)	CAPT	CAPT
LARRY T. HIGBEE	S-4 (9-31 May)	CAPT	CAPT
WARREN A. FERDINAND	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

2. Task Organization and Unit Location

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>	<u>Date of Office</u>
MAG-13	Chu Lai RVN	COL JAMES H. BERGE	1-31 May
H&MS-13	Chu Lai RVN	LTCOL PAUL L. SIEGMUND	1-31 May
MABS-13	Chu Lai RVN	LTCOL GEORGE L. BRUSER	1-31 May
VMFA-115	Chu Lai RVN	LTCOL GERALD W. VAUGHAN	1-31 May
VMFA-314	Chu Lai RVN	LTCOL HERBERT V. LUNDIN	1-31 May
VMFA-323	Chu Lai RVN	LTCOL HARRY T. HAGAMAN	1-15 May
VMFA-323	Chu Lai RVN	LTCOL DON J. SLEE	16-31 May

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3. Average Monthly Strength

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>USMC</u>			<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>USN</u>	
	<u>NA</u>	<u>NFO</u>	<u>AG</u>		<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
H&MS-13	*15	2	21	495	0	0
MABS-13	4		13	465	3	20
VMFA-115	13	15	4	266	1	3
VMFA-314	12	15	4	266	1	0
VMFA-323	12	15	4	261	1	0
	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	56	47	46	1753	6	23

*This figure includes 1 NAP (MGySgt J. A. CONROY)

4. Important Visitors to the Command

On 16 May Brigadier General Hill visited MAG-13 and attended the VMFA-323 Change of Command Ceremony. Prior the commencement of the ceremony General HILL presented 3 DFC's, 9 NCM's and 1 Purple Heart to members of MAG-13.

On 28 May Rear Admiral H. P. LANHAM, COMFAIRWESTPAC, visited the MAG-13 flight line and living area.

On 30 May General C. W. ABRAMS, newly assigned Commander US Forces Vietnam, visited MAG-13, talked with aircrews on the flight line and lunched with the Group Staff and Squadron Commanders.

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~~SECRET~~PART THREE: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. Personnel. MAG-13 transferred 22 officers and 96 enlisted personnel and joined 24 officers and 136 enlisted during this reporting period.
2. Administration. There were 77 enlisted men promoted and 21 were awarded meritorious masts.
3. Awards. The following medals were presented during this period. They were 5 DFC's, 20 NCM's, 2 Purple Hearts, 183 Air Medals, 3 Gold Stars in Lieu of DFC's and 20 Navy Achievement Medals.

4. Casualtiesa. Hostile

- (1) 2 KIA's
- (2) 15 Wounded
- (3) 2 MEDEVAC's

b. Non-Hostile

- (1) 21
- (2) 14 Returned to Duty
- (3) 11 MEDEVAC's

5. Civil Affairs

1 May - VMFA-115 personnel installed a water pump in Long Phu II; English classes were conducted for 33 children in the hamlet.

3 May - A tour was conducted by MAG-13 Civic Action personnel for the benefit of members of the Chu Lai Medical Society. The tour included an inspection of medical facilities in the Chu Lai area; increased participation of medical personnel throughout the base was the objective of the tour.

5 May - Ten children were treated on the Medcap to Long Phu II this morning.

6 May - English classes were taught in Long Phu II to 35 children.

7 May - English classes were taught in Long Phu I to 40 children. MABS-13 personnel and MAG-13 Civic Action Personnel, with steel burning and welding equipment constructed a bridge in Long Phu II. VMFA-115 personnel assisted in the work along with 10 Vietnamese from the Hamlet.

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8 May - Intelligence information was passed on location and size of VC/NVA units in Chu Lai area.

9 May - Three hundred Ky Lien elementary school children were transported by MAG-13 personnel to the Chu Lai base beach area for recreation activity.

12 May - Medcap to Long Phu II treated 30 men, forty women and 80 children. English classes were taught to 25 children.

17 May - Civic Action/Personal Response school was held at MAG-13 special services building.

23 May - English classes were conducted for 25 children in Long Phu I. MAG-13 Civic Action personnel and representative members of VMFA-323 traveled north of Chu Lai to Ly Tra refugee camp to distribute 500 lbs of clothing.

28 May - Intelligence information today included several coordinates of VC rocket positions. Air strikes were launched and secondary explosions were observed by Civic Action personnel while working near the enemy positions.

6. Intelligence. Briefing and debriefing of air crews and orientation of new air crews remains constant. Publication of the weekly S-2 "Tactical Brief" continues (See Supporting Documents, Part Four).

General Intelligence briefs are given each Thursday by the Group Intelligence Officer to all personnel in MAG-13, also special weekly intelligence briefs are given to the Group Guard concerning the Chu Lai TAOR.

7. Airfield Operations

a. Total of 479 aircraft were arrested and 24 of this total were declared emergencies. Cumulative total to date is 16,027 arrestments. Joint services Air Freight and Passenger Terminal processed 4,112 passengers and 428 tons of cargo.

b. Total operations for the Month of May, 44,920, establishes a new record for Chu Lai Air Base. Previous high was set last month at 40,446.

c. MATCU 67 averaged 1,449 operations daily for the month of May 1968.

d. Since commencing operations in the Republic of Vietnam, MATCU 67 has controlled 779,832 landings and take-offs.

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~~SECRET~~8. Combat Operations

SQUADRON		SORTIES	HOURS
H&MS-13	TA-4F	76	78
	C-117	110	87
VMFA-115	F-4B	597	664
VMFA-314	F-4B	696	757
VMFA-323	F-4B	603	638
		<hr/>	<hr/>
Total		2082	2224

Operations Supported

AIS	Ashau Valley	Muscatine	Houston
Scotland II	Samurai IV	Lancaster	Leatherneck Square
Kentucky	Carentan II	Wheeler/Wallowa	OPN 547
Ballard Valley	Burlington Trail	Allen Brooke	Nevada Eagle
Jeb Stuart II	Kimchi Hawk	Brilliant Dragon II	Mameluke Thrust
Delaware	Samurai V	Golden Valley	Jeb Stuart III
Brilliant Dragon Rice		Concordia Square	Brilliant Dragon III

Significant Bomb Damage Assessment

KBA (Confirmed)	198
Structures (Destroyed)	660
Structures (Damaged)	242
Bunkers (Destroyed)	465
Bunkers (Damaged)	86
Secondary Fires	16
Secondary Explosions	70
Anti-Aircraft Sites	14
Rocket Position	44
Boats	6
Automatic Weapons Positions	12
Mortar Positions	11
Trucks	2
Bridges	4

9. Base Development. Reconstruction of the Group Command bunker was completed during this period.

10. Communication/Electronics. The communications section implemented the new underground switch board complex.

11. Supply. Annual inventory started on 20 May 1968.

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~~SECRET~~12. Morale/Welfare

a. Religious Service

(1) Protestant Service

(a) Sunday - 6; attendance - 233

(b) Weekday - 16; attendance - 152

(2) Catholic Services

(a) Sunday - 8; attendance - 521

(b) Weekday - 27; attendance - 179

(3) Latter Day Saints

(a) Sunday - 4; attendance - 28

b. Counseling and Interviews

Counseling - 64

Interviews - 118

c. Hospital Visits

(1) Hospital visits have been made by designated Senior Officers within MAG-13 per Wing Order 1700.16.

13. Training

a. Normal on the job and technical training continued with in each squadron.

b. Utilization of the MAG-13 rifle range is being accomplished for the purpose of Fam Firing newly joined personnel and maintaining currency of other personnel.

c. The following schools were attended during this reporting period.

<u>School</u>	<u>Personnel Attending</u>
JEST	2
* NBC Contact Team	29
NCO Leadership	1
Embarkation	2

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<u>School</u>	<u>Personnel Attending</u>
Corrosion Control	2
Career Advisory	1
Explosive Ordnance Disposal	2
MARK-36 Training	12
Registered Publications	1
Transistor Fundamentals	2
*Motor Transport Maintenance Team	10
*Multi-Fuel Vehicle Instruction Team	20
KY-28 Operator/Limited	

*Denotes 1st MAW Instruction Team

NBC - 1 Day

M.T. Maint. - 2 Days

Multi-Fuel - 2 Days

14. Electronic Countermeasures. The use of the "Shoe Horn" ECM/Warning Equipment continued as the majority of missions flown by MAG-13 were in the SAM HI threat areas. Installation of the "Shoe Horn" equipment continues as aircraft are available for induction.

PART FOUR: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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- ✓ IV MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF OF 26 MAY 1968
- ✓ V " " Command Circumstances - Intelligence/Counter Intelligence

HEADQUARTERS
 Marine Aircraft Group-13
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
 FPO San Francisco California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY-INTELLIGENCE/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

PERIOD 1 MAY TO 31 MAY 1968

1. PREPARATION FOR EXECUTION OF ASSIGNED MISSION

a. Continued Intelligence Operations, Briefing and Debriefing of assigned aircrews, and orientation to insure that assigned units receive maximum familiarity with combat conditions in the Republic of Vietnam.

b. A general intelligence brief is given each Thursday by the Group Intelligence Officer at 1530 for the Officers and SNCO's of H&MS-13, and MABS-13. Officers and SNCO's of the tactical squadrons are also welcome.

c. Monitoring Hanoi radio broadcasts for additional background material continued.

d. The information and materials for intelligence briefs for all ranks of the tactical squadrons is provided by the Group Intelligence Section and is given by the tactical squadrons Intelligence Officer each week.

e. Continued publication of the weekly "S-2 Tactical Brief".

f. Weekly Intelligence briefings are given to the Group Guard. These half hours briefings cover the general situation in the Republic of Vietnam and the Chu Lai TACR in more specific detail.

g. A general Intelligence brief is given each Thursday by the Group Intelligence Officer at 1600 for sergeants and below of H&MS-13, and MABS-13. Personnel of VMFA squadrons are also welcome.

h. Intelligence briefs are presented to the Commanding Officer, staff, and Squadron Commanders at the weekly CO's conference.


i. On-the-job training for all intelligence personnel of the Group was conducted on a continuous basis during the entire period.

j. An in-country "For Official Use Only" written Intelligence/Counterintelligence briefing for all ranks continued.

k. Continued a system whereby the booklet "Who are the Viet Cong" is issued to all Officers and SNCO's.

2. ADMINISTRATION

- a. Classified files were maintained in accordance with OPNAVINST 5510.1C and current applicable directives.
- b. Unclassified files were maintained in accordance with SECNAVINST P5213.3 (Naval Filing System).
- c. Personnel security clearances were processed in accordance with current directives.


W. H. ALLEN JR.
MAJOR USMC

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
5 MAY 1968

DISPOSAL OF UNSERVICEABLE GEAR

Several weeks ago, a Marine from MABS-13 turned in a live fuze to Group S-2. The fuze is used to detonate napalm tanks, and EOD estimates that such a fuze would kill a man if it exploded in his hands. The fuze had been discarded in the trash system, and picked up by trash crews and taken to the dump for disposal. At the dump, Vietnamese employees had apparently picked up the fuze. It was later found in the Vietnamese trash truck by an alert Marine. Aside from the obvious danger to personnel on the base, it is possible that the fuze could have been smuggled out the gate. Later, it might have been used as the triggering device in a booby trap.

This one particular incident serves to reiterate that all gear, whether serviceable or not, should be disposed of through the proper channels to prevent it from falling into hostile hands. Gear which is disposed of in a trash can can be picked up by a Vietnamese worker and smuggled to VC outside the gate. The dump itself is not completely secure. An infiltrator can pilfer any gear at the dump awaiting destruction.

Personnel are reminded that gear should be disposed of through the proper organization: ammunition and weapons to the armory, 782 gear to supply, explosives to EOD, and all papers and batteries should be destroyed by burning.

In the past few months, a large array of discarded gear has been turned in to Group S-2 by Marines and in some cases by Vietnamese workers. Over 2500 rounds of small arms ammunition has been turned in, along with several live grenades, M-79 rounds, magazines, and 20 mm ammunition. Parts of M-1 machineguns have been found in the trash along with many items of 782 gear. Worn out batteries, which can still be used to trigger booby traps, have been found in the trash by the dozen.

There are some items which Vietnamese workers are permitted to salvage and keep out of the trash. However, specifically prohibited are weapons, ammunition, explosives of any type, military clothing, military gear such as web gear, mess kits, and barbed wire, PX resale items, and military printed matter regardless of classification.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYTHE ASHAU VALLEY

The Ashau Valley, about 30 miles southwest of Phu Bai, has been an enemy stronghold for about 26 months. In March 1966, the Army Special Forces Camp at Ashau at the southern end of the valley was overrun. Since then the enemy has been able to move troops and supplies through the valley with no opposition, except for air strikes. The enemy improved the road through the valley and has built roads out from the valley towards the more populated areas in I Corps. Route 547 gave the enemy access towards Hue, while another route leads towards Happy Valley, southwest of Danang. The enemy has emplaced many anti-aircraft guns in the valley to protect his truck traffic through the valley.

On 19 April, the Provisional Corps Vietnam, headquartered at Phu Bai, launched Operation Delaware. This is an effort aimed at ending communist domination of the valley and to cause a major disruption to enemy infiltration into South Vietnam. The operation is one of the largest ever undertaken in I Corps, with two divisions being committed. Security considerations, however, have prevented most of the details of this operation from being disseminated.

Operation Delaware is essentially in two phases: The Air Cavalry has made a helicopter assault into the northern Ashau Valley, while the 101st Airborne Division has been driving down Route 547 towards the valley. Thus far the Air Cavalry has met little opposition, except for intense anti-aircraft fire. The enemy appears to have abandoned their positions in the face of the Air Cavalry's assault. Enemy storage areas and supply dumps have been captured without a fight. At one point, the Cavalrymen captured three 37 mm anti-aircraft guns intact.

It has been a different story for the 101st Airborne and the Vietnamese airborne task force which is moving towards the valley with them. The paratroopers have met constant opposition from communist troops along Route 547. However, the paratroopers have approached to within ten miles of the valley.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE NOTE

An agent report recently confirmed the existence of a Japanese organization whose objective is to promote defection among U. S. servicemen. This organization encourages Americans to defect and then will hide them in Japan while arranging their transportation to a "socialist" country. This organization also has an affiliate on Okinawa.

Personnel on R&R, TAD, or in transit in Southeast Asia are cautioned against the possibility of being approached by members of such an organization. Incidents of this nature should be reported to unit S-2's.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYKIT CARSON SCOUTS

In November of 1966, III MAF adopted the Kit Carson Scout Program. This program had been initiated by the 1st Marine Division to employ enemy defectors (Chieu Hoi returnees) in support of Marine tactical and psychological operations. As former enemy personnel, the Scouts have a knowledge of enemy tactics. Since the Scouts are used in their former areas of operation as a VC, they also know the terrain and the people. This permits them to provide valuable assistance to Marine patrols by disclosing enemy mines and ambushes and discovering hiding places of enemy personnel, weapons, and supplies. The Scouts are also able to pick up intelligence information from villagers and to identify enemy personnel. The Scouts can also be used in psychological operations by telling the people the advantages of life under the Government as opposed to life in a Viet Cong village.

The Kit Carson Scout program has been adopted by Army units also, even though names for the Army scouts may vary. Both the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions now have active programs which include thorough screening of potential scouts at Chieu Hoi Centers and evaluation of potential scouts at Kit Carson Scout schools. Schools for Kit Carson Scouts teach such subjects as English, U. S. weapons, scouting and patrolling, map reading, the compass, and close-order-drill. Following their formal schooling, the potential scouts are given further training while in direct support of Marine units under combat conditions.

Kit Carson Scouts are normally assigned and live with a particular Marine line company. As a result, friendship and familiarity develop between Marines and Scouts which increases the effectiveness of operations.

NATIONAL POLICE AND NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCES

Both the National Police and National Police Field Forces contribute to the Government's Revolutionary Development program. The basic mission of the National Police is to maintain law and order, protect life and property, and to perform regulatory functions. In the present war environment, the National Police also support and assist the Vietnamese Armed Forces. One function in direct support of the military is the establishment of intelligence nets in areas cleared by the military.

The National Police Field Forces are the action arms of the National Police and are trained in para-military operations. They are organized into companies and perform Police operations down to village and hamlet level. In conjunction with other military forces, they provide security for RD teams and have the additional task of locating and eliminating the Viet Cong infrastructure.

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
12 MAY 1968THE "SECOND WAVE" ATTACKS

The long expected wave of enemy attacks finally took place throughout I Corps on the morning of 5 May. However, these attacks did not develop into the second wave of the Tet Offensive, which intelligence sources had anticipated. The enemy limited his attacks to coordinated heavy weapons attacks on installations throughout I Corps. There were also heavy weapons attacks on installations in the remainder of the Republic, and heavy fighting broke out in Saigon and is still in progress. Generally, the enemy did not follow up his attacks with ground assaults. Any ground attacks in I Corps were limited in nature.

In northern I Corps, the enemy hit Quang Tri Airfield with rockets and mortars, causing limited damage to aircraft and few casualties. The MACV compound at Hue was also hit by rockets and mortars, suffering only a few wounded.

In the Danang area, the enemy hit many different locations simultaneously. Hit by rockets were the FLC facility at Red Beach, III MAF headquarters, I Corps headquarters, Marble Mountain Air Facility, and downtown Danang. An LST docked at Danang took at least one hit with heavy casualties resulting.

Southeast of Danang, the 3rd Amtrac Battalion compound received B-40 rockets and mortar fire, which wounded several men and destroyed two tractors. The VC tried to penetrate the perimeter, but all the VC were killed or driven out.

Throughout the Americal Division's operating area, fire support bases and landing zones were hit. The heaviest attack was at LZ Ross, in the Que Son Valley. Ross was hit by 1 rounds of mortar and 32 rockets. At LZ Center, 15 miles west of Tam Ky, the enemy attempted a ground attack but lost 18 KIA and 13 weapons captured.

Since 5 May, the enemy has attempted to keep up the pressure. Installations in the Danang area were rocketed on 8 May and 9 May. A patrol of the 27th Marines spotted the enemy firing rockets at Danang on the evening of 8 May, forcing the enemy to break off his attack and to abandon several rockets.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYCHU LAI AREA ATTACKS

In the Chu Lai area, on 5 May, the enemy rocketed three installations almost simultaneously, mortared several Americal Division bases, and launched one ground attack. At Chu Lai Base, the enemy struck at two targets simultaneously. The MAG-13 area received 15 rounds of rockets, while in Sub Sector II of the CLDC, a battery of the 2nd LAAM Battalion and the FLSG area received an estimated 21 rockets.

The enemy fired from two separate sites about two miles apart. Three launchers fired from each site. The site from which MAG-13 was rocketed was taken under fire by an Army OP with 50 caliber machineguns. Artillery was placed on the site ten minutes after the attack started. However, there is no evidence that the enemy had to break off his attack before expending all his rockets. There was no evidence of any enemy casualties. At both sites, trenches had been dug for protection of personnel.

Hill 54, about ten miles above Chu Lai on Route One, received six rockets, fired from two launchers. There were no casualties resulting from this attack.

In addition, two other Army bases in the Chu Lai TAOR received mortar fire. An Engineer base at "Fat City", six miles northwest of Chu Lai, was hit with mortars. South of Chu Lai, LZ Dottie received 18 to 20 rounds of mortar fire with several WAs.

The enemy launched his only ground attack in the Chu Lai area on a Regional Forces compound at a bridge site on Route One, 12 miles above Chu Lai. The enemy overran the compound and occupied two bunkers overlooking the bridge. With cover fire from the bunkers, enemy demolitions men destroyed the bridge.

The enemy probably intended to attack another installation northwest of Chu Lai. A mile beyond the District Headquarters, an enemy group was ambushed near Route One. Friendlies killed five VC and captured six weapons, including a 60 mm mortar tube.

Since 5 May, the enemy has mortared several installations but has done little damage. On 8 May, the enemy demonstrated that he has the capability to rocket Chu Lai in broad daylight. The enemy fired two rockets at 1734 which impacted west of the runway.

(Note: In a non-classified, written brief of this nature, much information, including friendly casualties and damage to friendly installations, can not be given for security reasons. However, all available information is passed at the S-2 Brief on Thursday afternoons.)

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYHAPPY NEW YEAR FROM UNCLE HO

The following propaganda message was found in Ly Tin District after the Tet Offensive:

"President Ho Chi Minh's New Year Message to American Friends struggling for Freedom, Peace, and Justice against the U. S. Imperialist War in Vietnam"

"I send you, friends, my best wishes of the New Year.

"As you all know, no Vietnamese have ever come to trouble the United States. Yet half a million US troops have been sent to South Vietnam, and who, together with over 700,000 puppet and satellite troops are daily massacring the Vietnamese people and burning and demolishing Vietnamese towns and villages.

"In North Vietnam, thousands of planes have dropped over 800,000 tons of bombs, destroying schools, churches, hospitals alike and dense populated areas.

"The US government has caused tens of thousands of American youth to be wounded in vain of the Vietnam battlefield.

"Each year the US government spends tens of billions of dollars, the fruit of the American people's sweat and toil, to wage war.

"In a word, the US aggressors have not only committed crimes against Vietnam but have also wasted US lives and riches and stained the honor of the United States.

"Friends, in struggling hard to make the US government stop its aggressive war in Vietnam, you are defending justice and at the same time you are giving us support.

"To insure freedom, independence and unity of our Fatherland with our desire of living in peace and friendship with all the people the world over, including the American people, our people are entirely united in one mind and are determined to fight the US imperialist aggressors.

"We enjoy the support of the brother and friends on the five continents. We shall win and so shall you.

"Thank you for your support for the Vietnamese people.

"Best wishes to you all."

HO CHI MINH

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
19 MAY 1968

OPERATION MARKET TIME

The long irregular coast of South Vietnam provides the enemy with yet another route to infiltrate troops and supplies. To cut off waterborne infiltration, Operation Market Time was initiated during the early days of the Vietnam conflict. The operation is essentially a coordinated surveillance of the sea off South Vietnam by both aircraft and surface craft.

The waterborne part of the coastal surveillance consists of three "layers". The outer layer is the Coast Guard cutters and other larger vessels which patrol far out at sea. These vessels make the initial contact with an enemy boat and will keep it under surveillance as it approaches the 12 mile coastal limit.

In the middle layer are high speed gunboats mounting three-inch radar controlled guns. These vessels will often make the intercept of the enemy infiltrator.

In close to the coast are the Swift Boats. These 50-foot vessels mount twin 50 caliber machine guns and a combination 50 caliber machinegun and 81 mm mortar. Swift Boats will inspect suspicious vessels off shore and keep the fishing fleets under surveillance.

There is another part to coastal surveillance also. Much of the Vietnamese coast is marked by inland waterways. These also provide the enemy with a communication and supply route. It is the mission of the Vietnamese "junk fleet" along with their U. S. Navy advisors to patrol the inland waterways and check sampan traffic.

Swift Boats of the Chu Lai based Coastal Division 12 patrol the coast line from below Quang Ngai City to above Hoi An. In addition to intercepting potential enemy infiltrators, Swift Boats are occasionally called upon to provide fire support missions to friendly units on land. Recently, Swift Boats have contributed to Psyops by broadcasting Vietnamese language tapes encouraging VC to take advantage of the Chieu Hoi program. As these broadcasts are made off the coast from villages with strong VC influence, Swift Boats are often the target for enemy fire.

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Heavy contact is continuing north of Dong Ha, above the Cua Viet River. Marine units, ARVN troops, and an Army battalion have been successful in breaking the NVA grip on the river supply route. The presence of the 320th NVA Division in the area above Dong Ha continues to be a threat to the 3rd Marine Division's lifeline.

The Khe Sanh Combat Base continues to receive incoming rounds daily, although not in large numbers. However, Marine units deployed in the hills surrounding the base report little contact on the ground.

The 25 mile long Ashau Valley is now completely under Allied control. The 1st Air Cavalry Division is solidly entrenched in the northern part of the valley. C-130s are making flights into a temporary airstrip at A Loui, in the northern half of the valley. Last week, an ARVN regiment moved into the southern Ashau Valley and reoccupied the village of Ashau and the nearby Special Forces camp which was overrun in March 1966.

In the valley, large stores of enemy weapons have been located. The Air Cavalry has captured intact 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, enemy vehicles, and a destroyed PT-76 tank. The tank and documents verified the presence of an NVA tank battalion which had been in the valley. Meanwhile, troops of the 101st Airborne Division completed their drive down Route 547 from Hue and linked up briefly with the Cavalrymen in the valley. The paratroopers then moved out into the jungle in search of the enemy.

Chu Lai and Danang have both been harrassed by rocket attacks every few nights. At both installations the pattern has been the same: one or two volleys of rockets then a rapid withdrawal.

In the Americal Division's operating area, the heaviest ground action has been in the vicinity of Landing Zone Center. Ground troops have made constant contacts in the area, even though contacts have not resulted in a large scale engagement. LZ Center itself has been the target for all types of harrassing fire.

In western Quang Tin Province, the Kham Duc Special Forces Camp has been abandoned under overwhelming pressure. The camp is 60 miles west of Chu Lai and completely isolated. Earlier, on May 10, an artillery base, manned by Marines and located five miles away, was overrun. Two guns had to be spiked to prevent their falling into enemy hands.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYARMED PROPAGANDA PROGRAM

The Armed Propaganda Program is one of the less known Vietnamese Government programs that employs ex-VC to encourage other VC or NVA defections. It is one more use for returnees under the Chieu Hoi program.

Armed Propaganda personnel are used to contact enemy guerillas, either personally or through their families. The VC are persuaded to rally to the Government. The teams also circulate among the people in market places and other popular gathering places to tell of their experiences in defecting, the advantages they have found living under the Government rather than the VC, and to explain the Chieu Hoi Program. Besides employing the personal touch, Armed Propaganda teams also make use of standard psyops materials such as leaflets, banners, posters, and other reading materials. The other Allied forces also use Armed Propaganda personnel to support their own unit Psyops programs.

When not employed in their primary purpose of causing VC defections, Armed Propaganda personnel provide an armed force to provide security for Chieu Hoi Centers and New Life hamlets where enemy defectors are housed.

Armed Propaganda personnel are organized into military units, even though the personnel are not actually military personnel. Units exist up to company size. The basic unit is the team which consists of five men. A company consists of 74 men. Armed Propaganda units are normally under the control of the Provincial Chief or the Province Chieu Hoi Chief. Because of the para-military nature of the organization, there is no rank structure and all decisions must be made through discussion and persuasion.

Each of the five provinces in I Corps plus the city of Danang are authorized one company of Armed Propaganda personnel. Several of the more populous provinces are authorized an additional platoon.

RUMOR CONTROL

During these days of a high probability of enemy activity, rumors often fly unchecked through a cantonment. The best way to combat the panic and uneasiness encouraged by rumor-mongers, is to pass the true store.

S-2 does this every Thursday afternoon by presenting the true picture in I Corps and locally in the Chu Lai area by its Thursday afternoon briefs: at 1530 for Staff NCOs in the Staff Club, and for Sergeants and below at 1600 in the E-Club.

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
26 MAY 1968

23 MAY ATTACKS IN THE CHU LAI AREA

On the morning of 23 May, the enemy put together his second coordinated attack of the month on the installations in the Chu Lai area. All the attacks were within minutes of each other.

At about 0140 the 9th Engineer Battalion compound was hit with a barrage of about 20 82 mm mortar rounds. The rounds all impacted within a period of about four minutes. The fire was inaccurate and most of the rounds landed outside the perimeter of the compound. There were no casualties.

The mortar attack on 9th Engineers resulted in the CLDC bunker line going to a condition of 100 percent alert. As a result, many of the personnel in the CLDC were already in bunkers when the first rockets impacted in the MAG-13 area at 0200. Machine guns in the 9th Engineers perimeter engaged a suspected enemy firing position during the attacks.

At about the same time as the 9th Engineer attack, Binh Son District Headquarters, ten miles south of MAG-13 on Highway One came under mortar attack. Several satchel charges were also thrown into the perimeter wire.

Hill 54, an Americal Division outpost ten miles north of MAG-13 on Highway One received ten rounds of mortar fire and five 122 mm rockets. There were no casualties.

An Army Engineer unit at "Fat City", six miles northwest of MAG-13, suffered the only casualties in all the night's attacks. The compound was fired on by a total of 25 rounds of mortar fire and B-40 rockets.

In "Rocket Valley", directly west of Chu Lai, an Army observation post received seven rounds of mortar fire just minutes after Chu Lai was rocketed. The observation post was located less than a mile from the rocket launching site.

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MORE ROCKET ATTACKS AT CHU LAI

In the 23 May attack, two targets were hit in the Chu Lai Defense Command, the MAG-13 area and the FLSC area. These were the same two targets the enemy hit in his 5 May attacks. However, this attack was not as extensive as the enemy only fired six rockets at MAG-13 and four at the FLSC area. Two of the rockets fired at FLSC are believed to have gone into the sea. There were no casualties as a result of these attacks, although there was some structural damage.

The rocket fire came from "Rocket Valley" which has been the source of nearly all the rocket attacks on Chu Lai. A nearby Army observation post observed the rockets being fired and artillery fire was called in. The next morning an Army patrol investigated the rocket launching site. It was apparent that the artillery fire had caused some casualties as blood trails and one body were found nearby. Miscellaneous gear such as shipping packages were found at the launching site.

The Americal Division has increased its night time patrolling in "Rocket Valley". New units have been moved into the valley to man new observation posts. These observation posts are equipped with a 106 mm recoilless rifle and a quad 50 caliber machinegun for quick reaction to rocket attacks.

Patrolling and observation posts, however, will not eliminate the possibility of harrassing type rocket attacks. However, it will be more risky for the enemy to launch rockets and the possibility of large scale attacks similar to the 31 January attack is drastically reduced. The enemy must make extensive site preparations and move large numbers of personnel for a large attack, and this is subject to detection by Army patrols.

In the Danang area, it has been reported that the enemy has been firing rockets with a minimum of site preparation. Rather than set up launchers, the enemy has been using stovepipes for launchers and firing the rockets from sloped trenches. The accuracy of such techniques is limited, of course, but the enemy can fire rockets with much less chance of detection. He can exit the area rapidly as no gear need be carried off. Thus far there has been no report of the enemy using this technique in the Chu Lai area.

In the "Rocket Valley" area, the Americal Division has yet to make any large contacts with enemy forces. There have been several encounters at night, one of which resulted in one VC killed and his AK-47 captured. Quite possibly, other enemy harrassing attacks have been aborted because of the presence of Army patrols throughout "Rocket Valley".

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The Americal Division opened Operation Burlington Trail on 8 April 1968 in a former VC infested area 20 miles northwest of Chu Lai. The purpose of the operation was to destroy Viet Cong Local and Main Force units in the area and to open the road from Tam Ky to the Army Special Forces Camp at Tien Phuoc, 15 miles southwest of Tam Ky. Parts of two battalions of the 198th Light Infantry Brigade, supported by armor, have participated in the operation along with Vietnamese units.

The operation achieved tactical surprise and in the early days of the operation, several large contacts with VC units resulted. The road opening part of the operation was successful and for the first time in four years, the Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp was supplied by a truck convoy.

Americal troops uncovered a number of enemy base camps and located several weapons caches. Since the operation started, 176 individual and 51 crew served weapons have been captured. One of the crew-served weapons was a 20 mm anti-aircraft gun. The enemy lost almost 400 killed so far, and nine PWs have been captured.

UNSOLICITED MAIL

Recently, a new newspaper turned up in I Corps. This paper is called the Vietnam GI. Although the "GI" is supposedly published by Vietnam veterans, it is typical of the anti-war papers which have found their way to Vietnam by various means. It is similar to the Bond, an anti-war paper which was received, unsolicited, by members of MAG-13 last year.

Should any members of this command receive the Vietnam GI or any other paper of this type, unsolicited, it should be turned in to Group S-2 along with any amplifying information available.

It should be emphasized that there is nothing illegal about either receiving or reading any of these papers. However, because they border on the subversive, Naval Intelligence is interested. It is also of intelligence interest as to how one of these papers obtains its mailing lists of names and units.

In addition to papers, servicemen occasionally receive questionnaires from "news services", "research surveys", etc. These may also be questionable and should be brought to the attention of Naval Intelligence so that their validity can be determined.

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