

HEADQUARTERS
 Marine Aircraft Group-13
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
 FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

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 14 July 1968

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 Subj: Command Chronology Period 1-30 June 1968
 Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
 (b) WGO 5750.1C

Encl: (1) MAG-13 Command Chronology Period 1-30 June 1968
 (2) H&MS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-30 June 1968
 (3) MABS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-30 June 1968
 (4) VMFA-323 Command Chronology Period 1-30 June 1968
 (5) VMFA-314 Command Chronology Period 1-30 June 1968
 (6) VMFA-115 Command Chronology Period 1-30 June 1968

Filed
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1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the subject report is submitted as enclosures (1) through (6).
2. Upon removal from the subject report this letter is downgraded to unclassified.

J. D. Hays

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MAG-13

1st MAW

JUNE 1968

MAG-13

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

FOR

1-30 JUNE 1968

PART ONE: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA (1-30 JUNE)

1. Commanders and Staff

a. Headquarters, MAG-13

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
JAMES H. BERGE	CO	COL	COL
PHILIP D. SHUTLER	XO	LTCOL	LTCOL
MARTIN J. BASAR	ADJ	CAPT	WO
LEONARD R. LANG	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ
ROBERT H. SCHULTZ	S-1	MAJ	LTCOL
WILLIAM H. ALLEN	S-2 (1-19 June)	MAJ	MAJ
JOSEPH MARZIOLI	S-2 (20-30 June)	MAJ	CAPT
ROY A. SEAVER	S-3	LTCOL	LTCOL
HARRY T. HAGAMAN	S-4	LTCOL	LTCOL

b. H&MS-13

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
PAUL L. SIEGMUND	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
HENRY G. MILLER	XO	MAJ	MAJ
CHARLES R. CONNOR	S-3	CAPT	CAPT
HAROLD G. DEAN	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	LTCOL
LAWRENCE J. GALLAGHER	ADMINO	LT	CAPT

c. MABS-13

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
GEORGE L. BRUSER	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
CHARLES V. V. SMILLIE JR.	XO	MAJ	MAJ
HAROLD E. WILSON	ADMINO	CAPT	CWO
CHARLES J. CONION JR.	BASEOPSO (1-28 June)	MAJ	CAPT
ALBERT R. EASTMAN JR.	BASEOPSO (29-30 June)	MAJ	CAPT
JACOB W. MOORE	BASESERVO (1-10 June)	MAJ	MAJ
ERRHARD K. A. WINKELBRANDT	BASESERVO (11-30 June)	MAJ	CAPT

d. VMFA-115

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
GERALD W. VAUGHAN	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
JOHN I. HUDSON	XO	MAJ	MAJ
JAY N. BIBLER	OPSO	MAJ	MAJ
WILLIAM J. GRIFFIN	ADMINO	LT	MAJ
WILLIAM A. McMAHON	S-2	LT	CAPT

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
DENIS L. SHORTAL	S-4 (1-29 June)	CAPT	CAPT
ANTHONY A. YATSKO	S-4 (30 June)	CAPT	CAPT
RONALD G. KROPP	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

e. VMFA-314

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
HERBERT V. LUNDIN	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
CARL E. R. BLACK	XO (1-25 June)	MAJ	MAJ
HARRY H. ZIEGLER	XO (26-30 June)	MAJ	MAJ
BERNARD D. SCHMIDT	ADMINO	LT	CAPT
JOHN M. HERRING	S-2	LT	CAPT
PHILIP M. HINKLE	OFSO (1-25 June)	MAJ	MAJ
CARL E. R. BLACK	OFSO (26-30 June)	MAJ	MAJ
MARTIN W. MERIDITH	S-4 (1-11 June)	CAPT	MAJ
PHILIP M. HINKLE	S-4 (26-30 June)	CAPT	MAJ
GERALD E. WALSH	A/C MAINTO (1-7 June)	MAJ	MAJ
FREDERICK J. SCHOBEL	A/C MAINTO (8-30 June)	MAJ	MAJ

f. VMFA-323

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
DON J. SLEE	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
DANIEL I. CARROLL	XO	MAJ	MAJ
KARL S. SMITH	OFSO (1-24 June)	MAJ	MAJ
HENRY C. IVY	OFSO (25-30 June)	MAJ	MAJ
EDWARD R. BAILEY	ADMINO	LT	MAJ
LARRY T. HIGBEE	S-4	CAPT	CAPT
WARREN A. FERDINAND	A/C MAINTO (1-13 June)	MAJ	MAJ
CHARLES L. ZANGAS	A/C MAINTO (14-30 June)	MAJ	MAJ

2. Task Organization and Unit Location

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>	<u>Date of Office</u>
MAG-13	Chu Lai RVN	COL JAMES H. BERGE	1-30 June
HQMS-13	Chu Lai RVN	LTCOL PAUL L. SIEGMUND	1-30 June
MAES-13	Chu Lai RVN	LTCOL GEORGE L. BRUSER	1-30 June
VMFA-115	Chu Lai RVN	LTCOL GERALD W. VAUGHAN	1-30 June
VMFA-314	Chu Lai RVN	LTCOL HERBERT V. LUNDIN	1-30 June
WFA-323	Chu Lai RVN	LTCOL DON J. SLEE	1-30 June

3. Average Monthly Strength

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>USMC</u>			<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>USN</u>	
	<u>NA</u>	<u>NFO</u>	<u>AG</u>		<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
H&MS-13	*14	3	21	515	0	0
MABS-13	4		14	485	4	20
VMFA-115	11	17	4	262	1	1
VMFA-314	13	17	4	264	1	0
VMFA-323	12	17	4	260	1	0
	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	54	54	47	1786	7	21

*This figure includes 1 NAP (MGySgt J. A. CONROY)

4. Important Visitors to the Command

Major General N. I. ANDERSON visited MAG-13 on 11 June 1968. The General again visited MAG-13 on 13 June and accompanied LtGen. HENRY W. BUSE JR., CG, FMFPAC, LtGen. Robert E. CUSHMAN JR., CG, III MAF. Also accompanying General BUSE and General CUSHMAN were the following Staff members, Col. J. W. HUBBARD, G-1 FMFPAC; Col. J. B. ORD JR., G-2 FMFPAC; Col. R. C. DENNY JR., G-4 FMFPAC; Col. W. E. DEEDS, Director FMFPAC Command Center and the III MAF Sergeant Major, Sergeant Major McIntire.

PART TWO: NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Marine Aircraft Group-13 continued in its support of III MAF and all other free world Armed Forces in the I Corps area. Operations supported were; AIS, Scotland II, Seasite, Mameluke Thrust, Allen Brooke, Jeb Stuart III, Muskrat Ramble, Houston, Kentucky, Lancaster II, Mongoose Run, Nevada Eagle, Dragon Palace, Napoleon Saline, Golden Lemon, Dunbar County 14, Ashau Valley and Wheeler Wallowa. In the support of the aforementioned Operations this Group expended 3230 tons of ordnance while flying 1828 combat sorties and 1919 combat flight hours. Significant items included 49 KBMA/13 probables, 28 secondary explosions, 11 secondary fires, 17 sampans, 253 structures destroyed.

II-1

ENCLOSURE (|)

PART THREE: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. Personnel. The following personnel changes were effected during this reporting period.

<u>JOINED</u>		<u>TRANSFERRED</u>	
<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
18	112	4	102

2. Administration. There were 72 enlisted men promoted during this reporting period.

3. Awards. The following awards were presented: DFC's-7, NCM-1, Purple Heart's-13, Air Medals-17, Navy Achievement Medal's-3, Meritorious Masts-7.

4. Casualties

a. Hostile. There were no hostile casualties during this period.

b. Non-Hostile

(1) Total - 19

(2) Returned to Duty - 12

(3) Medical Evacuated - 3

(4) Retained at Sick Bay - 4

5. Civil Affairs

a. On 5 June 1968, leaflets were distributed in Long Phu I ("Understanding the Americans") also Chu Lai Air Base Veterinarian treated the cattle of that Hamlet.

b. Continuous English classes were conducted throughout the month, approximately 86 children attended these classes.

c. Each Civic Action village received approximately 200 lbs of clothing, these boxes of clothing were presented to the Hamlet Chiefs for distribution to the needy families in his village.

d. Chu Lai Civic Action Officers, MAG-13, MAG-12, FLSG-B, Sea Bees and Army Support Group held a meeting in the Americal Headquarters. Main topic discussed was, "the increase of inter-service civic action efforts in the Hamlets surrounding the Chu Lai Complex."

III-1

ENCLOSURE (/)

6. Intelligence

a. Briefing and debriefing of air crews and orientation of new air crews remains constant. Publication of the weekly S-2 "Tactical Brief" continues (See Supporting Documents, Part Four).

b. General Intelligence briefs are given each Thursday by the Group Intelligence Officer to all personnel in MAG-13, also special weekly intelligence briefs are given to the Group Guard concerning the Chu Lai TAOR.

7. Airfield Operations

a. Total operations for the month of June were 42,057, which marks the fourth consecutive month that operations at Chu Lai have exceeded 40,000.

b. MATCU-67 averaged 1,508 operations daily for the month of June 1968.

c. Since commencing operations in the Republic of Vietnam, MATCU-67 has controlled 825,079 landings and take-offs.

8. Air Operations

<u>SQUADRON</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>COMBAT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>COMBAT</u>
H&MS-13 C117	175	143	119	87
TA4F	59	58	61	60
VF-115 F-4B	584	563	647	616
VF-314 F-4B	569	549	613	587
VF-323 F-4B	545	515	597	569

Operations Supported

AIS	Muskrat Ramble	Dragon Palace
Scotland II	Houston	Napoleon Saline
Seasite	Kentucky	Golden Lemon
Mameluke Thrust	Lancaster II	Dunbar County 14
Allen Brooke	Mongoose Run	Ashau Valley
Jeb Stuart III	Nevada Eagle	Wheeler Wallowa

Significant Bomb Damage Assessment

KBA (Confirmed)	49
KBA (Probable)	13
Secondary Explosions	28
Secondary Fires	11
Structures.	253 Des/77 Dam
Bunkers	358 Des/28 Dam
Fighting Holes	74
Automatic Weapons Positions	10 Des/9 Dam
Rocket Positions	2
Mortar Positions	6 Des/1 Dam
Vehicles	4 Des/1 Dam
Road Cuts	29
Trench Line (meters)	1735
Bridges	4
Sampans	17 Des/3 w/Supplies
AAA Sites	1
Tank	1

9. Base Development

a. Construction of the Air Crew Quarters are nearing completion. The Air Crews will move in the first week in July.

b. The water point produced 2,110,000 gallons of potable water. The laundry section washed 30,000 pounds of laundry.

c. Design for troop housing has been submitted to BDO, Chu Lai for final design features and drawing. Upon receipt from BDO, the package will be submitted to CG, 1st MAW.

d. New enlisted club was opened. Snack bar and plumbing facilities yet to be completed.

e. Commencement of installation of new reefers at rear of mess hall. MABS-13 erecting units, NSAD has constructed the overhead shelter.

f. MCB-71 installing secondary power distribution throughout the cantonment.

g. Site preparation commenced on new PX building.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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10. Communications/Electronics. Installation has begun on the new Torn 20 Inter-communication hot line between squadron work centers and the 3M Expediter at Group Supply. The MAG-13 Communication Center handled over 20,000 messages during this reporting period.

11. Supply

a. During the month of June a wall to wall inventory was held and completed.

b. Approximately \$66,000 in NSA and \$108,000 in AFA was gained by inventory.

c. The annual AVCAL recouffitting request was submitted to Wing.

d. A shelf-Life Program was begun.

e. Fifty (50) high usage items were pre-positioned in the Maintenance area for easy access by the maintenance personnel.

f. Personnel sent to FLC and constructed 600 insert boxes of various sizes.

12. Morale/Welfare

a. Religious Services

(1) Protestant Services

(a) Sunday - 7; attendance 333

(b) Weekday - 17; attendance 190

(2) Catholic Services

(a) Sunday - 10; attendance 621

(b) Weekday - 20; attendance 75

(c) Religious Information Classes 8; attendance 68

(3) Latter Day Saints (Mormons)

(a) Sunday - 5; attendance 57

(4) Christian Science

(a) Sunday - 4; attendance 57

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ENCLOSURE (1)

b. Counseling and Interviews

Counseling - 42

Interviews - 78

c. Red Cross Cases - 9

13. Training

a. Normal on the job and technical training continued within each squadron.

b. Utilization of the MAG-13 rifle range is being accomplished for the purpose of Fam Firing newly joined personnel and maintaining currency of other personnel.

c. All Air Crews attended APR-25 Training Lecture by Mr. R. L. GREENALCH of Applied Technology Inc. on 5, 6 and 7 June 1968.

d. The following schools were attended during this reporting period.

<u>SCHOOL</u>	<u>PERSONNEL ATTENDING</u>
NCO Leadership	1
Embarkation	1
Corrosion Control	2
Career Advisory	1
Advisor Orientation Course	1
Welding Certification	1
JEST	7
5th Air Force Sea Survival	4

14. Electronic Countermeasures. The use of the "Shoe Horn" ECM/Warning Equipment continued as the majority of missions flown by MAG-13 were in the SAM HI threat area. Installation of the "Shoe Horn" equipment continues as aircraft are available for induction.

PART FOUR: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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IV-1

ENCLOSURE (1)

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
2 JUNE 1968

LOCAL SUMMARY

The enemy retains the capability to mount a limited ground attack on Chu Lai and Tam Ky City, and to attack by fire at the time of his choosing.

On 26 May, Chu Lai came under attack by 122 MM rockets. MAG-13 received four rocket at 0130. One round impacted to the rear of the new Air Crew Quarters, damaging quonset huts, two rounds impacted in the MAG-13 fuel area, and one round between 115 and 314 refueler area. Two aircraft received minor damage, there were no casualties from MAG-13.

At the same time, two rounds impacted in FLSG-Bravo area, damaging five 2½ ton trucks, and wounding two men. The rockets were fired from 6 miles southwest of the base. There were two launch positions and crew protection pits located at the site. At the time of firing the rockets, the launch site was taken under fire by quad .50 and 106 recoilless rifles from Hill 76. Counter battery fire was short by approximately 800 meters, it took approximately six to eight minutes for counter battery fire to be returned.

The launch positions were very hastily constructed, used and evacuated; there was no evidence of camouflage. The enemy egressed to the west. The area was in an old abandoned ville with many old wells, bunkers, underground living holes, etc.

RECENT REPORT ON THE DISTAFF VIET CONG

A 3 April report disclosed that the VC have established an organization composed primarily of female cadre to exploit individual US servicemen. The organization's major area of operations is Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province, although elements often work as far north as Da Nang City. The girls attend a two-day training course on Thanh Tu Village, Dien Ban, where they are taught procedures for exploiting Allied personnel. The girls are instructed to strike up casual conversations with Americans concerning names, families, time in-country, and morale.

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They are taught to ask their targets to cease interference in Vietnamese affairs and to allow the VC and GVN to solve their own problems. If the target is single and shows an interest, the girl is to arrange a further rendezvous in an effort to kidnap or kill him.

According to agent reports, approximately 100 VC female cadre have infiltrated Pleiku City, Pleiku Province. These cadre are to obtain employment as bar girls and prostitutes in an effort to elicit intelligence information from US personnel. They receive English language training at an unidentified center in Kontum Province and were furnished identification papers to facilitate entry into the city.

There have been previous reports of the Viet Cong use of females for intelligence collection purposes in the Pleiku Air Base area. A report received in September 1967 indicated that the VC planned to recruit girls whose missions would be to become acquainted with Allied military personnel and attempt to extract information or steal documents from them. Information developed in October 1967 showed that three Viet Cong intelligence collection teams composed of four girls each had infiltrated a village 13 kilometers from Pleiku Air Base to collect information concerning US forces in the area.

A investigation into the circumstances surrounding two US personnel missing in action and one killed in action revealed that at least one of the personnel had observed three young women swimming in the nude immediately prior to his disappearance. The investigation concluded that the women had probably been used as lures to entice the personnel into the hands of nearby VC.

On 4 May, the National Police apprehended several females in Saigon armed with Chicom pistols. Interrogation disclosed that they were members of a sizeable group of women organized into cells of three to four individuals, each cell with the mission of both propaganda dissemination and assassination of Government of Vietnam and Allied personnel.

Any information concerning developments in the Viet Cong employment of females should be brought to the attention of the Group S-2 Section.

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Every Marine in Vietnam is a potential source of information to the enemy. The average Marine either knows something that an enemy agent would like to know, or is regarded as a possible means of obtaining such information. Don't short change yourself. That information you possess may be all the enemy needs to fit that last piece of the puzzle together.

During the past week numerous reports have indicated that undercover enemy activity has increased on many military installations. One report indicated that the VC have infiltrated into Chu Lai Air Base disguising as daily-hired employees, also that the VC have been paying for information concerning the areas being shelled for accurate adjustments. Would you say that the VC have increased their rocket accuracy lately??

All Marines should be aware that the damages caused by the shelling or the area hit should not be disclosed to civilian employees and that no unauthorized employees are allowed to approach the shelled area.

Men who have been assigned the job of escort for Vietnamese employees have at times become slack in their duties. This job is sometimes overlooked as an important job. Some Vietnamese employees have been known to pick up and conceal material which is considered unauthorized trash. A few of these items which are sometimes overlooked as unauthorized trash are as follows:

1. Uniform items of specific military use i. e. helmets, web belting, canteens, etc.
2. PX resale items in an unopened, unused condition.
3. New clothing, shoes, canvas, mosquito netting and bedding.
4. Mess gear suitable for service use..
5. U.S. Government and printed matter.
6. Automotive, truck, military vehicle parts including salvage parts from aircraft.

There are no exceptions to the above list. Remember your generosity may help support the enemy's cause.

S-2 BRIEFINGS

An informed Marine is a better Marine, attention by OIC's and NGOIC's to releasing some number of Sergeants and below to attend Group S-2 briefs is requested. These half hour briefings cover the general situation in the Republic of Vietnam and the Chu Lai TAOR in more specific detail.

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
9 JUNE 1968

I CORPS SUMMARY

Enemy activity in the I Corps Tactical Zone was at a moderate level as compared to the intensity of the month of May. Enemy activity consisted of ambushes, minings, sabotage, and terrorism and harassment. Attacks by rocket fire continued to be a major enemy effort as he put over 900 rounds of rocket, artillery, and mortar fire into friendly positions throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone.

In the leatherneck square area of operation, 1/4 made contact with an unknown size enemy unit northwest of Dong Ha on 29 May. Contact continued until the morning of 30 May, resulting in 19 US KIA, 33 US WIA. Enemy casualties were 91 NVA KIA.

In operation Kentucky on 31 May, elements from 2/3 made contact with an unknown size enemy force and received heavy mortar fire, resulting in 6 US KIA, 52 US WIA. The enemy casualties were 64 NVA KIA.

Operation Scotland II had the most significant contact in the northern I Corps area this reporting period of 31 May when elements of 1/1 made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 143 NVA KIA.

In Thua Thien Province, the enemy continued to improve his lines of communication and supply running from Laos and the Ashau Valley to the coast. On 4 June, 1st ARVN Division Black Panther Company discovered 44 enemy bodies that had been killed by air strikes approximately 4 miles north of Hue.

In the Operation Tennessee Grove area, 101st Airborne troops discovered a weapons cache containing 87 AK-47's, 300 82 MM mortar rounds and small arms ammunition.

LOCAL SUMMARY:

On 31 May, Binh Son District Headquarters received 10 rounds of 81 MM mortar, resulting in 3 PF and 3 civilians WIA.

The enemy will probably continue his attacks by rocket fire, elements of the 3rd Regiment are still capable of mounting ground attacks against the Tien Phouc Special Forces Camp, Tam Ky, and Chu Lai.

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However, the enemy will probably continue his attacks by rocket fire against the air field with 122 MM rockets. At the present time the enemy does not seem ready or willing to commit his forces in a sustained attack other than in Fire Support Base Center.

MINES

Recently a new type of nonmetallic mine was recovered near Kontum City. This mine contains sufficient explosive to disable any armored vehicle being utilized by friendly forces. The case material is black plastic, painted olive green. The fuze is a chemical, pressure type. The mine is 4.6 inches high and weighs 25 pounds.

DISSENSION BETWEEN NVA AND VC TROOPS

A directive prepared by an unidentified Current Affairs Committee in Binh Duong (P), instructs subordinate units to take necessary action to stop discrimination against NVA troops. The directive further stated that northerners had become the butt of jokes by some parochialists, and local villagers tended to overcharge them for goods and services. Addresses were urged to settle the problem by properly indoctrinating VC and emphasizing great sacrifices made by northerners.

ENEMY INTELLIGENCE

A key element in the Viet Cong effort is an elaborate organization in Hanoi called the Central Research Agency (C.R.A.) Though it handles Hanoi's intelligence effort on a worldwide scale, the main focus of its operation is on South Vietnam. The C.R.A. reportedly operates under the close personal observation of Ho Chi Minh himself. Considerable information on the organization of the C.R.A. has become available from captured Viet Cong agents and from the work of intelligence agents of the Republic of Vietnam. Much of this information can not be made public for security reasons, but it is possible to describe the C.R.A. organization and its operations in broad outline.

The headquarters of the C.R.A. in Hanoi is divided into six main sections, not including a special code unit. The six sections are responsible for administration, cadres, communications espionage, research, and training. Each section has units to handle the specialized activities of its particular area of responsibility. The research section, for example, has subsections that handle political, economic, and military affairs respectively.

C.R.A. headquarters directs a number of special centers for overseas operations. One such center maintains intelligence channels to overseas areas. It operates through special units at Haiphong and at Hongay.

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A second special center is responsible for VC intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos. A third center handles activities along the "demarcation line", the border with South Vietnam. This unit, based in Vinh Linh in southeast North Vietnam, is responsible for sending agents and supplies to the South by sea. It also cooperates with the North Vietnamese army in planning and carrying out infiltration. The C.R.A. maintains intelligence bases in Laos and other countries.

Many Viet Cong agents have been captured in Saigon. They have exposed the extensive effort by the C.R.A. to penetrate all Republic of Vietnam Government agencies, foreign embassies, and other specialized organizations. Party and military intelligence units and agents work closely with C.R.A.

Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese intelligence operations in support of the Viet Cong is one of the most extensive of its kind on the world.

BLAST OR BLOW? POT OR GRASS?

Those four terms are very common especially for those who use marijuana. The physiological reaction of an individual who has used marijuana consists of widely dilated eyes, fixed, staring pupils with the whites of the eyes severely bloodshot (orange-red).

The user may begin giggling or laughing uproariously. His perception of time, space and distance is distorted so that objects begin to appear larger or smaller than the actual size. There is no physical or psychological dependence created by using marijuana, but it does produce both tolerance and habituation. It is an addicting drug only in the sense that existing psychological factors of the user may lead him to depend upon its use. Its greatest dangers are that the intoxication and hallucinations produced may lead to violent conduct such as attacking a friend thinking that it is necessary for self-defense, and that it may lead to the use of other, more addictive and dangerous drugs. The effects upon character and morality are even more devastating.

Under article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice maximum punishment for wrongful possession or use of marijuana is 5 years confinement at hard labor and a dishonorable discharge.

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
16 JUNE 1968

ALERT CONDITIONS

WHITE: Possible enemy activity.

This is the normal security/alert condition during hours of darkness.
It indicates a need for increased security precautions.

GREY: High probability of enemy activity.

Personnel and vehicle movement should be minimized.

GREEN: High probability of enemy activity.

Personnel be prepared to muster with Ground Defense or Disaster Control forces. Minimized vehicle and personnel movement.

GREEN ALFA: Imminent.

Only essential combat work authorized. All other personnel report to their quarters if not engaged in essential work. All unnecessary lights out. Only essential vehicular and personnel traffic authorized. Ground Defense and Disaster Control forces muster and be made available in the living or work area, as appropriate.

YELLOW: Contact has been made with the enemy on the perimeter or explosive fires are being received.

All personnel take cover. No authorized movement except Ground Defense and Disaster Control forces. Complete blackout. Flight operations may continue.

RED: Enemy forces have penetrated the perimeter.

Secure flight operations. Do Not fire individual weapons except when directed by competent authority or to protect life or property. Extreme care must be exercised to keep from firing on friendly forces.

All personnel upon hearing the alarm or incoming explosions will immediately fall to the prone position and crawl to the closest covered position. They will remain prone until the initial volley is over. Then each individual will move as rapidly as possible to the nearest bunker. It is imperative that all personnel assume the prone position as soon as the initial warning is received and not wait to look for the rockets in flight or stand up to seek or run to a bunker.

The all clear signal will be passed by word of mouth. No audible signal by sirens will be used to signify all clear condition.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYENEMY ACTIVITY IN I CORPS

Enemy-initiated activity in the I Corps Tactical zone decreased as compared to May 1968. The Communist forces avoided contact where ever possible.

In northern I Corps on 10 June elements of the 2nd ARVN Regiment made contact with an unknown size enemy force, about 7 kilometers south of Gio Linh which resulted in 100 NVA KIA. ARVN casualties were reported as light.

In the vicinity of Khe Sanh Combat Base on 6 June 3/1 made contact with an unknown size enemy force which resulted in 56 NVA KIA.

On 11 June elements of 1/3 and 1/4 at LZ Torch located south of Khe Sanh Combat Base made contact with an estimated enemy company. They received intense small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG rocket fire. The contact broke at 0930 with 28 NVA KIA.

Ten miles south of Danang on 7 June elements of 1/26 made contact with an unknown number of enemy and were receiving small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG rocket fire. The Marines employed their organic weapons, and called in artillery airstrikes and gunships. The contact was broken at 1630 with 64 NVA KIA.

In the Tam Ky area, 15 miles north of Chu Lai, the enemy continued to refuse to commit his forces to ground actions, when he could avoid it, preferring instead to utilize 82MM and 60MM mortars in attacks by fire against Americal unit command posts. 114 rounds of mixed 82MM and 60MM mortar fire were received by the Army units in an area south and west of Tam Ky.

Five miles southwest of Tam Ky on 6 June, elements of 1/52 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 NVA KIA.

LOCAL SUMMARY:

In the local area, Operation Muscatine 10 miles south of Chu Lai, secured 10 June with a final result of 1130 VC/NVA KIA.

On 6 Jun A5/46 Infantry Division found and destroyed four 55 gallon drums of CS 7 miles southeast of Chu Lai. The next day D5/46 Infantry found and destroyed 2 500 pound bombs 4 miles south of Chu Lai. On 11 June D5/46 found 55 122MM rocket containers 8 miles west of Chu Lai.

At 090155H June, Chu Lai received seven 122MM rockets. MAG-13 took one rocket which impacted in Lake Robertshaw. One round impacted near the Army helo pad resulting in five UH-1E's damaged. One rocket landed in the MAG-12 Staff NCO living area. The rocket fuze was apparently set on long delay as the sand took most of the shrapnel and the huts around the impact area did not sustain any degree of damage to speak of. FLSG-Bravo received the remaining four rockets resulting in light casualties.

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One of the most important and dramatic programs in the war against aggression in South Vietnam is the Chieu Hoi (pronounced "chew hoy") or "Open Arms" program. It offers amnesty to Viet Cong guerrillas and persuades them to rally to the side of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Chieu Hoi's central theme is an appeal to individual Viet Cong to return to the Government of Vietnam (GVN), to start a new life within GVN society, and to help in the economic and political development of the new nation.

The Chieu Hoi Program, begun in 1963, is today operating effectively in the field. There were 2539 Viet Cong in I Corps alone that rallied to Chieu Hoi in 1967. This year as of June 1968 we have had 952 Viet Cong who have "seen the light" under our Chieu Hoi Program.


As time goes on, the caliber of the returnees is improving. There are now more platoon and squad leaders, political cadre, and Communist Partymembers rallying to the Saigon Government. Many are trained intelligence specialists, medical officers, and combat-toughened soldiers.

Once a Viet Cong rallies, he is taken to one of the Chieu hoi centers. Each man is questioned to determine if he is a bona fide Viet Cong. The returnee is then given a physical examination at a dispensary. If medical care is indicated, he is sent to the hospital nearest his center.

The men stay at the rehabilitation center for as long as 45 days unless they wish to stay longer to learn a vocational skill. When they have completed their training they may join the South Vietnamese Armed Forces or their own Hoi Chanh armed team, settle down in a "new life" hamlet, or just walk out and begin life anew with 500 piasters in pocket money. Some also get help in finding jobs. When they walk out of the Chieu Hoi center, they receive standard identification papers which bear no justification that the bearer has ever been a Viet Cong or a Hoi Chanh.

The Chieu Hoi program has demonstrated that freedom's appeal is relentless. Doan Ket, the National Reconciliation Policy of the Republic of Vietnam, promises to bring over more and more Hoi Chanh from Communist tyranny. For each "rallier" who comes over to the Government of Vietnam, another

GIẤY THÔNG-HÀNH



SAFE-CONDUCT PASS TO BE HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED FORCES

이 안전보장패스는 월남정부와 모든 연합군에 의해 인정된 것입니다.

รัฐบาลเวียดนามและหน่วยพันธมิตร ยินดีให้เกียรติแก่ผู้ถือบัตรผ่านปลอดภัยนี้.

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
22 JUNE 1968

I CORPS SUMMARY

Enemy initiated activity remained at a moderate level during the week; attacks by fire decreased slightly as the Communists fired over 740 rounds of rockets, artillery, and mortars into friendly positions. Free World installations and combat support units along the DMZ received the majority of the incoming. The Communist ground forces did not fare well, as they had over 852 men KIA, with 86 of that number confirmed killed by Marine Air.

Activities are starting to pick up in the Khe Sanh area of operations. On 15 June, about 10 kilometers south of the Khe Sanh Combat Base, elements of 3/4 came under attack from an unknown size enemy unit. The attack lasted throughout the major portion of the next day, resulting in 186 NVA KIA and 7 North Vietnamese prisoners of war. In the same general area on 18 June, 3/4 received two rounds of 82MM mortar fire and a probe from an unknown size enemy force. Artillery and air strikes were called in resulting in 128 NVA KIA (49 KBMA), and 9 crew-served weapons captured.

On 19 June, Quang Tri Citadel received ten 82MM mortar rounds inside the city and ten rounds outside the city. Damage and casualties were light.

Camp Evans, about half way between Hue and Quang Tri City, received seven 122MM rockets on 18 June. Counter battery fire was returned, resulting in 4 NVA KIA.

On 14 June, an ARVN battalion made contact with an unknown size enemy force about five miles northeast of Phu Bai. The action was short and resulted in 14 NVA KIA, and 8 individual weapons captured.

Rice denial and sweep operations in the coastal areas around Hue and DaNang have disrupted the Communist efforts directed at reorganizing his forces and extracting (stealing) the rice crops from the Vietnamese farmers. So far, these operations have discovered and destroyed or redistributed over 85 tons of VC rice, a ton of salt, over two tons of small arms ammunition, 1,075 B-40 and B-41 rockets, 100 claymore mines, 200 hand grenades, 16 140MM rocket launchers, and other items.

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In the DaNang area on 14 June, the VC fired thirteen 122MM rockets into military installations in the area, including FLC, MCB-58, and C/1/11 cantonements. Damage and casualties were reported as light.

On 12 June, a Vietnamese Popular Force unit captured a three man VC Special Action terrorist cell in the vicinity of DaNang City's China Beach area.

On 13 June, two Viet Cong platoons entered the Vinh Tho refugee camp, located about 12 miles south of Danang, burned 22 tents and kidnapped 60 civilians.

In the southern I Corps Tactical Zone, the Communist forces have the capability to mount attacks by fire against Chu Lai and Tam Ky. However, Americal Division units are aggressively patrolling the area. These patrols have done much to discourage the VC rocket units from anything more than harassment type attacks.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) was officially formed in January 1962. For the first few months of its existence, it continued to use the liason net and communication channels that had been established by its predecessor, the southern wing of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, the Lao Dong, and the Lao Dong appeared to be its chief sponsor in Hanoi. In 1963, however, a committee was established in Hanoi called the Committee for Supervision of the South which was given the job of administration for the PRP.

Publicly, North Vietnam pictured the PRP as simply a southern proletarian (working class) party. Internally, to the North Vietnamese Communist Party members, Hanoi leaders explained that the PRP was merely a continuation of the older party, and that the creation of the PRP was only a matter of strategy, to deceive the South Vietnamese and the Americans, and to improve the image of the "Revolution" to the rest of the world.

Shortly after its creation, the PRP launched an intense propaganda campaign throughout South Vietnam to acquaint the South Vietnamese with its existence and to promote acceptance of the Party. However, the PRP cadres were under instruction to tone down the Socialist-Communist theme should it be inappropriate in the particular area where they would be working; for example an area with a heavy concentration of Catholic Vietnamese.

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The PRP is a two-faced organization. To the world in general and South Vietnam in particular, it insists that it is not communist but Marxist-Leninist, indicating philosophic but not political allegiance and implying some sort of national communism without outside ties. In the North, the Hanoi regime characterizes the PRP as a vanguard Marxist-Leninist organization, indicating it is in the mainstream of the worldwide communist movement, both spiritually and materially connected to the North Vietnamese, the Hanoi government and the Lao Dong.

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MAG-13 S-2 TACTICAL BRIEF
29 JUNE 1968I CORPS SUMMARY

In northern I Corps, enemy artillery and rocket units were busy. On 21 June, Dong Ha started receiving 152 MM and 130 MM artillery fire, resulting in moderate damage to the area.

Also on the 21st, the Quang Tri airfield received fifteen rounds of 122 MM rockets (launched from approximately eight miles south west of the base). Two of the rockets impacted on the west side of the base in the service area. The remaining thirteen rockets impacted in the northwest section of the base. A short time later, the base received a probe by fire, consisting of small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire. The enemy attacks caused no damage or casualties.

On 21 June, approximately twenty miles west and south of Da Nang, elements of the 26th Marines discovered and destroyed a weapons cache that contained 33 140 MM rocket launchers, 19 140 MM rockets, 77 122 MM rocket warheads, 50 122 MM rocket fuzes, 13 75 MM recoilless rifle rounds, 10 cases of 60 MM mortar rounds, 50 cases of RPG rounds, and 94 cases of 7.62 MM small arms ammunition.

In the area around Tam Ky City during the past week, Marine and Army reconnaissance units sighted over 107 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers; they called artillery and air strikes on the larger groups, resulting in 4 NVA KIA confirmed. They also detained three suspects. Captured Viet Cong documents indicate that the enemy is aware of these recon teams operating in their area (the VC name for them is "Biet Kich"). The captured documents also revealed that the recon teams have disrupted the enemy's freedom of movement and forced him to take more extreme measures to protect his position.

Approximately ten miles to the west of Tam Ky City on 19 June, elements of the 1st Cav were subjected to enemy psychological operations, when a female voice was heard on a loudspeaker, saying "Lay down your arms; refuse to fight." The psy ops effort left something to be desired, as the 1st Cav troops put mortar fire on the suspected position. After the first round, the young lady shut up!

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LOCAL SUMMARY

During the month of May, the Viet Cong were actively attempting to recruit replacements in the Ly Tin District. Although the Vietnamese in the general area are overwhelmingly pro-government, four teen-age males were recruited from one of the refugee camps in the area. However, also during the month of May, 72 Viet Cong soldiers returned to government control under the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program, and friendly ground operations into Communist safe havens and base areas, coupled with the growing psychological operations are likely to yield a growing number of returnees. At the rate of 72 to 4, the Viet Cong will definitely have a personnel problem.

On 23 June, the NSAD Sand Ramp area took 23 incoming mortar rounds from 0104 until 0115. The mortars were fired from at least two different sites. The mortar fire is believed to have been a diversion for Viet Cong swimmers to get into the Sand Ramp area, where they placed two 35 pound satchel charges equipped with time fuzes on each side of a barge, and swam out of the area. At 0114 the charges exploded, severely damaging the barge, but not sinking it.

Twice in the early morning hours of 25 June, a swimmer was observed in the area by a guard in the NSAD dock area. The guard fired at the swimmer with unknown results. While it is well known that the VC have frog-man units, this is the first instance of their being utilized against Chu Lai.

SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM

On 22 June, on Ky Hoa Island, a truck from the 8th Cav was set on fire. It had been booby-trapped with a pencil size length of C-4 placed under the accelerator.

On 26 June, in the DaNang area, an Air Force bus being used on a USO tour was booby-trapped. The explosive device used was a two and one half pound package of C-4 equipped with a chemical pencil fuze. The bomb was placed in the front of the bus between the fire extinguisher and the fire wall. The bus had been left unattended for approximately one hour while the tour was being conducted at a pagoda at Marble Mountain. While enroute back to the base, the bomb exploded resulting in 12 wounded.

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The two incidents just related could have easily been avoided if someone had only used a little common sense.....don't let yourself be caught short. It only takes a second to place a booby trap where it will do the most damage and the Viet Cong have been at it for almost twenty years. When you leave the Cantonment on official business, bring a firend to watch your vehicle. Don't leave vehicles unguarded, even for a little while.

KIT CARSON SCOUT PROGRAM

In November 1966, III MAF adopted the Kit Carson Scout program, initiated the the 1st Marine Division, to employ Chieu Hoi returnees (VC/NVA defectors) in support of Marine tactical and psychological operations. As former enemy troops, the Scouts have a knowledge of enemy tactics, and since they are employed in their former areas of operation as a VC, they also know the terrain and the people. This knowledge has proven to be of invaluable assistance to Marine patrols by disclosing enemy mines, booby traps, and ambushes, and discovering the hiding places of enemy personnel, weapons, and supplies. The Scouts also gain valuable intelligence information from the villagers and identify their former comrades. Additionally, the Kit Carson Scouts are able to show the people the advantages of living under the Government of Vietnam as opposed to life under the Viet Cong. Both the 1st and the 3rd Marine Divisions, as well as several Army units, have active programs which include thorough screening of potential scouts at Chieu Hoi Centers and evaluation of potential scouts at Kit Carson Scout schools. These schools teach subjects such as basic English, U. S. weapons, scouting and patrolling, map reading and the compass, and close order drill. Following their training, the potential scouts are given further training while in direct support of Marine units under combat conditions. Kit Carson Scouts are normally assigned and live with a specific Marine infantry company, under the guidance of a Marine "buddy", drawing pay and allowances like any other man in the unit. As a result, friendship and familiarity is developed between the Marines and Scouts which increases the effectiveness of operations and at the same time gives the scouts a new lease on life as a valuable member of his country.