

HEADQUARTERS
 Marine Aircraft Group-13
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
 FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3:WLR:tjc
 5750
 Ser: 003A22868
 15 August 1968

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 Subj: Command Chronology Period 1-31 July 1968

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
 (b) WGO 5750.1C

Encl: ✓(1) MAG-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 July 1968
 ✓(2) H&MS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 July 1968
 ✓(3) MABS-13 Command Chronology Period 1-31 July 1968
 ✓(4) VMFA-115 Command Chronology Period 1-31 July 1968
 ✓(5) VMFA-314 Command Chronology Period 1-31 July 1968
 ✓(6) VMFA-323 Command Chronology Period 1-31 July 1968

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the subject report is submitted as enclosures (1) through (6).
2. Upon removal from the subject report this letter is downgraded to unclassified.

J. H. BERGE
 J. H. BERGE

SEC 6	68-1103
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1st MAW SSC No.	Copy No.
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MAG-13
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
FOR
1-31 JULY 1968

PART ONE: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Commanders and Staff

a. Headquarters, MAG-13 (1-31 July)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
JAMES H. BERGE, JR.	CO	COL	COL
PHILIP D. SHUTLER	XO (1-11 Jul)	LTCOL	LTCOL
ROY A. SEAVER	XO (12-31 Jul)	LTCOL	LTCOL
MARTIN J. BASAR	ADJ	CAPT	WO
LEONARD R. LANG	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ	SGTMAJ
ROBERT H. SCHULTZ	S-1	MAJ	LTCOL
JOSEPH MARZIOLI	S-2	MAJ	CAPT
ROY A. SEAVER	S-3 (1-11 Jul)	LTCOL	LTCOL
GEORGE L. BRUSER	S-3 (12-31 Jul)	LTCOL	LTCOL
HARRY T. HAGAMAN	S-4	LTCOL	LTCOL

b. H&MS-13 (1-31 July)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
PAUL L. SIEGMUND	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
HENRY G. MILLER	XO	MAJ	MAJ
CHARLES R. CONNOR	S-3	MAJ	CAPT
HAROLD G. DEAN	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	LTCOL
LAWRENCE J. GALLAGHER	ADMINO (1-28 Jul)	LT	CAPT
WILLIAM K. HEHNER, JR.	ADMINO (28-31 JUL)	LT	LT

c. MABS-13 (1-31 July)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
GEORGE L. BRUSER	CO (1-12 Jul)	LTCOL	LTCOL
CHARLES V. V. SMILLIE, JR.	CO (13-31 Jul)	LTCOL	MAJ
CHARLES V. V. SMILLIE, JR.	XO (1-12 Jul)	MAJ	MAJ
EDWARD R. BAILEY	XO (13-31 Jul)	MAJ	MAJ
HAROLD E. WILSON	ADMINO	CAPT	CWO
ALBERT R. EASTMAN, JR.	BASEOFNSO	MAJ	CAPT
EHRHARD K. A. WINKELBRANDT	BASESERVO	MAJ	CAPT

d. VMFA-115 (1-31 July)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
GERALD W. VAUGHAN	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
JOHN I. HUDSON	XO	MAJ	MAJ
WILLIAM J. GRIFFIN	S-1	LT	MAJ
WILLIAM A. MCMAHON	S-2	LT	CAPT
JAY N. BIBLER	S-3	MAJ	MAJ
ANTHONY A. YATSKO	S-4	WO	CAPT
ROGER G. KROPP	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

e. VMFA-314 (1-31 July)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
HERBERT V. LUNDIN	CO (1-28 Jul)	LTCOL	LTCOL
FRANK E. PETERSON, JR.	CO (29-31 Jul)	LTCOL	LTCOL
HARRY H. ZIEGLER	XO	MAJ	MAJ
BERNARD D. SCHMIDT	S-1	LT	CAPT
JOHN M. HERRING	S-2	LT	CAPT
CARL E. R. BLACK	S-3	MAJ	MAJ
PHILIP M. HINKLE	S-4 (1-26 Jul)	WO	MAJ
RAYMOND E. REDFORD	S-4 (27-31 Jul)	WO	LT
FREDERICK J. SCHOBBER	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

f. VMFA-323

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	
		<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
DON J. SLEE	CO	LTCOL	LTCOL
DANIEL I. CARROLL	XO	MAJ	MAJ
EDWARD R. BAILEY	S-1 (1-12 Jul)	LT	MAJ
JEROME L. HESS	S-1 (13-31 Jul)	LT	CAPT
FREDERICK X. GULDI	S-2	LT	CAPT
HENRY C. IVY	S-3	MAJ	MAJ
LARRY T. HIGBEE	S-4 (1-18 Jul)	WO	CAPT
JAMES E. BIRDWELL	S-4 (19-31 Jul)	WO	CAPT
CHARLES L. ZANGAS	A/C MAINTO	MAJ	MAJ

2. Task Organization and Unit Location

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>	<u>Date of Office</u>
MAG-13	CHU LAI, RVN	COL JAMES H. BERGE, JR.	1-31 Jul
H&MS-13	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL PAUL L. SIEGMUND	1-31 Jul
MAB-13	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL GEORGE L. BRUSER	1-12 Jul
MAB-13	CHU LAI, RVN	MAJOR CHARLES V. V. SMILLIE	13-31 Jul
VMFA-115	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL GERALD W. VAUGHAN	1-31 Jul
VMFA-314	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL HERBERT V. LUNDIN	1-28 Jul
VMFA-314	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL FRANK E. PETERSON, JR.	29-31 Jul
VMFA-323	CHU LAI, RVN	LTCOL DON J. SLEE	1-31 Jul

3. Average Monthly Strength

	USMC				USN	
<u>Squadron</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>NFO</u>	<u>AG</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
H&MS-13	*16	4	22	513	0	0
MABS-13	5	1	13	486	3	20
VMFA-115	15	18	4	259	1	1
VMFA-314	16	17	4	261	1	0
VMFA-323	15	18	4	252	1	0
	—	—	—	—	—	—
MAG-13	67	58	47	1771	6	21

* This figure includes 1 NAP (MGySgt J. A. CONROY)

PART TWO: NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Marine Aircraft Group-13 continued its support of III MAF and all other free world Armed Forces in the I Corps area. Operations supported were: Napoleon/Saline II, Scotland II, Lancaster II, Lancaster WEST, Mameluke Thrust, Dodge City, Dragon Palace III, Allen Brook, Jeb Stuart III, Houston, Nevada Eagle, Lamson 216, Canton II, Thor, Kentucky, Mongoose Run, and Pocahontas Forest. Elements of the U.S. Army, Republic of Korea and ARVN Forces were supported.

An increased number of strikes were flown in the Talley Ho area.

As a result of H&MS-13's "CAL DOCK" program we have seen an increase in available radars. Pilots and RIO's are being encouraged to practice self-contained approaches in anticipation of the oncoming monsoons.

H&MS-13's TA-4F's have returned from NAS, Cubi Point and now have FM radios installed which will enable the Group to provide TAC(A)'s in the near future.

Significant BDA for this period in support of the aforementioned operations was 32 KBMA, 38 Secondary explosions, 42 Secondary fires, 266 Structures destroyed, 253 Bunkers destroyed and 6 Boats destroyed or damaged.

PART THREE: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. Personnel. During the month of July, Marine Aircraft Group-13 had a loss of 13 Officers and 165 enlisted due to rotation and transfers. During this same period 35 Officers and 91 enlisted personnel reported for duty.

2. Awards. There were two Distinguished Flying Crosses, one Navy Achievement Medal and two hundred eighty (280) Air Medals received by members of this command during the month of July.

3. Casualties.

Non-hostile

- a. Total for July.....24 (Includes 2 deaths)
- b. Total returned to duty.....18
- c. Total MedEvac.....7
- d. Total number of man-days lost.....151

Hostile

- a. Killed in Action.....2
- b. Wounded in Action.....0
- c. Missing in Action.....0

4. Civil Affairs

a. 1 July: MAG-13 CA team travelled to Tam Ky to transport hospital beds to the Dickey Chapelle dispensary in the Chu Lai refugee hamlet.

b. 7 July: MEDCAP conducted in Long Phu II - 40 people were treated. MAG-13 CA team located and transported a male corpse from 27th Surgical Hospital to the surviving family in Long Phu II; the man died of natural causes.

c. 7 July: The MAG-13 CA team attended a Vietnamese theater presentation during the evening as guests of the district chief. The presentation was a tragic-comedy expressing Vietnamese philosophy; the civilians present expressed extreme gratitude that the Americans honored an invitation to such an event.

[REDACTED]

d. 10 July: MABS-13 Civic Action personnel transported six Long Phu II civilians to Chu Lai Air Base to construct portions of a bridge that will be erected in Long Phu II. The bridge is the beginning of a road which the Vietnamese are building. It will connect the hamlets of Long Phu I and II and improve commerce between the hamlets.

e. A meeting was conducted at the An Tan Dispensary by the Ky Lien village chief. All Civic Action teams in the Chu Lai area were represented, which marks a significant achievement in coordination of Civic Action in the Chu Lai area.

f. 12 July: Intelligence information was received warning of future VC sapper attacks on Chu Lai.

g. 13 July: Seven Hundred (700) sand bags were given to An Tan village Headquarters. Long Phu I dispensary construction is 80% completed. Road construction began in Long Phu II by MABS-13 personnel.

h. 14 July: MEDCAP to Long Phu II, treated 28 villagers. Received intelligence information and three VC were apprehended.

i. 18 July: MAG-13 Civic Action team and an Army Psychological Operations Team showed a movie in Long Phu II.

j. 20 July: WMFA-323 Civic Action team toured the Long Phu I area and conducted a meeting with that hamlet chief.

k. 21 July: MEDCAP team to Long Phu II treated 30 civilians and the dental corpsman treated six children. Upon completion of the treatment the team was invited for refreshment by the villagers, also received intelligence reports of enemy build up in the Chu Lai area.

l. 26 July: Province and National newspapers were distributed to hamlets in MAG-13 area of responsibility. Village officials conducted a meeting with MAG-12 and MAG-13 Civic Action teams to discuss current projects in progress.

m. 28 July: MEDCAP to Long Phu II, treated 45 people. 20 pounds of soap were distributed and dental hygiene instructions were given to 12 children. During the afternoon the Civic Action team enjoyed lunch at a Vietnamese house in the refugee hamlet. The host is a constant source of intelligence information concerning enemy movement south of Chu Lai.

n. 30 July: Intelligence information received warning of possible attack on An Tan.

5. Intelligence

a. Briefing and debriefing of aircrews and orientation of new aircrews remains constant. Publication of weekly S-2 "Tactical Brief" continued (See Supporting Documents, Part Four)

b. General Intelligence briefs are given each Thursday by the Group Intelligence Officer to all personnel in MAG-13. Special weekly intelligence briefs are given to the Group Guard concerning the Chu Lai TAOR.

6. Air Operations

<u>SQUADRON</u>		<u>SORTIES</u>		<u>HOURS</u>	
		<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>COMBAT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>COMBAT</u>
H&MS-13	C-117	175	156	125	109
	TA-4F	38	28	44	29
VMFA-115	F-4B	530	506	608	571
VMFA-314	F-4B	545	541	579	575
VMFA-323	F-4B	592	580	659	645

Operations Supported

Nevada Eagle, Kentucky, Houston, Mongoose Run, Lancaster II, Jeb Stuart III, Mameluke Thrust, Canton, Lancaster West, Dodge City, X-Ray, Eagle Yankee, Thor, Dragon Palace, Allen Brook, and Pocahontas Forest.

Significant Bomb Damage Assessment

KBA (Confirmed)	32
Secondary Explosions	38
Secondary Fires	42
Structures (Destroyed)	266/54 Damaged
Bunkers (Destroyed)	253/49 Damaged
Fighting Holes (Destroyed)	54
Rocket Positions (Destroyed)	1
Mortar Positions (Destroyed)	5
Trucks (Destroyed)	3
Bridges (Destroyed or Damaged)	3
Boats (Sunk or Damaged)	6
AAA Sites (Destroyed)	2

7. Base Development

a. On July 15 construction of the wall and roof of the new MAG-13 Post Exchange was completed. Opening date for the exchange has not yet been scheduled. Relocation of the MAG-13 Disbursing and Post Office was begun during the reporting period. Completion of this relocation is scheduled for late August. The building of the new PX, relocation of the post office and disbursing centralized almost all recreational activities within easy access for all MAG-13 and visiting personnel. (See Part Four, Supporting Documents).

b. Renovation of the Sergeant's Club was completed during this reporting period. The grand opening is scheduled for 1 August.

c. The new air crew quarters opened and aircrews are presently occupying them.

d. The new reefers in the rear of the mess hall were completed and are being utilized.

8. Communications/Electronics. Two new buildings were constructed in the MAG-13 Communications compound. The Communications center handled over 21,377 messages during this period.

9. Supply

a. An outside bulk storage area, approximately 14,400 sq. ft., was constructed for easier access to the bulk storage area.

b. New procedures were established for items not held in the supply officers stores. Requests are hand carried to Wing for subsequent delivery to NSD Subic.

10. Morale/Welfare

a. Religious Services

(1) Protestant Services:

- (a) Sunday-8; attendance-369
- (b) Weekdays-16; attendance-216
- (c) Choir Practice-4; attendance-51

(2) Catholic Services:

- (a) Sunday-8; attendance-440
- (b) Weekdays-19; attendance-64
- (c) Religious Information Classes-6; attendance-38

(3) Latter Day Saints (Mormons):

(a) Sunday-3; Attendance-27

(4) Christian Science:

(a) Sunday-4; attendance-42

b. Services rendered other than at MAG-13

(1) Catholic Services:

Sunday

(a) FLSG-B Services (4) Attendance (107)

(b) NSAD Services (4) Attendance (374)

(2) Protestnat Services:

Sunday

(a) FLC Bomb Dump Services (3) Attendance (23)

c. Counseling and Interviews:

(a) Counseling-34

(b) Interviews-55

d. Red Cross Cases-11

e. Meeting and Trips:

(a) Chaplain Samples attended the dedication of a new church at Quang Ngai.

(b) Chaplain NOLAN attended the Wing Chaplain's meeting.

(c) Chaplain Samples and Chaplain Nolan attended the Chu Lai area Chaplains' meeting.

11. Training

a. Normal on the job and technical training continued within each squadron.

b. Utilization of the MAG-13 rifle range is being accomplished for the purpose of FAM firing newly joined personnel and maintaining currency of other personnel.

c. The following schools were attended during this reporting period:

Schools - July 1968

NCO Leadership	2
Embarkation	1
Corrosion Control	3
ALQ 51A	2
MK-36	12
NBC	2
16 MM Projectionist	4
H7 Rocket Ejection Seat	4
Basic Organic Accounting	1
Sea Survival	3
JEST	11
KY-28	9
Personal Response	5

12. Electronic Countermeasures. The use of the "Shoehorn" ECM/Warning Equipment continued as the majority of missions flown by MAG-13 were in the SAM High Threat area. Installation of the "Shoehorn" equipment continues as aircraft are available for induction.

PART FOUR: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- ✓ I MAG-13 S-2 Counterintelligence Security Brief
- ✓ II Diagram of the MAG-13 Chapel, PX, Education Center,
Recreation Center, Post Office and Disbursing

IV-1

HEADQUARTERS
Marine Aircraft Group-13
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY-INTELLIGENCE/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

PERIOD 1 JULY 1968 TO 31 JULY 1968


1. PREPARATION FOR EXECUTION OF ASSIGNED MISSION

- a. Continued Intelligence Operations, Briefing and Debriefing of assigned aircrews, and orientation to insure that assigned units receive maximum familiarity with combat conditions in the Republic of Vietnam.
- b. A general intelligence brief is given each Thursday by the Group Intelligence Officer at 1530 for the Officers and SMO's of H&MS-13, and IABS-13. Officers and SMO's of the tactical squadrons are also welcome.
- c. The information and materials for intelligence briefs for all ranks of the tactical squadrons is provided by the Group Intelligence Section and is given by the tactical squadrons Intelligence Officer each week.
- d. Continued publication of the weekly "S-2 Tactical Brief".
- e. A general Intelligence brief is given each Thursday by the Group Intelligence Officer at 1600 for sergeants and below of H&MS-13, and IABS-13. Personnel of VFA squadrons are also welcome.
- f. Intelligence briefs are presented to the Commanding Officer, staff, and Squadron Commanders at the weekly CO's conference.
- g. On-the-job training for all intelligence personnel of the Group was conducted on a continuous basis during the entire period.
- h. An in-country "For Official Use Only" written Intelligence/Counterintelligence briefing for all ranks continued.

2. ADMINISTRATION

- a. Classified files were maintained in accordance with OPNAVINST 5510.10 and current applicable directives.
- b. Unclassified files were maintained in accordance with SECNAVINST P5213.3 (Naval Filing System).
- c. Personnel security clearances were processed in accordance with current directives.

J. Marzoli
J. MARZOLI



HEADQUARTERS
Marine Aircraft Group-13
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

2:JM:jwp
5500
4 Aug 1968

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Counterintelligence Security Brief

Encl: ✓(1) Counterintelligence Security Brief

1. Enclosure (1) is for information and retention.
2. In an effort to increase an awareness of security of classified and unclassified material, enclosure (1) was prepared for use by units and sections in their security indoctrination.

J. Marzioli
J. MARZIOLI
By direction

Distribution: "A"

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SECURITY BRIEFINGEspionage1. Enemy Agents and You

Every Marine in Vietnam is a potential target of espionage activities. The reason is that he either knows something that an enemy agent would like to know, or is regarded as a possible means of obtaining such information. The fictional or dramatized espionage stories which appear in novels, movies, and on T. V. thrillers seek only to entertain us, but often the most adventurous and gripping of these stories are based on real-life incidents. Real espionage operations conducted by enemies of the U.S. and the Republic of Vietnam have a far more serious purpose -- to destroy us.

It is extremely important that Marine Corps personnel know how to recognize and defend themselves against possible or actual attempts at espionage. Each Marine should know exactly what to do if he suspects that such an attempt is being made to involve him or get information from him. (What to do about suspected espionage activities will be discussed in paragraph 2.)

"Enemy agent" is a term which has a special meaning. Enemy is normally applied to wartime when it is proper to speak of enemy armed forces, governments, and activities such as the situation here in Vietnam. Espionage is a never-ending activity. Even when we are not engaged in war there are logical reasons for describing espionage against the Marine Corps as the work of enemy agents. The following are a few of the main facts about espionage methods, and some basic rules for guarding against them.

First off, espionage is the secret (or undercover) aspect of a broader activity known as intelligence. Intelligence is knowledge about the enemy. It includes facts about his capabilities, plans, and intentions. However, facts by themselves are information rather than intelligence. Information becomes intelligence when it has been evaluated, studied, related to other known facts, interpreted or analyzed to reach conclusions about its meaning with reference to already established intelligence or that subject. Intelligence is most often thought of as an activity of competing nations and governments. One country wants to know all it can about the capabilities, plans, and intentions of another. Such information has an important bearing on a nation's decisions, plans, and actions in international affairs. Not to forget tactical deployment during periods of war as is current here in Vietnam.

In Vietnam, enemy agents are continuously conducting espionage activities against Marines, particularly those stationed aboard permanently established installations such as Chu Lai. Secret intelligence (espionage) activities are concentrated toward gathering the kind of information which is not available through legitimate channels such as newspapers, magazines, books, unclassified reports and personal observations.

This is the espionage side of the intelligence effort. Espionage agents are interested in gathering "classified" information -- military and other security information in the "CONFIDENTIAL", "SECRET", and "TOP SECRET" categories. But in addition here in Vietnam, they are also considerably interested in any aspect of unclassified information which might assist them in answering questions or amplify other information which when put together, would be in itself classified.

Enemy agents use many different methods and techniques. The most skilled ones always carefully fit their operations to the particular job. It is especially important to keep in mind that an agent is almost always part of a spy organization or network. As such, his mission at a given time may involve only one small portion of the whole espionage mission in which the network happens to be engaged. Agents often spend much time and effort gathering information for other agents to use in performing the actual espionage job.

2. What To Do About Suspected Espionage Activities.

Espionage is a "no-hold-barred" business. Enemy agents are ruthless, usually clever, and always determined to get what they want by any means that may be necessary. They are ready to use any form of physical or mental torture, and even to kill. No one who becomes involved with them, innocently or otherwise, should expect them to show any mercy or softness. They are shrewd and merciless, and therefore dangerous. Their operations can be frustrated only by trained and experienced counterintelligence personnel. For this reason, the following instructions are extremely important. If anyone ever has reason to believe that he is the target of attempted espionage, remembering and sticking to a few simple rules may actually save his life and possibly prevent a Viet Cong attack. Here they are:

a. DO NOT SHOW THAT YOU ARE SUSPICIOUS. Any marked or sudden change in your manner will alert an experienced agent. If you have been cordial and friendly before, do not switch suddenly to a distant or hostile attitude.

b. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, TELL YOUR COMMANDING OFFICER, S-2 OR OTHER PROPER AUTHORITY ABOUT YOUR SUSPICIONS. DO NOT TELL ANYONE ELSE.

c. Your commanding Officer will promptly report the incident to the proper authorities (the nearest counterintelligence unit or representative). These authorities may ask you to help in handling the case; if so, DO ONLY WHAT THEY TELL YOU -- NO MORE, NO LESS.

d. DO NOT TRY TO INVESTIGATE OR "CRACK" THE CASE YOURSELF. This is a complicated job for trained professional counterintelligence personnel only.

3. Individual Defense Against Espionage.

No matter how big or important an enemy agent's mission might be, he usually gets his information piece-by-piece, item-by-item. In order to do this, he always looking for individuals who will supply him with the bits and pieces -- because of carelessness, ignorance, weakness, or outright disloyalty.

Some Marines whose regular duties do not involve the handling of classified documents are inclined to think that they don't know anything of value to enemy agents. This is a serious error. To repeat: **EVERY MARINE KNOWS SOMETHING THAT AN ENEMY AGENT WOULD LIKE TO KNOW.**