

HEADQUARTERS
 Marine Aircraft Group 16
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac
 FPO, San Francisco 96602

3:RPG:bew
 5750
 003A34670
 12 December 1970

[REDACTED] -- Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Distribution List

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 - 30 November 1970

Ref: (a) WgO 5750.4

Encl: ✓(1) Marine Aircraft Group 16 Command Chronology

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted.
2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

L. C. Street

L. C. STREET III

DISTRIBUTION: 1st MAW (3)
 MAG-16 S-3 (1)

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
 DOD DIR 5200.10

1st MAW SEC No.	Copy No.
3815-70	1

MAG-16
SAC # 00793-70
COPY # 1 of 4

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PART IOrganizational Data

<u>1. Designation</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>1-30Nov70</u>
CO, MAG-16	Col L. C. STREET III	1-30Nov70
XO, MAG-16	LtCol J. E. GILLIS	1-12Nov70
	LtCol R. P. GUAY	13-30Nov70

Subordinate Units

H&MS-16	Major C. H. PERRYMAN	1-23Nov70
MABS-16	Major C. H. PITMAN	24-30Nov70
HML-167	Major P. E. BENET	1-8Nov70
HML-367	LtCol J. M. DEAN	9-30Nov70
HMM-262	LtCol D. A. MCCUAHEY	1-30Nov70
HMM-263	LtCol C. E. REESE	1-30Nov70
HMM-364	LtCol G. S. PATE	1-23Nov70
HMH-463	LtCol F. K. WEST	24-30Nov70
	LtCol L. K. KECK	1-30Nov70
	LtCol H. W. STEADMAN	1-30Nov70
	LtCol R. R. LEISY	1-30Nov70

2. Location

1-30 November 1970: Marble Mountain Air Facility, RVN

3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer	LtCol J. E. GILLIS	1-12Nov70
Adjutant	LtCol R. P. GUAY	13-30Nov70
S-1	Capt. W. J. STEFFAN	1-30Nov70
S-2	LtCol C. A. BLOCK	1-12Nov70
S-3	Major J. E. CARROLL	13-30Nov70
S-4	Capt. E. G. NOLL	1-30Nov70
	LtCol R. P. GUAY	1-12Nov70
	Major H. F. LAWSON	13-30Nov70
	LtCol W. R. FAILS	1-30Nov70

4. Average Monthly Strength

<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
339	2,234

<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
6	23

DEGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
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PART II

Narrative Summary

During the month of November 1970, MAG-16 flew a total of 7,161.3 hours in support of Free World Military Assistance Forces in the I Corps Tactical Zone. These hours, along with a total of 25,327 sorties were flown in support of the First Marine Division, First Marine Aircraft Wing, the United States Army, the Republic of Korea Marines and the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam.

During this period there were four changes of command. LtCol J. E. GILLIS was temporarily medevaced and LtCol R. P. GUAY was made Executive Officer for MAG-16 in his stead. H&MS-16's Major C. H. PERRYMAN relinquished command to Major C. H. PITMAN. Prior to his return to CONUS, the command of MABS-16 was given to LtCol J. M. DEAN by Major P. E. BENET. LtCol G. S. PATE relinquished command of HMM-262 to LtCol F. K. WEST upon being transferred to Danang DASC.

On 29 November 1970, the Combat Tactical SOP for MAG-16 was published to establish combat operating procedures for all helicopters assigned to this command. Distribution of this document included all Marine Air Groups and Marine Divisions.

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PART III

Sequential Listing of Significant Events

1. Awards. 3 Navy Commendation Medals, 1 Combat Action Ribbon, 700 Strike/Flight Air Medals, 6 Purple Hearts and 3 Good Conduct Medals were presented during the month of November 1970.
2. Enemy Casualties and Damage Inflicted. MAG-16 inflicted 41 KBMA (Confirmed), 15 KBMA (Probable), 4 hootches destroyed, 4 hootches damaged, 5 bunkers destroyed, 3 bunkers damaged, 2 boats destroyed, 1 rocket launcher with rocket destroyed and one water buffalo KBMA.
3. Intelligence. 19 aircREW spot reports of intelligence value were received from aircREWs and other sources; this is 6 less than reported for the previous month.

4. Sequential Listing of Significant Events by Date

1 November 1970: Six CH-46D, two AH-1G, one UH-1E, and one CH-53D supported First Marine Division in a tactical assault which resulted in one probable KBMA. The kill was attributed to HMM-262.

4 November 1970: Six CH-46D, four AH-1G, one UH-1E and one CH-53D supported First Marine Division in a tactical assault which resulted in eleven KEMA's (Confirmed). Six were attributed to HML-367 and five to HML-167.

4 November 1970: Two UH-1E's, while on a visual reconnaissance run through the Rocket Belt, were attributed with one probable KBMA. The helicopters were HML-167's.

7 November 1970: Six CH-46D, four AH-1G, one UH-1E and one CH-53D supported First Marines in a tactical assault which resulted in one bunker destroyed.

10 November 1970: While on a Baldy Medevac flight one CH-46D accounted for one probable KEMA.

12 November 1970: Two AH-1G's while on a Bald Eagle Quick Reaction mission, from HML-367, scored two bunkers destroyed.

14 November 1970: Two AH-1G's, supporting First Marines in a tactical assault, from HML-367 were attributed with 2 KBMA and 3 Probable KBMA.

16 November 1970: While on a Bald Eagle Quick Reaction, two AH-1G's from HML-367 scored 2 Boats destroyed and one bunker damaged.

18 November 1970: Two AH-1G's from HML-367, while supporting a Quick Reaction destroyed 1 grass hootch and damaged 3 more.

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18 November 1970: On an emergency extract of a recon team from the Que Sons a CH-46D from HMM-263 crashed resulting in Alpha damage to aircraft and crew and all members of the recon team.

18 November 1970: On a tactical assault two of HML-367's AH-1G's scored 3 probable KBMA's.

18 November 1970: On another assault of the same day, HML-367's aircraft again scored 1 bunker destroyed.

22 November 1970: On a rocket belt visual reconnaissance run, two UH-1E's from HML-167 damaged 2 bunkers.

23 November 1970: Two AH-1G's supporting a tactical assault were ascribed with 8 KBMA and 3 Probable KBMA.

25 November 1970: On a tactical assault HML-367's two AH-1G's supporting the mission tallied up 3 KBMA, 3 Probable KBMA, one Bunker destroyed and one Water Buffalo KBMA.

28 November 1970: On a tactical assault HML-367's birds again scored with 3 KBMA.

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5. Air Operations

HML-167(UH-1E) HML-367(AH-1G)

Hours	1,799.7	1,281.2
Sorties	4,904	3,541
KBA(Confirmed)	5	36
Pax	2,785	Ø

HMM-262(CH-46D) HMM-263(CH-46D) HMM-364(CH-46D)

Hours	1,179.2	1,088.8	1,047.0
Sorties	4,488	3,931	4,111
Evacs	297	260	275
Pax	10,412	10,822	9,861
Cargo (Tons)	221.0	209.5	214.4

HMH-463(CH-53D) H&MS-16(CH-46D)

Hours	762.0	3.4
Sorties	4,352	Ø
Pax	15,232	Ø
Cargo (Tons)	3,520.8	Ø
TAR's	7	Ø

MAG-16

TOTAL

MAG-16

TOTAL FY71

Hours	7,161.3
Sorties	25,327
Pax	49,112
Cargo (Tons)	4,165.7
Evacs	832
KBA (Confirmed)	41
TAR's	7

Hours	43,920.0
Sorties	147,629
Pax	339,877
Cargo (Tons)	26,227.4
Evacs	6,855
KBA(Confirmed)	196
TAR's	37

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6. Hostile Fire Analysis

a. Fire Incident/Hit Chart

ALTITUDE
(Hundreds of Feet)

INCIDENTS	0 - 2	2 - 5	5 - 10	Above 10	Total
NO.	24	5	14	18	61
%	39	08	23	30	100
HITS					
A/C HIT	10	0	2	1	13
%	75	0	15	10	100
No. Holes	33	0	5	1	39

(1) Based on the above chart the following conclusions may be drawn:

(a) 47% of fire incidents occur below 500 feet AGL.

(b) 75% of all aircraft hits occur below 500 feet AGL.

(c) Of the total number of individual projectile hits sustained, 33 were below 500 feet AGL.

(d) Therefore, flight at or below 500 feet AGL places the aircraft in its highest area of vulnerability and reduction of this vulnerability is directly proportional to the amount of supporting arms utilized and/or tactics employed.

b. Medical Evacuation Incident/Hit Chart

	HRS	% FLT TIME	INCIDENTS	%	A/C HITS	%
DAY	436	06	17	48	5	37
NIGHT	59	04	6	10	1	10
TOTAL	498	10	23	58	6	47

(1) Analysis of fire incidents/hits sustained by this command indicates that most occur at random in regards to assigned missions dependent on the enemy situation, operating environment, and tactics employed at a given time. An exception to this is the medevac mission where a definite trend can be postulated. Based on the above two charts, the following conclusions may be drawn:

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(a) Of all the incidents/hits depicted in paragraph b. above, 48% of the incidents and 37% of the aircraft hit occurred on day medevac.

(b) Night medevac sustained less individual fire incidents than day medevac and only 10% of all aircraft hit occurred during night medevac.

(c) In view of the above analysis, this command has initiated correspondence requesting additional fire support from units needing medevac support. Since 75% of all aircraft hits occur below 500 feet AGL; a constant field of fire by the supported unit when the aircraft is descending to final approach would be beneficial. It is felt that this action, combined with proper gunship air-support procedures, would reduce the vulnerability of the medevac transport.

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PART IV

Supporting Documents

	<u>MAG-16 Control Number/ Letter Identification</u>
✓ Command Chronology of HML-167	03A33870
✓ Command Chronology of HML-367	03A33670
✓ Command Chronology of HMM-262	03A34070
✓ Command Chronology of HMM-263	03A33770
✓ Command Chronology of HMM-364	03A33870
✓ Command Chronology of HMH-463	CO, HMH-463 ltr 3:RFV:trs 5750 dtd 5 December 1970
✓ Command Chronology of H&MS-16	CO, H&MS-16 ltr 1/CTL/erg 5213 dtd 5 December 1970
✓ Command Chronology of MABS-16	CO, MABS-16 ltr dtd 4Dec70