

HEADQUARTERS  
Marine Aircraft Group 36  
1st Marine Aircraft Wing  
Fleet Marine Force Pacific  
FPO San Francisco, 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

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7 Feb 1967

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Attn: ACoFS G-3)  
Subj: Command Chronology, for January 1967 (U) (Report Symbol 1st MAW 5750-1)  
Ref: (a) WGO 5750:10

Encl: ☒ (1) Part One - Organizational Data  
☒ (2) Part Two - Narrative Summary  
☒ (3) Part Three - Significant Events  
☒ (4) Part Four - Supporting Documents

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) through (4) are submitted for the month of January 1967.

*A. L. Phillips*  
A. L. PHILLIPS  
Acting

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## PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

## A. Commanders and Staffs, MAG-36 Headquarters and attached Squadrons.

## MAG-36

CO	(1-31 Jan)	ARMSTRONG, Victor A.	Col
XO	(1-31 Jan)	PHILLIPS, Allen L.	Col
ADJ	(1-31 Jan)	WILSON, William H.	2ndLt
S-1	(1-31 Jan)	TUTTEROW, Henry W.	Capt
S-2	(1-31 Jan)	SMITH, Lloyd W.	Maj
S-3	(1-31 Jan)	SLATON, Clyde H. Jr.	LtCol
S-4	(1-31 Jan)	GARROTTO, Alfred F.	LtCol
FLT SURGEON	(1-31 Jan)	MOFFITT, Bayard L.	Lt (USN)
MTO	(1-31 Jan)	BURGESS, Robert E.	Capt
EMB	(1-31 Jan)	SELLARS, James A.	2ndLt
ORD	(1-31 Jan)	SELLARS, James A	2ndLt
AMO	(1-31 Jan)	BOUDREAUX, Sidney J. Jr.	Maj
COMM	(1-31 Jan)	TAYLOR, Charles W.	Maj
CIVIL AFFAIRS	(1-31 Jan)	DAY, Dallas C.	1stLt
AVN SAFETY	(1-31 Jan)	BONNEY, Richard A.	Maj
NATOPS	(1-31 Jan)	GREGORY, Rawley M.	Maj
LEGAL	(1-31 Jan)	TUTTEROW, Henry W.	Capt
SECURITY	(1-31 Jan)	SMITH, Lloyd W.	Maj

## H&amp;MS-36

CO	(1-31 Jan)	CARLSON, William C.	LtCol
XO	(25-31 Jan)	LEWIS, Harold E.	Maj
MAINT O	(1-31 Jan)	BOUDREAUX, Sidney J. Jr.	Maj

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## MABS-36

OO	(1-31 Jan)	NELSON, Joseph A.	LtCol
XO	(1-31 Jan)	FISH, Thomas E.	Maj
OPS	(1-31 Jan)	VAN VOORHIS, Thomas M.	Capt

## HMM-165

OO	(1-31 Jan)	ELDRIDGE, William W. Jr.	LtCol
XO	(1-21 Jan)	BRADLEY, William C.	Maj
	(22-31 Jan)	READ, William T.	Maj
OPS	(1-21 Jan)	READ, William T.	Maj
	(22-31 Jan)	LOUGHEED, Thomas P.	Maj

## HMM-262

OO	(1-31 Jan)	SHADRICK, Ural W.	LtCol
XO	(1-31 Jan)	CORLISS, Gregory A.	Maj
OPS	(1-31 Jan)	ALBER, John W.	Maj

## HMM-362 (19-31 Jan Attached MAG-36)

OO	(19-31 Jan)	ARMSTRONG, Marshall B.	LtCol
XO	(19-24 Jan)	LEWIS, Harold E.	Maj
	(25-31 Jan)	WRIGHT, Herbert L.	Maj
OPS	(19-31 Jan)	GORDON, James T.	Maj

## HMM-363 (1-19 Jan Attached MAG-36)

OO	(1-19 Jan)	HUNTINGTON, Kenneth E.	LtCol
XO	(1-19 Jan)	DAY, Marvin E.	Maj
OPS	(1-19 Jan)	ECKMAN, Ronald R.	Maj

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Enclosure (1)

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## VMO-6

CO	(1-31 Jan)	MALONEY, William R.	LtCol
XO	(1-31 Jan)	SAMPLE, Edward J.	Maj
OPS	(1-31 Jan)	WALKER, James H.	Maj

## B. Task Organization and Unit Location.

UNIT DESIGNATION	LOCATION	DATE
H&MS-36	KY HA	1-31 January 67
MABS-36	KY HA	1-31 January 67
HMM-165	KY HA	1-31 January 67
HMM-262	KY HA	1-31 January 67
HMM-362	KY HA	19-31 January 67
HMM-363	KY HA	1-19 January 67
VMO-6	KY HA	1-31 January 67

## C. Average Monthly Strengths of Squadrons.

UNIT	MAR OFF	MAR ENL	NAV OFF	NAV ENL
H&MS-36	43	494	0	0
MABS-36	18	581	5	28
HMM-165	49	205	1	0
HMM-262	59	196	1	0
HMM-362	52	149	1	0
HMM-363	51	190	1	0
VMO-6	48	170	1	0

## D. Important Visitors.

1. On 1 January, Lieutenant General KRULAK and party visited the Chu Lai area and received a briefing from the area commanders. Colonel ARMSTRONG gave a short brief on the current status of MAG-36.

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2. On 4 January, Rear Admiral WHITE, COMFAIRWESTPAC and party visited Chu Lai for a tour of the areas air base installations. Brigadier General OWENS acted as host/moderator during the Admiral's visit.

3. On 8 January, General Wallace M. GREENE Jr., CMC, and party visited U. S. Marine units in the Chu Lai area. At the MAG-13 area of Chu Lai, General GREENE presented awards to U. S. Marines from aviation and ground units in the area.

4. On 11 January, The Honorable H. B. BALDWIN, Under Secretary of the Navy visited the Chu Lai/Ky Ha areas. He was transported about by MAG-36 helicopters.

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## PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

A. During the month of January, MAG-36 provided continuous helicopter support for the III Marine Amphibious Force, the Second Republic of Korea Marine Corps Brigade, and I Corps Army of the Republic of Vietnam Forces. Although flight operations were restricted many days because of monsoon rains, group aircraft nevertheless flew a monthly total of 5681.4 flight hours, carried 27,982 troops/passengers and 2080.2 tons of cargo. In addition, MAG-36 aircraft, providing "round the clock" service, performed 338 medical evacuation missions carrying 841 wounded or sick patients. The MAG-36 C-117 aircraft throughout the month flew personnel, cargo, and night flare drop missions for a total of 109.0 hours. MAG-36 helicopters also augmented MAG-16 by providing UH-1E and CH-46A aircraft for support of MAG-16 operations in the Danang, Phu Bai and Dong Ha TAOR's.

B. On 18 January, the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) arrived off the coast of Ky Ha to commence rotation of MAG-36 squadrons aboard the Special Landing Force. Monsoon rains, low ceilings, and poor visibility prevented the switch of squadrons that day. However, on 19 January, the weather improved and HMM-362 moved off the LPH to Ky Ha and was replaced aboard ship by HMM-363.

C. During the month of January 1967, MAG-36 aircraft participated in the following operations:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>DURATION</u>	<u>IN SUPPORT OF</u>
SIERRA	12Dec - 21Jan67	U.S. MARINES, ARVN
DE SOTO	26Jan - Continuing	U.S. MARINES
TRINITY	30Jan - Continuing	U.S. MARINES

D. MAG-36 aircraft reported 338 fire incidents during the month and 68 aircraft were hit by enemy fire. Twenty-two (22) aircrewmembers were wounded in action during the month and one (1) crew-chief from HMM-262 was killed in action on 28 January 1967.

E. There were ten (10) incidents involving downed MAG-36 helicopters.

1. On 1 January, while carrying U.S. Marines from the vicinity of Nui Dang to Mo Duc during marginal weather, one CH-46A aircraft from HMM-262 was hit by enemy fire. The aircraft attempted to return to home base, but due to a hydraulic leak caused by the hit, made a forced landing at Chu Lai. Squadron maintenance personnel were quickly taken to the scene and repaired the aircraft. The aircraft was then safely flown to Ky Ha.

2. On 9 January, while participating in a retraction of a U.S. Marine Force, one HMM-262 CH-46A aircraft was hit by enemy fire after departing the pick-up zone. The hit ruptured a hydraulic line and the aircraft made

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a forced landing in an enemy area 17 nautical miles southeast of Chu Lai. U.S. Marines aboard the other twelve CH-46A helicopters of the flight were quickly inserted around the downed helicopter. A squadron maintenance team was quickly helicopter lifted to the area and made temporary repairs on the aircraft. The aircraft was then safely flown to Ky Ha. Due to darkness, the inserted troops remained in the area and were withdrawn the next morning.

3. Late in the afternoon of 10 January, three UH-1E helicopters from VMO-6 and two CH-46A's from HMM-262 were launched in monsoon weather conditions on an emergency medical evacuation mission to an area eight nautical miles south of Chu Lai. A ROKMC patrol had sustained heavy casualties and required immediate evacuation of their critically wounded personnel. Flying beneath 300 foot ceilings through heavy rain and intense enemy fire the flight located the besieged patrol. In the process of completing the emergency pick-up, one CH-46A received 31 individual hits and limped back to a secure ROKMC CP with a wounded copilot and gunner. One of the armed UH-1E's escorting the transport CH-46A's, received multiple hits and was shot down in the pick-up zone. One crewman was seriously wounded after he debarked from the aircraft. Quickly, reinforcements were flown into the area until darkness and deteriorating weather terminated the lift. The next day, additional troops were lifted into the zone and maintenance personnel prepared the UH-1E for external pick-up by a CH-46A "Slick" from HMM-165. On the afternoon of 12 January, the UH-1E was successfully picked-up and returned to Ky Ha. On 13 January, repairs were completed in the field on the CH-46A that received intense enemy hit damage and it was flown back to Ky Ha.

4. On the afternoon of 11 January, a UH-34D helicopter from HMM-363 on an administration/liaison mission crashed into the sea one-half mile south of Ky Ha. The aircraft carried a crew of four and six U.S. Marine passengers. Apparent cause of the crash was engine failure. The aircraft landed in the heavy storm swept surf and came to rest inverted. There were no survivors. All the bodies were recovered.

5. On 14 January, a UH-1E helicopter from VMO-6, participating in a reconnaissance insertion mission 20 nautical miles west of Phu Bai, lost directional control and crashed in a heavily wooded mountain area. The aircraft received enemy fire and probable cause of the crash was enemy action. Fortunately all crew members survived the crash and only one crewman received serious injuries. All personnel were immediately rescued via hoist by a CH-46A helicopter. The UH-1E aircraft was completely destroyed in the crash and due to the enemy situation and inaccessibility of the jungle, recovery of the wreckage was not attempted.

6. On 20 January, while completing a mission, two HMM-262 CH-46A aircraft received intense enemy fire from numerous mountain top enemy gun positions 13 nautical miles southeast of Chu Lai. Both aircraft were

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hit by enemy 12.7 mm fire and one aircraft received substantial damage. Both aircraft limped back to a secure area in the ROK Marine Corps CP. A squadron maintenance team was sent to repair the aircraft. After considerable "on the spot" repairs, both aircraft were flown to Ky Ha.

7. On 25 January, while participating in a retraction of a U. S. Marine "Sparrow Hawk" force seven miles southeast of Chu Lai, two CH-46A helicopters from HMM-262 received enemy automatic weapons fire while loading in the troop pick-up zone. As the lead aircraft lifted a few feet off the ground for take-off it violently rolled over and crashed in a nearly inverted position. Fortunately all the crew and Marine passengers abandoned the wrecked aircraft before it was consumed and completely destroyed by fire. Moderate injuries were received by some of the crew and passengers. Other HMM-262 aircraft operating near the area quickly rescued the injured personnel and retracted the remaining Marine force. Enemy hits, causing control failure, was the suspected cause of the crash.

8. On 28 January, one UH-34D helicopter from HMM-362 while participating in a resupply to the Minh Long outpost had an engine failure at low altitude during a take-off from the outpost. The aircraft made an emergency landing and was substantially damaged as it landed in a deep ravine. Fortunately, no crew members were injured and the crash site was within the confines of the friendly outpost. On 29 January, the aircraft was dis-assembled and extracted by external pick-up by a CH-46A "Slick" aircraft from HMM-165 and returned to Ky Ha.

9. On 28 January, while making an emergency medevac pick-up in a "hot zone" near Nui Dang, a CH-46A aircraft from HMM-262 was hit by enemy automatic weapons fire. The crew-chief was wounded by the enemy fire and the aircraft was forced to land in a nearby landing zone that was secured by U.S. Marines. The crew-chief died immediately from his wounds. A maintenance team was quickly helo lifted to the area and commenced repair work on the damaged helicopter. On 29 January, the aircraft was sufficiently repaired to be flown back to Ky Ha.

10. On 28 January, while making an emergency night medevac pick-up in a "hot zone" near Nui Dang, a CH-46A aircraft from HMM-165 was hit by enemy automatic weapons fire. Fortunately, no personnel were injured although the aircraft received multiple hits. The aircraft had received several hits in the fuel tanks and due to fuel leakage, the pilot was forced to land the aircraft before he could reach a secure friendly position. However, the pilot did land near an ARVN outpost, and the ARVN's quickly dispatched troops to the area to protect the aircraft for the night. The next morning, maintenance personnel from the squadron were helo lifted to the scene to make temporary repairs on the downed aircraft. After much improvising and "on the spot" repairs, the aircraft was sufficiently repaired to be flown back to Ky Ha.



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F. On 12 January, an emergency U. S. Marine ground force was inserted in an area three miles southwest of Chu Lai to recover the bodies from a crashed Air America aircraft. On 13 January, the troops were retracted. Five (5) bodies and all the usable parts of the aircraft were recovered from the mountain crash site.

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## PART III - SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

A. When not heavily engaged in combat commitments, MAG-36 helicopters flew medical civic action personnel to Cu Lao Re Island located 25 nautical miles east of Ky Ha.

1. On 7 January, MAG-36 civic action personnel visited the island. They distributed 150 pounds of clothing and 400 bars of soap to approximately 250 island inhabitants. In addition, 1500 wooden pencils were turned over to the island chief for distribution to the islands' schools. MAG-36 helicopters transporting the civic action personnel to the island also carried 12 Vietnamese province officials from Quang Ngai to the island for official business and returned them to Quang Ngai.

2. On 14 January, MAG-36 medical civic action personnel visited the island and conducted "sick call." Sixty-five (65) medical and ten (10) dental patients were treated.

3. On 28 January, MAG-36 medical civic action personnel again visited Cu Lao Re Island. Two hundred (200) pounds of clothing were distributed to one hundred ninety-one (191) island personnel. In addition, one hundred-ten (110) medical patients were treated.

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## PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- ✓A. Command Chronology H&MS-36
  - ✓B. Command Chronology MABS-36
  - ✓C. Command Chronology HMM-165
  - ✓D. Command Chronology HMM-262
  - ✓E. Command Chronology HMM-362
  - ✓F. Command Chronology HMM-363
  - ✓G. Command Chronology VMO-6
  - ✓H. Marine Aircraft Group 36 Operation Order 1-67
  - ✓I. Photograph of MAG-36, Ky Ha Helicopter Mat Areas - Looking Southeast.
  - ✓J. Photograph of MAG-36, Ky Ha Complex - Looking North.
  - ✓K. Photograph of MAG-36, Ky Ha Helicopter Mat Areas - Looking North.
  - ✓L. Photograph of MAG-36, Ky Ha Helicopter Mat Areas and Hillside Housing - Looking West. Aground LST-912 in the Foreground.
  - ✓M. Photograph of MAG-36, Ky Ha Complex - Looking South. Sand Ramp Area in the Foreground and Chu Lai in the Background.
  - ✓N. Photograph of MAG-36, Ky Ha Complex - Looking Southeast. Aground LST-912 in the Left Background.
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MAG-36, 1st MAF  
KY-HA AIR FACILITY, RVN  
010001H January 1967

Operation Order 1-67

- Ref: (a) 1st MAF OpOrd 303-67  
(b) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS Sheets 6659II, III, IV; 6658I, II, III, IV; 6758III, IV; 6657I, II, III, IV; 6757II, III, IV; 6656I, II, III, IV; 6756I, II, III, IV; 6755I, II, III, IV; 6855III; 6852I, II, III, IV.  
(c) Task Force X-Ray Chu Lai Defense Command OPOrd 301-66

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization).

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy forces. See Annex B (Intelligence) and current intelligence summaries.
- b. Friendly forces.
  - (1) ARVN I Corps forces continue operations against the Viet Cong assisted by the U. S. Military Assistance Command.
  - (2) Marine Divisions conduct operations in the DaNang, Hue, Phu Bai, Dong Ha and Chu Lai tactical areas of responsibilities.
  - (3) 2D ROK Marine Brigade conducts operations in their assigned tactical area of responsibility, south of Chu Lai.
  - (4) Vietnamese Air Force conducts air operations in support of I Corps.
  - (5) Vietnamese Navy maintains counter-infiltration screen along the RVN coast.
  - (6) U. S. Seventh Fleet conducts counter-infiltration, air and naval gunfire operations as required in support of III Marine Amphibious Forces.
  - (7) 7th Air Force (USAF) participates in and coordinates the air defense of RVN: maintains air supremacy; conducts air operations against VC; and supports ground actions of RVNAF and U. S. forces as necessary.

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- (8) U. S. Allied forces, Vietnam, in coordination with CG II RVNAF Corps; defends specified U. S./GVN critical installations and facilities and conducts operations against the VC.
  - (9) 1st Infantry Division (+), in coordination with CG III RVNAF Corps; defends specified U. S./GVN critical installations and facilities and conducts operations against the VC.
  - (10) U. S. Army Aviation and ground elements support for III MAF forces when requested.
  - (11) Marine Wing Headquarters Group provides Tactical Air Direction Center, Air Control System, Direct Air Support Center/ Helicopter Direction Center, Air Support Radar Teams and Hawk Missile Defense of Da Nang and Chu Lai TAOR.
  - (12) Marine Wing Service Group 17 provides logistical support as required.
  - (13) Marine Aircraft Groups 11, 12 and 13 conduct offensive and defensive fixed wing operations in support of III MAF, ARVN and other friendly force operations.
  - (14) Marine Aircraft Group 16 conducts helicopter support operations for III MAF, ARVN I Corps and other friendly forces.
  - (15) VMGR-152 conducts in and out of country transport operations.
  - (16) Force Logistics Command and FLSG "B" provides logistic support of III MAF.
  - (17) Coastal Patrol Fleet 15, RVN Navy conducts counter-infiltration and anti-smuggling operations off the coast and in the waters of the Thuong Giang.
2. MISSION. Conduct helicopter support operations for III MAF, ARVN I Corps and other friendly forces as may be directed. Provide aircraft for troop lift, reconnaissance, TAC(A), logistic, SAR, MED EVAC and such other requirements as specified in daily frag orders. Provide armed helicopters for escort, reconnaissance and delivering of suppressive fires as required.
  3. EXECUTION.
    - a. Concept of operation.
      - (1) MAG-36 operates primarily from KY-HA Air Facility (BT 530 115) in the Chu Lai enclave and provides helicopter support primarily to those III MAF units in the Chu Lai enclave. This Group may be required to deploy units in temporary or extended support of units not associated with I Corps or within III MAF. An HPM squadron is normally deployed with the SLF aboard ships of the 7th Fleet. In addition to support of III MAF units, MAG-36 provides support to 2D ARVN Division, other I Corps units, II Corps units and other friendly forces as directed. All units will be prepared to deploy independently on order and operate from other airfields as required.

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- (2) When 1st MAF aircraft are providing close and immediate support for Marine ground forces actively engaged in combat, standard Marine Close Air Support doctrine applies.
- (3) On missions requiring aircraft from more than one squadron, this headquarters will assign the helicopter commander airborne who will be in command of all transport helicopters assigned. Tactical Air Controller Airborne will control fixed wing support of all heliborne operations, controlling preplanned strikes, landing zone preparations, helicopter escort and close air support. For Marine Corps operations a Marine Corps TAC(A) will be assigned. For operations with other friendly forces, TAC(A) may be assigned from the supported unit.

b. Assigned HMM Squadrons.

- (1) Provide helicopter support to III MAF, the ARVN I Corps and to other friendly forces as directed.
- (2) Be prepared to deploy the entire squadron or elements thereof on one hour notice for independent operations of limited duration as directed.
- (3) Be prepared to embark aboard LPH on order for operations with Special Landing Forces.
- (4) Provide personnel and equipment to the Provisional Rifle Company as directed. Rotate personnel every two months.

c. VMO-6

- (1) Provide helicopter support for III MAF units, ARVN I Corps units and other friendly forces as directed.
- (2) Provide aircraft for reconnaissance, TAC(A) and MedEvac as directed.
- (3) Provide armed helicopters for escort, reconnaissance and delivery of suppressive fires as directed.
- (4) Be prepared to deploy entire squadron or elements thereof on a one hour notice for independent operations of limited duration as directed.
- (5) Be prepared to deploy detachments with necessary support equipment to SLF as directed.
- (6) Provide personnel and equipment to Provisional Rifle Company as directed. Rotate personnel every two months.

d. H&MS-36

- (1) Provide the required command, administrative, logistical and aircraft maintenance facilities for operation of Marine Aircraft Group 36.
- (2) Be prepared to provide Command, Administrative, Logistical and Maintenance facilities for deployed operations on short notice.

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- (3) Maintain pool status aircraft as directed.
- (4) Provide personnel and equipment for the Provisional Rifle Company as directed. Rotate personnel every two months.
- (5) Provide C-117 aircraft for logistics, radio relay and flare drop missions.

h. MABS-36

- (1) Provide Base Operations and Base Services as directed.
- (2) Provide Communications personnel and facilities for Command and Control of MAG-36 and squadrons assigned. See Annex C (Communications-Electronics)
- (3) Be prepared to provide personnel and equipment on one hours notice for independent operations of limited duration for squadron size or larger operations. Maintain pack-up for operations from a forward airfield.
- (4) Provide personnel and equipment to the Provisional Rifle Company as directed. Rotate personnel every two months.
- (5) Provide Air Freight Liaison personnel at Marine Air Freight at DaNang Air Base and Chu Lai Air Field.
- (6) Provide 40,000 gallons TAFDS at Quang Ngai Air Field.
- (7) Provide 40,000 gallons TAFDS at Quang Tin Province Headquarters at Tam Ky.

i. Provisional Rifle Company

- (1) See Annex F (Ground Defense and Passive Air Defense) to Operation Order 1-67.
- (2) On order, be prepared to deploy security force in support of MAG-36 forward operations.

j. Coordinating instructions

- (1) Command and Control of Marine Air Operations in RVN as specified in Annex D (Air Operations) to Operation Order 1-67.
- (2) Helicopter operations will be coordinated by Direct Air Support Center (DASC).
- (3) Coordination of all fixed wing air operations will be through Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC).
- (4) Mission assignments will be specified by individual Helicopter Mission Request forms daily. All flights will meet scheduled times specified on Helicopter Mission Request unless otherwise directed by this Headquarters.

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- (5) Operations and all associated activities will be conducted in such a manner as to minimize noncombatant casualties and damage to civilian property.
  - (6) Rules of Engagement in accordance with Annex D.
  - (7) Reports in accordance with Annex I.
  - (8) This Order is effective upon receipt.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Annex G (Administrative and Logistics).
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
- a. Command relationships.
- (1) Commander, U. S MACV, as subordinate unified commander under CINCPAC, has operational control of all U. S. Forces in RVN. The Commander 7th Air Force, has been designated the MACV Air Force Component Commander. The Commander 7th Air Force, as MACV Air Force Component Commander exercises coordinating authority for all air operations in Vietnam.
  - (2) COMUSMACV exercises operational control of all U. S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam through the Commanding General III MAF.
  - (3) The CG 1stMAW as Tactical Air Commander for CG III MAF, controls all Marine Aviation through the Marine Air Control system and in turn coordinates with the 7th Air Force through the existing USAF Tactical Air Control System.
  - (4) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 36 exercises OPCON and ADCON of squadrons assigned.
- b. Command posts.
- (1) MAG-36 KY HA Air Facility, RVN
  - (2) H&MS-36 KY HA Air Facility, RVN
  - (3) MABS-36 KY HA Air Facility, RVN
  - (4) Assigned HMM squadrons KY HA Air Facility, RVN
  - (5) VMO-6 KY HA Air Facility, RVN

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- c. Communications-electronics. See Annex C (Communications-electronics) and WgO P02000.2 (1stMAW COI (RVN)).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

*A. L. Phillips*

A. L. PHILLIPS  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

ANNEXES:

- ✓ A - Task Organization
- ✓ B - Intelligence
- ✓ C - Communications-Electronics
- ✓ D - Air Operations
- ✓ E - Rules of Engagement
- ✓ F - Ground Defense and Passive Air Defense
- ✓ G - Administration and Logistics
- ✓ H - Civil Affairs
- ✓ I - Reports
- J - Y Omitted
- ✓ Z - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to  
Operation Order 1-67

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KY HA AIR FACILITY, RVN  
010001H January 1967

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 1-67

Time Zone: H

Marine Aircraft Group 36

H&MS-36

MABS-36

HMM-165

HMM-262

HMM-362

HMM-363

VMO-6

Col ARMSTRONG

LtCol. CARLSON

LtCol. NELSON

LtCol ELDREDGE

LtCol SHADRICK

LtCol ARMSTRONG

LtCol. HUNTINGTON

LtCol. MALONEY

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

*A. L. Phillips*  
A. L. PHILLIPS

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to  
Operation Order 1-67

A-1

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 1st Marine Aircraft Wing  
 KY HA Air Facility, RVN  
 010001H Jan 1967

ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 1-67

Ref: (a) Maps, AMS Series JOG, 1:250,000 NE 48-12, NE 48-16, NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 48-8, ND 49-1, ND 49-5

(b) 1st MAWO 03800.3B (SOP FOR INTELLIGENCE)

Time Zone: H

### 1. Enemy Situation.

a. For the general enemy situation see Appendix 1(Intelligence Estimate).

b. For the current enemy situation see IIIMAF and 1st MarDiv weekly Periodic Intelligence Reports and current ISUMS.

### 2. Essential Elements of Information.

a. The following are general EEI's for MAG-36.

(1) Determine the location, number, size and capabilities of enemy AAA weapons, to include unoccupied positions.

(2) Determine if the enemy will defend HLZ's, approach and retirement routes, if so with what type weapons, to include land mines, booby traps, anti-helo stakes or other anti-helo devices.

(3) Determine the location and number of enemy units, to include type uniform and equipment.

(4) Determine the location of enemy obstacles, barriers and field fortifications to include bunkers, fighting holes, blown bridges and other type roadblocks.

### 3. Reconnaissance and Observation.

a. Orders to Subordinate Units.

(1) The helicopter by virtue of type missions assigned and the functional environment in which it operates, provides an ideal observation platform. Although only a relatively few missions flown by MAG-36 are pure reconnaissance missions, crew members must be thoroughly indoctrinated and repeatedly briefed on the fact that every mission flown has a secondary mission of observation. The opportunity to procure information relating to the EEI's occurs on all flights, no matter how mundane. Post flight debriefing will be conducted in an orderly and thorough manner to obtain maximum intelligence from the helicopter crew.

(2) Pilots will debrief after each flight at the Squadron Intelligence Section. Information elicited from debriefs will be

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phoned immediately to the Group S-2 utilizing the AAA Fire Incident Report form or Spot Report form, as applicable, listed in reference (b).

b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent and Supporting Units.

(1) Requests to Higher, Adjacent or Supporting Units will be coordinated through this Headquarters to prevent duplication of effort and to insure full utilization of the capabilities available in the collection effort.

4. Captured Personnel, Material and Documents

a. All enemy material and documents captured by members of MAG-36 will be handled in accordance with reference (b) and forwarded to Group S-2 via Squadron S-2 or Squadron Security Officers.

b. Enemy personnel captured within or contiguous to the MAG-36 enclave will be searched, bound, blindfolded and placed under armed guard, after which the Group S-2 will be notified by the fastest possible means. POW's will not be brought to the Group COC or other sensitive areas unless ordered to do so.

c. With the exceptions noted in a. and b. above, all captured personnel, material and documents will be delivered to the 1st MarDiv Collecting and Clearing Point located South of the Chu Lai Airfield at BT 552053 unless otherwise directed by competent authority in the field or appropriate air control agency.

5. Maps, Charts and Aerial Photographs

a. Requests for maps and charts will be directed to the Group S-2 using the MAG-36 map request form in duplicate.

b. Squadrons will maintain a sufficient supply of 1:250,000 AMS Graphics and 1:50,000 AMS topographic maps of the normal operating area to issue one (1) per pilot and have a minimum reserve shelf stock of 10 each 1:250,000 and 25 each 1:50,000.

6. Counterintelligence

a. Reference (b) provides specific guidance regarding Counterintelligence policies and procedures for 1st MAF units.

b. Counterintelligence investigative and technical assistance is provided MAG-36 by the 7th CI Team located in the Chu Lai Enclave. Request for counterintelligence support will be made to the Group S-2 who will coordinate all requests for assistance.

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7. Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape

a. See Appendix 2 (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape).

8. Reports.

a. See reference (b) for required reports and reporting formats.

b. AAA Fire Incident Reports and Spot Reports listed in reference (b) will normally be phoned into the Group S-2 immediately upon completion of post-flight debriefing. In the event aircraft are deployed away from Ky Ha for more than 12 hours, it is the responsibility of the HAC to debrief with the host unit, or if no intelligence personnel are available, report by radio to the nearest friendly unit that may be adversely affected by the non-reporting of information of enemy activity. Such reporting measures does not, however, relieve the HAC from a full debrief upon his return to Ky Ha.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG



A. L. PHILLIPS  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

## APPENDIXES:

- ✓1-Intelligence Estimate
- ✓2-Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape

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 1st Marine Aircraft Wing  
 Ky Ha Air Facility, RVN  
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APPENDIX 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to  
Operation Order 1-67.

Ref: (a) Maps, same as basic ANNEX.

Time Zone: H

1. To conduct : operations against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army Forces.

a. Area. Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces, Republic of Vietnam.

2. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

a. Weather

(1) Existing Situation. The area of operations has a climate tropical in nature and greatly influenced by two monsoon seasons. The northeast monsoon begins in November and ends in January and is a period of heavy precipitation, cloudiness and relatively low temperatures. The southwest monsoon begins in mid-May and ends in October and is the dry season for the Eastern Coastal Region. Annual precipitation in Quang Ngai is 65 inches and at Danang, 83 inches. A phenomenon occurring in the area of operations is the "Crachin" which is a period of wide-spread fog and drizzle. The Crachin begins in December, is most frequent in March, and seldom occurs after May. During the Crachin, clouds are generally 3000 to 5000 feet thick, with ceilings below 1000 feet and frequently below 500 feet. In most instances visibility is quickly and greatly reduced at the onset of the Crachin, often below 2 miles and frequently below 1/2 mile. This phenomenon generally occurs in recurring periods of 2 to 5 days each. The typhoon season lasts from April to December, with October and November the months of greatest frequency.

(2) Effects on Enemy Operations. The general weather of the Crachin and northeast monsoon will favor the enemy by providing frequent periods of low visibility for movement within a familiar area and the use of areas of poor trafficability as obstacles to support their operations.

(3) Effects on Our Operations. Low ceilings and periods of poor visibility will limit the operation of aircraft and the effectiveness of visual and photographic reconnaissance capabilities.

b. Terrain.

(1) Relief. The area of operation is generally mountainous with a narrow coastal plain extending from 5 to 20 miles inland.

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The mountains rise to an altitude of 3000 to almost 5000 feet. The slopes of all the mountains and ridges are steep.

(b) Drainage. The drainage forms a complex pattern of small streams and rivers flowing generally eastward to the South China Sea.

(c) Vegetation. Dense rainforest with canopies in excess of 100 feet cover the mountains and ridges. Cultivated areas are in the valleys and along the coastal plain.

(2) Effects on Enemy Operations. Terrain will provide the enemy with only a limited capability for maneuver. His movements will be generally confined to a network of narrow trails. The dense canopy which covers most of the mountainous area and the heavy undergrowth will provide the enemy with excellent concealment from air observation. The rough terrain will provide cover from flat trajectory weapons. The heavy vegetation and rough terrain will provide the enemy with excellent opportunities to conduct ambushes and to delay our forces by the use of mines and booby traps.

(3) Effects on Our Operations. Dense vegetation in the mountainous areas will restrict helicopter operations to a few relatively small landing areas. The dense canopy which covers most of the area will severely limit the effectiveness of our supporting arms and will reduce the effectiveness of our visual and photographic reconnaissance and surveillance systems. In the flat coastal plains where the chief vegetation is wetland rice paddies and dry crops the areas cleared for cultivation offer numerous HLZ's, however, the dense vegetation around the paddies and in the villages tend to restrict fields of fire and provide cover for enemy ambushes of selected HLZ's.

### 3. Enemy Situation

a. Disposition. See current III MAF PERIMETER and current ISUES.

b. Composition.

(1) Headquarters, Military Region-5 located in Western Quang Ngai Province, is the senior VC Headquarters in I Corps. All Main Force units, both VC and NVA are subordinate to Military Region-5. Local Force units are subordinate to Province or District Committees. Battalion size LF units are usually subordinate to a Provincial Committee while company size units are subordinate to a District Committee. Guerrilla units are subordinate to the Village or Hamlet. Both Military Region-5, and the Province and District Committees are subordinate to the Central Office of SVN (COSVN) the highest echelon in the Viet Cong infra-structure.

(2) The largest confirmed NVA unit based in Quang Tin/Quang Ngai Provinces is the 2nd NVA Division (AKA 620th) with Headquarters in Western Quang Tin Province (Hiep Duc) this Division consists of

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two (2) Infantry Regiments, one (1) Artillery Regiment and two support Battalions. The Artillery Regiment consists of one (1) AAA Battalion with 18x12.7mm AA machine guns, one (1) 75 Recoiless Rifle Battalion, and one (1) 120mm mortar Battalion. There is one (1) Engineer and one (1) Signal Battalion in support of the Division. The largest confirmed Viet Cong unit based in Quang Tin/Quang Ngai Province is the 1st VC Regiment composed of 3 infantry Battalions, currently believed to be based in NorthWestern Quang Ngai Province in the mountainous region between the Song Tra Bong and Song Tra Khuc rivers.

4. Capabilities. The VC/NVA forces can:

a. Attack in force against the MCAF Ky Ha/Chu Lai Combat Base with up to one NVA Division (2nd NVA (-) (+), one separate VC Regiment (1st VC) and 6 plus separate VC battalions (38th, 48th, 70th, 20th, 72nd, 409th SAPPER, and 1506 Eng). These enemy forces have that capability to support such an attack with mortars up to 120mm, 57mm, 75mm and 82mm Recoiless Rifles, B-40 and B-50 Anti-tank (Grenade Launchers) weapons and a variety of manufactured and locally fabricated demolitions.

b. Conduct SAPPER demolition raids against MCAF Ky Ha and other critical targets within Chu Lai Combat Base employing SAPPER demolition units up to battalion size (409th SAPPER Bn) supported by Local Force SAPPER teams, and Local Force Guerillas, separate from, or in conjunction with an attack by fire.

c. Attack by fire on MCAS Ky Ha utilizing small arms, small arms a/w, grenades and the crew-served weapons listed in capability (1), separate from or in conjunction with a SAPPER/demolition attack.

d. Conduct probes/harassing attacks with small arms/small arms a/w and grenades, on the Ky Ha defensive perimeter employing Local Forces Units up to platoon size.

e. Continue to fire on our aircraft at every opportunity with any and all weapons at his disposal.

(1) In addition to the above Main Force and NVA units listed above there are in the two provinces, five (5) Local Force Infantry Battalions, one (1) SAPPER Battalion and nineteen (19) Local Force Companies confirmed.

5. Strength. The estimated strength of known VC/NVA units normally based and operating in Quang Tin/Quang Ngai Provinces is 16,460. This estimate does not take into consideration VC sympathizers who could be readily armed to augment the para-military Local Force and Main Force units.

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6. Conclusions.

## a. Probable Courses of Action.

(1) Based on analysis of recent increased enemy activity throughout I Corps it can be expected that he will continue his attacks in Quang Tin/Quang Ngai Provinces to include MCAF Ky Ha and other vital installations in our TAOR. The NorthEast Monsoon offers the enemy increased marginal weather in which to maneuver with relative freedom from observation and decreased effectiveness of friendly Artillery and Air Strikes. The frequency and severity of the enemys attacks can be expected to increase during the January-March time frame.

(2) The probable courses of action related to the capabilities itemized in paragraph 5 are listed below in order of their probability of adoption by the enemy.

1. Capability- e and d
2. Capability- c
3. Capability- b
4. Capability- a

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG



A. L. PHILLIPS  
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Executive Officer

TABS:

✓A- Enemy Weapons

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TAB A (Enemy Weapons) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B  
 (Intelligence) to Operation Order 1-67.

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL: The VC/NVA armament inventory in Southern I Corps consists of a wide variety of individual and crew-served weapons ranging from shotguns and bolt action "trash" rifles to modern ChiCom and Russian assault rifles and anti-tank grenade launchers. 1966 has seen a considerable upgrading of VC/NVA armament with emphasis on increased fire power by introduction of more and newer automatic rifles, sub-machine guns and machineguns. The willingness of enemy forces in recent months, to expend large volumes of fire during offensive and defensive operations indicates an adequate supply of ammunitions to support this weapons build-up. Although various Field Pieces and AAA guns are known to be available to the enemy there has not been, to date, any confirmed instances of either type fire in Southern I Corps. The enemy's current tactical doctrine of "Mobile Warfare", which emphasises mobility, has apparently precluded his employment of Field Artillery and Anti-aircraft Artillery weapons in Southern I Corps.

a. Field Artillery- The VC/NVA forces "artillery" support has been exclusively 60mm 81mm and 82mm mortars, 57mm and 75mm Recoilless Rifles, B-40(82mm) and B-50(90mm) Anti-tank grenade launchers.

Main force VC/NVA units in Southern I Corps are known to possess 120mm mortars, however, there has been no confirmed report of their employment against friendly forces in this area.

b. Anti-Aircraft Artillery-The VC/NVA forces have employed virtually every weapon known to be in their possession in an antiaircraft role. He attacks by fire, without provocation, with any weapon at hand all aircraft which offers him a target. The preponderance of AA fire friendly aircraft in I Corps is small arms semi-automatic and small arms automatic weapons, both individual and crew served types. 12.7mm and .50 Cal (US) machine guns have frequently been used against aircraft in Southern I Corps, however, this caliber weapon is rarely employed in a sniper/target of opportunity role but is most often encountered when the enemy chooses to defend a Base Area and/or a fortified position. Mortars and flat trajectory H.E. firing weapons are also employed to a limited degree in an AA role, especially against Helicopters. A number of mortar, R.R. and grenade launcher attacks (using standard point detonating fuses) against Helicopters while approaching, on ground and departing landing zones have been confirmed. Additionally single and multiple airbursts at varying altitudes have been reported, which are attributed to these weapons using either jury rigged variable time fuzes and/or timed self destruct fuzes. Even hand grenades have been utilized in an

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AAA role. A homemade device was captured from the VC which was constructed in such a way that several grenades attached to a board would be propelled about 300 feet into the air by an explosive charge. where the grenade would detonate, giving a multiple airburst.

c. Small Arms (Up to .50 Cal)- See weapons characteristics tabulation below.

TYPE WEAPON	CAL	EFF VERT RANGE(FT)	EFF HORIZ RANGE(YDS)	MAX HORIZ RANGE(YDS)	PRACTICAL RATE OF FIRE
CHICOM TYPE-50 SubMG	7.62mm	-----	220	-----	100 RPM
VC SUBMG (MOD.MAT-49	7.62mm	-----	165	-----	100 RPM
FRENCH SUBMG, MAT-49	9mm	-----	150	-----	100 RPM
FRENCH MAS-36 (Bolt Action)	7.5mm	-----	440	3200	-----
CHICOM TYPE-53 (BOLT ACTION CARBINE)	7.62mm	-----	400	3200	-----
CHICOM AK-56 (ASSAULT RIFLE)	7.62mm	-----	330	2700	100 RPM
CHICOM SKS-56 Semi-Auto Rifle	7.62mm	-----	440	2700	-----
CHICOM RPD-56 LT MG	7.62mm	-----	880	2750	650 RPM
CHICOM TYPE-54 HEAVY MG	12.7mm	3300	3300	7700	600 RPM
CHICOM TYPE-56 AT GRENADE LAUNCHER	40mm	-----	165	-----	-----
CHICOM RL	90mm	-----	110	935	-----
CHICOM TYPE 36 RECOILLESS RIFLE	57mm	-----	-----	4340	-----
CHICOM TYPE 56 RECOILLESS RIFLE	75mm	-----	-----	7000	-----
CHICOM TYPE 53 MORTAR	82mm	-----	-----	3320	-----
SOVIET MORTAR	120mm	-----	-----	6230	-----

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Marine Aircraft Group 36  
1st Marine Aircraft Wing  
KY HA Air Facility, RVN  
010001H January 1967

Appendix 2 (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) to  
Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 1-67

Ref: (a) NWP 43  
(b) FM 21-75  
(c) FM 21-77  
(d) 21-77A  
(e) FM 31-30

1. GENERAL: Reference (a) relates to the training of personnel in Evasion, Escape and Survival. Reference (b) through (e) are training manuals in the technique of Evasion and Escape.

2. BACKGROUND. A close degree of interrelation exists between climate, terrain and the population of South Vietnam. Rainfall, or the absence of it, is perhaps the most significant variable concerning movement in South Vietnam. During the monsoon season, mountain streams and rivers are swollen and turbulent due to run-off. Many streams are traversed only by some kind of bridging during this period. This brings up two factors of consideration:

a. There is an increased probability of encountering indigenous personnel in the vicinity of these bridges and they should be avoided. Small boat traffic on streams and rivers is likely to be minimal during these times and travel along river banks would perhaps be safer than at any other time.

b. Another climatological variable - different from that of other parts of the world - occurs during the hot season which generally lasts through August. While trees in the U.S. drop their leaves in the fall and winter, the deciduous flora of Southeast Asia drops its leaves during the hotter weather. At this time extensive bamboo jungles turn yellow leaving the jungle floor littered with a carpet of crackling leaves. In the jungle, fields of fire are at their ~~maximum~~ and the smaller streams, no longer obstacles, become a series of moss covered puddles. Obviously, an individual's plan of maneuver as an evadee would be considerably different than during the monsoon season.

c. The monsoon determines the living habits of the Native population somewhat similar to the winter season in some other lands--i.e. mobility is restricted and cultivation is hampered or discontinued. The aviator, accustomed to viewing bad weather as a hazard, should be aware that in a hostile human environment, the same bad weather can be his ally.

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d. Of special importance to a downed aviator or air crewman making his way out is his comprehension of the overall weather picture. He must be aware that, in the mountainous interior during the months of September to February, monsoon conditions will generally prevail. As he comes closer to the seacoast, the weather is less severe and the population much greater. He might therefore consider night travel when getting into this area.

e. The extreme density of SE Asian jungle in the interior permits effective night movement only along trails. In an area where the trails are both booby-trapped and traveled at night, movement along trails, either by day or night, may have to be avoided entirely.

f. Cross-country jungle movement is a tremendously difficult procedure in most of the Vietnam highland regions. It can only be accomplished by day. Yet when coming near a populated or traveled area in the jungle, movement must be postponed until night fall.

g. The primary principle in the SE Asian E&E effort is flexibility. The evadee must have a thorough knowledge of the terrain, climate and population habits. The practice of continually calling to the aviator's mind the current situation is the only way to ensure that he is aware of the factors that pertain to successful survival in a hostile environment.

### 3. POINTEE-TALKEES AND BLOOD CHITS

a. While as a general rule contact with the indigenous population should be avoided, certain circumstances may bring it about. If for some reason inadvertent contact is made or must be made, the aviator must be acquainted with the means at his disposal for communication.

b. Pointee-Talkees are language guides to help the evadee overcome the language barrier. Each guide includes key phrases in English and their counterpart translations in five or more languages or dialects of the general area. They contain: instructions for use; blood-chit statement; finding an interpreter; courtesy; food and drink; comfort and lodging; communication; injury; enemy-occupied territory; time and table of figures.

c. The term "pointee-talkee" derives from the mechanics of its use. The evadee points out to the native the text of the instructions for use, which is in the native's language. Following this, the English version of the question to be asked is found and its foreign language counterpart is pointed out. In reply, the native will point to the phrase he wishes to answer with. The obvious limitation in this device is the necessity to find a literate person. Many villages will have at least one person who

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can read a little, however, in dealing with this individual it is extremely important to bear in mind his position. As a translator of written languages he is very likely the most highly respected and revered individual in the locale. Deference and diplomacy to this person is essential if his cooperation is to be gained.

d. Blood chits were originally developed in the China-Burma India theater in WWII. The unusual name came into use because of the significance of two of the Chinese characters used- "blood" indicating a seal or signature in blood, the most binding form of contract, and "chit" with its commonly understood oriental meaning of bill or note. Together they signify a promissory note signed in blood. With slight variations depending on the area involved and the languages used, all blood chits state approximately the following:

"I am an American. I do not speak your language. Misfortune forces me to seek your assistance in obtaining food, shelter and protection. Please take me to someone who will provide for my safety and see that I am returned to my people. I will do my best to see that no harm comes to you. My government will reward you."

e. Extreme caution must be exercised in safeguarding these chits not only in the process of evasion but in so-called "friendly" areas as well.

4. In the event of capture, all personnel should be thoroughly indoctrinated to pursue the following procedures:

a. Observe your surroundings and mentally note methods of enemy operations. Your experiences may yield valuable intelligence information on return to friendly forces.

b. Examine and pursue possibilities of escape. Escape is easier while in control of lower echelon personnel who are not trained as prisoner guards.

c. Maintain spirit and "will to survive". You have a responsibility to yourself, your family and your country to make it through the ordeal.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

*A. L. Phillips*  
A. L. PHILLIPS

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

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Annex C (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 1-67

- Ref: (a) FMFPacO PO2000.2, COMPLAN SIX  
 (b) III MAFO PO2000.1, III MAF COMPLAN TWO  
 (c) 1st MAWO PO2000.1, 1st MAW COMPLAN FIVE  
 (d) 1st MAWO PO2000.6, 1st MAW COI  
 (e) 1st MARDIVO PO2000.2, 1st MARDIV CECI  
 (f) 1st MARDIV TELEPHONE DIRECTORY JUNE 1966  
 (g) 3rd MARDIVO PO2000.2, 3rd MARDIV COI  
 (h) GruO P2100.1, SOP for MESSAGE PREPARATION and HANDLING  
 (i) CO MAG-36 ltr 50:FHM:fhm over 2000 of 15 Oct 1966, TELEPHONE DIRECTORY MAG-36

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 1-67.
- (2) The enemy has the capability to:
  - (a) Conduct wire tapping.
  - (b) Insert deceptive traffic on any communication channel.
  - (c) Monitor, jam and interfere with any communications channel.

b. Friendly Forces. See Operations Order 1-67.

c. Communication and Cryptographic Guard. MAG-36 guards for MACS-7.

2. MISSION

Support MAG-36 during operations in RVN by providing continuous communications.

3. EXECUTION

a. Communications Section, MAG-36

Establish, operate and maintain communication facilities in accordance with this annex and references (a) through (i).

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b. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) See references (a) through (i).

(2) Communications Center.

(a) Operations in accordance with MAG-36 Message Center and Crypto SOP's and reference (d).

(b) Message preparation and handling in accordance with Group O 2110.1, SOP for Drafting and Handling of Messages.

(3) Radio.

(a) Voice radio call signs in accordance with references (b), (d), (e), and (g).

(b) Group radio communication established in accordance with MAG-36 Communication Section SOP, reference (d), and Appendix 1 (Radio Plan).

(c) Landing Zone Control Teams provided as required.

(d) Maximum use of authentication on all radio circuits (both station and message authentication).

(4) Wire

(a) Wire communications established in accordance with MAG-36 Communications Section SOP and reference (d).

(b) Review group telephone directory and issue changes as required.

(c) Switchboard Code Names. See reference (d), (f), (g) and (i).(5) Communication Security.(a) Cryptographic Security.1 On-line cryptographic operations using KW-7 equipment provide the primary means of message encryption.2 Off-line cryptographic operations provides a secondary of back up method of encrypting message traffic.3 Authentication. KAC-QT used on intra-MAF circuits and KAA-60 used on external circuits.

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4 Numeral Code.

- a NUMERICAL CODE KAC-QT used on intra-MAF circuits and KAC-138 used on external circuits to provide number protection when for operational necessity the remainder of the transmission is made in plain language.
- b Extracts of KAC-QT and KAC-138, but never the entire publication may be carried in aircraft.
- c Radio operators and communication personnel will not encipher or decipher using numeral codes. This is the responsibility of the message drafter and/or addressees.
- d Draw effective editions from the Group RPScustodian.

5 Operational Codes. KAC-181 is employed within I Corps Tactical Zone in RVN for encryption of spot reports, intelligence reports and other information classified no higher than CONFIDENTIAL which requires only short term security. Information so encrypted may be transmitted by any means. Code editions are normally every 48 hours.

(b) Transmission Security.

- 1 ACP-122 applies.
- 2 Do not discuss classified information over radio and telephone circuits.
- 3 Keep all transmissions brief and adhere to proper procedures.

(c) Physical Security.

- 1 Emergency destruction in accordance with MAG-36 Communication Section Emergency Destruction Bill.

(6) Visual, Sound and Pyrotechnics. See reference (d).(7) Aircraft and Air Control Frequencies. See reference (d), Annex D (Air Operations) to Operations Order 1-67 and Appendix 1.(8) Ground Defense Communications. See Appendix 2 (Ground Defense Communications).(9) Helicopter Messenger Service. Provided as required and when aircraft are available.

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4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Second and third echelon maintenance for communication-electronic equipment performed by communication repair unit.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

*A. L. Phillips*

A. L. PHILLIPS  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

APPENDIXES:

- ✓ 1 - Radio Plan
- ✓ 2 - Ground Defense Communications (Provisional Rifle Co.)

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Appendix 1 (Radio Plan) to Annex C (Communications-Electronics) to  
 Operation Order 1-67.

Ref: (a) 1st MAWO P02000.6, 1st MAW COI

Time Zone: H

1. Radio Communications Established by MAG-36.

UNIT	NET	FREQ DESIG- EMISSION		
		ATOR		
MAG-36	(P) WING COMB#2	11592	M241	3A3J
	(S) WING COMB#2	AS DESIGNATED		
H&MS-36	(P) TACT AIR COMB-TAC	2422	M-20	3A3J
	(S) TACT AIR COMB-TAC	5079	M-122	3A3J
HMM-165	(P) GROUP COMB	2526	M-27	3A3J
	(S) GROUP COMB	1333.4	M-256	3A3J
HMM-262	(P) VMO-6 SQDN COMMON	5155	M-127	3A3J
	(S) VMO-6 SQDN COMMON	4631	M-113	3A3J
HMM-362	VMO-6 SQDN COMMON	327.0	M-1267	6A3
	VMO-6 SQDN COMMON	39.2	M-519	36F3
HMM-362	HMM-165 SQDN COMMON	319.0	M-1259	6A3
	HMM-165 SQDN COMMON	42.3	M-576	36F3
HMM-362	HMM-262 SQDN COMMON	246.8	M-1190	6A3
	HMM-262 SQDN COMMON	42.1	M-574	36F3
HMM-362	HMM-362 SQDN COMMON	282.2	M-1222	6A3
	HMM-362 SQDN COMMON	43.7	M-613	36F3
H&MS-36	H&MS SQDN COMMON	248.2	M-1192	6A3
	H&MS SQDN COMMON	42.6	M-582	36F3
CRASH CREW	CRASH NET	40.82	NONE	36F3
	(P) KY HA TOWER/GRP			
PROV RIFLE CO.	COMMON	285.8	M-1227	6A3
	(S) KY HA TOWER	335.4	M-1276	6A3
PROV RIFLE CO.	KY HA TOWER/GRP COMMON	41.5	M-567	36F3
	(P) PROV RIFLE COMPANY	47.0	M-667	36F3
PROV RIFLE CO.	(S) PROV RIFLE COMPANY	54.6	M-768	36F3

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

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Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
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Appendix 2 (Ground Defense Communications) to Annex C (Communication-  
Electronics) to Operation Order 1967.

Ref: (a) Chu Lai Defense Command Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. Ground defense communications provided as follows:

a. Communications Section, MAG-36

Support, supervise and maintain communication facilities in accordance with this appendix and reference (a).

b. Provisional Rifle Company.

Establish and operate communication facilities in accordance with this appendix and reference (a).

2. Messenger Service. As required.

3. Wire.

a. Wire is the primary means of communication. See Tab A (Wire Traffic Diagram).

b. Report to Chu Lai Defense Command hourly by telephone between 1800 and 0600.

c. Maintain an accurate log reflecting all installations and preventive maintenance accomplished, also all problem areas encountered.

d. Provisional Rifle Company voice radio call signs will be used as telephone directory names.

4. Radio.

a. Radio is an alternate means of communications. See Tab B (Radio Plan).

b. Radio operators affected by jamming shall not answer or take action which would indicate to the enemy that the jamming is being effective. Report jamming to the Group Communications Officer immediately.

c. Radio operators maintain accurate logs.

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- d. Maximum use of authentication on all circuits. Draw effective edition of KAC-QT( ) from the Group Communications Officer.
5. Visual, Sound and Pyrotechnics. See reference (a).
6. Group Communications Section provides all required communications equipment.
7. First echelon maintenance will be performed on all communication equipment held by the Rifle Company.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

*A. L. Phillips*  
A. L. PHILLIPSColonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
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TABS:

- ✓ A-Wire Traffic Diagram
- ✓ B-Radio Plan

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Operation Order 1-67

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
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Tab A (Wire Traffic Diagram) to Appendix 2 (Ground Defense Communications)  
 to Annex C (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 1-67.

Ref: (a) Chu Lai Defense Command Operation Order 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. Wire Diagram.



C-2A-1

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2. Emergency Ground Defense Force Platoons use the telephone closest to their CP for reporting to the Provisional Rifle Company CP and for use when assigned interior guard.

<u>EGDF Platoon</u>	<u>Telephone Location</u>
H&MS-36	ELUSIVE 1 or 56
MABS-36	BAGSEED 3
HMM-165	BUFFALO CITY 3 or 56
HMM-262	SWITCH 3 or 56
HMM-362	CLIP CLOP 3 or 56
VMO-6	KLONDIKE 3 or 56

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 Annex C (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 1-67.

Ref: (a) Chu Lai Defense Command Operations Order  
 301-66.

Time Zone: H

## LEGEND:

C-Net Control

X-Guard

O-When Directed

R-As Required

UNIT	CALL SIGN	Net		CLDC Tact		Prov Rifle Co Tact	
		Freq	Designator	M-633	M-510	M-667	M-768
		Emission		36F3	36F3	36F3	36F3
		Frequency		(P) 14.9	(S) 38.6	(P) 47.0	(S) 54.6
Chu Lai Def Comd	EVENING STAR			C	C		
MAG-36, S-3	NAIL FILE 3					R	R
Prov Rifle Co	NAIL FILE XRAY			X	O	C	C
1st Plat	NAIL FILE XRAY 1					X	O
2nd Plat	NAIL FILE XRAY 2					X	O
3rd Plat	NAIL FILE XRAY 3					X	O
4th Plat	NAIL FILE XRAY 4					X	O
Mortars	NF XRAY WHISKEY					X	O
Mat Guards	NAIL FILE XRAY L&B					X	O
Patrols	NAIL FILE SRAY ZULU					O	O

1. Prov Rifle Co Tact Net activated from 1800 until 0700 daily. All stations check in on the hour and come up on the net during alerts and when wire communications are out.
2. Rifle Co check into the Chu Lai Def Tact Net at 1800 for radio check. Radio check every hour on the hour from 1800 until 0630.

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Annex D (Air Operations) to Operation Order 1-67

Ref: (a) WgO P3310.5\_\_  
 (b) 1st MAW OpO 303-67  
 (c) WgO P3310.7\_\_  
 (d) GruO 6410.1\_\_  
 (e) GruO 03730.3\_\_  
 (f) 1st MAWO 03310.1\_\_  
 (g) GruO 03310.1\_\_  
 (h) WgO P3310.6\_\_

Time Zone: H

## 1. SITUATION

Marine Aircraft Group 36 forces operate from KY HA Air Facility RVN and provide air support for III MAF and other friendly forces as directed.

a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence) and current intelligence summaries.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) See basic order.
- (2) I Corps TOC provides coordinator for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units providing air support for ARVN forces in I Corps area.
- (3) I Corps DASC provides clearance for air strikes against those targets within the I Corps area outside III MAF areas of operation.
- (4) DASC (-) Chu Lai (LANDSHARK ALPHA) provides coordination of helicopter operations in the Chu Lai combat base.
- (5) Danang Combat Reporting Center (CRC) (PANAMA) provides air traffic control for all aircraft operating in or through I Corps area and is the primary air defense agency.
- (6) MACS-7 (COFFERDAM) provides air traffic control during IFR weather.

## 2. PROCEDURES

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- a. Requests for pre-planned air support for the following day are submitted to CG, 1st MAW by 1100H daily. In turn CG, 1st MAW issues frag orders to this group usually prior to 1700H daily. Request for helicopter support within the Chu Lai TAOR in support of the 1st Marine Division, I Corps and ROKMC units are submitted to the DASC (-) (LANDSHARK ALPHA) who in turn frags this group immediately on receipt from the requesting agency.
- b. MAG-36 frag orders for the following days operation will, if possible, be issued prior to 1930H daily. See Appendix 1 (Helicopter Mission Request) for Helicopter Request Form on which frag orders will be issued. Medical Evacuation Frags will be passed in format listed in Appendix 2 (Medical Evacuation Request Format).
- c. Mission numbers for on-call missions will be assigned by DASC (-) (LANDSHARK ALPHA) on request of this group.
- d. Helicopter operations will be carried out in accordance with references (a), (c) and (h).
- e. TADC (JOYRIDE) has scramble authority for all ground alert aircraft. Requests for fixed wing escort support will be requested via this Headquarters (S-3) prior to launch and via DASC after launch.
- f. Coordinating Instructions.
  - (1) Air Support Procedures. See Appendix 2 (Air Support) to Annex D (Air Operations) to 1st MAW Operation Order 303-67.
  - (2) Air Defense. See Appendix 3 (Air Defense) to Annex D (Air Operations) to 1st MAW Operation Order 303-67.
  - (3) Medical evacuation missions in accordance with reference (d).
  - (4) Ground Alert Conditions in accordance with Appendix 3 (Ground Alert Conditions).
  - (5) Air Traffic Control in accordance with Appendix 5 (Air Traffic Control) to Annex D (Air Operations) to 1st MAW Operation Order 303-67.
  - (6) Pilots of all helicopter missions will make pre and post mission reports to the DASC in the enclave from which launched. This report will include mission number and time of return only.
  - (7) Aircraft Armament Codes. See Appendix 4 (Aircraft Armament Code) to Operation Order 1-67.

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- (8) Search and Rescue. See Appendix 8 (Search and Rescue) to Annex D (Air Operations) to 1st MAF Operation Order 303-67.
- (9) Downed aircraft procedures in accordance with reference (e).
- (10) Mission priorities in accordance with reference (f).
- (11) Operations in marginal weather in accordance with reference (g).
- (12) Air-to-ground strikes in any operational area, including, landing zone preparation, close air support, direct air support, suppressive fire, interdiction and TPQ delivery must be under positive control of a TAC(A), FAC, FAC(A), TACP, or ASRT. All strikes will conform to the Rules of Engagement set forth in Annex E (Rules of Engagement) to this order.
- (13) Unless otherwise directed VC, VCS, VCC will be delivered to the Collection and Clearing Point at Chu Lai. Captives will be blindfolded, bound, and guards provided by the unit requesting evacuation. Captives will be searched before being brought to the proximity of helicopter. Crews will be briefed to refuse captives not bound, searched, blindfolded, tagged, and guarded.
- (14) On completion of lift of all ARVN, Vietnamese civilians, troop compartments and tail cones will be thoroughly searched for loose ammunition, grenades, documents, etc.
- (15) Report of actual or suspected enemy AA and heavy caliber automatic weapons fire will be passed to the DABG and Group S-2 on a priority basis.

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

See Annex G (Administration and Logistics).

## 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

- a. The Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is the tactical air commander for CG, III MAF and has command of all 1st MAF units in RVN.
- b. Commanding Officer, MAG-36 has OPCON and ADCON of all assigned units.

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- c. Communications in accordance with Annex C (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 1-67.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG



A. L. PHILLIPS

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

## APPENDIXES:

- ✓1 - Helicopter Mission Request
- ✓2 - Medical Evacuation Request Format
- ✓3 - Ground Alert Conditions
- ✓4 - Aircraft Armament Codes

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Operation Order 1-67

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Appendix 1 (Helicopter Mission Request Form) to Annex D (Air Operations)  
 to Operation Order 1-67

Time Zone: H

SAMPLE -

<u>HELICOPTER MISSION REQUEST</u>		<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO</u>	
1. ACTION _____		SUPPORTED UNIT _____		
2. NO A/C _____	UH-34D	3. EMERGENCY	4. TROOPS	VIP
	UH-1E	PRIORITY	LOGISTICS	STOP/OPS
	CH-46A	ASAP	ADMIN	NEED EVAC
		ROUTINE	RECON	OTHER
5. NO TROOPS _____				
DESCRIP/WT INTERNAL CARGO _____				
EXTERNAL CARGO _____				
REMARKS _____				
6. <u>F/U COORDINATES</u>	<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>DEST COORDINATES</u>	<u>CARGO/PAX</u>	
a. _____				
b. _____				
c. _____				
d. _____				
e. _____				
f. _____				
7. ADDITIONAL REMARKS _____				
LZ IS/NOT SECURE _____				
8. PICK UP	PANELS	LANDING ZONE	PANELS	
MARKED BY _____	SMOKE	MARKED BY _____	SMOKE	
(color)	LIGHTS	(color)	LIGHTS	
	FLARES		FLARES	

D-1-1

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
9. CONTACT \_\_\_\_\_ ON FREQ \_\_\_\_\_ AT \_\_\_\_\_

10. ESCORT: NO/TYPE/A/C \_\_\_\_\_ TCS \_\_\_\_\_ CALL \_\_\_\_\_

CONTROL BY \_\_\_\_\_ FREQ \_\_\_\_\_ RENDEZVOUS \_\_\_\_\_

11. DTG RCVD BY \_\_\_\_\_ REMARKS \_\_\_\_\_

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Appendix 2 (Helicopter Med Evac Request Form) to Annex D (Air Operations)  
 to Operation Order 1-67

Time Zone: H

MED EVAC REQUEST DATE \_\_\_\_\_ MSN NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_

EMERGENCY

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

REQUEST BY \_\_\_\_\_ ACTION TO \_\_\_\_\_

PICK UP COORDINATES \_\_\_\_\_ T/CAN BEAR/DIST \_\_\_\_\_

NUMBER OF WIA \_\_\_\_\_

US

ARVN

CIV

VC

KIA \_\_\_\_\_

ILL/INJURED \_\_\_\_\_

MED ASSISTANCE REQUIRED YES NO DOCTOR REQUIRED YES NO

LZ SECURE

MARKED BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 (color)

SMOKE

LIGHTS

PANELS

FLARES

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

CONTACT \_\_\_\_\_ Or FILED \_\_\_\_\_

DESTINATION \_\_\_\_\_

REMARKS \_\_\_\_\_

TIME REQUEST RECEIVED \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

TIME RECEIVED BY SQDN ODO \_\_\_\_\_

TIME HELOS AIRBORNE \_\_\_\_\_


TIME HELOS RETURNED KY HA \_\_\_\_\_

MISSION NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_



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Appendix 3 (Ground Alert Conditions) to Annex D (Air Operations) to  
 Operation Order 1-67

Time Zone: HK


# 1. GROUND ALERT CONDITIONS

a. CONDITION	ALERT STATUS	A/C STATUS
1	2 Minutes	Cockpit manned, engine running
2	5 Minutes	Cockpit unmanned
3	15 Minutes	Cockpit unmanned
4	30 Minutes	Cockpit unmanned
5		Released

# 2. RECONSTITUTING INSTRUCTIONS

- a. Aircraft in lesser alert condition will automatically assume the higher conditions vacated by a scramble.
- b. Within one half hour after scramble all alert conditions will be reconstituted from released aircraft as required and as available.

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Appendix 4 (Aircraft Armament Codes) to Annex D (Air Operations) to  
 Operation Order 1-67

Time Zone; H

<u>CODE</u>	<u>ORDNANCE</u>
D-1	MK 81 250# Low Drag GP bomb
D-1A	MK 81 Snakeye
D-2	MK 82 500# Low Drag GP bomb
D-2A	MK 82 Snakeye
D-3	MK 83 1000# Low Drag GP bomb
D-4	MK 84 2000# Low Drag GP bomb
D-5	Aero 7D Pod 2.75" FFAR
D-7	LAU-10A Pod 5" Zuni FFAR
D-8	AN/M 64 500# GP bomb
D-9	MK 77 Fire Bomb 500# napalm
D-10	MK 79 Fire Bomb 1000# napalm
D-11	AN/M 57 A-1 banded lug 250# GP bomb
D-12	AN/M 81 banded lug 260# frag bomb
D-13	AN/M 88 banded lug 260# frag bomb
D-14	CBU 1A/A
D-15	CBU 2A/A
D-16	AIM 7E Sparrow missile
D-17	AIM 9B Sidewinder missile
D-18	AGM 12B Bullpup
D-19	AGM 45 Shrike
D-20	20mm Ammunition
D-21	FS Smoke
D-22	Parachute Flare
D-23/23A	MK 44/Aero 7E Lazy Dog
D-24	MK 4 Gun pod
D-25	AN/M 65 1000# High Drag GP bomb

#### FUZES

V	VT (Proximity)
W	0.1 second delay
X	0.025 second delay
Y	Instantaneous
Z	Point Detonating

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Annex E (Rules of Engagement) to Operation Order 1-67

Ref: (a) COMUSMAC Directive 95-4

Time Zone: H.

1. The Mission.

- a. The mission of all US military aviation in RVN is to provide support for the counterinsurgency effort of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) by both supplementing the Vietnam Air Forces (VNAF) in support of the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and by supporting US ground forces. In order to effectively accomplish the task of augmenting RVNAF or US ground force endeavors against hostile targets and to minimize casualties among friendly forces and non-combatants, necessary guidelines and procedures for air strikes are established in this Annex. It is extremely important that priority emphasis be placed on the reduction of incidents involving friendly forces, non-combatant casualties, and civilian property damage.
- b. While restraints and procedures designed to minimize losses among friendly forces and non-combatants are necessary, the objective to obtain the full productivity of US air capabilities without inhibiting responsiveness or flexibility remains. US personnel operating under the terms of this Annex retain, at all times, the inherent right to defend themselves against hostile attack. When possible, coordination with the unit ground commander and the appropriate Direct Air Support Center (DASC) should be obtained prior to initiating an air strike. In the case of fire suppression in an approved target area where all friendly locations are known, the strike may be accomplished immediately at the FAC's discretion.

2. Commanding General III MAF, through his Tactical Air Commander, the Commanding General, First Marine Aircraft Wing, will conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations in accordance with the rules of engagement. As a subordinate organization of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, this Group will strictly adhere to the employment of and operational restrictions outlined in reference (a).

3. Definitions.

- a. Areas of operation previously referred to as "Free Bomb Zones" or "Free Strike Areas" are hereby redesignated as "SPECIFIED STRIKE

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ZONES." These zones are further defined as those areas where strikes may be made without further approval by the province chief.

- b. FAC as used in reference (a) refers to an Airborne Forward Air Controller. In Marine Corps terminology this individual is known as the Tactical Air Controller (Airborne) (TAC(A)).

4. Specific Instructions.

a. General.

- (1) All targets selected for an air strike will be approved by the Province Chief directly or through higher ARVN authority.
  - (2) All pilots will endeavor to minimize non-combatant casualties and civilian property damage. A strike will not be executed where identification of friendly forces is in doubt.
  - (3) All pilots will have a knowledge of the disposition of friendly forces and/or civilians prior to conducting a strike. This information may come from ground or air briefing.
  - (4) For purposes of this directive, references to the Forward Air Controller (FAC) also encompass and apply to the Marine Tactical Air Controller Airborne (TAC(A)).
  - (5) USAF, USMC, and USN strike aircraft will normally be controlled by the following in order of preference as listed:
    - (a) USAF ALO/FAC or USMC TAC(A).
    - (b) VNAF FAC/FAO.
    - (c) USAF MSQ-77 (SKY SPOT) or USMC TPQ-10.
  - (6) In an emergency, when no qualified means of control is available, the following personnel may designate the target for strike aircraft:
    - (a) The commander of a ground unit or US advisor engaged with the Viet Cong.
    - (b) US pilot of an airplane or helicopter supporting a ground unit, who has radio contact with the ground unit involved and/or can identify friendly positions in relation to enemy positions.
- \*Under VFR conditions, when a USAF, USMC or VNAF FAC is not available, a qualified Army Target Identifying Pilot (TIP) may designate the target to be struck and the flight

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leader of the strike aircraft will control the strike.

- (c) US pilot of an airplane or helicopter required to operate within the vicinity of a hostile village or hamlet for the purpose of conducting a medical evacuation or supply mission, and where enemy fire presents an immediate threat to the lives of the helicopter or transport crew.
- (7) Close air support missions that involve strikes on hamlets or villages must always be controlled by a FAC. If the attack on a village or hamlet is deemed necessary and is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving movement of ground forces through the area, the attack may be made without warning; however, appropriate US-GVN-RVNAF approval is required, except in emergencies. If the attack on a village or hamlet is not in conjunction with any immediate ground operation, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets and/or loud-speaker system prior to the attack and must be given sufficient time to evacuate the area.
- b. (C) Specific Instructions for Close Air Support to Include Interdiction (Day or Night).
  - (1) ALO/FAC will:
    - (a) Have thorough knowledge of the ground scheme of maneuver.
    - (b) Make every effort to secure a VNAF observer to assist in directing an air strike. If a VNAF observer is not available, an ALO/FAC is authorized to direct the air strike.
    - (c) Maintain reliable communications with ground unit and with strike aircraft.
    - (d) Make positive identification and mark the target.
    - (e) Insure that strike pilots are aware of friendly locations in relation to target, characteristics of target area, and local weather conditions.
    - (f) Use 1:50,000 scale maps of target area, and photographs when available.
  - (2) Strike Pilots will:
    - (a) Always be under the control and have direct radio contact for a strike with a Forward Air Controller or designated control agency (airborne or ground).

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- (b) Have visual contact with target or target marker except as noted in paragraph (f), below.
  - (c) Always ascertain the position of friendly troops (or civilians, when applicable).
  - (d) Ascertain local conditions regarding weather, target area, and surrounding terrain characteristics.
  - (e) Defend themselves against ground fire providing:
    - 1 Source of fire can be visually identified.
    - 2 The strike can be positively oriented against the source.
    - 3 The fire is of such intensity that counter-action is necessary.
  - (f) Strike at night only with flares, unless under control of TPQ-10 or MSQ-77.
- c. (C) Border Restrictions for Aircraft Conducting Assigned Missions in RVN.
- (1) Aircraft will not cross the demilitarized zone or Cambodian border unless specifically authorized by COMUSMACV.
  - (2) All FAC's operating in the vicinity of the border will have a 1:50,000 map of the target area. Maps, mosaics, and photos will be made available to the pilots.
  - (3) Joint operations-intelligence facilities will be established and complete prestrike briefings and poststrike debriefings will be conducted for strikes within 5000 meters of the border, when practical.
  - (4) Cambodian border restrictions which are additional to the above:
    - (a) Strike aircraft within 5000 meters of the Cambodian border will be under positive control of a FAC or MSQ-77/TPQ-10. The authority to waive this requirement is restricted to COMUSMACV or his designated representative.
    - (b) All organizations responsible for planning or execution of missions within 5 KM of the border will have posted in operations a 1:250,000 or larger scale map on which the Cambodian border is distinctly marked, on the RVN side, to the depth of 5 KM.



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
- (c) Aircraft supporting border outposts (fire support, reconnaissance, supply, and transportation) are allowed to operate as necessary in the outpost area, but will neither cross or fire across the border.
  - (d) Appropriate radar stations will flight follow aircraft on missions within 5 KM of the border within equipment capability.
- d. (C) Jettison.
- (1) Munitions will be jettisoned only in designated jettison areas.
  - (2) During night or ~~TPW~~ conditions, aircraft will be under positive radar control while jettisoning.
  - (3) During day VFR, drops will be monitored by radar whenever possible.
- e. (C) US Armed Helicopters.
- (1) US Army and US Marine armed helicopters will be marked "US Army" or "US Marine," as appropriate, and may be manned with all-US crews at the unit commanders discretion.
  - (2) If the target involves non-combatants, such as in a hamlet or village, whenever possible an RVNAF observer will be aboard the helicopter and US-GVN-RVNAF approval to fire must be obtained unless the situation clearly presents an immediate threat to the lives of the crew.
- f. (C) USAF C-123 Aircraft (Ranch Hand). Ranch Hand aircraft flying Trail Dust missions in RVN for the purpose of crop destruction will be flown under "Farmgate" rules which require Vietnamese markings on the aircraft and a Vietnamese observer aboard.
- g. (C) Air Reconnaissance and Aerial Surveillance Missions.
- (1) Operational restrictions placed upon reconnaissance aircraft near the RVN/Cambodian border, for the purpose of insuring that inadvertent overflights do not occur, preclude aerial reconnaissance over large areas within RVN where significant enemy activity is known to be taking place. In order to eliminate the immunity of such areas to observation and photography, these restrictions may be waived on a case-by-case basis.
  - (2) Reconnaissance requests for coverage in areas which present a danger of an overflight or border violation will be forwarded through normal reconnaissance request channels to the TASE.

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Upon determination that a waiver is justified, the request will be executed. In the event of particularly sensitive complications, COMUSMACV will be the final determining authority.

- (3) US Army OV-1 aircraft may be armed with target marking ordnance while on surveillance missions.
- h. (U) Air to Air Restrictions. Commander, 7th Air Force, prescribes Rules of Engagement and Restrictions for air to air combat in RVN. These are published by that headquarters in Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) Operating Instructions (OI) No 55-33, 30 March 1966.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG



A. L. PHILLIPS  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
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Annex F (Ground Defense and Passive Air Defense) to Operation Order 1-67

Ref: (a) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000 AMS L701 Series, Sheet 6757. III  
 (b) 1st MAW COI  
 (c) I Corps Coordinator Instruction 5500.1  
 (d) 1st MAW Operation Order 303-66  
 (e) Chu Lai Defense Command Operation Order 303-66

Time Zone: HV

## 1. Situation

### a. Enemy Forces

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 1-67
- (2) See current INSUMS.

b. Friendly Forces The Chu Lai Defense Command (CLDC) is divided into seven sub-sectors (Annex A of reference (e)). The Commanding Officer of Marine Aircraft Group 36 is designated Commander, Sub-Sector I. Coordination of defensive measures within Sub-Sector I will be exercised through the MAG-36 Area Defense Coordinator. The following forces are assigned to Sub-Sector I.

- (1) MAG-36 Provisional Rifle Company.
- (2) MAG-36 Emergency Ground Defense Force.
- (3) MACS-7 Ground Defense Force, augmented by reaction force personnel from MAG-36 Motor Transport.
- (4) MASS-3 Ground Defense Force.
- (5) NSF Ground Defense Force.
- (6) MCB-8 Ground Defense Force.

## 2. Mission.

Provide internal security, ground defense, perimeter defense, passive air defense and aircraft dispersal measures within Sub-Sector I.

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## 3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations

(1) The Commanding Officer of MAG-36 exercises operational control over all ground and perimeter defense forces assigned to Sub-Sector I. Defense of Sub-Sector I will be coordinated with the Chu Lai Defense Command (CLDC) in accordance with the provisions of reference (e). The Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, may direct implementation of certain security measures not prescribed by the (CLDC), in which instance, prior concurrence of the CG, III MAF will be obtained. In the event an emergency is declared by the Chu Lai Installation Coordinator, the CLDC will exercise operational control of Sub-Sector I, Ground and Perimeter Defense forces. Ground Defense Alert Conditions are set forth in Appendix I. These conditions will be passed to all units from the Sub-Sector I Command Post.

(2) Internal security of individual areas of each unit within Sub-Sector I is the responsibility of the Unit Commanders. Check points, road blocks and the delineation of area by wire or fence will be coordinated with the MAG-36 Area Defense Coordinator. Internal security plans will include guard organization, general and special orders for each post and diagrams of limits of each post.

(3) Aircraft dispersal measures will be planned and coordinated by the S-3 of MAG-36. Aircraft will be dispersed upon order of CO, MAG-36. Operating Squadrons will be prepared to disperse aircraft upon thirty minute notice. The MAG-36 Area Defense Coordinator will keep the S-3 informed of the Ground Defense Alert Condition (Appendix I) at all times.

(4) Passive Air Defense Conditions are set forth in Appendix 2. If an Air Defense Condition is set it will be passed to Commands within Sub-Sector I through the Ground Defense Communications network. Operating Squadrons of MAG-36 will receive the Condition through the S-3 Duty Officers. H&MS-36 and MABS-36 will be notified by the Group Duty Officer.

b. MAG-36 Provisional Rifle Company

(1) Provide perimeter defense in assigned area of responsibility (Appendix 3).

(2) Maintain a 24 hour perimeter security checkpoint for MAG-36 at the Sam Hai gate (BT 521 115).

(3) Provide internal security for the Helicopter Mats and related working areas and installations during hours of darkness.

(4) Coordinate sentry dog patrols into the perimeter and internal defense plan.

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(5) Provide internal security by manning 24 hour road blocks at BT 523 116 and BT 530 109.

(6) Employ additional weapons (tanks, ontos, etc.), as assigned in direct support by the CLDC, into the perimeter defense.

(7) Coordinate and supervise the employment of the MAG-36 Emergency Ground Defense Force to accomplish a perimeter defense in depth and a minimum two platoon reaction force.

(8) Maintain a minimum one squad reaction force during Alert Condition WHITE.

(9) Be prepared to provide 81mm Mortar illumination to all units of Sub-Sector I.

(10) Conduct a daylight patrol each day to inspect the wire barrier and tree line on the Southwest perimeter. Coordinate patrol in accordance with the instructions contained in reference (e).

(11) Provide such other security forces and measures as deemed appropriate by CO MAG-36. Comply with the provisions of reference (e).

e. MAG-36 Emergency Ground Defense Force. Each operating and support Squadron of MAG-36 will provide one platoon for the Emergency Ground Defense Force. These platoons will be mustered and emplaced when directed by the Sub-Sector Command Post through the Operations Duty Officers of the operating Squadrons and through the Squadron Duty Officers of the Support Squadrons. Assigned Platoon Commanders and Platoon Sergeants will be prebriefed on individual platoon missions in the event of an alert. Each Platoon Commander is responsible for the organization, indoctrination, training and employment of his platoon.

d. MASS-3 and MACS-7

(1) Provide ground perimeter defense in assigned sector.  
(Appendix 3)

(2) Provide a reaction force for assigned sector.

(3) Coordinate defensive positions with adjacent units.

(4) Comply with the provisions of reference (e).

e. NSF and MCB-8

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(1) Provide shoreline perimeter defense in assigned sector (Appendix 3).

(2) Provide a reaction force in assigned sector.

(3) Coordinate defensive plans with adjacent units.

(4) Comply with the provisions of reference (e).

f. Coordinating Instructions

(1) The Ground Defense alert, passive Air Defense and MACV security conditions set forth in references (c), (d) and (e) are all interrelated. Ground Defense alert conditions may be set without setting a Passive Air Defense condition. However, the setting of a Passive Air Defense condition will always precipitate the setting of a corresponding Ground Defense alert condition. The conditions are set forth in Appendix (1) and (2). To avoid confusion in respect to these conditions, the relationships are as follows.

<u>GROUND DEFENSE ALERT CONDITION</u>	<u>PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE CONDITION</u>	<u>MACV SECURITY CONDITION</u>
WHITE	WHITE	WHITE
GRAY	No Corresponding Condition	GRAY
YELLOW	YELLOW	YELLOW
RED	RED	RED

(2) All personnel will be instructed in the Rules of Engagement (Appendix 4) and the proper procedures for challenging (Appendix 5).

(3) All personnel included in perimeter defense will wear the armored vest and steel helmet with camouflage cover in addition to their normal combat uniform and equipment.

(4) Seismic Intrusion Devices (SIDS), trip flares and claymore weapons will be emplaced at dark and retrieved at first light. The position and location will be varied nightly.

(5) For use of the Claymore weapon, the following conditions must be met:

(a) Claymore is within vision of person controlling its detonation.

(b) Detonation effected only by hand ~~generator~~.

(c) Individuals handling or controlling claymores have been thoroughly schooled in capabilities, limitations and safety precautions of the weapon.

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(6) Units assigned to Sub-Sector I will provide a spot report to the Sub-Sector I Command Post by phone on all significant incidents within their assigned sectors. The report will be in accordance with reference (e).

(7) The Sub-Sector Command Post will be notified by phone of any weapon or pyrotechnic discharged within the Sub-Sector.

(8) Insure all personnel are instructed on their sectors of fire and location of adjacent friendly units.

(9) Instruct those personnel whose sector of fire may fall in friendly areas, to use fragmentation grenades whenever possible. If they must fire, deliberately fire low when a target appears inline with adjacent friendly forces.

(10) Provide each manned perimeter position with a minimum of four fragmentation grenades and four hand-held illumination devices. (grenades or flares). Spoons on all casualty producing grenades (WP or HE) shall be securely taped to the body of the grenade. Strict accountability will be placed on all ordnance and proper storage areas will be provided. No ordnance or pyrotechnics will be left at anytime in an unmanned position.

(11) All units prepare Emergency destruction plans for destruction of Classified Material.

(12) All units prepare protective bunkers in contourment areas to protect personnel in the event of enemy ground, air, or mortar attacks.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS. See Annex G (Administrative and Logistics) to Operation Order 1-67.

a. Personnel assigned to the Provisional Rifle Company will be transferred to MABS-36 for temporary duty.

b. The Group S-2 will be notified immediately of any VC or VCS. The Chu Lai Defense Command (Anchor Watch) will be contacted for disposition.

c. Medical evacuees will be initially sent to the Group Aid Station or to the 1st Med Battalion if designated.

#### 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

##### a. Communications-Electronics

(1) See annex C (Communication-Electronics to Operation Order (1-67)

(2) Radio and telephone Plans for Chu Lai Defense Command. See Annex H (Communication-Electronics) to reference (e).

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b. Command Post

(1) Sub-Sector I. Provisional Rifle Company BT 527 113

(2) Chu Lai Defense Command BT 524 089

c. Command Relationships

(1) Operational control of Sub-Sector I defense force will pass to the Chu Lai Defense Command as dictated by an emergency tactical defense situation. The Commanding Officer, Provisional Rifle Company, will be responsive to the orders and directions of the Chu Lai Defense Command in matters relating to the security of the Chu Lai enclave.

(2) Under emergency conditions, operational control of aircraft and other operational functions remains with the Commanding Officer of MAG-36 and ultimately CG, 1st MAW.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG



A. L. PHILLIPS

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Executive OfficerAPPENDIXES:

- ✓1-Ground Defense Alert Conditions
- ✓2- Passive Air Defense Conditions
- ✓3-Sector Assignments
- ✓4-Rules of Engagement
- ✓5-Procedures for Challenging

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-67.

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1st Marine Aircraft Wing  
KY HA Air Facility, RVN  
010001H January 1967

Appendix 1 (Ground Defense Alert Conditions) to Annex F  
(Ground Defense and Passive Air Defense) to Operation Order 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. The Chu Lai Defense Command (CLDC) Operations Center will announce the Ground Defense Alert Conditions in effect for all or a part of the CLDC area. The Alert Conditions will be passed to all Organizations within Sub-Sector I from the Sub-Sector Command Post.

2. During daylight hours, which is defined as the period from sunrise to sunset, normal conditions of security will be maintained unless an alert condition is set by CLDC. The minimum security requirement for normal daylight hours is that perimeter defense positions will be manned to the extent necessary to provide continuous surveillance of the entire barrier. At least one man in each position selected for surveillance will be alert and constantly observing the barrier especially during inclement weather. He will report all suspicious acts of indigenous personnel in his area of observation, especially those instances where indigenous personnel are gathered and are active in the vicinity of the barrier.

a. SECURITY ALERT CONDITION WHITE. This is the normal security alert condition during the hours of darkness. It means that there is a need for increased security precautions to be exercised in all of the CLDC Sector of Responsibility. It indicates that there is higher probability that actions against the CLDC Vital Areas will occur. This security alert condition may also be set during daylight hours when the situation warrants such action.

#### ACTION

(1) Personnel will enter villages only as necessary in the performance of duties.

(2) Man all perimeter defensive positions. At least one man in each perimeter position will be alert and keeping assigned sector under continuous observation.

(3) Check in on the CLDC Tactical Net.

(4) Ensure that all personnel are properly equipped to effectively assist in the defense of the perimeter.

(5) Ensure that all personnel are assigned alert positions.

(6) Engage in other defensive measures deemed necessary.  
(Review plans to provide re-supply of Class I and V supplies, for

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medical support to perimeter forces, observing of blackout conditions etc.)

b. SECURITY ALERT CONDITION GRAY. Will be set whenever information available indicates a need for active defense measures to prepare the CLDC Area against imminent enemy activity. Intelligence sources indicate a strong probability of enemy activity against the CLDC Area within 3 hours.

ACTION (ALERT SIGNAL- ONE TEN SECOND SIREN BLAST.)

- (1) Intensify the provisions of Condition WHITE.
- (2) Curtail visits to villages to maximum extent.
- (3) Minimize vehicular and other movement within the CLDC area.
- (4) Devote maximum effort to the preparation of defensive positions. Secure all unnecessary work.
- (5) Alert, muster, brief, and inspect Reaction Forces.
- (6) 50% of personnel in perimeter defensive positions awake and on watch, keeping assigned sectors under continuous observation.

c. SECURITY ALERT CONDITION YELLOW. Will be set whenever contact has been made with the enemy on the perimeter or explosive fires are falling within the CLDC Area.

ACTION (ALERT SIGNAL- TWO TEN SECOND SIREN BLASTS.)

- (1) Complete all actions specified in Conditions WHITE and GRAY.
- (2) All hands report to pre-assigned alert positions prepared to fight. 100% of personnel in perimeter defensive positions awake and on watch, keeping assigned sector under continuous observation.
- (3) All hands not engaged in defense or essential work, take cover, or man assigned rear area positions.
- (4) Reaction Forces be prepared to deploy as directed.

d. SECURITY ALERT CONDITION RED. Will be set whenever enemy forces have penetrated the defense and are within the perimeter.

ACTION (ALERT SIGNAL- THREE TEN SECOND SIREN BLASTS.)

- (1) Cease all work and movement except that of an emergency nature.
- (2) All hands not engaged in emergency work or defensive tasks take positions around equipment, billeting and working areas for close-in protection of same. These personnel may fire at targets

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ONLY to protect lives and property. Extreme care must be taken to prevent shooting friendly forces.

(3) Reaction Forces maneuver as directed to seek out and destroy the enemy.

(4) Review Classified Document Removal Destruction Plans.

e. MISCELLANEOUS

(1) Minimize night movement of individuals and vehicles within all Sub-Sectors after curfew.

(2) During the hours of darkness, all indigenous personnel and civilian vehicles transporting personnel other than U.S. or Free World Force military, and civilian personnel will be apprehended and the provost marshal notified.

(3) At night, WALK-DO NOT RUN to assigned alert positions.

(4) Observe blackout procedures to maximum extent possible.

(5) Submit Spot Reports to the Sub-Sector Command Post by the most expeditious means.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

*A. L. Phillips*  
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Appendix 2 (Passive Air Defense Conditions) to Annex F (Ground Defense and Passive Air Defense) to Operation Order 1-67

Ref: (a) CG III MAF msg 011012Z Sep65 (U) (NOTAL)

Time Zone: H

1. Units within Sub-Sector I be prepared to take passive air defense measures as established by CLDC.

2. Air defense conditions for all USMC enclaves have been established by reference (a) as follows:

YELLOW - ATTACK IS PROBABLE

RED - ATTACK IS IMMINENT OR IS TAKING PLACE

WHITE - ALL CLEAR

3. Air Defense Battle Commander (CRC PANAMA) passes air defense condition to Senior Air Director, AAOC/CAOC (TAOC) who in turn notifies units/agencies in accordance with instructions issued by the Installation Defense Coordinator, CHU LAI.

4. Chu Lai based units will take the following measures when air defense conditions are set.

a. Condition YELLOW - Set ground defense condition YELLOW. Position ground defense forces to counter possible ground attack in conjunction with air attack. Continue essential operations. All other personnel take cover. Report progress.

b. Condition RED - Set ground defense condition RED. Same actions as required for condition YELLOW. Continue essential operations from Command Post bunkers. All personnel take cover. Execute aircraft dispersal plans. Report progress.

c. Condition WHITE - If air attack has not taken place, return to the ground defense condition established prior to the air defense alert. If air attack has taken place in the CHU LAI area, remain in highest ground defense condition attained and be prepared to render assistance to affected units as directed. Report progress.

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5. Reference to the various conditions is not classified information, however, the actions required under each condition is classified information and will be treated as such.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

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
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Appendix 3 (Sector Assignment)  
to Annex F (Ground Defense and  
Passive Air Defense) to  
Operation Order 1-67



BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

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Appendix 4 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex F (Ground Defense and Passive Air Defense) to Operation Order 1-67

Time Zone: H

## 1. General

a. The rules of engagement set forth herein are prescribed to minimize non-combatant personnel and property losses which may occur in the execution of military action against enemies of the Republic of Vietnam.

b. Unnecessary firing of weapons leads to non-combatant battle casualties to both U. S. Combat Forces personnel and the friendly populace. Incidents of non-combatant casualties and destruction of property by U. S. Combat Forces are exploited to the fullest extent by the enemy to foster resentment against the United States and to permanently alienate the Vietnamese people from their government.

c. In carrying out patrols and ambushes, all practicable measures will be taken to minimize the destruction of indigenous private property and to ensure proper control and safe guarding thereof.

d. All personnel assigned to defensive positions within the Chu Lai Defense Command Area will be indoctrinated frequently on the Rules of Engagement with emphasis on the importance of minimizing non-combatant battle casualties and ~~property~~ losses to the friendly populace.

## 2. Rules of Engagement

a. During the hours of darkness the sequence of engagement will be:

(1) Challenge in English and Vietnamese (Dung Lai).

(2) If the person challenged makes an overt attempt to avoid apprehension, opens fire, or commits any hostile act endangering the life of the challenger, the challenger may fire. Illumination will be used prior to firing.

b. Security Officers of organizations within Sub-Sector I, may authorize magazines to be placed into weapons during periods of low visibility.

c. Warning shots will not be employed on contact with the enemy, except as a day time control of water traffic. Watercraft failing to respond to challenge may be warned by fire.

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d. Rounds will not be chambered in individual weapons or machine guns, nor will grenades be placed in launchers unless contact with the enemy is imminent. The senior Marine present will determine if, in his judgement, rounds must be chambered or grenades placed in launchers to preserve Marine lives, or to accomplish the mission.

3. Rules of Engagement for Tanks and Ontos. Tanks and Ontos will observe the same rules of engagement as other units within the Chu Lai Defense Command. If being fired upon or if a definite hostile target is positively identified within the CLDC zone of responsibility, the enemy target will be engaged. Tanks and Ontos will attack targets with a priority of weapons in ascending order from the .30 caliber machine gun to the .50 caliber machine gun. The 90mm tank cannon and 106mm recoilless rifle will not be fired except as may be directed by the Sub-Sector Commander. When tanks are authorized to fire the 90mm cannon, only cannister ammunition will be fired and then only on targets within the Chu Lai Defense Command area of responsibility.

4. All firing incidents within Sub-Sector I will be reported immediately to the Sub-Sector C. P. All fire incidents will be investigated immediately to insure the Rules of Engagement have been complied with. A written report will be forwarded to the Sub-Sector Commander within twelve hours.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

*A. L. Phillips*

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Appendix 5 (Procedures for Challenging) to Annex F (Ground Defense and Passive Air Defense) to Operation Order 1-67

Ref (a) Force O 03440.(C)

Time Zone: H

1. The challenge and password is a proven method of recognizing and identifying friendly individuals. This method has been, and will continue to be used in this Command. Procedures for challenging are not classified.

2. The III MAF Headquarters promulgates lists of challenges and passwords and the effective challenge and password is disseminated by message to cover five 24 hour periods which run from 1201 to 1200 daily. The following procedures will be followed when using the challenge and password:

a. Challenging personnel on foot.

(1) The sentry will allow the individual, or party, to approach to within range of the normal voice. The sentry will command "Halt, who goes there?" Multiple posts will only use one sentry for challenging. The remainder staying concealed in supporting positions to cover the sentry and challenged party.

(2) The challenged individual, or senior man in the party, will halt, then give his rank, name, size and nature of party.

(3) The sentry will then allow the individual, or senior man, to advance by saying "Advance (rank and name) and be recognized." No further challenging is necessary if individual is recognized.

(4) When the challenged person is not recognized, the sentry will allow him to advance up to a point where the challenge spoken in a low voice will only be heard by the challenged individual. The sentry will then command "Halt" and give the challenge in a low voice. The challenged individual will then give the password.

(5) When satisfied that the individual or party is friendly, the sentry will allow them to pass. If a party is involved, the senior man will verify each man as they pass the sentry.

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## b. Challenging a vehicle.

(1) The sentry will position himself at a good vantage point. As the vehicle approaches he will command "Halt."

(2) When the vehicle is halted, the sentry will direct the driver to stop engine, dismount and stand in plain sight near the vehicle. Passengers will remain in the vehicle.

(3) The sentry will challenge the driver using procedures outlined above for challenging individuals on foot.

3. In addition to proper challenging procedures, individual weapons will be handled in a safe manner. The following rules for loading of weapons apply:

a. Magazine will not be inserted in weapon during daylight hours unless under attack or unless on patrol outside of perimeter defense positions. Magazines may be inserted at night at the discretion of the individual commander.

b. A round will not be inserted into the chamber of an individual weapon unless an encounter with the enemy is obvious and in the judgement of the senior Marine present, this measure is necessary to preserve friendly lives.

c. A sentry may insert a round in the chamber of his weapon if after challenging, the challenged individual does not halt. The loaded weapon, however, will not be pointed directly at the individual until it is determined that he is an enemy.

4. The proper utilization of the challenge and password will enhance security and save lives. In order to achieve this, every commander at every level, front line or rear area will ensure that the effective challenge and password for the day is passed on to every man in his command each day. Continuous schooling will be conducted to ensure that every man understands and complies with the procedures outlined in this appendix.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

*R. L. Phillips*

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Annex G (Administration and Logistics) to Operation Order 1-67.

Ref: (a) WgO PH400.16B  
 (b) 1st MAW Op O 303-67  
 (c) WgOP13000.1 SOP Aircraft Maintenance

Time Zone: H

# 1. SUPPLY

## a. Supply Sources.

- (1) Marine Corps furnished supplies and equipment Classes I through V from Force Logistical Support Unit (FLSU-1)
- (2) Navy furnished aircraft spares, (Class II-A) provided by NSD Subic Bay.
- (3) All other Navy requirements furnished by NSD Yokusaka except combat pack, NAVORD and TBA Part III material furnished by MWSG (WSSD) 17.
- (4) All Class III-A provided by FLSG-B
- (5) All Class V-A provided by MAG-12.

## b. Control. In order to efficiently manage assets within this Group the following are authorized levels of supply to be issued to each squadron upon independent deployment.

### (1) Class I

- (a) Meal Combat Individual - 3 days.
- (b) "B" Rations - 5 days; one being consumed, three on hand and one on order.

### (2) Class II - 30 day mount out block for support of Marine Corps material has been issued to squadrons.

### (3) Class II-A - 15 days of consumable high velocity turnover material. A pack-up of repairable aviation material will be issued.

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- (4) Class III - 5 days of packaged POL required to support ground equipment.
- (5) Class III-A - 5 days of packaged aviation POL products required for support of aircraft.
- (6) Class IV - As required by each squadron.
- (7) Class V and V-A - Basic allowance of ammunition.

c. Resupply.

- (1) As specified in paragraph 1 (a) above.
- (2) Air Supply - See paragraph 1 c (2) Annex E to reference (b).

2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

- a. Evacuation. Two day evacuation policy is in effect. See Annex E to reference (b).
- b. Hospitalization. See Appendix 2 E to reference (b).

3. TRANSPORTION

- a. No vehicle will move out of the CHU LAI TAOR without prior approval of this Headquarters.
- b. Maximum use of organic vehicles will be made to meet transportation requirements.
- c. Requests for augmentation vehicles will be made to this Headquarters (Attn: S-4).
- d. All local military and civilian traffic regulations will be observed.

4. SERVICES

- a. Construction - As directed by this Headquarters (S-3).
- b. Salvage.
  - (1) A salvage collection point will be maintained by Group Supply. See Section XI of reference (a).
  - (2) Reference (c) outlines procedures for reporting aircraft considered eligible for strike.

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(3) Unflyable damaged aircraft will be reported to this Headquarters for evacuation.

c. Maintenance - Normal unless otherwise directed by this Headquarters. See paragraph 4 a (3) of reference (b).

d. Personnel. See Appendix 1 (Personnel)

5. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Air Base Defense. See Annex F (Ground Defense and Passive Air Defense) to Operation Order 1-67.

b. Reports. See Annex I (Reports) to Operation Order 1-67.

c. Fiscal. Fiscal will be in accordance with current directives.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

*A. L. Phillips*  
A. L. PHILLIPS

Colonel U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

APPENDIXES:

✓ 1 - Personnel

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Operation Order 1-67

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 010001H January 1967

Appendix 1 (Personnel) to ANNEX G (Administration and Logistics) to  
 Operations Order 1-67.

Ref: (a) FMFPacO P3000.1 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (b) MCO 3040.1 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (c) 1stMAW(adv)O 3040.1 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (d) MCO P5000.3 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (e) 1stMAWO 5800.1 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (f) ForceO 01060.1 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (g) 1st MAWO 1050.7 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (h) ForceO 1710.2 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (i) MACV Dir 28-2 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (j) 1stMAWO 1650.5 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (k) GruO 2700.1 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (l) GruO 5000.9 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (m) CO MAG-36 ltr 11:RMA:fls/1700 dtd 4Nov65  
 (n) MCO P3000.1B  
 (o) 1stMAWO 1300.1D  
 (p) 1stMAWO 3000.1

Time Zone: H.

#### 1. STRENGTHS

- a. All units deployed to South Vietnam will be brought to as near T/O strength as is possible from Wing assets and incoming replacement personnel.
- b. Recommendations for changes to T/O's and/or manning levels in accordance with reference (a).
- c. Required nominations from higher headquarters will be filled with highly qualified personnel.
- d. Casualty reporting will be in accordance with reference (b), (c) and Chapter 12 of reference (d).

#### 2. REPLACEMENTS

- a. All replacements will be provided by Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, as units, or individuals from replacement drafts.
- b. Requests for normal losses are not desired.
- c. Requests for critical shortages may be submitted at any time.

#### 3. DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER

- a. All unauthorized absence offenders will be returned to parent

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units for disciplinary action.

- b. Military Police will be furnished by higher authority.
- c. Military justice will be conducted in accordance with reference (e).

#### 4. PRISONERS OF WAR

- a. The term "prisoner of war" is not applicable in its literal sense. Either "Viet Cong Suspects" (VCS) or "Viet Cong Captured" (VCC) will be used.
- b. Processing of VCC or VCS will be in accordance with reference (f).

#### 5. GRAVES REGISTRATION

- a. Graves Registration is provided by Force Logistic Support Group.
- b. Disposition of personal effects of deceased personnel will be in accordance with paragraph 12282 of reference (d).

#### 6. MORALE AND PERSONNEL SERVICES

- a. Leave, only emergency leave will be granted in accordance with reference (g).
- b. Rest and Recuperation, is in accordance with reference (h), and (i).
- c. Medals and Awards, submission and processing in accordance with reference (j).
- d. Postal Service, Postal Services will be in accordance with reference (k).
- e. Exchange Services
  - (1) Afloat - Ships Store.
  - (2) Ashore - Marine Aircraft Group 36 Field Exchange.
- f. Pay. Military Payment Certificates will be used in Republic of Vietnam. MPC will be changed to Piasters through the Disbursing Officers. MPC used in the Republic of Vietnam must be changed to other forms of currency prior to leaving Republic of Vietnam.
- g. Information
  - (1) New joinces will be indoctrinated in accordance with reference (1).

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- (2) Rotatees will be indoctrinated in accordance with reference (m).

## 7. CIVIL AFFAIRS

- a. See Annex H (Civil Affairs) to Operation Order 1-67.

## 8. PERSONNEL PROCEDURES

- a. Personnel procedures will be in accordance with reference (a), (n), and (o).
- b. Personnel evacuated from the Republic of Vietnam will be transferred by Service Records in accordance with paragraph 4020 of reference (d) upon appropriate notification.
- c. Rotation of personnel to CONUS will be in accordance with reference (p).

## 9. INTERIOR MANAGEMENT

- a. Marine Aircraft Group 36 Headquarters is activated at KY HA, Republic of Vietnam.

## 10. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES

- a. Civilians will not be employed without prior permission from this headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

*A. L. Phillips*  
A. L. PHILLIPSColonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

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## ANNEX H (Civil Affairs) to Operation Order 1-67

- Ref: (a) III MAF Order 1750.1 (Concepts)  
(b) III MAF Order 5800.1 (Projects)  
(c) III MAF Order 5800.3 (Medical Teams)  
(d) III MAF Order 5800.4 (Logistics (FLSG))  
(e) III MAF Order 5800.6 (Logistics (MEDCAP))  
(f) III MAF Order 5800.7 (Logistics (CARE))  
(g) Force Order 5081.2B  
(h) WgO 5080.1B

Time Zone: H

## I. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 1-67

- b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Cooperative for American Relief to Everywhere (CARE).

CARE is a voluntary relief agency, operating as a private aid organization in 42 countries, including the Republic of Vietnam. CARE, Vietnam, has offered to make its supplies available to units of this organization for distribution in connection with their respective civic action projects.

- (2) Project Handclasp. This project involved spontaneously from the desire of Naval personnel to enhance mutual respect and understanding in all nations of the world. It was originally a voluntary effort which reflected the motivation of the Navy men to act as individual ambassadors of good will. To date, several million pounds of cargo have been transported in Navy ships for distribution to refugees and other deserving groups.

- (3) United States Aid for International Development (USAID).

This organization has stores of cement, aluminum, asbestos, reinforcing bars, corn, bulgar wheat, cooking oil, rice, and other materials available for distribution in conjunction with Civil Affairs programs. USAID deals directly with the agencies of the Vietnamese government, and will provide information as to which agency such requests should be directed.

USAID policy is based upon the assumptions that strengthening the Vietnamese government agencies will result in a stable administration, and that only a government responsive to the needs of the people can successfully conduct a war.

(4) Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO).

JUSPAO is a source of aid capable of providing timely informational and educational materials for distribution to the Vietnamese people. They have the resources for preparing documents to be read to the people, and it is a good practice to coordinate with the JUSPAO regional representative and the U.S. Advisors to the Current Affairs/Psychological Warfare Branch Officer located at the I Corps Headquarters in Da Nang before launching any Psychological efforts.

(5) Medical Civic Action Program. (MEDCAP).

A comprehensive Rural Health Program has been developed by the Vietnamese Ministry of Health and USAID's Public Health Division. The program provides basic services for rural Vietnam, integrating curative and preventive services within a permanent, continuously developing structure. A network of health services and facilities extend forward from the lowest rural levels with increasingly sophisticated care, organization, and administration toward the higher levels. The program utilizes nurses and sub-professional health workers at the three lower levels (district, village, and hamlet), and places emphasis on referral from the lower to higher levels as required. Application of disease prevention and public health principles provides a backdrop to all medical care activities.

(6) Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG).

The Force Logistic Support Group and its subordinate elements in the Republic of Viet Nam are capable of performing and supporting a variety of civic action projects.

c. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization) to Operations Order 1-67

d. Assumptions.

(1) Personnel involved in Civil Affairs programs must maintain constant alertness to the subversive influence of hard core Viet Cong and Viet Cong sympathizers that would destroy the effectiveness of the Civil Affairs effort.

(2) There is a continuing need for medical and logistic support of the villages and hamlets in the Marine Aircraft Group 36 area of civic action responsibility.

(3) The Civil Affairs program of Marine Aircraft Group 36 is dependent upon the availability and use of helicopters, and is thus subject to the influence of the tactical situation and weather conditions.

## 2. MISSION

Marine Aircraft Group 36 Civil Affairs program has a three fold mission: (1) To demonstrate to the free people of Viet Nam that the United States is genuinely interested in their welfare; (2) To assist in the development of living conditions, health programs, and educational facilities for the Vietnamese people; (3) To establish working relationships and contacts with the local Vietnamese in order to receive intelligence information on the Viet Cong.

## 3. EXECUTION

### a. Concept of Operation

(1) Civil Affairs programs will be executed on the Group level, guided by III MAF and 1st MAF directives. Specifically, Marine Aircraft Group 36 has been assigned the island of Ly Son (Cu Lao Re) as a Civil Affairs area of responsibility. Programs scheduled to assist the inhabitants of this island will be published, and the assistance of the squadrons requested.

### b. All MAG-36 Squadrons (In-Country)

(1) Squadron Commanders will appoint Civil Affairs officers.

(2) Squadrons under OPCON of another headquarters are encouraged to initiate Civil Affairs programs by coordinating with the headquarters concerned.

(3) A Group medical action team will be established in accordance with current III MAF directives.

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. A report of all Civil Affairs projects involving personnel and material from Marine Aircraft Group 36 will be submitted to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Civil Affairs Officer on the form provided by that office. All civic action undertaken by personnel of this Group will be reported to the Group Civil Affairs Officer for inclusion in the Group report.

b. The Group Civil Affairs Officer will be contacted for any assistance required in the establishment and support of civic action programs initiated by personnel of this command. Marine Aircraft Group 36 (Attn: Civil Affairs Officer).

5. COMMUNICATIONS

In accordance with WgO PC2000.2 (1st Marine Aircraft Wing COI).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

*A. L. Phillips*  
A. L. PHILLIPS

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

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Annex I (Reports) to Operation Order 1-67

Ref: (a) 1st MAW Operation Order 303-66  
 (b) 1st MAW Order 3000.2 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (c) 1st MAW Order 5213.2 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (d) Group Order 003000.2 \_\_\_\_\_

Time Zone: H

# 1. GENERAL

- a. To expedite dissemination of combat information and to satisfy requirements of higher echelons, the following reports will be submitted by all squadrons assigned to MAG-36 as indicated below:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE/TIME DUE</u>	<u>SUBMIT BY</u>	<u>SUBMIT TO</u>	<u>DATE/TIME DUE WING</u>
SITREP/DAAR	2000 Daily	Each Sqd.	Group S-3	2400 Daily
A/C AVAILABILITY/ POSSESSED REPORT	0445, 1245, and 1745 Daily	Each HEM, VMO, H&AS	Group S-3	0500, 1300 1800, Daily
OPSTAT	0830 Daily	Each Sqd.	Group S-3	0930 Daily
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS	2000 Daily (When directed)	Each HEM, VMO	Group S-3	2400 Daily
COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT	96 hrs after completion of major operation	Each Sqd.	Group-S-3	10 days after major operation
LESSONS LEARNED	25th Monthly	Each Sqd.	Group S-3	10th of following month
FLASH REPORT	ASAP after incident	Each Sqd.	Group S-3	ASAP after incident

- b. Reference (b) and (c) list the reports required by all units.  
 c. OPSTAT reports will be made in accordance with reference (d).

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- d. Command attention is directed to insure timely and accurate reporting.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG



A. L. PHILLIPS  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

## APPENDIXES:

- ✓1 - SITREP/DAAR
- ✓2 - Aircraft Availability
- ✓3 - Summary of Operation
- ✓4 - Combat After Action Report
- ✓5 - Lessons Learned
- ✓6 - Flash Report

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Appendix 1 (SITREP/DAAR) to Annex I (Reports) to Operation Order 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

This headquarters requires a daily situation report/daily aircraft activity report in order to evaluate and report the days activities to higher echelons of command.

2. ACTION

The reporting period is 0001H to 2400H daily. All squadrons will compile the required information indicated below and submit the report to this Headquarters (S-3) not later than 2000 each night. The narrative of significant events occurring between 2000 and 2400 daily will be reported via phone or messenger to this Headquarters (S-3) as they occur. All statistics will be compiled on a 2001H to 2000 basis. The early reporting time is required in order that squadron reports can be compiled and submitted to higher headquarters via message prior to 0200H daily. Utilize the following format:

- a. Daily Summary of Operations. The first paragraph will be a narrative summary to include the total sorties flown, total flight hours, and total troops/passengers, cargo tons and battle evacs lifted by the squadron. Also include any operational significant events which effect the squadron as a whole, i.e. weather, ground attacks, change of command, aircraft shot down.
- b. Operational Highlights. Succeeding paragraphs will cover significant operational events, in the chronological order in which they occurred. It is not necessary to include routine flights within the TAOR unless unusual occurrences are involved, however all TAOR/RAOR sweeps will report all significant sightings. When reporting significant lifts such as strikes or major re-supply missions, give numbers and types of aircraft, squadron identity, date, time, and name plus coordinates of pick up point, number and unit identity of troops or passengers, weight (and type, if unusual) of cargo, and name plus coordinates of the delivery point. Include information on escort aircraft and significant actions by escorts toward accomplishing mission. Report enemy sightings, enemy fire received and other significant events on each mission. If a single mission is extended over a

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long period of time give a beginning and ending time.

- c. Daily Helicopter Statistics. The third paragraph of the report will contain the statistics outlined in Tab A to this appendix. it is imperative that these statistics be accurate and complete.

(1) Use of Task Symbols

- (a) General. The purpose in reporting tasks is to indicate what was accomplished on a sortie. Occasional difficulties may arise in determining what and how many tasks were performed, particularly in the case of helicopters operating away from home base for extended periods. Report all tasks as accurately as possible and apply common sense to the basic idea of task reporting in resolving specific difficulties. Some rules and examples to use as guidelines follow.

(b) Specific

1. Helicopters. Definitions of tasks and abbreviations to indicate the type task(s) performed by a sortie are listed in Tab B (Abbreviations/Definitions). Helicopters may record sorties without tasks if none are performed. A helicopter may perform more than one task on a single sortie. A helicopter may also perform one particular task during the course of two or more sorties and need only report that task once, as a single task, if the intermediate stops are unrelated to the accomplishment of the task in question (such as the Med Evac in example below).

(c) Examples

1. One UH-34D lifts troops from A to combat zone B, drops them off and returns to A with a casualty. This is one mission two sorties and two tasks (referring to Tab B abbreviations/Definitions, this is one CT task and one MED task).
2. A helicopter delivers supplies from A to battle zone B. He evacuates casualties for delivery to A but is diverted while airborne to C to pick up a passenger, also for delivery to A. This is one mission, three tasks (CC, MED, A/L). Notice that the MED task is counted only once, since the stop at C had no bearing on its accomplishment and was accounted for by an A/L task.

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
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3. A UH-1E armed helo launches on an armed recon mission but returns soon after take off with mechanical difficulties. One mission, one sortie, one task (an "other" task in the case of an aborted mission).

(2) Reporting Commands Supported. A breakdown of command support by type aircraft and sorties will be shown on the statistics summaries (paragraph 3). The command supported will normally be listed on the frag, but care must be taken to ensure the aircraft was not diverted to support of a command different from that listed on the frag. All I Corps Support will be listed in paragraph 3E of the SITREP. All ROKMC Support will be listed in paragraph 3F of the SITREP.

- d. SITREP's will be signed each day by the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, or Operations Officer only. The report will generally be classified CONFIDENTIAL, unless the nature of operations has a higher classification.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG



A. L. PHILLIPS  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

TABS:

- √ A - Daily Helicopter Statistics Form  
√ B - Abbreviations/Definitions

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Tab A (Daily Helicopter Statistics Form) to Appendix 1 (SITREP/DAAR) to  
 Annex I (Reports) to Operation 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. The following format will be utilized as Paragraph 3 of the Daily  
 SITREP/DAAR.

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SQDN \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ TYPE AIRCRAFT \_\_\_\_\_

## 2. DAILY HELICOPTER STATISTICS

### A. NUMBER OF SORTIES/TASKS BY FUNCTION:

AH _____	TAC(A) _____	SAR _____
E (Convoy) _____	TAR _____	MPD _____
CT _____	TR _____	VIP _____
CC _____	M _____	A/L _____
LT _____	LC _____	PSY _____
RECON _____	COM _____	OTHER _____

### B. TOTALS BY AIRCRAFT TYPE:

TASKS _____	7.62MM ROUNDS _____
PAX _____	VC KBA CON/PCS _____
TONS CARGO _____	VC WIA CON/PCS _____
BATTLE EVACS _____	STRUCT DES/DAM _____
2.75 ROCKETS _____	SAMPANS DES/DAM _____

### C. SUPPORT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT:

	<u>III MAF</u>	<u>I CORPS</u>	<u>ROK</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
SORTIES _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
HOURS _____	_____	_____	_____	_____

### D. RUNNING TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS FOR MONTH:

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>RVN SUPPORT ONLY</u>	<u>ROKMC SUPPORT ONLY</u>
HMM _____	_____	_____	_____
HMM _____	_____	_____	_____
HMM _____	_____	_____	_____
HMM _____	_____	_____	_____
HMM _____	_____	_____	_____
VMO _____	_____	_____	_____
H&MS _____	_____	_____	_____

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## E. FOR ALL I CORPS RVN SUPPORT ONLY (USE ONE LINE FOR EACH MISSION)

MSN NR	OPN NAME	NR/TYPER HELOS	PAX	TONS	HOURS

## F. FOR ALL ROKMC SUPPORT ONLY (USE ONE LINE FOR EACH MISSION)

MSN NR	OPN NAME	NR/TYPER HELOS	PAX	TONS	HOURS

## G. C-117 FLIGHT OPERATIONS:

NUMBER OF SORTIES:

CF	TR
CC	M
LT	A/L
LC	OTHER
FL	TOTAL

TOTAL HOURS \_\_\_\_\_  
 TOTAL PAX \_\_\_\_\_  
 TOTAL CARGO TONS \_\_\_\_\_

## H. SPARROW HAWK OPERATIONS

NUMBER OF SORTIES \_\_\_\_\_  
 TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS \_\_\_\_\_  
 TROOP/PAX CARRIED \_\_\_\_\_  
 CARGO CARRIED \_\_\_\_\_

## I. ARMED HELICOPTER SORTIES/TASKS BY TYPE FLOWN

A. ESCORT \_\_\_\_\_  
 B. TAC(A) \_\_\_\_\_  
 C. SUPPRESSIVE FIRE \_\_\_\_\_ TOTAL \_\_\_\_\_

## 3. Prior to submission the following checks and balances will be performed:

- Total sorties reported in paragraph A must balance against total tasks reported in paragraph C.
- Total tasks reported in paragraph A must balance against total tasks reported in paragraph C.

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- c. Total hours reported in paragraph C must balance out with the running total of flight hours reported in paragraph D, i.e.; if 10.5 hours are reported in paragraph C then 10.5 hours should be added to the total reported on the prior days SITREP on the present SITREP.
- d. Total hours reported in paragraph E for I Corps support must balance out against total hours added to paragraph D (RVN Support Only) of the prior days SITREP. The same applies for paragraph F (ROKMC Support Only).
- e. Total Sorties/Tasks for part G (Armed Helos) must equal those in part A.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG



A. L. PHILLIPS

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

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Tab B(Abbreviations/Definitions) to Appendix 1 (SECRET/DAAR) to Annex I  
(Reports) to Operation Order 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. Definitions

- a. Sortie. One sortie is one aircraft making one take-off and one landing for the purpose of loading or unloading troops, cargo, ordnance, or fuel except that specifically, armed helicopters escorting transport helicopters in air mobile assault operations will log a sortie in the landing zone regardless of whether they land or not.
- b. Task. A single, definite accomplishment by an individual aircraft not to be confused with mission or sortie. Two or more tasks may be performed by a single aircraft at the same time, ie., lift troops and cargo at same time is two tasks. If the aircraft flies from point A to point B and lifts nothing, no task is performed.

2. Abbreviation/Definition

- a. A/L - Admin/Liaison. Flights of an operational nature not directly connected with specific combat operations or logistic movements. Includes: Transportation of commanders, staff or liaison personnel (except VIP) between military installations, outposts, hamlets, and courier service. Not to be confused with logistic troop carrier or cargo hops which are normally resupply and troop movement between military installations and outposts.
- b. AH - Armed Helo. Includes airborne alert, armed recon and fire suppression helo tasks as well as armed helicopter escort of transport helicopters providing ready firepower.
- c. CC - Combat Cargo. Cargo carrying and cargo paradrop sorties in support of ground forces conducting specific combat operations.
- d. CT - Combat Troop. Aircraft delivery of combat troops and troop paradrop sorties in support of ground forces conducting specific operations.

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- e. COM - Command. Airborne control of ground operations, to include artillery adjustment.
- f. E (Convoy) - Escort (Convoy). Escort of convoys.
- g. LC - Logistic Cargo. Normal resupply missions such as moving cargo from QUANG NGAI to NUI DAU etc.
- h. LT - Logistic Troop Carrier. Aircraft delivery of troops not on a specific combat operation. Lift of troops from QUANG NGAI to MINH LONG for training. Logistic troop carrier will be used for non-tactical Med Evacs.
- i. M - Maintenance. Maintenance test hops.
- j. MED - Med Evac. Flights to remove casualties from a combat zone to the rear. Non-tactical evacuations will be considered LT tasks.
- k. Other. Includes all sorties not classified by other reportable categories. Aborted missions will be reported under this caption.
- l. PSY - Psychological Warfare. Leaflet drops and speaker operations.
- m. Recon. Includes visual recon, photo recon, and weather recon tasks.
- n. SAR. Search and Rescue.
- o. TAC(A) - Tactical Air Controller, Airborne. A mission assigned to an airborne controller to direct the expenditure on target of ordnance carried by aircraft.
- p. TAR - Tactical Aircraft Recovery. Includes all sorties flown in support of recovery operations including airlift of security forces, maintenance crews, suppressive fires, and aircraft recovery aircraft.
- q. TR - Training. Training hops.
- r. VIP - Very Important Person. General and Flag officers, Senators, Congressmen, Secretaries of departments, etc.

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3. Other Abbreviations

- a. KBA - Killed by air.
- b. BDA - Battld damage assesment.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

*A. L. Phillips*

A. L. PHILLIPS  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

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Appendix 2 (Aircraft Availability Report) to Annex I (Reports) to  
Operation Order 1-67

Ref: (a) GruO 03740.9

Time Zone: H

1. ACTION. The daily report of aircraft assigned, possessed and available will be submitted in accordance with the instructions contained in reference (a) to this Appendix.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG



A. L. PHILLIPS  
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Executive Officer

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Appendix 3 (Summary of Operations Report) to Annex I (Reports) to  
 Operation Order 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. Summary of Operations Report will be submitted by 2200 daily when a unit has flown in support of an operation.

2. FORMAT - (SAMPLE)

CONFIDENTIAL  
 (When filled in)

# SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

Period \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

Operation Name \_\_\_\_\_

Unit \_\_\_\_\_

## A. HELICOPTER SORTIES (2200 Summary only)

(1) Type

- (a) Armed helo \_\_\_\_\_
- (b) Transport \_\_\_\_\_
- (c) Other \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Total troops and passengers \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Total cargo (tons) \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Ordnance expended

- (a) 2.75 FFAR \_\_\_\_\_
- (b) 7.62 Rounds \_\_\_\_\_

(5) Total hours \_\_\_\_\_

B. Aircraft damage. (Include time, place, extent of damage and recovery procedures instigated).

SIGNATURE

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

*A. L. Phillips*

A. L. PHILLIPS

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
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Appendix 4 (Combat After Action Report) to Annex I (Reports) to  
 Operation Order 1-67

Time Zone: H.

1. Report Title: Combat After Action Report

2. FORMAT

- a. Basic letter will contain general information on squadron participation in a particular operation.
- b. Enclosure (1) will contain a narrative chronological summary of each days highlights on the operation. Each flight need not be covered unless unusual happenings occurred.
- c. Enclosure (2) will contain a statistical summary of the operation in the following format:

DATE	MSN	SORTIES	FLT HRS	TROOP PAX	CARGO TONS	BATTLE VACS	ROCKETS	IDS	VCKBA Con/Pos
TOTAL									

MSN	STRUCT DES/DAM	SUPPLIES DES/DAM
TOTAL		

- d. Enclosure (3) will contain the problem areas encountered during the operation, including the complete details as to who, what, where, why, and when. Each problem area will be stated as follows:

ITEM:  
 COMMENT:  
 RECOMMENDATION:


**SECRET****3. FREQUENCY**

Ninety-six (96) hours after completion of specific operations as directed by this Headquarters (S-3). Submit to Group S-3 who in turn will consolidate squadron reports and prepare the MAG-36 Combat After Action Report for submission to higher headquarters not later than 15 days after completion of the operation.

**4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS**

Future operation will be in part based upon past experiences. It is imperative therefore that problem areas be covered in sufficient detail in order that a through analysis of the problem area may be made and logical recommendations for future operations be submitted to higher and adjacent headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG



A. L. PHILLIPS  
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Executive Officer

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Appendix 5 (Lessons Learned Report) to Annex I (Reports) to Operation Order 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. Report title: Lessons Learned

2. Format

a. The Lessons Learned Report will be submitted in letter form prior to the 25th of each month.

b. The report will contain any suggestions regarding improvement of the mission of this command and any occurrences that have hampered operations.

c. The report will show:

(1) ITEM:

(2) COMMENT:

(3) RECOMMENDATION:

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG



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Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

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Appendix 6 (Flash Report) to Annex I (Reports) to Operation Order 1-67

TIME ZONE: H

1. The following format will be utilized for the Flash Report.

MISHAP FLASH REPORT

DTG (LZT) AND MONTH OF MISHAP: \_\_\_\_\_

ACCIDENT \_\_\_\_\_ INCIDENT \_\_\_\_\_ GRND ACCIDENT \_\_\_\_\_ FORCED LDG \_\_\_\_\_ PRECAU LDG \_\_\_\_\_

GROUP \_\_\_\_\_ SQDN \_\_\_\_\_ TYPE A/C \_\_\_\_\_ BUNO \_\_\_\_\_ MODEX \_\_\_\_\_

PILOT: \_\_\_\_\_ RANK: \_\_\_\_\_ SERNO: \_\_\_\_\_ USMC/R

CO-PILOT: \_\_\_\_\_ RANK: \_\_\_\_\_ SERNO: \_\_\_\_\_

CREW CHIEF: \_\_\_\_\_ RANK: \_\_\_\_\_ SERNO: \_\_\_\_\_

GUNNER: \_\_\_\_\_ RANK: \_\_\_\_\_ SERNO: \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_ RANK: \_\_\_\_\_ SERNO: \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_ RANK: \_\_\_\_\_ SERNO: \_\_\_\_\_

LOCATION: \_\_\_\_\_ OPERATING FROM: \_\_\_\_\_

MISSION: \_\_\_\_\_

DAMAGE TO A/C: A-STK B-OVRHL C-SUBSTANTIAL D-MINOR E-LIMPD F-NONE

DESCRIBED: \_\_\_\_\_

INJ TO PERS: U-UNK A-FATAL B-CRITICAL C-SERIOUS D-SEVERE E-MODERATE  
 F-MINOR G-NONE

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SECRET

SECRET

DAMAGE TO PROPERTY: \_\_\_\_\_

BRIEF SUMMARY: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

REPORTED BY: NAME \_\_\_\_\_ RANK \_\_\_\_\_ UNIT \_\_\_\_\_

DTG REPORTED: \_\_\_\_\_  
-----

CALLED TO WING BY: \_\_\_\_\_ RANK \_\_\_\_\_

RECEIVED AT WING BY: \_\_\_\_\_ RANK \_\_\_\_\_

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL ARMSTRONG

*A. L. Phillips*A. L. PHILLIPS  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

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Z-1

DECLASSIFIED

MAG-36 KY-HA Helicopter Mat Areas - Looking Southeast



DECLASSIFIED



MAG-36 KY-HA Complex - Looking North



MAG-36 KY-HA Helicopter mat areas and hillside housing - looking West.  
Note aground LST-912 in the foreground



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MAG-36 KY-HA Complex - looking Southeast. Aground LST-912 in the left background.



MAG-36 KY-HA complex - looking South. Sand Ramp area in the foreground and Chu Lai in the background.



MAG-36 KY-HA Helicopter Mat Area - Looking North

