

MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 122
Marine Aircraft Group 13
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, Pacific
FPO San Francisco, 96602

3:JWH:plh
5750
03A25370
9 Sept 1970

[REDACTED]

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 13 (S-3)

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1-8 Sept 1970

Ref: (a) WgO 5750.4
(b) CruO 5750.1

Encl: (1) VMFA-122 Command Chronology

1. In accordance with instructions contained is reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Upon removal of enclosure (1), this letter is unclassified.

R. C. Chaimson
R. C. CHAIMSON

VMFA-122 S&C
LOG NO: 0355-70
CUSTODY: MAG-13 S-3
COPY NO: 1 OF 6

100-2122

[REDACTED]

108 Sep 1970

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MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 122
Marine Aircraft Group 13
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, Pacific
FPO San Francisco, 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 September 1970 - 8 September 1970

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. (C) Task Organization Commanding Officer
VMFA-122 Major Ross C. CHAIMSON
2. (U) 1-8 September 1970; Chu Lai, RVN
3. (C) Commanding Officer and Executive Staff Officers.

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>INCLUSIVE DATES</u>
Commanding Officer	Major	Ross C. CHAIMSON	1-8 Sep 1970
Executive Officer	Major	Chauncey R. FAIRCHILD	1-8 Sep 1970
Administrative Officer	1stLt	Orin J. RIDDELL	1-8 Sep 1970
Operations Officer	Capt	Thomas M. CONLEY	1-8 Sep 1970
Material Officer	Capt	Walter J. COSTELLO	1-8 Sep 1970
Maintenance Officer	Major	Frank J. HORAK Jr.	1-8 Sep 1970
Safety Officer	Capt	Charles S. TUTT	1-8 Sep 1970
SgtMaj	M/Sgt	John C. ODOM	1-8 Sep 1970

4. (c) Average Monthly Strength:

USMC		USN	
Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted
36	100	01	00

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. (C) During the first thru the eighth of September VMFA-122 flew 27 sorties for a total of 41.5 hours. The type sorties flown included close air support, test and ferry flights. Aerial refueling and fuel profile missions were flown also to prepare for the redeployment of VMFA-122 to MCAS Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii.

2. (C) The final combat mission flown by VMFA-122 in RVN was shared with VMFA-314. The mission was a close air support under the control of Helix 32, supporting Americal. LtCol J. V. Cox executive officer of MAG-13 led the mission, with LtCol C. Schwab as his RIO. Major R. C. Chaimson commanding officer of VMFA-122 was dash two with Major C. R. Fairchild as his RIO. LtCol R. H. Christy Commanding Officer of VMFA-314 was dash three with Major D. T. Benn as his RIO. Dash four was Col J. W. Stien, Commanding Officer of MAG-13 with Major R. R. Dunlevy as his RIO. This mission also closed combat air operations for Marine Air Group 13 in RVN.

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SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. (U) Personnel

Officers Joined:	1	Enlisted Joined:	4
Officers Transferred:	7	Enlisted Transferred:	77

2. (U) Administration

- a. Squadron Orders and Bulletins published: 0
- b. Average Savings Bond participation: 70%
- c. Awards

(1) Award recommendations submitted:

- (a) Capt DeLa Garza, NCM
- (b) Capt Cordes, NCM
- (c) Capt Tutt, NCM
- (d) 1stLt Sturm, NCM
- (e) 1stLt Wise, NCM
- (f) 1stLt Riddell, NCM
- (g) 1stLt McGaughey, NCM
- (h) 1stLt Silver, NCM
- (i) 1stLt Bond, NCM
- (j) 1stLt Haynes, NCM
- (k) 1stLt Dunn, NCM
- (l) MSGT Zieger, NCM
- (m) SSgt Carter, NCM
- = (n) 1st Lt Haskell, NAM

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- (o) Sgt Prall, NAM
- (p) Sgt Hodges, NAM
- (q) Sgt Sprague, NAM
- (r) Cpl Monroe, NAM
- (s) Cpl Cambell, NAM

3. Career Advisory/Education/Information

- a. During this period there were 3 reenlistments.
- b. There were 40 Hometown news releases.

4. Air Operations

- a. Sorties: 27
- Hours: 41.5
- Combat hours: 12.3
- Air Aborts: 0
- Ground Aborts: 12

b. Ordnance

(1) Total tons expended was 28.5. The percent of ordnance expended was 98.2.

	<u>AMOUNT</u>	<u>TONNAGE</u>
(2) MK 82 CON	96	24.1775
MK 77 NAP	14	3.4006
MK 20 CBU	4	.9800

5. (U) Aviation Safety

- (a) No mishaps of any type during this period.

6. (U) Aircraft Maintenance

- a. The following data is submitted for the period 1-8 Sept 1970.

<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>% READY</u>
14 Aircraft (9 operational)	Analysis
1 NC-10	90.0
1 NCPP-105	60.0

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Enclosure (1)

PART IV
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. Attached copy of Operation Key Grasp II Post Exercise Report. dtd 24Sep70

MARINE FIGHTER/ATTACK SQUADRON 122
 Marine Aircraft Group 24
 1st Marine Brigade, FMF Pacific
 FPO, San Francisco 96602

3:TMC:rus
 3000
 24 September 1970

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Movement Control Officer Transpac Key Grasp II

Ref: (a) CG, 3dMAW 012207Z Aug 70

Subj: Operation Key Grasp II Post Exercise Report

Encl: (1) Text of VMFA-122 msg 150653Z Sept 70
 (2) Maintenance performed enroute

1. ABSTRACT.

a. General. As directed by CG 3rd MAW, VMFA 122 deployed 9 F-4B aircraft from MAG 13, Chu Lai, RVN to MAG 24, 1st Marine Brigade, MCAS Kaneohe Bay.

The concept and conduct of the operation was as set forth in reference (a) with one exception. Due to the approach of Typhoon Georgia, VMFA 122 departed NAS Cubi Point on D-4 and staged out of Kadena AFB, Okinawa. This proved to be advantageous in the long run because although JP-5 fuel was not available, the leg from Kadena to Agana, Guam was 200 nautical miles shorter than the leg from Cubi Point to Agana.

D-Day was 14 September 1970. It was planned to deploy one serial of 5 aircraft at 0800 on D-Day and follow with a second serial of four aircraft 30 minutes later. Each serial was to fly one leg per day recovering at Agana and Wake island. The Midway Island and MCAS Kaneohe legs were to be flown the same day. A one day stand down was scheduled at Agana.

b. Conduct of the Operation.

(1) On D-Day nine aircraft departed Kadena AFB and recovered at NAS Agana. Call Sign, Aircraft and crew assignment were as follows:

DC 11	MAJ CHAIMSON/MAJ BENN	150638
DC 12	LT RIDDELL/LT STEWART	151452
DC 13	CAPT TUTT/LT MCGAUGHEY	152998
DC 14	CAPT CORDES/LT HORTON	153006
DC 15	CAPT CONLEY/LT HAYNES	152316
DC 21	MAJ HORAK/MAJ FAIRCHILD	150419
DC 24	LT SHACKELFORD/LT DOYLE	150478
DC 23	CAPT COSTELLO/LT HINES	151472
DC 24	LT WISE/LT SILVER	152990

ENCL-1

(2) Upon landing DC 21 lost a nose wheel but but roll out was completed without further incident (enclosure (1)).

(3) After a one day stand down at NAS Agana, nine aircraft departed for Wake Island on D +2. Crew assignments remained the same with the exception that LT FRANGER and LT FORTINBERRY replaced LT WISE and LT SILVER in 152990. DC 22 experienced a PC-1 failure shortly after take off and diverted back into Agana with DC 21. They then joined VMFA-314 and flew into Wake on D +4.

(4) Although scheduled to depart Wake Island the morning of D +3, VMFA-122 was delayed 24 hours when the KC 130 which was to take the advance maintenance team to Midway Island lost an engine and had to be replaced. On the morning of D +4, VMFA-122 launched and recovered 7 F-4B aircraft in flights of three, two and two at 15 minute intervals. The flight was without incident and all 7 aircraft were turned around immediately. The final leg from Midway Island to MCAS Kaneohe Bay was launched less than two hours after recovery at Midway. This leg also was flown without incident. Call sign, crew assignment and aircraft were as follows:

DC 11	MAJ CHAIMSON/MAJ BENN	150638
DC 12	LT RIDDELL/LT STEWART	151452
DC 13	CAPT CORDES/LT HORTON	153006
DC 14	CAPT CONLEY/LT HAYNES	152316
DC 15	CAPT TUTT/LT MCGAUGHEY	152998
DC 23	CAPT COSTELLO/LT HINES	151472
DC 24	LT FRANGER/LT FORTINBERRY	152990

(5) On D +5 the final two aircraft attached to VMFA-122 completed the Transpac to Kaneohe Bay via Midway Island as part of a VW serial. Callsign, crew assignments and aircraft were as follows:

DC 21	MAJ HORAK/MAJ FAIRCHILD	150419
DC 22	LT WISE/LT SILVER	150478
	*LT SHACKELFORD/LT DOYLE	

*Flew the leg from Wake Island to Midway Island

(6) Fuel and Oxygen Usage. The following table indicates fuel and oxygen usage for two of the four legs. They are typical for the entire transpac. Neither fuel nor oxygen was a factor on any leg.

a. Kadena to Guam (JP-4)		T/O		LET		
CREW	A/C	T/O	LAND	FUEL	DOWN	LAND
		02	02	(INTERNAL)	FUEL	FUEL
MAJ CHAIMSON/MAJ BENN	150638	8.0	2.0	12400	4600	3900
LT RIDDELL/LT STEWART	151452	8.0	5.0	11800	3700	3000
CAPT TUTT/LT MCGAUGHEY	152998	9.5	4.5	12300	4400	3700
CAPT CORDES/LT HORTON	153006	7.0	2.0	12700	4400	3200
CAPT CONLEY/LT HAYNES	152316	10.1	7.0	11400	3500	2900
MAJ HORAK/MAJ FAIRCHILD	150419	9.0	2.1	12200	4000	2600
LT SHACKELFORD/LT DOYLE	150478	10.0	5.0	12400	4200	3100

CAPT COSTELLO/LT HINES	151472	8.0	5.0	12200	5000	4100
LT WISE/LT SILVER	152990	9.5	6.5	12300	4200	3700

b. Guam to Wake (JP-5)

MAJ CHAIMSON/MAJ BENN	150638	9.5	7.5	12700	5000	4600
LT RIDDELL/LT STEWART	151452	10.0	7.0	12600	*	4000
CAPT TUTT/LT MCGAUGHEY	152998	**	**	12600	5000	4000
CAPT CORDES/LT HORTON	153006	7.0	3.5	12800	5000	4000
CAPT CONLEY/LT HAYNES	152316	10.0	6.3	12400	4600	3200
MAJ HORAK/MAJ FAIRCHILD	150419	9.7	5.8	13100	5000	4200
LT SHACKELFORD/LT DOYLE	150478	10.0	8.0	12600	4500	4000
CAPT COSTELLO/LT HINES	151472	9.0	4.0	13200	6000	5800
LT FRANGER/LT FORTINBERRY	152990	9.0	5.0	12900	5300	4800

* Unknown due to a fluctuating fuel quantity gauge

** Unknown due to a lox gauge failure

(7) AUTHORITY. CG THIRD MAW 012207Z Aug 70 (C) directed VMFA-122 to be in position to transpac 12 F-4B aircraft from NAS Cubi Point on 14 September 1970 (D-Day). CG 1st MAW then coordinated the fly away from Chu Lai and VMFA-122 launched all 9 on hand F-4B's to Cubi Point the morning of 9 September 1970.

3. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Training

(1) Discussion. Profile flights were flown by all transpac crews to check out fuel consumption characteristics of all aircraft and to acquaint crews with cruise control procedures. The profile legs flown were equal in distance to the longest leg anticipated for the proposed transpac (1450 nautical miles). Thus the aircraft systems were checked out and participating crews acquired practice in navigation as well as sustained periods of flight at altitude.

Although inflight refueling was not anticipated, practice refueling was conducted for all aircrews in case unforeseen problems would necessitate using the Airborn Standby Tanker on any leg. This also insured the proper status of all aircraft inflight refueling systems.

Water survival procedures were covered in a lecture and question and answer discussion. A follow up practical exercise was conducted and aircrews practiced water pickups using a CH-46 SAR helicopter.

In addition to the above lectures on all areas concerning the transpac were held. Aircraft procedures and emergency situations, fuel management, enroute field facilities, weather and navigation procedures, AST and precautionary orbit points, along with enroute procurement of aircraft servicing, facilities and support were covered in depth.

(2) Conclusions. There is no doubt that training in depth paid off during the actual transpac. All aircrews knew just what to expect and how to accomplish their mission with utmost confidence. No situations occurred in which the aircrews had not been prebriefed.

(3) Recommendations. All training be thoroughly planned and meticulously carried out so as to preclude embarrassing or even disasterous situations developing if unforeseen events occur.

b. Planning.

(1) Discussion. Operations personnel reviewed all routes, facilities enroute agencies available and prepared transpac howgozit for each leg. Each crew received a flight card with headings, distances, time and projected fuel figures based on no wind computations for each leg. Each section leader was given a master ICAO flight plan or DD 175 to turn in before each leg. Facilities cards were made up with essential information concerning characteristics, frequencies and available equipment of each airfield. Flight leader briefing guides all briefs were comprehensive. A pre-departure AOM was conducted to cover the first leg and answer any last minute questions. A wather prognostication was acquired

from Chu Lai Weather Service concerning expected weather characteristics during the transpac. All crews received a complete set of maps, charts and supplements and were able to copy from a master set each leg's headings, distances equal time point and other essential information. Flight packets containing requisitions for fuel, oil, and parts and instructions for their use were also given to each crew. Maintenance briefs and debriefs were made available to crews to ensure proper maintenance and acquaint the pilots with individual aircraft characteristics. Example movement reports and messages were made up for all flight leaders to ensure correct reporting.

(2) Conclusions: By careful pre-planning a very minimum of problems occurred. The transpac was conducted efficiently with delays caused only by unscheduled maintenance problems which could not be foreseen. Because each leg was planned in depth prior to leaving Chu Lai, a minimum of time was required for last minute updating enroute.

(3) Recommendations: A maximum amount of planning should be accomplished well before the transpac is to begin. Even when some areas are in doubt, by considering several options the work load at the last minute is decreased significantly.

c. Personnel.

[1] Discussion: The criteria, for personnel who were to deploy with the unit, was changed to close to the deployment date.

[2] Conclusions: The late change in criteria made it impossible to submit personnel reports as required by the original deployment message. Individuals were transferred an excessive number of times between squadrons, which adversely affected morale and caused excessive administrative paper work.

[3] Recommendations: A unit should be stabilized at least thirty days prior to deployment.

a. Logistics.

(1) Discussion

(a) Aircraft Maintenance. No serious problems were encountered in maintaining squadron aircraft enroute. There were two air aborts during the transpac. DC 13, aborted twice due to a PC-1 failure at Kadena AFB on D-day and at NAS Agana on D+2. DC 13 and his wingman, DC 15, remained at Agana, completing the transpac with VMFA-314. Since the transpac went so smoothly, the advance crew was always on the deck when the chase crew arrived. A complete maintenance briefing was held between crews at each stop. This passdown of information between maintenance crews was an invaluable asset. A complete list of maintenance actions accomplished on the transpac is listed in enclosure (2).

(b) Aviation Supply. The transpac packup supplied by MAG-13 included approximately 70% of the parts requested by VMFA-122. The Packup was entirely adequate for Key Grasp II, as maintenance requirements were extremely light. However, many items were not available in requested quantities, especially high usage rotatable pool items, such as UHF radios and hydraulic pumps.

(c) Airlift Support. VMFA-122 was provided with one C130 for airlift of the chase maintenance party and supply packup. However, VMFA-122 was allotted only 1/2 of one C150 configured as a tanker for airlift of the advance maintenance party. This aircraft was shared with VMA (AW) 242. Space limitations precluded carrying any spare parts or sufficient quantities of tools and other aircraft maintenance support equipment. Personnel were also limited. The advance C130 could only carry 10 men for VMFA-122.

This lack of space seriously limited the capabilities of the advance maintenance party. They could only service aircraft and perform basic troubleshooting. No detailed or extensive maintenance action could be initiated until the arrival of the chase maintenance team.

[d] Base Support. Enroute bases provided adequate and timely support throughout the transpac. Kadena Air Force Base provided excellent support on extremely short notice when the transpac route was changed due to typhoon Georgia. NAS Agana AMO provided excellent maintenance support in a manner and spirit well above that normally encountered at enroute bases. The servicing support at N.S. Midway was noteworthy. The ability, efficiency, and "can do" spirit of N.S. Midway personnel was a primary factor in the safe turn around of all aircraft in absolute minimum time.

[e] Ground Support Equipment. There was a shortage of RCPT/NCPP 105's at Kadena AFB and NAS Agana; however, no problems were encountered using the MA-1a as an alternate starting unit.

[f] Fiscal. VMFA-122 expended OFC Ø1 funds in support of the transpac as follows:

Fuel, Lox, Oil	\$19,537.20
Spare parts	294.00
	<u>\$19,831.20</u>

Flying hours	132.7
Cost per flying hour	\$149.44

[2] Conclusions:

[a] Aircraft maintenance. Since no serious maintenance problems were encountered, the transpac went very smoothly. The lack of problems due largely to the stand down period and flying of profile legs before commencing the Transpac. All aircraft were therefore in

excellent condition in departure. Maintenance efforts were further aided by the short stand down periods at Kadena AFB and NAS Agana.

[b] Aviation Supply. The Transpac packup was entirely adequate for Key Grasp II. However, it was obvious that it would not have been sufficient if serious maintenance problems had occurred. An engine failure or multiple Avionics or hydraulic problems, could not have been corrected with the limited number of high usage parts available in the packup.

[c] Airlift Support. One cargo configured C-130 was entirely adequate for the chase maintenance crew. However, one-half of a tanker configured C-130 was inadequate for the advance maintenance crew. Sufficient personnel, equipment, and spare parts were not available to perform maintenance. If serious maintenance problems had developed, much valuable time would have been lost waiting for the chase crew to arrive.

[d] Ground Support Equipment. Ground Support equipment was available or prepositioned in sufficient quantities.

[3] Recommendations:

[a] The concept of operations of the Transpac worked very well and should be continued. The Advance/Chase concept of maintenance support was very sufficient. Care should be taken in planning so that the chase crew arrives at an enroute base before the departure of the advance crew. This is essential to provide necessary maintenance briefing.

[b] More effort should be made to obtain critical parts requested by squadrons prior to Transpac.

[c] Transpac squadrons should be provided at least one C-130 configured as a tanker or share one configured C-130 with one other squadron for airlift of the advance maintenance crew. One cargo configured C-130 is adequate airlift support of the chase maintenance crew.

[d] The Key Grasp Operations Plan was otherwise adequate in all respects and should be used in further Transpacs.

f. Communications.

[1] Discussion: Airborne Communication procedures were discussed by the operations section prior to Transpac. FLIP publications and the Transpac Order where applicable, were used as guidelines for briefing the communication procedures. Administrative Communications (i.e. MOVREPS, TRANSPAC, ARRIVAL/DEPARTUE REPORTS) were prepared in advance by the operations department and the Movement Control Team Operations Officer.

[2] Conclusions: Because the required voice procedures and messages were discussed, briefed, and prepared before hand all the required communications procedures were accomplished with minimum confusion.

(3) Recommendations. Examples of MOVREPS and Naval Messages be prepared by the Movement Control Team and be forwarded to the individual squadrons prior to the move.

g. Remarks. None

R. C. CHAIMSON

TEXT OF VMFA-122 MSG 150653Z SEP70

SAFETY UR/AIRCRAFT INCIDENT REPORT

- A. NAVAIRINST 4700.2
- B. OPNAVINST 3750.6
1. VMFA-122, SAFETY/UR 0044/ACFT INCIDENT REPORT 09-711.
2. NAS AGANA GUAM, 14 SEP 1970, 1230 LOCAL.
3. F4B/150419
4. N/A
5. ECHO/2 GOLF/GOLF
6. NONE
7. AFTER 1500 FEET OF LANDING ROLL, AT NAS AGANA, PORT NOSE WHEEL SEPARATED FROM ACFT. NO CONTROL PROBLEMS WERE EXPERIENCED AND LANDING ROLL WAS NORMAL. ALL PARTS OF NOSE WHEEL ASSEMBLY EXCEPT LOCKING KEY OF SPACER ASSEMBLY WERE RECOVERED. NUT ASSEMBLY, NOSE STRUT AXLE, AND SPACER ASSEMBLY WERE STILL BOLTED AND SAFETY WIRED TOGETHER.
8. SPACER ASSEMBLY, NOSE STRUT AXLE, PART NUMBER 32-45240-301.
9. UNKNOWN, A/C LOGS NOT AVAILABLE DUE TO TRANSPAC.
10. N/A
11. SUSPECT MATERIAL FAILURE OF LOCKING KEY ON SPACER ASSEMBLY.
12. N/A
13. N/A
14. N/A
15. N/A
16. CAPT C. S. TUTT, VMFA-122, ASO.
17. MAINT HISTORY NOT AVAILABLE DUE TO TRANSPAC. BELIEVE NOSE WHEELS CHANGED ON 8 SEPT USING SAME SPACER ASSEMBLY. ACFT MADE THREE UNEVENTFUL TAKEOFFS AND TWO LANDINGS PRIOR TO INCIDENT.

ENCLOSURE (1)

MAINTENANCE PERFORMED ENROUTE

NAS Cubi Point

	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>ACTION TAKEN</u>
DC 01	1. ICS stuck hot mike 2. LOX lock	R&R ICS control box R&R rear C/P upper block
DC 03	1. IFF out	R&R IFF
DC 08	1. Chunk out of stbd tire	R&R stbd MLG tire
DC 13	1. TACAN out	R&R KY 312

Kadena AFB

DC 01	1. LOX leak 2. Fuel leak stbd drop tank 3. Left joinup lite broken	R&R seat pan R/C Applied sealent to drop tank R&R lite cover
DC 02	1. Radar XTAL's low 2. Bad LOX convertor 3. SPC, ALT, HSI, VDI jumping 4. Hydraulic leak	Checked good on deck R&R convertor Drained static system Tightened line
DC 03	1. Could not turn down UHF volume 2. No LOX indication 3. Radar down	Could not duplicate R&R LOX leads Checked good on deck
DC 07	1. Roll Aug-Violent roll inputs 2. Radar down 3. UHF weak 4. Right fire warning light doesn't work	Ran A/C - nulled auto pilot amp R&R ICU R&R RT 853 R&R bulbs - checked good
DC 08	1. Landing gear hangle lite out 2. Stbd main landing gear time bad	R&R bulb R&R tire
DC 10	1. 150' jump when SPC ENGARED 2. AOA probe bad	Drained static system R&R AOM probe
DC 13	1. TACAN down 2. Port gen out and stayed out 3. PC-1 failure pump seal failed	R&R 3076 R&R 30 KVA CSD/20 KVAG gen R&R PC-1 pump

ENSLOSURE (2)

DC 15	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Engine lossing RPM on climb out 2. Pneumatic leak canopy system 	<p>Ajusted RPM on burner ramp</p> <p>Replaced canopy relief valve</p>
DC 16	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Altimeter off 100' both C/P's 	Reset both altimeters
<u>Guam</u>		
DC 01	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. LOX consumption high 2. No Inst lites 	<p>R&R seat pan and upper block of rear cockpit oxygen regulator</p> <p>R&R fuse</p>
DC 02	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Fuel guage rotates 2. Oil leak air comp 	<p>Adjusted indicator</p> <p>R&R air compressor</p>
DC 03	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Parachute wet 2. TACAN down 	<p>R&R both chutes</p> <p>R&R KY 312</p>
DC 07	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hyd leak 2. NAVCOMP down 	<p>Could not duplicate</p> <p>Could not duplicate</p>
DC 08	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. LOX guage down both C/P 	R&R LOX leads
DC 10	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Loud squeal in UHF/ICS 	R&R distribution box
DC 13	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Radar down, no Pressurization 2. PC-1 failure 	<p>R&R "O" ring on Receiver/Transmitter</p> <p>R&R PC-1 pump - flushed system - cleaned filters</p>
DC 16	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Port nose gear tire came off on landing 2. IFF down 3. Right engine would not start 	<p>R&R bearings, okay in outer race, dye penetrated axle</p> <p>R&R KY 311</p> <p>Rewired impengment valve system and replaced both cannon plugs</p>
DC 16	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Wing trim inoperative 2. Hyd leak 	<p>Could not duplicate</p> <p>Could not duplicate</p>

Wake Island

DC 02	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pneumatic pressure indication off 	Could not duplicate
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Midway Island

No maintenance. Quick turn-around and launch for Hawaii

ENCLOSURE (2)