

MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 163  
 Marine Aircraft Group 16  
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac  
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

3: PJV: jdt  
 5750  
 22 Oct 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing  
 Subj: Command Chronology; Special Landing Force Operations 26 June 1965 through 10 October 1965; report of

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
 (b) WGC 5750.1A

Encl: ☒ (1) SLE Area of Operations  
☒ (2) Operation "STARLINE"  
☒ (3) Dagger Thrust Operation #1 (Target #2)  
☒ (4) Dagger Thrust Operation #2 (Target #4)  
☒ (5) Dagger Thrust Operation #3 (Target #11)  
☒ (6) BuWeps Allowance List Deficiencies

1. The following information and enclosures (1) through (6) are submitted in accordance with reference (a) and (b).

2. Organizational Data

a. Designation/Location. Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-163 (TU 78.5.3), Marine Aircraft Group 16, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac, FPO San Francisco, California 96601. On board U.S.S. IWO JIMA (LPH-2) in support of Special Landing Force under Commander Task Group 78.5.

b. Period Covered. 26 June 1965 through 10 October 1965.

c. Commanding Officer and Staff

- (1) H. G. EVERS, LtCol., Commanding Officer
- (2) E. G. YOUNG, Maj., Executive Officer
- (3) B. H. MANN Jr., Maj., Operations Officer
- (4) R. A. FETTERLY, Capt., Administrative Officer
- (5) H. J. MAXWELL, Capt., Intelligence Officer
- (6) J. R. SMILEY, Capt., Logistics Officer
- (7) C. A. BLOCK, Capt., Maintenance Officer
- (8) D. S. WAUNCE, Capt., Aviation Safety Officer

d. Average Monthly Strength

	<u>Marine Officer</u>	<u>Marine Enlisted</u>	<u>Navy Officer</u>	<u>Navy Enlisted</u>
June	54	156	1	2
July	54	169	1	2
August	54	172	1	2
September	54	172	1	2
October	55	171	1	2

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2. Special Staff. Members of the squadron who were also members of the CTC 78.5 Special Staff are as follows:

- (1) N. G. EWERS, Ltcol., Commander Task Group
- (2) B. H. MANN Jr., Maj., Operations Officer
- (3) C. A. BLOCK, Capt., Assistant Operations Officer
- (4) D. T. WALLACE, Capt., Administrative Officer
- (5) D. S. WACHON, Capt., Logistics Officer
- (6) W. B. SHIRE, 1/Lt., Intelligence Officer
- (7) D. B. WILLIAMS, 1/Lt., S&C Officer

### 3. Chronology

a. Narrative of Significant Events. In June 1965, HMM-163 received orders to proceed from Da Nang, Viet Nam to Okinawa and upon arrival to constitute the HMM element of the Special Landing Force (SLF) under Commander Task Group 78.5 (CTG 78.5). An advance party departed Da Nang on 10 June and upon arrival at Okinawa initiated liaison and embarkation planning with BLT 3/7. The squadron arrived Okinawa on 21 June and continued liaison and embarkation planning under command of LtCol. N. G. EWERS, who at this time assumed the additional duty as CTC 78.5. Significant events are listed below and in enclosure (1) through (6) as they occurred during SLF operations:

(1) On 24 June HMM-163 commenced the simultaneous embarkation support of BLT 3/7 and HMM-163 aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) at White Beach, Okinawa. Embarkation was completed on the morning of 26 June. During this period the squadron logged 124.0 flight hours, 316 sorties, 200 pax, 250,000 lbs of cargo.

(2) The IWO JIMA departed Okinawa on 26 June enroute to Qui Nhon, Republic of Viet Nam, arriving there on 30 June. During this period, preparation and planning was completed for the off-load of BLT 3/7.

(3) On 1 and 2 July BLT 3/7 landed at Qui Nhon by combined helo lift and amphibious vehicles. See enclosure (2). During off-load the squadron logged 203.5 flight hours, 156 sorties, 891 pax., 41,610 lbs cargo.

(4) The squadron remained in support of BLT 3/7 ashore from 2 to 5 July simultaneously night and day carrier qualifying all pilots. During this period the squadron logged 165.2 flight hours, 272 sorties, 738 pax., and 103,585 lbs. of cargo. Two aircraft received small arms hits.

(5) On 6 and 7 July BLT 3/7 was relieved by BLT 2/7 in position. Re-embarkation of 3/7 and the landing over the beach of 2/7 was squadron supported. The squadron logged 130.0 flight hours, 1324 sorties, 1560 pax., and 158,545 lbs. of cargo during this period.

(6) The squadron remained in support of BLT 2/7 between 7 and 20 July. Instrument training and support flights were flown during this period and the squadron logged 354.1 flight hours, 474 sorties, 1257 pax.; 115,150 cargo. On 14 July Y2-17 was lost at sea due to engine failure. There were no casualties; the aircraft was not recovered.

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(7) The IWO JIMA departed Qui Nhon on 20 July enroute to Subic Bay. On 21 July it was ordered to divert to assist in salvage operations of the USS FRANK KNOX (DDR 742) which was aground at Prattas Reef. The IWO JIMA arrived at Prattas Reef on 22 July. The squadron provided helicopter support of this operation from 22 July through 31 July lifting personnel, supplies and water to the USS FRANK KNOX. A total of 334.1 flight hours; 856 sorties, 1394 pax; 554,480 lbs of cargo and water were logged during this period.

(8) The IWO JIMA departed Prattas Reef on 31 July enroute to Hong Kong for crews rest and liberty. The ship arrived in Hong Kong on 2 August and remained in port through 10 August. No flight operations were conducted during this period.

(9) The IWO JIMA departed Hong Kong on 10 August enroute to Subic Bay for repair, resupply and Squadron/BLT training. The ship arrived at Subic Bay on 12 August. The squadron off-loaded all aircraft and the majority of personnel. Local fam and training flights were scheduled through 16 August at which time the squadron was ordered to back-load in preparation for the ship to get underway. The squadron back-loaded personnel and equipment and provided helicopter support for the BLT 3/7 backload. It logged a total of 94.3 flight hours, 136 sorties, 115 pax., and 32,000 lbs of cargo during this period.

(10) The BLT and squadron back-load was completed on 16 August and the ship departed Subic Bay enroute to Van Tuong Peninsula, Republic of Viet Nam to support Operation "STARLITE". The ship arrived off Van Tuong on 18 August.

(11) For Special Operation "STARLITE" see enclosure (2).

(12) On 24 August after wrap up of Operation "STARLITE", BLT 3/7 was back-loaded and the IWO JIMA departed Van Tuong enroute to Subic Bay for ships repair and resupply. While entering harbor at Subic Bay on 26 August, YP-7 was lost at sea due to engine failure. There were no casualties; the aircraft was not recovered.

(13) The squadron off-loaded all aircraft and the majority of personnel at Subic Bay on 26 August with plans for conducting training. Orders were received to back-load in preparation for the ship to get underway on 29 August. A minimum of training was accomplished due to the modification of orders. The squadron logged 14.4 flight hours, 38 sorties, 30 pax., and 4,500 lbs. cargo during this period.

(14) The IWO JIMA departed Subic Bay on 29 August enroute to Chu Lai with orders to disembark BLT 3/7. The ship arrived at Chu Lai on 30 August. No flight operations were conducted during this period.

(15) The off load of BLT 3/7 commenced on 1 September and was completed on 2 September. The squadron logged 59.8 flight hours, 514 sorties, 329 pax., and 253,520 lbs. cargo during this period. On 1 September YP-1 was lost at sea due to engine failure. The pilot Capt. GRAVELLE incurred a back injury, all other members of the crew escaped with minor or no injury. The engine was salvaged by UDT personnel and returned by the squadron to O&R for analysis.

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(16) On 2 September the IWO JIMA departed Chu Lai enroute to Okinawa with orders to embark BLT 2/1 at White Beach.

(17) The ship arrived off White Beach on 5 September. The squadron off-loaded aircraft and personnel at MCAF Futema. Liaison was conducted with 2/1 and the squadron provided helicopter support for BLT 2/1 embarkation. The squadron re-embarked on 7 September; 39.0 flight hours, 192 sorties, 406 pax., and 134,000 lbs. of cargo were logged during this period.

(18) On 7 September the IWO JIMA departed Okinawa enroute to Qui Nhon, Republic of Viet Nam to support Operation "HIGHLAND". The BLT and squadron had previously dispatched a planning group to Subic Bay for planning of Operation "DAGGER THRUST". This group was picked up by helicopter on 8 September with the ship remaining underway. The squadron logged 5.9 flight hours, 8 sorties, 30 pax., and 1400 lbs. cargo during this period.

(19) The IWO JIMA arrived at Qui Nhon on 10 September. The BLT was placed on standby as a ready reserve in support of Operation "HIGHLAND", the landing at Qui Nhon and movement inland to An Khe of the 1st Cavalry (Air Mobile) Division. The squadron maintained a standby condition with the BLT through 21 September. During this period, area familiarization, liaison and training flight were flown, logging 288.5 flight hours, 564 sorties, 1685 pax., and 5,650 lbs. of cargo.

(20) While at Qui Nhon the squadron conducted a 20 aircraft pre-dawn launch. The purpose was to exercise the ship, flight deck, and aircraft crews in night launch procedures and to arrive at launch and rendezvous times for future "Dagger Thrust" operations. This and subsequent operations proved that a L-36 launch time was needed for arrival at a landing zone located 10 miles from that LPH at L-Hour.

(21) The IWO JIMA departed Qui Nhon on 21 September enroute to Chu Lai to conduct landing rehearsal for Operation "Dagger Thrust".

(22) The ship arrived off Chu Lai on 22 September, conducted liaison with units ashore and on 23 September conducted rehearsal for forthcoming "Dagger Thrust" operations. For details of this rehearsal see enclosure (3). The squadron logged 83.0 flight hours, 367 sorties, 952 pax., and 23,850 lbs. cargo during this period.

(23) On completion of rehearsal the IWO JIMA departed Chu Lai area enroute to Vung Mu Peninsula, the objective for "Dagger Thrust" operation #1.

(24) For details "Dagger Thrust" operation #1, (Target #2) see enclosure (3).

(25) On completion of "Dagger Thrust" operation #1 the IWO JIMA departed the Vung Mu Peninsula area enroute to Ben Goi for "Dagger Thrust" operation #2. The ship arrived Ben Goi Bay area on 27 September.

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(26) For details of "Dagger Thrust" operation #8, (Target #4) see enclosure (4).

(27) On completion of "Dagger Thrust" operation #2 the ship departed on 28 September enroute to Tam Quan for "Dagger Thrust" operation #3 arriving on Phan Thong and commencing operation on 1 October.

(28) For details of "Dagger Thrust" operation #3, (Target #11) see enclosure (5).

(29) During "Dagger Thrust" operation #3 the IWO JIMA and CTG 78.5 was alerted for duty involving possible evacuation of American Nationals from Indonesia due to crisis in that country.

(30) The IWO JIMA departed Tam Quan on 2 October enroute to pre-designated area north of Indonesia. The ship remained on standby until ordered to Da Nang for debarkation of HMM-163 and embarkation of HMM-263. The squadron debarked on 10 October. The squadron logged 21.5 flight hours, 205 sorties, 267 pax., and 24,800 lbs. cargo during this period.

(31) Total operations for the period 26 June to 10 October were 3167.0 flight hours, 11,027 sorties, 18,283 pax., and 2,582,574 lbs. of cargo.

#### 4. Detailed Data by Staff Section

##### A. S-1

(1) Personnel. Personnel strength on receipt of orders to SLF was as follows: 53 Officers, 165 enlisted men with shortages noted by MOS: 1341-1, 3516-1, 5711-1, 6422-4, 6441-1, 6442-1, 6443-1, 6615-3. On 18 June augmentation personnel were requested from MAG-16 and arrived as listed below:

<u>Billet/MOS</u>	<u>Requested</u>	<u>Provided</u>	<u>Arrived</u>
Legal clerk/0121	1	0	
Cooks & bakers/3371	2	2	7 July 1965
Disbursing clerk/3421	1	1	11 July 1965
Stewards/3611/3612/3613	9	3	1 July 1965
Barber/8941	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	
	14	6	

Shortages in augmentation personnel necessitated the squadron furnishing personnel to fill in the vacancies. Departments were providing 47 personnel for normal details required by the ship. The squadron's requirement for detail personnel are listed below:

<u>Detail</u>	<u>Men Provided</u>
Enlisted Mess	6
Flight Deck	35
Laundry	4
Aviation Ready Issue	<u>2</u>
	47

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A realistic recommendation for Wing augmentation personnel would be as follows:

1--CR21	E4	Special Court capability
1--2111	E5	Armory
1--3371	E5/E6	Augment Galley capability
1--3371	E2/E3	" " "
1--3442	E3	Augment Disbursing capability
1--3611	E4	Provide Officer/Wardroom support
6--3611	E2/E3	" " " "
2--3613	E3/E4	" " /mess support
1--8941	E2/E3	Provide service support

(2) Administration. Administrative procedures for the SLF are considered routine. Difficulties did occur due to the lack of regularly scheduled transportation between SLF units and higher echelon. Official correspondence, directives, etc, sent by mail may expect delays of up to one month in delivery. The HMM does not have authority to write orders resulting in unnecessary delays in processing emergency leave, hospitalization and difficulty in obtaining air transportation from points along the Viet Nam coast. Several instances required requesting orders from the MAG for personnel transfers, emergency leave, etc, incurring delays. HMM sent several persons, utilizing Red Cross messages in lieu of orders.

(3) Civil Affairs/Military Government. Not applicable to HMM SLF.

(4) Morale/Welfare Programs. A mission with purpose and the accomplishments of the squadron during Operation "STARLITE" and the three "Dagger Thrust" operations kept the squadron personnel in a high state of morale despite the limited liberty provided by the ships schedule. Mail created some problem in this area in that periods of up to twenty-three days occurred between delivery. Career Advisory continued to function in a routine manner during the period covered by this report. Personnel living conditions aboard ship were considered adequate. Bathing facilities were considered inadequate for enlisted personnel as only three showers were provided for ninety-six men.

(5) Public Information. Home town news releases were updated during SLF tours.. Individual participation in "Dagger Thrust" operations information was released to the Home Town News Release Center, Great Lakes, Illinois.

(6) Casualties. The following non-combat casualties occurred during SLF deployment:

a. Capt. W. J. GRAVELLE, 078531/7335, USMC received back injury in an aircraft accident on 1 September 1965, assigned Army Hosp., Camp Kue, Okinawa 7 September 1965.

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b. L/Cpl. Thurman CAMPBELL, 2006261, received chest injury in flight deck accident on 20 August 1965. Sent to USNH Subic Bay, Philippines on 27 August 1965.

c. S/Sgt. R. T. SIMMONS, 994011, bitten on hand by monkey during liberty was sent to USNH Subic Bay, Philippines for anti-rabies treatment on 1 September to 24 September 1965.

(7) Medical

a. Facilities Available

(1) Administrative. Adequate only through the co-operation with the ships' company. Available corpsmen assigned to the squadron were not trained in procedures. BuMed Instructions and Notices were readily available.

(2) Sick Bay. Adequate, but lacking in Aviation Medicine equipment as well as that equipment normally utilized in routine examinations and procedures. During this period 62 physical examinations were completed.

(a) Audiometer. A Maico Unit was available and in working order, but no sound-proof chamber was available, making a valid examination impossible due to the environmental noise level.

(b) Eye Lens. Not available, decreasing the accuracy with which eye examinations are carried out.

(c) Refraction Equipment. Not available.

(d) Miscellaneous Inadequacies. Ophthalmological and Otoscopic equipment, plus electrocardiographic and laboratory supplies. These were corrected prior to debarkation.

3 Health Records. Maintained by squadron medical personnel and brought up to date prior to debarkation. Revised on aviation personnel and completed as necessary.

4 Preventive Medicine

(a) Periodic inspections were made by ship's medical personnel.

(b) Cockroaches were a continuing problem in the mess areas.

(c) Immunizations. Adequate supplies. Records were received and checked against immunization certifications and brought up to date.

(d) Physical Conditioning. Voluntary physical exercise was initiated by the squadron on a daily basis yielding gratifying results.

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5 Venereal Disease Control.

- (a) No new cases of venereal disease were encountered.
- (b) No flagrant cases of repeated V.D were noted.
- (c) All personnel that had acquired V.D prior to embarkation had been treated and cured prior to debarkation.

6 Aviation Safety and Aviation Medicine.

- (a) Protective clothing and devices were used.
- (b) Protective devices were in good repair.
- (c) "Crash Bag" was inadequate. Complete revision was initiated.

7 Combat Conditions.

- (a) The Flight Surgeon was assigned to treat the "Walking wounded". This allowed a state of readiness to go on any medical evacuation which necessitated a medical officer.
- (b) One corpsman was assigned to the flight deck during all flight operations.

8 Medical Evacuations. One corpsman was available for SAR, assisting in sick bay as needed. For the operation we were in, this was more than adequate. Actual battle casualties helicopter evacuated and treated consisted of heat exhaustion primarily, with two bamboo puncture wounds and a few sprains. It is expected that with further operations and an anticipated increase in work load that this system will be better evaluated. Medical evacuations by helicopter during the initial few hours were accomplished only by returning off-loaded helicopters. Returning casualties arrived in sick bay as expeditiously as desired. Again, more accurate evaluation is pending more extensive operations and the expected increased load.

3. S-2

(1) Intelligence/Counterintelligence. Counterintelligence is not applicable to a HMM deployed on SLF. Intelligence events, problems and recommendations are as follows:

a. During the period of HMM-163's assignment to the SLF, squadron intelligence worked closely with BLT 3/7 and their successor in the SLF, BLT 2/1. In spite of our combine resources however, we operated much of the time in an intelligence vacuum, relying almost entirely on Task Force 78 Aerial Photo Interpretation to provide us with



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information on possible areas of operation. When possible, we established liaison with friendly forces in or near our objective area. Other sources included the III MAF Intsum and SPOT reports, the MARKET TIME Intsum, and isolated messages from COMUSMACV. These sources, while good, often failed to give us information pertinent to our operational areas.

b. In late June the SLF received two missions, the first being to land BLT 3/7 at Qui Nhon; the second to begin planning for operation DAGGER THRUST. Upon our arrival at Qui Nhon on 30 June, we contacted 22nd ARVN Division G-2, Special Forces and the Binh Dinh Sector Operations Intelligence Center for briefings on the area. These agencies were our primary sources of information while 3/7 was moving ashore. Once ashore, the Battalion sent Intsums to us aboard the Iwo Jima.

c. On July 6, BLT 2/7 relieved 3/7. We were able to provide the arriving battalion with a briefing on the Qui Nhon area and a 1 to 12,500 vertical mosaic, acquired through Task Force 78.

d. From 7 July to 20 July we stood off-shore near Qui Nhon, utilizing our time to prepare for the DAGGER THRUST operations. Frequent helicopter traffic along the coast enabled us to make reconnaissance flights over our first two DAGGER THRUST Targets without fear of compromise. The oblique photographs taken at this time by the AO attached to 3/7 were valuable for orientation purposes and a low level view of activities on the objective.

e. During this period we made a staff visit to Task Force 78 on the USS Estes in Da Nang Harbor. TF 78 G-2 provided us with Intelligence Estimates and enemy situation overlays for the first two targets: Vung Mu Peninsula and Ben Goi Bay. (The third target was uncertain at this time.) During this visit, it became apparent that our most valuable source of information would be the aerial photography interpretations made at TF 78. Order of Battle information was dated, coming mainly from the COMUSMACV ORDER OF BATTLE dated 31 March 65. This publication was, and is, good for general information on VC organization and equipment, but provided little information on the current situation in the target areas. As in most of the RVN, timely intelligence would best be obtained through direct liaison with friendly forces operation in or adjacent to the objective area. However, for security reasons, we were unable to make direct contact with such units during the early stages of planning. As it happened, we would not make the DAGGER THRUST operations with 3/7 anyway, for the grounding of the FRANK KNOX on Pratt's Reef and Operation "STARLITE" interfered.

f. On 12 August we arrived at Subic Bay to finalize plans for the first DAGGER THRUST target: VUNG MU Peninsula. This planning was interrupted by a message to proceed to Chu Lai for Operation "STARLITE". TF 78 had, by chance, oblique photography of the coastline in the Van Tuong area. This, and the messages received from III MAF

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were the only information we had going into Operation "STARLITE". When the battalion was committed, we had no intelligence sources other than direct liaison with GP's ashore and pilot debriefs. It was difficult to keep the pilots informed of events under these circumstances.

g. In future amphibious operations of this sort, it would be very helpful if Regimental Intsums were routed to units afloat for information. The III MAF Intsum was helpful in getting the overall picture, but generally arrived too late to provide timely intelligence. During Starlite, debriefing of pilots was found to be of little value in the rapidly changing situation around Van Tuong. Information was best passed through the Air Liaison Net, for by the time the Pilot returned to debrief the situation had probably changed. This contrasts with the usual circumstances at Da Nang and Chu Lai, where pilot debriefing is very valuable for keeping track of developments in the area over a long period of time.

h. On 1 September BLT 5/7 went ashore at Chu Lai and the Iwo Jima proceeded to Okinawa, embarking BLT 2/1 on 7 September. At this point, our intelligence for DAGGER THRUST had not increased appreciably, though the photo interpreters at TF 78 had begun work on current photography of our targets. COMUSMACV was unable to provide us with intelligence on any of our targets.

i. On 10 September, we arrived at Qui Nhon, again with a double mission: first, to cover the off loading of the 1st Cavalry Division; second, to make the final preparations for DAGGER THRUST. This time, we were more fortunate in our intelligence resources than on our previous visit to Qui Nhon. BLT 2/7 had been established in the Qui Nhon area for over 8 weeks. Their Intelligence Section had an aggressive collection effort concentrated on the immediate area around Qui Nhon, and was most cooperative. We found that 2/7, along with other friendly units in the Qui Nhon area had received direction to collect intelligence on the area surrounding our first target, Vung Mu Peninsula. BLT 2/7 gave us OCB on the VC local forces in the area, a black list and general information on the daily activities of the populace. The bulk of this information, we understood, came from interrogations conducted on VC, VCS and people passing through the Battalion lines on their way to market.

j. Vung Mu was the only target on which we had intelligence other than that derived from aerial photography. There are two sides to this coin, however, for it appears that the increased interest in the Vung Mu area by friendly units may have contributed to compromise of the target.

k. Around the middle of September we received word that ARVN personnel were aware of the Vung Mu target. At this time we sent a message to TF 78 stating that we felt the target had been compromised. Plans continued, however, and by 15 September, we had received the final photo read-outs on our targets, including our third, Tam Quam. These

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were excellent, except that photo interpretation could not reveal the age of the fortifications observed. When the BLT landed on Vung Mu on 25 September, it was found that much of the digging which appeared on the photography had been unused for some time. Also, we found that neither aerial observation nor photography had revealed the numerous stakes which stood in landing zone Buzzard at the northern end of the peninsula. These became evident only after the pilots were right on top of them. Judging from their appearance, the stakes had been in the zone for some time, and could be seen only late in the day when they cast a shadow from the setting sun.

l. Vung Mu yielded little in the way of contraband, information or prisoners, but gave us an opportunity to test our squadron intelligence procedures. Again, when pilots had information of immediate value, they passed it directly to the battalion. We also had pilots jot observations on their knee pads which were picked up when they returned to the ship to refuel without shutting down. This system, while simple, gave us a method of gathering information should the action become so confusing and communications so clogged that the pilot might have difficulty passing sightings over the Air Liaison Net. The primary value of pilot debriefing was collection of intelligence for the Intsums, passed to TF 78 at 6 hour intervals.

m. On 27 September, we began our next Target, Ben Goi Bay. We knew next to nothing about this objective as the photography showed little activity in the area. For this reason Force Reconnaissance Teams were inserted by rubber boat on the night of 27 September. They were pulled out by helicopter on 28 September. The most noteworthy fact about this operation, from an aviation viewpoint, was that nobody realized the density of the vegetation and the ruggedness of the terrain on HON LON Island, even though we had made thorough reconnaissance of the place. The vegetation was deceptive, for it was not high enough to form a canopy and appeared from the air to be similar to that found on the hills of Southern California.

n. On 1 October we landed the Battalion at Tam Quam, certain that it was VC territory, but almost completely ignorant of the current enemy situation. We were aware that a large battle had taken place about 10 miles south of the objective area, near BONG SON. However, we were unable to get detailed information about the battle and could only speculate on the strength and direction of movement of the VC forces involved. Again, our primary source of intelligence was aerial photography interpretation which showed very extensive preparation of the ground in the objective area. (This information proved out when the battalion landed). (Task Force 78 did an HLZ study for us from their vertical photos, which provided detailed information on zones in the objective area.) Also, we had thorough oblique photo coverage taken by extensive F101 forward firing runs. This oblique coverage was valuable for terrain analysis and selection of Helicopter Landing Zones. We used the same pilot reporting system as before. Pilots reported extensive digging in that area as well as pockets of enemy activity. The value of direct radio contact with the Battalion was demonstrated during the withdrawal phase, when pilots reported enemy build up in the Western portion of the area.

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o. In summary, direct personal liaison is the best source of intelligence for squadrons operating with the SLF. Since communications with units ashore is limited, the Squadron Intelligence Officer must take every opportunity to visit his counterparts ashore, establish good liaison and make squadron/SLF intelligence needs known.

C. S-3

(1) Air Operations: A chronology of Air Operations and Special Operations are listed in paragraph (3) above and enclosure (2) through (5). During these operations the squadron applied doctrine and technique as provided by FMFM 3-3 and NATOPS. These doctrines were found to be sound throughout all operations. However, ships operation for extended periods cannot fail to provide new experiences and lessons learned. Those considered significant are as follows:

a. Crews Briefing. Briefing 60 minutes before launch proved adequate. This provided 35 minutes for the actual brief with pilots called away 25 minutes prior to launch time. When squadron lifts or strikes were scheduled, detailed briefs were held for pilots and crew chiefs the night before. It was found that personnel from ships' priority and Helo Direction Center (TACRON) should attend these briefs to receive a comprehensive briefing on concept of operation.

b. Launch. A call away time of 25 minutes for pilots prior to launch proved adequate. Four (4) plane divisions could be handled more expeditiously than three (3) plane divisions for both launch and recovery. The first division could be expected to be airborne in 18 minutes with successive divisions airborne every five (5) minutes. These figures, applicable to Iwo Jima class carriers, are based on landing spots 1 through 4 being used to launch aircraft, with aircraft fed into these spots from the pack with engines running.

c. Troop Loading. The squadron lost three (3) aircraft at sea during the SLF deployment. These aircraft sank in such an expeditious manner as to preclude the crew from abandoning the aircraft before the cockpit and cabin were under water. There were no passengers involved in either of the 3 accidents. However, these accidents point out the need for constant emphasis being placed on proper indoctrination and continuous training of personnel for helicopter embarkation and emergency debarkation. Troop vests were donned at embarkation stations expedites actual in planning and provides an opportunity for proper inspection of the individual prior to entry of aircraft.

d. Fuel Loads. A 900 lb. fuel load was determined to be an optimum load for shipboard SLF operations. This load permits: first, ample fuel for all but long-range administrative flights; second, the lifting of a minimum of 7 combat loaded troops (1575 lbs.); third, it provided 20 minute fuel reserve for delays encountered during large troop lifts while proving adequate for staggered refueling during this type of lift; and last, requires a minimum of fuel load changes for varied commitments.

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e. Refueling. Combat operations aboard an Iwo Jima class carrier dictates that hot (engine & rotor turning) refueling be accomplished. Time delays encountered by shutting aircraft down would seriously impair early build up of forces ashore. This procedure was utilized and proved effective with no incidents of fire occurring. It is noted, however, that troops cannot be loaded during refueling due to position of cabin door. The door must be closed to permit fuel caps removal. The removal of this door for operations aboard the SLF would further improve the refuel/troop embark turn around time.

f. Aircraft Performance. It was generally noted that conditions aboard ship differ somewhat from those over land. The aircraft could be expected to pull 53" + or - 1" manifold pressure instead of 56.5" as advertised at 2800 RPM. While 2700 RPM Sea Level NATOPS Charts proved accurate we were considerable surprised at one point. During the Prattas Reef salvage operation with the HOGG Charts advertising a 1800 lb. payload under existing climate conditions, 1250 lbs. proved to be the maximum that could be safely lifted. A good deal of chart research failed to reveal a satisfactory explanation for this phenomenon. However, probable cause was a combination of ambient air temperature at deck level, (readings by meteorology were taken on 0-4 level); erratic winds with ship at anchor; and max power of 53" + or - 1". This situation dictated a rule of thumb that proved applicable for the duration of the tour. "If the aircraft would not hover with 50"/2800 RPM a portion of the load was removed until it would."

g. Standby. The ships operation doctrine called for 4 conditions of standby: Condition I requested aircraft to be airborne in 2 minutes; Condition II, 5 minutes; Condition III, 15 minutes; and condition IV, 30 minutes. The squadron maintained 4 aircraft and crews on Condition IV at all times while embarked, going to other conditions as operations dictated.

h. Command Post Standby. The Squadron assigned a minimum of (2) aircraft and crews ashore with the BLT Command Post (CP) during all operations ashore. The purpose was twofold: first, it created a quick re-action force; and second, the crews could act as liaison and planners to assist the BLT Commander in planning helicopter supported missions for the following day. It was our practice to return these aircraft to the ship overnight, or in the event of enemy action in the CP area. The later decision was discretionary with the flight leader and dictated by the situation.

i. Tactical Airborne Observer. During Dagger Thrust operations the squadron assigned aircraft and crews to act as Tactical Airborne Observers. The missions accomplished by these aircraft were many. The aircraft was used to guide the strike flights into LZ, marking these LZ's with smoke. They controlled on-call troop lifts and retrogrades, air strikes when appropriate, and generally kept track of everything going on in the objective area. It also acted as a free aircraft for the Unit Commander during assault landings. While these aircraft performed an important and necessary mission it is felt that the UH-34D is not satisfactory for this mission; also see enclosure (5).

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1. Flare Drops. Night flare drops were conducted at Qui Nhon in order to acquire an additional means of providing support to the BLT. The aircraft operated in sections, were loaded with 4 to 6 ~~MK-5~~ MOD-10 flares, each produced a 4,250,000 candle power. The drops were controlled by both the flight leader and by units on the ground. Timed drops could be made alternately between aircraft by either pilot calling the drop. This technique is preferred over having each aircraft drop all his flares before the second aircraft starts, for in the latter case all flare lanyards must be tied to the aircraft at once. For safety reasons individual lanyards with six foot extensions should be attached to tie-down rings. The flare should be set to ignite at 300 ft. below the aircraft drop altitude. The recommended drop altitude is 2000 to 3000 ft.. The drops are then made on order of the pilot by the crew chief who simply throws it overboard. It is considered that development of tactics to include helicopter assault landings using these techniques are possible.

(2) Air Defense. Not applicable.

(3) Ground Defense. Not applicable due to deployment aboard ship.

(4) Special Operations. See enclosure (2) through (5).

(5) ECM. Not applicable.

(6) Photo. Aerial photographs were used as a source of intelligence. See paragraph 3.d above. Additional oblique shots supplementing the vertical were taken for the three Dagger Thrust operations by squadron aircraft utilizing ships photographer and equipment. These photos were taken during flights requiring a routine fly by of designated targets enroute to either Da Nang or Nha Trang. These procedures were used to preclude compromising targets by Viet Cong observation of suspicious air activity in target area.

(7) Command and Control. During the SLF HMM-163 was embarked aboard a single ship. Although detachments were contemplated in connection with the Indonesian affair, these never occurred, and command and control for this reason was routine.

(8) Training. Operations in the Republic of Viet Nam immediately preceeding formation of the SLF precluded specific pre-deployment training by HMM-163. Training accomplished during Stateside, and Okinawa cycle and the operational experience provided by the tour in Viet Nam created a squadron easily adapted to SLF operations. Significant events during the tour are listed below:

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a. The squadron arrived at Okinawa on 21 June. It was immediately committed to support embarkation of the SLF aboard the USS Iwo Jima. It accomplished this task and additionally disembarked BLT 3/7 at Qui Nhon on 1 and 2 July. Carrier qualifications both night and day were accomplished subsequent to these operations at Qui Nhon on 4 and 5 July while simultaneously supporting 3/7 ashore.

b. Instrument flights were scheduled during the SLF deployment when ships operation and commitments permitted. GCAs and instrument approaches were made between 7 and 20 July. While a limited number of these approaches were made, generally ships equipment and personnel limitations preclude dependence on LPH type carrier as a means of obtaining necessary instrument approaches for annual pilot qualification. Additional training was accomplished using Qui Nhon facilities during operations in that area.

c. On 20 September the squadron conducted a pre-dawn launch rehearsal at Qui Nhon. The purpose of this rehearsal was twofold; first, to launch the number of aircraft that were scheduled to be utilized in the actual problem and to familiarize the squadron pilots and the ships air department in the problems encountered in a pre-dawn launch under semi-blackout combat conditions. Second, the squadron desired to rehearse the Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table (HEALT) for the proposed landing rehearsal at Chu Lai. The idea in mind in the timing for the launch was to have the first aircraft touch down in the landing zone at L-Hour, which was scheduled to be the Beginning of Morning Nautical Twilight. (BMNT). The rehearsal was considered to be a success in that all aircraft were launched within a 15 minute time period and enough time to rendezvous, depart the ship to the initial point and land in the landing zone right at BMNT, 0615 H.

d. Basic training and pilot ground training was conducted throughout the SLF tour. The ready room assigned to the squadron were adequate to handle (1) duty section or all officers at any one lecture. The squadron exchanged instructors with BLT 3/7 on several occasions and found this to be a very satisfactory method of obtaining lectures on infantry units and tactics.

(9) NEC. Not applicable during deployment; however, recent intelligence indicates possible future use of chemical agents by Viet Cong.

#### D. S-4.

(1) Embarkation. The squadron sent an advance party to Okinawa to conduct planning for embarkation on 10 June. This lead time (10 Days) is considered necessary; pack up information and previous pre-planning information was somewhat hard to come by. Information and events concerning actual embarkation are as follows:

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a. On 26 June the squadron embarked aboard the USS Iwo Jima for SLF deployment. At this time the material section was up to T.O. strength with the exception of one (1) 3516 motor transport mechanic who was undergoing surgery at Camp Kue Hospital, Okinawa. All Navy property items as designated were embarked with the exception of deficiencies to BuWeps Allowance List items included as enclosure (6) to this report. Said deficiencies were considered the result of numerous squadron rotations with the ensuing frequent exchange of material. The Marine Corps Property Section came aboard with all items as specified in the M. C. Table of Allowance with the noticeable exception of some tentage and field range removed from the squadron pack-up by MAG-16 for use in the Republic of Viet Nam. The Motor Transport Section embarked with those helicopter transportable items, designated for use in the SLF: namely, five M-422 "mighty mites" and two M-100 "mighty mite trailers". While 15 days ammunition supply was considered adequate this squadron embarked with some 18 days supply and later found it necessary to requisition a like amount. All preceeding material was actually embarked by means of helo lift and required 127 external and 7 internally loaded sorties. Lifting the personnel required some 30 sorties. This squadron came aboard with and turned over to HMM-261:

- 1 Class I 15 days.
- 2 Class II Basic Allowance
- 3 Class IIA Basic Allowance plus 30 day Section B.
- 4 Class V 15 days - 43,000 rounds of bandolier 7.62,  
20,000 rounds linked 7.62.
- 5 Used 20,000 round of 7.62 during embarked operation.

(2) Logistics. Billetting personnel aboard the LPH-2 was handled expeditiously by instituting a messing and billeting officer who received block spaces from the ships Combat Cargo Officer, and assigned rooms to individual officers and specific compartments to enlisted, according to their rank and/or duty section. Messing facilities were good and when, due to operational necessity, unusual eating hours were required, service was always available. Offices and shop spaces were adequate and centrally located. Some degree of ingenuity was required to solve the problem of adequate space and security for the squadron armory, however, a small Staff NCO living area next to the ready room was requisitioned and after the installation of a steel screen over the hatch by ships metal shop, was entirely satisfactory. Considering the number of embarked personnel, the ships laundry functioned adequately, however, particularly judicious use is required should clean bed linen for the troops be required weekly. Traditionally the SLF squadron on aboard the LPH-2 furnishes one or two of its own people for use as the squadron barber and as there is no provisions made for this billet in a squadron's T.O. A good deal of charity is required of the squadron personnel while the appointed completes his apprenticeship.



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After observing operations on the flight deck the squadron ground safety officer deemed it necessary for all personnel working on the flight deck with any consistency during flight operations to wear flight deck shoes. Said directions placed somewhat of a strain upon the ships stores of flight deck shoes in the average size range. While embarked personnel of the material section were required to fill various details such as messmen, laundry and flight deck crew. The motor transport section had an average of 85% of its personnel on the flight deck crew for a period of over ninety days without adverse effects on vehicular readiness.

(3) Navy Supply. Material support of Navy furnished items for the squadron afloat is the responsibility of the host LPH. Generally higher usage than previously recorded by any supply source, therefore, not anticipated, was prevalent in selected parts such as engines, tail and main rotor blades. Due to operational necessity the ship was unable to resupply periodically, resulting in occasional shortages in aviation stores. The recent move of the UH-34D facility from Yokosuka to Subic Bay is expected to alleviate this situation. As there is no central supply point in the Far East for all flight equipment for the ships section "H" stores, there were frequent depletions by previous SLF squadron which could not be replaced resulting in very short supplies of selected items, such as flight suits, gloves and boots. The remote location of the squadron necessitated only message traffic. Occasionally supply directives were not received and liaison was difficult in problem areas concerning new developments or revised procedures.

(4) Marine Corps Supply. Material support of Marine Corps furnished property was handled in a most unusual manner. The squadron went directly to FSR at Okinawa for support. However, the squadron has no project 11 funds to finance this, necessitating the use of the BLT's JON and a squadron stub number. A clear out Marine Corps (including section "M") allowance resupply system was not present. Perhaps a solution would be to have the MAG assign a block of stubs to the SLF squadron. Perhaps also worthy of note is the necessity for having MAG-16 pre-position any ammunition the squadron may need either as a resupply of basic stocks or for training purposes while at Subic Bay. This squadron's Dagger Thrust rehearsal plans required us to attempt to draw ammunition from the Navy magazine at Subic Bay. We learned that, while provisions are made to resupply the BLT here, there are no provisions made for squadron use and any issue to the squadron would necessitate using "storm" ammo supplies which required FMFPac release.

(5) Fiscal. Due to operational commitments no definite flying program could be established. The 900 hour Bravo funds per month programmed for, was considered adequate. While sporadic flying made expenditures varied, the squadron's operating costs remained much the

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same as programmed for by the Wing. The internal status report (01) shows gasoline usage varying from 1,615 gals. to 56,849 gals. a reporting period, with resulting cost per hour figures ranging from \$11.19 to \$16.40. The average cost per hour during the over all SLF tour amounted to \$13.50.

(5) Motor Transport. Motor transport functions aboard the SLF were of a very limited nature due to the small number of vehicles aboard and limited usage opportunity. Ships regulations limited the scope of vehicular maintenance possible; for example, complete quarterly inspections could not be pulled, resulting in the accomplishment of minor preventative maintenance only. Vehicles and ground support equipment suffered from lack of use while aboard and necessitated frequent "run-ups" to maintain availability. It was found that two persons were capable of handling all motor transportation requirements, and the remaining personnel of the section were employed as part of the flight deck crew.

#### E. Aircraft Maintenance.

(1) General. HMM-163 had operated in Viet Nam for four and one half months just prior to the SLF assignment. The experience gained during this period about the expected operating area and conditions proved to be a valuable asset. Experiences gained during the deployment are listed below:

a. On embarkation the squadron had 24 aircraft assigned and aside from shortages of personnel (See paragraph 4.A.1) had all equipment necessary to support extended operation aboard ship.

b. Working spaces aboard an LPH of the Iwo Jima class can present problems. During our stay aboard, a maximum of five (5) aircraft could be repaired on the hanger deck at any one time. This was partially due to use of one end of the deck for crews movies and as a storage area for BLT ready ammunition. This arrangement also precluded use of one of the tow chain dead falls limiting engine changes to one at a time. Most minor repair was accomplished on the flight deck.

c. Engine failure problems, while not peculiar to ships operations alone, but rather to the whole of operations in Viet Nam, were excessive. During this period constant inspection and yellow sheet write ups resulted in 13 engine changes due to the following failures: three (3) engines, under powered; three (3) engines, high oil consumption; two (2) engines, metal contamination; two (2) engines, FOU; one (1) engine, broken oil ring; and one (1) engine, small arms hit.

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An additional three (3) engines failed in flight and the aircraft were lost at sea. While pilot indoctrination, inspection and close watch on performance is considered important it does not appear to be the complete answer. Considerable effort could establish no trend and low or high time engines were equally susceptible to failure.

(2) Replacement Parts and Supplies. Aircraft parts procurement was the largest single factor in reducing availability during deployment. The avionics shop could not get CW-1003's or parts to repair those they had. It was difficult to get inverters, tack generators, servo motors and parts for the ARC-52, ARC-55, and ASE. The metal shop could not procure sheet metal, rivets, paint and thinner. Flight equipment could not get ear phones and lip mikes. The following were considered to be high usage items: lead assembly, dampers, tail rotor blades, carburetors, inverters and tail rotor blades. Note: Use of heavy ordnance tape on leading edges of tail rotor blades measurably increased useful life.

(3) Personnel. Operations from an LPH require a great deal in the way of man power. The LPH-2 required that 50 men from the squadron serve on details. Thirty-five of these men on flight deck crews (blade folders, and plane pushers), and fifteen men for such details as wardroom, mess, laundry and barber. In addition to these details we supply men for compartment cleaners each morning, and men for the integrity watch at night. Consequently, all shops are below their manning level which slows maintenance during large operations, and necessitates extra hours. We feel that a larger ships T.O. for flight deck handlers or additional men assigned to the squadron for this purpose would greatly ease carrier operations.

#### F. Aviation Safety.

(1) General. The pilots and men of HMM-163 embarked aboard the USS Iwo Jima five days after departing Da Nang, Republic of Viet Nam. Behind them were oppressive days of flying and sweltering nights of discomfort. But taken away were valuable combat experience and a certainty that the squadron's readiness posture was at its apex. Each pilot at one time or another had been faced with calculated risk verses strict adherence to aircraft safety in a combat environment. Each was mission oriented, and retained a high regard for crew and passenger safety. As a result, the tasks assigned were accomplished successfully after thought, preparation, and professional execution. HMM-163 was qualified to assume any mission assigned, and within their capabilities, to assure maximum effectiveness.

#### (2). Shipboard Operations.

a. It did not take long to realize that shipboard flight operations were quite different from those on land. Besides the obvious psychological discomfort afforded by an unsupporting sea

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beneath ones helicopter, other flight aspects which contribute to aircraft capabilities were absent. Heavy internal and external weight operations at maximum power limitations were routine over land. Because wind was almost always present in sufficient strength, and because pilots could maneuver within ground effect, the maximum allowable payload was restricting only with excess fuel and extreme temperature conditions. However, shipboard operations required a review by all pilots in the effects of adverse wind conditions, high temperature and humidity, and a re-awakening to hover out of ground effect limitations and lifting capabilities. More than sufficient practice for future combat operations was afforded the squadron during the Prattas Reef salvage operation. Each pilot gained valuable knowledge and finesse through extensive hoist and external weight operations in adverse atmospheric conditions.

b. During the three month period spent at sea, three aircraft were lost after engine failure. All the crews involved complied with established emergency procedures for ditching the helicopter, and all three crews were rescued without serious injury. Periodic pilot and crew training was conducted in ditching procedures, and correct embarkation drills relative to combat equipped passengers was stressed.

c. The squadron's flight discipline and professional attitude toward shipboard operations contributed to the success of each amphibious operation.

  
M. G. EWERS

## Copy to:

CG FMAW (6)  
CO MAG-16 (2)  
CTG 78.5 (2)  
CTF 78 (2)  
CTF 79 (2)  
CTG 79.3 (2)  
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Operation "STARLITE" Van Tuong, Republic of Viet Nam. (Map: Series 6757 sheet I, II and III).

TAB "A" -- Area of Operations

- (1) HMM-163's effort in Operation "STARLITE" was accomplished without a rehearsal and with little preplanning. The use of existing landing plans prepared in advance for contingencies facilitated the execution of this operation. Intelligence was provided by CTF 78 and proved to be very accurate.
- (2) Flight operations for Operation "STARLITE" commenced at 1455H, 18 August 1965. (Prior to this date the squadron was embarked aboard the LPH-2 in Subic Bay, P.I., and departed on 15Aug65 to steam with the Task Group for Chu Lai, Republic of Viet Nam. The Task Group had been in Subic Bay, P.I., for upkeep and training since 12Aug65). On D-Day, 18 August 1965, flight operation began with the launching of two TAO aircraft for a pre-L Hour reconnaissance of proposed helicopter landing zones. See TAB "A". At 1312H eighteen troop aircraft commenced lifting elements of BLT 3/7 into landing zone Green in support of units of the III MAF engaged in heavy fighting against the First Viet Cong Regiment. The troop lift was completed at 1652H. Reconnaissance resupply, liaison and medical evacuation missions were flown until 2242H. One aircraft sustained a small arms hit in one rotor blade while on a reconnaissance mission, with the aircraft returning to the USS Iwo Jima after completing the mission. A total of 77.1 hrs., 436 pax., 24,500 lbs. cargo in 232 sorties were logged.
- (3) Operations 19 Aug65 commenced at 0500H with troop emplacement, resupply, reconnaissance, liaison and medical evacuation flights, continuing until 2105H. HMM-163 flew 106.6 hrs., carrying 448 pax., 79,600# cargo in 463 sorties. A total of 95 medical evacuees were taken from the operation area.
- (4) Troop emplacement, resupply, reconnaissance, liaison, and medical evacuation missions were flown on 20 Aug65, commencing at 0722H. A total of 156.6 hrs., 1226 pax., 14 medical evacuees, 96,750# cargo and 687 sorties was logged.
- (5) A pre-planned strike mission was undertaken on 21 August. A company from BLT 3/7 was transported from LZ Green to coordinates BS 685918. The flight utilized fixed wing escort and pathfinder helicopters and went into the zone with permission to the helicopter gunners to fire if any suspected enemy troops were in the area. Considerable enemy had been reported in the area. Gun-fire was encountered in the zone, but no aircraft were hit. The strike force and BLT 3/7 were supported throughout the day. The squadron logged 130.4 flight hours, 950 pax., 2 med evacs, 112,739# cargo and 591 sorties.
- (6) On 22 August flight operations began at 0905H and ended at 2221H. Troop emplacement, resupply, reconnaissance, liaison and medical

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evacuation missions were flown. A total of 52.6 hours, 338 pax., 19 med evacs, 24,700# cargo and 296 sorties were logged.

(7) 23 August flight operations included a strike mission. A re-inforced company of BLT 3/7 was helolifted to BS 740870 at 0730H. Continued support was given throughout the day concluding at 2246H. The squadron flew 48.2 hours, 270 pax., 12 med evacs, 23,875 # cargo and 253 sorties.

(8) Flight operations on 24 August included troop placement, resupply, reconnaissance, liaison and medical evacuation sorties. Continued support was given throughout the day. During a sweep of the friendly strike forces a Viet Cong suspect was observed by a reconnaissance helicopter trying to escape under fire from the sweeping forces. The helicopter landed and the crew chief, Sgt. TORRES, departed the aircraft and, giving chase, tackled the V. C. suspect and effected a single-handed capture. At 1530H a squadron aircraft sustained an engine failure in flight. A successful auto-rotation was accomplished into a field at BS 724885. A re-actionary platoon of Marines from "M" Company, BLT 3/7 was helilifted to the scene for perimeter defense. A squadron maintenance crew was flown from the LPH and repairs were successfully accomplished and the aircraft returned to the ship at 1755H. The re-actionary platoon was returned to the Command Post. The BLT was back-loaded by boats, completing the "STARLITE" operations. The withdrawal was unopposed. A total of 77.4 hours, 986 pax., 24 med evacs, 125,830# cargo, and 453 sorties were flown.

(9) Conclusions derived from Operation "STARLITE" are as follows:

a. Supporting arms were adequate. Helicopter escort was available from MAG-12 at Chu Lai on request.

b. Although a FSCC was established ashore, control and coordination of both Naval Gunfire and artillery appeared to be inadequate. Several near misses occurred due to helicopters not having knowledge of artillery and NGF that were firing.

c. Command and Control was very vague from beginning to end. Although it was clear that III MAF had the authority to commit SLF troops, they were committed without CTG 78.5 being informed. The control of helicopters also became confusing due to the procedure of going directly to the LPH-2 for support, not being routed through a controlling agency.

d. Helicopters were utilized at a 100 hour per day rate in excess of 3 days. This resulted in an unacceptable low level of availability. Helicopter utilization, when possible, should be preplanned to not overcommit resources available.

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
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e. A summary of air operations 18 through 24 August 1965 with 23 UH-34D's assigned is as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>AVAILABILITY</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>MED EVAC</u>
18	83%	77.1	232	24,500	436	21
19	87	105.6	463	79,640	448	95
20	87	156.6	687	96,750	1226	14
21	52	130.4	591	112,739	956	12
22	67	52.6	296	24,700	388	19
23	79	48.2	253	23,875	270	12
24	<u>79</u>	<u>77.4</u>	<u>453</u>	<u>125,830</u>	<u>986</u>	<u>24</u>
TOTAL	76%	647.9	2975	488,034	4710	197


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## SLF AREA OF OPERATIONS



ENCLOSURE (1)