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VMA (AW)-242 S&C FILES
Log No. 00348-66
Distribution MAG-11
Copy 1 of 4

MARINE ALL WEATHER ATTACK SQUADRON 242
Marine Aircraft Group 11
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, Pacific
FPO San Francisco, 96602

3:EMW:rar
Ser: 003A34366
9 December 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 11 (Attn: S-3)

Subj: Command Chronology report, letter of transmittal

Ref: (a) WgO 5750.1B

Encl: (1) Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 242 Command Chronology for November 1966 (S)
(2) Operation File Cabinet Post Exercise Report (U) (w/Original Only)
(3) Roster of Awards and Dates (U)
(4) Situation Report (C) (w/Original Only)
(5) Logistics Report (U) (w/Original Only)

1. In accordance with reference (a), the enclosed Command Chronology report for the period 1 through 30 November 1966 for this squadron is hereby submitted.

2. This letter is unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

H. WOLF

MAG-11 S&C
NO. 002308-66
COPY 1 OF 2

VMFC(AW)-242

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

Nov 1966

[redacted]

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PART - Organizational Data

1. Command and Staffs

a. Commanding Officer and Executive Staff

Commanding Officer	LtCol Howard WOLF	1-30 Nov
Executive Officer	LtCol Earl E. JACBOSON, Jr.	"
Administrative Officer	Capt. James L. ANDERST	"
Intelligence Officer	Capt. Michael W. TIERNEY	"
Operations Officer	Major James M. McGARVEY	"
Logistics Officer	Major John A. MARTIN	"
Maintenance Officer	Major Fred J. CONE	"

b. Special Staff

Safety Officer	Capt. James K. ENGSTRON	1-30 Nov
Flight Surgeon	Lt (MC) William F. ARNDT	"
Supply Officer	2/LT. Harry A. KLING	"
Headquarters Flight Leader	Major James M. McGARVEY	"
"A" Flight Leader	Major John A. MARTIN	"
"B" Flight Leader	Capt. Jesse T. RANDALL	"
"C" Flight Leader	Capt. Michael W. TIERNEY	"

2. Task Organization and Location

VMA(AW)-242 - DaNang A.B. Republic of South Viet Nam.

3. Average Monthly Strength

a.	Naval Aviators	17
b.	Naval Flight Officers	17
c.	Ground Officers	4
d.	Flight Surgeon	1
e.	Enlisted Marine	232
f.	Enlisted Navy	4
	TOTAL:	305

4. Visitors to the Command

a. Major General ROBERTSHAW and Brigadier General ELWOOD - greeted the Squadron upon arrival on 1 November 1966.

b. Lieutenant General KRULAK - visited the Squadron on 2 November 1966.

c. Brigadier General ELWOOD flew a refamiliarization flight with Captain RANDALL, on 4 November 1966.

d. Major General ROBERTSHAW - informally inspected flight operations on 19 November 1966

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Enclosure (1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

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PART II

VMA(AW)-242, prior to its official arrival, had established a forward echelon at DaNang on 10 October, headed by Major J. M. McGARVEY, to receive the Squadron. On 1 November 1966, LtCol H. WOLF landed the first of the Squadron's 12 A-6A aircraft which were successfully Trans Paced as a unit from MCAS Cherry Point. (Enclosed report.) These were the first such type aircraft to be deployed by the Marine Corps in Viet Nam. For the next day and a-half the Squadron stood down, in order to become organized, receive required briefings and be ready to meet any assigned task. Radar Survey missions commenced on 3 November, to familiarize the aircrews with the terrain in which they'd be flying, as well as to develop uses of the aircraft's weapons systems in support of the ground forces, particularly under any weather and night conditions. Several projects have been undertaken with the initial results being satisfactory. New concepts and equipments are being developed to accomodate the projects, such as radar reflectors for offset bombing and a manual computer to determine the offset information required.

On 11 November, the 1stMAW Commander ordered continuous strikes against specified targets of enemy build-up. Thus Operation Heavy Hand commenced, and on the afternoon of 12 November the Squadron launched 11 sorties dropping 68.750 tons of bombs, either by systems or TPQ control. Thereafter, for the next 9 days, 86 sorties were launched, mainly during the evening and night hours; and delivered 450.625 additional tons into the known and suspected enemy areas of concentration. This operation was concluded on 21 November 1966.

As an outgrowth, one Tally-Ho sortie is fully equipped and loaded per night, and makes a road reconnaisance of the area just north of the DMZ, seeking and attacking moving and preplanned fixed targets under cover of darkness and weather.

Since the cessation of Operation Heavy Hand, the squadron continues to fly night missions under the control of TPQ, providing air support throughout the I Corps area. Additional projects with several supporting evaluations have been assigned and are currently continuing. These are: the evaluation of offset bombing accuracy with TPQ monitor and a Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) (TAC (A)) spotting; and development of a cockpit "plotting board" device for converting UTM coordinates to usable bearings and distances. Unfortunately, dependance on visual support has slowed the evaluations through this month.

The personnel of the Squadron have worked long and hard to make their first month in combat a successful one. Round-the-clock maintenance, and full employment of the SATS ordnance loading concept on a continuing basis - a "first" for any Marine Squadron - enabled the Squadron to set an all time 1stMAW record for ordnance tonnage expended, during their first month in country.

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure (1) [redacted]

[redacted]

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On 9 November while on routine missions, LtCol WOLF's and Major CONE's flights were diverted to provide close air support to protect and allow extraction of a recon patrol 14 miles South West of Hue. Again a similar divert was made on the 19th with Major McGARVEY and Capt. OETTING piloting. This incident occurred 20 miles South of DaNang and, after many ordnance runs, another patrol was recovered.

PART III - Significant Events

1. Personnel. Two officers and 2 enlisted men were joined. Motor Transport personnel were sent TAD to MABS-11 motor transport section. Two officers were promoted to the next higher rank, one to Major and one to Chief Warrant Officer 2.

2. Administration. N/A

3. Awards. On the 18th of November LtCol H. WOLF (Pilot) and Capt. R. B. MIZE (Bombardier/Navigator) earned the Squadron's first air awards. LtCol WOLF's was his 7th star in lieu of a medal and Capt. MIZE received the Air Medal. At the close of the month 31 Air Medals and 2 Gold Stars had been awarded. See enclosure (3).

4. Casualties. N/A

5. Civic Action. N/A

6. Morale/Welfare Programs. Several members of VMA(AW)-242 are participating in Group Intramural activities such as tennis, chess, and pool tournaments which will conclude in December.

Information concerning the Limited Duty Officer Program has been promulgated to eligible personnel in the Squadron.

7. Informational Services. 300 fleet home town news releases concerning the squadron's personnel arrival in South East Asia were sent out.

8. Intelligence/Counter Intelligence. N/A

9. ECM. N/A

10. Photo. N/A

11. Air Operations. See Part Two. The squadron flew 319 sorties delivering 1,132.5 tons of ordnance in 428 flight hours.

12. Air Defense/Control. N/A

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

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13. Special Operations

a. Heavy Hand - 12-21 November 1966.

b. Tally-Ho road reconnaissance - 19-30 November 1966.
7 Sorties with 1 divert and 3 Cancellations.
24 tons of bombs and 8 Lau-32 A/A delivered.

c. Radar surveys and CEP development missions were flown throughout the month.

14. Ground Defense. N/A

15. Command Relationships/Command and Control joined MAG-11 on 1 November 1966.

16. NBC Warfare. N/A

17. Training. 15 men FAM fired caliber .45 M3A1 machine gun on 27 November 1966. Troops made aware of security responsibility and importance with assignments to the defense of the flight line area. Officers received training through ACM's on Rules of Engagement, legal SOP, tactics, morest and arrested landings, ground and airfield operations. A read and initial file records subject material and is available to aircrews in the ready room.

18. Logistics. See enclosure (5).

19. Supply. N/A

20. Motor Transport. Motor transport availability was 78% for the six vehicles allotted to the Squadron.

21. Engineering. N/A

22. Maintenance. N/A

23. Avionics. N/A

24. Base Development/Construction. Marine Corps property tent relocated from Group to Squadron's billeting area. Six additional huts were constructed for billeting in the Squadron area.

25. Communication/Electronics. N/A

Enclosure (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

[redacted]

3:EMW:rar
Ser: 003A34366

26. Ordnance Delivered

673 MK81's; 3236 MK82's; 215 MK83's 46 AN-M66 GP's; and 8 LAU 32 A/A rocket launchers.

Total ordnance expended 1,132.5 tons.

Enclosure (1)

[redacted]

MARINE ALL WEATHER ATTACK SQUADRON 242
Marine Aircraft Group 11
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, Pacific
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3:HW:rar
3710
30 November 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 11
(2) Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: Operation File Cabinet Post Exercise Report

Ref: (a) MCO Pac O 3710.3
(b) CO 3rd MAW msg 2121062 Nov 66

Encl: (1) VMA(AW)-242 Enroute Flight Packet
(2) Spare Parts and Support Equipment for A6 Deployment

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), the following report is submitted.

2. Abstract. Upon initial notification of this squadron's deployment by CMC, staff action was initiated for the planning and execution of the Trans Pac Movement. Detailed planning in the areas of Personnel, Logistics and Operations was begun, and at the same time liaison established with VMA-2 Cadre.

When firm dates were established, flight crew assignments were made; and maintenance personnel and equipment were distributed between the Pathfinder and Chase Aircraft.

On 20 October 1966, three four-plane divisions departed MCAS Cherry Point for MCAS El Toro on the first leg of the Trans Pac Movement. In-flight refueling was conducted over Walnut Ridge Arkansas. This point was selected because the time/distance factors duplicated those of the designated ARCP for the El Toro-Kaneohe leg.

The Trans Pac schedule allowed for a 48 hour delay at El Toro. However, due to a variety, of reasons (weather, refueler availability and A6's availability), five A6's of this squadron were directed to depart for MCAS Kaneohe on 21 October 1966. This decision was made although the squadron commander strongly urged a 24 hour delay to allow division integrity of four aircraft. Further discussion will be made in paragraph 5g.

ENCLOSURE (2)

The remaining aircraft left on 22 October, but one section returned to El Toro when one aircraft experienced a fire warning light. Maintenance personnel checked the aircraft over, but found no evidence of a fire and could not duplicate the fire warning on the deck. A sensor was replaced, and on 23 October, the section again departed El Toro and again had to abort for a fire warning light. Maintenance personnel worked on the aircraft and determined that a coupling had overheated the warning light system giving a false indication. The aircraft was test flown without incident on 23 October and the section proceeded to Kaneohe, Hawaii, on the 24th. The three divisions departed Kaneohe on schedule for Wake Island on 26 October 1966, refueling over Midway Island, which was the primary divert field if needed. The International Dateline was crossed and thus the date of arrival at Wake Island was 27 October 1966.

The next leg to Guam was uneventful except for the apparently arbitrary decision to launch two hours ahead of schedule. Fatigue of the personnel assigned to the Chase Aircraft was becoming a critical factor. On 29 October, another two-hour advance in departure time for Cubi Point was directed. Because of the fatigue factor (no bed rest for thirty-six hours) the squadron commander strongly recommended adherence to the original schedule. This request was approved. The squadron departed on the pre-planned schedule.

The two day layover at NAS Cubi Point allowed for a concentrated maintenance effort prior to the in-country leg of 1 November 1966. [redacted]-2-2 arrived at Da Nang, Republic of Viet Nam on 1 November 1966, completing the Trans Pac Movement on schedule.

3. Authority. Authority for this move was CINCPACFLT 091700Z Apr 66 as subsequently modified to effect the move.

4. Staff Responsibility. Not required.

5. Discussions, Conclusions and Recommendations

a. Training

(1) Discussion - Specific flight training was undertaken to accomplish three tasks; determine the fuel specifics for the J52 P6 engine (all fuel data charts were for the J52 P6 engine); provide additional training in max gross weight operations; and regain all aircrews in daylight in-flight refueling at high gross weights.

(2) Conclusions - This training, directed specifically to the Trans Pac Movement, proved to be invaluable and contributed significantly to the success of the operation.

ENCLOSURE (2)

(3) Recommendations - That all squadrons conduct a similar training program. A procedure for in-flight refueling for A6 aircraft was developed and is strongly recommended for all squadrons operating the aircraft. The technique is to lower the flaps/slats to the T/O position approaching the assigned drogue. This configuration allows for greater stability of the aircraft and precludes the requirement for the tanker to toboggan as the maximum fuel load is reached. This procedure has been submitted via appropriate channels for incorporation in the A6 NATOPS Manual.

b. Planning

(1) Discussion - Representatives of VMA(AW)-242 were directed to report to the Trans Pac Planning Staff, 3rd MAW for final planning. Anticipated Trans Pac profiles were conducted to once again verify fuel specifics for the J52 P8 engine.

Planning at the squadron level was begun about two months prior to the anticipated departure date. This included procurement of the necessary charts and publications, reproducing "Howgozit" charts, and incorporating all available information into individual flight packets. One packet was assigned to each aircraft and included route cards, range control charts, movement schedules, fuel graphs (Howgozit), standard enroute publications and a blank intinerary rough for administrative purposes. This detailed planning phase required approximately one month to complete.

(2) Conclusions - The flight packets aided the crews in the organizing, planning and execution of each leg. Crews felt that the packets kept them "well ahead" throughout the Trans Pac. In addition, the predicted fuel usage graphs - updated enroute - in each aircraft gave excellent data for future use by squadrons operating similar aircraft. It was discovered on these graphs that higher indicated mach numbers shortened the enroute time and did not measurably increase fuel consumption. The blank itinerary form helped the crews record this and other data. It should be noted that, based upon VMA(AW)-242's experience, it appears entirely feasible to Trans Pac A-6A aircraft without in-flight refueling should the necessity arise.

(3) Recommendations - The flight packet utilized by this squadron is incorporated as enclosure (1), to this report. It is strongly recommended that a similar packet be utilized by other squadrons.

c. Personnel

(1) Discussion - The squadron deployed with the authorized manning level in officer and enlisted strength. Because of the pilot strength authorized and administrative requirement such as the advanced echelon, there were only 12 pilots to man the twelve aircraft. This was not true for the B/N strength which allowed four spare B/N's to accompany the Trans Pac movement.

ENCLOSURE (2)

(2) Conclusions - Whenever possible spare crew members should accompany the flight movement to cover unforseen draw downs on aircrew strength; i.e. illness or injury. Switching of aircrews will also allow each squadron crew member to receive the benefits of this training.

(3) Recommendation - That the maximum number of crew members participate in the Trans Pac movement.

d. Operations

(1) Discussion - Because of the detailed planning and briefings conducted, the execution of the Trans Pac was relatively trouble free. One area of concern, however, was the apparent elimination of the squadron commander from the decision making process in the Trans Pac movement, including those areas associated with safety of flight, unit tactical integrity, and administrative control of the squadron's specific interests in the ferry movement.

In some cases (El Toro to Kaneohe, Wake to Guam, Guam to Cubi) schedule changes had not been passed to all supporting activities, causing some communication/navigation agencies not being on station nor thoroughly briefed, and being confused as to what was actually occurring.

(2) Conclusions - While the necessity of a single co-ordinator and director is well recognized, this function should not in effect bypass the squadron commander and relegate this officer to the position of an element flight leader.

Confusion exists when all agencies are not aware of last minute schedule changes.

(3) Recommendation - The squadron commander's position should not be diluted, but in fact he should assume a very real position in decisions affecting his unit.

That all agencies supporting the operation be informed by the most rapid means of all schedule changes.

e. Logistics

(1) Discussion - Significant problems in the area of logistics support were most notable in the aircraft maintenance field. This in part can be attributed to the apparent world wide shortage of A6/EA6 spare parts and support equipment. Therefore VA(AW)-242 departed [redacted] Cherry Point with anticipated spare parts with little or no chance of procurement enroute.

ENCLOSURE (2)

One area of particular concern was the scheduling of the Pathfinder and Chase Aircraft. After the departure from [redacted] Kaneohe subsequent scheduling of the maintenance aircraft was such that there was no overlap at the stop over bases. This situation resulted unnecessarily delays in correcting gripes and no cross talk between maintenance crews. In many cases the Chase Aircraft personnel were afforded little or no sleep between arrival and departure at stop over points.

Billeting in most cases was satisfactory. However, enlisted billeting had not been arranged for at [redacted] Kaneohe. Confusion existed over officer billeting at Cubi Point which may have resulted from the unscheduled arrival of the Oriskany in port.

Most of Kaneohe, "Ala Cabinet" ceased to have any meaning to supporting activities and [redacted].

(2) Conclusions - Spare parts and maintenance skills for A-6 aircraft must be a self contained capability. Maintenance crews on the Chase and Pathfinder Aircraft must be allowed sufficient overlap to ensure continuity of the maintenance effort. Scheduling should be arranged so that fatigue in maintenance crews is an important consideration as that of the flight crews.

In some cases administrative requirements were not known by support activities (billeting at Kaneohe and Cubi Point).

(3) Recommendations - Until the spare part and support picture for the A-6 improves the deploying squadron should thoroughly plan for their own requirements enroute. To insure this, the squadron must be placed on the highest priority at least thirty days prior to deployment.

The maintenance aircraft must be assured of at least a four hour overlap to ensure maintenance continuity and effort.

Every effort should be made to insure that all activities enroute are aware of the operation in progress to preclude misunderstanding and possible delays.

Aircraft spare and support equipment considered to be adequate is listed in enclosure (2).

1. Communications

(1) Discussion - Communications were adequate although some frequency congestion was experienced on the legs where refueling was conducted. Those required by the squadron [redacted] equipment of the Movement Control Team was excellent.

(2) Conclusion - The frequency congestion on the primary frequency was experienced on those legs where refueling was conducted.

ENCLOSURE (2)

(3) Recommendation - If possible once voice contact is made with the refueler force the aircraft engaged in the refueling switch to the secondary frequency.

g. Remarks

(1) Discussion - From the standpoint of this squadron, the Trans Pac was completely successful. It was evident that the schedule was quite realistic and prudent. It permitted both schedule advancements on short notice (i.e. 24 hour advance From El Toro, 2 hour advance from Wake, 2 hour advance from Cubi Point) and maintenance aborts (one aircraft 36 hours at El Toro). However, there were dangers introduced by some of these scheduled changes that were evident to the squadron commander, such as the necessity to use any available personnel for the receiving of the aircraft at way stations, the break-down in continuity between "Pathfinder" and "Maintenance" (chase) echelons, and the possibility of boxing in a flight carefully pre-briefed against single plane operations. With the good communications available, it seem totally arbitrary to effectively eliminate these considerations from the decision making process, no matter how compelling the reasons for schedule changes at the Movement Control level. Only one message was received directly by this command from Movement Control and this was a directive in nature. All other communications were verbal via the Movement Control Liaison Team Officers, effectively making any input from the squadron commander assume the aspects of a protest. In comparison, at Kaneohe, where it was possible to effect personal liaison with Movement Control, a course of action to catch up the two aircraft delayed at El Toro was arrived at which fully considered the requirements of the squadron and the over-all movement.

(2) The pre-planning provided an excellent space-time framework, with a necessary regard for flexibility in both fore-shortening and stretch-out. In the execution of the inevitable schedule adjustments, however, the ultimate responsible officer, the unit commander, was not afforded adequate input, and vital considerations could well have been lost.

(3) The unit commander should be aware of the requirements for schedule changes as they apply to his command and his recommendations solicited before change are final and directive in nature.

H. W. [illegible]

ENCLOSURE (2)

SPARE PARTS AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR A6 DEPLOYMENT

1. The following list of spare parts and support equipment is submitted to aid future deploying A6 squadrons, in Trans Pac planning. It is recommended that these items be included on the maintenance aircraft.

A. General Support Equipment.

1. One hydraulic jenny 28-30 GPM.
2. One complete set of aircraft jacks (including: wing, nose, tail and two wheel jacks).
3. One sealant gun with caulking compound.
4. One oil bowser - check and fill cart.
5. One hydraulic check and fill cart.
6. Two MK 8 bomb hoists.

B. Special Support Equipment.

1. Two tow bars.
2. Four wing jury struts.
3. One test box, constant speed drive.
4. Two small portable air bottles.
5. One hydraulic servicing cart.
6. Main and Nose Axle wrenches.
7. Cross over adapters for hydraulic jenny.
8. One set of jack pads.
9. One front and rear engine adaptor assembly.
10. One set of rigging throw boards.
11. Meters for electric shop and various repair kits for hydraulic shop.
12. Four nose and four main wheels (built up) plus six main and four nose tires, including "O" rings and fuselage plugs.
13. Two brake assemblies
14. One set hydraulic filters.
15. One set wires, IFB, and section "B".
16. As many hand tools as possible.
17. As much AN, 57 gear as possible.

ENCLOSURE (2)

[redacted] ROSTER OF AWARDS [redacted]

LTCOL H. WOLF - Gold star in lieu of his 7th Air Medal on the 18th

LTCOL E. E. JACOBSON - 1st Air Medal on the 21st

MAJOR F. J. CONE - 1st Air Medal on the 20th

MAJOR J. A. MARTIN - 1st Air Medal on the 19th

MAJOR J. M. McGARVEY - 1st Air Medal on the 20th

CAPT J. A. ANDERST - 1st Air Medal on the 21st

CAPT J. H. BENTLEY - 1st Air Medal on the 29th

CAPT J. BUTCHKO - 1st Air Medal on the 21st

CAPT J. E. CARLTON - 1st Air Medal on the 21st

CAPT C. E.DIXON - 1st Air Medal on the 23rd

CAPT J. K. ENGSTROM - 1st Air Medal on the 23rd

CAPT T. W. GILLEY - 1st Air Medal on the 22nd

CAPT J. J. HAHN - 1st Air Medal on the 21st

CAPT E.A. HARCSAR - 1st Air Medal on the 24th

CAPT K. D. HORNBACHER - 1st Air Medal on the 23rd

CAPT R. G. MIZE - 1st Air Medal on the 18th

CAPT R. L. OETTING - 1st Air Medal on the 21st

CAPT S. P. PORCARI - 1st Air Medal on the 23rd

CAPT J. T. RANDALL - 1st Air Medal on the 19th

CAPT J. D. SEALE - 1st Air Medal on the 24th

CAPT R. L. SPRINGFIELD - 1st Air Medal on the 27th

CAPT R. C. TINSLEY - 1st Air Medal on the 20th

CAPT J. M. WARSHAW - 1st Air Medal on the 21st

CAPT E. M. WEBER - 1st Air Medal on the 20th

1/LT C. A. CLARK - 1st Air Medal on the 28th

1/LT R. E. KEARNS - 1st Air Medal on the 23rd

1/LT J. L. KLINGERMAN - 1st Air Medal on the 22nd

1/LT D. E. SAARELA - 1st Air Medal on the 24th

1/LT R. W. SHELTON - 1st Air Medal on the 23rd

2/LT H. A. KLING - 1st Air Medal on the 21st

2/LT G. M. SMITH - Gold Star in lieu of his 14th Air Medal

2/LT E. YOUNG - 1st Air Medal on the 20th

CWO-2 D. E. WILSON - 1st Air Medal on the 21st

[redacted]

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MARINE ALL WEATHER ATTACK SQUADRON 242
Marine Aircraft Group 11
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, Pacific
c/o FPO San Francisco, California 96602

VMA (AW)-242 S&C FILES
Log No 0346-66
Distribution
Copy 3 of 5

HU/USP/cdb
4/1400
9 DEC 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 11
(Attn: S-4)

Subj: A6A SITREP (U)

Ref: (a) CMC Spd Ltr 04:SDC:ale Ctd 7 December 1966

Encl: (1) A6A SITREP

1. In accordance with instruction contained in Reference (a), the A6A SITREP is stated for the month of November 1966 in Enclosure (1).

H. WOLF

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[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (4)

[redacted]
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[illegible]

1. Average Daily Availability

   a. (Airframe and Engine) "Flyable Aircraft" ____9____

   b. Average System Availability (With/Without Track Radar) ____2 / 2____

   c. Engine, Airframe and System, With/Without Track Radar ____2 / 2____

2. Utilization

A. Day Sorties Scheduled/Flown	211/ 165*
A.1. Day Sorties Visual Delivery Only	6
A.2. Day Sorties System Up	55
B. Night Sorties Scheduled/Flown	207 / 151
B.1. Night Sorties TPQ-10 delivery	148
B.2. Night Sorties System Delivery	41
C. Total Hours Day/Night	270.9/207.5
D. Refueler/Tanker Sorties	0
E. Ordnance Sorties	221
F. Ferry/Test Sorties	12 / 7
G. Total Sorties	319

3. System Statistics Based Upon __319__ Sorties

A.	Launch	Target	Landing
System (%)	No/%	No/%	No/%
Computer	45.7	40.6	36.4
Inertial Platform	52.6	50.1	49.7
Search Radar	63.0	49.0	40.8
Track Radar	39.1	24.3	16.6
Doppler Nav	47.6	42.3	41.6
Radar Alt	80.2	79.7	79.2
VDI	61.4	60.0	59.0

   B. Over Target Full System/Auto Delivery Capability __21.4 %__

4. Supply Categories

	Ave No A/C	Ave No Items	[illegible]
(1) [illegible]	2	[illegible]	XX
(2) [illegible]	11	[illegible]	XX
(3) Weapons System [illegible]	9	27	XX
(4) [illegible] 02	XX [illegible]		
(5) [illegible] 05	[illegible]-11		

* Of the indicated 69 cancellations: 26 day/45 night cancellations ~~due to [illegible]~~ by higher authority, 14 day/5 night cancellations due to aircraft availability.

Enclosure (1)

UNCLASSIFIED
[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (4)

HIGH CANNIBALIZATION ITEMS				
[redacted]	P/N	FSN		
[redacted]	761546	NG 1280-872-3963	7 Times	15.3 M/H
	199-22000	NG 5841-877-6992	PAIN	5 Times 6.0 M/H
	199-19080	NG 5841-866-5593	PAIN	5 Times 9.0 M/H
TRANSDUCER	SLP-2303	NG 6610-571-1811	VTAS	5 Times 2.7 M/H
COMPUTER-NAVIGATION	761545	NG 1280-872-3970	VCPG	4 Times 9.5 M/H
NAV. COMPUTER	636363	NG 6605-872-1720	VCSP	4 Times 9.0 M/H
CONTROL UNIT	1123-58000	NG 5841-909-1362	PAIN	4 Times 7.1 M/H

58.6 man hours expended moving 29 parts

C. Operationally Ready A/C 208 NORS 26.1% NMCS 53.8%

5. Target acquisition/delivery mode/control

A. Day Visual operations 166 Sorties 287.00 Tons ordnance expended.

a. (1) Under TPQ Control 57 Sorties 213.00 Tons

(2) TAC/TACA Control 3 Sorties 3.75 Tons

(3) Pilot Control 9 Sorties 21.50 Tons

(4) Weapons System Control 3 Sorties 6.00 Tons

B. Night Visual Operations

(1) Under TPQ Control 140 Sorties 763.75 Tons

(2) Under Flares Pilot Control 0 Sorties 0 Tons

(3) Under Weapons System Control 10 Sorties 36.50 + 9B-5 Tons

C. IFR Operations

(1) Under TPQ Control 0 Sorties 0 Tons

(2) Under Weapons System Control (direct) 0 Sorties 0 Tons

(3) Under Weapons System Control (offset) 0 Sorties 0 Tons

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (4)

MARINE ALL WEATHER ATTACK SQUADRON 242
Marine Aircraft Group 11
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, Pacific
c/o FPO San Francisco, California 96602

JAM/rah
4000
3 DEC 66

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer Marine Aircraft Group Eleven
(Attn: S-4)

Subj: Logistics Summary Report (Log Sum)

Ref: (a) MAG-11 Spd Ltr 04:SDC:jhk Dtd 28Oct66

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following information is submitted:

A. Status

Type	Average Percent OR	Average Percent NORS	Average Percent NORM
A6-A	18	25	57

Comment: The operational readiness of this squadron for the reporting period was well below that required by OPNAVINST 05442.4A. The 25% NORS monthly average was due to two primary factors.

(1) Removal of avionic components from the aircraft and introduction into the IMA without replacement from rotable pool.
(2) The excessive time lag between introduction of component to IMA-determination of repairability at IMA-necessaity to put component on requisition, and processing of the requisitioned item.

As of this date 38 major components are on Priority 02 requisition. During the past 30 days 10 Priority 02 requisitions have been supplied. Additionally during the past 30 days, 232 major components have been turned into the IMA and determined repairable, with 176 returned RFI.

The 57% NORM, again excessive by OPNAVINST 05442.4A standards, is attributed primarily to inadequacy in ground support equipment availability.

ENCLOSURE (5)

Over the past 30 days this squadron has averaged 1 NC-10, or substitute, A/C power generating equipment per day; 2-HR2 air conditioner per day; 2 gas turbine starting units per day. Historically, this squadron has documented a need for a minimum of 7 NC-10's or substitutes, 4 NR-3A/NR-5 air conditioners and 4 gas turbine compressor starting units per day to support scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, and flight operations, Additionally, maintenance must be interupted during periods of bad weather due to non-avilability of aircraft shelter. This situation should be relieved, along with some aux. aircraft power generating requirements when full occupancy of the programmed hangars is effected.

Contributing to the NORM rate are the components deadlined at the IMA awaiting repair and for which no requisitions may be executed. The status of the aircraft to which these boxes are chargeable is therefore NORM.

B. Critical Items

FSN	NOMANCLATURE	NO. DOCS DURING PERIOD
RQ 6610-671-1811 VTMG	AOA PROBE	10
RG 6610-942-5104 VAXG	ALTITUDE MODULE	2
RG 6620-970-9113 VJQZ	FUEL FLOW INDICATOR	5
RG 6620-972-8491 VJPX	RPM INDICATOR	6
RG 6615-531-6389 VUBC	MA-1 GYRO	4

C. Significant Problems

In summary, the high NORM and NORS rate experienced over the past 30 days is attributable to:

1. In adequancies in available support equipment.
2. No replacements for removed avionics components either from rotable pool, Priority 02 requisitions, or repaired components from IMA.

H. WOLF

ENCLOSURE (5)