

MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 262
 Detachment Alpha
 Marine Aircraft Group 15
 Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade
 FPO San Francisco, 96602

S-3:RLG:gmc
 5750
 03A00368
 3 January 1968

From: Officer-In-Charge
 To: Commander, Task Group 79.5

Subj: Command Chronology, Period 1 December 1967 to 3 January 1968

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67

* Encl: M(1) Command Chronology

✓(3) *After Action Report, Operations Badger Tooth*
 1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is hereby submitted. *26 Dec - 2 Jan*

2. This letter becomes unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

D. L. Althoff
 D. L. ALTHOFF

* (2) *4/a, Opn FORTRESS RIDGE, 21-24 Dec 68*

SLF Task Group 79.5
 SEC Control No 0967

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22 A, HMM-262
 CMD CHRON

1 DEC - 2 JAN 1968

COMMAND CHRONOLOGYPART I1. Organizational Data - HMM262, Detachment Alpha

a. Officer-In-Charge	D. L. ALTHOFF, MAJOR, 1Dec67 - 3Jan68
b. Operations Officer	G. L. LARKIN, MAJOR, 1Dec67 - 15Dec67 R. L. GATEWOOD, CAPT, 16Dec67 - 3Jan68
c. S-1 Officer	W. A. JULIAN, CAPT 1Dec67 - 9Dec67 R. F. YEAGER, CAPT 10Dec67 - 3Jan68
d. S-2 Chief	J. Jr. BEEUMEN, SSgt 1Dec67 - 3Jan68
e. Logistics Officer	J. A. COOPER, 1STLT 1Dec67 - 3Jan68
f. Maintenance Officer	R. G. RITCHIE, MAJOR 1Dec67 - 15Dec67 G. L. LARKIN, MAJOR 16Dec67 - 3Jan68

2. Task Organization and Unit Location

a. HMM-262, Detachment Alpha, Marine Aircraft Group-15, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade, FPO San Francisco, California 96602.

3. Average Strength of Detachment Alpha

a. <u>Naval Aviators</u>	<u>AGO</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
16	0	55

4. Important Visitors to Detachment Alpha

a. None

PART II

- 1 December 1967 - Launched three aircraft in support of the SLF. They flew 49 sorties and carried 120 troops of which 41 were med-evacs carried from the USS SANCTUARY to G-4 Med Bn. 31,200 lbs. of ice cream and milk was helo lifted to the USS VALLEY FORGE.
- 2 December 1967 - Launched four aircraft in support of the SLF. They flew 97 sorties, carrying 3400 lbs. of cargo, and 664 troops for a total of 9.6 flight hours.
- 3 December 1967 - No flight operations. Enroute to Subic Bay, Philippines.
- 4 December 1967 - Launched seven aircraft to relocate the Detachment from the USS Valley Forge to NAS, Cubi Pt., Philippines. They

Enclosure (1)

carried 32 troops, 10,544 lbs. of cargo for a total of 12 sorties, 10 tasks and 3.7 flight hours.

- 5 December 1967 - Launched four aircraft for unit training. They carried 27 troops for a total of 24 sorties, 1 task and 12.1 flight hours.
- 6 December 1967 - Launched three aircraft for unit training in support of the SLF. They flew 81 sorties for a total of 7.6 flight hours. Two aircraft were launched to assist in the investigation of the wreckage of an S-2 aircraft. They flew 11 sorties, carrying a total of 2 passengers and 200 lbs. of cargo in 9.3 flight hours.
- 7 December 1967 - Launched three aircraft in support of the SLF. They flew 33 sorties and 6 tasks and carried 52 troops in 12.1 flight hours. Two aircraft were launched in support of NAS Cubi. They carried 4 passengers for a total of 10 sorties, 5 tasks and 7.6 flight hours.
- 8 December 1967 - Launched five aircraft in support of the SLF. They carried 4,350 lbs. of cargo and 691 troops for a total of 121 sorties and 20.9 flight hours.
- 9 December 1967 - Launched four aircraft in support of the SLF. They carried 171 passengers and 1,350 lbs. of cargo for a total of 62 sorties and 10.4 flight hours.
- 10 December 1967 - Launched five aircraft in support of the SLF. They carried 5,360 lbs. of cargo and 522 troops for a total of 67 sorties and 13.4 flight hours.
- 11 December 1967 - Launched three aircraft in support of the SLF. They carried 9,950 lbs. of cargo and 124 troops for a total of 84 sorties 24 tasks and 13.7 flight hours.
- 12 December 1967 - Launched five aircraft in support of the SLF. They carried 399 troops and 35,300 lbs. of cargo for a total of 96 sorties, 60 tasks and 16.0 flight hours.
- 13 December 1967 - Launched five aircraft in support of SLF. They carried 10,600 lbs. of cargo, 104 troops for a total of 100 sorties, 33 tasks and 15.5 flight hours.
- 14 December 1967 - Launched seven aircraft in support of the SLF. They carried 164 troops and 22,200 lbs. of cargo for a total 33 sorties, 25 tasks and 8.5 flight hours.
- 15 December 1967 - Launched five aircraft in support of the SLF. They

Enclosure (1)

carried 1360 troops and 5300 lbs. of cargo for a total of 139 tasks, 265 sorties and 31.4 flight hours.

- 16 December 1967 - Launched six aircraft in support of the SLF. They carried 545 troops, and 25,300 lbs. of cargo for a total of 126 sorties and 14.7 flight hours.
- 17 December 1967 - Launched three aircraft for day and night Carrier Qualifications. They flew 129 sorties for a total of 8.9 flight hours.
- 18 December 1967 - No flight operations. Enroute to Area of Operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
- 19 December 1967 - Launched five aircraft in support of the SLF. They carried 169 troops and 10,930 lbs. of cargo for a total of 74 sorties 45 tasks and 19.5 flight hours.
- 20 December 1967 - Launched five aircraft in support of the SLF. They flew 65 sorties and 25 tasks for a total of 21.5 flight hours. They carried 5500 lbs. of cargo and 81 troops.
- 21 December 1967 - Launched five aircraft in support of Operation FORTRESS RIDGE. They carried 28 med-evacs, 718 troops and 16,200 lbs. of cargo for a total of 146 sorties, 86 tasks and 33.1 flight hours.
- 22 December 1967 - Launched three aircraft in support of Operation FORTRESS RIDGE. They flew 11.2 flight hours accounting for 22 tasks and 36 sorties.
- 23 December 1967 - Launched five aircraft in support of Operation FORTRESS RIDGE. They carried 1 med-evac, 63 troops and 22,375 lbs. of cargo for a total of 53 sorties, 37 tasks and 16.6 flight hours.
- 24 December 1967 - Launched seven aircraft in support of Operation FORTRESS RIDGE. They carried 770 troops and 18,580 lbs. of cargo in 123 sorties for a total of 25.3 flight hours. Five aircraft were launched on admin/liasion flights. They carried 61 troops and 14,800 lbs. of cargo in 28 sorties and 10.6 flight hours.
- 25 December 1967 - Launched four aircraft in support of the SLF. They carried 16,000 lbs. of cargo and 144 troops, for a total of 55 sorties, 32 tasks and 7.1 flight hours.
- 26 December 1967 - Launched eight aircraft in support of Operation BADGER-TOOTH. They carried 1000 lbs. of cargo and 743 troops.

Enclosure (1)

for a total of 114 sorties, 58 tasks and 20.2 flight hours.

27 December 1967 - Launched six aircraft in support of OPERATION BADGERTOOTH. They carried 16.7 tons of cargo, 63 med-evacs and 216 troops for a total of 92 sorties, 60 tasks and 36.6 flight hours. One aircraft ET-44, BUNO 152557 was downed on the beach by enemy fire. A maintenance team was launched and the aircraft returned at 1730H.

28 December 1967 - Launched five aircraft in support of Operation BADGER-TOOTH. They carried 45,775 lbs. of cargo, 63 med-evacs and 23 troops for a total of 72 sorties, 70 tasks and 21.8 flight hours.

29 December 1967 - Launched five aircraft in support of Operation BADGERTOOTH. They carried 15,600 lbs. of cargo, and 32 troops for a total of 18 sorties, 17 tasks and 4.3 flight hours.

30 December 1967 - Launched six aircraft in support of Operation BADGER-TOOTH. They carried 16,450 lbs. of cargo, 36 med-evacs and 5 troops for a total of 14.8 flight hours.

31 December 1967 - Launched four aircraft in support of Operation BADGER-TOOTH. They carried 10 med-evacs and 22 troops, 8,660 lbs. of cargo for a total of 27 sorties, 17 tasks and 5.3 flight hours.

1 January 1968 - Launched six aircraft in support of Operation BADGERTOOTH. They carried 12,200 lbs. of cargo, 1 med-evac and 224 troops, for a total of 50 sorties, 32 tasks and 12.7 flight hours.

2 January 1968 - Launched six aircraft in support of Operation BADGERTOOTH. They carried 36,510 lbs. of cargo, 525 troops for a total of 63 tasks, 128 sorties and 25.4 hours.

PART III

1. Listing of Significant Events

a. Personnel

(1) Transfers to HMM-262 Detachment Alpha

(a) Three Pilots: Lt. B. R. ARCHER
Lt. S. P. FICKEL
Lt. M. R. MULLEN

Enclosure (1)

(2) Transfers from HMM-262 Detachment Alpha

- (a) Three Pilots: Major D. R. RITCHIE
Captain W. A. JULIAN
Captain G. L. SEFULVADO

(3) Promotions to Present Grade

- (a) Captain S. B. DICKY
(b) Captain J. B. MURRAY
(c) Sergeant H. L. COLLINS

(4) Emergency Leave

- (a) LCPL R. A. GILLASPIE - 17 December 1967

b. Operations

Operations FORTRESS RIDGE: Detachment Alpha carried 107,355 lbs. of cargo, 1748 troops, 55 med-evacs in 386 sorties for 182 tasks accounting for 96.8 flight hours.

Operation BADGERTOOTH: Detachment Alpha carried 149,619 lbs. of cargo, 1854 troops, 169 med-evacs in 495 sorties for 311 tasks accounting for 127.2 flight hours.

c. Training

1. During the period 4 Dec 67 - 17 Dec 67, Detachment Alpha conducted instrument training flights for all pilots. During the same period the detachment participated in a landing exercise with BLT 3/1 and the USS VALLEY FORGE.

2. On 13 Dec 67 all new pilots participated in day and night field carrier landing practice.

3. On 17 Dec 67 all detachment Alpha pilots were day and night carrier qualified.

d. Awards

1. None

e. Informational Services

1. None

MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 262

Detachment Alpha
 Marine Aircraft Group 15
 Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade
 FPO San Francisco, 96602

3:WHB:wab
 3480
 003A36267
 28 December 1967

[REDACTED] - NOFORN

From: Officer-In-Charge
 To: Commander, Task Group 79.5

Subj: After Action Report, Operation **FORTESS RIDGE**: submission of

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67

Encl: (1) Chronology of Significant Events
 (2) Analysis of Helicopter Operations
 (3) Statistical Summary

1. In accordance with the instruction contained in reference (a), enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are submitted.

2. This letter may be downgraded to Unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1), (2) and (3).

D. L. Althoff
 D. L. ALTHOFF

SLF Task Group 79.5
 S&C Control No 00968

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ALFA, NMM-262

ALFA **FORTESS RIDGE**

21-04-1067

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CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

21 December 1967

Plagued with last minute maintenance problems, Detachment Alpha launched three aircraft on L-Hour of D-Day. The initial build up began in LZ ROBIN(YD288718). Landing zones HAWK(YD300729) and EAGLE(YD310710) were used as the landing zones for the remainder of the heliborne companies. After three hours of flight, mortar fire was received in landing zone HAWK which continued until dark. No aircraft were damaged. A total of 28 med-evacs were helo lifted out of three positions: YD297732, YD297740 and YD313710. Along with the 718 troops inserted on Operation FORTRESSRIDGE, 16,200 lbs. of cargo were carried by the three aircraft.

One aircraft was sent to Danang on an emergency med-evac mission and remained over night at Marble Mountain because of maintenance problems. The aircraft returned to the USS VALLEY FORGE early the next day.

22 December 1967

Resupply, med-evac and administrative/liaison flights were conducted in support of the operation this day. Lima Company was resupplied at YD285696; Mike and India Companies at YD303737; and the Command Post at YD310700. Three aircraft carried 35,400 lbs. of combat cargo, 107 combat troops and 12 med-evacs.

23 December 1967

Routine resupply, med-evac and administrative flights were conducted in support of the operation. Mike and India Companies were resupplied at YD310741; Lima Company at YD185695 and the Command Post at YD310700. Five aircraft carried 22,375 lbs. of combat cargo, 64 combat troops and 13 med-evacs.

Two aircraft were launched at 1920 on a night emergency med-evac to coordinates YD335703. One heat case was returned safely to the USS VALLEY FORGE.

24 December 1967

Operation FORTRESS RIDGE was terminated this date by extracting Mike, India and Headquarters Company from YD313716, YD340700, and YD321717, with seven aircraft.

Including the administrative flights seven aircraft carried 33,380 lbs. of cargo, 831 combat troops and one med-evac.

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CASUALTIES:

None

INTELLIGENCE/COUNTER INTELLIGENCE:

<u>A/C Fired On</u>	<u>Incidents</u>	<u>A/C Hit</u>	<u>No. Hits</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Hours</u>
3	0	0	0	386	94.8

BREAKDOWN OF FIRE INCIDENTS WITH RESPECT TO ALTITUDE:

<u>ALTITUDE</u>	<u>INCIDENTS</u>	<u>A/C HITS</u>	<u>A/C LOST</u>
0-499	3	0	0
500-999	0	0	0
1000-1499	0	0	0
1500-2000	0	0	0

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Enclosure (1)

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ANALYSIS OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

1. General

Operation FORTRESS RIDGE began at 211000H December 1967 by a combined heliborne and waterborne assault through landing zones EAGLE, ROBIN and HAWK and over designated beaches at H and L-Hour on D-Day. Subsequent helo lifts were made into LZ's HAWK, ROBIN and EAGLE. The operations were executed in the following four phases: 1) Through a rapid build up of LF ashore and aggressive movement to secure the LF objectives. 2) Through conducting an aggressive search and destroy operation within the AOA to capture, destroy enemy forces and rockets, logistic caches and obtain intelligence. 3) Through preparedness for employment around the A-3 position. 4) Through an amphibious and heliborne withdrawal.

2. Analysis

a. Ship-to-Shore Operations

1. In accordance with the landing plan, six CH-46A's were to conduct the first heliborne wave from the LPH to LZ HAWK. These same aircraft were to make subsequent assault waves into adjacent LZ's EAGLE and ROBIN thereby providing the initial shock effect and a rapid troop build-up ashore. The initial shock effect was provided by (1) air strike and artillery bombardment of the zone and (2) entering these three LZ's by a low level high speed approach started at the shore line. This tactical maneuver proved very effective due to the closeness of the zones to the shore line, and the nearness of the DMZ. On call fixed wing aircraft and naval gunfire were employed and controlled by the TAC(A) gunships.

2. Because of the extensive deck space, no launching problems were encountered and the launch plans were met. The launch plan called for launching six CH-46A's and three UH-1E's for the initial assault wave. These aircraft were all spotted, and when three of the CH-46A's went down, they were folded and respotted in the standby pack without difficulty.

3. All subsequent assault waves were executed smoothly in accordance with the landing plan.

4. The augmentation of the SLF helicopter assets consisted of two UH-1E gunship escorts plus one UH-1D Slick provided by the 1st MAW. UH-1E's provided vital TAC(A) armed escort support in addition to marking the zones for resupply and medical evacuations.

b. Ashore Operations

(1) Flight operations ashore consisted of the normal resupply, medical evacuation, troop transport and administrative missions by the

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CH-46A's, and C&C and TAC(A)/gunship support mission by the UH-1E's.

2. The TACP and LZ Control Net started out on different frequencies, however, this created problems because the TACP frequency was incompatible with the helo FM radio and could not be dialed in. The TACP frequency was then changed to the LZ Control frequency. This frequency then became so crowded that it became necessary for the TACP to utilize a different frequency in order for the support helos to be able to maintain contact with LZ Control. This resulted in good control of the SLF helicopter support. Good communications between the helos and HST personnel in the landing zone was then maintained. The only other problem encountered was getting the HST up on the radios while helo resupply was in progress.

Outside air support by the 1st MAW consisted of an on-call fixed wing cover, and three UH-1E's for C&C and gunship escort.

c. Offloading Operations

The offloading operations consisted of the offloading of troops, supplies, and equipment from LPH-8 to LZ's ROBIN and EAGLE. Normal resupply and med-evac missions were carried out during the rest of the operation.

3. Problems Encountered

a. The squadron flew five aircraft, out of eight, for a total of 25 hours the day before the operation on administrative runs. As a result, maintenance crews worked all night and were only able to have six aircraft available for the launch. Three of these went down just prior to takeoff, leaving three aircraft for launching the first wave of the vertical assault. This could have been disastrous if the first wave would have encountered heavy enemy resistance. This also slowed down the build-up of troops on the beach.

b. The lack of coordination or control of the naval gunfire support resulted in the firing of naval gunfire across helicopter approach and retirement lanes to and from the beach. Helicopters had to be vectored several miles south of the designated helicopter lanes. This caused undue delay and made planning for refueling difficult.

|| c. It is of utmost importance for the LPH to maintain 15-30 knots of wind across the deck at all times during the initial phase of an operation in order for the heavy loaded helicopters to be launched and recover without delay. This can be accomplished by the ship maintaining a continuous port turn in light or no wind conditions. Thus maintaining the desired wind over the deck. In surface winds about 15 knots the ship might head directly into the wind and maintain steerageway with a minimum of movement within the operation area. This will prevent delays and delta time while the ship is forced to turn around and then build up wind each time it approaches AOA boundaries. This method will also keep the LPH centrally located within the AOA. "

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d. On several resupply missions, the CH-46A's were loaded internally with ammunition and cargo. This required a delay for loading on the flight deck and also caused the helicopter's to be in the landing zone for about 10 minutes while being unloaded. This could have been disastrous, especially with the constant threat of incoming mortars which was present during this operation. These resupplies should be done with external loads to expedite the resupplying and prevent the helicopters from sitting in the zone.

e. Due to the fact that several helicopters had inoperative external cargo hooks, the planning for external load pickups was made extremely difficult. At times, helicopters with good hooks were loaded internally and helicopters with bad hooks were requested for externals. Sufficient amounts of spare parts for hooks should be available at all times in order to keep the hooks in an up status.

f. External slings and nets should be provided to the BLT ashore well in advance of pickup time to allow them to be ready when the helicopters arrive. The lack of slings and nets caused approximately 30 minutes delay with a flight of helicopters circling the zone or within the immediate vicinity.

g. When carrying 15 troops during a lift, pilot should be advised by LZ Control if the troops are carrying heavy weapons for load computation reasons. This will prevent the helicopters from becoming overloaded and leave the safety factor necessary for climbing out of the zone.

4. Conclusions

a. That D-1 be a maintenance stand-down day in order to ensure maximum availability of squadron aircraft on D-Day. Missions could be consolidated to ensure the use of minimum number of aircraft and maximum number of aircraft available for maintenance work and inspections prior to a maximum effort on D-Day.

b. That closer coordination be established with Naval gunfire units to ensure that helicopter approach and retirement lanes are unrestricted, especially during the assault landing phase.

c. That whenever possible the ship remains in a port turn to reduce the amount of Delta time due to adverse winds across the deck, or that steerageway is maintained into the wind maintaining satisfactory winds with minimum turns.

d. That combat cargo and the BLT should coordinate more closely loads which could be carried more expeditiously externally than internally. This would reduce the loading time on the ship and also the time required for the unloading in the zone.

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e. The squadron must make every effort to maintain all external cargo hooks in an operating status to provide the flexibility required for resupply missions.

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STATISTICAL SUMMARYOPERATION FORTRESS RIDGE21-24 DECEMBER 1967

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>MED-EVACS</u>	<u>TASKS</u>	<u>FLIGHT HOURS</u>
21DEC	124	746	16,200	28	72	25.0
22DEC	58	107	35,400	12	12	19.3
23DEC	53	64	22,375	14	14	16.6
24DEC	<u>151</u>	<u>831</u>	<u>33,380</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>35.9</u>
TOTAL	386	1748	107,355	55	132	96.8

Enclosure (3)

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MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 262

Detachment Alpha
Marine Aircraft Group 15
Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade
FPO San Francisco, 96602

3 WJB:wab
3480
003A00368
8 January 1968

- NOFORM

From: Officer-In-Charge
To: Commander, Task Group 79.5

Subj: After Action Report, Operation BADGER TOOTH; submission of

Ref: (a) CTS-79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67

Encl: ✓(1) Chronology of Significant Events
✓(2) Analysis of Helicopter Operations
✓(3) Statistical Summary

1. In accordance with the instruction contained in reference (a), enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are submitted.
2. This letter may be downgraded to Unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1), (2) and (3).

D. L. ALTHOFF

SLF Task Group 79.5
S&C Control No 00966

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CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

26 December 1967 - HMM-262 Detachment Alpha launched eight aircraft in support of Operation BADGER TOOTH. They carried 1000 pounds of cargo and 743 troops for a total of 114 sorties, 58 tasks and 20.2 flight hours.

At 1230H on D-Day, 8 aircraft launched into LZ FINCH with the first assault wave. ET-40, BUNO 151942 took one hit from small arms fire, but continued with the troop lift. Subsequent waves followed until all committed troops were landed.

27 December 1967 - HMM-262 launched six aircraft in support of Operation BADGER TOOTH. They carried 33,400 pounds of cargo, 63 med-evacs and 216 troops for a total of 92 sorties, 60 tasks and 36.6 flight hours.

At 1430H, four aircraft were launched from the LPH to LZ FINCH with the Sparrow Hawk Company. At 1600H ET-44, BUNO 152557 was down on the beach by enemy fire while attempting to extract 15 med-evacs. The aircraft took two hits in the flight boost hydraulic system. At 1630H, a maintenance recovery team was launched and the aircraft was recovered at 1730H. At 1600H, four aircraft were launched to emergency resupply the companies in the field. The emergency resupply lasted until 2112H.

28 December 1967 - Five aircraft launched in support of Operation BADGER TOOTH. They carried 45,775 pounds of cargo, 63 med-evacs and 23 troops for a total of 72 sorties, 70 tasks and 21.8 flight hours.

At 0705H, three aircraft were launched to resupply the companies on the beach. The resupply lasted for three hours. At 1218H, two aircraft were launched for a resupply and med-evac lift.

29 December 1967 - Five aircraft launched in support of Operation BADGER TOOTH. They carried 15,600 pounds of cargo and 32 troops for a total of 18 sorties, 17 tasks and 4.3 flight hours.

At 0955H, one aircraft was launched for 5 emergency med-evacs at "L" Company. At 1202H, one aircraft was launched to pick up an emergency med-evac at "K" Company. At 1515H two aircraft were launched for

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normal resupply to the troops on the beach. At 1830H, one aircraft was launched on an emergency med-evac. Due to night IFR conditions, the aircraft was unable to locate the zone and returned to the LPH.

- 30 December 1967 - Six aircraft launched in support of Operation BADGER TOOTH. They carried 16,450 pounds of cargo, 36 med-evacs and 5 troops for a total of 14.8 flight hours. Normal resupply and med-evacs also took place the remainder of the day.
- 31 December 1967 - Four aircraft launched in support of Operation BADGER TOOTH. They carried 8660 pounds of cargo, 10 med-evacs and 22 troops for a total of 27 sorties, 17 tasks and 5.3 flight hours.
- 1 January 1968 - Six aircraft launched in support of Operation BADGER TOOTH. They carried 12,300 pounds of cargo, 1 med-evac and 224 troops for a total of 50 sorties, 32 tasks and 12.7 flight hours.

At 1700H, 5 aircraft were launched into Green Beach to back load one company.

- 2 January 1968 - Six aircraft launched in support of Operation BADGER TOOTH. They carried 36,510 pounds of cargo, 525 troops for a total of 128 sorties, 63 tasks and 25.4 flight hours.

At 0850H, six aircraft were launched to back load the BLT. The back load ended at 1040H which terminated the operation.

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CASUALTIES

a. None.

INTELLIGENCE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

<u>A/C Fire On</u>	<u>Incidents</u>	<u>A/C Hits</u>	<u>No Hit</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Hours</u>
13	16	3	3	495	127.2

Breakdown of fire incidents with respect to altitude:

<u>Altitude</u>	<u>Incidents</u>	<u>A/C Hits</u>	<u>A/C Lost</u>
0-499	14	3	0
500-999	0	0	0
1000-1499	0	0	0
1500-2000	2	0	0

Enclosure (1)

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ANALYSIS OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

1. General

Operation BADGER TOOTH began 261100H by landing elements of the BLT on Green Beach at H-Hour by LVT's. These elements then moved inland and secured Landing Zone FINCH. At 1230H on L-Hour, D-Day heliborne troops were landed in LZ FINCH from the LPH-8. Subsequent helo lifts were made into LZ FINCH until all committed troops were inserted. The operations were executed in the following four phases: (1) Through a combined heliborne and waterborne assault through designated landing zones and over designated beaches. (2) Through conducting a deliberate search and destroy operation within the AOA to capture, destroy enemy forces, logistics caches and interrupt enemy rice gatherings. (3) Through combined operations ashore as directed. (4) Through conducting an amphibious withdrawal.

The helicopter operational concept was sound and employed in accordance with FMFM 3-3.

2. Analysis

a. Ship-to-Shore Operations

(1) In accordance with the landing plan, eight CH-46A's conducted the first heliborne wave from the LPH to LZ FINCH. The same aircraft made continuous waves into LZ FINCH thereby providing a rapid troop build up ashore. The initial shock effect was provided by (1) Air strikes and naval gunfire in adjacent zones, (2) Entering this LZ by a low level, high speed approach starting at the shore line. This tactical maneuver proved very effective due to the closeness of this zone to the shore line. On-call fixed wing aircraft and Naval gunfire were employed and controlled by the TAG(A) gunships.

(2) Due to the extensive deck space, no launching or recovery problems were encountered in the initial phase of the operation. The launch plan called for launching eight CH-46A's and three UH-1E's for the initial wave. All the aircraft were spotted and launched without difficulty.

All subsequent assault waves were executed smoothly in accordance with the landing plan. The LPH did an outstanding job maintaining the desired winds across the deck throughout this phase.

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needed supplies in the field.

b. That a closer coordination be maintained between combat cargo and the B-4, to insure that prior to take off, the pilots are given the correct destination of the cargo aboard the aircraft. This will assure that the proper cargo will arrive at the correct destination with the minimum amount of delay.

Enclosure (2)

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STATISTICAL SUMMARYOPERATION BADGER TOOTH26 DECEMBER 1967 TO 2 JANUARY 1968

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>MED-EVAC</u>	<u>TASKS</u>	<u>FLIGHT HOURS</u>
26DEC67	114	743	1,000	0	58	20.2
27DEC67	92	279	33,470	63	67	36.6
28DEC67	72	86	44,775	49	70	21.8
29DEC67	18	32	15,600	10	17	4.3
30DEC67	42	41	16,450	36	19	14.8
31DEC67	27	32	8,660	10	17	5.3
1 JAN68	50	225	12,200	1	32	12.7
2 JAN68	80	416	17,460	0	38	11.5
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>495</u>	<u>1854</u>	<u>149,615 LBS</u>	<u>169</u>	<u>311</u>	<u>127.2</u>

Enclosure (3)

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(3) The augmentation of the SLF helicopter assets consisted of two UH-1E gunships escorts plus an UH-1E C&C provided by the First Marine Aircraft Wing. The UH-1E guns provided vital TAC(A) armed escort support in addition to marking the zones for resupply and medical evacuations.

b. Ashore Operations

(1) Flight operations ashore consisted of the normal resupply, medical evacuation, troop transport and administrative missions by the CH-46A's. This operation also called for launching the Sparrow Hawk Company into LZ FINCH and an emergency night resupply. The C&C and TAC(A) gunship support missions were flown by the UH-1E's.

(2) The TACP and LZ control nets were on different frequencies. This resulted in good control of the SLF helicopter support by keeping the LZ control net from becoming too crowded. Good communications between the helos and HST personnel in the landing zone was maintained.

Outside air support by the 1st MAW consisted of on-call fixed wing cover, and three UH-1E's for C&C and gunship escort.

c. Offloading Operations

The offloading operations consisted of the offloading of troops, supplies, and other equipment from the LPH into LZ FINCH and other LZ's. Normal resupply and med-evac missions were carried out during the rest of the operation. An emergency night resupply and the launching of the Sparrow-Hawk were also carried out.

3. Problems Encountered

a. One flight of helos was given the wrong destination coordinates and the wrong frequency for a LZ during a resupply mission. This caused a delay in the resupply, for the pilots were unable to locate the proper zone and talk to the LZ control.

b. On several occasions during resupply, helos were sent to a company's LZ with gear which was for another company. Several times while orbiting over the LZ, it was impossible to get confirmation as to where the supplies should go. This created undue delay in the resupplying, the shuffling around of gear by the helos between companies, and unnecessary orbit time. This could be disastrous in an emergency situation, for a company needing small arms ammunition will not have much success with a supply of mortar rounds.

4. Conclusions

a. That before coordinates and LZ frequencies are passed to the pilots they be checked for accuracy. This will prevent untimely delays of much

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Exposure (2)

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