MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 265 Marine Aircraft Group 15 Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

OPS/CCB/res 5750 9 August 1967



From: Commanding Officer

To: Commander, Task Group 79.5

Subj: Command Chronology, period 12 - 31 July 1967

(a) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67 Ref:

Encl: (1) Command Chronology In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is hereby submitted.

(3) After Action Report, Operation Boar Chair

This letter becomes unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

WILLIAM R. BEELER

TAL

Part I Organization Data

a. Commanding Officer

b. Lecutive Officer

c. Operations Officer

d. Administrative Officer

e. Material Officer

f. Maintenance Officer

g. Intelligence Officer

LtCol. W. R. BEELER

Maj. E. L. SANBORN

Maj. D. E. SCHNEIDER

Capt. D. W. ARISS

Capt. H. H. CLARK

Maj. C. H. PITMAN

Capt. S. T. HENICK

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265
 Marine Aircraft Group 15
 Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade
 FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

3. Average monthly strength: 40 Officers and 170 Enlisted.

Part II Narrative Summary

12 July 1967: HMM-265, under the command of LtCol. William R. BEELEK, onloaded aboard the LPH-10, relieving HMM-164 as supporting squadron to CTG 79.5. All flight operations were in the support of moving the squadron aboard from the Hue-Phu Bai Airfield.

13 July 1967: Four aircraft were launched to Dong Ha to carry out routine resupply and medical evacuation missions in support of BLT 2/3 during Phase II of Operation BEAVER TRACK. PLT 2/3 was in a blocking position near Cam Lo.

Routine administrative flights were conducted in support of the SLF and the LPH.

14 July 1967: BLT 2/3 was supported by four CH-46's on routine resupply and medical evacuations from Dong Ha.

At 0815, four CH-46's launched from LPH-10, on a simulated troop lift and feint operation from LZ Eagle to YD 045613. Enemy fire was received but no hits were taken. The flight made three simulated landings into the zone.

EP-160 sustained moderate battle damage from a land mine detonation in the Grey Rebel "E" LZ at YD 070635 during an emergency medical evacuation. Eight ground troops were wounded and one KIA resulted from the blast. These were medevaced by EP-160's wingman to LPH-10.



15 July 1967: Elements of BLT 2/3 were supported by several routine resupply and medical evacuation flights.

Routine administrative flights were launched in support of the SLF and the LPH.

EP-160 was flown from Dong Ha and returned to LPH-10 for battle damage repair.

16 July 1967: Routine resupply, medical evacuation and administrative flights were flown in support of BLT 2/3.

During a routine admininstrative flight, EP-164 experienced an engine failure, requiring the pilot to make a precautionary landing at Quang Tri (MACV Pad) where the aircraft remained until 17 July, when it was flown back to the LPH-10 by a recovery crew,

17 July 1967: HMM-265 aircraft conducted external resupply of 90,000 pounds of ammo from LST 1157 to LPH-10.

During the remainder of the day, routine administrative flights were flown in support of the back-loading of BLT 2/3.

Operation BEAVER TRACK terminated at 1800.

18 - 19 July 1967: Routine administrative and logistics flights were launched in support of the SLF and LPH-10.

20 July 1967: D-Day, Operation BEAR CHAIN, Phase I commenced with a 0630 L-Hour, and a 0700 H-Hour. Eight CH-46's launched from the LFH-10 with troops from BLT 2/3 aboard. The landing was executed in the coastal region, between Quang Tri and Hue. A total of 337 U.S. troops were helo-lifted by the strike aircraft into landing zones BLUEJAY and SPARROW, no fire was received on the landing.

At 0925 four CH-46's were launched to lift 146 troops into YD 522495 from LPH-10 and LPD-5.

At 1215 a section of two CH-46's were launched to YD 511454 on an emergency medevac. The aircraft, EP-158, sustained heavy battle damage from small arms and automatic weapons. EP-158 crashed after take off at YD 512486. LCpl Kroshus, the Crew Chief was wounded in the leg. The Crew was rescued by the wingman.

Throughout the remainder of the day the aircraft of HMM-265 flew numerous resupply, medical evacuation and administrative missions.

21 July 1967: Several administrative and resupply missions were flown from the USS TRIPOLI.

At 0925 four CH-46's were launched to lift 157 troops of "HOTEL" company from YD 458483 to YD 530462.



A 16 man RECON TEAM was inserted at YD 481450 at 1130 by two CH-46's.

At 1400 the SLF was chopped to 3rd MIRINE DIVISION.

22 July 1967: Several routine resupply and administrative flights were launched from the USS TRIPILI.

Four aircraft lifted a portion of "G" company 2/3 from YD 530490 to a blocking position at YD 528444. Sixty five U.S. troops were lifted into position, no fire was received.

At 2100 a two plane section of Ch-46's were launched on an emergency resupply of Grey Rebel "H" and Grey Rebel Gulf.

Routine medical evacuation flights had been carried out during the day.

23 July 1967: Several routine resupply, medical evacuation, and administrative missions were flown. During the resupply missions a total of 56,700 pounds were carried to units of 2/3.

24 July 1967: At 0635 three CH-46's were launched from LPH-10 on a troop lift of Grey Rebel "Foxtrot" and Grey Rebel "Gulf" to YD 492421, YD 494530, and YD 483454 to act as a blocking force. Sporatic sniper fire was received, however no hits were sustained.

At 1430 two CH-46's commenced a troop lift of 230 troops of Grey Rebel "Gulf" from YD 520471 to YD 540471. This troop lift was to facilitate the rapid movement of Grey Rebel "Gulf" accross the O LAU river.

25 July 1957: The backload of the battalion commenced this date. Several flights were made between company positions, regrouping and consolidating for the termination of operation BEAR CHAIN. HMM-265 carried 62,525 pounds of gear to LPH-10, LPD-5 and SCAT LZ. Four CH-46's carried 17,900 pounds of captured VC rice from YD 479512 Grey Rebel "F" to SCAT LZ. Resupply and medevac's were flown through out the day.

26 July 1967: Four squadron aircraft flew a total of 19.2 hours tactically backloading the MARINES of 2/3 aboard the LPh-10 and LPD-5. 619 Passengers and 8,400 pounds of gear were Helo-lifted during the day. Operation BEAR CHAIN terminated.

27 - 31 July 1967: Routine administrative and logistics flights were launched in support of the SLF and LPH.

Part III Significant Events

1. Personnel:

- a. Joined one man and transfered none during this period.
- b. There were no promotions during this period.



2. Awards:


- a. 137 Air Medals were awarded to personnel of HMW-265 during this reporting period.
 - b. Captain W. R. YOUNG was awarded the Navy Commendation Medal.
 - c. Two Purple Hearts were awarded to the following personnel:
 - (1) SSgt. H. G. CORLEY
 - (2) Cpl. G. L. BONGER

3. Casualties:

- a. Captain D. W. ARISS 082292/7562 USMC received minor abrasions when his aircraft crashed after receiving enemy fire in the landing zone on 20 July 1%7; Injury minor, returned to duty.
- b. Major T. S. DUNLAP 660274/7562 USMC received minor abrasions when his aircraft crashed after receiving enemy fire in the landing zone on 20 July 1967; Injury minor, returned to duty.
- c. LCpl R. E. KINDRICK 2214601/6311 USMC received minor abrasions when his aircraft crashed after receiving enemy fire in the landin zone on 20 July 1%7; Injury minor, returned to duty.
- d. LCpl R. L. KROSHUS 2138379/6320 USMC received abrasions and schrapnel wounds in left leg when his aircraft crashed after receiving enemy fire in the landing zone on 20 July 1967; Injury moderate, condition good, remaining at sickbay. LPH-10 for further treatment.
- L. Intelligence/Counter Intelligence:
- a. Eriefings were given by the Intelligence Section prior to each flight and debriefings were given at the termination of each flight as applicable.
- 5. Air Operations:
 - a. Total Hours Flown: 627.8
 - b, Number of Sorties: 1,786
 - c. Tons of Cargo: 301.8
 - d, Number of medical evacuations: 205
 - e. Number of passengers carried: 4,397
- 6. This squadron participated in the following operations:
 - a. BEAVER TRACK
 - b. BEAR CHAIN



DECLASSIFIED



a. No training was conducted during this period due to aircraft commitments.

8. Maintenance:

a. An average daily availability of 45.3% was maintained with an average of 17 aircraft possessed. Aircraft down due to NORS - 34.7%. Aircraft down due to NORM - 20.0%.

MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 265. Marine Aircraft Group 15 Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade FPO San Francisco, California 96601

OPS/DES/res 3480 27 July 1967

- NOFCRN

From: Commanding Officer

Commander, Task Group 79.5

Subj: After Action Report, Operation BEAVER TRACK; submission of

(a) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67 Ref:

(1) Chronology of Significant Events (2) Analysis of Helicopter Operations (3) Statistical Summary Encl:

- 1. In accordance with the instructions contained in reference (a), enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are submitted.
- 2. This letter may be downgraded to Unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1), (2) and (3).

WILLIAM R. BEELER

нмм-265 / 52



CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

12 July 1967

HMM-265, under the command of ItCol. William R. BEEIER, on-loaded aboard the IPH-10, relieving HMM-164 as supporting squadron to CTG 79.5. All flight operations were in the support of moving the squadron aboard from the Hue-Phu Bai Airfield.

13 July 1967

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Routine administrative flights were conducted in support of the SLF and the LFH.

14 July 1967

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At 0915, four CH-46's launched from IPH-10, on a simulated troop lift and feint operation from IZ Eagle to YD 045613. Enemy fire was received but no hits were taken. The flight made three simulated landings into the zone.

EP-160 sustained moderate battle damage from a land mine detenation in the Gray Rebel "E" IZ at YD 070635 during an emergency medical evacuation. Eight ground troops were wounded and one KIA resulted from the blast. These were medevaced by EP-160's wingman to LPH-10.

15 July 1967

Elements of BIT 2/3 were supported by several routine resupply and medical evacuation flights.

Routine administrative flights were launched in support of the SLF and the LPH.

EP-160 was flown from Dong Ha and returned to LPH-10 for battle damage repair.

16 July 1967

Routine resupply, medical evacuation and admininstrative flights were flown in support of BLT 2/3.

During a routine admininstative flight, EP-164 experienced an engine failure, requiring the pilot to make a precautionary landing at Quang Tri (MACV Pad) where the aircraft remained until 17 July when it was flown back to IPH-10 by a recovery crew.

<u>17 July 1967</u>

Squadron aircraft conducted external resupply of 90,000 pounds of ammo from IST 1157 to IPH-10.

ENCLOSURE (1)
NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED

- NOFORN

During the remainder of the day, routine administrative flights were flown in support of the back-loading of BIT 2/3.

Operation BEAVER TRACK terminated at 1800.

Casualties: None

Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence

A/C Fired On Incidents A/C Hit No. Hits Sorties Hours
4 1 0 0 702 248.3

Breakdown of fire incidents with respect to altitude:

 Incidents
 A/C Hit
 Altitude

 4
 0
 0-499



ANALYSIS OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

1. General

The replacement of HMM-164 by HMM-265 midway through Operation BEAVER TRACK proved timely for such a move. Since BLT 2/3 was in its mopping up stages, flight support commitments were kept to a minimum which enabled the two squadrons to replace one another within their respective commands without decreasing the overall operational readiness to either supported unit.

2. Analysis

a. Operations Ashore

- (1) During Operation BEAVER THACK, normal flight operations consisted of resupply, medical evacuations, troop lifts, Command and Control missions, and administrative flights to the Danang Area. Resupply missions were conducted from both the IPH and the logistic support area located at YD 242596.
- (2) The tactical air controller (airborne), necessary gunship cover and fixed-wing support during the feint operation conducted on 14 July was provided by the First Marine Aircraft Wing.
- (3) Back-loading flight operations of the SIF were normal. Two aircraft moved 45 tons of ammunition from the IST 1157 to the IFH.

3. Problem Encountered

- a. Some difficulty was encountered with the supporting UH-1E gunships during a feint operations ashore. By not attending a common briefing conducted by the SIF helicopter commander, certain tactical details were left uncovered to the UH-1E pilots who had received their frag order via the communications channels.
- b_{\bullet} Air to ground communications with the supported ground unit proved adequate.

4. Conclusion

- a. The SIF Helicopter Commander should conduct an operational brief attended by all pilots involved whether they are attached or in support of the operation for a particular day or for an extended period of time.
- b. The overall operational procedures proved adequate during the period of this report.



STATISTICAL SUMMARY

OPERATION BEAVER TRACK

12 July - 17 July 1967

DATE	SORTIES	PASSENGERS	CARGO	MEDEVACS	FLIGHT HOURS
12 July	77	142	22.5	0	75.0
13 July	88	124	4.9	24	23.7
14 July	126	144	15.1	23	24.1
15 July	1 0 6	106	12.9	23	55.4
16 July	112	251	20,6	5	20,2
17 July	193	152	62.1	0	49.9
TOTAL	702	919	138.1	75	248.3

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MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 265
Marine Aircraft Group 15
Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

OPS:DES:res
3480

20 August 1967

SECRET - NOFORN

11MM-265 36 S.A

Frcm: Commanding Officer

To: Commander, Task Group 79.5

Subj: After Action Report, Operation BEAR CHAIN; submission of

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67

Encl: (1) Chronology of Significant Events (2) Analysis of Helicopter Operations

(3) Statistical Summary

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in reference (a), enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are submitted.

2. This letter may be downgraded to Unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1), (2) and (3).

WILLIAM R. BEELER

NOFORN



CHLONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

20 July 1967:

Operation BEAR CHAIN began on D-Day by landing eight troop loaded CH-46's into LZ SPARROW at C630 L-Hour from the LPH-10. Subsequent troop-heliborn waves from the LPD-5 were moved immediately into LZ BLUE JAY to provide maximum troop build-up ashore. Enemy fire was not received from either landing zone.

At 0945H the SPARROW HAWK force, consisting of 146 troops, was helilifted from both the LPH-10 and LPD-5 into YD 522495 by four CH-46 helicopters. Later, as a non-scheduled serial, a section of two helicopters was diverted to YD 511454 at 1215H for an emergency medevac mission by the HDC. EP-158 landed in the designated LZ and while awaiting the WIA, received heavy enemy automatic small arms fire from a nearby tree line. With the medevac aboard, the aircraft took off immediately, however, once airborne, EP-158 lost both control boost systems and crashed uncontrolled into the ground at YD 512486. None of the crewmembers were injured except the crewchief who had been wounded previously in the leg by shrapnel. The wingman rescued the crew and returned to the LPH-10.

Resupply, medical evacuation and local administrative missions were flown throughout the remainder of the day.

21 July 1967:

"Grey Rebel H" with 157 troops was helilifted from YD 458483 to YD 530462 by four CH-46's at 0925H.

A 16 man recon team was inserted into YD 481450 at 1130 by a section of helicopters.

Throughout the remainder of the day resupply, medical evacuation and local administrative flights were conducted by HMM-265 from the LPH-10.

22 July 1967:

Several routine resupply and administrative flights were launched from the USS TRIPOLI.

Four aircraft lifted a portion of "G" Company from YD 530490 to a blocking position at YD 528444. Sixty five U. S. troops were lifted into position; no fire was received.

At 2100 a 2 plane section of CH-46's was launched on an emergency resupply of Grey Rebel "H" and "G".

Rcutine medical evacuation flights were flown throughout the day.

23 July 1967:

Several routine resupply, medical evacuation, and administrative



missions were flown. During the resupply missions a total of 56,700 pounds was carried to units of BLT 2/3.

24 July 1967:

At 0630 three CH-46 s were launched from LPH-10 to lift Grey Rebel "F" and "G" to YD 492421, YD 494530, and YD 483454 where they were to act as a blocking force. Sporadic sniper fire was received; however, no hits were taken.

At 1430 two CH-46's commenced a troop lift of 230 troops of Grey Rebel "G" from YD 520471 to YD 540471. This troop lift was to facilitate the rapid movement across the O LAU River.

25 July 1967:

Numerous and varied types of tasked flights were made by HMM-265 between units of BLT 2/3 during the regrouping and consolidation phase of Operation BEAR CHAIN. The initial backloading began when some 62,525 pounds of assorted equipment and supplies were flown to the LPH-10, LPD-5 and LZ SCATT. Four CH-46's lifted some 17,900 pounds of captured VC rice to LZ SCAT from Grey Rebel "F" (YD 479512). Additional helicopter flights throughout the day consisted of resupply, medical evacuation and local administrative flights.

26 July 1967:

Most of the flight effort was spent in the termination of Operation EEAR CHAIN through the final tactical backloading of BLT 2/3 to the LPH-10 and LPD-5. Four squadron aircraft were on station throughout the day for the backloading operation which consisted of lifting 619 passengers and 8,400 pounds of various supplies and equipment.

Operation BEAR CHAIN terminated at 1800H.

Casualties:

Captain D. W. ARISS 082292/7562 USMC, minor abrasions, returned to duty.

Major T. S. DUNLAP 060274/7562 USMC, minor abrasions, returned to duty.

LCpl. R. E. KINDRICK 2214601/6311 USMC, minor abrasions, returned to duty.

LCpl. R. L. KROSHUS 2138379/6320 USMC, abrasions, shrapnel wound in left leg. Retained in sickbay for futher treatment.

Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence

A/C Fired On	Incidents	A/C Hit	No. Hits	<u>Sorties</u>	Hours
19	9	2	Unk	840	282.1

Breakdown of fire incidents with respect to altitude:

<u>Altitude</u>	<u>Incidents</u>	A/C Hit	A/C Lost	
0 - 499	5	2	1	
499 - 999	4	0	0	

ENCLOSURE (1)
NOFORN



ANALYSIS OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

General

The amphibious helicopter operational concepts proved sound and were planned and executed in accordance with FMFM 3-3. All supporting agencies worked in unison throughout Operation BEAR CHAIN, especially during the assault phase of operations. The limited amount of landing deck space on the LPH in relation to the number of supporting helicopters, required constant and careful flight planning.

2. Analysis

a. Ship to Shore Movement

- (1) In order to provide the required maximum number of troops placed ashore into the designated LZ's, BLUE JAY and SPARROW, eight CH-46's were used carrying fifteen troops per aircraft. This course of action was based upon the squadron's ready helicopters, available deck space aboard the LPH and the LPD, plus the consideration of troop locations aboard ships other than the LPH. The first launch consisted of four helicopters and a spare fully fueled but minus troops. These aircraft were placed into the ship's DELTA pattern until the second four aircraft plus a spare could be launched pre-loaded with 1400 pounds of fuel and 15 troops. As planned, it took fifteen minutes to deck spot, spread blades and launch these aircraft.

 The first four aircraft were then recovered, troops
- leaded aboard and again launched, this time to form the first eight plane wave into LZ SPARROW. The second wave of eight aircraft was sent to LZ BLUE JAY after being embarked with troops from the LPD. The two spare helicopters from each four plane launch were used as needed to replace down aircraft and, after initially serving as SAR aircraft, they were returned to the LPH ready to be launched on call. The helicopter assault force proceeded to the designated LZ with out incident granting the maximum troop build up ashore required by the tactical situation. The Landing Plan was executed on time with all scheduled serials arriving at their correct destination.
- (2) The SLF was provided additional air support by the 1st MAW through the use of on-call fixed wing attack aircraft employed initially during the ship to shore movement, two CH-53's in support of and transporting the BLT artillery, ammunition and personnel and five UH-1E helos in direct support throughout Operation BEAR CHAIN. Four UH-1E armed escort gunships were used in the ship to shore movement along with one command-control aircraft also acting as TAC(A). Although the five UH-1E's provided the meeded flexibility dependent upon the expected enemy situation, limited deck space then available required the utmost attention by the flight deck handling crew.

b. Operations Ashore

(1) Flight operations ashore consisted of normal but maximum use of the helicopters in resupply, command and control, TAC(A), troop lifts, medical evacuations and armed escort missions, each supported from the LPH, LPD and LZ SCAT as appropriate.



c. Backloading

- (1) The backloading phase began well enough in advance to lessen the back-log of troops, supplies and equipment from the beach to the ships. Tons per aircraft hour were maximized, while pilot fatigue and unnecessary. night flying were minimimized. Such planning provided a better aircraft maintenance and availability posture.
- (2) Two CH-53's accomplished the heavy lift capability for the back leading of the artillery, artillery ammunition, and attached battery personnel.

3. Problems Encountered

- a. It became apparent that the FM frequencies assigned the SLF for operational control of the helicopters via the TACP net (42.8) and the LZ common (48.0) net were inadaquate due to several contributing factors. The TACP net was used primaily for aircraft reporting in and out of the AOA and the premulgation of any effective SAV-A-plane pertinent to the aircraft's specific sector of operations. This frequency was also used by SCAT 14, located at the LSA, who controlled all aircraft entering his area of responsibility. In addition, the TACP net was also used to control the UH-1E gunships for emergency strike missions. The LZ control net (48.0) was used by HST personnel attached to each company of BLT 2/3 to direct and control the transport helicopters into and out of the BLT's LZ's to run TAC(A) missions by the UH-1E gunships, and to give landing instructions to incoming helicopters at SOCIALITE LZ located at the SCAT LSA. Totally, either FM net had various support missions being run simultaneously. The end results were: (1) crowded nets (2) the TACP could not monitor the LZ centrol net in order to be abreast of the logistic, medical evacuation and troop movement support mission; and (3) HST personnel controlled the transport helicopters while they themselves were unsure of the current tactical situation in or around their LZ.
- b. Limited deck space on the LPH resulted in excessive down time during helicopter maintenance inspections and test flights. The tempo of operations and the additional deck storage of five UH-1E support helicopters limited maintanence operations. The problem was overcome mainly by working late into the night readying aircraft for the next day's flight operations by both squadron and ship's personnel.
- c. The operational readiness of the squadron is slowly decreasing because of the non-abailability of aircraft spare parts. Needed parts are requisitioned on a authorized Priority II basis via normal supply commands. Follow-up requisitions are resumbitted by message each five days thereafter until the spare part is received; however, the rate at which these parts are forth coming is slowly building into a danger ous back-leg.
- d. The present delivery of sav-a-planes by the TACP, HDC and DASC units is given by grid designaters which sometimes are numerous and difficult to copy by the affected helicopter pilots. This present system would be tetally non-effective at night while operating in a specific section of the AOA since



land marks are difficult to see from the air more especially specified impact areas and artillery firing positions.

4. Conclusions

- a. That the TACP FM frequency should be used exclusively for controlling helicopters in the SLF AOA thereby eliminating such situations as the passage of administrative traffic. The net control should monitor all stations for effective air traffic centrol. As control is passed ashore, so should the net control move ashore.
- b. That the TACP in conjunction with the HST should monitor the LZ control net in order to provide the latest tactical and enemy situation to the helicopter support units and keep up-dated with the status of requested logistic, troop or medical evacuation missions.
- c. That a flight deck spot should be assigned to maintenance inspection and test flights during flight quarters or on an "as required" basis.
- d. That SAV-A-planes information issued at night by the supporting control agencies should be modified to include the TACAN bearing and distance to the specific objective or target area within the AOA.
- e. That the non-availability of aircraft spare parts and slow supply support continues to present a serious problem towards the combat readiness of the squadron and the SLF.



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STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Operation BEAR CHAIN

20 July - 27 July 1967

DATE	SORTIES	<u>PASSENGERS</u>	C ARGO	MEDEVACS	FLIGHT HOURS
20 July	156	389	27.1	51	40.3
21 July	62	77	18.5	22	42.6
22 July	59	196	6.3	22	49•1
23 July	100	54	36 . 5	12	36.8
24 July	166	600	29.0	2	39•3
25 July	98	142	31.8	3	14.1
26 July	118	5 43	4.5		39.8
27 July	11	42			20.1
TOTAL	840	2043	153.7	112	282.1