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MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON-361  
Marine Aircraft Group-16  
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac  
FPO San Francisco, 96602

373FT from  
3428  
09105268  
21 Feb 1968  
Copy 13 of 25

SECRET-NOFORN

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commander, Task Group Seven Nine Point Four  
Subj: After Action Report, Fortress Attack/Kentucky/Lancaster II; submission of (U)

Ref: (a) Annex to CTG 79.4 Operation Plan 120A-67

Encl: ✓(1) Chronology of Significant Events  
✓(2) Analysis of Helicopter Operations  
✓(3) Statistics for Operations Fortress Attack/Kentucky/Lancaster II

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) through (3) are submitted.

2. This letter may be downgraded to "UNCLASSIFIED" upon removal of enclosures (1) through (3).

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D. M. WILSON

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TAB B

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HMM-361

Ops A/A Rpts Fortress Attack/Kentucky/Lancaster II

27 Jan-1968

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INDEX

ENCLOSURE (1)	CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
ENCLOSURE (2)	ANALYSIS OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS
ENCLOSURE (3)	STATISTICS FOR OPERATIONS FORTRESS ATTACK, KENTUCKY/LANCASTER II

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CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS27 Jan 1968

At 0900, 16 UH-34D helicopters commenced lifting elements of BLT 2/4 into Charlie-2 (YD 135655). During the initial offload the LZ was quiet with no enemy fire. During the afternoon resupply 3 fire incidents were reported but the aircraft received no damage.

One CH-53, four CH-46's and two UH-1's supported the offload.

28 Jan 1968

Squadron aircraft were utilized flying resupplies from LPH-2 and LPD-7 to various companies of the BLT. C&C missions were also flown. No fire incidents were reported.

29 Jan 1968

Squadron aircraft flew the ~~normal resupply, C&C, Medevac and administrative~~ missions in support of BLT 2/4. No fire incidents were reported.

30 Jan 1968

The squadron flew regularly assigned missions in support of the BLT. No fire incidents were reported.

31 Jan 1968

The squadron flew no missions in support of the BLT due to bad weather.

1 Feb 1968

The squadron flew regularly assigned missions in support of the BLT. No fire incidents were reported.

2 Feb 1968

The squadron was held to one C&C flight due to bad weather.

3 Feb 1968

The squadron was again held to one C&C flight due to bad weather.

4 Feb 1968

Bad weather again hampered flight operations.

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5 Feb 1968

Bad weather held down flight operations to one C&C flight and one division of four planes on a resupply to Camp Carroll.

6 Feb 1968

Bad weather cancelled all flight operations for the squadron.

7 Feb 1968

The squadron flew regularly assigned missions in support of the BLT. No fire incidents were reported.

8 Feb 1968

Flying was held to a minimum due to bad weather.

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## ANALYSIS OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

1. General

Helicopter operations were conducted from the USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) during the entire Fortress Attack/Kentucky/Lancaster II Operation. Most of the resupply was conducted from LPH-2 and LPD-7. Adverse weather affected resupply missions from 1 February through 9 February. Communication of helicopters was good.

2. Analysis

a. Helicopter Utilization. The squadron helicopters were not utilized to an extent to impose any excessive burden on the squadron.

b. Communication and Coordination. There were no problems concerned with communications. The use of panels supplemented by smoke, proved satisfactory in the marking of landing zones.

c. Operations of Logistic Support Areas. There were no problems in coordinating local resupply of the BLT.

d. Resupply of Companies. The only problem incurred during resupply of zones was bad weather. The zones selected were adequate.

3. Conclusions. Three fire incidents were reported the day of the off-load. Weather had an adverse affect on flight operations and the resupply of the BLT from 1 February to 9 February.

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Enclosure (2).

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## STATISTICAL SUMMARY

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>FLYING</u>	<u>MEDEVAC</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
27 Jan 1968	228	635	21,400	1	105.5
28 Jan 1968	106	90	22,700	0	41.4
29 Jan 1968	88	65	33,450	0	30.2
30 Jan 1968	86	65	21,300	1	30.7
31 Jan 1968	0	0	0	0	0
1 Feb 1968	28	26	800	5	11.1
2 Feb 1968	4	4	0	0	2.9
3 Feb 1968	8	21	0	11	2.8
4 Feb 1968	4	21	200	0	2.8
5 Feb 1968	67	79	19,650	16	21.0
6 Feb 1968	0	0	0	0	0
7 Feb 1968	77	143	3,900	0	29.7
8 Feb 1968	10	8	3,000	0	8.0
9 Feb 1968	16	4	1,500	0	4.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>719</b>	<b>1,161</b>	<b>149,900</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>290.1</b>

No. aircraft hit by enemy fire	0
No. fire incidents	3
No. aircraft damaged or destroyed operationally	0
No. personnel wounded in action	0
No. personnel killed in action	0

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Enclosure (3)