

MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON-362  
Marine Aircraft Group-36  
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

30:JGV:dec  
5750  
4 February 1967

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group-36  
Subj: Command Chronology for period 19 January 1967 to  
31 January 1967

Ref: (a) WgO 5750.1B  
(b) GruO 5750.1A

Encl: ✓(1) HMM-362 Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Down Graded at 12 year intervals; Not automatically declassified. DOD Dir 5200.10.

*M. B. Armstrong*  
M. B. ARMSTRONG

MAG-36 S&D Files

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HMM-362

CMD CHRON

19-3 JAN 1967

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MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON-362  
Marine Aircraft Group-36  
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMFPac  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

19 January 1967 to 31 January 1967

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## COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 19 JANUARY - 31 JANUARY 1967

## PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. SQUADRON STAFF

Commanding Officer:	LtCol. M. B. ARMSTRONG	Entire period
Executive Officer:	Major H. E. LEWIS	19-24 Jan67
	Major H. L. WRIGHT	25-31 Jan67
Administrative Officer:	Capt. D. B. HIRSCH	Entire period
Intelligence Officer:	Capt. T. K. TIERNEY	Entire period
Operations Officer:	Major J. T. GORDON	Entire period
Material Officer:	Capt. W. T. SINNOTT	19-23 Jan67
	Major J. A. BARRY	24-31 Jan67
Maintenance Officer:	Capt. W. C. RYAN	Entire period

2. LOCATION

- a. Throughout the reporting period, HMM-362 functioned as a helicopter transport squadron attached to Marine Aircraft Group-36.
- b. HMM-362 was located at MCAF Ky Ha, RVN, 19-31 January 1967.

3. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
52	149	1	0

4. IMPORTANT VISITORS

None

## PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During this reporting period, HMM-362 moved ashore from USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) to MCAF Ky Ha, RVN and once again came under the operational control of Marine Aircraft Group-36, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Squadron activity started slowly but built up to normal operating level shortly after return to Ky Ha. Primary activities during this period were medevac, VIP and liaison flights and support of the Korean Marines. The squadron also participated in Operations "SIERRA" and "DESOTO" in Quang Ngai Province.

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## PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

On 19 January HMM-362 moved ashore from USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) to MCAF Ky Ha, RVN and was replaced on the Special Landing Force by HMM-363.

On 20 January, activity consisted of routine logistics and administrative flights in and around the Chu Lai Defense Command area. A flight of two UH-34D's transported two emergency patients from 1st Med. Bn. to G-4 hospital at Da Nang.

Activity on 21 January consisted of medevac, logistics and administrative/liaison flights and SAR Chu Lai. In addition, squadron aircraft flew 6.6 hours and 18 sorties in support of Operation "SIERRA". A flight of two UH-34D's flying support for Operation "SIERRA" received moderate automatic weapons fire from BS 793416 and BS 785435 while picking up a medevac at Duc Pho (BS 808377) under marginal weather conditions. No hits were received, fire was not returned.

On 22 January, activity again consisted of medevac, SAR Chu Lai, logistics and administrative/liaison flights. While flying a medevac from 1st Med. Bn. to G-4 hospital at Da Nang, fire was received from BT 091528. No hits were received, fire was not returned. A flight of two UH-34D's succeeded in exchanging reconnaissance teams at Nui Tron (BS 516778) despite marginal weather conditions.

Activity on 23 January consisted of medevac, SAR Chu Lai, logistics and administrative/liaison flights. One UH-34D transported 23,000 pounds of resupply cargo to LST 813, grounded at Ky Ha.

Activity on 24 January consisted of medevac, SAR Chu Lai, administrative/liaison and logistics missions. The medevac aircraft escorted by one armed UH-1E flew nine medevac missions for a total of 8.1 hours, 23 sorties and 15 medevacs. A flight of two UH-34D's received small arms fire from BS 793408 enroute from Quang Ngai to Duc Pho (BS 808377). No hits were received. While escorting Klondike 4-5, YL-30 received small arms fire from BS 574943. No hits were received.

On 25 January, squadron support of III MAF consisted of medevac, SAR Chu Lai, administrative liaison and logistics missions.

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On 26 January, in addition to regular support missions, aircraft flying direct support for the Korean Marines flew 27.2 hours, 130 sorties, 24.8 tons of cargo and 100 passengers. Medevac aircraft flew 16.8 hours, 34 sorties and medevaced 26 casualties. On three separate missions, the medevac aircraft received fire from BS 792415, BT 354025 and BS 791414. No hits were received.

On 27 January, the majority of missions were once again credited to the medevac aircraft and aircraft flying direct support for the Korean Marines. Medevac aircraft flew 12.4 hours, 33 sorties and medevaced 34 casualties while the direct support aircraft flew 21.3 hours, 113 sorties, 6.3 tons of cargo and 74 passengers.

Activity on 28 January again consisted mainly of medevac and direct support for the Korean Marines. Medevac aircraft flew 19.2 hours, 39 sorties and medevaced 26 casualties. Direct support aircraft accumulated 19.2 hours and 79 sorties while carrying 12.5 tons of cargo and 141 passengers. While on an administrative/liaison mission, YL-51 experienced power failure on take-off from Minh Long (BS 543525) and sustained moderate fuselage and rotor system damage in the subsequent forced landing. No injuries resulted.

On 29 January, missions flown were medevac, SAR Chu Lai, administrative/liaison and logistics. Once again, the majority of the workload was carried by medevac and direct support (Korean Marines) aircraft. Medevacs flew 10.5 hours, 26 sorties and carried 31 casualties. Direct support aircraft flew 8.7 hours, 37 sorties, 2.5 tons of cargo and 31 passengers.

Activity on 30 January was again highlighted by the performance of medevac aircraft which flew 22.2 hours, 35 sorties and carried 24 casualties. On one of these missions, YL-50 received 8 small arms hits while in the zone at BS 828397. No injuries resulted and the aircraft was flown back to Ky Ha. While returning from another medevac, YL-32 experienced partial loss of engine power and made an emergency landing on runway 14W at ChuLai. No injuries resulted. Other missions consisted of SAR Chu Lai, logistics, administrative/liaison and direct support for the Korean Marines.

On 30 January, HMM-362 flew its first missions in support of Operation "DESOTO". Flying medevac for the operation from the LSA at Quang Ngai, the squadron accumulated 9.4 hours, 14 sorties and 7 medevacs. The 7 medevacs were picked up at BS 818394 after the aircraft had circled and searched for the zone at night and in IFR conditions for nearly 3 hours.

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Activity on 31 January continued support of Operation "DESOTO" with day and night medevac aircraft operating from the LSA at Quang Ngai. Other missions in support of III MAF consisted of medevac, SAR Chu Lai, administrative/liaison and logistics missions.

## PART IV

OPERATING STATISTICS1. FLIGHT DATA

	<u>19-31 Jan</u>	<u>SIERRA</u>	<u>DESOTO</u>
Flight Hours	630.5	6.6	9.4
Sorties	1892	18	14
Pax/Troops	1600	13	3
Tons Cargo	172.4	0.7	0
MEDEVACS	240	0	7

2. AWARDS

LCpl. E.M. BAKER	Gold Star in lieu of 2nd Navy Commendation Medal
Maj. J.T. GORDON	1st Air Medal
Capt. R.J. SHEEHAN	11th Air Medal
Capt. J.B. HIPPERT	10th Air Medal
Capt. T.J. SNEE	11th Air Medal
Capt. D.A. KEMNA	10th Air Medal
Capt. R.E. MOSER	15th Air Medal
1stLt. M.J. CARLEY	13th Air Medal
1stLt. J.S. ECK	14th Air Medal
1stLt. M.W. READICK	9th Air Medal
1stLt. W.M. KENNETT	12th Air Medal
GySgt. R.B. SIMPSON	1st Air Medal
Cpl. W.F. GAUCH	1st Air Medal
Cpl. R.J. GRAY	1st Air Medal

SECRET - NOFORN

MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON-362  
Marine Aircraft Group 15 (Rein)  
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMFPac  
FPO San Francisco, California, 96602

lo:JGV:wak  
5750  
19 January 1967

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, Special Landing Force  
Subj: After Action Report, Operation DeckHouse V, submission of  
Ref: (a) Annex U to Operation Plan CTG 79.5 328-67  
Encl: (1) Chronology of Significant Events  
(2) Analysis of Helicopter Operations  
(3) Statistical Summary  
1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are submitted.

*M.B. Armstrong*  
M. B. ARMSTRONG

ENCLOSURE (2)

SECRET - NOFORN

MMN-362

a/a, DECKHOUSE V

6-15 Jan 67

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CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS6 January 1967

At 0715H a flight of sixteen UH-34D's escorted by two UH-1E armed helicopters commenced the helicopter assault for Operation Deck House V by lifting troops and equipment of BLT 1/9 from USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2), USS Vancouver (LPD-2) and USS Thomaston (LSD-28) into landing zones Crow, Duck and Sparrow in Thanh Phu District, Kien Hoa Province, Republic of Vietnam. Two additional UH-1E's conducted observation and reconnaissance missions, and two CH-46's operating from USS Vancouver also carried troops and equipment into the landing zones. The zones were prepped by naval gunfire and Air Force F-100 Super Sabres and B-57 Canberras. No fire was received during the lift.

A flight of three UH-34D's landed the Recon Plat attached to BLT 1/9 at XR798971. No fire was received.

A flight of five UH-34D's completed a lift of 41 troops BLT Command Group "B" to LZ Sparrow. No fire was received.

During the day, UH-1E's flew reconnaissance, naval gunfire registration and armed escort missions. Other lifts by UH-34D's included several flights to carry additional troops and equipment ashore to the various landing zones. No fire was received during the day.

7 January 1967

A flight of eight UH-34D's completed a troop lift of the 4th Battalion Vietnamese Marines from USS Vancouver to LZ Eagle. No fire was received.

Additional flights by UH-34D's consisted of small troop movements, resupply and medevac. On one of these missions, shortly after landing in LZ Duck, a hand grenade was accidentally exploded in the cabin of YL-45 killing the gunner and one passenger. Four other passengers were wounded. The aircraft was later flown back to USS Iwo Jima. Shortly after this incident, the crew chief in YL-49 spotted VC firing into LZ Duck from XR 740877. Fire was returned resulting in one (1) VC KIA (probable).

During the day, UH-1E aircraft provided armed escort for troop lifts, flew aerial reconnaissance and shore to shore liaison for task Group Commanders. Administrative missions to Saigon, Thanh Phu, Can Tho, and My Tho were also flown.



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8 January 1967

A flight of ten UH-34D's completed a troop lift of the 4th Bn Vietnamese Marines from LZ Eagle to LZ Hawk. Light automatic weapons fire was received while landing in and taking off from LZ Hawk from XR 736897 and XR 735903. Approximately 100 rounds of 7.62mm suppressive fire was returned with unknown results.

Other missions flown by UH-34D's consisted of small troop movements, resupply and medevac.

UH-1E aircraft provided armed escort for troop lifts, night medevac and also flew aerial reconnaissance and shore to shore and ship to shore liaison.

9 January 1967

At 0745H a flight of fifteen UH-34D's departed USS Iwo Jima escorted by two armed UH-1E's. The flight made two trips into LZ Oriole with troops from "C" Company and returned troops from "A" Company to USS Iwo Jima. The flight then proceeded to LZ Sparrow to pick up troops and take them to LZ Gull and returned troops already in LZ Gull, to LZ Sparrow and USS Iwo Jima. No fire was received. The lift was completed at 0945H.

A flight of two UH-34D's flew resupply missions to LZ Sparrow and LZ Crow, a medevac from XR 763902 and a mail run to Vung Tau. No fire was received.

Two flights of two UH-34D's flew troop and cargo transport to LZ Hawk and Red Beach from USS Iwo Jima. No fire was received.

A flight of two UH-34D's flew direct support missions for the BLT at LZ Sparrow. No fire was received.

A flight of two UH-34D's flew resupply to XR 808885, LZ Crow, XR 767851, and XR 809886. No fire was received.

A flight of two UH-34D's flew direct support missions from Red Beach. No fire was received.

During the day, UH-1E aircraft flew reconnaissance, armed escort and admin/liaison flights in support of the Special Landing Force.

10 January 1967

Activity consisted of small troop movements, resupply and medevac missions. Red Beach, LZ Crow and LZ Sparrow were the principal points of resupply.

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Two UH-34D's were hit by ground fire. YL-39 received light sniper fire from grid square XR 7695 and received one hit in a main rotor blade. The other aircraft (YL-30) received automatic weapons fire from XR 761948, one round going through the radio compartment.

A flight of two UH-1E armed helicopters flew fire support missions and expended 600 rounds of 7.62mm and one 2.75" rocket at targets in grid square XR 8090.

11 January 1967

Activity again consisted of small troop movements, resupply and medevac missions. A flight of two UH-34D's received moderate small arms fire while climbing out of a landing zone at XR 790914. The first aircraft (YL-40) received one hit and the second aircraft (YL-32) was hit four times. Another UH-34D of a flight of two received light small arms fire in the vicinity of XR 715960. No hits were received.

UH-1E armed helicopters again provided armed escort throughout the day. Two other UH-1E's flew ship to shore and shore to shore liaison missions. During the day, 6,500 rounds of 7.62mm and 24 2.75" rockets were expended by UH-1E armed helicopters in suppressing ground fire.

12 January 1967

At 0700H a flight of two UH-34D's joined with two CH-46's to lift 165 troops of "C" Company from XR 769935 to XR 787927. With the first lift completed at 0750H, the flight then lifted 1st Plt. Co "D" from XR 786963 to XR 787950. No fire was received on either lift. The flight returned to USS Iwo Jima at 0815H.

At 0715H a flight of ten UH-34D's escorted by two UH-1E armed helicopters departed USS Iwo Jima to lift 3d Battalion Vietnamese Marines Brigade Force Bravo from XR 717976 to XS 757001. The zone was prepped by three Air Force F-100 Super Sabers and two B-57 Canberras were on call if needed. Light small arms fire was received from XS 745005. No hits were received and fire was not returned. The flight returned to USS Iwo Jima at 0940H.

At 1105H a flight of ten UH-34D's departed USS Iwo Jima escorted by two UH-1E armed helicopters to lift 4th Bn Vietnamese Marines Brigade Force Bravo from XR 738937 to XR 755967. The zone was again prepped by Air Force F-100's and B-57's. Sniper fire was received from XR 746953 and XR 753952. One aircraft returned 50 rounds suppressive fire with unknown results. No hits were received. The flight returned to USS Iwo Jima at 1250H.

While on an emergency medevac from XR 818921, YL-30 received sniper fire from XR 819922 and XR 816920. Approximately 300 rounds of 7.62mm were expended suppressing fire with unknown results. No hits were received.

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A flight of two UH-34D's, while conducting a resupply from White Beach to XR 770924 received light small arms fire from XR 771922. Fire was not returned, no hits were received.

During the day, UH-1E aircraft flew armed escort, reconnaissance and prepped zones for troop lifts. UH-1E armed helicopters expended 4200 rounds of 7.62mm and 30. 2.75" rockets suppressing ground fire and prepping zones.

#### 13 January 1967

Activity consisted mainly of small troop lifts, resupply and medevac. A flight of seven UH-34D's lifted "D" Company from XR 876931 to XR 825932. and a flight of six UH-34D's lifted "B" Company to USS Iwo Jima.

Light small arms fire was received from XR 800954 and XR 775925. Fire was not returned. No hits were received.

Throughout the day, UH-1E aircraft provided armed escort and flew liaison and reconnaissance missions.

#### 14 January 1967

At 0710H a flight of four UH-34D's escorted by two armed UH-1E's departed USS Iwo Jima to lift Co C (-) from XR 764893 to XR 833884. Light small arms fire was received from XR 808902. Fire was not returned. One aircraft received one hit. The flight returned to USS Iwo Jima at 0840H.

A flight of seven UH-34D's escorted by two UH-1E armed helicopters departed USS Iwo Jima at 0947H to lift 3d Bn (650) Vietnamese Marines from XR 730997 to XR 713995. No fire was received. The flight returned to USS Iwo Jima at 1200H.

At 1353H a flight of eight UH-34D's supported by one CH-46 lifted 4th Bn (730) Vietnamese Marines from XS 750002 to XR 707925. No fire was received. The flight returned to USS Iwo Jima at 1553H.

A flight of four UH-34D's departed USS Iwo Jima at 1530H escorted by one armed UH-1E to move 3d Plt Co "C" BLT 1/9 from XR 764893 to XR 849900. Light small arms fire was received from 850901. No hits were received. Fifteen rounds suppressive fire was returned with unknown results. The flight returned to USS Iwo Jima at 1630H.

At 1710H a flight of five UH-34D's departed USS Iwo Jima to lift Co C (-), BLT 1/9 from XR 828881 to XR 867933. No fire was received. The flight returned to USS Iwo Jima at 1845H.

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During the day UH-1E aircraft flew armed escort, reconnaissance and liaison missions. Ammo expended while prepping zones and suppressing ground fire totalled 7500 rounds of 7.62mm and 46. 2.75" rockets.

15 January 1967

Starting at 0700H a flight of sixteen UH-34D's launched from USS Iwo Jima to begin the tactical withdrawal from the Deckhouse V AOA. Assisting in the withdrawal was one CH-46 and two armed UH-1E's. Troops and equipment were withdrawn from LZ's Sparrow, Goose, Raven, Red Beach XR 823905, XR 786932, and XR 823937 to USS Iwo Jima and USS Vancouver.

While lifting the Howtar Battery from XR 786932, sniper fire was received from XR 769923. Sniper fire was suppressed by a UH-1E armed helicopter. No hits were received.

While lifting Co "A" 1/9 from XR 823905, moderate small arms fire was received from XR 828905. YL-30 received one hit and YL-34 received three hits one of which necessitated a forced landing at LZ Sparrow. One passenger in YL-34 was slightly wounded in the arm and was medevaced to USS Iwo Jima. Helicopters again suppressed the sniper fire. The downed aircraft was returned to USS Iwo Jima by an Army CH-47. The lift was completed at 1700H.

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ANALYSIS OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS1. General.

Helicopter operations with BLT 1/9 and Vietnamese Brigade Force Bravo during Operation Deck House V were considered well coordinated and no major problem areas were encountered. The 3d Bn, VNMC Bde Force "B" was lifted two times and the 4th Bn, VNMC Bde Force "B" was moved by helicopter a total of four times. It was evident that these Marines were well trained and the helicopter moves were extremely well organized and executed. The initial ship-to-shore helicopter assault of the VNMC 4th Bn was accomplished from the USS VAN-COVER (LPD-2) and 730 troops were involved. The first two waves consisted of eight UH-34Ds and after that the Marines were moved by the "daisy chain" concept. The round distance from the LPD to the HLZ was 37 miles. The entire lift was completed in 4 hours.

2. Analysis.

a. During previous amphibious training with BLT 1/9 the Special Landing Force had stressed the critical importance of coordination and communication between the HMM and the BLT. Very few problems were encountered in the numerous helicopter troop lifts. Enclosure (3) indicates the heavy commitment of HMM-362 (Rein). This was only accomplished by teamwork and a good working relationship between the Squadron and the supported units.

b. The Squadron did not have an opportunity to train with the Vietnamese Brigade Force Bravo prior to the actual combat operation. The Special Landing Force assigned their Air Officer to that unit and it is believed that this materially assisted them in helicopter operations. Their lifts were well executed and very few problems were encountered. As an example - the 3dBn was lifted 3,000 meters in less than 30 minutes and on the first night medical evacuation the zone was properly lighted and ground to air communications were excellent.

3. Conclusion.

The Special Landing Force has continually stressed the importance of coordination and control of helicopterborne operations. This has resulted in a valid employment of the HMM. This should be continued in future combat operations and during all phases of training. There will always be some problems encountered in marking zones, preparation of helicopter frags, communications between the infantry units and the helicopters, and the use of ground to air signals. This can certainly be alleviated by training and a good relationship between the BLT and HMM assigned to the SLF.

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DECKHOUSE V DAILY STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF HELO OPS

DATE	SORTIES	PAX	TONS CARGO	MEDEVACS	HOURS
6 Jan	457	990	27.5	0	180.0
7 Jan	462	1448	18.7	19	161.4
8 Jan	455	1120	23.9	7	119.1
9 Jan	392	600	25.5	10	108.6
10 Jan	248	151	27.4	9	94.3
11 Jan	278	333	18.6	26	90.4
12 Jan	592	1948	32.1	13	131.1
13 Jan	362	757	19.2	10	94.4
14 Jan	535	1786	16.1	9	131.9
15 Jan	463	958	36.3	1	146.1
TOTALS	4,244	10,091	245.3	104	1,257.3